[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
CHECKING CHINA'S MARITIME PUSH
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 28, 2017
__________
Serial No. 115-6
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina AMI BERA, California
MO BROOKS, Alabama LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
PAUL COOK, California TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
TED S. YOHO, Florida DINA TITUS, Nevada
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois NORMA J. TORRES, California
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
DANIEL M. DONOVAN, Jr., New York THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York
Wisconsin TED LIEU, California
ANN WAGNER, Missouri
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
THOMAS A. GARRETT, Jr., Virginia
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific
TED S. YOHO, Florida, Chairman
DANA ROHRABACHER, California BRAD SHERMAN, California
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio AMI BERA, California
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DINA TITUS, Nevada
MO BROOKS, Alabama GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
ANN WAGNER, Missouri
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
WITNESSES
Mr. Dean Cheng, senior research fellow, Asian Studies Center, The
Heritage Foundation............................................ 8
Michael Auslin, Ph.D., resident scholar, director of Japan
studies, American Enterprise Institute......................... 17
Michael D. Swaine, Ph.D., senior fellow, Asia Program, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace.............................. 28
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Ted S. Yoho, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Florida, and chairman, Subcommittee on Asia and the
Pacific: Prepared statement.................................... 3
Mr. Dean Cheng: Prepared statement............................... 10
Michael Auslin, Ph.D.: Prepared statement........................ 19
Michael D. Swaine, Ph.D.: Prepared statement..................... 30
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 56
Hearing minutes.................................................. 57
Written responses from the witnesses to questions submitted for
the record by the Honorable Ann Wagner, a Representative in
Congress from the State of Missouri............................ 58
CHECKING CHINA'S MARITIME PUSH
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TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2017
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Yoho
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Yoho. We are going to call this meeting to order. This
will be the first committee hearing of the Asia and the Pacific
Subcommittee, and it is an honor to be the chairman.
I welcome you guys here, and thank you for being part of
this committee and allowing me to be at the helm of it.
Good afternoon and welcome to the first meeting of the
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the 115th Congress. The
subcommittee will come to order. Members present will be
permitted to submit written statements to be included in the
official hearing. Without objection, the hearing record will
remain open for 5 calendar days to allow statements, questions,
extraneous material for the record subject to length
limitations in the rules.
The People's Republic of China's aggressive and provocative
behavior in the maritime territorial disputes represents a
threat to vital U.S. interests as severe as those from Russia,
Iran, North Korea, and terrorism from the Middle East,
according to the Heritage Foundation's 2017 index for U.S.
military strength. Since 2013, China has rapidly advanced its
maritime capabilities, employed them to transform the South
China Sea with artificial islands, place Japan under increasing
pressure in the East China Sea, and attempt to restrict freedom
of navigation in its near waters. Unbelievably, China has
suffered little, if any, cost for this maritime push.
In the South China Sea, China has built over 3,200 acres of
land over disputed features in the Spratly Islands, complete
with military-capable airstrips, ports, radars, anti-aircraft
weapons, and, confirmed just last week, surface-to-air missile
silos.
China also continues to press Japanese vessels around the
Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. Uncommitted to existing
global norms, China continually undermines attempts at a
unified response of these activities from ASEAN and has
attempted to use its economic influence to buy off other
claimants.
The United States and our allies and partners recognize
that our military presence in the Western Pacific has been a
force for stability and for good across decades, but so far, we
haven't acted with nearly the level of resolve that China has
in its aggressive pursuit of its arbitrary claims.
For example, officials from the last administration
proclaimed the importance of freedom of navigation far and wide
in response to China's effort to restrict it. But this
fundamental right, and the international law which protects it,
was only hesitantly enforced with four Freedom of Navigation
operations, none of which challenged China's tacit assertion
that its artificial islands are entitled to territorial seas.
For nearly a decade, we have said much and done little.
While the South and East China Seas may seem distant, we have
important national interests at stake. The disputed areas are
key global economic and trade arteries. Nearly 30 percent of
the world's maritime trade moves through the area. Domination
of these routes might allow a regional power to use disruption
as leverage.
The security of these areas is also essential for the
energy security of key U.S. defense allies and partners. Most
of the energy supplied to South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan comes
through the South China Sea. Energy insecurity among our
friends in the region could have serious implications for our
ability to handle potential contingencies arising from North
Korea and elsewhere.
Perhaps most importantly, the lack of U.S. resolve hasn't
just allowed China to change the status quo on the ground but
contributes to worries among our allies and partners that the
United States lacks sufficient commitment to the region and
feeds the narrative that China has been successful in degrading
U.S. influence and global norms. The perceived potency of our
military and diplomatic power is very much at risk. The South
and East China Seas are strategic keys to East Asia, and
acquiescence to restrictions on U.S. Forces' freedom of
operations there will undermine the U.S. security guarantee and
degrade both regional and world stability.
We need a new strategy, and the entrance of a new
administration represents a good opportunity to form and
implement better policies to represent or reassert U.S.
strengths in these critical areas. It may be time to consider
an assertive plan. As we have seen, endlessly backing away from
conflicts carries its own risks. China has taken advantage of
U.S. acquiescence to revise the status quo, advancing its
strategic interests in ways that raise the risk of conflict.
Timidity hasn't de-escalated these maritime disputes; it has
only raised the stakes.
Today, we will hear suggestions from our expert panel for
defining U.S. goals and addressing China's maritime push as
well as policy options to operationalize more effective U.S.
engagement on this important issue.
At this moment, without objection, the witnesses' written
statements will be entered into the hearing record.
I now turn to our ranking member, Mr. Sherman, for any
remarks he may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Yoho follows:]
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Mr. Sherman. Chairman Yoho, thanks for those remarks.
Welcome to your new role. I look forward to working with you.
And you will find, as you already know, that I am hawkish on
our trade relationship with China and dovish on the so-called
islands, more reefs than anything else.
China is waging--every day--an attack on American working
families by refusing to accept our exports and by demanding
coproduction agreements when they will take a few of our
exports, demanding that we transfer factories and technology as
a price for having some limited access to their markets. That
is devastating State after State in America. And, instead, we
are focused on these islands.
Why? Well, because the most powerful economic decision
maker in America is Wall Street, and they want us to ignore the
devastation of America's working families. And the most
important decisionmaker in the area of our military and
national security is the Pentagon and others who want to see a
10-percent increase in our defense budget, and they know that
China is the only worthy adversary to the might of the American
military.
So I do think it is important that we look at our bilateral
relations with China, and the aggression of China in the South
China Sea, the East China Sea, is an irritant and maritime
disputes and our support for a free, international maritime
regime is important.
If it was more important, we might join UNCLOS and actually
be part of the international order when it comes to maritime
disputes. Instead, we focus all of our attention on China's
refusal to adhere to international law on these disputes.
There are 20 maritime disputes that do not involve China,
and not a single one of them has been the subject or even a
partial subject of any hearing of this subcommittee, any
subcommittee, or the full committee of Foreign Affairs. Why?
Because none of those disputes justify a massive increase in
the American military budget, and none of those disputes
distract us sufficiently from the war that China is waging
against American working families.
Now, we are told that these ports--these islands pose this
great threat to international trade because $5 trillion of
trade goes close to these islands or reefs. Yet, almost all of
that trade is going in and out of Chinese ports, and if China
controlled these reefs, they could blockade their own ports,
and what threat, witnesses, does that pose to American national
security?
Now a few--some of that trade--are oil tankers coming from
Saudi Arabia to Japan, and in a worst-case scenario--and I do
note--that if China somehow dominated wrongfully and tried to
interdict in this area, those tankers would have to change
their course, thus increasing the cost of gasoline in Japan by
at least \1/10\ of 1 cent per gallon. That is the worst that
could happen to international trade. If they could blockade
their own ports, they could force some trade to go a little--on
a slightly different route. And that is a level of aggression
that I don't think any of us would tolerate.
So we have--let me see.
Finally, we have got to look at burden sharing. Japan
demands that we risk lives to defend these uninhabited islands
and that we spend billions--and apparently need to shut down a
quarter or a third of our State Department to be able to afford
to do it--to defend these islands. They spend less than 1
percent of their GDP on defense. We have to defend their
islands. There is no oil there, but if there is any oil there,
it is Japan's oil or South Korea's oil; it is not our oil. But,
also, what happens to our mutual defense treaty when America
was attacked on 9/11? Our European forces--partners at least
put troops in harm's way. Some of them are spending 2 percent
of their GDP on defense. Japan said, ``Well, we have got this
constitution. So we won't help you, and we won't amend our
constitution either to help you.'' So Americans died by the
thousands, a country with a mutual defense treaty with the
United States binding them to help defend us, basically
ignored. I think there was a ship in the Indian Ocean that had
a Japanese flag on it.
