[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 115-20]
AMERICA'S ROLE IN THE WORLD
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 21, 2017
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Fifteenth Congress
WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina ADAM SMITH, Washington
JOE WILSON, South Carolina ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
ROB BISHOP, Utah JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio RICK LARSEN, Washington
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama JIM COOPER, Tennessee
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado JOHN GARAMENDI, California
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia JACKIE SPEIER, California
DUNCAN HUNTER, California MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri BETO O'ROURKE, Texas
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
MO BROOKS, Alabama RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
PAUL COOK, California SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii
BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire
BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
SAM GRAVES, Missouri A. DONALD McEACHIN, Virginia
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California
MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland
STEPHEN KNIGHT, California STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida
STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma RO KHANNA, California
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee TOM O'HALLERAN, Arizona
RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
TRENT KELLY, Mississippi (Vacancy)
MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
MATT GAETZ, Florida
DON BACON, Nebraska
JIM BANKS, Indiana
LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
Robert L. Simmons II, Staff Director
Elizabeth Conrad, Professional Staff Member
William S. Johnson, Counsel
Anna Waterfield, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 2
Thornberry, Hon. William M. ``Mac,'' a Representative from Texas,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.......................... 1
WITNESSES
Albright, Hon. Madeleine K., Former Secretary of State........... 3
Hadley, Stephen J., Former National Security Advisor............. 5
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Albright, Hon. Madeleine K., joint with Stephen J. Hadley.... 52
Smith, Hon. Adam............................................. 50
Thornberry, Hon. William M. ``Mac''.......................... 49
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Ms. Bordallo................................................. 63
Mr. Franks................................................... 63
Mr. Langevin................................................. 63
AMERICA'S ROLE IN THE WORLD
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 21, 2017.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. ``Mac''
Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
So far this year, the committee has examined the state of
the strategic environment in the world around us as well as the
state of the U.S. military. We have examined specific security
challenges such as cyber and nuclear deterrence. We have, of
course, a lot more work to do before we mark up this year's
defense authorization bill.
But today we step back and consider the bigger picture. The
size and characteristics of the United States military should
be related to the role we expect the United States to play in
the world, which is the topic of today's hearing.
Let me read the opening words of the 2014 National Defense
Panel report, and for members who were not here at the time, I
might mention that the National Defense Panel was led by former
Secretary of Defense William Perry and retired General John
Abizaid and consisted of a bipartisan group of eight proven
national security leaders.
They started their report with the following: ``In the
first half of the 20th century alone, the world experienced two
devastating world wars, the rise of the Soviet Union as a
totalitarian menace, and the advent of the nuclear age. This
grim history and the threats to America and our interests
following World War II prompted America's leaders to employ our
extraordinary economic, diplomatic, and military power to
establish and support the current rules-based international
order that has greatly furthered global peace and prosperity
and ushered in an era of post-war affluence for the American
people.''
National Defense Panel goes on: ``Since World War II, no
matter which party has control of the White House or Congress,
America's global military capability and commitment has been
the strategic foundation undergirding our global leadership,''
end quote.
There have been debates in both parties questioning whether
the role America has played over the last 70 years should be
reduced or otherwise changed. Few witnesses have thought more
about these issues or could provide more thoughtful insights
than those we are privileged to welcome today. Before turning
to them, let me yield to the ranking member for any comments he
would like to make.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Thornberry can be found in
the Appendix on page 49.]
STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON,
RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate you
having this hearing and having two such distinguished witnesses
to testify and help us develop an understanding of our national
security strategy and of where we are going in the world. I
think it is, you know, without question true at this point that
the world order that existed for, you know, a long time post
World War II is stressed and requires some changes.
We need to figure out what role we are going to play in
that, how we are going to work together with allies, and also,
frankly, a lot has changed since World War II ended. You have
had the rise of a great many powers. How does that change how
we use the international organizations that have served us so
well, how we continue to build partnerships that will help us
meet national security. There is a lot that can be said about
this, but the big thing is we need changes, we need a new
strategy, we need a new idea of how to approach this.
The only thing that I will say before yielding back is that
I think this needs to be a comprehensive and not just military
strategy. Foreign aid, development, these matter in terms of
building the types of relationships that we are going to need
to build in order to protect ourselves and our interests and
the rest of the world, and hopefully work towards a more stable
and peaceful globe, and that is in our best interest.
But you know, one thing is clear. There is a lot of powers
out there, China, Russia, India, Brazil, that have risen up and
are going to play a greater role in the world than they did
from much of that post-World War II era. How do we work into
that greater role that they are going to play? What
relationships do we set up to accommodate it?
It is a complex and difficult question and one I hope we
will make some progress on answering today. I look forward to
the testimony and to the questions.
I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
Appendix on page 50.]
The Chairman. We are very pleased and grateful that each of
our witnesses have joined us today. Of course, former Secretary
of State Madeleine Albright, former National Security Advisor
Stephen Hadley, there is much more to their resumes before and
since those jobs and currently, but members have that fully in
front of them.
I understand you-all have a joint written statement, and
without objection, that will be made part of the record, and we
would be pleased to hear any oral comments you-all would like
to make.
Madam Secretary.
STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE ALBRIGHT, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE
Secretary Albright. Thank you very much, and Chairman
Thornberry, Ranking Member Smith, distinguished members of the
committee, thank you very much for the opportunity to testify
before you this morning.
And I am very honored to appear alongside my good friend
Stephen Hadley, who is one of the most brilliant and principled
people that I know.
