[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 115-14]
NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD'S PERSPECTIVE
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 9, 2017
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona, Vice Chair JIM COOPER, Tennessee
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
DUNCAN HUNTER, California RICK LARSEN, Washington
MO BROOKS, Alabama JOHN GARAMENDI, California
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma BETO O'ROURKE, Texas
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii
BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama RO KHANNA, California
SAM GRAVES, Missouri
Drew Walter, Professional Staff Member
Leonor Tomero, Counsel
Mike Gancio, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Larsen, Hon. Rick, a Representative from Washington, Subcommittee
on Strategic Forces............................................ 2
Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces............................... 1
WITNESSES
John, Dr. Miriam, Dr. Michael Anastasio, and Dr. William
LaPlante, Members, Defense Science Board....................... 4
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
John, Dr. Miriam, joint with Dr. Michael Anastasio and Dr.
William LaPlante........................................... 28
Larsen, Hon. Rick............................................ 25
Rogers, Hon. Mike............................................ 23
Documents Submitted for the Record:
Richard L. Garwin letter, January 11, 2016................... 45
Roy Schwitters statement, January 11, 2016................... 41
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Cooper................................................... 56
Mr. Franks................................................... 57
Mr. Rogers................................................... 51
NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD'S PERSPECTIVE
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Washington, DC, Thursday, March 9, 2017.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:36 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Rogers. Good afternoon. The subcommittee will come to
order. I want welcome to our hearing on ``Nuclear Deterrence--
The Defense Science Board's Perspective.''
I want to thank all of our witnesses for being here today,
and for your service to the public. Our witnesses are all
experts who have spent their careers in fields related to
nuclear deterrence. They are appearing today in their
capacities as members of the Defense Science Board [DSB], but
all have long and distinguished histories in the topic of our
hearing today.
We thank you for the hard work it takes to prepare for this
hearing.
And our witnesses are Dr. Michael Anastasio, Dr. Miriam
John, and Dr. William LaPlante.
Without objection, I will introduce my full statement for
the record, but I would briefly summarize.
In December 2016, in the waning days of the Obama
administration, the Defense Science Board completed a report
titled, ``Seven Defense Priorities for the New
Administration.'' It made recommendations to the new Trump
administration on key issues in the world of defense. Chapter 2
of this report summarized years of work by the Board on nuclear
deterrence, which is exactly what we will explore today.
The Board has published 12 studies over the 14 years on
this topic. So it is clear the Board has spent a lot of time
thinking about this, as well it should. A defense mission of
this importance seems worthy of sustained and focused
attention.
As the new administration and Congress goes forward with
the nuclear modernization program initiated by President Obama,
the Board's experts help us take stock. They help us understand
how nuclear threats are evolving and how we should compensate.
They help us understand where we have been and where we should
go.
Our witnesses today will be able to provide the collective
views and recommendations of the Board as well as their own
views as Board members.
Ensuring a credible nuclear deterrent for the long-term
future will continue to be a major priority for this Nation and
the Congress and this committee.
With that, let me turn to my friend and colleague, the
acting ranking member from Washington State today, Mr. Larsen,
for any opening statement he may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers can be found in the
Appendix on page 23.]
STATEMENT OF HON. RICK LARSEN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
WASHINGTON, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Doctors, I join Chairman Rogers in welcoming you to the
subcommittee. Thanks for helping us out.
Ranking Member Cooper is unable to participate in today's
hearing. He is pretty ill right now, just sort of kind of a
head cold and can barely speak. So I am sitting in for him, and
I know he would be here if he could.
So as independent advisers, though, the DSB has an
important role to play in making recommendations to the
scientific and technical matters to the DOD [Department of
Defense] leadership. And in its ``Seven Defense Priorities for
the New Administration'' report, the DSB correctly noted that
our nuclear forces remain a cornerstone of U.S. national
security. I agree that this is one of the most important areas
for the Department and for our community to focus on.
Given how critical these nuclear systems are and with
costly modernization programs occurring concurrently, we can't
afford to get this wrong. While I appreciate the vision
represented in the report, I would be remiss if I did not
mention that DOD still has been unable to provide us with a 30-
year estimate on the full costs of nuclear modernization.
It is not a matter of partisan politics. Members of this
committee have been asking for this accounting across multiple
administrations.
In your report, you write that the budget for
modernization, quote, ``will significantly compromise
investments in conventional capabilities,'' unquote. This
commonsense observation should alarm those who seek to downplay
the impact on the defense budget of nuclear modernization and
provoke all of us to understand the inherent tradeoffs that are
looming.
There are other elements of this report that I find
concerning. You recommend prototyping and fielding low-yield
nuclear weapons. I found the justification to be unclear. Are
these intended to address new threats? To enable us to reduce
our stockpile of other types of nuclear weapons? To deter a
Russian escalate-to-deescalate scenario? Are they to keep
nuclear weapon scientists sharp and interested in their
mission?
These are all very different objectives. I have not seen a
sufficiently detailed analysis of what the proposals are,
whether they are necessary, what alternatives are being
considered, what the tradeoffs are, what the costs would be,
and, of course, what the policy implications are.
I also find this recommendation to run contrary to General
Hyten's testimony yesterday. During the full committee hearing,
General Hyten stated that the deployment of nuclear weapons is
always an attempt to achieve strategic effects and disagreed
with the distinction between tactical and strategic nuclear
weapons.
Smaller nuclear weapons would require prototyping. However,
Dr. Richard Garwin and Dr. Roy Schwitters, both of the eminent
JASON scientific group, strongly criticized the need and value
of manufacturing prototypes of new nuclear weapons in written
comments to this subcommittee last year.
I am particularly concerned that new types of nuclear
weapons would have significant policy and proliferation
implications. Adding new military capability and building new
nuclear weapons would be a radical shift, one that Congress,
rightly so, has not been willing to approve for nearly 25
years. This approach could lead to a requirement for renewed
nuclear testing, a policy shift that would be unwise,
unnecessary, and have potentially disastrous consequences in
re-legitimizing nuclear testing and helping to advance our
adversaries' nuclear forces.
The DSB report more explicitly opens the door to the
potential need to resume testing. Until now and for the
foreseeable future, our top scientists have confirmed that
there is no need to resume nuclear testing to certify the
current stockpile.
Still, there is much to commend in your report. It
highlights correctly, I believe--and we get ice cream sometimes
with our Brussels sprouts--it highlights correctly, I believe,
the need for investments in detection and monitoring
technologies, which can reduce the threat posed by nuclear
proliferation. With new technologies such as 3D printing
emerging, these investments can support current and future
nonproliferation and arms control agreements with a robust
technological foundation.
The report also correctly identifies some of the
geopolitical complexities that have challenged our nuclear
deterrent. These include proliferation of nuclear weapons, and
our allies' concerns that the U.S. may be weakening its
security guarantees.
As a candidate, the President expressed support for
proliferation and seemed to threaten the sanctity of the
American security guarantee to our allies. It is my hope that
as Commander in Chief, he understands the destabilizing effects
of these statements.
A 2014 DSB report warned that, quote, ``For the first time
since the early decades of the nuclear era, the Nation needs to
be equally concerned about both vertical proliferation, the
increasing capabilities of existing nuclear states, and
horizontal proliferation, an increase in the number of states
and nonstate actors possessing or attempting to possess nuclear
weapons. Monitoring for proliferation should be a top national
security objective, but one for which the Nation is not yet
organized or fully equipped to address,'' unquote.
Your comments and insights on this issue are most welcome.
I would be interested in more specific recommendations in
support of this mission, particularly with regard to what gaps
remain and how we can use advancing technology and analytical
approaches, including big data analytics, to improve our
capabilities.
I want to thank you for joining us today. And I yield back,
Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Larsen can be found in the
Appendix on page 25.]
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
I want to let the witnesses know that their entire opening
statements will be accepted for the record. If you would like
to just spend your 5 minutes summarizing, that is fine--or
less.
But I will take the first witness, Dr. Anastasio, for your
opening statement--oh, okay. I understand that you have a joint
opening statement?
Dr. Anastasio. Yes.
Mr. Rogers. And Dr. John is going to present that to us.
And then the other two, if you have an opening statement
you want to submit individually, we will take that for the
record.
With that, you are recognized, Dr. John.
STATEMENT OF DR. MIRIAM JOHN, DR. MICHAEL ANASTASIO, AND DR.
WILLIAM LAPLANTE, MEMBERS, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD
Dr. John. Thank you. I lost the coin toss.
Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Larsen, and members of the
subcommittee, we thank you for the opportunity to testify today
concerning ``Nuclear Deterrence--The Defense Science Board's
Perspective.'' And we are here representing the Defense Science
Board.