So we are told that the Pentagon needs more money to defend
islands that Japan is unwilling to tax itself to defend, a
country that responded rather insufficiently when America was
attacked.
And we are told: Don't pay attention to China's attack on
American working families; pay only attention to whether they
are adding a little dirt to a reef in the South China Sea.
I yield back.
Mr. Yoho. I appreciate my colleague's comments there. And,
yes, there are a lot of other conflicts or areas that are a
concern out there. But when we start seeing military equipment
going in their land strips and things like that, I think it
causes more concern in this issue. And I look forward to the
dialogue.
And at this point, I would like to yield a minute to my
colleague Mr. Rohrabacher from California.
Mr. Rohrabacher. And congratulations, Mr. Chairman----
Mr. Yoho. Thank you.
Mr. Rohrabacher [continuing]. On being Mr. Chairman.
Let's just note that President Abe in Japan has been doing
his best to end the type of relationship that you have just
described. President Abe and the people of Japan are honorable
people, and they are courageous people when they have to defend
their interests. We have been doing that, and we have insisted
upon that since the end of the Second World War.
President Abe is moving forward now and trying to move
through his Parliament an end to the restrictions that were
placed on Japan by their constitution after the Second World
War.
I think that President--and we should applaud that. I don't
know if--certainly, the last administration did not applaud it,
and I would hope that President Trump would, indeed, look at
what Abe is trying to do to become an equal partner rather than
a junior partner who is being taken care of. So we should
applaud that.
And, second of all, in terms of what is going on with the
Chinese, if we turn our back and just say, ``That doesn't
affect us,'' what we are talking about is an arrogant
disruption of international rights-of-way both in the air and
on the sea that will do nothing but embolden this rotten
dictatorship in Beijing from moving forward with even more
aggressive moves elsewhere.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you.
Now we will turn to Mr. Bera, Dr. Bera, from California.
Mr. Bera. Thank you. I want to add my congratulations to
Chairman Yoho.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you.
Mr. Bera. And welcome back to the ranking member.
I think this is a timely topic for us to start this session
of Congress off and this subcommittee off. I was in Japan last
week, had a chance to meet with the Prime Minister, Prime
Minister Abe, and some of his team, and I think it is very
important for us to reassure our allies in the region that we
will uphold our commitments. I mean, we can talk about the
South China Sea. We can talk about the East China Sea. And more
acutely what is happening in North Korea is an existential
threat to Japan and our allies in the Republic of Korea. So
this is very much a timely topic.
And I would agree with my colleague from California, Mr.
Rohrabacher, that Prime Minister Abe is trying to step up some
of Japan's defensive capabilities, and they are working within
the confines of their constitution to take on some more of the
burden.
But, again, it was a bipartisan group meeting with our
Japanese counterparts. We did send a strong message that we are
ready to stand with our allies in the region in a collaborative
way.
With that, I will yield back.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you. And I appreciate your comments.
And the thing that I am excited about is so much trade goes
through here. This region is so important to so many people
around the world that it is having these discussions in the
open that we can help maybe draft policies that would direct
our State Department, our administration, and build alliances
stronger in that area and focus on economies, trade, and
national security that affects all of us. And so I look forward
to those debates.
As typical for meetings, we will have 5 minutes of
questioning. You will each have an opening statement of 5
minutes that will be submitted into the record. And then each
member will go back and forth for 5 minutes of questioning.
And so, with that, I would like to introduce our panel.
Mr. Dean Cheng, senior research fellow at the Heritage
Foundation's Asia Studies Center. Thank you. You have been here
before, and we appreciate you coming back.
Dr. Michael Auslin, resident scholar and director of Japan
studies at the American Enterprise Institute. And, again, we
thank you for your contributions.
And Dr. Michael Swaine, senior fellow with the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, Asia Program.
And I have read all of your opening statements and several
things from you, Dr. Swaine, and I look forward to an
informative hearing.
So, with that, Mr. Cheng, if you would start your opening
statement. Thank you.
Mr. Cheng. Chairman Yoho.
Mr. Yoho. And make sure everybody turns their mike on when
you speak.
STATEMENT OF MR. DEAN CHENG, SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW, ASIAN
STUDIES CENTER, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION
Mr. Cheng. Chairman Yoho, Ranking Member Sherman, and
members of the committee, thank you very much for the
opportunity to testify before you this afternoon at the first
meeting of the Asia and the Pacific Subcommittee. My name is
Dean Cheng. I am the senior research fellow for Chinese
political and security affairs at the Heritage Foundation, but
my comments today reflect solely my own opinion and do not
reflect the views necessarily of the Heritage Foundation.
As has been very clear to anyone who has been watching the
news, China is heavily engaged in the South China Sea region as
the PRC has been asserting claims over an extensive expanse of
the South China Sea based on a combination of claims of
historic rights and a so-called nine-dash line that was laid
down in 1947 under the previous Government of the Republic of
China.
The Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague, however,
found that neither of those arguments was, in fact, a basis for
legitimating China's very expansive claims, including its
artificial island construction in the Spratlys.
It is worth, I think, considering a bit about why China is
so interested in the South China Sea. And I would suggest that
there are several factors involved that are driving China's
insistence on pushing in the region, even when it antagonizes
its neighbors. And these broadly fall into the categories of
resources, strategic depth, and national reputation, as well as
the potential capacity for the Chinese concept of deterrence,
which it is important to note, for the Chinese incorporates the
idea of coercion. If you all have read Bernard Brodie, Thomas
Schelling, and Herman Kahn, the American concept of deterrence
is solely focused on dissuasion, but for the Chinese, it
incorporates coercion.
When we talk about resources in the South China Sea, we
tend to assume that it is about oil. The funny thing is that,
although there have been a number of studies about potential
hydrocarbon reserves in the South China Sea, the actual amount
of hydrocarbon discovered by various test walls has, in fact,
been extremely limited. It hasn't yet panned out.
The main resource, currently, that is actually of
particular interest to the Chinese but also to neighboring
states is that of food. The South China Sea includes some of
the richest fishing grounds in the world. And while some of
those rich fishing grounds are actually now being pushed toward
collapse due to overfishing, it nonetheless remains a key
source of relatively free protein. As China moves up the
socioeconomic scale, its people are demanding more protein. So,
if you are going to try to meet those demands, you can import
meat, which is going to be very expensive, or you can try to
catch more of it basically off the hooks, so to speak.
The second aspect here is strategic depth. And here, the
Chinese have a distinct need to control the East Asia littoral,
not just the South China Sea but the waters up through the
entire first island chain, as a defensive measure because
China's center of gravity, its economic center of gravity, is
now on the coast. If you think about Shenzhen, Shanghai,
Pudong, Tianjin, these are all port cities, and this is what
China has invested billions and billions of dollars over the
last 30 years in terms of building up its economic
infrastructure.
The South China Sea, however, is especially important given
the militarization of Hainan Island, which contains, among
other things, China's newest and largest space sport, a
facility for ballistic missile submarines, a carrier berth,
submarine pens, and multiple military airfields, including the
one that the U.S. EP-3 had to crash land on after the collision
in 2001.
One of the American trump cards is our submarines, our
nuclear attack submarines. They are extremely quiet. China has
openly discussed the creation of sonar surveillance arrays in
the bottom of the South China Sea. Those arrays need to come up
at some point in order to collect the data, to allow the data
to be analyzed and exported. And I would suggest that some of
these islands may serve that particular function.
In addition, for this Chinese Communist Party, legitimacy
rests upon core interests. And among the core interests that
were defined by the senior counselor Cui Tiankai in his
meetings with then Secretary of State Clinton is maintaining
territorial integrity and State sovereignty, which is
especially important in the wake of the so-called century of
humiliation that China suffered when China was faced with the
potential of dismemberment.
So the South China Sea, like Taiwan, like Xinjiang, like
Tibet, is increasingly associated by the Chinese leadership as,
basically, if we lose this, where will it end? Where will it
stop?
It is no surprise, then, that the U.S. has been accused of
fomenting the entire South China Sea problem from the--by such
senior leaders of General Fang Fenghui in his joint press
conference with then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Dempsey and
Madam Fu Ying of the National People's Congress.
