[House Hearing, 115 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE BALTIC STATES ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION __________ MARCH 22, 2017 __________ Serial No. 115-11 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ ______ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 24-752PDF WASHINGTON : 2017 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida TED POE, Texas KAREN BASS, California DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina AMI BERA, California MO BROOKS, Alabama LOIS FRANKEL, Florida PAUL COOK, California TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas RON DeSANTIS, Florida ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania TED S. YOHO, Florida DINA TITUS, Nevada ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois NORMA J. TORRES, California LEE M. ZELDIN, New York BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois DANIEL M. DONOVAN, Jr., New York THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York Wisconsin TED LIEU, California ANN WAGNER, Missouri BRIAN J. MAST, Florida FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania THOMAS A. GARRETT, Jr., Virginia Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director ------ Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats DANA ROHRABACHER, California, Chairman JOE WILSON, South Carolina GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York TED POE, Texas BRAD SHERMAN, California TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island Wisconsin ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania C O N T E N T S ---------- Page WITNESSES Mr. Paul A. Goble, principal professor, The Institute of World Politics....................................................... 7 Ms. Lisa Sawyer Samp, senior fellow, International Security Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies........ 13 Mr. Matthew Rojansky, director, Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson Center......................................................... 23 Mr. Edward Lucas, senior vice president, Center for European Policy Analysis................................................ 39 LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING Mr. Paul A. Goble: Prepared statement............................ 9 Ms. Lisa Sawyer Samp: Prepared statement......................... 15 Mr. Matthew Rojansky: Prepared statement......................... 26 Mr. Edward Lucas: Prepared statement............................. 42 APPENDIX Hearing notice................................................... 64 Hearing minutes.................................................. 65 The Honorable Robin L. Kelly, a Representative in Congress from the State of Illinois: Prepared statement...................... 66 Ms. Lisa Sawyer Samp: Material submitted for the record.......... 68 Mr. Matthew Rojansky: Material submitted for the record.......... 69 Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Robin L. Kelly and written responses from: Mr. Edward Lucas............................................... 71 Ms. Lisa Sawyer Samp........................................... 72 U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE BALTIC STATES ---------- WEDNESDAY, MARCH 22, 2017 House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC. The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:08 p.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dana Rohrabacher (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Mr. Rohrabacher. Good afternoon. I call the subcommittee to order. Today's hearing is focused on the Baltic region, U.S. policy to the countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. My colleagues in Congress, other opinion makers, and policy deciders often refer to the danger or conflict of this region. The reality of what has been happening or not happening in this corner of the world deserves a closer and, yes, a more comprehensive examination. And that is what this hearing is all about. Our relationship with the Baltic people and governments has probably lasted 100 years. We have stood by those populations through the Soviet period in our firm support for the rights of Baltic people to freely choose their own governance and not have it dictated to them by the Nazis, the Communists, or anybody else. Those who know me know how strongly I believe in self- determination. I am proud that American support helped these three Baltic countries reestablish their independence as communism collapsed in the Soviet Union. We stood by Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in the past, and they can be confident that we will remain the case in the future. The citizens of the Baltics, like citizens in the Eastern Europe, are not pieces on a board for foreign policy powers to manipulate and to control. They are fully and equally sovereign nations. Within that context, the Baltic nations were permitted to join NATO, which, as a consequence, has put troops that are a part of a hostile military alliance positioned right on Russia's border, a potential threat from Russia's perspective. Whatever you think about Russia today, it behooves us to act responsibly and to recognize that Russia too is a powerful nation, whose leaders make decisions based on their country's security and national interests. We do that, as well as every other major power. However, the question today remains: Has Russia stepped over the bounds of acceptable behavior or has the U.S. been overreacting? Since 2014, there have been numerous NATO exercises in the Baltics. And when we say that, that means we have had numerous NATO military exercises within a relatively short distance from St. Petersburg and Moscow and directly on the Russian border. Some of our witnesses today will help explain what is happening and what's been happening there in the Baltics and why. Knowing the facts of what is happening certainly will help us determine what America's policy toward this region should be, and what should our policy be toward Russia as well. But establishing the prerequisites for a peaceful world must remain a priority for us and for the Russians and for the people in the Baltics. One thought. We here should do our best not to confuse a strong U.S. policy with a confrontational policy. What is the goal of peace through strength? It is not just strength. It is peace, and that we should never lose that perspective. I welcome our witnesses this afternoon. Without objection, your full written statements will be made part of the record. So if you could, we would like to ask you to make a 5- minute presentation, and then we will move on to questions and dialogue with the panel and with the members. I would like to focus on a few key questions. I would like to know about the specific acts that Russia is accused of doing in the Baltics. I don't want intentions. What are the specific acts that we should be most concerned about? And is our response to these specific acts reasonable or is it belligerent? With that said, would ask my ranking member, Mr. Meeks, to move forward with his opening statement. Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for calling today's hearing on U.S. policy regarding the Baltics. It is a region we do not always get to examine in detail, but do not often see in the news either. Before my remarks, I would like to take a moment, though, to remember the attacks in Brussels just 1 year ago. And, today, we see a similar democracy being attacked again in London. It is a reminder that democracy is continuous, it is daily, and it is difficult. And we mourn those that may have lost their lives in the attack in London today. The Baltics hold a special place in modern history. I admire their citizens for their peaceful, brave resistance to the Soviet regime during the nonviolent Singing Revolution. Soviet repression was not able to crush their cultures, their people, or their thirst for freedom. A beautiful story that one--and one that resonates here in the United States Congress. The U.S. never recognized the Soviet occupation by force, and upon deliberation, they continued normal diplomatic relations. The same international laws compel us to never-- today, to never recognize the Kremlin's attempt to annex Crimea. In 1991, newly independent Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and--had to mature quickly in a dangerous post-Communist space where corruption, economic malice, and ethnic divisions were always a threat. The scars from the transformation can be seen and manipulated by outside actors today. Nevertheless, they are free. They reformed. They are banging on the doors to Europe saying, don't forget us. They are persistent. They joined NATO and the EU in 2004, and continue to play integral roles in both. Estonia takes over the presidency of the council in July, and I look forward to learning more about their stories on the ground soon. I am also a senior member of the