We are going to discuss our principal findings and
recommendations over the past 15 years' worth of work, and as
you noted, they are summarized in chapter 2 of the report that
we issued in December.
For those that are not fully familiar with the Defense
Science Board, we are indeed a Federal advisory committee to
the Secretary of Defense and a source of independent scientific
and technical advice.
Our tasking, we do not invent our tasking. Our tasking
comes from Department leadership and occasionally comes from
you all, from Congress. And, typically, it is to address tough
problems that may not have a lot of structure, like cyber and
nuclear in the early days of its emergence, and/or problems it
may present on the positive side, game-changing opportunities.
We have done a lot of work in things like directed energy over
time, autonomy, and electronic warfare.
There are currently 46 members of the Board, and we come
from a wide variety of walks of life in the national security
arena. The three of us represent, all right, over 100 years of
experience in the nuclear area. And when we wrote that down, my
God, I felt old.
All right. For the topic of this hearing, namely, the DSB's
perspective on nuclear deterrence, we have summarized over a
decade's worth of work in chapter 2 of our recently released
``Seven Defense Priorities for the New Administration.'' Based
on what you have already heard this week, and especially
yesterday from our military leaders, you are probably not going
to learn much new from us, because there is a lot of
harmonization of views. It is just that we have been saying it
a lot longer, I think, than they have.
Our working assumptions have always been that there is no
more important defense objective than preventing a nuclear
attack on the United States or its allies, and the foundation
for prevention is deterrence.
Three key points that we would make around that, and you
can find them in the report, although they are not stated quite
this succinctly.
The first, the threat environment has been evolving in very
troubling ways. Since the end of the Cold War, the United
States has sought to raise the threshold for nuclear use, at
least for ourselves, by emphasizing dramatically improved
nonnuclear or conventional force capabilities.
Unfortunately, others have gone the wrong way--let's just
say different directions--in part, because they can't afford to
overmatch us conventionally. Russia has modernized and expanded
the capabilities of its nuclear force. China has expanded both
its nuclear and nonnuclear forces. And we face a new and
unpredictable nuclear proliferator in North Korea.
We have also seen attempts at commerce in nuclear know-how
and materials and acquisition--attempts at acquisition
elsewhere, name them. North Korea, Libya, Pakistan, Iran are on
the list.
The second point, modernization of the triad and the
infrastructure to support it is long overdue. The triad remains
a key component of the Nation's deterrence posture. The
platforms and warheads have aged well beyond their original
design intent. In addition, critical elements of the DOE
[Department of Energy] production infrastructure are very old
and inefficient. We simply can't wait any longer to renew all
three legs of the triad and to assure their operational
viability and readiness.
Our third point, and this is the one that may engender the
most discussion, we must hedge against an uncertain future. We
should expect--we already are, but we should expect that it
won't change, that the future holds a very dynamic geopolitical
environment for us, that the advances in science and technology
are happening at a breathtaking pace and are happening on a
global scale, and continued attempts by adversaries will be
paramount in thwarting U.S. advantages.
To ensure a robust deterrence posture besides the triad,
there is much more to the story, and we believe there also need
to be healthy efforts to, one, deepen our insight into the
developing capabilities, doctrine, and threats of current and
potential adversaries. So we have got to keep an eye on what
they are doing.
We need to ensure a very robust nuclear command and control
and communication system. We need to ensure the survivability
of U.S. forces, both nuclear and nonnuclear forces, in the face
of their use of nuclear weapons. And we need to ensure a
demonstrated, flexible, and adaptive capability to respond to
changing threats through a strong research and development
program.
And finally, and equally important, we need to prevent
further proliferation through both cooperative and unilateral
measures, through the tools of diplomacy, and through renewed
and strengthened efforts at assurance of extended deterrence to
our allies.
The linchpin of all this, of course, is the demonstrated
skills of the talented, knowledgeable, committed, and valued
people who are part of this enterprise.
With that brief background, we would be happy to take your
questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Dr. John, Dr. Anastasio,
and Dr. LaPlante can be found in the Appendix on page 28.]
Mr. Rogers. I thank you. And I will recognize myself for
the first set of questions.
The DSB report from December says that we should focus our
nuclear weapons R&D [research and development] on concept and
advanced development. Prototyping, placing options on the shelf
should be needed rapidly. It goes on to say: Already, the DOD
can anticipate the need for capabilities such as hardening or
maneuvering for defensive penetration.
In this open forum and in more detail later, when we are in
our classified session, would you please explain why the DSB
and DOD anticipate needing to pursue capabilities like
maneuverable warheads or lower yield, primary-only missile
warheads?
Dr. Anastasio. Well, Mr. Chairman, I am trying to be
careful.
Mr. Rogers. Well, what you can't say here we will say in
the classified.
Dr. Anastasio. No, I understand. I am just getting my
thoughts right.
I think the issue is the developing capabilities in our
adversaries like the Russians and the Chinese with more and
more capable denial capabilities, denial our access for our
systems. They have to believe that if we were ever--if a
President ever made a decision to use it, that it would get to
its target. And if they develop capabilities to try to deny us
that, then we need to assure that we have alternate ways to do
that.
And I think that is the origin of the thinking about how do
you anticipate what might be coming from an adversary and have
our deterrent be in a place where we can counter their
capabilities. And so we should be thinking about the kinds of
options that we in the military might have to do that. So how
do you anticipate what a future threat might be and how are we
going to be prepared to deal with that?
Mr. Rogers. Based on the threats we see developing with our
adversaries, when do you think we are going to need to be able
to field these capabilities that you referenced?
Dr. Anastasio. Well, I think they are developing
capabilities now, and we can talk more about that later. And I
think it is it up to the military and the Defense Department
and all the leadership of the country to decide what actually
needs to get done when. But I think those capabilities are
developing, and we can talk about that later.
Mr. Rogers. Okay.
Dr. LaPlante. I would just add, Chairman Rogers, to my
colleague that one of the things that the science and
technology community must do is always understand the limits of
what physics and engineering can be done. That is separate from
what the threat is assessed to be.
So we have a duty to understand things like the
maneuvering, what is capable technologically, and what could be
done to counter it, both ways, offensive, defensive. We have to
understand that and be ahead of a potential adversary.
So just from a technical edge and an engineering edge, we
have to understand that, and then watch, as you say, as the
threat evolves or if operationally there is a change, we can
provide to the policy makers, to the leadership, what the
technology can do or what it can't do.
Mr. Rogers. Do warhead life extension programs truly
utilize all the design, engineering, science, and manufacturing
capabilities that would be needed to produce a new nuclear
weapon?
Dr. Anastasio. Not completely, Mr. Chairman. What we are
doing with the life extension programs is largely renewing the
capabilities, the systems that we had during the Cold War. And
in some cases, we are having to make some accommodation to the
fact that certain materials and so forth are not available
anymore. But, largely, we are replicating something that we
had.
What we are not doing is exercising that full end-to-end
partnership with the Department of Defense and DOE to think
about what a requirement might be, how would you go implement
that requirement with the constraints that get imposed, and
then carry that all the way through to developing a weapon
system out the door that could potentially go in the stockpile.
And we have not exercised that full system process since
the end of the Cold War, for over 25 years. So there is a skill
set that is involved in doing that process and that
collaborative work between DOE and the DOD that we haven't
fully exercised. Certainly, doing the LEPs [life extension
programs] exercise is part of that, but not that full sweep.
Mr. Rogers. What should Congress do to improve the
stockpile responsiveness program to get after the problems you
have described here in your report?
Dr. John. We saw your authorization for the stockpile
responsiveness program as a huge step forward, but it is
authorized and it is not appropriated. So there needs to be
some continued encouragement that DOE put money behind it, but
it is also important that it is a partnership with DOD. And it
is not on the radar screen at DOD to think about the future at
this point, because there are trades to be made between what
you put on the weapon, what you put on the delivery platform.
And across the board, they have got to be concerned about
the new threats to new systems that we are putting forward. And
I would throw out cyber as something that this community is
just waking up to thinking about.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. Thank you. The Chair recognizes the
ranking member for any questions he has.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
So the 2014 report warned of this vertical proliferation
and horizontal proliferation. It led to a provision in the NDAA
[National Defense Authorization Act] at the time calling for a
national roadmap, identifying costs, gaps, opportunities to
partner with industry and academia that would improve nuclear
verification. We are still waiting to get that report 3 years
after the provision in the bill.
Do you think that report should be a priority for the
administration to answer those questions?
Dr. John. Well, since I was the prime mover behind that
report, you would see me say, yea, verily. Because for one
thing, technology has moved forward in ways that would allow us
to do a much stronger job at what I would call early, early
detection of proliferation where you have many more options to
either cooperatively or unilaterally thwart the acquisition by
a new proliferant.