We have worked together on a number of foreign policy
initiatives in the years since we left office and most recently
co-chairing the Atlantic Council's Middle East Strategy Task
Force. We have done this not only because we happen to like
each other but also because we both believe fervently in the
importance of a bipartisan foreign policy.
We know this committee has always been bipartisan in its
approach, and you have had your share of vigorous debates, but
you have been able to come together, compromise, and do what is
right for our country and our men and women in uniform. Steve
and I have also had our share of debates, and it is no secret
that I was critical of some decisions made by the Bush
administration. I suspect he had some disagreements with the
Clinton administration, which is fine because everybody knows
we were perfect.
But whatever arguments we have had in the past, we are in
vigorous agreement on the defining question before us today,
the question of America's role in the world. We both believe it
is profoundly in America's greatest interest to be engaged
globally because our security and prosperity at home are linked
to economic and political health abroad. This mindset is what
led our country to construct a system of international
institutions and security alliances after World War II, as both
the chairman and the ranking member said. It is why Presidents
of both parties have worked to promote peace, democracy, and
economic opportunity around the world.
The system America built has not been perfect, but it has
coincided with a period of security and prosperity unmatched in
human history. And while many nations have benefitted from the
investments America has made in global security and prosperity,
none have benefitted more than the United States.
We recognize that today this system is under stress in
different ways from China, Iran, North Korea, and a resurgent
Russia. Meanwhile, the value of our global engagement is under
question at home. Many Americans feel that their lives have
been threatened rather than enhanced by it. This popular
dissatisfaction with international trade, technological change,
and the facelessness of globalization, needs to be understood
and acknowledged, but so do the consequences of disengagement.
For while it is comforting to believe that we can wall
ourselves off from the ailments of the world, history teaches
us that whenever problems abroad are allowed to fester and
grow, sooner or later they come home to America. Isolationism
and retreat do not work. We know because we have tried them
before.
I am sure this will come as a surprise, but I am slightly
older than most of you, and also, I was not born in the United
States. Instead, I entered the world in Czechoslovakia only a
year before the Munich Agreement sacrificed my country's
sovereignty in order to appease Hitler.
In my early years, I saw what happened when America was
absent as it was at Munich and what happened when America was
present as it was during World War II when I lived in London
during the Blitz. The lesson I drew is that terrible things
happen when America is not engaged. We are not an ordinary
country that can just put our narrow interests first and forget
about the rest of the world. We are the indispensable nation,
and it would be terrible to pretend otherwise.
But we should also remember that there is nothing in the
word ``indispensable'' that means alone. We want and need other
countries to have the desire and the capacity to work alongside
us in tackling global challenges.
The testimony that Steve and I have submitted for the
record makes a bipartisan case for continuing America's global
leadership in partnership with our allies while acknowledging
that the international order needs refurbishment as do most
humans and institutions after 70 years of age.
Drawing on the task force's work, we also outline a new
approach for dealing with the chaos and disorder of the region.
In a moment, Steve will provide a brief overview of the
strategy we propose, but since we are very much looking forward
to your questions, I would just make a few points before
turning to him.
First, decades of experience have taught us that in order
for America to engage effectively in the world, we need to be
able to use every tool in the national security toolbox. This
includes diplomatic pressure, economic leverage, technical
assistance, and the threat of the use of force. Any one of
these tools is ineffective on its own, which is why Steve and I
are opposed to the steep and arbitrary cuts to the State
Department and international affairs budget which were proposed
last week.
Our diplomats work every day at considerable sacrifice to
ensure that the United States has the superb representation
that our interests demand and the civilian capabilities our
military needs in order to achieve its mission. We cannot have
that on the cheap.
We must invest the resources necessary to make sure that
our diplomats succeed, and this is especially true today when
our personnel are often in danger in conflict areas, when our
diplomats face criticism from would-be autocrats who do not
like their advocacy for democracy, American values, and
American nongovernmental organizations. It is your
responsibility as Members of Congress to ensure that all of our
instruments of national power are properly funded, and so I
hope that you will join us in rejecting these unwise cuts. And
I would like to thank the chairman and the ranking member and
the members of this committee who have already spoken out about
this.
As we consider America's role, another point worth
emphasizing is that we need to be clear, not only about what
our Nation is against in the world, but also of what we are
for. We cannot and will not give in to those who threaten us or
who conspire to kill our citizens but neither can we allow any
enemy to cause us to abandon the ideals that made America a
symbol of liberty and justice.
For more than 200 years, our country's strength has come
from its inclusiveness. You cannot tell an American by his or
her last name. You all know me as Madeleine Albright, but in
fact my name is Marie Jana Korbelova. America has always been
able to lead the world because we spoke and listened to people
from vastly different cultures. In today's era of
interdependence, these are traits that we must retain, and this
hearing comes at a time of deep political division at home and
heightened instability abroad.
In this pivotal moment, there must be a national debate
about how and why America engages in the world. Congress has a
vital role to play in convening that debate, given your
representative nature and the responsibilities given to you by
Article I of the Constitution, which I read to my students
yesterday at Georgetown and was delighted to see Article I
section 8 embodied in a tablet in your room. This is the time
for Article I.
So let me close by thanking this committee for convening
this hearing and by urging you and your colleagues to continue
working together in a bipartisan way to explore these issues.
Thank you so very much for your attention.
[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Albright and Mr.
Hadley can be found in the Appendix on page 52.]
The Chairman. Thank you, ma'am. Mr. Hadley.
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN HADLEY, FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR
Mr. Hadley. Good morning.
Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Smith, other
distinguished members of this committee, thank you for the
opportunity to be with you this morning.
