[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 115-11]
MILITARY ASSESSMENT OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE REQUIREMENTS
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 8, 2017
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__________
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Fifteenth Congress
WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina ADAM SMITH, Washington
JOE WILSON, South Carolina ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
ROB BISHOP, Utah JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio RICK LARSEN, Washington
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama JIM COOPER, Tennessee
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado JOHN GARAMENDI, California
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia JACKIE SPEIER, California
DUNCAN HUNTER, California MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri BETO O'ROURKE, Texas
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
MO BROOKS, Alabama RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
PAUL COOK, California SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii
BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire
BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
SAM GRAVES, Missouri A. DONALD McEACHIN, Virginia
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California
MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland
STEPHEN KNIGHT, California STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida
STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma RO KHANNA, California
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee TOM O'HALLERAN, Arizona
RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
TRENT KELLY, Mississippi (Vacancy)
MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
MATT GAETZ, Florida
DON BACON, Nebraska
JIM BANKS, Indiana
LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
Robert L. Simmons II, Staff Director
Drew Walter, Professional Staff Member
Leonor Tomero, Counsel
Mike Gancio, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 2
Thornberry, Hon. William M. ``Mac,'' a Representative from Texas,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.......................... 1
WITNESSES
Hyten, Gen John E., USAF, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command...... 5
Moran, ADM William F., USN, Vice Chief of Naval Operations....... 6
Selva, Gen Paul J., USAF, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff... 3
Wilson, Gen Stephen W., USAF, Vice Chief of Staff of the Air
Force.......................................................... 7
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Hyten, Gen John E............................................ 59
Moran, ADM William F......................................... 68
Selva, Gen Paul J............................................ 52
Smith, Hon. Adam............................................. 49
Thornberry, Hon. William M. ``Mac''.......................... 47
Wilson, Gen Stephen W........................................ 74
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Cooper................................................... 92
Ms. Hanabusa................................................. 100
Mr. Rogers................................................... 93
Ms. Rosen.................................................... 103
Mr. Smith.................................................... 91
Ms. Speier................................................... 99
Dr. Wenstrup................................................. 101
MILITARY ASSESSMENT OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE REQUIREMENTS
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 8, 2017.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. ``Mac''
Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
The Chairman. Committee will come to order.
The Nation's strategic deterrent is the foundation upon
which all our defense efforts are built. We simply cannot allow
it to weaken or to crack, and yet we have neglected it for some
time while other nations have not only invested in their
nuclear systems but advanced their capability.
Our strategic deterrent consists of the delivery systems,
the three legs of the triad, and also the nuclear weapons
themselves and the command and control over those systems.
Our Minuteman III missiles were first fielded in 1970; our
B-52 and B-2 bombers were first deployed in the 1950s and the
1980s; our ballistic missile submarines began entering service
in 1981 and, like the other legs of the triad, have a limited
lifespan. The warheads themselves were largely designed and
built in the 1970s or before, and the last time a warhead was
fully tested was 1991.
And so, for some years some of our most brilliant
scientists and engineers have been working to keep these
complex machines safe, secure, reliable, and credible without
being able to test the entire weapon. They have done so in
aging, neglected facilities with an aging workforce.
Similarly, the command and control systems for our
deterrent have not received the attention something so vital
should have received. And meanwhile, our potential adversaries
develop and field new delivery systems and they develop and
field new weapons. And confidence in the U.S. strategic
deterrent erodes.
I am sure all of you have noticed articles over the last
few days which reported that Europe was considering developing
their own nuclear deterrent if they can no longer count on
ours. The same may well be true in Asia, as well.
Some say we cannot afford to update this part of our
defenses, but depending on how one allocates the cost of the
new bomber, operating, sustaining, and updating our strategic
deterrent never requires more than 6 to 7 percent of our
defense budget.
As former Secretary of Defense Ash Carter and others have
pointed out, this is affordable because it is our highest
priority defense mission. Contemplating a world without a
reliable strategic deterrent is a nightmare the modern world
has never had to face, and I hope it never does.
The committee has a number of events over the course of
this week focusing on this topic of strategic deterrence. Today
we are grateful to have several of our top military leaders to
help us consider what our strategic deterrent means for
American national security.
Now, it may well be that members have some policy questions
which uniformed military members are not able to answer. As you
know we are--do not yet have people in place in the new
administration to answer some of those questions. But they are
here to talk about the military implications of our strategic
deterrent.
This hearing and the committee's broader series on nuclear
deterrence will remind us, the American people, our allies, and
potential adversaries that the U.S. strategic deterrent must
always be credible and must always be ready.
Before turning to our witnesses, I would yield to the
ranking member for any comments that he would like to make.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Thornberry can be found in
the Appendix on page 47.]
STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON,
RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you having
this hearing. I appreciate the focus on our nuclear weapons
deterrent for this week. I think it is incredibly important.
And the chairman is correct, it is a series of aging
systems that need to be replaced, and we need to think about
what our long-term nuclear strategy is.
The concern that I have, we absolutely have to have a
nuclear deterrent because, unfortunately, there other
countries--and hostile countries like Russia, North Korea--that
have nuclear weapons. We have to have enough of a deterrent to
make sure that they never use them because they know that it
would lead to their own destruction because of the size of our
deterrent.
My questions as we go forward is whether or not we need as
many nuclear weapons as we have had to present that deterrent.
I have always pointed out that China has a very
straightforward deterrent. They don't have anywhere near as
many nuclear weapons as we do, but they have got enough. And if
anybody challenges them, they have enough weapons to obliterate
that person if they were to use nuclear weapons.
So I hope that as we go forward and try to figure out what
the new nuclear deterrent needs to look like we don't imagine
that we have to have absolutely everything, that we really look
at it. What is a credible deterrent force?
We are coming down, but at the peak here a year or so ago--
it wasn't the peak--but we had well over 5,000 nuclear warheads
and, you know, plenty of delivery systems. Is there a way that
we can do this in a more cost-effective manner?
And I say that because while I agree with the chairman that
we have to have a nuclear deterrent, no question about it, we
also have to have it fit within a budget because we have a lot
of other priorities. When you look at what President Trump has
said he wants, in terms of the size of the force--you know, the
size of the Army, the size of the Marine Corps, the way we want
to build out the Navy--at a certain point the numbers don't add
up.
So if there is a way to do this in a more cost-effective
manner, I think that is something we should look at. I don't
think we should simply say, ``Well, it is important so we are
going to spend whatever it takes.'' I don't think we can afford
that, and I don't think it is a credible deterrent.
And I also want to make sure that our policy going forward
continues to be just that, that it is a deterrent force against
any other adversary using nuclear weapons, that we don't dive
into some of the conversations that have happened in our
military circles over the course of the last 30 years that
somehow we can use, quote, ``tactical'' nuclear weapons on a
first-use basis. I think we should maintain our policy of not
using them first and using them as a credible deterrent. And I
worry that some of the discussions have moved us in that
direction.
Now, I am aware that Russia has changed its tone on that
and there is cause for worry about how they view the use of
nuclear weapons. And that is the last point I will make:
Credible deterrent is not just about how many nuclear weapons
you have, but it is also about maintaining an open dialogue
with as many of those adversaries as possible to make sure that
they know about that credible deterrent and that discourages
them.
This is not just a military issue; it is diplomatic as
well, to make sure that we keep open those channels so there
are not misunderstandings about what our nuclear deterrent is
and what we are prepared to do with it. We certainly don't want
a country like Russia to start thinking that they can do a
first-use nuclear weapon attack and get away with it.
So with that, I look forward to testimony and the
questions, and I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
Appendix on page 49.]
The Chairman. Let me welcome our distinguished witnesses
today.
We have the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
General Paul Selva; we have the Commander of U.S. Strategic
Command, General John Hyten; Vice Chief of Naval Operations,
Admiral Bill Moran; and Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air
Force, General Stephen Wilson.
Without objection, your full written statements will be
made part of the record. Again, thank each of you for being
here.
General Selva, the floor is yours for any comments you
would like to make.
STATEMENT OF GEN PAUL J. SELVA, USAF, VICE CHAIRMAN, JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF
General Selva. Thank you, Chairman Thornberry and Ranking
Member Smith and members of the committee.
Thanks for the opportunity to testify on the continuing
relevance of our U.S. nuclear forces for our national security,
the considerations that are influencing the size and shape of
those forces, and the steps the joint force is taking to
modernize or replace them. Given the gravity of these issues, I
deeply appreciate the committee's interest, attention, and
oversight.
With the President's recently directed Nuclear Posture
Review to assess the existing nuclear policy, and through many
details regarding U.S. nuclear capabilities and employment
concepts, these are all highly sensitive. Although they are, I
look forward to your questions in this public forum and my
ability to answer them as appropriate.
As you know, the fundamental role of U.S. nuclear forces is
to deter nuclear use against the United States, its allies, and
partners. Simply put, nuclear weapons pose the only existential
threat to the United States and there is no substitute for the
prospect of a devastating nuclear response to deter that
threat.
Our nuclear forces play important roles as well, to include
reducing the risk of nuclear proliferation and contributing to
the deterrence of large-scale conventional war.
These are longstanding objectives that have served U.S.
national interests, but our ability to achieve them cannot be
taken for granted. No one should doubt that our weapons, our
delivery systems, the infrastructure that supports them, and
the personnel who operate, monitor, and maintain them, are
prepared to respond to any contingency.
Our current challenge, however, is to maintain this high
level of readiness and capability as long as the policy and
strategy of this Nation depends in part on nuclear weapons for
its security. This hearing comes at a critical moment in
meeting that challenge.
For more than two decades, the joint force has implemented
a U.S. policy that calls for the reduction of the role of
nuclear weapons and forces and our strategies and plans to
decrease the number and types of those nuclear forces in our
inventory. Yet a number of nations, including potential nuclear
adversaries, have not followed our example.
They instead are increasing their reliance on nuclear
weapons, improving their nuclear capabilities, and in some
cases expanding their nuclear arsenals.
Our nuclear deterrent, as has already been stated, is
nearing a crossroads. To date, we have preserved this deterrent
by extending the lifespan of legacy nuclear forces and
infrastructure, in many cases for decades beyond what was
originally intended. But these systems will not remain viable
forever.
In fact, we are now at a point where we must concurrently
recapitalize each component of our nuclear deterrent: the
nuclear weapons themselves, the triad of strategic delivery
platforms, the indications and warning systems that support our
decision processes, the command-and-control networks that
connect the President to our fielded forces, and our dual-
capable tactical aircraft that can be equipped with
nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
Our joint force's ability to preserve these capabilities
beyond their intended lifespan is indeed a technical
achievement. However, nuclear modernization can no longer be
deferred.
Any disruption in the current program of record for future
acquisition plans will introduce the risk--significant risk to
our deterrent. As a result of previous delays and deferrals,
all well considered, we are currently depending on just-in-time
modernization and replacement of many of the components of our
nuclear triad.
The cost of these efforts is substantial. Even at their
peak, however, they will still represent less than 1 percent of
anticipated Federal spending and approximately 6 percent of the
defense budget.
Moreover, there is no higher priority for the joint force
than fielding all of the components of an effective nuclear
deterrent, and we are emphasizing the nuclear mission over all
other modernization programs when faced with that choice.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate accepting my written statement
into the record and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Selva can be found in
the Appendix on page 52.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
General Hyten.
STATEMENT OF GEN JOHN E. HYTEN, USAF, COMMANDER, U.S. STRATEGIC
COMMAND
General Hyten. Good morning, Chairman Thornberry, Ranking
Member Smith, members of the committee.
On behalf of the men and women of United States Strategic
Command [STRATCOM], I would like to echo the thanks of the vice
chairman and express our appreciation for the committee's
continued support for the nuclear mission. I look forward to
build upon this relationship on our shared objective of
protecting the Nation.
Our mission at United States Strategic Command is to employ
tailored nuclear, space, cyberspace, global strike, joint
electronic warfare, missile defense, and intelligence
capabilities. We deter aggression, decisively respond if
deterrence fails, assure allies, shape adversary behavior,
defeat terror, and define the force of the future.
Let there be no doubt, we have a safe, secure, reliable
nuclear enterprise today, and our nuclear forces are ready to
meet any challenge.
Nonetheless, much work is needed to make sure that this is
the case as we look out into the coming decades. At STRATCOM
peace is our profession, and one of the ways it is achieved is
through strategic deterrence. That mission has been the bedrock
of our national security for decades now. It is foundational.
As such, I have three priorities in my command.
My number one priority is to provide that strategic
deterrence against any potential adversary. Our operations are
ceaseless, deliberate, and enabled by a commitment to execute
and modernize our C2 [command and control] and nuclear
enterprise, which will enable us to meet the demands of the
current and future strategic environment.
My second priority is to account for a deterrence failure,
in which this Nation will count on us for a decisive response.
That response must defeat any adversary with our nuclear,
space, cyberspace, missile defense, and other strategic
capabilities.
Neither strategic deterrence nor decisive response will
function, however, without a resilient, equipped, trained, and
combat-ready force, which is my final priority.
Our fight is continuous, each and every day, across and
around the globe. This requires our forces to have depth in
capability and breadth in capacity.
We cannot do it alone. We must constantly challenge
ourselves to integrate with allies, partners, the
interagencies, the Department, the Joint Staff, and other
commands to ensure we capitalize on the unique capabilities
that STRATCOM can bring to bear.
Today's deterrent force remains safe, secure, reliable, and
ready. However, the United States faces significant future
challenges in sustaining the required capabilities to meet our
enduring national security objectives and the extended
deterrence commitments we have around the world.
At a time when others continue to modernize and upgrade
their nuclear forces, nearly all elements of the nuclear weapon
stockpile, our delivery systems, our other critical
infrastructure are operating well beyond their designed service
life.
Maintaining strategic deterrence, assurance, and escalation
control capabilities requires a multifaceted long-term
investment approach and a sustained commitment to maintain a
credible nuclear deterrent. That nuclear deterrent is only as
effective as the command and control that enables it to
function. Therefore, our nuclear command and control
communication systems, NC3, must be assured, reliable, and
resilient across the full spectrum of conflict.
Maintaining a credible deterrent requires sustainment and
modernizations of key systems and capabilities throughout the
architecture. The unpredictable challenges posed by today's
multi-domain, multi-threat security environment make it
increasingly important to optimize our legacy NC3 systems and
leverage new technologies and capabilities. Through continuing
funding for NC3 modernization we can ensure effective command
and control for these forces well into the future.
So I look forward to participating in the hearing today and
the
administration's recently announced Nuclear Posture Review,
which
will address many of the issues we will discuss.
And I thank the committee again for your support. I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Hyten can be found in
the Appendix on page 59.]
The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
Admiral Moran.
STATEMENT OF ADM WILLIAM F. MORAN, USN, VICE CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS
Admiral Moran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
opportunity to be here this morning, and I echo the comments by
both General Selva and General Hyten.
And I am extremely proud to represent the men and women who
man, operate, and maintain our strategic ballistic submarine
force. And I look forward to your questions, thank you.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Moran can be found in
the Appendix on page 68.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
General Wilson.
STATEMENT OF GEN STEPHEN W. WILSON, USAF, VICE CHIEF OF STAFF
OF THE AIR FORCE
General Wilson. Chairman, the same. I look forward to any
questions from the members here today. I represent the United
States Air Force, that provides two-thirds of the Nation's
triad and three-fourths of the nuclear command and control
communications. We stand ready to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Wilson can be found in
the Appendix on page 74.]
The Chairman. Well, thank you all.
General Selva, yesterday I had the opportunity to tour Fort
Campbell. It just reminds me that we have a lot of needs in
this military, and--but did I hear you correctly, that there is
no higher priority for the joint force than modernizing this
part of our defense effort, our strategic deterrence?
General Selva. Mr. Chairman, we in the joint force put our
nuclear deterrent as the number one priority for modernization
and recapitalization.
I would make two quick points.
One, we have made several--and I have referred to them as
considered decisions over the last decade to defer some of the
modernization of that force in order to address urgent needs
while still maintaining a safe, reliable, and secure arsenal
and delivery capability. But in making those decisions we have
squeezed about all the life we can out of the systems we
currently possess, and so that places an extra premium on a
very deliberate long-term investment strategy to replace those
systems as the existing systems age out of the inventory.
And that is the reason we use the terminology we place it
as our number one priority. There is an urgency in terms of
time and in terms of stable long-term investment in order to be
able to deliver this capability.
The Chairman. Okay. Let me just ask one other question for
either you or General Hyten to comment on.
A couple weeks there--ago there was an article by Peter
Huessy, who is president of GeoStrategic Analysis and guest
lecturer at the U.S. Naval Academy. Among other things he
writes in this letter is that early in the next decade, around
2020 or 2021, Russia will have modernized close to 100 percent
of its bombers, land-based missiles, and submarines.
And China will, by the end of the next decade, have a fully
modernized and expanded nuclear deterrent with mobile ICBMs
[intercontinental ballistic missiles], a new missile-armed
submarine, and long-range cruise missiles. New data now
indicates that China can build a thousand new nuclear warheads
quite rapidly. If the U.S. stays on its current projected
course we will, at best, fully modernize our nuclear deterrent
by the mid-2030s, some two decades hence.
He then goes on to say we are at about 10 percent of a
number of warheads where we were at one time and talks about
Russia's tactical nuclear weapons.
I am not asking you all to comment on the accuracy of
information that may be, and probably is, classified. But I am
asking relative to other nations, are they gaining in
capability faster than we are? Where is the momentum here?
Because if you--if he is in the ballpark of being right, that
Russia will have modernized everything in a handful of years
and at best we are two decades after that, it looks to me like
we are behind in this race.
General Selva. Chairman, thanks for the question.
There are two dynamics that are at play here. One is Russia
has been and continues to modernize their nuclear force, and
China continues to modernize and grow their nuclear force.
Those are facts. We don't have to go to intelligence to
determine those.
Having said that, the path that we have chosen to modernize
and replace our existing nuclear arsenal, particularly the
delivery systems, the indications and warning, and command and
control, potentially puts us in a position not only to keep
up--because we do have a qualitative advantage at this point--
but to capitalize on that advantage over time by continuing to
have a triad that gives us a ballistic missile force that
confounds Russian and Chinese targeting; a bomber force that is
resilient enough and capable enough to penetrate enemy air
defenses and respond to a nuclear attack; and a survivable
portion of that triad, in the case of our strategic ballistic
missile submarines, that gives us an ability to respond even if
an adversary were to believe that they could execute a
decapitating attack on our nuclear capability.
So it is our strategy going forward to continue to
modernize all three legs of the triad in order to continue to
pose unsurvivable targeting challenges to adversaries that
match us in number and very close to match us in quality to the
delivery systems themselves.
The Chairman. Okay. General Hyten, you want to add
anything?
General Hyten. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think the only thing I will add is that the key to a
nuclear deterrent is safe, secure, reliable, and ready. It has
to be able to work.
Now, I think the vice chairman used the term ``just-in-time
delivery,'' so if you look at all of the elements, each
element, leg of the triad--our nuclear weapon system, our
nuclear command--and you put them all on a table, they all
deliver in just in time. And that is the risks that we have to
make sure we monitor.
Because the forces that we have, the forces that we are
projected to have in our budget, will provide that nuclear
deterrent without a doubt as long as we can modernize according
to that schedule. If those schedules slip, though, that is when
we put risk in the system.
The Chairman. So back to what General Selva said at the
beginning, we have no room for error here in getting this done
because we have stretched things as far as we can.
General Hyten. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Okay.
Mr. O'Rourke.
Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
For General Selva, I would like you to talk a little bit
about the long-range standoff capability for which you
advocate. Talk about where it is in your priorities, what it
gains the United States. And I would also like you to address
some of the concerns raised about unintended consequences and,
you know, things that we may want to know in terms of the total
cost of ownership of these strategically, in terms of what our
adversaries or potential adversaries will interpret by that and
what that may invite from them.
General Selva. Thank you, sir.
Several quick points. First of all, the long-range strike
system is integral to extending the life and utility of our
current bomber fleet, and it also increases the number of
options for the use of our future bomber fleet.
In this respect, the missile itself imposes a cost on any
potential nuclear adversary because in addition to modernizing
their nuclear arsenal, they also have to modernize their air
defense arsenals. This is a strategy that we used in the 1980s
when we widely deployed the air-launched cruise missiles into
our B-52 inventory.
We believe that over the course of time, to keep the B-52
viable and buy us enough time to deploy the B-21, we have to
have a long-range standoff weapon in our inventory that poses a
challenge to increasingly sophisticated air defense systems in
any one of the potential adversary nations that we might face.
And so in that respect, the missile itself is an integral part
of our modernization and replacement strategy.
There are those who say that long-range standoff strike
capabilities are inherently destabilizing. I disagree with that
particular point for two reasons.
One, it ignores the fact of deployment of those same
systems by our adversaries. If you look at Russian deployments
in their bomber force, they are largely composed of long-range
standoff air-launched cruise missiles launched from what we
would consider relatively old legacy bomber platforms. That is
a challenge we are going to have to face and they are going to
have to face.
The second reason I think it is something we must introduce
into our arsenal is if we don't have that capability in our
arsenal, negotiating it out as a type and class of weapon over
time becomes increasingly unlikely. So the places we have had
success in negotiating types and classes of weapons out of
adversary nuclear arsenals in our strategic arms reductions
talks has been when we possess a similar capability that poses
a tactical, operational, and strategic problems for our
adversaries.
So I am very concerned that the open debate about
abandoning the system in the interest of cost actually puts us
at a strategic disadvantage over the length of time.
Mr. O'Rourke. So there is the argument on cost. You
referenced the argument that it may destabilize or introduce
some ambiguity that could be--that could turn out badly for
both sides. And your response to that seems to be that our
adversaries have this capability, and it wouldn't be
responsible for us not to match that.
Would you then say if our adversaries did not have this
capability the United States would not seek to introduce it?
General Selva. I think I would say that we should take that
to the table and negotiate it in a bilateral, verifiable way so
that we don't give up the option and the strategic leverage
that we have in the existence of the system a priori.
Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. Couple of administrative notes.
We have obviously a lot of member interest. We need to try
to just stay within the 5 minutes.
Secondly, if--when you all answer questions, if you would
talk directly into the microphone. Sometimes it is hard to hear
back here and that would help us.
Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you for being here today.
I am very grateful to represent the Savannah River Site,
where multiple generations have been dedicated to promoting
peace through strength by building our nuclear weapons
capability. In fact, the staff and workers there have made, I
think, a positive difference, as General Hyten has cited,
protecting the Nation.
And so it really is very meaningful to me that you are here
today and your success that we want to continue.
General Selva, over the course of the past 8 years the
military has contributed to detailed efforts to examine various
options for changing the structure of the U.S. nuclear forces.
We know from a GAO [Government Accountability Office] study and
review of these efforts that the Obama administration examined
big changes, like eliminating one or more of the legs of the
triad. After these reviews, President Obama ultimately
concluded to retain the triad and continue pursuing the nuclear
modernization plans laid out by his administration.
Did the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the services recommend
and support the decision to retain the triad, and what was the
reasoning?
General Selva. Congressman, in advance of the consultations
with President Obama's administration on the status and
potential options for how to manage the triad the Joint Chiefs
did meet. We did affirm the necessity to maintain a triad,
largely for the reasons that I have already pointed out about
managing the strategic risk not only with Russia as a potential
adversary, but China as a potential nuclear adversary, with an
increasingly aggressive North Korea and his pursuit of nuclear
weapons, and based on the fact of JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action], that we have forestalled an Iranian entry into
the nuclear arena but have not completely stopped it for the
future.
So based on the collection of potential threats and
adversaries that exist in the world, the Joint Chiefs
affirmed--pardon me--the necessity to maintain a triad and to
modernize the weapon systems, the indications of warning, and
the command and control associated with that triad.
Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. And I am grateful for
President Obama's decision, although you referenced Iran, and I
am so concerned about the continuing development of missile
capability, ICBMs. Sadly, that can only be used for the purpose
of, in my view, delivery of a nuclear weapon and a threat to
the American people.
General Hyten, we sometimes hear arguments that the triad
has too much redundancy, that it will not intentionally--it is
not intentionally designed, it is more by accident and grew up
into what it is today. Do you believe we should retain and
modernize the full triad? And additionally, what reasoning do
you have on this?
General Hyten. So, I believe we should retain and modernize
the triad, Congressman, absolutely. I believe that is
fundamental to deterrence.
In order to deter you have to have a capability that
provides the adversary a calculus that he looks at and decides
that his options will fail. If the adversary has capabilities
to operate from the sea, from the land, from the air, then we
have to be able to deter in all those elements. That is how the
triad was developed and that is how we need to go.
And I will just end with the fundamental statement that I
am fundamentally opposed to unilateral disarmament because that
fundamentally changes the deterrent equation. In deterrence,
parity--rough parity--is actually a good thing, not a bad
thing, because that causes the adversary to pause when they are
about to make a decision.
Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. And I agree with your
analysis just there of peace through strength. Thank you very
much.
And, both General Selva and General Hyten, what are your
view of the concerns that we are launching a new nuclear arms
race with Russia by pursuing the nuclear modernization program?
General Selva. Congressman, I would suggest that we are not
entering an arms race because we bilaterally have a verifiable
inspection regime for the weapons that are deployed; we have
capped the number of weapons that are available. What we are
doing in this modernization program--and I very bluntly try to
call it a replacement program--we have to replace the systems
that exist. We should replace them with systems that are
viable.
The Russians understand that is what we are doing. They
know it is a path we are on.
So we have a bilateral, mutually verifiable treaty cap at
this point in our relationship, and I think that keeps us from
entering an arms race.
General Hyten. Congressman, I agree with the vice chairman.
We have numbers of our force: 400 ICBMs, 240 SLBMs [submarine-
launched ballistic missiles], 60 bombers, 1,550 accountable
warheads. Those are defined numbers that we have to meet.
So we are not racing to increase that number; we are not
racing to beat that number. We are working hard to make sure we
can maintain that.
Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Mr. Moulton.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you
very much for joining us here today.
General, I was wondering--General Selva, I was wondering if
you could talk about the Russian compliance with the
Intermediate [Range] Nuclear Forces Treaty. There have been
some concerns expressed in the press that they have not been
complying. I would like to know what your view is on that
situation.
General Selva. We believe that the Russians have deployed--
pardon me--a land-based cruise missile that violates the spirit
and intent of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. We have
conferred with the Russians in a bilateral consultation
committee that exists underneath the New START [Strategic Arms
Reduction] Treaty in order to confront them on that deployment,
and we will continue to do so.
The system itself presents a risk to most of our facilities
in Europe, and we believe that the Russians have deliberately
deployed it in order to pose a threat to NATO [North Atlantic
Treaty Organization] and to facilities within the NATO area of
responsibility.
Mr. Moulton. If those discussions do not bear fruit, what
is the next step? What is the administration's plan to deal
with what seems like a flagrant violation of a treaty?
General Selva. We have been asked to incorporate a set of
options into the Nuclear Posture Review, so it would be
premature for me to comment on what the potential options might
be for the administration to respond.
Mr. Moulton. Okay. It seems that this is part of a broader
move of Russian aggression throughout Europe and against NATO.
One of things that concerns me is that as Russia continues to
threaten the Baltic States, may not be deterred from further
action in places like Ukraine, that a conventional conflict
could escalate to the point where it becomes nuclear.
What is the U.S. doing to make sure that that doesn't
happen, that Russia never crosses a threshold into using
tactical nuclear weapons in a theater like Eastern Europe?
General Selva. Congressman, never is a fairly absolute
word, but our strategy in Europe is to maintain an inventory of
nonstrategic nuclear weapons that are in the hands of both the
United States and our NATO allies. They are operated on a
category of aircraft we call dual-capable aircraft, where the
aircraft are designed to actually accommodate the use of
nuclear weapons.
Those aircraft are distributed in a very deliberate
readiness process between U.S. forces and our NATO allies, and
we believe that that capability poses a significant risk to
Russia and, therefore, it helps deter Russia from employing
nuclear weapons on the European continent.
Mr. Moulton. General, I would hazard to say that using the
word ``never'' is not going too far when we are talking about
the existential threat of----
General Selva. No, sir, I am not----
Mr. Moulton [continuing]. Nuclear weapons.
General Selva [continuing]. Not suggesting it is too far.
It is just such an absolute word I avoid it.
Mr. Moulton. Fair enough. What kinds of doctrine changes
are we contemplating in the face of what appear to be doctrine
changes on the side of the Soviet--of the Russians?
General Selva. Sir, we have begun an investigation of a
series of potential strategy changes, many of which will have
to be incorporated into the Nuclear Posture Review. As you
recall, in the prior administration we looked to limit the
potential use and utility of nuclear weapons in any scenario
with an eye towards reducing the numbers to a much smaller
inventory than we have today--a noble goal, to be sure.
One of the things that happened in the context of that
conversation is our adversaries started to articulate a
doctrine of escalation to deescalate. And we have to account
for in our nuclear doctrine what that means and what the ladder
of strategic stability implies as we look at an adversary that
expresses in their rhetoric a willingness to use nuclear
weapons where they may or may not actually be exercising the
operational capability to do so.
So we are going to have to get to the bottom of what that
means. We have done several war games and exercises over the
last couple of years. We are not done with that process but
this will be part of the Nuclear Posture Review.
Mr. Moulton. General, I think you will find bipartisan
support in this committee for making sure that we have an
effective nuclear deterrent. But at the end of the day, I think
you would also find bipartisan support for working towards
strategic arms reductions.
What is the most effective thing we can do today to head
down that path, because obviously those talks seem to be
stalled?
General Selva. Sir, I think there are two things we can do
from a military perspective.
The first is maintain a safe, secure, reliable, and ready
nuclear arsenal and project to the public and to our
adversaries that we take this incredibly seriously. It is why
it is our top priority.
The second is also emphasize that the existence of that
arsenal need not be absolute, that we are open to negotiations
but they must be bilateral, they must be verifiable, and we
have to go into this completely open to the idea that there are
now more than just two nuclear players at a strategic level in
the world. We must accommodate in our bilateral relationships
with any adversary the existence of other adversaries.
And so the inventory today grows. Russia and China present
strategic threats to the United States if they chose to use
their weapons, and our deterrent must be able to address both.
If new nuclear adversaries enter the population of potential
threats, we need to be ready to address them.
I think if we can balance those two things in our
discussion both publicly and privately of what the implications
are for maintenance of an arsenal and reduction of that arsenal
in a measured and prudent way, we can be successful.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, I
appreciate you talking today to us about what you have
described, General Selva, as the top priority.
General Selva and General Hyten, I would like to talk to
you for a moment about the nuclear command and control system
component of that top priority. The PowerPoint we have been
given describes the command and control as enabling national
command conferencing, attack detection, strike planning, and
dissemination of execution messages--all incredibly important.
It also allows the President to have uninterrupted connectivity
with nuclear forces.
Admiral Moran says maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent
for the long term requires recapitalization of these key
systems, so we know that it is essential for our concept of a
credible deterrent.
General Hyten, in your written testimony you say that our
command and control system is increasingly unreliable and in
desperate need of modernization. ``Unreliable'' and
``desperate'' are words that are in contrast to ``credible.''
General Selva, you say that the ability to preserve these
capabilities beyond their intended lifespan is a technical
achievement, acknowledging they are already past their
lifespan. However, nuclear modernization can no longer be
deferred.
Well, as we talk about the issue of deterrence I would like
for you to describe to me some of the risks that we are facing
by doing this, because it is not just that these might not work
or that we can't respond if we are attacked. Doesn't it go
right to the calculation of our adversaries as to whether or
not we have a credible deterrent, as we have here what is an
open hearing and we are hearing words such as ``unreliable''
and ``desperate''? And we also don't have an ability to fix
this tomorrow, right?
General Selva, General Hyten, could you describe the risk
that we are taking and the situation we are in?
General Hyten. Congressman, I will go first.
The nuclear command and control and communications, NC3, is
my biggest concern when I look out towards the future. When I
put all the modernization plans on the table I see the
modernization plan for the submarine, for the bomber, for the
long-range standoff munition, for the GBSD [ground-based
strategic deterrent], I see--the new missile--I see all those
coming together.
When I look out at the NC3, although everything we have
today works very effectively, but it is very resilient, robust,
and ancient. Ancient is the concern I have because an ancient
command and control system in today's world is very, very hard
to recapitalize.
Mr. Turner. And, General, doesn't that mean that our
adversaries know that and if they are taking a calculation as
to whether or not we can credibly respond, don't they look at
those issues as to our decaying infrastructure?
General Hyten. I am sure they do. I am sure they look at
those. We look at those very hard.
That is why it is my number one priority now inside the
modernization piece to make sure we have a plan to modernize
the nuclear command and control capability.
Mr. Turner. In order to fix this--again, we can't just fix
it tomorrow. You can't go down to Home Depot and buy a bunch of
stuff and just plug it in and make this thing work. Let's talk
about some of those components on the entire system.
Could you speak about the ITW/AA system, and what if it
doesn't do its job of providing an early warning of attack?
General Hyten. So the integrated tactical warning and
attack assessment system, ITW/AA, is the--it is the integrated
architecture that basically goes all the way from indications
and warning from our space-based constellations to our ground-
based radars into the command and control system and provides
the picture of any threat that would come at the United States
of America.
So it is exercised every time there is a launch on the
planet, as recently as last Sunday night. We were up most of
the night watching the North Korean launches of Scuds. Even
though that did not present a threat to North America, we still
exercised those same pieces.
The satellites see the threats. If it comes into the radar
fans the radars will see it, and then the command and control
system works.
But as we look at that structure and we look at it 10 years
from now, when you have a 20th-century architecture that you
are trying to maintain 10 years from now, 10 years from now is
when my concern really is. It is not 2035 in the NC3
architecture. It is much more fragile than that. That is why we
have to take a hard look----
Mr. Turner. If it doesn't work or if there are deficiencies
in it, does our adversaries, again, understand that that
relates to our ability to respond?
General Hyten. Congressman it works. It works every time we
pull it together.
My concern is that we are creating fragility in the future,
and that fragility in the future has to be addressed and it has
to be addressed in the near term across the enterprise--that is
in the Navy and in the Air Force.
Mr. Turner. And can you talk about the assent system? And
there are delays in this system that apparently we were not
informed of, and how do we address that?
General Selva. Congressman, all of the national command and
control leadership communication systems have now been brought,
with the help of this committee and the Senate Armed Services
Committee, under the oversight of a single council in the
Pentagon. I co-chair that council with the director of
acquisition, technology, and logistics. It is----
Mr. Turner. Do you believe that the services and DISA
[Defense Information Systems Agency] should have to provide
everything they know about delays in the system?
General Selva. Yes, sir. And that is precisely what that
oversight council does is it pulls all of the community of
interest together so that we don't run the risk of looking at
the process in ``eaches''; we actually look at it as an entire
end-to-end set of programs that are critical to providing
nuclear command and control and connectivity to our most senior
leadership.
The Chairman. Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our
witnesses for your testimony today, and most especially of your
service to the Nation.
Gentlemen, as you know, our nuclear enterprise is aging,
and we have spoken about that several times this morning,
obviously. And like the previous member, I had the privilege of
chairing the Strategic Forces Subcommittee a few Congresses
ago, and so I was able to do a deep dive on this aging nuclear
enterprise.
One of the things that I certainly find concerning is the
work that our adversaries are doing in their nuclear programs,
particularly China and Russia. And they are designing new
delivery systems and warheads.
And I wanted to touch on a, you know, somewhat sensitive
but important topic, and that is our nuclear warheads that we
have in our arsenal.
I know we are going through the refurbishment program. I
mean some of the components of our warheads don't even exist
anymore. It is not easy to replace them. And some of the
materials are not easily obtainable.
So the question is obviously I--we are not interested in at
all setting off an arms race, but does it make sense to
continue to try to refurbish and make things work, or does it
make more sense to design a more modern weapon?
And the question, if so, what does that do in terms of does
that endanger us of setting off an arms race? And could we
design a new warhead without testing?
General Selva. Sir, one of the first priorities I engaged
in when I took this job was to partner with Frank Klotz at the
National Nuclear Security Agency, which is the arm of DOE
[Department of Energy] that builds and does the actual physical
maintenance of the warheads themselves. I took a trip to both
Livermore and Sandia and talked to the scientists who are doing
the work of design and prototyping of those--I will use the
words ``modernized repurposed warheads.''
And their belief, and all of the information that they
could present to me, is that there is sufficient life and
resiliency left in the warheads that we currently possess that
we can very deliberately modernize them with new technologies
without building new warheads and essentially replicate the
capability we have today in a safer, more secure, more
reliable, and more resilient set of weapons without going into
the detail of what that strategy looks like.
So the scientists themselves--and I spent a day at each
location quizzing them and having them demonstrate their
beliefs, not just in showing me their conclusions but actually
showing me the math--they are convinced, as am I, that the path
we are on is actually a reasonable path into the near future.
That doesn't ignore the fact that sometime in the future of
these weapon systems we are actually going to have to replace
the core components that still have lifetime left in them.
General Hyten. And, Congressman, I will just add on that
tomorrow we will have a classified session with this committee
where we will actually bring in Frank Klotz and Charlie
McMillan and myself, and we will sit down and we will walk
through that entire nuclear weapons piece with you, as well as
the threat information that we can't share in this hearing.
Mr. Langevin. Okay, thank you.
Admiral Moran, being from Rhode Island and as co-chair of
the Submarine Caucus with my good friends Congressman Courtney
and Congressman Wittman, I understand the critical importance
placed on our SSBN force in conjunction with our nuclear
deterrence. Showing as the most survivable leg of the triad,
the maritime force shoulders a significant burden and the Ohio-
class submarines has primarily borne it.
The existing modernization projects that the Columbia-class
submarines won't enter service until 2029 and that the Navy
will only operate 10 SSBNs during the 2030s, reaching a full
fleet of 12 SSBNs in 2041.
So, Admiral, how will we sustain our nuclear deterrence
requirements while transitioning to the Columbia-class
submarine, and what can Congress do to ensure the future
requirements of the Navy's nuclear submarine fleet are met?
Admiral Moran. Congressman, thanks for the question. We
have worked out the requirements in the 2030s with STRATCOM and
the joint force. Clearly, what will be done with re-cores of
Ohio here in the not too distant future, so that is a major
draw on our total force structure, if you will.
Then, as you indicated, in the late 2020s and early 2030s
we start replacing Ohio with Columbia class. So we think we can
accept that and we are going to have to maintain a ready status
of fewer submarines during the 2030s, but working that through
STRATCOM we believe we have enough to satisfy the requirement.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
General Selva, for you I wanted to ask, what are the risks
of launch on warning and what can be done to increase
Presidential decision-making time in the midst of a crisis?
General Selva. Thank you, Congressman.
As you are aware, the launch-on-warning criteria basically
are driven by physics. The amount of time the President has to
make a decision is based on when we can detect a launch, what
it takes to physically characterize the launch, and the entire
scenario is predicated on an adversary that believes they can
attack us and decapitate our intercontinental ballistic missile
fleet without us responding.