I will say that my somewhat limited insight into things
that have happened around a Presidential directive in the last
administration created some working groups across the
interagency. And I had the opportunity to spend the day with
them about a year ago, and I have never seen so many different
intelligence community representatives who knew each other and
were sharing information.
Now, that is the good news. And you say, why is that
happening? Well, it is a very small community still, so it has
been easy to make the connections.
We on the Defense Science Board are about to publish
another report that really hammers home this early, early
warning piece and the potential for the tools of big data
management and acquisition and data analytics and the promise
that that holds, particularly when you tap into open source,
for the sort of cueing that you would need on where to look and
all. So continued emphasis on that, because it is a new
paradigm for the intelligence community to step up to this.
Dr. Anastasio. Could I add one more thought to that? Which
is that as technology evolves and as we do more R&D, you can
imagine that the paths to proliferation can change. When we get
in another room, we can talk more about opportunities like that
that could be out there that would be nontraditional paths,
and, hence, the R&D community needs to help the intelligence
community understand what are the potential threats of the
future that might come about and how would you look for those,
too. So it is not just monitoring what you are used to
monitoring, but, perhaps, there are other things you have to
look for.
Mr. Larsen. Would you argue, then, this could help us with
detection and verification as well?
Dr. John. We really didn't touch the verification problem
in what we looked at. We started out to, because we had
anticipated a more robust arms control agenda when we started
the study in the 2010 timeframe, and that quickly fell apart.
But at the same time, arguing among ourselves, we actually were
taken with the fact that we have a problem with proliferation
that seems to be cropping up in many different ways. And so
let's take a step back and figure out if we have got the tool
set to be able to deal with what we see coming.
Mr. Larsen. Yes. Would you suggest that that be on our
plate, the subcommittee, to look at that?
Dr. Anastasio. Verification?
Mr. Larsen. Yes, the verification, the use of these new
tools and how it applies to verification.
Dr. John. I am not sure, because it depends on what
treaties are going to be honored by our partners who have
signed up and the like as to how much to put in a verification
piece of it at this point.
Dr. Anastasio. I think there has been work done in the past
to think about how you do verification on what potential
agreements might look like, and if you get to the point where
you are starting to count warheads themselves, the individual
objects, how would you do verification of that and how could
you agree on protocols for how to do that, et cetera. And there
has been work done on things like that. And so that might be
something that is worth the committee getting updates on. But
it does depend on what you might think an agreement of the
future might look like.
Mr. Larsen. Yes. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will
yield back to other members.
Mr. Rogers. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Colorado, Mr. Lamborn, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. And thank you for all the work that
you have done on these important issues.
You talk about the lack of funding, and you talk about the
modernization that Russia and China have done in recent years
but we have not done because of lack of commitment and funding.
And I think after meeting with some of the uniformed people
that we have listened to this week, and previously also, we
know the way forward. We just have to have the financial
commitment to do the modernization and upgrading and enhancing
reliability and safety and security.
If we don't do that, what is the risk that our nuclear
umbrella has if it begins to develop leaks, if the 30 or so
allies that rely on our nuclear umbrella have doubts as to
whether we can actually carry through on our commitments? Will
they begin to contemplate developing their own nuclear
programs, for instance?
Dr. LaPlante. As you note, Congressman, the fact that we
have put off modernization for lots of reasons until where we
are today, where we basically have no more life extension that
can be done, that is one of the reasons why we are in this
situation today where you have in the 2020s all this stuff that
has to happen at the same time. We can't push it anymore.
It is remarkable that we are flying the B-52s today in the
nuclear mission. Grandfathers, sons, and grandsons, literally
have the same airplane. It is absolutely remarkable. As a
former chief of staff for the Air Force used to say, it would
qualify for an antique license plate in the State of Virginia.
So I think, getting to your question about how does that
deal with our allies, giving them confidence, well, no matter
what you say in terms of your commitment, if you don't do it,
and if you don't keep your systems current, people are
watching. They are watching not just what you are saying, they
are watching, are you really going to extend and go into the
next version of Ohio replacement? Are you really going to build
this bomber? Are you really going to do it and not just talk
about it, not just study it? And we are sort of at that point
where we are either going to do it or we are not, because,
really, you can't life extend. So I would imagine everybody is
watching what we do for all the reasons that you imply.
Dr. John. Just to add a little color here, I guess. There
are discussions that have been ongoing, I am sure you are all
aware, in South Korea and Japan. They are not the majority yet,
but the noise is there. And, my God, the last week, the Poles,
the Germans said, maybe we better start thinking about a NATO
European-owned deterrent. So we have got some fraying around
the edges here. And so it is part what we do. It is also part
what we back up with our words and actions.
Mr. Lamborn. Let me ask about one other possible erosion of
our nuclear umbrella, and that is the lack of testing. It has
been 25 years since any tests have been done. I think we can be
confident today that our weapons would still perform as needed,
as advertised. But as each year goes by, we are going to lose,
I believe, some of that certainty and the day will arrive when
we need to negotiate with near peers about maybe a one-time
round of testing and negotiate it.
What threat do we have--and I will disagree with my
colleague to my left--what risk do we have if our credibility
becomes eroded because people don't have confidence that the
weapons will actually--or at least all of them will perform?
Dr. Anastasio. Let me try to take that one on, since I had
the honor to write nine of the letters, annual assessment
letters that go to the President and Congress about the need
for testing. And I would reiterate that I believe and that I
think the Defense Science Board believes that there is no need
for testing right now. And the way I think about it is that
nuclear testing is a tool. It is a technical tool to help us do
a job. And our view is that the job we have today, we don't
need that tool right now.
The question becomes, would I need it in the future? Well,
the answer to the question depends on what my job is in the
future. There are potential versions of the job, like the job
we had in the Cold War, for which we would say we do need
nuclear testing. But if the job looks like the one we have
today, I think the view is that we don't believe that is an
essential element, a tool, for us to get our job done with
confidence. So it is a tool to be used, and it depends on what
you are trying to accomplish when you do it.
The other piece is, as our chairman of the Defense Science
Board reminds us, we should be humble about the future. We
don't know what the future is going to look like in 10 or 20
years. And so to make a blanket statement about what it is we
need or don't need then is probably a fool's game.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you. The Chair will now recognize the
gentleman from California, Mr. Garamendi, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
A lot of things to discuss here. I think we are spending
several billion dollars on a testing machine in Lawrence
Livermore, aren't we, Dr. Anastasio? How is it working?
Dr. Anastasio. I believe you are talking about the National
Ignition Facility, the NIF?
Mr. Garamendi. Oh, yes, that is what I am talking about.
Dr. Anastasio. I don't work at Lawrence Livermore anymore.
Mr. Garamendi. Well, I know you are familiar with it. You
spent a lot of time teaching me about it, so----
Dr. Anastasio. Yes, sir. And it is good to see you, again,
sir.
I think the Defense Science Board has looked at NIF and has
felt it was a valuable tool and asset for the Stockpile
Stewardship Program.
Mr. Garamendi. We will let it go at that.
Dr. Anastasio. I will say that much.
Mr. Garamendi. I think we need an update on that. It is an
important element in what Mr. Lamborn just talked about.
I want to go to a recommendation here about tactical
nuclear weapons. And under what circumstances does the Board
assume that we would be using them?
Dr. John. We were puzzled by the reference to us
recommending tactical nuclear weapons, because we never wrote
that. We just didn't say that.
Mr. Garamendi. Then how did I come to believe that you did?
Maybe somebody is interpreting your work?
Dr. John. Yes. I think somebody decided what we meant to
say was.
Mr. Garamendi. What did you mean to say? Where are you with
tactical nuclear weapons?
Dr. John. If there is a military need, if the military
stands up and says, we need it, then the enterprise will
respond. But there is no military requirement right now.
Mr. Garamendi. Let me be sure that I understood. As far as
the Board is concerned, you know of no military requirements
for tactical nuclear weapons?
Dr. John. Today.
Mr. Garamendi. Well, there is tomorrow.
Well, how about low-yield weapons, what is the purpose of a
low-yield weapon?
Dr. Anastasio. Well, currently, without going into any
detail here, we have weapon systems that have low yields.
Mr. Garamendi. Yes, we do.
Dr. Anastasio. As you know. And so they have a purpose. We
have a requirement. The enterprise has a requirement to produce
those, and that is fine.
I think the discussion that you have seen in this document
was intended to be along the lines: We don't know what the
future brings. We do see what adversaries are off doing. And I
think the Board felt it was prudent for us to spend time
thinking about how might we respond to a different requirement
than we have today sometime in the future, would we be ready to
respond to that?
Mr. Garamendi. In other words, do you have a low-yield
tactical nuclear weapon?