One of the great privileges I have enjoyed since leaving
the Bush administration has been the opportunity to work with
Madeleine Albright on bipartisan solutions to today's foreign
policy problems, and I am honored to have the chance to appear
with her again here today.
Madeleine has well summarized our views as set out in our
more detailed written testimony. Let me just elaborate on three
points, if I might.
First, the state of the U.S.-led rules-based international
order. As Madeleine so eloquently pointed out, for 70 years
since the end of World War II, the centerpiece of U.S. grand
strategy has been to build and lead an international order
composed of security alliances, international institutions, and
economic openness to advance the causes of freedom, prosperity,
and peace.
But this international order is under enormous strain
because of the return of great power rivalry with Russia
challenging the international order in Europe, and China
challenging it in Asia, chaos in the Middle East spreading
disorder throughout the region and beyond, increasingly
disruptive and accelerating technological change, popular
dissatisfaction in the West with globalization and the economic
and political status quo, and disillusionment in the United
States with American global leadership.
Madeleine and I would argue that the reason for the current
chaos, conflict, and disorder in the world today is precisely
the breakdown of the U.S.-led international order in the face
of these challenges. We believe a U.S.-led global order is
necessary to provide a framework for effectively dealing with
these threats and to advance the peace and prosperity of the
United States as well as our friends and allies around the
world. But at the same time, the order needs to adapt to
changes in the international environment and to take account of
the real grievances and concerns expressed by American voters
in the last Presidential election.
It is in the interest of the United States to lead this
effort, which presents a real opportunity for the Congress to
work with the Trump administration and for Republicans and
Democrats to come together on this common project. Congress can
begin the process by conducting a national debate on what such
an international order would look like through a series of
structured hearings. These need to be held not just in
Washington but throughout the country to ensure that
congressional deliberations reflect the views of all Americans.
A good place to start the debate would be a recently issued
Brookings Institution report written by a bipartisan group of
foreign policy experts, including myself, entitled, ``Building
Situations of Strength.''
Second, let me say a word about the Middle East, if I
might. This new international order and American leadership
will be sorely tested in the Middle East. As described in our
Atlantic Council Middle East Strategy Task Force report, the
goal of U.S. strategy in the region should be to help change
the trajectory of events there toward a Middle East that no
longer spawns terrorism and refugees, is not a drain on
international resources, and does not, through instability and
political vacuums, aggravate great power and regional
competition. To achieve this goal, the U.S. approach to the
Middle East should be informed by a set of guiding principles
that reflect the new reality of the region since 2011.
First, the old order is gone and it is not coming back. The
region itself should assume the principal responsibility for
defining a new order that will offer the people of the region
the prospect of a stable and prosperous future, free from both
terrorist violence and governmental oppression.
Second, disengagement is not a practical solution for the
United States or the West. Disengagement will only allow the
region's problems to spread and deepen unchecked, creating
further threats. But the role of the West must be different
from what it has been in the past. Rather than trying to impose
its will or dictate how countries in the region should behave,
outsiders should support and facilitate the positive efforts of
people and governments in the region.
Our report outlines a two-pronged strategy. The first prong
involves outside actors helping partner countries in the region
to wind down the violence, starting with the civil wars. This
means containing the spread of the current conflicts and
accelerating diplomatic efforts to resolve them while
addressing the staggering humanitarian crisis they have
generated, but it will also require increased diplomatic and
military engagement from the United States and its friends and
allies, something that we are already beginning to see from the
Trump administration.
The second prong, which must be pursued simultaneously and
in parallel with the first, seeks to support now those efforts
in the region that will create the social basis for long-term
stability, prosperity, and peace. This means supporting the
bottom-up citizen-based entrepreneurial and civic activity that
is already occurring throughout the region. It also means
encouraging those regional governments that are facilitating
these efforts by their citizens and that are investing in the
education and empowerment of their people, and addressing the
societal, economic, and governance issues that are key to
future peace and success.
Finally, let me say a word about the significance of this
last point for the budgetary guidance recently issued by the
administration. Madeleine and I agree that we must continue to
upgrade and enhance our Nation's military capabilities and
deterrent power. There is no debate on that. But to accomplish
the second prong of our Middle East strategy requires the
nonmilitary civilian instruments of our national security
toolkit: diplomacy, trade and investment, development
assistance, reconciliation and peace-building skills, and sound
political advice. These are precisely what have been targeted
in the administration's recent budget guidance.
The administration has made destroying ISIS [Islamic State
of Iraq and Syria] a top priority. Military forces can push
ISIS out of Iraq and Syria and other territory it controls, but
ISIS will return in an even more vicious and virulent form if
those liberated lands do not enjoy some measure of political
stability, societal reconciliation, and economic progress. And
such progress requires the very nonmilitary elements of
national power targeted by the recent budget guidance.
Gutting these institutions will make America less safe,
undermine the success of our military, and open the door to
terrorists. And if you don't believe us, then ask the military
men and women who have served in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other
conflict zones. They will tell you that they cannot succeed in
the military mission without these civilian capabilities.
Failing to win the peace, after so many have fought so bravely,
would be an insult to the memory of those who laid down their
lives in service to our Nation.
Thank you again for this opportunity to testify before you.
The Chairman. Thank you both for being here.
And Madam Secretary, I appreciate your reflections on your
personal experience and how they relate to this topic. They not
only are a credit to you but a credit to the country if you
think about the journey you have taken.
Madam Secretary, a couple of years ago you testified on the
other side of the Capitol and said: The greatest danger is
becoming so intent on enjoying our freedom that we neglect the
responsibility to defend it.