So, within this focus, within this broad context, then,
China is driven by a number of considerations here to push for
extending its sovereignty over what normally would be
considered international common spaces. And this is likely to
become even more urgent as China's leadership faces the 19th
Party Congress this fall, where Xi Jinping is going to wind up
with an entirely new leadership cadre.
In order to counter China, I think some of the things that
we should be considering and which I hope the committee will
consider future hearings are the issues of maintaining a
presence in the region, emphasizing the legality of the
Permanent Court of Arbitration's findings, and employing
economic as well as more traditional political and diplomatic
means to pressure China.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cheng follows:]
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----------
Mr. Yoho. Thank you, and I appreciate your testimony. And
those are the things we want to gain out of this. You know, we
will come back to some of your comments that I have questions
on.
Dr. Auslin, if you would go ahead.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL AUSLIN, PH.D., RESIDENT SCHOLAR, DIRECTOR
OF JAPAN STUDIES, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE
Mr. Auslin. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sherman, members
of the committee, I am honored to speak before you today on the
issue of U.S. maritime strategy in Asia. With a new
administration, it is a particularly timely moment to do so. I
believe it is also time to adopt a larger geostrategic picture
of the entire Asia-Pacific region. Seeing the South China Sea,
the East China Sea, and the Yellow Sea as one integrated
strategic space or what we might refer to as the Asiatic
Mediterranean.
The United States maintains several enduring interests in
maritime East Asia. First, since the close of World War II, we
have sought to prevent the emergence of a hostile hegemon that
could dominate our partners or eventually threaten the U.S.
mainland. U.S. forward-based military forces along Asia's first
island chain have served to deter full-scale war in Asia for
more than six decades.
Second, the U.S. maintains an interest in preserving our
network of allies and partners in the region. American
alliances remain a fundamental source of our strength in the
world.
Third, the U.S. retains an interest in defending the free
flow of trade and commerce through Asia's waterways. Annually,
$5.3 trillion of trade passes through the South China Sea. U.S.
trade accounts for $1.2 trillion of this total.
There are numerous threats to U.S. interests or potential
threats to U.S. interests that may emerge in the future. From a
domestic political perspective, Beijing views its maritime
claims in the South and East China Seas as what it calls ``blue
national soil.'' Foreign claims to the Spratly and Paracel
Islands are an infringement, in Beijing's view, on its
sovereign territory, and Chinese leaders have hardened their
public positions on the South China Sea over time.
China's nine-dash line encompasses 90 percent of the South
China Sea. While Beijing remains vague about its claims to the
waters and airspace within the line, it considers the area to
be historically Chinese waters. To both defend its maritime
claims and protect its southeastern flank, Beijing has spent
the past three decades building its military power projection
capabilities out to dispersed island chain and beyond,
developing anti-access/area denial technology and naval forces
to challenge the U.S. military in its near seas.
Over the past two decades, Chinese ships have harassed,
shadowed, and interfered with the activities of U.S. naval
assets operating in its near seas. While in the East China Sea,
the PRC continues to challenge Japan's administration of the
Senkakus by frequently sailing flotillas of fishing boats,
coast guard ships, and maritime militias in and around the
Senkakus territorial waters.
By slowly changing the situation on the ground or on the
water, China hopes to transform the Asiatic Mediterranean into
a Chinese lake. Chinese control of the South China Sea at the
exclusion of the U.S. is obviously not a fait accompli, but we
must act to implement a counter coercion strategy if we hope to
maintain assured access to Asia's littorals.
Let me mention a few policy recommendations. First, we
should demonstrate diplomatic leadership. Washington's network
of allies and partners throughout the Asia Pacific remains the
backbone of our engagement in the region. The first order of
business for the Trump administration is to continue energetic
diplomacy throughout the region, to assure allied capitals, and
signal to the China that we remain committed.
Later this year, I hope to see the administration send
high-level attendees to the June Shangri-La dialogue, the
August ASEAN regional forum, and the November East Asia and
APEC summits. Diplomatic jaw-jaw alone, however, is
insufficient. We must also strengthen economic ties with our
liberal allies in the region. While the current administration
has declared the Trans-Pacific Partnership dead, it has
remained open to the possibility of bilateral free-trade
agreements. If it pursues this path, then the best place for
President Trump to start would be with Japan.
In addition, we must engage in more multilateral security
cooperation. It is incumbent on the U.S. to attempt to better
train and equip the forces of Southeast Asian nations as well
as our allies and partners to resist coercion and intimidation
by the Chinese Navy and raise the cost of Beijing's salami-
slicing strategy in the East Asia Seas.
I believe the U.S. must continue to raise foreign military
financing levels in Southeast Asia. In 2015, Congress
authorized a $28 million East Asia-Pacific foreign military
financing fund that could be disbursed to various Southeast
Asian nations as needed. This pot of money should be renewed
annually. The U.S. should also encourage regional players to
engage in these cooperative security efforts including our
allies in Japan, Australia, and South Korea.
And, finally, we should reinforce these efforts with U.S.
hard power. We should increase the tempo of our Freedom of
Navigation operations in the region, not as a provocation but
as a signal that we will defend our rights in accordance with
international law.
We must be more willing to use coercive diplomacy to raise
the costs on China and against its actions against our allies
or our interests.
The goal, in conclusion, is not to back the Chinese into a
corner or goad them into further aggression but, rather, just
the opposite. They must understand that unprovoked and
belligerent acts will merit a rejoinder; otherwise, they will
get the wrong message and continue testing the U.S. Government
and our allies.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Auslin follows:]
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----------
Mr. Yoho. Thank you for your statement.
And, Dr. Swaine, look forward to hearing yours.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL D. SWAINE, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW, ASIA
PROGRAM, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE
Mr. Swaine. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, members. It
is a pleasure to be here today.
Let me speak, first, about the situation in the maritime
areas, as I see it. Since roughly 2007, 2008, China has clearly
taken a more assertive and active stance toward its
longstanding territorial claims in the South and East China
Seas, both bordering its long maritime coast. In truth, the
historical dynamic at work in the disputed maritime areas has
long involved an interactive tit-for-tat rivalry among the
claimants made possible by the absence of any clear and
commonly accepted code of conduct and driven by deep-seated
suspicions and strongly felt nationalist impulses on all sides.
In recent years, however, Beijing has certainly gone beyond
such proportional tit-for-tat interaction to apparent attempts
to establish itself as the dominant claimant in the Spratly
Islands, which are the southern islands in the South China Sea,
arguably to deter perceived provocations by others and to
establish a strong position in future negotiations, correcting
what had been a very weak position in that area.
In the case of the East China Sea dispute with Japan,
Beijing has also departed from its past tit-for-tat stance in
an attempt to establish itself in recent years as an equal
claimant to Tokyo over disputed islands, thereby supposedly
correcting years of what it regards as Japanese dominance.
While not taking any formal position in support of any
claimant's sovereignty, Washington has clearly focused the vast
majority of its concern and its actions since roughly 2010 on
Beijing while backing its allies. The obvious danger presented
by this situation is that increasing numbers of U.S. allies and
Chinese air and naval assets operating in close proximity to
one another or perceived provocations of various sorts,
including further military deployments onto land features,
could produce escalating crises and conflict.
This danger is reinforced by the failure of China, and to a
lesser extent other disputants, to clarify their claim
regarding various waters. Contrary to widespread claims in the
media and elsewhere, Beijing has yet to define exactly what the
so-called South China Sea nine-dash line denotes regarding the
waters within it. The resulting uncertainty stimulates worst-
casing about motives and behavior, thus leading to further
escalation.
So what is to be done in this situation? First, I think
there needs to be a recognition that a continuous, unilateral
U.S. military escalation in presence and activities in an
effort to retain a clearcut level of military predominance over
China will have, at best, a limited short-term dampening effect
on the worsening security competition and would more likely
make the situation much worse.
The forces of nationalism, the public visibility of actions
taken, the close proximity of the disputed areas to mainland
China and Beijing's continued economic and military growth and
distrust of U.S. make a confrontation more, not less, likely
under such circumstances.
Moreover, barring an unlikely near total collapse of the
Chinese economy and/or a major surge in the overall U.S. GDP,
Washington will not possess the capacity to greatly exceed the
kind of military and economic capabilities that China will be
able to bring to bear in its nearby maritime areas over the
coming years.
We are looking at the emergence of a de facto unstable
balance of power in the Western Pacific under present
conditions.
Second, in place of an open-ended escalation, a stable,
enduring modus vivendi among all relevant parties is needed.