Financial Services Committee and remember seeing the Baltic States suffer immensely during the financial crisis in 2008. Latvia saw its GDP shrink over 25 percent in less than a year, for example. The final result, a success story. Internal devaluation, belt tightening within an agreement between society and the government helped the small open economies turn the corner and enjoy sustained growth. It was not easy, but the results are a best practice example for dealing with the euro crisis. The Baltic States are also leaders in the internet age. I admire the Estonia movement, the dedicated push to bring the country to the forefront in e-commerce and e-democracy, where citizens can vote and register businesses online. I believe we have a few e-residents in the crowd today. However, this makes Estonia vulnerable to cyber attacks, which they have experienced, most notably in 2008. The result: Estonia is now home to the NATO Cyber Centre of Excellence, where all NATO member states can share and sharpen their skills in today's wide world. The region is also a leader in the push toward energy transformation and independence. Seeing and feeling the way the Russian Government uses energy as a political tool is a direct threat to the economies and populations in the Baltic States. A striking example is Lithuanian LNG terminal independence, which is only a part of a puzzle linking the region with a competitive supply of energy. Projects like this help Lithuania and Europe, both, from an energy and supply side and, importantly, from a security angle. Finally, the success of the three states is an important symbol for those who need a united and free Europe. With NATO support, it is an important symbol for the region as an example of what can be achieved with membership in the transatlantic organizations that the guarantee of justice and the rule of law. Yet as the Baltic States continue to integrate and flourish as democracies, they are under threat. I do not believe that Russian tanks will roll across their borders, but the threat from the Kremlin is often subtle, often denied, in fact--or a post-fact world, but just as real and just as powerful. Their tools corrupt our information sphere, our economies, and use cynicism only to protect kleptocracies in Moscow. I believe we have an excellent panel here to examine these threats and discuss the best responses. I believe we must support the free press, much like we recently examined with Chairman Royce of the full committee level. And I also would like to examine the role, both symbolic and economic, of personal sanctions, specifically, the Magnitsky Act, which goes after corrupt individuals, not the Russian people. I am also an adamant supporter of NATO and the EU's role in values-based transatlantic relationship and how economies and people are better off with it. To conclude, I would like to submit two excellent reads for the record that shaped what I am talking about today. President Reagan's Proclamation 4948, which created Baltic Freedom Day, and President Obama's speech in Tallinn in 2014. These documents show the continued bipartisan support for the Baltic States and the freedom and democracies that they bravely fought to establish. I yield back. Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, thank you. And I sure appreciate you putting some of my writing into the work. And then we have Mr. Fitzpatrick from Pennsylvania---- Mr. Fitzpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Rohrabacher [continuing]. For 2 minutes. Mr. Fitzpatrick. Yes, sir. The fall of the USSR in 1991 ushered in a new era of freedom for many former Soviet Republics who had struggled for decades to maintain and express their national identities. The Baltic States of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia are prime examples of the demise of the Soviet Union and how the demise of the Soviet Union led to a freer and more independent Europe. After gaining their independence in the summer of 1991, the Baltic States began to craft their own economies, their own militaries, and even more importantly, their own identities. This is something that we as Americans should all appreciate. The Baltic States also desire to become part of the integrated global community by becoming both members of NATO as well as the European Union. However, in recent years, the Russian bear has once again reared its ugly head. We first saw this in 2008 when the Russian army invaded its fiercely independent southern neighbor, Georgia. In a quick but brutal war, the Russians showed what lengths they were willing to go in order to exert their dominance over their newly independent neighbors. Likewise, in 2014, Vladimir Putin covertly moved Russian military forces into the Crimean region, quickly seizing it. Subsequent that year, the Russian-backed insurgency began to take hold of the eastern Donbass region in the Ukraine, culminating in the shoot-down of a Malaysian Airlines flight under very suspicious circumstances, this all being done with limited intervention from previous administrations; As we look forward, it is imperative that we maintain our relationship with critical allies in the Baltic States. We must reassert America's commitment to prevent the rise of another Soviet block where a country's leaders are beholding to Moscow and not their own people. I yield back. Mr. Rohrabacher. And now Brad. All right, Brad, you are first. Mr. Sherman. Okay. I want to associate myself with the comments of the ranking member recognizing the people of Belgium and the people of the United Kingdom and what they have suffered, and his praise for the Baltic States. The foreign policy establishment has spoken. Everything that Putin does is wrong and, therefore, anything done by anyone in conflict with Putin must be right. I will spend a few minutes questioning that second assumption. The Baltic States are, indeed, praiseworthy, but they can and should do better. I have been in this room for 20 years, and for most of that time, the foreign policy establishment said anyone who focused on burden sharing was ignorant or worse. Now, they have caved in on that and, instead, clung to this 2 percent standard. It should be a 4 percent standard. America spends over 4 percent of our GDP on our military. The foreign policy establishment deliberately understates that by ignoring the cost of the veterans benefits which, after all, are compensation we provide our soldiers and sailors. Unfortunately, only one of the Baltic States even meets the 2 percent requirement, and the others--one other is saying they will get to it eventually, but that leaves their armaments way too low a level because, for decades, they have been underspending. Baltic States should at least match our 4 percent level and make up for the armaments they don't have because they've deliberately underspent for decades. NATO is important. Only one NATO country has been attacked during NATO, and that is the United States. We had support in Afghanistan. The support from the Baltic States was there, but incredibly modest. In contrast, the Baltic States have asked us for an incredibly robust response to the national security threats that they face, including, as the chairman points out, deploying American soldiers by the thousands on the Russian border. In the United Nations, I have been disappointed with the Baltic States support for us, voting against us again and again and again in the general assembly, though I support the recent support of two of the Baltic States in one UNESCO vote. And, finally, we need to urge the Baltic States to treat the Russian minorities with as much respect as possible and more respect than maybe popular in their own political--among their own people, especially the Estonian issue with so many citizens of Estonia or residents of Estonia not be--having Estonian passports, not being recognized as citizens. I would hope that there would be a system that would allow dual citizenship and allow these folks to have whatever rights Russia chooses to grant them, but to have all the rights of Estonian citizens. There are many arguments on both sides as to how the Russian-speaking minority should be treated, but since this could be a flashpoint for a major war, I would hope the Baltic States would err on the side of treating their Russian-speaking minority well. And I yield back. Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you, Mr. Sherman. And now, Mr. Cicilline. Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Chairman Rohrabacher and Ranking Member Meeks for calling this hearing today and to the witnesses for being here to discuss a region that is vital to America's strategic national security interests. Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are located at Russia's doorstep and, in many ways, are at the forefront in the increasing tensions in Eastern Europe. Each of these states serves as an example of the ability of the people to rise out of the chaos of the fall of the Soviet Union, embrace democracy and free markets, and thrive. Formerly members of the Warsaw Pact, as part of the Soviet Union today, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are vital members of NATO. And perhaps no countries face a graver challenge from the renewed aggression of Putin's Russia. The invasions of Georgia and Ukraine have caused many within the Baltics to fear for their own sovereignty as Putin attempts to delegitimize states that have a large Russian-speaking population. And that is why it is so important that the United States not waiver in our commitment to the NATO alliance and to our Baltic friends to ensure that the ties we have forged remain strong in the face of increased pressure. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today. And I want to apologize in advance, we have a Judiciary Committee markup, so I will be in and out. But I'm anxious to hear what we can do to reinforce and strengthen our NATO commitments and to continue the strong relationships the United States has built with our Baltic friends. I thank you. And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, thank you very much. And I would like to thank the witnesses for joining us today. I will introduce all of you, and then we will proceed. First, we have Paul Goble, who is a long-time expert in minority nationalities and the former Soviet Union. He has had a distinguished career working at various times for the United States Government, the State Department, as well as Radio Free Europe. He has been honored by the governments of all three Baltic republics for his efforts to promote their independence. Lisa Sawyer Samp or Sap? Ms. Samp. Samp. Mr. Rohrabacher. Samp. Okay. A senior fellow in the Internation Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. She is an expert on NATO and European defense strategies. And before joining CSIS, she was in a previous role as director for NATO and European Strategic Affairs on the National Security Council staff. We have Matthew Rojansky. He is the director of the Kennan Institute at the Woodrow Wilson Center. He is a leading expert on U.S.-Russian relations and an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins. He serves as U.S. executive secretary for the Dartmouth Conference which is a two-track of the Russian-U.S. conflict resolution initiative. I hope I got that exactly right, but you get the picture. Mr. Edward Lucas is a senior editor for The Economist. And I might add, I read that magazine all the time. I think it is, frankly, the only magazine I do read all the time. He is a senior vice president at the Center for European Policy Analysis. He has been observing and writing about developments in Eastern Europe and that part of the world for over 20 years. So we are very pleased to have you and grateful to have you with us. So, as I say, if you could proceed with 5-minute opening statements or you could add to that, just for the record, and then we will proceed with questions from the members. Mr. Goble. STATEMENT OF MR. PAUL A. GOBLE, PRINCIPAL PROFESSOR, THE INSTITUTE OF WORLD POLITICS Mr. Goble. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for calling this hearing on this most important topic and for giving me an opportunity to appear. I would like to dedicate my remarks to the late Aleksander Einseln, the Estonian-American colonel, who died about 10 days ago, who went to Estonia and became the commander of the Estonian Defence Forces and played a key role in transforming those forces into ones that could be integrated into the Western alliance. It is an ancient observation that old generals always prepare to fight the last war, but we don't always think about what that means. It often means that they look for the same kind of threat that happened in the past and try to counter it, or not seeing it, decide there isn't any threat at all, and that they fail to prepare for combating new threats, because the means they have adopted in the past to counter the threats of the past are no longer the ones that are most important. I do not believe, as long as Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are a members of the western alliance, that any Russian Government will send its tanks over the eastern borders of those countries. I think that is almost unthinkable because I think it is almost certainly suicidal. Having said that, however, I believe there is a very real Russian threat that flows both from the purposes that Mr. Putin has announced for his government going back more than a decade and the means he has chosen to use to pursue those purposes. On the one hand, Mr. Putin has clearly signaled that the three--that his foreign policy is driven by a desire to challenge the three bedrock principles of the international system that the United States took the lead in forming in the 20th century. First, the 1919 settlement that declared that the Arab empires is over. He wants to restore one. Second, the settlement of 1945, which held that citizenship is more important than ethnicity. That is what we fought World War II about when the Germans thought that ethnicity was more important than citizenship. And 1991, when the international community accepted the demise of the USSR as something that was irreversible. But the other aspect of the Russian threat is also serious, and that is that Mr. Putin has chosen to use the strategies of subversion rather than the strategies of open force. Far more often we have seen actions by the Russian Government that are those of intelligence services rather than those of defense ministries. What that means is if you are looking for actions by the military, you won't find them, but if you are looking at what goes on in banks, in government offices, in propaganda outlets, they are very much there. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have particular reasons for being concerned about both Mr. Putin's goals--if any of those are realized, they would be at risk--and his tactical approach because of their size and their propinquity to Russia. We in the United States tend to forget how small the Baltic countries are, how much they suffered under various aspects of Russian rule, and how much they have depended on the United States. For Putin, those three realities have a contradictory message. On the one hand, they mean that Mr. Putin is certainly aware that any military move against the Baltic countries would be resisted by the United States as part of its NATO alliance and, second, it means that Mr. Putin has an interest in challenging the West precisely there as a way of indicating that the West is more of a paper tiger than the West believes. I believe that what we need to do in order to promote Baltic security has less to do with the expansion of NATO presence there, although I welcome that presence, than it does with doing other things. And I would like to suggest three of what would be a very large list. First, as several of the members have pointed out, we need to encourage all three countries to complete the integration of ethnic minorities in their countries, that the progress that has been made is truly amazing. Indeed, last week, it was announced that there are 4,000 ethnic Russians in Estonia who now declare that Estonian is their native language, which is-- would have been unthinkable a decade ago. That is an impressive achievement. Second, we need to promote transparency of all economic and political activities, banking, the communication sector. And, third, we need to involve Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians in as many conversations as possible with Russian counterparts. There are people in the West who are not interested in pushing that, who prefer to see the question of Russian power as being one that there is only a military response to. But, in fact, it is in these other areas that the fight is going to be won or lost, and, therefore, we should be spending far more time developing strategies in those areas than in others. Thank you very much. [The prepared statement of Mr. Goble follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] ---------- Mr. Rohrabacher. Ms. Samp, you may go right ahead. STATEMENT OF MS. LISA SAWYER SAMP, SENIOR FELLOW, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES Ms. Samp. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Meeks, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, good afternoon. I would like to make just two points regarding the current security situation in the Baltic States. My first point is foundational to this discussion. Russia is a threat. Russia is a threat to the Baltic States and, more broadly, to the post- World War II international order. In the Baltics, Russia has conducted cyber attacks, crossborder kidnappings, and unannounced snap exercises with up to 80,000 troops just across the border. It has also violated their sovereign airspace, issued hostile statements, and filled their airwaves with propaganda. For an accurate threat picture, though, this behavior must be considered in the context of what Moscow has done and is doing beyond the Baltics. In addition to meddling in foreign elections, violating arms control agreements, and nuclear saber rattlings, Putin's bullying has escalated to the use of military force in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria. In Ukraine, he has annexed Crimea and continues to sow instability and violence in the country's east. Thousands have died and over a million have been displayed. Let us also please not forget about the 298 civilians who were killed when a Russian-provided missile brought down a civilian airliner, or about the thousands of civilians killed by indiscriminate Russian bombs in Syria. Russia's actions reflect an effective blending of both conventional and unconventional tactics. These tactics are designed to circumvent U.S. and NATO redlines, confuse traditional response options, and use the virtues of the West against it. Putin likely doesn't want a war with the West, but he is finding he can get a lot done without one. For that reason, he has no intention of stopping now. He is becoming more emboldened over time and growing increasingly comfortable taking risks. What was once primarily an eastern-flank challenge is now hitting closer to home. Moscow may no longer be motivated by a Communist ideology that sees it trying to overthrow democracies and replace them with dictatorships. But that does not mean Russia isn't still a threat to our democracy and our institutions. The difference today is that instead of offering an alternative, Russia is satisfied to create chaos and sow instability. It wants to knock the United States down a peg and break Western unity so we can't call shots Russia doesn't like or hold it accountable to the rule of law. The system, though, that Russia is seeking to undermine has served the United States well over the past 70 years. And without it, the world would undoubtedly be poorer, less free, and less safe. Russia may just be looking out for what it considers to be in its national interests, but then we need to do the same, and that entails pushing back to protect ourselves, our allies, and the international order. This brings me to my second point, which is that the steps taken by the United States and NATO to bolster security in the region are prudent and are what is minimally required. They are neither hostile nor provocative. While Russia has not resorted to military force in the Baltics, and while its ever doing remains extremely unlikely, the possibility cannot be discounted completely. To manage this risk, the United States and NATO have taken steps, as described in my written testimony, to establish a credible deterrence. Far from being provocative, these steps are designed to prevent war and to make clear the costs that would be entailed with any aggression. It may, in fact, be more provocative to do nothing. To invite Russian opportunism by baiting it would weak defenses. While it is important to debate what constitutes credible deterrence and what amounts to unhelpful provocation, one can also err in being too cautious, lending credence to Russia's reflexive protests and false indignation. I would argue there exists a wide gulf between the steps that have been taken to date and the steps that could be taken in the future to increase the West's leverage without sparking a conflict or even coming close. Step back and recall, for example, that despite recent troop increases, the U.S. combat presence in Europe remains a full brigade-strength below what it was in 2012, prior to renewed tensions with Russia, and that NATO's largest exercise conducted since the end of the Cold War included about 30,000 troops. By contrast, Russia's Zapad exercise planned for later this year may reach up to 200,000. Thus, the idea that holding relatively moderately sized exercises on alliance territory constitutes provocation seems wildly unfair. NATO is also not the ones flying with its transponders off, failing to announce exercises in accordance with the Vienna document, and buzzing ships in the Black and Baltic Seas. While it is also fair to consider the West's role in contributing to the current standoff with Russia, suggesting moral equivalencies or assigning blame does not solve the current problem. It neither changes how the West or Russia view their security interests nor makes what we seek to preserve any less valid. To conclude, none of this means we cannot still cooperate with Russia where it is in our interest, but rushing to make deals with Moscow to secure what would amount to short-term gains may well end up sacrificing more fundamental goals. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Ms. Samp follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] ---------- Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much. And, Mr. Rojansky. STATEMENT OF MR. MATTHEW ROJANSKY, DIRECTOR, KENNAN INSTITUTE, WOODROW WILSON CENTER Mr. Rojansky. Yes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman---- Mr. Rohrabacher. But you need to turn your mike on. Mr. Rojansky. Right. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Meeks. I am enormously grateful to have this opportunity. And I have got to do this, the disclaimer: Personal views only, not those of the Wilson Center, which, of course, is a congressionally chartered memorial to President Wilson. So we are very grateful that we can fulfill our public interest mission and participate in here. You know, I think--I understood your question, Mr. Chairman, about Russia's specific acts rather than just sort of vague general ideas of a threat and the reasonableness of American response as soliciting an analysis of how the Russians are thinking and why. What do they intend, and is there evidence for their intent? And so I would like to tackle that problem as directly as I can, and I break it down into three parts. Any time that I think about a threat, I try to break it down into motive, capability, and opportunity. So those are the three parts I want to tackle in that order. In terms of motive, let's look at what Russia's actions have been against other states to try to discern a motive, vis- a-vis, in particular, its neighborhood or what Russians call the near abroad. Generally speaking, Russians do not view other countries in the near abroad as fully sovereign. Certainly, not in the way they see themselves or the United States. Obviously, we know that President Medvedev talked about a sphere of privileged influence; the Russians have supported separatists in Moldova, in Georgia; they have invaded Ukraine. This is well known. In terms of specific actions against the Baltic States, famously in 2007, around the Bronze Soldier conflict, they intervened with cyber attacks against Estonia. In 2014, they abducted Eston Kohver, an Estonian security agent from the border, essentially kidnapped him. In Latvia, they have mobilized ethnic Russian voters, stirred up antigovernment sentiment in Latgallia. In Lithuania, they have mounted an information war disparaging living standards for Lithuanians and encouraging them to move to Kaliningrad, a neighboring exclave of Russia. And, of course, there's been sophisticated social media campaigns backing all of these things up. Now, what do Russians want in the Baltic States? Basic motivation. Certainly, they fear the American presence there, what it may lead to, but they like to maintain, basically, stable political and economic ties. Now, much is made of the Russian-speaking population. It is a tricky issue. Who is an ethnic Russian? Who is a Russian speaker? In terms of percentages, we may be dealing with somewhere between 30 and 36 percent in Latvia, 25 to 28 percent in Estonia, 5 to 8 percent in Lithuania, depending on how you define those numbers. Sometimes they are concentrated, like in Narva and eastern Estonia; sometimes they are very well integrated, like in the city of Riga, the capital of Latvia. Now, Putin talks about the Russian world within which these people would certainly be included as being a major priority for Russian foreign policy and being the largest diaspora in Europe. He claims 25 million Russians left outside the borders of The Russian Federation. And in 2014, in a speech in Riga, Russia's commissioner for human rights, Konstantin Dolgov, said: It has to be stated with sadness that a huge number of our compatriots abroad, whole segments of the Russian world, continue to face serious problems securing their rights and lawful interests. We will not tolerate the creeping offensive against the Russian language that we are seeing in the Baltics. So does Russia intend to use force in the Baltics? Interestingly, most Russian sources say, no, they don't. Dmitri Trenin says Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland are safe, even if they don't feel that