And I would want to invite each of you to reflect a little
more on the role, the size, the shape of the United States
military, what it should be in order to defend our freedom, in
order to play its appropriate role in the sort of world that
you all have outlined.
And I appreciate your point about the proposed cuts in
other agencies of government, which as you know I share; but as
we think about the size, characteristics of the United States
military in this rapidly changing world, how should we think
about that? What are the things that we ought to look for and
try to help shape?
Secretary Albright. Let me just take a crack at it.
Thank you very much. And I do think that we have to
recognize the fact that the role of the military has adjusted
over the last 70 years. What I have found very interesting is
that we have moved away from the concept of two-and-a-half wars
in terms of that there are a variety of different kinds of
conflicts out there. Often that it is hard to identify the
enemy, that they are many--a variety of conflicts that erupted
after the end of the Cold War, and that they really are
different, and that we have to adjust our military to deal with
that.
I do think we also have to pay attention to the third
offset to kind of look at how we look at new technology, how we
deal with the cyber aspect, and just basically to understand
the modernization of it.
I have had the privilege of serving on the Defense Policy
Board, and have spent quite a lot of time over at the Pentagon,
and I have the greatest admiration for our military and the
civilians that are a part of it.
But I do think that your job here is really one that is so
crucial in terms of analyzing what the force needs to look
like, the adaptability of it, what the weapons systems are that
need to be there, and then how in fact we deal with the
asymmetrical threats that are out there. And those are evident
whether one looks at what is happening in the Middle East or
what we are about to see in Asia, and then the asymmetrical
aspects of what the Russians are doing vis-a-vis Central and
Eastern Europe and the Baltics and what they have done in
Ukraine.
So I think it is a period where there needs to be a lot of
exploration and openness in terms of living in a different era
with different kinds of conflicts that require a different
force, and I very much liked reading General--Secretary Mattis'
memo that came with the skinny budget that explained that
readiness was one of the very important parts, and strategy was
important.
The Chairman. Mr. Hadley, and just to further that for a
second, we have had testimony that half the planes in the Navy
can't fly; Army readiness is not where it should; Air Force,
smallest, oldest it has ever been. Do we have the sort of
credibility our military needs in that sort of world?
Mr. Hadley. I think we clearly don't. We have got to fix
that readiness problem, but I think we also, as this committee
well understands, the challenge our military face is sort of
like no challenge that any other military in the world faces. I
always am amused where people say: Well, we spend more on
defense than the next 7, 9, 11, whatever the countries
combined. Well, that is because we have a national security
challenge like no other nation in the world.
If you think about it, we have to simultaneously modernize
and maintain our nuclear infrastructure and weaponry, which is
in some sense of decline. We have got to deal with the military
innovations and improvements that China and Russia have been
pursuing for the last decade or two while we have been focused
heavily on the Middle East. We have to make sure we don't lose
those capabilities we have learned in Iraq and Afghanistan and
elsewhere.
We need to find how to aid and support other countries so
that they can take more responsibility for their own defense
and we can do less. That is itself an art. And we have got to
deal with the burgeoning personnel costs of our military while
still keeping faith with our men and women in uniform.
That is a lot of stuff to do, and I think one of the
things, Mr. Chairman, we talked about before the hearing was
there is an issue of risk management and prioritization that is
required and it has really got to start with some sense of
national strategy. What is the national strategy of this
administration, how does that translate into a defense
strategy, and then what does it mean for where we are going to
put our resources? That is where it has to start.
And I would hope, as we talked about, one of the things
this committee could do would be start a structured set of
hearings on what is the national security strategy, have
administration officials come forward and testify before you in
public session and private session. I think it will stimulate
exactly the kind of thinking we need to have within the
administration to get that national security strategy right and
in order to give the committee a framework as you look at what
to do with the resource and budgetary aspects.
The Chairman. Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Following up a little
bit on the budget thing. The thing that worries me about it is,
you know, everyone makes a very passionate argument for all the
areas that need more money, you know, but at the same time we
have a $20 trillion debt, and forgive me, I forget what the
deficit of that is these days, I think it is in the $650
billion range and projected to go up, and you know, when you
are dealing with the discretionary budget, it is a trillion
dollars, you know, very small portion of the overall, like
maybe 25 percent, 30 percent of the overall budget.
So you know, if we talk about, well, gosh, our military has
all these needs, and we hear about it in this committee all the
time, some of it the chairman alluded to, more I am sure will
be said later, you know, really even the $603 billion that the
President proposed or the $640 billion that I gather the
chairman and Senator McCain are going to propose, I mean, that
doesn't get us to where President Trump said he wants to be.
And if you are doing a dollar-for-dollar thing, my goodness, we
may as well just get rid of the discretionary budget at that
point.
And as we have heard, forget about the domestic needs for
the moment, there are national security implications in the
nondefense discretionary budget, that is the State Department,
Homeland Security, foreign aid, development assistance, which
is all part of our plan.
So I guess I don't see any way to square this circle, you
know, except to say, look, we have got to spend less money and
therefore we have to adjust our strategy. Am I wrong about
that, or can we keep on fantasizing that we are going to have
more money than we actually are and develop a strategy that,
frankly, leads us to the place that we are at, which is if you
have the strategy that has all these grandiose ambitions, then
you get to the reality of you can't spend the money for it, so
half your airplanes don't fly, so your readiness is down, you
know, all of these things happen when we give our military a
larger mission than they can accomplish. Is there a way to
shrink that mission, in your viewpoint?