This should center on agreements to exercise mutual restraint
in asserting local sovereign or special rights as well as an
effective peaceful process for handling incidents. Such an
understanding ideally should consist of several elements. The
first is a far greater emphasis on diplomacy than we have seen
thus far to establish an interim set of understandings among
the claimants and between Beijing and Washington regarding
levels and types of militarization and non-use of force. The
United States and China must take the lead in this effort based
on a common recognition of the need to remove the maritime
issue as a driver of their deepening strategic competition.
A second element should include a staged diplomatic process
for clarifying the jurisdictional disputes involving both
sovereignty issues and nonsovereignty rights over resource
extraction such as fishing. Washington must do more to
facilitate this effort and not leave it simply to Beijing and
the other disputants to determine. During this process, Beijing
would need to clarify the meaning of the nine-dash line, and
all claimants would specify their claim to land or underwater
features and corresponding waters as well as so-called
historical rights ideally as they relate to relevant legal
definitions under UNCLOS.
Third, on the basis of such clarification of claims and
jurisdictions, all parties in the South China Sea and East
China Sea disputes must reach an agreement on those areas
subject to joint resource development and a procedure for
implementing such development.
Finally, on the basis of the previous actions, the
claimants must eventually negotiate elements of a binding code
of conduct for limiting levels of militarization and handling
future incidents over the long term. Obviously, many obstacles
would confront any efforts to greatly reduce disputes over
maritime territory claims. And American leverage is extremely
limited in this area because of its failure to ratify UNCLOS.
How can Washington seriously press China and others to abide by
UNCLOS rulings and establish a code of conduct when it refuses
to subject itself to such scrutiny? These obstacles are not
insurmountable however, especially if they are placed within a
larger effort to create an overall regional balance of power,
and they must be surmounted since the likely alternative is a
steady escalation toward more crises.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Swaine follows:]
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----------
Mr. Yoho. Thank you. And I appreciate everybody's comments.
And that is what we are here for, you know, let's define the
region. Let's define what the norms are.
Dr. Auslin, you were talking about China pressing its
national sovereignty in the out islands against international
norms. Our historical agreements with countries like Japan, the
Philippines, Taiwan, South Korea, if we look at the advent of
those when they came out, it was peaceful in nature, non-
aggressive, and non-encroaching on other nations whereas what
we are seeing with the Government of China has expanded its
reach. We see the militarization of the islands that have come
out of nowhere, the castles in the sand. And I think your
description of the lake of China versus the South and East
China Sea is very descriptive in the mentality coming from the
Chinese Government.
When we see the--not just offensive weapons on there--or
the defensive but the offensive weapons, I think it is time
that we come to the table and get clarification on this so that
we can make policies and get people in agreement on that.
After becoming party chairman in the late 2012, President
Xi announced his so-called Chinese dream, which he said would
lead to the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. How
important do you think China's maritime claim in the South and
East China Seas are to achieving President Xi's Chinese dream?
That is question number one.
What is Beijing's ultimate goal in the South and East China
Seas, and how far do you believe China is willing to go to
defend these claims? And I am going to open it up to all three
of you, but Dr. Auslin, if you will start on that.
Mr. Auslin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think that, in terms of the ultimate goal that Xi Jinping
has, it is--which is not surprising for any national leader--it
is to have the ability to do what he decides he wants to do in
the future, meaning, to reduce any restrictions on either his
own capabilities, which is a domestic issue, or against those,
such as the United States, who may pose an obstacle, or
potentially international norms that conflict with those
interests.
One thing I don't think we have fully appreciated here in
the States is the degree to which China considers the new
territories that it has built and reclaimed in the South China
Sea as sovereign territory and how that will change Chinese
doctrine, military doctrine, defense doctrine should they feel
that those territories are at risk. After all, they point out
to us that those are--there are post offices and schools on the
islands, not just airstrips and defensive installations.
I think, secondly, to wind up in terms of your question as
to how important this is, it is--I would not say it is the
single most important driver of China's perception of its own
position and role in the region, but it is part of a much
larger perception that China has of regaining a position of
dominance that it once had, of being recognized as, if not the
hegemon, as the dominant player, and, therefore, with the
ability to have its own perceptions of what its interests are
and the norms that surround those respected by its neighbors.
This is where the other nations and Asia push back. It is
where the United States has hesitated to step in to uphold the
global norms that go on to issues that include free trade and
fair trade. So that is where I would actually link Ranking
Member Sherman's opening statement with our discussion on
security. It is a question of liberal norms and behavior
globally.
Thank you.
Mr. Yoho. All right. Let me interject in here.
Dr. Swaine, you were saying, as you stated, it will be
harder in the future for us to have more of a presence there.
You know, if you look at our economic situation and our
military strength, that is why I find it is imperative that we
have an agreement now and understanding that we can build from
in the future. What are your thoughts on the direction that we
should go and knowing our current state of affairs in America?
Mr. Swaine. Oh, that is an important caveat.
Mr. Yoho. We will just deal with the Asia-Pacific area
right now.
Mr. Swaine. Yes. I mean, in some respects I think we are
moving in the wrong direction on a lot of fronts.
Mr. Yoho. Agreed.
Mr. Swaine. I am not a big fan of the revoking of TPP. I
think it can be modified, and it is something that signifies
American's presence in the area. But I do believe that it is
incumbent on the United States to think long term on this issue
and think hard about what our relative capabilities in that
field, in that area, because they are changing. And the ability
of the United States to be able to predominate in the Western
Pacific is going to go away. And so how do you deal with that
effectively? Well, you can argue that you want to double down
and just spend more on defense, and you will maintain that gap.
I don't think that is going to be feasible, particularly if the
United States is not a strong economic player in the region as
well.
So the best procedure is to move toward some type of
balance of power in the region. And that means gaining
understandings with, first of all, allies, the United States
with Japan, with South Korea, and with the Philippines, about
what is needed in the region in the long term. And, secondly,
reassuring them that balance of power does not mean
accommodation. Balance of power does not mean retreat from the
region. Balance of power does not mean a weak U.S. The U.S.
acts on the basis of its strength and influence to try to do
that.
And I have laid out a whole series of moves that I think
are necessary in a report that I wrote last year on this
question.
Mr. Yoho. I saw that. And I appreciate that because that is
what this is all about. You know, we can't do it. It is not
sustainable for us to do it alone. We have to come to
agreements in that area so that we can forge strong alliances
and have a common understanding because if we allow the
precedent of China moving on, does that allow any other nation
to do the same thing?
Mr. Swaine. Right.
Mr. Yoho. And that is what I fear. We need to come together
on an agreement.
I am out of time, and I am going to turn this over to the
ranking member for his 5 minutes.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you. I want to make it clear: I regard
this aggressiveness by China as important. I am just not so
sure it is as important as the administration has said as ISIS
or Crimea.
American weakness is hurting us, and American weakness is
demonstrated by our weakness on trade, and our response is,
well, let's get tough on the islands. Yes, China may be
stealing some fish from Japan, but China's refusal to accept
American imports, China's demand for coproduction agreements,
where we have to transfer technology as a price for access to
their markets, this has devastated Michigan and Wisconsin and
Ohio and western Pennsylvania, millions of American families,
and we show weakness every day that we do not impose tariffs on
Chinese goods coming into our country.
And the best way to preserve our weakness is to say: Look
over here. There are some islands. There are some fish.
What we haven't discussed much here is how China and its
government can use nationalism to expand power. It works here;
it works there. Now, the Chinese Government has a problem in
that there is no theoretical answer for the question, why does
that government rule? Democracy is a good theoretical basis.
Theocracy works reasonably well for the government of Tehran,
and even the divine right of kings has justified why people are
in control. But the rulers in Beijing are not the vanguard of
the proletariat.
Their only answer for the question why they rule is the
exaggerated nationalism, and we play right into that hand. We
may have to because they may get so aggressive that we have to
respond. But we play right into their hands when we confront
them in the South China Sea.
Dr. Auslin, you talk about coercive diplomacy. Do you have
anything in mind other than yelling loud? Give me--spend 10
seconds and just tell me what is--one example of coercive
diplomacy.
Mr. Auslin [continuing]. Including disinviting China from
maritime exercises we can invite them to like RIMPAC,
curtailing military exchanges, considering whether or not to
continue high-level diplomatic dialogue.
Mr. Sherman. Some of that just makes the South China Sea
far more dangerous. They play games; we respond. And I don't
want to start a war there by accident. I notice, of course, you
didn't say tariffs as part of that.