Dr. Anastasio. Well, there are many, many different kinds
of options that could be possible in the future and are we
ready to be able to respond to that. So it is a capability
question. It is not a recommendation that this is something
that the country should be doing now. It is a desire to be
capable of thinking about such a thing in the future.
Mr. Garamendi. Well, help me think about it for a while. We
do have a nuclear weapon that has a quite low yield----
Dr. Anastasio. Yes, sir.
Mr. Garamendi [continuing]. And a quite high yield. Does
that meet the anticipated--potential anticipated needs that you
are thinking about? If not, why not?
Dr. Anastasio. Let's see, I am trying to think of how to
answer that. We don't have a requirement for something other
than that. So what might happen in the future is speculation.
I think what we are trying to--our intent was to
distinguish between the technical capability of this enterprise
versus the policy questions. We were not trying to address the
policy questions of whether that is a good thing to do or an
appropriate thing to do sometime in the future. It was more,
are we as an enterprise collectively in the DOD and the DOE
capable of responding to a different requirement than the ones
we have today? And that is a technical capability question
versus a statement about what the policy should be.
Mr. Garamendi. I am out of time. I will come back.
Mr. Rogers. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Louisiana, Dr. Abraham, for 5 minutes.
Dr. Abraham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the witnesses
for being here.
The DSB report from December emphasizes, and I am going to
quote, ``that the nuclear weapons are a steadily evolving
threat,'' end of quote.
Would you please describe how the nuclear weapon threat has
evolved, particularly since the last NPR [Nuclear Posture
Review], I think what was written in 2010, the new threats, the
new vulnerability, opportunities that have emerged are changed
since that 2010 report?
Dr. John. Let's see, we will be a little bit careful until
we go into classified session, but certainly there is plenty of
awareness in the public domain that Russia is fielding their
modernized systems. They have been at it since the late 1990s
to retool their capabilities. And that includes a number of
advances in their air defense systems that present very thorny
opportunity--I mean challenges for us to be able to penetrate
Russian airspace.
In addition, the Chinese have gone from order a dozen
strategic weapons, as in long-reach weapons, to something like
100 or so. And look at North Korea. We have underestimated them
every step of the way. I will stop it at that.
Dr. Abraham. Okay. And we will pick this up in a different
briefing. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. The Chair now recognizes Ms. Hanabusa for 5
minutes.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you all for being
here.
I think the problem that I am having with this is that when
we talk about nuclear deterrence, you seem to imply in your
report that there is both nuclear weapons, but also nonnuclear
weapons that can also act as deterrents. And you talk about the
triad, and we had a session yesterday where I was telling the
military members who were sitting where you are that I think
the assumption of the triad was something that I questioned
right off the bat. In other words, how can you say something
that has been in the shape that it has been for all these
years, you talk about modernizations, which you also talk
about, and then somehow the modernization includes the
structure that has been there for all of these years.
So what I would like to ask you is, when you talk about the
deterrence of nuclear weapons and you also mention the
nonnuclear weapons, what are you talking about? And when you
talk about modernizing the triad, it seems to assume that
somehow the inherent structure of the triad is what we need.
And I just can't understand how when you sit here before us
that that would be something that you would begin this whole
discussion with. So if anyone can take a stab at that.
Dr. LaPlante. I can start by saying the Board believes and
enforces the fact that the triad needs to be strong, robust,
and modernized. One would argue that we have used the--we use
the triad every day, and we use the ICBMs [intercontinental
ballistic missiles], we use the SSBNs [ballistic missile
submarines] every day, we use the bombers every day, okay? We
talked earlier about the fact that they are all running to the
end of their life. And so what the Board has pointed out, as
has others, is it is time to modernize.
Now, the triad itself is the ultimate part of deterrence.
It is the ultimate. It is to deter the country against, God
forbid, a nuclear attack. And the fact of the matter is there
are other kinds of deterrence, lower on the escalation ladder,
as you imply, conventional. But, God forbid, if all of those
failed, all we have is the triad, and that is our point.
The other point about the triad is each leg of the triad
has unique characteristics, and they are actually complementary
with each other. The ICBMs, in order for an adversary to take
out the ICBMs in a first strike, would have to be a massive
first strike against the continental United States, something
that would be a very high bar for any country, God forbid, to
even think about, and that is what we want them, not to think
about it.
The bombers have an inherent flexibility. We can signal
with the bombers. We can move them. We can show them. We can
recall them. They have a flexibility that is unique of
themselves. The SSBNs are an ace in the hole. No matter what
happens, they will always survive and be there as a credible
second strike.
Now, there is always talk and there will be talk and there
should be talk about is there a better way to do business. And
we would encourage that. We think the NPR that is being started
should be informed by the best experts. But the triad as I just
described it and having it be modern and having been it be
proficient and credible is the state that we are in, and that
is what the Board emphasized in its report.
Ms. Hanabusa. So when the Board says it should be modern, I
guess that is the problem I am having. I understand the SSBN. I
understand the move from Ohio to Columbia class. That I
understand. But when you talk about bombers or ICBMs, how do
you modernize ICBMs?
And your other statement that I find curious, you say, we
use it every day. How are we using ICBMs every day?
Dr. LaPlante. Right now there are people in the missile
fields, in the LCCs [launch control centers], airmen in the
LCCs, that are airmen doing that mission. So they are doing
that mission right now as we speak.
Ms. Hanabusa. So are you saying we are deploying ICBMs
every day?
Dr. LaPlante. No, the deterrence posture--we have right now
SSBNs in the ocean, we have ICBMs in CONUS [continental United
States], in the United States, and we have bombers. Those are
all part of an active deterrent that operates 24/7.
Ms. Hanabusa. So when you say we are using it every day,
you are not meaning we are actually using it in the
conventional sense. You mean just their presence is sufficient
to be the deterrent?
Dr. LaPlante. Absolutely. Absolutely.
Dr. Anastasio. Absolutely.
Dr. LaPlante. In fact, that is the point. The point is, you
know, there are the three C's of deterrence: credibility,
capability, and clarity. And this is part of the capability. We
have to show that we have this capability.
Ms. Hanabusa. My time is almost up, so we will continue
this in the next session.
Dr. LaPlante. Sure.
Ms. Hanabusa. I yield back, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentlelady. The Chair now
recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Coffman, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
When we talk about the triad, I am awfully concerned about
the next-generation bomber. And given our capability in terms
of cruise missiles, of precision guidance, guided munitions,
those things, how important is it to have--I mean, is that part
of the triad in terms of having a next-generation manned
bomber? Is that dated or is that still as critical as it has
always been?
Dr. LaPlante. The Board has not, as far as I know,
actually--the Defense Science Board has not addressed that
specific question. I have personal experience in this in my
previous job as the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, but
the Board has not answered that.
But I would say that it is a policy of the United States
and the plan that the next bomber, the B-21, is replacing and
is that part of the triad. And as the Air Force has stated
publicly, initially it is going to be manned, but they are
building in the hooks and the capabilities, so if there is a
potential future that it needs to be unmanned they don't have
to start from scratch.
Mr. Coffman. Okay.
``Redundancy'' is a term we hear repeatedly when discussing
the nuclear triad and our ability to retaliate in the event of
a hostile nuclear attack. How vulnerable are our satellite
detection systems to Chinese and Russian kinetic kill or
directed energy antisatellite weapons? Are these systems
redundant in any way?
Dr. LaPlante. I will try to answer it, because the Board
has looked at space, and there is a limited amount we can say
in this open session. But are you saying is the triad redundant
given antispace capabilities?
Mr. Coffman. That is right, ASAT [antisatellite]
capability.
Dr. LaPlante. By an adversary?
Mr. Coffman. Right.
Dr. LaPlante. No. No, it is not. In fact, quite the
contrary. The idea being that these--like, I used the example
of the SSBNs and others. We have to have ways that the triad
can be a credible deterrent even in the most extreme
warfighting scenario, and including in a space situation. So
while we can't go into the details here, a nuclear command and
control has to be robust enough to deal with the fact that
space is going to also be contested, so communications that use
space have to be considered redundancies, resiliencies to deal
with that to make sure the triad works.
But, no, no. In fact, the triad is supposed to be able to
be robust against the full spectrum of space threats, cyber
threats, and, God forbid, a nuclear threat.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
California, Mr. Khanna, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Khanna. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Do you agree with President Ronald Reagan's statement that
a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought?
Dr. Anastasio. I think it is the hope of all of us that we
never have a nuclear war.
Mr. Khanna. That wasn't his statement. He said it must
never be fought. I mean, it can't be won. Do you believe that
he was correct, or do you believe that we need to reconsider
President Reagan's approach to deal with nuclear weapons
because the times have changed? And do you think that--are you
here saying that his thinking is outdated, or do you believe
that his thinking still applies?