Because if you look at the Defense Department guidance, if
you at their projections for what it is our military is
supposed to be able to do, you know, I am just pulling this
number off the top of my head, but you are looking at a budget
of 7-, 8-, 900 billion, you know, not 603 or even 640.
So is there another way to look at this and say, you know,
we can adjust our national security strategy where the Defense
Department is concerned and spend less money? Is there any area
in there where you could see for that to happen?
Mr. Hadley. I think you are right. It has to start with
strategy, and one of the problems about strategy is everybody
says: Well, you know, say what are our priorities, and then in
the administrations, you always come up with priorities, you
know, one through eight, and you think, well, seven and eight
don't really matter until something happens in strategy seven
and eight and--on issues seven and eight. They are on the front
page of all the papers and in the social media and everybody
asks: What are you doing about it?
Mr. Smith. I think the number is actually higher than
eight, and that is part of the problem.
Mr. Hadley. Right, right.
Mr. Smith. In security we seem to have like 25 top
priorities.
Mr. Hadley. So I think the only way to do it is, one, a
sense of strategy, which leads to prioritization, and secondly,
you know, we always start with the threat assessment, but you
don't have to meet every threat. What you need to do is a risk
management. Some threats, you are going to focus on; some
threats, you are going to say that the risk of their happening
is acceptable.
These are very difficult decisions because once they happen
and the threats present, everybody is sort of asking what are
you doing about it and why was it number 7 or 8, or 19 and 20,
when it should have been 1 or 2? So it is not an easy problem,
but I think it has to begin with a sense of strategy and sense
of priority.
You have to fix the readiness. There is no point in having
the forces if they are not ready to deploy, and that is--and
you know, paper tigers are not good for deterrence and they are
not good for military operations, so you have to fix that.
I think President Trump is right, allies need to do more,
and we need to be developing the capabilities of our high-end
allies and those allies that are more dealing with the problems
of terrorism so they can take more responsibility for itself.
The model of what we are doing in Iraq and Syria is
basically, I think, the right model, and that is what we have
to pursue and that is what we have to get good at. I think also
we need to have a different view about innovation. Innovation
has been used really to increase performance. I think we have
got to find a way to use innovation to cut costs. Innovation
not just in technology but how we operate the force that has an
eye towards reducing cost and making it more effective.
But I don't--you know, and I am not a budget guy and I am
not an economist. I just don't see how you square the circle
for what we need to do with defense to not gut the nonmilitary
elements of the national security toolkit, to still pursue
these nonmilitary discretionary items and meet our budget
requirements without doing something about entitlements. That
is where the money is.
And I just think it is difficult, it is politically
difficult, politically difficult for the administration given
what they campaigned on; but I don't see any way around it
without getting some of the money out of the entitlements while
still keeping faith with Americans and particularly those
Americans that are most dependent on those programs.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
Madam Secretary, did you want to comment.
Secretary Albright. Let me say I worked for Ed Muskie as
his chief legislative assistant when the budget process came
into place. It was the first time that the Budget Committee got
together and how it worked, and I think that the very important
part is to remember how many functions there are in the budget
and the fact that there are ways to also create revenue. I do
think that that is something that needs to be looked at.
It is a privilege to live in this country, and paying taxes
is one of them, and I do think that that has to be looked at.
And I do think that personally I wouldn't change our mission.
As I said earlier, the United States is the indispensable
nation but not alone, and obviously I agree with Steve in terms
of the way that we have to get our allies to help us. It is a
total thing, I think, in terms of whether we threaten them and
kind of act as if they owe it to us. We owe it to each other;
but that is a point that has to be made.
I, as part of my discussion really, I don't want to see the
U.S. withdraw, and we do need to be ready, and so it is a
question of balancing that but also looking at what the revenue
stream can be. And I think part of the problem that we are
seeing is that all of this is taking a long time, that the idea
of what is happening in terms of tax reform along with the
health packages and all that is going to take some time, and in
the meanwhile, you all have to begin to look at what the
defense budget looks like.
Mr. Smith. Okay. A couple of observations, and then I will
yield back the time.
First of all, yes, I mean, more revenue is certainly an
option, and I understand campaign promises, but all of the
campaign promises that the administration made, they don't add
up, so something has got to give, and that will be one
suggestion.
And also, partnerships are so important to what we do. You
know, when you look at what we are doing in Southeast Asia, a
lot of people aren't aware of how much Japan and South Korea
contribute to our presence there. You know, in dealing with
Somalia, we have had great allies in Ethiopia, and Kenya, and
Rwanda, Uganda. We built those partnerships so that we don't
have to spend as much.
And the last thing I will say, yeah, it is perfectly okay
to push our allies that they need to contribute more, but if
you are pushing them in a way that sort of implies that they
are not even allies anymore, you know, then they are not going
to contribute more and they are going to go their own way. So
we have to maintain those relationships even as we try to get
more out of them.
With that, I will yield back.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Jones is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and Mr.
Hadley and Madam Secretary, thank you for being here today.
Thank you for what you have done for our Nation.
I represent the Third District of North Carolina, the home
of Camp Lejeune Marine Base. I have a great relationship with
Marines who are active duty as well as Marines who are now
retired.
I bring up this issue because every time experts like you,
I mean that most sincerely, testify, it is always the bottom
line is revenues, whether it be a foreign policy decision or a
military decision. What has disappointed me as a Member of
Congress for 22 years, and I go back, Mr. Hadley, when Mr. Bush
went into Iraq, is the fact that we in Congress never seem to
be willing to debate and review a policy.