And so the only ways physically to buy more time for the
President to make that decision are to increase the fidelity
and the distribution of our radar and on-orbit detection
systems.
But even those criteria face the facts of physics, which
say while you may detect the launch, it--the weapon itself must
cross through some sort of radar detection capability in order
to characterize the launch as an attack on the United States.
The short answer to your question is, I don't believe the
physics let us give him much more time. And so what we owe the
President is a set of options ahead of time that he or she can
consider and determine whether or not they are willing to take
that shot, because they are not going to have the benefit of a
long period of time to make that decision.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, General.
And in addition to that, obviously I have always been a big
believer that good intelligence is always the very pointy tip
of the spear, and the better our intelligence is the more
standoff warning time we may have, as well. It adds to what we
already have in place.
So, I want to be respectful of other people's time, so with
that I will yield back.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
Mr. Rogers.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank the witnesses
for being here, for your service to our country.
In April of 2016 the State Department released its most
recent Arms Control Compliance Report, and it found in there
that Russia remains in violation of the Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces Treaty, or the INF Treaty.
General Selva, in your professional military view, do you
believe that Russia intends to return to compliance with this
treaty?
General Selva. Congressman, I don't have enough information
on their intent to conclude other than that they do not intend
to return to compliance absent some pressure from the
international community and the United States, as a cosigner of
the same agreement. There is no trajectory in what they are
doing that would indicate otherwise.
Mr. Rogers. And did I hear you say earlier in this hearing
that Russia is now deployed?
General Selva. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rogers. What is the military's assessment of the
impacts of this violation?
General Selva. Sir, our assessment of the impact is that it
more threatens NATO and infrastructure within the European
continent than any other part of--area of the world that we
have national interests in or alliance interests in.
And our intent is to factor that into the NPR [Nuclear
Posture Review] and look for leverage points to attempt to get
the Russians to come back into compliance. I don't know what
those points are at this point in time.
Mr. Rogers. Witnesses from the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy testified several times in the
past several years that the U.S. was considering various
responses, including active defense; two, counterforce; three,
countervailing capabilities. What actions have been taken in
each of these three to implement such capabilities?
General Selva. Sir, I would like to give you a more fulsome
answer in a classified environment, but basically it is the
assessment of where the Russians are deploying and how they are
deploying that system that provide for the latter option, which
is a countervalue or counterforce option against the actual
weapon system itself. But the balance of the capabilities I
would have to talk to you about in a classified environment.
Mr. Rogers. Okay.
General Hyten and General Selva, would you please provide
this committee before the end of the month your recommendation
on military options based on your best professional military
advice for options that policy makers like this committee can
choose to support?
General Selva. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Veasey.
Mr. Veasey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I wanted to ask General--all the generals that are here
today about the F-35's Block 4 dual-capability platform, and
with it being a--strictly a tactical complement to the
strategic bomber fleet. And I was wondering, in your opinion,
can this platform actually supplant some functions that the
bomber fleet performs in the future, in conjunction with the
new B-21, as our strategy evolves?
General Selva. Congressman, I think it is possible they can
work together. But given the relatively small numbers of dual-
capable aircraft and the fact of that commitment only to our
NATO allies, that we have not extended our dual-capable
aircraft outside of the European area of responsibility in more
than a decade, our capacity to provide for an extended nuclear
deterrent umbrella over other allies, partners, and friends
principally comes from our capacity to deploy weapons from the
United States to those locations.
So I am cautious that we not build the connotation that
because the airplanes can operate together they would
necessarily at a strategic level be built into the same plan.
Mr. Veasey. Thank you. Anyone else? Okay.
My next question is to General Selva and Hyten. Each
element of the nuclear triad requires significant investment
and modernization. Of the three, how would you rank order with
them, in terms of priority, to undergo modernization efforts?
General Hyten. I will take that first, General. Thank you,
Vice Chairman.
It is choosing among your children. It is impossible. It
depends on your perspective.
You can come at from a perspective of which is the oldest.
Which is the oldest? You probably go to the bomber. The bomber
is the oldest. We need a modernized, penetrating bomber.
But then you look at the ICBM and the ICBM has a problem.
You look at the submarine, the submarine--at some point in time
the Ohio class will not be able to go under the surface of the
water, and a submarine that can't go under the surface of the
water does not have a significant use to the United States of
America.
So as you walk through each of those you realize that under
the current construct of what deterrence is, I can't give up
any element of the triad. And that is why all three have to be
modernized and all three have to be monitored as you go through
that.
I think it is important that we look at it as each of these
programs goes on and we make prudent decisions concerning where
we are spending our money to make sure that they deliver in
time, but I can't make a determination of which one today would
be the most important.
General Selva. Congressman, the way I would phrase it is
not unlike my colleague, and that is: If you believe the triad
is important, if you believe the existence of all three legs of
the triad are necessary in order to deter an adversary from
openly attacking the United States and denying them the
capacity to be able to do that, then you have to put all three
of them as a--as priorities and not pick and choose among the
three.
There are schedule realities within the triad that drive us
to pay particular attention to the modernization of each leg.
The Ohio-class submarine is on a design and construction
schedule that has almost no slack in it because of the dynamic
that was just pointed out a few moments ago about the Ohio
class reaching end of life and Columbia class having to be
ready to replace her. And so that puts a premium on that design
and construction schedule.
The B-52 fleet, as the chairman pointed out, that is the
bulk of our air leg of the triad; that fleet was built in the
1950s and 1960s. The weapons that they employ, the air-launched
cruise missile and the gravity bombs that they carry, were
designed and built in the 1970s with a 10-year lifespan. We
know today they remain relevant, but we can't continue to
maintain them.
A decade from now those weapons will not be able to
penetrate Russian air defenses. And therefore, there is an
urgency to their replacement.
And finally, the Minuteman III missile system was put into
silos in the 1970s with an expected 10-year lifespan. We have
extended its lifespan and believe we can continue to do so for
about another decade.
When we did the analysis of alternatives on what would be
best--extending life again or replacing--the cost of extending
life actually almost matches the cost of replacement. So that
means all three of them must be addressed at the same time.
What we have to do, and what we owe you, is our considered
judgment on where we put resources to make sure that all three
of those replacement programs stay on a schedule for design and
deployment that matches the time span that the weapons
themselves will age out of the fleet.
Mr. Veasey. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Franks.
Mr. Franks. Well thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank all of
you gentlemen for your lifetime commitment to human freedom.
Let me begin by suggesting that the comments you have made
here today as to the importance of our nuclear deterrent, I so
deeply agree with, given that I think it has kept us out of
involvement in a world war for 70 years. I mean, it is almost
impossible to overstate its significance.
And with that, I will probably go ahead and bias my
question deeply and suggest to you that I think that the long-
range standoff capability is one of the strongest--one of the
strong components for rationale and for leverage to keep the
bomber leg of our triad.
And I know that the argument is made that somehow this is a
destabilizing weapon--and, General Selva, you had mentioned
earlier, and I thought you addressed it well, but I would like
to kind of expand on it slightly because I think that this is
one of those things that is in play.
And with that, you know, I have asked the Air Force many
times now how many times--and, General Wilson, this is
addressed to you too, sir, and General Hyten--how many times
the ALCMs [air-launched cruise missiles], you know, has been
fired and how many times that--in combat, and how many times it
has been taken as a potential nuclear strike. And, of course,
the answer was none.
And if, indeed, the LRSO [long-range standoff weapon] is
destabilizing then so are dual-capable bombers. I mean, all of
these things just don't make sense in my mind.
And so the questions I have for you--first--I am going to
make a series of them because I don't want to run out of time
here--what do you think of LRSO? Do you support the program?
What is the military requirement for this program? Do you think
it is destabilizing?
And, General Selva, I will point over to you specifically:
Do the Joints Chiefs of Staff support the program? And do you
believe LRSO is a good part of cost-imposing strategy on our
adversaries?
That is a lot of questions. I am sorry to throw it all at
the same time.
General Selva. Congressman, the Joint Chiefs did consider
the commitment to the LRSO and the development program when we
looked at our recommendation to President Obama last year on
whether or not to adjust the modernization and recapitalization
program and committed to the fielding and deployment of the
LRSO. We do believe that it is a significant tool for imposing
costs on our potential adversaries.
The requirements state in short that it be able to fly a
specific range, which I won't talk about in this forum; that it
be able to penetrate the sophisticated air defenses of an
opponent; and deliver a nuclear weapon. And those are the three
baseline requirements for the system that I can talk about in
this room.
Mr. Franks. And you would reject again the notion that it
is destabilizing?
General Selva. Yes, sir.
Mr. Franks. And what emphasis do you put on the
significance of that capability and maintaining in the future
an effective rationale for keeping our bomber leg of our triad?
General Selva. I think it does two things for us. We have
already talked about the cost imposition on any potential
adversary. That is a critical piece of keeping the bomber leg
of the triad viable.
It is also critical to keeping the B-52 viable, as the
airframe itself cannot penetrate Russian air defenses--or
Chinese air defenses, for that matter--and, as a consequence,
must have a standoff weapon that is capable of contributing to
its leg of the deterrent.
Mr. Franks. Yes. General Hyten.
General Hyten. Congressman, I will bring to the classified
session tomorrow a detailed explanation. There is actually an
integrated story when you put the bomber together with the LRSO
that we can only talk about in a classified forum that actually
explains the military requirement very specifically and why we
need that.
There are a lot of policy discussions we have had today but
I think the military requirement is actually the most powerful,
and we can share that tomorrow.
Mr. Franks. Thank you, and I look forward to that. General
Wilson, did you have anything to add?
General Wilson. Congressman, I would say the LRSO is the
most flexible leg because when I match a weapon with all the
bombers--in the future it will go on not only the B-52, the B-
2, or the B-21--it provides lots of flexibility.
Mr. Franks. Yes.
General Wilson. When you put numbers on them, again, just
as the other generals have said, it is a cost-imposing strategy
against our adversaries. I think it is a very effective
deterrent capability and will do so in the future.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you. And, Mr. Chairman, I think
that last point was very important: It gives our command
capability the opportunity to make some additional decisions if
they have to rather than having the bombers over enemy
territory.
And finally, I think we should reject this notion of
destabilization because Russia certainly has this capability
and they continue to build on it and expand it.
So I appreciate you all being here today. And thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Ms. Hanabusa.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
gentlemen, for being here.
One of the things that concerned me as I was reading
through everything: Yes, there is an emphasis by all of you of
the need for modernization and for replacement, and there is
this concept of the triad. And I have heard the testimony
before, and you seem to be just assuming that the triad is the
way we must go. And I have heard your explanations and I, quite
honestly, I am not necessarily convinced that that is the way
that we must go.
For example, the warheads you talked about, 1971, I think,
was when they were put together. You all realize that it took
10 years after that before you all graduated college.
So when we are talking about modernization, right, how or
why are you all assuming that the triad system is like the
essential threshold to modernization? And that is other than--
if you will respond in this way--other than your respective
jurisdictional areas.
General Selva. Thank you, ma'am, for the question.
First of all, it is not that the triad is foundational to
modernization. We believe the triad is foundational to
deterrence. It is not about how we view the triad; it is how
our potential adversaries view the triad.
So three times in the last 5 years the Joint Staff has been
asked this question: Could we go to a dyad? Could we eliminate
a leg of the triad? If you were to eliminate a leg, which leg
would you eliminate?
The sum total of all of that analysis has resulted in a
commitment on the part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to maintain
the triad because of its value in deterring our opponents.
It does several things for us. We have talked about the
operational parts, where no single leg can be taken out at one
time and that presents a targeting and strategic problem to an
adversary.
The other thing it brings us is the ability, strategically,
to hedge between legs of the triad, so if someone were to
figure out how to completely defeat our bomber force we have a
fallback position.
Ms. Hanabusa. But, General, you have all basically said
that everything that we have in the triad needs to be
modernized. And I believe General Wilson, in his testimony,
said that, you know, the really peer that we have is Russia.
There is China and North Korea who are coming on board, but our
real peer in terms of this area is Russia.
So, I guess my issue is this: If we are looking at how we
are going to battle into the, quote, ``the modern era,'' or
modernizing, shouldn't we be focusing on how they--our quote,
``potential adversaries'' and the ones that we anticipate are
coming on board--how they will arm and what we must do to
combat that?
Because it seems like we are sort of in this mode of, well,
we--not necessarily that the triad is the essence of
modernization but somehow it is sacrosanct right now, and this
is what we think works best.
But we are talking about modernizing; we are talking about
a new series of adversaries. And so how is it that you have
thought about that potential and in then assuming that the
triad is necessary and the way that you are all choosing to
modernize within the triad is what is going to be the best way?
I understand the Columbia class coming on board. I do
understand that. And I understand the essence of the--then the
quote what we call the ``deep blue sea'' and what they need to
do. However, I am wondering about the ICBMs, where we place
them, and this bomber capacity.
General Hyten. Congresswoman, we start from the adversary.
That is where all the analysis starts.
We start looking at Russia. That is where the nuclear
analysis starts.
Then we look at China, we look at North Korea, look at
Iran. But we start from what they are doing, because the
adversary gets a vote. They get a vote, and we don't get the
vote on what they are going to do. So we have to look at what
they are doing and figure out how to respond.
And if you look at the role of deterrence, the primary role
of deterrence is to deter the use of nuclear weapons anywhere
else on the planet. And if you eliminate one element of the
triad, the challenge that creates for us as military officers
is that now we are one failure, we are one problem away, we are
one challenge away, we are one breach in intelligence away from
an adversary thinking that they can possibly attack the United
States with a nuclear weapon.
That fundamentally changes deterrence.
Ms. Hanabusa. General, I am going to run out of time, and
what I would like is to have you respond to me in writing if
you can.
I understand that. However, when your basic essentials,
which is the weaponry that we have and all of that, may not be
the proper deterrent, or the bombers may be something that can
be detected, those are the issues that I would like to have you
respond as to how that fits into modernization.
Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, gentlemen, thank
you so much for joining us, and thanks so much for your
service.
General Hyten, I would like to discuss the military
requirement for the long-range standoff cruise missile in a
little more detail. I want to focus on the platforms.
And we have penetrating platforms like the B-2 and upcoming
the B-21. Tell me why those platforms, with their capability
and them going in to deliver a gravity nuclear weapon like the
B-61 would not meet the standards or the requirements that have
been set by LRSO.
General Hyten. Sir, I can't talk about the specifics in an
open hearing. I will bring those specifics into the closed
classified session tomorrow so I can give you the number.
But in general, let me just describe that it is a mix of
ranges. What is the range of the long-range standoff weapon?
What is the range of the bomber? What is the target that we
have to do?
And if you look at the globe and you look at Russia and
China in particular, they are very large countries, and it is
about an access issue. And so when we combine all those
military requirements together and we meet the requirements
that are in the air leg of the triad for what we have to do,
that is how it comes together.
And I will show you the details tomorrow in the classified
session.
General Selva. Congressman, if you would let me add one
more point to that----
Mr. Wittman. Yes, General Selva, yes.
General Selva [continuing]. And this is something that is
missed quite often in the LRSO conversation. In order for a
bomber to deliver gravity--to deliver a gravity bomb it must
fly over or approximate to the target. And it has to do that
one target at a time.
If we find ourselves in a position where we have to strike
multiple targets with relative simultaneity, the lack of
existence of a long-range standoff munition means we have to
dedicate more force to that same problem set.
And so part of the advantage in the LRSO--and it is one of
the requirements--is that it be shot from some distance and
that it can be released from the bomber in relative short order
so that you can get that degree of simultaneity that you cannot
get with the laydown of gravity bombs.
And again, until or unless we negotiate cruise missiles out
of everyone's nuclear arsenal, the capacity to be able to do
that adds value, brings flexibility, and it confounds the
enemy's belief that they might be able to attack us and get
away with it.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you. Thank you. Great point.
General Wilson, I wanted to go to you and get your
perspective. We had heard some comments earlier about the aging
inventory of our air-launched cruise missiles, and we know
where they are today with their age, what they were planned for
originally.
But tell me, what happens with the current age of these
missiles and our ability to perform the mission if LRSO is not
delivered on time, and do we have the same element of
deterrence as that inventory of air-launched cruise missiles
ages and if we don't get LRSO?
General Wilson. Yes, thank you for the question.
As you remarked earlier, our current cruise missiles were
built in the early 1980s, designed to last 10 years. We are now
on their fifth SLEP [service life extension program], their
service life extension for those missiles. To meet General
Hyten's requirements we talk about being safe, secure,
effective, and ready.
As these missiles continue to age out they will become
potentially unreliable and--on one piece and not able to reach
their target. So there is an effectiveness piece and there is a
reliability piece.
They are currently safe, secure, effective, and reliable.
But looking 10 years in the future, we don't have much slack.
Again, right now we are on our fifth service life extension and
we need a new replacement for that ALCM missile, the LRSO.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you.
Admiral Moran, I wanted to talk to you about that
extraordinarily important part of the nuclear triad, our Ohio-
class submarines. We are today in the process of replacing
those submarines with the Columbia class.
Give me your perspective. I know that we are pushed with
having the proper number of 12 submarines, which is the
projection, and being, for a period of time, as you spoke of
earlier, at 11 submarines. Give me your perspective on what we
will do to accommodate for that lower number of submarines
through that period of time.
Is it longer deployments at sea? What do we do to make sure
we have the proper presence there? Because as we know, we need
11 submarines to have a presence, I believe, at any one time of
6 submarines at sea.
Can you give us perspective about how you create that
balance and why 11 is going to be sufficient for the mission
through that timeframe?
Admiral Moran. Thank you sir.
You captured it quite well there in terms of the length of
deployments and how much longer we would be able to sustain a
crew at sea or turn around a crew at sea, shorter durations. So
there are several aspects of what you described that we can do
to make up that delta.
The biggest one is the maintenance of those existing Ohio
as they reach the end of their life and the new Columbia as
they come in in the 2030s.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield
back.
The Chairman. Mr. Carbajal.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all
for coming here today.
The Congressional Budget Office [CBO] estimates the cost of
modernizing U.S. nuclear deterrent will cost about $400 billion
over the next decade. Reports also indicate U.S. will spend $1
trillion over the next 30 years in order to modernize and
maintain our nuclear triad.
All our witnesses have expressed the importance of
modernizing our nuclear capabilities and the risks of
continuing to use systems that are operating beyond their
service life. To this end, I believe it is imperative for this
committee to be informed of the long-term plans, timelines, and
cost projections of implementing such a costly and extensive
modernization program.
This is the National Nuclear Security Administration's
annual report that covers DOE's costs and plans for nuclear
warheads and related infrastructure over the next 25 years.
General Selva, can DOD [Department of Defense] provide this
committee with its 25-year plan, timelines, and cost estimates
in regards to its nuclear modernization efforts? If yes, when?
And if no, why not?
General Selva. Congressman, my understanding is we
communicated those requirements in our President's budget in
2017. They will be re-communicated as part of our program.
But I will be happy to work with our team back in the
Pentagon and come back to you with a more fulsome answer to
your question over the next decade to decade and a half. Our
numbers are slightly different than CBO's for a couple of
reasons, but we will work through that with you and make sure
you have the numbers.
Mr. Carbajal. Great. Thank you very much. I yield, Mr.
Chair.
The Chairman. Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Wilson, there are large differences in the opinion
of the Air Force and the Office of Cost Assessment and Program
Evaluation [CAPE] at the Secretary of Defense.
Why are there such large differences on the assessment of
the ground-based strategic deterrent? Does the Air Force stand
behind its service cost position? And when will the Air Force
and CAPE have enough data to revisit and revise their cost
estimates and narrow the range that we are seeing?