Dr. Anastasio. I don't know if I could speak for the Board
in that regard.
Dr. John. Let's see, let me help Mike out a little bit.
That is a policy statement which we, representing the Defense
Science Board, really would act upon or not.
We will say that we start with prevent nuclear war, and the
foundation for that is deterrence. And as I believe one of your
briefers said yesterday, and I can't remember who it was, or
General Kehler might have said in different testimony, that the
paradox of deterrence is that they have to be convinced that
you actually would use it. We have devoted our lives to putting
substance behind that proposition, and if you think there is a
better way to do deterrence, I think we would love to hear it.
Mr. Khanna. I guess I want to get your views in terms of--I
mean, I think President Reagan--and I disagreed with him on so
many things, but I think that many people would say that he had
an aspiration for peace. He, if you read his biographies, said
that he never wanted to see nuclear war. That is why he came up
with Star Wars, whatever you may think of it.
And my question is just he clearly would disagree with what
you are proposing, at least from his public statement. So are
you rejecting President Reagan's legacy on this issue? Which
would be fine, I mean, you can say we are in different times
and President Reagan didn't know what he was talking about when
it came to nuclear deterrence and you have a different
approach. I just want to see if that is your view.
Dr. John. I don't know how different it is today, because
the most significant modernization program, last modernization
program, was in his administration, modernization of our
nuclear weapons.
Dr. LaPlante. We are living off the modernization, many of
which was done during the Reagan administration, the Ohio
class, the Minuteman. And so, again, the Defense Science Board
is not a policy board.
Now, clearly, the objective of having a triad as a
deterrent is stability. And stability is, as I my colleague
here said, is what you are after. You are after stability. You
are after stability. And the paradox is to get stability in
deterrence theory, you have to have a credible capability. That
is the paradox.
Mr. Khanna. I guess I still want to just get to the point.
I agree with your point on modernization having been done
there, but your quote, which is in the Defense Science Board's
report, that you believe in a more flexible nuclear enterprise
for limited use, that basically what you are saying is that we
should have a first strike option if it is in our strategic
interest. Is that not correct? I mean, because that is how
Senator Feinstein characterized it in her op-ed this morning.
Dr. Anastasio. I would suggest that that is not what we--
what the Board believes. What we believe is--as my colleague
said, we are not making policy recommendations. What we are
trying to say, is in an uncertain future, are we capable and
prepared to respond in whatever way the policy makers in this
country decide we should? Are we prepared, are we capable, can
we go execute that if that were something that was required of
the community?
And that is one of the things that we believe has been
ignored in recent decades, which is, how do you think about
what potential things you might have to do in the future and
how do you assure the country and our adversaries that if this
country has to go a different place, that we are ready to go
there and capable of doing that?
And so it is not making a policy recommendation that we
should do this or should do that, and I think that is a
misreading of our report.
Mr. Rogers. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Wyoming, Ms.
Cheney, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Cheney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to take issue with my colleague from California's
interpretation of Ronald Reagan's policy. You know, President
Reagan believed and said that war comes not when the forces of
freedom are strong, it is actually when we are weak that we are
threatened.
So wouldn't you say that fundamental to the notion that
nuclear war should never be fought is the idea that our forces
must, in fact, be so strong, so able to overwhelm any adversary
that they understand they will not survive such a conflict?
That, in fact, deterrence requires both a characterization and
calculation about the threats we face, but also ensuring the
lethality, the modernization, the effectiveness of our force
across a broad array of circumstances so that our adversaries
never mistake any action that we take for some sort of
indication that they could actually prevail in a nuclear
conflict?
Dr. Anastasio. Yeah, it is a risk-benefit. It is, does an
adversary believe that if they take an action that they would
gain more benefit than they would have to pay a cost in our
response?
And I think my comment, back to the previous question, was
along that line, is how do we make sure an adversary believes
that whatever avenue they try to follow to negate the military
capability of this country, whatever avenue they pursue, that
we are ready and capable of responding in whatever way we have
to, to convince them that whatever benefit they think they
might accrue, that is not going to work, and that we can impose
a cost that is much more significant than the benefit they
think they can gain.
Dr. LaPlante. I would just add that the classic deterrence
theory is, this is the hardest part, is you are really trying
to get--all that matters is inside the head of the adversary or
peer that you are trying to deter. And so, as my colleague
said, the idea behind deterrence, the theory of deterrence is
fundamental, is that, as you said, whatever action that this
adversary, potential adversary, is going to take to their
advantage, that they must be convinced that the downside of
taking that action will way overrule any upside they will get.
That is the theory.
Ms. Cheney. Thank you. And I think it is important also
just for the record to point out that it was the policy of
President Reagan to ensure that we had superiority across the
Board, including in our nuclear forces, so that, in fact, we
could guarantee that nuclear war would never be fought.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. All right. The Chair now recognizes the ranking
member.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would just ask
consent to enter into the record the January 11 statement from
Roy Schwitters and the January 11 letter from Richard Garwin,
both with regards to Peer Review and Design Competition in the
NNSA [National Nuclear Security Administration] National
Security Laboratories.
Mr. Rogers. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 41.]
Mr. Rogers. We are now going to stand in recess as we move
to--what room are we moving to? To another room. We are in
recess.
[Whereupon, at 4:31 p.m., the subcommittee proceeded in
closed session.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 9, 2017
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 9, 2017
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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 9, 2017
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS
Mr. Rogers. What are your recommendations regarding how the
Stockpile Responsiveness Program authorized by Congress in the FY16
NDAA, and the foreign design prototyping requirement in the FY15 NDAA,
could be improved to better tackle the concerns expressed by the DSB?
What actions should the administration take here? What actions should
Congress take here?
Dr. John, Dr. Anastasio, and Dr. LaPlante. As stated in the ``Seven
Defense Priorities. . .'' report, the DSB believes that a hedge against
uncertainty is as important a part of the nation's nuclear weapons
program as both the certification of the current systems and the life
extension or replacement of systems that have aged out. The foreign
design prototyping requirement, known as the Foreign Nuclear Weapons
Initiative (FNWI) in the FY15 NDAA and the Stockpile Responsiveness
Program in the FY16 NDAA were positive steps to support such hedging,
but their focus is on DOE. Two ways the Stockpile Responsiveness
Program could be more effective would be through the participation of
the DOD and with Congressional funding of the Program, to include
options for prototyping promising concepts. The FNWI would also benefit
from a DOD partnership to posit a set of signatures not just of threat
warheads, but also system and operational capabilities for which the
intelligence community could monitor as early as possible.
Mr. Rogers. Please describe why the DSB thinks it is important to
truly flex all of the muscles needed to build nuclear weapons from
scratch? Why don't life extension programs flex all of these muscles?
Dr. John, Dr. Anastasio, and Dr. LaPlante. The DSB has confidence
in the current U.S. stockpile but believes that the nuclear weapons
have aged well beyond their expected lifetimes with no margin to
further extend their life. Life extension programs (LEPs) for existing
delivery platforms and warheads are essential to sustain the safety,
security, and reliability of our currently fielded systems, but only go
so far and do not produce a fully modernized system with a long life,
nor do they address the growing concerns about our ability to be
flexible in the face of unpredictable threats. However, LEPs are
replacement programs that rebuild fashion, legacy system which
originated during the last decades of the Cold War. They do not
exercise the full scope of activities across the spectrum of concept
development, design, engineering, production, and certification. To be
sure, LEPs often involve some level of component or subsystem redesign
and certification as duplicate replacement parts may no longer be
available. But they do not start from a ``clean sheet'' for the entire
system in which the options that would optimize the system for the
purposes the nation might need can be explored--whether that
optimization be fore performance, improved margin, employment of new
manufacturing techniques, etc. The DSB recognized this shortcoming in
an LEP approach as early as 2004 and again in 2006, as limiting
flexibility against an uncertain future, and calling for research to
meet emerging needs for east of manufacture, higher margins, lower
collateral damage, and special effects. If the nation ever decided it
needed something different, the DOD-DOE partnership would need to
recreate skills that have atrophied over the last 25 years in the
context of different requirements and constraints (such as modern
delivery platforms or no nuclear testing).
Mr. Rogers. The DSB report indicates that U.S. nuclear force
planning must do a better job anticipating threats and be ready to
respond to them. What are some of those threats? How should our nuclear
forces programs and enterprise be postured to respond to them? Do DOD,
NNSA, and the IC have an active and ongoing effort to anticipate
threats in the nuclear weapons realm? What is it? What can Congress do
to help ensure DOD and NNSA are effectively and actively working to
anticipate threats?
Dr. John, Dr. Anastasio, and Dr. LaPlante. [A classified response
was provided and is retained in committee files.]