I am looking at Afghanistan. We have wasted I don't know
how many billions of dollars in Afghanistan. I don't know what
we have to show for it. Mr. Karzai right now is reaching out to
the Russians trying to get the Russians to come back and meet
with the Taliban, our enemy. Now we know that the Chinese want
to put military troops in Afghanistan.
My concern is that we, in Congress, after 16 years, have
never had another debate on the floor of the House. I am not
talking about the committees of jurisdiction, which this would
be one of them, but the American people who pay the bills, I
think we owe them, based on our constitutional responsibility,
after 16 years, to review where we are in Afghanistan.
I met with Mr. Royal. I wrote a letter to Ash--excuse me,
yes, to Ash Carter, who is now out of office, several months
ago when I read an article in the Washington Post that we have
been paying 200,000 Afghan soldiers that don't even exist. They
called them ghost soldiers. I got a very nice letter back of
what they want to do to correct it and met with Mr. Royal.
What I got from my conversation with Mr. Royal--who I have
a great respect for, he worked for Jesse Helms--is the fact
that if these other countries have a presence in Afghanistan,
we need a presence.
I said: Mr. Royal, does that mean if my neighbor next door
bought a Cadillac and my wife and I can't afford a Cadillac
that I need to buy a Cadillac so I can compete, so I have got
the same thing my neighbor has? So where in the world, how
would you tell us in Congress, is it right that we should
review, after a period of time, because of the financial cost
and the cost of limbs and blood? What is your opinion to my
rambling?
Mr. Hadley. I would say amen. I think you are right. And
one of the things we say and we have it at the conclusion of
our written statement is we think the Congress of the United
States and the committee needs to get more involved in the
front end about this whole issue of America's role in the
world.
Do we still support a revised and revitalized international
order? What should be our strategy in the Middle East now that
we have been at this for, you know, 15 years or so? And we
believe very strongly that Congress needs to come forward and
lead a national debate on these issues, and we suggest some
ways to do it.
So I think you are absolutely right. I would say one word
at the beginning. You talk about revenues. The one word we have
not talked about here in this issue of the budgetary problem is
economic growth. You know, a way to get revenues is not to
raise taxes. It is also to get the economy growing and
expanding, and that produces revenues. So part of this strategy
that we are talking about has got to be to get this economy
growing in a more robust rate.
Mr. Jones. Thank you.
Madam Secretary.
Secretary Albright. I really agree in terms of the fact
that there needs to be a national debate, but I also do think
that Congress has to step up in some terms, in terms of asking
for reviews earlier and being a part of it and not thinking
that once the authorization has been given that you just kind
of say, okay, and pony up the money. I think there need to be
regular reviews of various of our missions in places and to
really be a partner.
My whole public life has been involved in terms of
executive-legislative relationships. It is the most interesting
part of our government, but that does mean that you are--well,
you are more than equal partners, and so I think you should be
asking for the reviews, not just of that but of our other
military commitments.
Mr. Jones. Thank you.
The Chairman. Ms. Bordallo.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
inviting such distinguished witnesses that we have today.
It is nice to see you again, Madam Secretary Albright and
Mr. Hadley.
Your testimony today has been a stark reminder of why
American leadership is needed on the international stage. Given
the challenges that the world faces, we need strong
relationships and a strong military, but a whole-of-government
approach in a coherent strategy is essential.
I represent Guam, and in Guam we are acutely aware of the
value of international engagement as many of our closest
neighbors are foreign nations. Some are friendly and some are
not so friendly.
Our strategic objectives will only be achieved in the
Pacific through inclusive engagement that reflects our values
and is consistent and clear to our allies and adversaries.
Pivoting inward is not an option. I also appreciated how you
noted that we must encourage other world leaders to join us to
address the challenges before us today.
It is only through strong partnerships, international rule
of law, and strength that we can deter aggressive and
autocratic behavior that threatens our homeland and many
citizens of the world.
Now we are starting to see that the administration is
looking to pursue a national policy that withdraws the U.S.
from a leadership role, and as you said, wall ourselves off
from the world, a quote. This in conjunction with the recent
statement by a senior diplomatic official that the pivot to the
Pacific is over, though what that means remains to be seen, is
particularly concerning.
So Secretary Albright, how would you demonstrate the value
of investing in diplomacy to the American taxpayer? Everyone
can see a new fighter or a carrier and understand where their
tax dollars have gone, but how do you articulate that an
investment in capacity building has paid off, and why is it not
enough to have just a strong military?
Secretary Albright. Thank you very much, Congresswoman. And
let me just say, Americans don't like the word multilateralism.
It has too many syllables and it ends in an ism. Mostly we have
to talk about partnerships and burden sharing and trying to
explain that we are in this together.
I do think that it is important to point out to people
that, in many ways, the State Department budget and our
diplomats are the front line, that they are there in terms of
trying to help us work through problems before in fact a
military involvement is necessary.
But I have always believed in a very close relationship
between the military and the civilians, that we do this
together, and I think that what I have heard that I find so
interesting, it is the military that believes that we should
have a strong diplomatic arm and that force and diplomacy go
together.
And I do think that we have to show--I mean, it is a little
hard because sometimes it is the dog that didn't bark, you
know, things that diplomats have been able to do that don't
show up. What does happen, though, is if we are going to--and I
believe we need to strengthen our security relationships in the
Pacific.
By the way, I have always said the U.S. is not monogamous,
we are both an Atlantic and a Pacific power, and we have to
remember that, and that this is not just a pivot to Asia, that
is where we belong. And I think that what is very important is
to be able to show that we have common interest with our Asian
allies and friends and that part of it is the diplomatic, the
economic of ties that then underpin what the military is doing.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you.
Mr. Hadley, do you have any views on this?