General Wilson. Congressman Scott, we certainly stand
behind our projections. Quite frankly, the projections differ
because we use different sources. We haven't built a new
missile in many years, so we used Minuteman III and Peacekeeper
data; CAPE used D5 [Trident II] data as well as MDA [Missile
Defense Agency] data. Therefore, the differences in the two
service cost positions.
We expect to have--we got our proposals in now and about a
year from now, this March of 2018, we should have further data
to be able to refine that and provide that forward.
Mr. Scott. Thank you.
General Hyten, would you please describe the military
requirements driving the need for GBSD? What are the military
effectiveness and cost implications of choosing to life-extend
the current Minuteman III missile fleet and related ground
infrastructure rather than pursue GBSD?
General Hyten. So, the detailed military requirements are
classified, sir. We can provide you with those in a separate
forum. We would be glad to do that.
Mr. Scott. Okay.
General Hyten. In general, the requirement for the land-
based element of the triad is to be able to provide a
survivable, responsive capability to any threat attack that is
coming from any adversary around the globe. We have to be able
to do that inside the timelines of what that adversary
missile--and if you just do the math, the public math is it is
about 30 minutes from Russia to the United States.
So that drives the timelines that we have to respond. That
not only drives the missile capabilities, but it describes the
infrastructure it has to be put into as well as the command and
control with it.
Mr. Scott. General Selva, if you can't speak to it in this
forum, perhaps tomorrow: What is the collective judgment of the
Joint Chiefs on whether we should pursue the GBSD program and
retain the land-based leg of the triad?
General Selva. The Joint Chiefs have endorsed moving
forward with the ground-based strategic deterrent program based
in large part on an analysis of alternatives that was done for
the Joint Requirements Oversight Council that incorporated in
one of its excursions life extension of the Minuteman III
versus deployment of a new missile, and the costs were seen to
be equivalent if not prohibitive for the continued life
extension of the Minuteman III.
Mr. Scott. Thank you.
General Hyten, we have seen a lot of GBSD acquisition
details loaded into unclassified acquisition databases and run
by the Air Force. We all know that Russia, China, and others
scoop all this stuff up to the best of their abilities and
analyze it intensively.
Why is all of this put out in the open? Should we reassess
what is unclassified in these acquisition documents?
And could you speak to also the greatest cost and technical
risk in the GBSD the program? For example, what is your view of
the priority of possible mobile command-and-control concepts
being considered?
General Hyten. I hate the stuff that shows up in the press.
I think we should reassess that.
Just to complete that thought, I hate the fact that cost
estimates show up in the press as well. Because if you put a
cost estimate out in the press it is not only our adversaries
that are looking at it, but the people that are going to build
the system are looking at that, and if that is what our cost
estimates say, if we say it is going to cost $80 billion it is
probably going to end up costing $80 billion. I hate that we go
down that path.
Mr. Scott. And then some.
General Hyten. And then some. So I would really like to
figure out a different way to do business than that. I hate
seeing that kind of information in the newspaper.
Now, as for the complications in the GBSD program, I think
the--you know, we spend all our time talking about the missile.
The missile, to me, is the easiest part of the structure.
Everybody thinks about the missile and how much is the missile
going to cost. How much is that?
At the last, just a couple weeks ago I was at F.E. Warren
in Wyoming. I went down in one of the missile holes and the
sign as you came in said, you know, this was created in 1963.
That structure was created in 1963.
The command-and-control assets that go around with it were
started in the 1960s, modernized in the 1970s. They have gone
through multiple life extension programs. It is the
infrastructure that is around the missile that will be the
challenge of the program, not the missile itself.
Mr. Scott. Gentlemen, thank you for your service. My time
is about expire so, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the 8 seconds.
The Chairman. And we will take it.
Mr. O'Halleran.
Mr. O'Halleran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank
you for being here today.
General Selva, you had mentioned in your written comments
about the 6.5 percent projection moving forward. How do we know
that that is going to be enough money to be able to deal with
the multitude of issues we have here, whether it is command and
control or new systems coming onboard?
General Selva. Sir, all I can tell you is that that is our
best judgment of what resources we are going to need to do the
modernization on the schedule that we have laid it out. So that
6.5 percent estimate is actually based on taking all of the
design and build programs and projecting them forward as a
percentage of our base budget.
Mr. O'Halleran. Admiral Moran, the Columbia class, the
minimum are--the minimum that we need are 10 at a time--are 10.
Two are going to be down because of reactors replacement at
times?
Admiral Moran. No, sir. The Columbia class has a reactor
core that it will last for 40-plus years, so we will not have
to re-core those unless we extend the life----
Mr. O'Halleran. Okay.
Admiral Moran [continuing]. Beyond 42 years.
Mr. O'Halleran. I misread that then.
Admiral Moran. Yes, sir.
Mr. O'Halleran. Thank you----
Admiral Moran. The other two, the reduction from 14 to 12
is to account for the fact that the core lasts that long, and
there is other maintenance that has to be done on any ship, and
that is why we are able to do it with the 12 instead of the 14.
Mr. O'Halleran. Okay. Thank you.
And, General Hyten, the cyber warfare aspects of all this,
command and control and the--how does that--has that factored
into your cost estimates?
General Hyten. So I will just say that, you know, we were
having a conversation with Congressman Turner a while ago about
the concerns about the NC3 capabilities that we have today. The
good news about the nuclear command and control capability we
have today is it is very cyber secure. When you build a system
in the 1960s, before anybody knew what the term ``cyber'' was,
you have inherently built in an amazing amount of
cybersecurity.
The challenge that we have as we go into the future is that
you can't build that again. We have to fundamentally build it
now in a 21st-century architecture, which will have the cyber
threat that we have to work through.
That is a significant element of our risk assessment as we
go through and part of the design criteria as we look at how we
are going to do this nuclear command and control in the future.
Mr. O'Halleran. And, General, you--I had mentioned cost,
also. How does that factor in as far as being able to fund the
other systems, which all require cyber issues, also?
General Hyten. It is a significant element of the cost
estimates. You would have to ask the services for the details
that are in those cost estimates, but I have talked to the DOD
CIO [Chief Information Officer] in particular about that
capability. I have sat in on the panels that General Selva was
talking about a while ago.
We look at those very close and that cybersecurity, cyber-
resilience, cyber-defense architecture is involved in every one
of the plans that we come up with, as well as the cost
estimates.
Mr. O'Halleran. Okay. Thank you. And, Mr. Chairman, I
yield.
The Chairman. Dr. DesJarlais.
Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Selva, you spoke with a bunch of us yesterday
regarding the aging of our nuclear forces and, you know, we
have talked about a lot of the slippage issues that we want to
avoid.
General Hyten, what are the impacts to the credibility of
our nuclear deterrent if we see major schedule slips to any of
these programs?
General Hyten. Congressman, that is the risk in the program
right now. I have been involved in this business long enough to
know that if you have five different programs that all deliver
just in time you have inherently put a risk in the program that
is very significant because, sadly, one of those programs, two
of those programs, three of those programs, they won't all
deliver on time.
Therefore, that is why we have to manage it very closely.
And that is why stable budgets, stable planning, stable
structure is so important to the entire Department of Defense,
but in this area in particular, because without that stability
we really do insert risk into the systems in the future.
Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. Chairman Thornberry mentioned earlier
that--this--the cost for this deterrence program is usually
about 6 to 7 percent of the budget. Considering that this has
been called the Nation's highest priority defense mission, do
you agree with CBO that roughly 6 percent is a proper amount?
General Selva. Congressman, we have looked at the numbers
for the better of the 18 months or so I have been in this job
and have scrubbed them really hard. Part of the debate about
how much is enough came from how much is it going to cost? So
we scrubbed every program to take any excess cost out of it;
6.5 percent is where we land.
On any given day we spend almost 3.5 percent of our defense
base budget on maintaining the existing strategic deterrent. So
what we are talking about is a period of time, roughly a decade
and change, where we have to double that investment to continue
to maintain the existing deterrent and field its replacement,
and that is the consequence of where those numbers came from.
Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. Well, I would like to thank all you
gentlemen for being here today, and I yield back my time.
General Selva. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. Mr. Garamendi.
Mr. Garamendi. Gentlemen, thank you very much for your
service and for the questions that you have answered. I look
forward to the classified hearing. Hope we can get into this in
much more depth.
But, General Hyten, a question for you. Last week
Lieutenant General Jack Weinstein stated that the New START
[Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] has huge value for the United
States and that the agreement has been good for us. He noted
that the reason you do a treaty is not to cut forces but to
maintain strategic stability among world powers, and the New
START Treaty allows us to maintain that stability. Those are
his quotes.
If the United States--and the question for you--if the
United States withdrew from the New START or took steps which
called into question our treaty obligation, what would be the
effect on strategic stability?
General Hyten. So, Congressman, I have stated for the
record in the past and I will state again that I am a big
supporter of the New START agreement. I believe that,
especially when it comes to nuclear weapons and nuclear
capabilities, that bilateral, verifiable arms control
agreements are essential to our ability to provide an effective
deterrent.
If you remove that effective deterrent structure, which is
the New START Treaty, it makes it very difficult for us to know
the levels. The risk would be an arms race.
We are not in an arms race now, to go back to a previous
question. The concern would be what do we have to do in order
to stay at the same level as our adversaries, and that could be
a very risky proposition. That is why I continue to support the
New START levels that we are under right now.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, General. General Selva, are you
of the same mind?
General Selva. I am, sir. When the New START Treaty was
brought to the Congress for ratification the Joint Chiefs
reviewed the components of the treaty and endorsed it. It is a
bilateral, verifiable agreement that gives us some degree of
predictability on what our potential adversaries look like.
Mr. Garamendi. Now, keeping that in mind, there has been
discussion about new tactical or new low-yield strategic
weapons. Maybe they are both tactical as well as strategic.
The Defense Science Board, in their seven defense
priorities for the new administration, recommended expanding
our nuclear options, including deploying low-yield weapons on
strategic delivery systems. Is there a military requirement for
these new weapons?
General Hyten. So, Congressman, that is a great
conversation for tomorrow when I can tell you the details. But
from a big picture perspective in a public hearing, I can tell
you that our force structure now actually has a number of
capabilities that provide the President of the United States a
variety of options to respond to any numbers of threats.
Mr. Garamendi. And----
General Hyten. I will also say that I don't agree with the
term ``tactical nuclear weapon.'' I just fundamentally disagree
that there is such a thing as a tactical nuclear weapon. I
believe that anybody that employs a nuclear weapon in the world
has created a strategic effect and all nuclear weapons are
strategic.
Mr. Garamendi. I thank you for that statement. I think it
is accurate. And that goes to escalate to deescalate; that also
goes to our deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.
General Selva, you spoke to this earlier about the dual-
capable aircraft that we have in Europe. And the purpose of
those apparently is to cause Russia not to invade, so that is
an escalation to deescalate, or could be.
General Selva. Congressman, not to be argumentative, the
stated purpose of those weapons is to deter the Russians from
escalating to nuclear warfare in order to prevent a
conventional attack from going nuclear. They are--I use the
NATO nomenclature--nonstrategic nuclear weapons, accepting what
General Hyten just said. But I take your point.
The stated intended purpose of those weapons is to deter
the Russians from using nuclear weapons if they were to attempt
to escalate a conventional war.
Mr. Garamendi. All of which creates a conundrum. Thank you
very much, gentlemen. I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Gallagher.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to zoom back out, if we could, to the
strategic level. The last Nuclear Posture Review was published
7 years ago. The world, obviously, is very different today than
it was in 2010, particularly when talking about countries like
Russia.
Today, at least for my perspective, it is hard to see
Russia as a partner and a friend, like the 2010 NPR envisioned.
For instance, Russia continues to make dangerous and aggressive
nuclear threats and exercises directed against the U.S., NATO
allies, and neighbors. Russia has declared an openly discussed
doctrine to use a Russian nuclear weapon early in a conflict to
deescalate and get the United States to back down.
Russia continues to brazenly violate the INF Treaty, and a
recent media report indicates its INF-violating cruise missile
is now operational and deployed. Russia intentionally broadcast
plans for its so-called Status-6 nuclear weapon, which is a
high-speed unmanned underwater vehicle that would carry a
megaton-class nuclear weapon into a U.S. harbor and detonate.
Not to mention the invasion, occupation, and annexation of the
sovereign territory of its neighbors.
Would you please, this is a question really for the entire
panel starting with General Selva: Would you please provide, in
your professional military views, what has changed in the
world, in your professional opinion, since the 2010 NPR? And
why, from a military perspective, does that matter?
General Selva. Yes, sir. I would make two points.
One, I have been public with the notion that Russia and
China are the two nations of the world that potentially pose an
existential threat to the United States. I am on the record in
my confirmation hearing as the vice chairman saying the same.
What has changed in the last 10 years is the--is a
continuing realization that Russia intends to assert themselves
as a great power and in doing so has changed the relationship
in terms of our military-to-military qualitative and
quantitative match. And we have to address that.
And so as we enter this first--the first NPR of this
administration--Nuclear Posture Review of the Trump
administration--one of the very key questions that will have to
be asked as we start the process from the intelligence
community is a definitive answer to what has changed since the
last time we did this work.
To be fair to the Obama administration, there was a 2010
NPR. There were two major nuclear strategy reviews in 2012 and
2014 as well, but they didn't raise to the status of an NPR
because the President didn't believe we needed to do one. So a
lot has changed, Congressman, to your point.
General Hyten. So, Congressman, the vice chairman hit
pretty much all the points I wanted to make with the exception
of one broad issue that has changed significantly since 2010.
Since 2010 our potential adversaries, particularly China
and Russia, have not just looked at the nuclear enterprise;
they have looked at space and cyber. And strategic deterrence
in the 21st century is much bigger than nuclear deterrence was
in the 20th century.
We have adversaries that are building weapons and
capabilities to counter our advantages in space and in cyber.
We have to look at the entire strategic landscape and make sure
we consider all that action. The nuclear capabilities that we
have is the backstop for all of that, but it is a much broader
issue that has become very apparent since 2010.
Admiral Moran. Congressman, I don't have much to add there
except that when we look just navy-to-navy, and the
capabilities that the Russians have deployed since the last
Nuclear Posture Review are significantly better than what we
saw leading up to that review. So we have to account for that
in this next step.
General Wilson. Congressman, the only thing I would add on
to tag onto General Hyten's comment is when we talk about the
nuclear triad we have to realize it is bigger than just the
bombers, the ICBMs, and the submarines. It is the command and
control; it is space; it is tankers. It is a much bigger
enterprise than just the three legs of the triad that we have
got to be thinking about.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman. I yield the rest of my time.
The Chairman. Mr. McEachin.
Mr. McEachin. Mr. Chairman, my question has been asked and
answered, and I have enjoyed listening and learning today, so I
yield back.
The Chairman. Ms. McSally.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks, gentlemen.
Good discussion today about the importance of investing in
recapitalization of the triad.
I want to talk about an important element of that, which is
the human capital and specifically, General Wilson, the
missileers in the ICBM force. I mean, we have seen over the
last year some challenges there.
You know, we are in a new time and we are with a different
generation. I don't like to make generalizations, but the old
SAC [Strategic Air Command] warriors that we all know and love
are very different from the mindset of millennials coming into
this role. There are real challenges. They are going to--no
insult to my colleagues from these States--but challenging
geographic locations.
F.E. Warren was our sister squadron when I was at the
Academy. For many years, you know, often no deployment, and
they see that they are working with old technology too, so that
shows, I think, that, you know, hey, this isn't a priority for
us to be further investing in that.
We have addressed some of these shortfalls very much in, I
think, a punitive way. I mean, obviously it is appropriate to
have zero-fail, but that doesn't help with morale, culture,
motivation, and all the important things that we need for
people to be motivated to do this important mission.
So as we are looking at modernizing parts of the
infrastructure and the force, are we looking at modernizing the
workforce? So are we thinking outside the box?
Does it need to be a dedicated career field anymore? Are
there ways for them to become the deterrent experts for our
military, not just in nuclear deterrence?
Is there a thought of how to do some innovative things for
their leadership development while they are in these
assignments that is not fake but actually very real and shows
that value?
So I am just wondering, are we willing to shake up and look
at some fresh ideas to modernize the workforce? It is very
important.
General Wilson. The short answer is absolutely. And that is
a key part of what you are hitting is this human weapon system.
So coming out of the Force Improvement Program, both the
internal and external reviews hit upon this piece of culture.
And I would say the culture had gone to a culture of
micromanagement.
And so today's workforce we are focusing on this, how do I
empower our airmen? And how do they see themselves in a future
of which they believe what they are doing is important?
So for a long time our Nation didn't, I would argue, didn't
value the nuclear force. We have to change that at all levels.
And so how do we then develop and grow airmen that realize
that what they are doing is important and then they can do
something about it? We have certainly lots of opportunities
that we develop our missileers, and empowering them earlier,
whether they become an expert in their weapon system, we make
them flight commanders in our weapon system, we send them to
weapon schools, we are sending them to very prestigious
universities, to Stanfords to Harvards for training.
We stood up the School for Advanced Nuclear Deterrence
Studies there at Kirtland Air Force Base, which is focused on
how do I build a person who can understand and articulate what
deterrence means in the 21st century?
So the short answer is yes. We think that this is a really
important part of changing the culture, and you are hitting on
a big piece of it.
Ms. McSally. Thank you. General Hyten or General Selva, you
got any other comments on that?
General Hyten. I would like to add something, ma'am.
One of the things I do on holidays is I just pick up the
phone, and I punch the number for the folks that are in the
missile fields, because when I left the enterprise really in
2009 the morale was really bad. Really bad. And I saw that you
couldn't miss it.
And now I--when I talk to lieutenants--and it is mostly
lieutenants that are there--their morale is high. They are all
excited about what they do. They understand the importance;
they understand it is the most important thing.
But I think one of the things that you mentioned is that
that can be a temporary issue. That is the power of leadership.
And leadership is good, but we need to follow it up with real
capabilities where they are operating on 21st-century
equipment, they are operating those kind of pieces. And if we
don't follow through on that I am afraid that the morale could
go back the other direction.
But right now, through the power of leadership and focused
effort, I am very pleased at how high the morale is in the
missile fields.
Ms. McSally. So you think the punitive culture that I am
talking about is behind us? We need to hold people accountable,
don't get me wrong; but when you feel like I am going to be
punished for all the little things, that's a morale----
General Hyten. So the change it's made is really good. It
is because the no-fail is now a no-fail mission.
Ms. McSally. Yes.
General Hyten. It is not a no-fail person; it is a no-fail
mission. And when you realize it is the entire team that has to
come together, and if there is a glitch on one person in the
team, whether that is a security forces or wherever it is, and
the rest of the team can overcome that and have a no-fail
mission, that is what we are trying to get after. And that is
the conversation I hear now with the lieutenants in particular.
Ms. McSally. Great. General Selva, anything?
General Selva. I think I would make two points very
quickly.
One is a path to leadership and a continuing real emphasis
on relevance and the importance of the mission. And what I see
when I go out to missile bases, bomber bases, and submarine
bases is a group of very motivated, very dedicated and
disciplined sailors and airmen who see both of those right now.
That has not always been the case, particularly in some of
the incidents that we saw inside the ballistic missile force
and in a small element of the bomber force.
So I am optimistic--and I am generally not an optimistic
person--that we have put in place a pathway that attends to the
professional development and the future of the officers and the
young airmen in the Air Force that we are asking to do this
mission, and in the case of the Navy, the sailors and the
officers who are manning our strategic ballistic missile
submarines and the infrastructure that supports them.
Ms. McSally. Great, thanks. I am over my time. I appreciate
it.