You say that $1.2 trillion of U.S. trade passes through the
South China Sea. Can you name the number one port that that
trade goes to that isn't Chinese? Is any significant portion of
that $1.2 trillion not U.S. trade with China?
Mr. Auslin. All the leading ports are Chinese.
Mr. Sherman. All the leading ports are Chinese. So, once
again, these strategic islands would allow China to close off
trade with the United States through Chinese ports.
Dr. Swaine, Japan has this constitutional provision. Does
that prevent them from spending 1.5 percent of their GDP or
even 2 percent of their GDP on defense? Does that prevent them
from defending what they say is their own territory?
Mr. Swaine. Well, by law, they have restrictions on the
amount that they pay as a percentage of their GDP----
Mr. Sherman. That is by law. That is not their
constitution. We have a law that we spend only so much for
defense, but we change that every year.
Mr. Swaine. They could spend more.
Mr. Sherman. And they could spend more. They could, and
they choose not to because they would rather we defend them----
Mr. Swaine. Well, if I may, it is a little bit more
complicated than that.
Mr. Sherman. I am sure it is. And if I was given more than
5 minutes, we would explore those complications. And, again, we
respect the Japanese people, but their willingness to tax
themselves to defend what they claim is their sovereign
territory faces certain political limits, and we are told that
we have got to increase our defense budget by 10 percent and
that these islands are an important part of that.
And 9/11 happened 16 years ago. Has there been any effort
in Japan to say we have to amend our constitution so that we
can send forces to Afghanistan?
Dr. Auslin, name the leading Japanese politician who has
called for the deployment of Japanese troops to Afghanistan?
Mr. Auslin. Combat troops, none, but they sent
reconstruction troops to Afghanistan. And they had an 8-year
refueling mission----
Mr. Sherman. Okay. But they haven't put their people in
harm's way?
Mr. Auslin. They are precluded by the constitution----
Mr. Sherman. And not a single Japanese politician has stood
up and said: ``America has defended us for the better part of a
century. America was attacked on 9/11. It is time for us to
change our constitution for the purpose of helping America.''
No Japanese politician has said that?
Mr. Auslin. Congressman, they respond to their constituents
as you do.
Mr. Sherman. Exactly. And their constituents want my
constituents to pay for the defense of their islands, and their
constituents don't want to pay in blood or treasure for the
defense of America, which is happening in Afghanistan right
now.
Again, these islands are important. We shouldn't let China
walk all over us, but the other view I am glad to have
represented here. And I think we have a balanced hearing
because I am sure that there will be others who will present
the other side.
I yield back.
Mr. Rohrabacher [presiding]. Well, thank you.
And I would yield to myself while the chairman is out. Look
at that. I have got it in my hands finally.
Mr. Sherman. Wait a minute. You have got one on your--you
are controlling the whole world.
Mr. Rohrabacher. That is it. There you go.
I have some very strong agreements with Mr. Sherman on some
of the trade issues that he has brought up today, and I also
have some very strong disagreements with him as to the scope
and depth of how we approach China today, a threatening China
to the world peace.
Certainly, China--I led the floor fight when I came here
with Chris Cox against Most Favored Nation status with China.
At that time, we made the argument that those people were
telling us that the more fluent and the more trade--the more
fluent China with more trade in the United States meant a
liberalization of China, that we would eventually have a more
democratic government. That has proven to be absolutely wrong.
And I call it the ``hug a Nazi, make a liberal'' theory. And it
is no more, liberal and politically, than it was two decades or
three decades. In fact, there is some evidence that, at that
time, because of Tiananmen Square, they actually had more
freedom than they have today in terms of political freedom in
China.
So let us note that the idea that we have permitted a
monstrously oppressive regime that brutalizes their own people,
that we have enabled them to put the rules of trade together
that has resulted in a massive transfer of wealth that has then
been kept in the control of the clique that runs China--and as
you said, Mr. Sherman, this is not a clique that is now
directed by beliefs of some philosophy like they are the
proletariat, as they were during the Communist days. This is
just a self-serving, vicious, fascist-state clique that runs
China, and that threatens the world when that type of clique
becomes a massive military power and dominates a region of the
world. That is when it becomes a threat beyond trade. And that
is what is happening today.
That massive wealth is being used to build up their
military capabilities, and what we have seen is an arrogance of
decisionmaking in Beijing, and I would say, again, there are no
opposition parties there. There are no people--there is no
reason for them to worry about public opinion. This is just a
power play by arrogant oppressors, as we have seen in many
throughout history. You have a vicious dictatorship in a
country that becomes a military power. They always end up
aggressing upon their neighbors.
So, with that, that means we have a threat to deal with,
especially when all the signs are there, which in the South
China Sea is not a--if I can just note here, the South China
Sea is closer, the Spratly Islands and these other islands
here, maybe not the Paracels, but the islands--the Paracel
Islands--are closer to the other countries in the South China
Sea, meaning the Philippines and even Indonesia and certainly
Vietnam, are much closer to those countries than they are to
China. There was no island there before. We are talking about
reefs that were under water at high water.
Now, I was lucky, after the CIA for decades prevented me--I
should say for a decade, not decades--for a decade prevented me
from flying over the Spratly Islands. And about 15 years ago, I
managed to fly--get another plane from another--anywhere where
I got it, to fly me over the Spratly Islands. And there they
were building the islands. And so all of this time for the last
15 years, we know that they have been building those islands,
and we have let it happen. We have not confronted it, which
they have seen as a sign of weakness.
And what maybe we could have done, maybe start building
islands of our own. We could have maybe financed the Filipinos
to go there and build their own islands right next door, see
what they would have thought about that. But most importantly.
And we are trying to come to this formula, and I have only got
a couple of minutes for you to reply, but let me just note: I
think the most important thing in making sure that we have
peace and stability in that part of the world is not to ignore
everything but the trade with China, but make sure that we work
with the Japanese. The Japanese are the only ones who are
strong enough to counterbalance this.
And let me note that if the United States had had a country
foolish enough for decades to say, ``Let us take care of all of
your defense,'' the American people wouldn't be in favor of
using their money when the other country would let them cover
their defense. It is time for us not to cover the defense of
Japan but treat the Japanese as equal partners and allies and
help President Abe, who is committed to being a force to
counteract this what I consider to be evil coming out of
Beijing.
Now, I have overspoke my time, but I will give all you
witnesses 15 seconds to say ``you are out of your mind'' or ``I
really like what you had to say.''
Mr. Cheng. I would note, sir, that what is essential is a
comprehensive approach toward dealing with China. We cannot
succeed in dealing with China simply via trade or simply via
military or simply via diplomatic issues. Comprehensive
includes what you have noted, which is working with our allies,
but it also means thinking about all of the instruments
available to the United States, including access to our
markets, as Representative Sherman has suggested, including
financial markets as well as things like supply chains and
things like that where many--much of that trade is going to
China. That is not finished products necessarily, but it is
often key spare parts.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Very good.
Mr. Auslin. Representative, just very briefly, I think we
do start with our allies and partners. Japan spends $50 billion
on its military per year. It is purchasing advanced weaponry,
such as the F-35, and it does take the lead in protecting its
own islands in the Senkakus. The United States Navy has done
none of that. What they have asked for is a guarantee that,
should war break out with China, that we would honor our
alliance commitment to them. But the Japanese Coast Guard and
Navy are always the first responders constantly to China.
Mr. Swaine. You are out of your mind. No.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Great.
Mr. Swaine. I mean, I just fundamentally disagree with
many, many of your assumptions, Congressman.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay.
Mr. Swaine. I mean, I think looking at the Chinese system
as simply a question of Communist dictators bent on overtaking
the world is a very inaccurate way of understanding them. Yes,
it is a one-party dictatorship. Yes, they restrict a lot of
political freedoms within their regime. They are not, however,
ruling over a population that is dying to overthrow them. They
have a lot of people in China who are very supportive of what
the PRC regime has done over the last 30 to 40 years, and I am
sure you are aware of that. It has raised their standards of
living up very, very high.
No, they don't have political rights in a variety of ways
that we would like them to have, but they are not going to
become like an American liberal democracy. They are going to
have some version of some kind of stronger state because of the
size of the country and because of the history of the country
and the fear that they have had of instability and collapse
within that regime.
Now, you can argue that a democratic China would be much
better for us and much better for them, but give me a good
sense about how you get there without creating chaos, and I
would be very willing to hear because nobody has thought of how
to do this.
So what you have, then, is an effort on the part of the
Chinese Government to expand their growth as great as they can,
and they do it for the people as well as for themselves, and to
establish a military that is going to reduce what they regard
as their vulnerabilities.