Mr. Hadley. You know, one of the things I think we have to
recognize is that this international order that the United
States helped build and maintain for 70 years after World War
II was really an almost an unprecedented experiment for a major
global power. Most major global powers historically have
maximized their own value, used their position to maximize
their own value at the expense of others.
We had a different concept. We constructed an international
order that benefitted the prosperity and security of the United
States but also advanced prosperity, security, and peace
globally.
Very unusual in history, but it requires America to
continue to participate in that because we have that vision.
Where we don't participate, where vacuums emerge, other people
come in with different agendas, and you have seen that in Syria
with the Russians and the like.
People forget that that international order was created as
much by American diplomacy as by our military. Crafting those
set of institutions that were developed after the end of World
War II, those set of alliances, which have underpinned our
security and prosperity for the last 70 years, that was the
work of our military certainly, but it was also a work of very
skillful American diplomacy, and we are going to need that
diplomacy going forward if we are going to adapt and revitalize
that international order.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you.
Thank you very much, and I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Hadley, Secretary
Albright, thank you so much up for joining us today and thanks
for your leadership.
Mr. Hadley, I want to begin with you. In reading through
your joint testimony with Secretary Albright, you mention three
immediate priorities. First, mitigating human suffering in
Syria, then recapturing ISIS-held territory, and then
containing Iran's aggressive foreign policy behavior in the
region, all important elements.
You also said there needs to be a greater degree of
engagement of American and allied interests in the region, both
diplomatically and militarily. We see today our special
operations forces working alongside Iraqi Security Forces
achieving success in Mosul. Eventually they will, I think,
recapture Mosul from ISIS.
Two questions. What comes next for the U.S. military after
Mosul is recaptured? And then what is America's military
engagement in a post-ISIS Iraq?
Mr. Hadley. I think the model that you just described is
the right one, and I think that model probably continues after
ISIS has been pushed out of Iraq, and that is very much what
Prime Minister Abadi was talking to President Trump about, some
residual U.S. presence that can continue to train and stiffen
the Iraqi forces so that they can maintain this security and
control over the country that we will help them regain. We
don't want to leave as we did in 2011. That was not a good
experience for us, but it has got to be done in a supportive
role for the Iraqis.
The real challenge, I think, is going to be whether we will
then work with the Iraqis as again Prime Minister Abadi said
yesterday very clearly, we need to follow up pushing ISIS out
of Iraq with good governance that isn't corrupt, that gets
economic activity going, that deals with the social needs of
the people. The question is whether we will, in a supporting
role with other friends and allies, help the Iraqis take on
that most difficult piece. If we don't, I think our military
operation will be in vain because I think the country will fall
back into sectarian violence and being--opening the door for
the terrorists. That is, I think, the real challenge, and that
is going to be as hard, if not harder than the military issue.
Mr. Wittman. Mr. Hadley, I agree. I appreciate that
perspective.
Secretary Albright, I wanted to ask you in a little bit
different perspective, and I know in the joint statement,
article that you and Mr. Hadley put out, you said that a
bipartisan approach in the Middle East would begin by insisting
that the bulk of the vision, effort, and resources come from
the country themselves, from the people within the country.
As we look at Syria and we look past where some sort of
security can be gained in Syria, the question then becomes
governance. Where does that go? What do we see in that region
where we see a tremendous amount of effort by Iran to influence
Syria? And when you have that, what happens with current
leadership? What happens in places like Aleppo and Damascus
when we are looking to engage them, when we are looking at a
post-ISIS Syria and the role that the U.S. has but there may be
affinities towards Iran or other influences in the area, how do
we assure governance? How do we assure that that takes place in
a proper way? We have seen in the past that those things
haven't turned out necessarily well in the aftermath of the
U.S. gaining security. Give me your perspective on how you see
that shaping up.
Secretary Albright. Well, there clearly has to be a
political settlement. The military has created an environment
that makes it possible to think about moving out the bad guys,
but we really do need to figure out a political settlement,
which requires the parties that have been involved to be a part
of it.
I have now been in a lot of different meetings where people
talk about the possibility of having Syria kind of divided into
a number of zones that would reflect who is in them at the
time. I personally think that Assad has lost any legitimacy to
run the government in any shape or form because he kills his
own people, but I do think that there are probably some people
around him that can be part of a transition government.
I do think that part of what has to happen is to engage
those countries that have been involved and explain or work
with them and put pressure on them diplomatically in order to
come along with a political settlement, but this is
unbelievably hard. And I think what is interesting is to put
yours and Congressman Jones' ideas together in terms we have
been in Afghanistan too long. Steve just said we left Iraq too
soon. And so we can't not pay attention, but I do think that
the reconstruction efforts are important in Syria as well as in
Iraq, but there has to be a political settlement, which is
where the diplomats really come in. But the level of difficulty
is as high as anything that I have ever seen.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. Ms. Speier.
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Secretary
Albright and Mr. Hadley. It is truly refreshing to hear you
both speak.
Secretary Mattis, when he met with us, made it very clear
that he thought that the Secretary of State and foreign aid was
critical to our national security. So he gets it. But the OMB
[Office of Management and Budget] director said, when the
budget was issued, that the budget seeks to reduce or end
direct funding for international organizations whose missions
do not substantially advance U.S. foreign policy interests, are
duplicative, or are not well managed. Funding for the United
Nations and affiliated agencies, including peacekeeping
organizations, foreign military assistance programs, support
for multilateral development banks such as the World Bank,
economic and development assistance, and international,
educational, and cultural exchange programs would be
specifically affected.