The Chairman. Mrs. Hartzler.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Our Oversight and Investigation Subcommittee is going to
have a hearing next week on infrastructure problems at the
Department of Energy's nuclear weapons enterprise. They have an
almost $4 billion backlog in deferred maintenance and are
operating facilities that date back to the Manhattan Project.
Now, I realize that the facilities still comply with
nuclear safety requirements, but I am not sure how long that
will last.
And so, General Selva and General Hyten, I know that you
have both had the opportunity to visit some of these important
DOE facilities. Can you tell us about the state of their
infrastructure, any views that you have on the need to rebuild
NNSA's [National Nuclear Security Administration's] facilities
so that they can deliver on their mission to support the
military?
General Selva. Ma'am, I think it is really important that
we get at the infrastructure shortfalls inside of DOE.
To that end, inside the Department we host every other
month a group we call the Nuclear Weapons Council that looks at
the safety, security, and reliability of the arsenal itself and
then attends to the issues in partnership between the National
Nuclear Security Agency, DOE, and DOD to the emerging
infrastructure needs and human capital needs inside of that
workforce that assembles and maintains the core parts of our
nuclear arsenal, and those are the weapons themselves.
Mrs. Hartzler. Very good. General Hyten.
General Hyten. Ma'am, the Department of Energy has taken
that on pretty seriously, but it has been about a year since I
was at the three national labs, in particular Livermore,
Sandia, and Los Alamos. And there are really two issues that
you have to look at, and two issues that I look at when I go
there. One is the people, and number two is the infrastructure.
And each of the labs has done a very interesting
recruitment process on the people. And now they have this young
set of physicists and engineers that have been brought onboard
that are some of the best and brightest in the country that
really set up for that structure.
But it goes back to the same conversation I was just having
with Congresswoman McSally, is that it is--if you don't follow
up with the infrastructure and all the other pieces that come
with that, you put that at risk because people that are that
bright have choices in this country today, and we want them to
be able to do that.
So the infrastructure is a significant issue and we need to
go after that as an enterprise. That is a national security
issue. That is why the Department of Defense is interested.
General Selva. Ma'am, if you would allow me to make a
follow-up point----
Mrs. Hartzler. Sure.
General Selva [continuing]. And that is we tend to be
focused on the physicists, the scientists, and the designers
that do the work of designing and analyzing the weapons that we
employ.
In point of fact, the infrastructure has a huge impact on
the young mechanics and machinists who are the people that are
touching the weapons and actually assembling them. And to see
the discipline that they put into the work that they do to
disassemble and reassemble nuclear weapons--and they know
precisely what that means--and to have them working in
infrastructure some of which dates back to the Manhattan
Project, and they have to deal with not only the safety and
security of the weapons but the physical environment that they
work in, my worry is for that part of the workforce because
they can come and go as they please.
And we have to address their capacity to do the work we are
asking them to do, which is a fairly major process of
remanufacturing weapons to meet the requirements for the
future.
Mrs. Hartzler. I really appreciate those comments. And
those will help build into what we are going to look at next
week, so thank you for sharing your views on that.
Let's talk about nonstrategic nuclear weapons because there
is a gross disparity on that front between United States and
Russia and they are not covered by any treaty.
So, General Hyten, would you please compare and contrast
the U.S. stockpile of nonstrategic nuclear weapons versus that
of Russia? And in general unclassified terms, would you
describe our respective stockpiles as equal in size and
capabilities?
General Hyten. I believe our stockpile allows us to provide
an effective strategic deterrent. Again, I have a unique
perspective as the commander of Strategic Command, but I look
at every nuclear weapon as having a strategic impact.
So as I look at what Russia is doing, I am very concerned
about that. That is why I agree with the vice chairman in his
discussions earlier about the need for future bilateral,
verifiable arms control discussions with Russia, China, all of
the players in--so that we can look at exactly where we are
going in the future. And all of those things should be
discussed.
Mrs. Hartzler. So what about the numbers?
General Hyten. The Russian numbers are huge and our numbers
are small. We will show you the specific numbers tomorrow. But
that is because we have--our nuclear weapons are a strategic
deterrent.
Mrs. Hartzler. Fifteen seconds, where are we in our
modernization compared to Russian modernization of the weapons?
General Hyten. The modernization of the weapons? I don't
have a detailed insight into the nuclear weapon modernization
in Russia or China, but I can tell you that they are, across
the nuclear enterprise, ahead of us in some areas of
modernization, behind in other areas.
But in general we can still provide the effective strategic
deterrent we have to in this Nation, but we have to step
forward quickly into the modernization realm.
Mrs. Hartzler. Good. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Bacon.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I want to thank all four of you for being here. We
respect the leadership that you are giving your organizations
and grateful.
I wanted to ask a question about unmanned aerial vehicles
and protecting our strategic installations. We are seeing a
growing threat, whether it is other countries or even
terrorists buying commercial drones or whatever it may be, and
it is the threat to our installations.
So in the fiscal year 2017 NDAA [National Defense
Authorization Act] the Secretary of Defense was given authority
to field and equip, train forces to defend our installations.
So I had two questions, really.
One to the force providers, Admiral Moran and General
Wilson: Are we starting the process of fielding and equipping
this capability to defend our bases?
And then I wanted to ask General Hyten if he could comment
about is he seeing the results? Do we need to do more? And how
can we help?
Admiral Moran.
Admiral Moran. Sir, thanks for the question.
As you know we have seen this issue around our submarine
bases and it is very concerning. There is a lot of technical
work going on to address the issue. I think the more important
aspects of this discussion, though, are the policy and
authorities to deal with them. So not only here in the U.S.,
but as well as overseas on the unmanned aerial threats that are
developing worldwide.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Admiral.
General Wilson.
General Wilson. Yes. Congressman Bacon, there is a big team
looking at this from across the Joint Staff and interagency to
be able to get at those questions that you just asked.
Are we fielding capability? I would say right now we are
giving--delivering on the first initial tranche of capability,
but there is a lot of work to do. This is a very complicated
threat, and we are learning more every day.
So we have a bunch of projects under work with a bunch of
different agencies, but in terms of actually delivering
capability to the field, we are not there yet.
Mr. Bacon. Yes. The threat is there and it is growing.
General Wilson. Right.
Mr. Bacon. General Hyten, how are we doing and what can we
do to help?
General Hyten. We are going too slow. We are going too slow
both on the material solution side as well as the policy and
authority side.
The NDAA was enormously helpful in starting us down the
policy and authority side. But, holy cow, the number of lawyers
that are involved in this discussion right now are just--well,
it is significant.
We have to get the right policy and authorities out so our
defenders know exactly what to do. Then we have to give them
the material solutions, allow them to react when they see a
threat and identify that it is a threat so they do the right
things. We are just going way too slow and we need to
accelerate that process across policies, authorities, and
material solutions.
Mr. Bacon. Well, thank you, General Hyten. Hopefully this
committee will help give a nudge on that, as well.
I wanted to ask one follow-up question or--on the command
and control. I used to fly in the ABM CAP [Air Battle
Management Combat Air Patrol], as you may know. I was one of
the flag officers on there. It was really old technology.
And I wanted to get your opinion, General Hyten. Should we
be recapitalizing that entire fleet? Do we have enough numbers
to do 24-hour operations if you wanted to go to that again?
And how does this work with the alert force, doing it at
Offut but based in another base? Do we need to relook at that?
Thank you.
General Hyten. So I believe that our airborne command and
control across the board, including the ABM CAP and the TACAMO
[take charge and move out], which is the same aircraft right
now, both have a recapitalization initiative that is out in the
future too, and we need to start looking at that right now. So
I have asked the Navy to start looking at that.
I will ask Admiral Moran to talk about those kind of
pieces, but I know they are going through an analysis right now
to determine what the right way is to get after those. But that
is really in the service line.
Mr. Bacon. Just a quick follow-up: Do we have the right
number, too, if you wanted to go back to 24-hour operations,
God forbid, if the world deteriorates?
General Hyten. So that is a good theoretical question
because a theoretical question when you actually put it out on
a whiteboard it works, but when you have an airplane that is
that old, how long you can actually keep that going is the
question.
There is no doubt that we could exercise it right now. We
could go to 24/7 ops. But when you are operating in an aircraft
that old, how long will they fly? And since we haven't done 24/
7 ops for a while that is a risk issue.
Now when we look at it really hard, we believe that we can
do that. We know we can execute it for a significant period of
time but we don't know if it is a month, 2 months, 3 months, 4
months, because they are old airplanes.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you. And, Admiral Moran, appreciate your
follow-up.
Admiral Moran. Yes, sir. We are jointly working on figuring
out a common airframe to satisfy the missions of both services.
We currently have a plan in place to extend the service life
for A-6s out to 2038, which will make them 49 years old, so you
know what that is all about.
That cannot be the final solution here. So we are looking,
as the general indicated, at a way to get at a joint program or
at least a common airframe to satisfy both missions.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you. And, Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. Dr. Abraham.
Dr. Abraham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Selva, thank you for hosting us--some of us
yesterday on the--aboard the National Airborne Operations
Center. It was instructional, educational, and it certainly
highlighted how important it is to maintain and modernize the
triad, that the dyad is not enough and we need all three legs
of the stool to keep America safe. So thank you again for that.
I am going to ask some rapid-fire questions. A lot of these
have been answered. I want to put them in one-question format
so we can refer back when we talk to our colleagues and educate
them of how important it is to fund these issues.
General Wilson, how old is the B-52?
General Wilson. B-52s were built, most of them, in 1960.
Dr. Abraham. And how old will it be when we plan to retire
it?
General Wilson. We are planning to fly it through 2050, so
it will be 90 years old.
Dr. Abraham. Wow. How old are the B-2s and how old will
they be when they retire?
General Wilson. B-2s today are 24 years old. We are
scheduled to fly them through 2058, so they will be in the mid-
60s.
Dr. Abraham. How old is the Minuteman III?
General Wilson. Built in 1970, but it is really built with
Minuteman I parts, which are 1960.
Dr. Abraham. How old will it be when it is retired in 2030?
General Wilson. Really old.
[Laughter.]
Dr. Abraham. Okay. Sixty. What was it designed to do? What
was its lifetime design----
General Wilson. Design life was 10 years.
Dr. Abraham. Wow. Admiral Moran, how old will the Ohio-
class submarines be when they are retired?
Admiral Moran. They will be 42 years.
Dr. Abraham. It is unusual for a submarine to----
Admiral Moran. It was designed for 30 years, so we got a 40
percent increase in the service life through engineering.
Dr. Abraham. And that brings risk, I am sure.
Admiral Moran. Yes, sir. We can't go beyond 42.
Dr. Abraham. I got you. General Hyten, what is the average
age of our nuclear warheads?
General Hyten. The average age of our nuclear warheads is
26 years old right now.
Dr. Abraham. Okay.
And one more for you, General Wilson. On the nuclear
weapons storage facility, I know most of them--or a lot of them
are so outdated that we can't store there so we are having to
store warheads in one place and Barksdale in Louisiana has to
go pick those warheads up if they need to fly an operational
mission. What does that do with readiness?
General Wilson. Well, it just puts a stress on the force.
And we have got to--when we consolidate to one place it
provides for vulnerabilities. We have a plan to get after that,
to re-modernize all of our weapon storage facilities.
We will start here with the first one here at F.E. Warren.
After that will become Barksdale and Malmstrom. And over the
next 13 years we have a plan to replace all of our weapon
storage facilities.
Dr. Abraham. Okay. Thank you for your service, gentlemen.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. General Wilson, I don't think anybody asked
you directly today the status of the new bomber program. Is it
on time, on schedule, moving ahead as it should?
General Wilson. Chairman, the chief of staff, the Secretary
of the Air Force and I receive regular updates on it. They just
finished a preliminary design review recently. It is making
great progress, and we are pleased with the way it is headed.
The Chairman. And so it is where it should be at this
point?
General Wilson. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Okay. And Admiral Moran, let me ask you about
the Columbia class. We have heard there is no slack. Today is
it on time, on schedule? Are you satisfied with where it is
today?
Admiral Moran. We are on time and on schedule. I am not
satisfied with how much margin we have and obvious impacts and
risk to delivering on time. But I am very comfortable with
where we are on the schedule and the costing today.
The Chairman. Okay.
General Hyten, a few moments ago you made an interesting
point. We tend to think of strategic deterrence as nuclear
deterrence, but it is broader than that. There are other
implications. There are press reports, and actually I think
some of this has been confirmed, that other nations are trying
to deny our ability to operate in space and from space.
That has implications for the broader sense of strategic
deterrence. I would ask you or General Selva, what should
potential adversaries understand about attacks on our space
system and how we would view such attacks?
General Hyten. So attacks in space in general are bad--bad
for the United States, bad for the world. Anything that creates
debris in space lessens our ability to explore.
I think all nations of the world have the desire to explore
the heavens, and if we contaminate the space environment then
we can never do that. So it is important for us to protect that
environment as we go forward.
When you look at what adversaries are doing, they are
clearly building capabilities to deny us. Some of those
capabilities could go after our strategic early warning
systems. If there is an attack on our strategic early warning
systems, our adversaries need to realize that they have just
crossed a threshold that puts our understanding of what their
actions are at risk and creates a potential issue that we may
have to respond to in the broader strategic deterrent
construct. Everything is integrated.
An attack against an overhead satellite of a tactical
variety has one impact; of strategic variety had another
impact. But they are all bad.
So our desire is to deter bad behavior in space, to deter
any kind of activity in space that would harm the space
environment.
And so the message to our adversaries that you ask is that
they should know that we are watching very, very closely. And
we are developing capabilities to allow us to continue to fight
through and respond to any attack that would come in the space
domain now and in the future.
The Chairman. General Selva, you have anything?
General Selva. Chairman, just quite briefly, specific to
the conversation we have been having today, the delineation
between the indications-and-warning and command-and-control
satellites is a signal we should send to our potential
adversaries, that crossing that line in space denies us
visibility into their actions and intentions and therefore
creates ambiguity that is not helpful in terms of nuclear
deterrence on both sides of the equation. I think that is a
clear message we have to send every single day.
The Chairman. Okay.
General Hyten, on nuclear command and control, as you were
talking about that being the thing you are most concerned
about, it goes through my mind about what I describe as a ghost
fleet phenomena. Are we better off to have 1960s technology
that cannot be hacked into and have more reliability with that
ancient sort of approach than if we were to update it?
General Hyten. So, sir, I have asked that question myself,
and there are two pieces to the answer.
Answer number one is that if you have the ability to
provide the President of the United States and the Secretary of
Defense better situational awareness because they can make
better decisions, you should do that. You can't do that with
the legacy infrastructure; we can do that with a new
infrastructure.
And the second piece--and it sounds a little bit trite but
it is actually true--is that with today's technology you really
can't build what we built in the 1960s. The information
technology today is fundamentally different.
If you try to go back and--you can't build 8-inch floppy
disk drives. You can't buy those things anymore.
So you really don't have a choice. You have to modernize
and you have to do it in a secure environment.
But what you can do and what you can learn from the 1960s
is you can segment things off so that people can't get into it.
There is no such thing as a fully closed network because there
is always a human in the loop, but you can create as closed a
system as possible to improve your cybersecurity.
The Chairman. Okay. One comment, and then I have one
additional question.
My comment is having been--watching these issues for a long
time, I have seen the interest of the Department of Defense wax
and wane in the DOE's activities on the weapons.
You know, General Selva, you were just talking about
visiting the labs, about the Nuclear Weapons Council meeting
and those other things. For what it is worth, I would just
encourage both you and General Hyten to keep the attention on
this issue. It is not a situation where you can say, ``Oh, that
is their job, and I am not going to worry about it.'' And you
talked about the infrastructure and the other challenges that
are facing the NNSA mission.
So for what it is worth, I just want to encourage you both
to stay on top of this because when DOD does not stay on top of
it usually we degrade our capability and it is not a good
thing. And we have seen this up and down over the last 20
years, so I would just mention that.
Last question I would like to ask each of you is just the
state of our thinking on deterrence, because there is concern
that after the fall of the Cold War we decided we didn't really
have to worry about strategic deterrence as much, that, yes we
had China but they weren't really a threat, and that we have
put a lot of intellectual capital into counterterrorism and
other problems but these issues have been neglected. And we
were talking about that a little bit with the Air Force, about
the importance that was put on these.
But talk about, if you will, your comfort level with the
intellectual effort that is being put on what is deterrence and
how do we know whether it is credible? And if something we
think will deter Russia, do we automatically assume that will
deter North Korea, or is that a different kind of deterrence
that we--that is not a lesser included case.
I am just interested in y'all's perspectives on how much we
have caught up in our thinking about these problems.
General Selva. Sir, I won't say we have caught up. We are
catching up.
The impact of the attacks on 9/11 on the focus of our
intellectual capital going after CT [counterterrorism], I would
argue right and appropriate. But we took our eye off of the
strategic nuclear deterrence intellectual capital of the Nation
in a way that may not have been healthy.
What I am encouraged by--and this is why I say we are
making progress but we are not there yet--is the number of
young men and women who are pursuing degrees in both physics
and political science that are now beginning to study the
components of nuclear deterrence and debate and seek graduate
and post-graduate degrees. I have a young man working for me
now who got his Ph.D. in political science and wrote about
strategic stability in his dissertation.
Those are the kinds of young men and women we are going to
have to seek out, bring into the circle of policymakers so they
can benefit from the experience of some of our more senior
policymakers who have been doing this for decades, and build
that cadre of people that are going to carry us into the
future.
General Hyten. Chairman, I will--I think catching up is the
proper characterization. We are in a good place catching up.
Where I think we have caught up is that inside the military
we are having a very robust discussion now. We are talking
about how do we integrate all of the plans between the various
combatant commanders, including Strategic Command, and with
European Command and Pacific Command.
We are having a robust discussion of what deterrence means
in Russia, in China, in space, in--but where we haven't caught
up yet--and if you remember when we were all younger, when we
were lieutenants and ensigns in the Air Force and the Navy,
there was a robust academic discussion of what deterrence
really meant. There were books written, there was debate. Even
though we didn't have nearly as broad-based of a national media
infrastructure, there was still this huge discussion in the
academic community. That is just really starting back up right
now.
In STRATCOM we have now formed an academic alliance with 35
different universities and think tanks to basically try to
reenergize that broader discussion because it is a national
discussion; it is not just a military discussion.
The Chairman. Well, I just think that is very important.
And there have been some articles written about whether you can
analogize cyber deterrence with strategic nuclear deterrence.
And I am not making a point for or against that.
But the key kind of skills about thinking about what will
deter an adversary in whatever realm you are talking about is
something I think we have neglected. And it is encouraging to
me to hear y'all think that that is getting going again and
that, as you say, we are catching up.
Thank you, each of you, for being here today. I think this
has been helpful.
And we will thank you ahead of time for the further
discussions we will have this week and beyond.
Hearing stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:07 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 8, 2017
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 8, 2017
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[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 8, 2017
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH
Mr. Smith. You stated during the hearing that we ``were not
entering an arms race because we bilaterally have a verifiable
inspection regime for the weapons that are deployed. We have capped the
number of weapons that are available.'' However, is there a risk that a
nuclear arms race could still occur because the New START Treaty, while
it imposes caps on launchers, does not impose any limits on the number
of non-deployed or reserve nuclear weapons? Why/why not?
General Selva. The New START Treaty caps the number of deployed
warheads and deployed and non-deployed launchers both sides can
possess. Thus compliance with New START is preventing either side from
``racing.'' There is always risk that a nuclear arms race may occur,
but not because the New START Treaty does not impose any limits on the
number of non-deployed warheads. For example, Russia could decide to
breakout from New START limits and continue its ongoing modernization
program beyond what is allowed under the Treaty. In fact, one of the
purposes of the U.S. stockpile of non-deployed warheads is to deter
such a breakout by enabling us to increase our forces as well.