The United States has dominated the Western Pacific right
up to China's 12-mile limit for the last 70 years. That is
changing. The question is, how do you address that problem
without provoking a conflict with the Chinese?
They are not like Iraq. They are not like Granada. They are
not like Panama. They have nuclear weapons and a big military.
Mr. Rohrabacher. All right. Thank you.
And we do have fundamental disagreements, but neither one
of us are out of our mind. So we will have a good discussion on
that. Thank you.
And Mr. Becerra.
Mr. Bera. Mr. Bera. Mr. Becerra is back in California.
Mr. Rohrabacher. No, we just met with him this afternoon.
Mr. Bera. You know, I think this is a very important and
interesting dialogue. I would agree with you, Dr. Auslin, that
as we look at Asia and the Pacific, and certainly East Asia, in
the latter half of the 20th century, post World War II, post
the Korean conflict, the U.S. presence really did have a
remarkable effect in creating a stable democracy in Japan,
creating a stable democracy in the Republic of Korea, you know,
helping create thriving economies. And that was a good thing.
And I do think it is important for us to reassure our
allies in the region that we are not withdrawing from the
region. I think it is also a good thing as Prime Minister Abe
and the Japanese Government looks at stepping up some of its
own defensive capabilities, understanding some of the threats.
And one of those threats, clearly, are tensions in the
South China Sea. And I would agree with my colleague, Mr.
Rohrabacher, that we should have responded sooner, but we are
where we are. And part of the challenge of not responding
sooner is there is--if you look at some of the Chinese strategy
is they will provoke, see what kind of response that they get.
If they don't get a response, well, then they will push a
little bit further and see what kind of response. And at this
juncture, it becomes a much more complicated issue, much more
so in the South China Sea than in the East China Sea.
None of us has an interest in creating a kinetic conflict.
And there is always a danger of an accidental kinetic conflict,
which whether that is a Chinese vessel with a Japanese vessel
or a Filipino vessel or an American vessel. And that is the
danger. So we do have to think about strategies to start
reducing those tensions.
I do think, you know, the other big piece of it, whether
you supported TPP or were opposed to TPP, these are the fastest
growing markets in the world. There clearly is a benefit to
American companies to be able to compete and sell in these
markets. You know, we sell a lot of American products in Japan.
We sell a lot of American products in Korea. And as the other
southeast Asian markets and Chinese markets open up, we want to
be able to compete and sell our products there. That is good
for American workers. We want to make sure we do it in a fair
way.
If I start to think about the next steps--and maybe I will
give each of you a chance to talk about that--with this desire
to avoid a kinetic conflict, that wouldn't be in China's
interests, either. What would be one or two next steps to start
reducing those tensions, and using some of our soft power to
reduce and deescalate the region?
Maybe, Mr. Cheng, if you want to start.
Mr. Cheng. Thank you very much, Representative.
Several thoughts do come to mind. First, I think it is very
important to note that the Chinese leadership does have to
worry about public opinion. They are not subject to election,
of course, but when we watch how quickly they suppress and
limit the internet and the free flow of information, it is very
clear, that is something that worries them.
And that is something that we should continue to champion
at a political level, internet freedom; at a governance level,
in terms of not walking away from things like ICANN; and at a
technical level, in terms of promoting the ability to flow
information around, over, and through the Great Firewall of
China.
The other thing here is to consider the extent to which
China's activities in places like the South China Sea land
reclamation are, nonetheless, dependent on Chinese companies,
which, in turn, are dependent upon imports. The spare parts
required for the mechanical act of reclamation often is sourced
not in China, ironically enough, but in Europe or the United
States. And a diplomatic effort on the part of the U.S. to
bring in Japan and our allies, to basically constrain Chinese
behavior, or else suffer the consequences to their supply
chains, is, I think, one that is worth considering.
Mr. Bera. Dr. Auslin.
Mr. Auslin. Congressman, I think you are right, that we are
where we are, meaning we are in a different situation today
than we were 8 years ago, or 16 years ago. There are certain
things we cannot do today. There are other things that we can.
I would say, first, we do need to consider how to best
build the capacity of our partners, high-end partners such as
Japan as well as lower-end partners, those that are struggling
to just protect their own waterways.
Second, I think enhancing the U.S. presence, ensuring that
we maintain a robust, U.S. presence, which is both air and
ground and naval in the region, that there is co-training,
there are exercises, there are port visits and the like, is not
inherently predominance, but it does maintain stability and it
sends messages of reassurance.
At best, what I think we want--not at best, what I think we
want to do is complicate China's perception of what it is able
to do uncontested in these areas, and nudge it toward a more
cooperative posture. And I think you do that by creating a
community of interests.
Mr. Bera. Dr. Swaine.
Mr. Swaine. Well, I mean, there are several different
aspects to what needs to be done. One of them is domestic. The
United States needs to, as I said before, think very carefully
about what the long-range future of the United States is in the
Western Pacific, in terms of its capabilities, its influence,
how likely is it able to match specific types of resources with
specific types of objectives.
And I don't think that dialogue or that discussion has
occurred. Nobody thinks really long term about U.S.
capabilities and tries to understand a range of outcomes that
may occur and what you would do to try and minimize the less
likely, or the less favorable ones and maximize the more
favorable ones. That is the first thing.
The second thing I think we have to do is we have to have a
discussion with our allies about them improving their relations
in various ways with the Chinese. There is very little
discussion by the United States in interacting with China and
ASEAN to do with their disputes in the South China Sea. After
all, the disputes are about them; it is about their
relationships. And we need to be more effective diplomatically
and not be reducing the State Department, cutting back on the
State Department's capability, in order to engage with allies
and with others in the region on how they are going to develop
a real code of conduct.
The Chinese have committed themselves to this. They are
supposed to have a framework for a code of conduct by the
middle of this year. The United States barely says a thing
about it. It needs to base itself on the 2002 declaration that
ASEAN and China reached, and then use that as a basis for
moving forward for a code of conduct that will cover a lot of
these areas.
Mr. Bera. Thank you.
Mr. Yoho [presiding]. Thank you. I am going to afford Mr.
Sherman 30 seconds.
Mr. Sherman. One comment is that we might be stronger
diplomatically if we were part of UNCLOS. We don't subscribe to
the international standards for maritime disputes, but we
demand China do so.
But I want to pick up on what Mr. Cheng said. They do need
to manipulate their domestic public opinion. They will
especially need to do that if economic conditions change, and
they can no longer, you know, provide 5 or 10 percent economic
growth. And if there is a recession in China, the best, or the
most likely way for them to try to retain power is to go
eyeball to eyeball with us and wrap themselves in nationalism.
I yield back.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you. At this time, we will go to Mr. Perry
from Pennsylvania.
Mr. Perry. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
I know this goes back a ways. It is probably longer than
most people care to think about, and maybe it is not even
relevant to today's conversation. But I would think, for
historical purposes, it is important that we remind ourselves
in a way how we got here. And I am one of the people that
believes that a United States diplomat named John Service in
the fall of Chiang Kai-Shek as opposed to Mao and our State
Department and our meddling on behalf of communists have helped
create the problem that we now find ourselves within. And I
just think it is important to think about those things, because
I see parallels to today with some other places we are engaged
and other things we are doing.
That having been said, I turn to Mr. Cheng. Our new
Secretary of State Tillerson warned of a more confrontational
South China Sea policy, but he also said that the island
building had to stop, and that access to those islands would
not be allowed.
The President has recognized the one China policy, as we
all know. The last administration expressed a floor for China,
including the militarization of the South China Sea; but as far
as I can tell, that was never backed up, never backed up with
any action.
So the question is, so if we are going to maintain, if we
are going to maintain that there is a floor for China, what
specific conditions should we articulate to China regarding
that; and when China invariably breaks the floor, or floors,
what should our actions be?
Mr. Cheng. Congressman, I think that, to begin with, we
should be treating our allies and our friends at least as well
as we treat China. So I think that the incorporation of China
into things like RIMPAC, when forces from, for example, the
Republic of China/Taiwan are excluded sends, I think, a very
distinct message to Beijing, especially when they show up not
only with the forces that are supposed to show up, but also spy
ships which were uninvited.
And yet, we are apparently going to invite them yet again.
They showed up in 2014 with a spy ship as well as their forces.
They showed up in 2016. And now, apparently, we are going to
invite them again in 2018. That isn't even a floor; that is not
a net; that is an open doorway.