Mr. Rogers. The DSB's report from December emphasizes that
``nuclear weapons are a steadily evolving threat.'' Would you please
describe how the nuclear weapons threat has evolved, particularly since
the last Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) was written in 2010? What new
threats, vulnerability, or opportunities have emerged or changed since
2010 that the new NPR must take a clear-eyed look at?
Dr. John, Dr. Anastasio, and Dr. LaPlante. Since the late 1990s,
Russia has been on a path to emphasize nuclear weapons as an integral
part of its security strategy by modernizing its strategic forces,
expanding its tactical capabilities, and promulgating and exercising
new doctrine for regional and strategic use. Since the 2010 Nuclear
Posture Review, the breakdown of any further U.S.-Russia arms control
discussions, Russian violation of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces
treaty, and its aggressive actions along its borders have occurred.
Russia's threatening actions on the borders with U.S. NATO partners
raised concerns about the alliance's commitment to mutual defense. In
addition, China made nuclear modernization and expansion of its
strategic arsenal a key part of its massive military expansion and
continued to surprise the U.S. with the speed at which it has fielded
new systems. North Korea has continued to develop and operationalize
its own nuclear force seemingly without more price to pay than it
already has. In both technical and operational aspects, Russia and
China are introducing asymmetries in nuclear capabilities and concepts
of operation that incorporates nuclear warfighting options in a more
integrated--or ``cross-domain''--approach with non-nuclear forces.
North Korea's opacity creates numerous questions as to what
capabilities would best deter it from further proliferation or use, and
as a result, raises serious concerns in the minds of U.S. regional
allies as to whether their interests are better served by having their
own nuclear capabilities instead of relying on our extended deterrence
guarantees. Depending on how these three situations unfold and how the
U.S. addresses them, the potential for further proliferation is
serious. Iran has demonstrated the difficult and tenuous nature of
stemming a state actor who sees nuclear weapons as a deterrent or hedge
against regional threats and as an equalizer against superior non-
nuclear military forces. A.Q. Khan, the Pakistani nuclear physicist,
demonstrated the ability, even before the advent of such enablers as
the dark web, to create an undetected network of nuclear commerce. To
complicate matters further, technology is advancing in directions with
the potential to make acquisition of a weapon more accessible to those
with limited resources.
Mr. Rogers. What action could the administration or Congress take
to improve the readiness and responsiveness of the NNSA enterprise to
produce nuclear weapons? Right now, it takes over 15 years to even life
extend an existing nuclear weapon--this is far too long. What can we do
to drive down timelines while maintaining safety and security (and
minimizing costs)?
Dr. John, Dr. Anastasio, and Dr. LaPlante. The sluggishness of the
NNSA enterprise has been recognized as a serious problem through
numerous studies, commissions and reviews over two decades, including
the 2014 Augustine-Mies Congressional Advisory Panel ``A New Foundation
for the Nuclear Enterprise.'' The DSB contribution to this topic came
in a 2006 study ``Nuclear Capabilities.'' The DSB observations and
recommendations differed little from the other studies both before and
after its publication, except that it included both DOE and DOD in its
review with the conclusion at that time that ``the production complex
was not configured, managed, or funded to meet minimum immediate
stockpile sustainment needs and that the organization, management, and
programs at both DOD and DOE did not provide for a nuclear weapons
enterprise capable of meeting the nation's future needs.'' Leveraging
the Stockpile Responsiveness Program to explore design approaches that
emphasize readiness and responsiveness provides another avenue to drive
down timelines while maintaining safety and security. The governance
structure and practices that have burdened the enterprise with
excessive oversight, inefficiencies, and mistrust are consistently
cited in almost all the dozens of studies as the root problems with
NNSA. It remains to be seen whether the Panel to Track and Assess
Governance and Management Reform in the Nuclear Security Enterprise,
jointly established by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering,
and Medicine and the National Academy of Public Administration at
Congressional direction to carry out a 4.5 year assessment of the
NNSA's responses to longstanding problems, will provide the forcing
function needed to affect the cultural change required to address the
inherent problems.
Mr. Rogers. The DSB report says ``The recent uptick in priority for
nuclear force modernization in both departments sends a strong message
of U.S. commitment to the deterrent, but it comes after 25 years of
downplaying (and poorly resourcing) the mission.'' Would you please
describe how this message has resonated within the DOD and NNSA
enterprises? Has it improved morale, recruitment, or retention? When
the DSB says the mission was poorly resourced, do you believe the
nuclear modernization and budget plans laid out now are sufficient?
Dr. John, Dr. Anastasio, and Dr. LaPlante. The DSB took a detailed
look at nuclear skills across both DOD and Doe in 2008 (an expanded
version of the 1999 Chiles Commission, also led by ADM Chiles) and
identified some serious skills shortfalls fueled by strategy and
leadership shortcomings in defining the nature and scope of the
nation's nuclear deterrent. In addition, the DSB Permanent Task Force
on Nuclear Weapons Surety undertook a series of studies from 2008-2013
focuses on the Air Force in the wake of the accidental transport of a
live round from Minot to Barksdale in 2007. Continuing missteps by the
Air Force and more recent ones by the Navy led then-Secretary Hagel to
request the ``Independent Review of the Nuclear Enterprise.'' The
persistent message through these reviews were that the root cause for
the operational mishaps linked to airmen and sailor perceptions that
the mission was not valued by leadership, as evidenced through their
actions that placed greater emphasis on compliance and inspections, and
their lack of commitment to address long standing operational support
shortfalls. Individual DSB members and a recent study on WMD deterrence
are observing that the uptick in priority for nuclear force
modernization has definitely improved morale, although there is concern
whether this priority will be sustained. The last three Chiefs of Naval
Operations have made clear that its nuclear mission is its highest
priority. As a result, the Navy has been able to sustain a capable
acquisition community and operational force. The Air Force has been
slower to change. It is recovering its skill base through a combination
of leadership and organizational changes, and is closing funding gaps,
but it will require years of sustained support to recreate the spectrum
of nuclear skilled military and civilians required. The NNSA
laboratories have been growing to meet the demands of the Lifetime
Extension Program schedule, with excellent success in attracting highly
talented new staff, but they are inexperienced and reliant on a
dwindling cadre of experienced (and retirement eligible) scientists and
engineers. Sustainment of the current priority placed on the mission,
through both words and actions, is the best bet for ensuring retention.
The DSB does not comment on specific levels of funding. However, we
note that there no funds for DOE/NNSA for plutonium pit production
beyond 30 pits/year or for a Stockpile Sustainment Program. For
delivery systems, we note that all three legs of the Triad (SSBNs,
ICBMs, and bombers) are at the end of their already extended life and
will need to be replaced over the next decade and a half. The
significant resourcing required will be competing against other
priorities in the Department.
Mr. Rogers. How do we guard against ``technology surprise'' or
``strategic surprise'' in the nuclear deterrence realm? Are we putting
enough effort into cutting-edge R&D in nuclear capabilities to
understand what is possible, what other nations may achieve? Are we
putting enough resources into collecting and understanding technical
intelligence on other nuclear powers and what capabilities they are
researching? What role does prototyping and basic, fundamental nuclear
science play here?
Dr. John, Dr. Anastasio, and Dr. LaPlante. [A classified response
was provided and is retained in committee files.]
Mr. Rogers. The December DSB report says that ``Despite the `peace
dividend' at the end of the Cold War, the DSB remains unconvinced that
downplaying the nation's nuclear deterrent would lead other nations to
do the same.'' Would you please elaborate on how the DSB believes the
U.S. has been downplaying its nuclear deterrent? What actions or
policies would you point towards? Have the steps the U.S. has taken to
de-emphasize its nuclear deterrent had any effects on the nuclear
programs of Russia? China? Any other nuclear power or aspiring nuclear
power?
Dr. John, Dr. Anastasio, and Dr. LaPlante. Successive
administrations since the end of the Cold War sought to place more
reliance on advanced non-nuclear force capabilities for deterrence
while downsizing the nuclear component and focusing investments in that
community on life extensions of systems fielded in the 1980s. That
strategy, however, had the unintended consequence that nuclear became
even more prominent for other nations because they could not afford to
meet or overmatch the U.S. with conventional capabilities. Russia began
undertaking and extensive modernization and expansion program over a
decade earlier than the U.S., China embarked on a steady march to
expand both its nuclear and non-nuclear forces, and North Korea became
fully committed to developing its own systems irrespective of external
pressures. At the same time, the end-of-life of all U.S. systems was
known but not addressed until left with no choice, and therefore few
options except replacement could be supported in the time remaining.
The relatively recent consensus reached by both Congress and the last
administration to support the full suite of modernization efforts at
both DOD and DOE is a welcome reversal, but any faltering in that
commitment going forward will lead to gaps in the viability of the
deterrent.