way. The Kremlin has no interest in risking nuclear war by attacking a member state, and the sphere of Russian control to which Putin aspires certainly excludes these countries. Now, Russians would have plenty of reasons to make these claims, but it may be that they have other motives and intentions in being threatening toward the Baltic States, like signaling to other post-Soviet countries. In particular, Belarus, Kazakhstan, part of the Eurasian core countries on Russia's borders. And most military deployments, if you look at Russian military deployments, are about exerting control and dominance over Ukraine. Capability--I will keep this very short. Russia's military capability is stronger than it was, for sure. It comes nowhere close to what the United States can feel, much less the NATO alliance. And one of the challenges in assessing Russia's actual capability is the bread-and-toast problem, vis-a-vis, Russian troops that are simply always going to be in and around St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad versus troops that are there for the specific reason of sort of either masking or preparing for an attack on the Baltic States. But there are other capabilities of concern, nonmilitary capabilities. And, again, this comes back to the issue of Russian speakers. Russian television has been called a couch potato's dream, an attractive, even mesmerizing mix of frothy morning shows, high-decibel discussion shows, tear jerker serials and song contests peppered with news bulletins and current events shows that tow the Kremlin line. So you get the idea that Russian broadcasting creates a very sophisticated media milieu within which people are persuaded by the Russian world view. But be careful not to generalize here. At the end of the day, Russian speakers, ethnic Russians in the Baltic States, they are people. Many of them don't necessarily like Mr. Putin, many of them have no desire to abandon their EU citizenship, which they have, thanks to being citizens of the Baltic States, and many of them tune out from politics altogether. The last point--and I will end quickly here--on opportunity there is both good news and bad news. The good news is that Mr. Goble is exactly right. The Russians do not seek to provoke a conflict with the nuclear armed alliance in NATO, and as long as the Baltic States are NATO members, that is going to be the case. The bad news is that a crisis is still absolutely possible. A crisis is possible. Either imagine a scenario within which this ethic Russian or Russian language issue is provoked, even completely made up and then blown out of proportion by Russian media, there is a firm response from local authorities, and that results in a crisis. And the other possible crisis here is a military crisis. This so-called heavy metal diplomacy, a Russian aircraft coming close to an American ship or another NATO flag vessel. So definitely, in terms of motive, capability, and opportunity, we are looking at a real threat, a real set of concerns, but it is important to see it in context. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Rojansky follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] ---------- Mr. Rohrabacher. In context. That is good. We will be discussing that as we get into the questions and answers. And, finally, Mr. Lucas, you may proceed. STATEMENT OF MR. EDWARD LUCAS, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, CENTER FOR EUROPEAN POLICY ANALYSIS Mr. Lucas. Chairman Rohrabacher, Ranking Member Meeks, and distinguished members, it is an honor and privilege to come here and give testimony to this committee on this vitally important subject. I have been dealing with this issue since the early 1980s. My message is very straightforward and is contained in my written testimony. I will now go on to answer some of the questions that have come up in the discussion already. Russia is a revisionist power. It doesn't like the way the world is at the moment. It wants to change it. It has the means to do this if we don't keep ourselves united and strong. So far, it is doing really well, much better than many people would have suspected. If you had been thinking 10, 15 years ago that we would be discussing a threat from Russia of the kind we are discussing now, people would have thought that was crazy. It is going to get worse before it gets better. You mentioned in your opening remarks, Mr. Chairman, that we created a hostile military alliance stretching to Russia's border and put troops there, and the Russians don't like that. I think it is worth reminding ourselves why they are there. Why did this change? Why has this happened? And, of course, during the 1990s, we didn't have NATO membership for the Baltic States, and we expanded it for a reason. We expanded it because these countries were scared, and there was enough going on that they were right to be scared. After 2004, many people said, that is it, job done. Russia will not touch a NATO member, and there is no reason to worry about it anymore. We had no plans, no contingency plans for defending the Baltic States. We had no troop deployments there. We had no exercises there. That would have been a stable situation, but Russia provoked, undermined, and subverted the Baltic States, notably in the Bronze Soldier attack, but in many other things as well. And so after 2008, the war in Georgia, President Obama said we need contingency plans. We developed a plan, and then we increased them. There was a huge jolt which came with the 2009 Zapad exercises, which practiced the invasion and occupation of the Baltic States and finished off with a dummy nuclear attack on Warsaw. That was a real wake-up call to the West. Russia tends to do the things that it rehearses, and everything we have done, in a much smaller scale, since then, I think has been a response to Russia raising the ante. Russia is testing our will in the Baltic States. And the best way of guaranteeing that we keep the peace that we have is by responding to that with calmness and firmness. You asked for specific examples. Well, I think the military exercise and, particularly, terrifying snap exercises, which happen at no notice and involve large numbers of troops hurdling toward the border when we have no idea, really, what is going on. And perhaps the biggest example, I would also mention the role of money in Baltic politics. And if you read the reports of the Estonian and Lithuanian security agencies, which are available on the internet, they list in chilling detail the things that Russia is doing inside those countries. I would also like to respond to the idea that it is a big ask from the Baltic States. They want a lot from America. Well, that is true. But you are not just defending them, you are defending the whole international order. And if you are worried about America's leadership in the world and you are worried about America's leadership in Asia and you are worried about whether your allies take you seriously, well, the Baltics is high noon. That is where it starts. If you can't defend the Baltic States, your treaty allies, then you have no credibility in other parts of the world. So you are defending the whole rules-based order, not just the Baltic States. And, finally, I would just point out that the Baltic States are not just consumers of security; they are also providers. They were warning us about this 20 years ago when we weren't listening. They see things that we don't see. They can go to places that we don't go. They understand things that we don't understand. And we, in my country in Britain, your country in the United States, and other NATO allies, we are eagerly and greedily lapping up some of this expertise, some of these capabilities they have in cyber, in intelligence, and other things, which fill gaps, stuff that we neglected, capabilities that we got rid of in the past 20 or 30 years because we thought we would never need them again. So they contribute a lot to us. What should we do? Well, first of all, we have got to understand that Russia is trying to change the rules and be clear that we want to defend that rules-based order. It is worth it. It brings peace, it brings prosperity, it brings freedom. It really matters. We need to raise the cost to Mr. Putin of his attacks, and I strongly endorse the point about raising visa sanctions on the Russian elite. We have no quarrel with the people of Russia. They suffer from this regime just as much as anybody else does, if not more. But we should say to those top 1,000, 10,000 people in Russia, if you preach anti-Westernism, if you say that the West is decadent, the fount of all evil, imperialist, horrible, backward, and so on, well, you can't then expect to launder money in the West. You can't expect to send your kids here to be educated. You can't send your families here for medical treatment. You can't come here on holiday. We can do that. That is not a quarrel with the Russian people. That is