Mr. Smith. Secretary Work stated before our committee in June 2015,
``Anyone who thinks they can control escalation through the use of
nuclear weapons is literally playing with fire'' and ``Escalation is
escalation, and nuclear use would be the ultimate escalation.'' Do you
agree, and do you think escalation can be reliably controlled? What are
the risks that using a lower-yield nuclear weapon would lead to a
massive nuclear exchange?
General Selva. As there has thankfully never been a limited nuclear
exchange, we do not know whether such escalation can be controlled, and
we cannot know for certain how reliable an effort to control escalation
might be. The use of any nuclear weapon could lead to a large-scale
exchange and the prospect of such uncontrolled escalation arguably
enhances the deterrence of nuclear first use. However, just because we
do not know for certain whether we can control escalation does not mean
we should not attempt it if an adversary uses a nuclear weapon in a
conflict. Were deterrence to fail in a limited way, it would be better
for the President to have a full range of response options, including
options to attempt to control further escalation and reestablish
deterrence.
Mr. Smith. Given the increasing costs for nuclear weapons
modernization and the conventional capabilities requirements, could you
provide a chart to the Committee showing the costs of nuclear weapons
modernization/recapitalization as a percentage of the DOD acquisition
budget over the next 10 years and next 25 years?
General Selva. [See table below.]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FYDP (2017-2021) Estimate 10-Year (2017-2026) Estimate
Program ($B) ($B)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COLUMBIA-Class 13.2 43.7
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ground Based Strategic Deterrent 3.4 13.2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Long Range Stand Off 2.2 5.6
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
B-21\1\ 0.6 1.9
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) 10.7 20.4
Investment \2\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes
1. These amounts represent the nuclear-related costs for the B-21 program which are estimated at 5%.
2. Includes procurement and research, development, test, and evaluation costs.
The Department is still compiling 10-year estimates based on the FY18 budget and cannot offer a 25 year plan.
Mr. Smith. Secretary Work stated before our committee in June 2015,
``Anyone who thinks they can control escalation through the use of
nuclear weapons is literally playing with fire'' and ``Escalation is
escalation, and nuclear use would be the ultimate escalation.'' Do you
agree, and do you think escalation can be reliably controlled? What are
the risks that using a lower-yield nuclear weapon would lead to a
massive nuclear exchange?
General Hyten. I agree with Secretary Work in that escalation
management is a complex concept. In the scenario described, nuclear
employment has occurred and, as an international community, we are in
uncharted waters. That is one of the reasons I do not like to use the
term ``tactical nuclear weapons.'' In my opinion, the employment of any
nuclear weapon is a strategic decision and will demand a strategic
response. Although considerable thought has been paid to the theory of
limited war over more than half a century, there remain considerable
risks of misperception and misunderstanding leading to miscalculation;
which is one reason why dialogue with foreign actors, arms control
agreements, and other mechanisms are so important Again, regardless of
the yield, any use of a nuclear weapon will have strategic implications
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER
Mr. Cooper. Are you concerned about the shift in Russian nuclear
doctrine and potential consequences as a result of such a shift that
could lower the threshold of using nuclear weapons? How can we increase
strategic and regional stability, especially in the context of nuclear
proliferation, modernization, and evolving nuclear doctrines?
General Selva. Yes, I am concerned about Russian nuclear doctrine
and the potential it creates for uncontrolled escalation in a crisis. A
fully modernized U.S. nuclear triad and nonstrategic nuclear forces
raise Russia's threshold for using nuclear weapons because it ensures
our ability to respond should Russia seek to escalate its way out of a
failed conventional conflict. Therefore one way for us to increase
strategic and regional stability is to continue the nuclear
modernization program of record to avoid capability gaps that might
threaten the credibility and effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent.
Another complementary way would be dialogue with Russia regarding
strategic stability to reduce the likelihood of misperception and
miscalculation.
Mr. Cooper. Should nuclear threat reduction and nuclear
nonproliferation be considered as part of the discussions related to
the nuclear posture review? Why/why not?
General Selva. Yes, I believe the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)
should consider aspects of nuclear threat reduction and non-
proliferation because they are important and related national security
interests. I believe our nuclear deterrence policies, strategies and
capabilities provide added insurance to achieve U.S. nuclear
nonproliferation objectives, and are key enablers to reducing threats
to the United States and our allies from nuclear and WMD-armed
adversaries.
Mr. Cooper. Should nuclear threat reduction and nuclear
nonproliferation be considered as part of the discussions related to
the nuclear posture review? Why/why not?
General Hyten. Yes, reducing the threat of nuclear weapon use and
proliferation are essential elements to determining the adequacy of
U.S. nuclear forces' ability to deter nuclear attack against the U.S.,
our allies, and our partners Beyond the nuclear posture review, the
U.S. regularly participates in dialogue with other ``P-5'' members and
the broader international community to improve understanding of nuclear
capabilities and reduce the potential for miscalculation Similarly,
consistent with our treaty obligations, the U.S., along with our allies
and partners, continue to pursue nuclear non-proliferation policies and
strategies to reduce escalatory risks and maintain strategic and
regional stability.
Mr. Cooper. How could the Department increase the incentives for
commonality between the Navy and the Air Force while minimizing risks,
in order to reduce long-term costs for the planned nuclear
modernization?
Admiral Moran. The Navy and the Air Force are both addressing the
challenges of sustaining aging strategic weapon systems in a fiscally
constrained environment, and are working collaboratively to ensure
these capabilities are retained in the long-term. We are seeking
opportunities to leverage technologies and make the best use of scarce
resources. The Navy and the Air Force assessed whether increasing
commonality between the GBSD program and the Trident II (D5) life
extension program could improve affordability while ensuring a safe,
secure, effective and credible nuclear deterrent, as well as retain
essential diversity to hedge due to unforeseen technical problems or
vulnerabilities. The assessment identified some impediments to full
commonality of major subsystems, like solid rocket motors; however, it
also identified several D5 life extension candidate processes and
components that showed promise for application in GBSD development. The
Navy also expects to leverage, where possible and feasible, Air Force
ICBM technologies in the longer-term for its own follow-on strategic
weapon system capability.
Mr. Cooper. Four years ago, you were faced with bad morale and poor
leadership in the ICBM missileer ranks and were called on to address
this problem. What caused the breakdown in leadership? What are the
milestones for improved morale and leadership?
General Wilson. In 2014, various internal and external assessments
identified a number of factors within the Intercontinental Ballistic
Missile (ICBM) force that had contributed to culture and morale issues.
Some of the most frequently cited included a culture of perfection and
micromanagement that had developed, manning and resource constraints
that led to workarounds outside of accepted procedures, and excessive
administrative requirements.
Since 2014, the Air Force has applied deliberate and sustained
focus to strengthen the ICBM mission as well as the broader nuclear
enterprise. Our ongoing efforts--spanning the full-range of personnel,
management, oversight, mission performance, training, testing, and
investment issues--continue to produce tangible and lasting
improvements. We have institutionalized a culture of continuous
improvement and have placed renewed emphasis on establishing effective
processes to assess and oversee the health of the nuclear enterprise.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS
Mr. Rogers. The Congressional Budget Office recently said that
we're planning to spend ``roughly 6 percent'' of the total defense
budget on the nuclear deterrence mission over the next 10 years. In
your professional military judgment, is 6 percent of our defense budget
an appropriate level of spending for the nuclear deterrence mission--
for what you termed in the hearing the nation's highest priority
defense mission?
General Selva. I will re-emphasize that the nuclear deterrent is
the nation's highest priority defense mission and, as such, needs to be
funded appropriately. The past sequestration and budget caps have
negatively impacted the modernization of our nuclear weapon systems and
infrastructure. We have delayed making investments in modernization
which has driven our current systems to the end of their service lives.
Further delays will cause gaps in our capabilities and jeopardize the
nuclear deterrence mission as well as increase costs later. It is
imperative that we fund the nuclear deterrence mission now to assure it
is safe, secure, and effective for years to come.
Mr. Rogers. The hearing touched on how cruise missiles are cost-
imposing capabilities. We know how hard it is defend against cruise
missiles. Please describe how LRSO is a cost-imposing capability/
strategy on our adversaries?
General Selva. LRSO complicates a potential adversary's air defense
problem by presenting many more small and low-observable penetrators
than a single bomber with gravity weapons can present on its own. In
combination with a penetrating bomber, LRSO will significantly reduce a
potential adversary's ability to achieve sanctuary within his borders.
Mr. Rogers. The hearing touched on whether dual-capable air-
launched cruise missiles (ALCM) are destabilizing. Does Russia deploy
such dual-capable ALCMs? How many times has the U.S. fired an ALCM in
combat and did any adversary ever mistake one of those conventional
ALCMs for a nuclear one? Do you believe LRSO would be destabilizing--
why or why not?
General Selva. Russia currently has multiple types of dual-capable
ALCMs. Russia has Kh-101 (conventional) and Kh-102 (nuclear) subsonic
cruise missiles that are comparable to U.S. CALCMs and ALCMs. Russia
also has Kh-32, a dual-capable air-launched supersonic cruise missile
for which the U.S. has nothing comparable. Of note, the Kh-101 and Kh-
102 have significantly greater range than their U.S. counterparts, and
Russian press has reported that Kh-101 was launched from Russian
strategic bombers (Tu-95 and Tu-160) into Syria over the past 6 months.
The United States has employed over 300 CALCMs in various conflicts
since 1991, most recently in 2003 in Iraqi Freedom. None have been
mistaken as nuclear variants. I do not believe LRSO is destabilizing
because, like the ALCM it is replacing, it does not provide a disarming
first strike capability.
Mr. Rogers. Did the Joint Chiefs of Staff examine eliminating LRSO
during the review of nuclear deterrence last year? Did the Joint Chiefs
ultimately recommend continuing to pursue LRSO? Why?
General Selva. As part of the previous Administration's review of
its nuclear policy last year, the Joint Chiefs of Staff evaluated a
proposal to defer the current LRSO acquisition program. The Joint
Chiefs recommended continuing the current program to ensure a
replacement for the Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) is available
before the ALCM ages out. When fielded, LRSO will sustain a nuclear
standoff capability that the ALCM has provided for decades, and it is a
critical element of our ability to enhance deterrence by enabling
credible response options to an adversary's limited or large-scale
nuclear attack.
Mr. Rogers. Are there military requirements that the U.S. military
cannot currently satisfy because we adhere to INF? What are they?
General Selva. There are no military requirements we cannot
currently satisfy due to our compliance with the INF Treaty. While
there is a military requirement to prosecute targets at ranges covered
by the INF Treaty, those fires do not have to be ground-based. However,
ground-based systems would increase both the operational flexibility
and the scale of our intermediate-range strike capabilities. We are
continually monitoring emerging needs in the face of a rapidly changing
security environment. If major shifts in the geopolitical landscape
drive a specific requirement for a ground-based intermediate-range
strike capability, our compliance with the INF Treaty would restrict
our ability to field such systems.
Mr. Rogers. Is there any compelling need to extend the New START
treaty today? The treaty currently goes to 2021. What are some of the
considerations that you, in your professional military opinion, believe
must be addressed in any decision by policymakers to extend this
treaty?
General Selva. No, there is no need to extend New START today. It
is too early to consider extending the Treaty. We are focused this year
on completing our reductions under the Treaty and ensuring Russia meets
its obligations by February 2018 when the Treaty's limits go into
effect. Russia remains in compliance with New START, and I support
continued implementation. New START continues to provide predictability
of and transparency into Russia's strategic forces. However, I
anticipate Russia's violation of its international commitments such as
the INF Treaty will be a consideration in any future arms control
discussions.
Mr. Rogers. Nuclear disarmament advocates are attempting to build
support for a treaty that would ban nuclear weapons around the world.
What are the military ramifications if U.S. allies sign such a treaty?
How might that affect our military, including alliance commitments to
NATO and the ability to deter and assure in Europe?
General Selva. If allies sign a treaty to ban nuclear weapons, it
would undermine long-standing security relationships that have
underpinned the international security structure in place since the end
of World War II. Efforts to negotiate such a treaty also seek to
delegitimize nuclear deterrence, which would be at fundamental odds
with the extended deterrence guarantees that we provide to allies in
Europe and Asia. Therefore, if NATO Allies were to sign such a treaty,
it would undermine longstanding U.S. extended deterrence commitments,
which are a core element of NATO's deterrence and defense posture.
Mr. Rogers. Do you believe we should pause or defer development of
LRSO to wait to see if we can successfully negotiate a treaty banning
on cruise missiles? In your professional military judgment, do you see
indications that Russia would negotiate, agree to, and abide by such a
treaty, given their ongoing violation of the INF Treaty?
General Selva. No, I do not believe we should pause or defer
development of LRSO to wait for a successful negotiation of a treaty
banning cruise missiles. As I stated in my testimony, we are currently
depending on ``just-in-time'' modernization and replacement of our
nuclear forces, and that is certainly true of LRSO replacing the aging
Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM). In my view, there is no chance
Russia or any of the numerous countries who possess cruise missiles
would negotiate or agree to such a treaty if the United States did not
also have a credible and effective cruise missile capability.
Mr. Rogers. The Congressional Budget Office recently said that
we're planning to spend ``roughly 6 percent'' of the total defense
budget on the nuclear deterrence mission over the next 10 years. In
your professional military judgment, is 6 percent of our defense budget
an appropriate level of spending for the nuclear deterrence mission--
for what you termed in the hearing the nation's highest priority
defense mission?
General Hyten. Yes. Modernization underpins national security and
will enable the U.S. to defend itself and Allies against existing and
emerging existential threats. Any further modernization delays will
result in the loss of deterrent capability. Recapitalization last
occurred in the 1980s and accounted for 12% of defense spending.
Mr. Rogers. The hearing touched on how cruise missiles are cost-
imposing capabilities. We know how hard it is defend against cruise
missiles. Please describe how LRSO is a cost-imposing capability/
strategy on our adversaries?
General Hyten. The combination of LRSO attributes (ability to
launch beyond range of adversary defenses, hold large geographical area
at risk, low observable signature, multi-axis routing, large attack
packages) severely challenges the effectiveness of even the most
advanced Integrated Air Defense System (IADS). Huge investments and
technological advancements in detection, tracking, command and control,
and area/point defenses are required to challenge LRSO viability.
Mr. Rogers. The hearing touched on whether dual-capable air-
launched cruise missiles (ALCM) are destabilizing. Does Russia deploy
such dual-capable ALCMs? How many times has the U.S. fired an ALCM in
combat and did any adversary ever mistake one of those conventional
ALCMs for a nuclear one? Do you believe LRSO would be destabilizing--
why or why not?
General Hyten. Yes, Russia deploys dual capable cruise missiles.
The United States has launched a total of 369 Conventional Air Launch
Cruise Missiles (CALCMs) and over 2,000 Tactical Land Attack Missiles
(TLAMs) in combat since 1987. None have been mischaracterized by an
adversary as a nuclear ALCM/TLAM-N. I do not believe LRSO is
destabilizing--nuclear cruise missiles have existed for decades.
Mr. Rogers. Would you please describe the military requirements
driving the need for GBSD? What are the military effectiveness and cost
implications of choosing to life extend the current Minuteman III
missile fleet and related ground infrastructure, rather than pursue
GBSD?
General Hyten. Minuteman availability and effectiveness is
increasingly challenged due to system and component age-out, asset
attrition, and facility degradation issues. As Minuteman III has done
for over 40 years, GBSD will continue to provide a responsive, highly
reliable, cost effective force as part of a credible strategic
deterrent capability. GBSD enhances strategic stability by forcing
potential adversaries to commit a large number of highly accurate
ballistic missiles and warheads in order to defeat the force. This
``barrier to entry'' encourages restraint as no adversary could defeat
GBSD without considering the consequences of a U.S. retaliatory
response. 2014 GBSD Analysis of Alternatives determined the entire
Minuteman weapon system, to include the C2 infrastructure, requires
modernization beginning in 2028 and concluded executing the GBSD
program is more cost effective than an additional Minuteman life
extension.
Mr. Rogers. Where do you see the greatest cost and technical risks
in the GBSD program? For example, what is your view on the priority of
possible mobile command and control concepts being considered for GBSD?
General Hyten. From USSTRATCOM's perspective, the greatest cost and
technical risk is executing a modernization program that goes beyond
replacing the missile. GBSD must be a fully integrated weapon system
spanning flight systems, weapon system command and control, missile
facilities, and the supporting equipment. The U.S. has not conducted
this level of work in the ICBM force for several decades and it will
require years of dedicated work and consistent investment to execute
the program successfully. USSTRATCOM supports the Air Force's
integrated weapon system approach which focuses low technical risk
solutions to deliver the required capabilities as the Minuteman force
retires. The Technical Maturation and Risk Reduction (TMRR) phase's
objective is to investigate technologies which reduce development and
production risk while meeting strategic deterrence requirements. As
part of this process, the TMRR will examine a full range of options,
including mobile command and control concepts, to meet our
requirements.
Mr. Rogers. We've seen a lot of GBSD acquisition details loaded
into unclassified acquisition databases run by the Air Force. We all
know that Russia, China, and others scoop all of that stuff up and
analyze it intensively. Why is all of this put out in the open? Should
we reassess what is unclassified in these acquisition documents?
General Hyten. We share your concerns regarding the amount of
program information that is available. We need to assess our
acquisition processes to strike a balance between protecting our
national security and providing industry the information they need to
develop our weapon systems while preventing the release of sensitive
information. We will continue assessing the information we must provide
to industry while safeguarding our classified information through DOD
security procedures and safeguards.
Mr. Rogers. Please explain why we must replace Vietnam-era UH-1N
``Huey'' helicopters that are currently used to help protect our ICBM
fields? Is it the case that one of the two security requirements can't
be met without new helicopters? Should this replacement be pursued with
all possible speed? Why? When you rescinded your request for forces,
what was your understanding of the date for issuance of the RFP for
this program? Has that date shifted?
General Hyten. The 1960's era UH-1N fleet does not have the
required speed, range, endurance, payload or survivability to fully
execute the emergency response mission. USSTRATCOM's rescinding the
Request For Forces (RFF) was not intended to diminish the need for a
replacement helicopter, but to support a focused effort on fielding a
replacement aircraft as soon as possible. At the time of the RFF
rescission it was my understanding that the Final Request For Proposal
(RFP) release was to be February 2017. Due to industry feedback a
second draft RFP was required and a final RFP is expected in summer
2017. The Air Force plans to award a contract in FY18 that will result
in delivery of the first operational helicopter in the FY21 timeframe.
I was very unhappy when the Air Force notified me of the need to
reissue the RFP. This should be a simple and straight forward
acquisition. I rescinded the RFF to ensure that the entire community
was focused on the new helicopter. I will continue to monitor this
closely.
Mr. Rogers. At the hearing, you said that ``rough parity is
actually a good thing'' in deterrence. I agree. In broad terms, how
does Russia's ability to produce nuclear weapons compare to the U.S.
capability at this time? Is this disparity in production capacity a
risk to the United States?
General Hyten. Russia is assessed to have a significantly greater
production capacity than the U.S. due to the preservation of a large,
modernized infrastructure (roughly comparable to Cold War era Soviet
Union capability). This infrastructure has enabled the continuous
modernization, expansion, and diversification of Russia's nuclear
arsenal. The U.S. has moved to a much smaller infrastructure with a
manufacturing capacity that limits our ability to address, within a
relevant time-frame component age-out and advancing adversary
capabilities. Although our nuclear stockpile is safe and secure, the
disparity in manufacturing capability puts the U.S. at a possible
future disadvantage from technical risks associated with an aging
stockpile and geopolitical risks, if Russia were to abandon parity and
seek to achieve supremacy.