I think that, with regards to confrontation, again, there
are economic aspects that can be undertaken. The companies that
are doing this reclamation should be given a fairly simple
choice. You can work for China and make millions, or you can
work the global market that the U.S., Europe, and Japan can
influence, and that is billions of dollars. I think many of
these companies may well, at least, impose pressure on their
own system to rethink some of their policies.
And then with regards to our allies, again, I think that
many of them are still militarily less capable. They want to
cooperate with the United States. We are representing the gold
standard. That doesn't mean we shouldn't be engaging
diplomatically. It doesn't mean we shouldn't be engaging in
other aspects. But these are things that also do send a
political signal as well, whether it is sales of more advanced
weapons, or whether it is cooperating in--inviting our friends
and allies to cooperate in multinational military exercises.
Mr. Perry. So that seems pretty proactive, I mean, not
inviting the Chinese. Maybe we continue to invite them, but we
also invite our allies is what you are saying. But I would say
that there also should be an immediate prohibition of them
bringing the spy ship, if you want to call it that. Right? That
seems pretty axiomatic as well as making the contractors make a
choice. Right? That seems pretty obvious as well. But those are
kind of prospective, right? We could make that decision right
now.
But anticipating that China will always step one foot
closer, what is in our arsenal of diplomatic--and maybe
``arsenal'' is not the right term, right, but what is in our
grab bag of options, something that will be meaningful to China
when it is either imposed upon them or taken away from them, et
cetera?
Mr. Cheng. Congressman, I think that, again, access to our
markets is something that China wants as much as we want access
to theirs. Financial markets in particular. We, in an odd way,
represent sort of the underwriters limited seal of approval
when a Chinese IPO occurs.
And the inability to access our stock markets, our
financial networks, is something that should be undertaken very
carefully, because that is a very, very serious step, but it
does send a very serious message to Beijing. If you want to
still benefit from that global transfer of funds that
undergirds your economy, then you need to play by the rules,
the rules that you have already signed up to play by.
Mr. Perry. Always a privilege, Mr. Cheng.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you. And now we will go to Ms. Titus from
Nevada.
Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Perhaps we shouldn't have been so anxious to send Bao Bao
back if we are facing these kind of diplomatic problems.
All of you have mentioned that we need to increase our
engagement in the South China Sea, and all of you have
mentioned we need to do this through diplomacy, not just with
China, but with our other allies there. You pointed that out,
Mr. Cheng.
Dr. Auslin said, I think your quote was energetic diplomacy
through ASEAN, or attending some of these other summits.
And then Dr. Swaine, you noted the only effective way to
create a more stable environment in the maritime areas near
China is for the U.S. to lead a serious diplomatic dialogue
with Beijing and others in the area. You kind of trumped my
question there in passing in your earlier answer, but I would
like to hear all of you say, how in the world are we going to
be able to increase diplomacy, not just with China, but the
other areas, when we have no clear message coming out of the
White House? We have so many vacancies at top levels in the
State Department, and we have what we anticipate a budget from
this new President where they are just cutting as much as they
can from the State Department.
How are we not creating a power vacuum there? How are we
going to deal with this situation? Maybe, Dr. Swaine, you could
start.
Mr. Swaine. Well, you are preaching to the choir on this. I
think what is--we don't know yet, right, exactly what the Trump
administration intends to do by way of cutting back in order to
pay for a $54 billion increase in defense spending. It is
claiming that it is going to have offsets to be able to do this
without having to raise taxes or increase the deficit. I don't
know what that means.
Ms. Titus. We do know he wants other people to step up and
do their share, so that is kind of a hint what is coming.
Mr. Swaine. Right. So gutting agencies, EPA and the State
Department. And to me, it is just incredibly foolish if that is
what is going to happen, because the State Department, more
than any other agency, needs to have more funding. It has been
operating on a shoestring for way too long. To put them at a
lesser level of spending is going to make the ability of the
United States to really be effective in places like the Far
East, where it really counts, much, much less.
So I don't, in any way, sanction or endorse the kind of
direction where the administration is going today. I think
there has to be a clear, strategic assessment about what our
long-term future is in the Western Pacific and how we bring to
bear our most important assets--diplomatic, military,
economic--to achieve those gains.
Much of U.S. policy has to do with process. Engagement is a
process, as if it is something we can do or not do. We have no
alternative to engaging with the Chinese. The Chinese are so
big and so influential and the rest of the world is so
committed to dealing with them that efforts by us to try and
cut back on that would be totally self-destructive.
So we have to get smart about how we are going to be more
engaged on this in a very changing dynamic for power relations,
particularly in the Western Pacific. That is the only real area
where the United States and China, in my view, can have serious
problems. It is not over larger questions globally; it is
primarily in the Western Pacific. And if we don't get that
right, things are going to affect many other areas. So I agree
that we need to have greater capabilities on the diplomatic
side and on the economic side.
Ms. Titus. We have seen, visiting some new democracies,
where China has moved in there very eagerly to build
infrastructure. And if you start cutting back at the State
Department, cutting back the small budget that is foreign aid,
this can have repercussions beyond the South China Sea.
Mr. Cheng, or Dr. Auslin?
Mr. Auslin. Congresswoman, just on your last point, I
agree. We don't do infrastructure. We do capacity building. So
if you want judges or police, you come to us. You want a road,
you want a school, a power plant, you go to China or Japan. We
should be doing infrastructure.
We have spent decades, however--to get to your earlier
point--we have spent decades stripping our capability of
spreading a democratic message about our values and our society
and our culture. USIA, U.S. Information Agency, was
disestablished years ago and rolled into the State Department.
The current cuts may be extreme, but they are part of a long
trend under both Democratic and Republican administrations to
make it harder for our diplomats to get our message out. We do
need to turn that around. I believe in it, but it is only part
of a solution.
And as much as we need to engage with China, we have to be
realistic. A country that wants to cooperate or be cooperative
will do so without our blandishments. We have to understand the
limitations of that even as we pursue it, because it sends a
message to others who want to emulate our ways. Thank you.
Ms. Titus. I guess I am out of time. I am sorry. Thank you.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you.
We will go to Ms. Gabbard from the great State of Hawaii.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here and sharing your
insights and thoughts.
No one has really talked about North Korea yet, and how the
various courses of action that are being suggested here will
impact the very direct threat that we face from North Korea,
and the reality that any resolution to North Korea's situation
will require the engagement and cooperation of China in that.
So I would love to just hear each of your thoughts on
specifically how you suggest your suggested course of action
will impact the threat we face from North Korea. Start with Dr.
Cheng.
Mr. Cheng. Representative, frankly, I don't see any
solution to North Korea, because the North Korean regime has
associated itself with retaining its nuclear capability, and
China has repeatedly demonstrated for pretty much the last 30
years it has no intention of solving the North Korean problem,
particularly for the United States.
And the reality is that North Korea's nuclear weapons
aren't aimed at China; they are aimed at Japan, South Korea,
and the United States, which, from the Chinese perspective, is
not a great solution, but not necessarily a particularly
troubling one.
I will note, however, that the one time that anything was
done that truly caught the North Korean regime's attention was
when we should the down Banco Delta Asia by using the financial
networks to force the Chinese, again, to make that choice, the
millions of dollars that they gain from working with North
Korea or the billions in dollars in financial flows that would
otherwise occur. Unfortunately, after less than a year, we
decided that those sanctions were too dangerous to continue and
sustain against North Korea.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you.
Mr. Auslin. Congresswoman, thank you. I would agree with my
colleague. I would say, however, I would modify it slightly to
say there are no good solutions to North Korea. There are lots
of bad solutions to North Korea. And I agree entirely that we
have to give up the fiction that China wants, in any way, to
solve North Korea, certainly for our own purposes.
I would say, however, that given the increasing erratic
nature of the Kim Jong-un regime, the assassination of his
half-brother, who was protected by China just a few weeks ago
in Malaysia, as well as the assassination in 2014 or 2013, of
Jang Song-Thaek, who was Kim Jong-un's uncle, but, more
importantly, China's main agent in North Korea, means that
Beijing is as worried about their influence as we are worried
about our lack of. And there may be opportunities out of pure
self-interest, which is a fine thing, for the two of us to
figure out ways of pressuring that regime, or at least talking
more creatively about how to contain it.
At some point, by the way, we are going to have to decide
when we declare it a nuclear power. It is a nuclear power. I
understand that we do not want to shred the nonproliferation
regime, but we are going to have to wake up to reality one day.
Thank you.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you.