targeting the sanctions on the elite. And, finally, I think we just need to do a bit more on deterrence. What NATO has done in the Baltics is very small. It is 1/10th, 1/20th of what Russia has done. It is already a game-changer. But just having a few more American soldiers in the Baltics would make a very big difference, because Russia takes you really seriously. And I will finish off by saying, we should look at the Baltic States like West Berlin. There are many things in West Berlin we didn't like during the Cold War. I know you, Chairman Rohrabacher, were a regular visitor there, and it was tremendously important symbolically for us. We didn't try and defend West Berlin militarily as West Berlin. We didn't put a Maginot line on West Berlin, anymore we should put a Maginot line down the Baltics. We said, this is where it stops. This is the furthest outpost of the West. And by defending West Berlin, we defend every member of the Western alliance, and we should look at the Baltic States in the same way. Thank you, sir. [The prepared statement of Mr. Lucas follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] ---------- Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, thank you very much. And I see we are on our own. Mr. Meeks. Me and you, baby. Mr. Rohrabacher. And me and you, baby. Let me start out by saying that I apologize that this is not a balanced panel. You all have basically the same message, and we should have had at least one person to present the other perspective, and we did not. And I am concerned about that. Well, I am here. There is only so much as to what I can do on my own. Okay. Let me first apologize about that, because I don't believe this is a balanced panel. I mean, I just have to say, you all are intellectuals. You all are good sources of information, but we need to juxtapose your arguments with someone else, and we didn't do it, and so we failed. And maybe we will have another hearing where the points that you have made, you could have two or three here, and maybe someone on the other side who could refute some of the points that have been made. So with that said, let me just go into some questions that will be provocative questions, anyway. I did ask for a specific military aggression and acts. I didn't seem to get any, frankly. I hear about the amassing of 300,000 troops in Russian territory, in Russia, is an act of an aggression against their neighboring countries. But amassing NATO troops and tanks in their neighboring countries, on their border is not an aggression. Talk about a double standard. I would think that that is a major double standard. I will have to say that when my friend, my fellow journalist, a former journalist as I am, that I believe that the idea of declaring the Baltics like to be similar to Berlin demonstrates a basic perceptional problem of why we are heading in the wrong direction. The Cold War is over. As long as we are thinking about Russia as it was during that time period, and others, and Berlin, West Berlin, as being threatened, as it was at that time, in a government that was controlled by the Communist Party, that was an ideological-based party that wanted to create Marxist, atheist dictatorships throughout the world, replace democracies with Marxist dictatorships. That is not the world we live in today, and it is not the Russia. Russia is different than what it was. Now, how different? Let me just ask for some specific things in the Baltics. I know there was a cyber attack, which someone brought up; I would like to ask about that cyber attack in Estonia, if you know about this. I am sure you all should. There was a cyber attack when the Russians and the Estonians got into a personality match when the Estonians said, we are going to take down the statue that is dedicated to the Russian soldiers who gave their lives in liberating the Baltics from the Nazis. And at that point, there was a massive cyber attack, which really was very extensive, and it was a heavy duty attack by Russia on Estonia. How long ago did that happen? When was it? What year was that? When was it? Mr. Lucas. 2007, sir. Mr. Rohrabacher. 2007. And since that time, have there been any attacks of that magnitude in the Baltics? Any other attacks since 2007? Now, I will tell you, we have heard over and over and over again about the incredible cyber attacks, and that was 2007. I am not excusing the fact somebody is insulting. France insulted us a number of times, and we didn't get so angry at them that we punished them. There are all sorts of stories about that. We are talking that their 300,000 troops are a threat, but our NATO 30,000 aren't. Is the panel aware that we are part of those NATO exercises and there has been a number of them now. Part of that has been B-52 flights headed from England and then turning around at the Russian border? Does anyone here not considered that a provocative act? Ms. Samp. I do not. Mr. Rohrabacher. You do not. Okay. So you think a nuclear weapons delivery system aimed at the heart of Russia and then turning around right on the border is not hostile and provocative? Ms. Samp. It might be if they weren't doing the same thing to us. They are flying bear and blackjack bombers off the coast of Alaska around the outer edges of Europe. So the flights are a wash---- Mr. Rohrabacher. It is not the same. Let me just note. What you are saying is ridiculous. It is not the same as aiming a flight of bombers into the capital areas, meaning St. Petersburg in Moscow, versus flying along a coast. Everybody has a right to fly along someone's coast. Now, let me ask you this: Are there also ships as part of those exercises that we had or do we have any nuclear weapons capability of carrying ships that were part of that? Any of you know that? Well, yes, there were. Tell me, if we actually are bringing nuclear weapons delivery systems to the Russian border, you don't believe that is provocative. Does anyone else here agree with that? Yes, go right ahead. Mr. Lucas. Sir, can I respond to that? I think one has to look at this in over a period of, say, 10 years, say we start in 2004, when we have expanded NATO and we have built quite good relations with Russia through the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the NATO-Russia Council. Things have deteriorated since then. But in each case, the deterioration started with actions on the Russian side, and we followed by much smaller actions on ours. Now, you mentioned nuclear weapons, and it is an extremely important point. Russia has a very large arsenal of so-called tactical nuclear weapons, and these are integrated into its military doctrine and integrated into its exercises. And they practice getting these nuclear artillery shells, depth charges, short-range weapons out of the bunkers onto delivery systems. And they do this again and again and again. We in the West have almost given up on tactical nuclear arms. We have very few. Those that we have are kept a very long way away from the Baltic States, chiefly in bunkers in the Netherlands. Our exercises do not involve their use. It is a specific part of Russian military doctrine to do what they call escalate to de-escalate, which means if they think they are losing a conventional war, they will go nuclear. They make no secret about that. And they talk about these nuclear weapons all the time in a way that the neighbors find terrifying, not just the NATO members. They say this to the Finns and to the Swedes. You mentioned B-52 flights. I don't know if you are aware of what happened on Good Friday 2014, I think it was, when a Russian flight carried out a dummy attack on Stockholm and on another very important military target in Sweden at a time when the Swedish Air Force had taken the weekend off because it was Easter. They had to scramble Danish fighters from Lithuania to intercept these Russians. In my country---- Mr. Rohrabacher. So the Russian---- Mr. Lucas. May I just finish? Mr. Rohrabacher [continuing]. In the incident you are describing, did they actually penetrate---- Mr. Lucas. No. They turned around at the last minute. And we also had a similar event in--and if you penetrate someone-- -- Mr. Rohrabacher. So they turned around at the last moment. You remember that, and you condemn that, but you don't condemn U.S. B-52 bombers and nuclear weapons carrying ships going right to the Russian border? Mr. Lucas. Understand that the Russians are trying to make us think that we have no nuclear deterrence. And they have said, and they say privately and publicly, they don't believe that NATO deterrence works. And so long as NATO is a nuclear alliance, we have to show that we are nuclear capable. Now, we have many gaps on the escalation---- Mr. Rohrabacher. Sir, I just have to tell you that I believe it demonstrates a double standard that will give the Russians a message that we are judging our behavior differently than we are judging yours. Mr. Lucas. Can I respond to that, sir? Mr. Rohrabacher. Yes. Okay. I am sorry we don't have other witnesses here to make these points, and I am going to have to give it to him. But I will let you answer that, and then we have to go on---- Mr. Lucas. I just want to respond to your point about West Berlin, sir. Mr. Rohrabacher. Yes. Mr. Lucas. You said the Cold War is over. It is true, the old Cold War is over. But as I said in my opening remarks, Russia is trying to change the rules. Russia doesn't like the way the world operates at the moment. It doesn't like American leadership. It doesn't like the Atlantic alliance. It doesn't like multilateral rules-based organizations by the EU, and that is a threat. It is not the same as the Soviet Union. It is much weaker. But the symbolic bastion of the West is the Baltic States, because they are militarily vulnerable. Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. Mr. Lucas. And in that sense, I think it is very similar to West Berlin. Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, let me just note that Great Britain seems not to like the EU either. Do they? Great Britain decided they might not like that as well. And, yeah, the institutions that were created during the Cold War are beginning to, not evaporate, but to readjust, and some of them will disappear, some of them will remain strong, but this isn't the Cold War. Let me just remind you, you are looking at the ultimate cold warrior here. I mean, this is not some guy who, you know, did not believe we should confront the Soviet Union. And I was deeply involved with that for 20 years of my life, actually, 30 years of my life. Well, anyway, we will have a second round of questions, even though it is just the two of us. Mr. Rojansky. Mr. Chairman, would it be possible before you move on to just add something on the---- Mr. Rohrabacher. With permission from my---- Mr. Meeks. Yeah. I was going to give you--okay. Mr. Rojansky. I appreciate that. I just feel badly, because I think I was invited to try to elucidate Russian thinking and the conclusion of much of my research into Russian analysis and the statements of Russian leaders and the disposition of Russian forces has been that while there are real causes for concern--and that is why I broke it into that three-part analysis of motive, capability, and opportunity--that, nonetheless, we are not facing an acute, immediate Russian military threat to the Baltic States. And there are two principal reasons for that on the military side, speaking about nuclear deterrence. One is that nuclear deterrence works. And the Russian sources I looked at were very clear that that is a big part of the reason why they wouldn't, under any circumstances, so assume plenty of other motives, potentially, to intervene in the Baltic States. The fact that you are talking about intervening against members of a nuclear armed alliance makes that--I mean, the Russian sources are very clear, they have no desire to provoke that, and there are certainly plenty of others targets that would be more desirable. The second issue, and I made this point very quickly before, and I do encourage you to take a look at my written remarks as well, is this issue of disposition of location, that even if kind of politically and psychologically the Baltic States may have a similar resonance to West Berlin today, they are in a different spot on the map. They are just a couple of 100 kilometers away from St. Petersburg. They are, in the case of Lithuania, actually bordering on Kaliningrad on a heavily militarized Russian exclave. And so what that means is, there is a certain amount of Russian military activity we are just going to see. We are going to keep seeing it, and it is sort of normal that we would see it, because that is where Russia's population is and that is where their assets are. So I think that is why in terms of context, I think it is very important that we interpret Russia's actions and threats, not with charity, but in the context in which they are actually taking place and not in a sort of fear-laden fever dream kind of politicized context. That would be my only---- Mr. Rohrabacher. And, Mr. Meeks. Thank you very much for that. Mr. Meeks. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. And let me say, Mr. Chairman, I am sure the committee would love to have maybe General Flynn or Paul Manafort come to testify, because they will have the opposite--you know, they will--hear their point of view. They may be great witnesses. Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. Go right ahead. Mr. Meeks. Well, let me jump into this, because--and maybe I will ask Ms. Stamp, because we started and we were talking about that, because over the past 2 decades, since the end of the Cold War, you know, we talk about what we are doing or what--NATO is there, but the Russians have also engaged in exercises and have often quadrupled, is that not correct, the size of the NATO forces in the region? In fact, a lot of the Russian exercises have--you know, you have seen over 100,000 troops. And NATO, our Baltic allies have been--you know, they have been talking and telling us this for years, that it is not just something happening on one side, but there is a threat that they see right across the border, 100,000 troops unannounced. You know, they do this unannounced. So my first question is, actually, has the U.S. military presence in Europe increased or decreased since the end of the Cold War? Two, is the post-Wales response enough? And what happens or what do you see with reference to the comparison of the exercises that the Russians have been going on for the last few years? Ms. Samp. Sir, thank you for that question. I would describe the scale of Russian activities as an order of magnitude greater, that is ten times greater than anything that NATO and the U.S. is doing. The size of the U.S. presence in Europe since the end of the Cold War has decreased dramatically. At its height, it was about 350,000 troops. That would have been in the late 1980s. We are now at about 62,000 troops. With the rotational forces that we have put in since 2014, that number has risen by about 6,000 rotational, nonpermanent forces. And is it enough? I would argue there is more to do. I think we should seriously consider having at least as many troops in Europe now as we did in 2012. Mr. Meeks. Does anybody disagree, agree? Mr. Goble? Mr. Goble. I would--Congressman, I would like to come at this in a slightly different way that I think speaks to that. I think we are wrong to both operate on a model that the Cold War has been restored and that the Cold War is over. The one implies that we are going back to a status quo ante of 1991, and therefore, we need to respond as we did then. The other is to imply that when you don't have a Cold War, the only possible default setting is cooperation, peace, happiness, and niceness with people. History suggests otherwise. There are competitions between countries. I have tried to say in my testimony, perhaps not very well, I tried--it is clear in my written remarks, I think this is-- that we need to address what Russia is doing less in terms of a military threat than in terms of the other kinds of threats it poses: Using subversive measures, using massive amounts of money. I would be far happier to learn that we were investing in more cyber attacks--counter cyber attack centers, that we were investing in more transparency in banking systems, especially, I would say, in the three Baltic countries, in Latvia, where the banks have been used as a major money laundering enterprise for Russian oligarchs, than to talk immediately about more troops anywhere. That is what I believe. Mr. Meeks. Let me ask this question, because I think in your written testimony, you do talk about the fact that you think the lines of communication between the Kremlin and the Baltic States should increase or they should be there. Mr. Goble. Absolutely. Mr. Meeks. Now, given the subversions that you are saying is taking place, and given that, you know, we are seeing it and feeling it, you know, from the hearings we just had right here in the United States---- Mr. Goble. Right. Mr. Meeks [continuing]. As to some things with reference to Russia trying to get involved in our politics and democracy, do you think that, you know, that the suppression that Mr. Putin obviously has at home against the media, et cetera, and then the subversion that he is trying to do in other countries, will that ever change under Mr. Putin's leadership? Mr. Goble. Congressman, the good news is Vladimir Putin will not live forever. That is the really best news I can tell you from this region. Moreover, Mr. Putin has changed his own approach domestically and in foreign policy terms several times since he came to--he was installed in power at the end of 1999. Encouraging conversations has at least three effects, all of which are positive: First, if the Baltic countries show themselves willing