Mr. Rogers. At the hearing, you said that ``rough parity is
actually a good thing'' in deterrence. You also said that for non-
strategic nuclear weapons, ``the Russian numbers are huge and our
numbers are small.'' We also know that Russia operates many different
types of non-strategic nuclear weapons while the U.S. operates
essentially one. Is this disparity a risk to the United States?
General Hyten. The distinction between tactical and strategic
nuclear weapons is nebulous--anybody that employs a nuclear weapon in
the world has created a strategic effect--all nuclear weapons are
strategic. Our current force structure, i.e. the Triad, is sufficient
to maintain strategic stability and manage the risk you are referring
to. The disparity between U.S. and Russian non-strategic nuclear
systems only becomes an issue if our nuclear modernization program is
not implemented. I am, however, concerned with the recent Russia
deployment of a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) in violation of
the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. We will need to decide,
as a nation, how to respond. I expect this will be addressed in the
upcoming Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).
Mr. Rogers. What are the impacts to the credibility of our nuclear
deterrent if we see major schedule slips to any of these programs? How
will such slips be seen by both our allies and our potential
adversaries?
General Hyten. All three legs of our TRIAD are serving well beyond
their planned service life, experiencing age related degradation, with
replacements characterized as just in time. There is no schedule margin
remaining for any program slips. Any further delays and/or
cancellations will result in the loss of deterrent capabilities and
failure to meet our strategic objectives and extended deterrent
commitments causing adversaries, allies and partners to doubt the
credibility of the U.S. deterrent.
Mr. Rogers. Do you agree with the characterization that we hear
that our nuclear forces, particularly our ICBMs, are on ``hair trigger
alert''? Please tell us what open-ocean targeting is and why it is
important?
General Hyten. No, our nuclear forces are not on ``hair trigger
alert.'' Comprehensive and redundant personnel, technical, and
procedural safeguards preclude the unauthorized use of TRIAD nuclear
forces. U.S. nuclear forces proactively strive for the utmost safety
and security standards, to include the practice of ``open-ocean
targeting.'' Our nuclear command and control system is constantly
exercised to ensure that only the President, after consultations with
his senior advisors and military leaders, can authorize any employment
of our nuclear forces. ``Open-ocean targeting,'' is the practice of
loading our ICBMs/SLBMs with target coordinates located in open ocean
areas. The practice of ``Open-ocean targeting,'' was implemented as
part of the 1994 Moscow declaration with the stated purpose to protect
the U.S. and Russia from an accidental or unauthorized nuclear strike
by the other.
Mr. Rogers. The Congressional Budget Office recently said that
we're planning to spend ``roughly 6 percent'' of the total defense
budget on the nuclear deterrence mission over the next 10 years. In
your professional military judgment, is 6 percent of our defense budget
an appropriate level of spending for the nuclear deterrence mission--
for what you termed in the hearing the nation's highest priority
defense mission?
Admiral Moran. Yes. The 1-2% of the national defense budget for the
sea based strategic deterrent is appropriate and consistent with what
our nation previously invested to build both the ``41 for Freedom'' in
the 1960s and the first nuclear modernization with the OHIO Class in
the 1980s. Beyond deterring the threat of massive attack on the United
States, having credible nuclear forces is essential to assuring our
allies of our extended deterrence commitments, thereby convincing them
that they don't need to pursue their own nuclear weapons.
Mr. Rogers. The Congressional Budget Office recently said that
we're planning to spend ``roughly 6 percent'' of the total defense
budget on the nuclear deterrence mission over the next 10 years. In
your professional military judgment, is 6 percent of our defense budget
an appropriate level of spending for the nuclear deterrence mission--
for what you termed in the hearing the nation's highest priority
defense mission?
General Wilson. Making the necessary investments in modernization
to ensure our nuclear forces remain credible and effective in the years
ahead is of paramount importance. The level of investment is
commensurate with the priority the Department of Defense places on this
mission and its foundational role in our National defense.
Mr. Rogers. The hearing touched on how cruise missiles are cost-
imposing capabilities. We know how hard it is defend against cruise
missiles. Please describe how LRSO is a cost-imposing capability/
strategy on our adversaries?
General Wilson. Developing and deploying defensive systems capable
of detecting, tracking, and defeating the Long-Range Standoff (LRSO)
weapon would require a potential adversary to expend significant
technical and financial resources. This investment in defensive systems
diminishes the amount of resources a potential adversary can expend on
the development and fielding of offensive capabilities.
Mr. Rogers. The hearing touched on whether dual-capable air-
launched cruise missiles (ALCM) are destabilizing. Does Russia deploy
such dual-capable ALCMs? How many times has the U.S. fired an ALCM in
combat and did any adversary ever mistake one of those conventional
ALCMs for a nuclear one? Do you believe LRSO would be destabilizing--
why or why not?
General Wilson. The Russian Federation possess dual-capable air-
launched cruise missiles.
Since its first use during Operation Desert Storm in 1991, more
than 350 conventional air launched cruise missiles (CALCM) have been
employed by the Air Force in combat. The Air Force is not aware of any
of these CALCM launches being mistaken for nuclear-armed air launched
cruise missiles.
I do not believe the Long-Range Standoff (LRSO) weapon would be
destabilizing. The U.S. has employed CALCMs in combat for more than 25
years without strategic miscalculation.
Mr. Rogers. What are the military effectiveness and cost
implications of choosing to life extend the current Minuteman III
missile fleet and related ground infrastructure, rather than pursue
GBSD?
General Wilson. Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) is the only
cost-effective solution that will fully meet Combatant Commander
requirements through 2075. The GBSD program addresses the challenges of
the future strategic environment that a life-extended Minuteman III (MM
III) Intercontinental Ballistic Missile cannot and will do so for
approximately the same cost. MM III was designed and fielded to counter
1970s-era threats; in the decades since, advancements in adversary
capabilities have created a significant and growing threat to MM III's
effectiveness.
Life extending MM III would not provide combat capability to 2075
and would also require multiple sub-system recapitalization programs,
including the flight system (i.e. boosters, propulsion system rocket
engine, and guidance and control), weapon system command and control,
and associated physical infrastructure. In some areas, integration of
remanufactured legacy components would create new and complex
compatibility issues, lead to higher costs, and fail to provide
critical capability upgrades. These and other challenges--such as
obsolescence and age-out of critical subsystems, asset depletion, and
diminishing manufacturing sources--make GBSD the only cost-effective
option that will deliver credible and effective combat capability
through 2075.
Mr. Rogers. Please describe the process the Air Force used during
the analysis of alternatives (AOA) for the GBSD program. Did it
thoroughly examine all options? Did it rigorously follow DOD and CAPE
guidance on how to conduct an AOA?
General Wilson. Yes, the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD)
Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) rigorously followed Department of
Defense processes, was structured in accordance with the Office of Cost
Assessment & Program Evaluation (CAPE) study guidance and included
direct Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) oversight through a
Study Advisory Group (SAG) chaired by Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics and CAPE senior leadership. The GBSD AOA study team complied
with all CAPE/DOD guidance as part of the assessment. The GBSD study
team conducted the AOA based upon CAPE's GBSD AOA Guidance, dated
August 28, 2013. Furthermore, CAPE provided sufficiency review and
concurrence for the GBSD AOA on November 10, 2015.
The AOA explored trade space in performance, schedule, and cost
across the full range of strategic options to include the impacts of
not meeting validated GBSD Initial Capability Document requirements.
The AOA was conducted in two parts: Part one was a basing mode analysis
with a primary focus on survivability; Part two analyzed the Minuteman
III (MM III) delivery system and focused on MM III recapitalization or
replacement. Additionally, Part two assessed the entire range of
validated gaps against several combinations of missile subsystems, to
include propulsion (boost and post boost), guidance, navigation and
control, re-entry systems, including existing and new technologies and
associated industrial base.
While the aforementioned options thoroughly examined basing modes
and delivery systems, the compression of the AOA timeline and funding
(from 18-months to 10-months) did require additional post-AOA
assessment of the Nuclear Command and Control (NC2) system to include
detailed NC2 architecture definition and an industrial base interface
analysis.
Mr. Rogers. Is the Air Force looking at pursuing putting new
engines on the B-52 fleet and leverage third party financing to do
this? This seems like a smart way to get this done in the near-term
while making the B-52 much more efficient and military effective for
the long-term.
General Wilson. The Air Force is assessing options to re-engine the
B-52 should it become a funded program.
Additionally, the Air Force is assessing the potential use of third
party financing options for the production phase of a re-engine
program. The initial B-52 re-engine Business Case Analysis (BCA)
indicates significant benefits with lifetime savings exceeding program
costs. Payback comes from a variety of engine related expenses; fuel
only provides 23% of the savings. Several factors contribute to the BCA
include: escalating engine overhaul and related costs; diminishing
sources of supply; engine related repair costs; fuel costs; increased
electrical power needs. New engines would also increase the B-52's
electrical power generation, which would support future modernization
efforts.
The Air Force requested $10 million in the Fiscal Year 2017
President's Budget (FY17PB) Amendment that was not received. The funds
were to be used to continue more detailed analysis and pre-acquisition
planning and preparation for a potential re-engine program. Efforts
include, but not limited to, analysis of engine data to determine best
value engines, scoping aircraft integration requirements for engines
(avionics, structural, electrical), and initial program documentation
preparation and support. The FY18PB requests $10 million for these
efforts.
Mr. Rogers. Do you agree with the characterization that we hear
that our nuclear forces, particularly our ICBMs, are on ``hair trigger
alert''? Please tell us what open-ocean targeting is and why it is
important?
General Wilson. The assertion that the Nation's Intercontinental
Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) are on ``hair trigger alert'' is incorrect.
The Minuteman III ICBM relies on extremely robust and secure command
and control that ensures only the President can authorize a launch.
All U.S. ICBMs are targeted day-to-day against areas in the open
ocean. Prior to launch, ICBMs must to be retargeted from the ocean to
their land-based targets. The U.S. and Russia agreed to implement this
confidence building practice in 1994.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER
Ms. Speier. The President has called publicly for a ``build-up'' in
our nuclear arsenal, claiming we've been ``falling behind'' our
adversaries. I don't understand what metric he's using to make that
assessment, and your statements mention nothing about an expansion
being needed to meet our warfighting and deterrence requirements. Are
you able to corroborate the President's claim that there's a valid
requirement for new warheads? Do you have any idea on what he's basing
his claim?
General Selva. We are initiating a Nuclear Posture Review at the
direction of the President. I anticipate this review will consider the
changes in the global security environment since the previous NPR
(2010) and assess U.S. nuclear policy, strategy, and capabilities
against the current and future threat environment. Once the 2017 NPR is
completed, we will have higher confidence in any recommendations that
may result in changes to U.S. nuclear policy, strategy, and
capabilities.
Ms. Speier. The President has derided the New START Treaty as
``one-sided'' and a ``bad deal.'' This is in stark contrast to comments
made last week by Lieutenant General Jack Weinstein, the Air Force
Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration.
General Weinstein said that the agreement has been ``good for us.'' He
further explained that ``The reason you do a treaty is not to cut
forces but to maintain strategic stability among world powers . . . I
think there is a huge value with what the New START treaty has
provided.'' General Selva: Do you agree with General Weinstein? Is the
Chairman prepared to offer his best military advice on this question to
the President?
General Selva. I believe the New START Treaty remains in the
national security interest of the United States as long as Russia
complies with its terms. Russia is currently in compliance with New
START, and I support continued implementation. The Treaty has provided
transparency, predictability, and stability over the past six years
since the Treaty entered into force and has helped increase mutual
confidence. The Chairman is prepared to offer his best military advice
on this question to the President.
Ms. Speier. President Obama declared that the greatest threat to
international security is a terrorist with a nuclear weapon--not a
state program. From what we can tell so far, President Trump also seems
to be prioritizing the terrorist threat. Yet we're talking here about
spending--according to independent estimates--up to a trillion dollars
over the next several decades on programs that have effectively zero
value against terrorists. At the same time, I'm concerned that,
following an intensive international effort during the Obama
administration to lock down nuclear material that could fall into the
hands of terrorists, our nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear threat
reduction programs at the Departments of Energy and Defense will be
getting short shrift under this administration. Are you prepared to
recommend to the Secretary and the President a sustained--or even
increased--level of funding for U.S. Government nuclear
nonproliferation and threat reduction programs?
General Selva. I support a continued multifaceted approach to
countering nuclear proliferation, including adequate funding for the
nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear threat reduction programs at the
Departments of Energy and Defense.
Ms. Speier. The string of problems that led to the 2014 Nuclear
Enterprise Review are a stunning example of how the Department can
spend billions on bombers, missiles, and subs--and then have military
readiness degraded by something incredibly stupid like mass cheating on
competency examinations, or failing to properly maintain the equipment
we already have. Can you please provide more details on how you will
ensure that the fundamentals of maintenance, morale, and management
don't get lost in the push to modernize?
Admiral Moran. The Nuclear Deterrent Enterprise Review in 2014
included an internal and external review and resulting in the
establishment of the Nuclear Deterrence Enterprise Review Group (NDERG)
by the Secretary of Defense. The NDERG codified senior leader
accountability and brought together all the elements of the nuclear
force into a coherent enterprise. The efforts following the review
strengthened the oversight and regulatory elements to ensure the
fundamentals of maintenance, morale, and management are fully supported
and integrated as we move forward with modernization.
In addition, the Department of the Navy took the following actions
to further strengthen the actions we were already taking in oversight
and management of the Navy's top mission.
- The Navy expanded the Nuclear Deterrence Mission Oversight
Council (NNDMOC) to include support commands and nuclear command,
control and communications (NC3). The council coordinates Navy nuclear
weapon activities and provides oversight, operations, personnel,
policy, and material support. The council meets every two months and is
updated on various aspects of the Navy's Nuclear Weapons Enterprise.
- Strategic Systems Program (SSP) was assigned the responsibility
as regulatory lead, reporting directly to the Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO) for the Navy nuclear deterrence mission. SSP performs a
continuous independent end-to-end assessment, reporting annually to the
CNO.
- Biennially the Navy continues to conduct a comprehensive Navy
Nuclear Weapons Assessment (NNWA) and reports the results to the Chief
of Naval Operations. The assessment includes specific site visits and
inspections to assess compliance with higher level guidance and also
the fundamentals of maintenance, morale, and management, as well as
security, safety, operations and facilities.
Ms. Speier. The President has derided the New START Treaty as
``one-sided'' and a ``bad deal.'' This is in stark contrast to comments
made last week by Lieutenant General Jack Weinstein, the Air Force
Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration.
General Weinstein said that the agreement has been ``good for us.'' He
further explained that ``The reason you do a treaty is not to cut
forces but to maintain strategic stability among world powers . . . I
think there is a huge value with what the New START treaty has
provided.'' General Wilson: Do you side with the comments made by your
Deputy Chief of Staff, or with those by the President?
General Wilson. The United States has consistently maintained its
obligations under the New START Treaty. It is a bilateral, verifiable
agreement that provides the U.S. with some degree of predictability on
Russia's capabilities and intentions concerning their strategic forces.
The President recently directed a bottom-up review of the U.S.'s
nuclear posture, an effort that may include a review of existing
treaties and agreements.
Ms. Speier. The string of problems that led to the 2014 Nuclear
Enterprise Review are a stunning example of how the Department can
spend billions on bombers, missiles, and subs--and then have military
readiness degraded by something incredibly stupid like mass cheating on
competency examinations, or failing to properly maintain the equipment
we already have. Can you please provide more details on how you will
ensure that the fundamentals of maintenance, morale, and management
don't get lost in the push to modernize?
General Wilson. The Air Force continues to apply deliberate and
sustained focus towards strengthening the nuclear enterprise. In recent
years we have implemented major organizational changes and streamlined
authorities to ensure the nuclear mission receives the focus it
deserves. We have institutionalized a culture of continuous improvement
and are developing a comprehensive assessment tool to monitor and
evaluate the health of the nuclear enterprise. Our goal is for this
process to enable early identification of issues and elevate them to
senior leadership before they escalate into problems.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. HANABUSA
Ms. Hanabusa. Given the significant modernization needs of the
Triad, particularly the deterrent abilities of our ICBMs and our bomber
fleet, how or why do you assume that fully modernizing the entire Triad
system is the threshold we need to meet? If we are figuring out the
best way to modernize our capabilities, shouldn't we focus on how our
adversaries like Russia, China, and North Korea will arm and develop
and how we can best counter them?
General Selva. We work closely with our partners in the
intelligence community to ensure that the decisions we make on the
future of our nuclear deterrent are informed by the current and
projected threat environment. In fact, it is this very uncertainty
regarding the future, particularly with respect to adversary
capabilities, that a triad of nuclear forces hedges against. Numerous
reviews conducted over multiple Administrations have considered whether
the United States still needs a triad of nuclear forces. Each one
determined that a nuclear triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles,
strategic bombers, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles provides
the most effective deterrent against the only existential threat to our
Nation, and is therefore essential to our national security. I have
participated in some of these reviews, and I agree with this
conclusion.
Ms. Hanabusa. Given the significant modernization needs of the
Triad, particularly the deterrent abilities of our ICBMs and our bomber
fleet, how or why do you assume that fully modernizing the entire Triad
system is the threshold we need to meet? If we are figuring out the
best way to modernize our capabilities, shouldn't we focus on how our
adversaries like Russia, China, and North Korea will arm and develop
and how we can best counter them?
General Hyten. Our nuclear modernization program has taken into
account a range of factors with respect to potential adversary
developments, not just offensive systems but defensive capabilities as
well, to ensure the continued effectiveness of our deterrent forces.
Moreover, because we cannot predict with absolute certainty the
direction potential adversaries might choose to invest in their nuclear
weapons programs; we maintain a flexible, responsive, and survivable
force that can meet a diverse range of threats. Collectively, the
comprehensive nuclear modernization program ensures an appropriate
range of options for the President to deter and achieve his objectives
if deterrence fails.
Ms. Hanabusa. Given the significant modernization needs of the
Triad, particularly the deterrent abilities of our ICBMs and our bomber
fleet, how or why do you assume that fully modernizing the entire Triad
system is the threshold we need to meet? If we are figuring out the
best way to modernize our capabilities, shouldn't we focus on how our
adversaries like Russia, China, and North Korea will arm and develop
and how we can best counter them?
Admiral Moran. Our nation's nuclear triad of intercontinental
ballistic missiles, strategic bombers, and submarine launched ballistic
missiles are essential to our nation's security because they have been
proven over time and we assess they will remain a necessary deterrent
as long as nuclear weapons exist. Sea-based strategic deterrence is the
Navy's #1 investment priority and is the bedrock of our ability to
deter aggression by major adversaries and to assure our partners and
allies. Maintaining our ability to deter threats against the U.S., our
allies, and partners is critical to our national security and strategy.
Recommendations for adjustments to the U.S. nuclear force structure and
stockpile should be addressed after careful consideration of the
current security environment and potential threats in the pending
Nuclear Posture Review.
Ms. Hanabusa. Given the significant modernization needs of the
Triad, particularly the deterrent abilities of our ICBMs and our bomber
fleet, how or why do you assume that fully modernizing the entire Triad
system is the threshold we need to meet? If we are figuring out the
best way to modernize our capabilities, shouldn't we focus on how our
adversaries like Russia, China, and North Korea will arm and develop
and how we can best counter them?