Mr. Rogers. The DSB's December report makes a pointed summary
statement, saying: ``In short, `nuclear' still matters, nuclear is in a
class of its own, and nuclear cannot be wished away.'' What recent
actions would you describe as ``wishing away'' the nuclear aspects of
defense? What actions do you think we could take that would again be
wishing it away? Or to put it another way--what actions could we take
that would be putting our heads in the sand? Would cancelling key
nuclear modernization programs fall in that list?
Dr. John, Dr. Anastasio, and Dr. LaPlante. [A classified response
was provided and is retained in committee files.]
Mr. Rogers. Our O&I Subcommittee had a hearing focused on the huge
backlog of deferred maintenance at NNSA's facilities. Has the DSB
looked at this issue? What are the impacts of all of this very old,
very decrepit infrastructure? How does it influence NNSA's readiness
and responsiveness to react to new taskings and changes in programs?
Dr. John and Dr. Anastasio. In its ``Nuclear Capabilities'' report
of 2006, the DSB reported that the production complex was not
configured, managed, or funded to meet minimum immediate stockpile
sustainment needs. Many of the problems that prompted that observation
remain, but the DSB has not taken a look at the issue recently. A
glimpse of the advantages that a modern facility employing advanced
manufacturing capabilities can provide can be found at the new Kansas
City plant, where non-nuclear components for the weapons are produced.
Mr. Rogers. What are the key drivers of the U.S. nuclear
modernization program? How is it affected by foreign threats and
capabilities? How is it affected by vulnerabilities or aging in current
U.S. nuclear forces? Is there margin to further slip or delay the
schedules for our nuclear modernization programs?
Dr. John, Dr. Anastasio, and Dr. LaPlante. [A classified response
was provided and is retained in committee files.]
Mr. Rogers. What could be done by DOD--and more broadly DOE and the
nation--to ``reestablish the knowledge base in nuclear matters and the
art of deterrence among both civilian and military leadership,'' which
the DSB notes ``has largely atrophied''? What role can Congress play in
this?
Dr. John, Dr. Anastasio, and Dr. LaPlante. The DSB has been
consistent through most of its work on nuclear matters to point out
that the most important part of the nation's deterrent posture is the
professional workforce, be they in the policy, technical, programmatic
or operational roles. In no other area of national security do these
several dimensions interact as intimately as they do for nuclear
matters, such that developing the knowledge and experience to made wise
decisions and take appropriate actions simply takes time. That said,
there are some practical things to be done such as re-introducing the
fundamentals of nuclear weapons and warfighting in the education,
training, and exercising activities of the DOD; creating and promoting
promising career paths for military and civilians; and rotating high-
potential professionals through a range of assignments that would
expose them to the policy, technical, and operational considerations
associated with nuclear deterrence. In addition, respectful debate
about the merits of various contributors to deterrence should be
encouraged. Contrary to the current perception held by many, the U.S.
deterrence posture of the Cold War was constantly evolving as the
country tested and implemented ideas, keeping some and discarding
others, and as non-nuclear capabilities advanced. In the more complex
21st century multi-polar environment, the U.S. is at the beginning of
developing new strategies for deterrence and should expect those
strategies to evolve as we get smarter about the threats it faces.
Mr. Rogers. Please describe the DSB's concerns on whether DOD's
conventional forces are adequately prepared to ``fight through'' a
nuclear environment. What should DOD be doing to ensure nuclear
survivability requirements are included in key DOD acquisition
programs? How should DOD examine tactics, redundancy, and recovery
plans to ensure it can ``fight through''?
Dr. John, Dr. Anastasio, and Dr. LaPlante. [A classified response
was provided and is retained in committee files.]
Mr. Rogers. Please talk us through the following recommendation the
DSB made: ``The DSB strongly recommends that all major acquisitions be
born with a nuclear survivability requirement derived from projected
threat scenarios relevant to the range of missions expected for the
system.'' DOD doesn't already do this? Which major DOD acquisition
programs are subject to nuclear hardening requirements--or requirements
to be able to ``fight through''--and which are not?
Dr. John, Dr. Anastasio, and Dr. LaPlante. [A classified response
was provided and is retained in committee files.]
Mr. Rogers. What is the state of knowledge and expertise in DOD and
the defense industry regarding nuclear weapons effects and
survivability? What could be done to improve this knowledge level? What
steps should Congress take here?
Dr. John, Dr. Anastasio, and Dr. LaPlante. Through its work in the
area of nuclear weapons effects and survivability over the decade from
2005-2015, the DSB observed that expertise was initially continuing to
decline as it had since the end of the Cold War. The area started to
draw attention, however, because of a number of activities, such as the
EMP Commission and the follow-on DSB Work through the standing
committee, the B61-12 program, and leadership at the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency (DTRA). While those coincident efforts did not result
in restoration of Cold War levels of investment or expertise, they did
stem the decline and produced a more stable programmatic situation at
DTRA and the National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA) laboratories. That
stabilization and even modest growth has persisted as a result of the
triad related modernization programs. In the past three years, there
have also been investments in applying the computational and above-
ground simulator tools of NNSA's Stockpile Stewardship Program to
advancing the science of weapons effects. The DSB has observed,
however, that this area has been a relatively poor sibling to the
weapons physics community. We recommended a more effective ``national''
enterprise in which DTRA and the NNSA laboratories were seamlessly
partnered. Such a partnership could create a more viable capability to
better serve the needs of both Departments and the defense industry
which has largely lost its in-house design, development, and testing
expertise.
Mr. Rogers. Please describe the history of the DSB's work on
nuclear deterrence issues. How long has DSB been working in this topic?
What are the backgrounds and expertise of the DSB members who
contribute to its work on nuclear deterrence?
Dr. John. The DSB has worked on nuclear issues since its inception
60 years ago. The list below covers work since 2004.
- Nuclear in the Context of Broader Themes--Defense
Imperatives for a New Administration, 2008
- Capability Surprise (2008 Summer Study), 2009
- Strategic Surprise (2014 Summer Study), 2015
- Deterring, Preventing, and Responding to the Threat or Use
of WMD, 2017 (in review)
- Nuclear Technologies and Systems--Future Strategic Strike
Forces (2003 Summer Study), 2004
- Employment of the National Ignition Facility (NIF), 2004
- Future Strategic Strike Skills, 2006
- Technology and Innovation Enablers for Superiority in 2030
(2012 Summer Study), 2013
- Assessment of Nuclear Monitoring and Verification
Technologies, 2014
- Operations (Reports of the Permanent Task Force on Nuclear
Weapons Surety) Report on the Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear
Weapons, 2008
- Nuclear Weapons Inspections for the Strategic Nuclear Force,
2008
- Independent Assessment of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise,
2011
- Air Force Nuclear Enterprise Follow-On Review, 2013
- Nuclear Survivability and Weapons Effects Nuclear Weapons
Effects Test, Evaluation, and Simulation, 2005
- Nuclear Weapons Effects National Enterprise, 2010
- Reports of the Standing Task Force on Survivability of DOD
Systems and Assets to Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) and other
Nuclear Weapon Effects, #1-5, 2011-2015
- Unconventional Nuclear Strike Preventing and Defending
Against Clandestine Nuclear Attack, 2004
- Reducing Vulnerabilities to Weapons of Mass Desctruction
(2005 Summer Study), 2007
- Skills and the Health of the Enterprise Nuclear
Capabilities, 2006
- Nuclear Deterrence Skills, 2008
Each report lists the members of the task force. While not
replicating that here, the participants have included retired senior
civilians and general/flag officers who made their careers in DOD's
nuclear weapons community, with backgrounds that span the policy,
technical, acquisition, and operational areas. Positions held include
former STRATCOM commanders, Air Force Chiefs, Navy submarine force and
nuclear weapons systems program leaders, Assistant Secretaries of
Defense from OSD (Policy) and OSD (AT&L), and technical leadership from
the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the Intelligence Community.
Participants were also drawn from senior leadership of DOD's Federally
Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs) and the Energy
Department's nuclear weapons laboratories, and form industries involved
in both the platform and technical services aspects related to nuclear
weapons. To keep entrenched perspectives in check, most studies also
include task force members whose expertise is in related fields (e.g.,
cyber ISR, missile defense) but not mainstream nuclear matters.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER
Mr. Cooper. The report suggests the potential need to return to
nuclear testing, noting that: ``Underground nuclear testing provided
both stockpile confidence and a powerful tool in advancing scientific
understanding, but nuclear testing has not been permitted . . . In its
place, the nation supported the Stockpile Stewardship Program that
significantly improved the fundamental understanding of material aging
and nuclear explosive physics through above ground simulators, and
state-of-the-art computational modeling. An open question remains as to
how long one can have confidence in the weapons through these
approaches alone.'' (emphasis added).