to have such conversations and the Russians refuse to do so, the onus of not talking is clearly demonstrated; second, the notion that people in the Baltic countries are interested in talking--in having conversations with their Russian counterparts can be an important conduit of information and influence into the Russian Federation; and third, and this week--you know, this is something when I was working on Baltic affairs at the State Department 25 years ago, while the President of Estonia at one point famously said he would rather have Canada for a neighbor and that he wished there was a very large ocean between himself and the Russian Federation, the reality is that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are going to be Russia's neighbors for a very long time. Now, one would like that relationship to be such that Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians will make the choices about what they will do rather than those choices being made in Moscow. And that is what this is about. But the best way to do that, in my mind, as I said in my written testimony, is for us to be promoting those kinds of transparency changes domestically that limit the ability of Moscow to engage in the subversive activities which it has been doing consistently since 1991. Mr. Meeks. Let me do this. We have a vote that is up, and I know my colleague may have a question. And I did want to ask Mr. Lucas one other question. I think that the chairman had made a statement, and it is important for me to know also. The benefits, you know, can you tell us a little bit what the benefits have been for the Baltic States to continue to be in the EU membership? And has the EU supported their liberty and independence in face of the aggression of Russia? And is there any difference--you know, and I think you being--you know, Mr. Rohrabacher indicated because of your accent, of course, and England, is there any difference of what you see the difference now with Brexit and NATO and the EU, and your opinion on that? Mr. Lucas. Thank you for the question. I am strongly against Brexit and I think it was a bad mistake by my country, but the position of the Baltic States is very different. There is overwhelming support for the EU in all three countries, and the benefits have been colossal, chiefly in the integration into decisionmaking, because in this rules-based format, small countries get a voice. This is not the Europe of the 19th century where the big countries do the deals that they can and the small countries accept the outcomes that they must. We have people in the Baltic States in really senior positions, and making a difference, in the EU's decisionmaking. Very large sums of money have flown into the Baltic States, and the infrastructure has been transformed by EU money. The people in the Baltic States have the right to live and work and travel all through the European Union as European EU citizens. This is extremely popular in the Baltic States. And I think one shouldn't read too into British thing wnhich is very specific and very, very different. I just wanted to relate to one other point. You were asking about why there are no examples of military aggression in the Baltic States. Well, that is because NATO works, Chairman Rohrabacher. And if there had been military aggression in the Baltic States since 2004, we would have responded in military terms and---- Mr. Rohrabacher. Excuse me. Can you repeat that? Mr. Lucas. Sir, I was just saying you were asking why there were no examples of military aggression in the Baltic States. That is because NATO works. You know, Russia tries other stuff, and my fellow panelists referred to some of the examples, and I could give many more. But we have drawn a red line in the Baltics, and that is a good thing, and everybody is therefore better off as a result, not least the Russians. Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much. We didn't have a big enough panel here. We didn't have anybody on the panel here to offer the other arguments. I am just going to have a very short closing statement and then I am going to have to run off and vote. We have a vote on right now. I am sorry we couldn't let this go on for another \1/2\ hour and have a better exchange. Look, I fought in Afghanistan against Russian troops. All right? I was a speech writer for President Reagan for 7\1/2\ years. One of the things my friend quoted was something I had worked on with President Reagan. Let me note, I just think there is a mind-set, and it is represented right here on the panel. I am sorry, I am going to be very frank with you, that we are dealing with the Soviet Union now, except maybe for the gentleman on the end, but this is not the threat that we faced. If the Russians were doing to us, what we are doing to them. Our manned bombers heading straight into Moscow and St. Petersburg. No, it is not justified. It is provocative and it is hostile. And the fact is that our Baltic friends, they don't even feel threatened enough to spend money for their own defense. So what does that tell you? That tells you that we have got people here, as well as there, that have a motive, in that they hate the Russians. All right? Not all the Baltic people hate the Russians, but there is hatred there for a just reason. While the Russians controlled the Baltics, they murdered millions of people. And Russians were in Eastern Europe, and they murdered millions of people. And, yes, that is because they were there when it was communism. It was communism that motivated that occupation. It was communism that motivated Russians to go in different places in the world to try to supplant democratic governments with atheist dictatorships. It was communism; it wasn't the Russian people. And I will just have to say that the current Russian Government is flawed dramatically, we all know that, but it is not the Communist government that existed before. Just this thing, I guess there was no other major cyber attacks that basically were able to cripple a country, except for the one in Estonia. I asked that. So I guess, as far back as 2007, we are going to start using that as an example of hostility today. The people in the Baltics don't think they are under military threat, because they don't even spend their own allocation for their own defense. And, finally, let me just say that when I look at Russia, I would hope that we do not judge other countries differently than we judge our own. And I will have to say that the United States has military forces all over the world today, and in some cases we are places that we shouldn't be. And sometimes it is greatly important for our national security, but the idea that when a Russian spy ship comes down our coast, that we all go crazy about it and start saying this is provocative, which is what I heard in the news, but it doesn't make any difference about us having our warships, some of which can carry nuclear warheads, right up next to the Russian coast. These double standards, we got. All I am saying is let's build a more peaceful world by at least dealing with the people who control Russia today, and try to reach an understanding, what is in your interest and what is in our interest. And today, we are acting in a very belligerent way as if, no, no, you don't have the right to do things in your own interest and to have a military exercise in your own country. We are comparing us having nuclear weapons delivery systems and thousands of troops right on the Russian border, we are saying, well, no, that is not aggression, but 300,000 troops inside Russia itself, its own country, that is aggression? This is nonsense, and we have got to, if we are going to have peace in this world, be realistic and we have to say to ourselves, how do we do this? And it is not giving up territory. Nobody is talking about giving up the Baltics. But let's not say over and over again, which I have heard, the Russian aggression in the Baltics. I have heard that expression, military aggression in the Baltics, dozens, if not 30 or 40 times used to justify a hostile foreign policy toward Russia. And I will tell you, nothing that I have heard today justifies that phrase being used: Russian military aggression in the Baltics. So with that said, I want to thank our panel. I am sorry that I was able to do this tirade at the end. I really wanted it to be an exchange where you could refute me, and back and forth, because that is what we are supposed to have here, but I have to go vote and my friend has to go vote as well. I want to thank you very much. And thank you for putting up with me venting at the very last minute without your chance to retort. But if you would like to put in the record a retort, we will do it. Okay? Thank you all very much. [Whereupon, at 3:20 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] A P P E N D I X ---------- Material Submitted for the Record [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] [all]