Mr. Swaine. Well, I agree with what Dean and Michael have
said already, that this is not a problem with a solution. I
mean, it is really trying to maximize, or optimize, a bad
situation. Unfortunately, what drives this situation the most
is the behavior of North Korea, which no country outside of
North Korea, has real control over, including the Chinese.
I believe that the Chinese have moved in their position
toward a greater degree of cooperation and support in dealing
with North Korea. They certainly wouldn't fully endorse
everything that the United States might want to see toward
North Korea for a legitimate national security interest of
their own, as well as other interests, which may not be as,
from our perspective, as legitimate; but I do think that we
have choices here.
We have a very--the policy thus far has not worked. So we
need to think about a new way of addressing this issue. We
can't simply regard the Chinese as being the panacea, that they
are going to solve it, because they are not going to solve it.
So we have to think about how we can work with the Chinese, the
South Koreans, and the Japanese to deal with it.
We have two different paths that we can go. One of them is
toward a greater degree of unified sanctions against North
Korea, in the hope that the regime will collapse or give up its
nuclear weapons. I think that is very unlikely. I think they
are committed to these weapons, and they are not likely to give
them up. And they are going to continue to move toward a
deliverable ICBM capability with a nuclear warhead. And when
they get close to that capability, the question is, what do we
do about that?
And, in my view, the only thing that one can do is you have
to make a choice between being--well, you can combine both. You
can be extremely clear about the consequences of any use or
threat of use of a nuclear weapon by North Korea, that it will
involve the destruction of North Korea, and that this applies
to threats to South Korea and to Japan, our allies for whom we
have a nuclear umbrella.
And at the same time, however, I think we have to consider
whether or not it is possible to develop a diplomatic strategy
in which you address each of the concerns that the North
Koreans have said that they have on their security front. Many
people say this is all useless, because the North Koreans will
ignore all this and continue to take advantage of it. But you
can make the argument that the United States and the other
powers have not fully tried to implement what you call an
omnibus approach to North Korea, that would give them over a
period of time in response to certain actions that they would
take a certain level of benefits for them, economic and
diplomatic.
And if they turn those things down, and you offered them
all in good faith and the Chinese sign onto that, then the
basis for the Chinese to continue to not cooperate in dealing
with North Korea will be reduced, in my view.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you. Thank you, gentlemen.
There are clearly no easy answers to the situation, but,
Dr. Swaine, I would argue that the time to ask that question
what will we do is now. And understand that as we look at these
other issues, whether it be the South China Sea or other issues
within the region, we can't operate in a silo with any of them,
because of the ripple effects that will occur as we look at the
various threats that exist there.
Thank you.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you. And they have called votes. We have
got 10\1/2\ minutes.
I am going to turn this over to Mr. Connolly from Virginia.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I would urge--welcome our panelists--if we can all be
concise, I would appreciate it, because we have to go vote.
What my concern is, at the very start of the new
administration, we have seen, or we are seeing policies that
contradict each other with respect to this region and China. So
we rattle the cage with a call to the President of Taiwan. We
announce a budget that is going to add $54 billion in defense
spending and the purpose of which is for ship building,
military aircraft, and establishing ``a more robust presence in
key international waterways and checkpoints,'' like the South
China Sea, while saying we are going to fund that, but cutting
back on the State Department and AID specifically.
Now, I was just in Sri Lanka. The Chinese, as you said, Dr.
Auslin, are building everything. You know, ports, airports,
roads, bridges, high-rises, sports stadiums, hospitals, they
are building it. But we are financing democratization. We are
providing real, in-depth assistance, both through IRI and NDI
to help, frankly, democratize institutions in Sri Lanka, and it
is working. But that is funded through the AID program.
Now, if we retrench in our foreign assistance and
diplomatic posture in places like the Philippines, Vietnam,
Burma, Sri Lanka, doesn't that create a vacuum for the Chinese?
And before you answer, so that is one vacuum I am worried
about, and one set of contradictions.
The other is, in the first week, we rip up TPP. And what is
happening as we speak, Beijing has summoned a region-wide
convocation to talk about a new trade agreement that has zero
provisions on labor, on human rights, and on the environment.
And I don't know, I am a simple soul, but that seems like we
just contradicted ourselves and, frankly, handed an enormous
victory to the Chinese that will be very long-lasting.
Your comments?
Mr. Cheng. Representative, I believe that TPP was
negotiated by the previous administration that indicated that
it was not going to bring it forward to Congress. It was not
going to present it for a vote at all. And in counting noses
over who would have voted, I am not sure how many members of
the previous administration's party could be relied upon to
vote for TPP.
Mr. Connolly. Irrelevant point, Mr. Cheng. I am making a
different point. And by the way, I happen to be one of those
people who would have and did.
However, what I am making--and if you don't want to answer
it, then I will move to Dr. Auslin and Dr. Swaine. The question
is, are we not handing an enormous victory, irrespective of
what Obama's administration was prepared to do or not do--they
were prepared to bring it to a vote, but time kind of ran out.
But did we just hand the Chinese an enormous victory, and isn't
the witness of that what is happening as we speak in Beijing?
Thirty percent of all of the world's economic activity is
going to be covered by the agreement they are now forging, and
I might add, U.S. allies, like Australia and New Zealand--maybe
Australia isn't an ally anymore after the tongue-lashing they
got from the new President.
Dr. Auslin, did you want to comment?
Mr. Auslin. Congressman, I would prefer to see the
administration go back to TPP. However, if all we can get are
bilaterals, then I think we should all push as strongly as
possible to get bilaterals, starting with Japan.
Your point about the AID vacuum, I think, is important. It
is an important part of our strategy. I would prefer to see
that part of the budget increased as well. But we have to do a
lot better at the messaging that we send out. We have not been
very good under either Democratic or Republican administrations
in the State Department sending out those messages.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you.
Dr. Swaine, real quickly, because we are running out of
time.
Mr. Swaine. I basically agree with that, but I think the
United States does really have to have a much better job, do a
much better job of presenting what the economic costs and
benefits are and what the advantages the United States gets
from multilateral trade agreements, but it is just not in the
position of doing that.
Mr. Connolly. I just have never seen the United States
quite so blatantly, in the matter of 1 month, contradict itself
so profoundly with respect to something so important, namely,
our relations with China. So on the one hand, we want to deter
them and we are going to build up military forces to do that;
and on the other, we are going to unilaterally disarm on trade
and foreign aid and diplomacy, because we are going to defund
it.
I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. Just kind
of one last comment, because, again, what I hope to get out of
this is to get enough information that we can help direct some
of the foreign policies.
I read an article, and I got chastised for this because I
brought it up in this committee. They were talking about how
China, as you brought up, Dr. Auslin, how they go in and they
build infrastructure, and we focus on other things. I think it
is a misstep of ours. We should go in and build strong
infrastructures and develop strong trading partners, and in
that process we will bring people to our side and meet the
goals that we have as far as human rights and things like that.
And I think we should focus on that.
I want to point out to Dr. Swaine, and I know you are well
aware of this. Robert Gates' book Duty, there was a section in
there where they were talking about military sales to Taiwan.
And a couple years ago, the Chinese negotiator raised holy
Cain, because of the military sales. And our negotiator says,
why are you making a big fuss over this? We have done this for
many years, since 1979. He goes, yes, you did, but we were weak
then; we are strong now. I think we are seeing that presence.
So I think it is imperative that we come to an agreement of
what we can do and can't do and forge those strong
relationships.
I am going to turn this over to the ranking member, and let
him finish, and we have to go vote.
Mr. Sherman. China will become more nationalistic as it
needs to satisfy its own population, and even more
nationalistic if they face economic reversals. TPP enshrined
the idea that currency manipulation isn't a problem. And its
rules of origin provision gave China a chance to have free
access to the U.S. market on goods that were to be purportedly
only 50 percent made in China, but, as an old accountant, I
know that would be 80 or 90 percent. So 90 percent of the
advantages of a free trade agreement. But at least they would
have a made in Vietnam label put on.
We do not have--we will not put tariffs on China, because
Wall Street won't let us. We will, instead, spend $50 billion
extra on our military, because the Pentagon will want that; and
we will meet the domestic needs of the institutions that are
most powerful in our society. Wall Street will be happy. The
Pentagon will be happy. Beijing will fan nationalism. And Ohio
and Western Pennsylvania will suffer.
I yield back.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you for your comments.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here with your great
information as you have helped us cipher through some things,
and I look forward to dealing with you more. We have to go vote
now. This meeting is adjourned, and thank you.
[Whereupon, at 3:57 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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