While recognizing that the Board did not consider policy
implications or cost considerations, please explain whether and how the
report recommends reconsidering the need for nuclear testing?
[Question #46, for cross-reference.]
Dr. John and Dr. Anastasio. Nuclear testing was one of several
tools used to develop the U.S. stockpile and advance scientific
understanding during the Cold War. With the end of the Cold War the
nation put in place the Stockpile Stewardship Program that has been
remarkably successful in providing the technical basis for continued
sufficient confidence in the current stockpile. As part of the DSB's
highlighting the need for a hedge to an uncertain future, we have
raised the question of how long this approach alone will provide the
needed confidence. The DSB has not made a recommendation of how and/or
when the need for nuclear testing should be reconsidered, but note that
there is an existing process of annual assessment by the Commander U.S.
Strategic Command and each of the national security laboratory
directors regarding the need to return to nuclear testing.
Mr. Cooper. Is nuclear deterrence just about U.S. nuclear forces?
What else contributes to deterrence? [Question #47, for cross-
reference.]
Dr. John and Dr. Anastasio. While the Triad represents the most
visible manifestation of deterrence and is overdue for modernization,
there are many other factors that contribute to deterrence and also
require attention. Together with the Triad, these factors present to
any adversary the credibility that the U.S. is fully capable of
executing against our strategy under any circumstance; namely that the
U.S. can impose unacceptable costs and/or negate any perceived benefits
of an adversary's actions. They include: The operational readiness of
the force as demonstrated through training and exercises; The ability
and capacity of the technical enterprise to anticipate and respond to
changes in the threat; The ability to operate in an adversary generated
nuclear environment (referred to as nuclear survivability); A robust
command and control system; Preventing further proliferation--both
``vertically'' by current nuclear weapons actors, and ``horizontally''
by new proliferators--through the tools of diplomacy (treaties and
agreements), cooperative and unilateral monitoring, and assurance/
extended deterrence to our allies. The lynchpin: the demonstrated
skills of talented, knowledgeable, committed, and valued people. The
DSB has addressed each of these areas (with the exception of command
and control, a topic covered by special commissions and the subject of
a new DSB study just getting underway) in some depth throughout its
history, and especially over the past 15 years as we began to see
worrisome trends in the threat. A relatively recent proposition to add
to the above list is that integration of U.S. advanced non-nuclear
capabilities with its nuclear forces--so-called cross-domain, or
integrated, deterrence--holds promise as a more fulsome approach. Over
the last three decades the U.S. has developed highly effective non-
nuclear capabilities to hold targets at risk that only nuclear weapons
could previously. Several of these capabilities--kinetic and non-
kinetic--seem likely to be able to enhance the credibility of both the
nuclear deterrent and the extended deterrent if effectively employed as
part of a broader integrated deterrence strategy. Each of the
capabilities have the potential to affect the confidence the adversary
can hold in his offensive nuclear capability to achieve a military or
diplomatic purpose. These non-nuclear capabilities include the
application of the technologies of autonomy, precision conventional
strike, and space and cyber operations. Successful integration will
require a seamless command and control system across nuclear and non-
nuclear warfighting domains.
Mr. Cooper. The DSB report recommends developing weapons with lower
yields. What is the need or benefit when we already have non-strategic
nuclear weapons that have low yields?
Dr. John and Dr. Anastasio. The DSB did not recommend the
development of nuclear weapons with lower yields. We did state that the
U.S. should have a robust hedge against an uncertain future and that
one consideration for such a hedge could be low yield options for
existing weapons beside the B61.
Mr. Cooper. How have advances in technologies made it easier for
aspiring nuclear weapons states or even terrorists to acquire nuclear
weapons? What investments should we make to keep ahead of this threat?
Dr. John and Dr. Anastasio. [A classified response was provided and
is retained in committee files.]
Mr. Cooper. What could be done by DOD--and more broadly DOE--to
``reestablish the knowledge base in nuclear matters and the art of
deterrence among both civilian and military leadership,'' which the DSB
notes ``has largely atrophied''? What role can Congress play in
supporting this effort?
Dr. John and Dr. Anastasio. The DSB has been consistent through
most of its work on nuclear matters to point out that the most
important part of the nation's deterrent posture is the professional
workforce, be they in the policy, technical, programmatic or
operational roles. In no other area of national security do these
several dimensions interact as intimately as they do for nuclear
matters, such that developing the knowledge and experience to made wise
decisions and take appropriate actions simply takes time. That said,
there are some practical things to be done such as re-introducing the
fundamentals of nuclear weapons and warfighting in the education,
training, and exercising activities of the DOD; creating and promoting
promising career paths for military and civilians; and rotating high-
potential professionals through a range of assignments that would
expose them to the policy, technical, and operational considerations
associated with nuclear deterrence. In addition, respectful debate
about the merits of various contributors to deterrence should be
encouraged. Contrary to the current perception held by many, the U.S.
deterrence posture of the Cold War was constantly evolving as the
country tested and implemented ideas, keeping some and discarding
others, and as non-nuclear capabilities advanced. In the more complex
21st century multi-polar environment, the U.S. is at the beginning of
developing new strategies for deterrence and should expect those
strategies to evolve as we get smarter about the threats it faces.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS
Mr. Franks. The DSB reports that ``nuclear testing has not been
permitted for 25 years'' and ``an open question remains as to how long
one can have confidence in the weapons'' by pursuing the Stockpile
Stewardship Program but no full-scale nuclear testing.
Does it believe our science-based tools will be enough to certify
the reliability of the stockpile for the long term or may we need to
return to nuclear testing at some point?
Dr. John, Dr. Anastasio, and Dr. LaPlante. As part the DSB's
highlighting the need for a hedge to an uncertain future we have raised
the question of how long this approach alone will provide the needed
confidence. (See also the answer to question 46.) [Question #46 can
be found on page 56.]
Mr. Franks. What could be done by DOD, DOE, and Congress to
``reestablish the knowledge base in nuclear matters and the art of
deterrence among both civilian and military leadership,'' which the DSB
notes ``has largely atrophied''? What are we doing to ensure our
nuclear scientists and engineers are able to design and build new
nuclear warheads if they were called upon to do so?
Dr. John, Dr. Anastasio, and Dr. LaPlante. The DSB has been
consistent through most of its work on nuclear matters to point out
that the most important part of the nation's deterrent posture is the
professional workforce, be they in the policy, technical, programmatic
or operational roles. In no other area of national security do these
several dimensions interact as intimately as they do for nuclear
matters, such that developing the knowledge and experience to made wise
decisions and take appropriate actions simply takes time. That said,
there are some practical things to be done such as re-introducing the
fundamentals of nuclear weapons and warfighting in the education,
training, and exercising activities of the DOD; creating and promoting
promising career paths for military and civilians; and rotating high-
potential professionals through a range of assignments that would
expose them to the policy, technical, and operational considerations
associated with nuclear deterrence. In addition, respectful debate
about the merits of various contributors to deterrence should be
encouraged. Contrary to the current perception held by many, the U.S.
deterrence posture of the Cold War was constantly evolving as the
country tested and implemented ideas, keeping some and discarding
others, and as non-nuclear capabilities advanced. In the more complex
21st century multi-polar environment, the U.S. is at the beginning of
developing new strategies for deterrence and should expect those
strategies to evolve as we get smarter about the threats it faces.
Regarding the second question, to be prepared to design and build
new warheads, NNSA scientists and engineers must actually do it.
Respecting the restructions of current legislation, the DSB is a strong
supporter of exploratory and advanced development activities, which is
the focus of the Stockpile Responsiveness Program at NNSA, with the
provision that concepts can be carried through to prototyping and
flight testing.
Mr. Franks. The December DSB report says: ``The lead time for
obtaining a modernized force is long and the U.S. is starting well
behind Russia and China's efforts.'' We heard this same message
yesterday at our hearing with General Selva and General Hyten.
Would you please explain why the U.S. is lagging behind Russia and
China's modernization efforts and what could be done to shorten this
timeline for the U.S. to catch up?
Dr. John, Dr. Anastasio, and Dr. LaPlante. The U.S. is lagging
because the Russian and Chinese started their modernization programs 20
years ago. There is little we can do to catch up, and delays in support
for modernization will only increase the gap. Care should be taken in
the current modernization efforts to ensure flexibility in the new
systems (e.g., open software architectures) that would allow their
rapid adaptation to changes in the threat once they are deployed. In
the meantime, there must be investment in sustaining the force that is
currently deployed for as long as possible and for engaging in a more
comprehensive approach to deterrence as discussed in the answer to
question #47. [Question #47 can be found on page 56.]
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