General Wilson. Sustaining the Triad will best maintain the U.S.'s
ability to preserve strategic stability, deter major conventional and
nuclear attack against the homeland or our allies and partners in the
21st century security environment. Combined, the distinct attributes
and capabilities of each of the Triad's legs creates valuable
synergistic deterrence effects that provide superior risk-mitigation
against geopolitical uncertainty and technical surprise. Multiple
studies conducted by multiple administrations have shown that the triad
is the best way to provide an effective nuclear deterrent and assurance
to our allies. Accordingly, this structure has allowed the U.S. to make
significant reductions in nuclear force posture over the decades while
preserving confidence in the reliability, credibility and effectiveness
of the nuclear force.
We are not modernizing the Triad to keep parity with modernization
efforts of other nuclear weapon states. We are modernizing because it
is long overdue and our capabilities must remain credible and effective
in the eyes of potential adversaries.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. WENSTRUP
Dr. Wenstrup. How do developments in foreign nuclear weapon
programs, or other strategic weapon capabilities, factor into your
recommendations and military assessments on the future of our nuclear
deterrent? Specifically:
a) What developments in foreign programs or actions of foreign
nations concern you, and how does that factor into your planning and
programs for the U.S. nuclear deterrent?
b) Over the long term, when other countries continue to build new
military nuclear capabilities, will our nuclear deterrent remain
credible if we don't also continue to improve our nuclear capabilities?
General Selva. In recent years, Russia has rejected our overtures
to take the next step in arms control and is in the midst of
modernizing its entire strategic triad, along with developing new
nonstrategic nuclear systems and weapons. Russia is also violating the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and has threatened to
use nuclear weapons against our NATO Allies. Nuclear weapons have been
assigned increased prominence in Russian strategy and doctrine.
Meanwhile, China continues to modernize and increase its nuclear
forces, and North Korea continues its drive towards a nuclear weapon
capability that can reach the United States. These threats underscore
the urgency behind our nuclear modernization program of record, and the
need to avoid further delays that would have severe impacts on the
credibility and effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent.
Dr. Wenstrup. How do developments in foreign nuclear weapon
programs, or other strategic weapon capabilities, factor into your
recommendations and military assessments on the future of our nuclear
deterrent? Specifically:
a) What developments in foreign programs or actions of foreign
nations concern you, and how does that factor into your planning and
programs for the U.S. nuclear deterrent?
b) Over the long term, when other countries continue to build new
military nuclear capabilities, will our nuclear deterrent remain
credible if we don't also continue to improve our nuclear capabilities?
General Hyten. a) The pursuit of offensive cross-domain and/or
asymmetric capabilities (cyber, hypersonic, counterspace. . .) designed
to challenge U.S. national security strategy drive the need to
continuously evaluate and re-prioritize assumptions within existing
plans and programs, to include the nuclear deterrent.
b) The U.S. nuclear deterrent will remain credible if we ensure
sufficient flexibility, responsiveness, and survivability in the force
structure. The current, Congressionally-funded modernization program is
designed to achieve these ends. I anticipate the upcoming NPR will
provide additional clarity and guidance on this subject.
Dr. Wenstrup. How do developments in foreign nuclear weapon
programs, or other strategic weapon capabilities, factor into your
recommendations and military assessments on the future of our nuclear
deterrent? Specifically:
a) What developments in foreign programs or actions of foreign
nations concern you, and how does that factor into your planning and
programs for the U.S. nuclear deterrent?
b) Over the long term, when other countries continue to build new
military nuclear capabilities, will our nuclear deterrent remain
credible if we don't also continue to improve our nuclear capabilities?
Admiral Moran. The assumptions of Russia and other potential
adversaries now and in the future on nuclear force structures,
capability developments, and doctrines play a major role in our
assessments of the current and future threat environment. Our
assessments directly contribute to the strategy and force structure
decisions of the future. Maintaining our ability to deter and, if
deterrence fails, respond to future threats underpins our national
strategy and is critical to this nation, our allies, and partners
security. The results of the Nuclear Posture Review will inform any
recommendations to the existing nuclear TRIAD program of record that
will ensure our deterrent forces remain credible.
Dr. Wenstrup. How do developments in foreign nuclear weapon
programs, or other strategic weapon capabilities, factor into your
recommendations and military assessments on the future of our nuclear
deterrent? Specifically:
a) What developments in foreign programs or actions of foreign
nations concern you, and how does that factor into your planning and
programs for the U.S. nuclear deterrent?
b) Over the long term, when other countries continue to build new
military nuclear capabilities, will our nuclear deterrent remain
credible if we don't also continue to improve our nuclear capabilities?
General Wilson. I am concerned about Russian, Chinese, and North
Korean military modernization efforts, continued aggression seeking to
annex international borders or waters, and the increase in ballistic
missile development from regional actors such as Iran. To maintain a
credible deterrent against this ever-evolving threat, our planning and
programs must provide flexible options for the President across the
entire spectrum of conflict.
The credibility of our nuclear deterrent relies on the capability
of our nuclear weapons; our Nation's will to use them; and also the
perception of potential adversaries regarding our capabilities and
will.
Foregoing modernization would send a strong message to potential
adversaries that we are not serious about maintaining any strategic
advantage or technological superiority. This will weaken our
credibility and may incentivize other nations to challenge U.S.
influence and the ability to operate around the globe. Furthermore, any
changes in U.S. nuclear force structure directly impacts U.S.
commitment to our allies.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. ROSEN
Ms. Rosen. Given Russia's threats towards its neighbors, NATO, and
the United States, its openly discussed doctrine to use nuclear weapons
early in a conflict to ``de-escalate'' and get the United States to
back down, its use of ``hybrid warfare'' against neighbors and
potentially against NATO member states--what are the risks of a
conflict in Europe involving the U.S. and Russia? What are the risks of
such a conflict escalating to the use of nuclear weapons? Why has
Russia adopted such a doctrine?
General Selva. The risk of a conflict in Europe involving NATO and
Russia is a function of the credibility of NATO's deterrence posture.
U.S. and U.K. extended nuclear deterrence guarantees are critically
important elements of that posture. This posture is designed to help
convince the Russian leadership that they cannot escalate their way out
of a failed conventional conflict. Exactly why Russia is pursuing its
current defense doctrine is uncertain, but I believe it reflects a
desire to compensate for Russia's perceived conventional inferiority
vis-a-vis the United States and NATO. The President has directed a
Nuclear Posture Review to ensure our nuclear policies, strategies, and
capabilities continue to address an increasingly complex security
environment.
Ms. Rosen. Do you believe the U.S. should have parity with Russia
in terms of numbers or capabilities regarding nuclear weapons? Why?
What are the differences between U.S. and Russian nuclear force
structures, sizes, and doctrine? How do they compare to those of other
nuclear powers?
General Selva. I believe maintaining rough parity with Russia in
terms of nuclear capability is the surest way to maintain strategic
stability. The United States and Russia have each designed their
nuclear force structure and doctrine to meet their own perceived
security needs. The Russians tend to rely more heavily on
intercontinental ballistic missiles and non-strategic nuclear weapons,
while the United States relies more heavily on submarine-launched
ballistic missiles. The nuclear forces of the United States and Russia
remain far larger than those of other nuclear powers.
Ms. Rosen. What advice would you offer to the Nuclear Posture
Review that President Trump has tasked Secretary Mattis to carry out?
What threats, risks, or opportunities have changed since the Obama
administration's Nuclear Posture Review was written in 2010?
General Selva. I anticipate the review will consider the changes in
the global security environment since the previous NPR (2010), and
assess U.S. nuclear policy, strategy, and capabilities against the
current and future current threat environment. Once we complete this
NPR, we will provide informed recommendations on U.S. nuclear policy,
strategy, and capabilities for the Secretary to present to the
President for consideration. There have been significant changes in the
security environment since 2010. Russia has been found in violation of
the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty; invaded its
neighbor, Ukraine; and publicly threatened nuclear use against our NATO
Allies--all while continuing a comprehensive modernization of its
nuclear forces. Additionally, China has become increasingly assertive
in the South China Sea and is also modernizing and expanding its
nuclear forces. North Korea continues its drive towards a nuclear
weapon that can reach the United States, and the Iranian ballistic
missile program, which is not covered under the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action, continues to make progress on weapon systems that
threaten our allies and partners in the region.
Ms. Rosen. President Obama indicated that he was willing to further
reduce U.S. deployed strategic nuclear weapons by up to one-third--to
around 1,000. The Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated at that time that it
would support these reductions if they are bilateral and verifiable. Do
you believe we should pursue such reductions while Russia is in
violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and other
arms control obligations?
General Selva. We are conducting a Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)
which will include a review of our nuclear arms control policy. Even if
the results of the NPR indicate that further reductions are desirable,
we need to consider Russia's current non-compliance with several arms
control agreements as well its disregard for other international
obligations before pursuing new negotiations with Russia. Additionally,
I would only support an effort to pursue further reductions if the
resulting agreement was verifiable.
Ms. Rosen. Given Russia's threats towards its neighbors, NATO, and
the United States, its openly discussed doctrine to use nuclear weapons
early in a conflict to ``de-escalate'' and get the United States to
back down, its use of ``hybrid warfare'' against neighbors and
potentially against NATO member states--what are the risks of a
conflict in Europe involving the U.S. and Russia? What are the risks of
such a conflict escalating to the use of nuclear weapons? Why has
Russia adopted such a doctrine?
General Hyten. Russia's aggressive actions towards its neighbors
and confrontational posture towards NATO have heightened the risk of
conflict in Europe. U.S. and NATO actions are meant to deter further
destabilizing Russian behavior and reduce the risk of conflict in
Europe. Russia's ``escalate to deescalate'' doctrine is based on a
belief that increasing the costs to an adversary, to include use of
nuclear weapons, will induce termination of a conflict. Russia's
assessment of American resolve in such a scenario and Russia's belief
in its ability to manage escalation dynamics following any nuclear
employment are deeply flawed.
Ms. Rosen. Do you believe the U.S. should have parity with Russia
in terms of numbers or capabilities regarding nuclear weapons? Why?
What are the differences between U.S. and Russian nuclear force
structures, sizes, and doctrine? How do they compare to those of other
nuclear powers?
General Hyten. I believe there is no distinction between the use of
tactical and strategic nuclear weapons--anybody who employs a nuclear
weapon in the world has created a strategic effect. While I acknowledge
Russia maintains significantly more tactical nuclear weapons, I believe
we have strategic parity and our current force structure is sufficient
to maintain strategic stability and manage risk. Russian doctrine
incorporates a broader range of nuclear employment scenarios, which is
also expressed through its acquisition of non-strategic and novel
nuclear weapons--this is the main difference in our doctrine and
capabilities. Both Russia and the U.S. employ a nuclear Triad. However,
Russia fields mobile ICBMs and configures their ICBM and SLBM forces
with multiple warheads. Rough parity exists in the size of strategic
forces as outlined by New START. Both Russian and U.S. nuclear
stockpiles are larger than those of other nuclear armed nations
Ms. Rosen. Please describe the force structure changes the Navy and
Air Force are making to implement the New START Treaty.
General Hyten. The Air Force is reducing 450 ICBM silos with
missile bodies to 400, retaining the 50 empty silos. The Air Force
reduced the number of nuclear-capable heavy bombers to 60, with 6
additional bombers for training and maintenance considerations. Each
SSBN originally configured with 24 SLBM launch tubes now has 20 with 4
tubes sealed and inoperable.
Ms. Rosen. What advice would you offer to the Nuclear Posture
Review that President Trump has tasked Secretary Mattis to carry out?
What threats, risks, or opportunities have changed since the Obama
administration's Nuclear Posture Review was written in 2010?
General Hyten. NPR assumptions and analysis should encompass the
full range of variables associated with the external threat
environment, Administration guidance, policy and strategy, the nation's
industrial might, defense priorities and budget considerations to
ensure the nation is properly positioned to address any future threat.
Since 2010, potential adversaries have pursued qualitative
advancements, quantitative, or both; while also broadening the range of
scenarios with which they might consider nuclear employment.
Ms. Rosen. President Obama indicated that he was willing to further
reduce U.S. deployed strategic nuclear weapons by up to one-third--to
around 1,000. The Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated at that time that it
would support these reductions if they are bilateral and verifiable. Do
you believe we should pursue such reductions while Russia is in
violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and other
arms control obligations?
General Hyten. Any reductions must be bilateral and fully
verifiable under transparent treaty inspection regimes. These
violations are very concerning and must be fully accounted for in any
future arms control discussions. We will also address them in the
upcoming Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). A full and deliberative process
is required to determine whether future strategic arms control
agreements are in the best interests of the United States
Ms. Rosen. Given Russia's threats towards its neighbors, NATO, and
the United States, its openly discussed doctrine to use nuclear weapons
early in a conflict to ``de-escalate'' and get the United States to
back down, its use of ``hybrid warfare'' against neighbors and
potentially against NATO member states--what are the risks of a
conflict in Europe involving the U.S. and Russia? What are the risks of
such a conflict escalating to the use of nuclear weapons? Why has
Russia adopted such a doctrine?
Admiral Moran. With the recent actions and rhetoric by Russia, the
potential risk of conflict arguably is at its highest since the end of
the Cold War. Maintaining our ability to deter this threat and, if
deterrence fails, respond to Russian action is critical to NATO and the
U.S. So the assumptions of Russian doctrine, the risks associated with
their doctrine, and our intelligence assessments of the current and
future threat environment will be central to a proper understanding of
the security environment for the upcoming Nuclear Posture Review. The
results of the NPR will inform a strategy and future force structure
decisions along with recommendations on how to best address the future
threat environment.
Ms. Rosen. Do you believe the U.S. should have parity with Russia
in terms of numbers or capabilities regarding nuclear weapons? Why?
What are the differences between U.S. and Russian nuclear force
structures, sizes, and doctrine? How do they compare to those of other
nuclear powers?
Admiral Moran. Russian nuclear forces represent an existential
threat to the United States. Maintaining the capacity of our nuclear
arsenal provides the ability to deter this threat against the U.S., our
allies, and partners is critical to our national security and strategy.
Therefore, an analysis of Russian or other nuclear powers' force
structures, capabilities, and doctrines will be a key to understanding
the threat environment and informing the nuclear force needs in the
upcoming Nuclear Posture Review.
Ms. Rosen. Please describe the force structure changes the Navy and
Air Force are making to implement the New START Treaty.
Admiral Moran. In accordance with the nuclear force structure
announced by the Secretary of Defense on April 8, 2014, the Navy has
been reducing the number of SLBM launchers on SSBNs and warheads on
deployed SLBMs in order to support U.S. security requirements and New
START Treaty central limits.
The number of submarine launched ballistic missile launchers will
be reduced from 24 to 20 launchers per SSBN, with no more than 240
deployed SLBMs and 280 deployed and non-deployed SLBM launchers total
at any time. In addition, the Navy will reduce the overall number of
deployed SLBM warheads on the OHIO class SSBNs to comply with New START
Treaty central limits. The Navy is converting launchers pursuant to the
Treaty so that they are incapable of launching an SLBM.
The Navy is aligning conversion efforts with the existing OHIO
Class SSBN operational schedule to minimize the impact to the fleet. As
of March 2017, conversions have been completed on eleven out of 14
SSBNs (a total of 44 converted SLBM launchers), and the Navy remains on
track to complete conversions prior to the February 2018 Treaty
deadline. Once the New START Treaty limits are achieved in 2018, the
Navy will responsible for approximately 70% of the U.S. nuclear
warheads deployed under the New START Treaty.
Ms. Rosen. What advice would you offer to the Nuclear Posture
Review that President Trump has tasked Secretary Mattis to carry out?
What threats, risks, or opportunities have changed since the Obama
administration's Nuclear Posture Review was written in 2010?
Admiral Moran. The advice I would offer to the Nuclear Posture
Review is to ensure a fresh review of the threats and assumptions made
in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review and how they have changed. The
assumptions of adversary force structure, intents, and doctrines should
be reviewed and if need, adjusted to match the current security
environment. The review of changes in the underlying security
environment will be a central aspect of how the next NPR will be
performed and the conclusions that will be made.
Ms. Rosen. President Obama indicated that he was willing to further
reduce U.S. deployed strategic nuclear weapons by up to one-third--to
around 1,000. The Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated at that time that it
would support these reductions if they are bilateral and verifiable. Do
you believe we should pursue such reductions while Russia is in
violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and other
arms control obligations?
Admiral Moran. Potential continued reductions of nuclear forces
should only be undertaken after a complete assessment of the current
security environment, particularly in regards to our nuclear armed
adversaries. Any future force adjustments based on arms control regimes
should take into account prior actions, verifiability, and the arms
control agreements contribution to maintaining strategic stability.
These things, along with a full intelligence assessment of the present
and future threat environment will be central to the upcoming Nuclear
Posture Review. The results of the NPR will inform any decisions on
adjustments to strategy, force structure, and recommendations on how to
best address the future threat environment.
Ms. Rosen. Do you believe the U.S. should have parity with Russia
in terms of numbers or capabilities regarding nuclear weapons? Why?
What are the differences between U.S. and Russian nuclear force
structures, sizes, and doctrine? How do they compare to those of other
nuclear powers?
General Wilson. The size and capabilities of U.S. strategic forces
are a function of National policy and combatant commander requirements.
Historically, the Air Force has pursued technological advancements to
win wars and maintain dominance in air, space, and cyber domains.
The United States and Russia both rely on a nuclear Triad
consisting of strategic bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles,
and submarine launched ballistic missiles. Strategic warheads are
limited to 1,550 operationally deployed warheads under the New START
Treaty. However, Russia maintains a stockpile of tactical nuclear
weapons that is an order of magnitude larger than that of the U.S. and
NATO. These numbers are troubling--especially considered in light of
Russia's continued non-compliance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces Treaty.
Ms. Rosen. Please describe the force structure changes the Navy and
Air Force are making to implement the New START Treaty.
General Wilson. To comply with New START Treaty requirements, the
Air Force converted 29 operational and 12 non-operational B-52H
strategic bombers to conventional only. In addition, the Air Force
transitioned 50 Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)
silos to operational non-deployed status, a process that involves
removing the missile and maintaining the silo in a configuration that
allows a missile to be reinstalled. Another 103 ICBM silos that were in
``caretaker'' or inactive test status were also destroyed. The Air
Force is on track to meet its obligations well in advance of the
February 5, 2018 Treaty deadline.
Ms. Rosen. What advice would you offer to the Nuclear Posture
Review that President Trump has tasked Secretary Mattis to carry out?
What threats, risks, or opportunities have changed since the Obama
administration's Nuclear Posture Review was written in 2010?
General Wilson. The Air Force remains actively engaged and ready to
support the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) directed by the President.
Since the 2010 NPR release, the strategic environment has evolved as a
result of rapidly advancing technology, geopolitical instability,
constrained resources, challenges to global commons, and hybrid
warfare. I believe the U.S. nuclear posture must account for these
changes to the strategic environment to safeguard the security of our
Nation now and in the future.
Ms. Rosen. President Obama indicated that he was willing to further
reduce U.S. deployed strategic nuclear weapons by up to one-third--to
around 1,000. The Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated at that time that it
would support these reductions if they are bilateral and verifiable. Do
you believe we should pursue such reductions while Russia is in
violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and other
arms control obligations?
General Wilson. The President has called for a comprehensive review
of our entire nuclear posture which should take into account the
totality of current and future threats, strategy, policy, programs,
readiness postures, infrastructure, nonproliferation and counter
proliferation objectives, arms control goals, implementation and
compliance, technology opportunities and the like. I fully support this
review. The overall assessment of all these considerations should form
the basis by which we judge the advisability of future strategic
nuclear weapon reductions with Russia. Thus, I believe it is wise to
await the results of this review before rendering a decision.
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