Can I have your thoughts on those cuts and what damage, if
any, they will do?
Secretary Albright. I think they are so stunningly damaging
to America's position that I find it hard to believe that
somebody that is in the U.S. Government could even suggest
them, if I could put it bluntly. And let me say that I do think
that the role that international organizations have played
generally in the wellbeing of this system that has been set up
have to be recognized.
But let me just say I was Ambassador of the United Nations
[U.N.]. I do know that it needs some reforms. It is very hard
for us to have influence in reforming if we are the ones that
are creating a financial crisis there and you lose your
influence. If you go off the Human Rights Council, you lose
your influence in terms of being able to explain who needs to
be doing what in terms of projecting our values.
So the bottom line is we are cutting off our nose to spite
our face if we decide that we are not going to be involved in
any of these aspects, and they also play to what Steve and I
have been talking about in this report, is I never--soft power,
nobody likes that term anymore, but in terms of other issues
that help to create an environment where terrorists don't
prosper.
And so we are--they are not--I teach a course on the
national security toolbox. There are not a lot of tools in it,
and if we decide that we are not going to fund half of them,
then we have lowered the possibilities of the United States,
our national interests being met in these countries or in these
organizations. We need to have an influence there, and we need
to be able to work.
I know when during the Clinton administration, when we were
behind in our bills and I was trying to get reform at the U.N.,
our best friends, the British, delivered a line they had waited
more than 200 years to deliver: representation without
taxation. And so if we are going to play a role there, we have
to be players there, and we have to use our influence in them
by being members of it.
Ms. Speier. Thank you.
Mr. Hadley.
Mr. Hadley. I think this distinction between soft power and
hard power is not a good one because a lot of our soft power
converts into real hard power. I will give you an example. I
chair the board of the U.S. Institute of Peace [USIP], one of
19 organizations that were destined to be disestablished in
this budgetary framework. The U.S.--just as an example, USIP
has been in Iraq since 2003. We never left in all the hard
times Iraq went through. Training local people who could
negotiate peace among the tribes and bring violence down.
So for example, in 2007, USIP in Mahmudiya Province, the
triangle of death, negotiated an arrangement among the tribes
to accept the U.S. military presence there. Violence went down
dramatically. The U.S. military presence was able to reduce by
80 percent. It saved a lot of lives, it saved a lot of dollars,
and that basic peace agreement among the tribes has held up for
10 years. Now that is how soft power can contribute to higher
powered tasks in a way that saves lives and saves money.
Ms. Speier. Thank you.
Mr. Hadley. It is crazy how----
Ms. Speier. I want to try and get one more question in.
Mr. Tillerson, our Secretary of State, just announced that
he is not going to NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization].
He is instead going to meet with the President of China and
then move to Russia and meet with Vladimir Putin. What does
that--what kind of signal is that saying to our NATO friends?
Secretary Albright. I think it is a most unfortunate
signal. I would blame it on schedulers, and I do think that
that is part of the problem. He will have met with a lot of the
ministers in other venues, but given the discussion that is
going on about NATO, I think that it is an unfortunate
scheduling problem.
Ms. Speier. Thank you.
The Chairman. The gentlelady's time is expired.
Mr. Hadley, I will just observe, soft power can also be a
lot more effective if it is backed up by military power, so it
goes both ways.
Mr. Hadley. No, I think they are complements, and we need
to think of them as complements and really integrated
complements of each other.
The Chairman. Yeah.
Mr. Hadley. But I agree that diplomacy without a military
backup is fantasy.
The Chairman. Yeah.
Mr. Bacon.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank you
both for being here, sir, and your wisdom and experience. I
would like to ask you a question on North Korea. It seems to me
the policy has not worked in previous administrations, but I
think the banking sanctions we had a while back were effective.
What would you recommend for the current President on our
way ahead, because we have a very unstable country and unstable
leader. He has killed two generals that I know of with cannons,
killed his half brother, we think he has 10 nuclear weapons,
and it is obviously very worrisome to many of us, so thank you.
Secretary Albright. Well, I believe that we need to really
look in that toolbox and that there are a lot of different
kinds of sanctions that can be put on that in fact really make
sure that they aren't shipping their material out, that they
can't get things in. I think the banking sanctions were very
important and that we have learned a lot about how sanctions
can be kind of parsed in a way that they affect, even the smart
sanctions, the targeted sanctions that really have to be looked
at.
We also do have to get the Chinese to be more helpful on
it, and I think that Secretary Tillerson was really working
that issue as best he could, and it has a lot to do with the
kind of strength that we maintain in the region.
And so I think it has to be a full court press that as
Secretary Tillerson said there is no option off the table. But
I do think that the sanctions regimes are the ones that need to
be really looked at very carefully and be very tight.
Mr. Hadley. I agree with that.
I think, look, two administrations, the Clinton
administration and then the Bush administration, tried and
reached agreements with North Korea to give up their nuclear
weapons, and neither administration was able to keep North
Korea in either of those agreements. So negotiations beginning
where we are now don't look particularly attractive.
I think, as Madeleine says, we have now more sophisticated
ways to put financial pressure on North Korea; we ought to be
doing those. I think we also use--need to build up a little bit
of our hard power, if you were, not the offensive hard power,
but I think we need to enhance deterrents and capabilities to
deal with a ballistic missile threat from North Korea to us, to
our friends and our allies. I also think we need to do things
to reduce the threat North Korea can pose to Seoul through its
rocket attacks and the like.
If we do these things, I think it both will increase
pressure on North Korea in the event it is possible to reach a
negotiated solution, but if it is not, it will put us in a
position to be able to deter and defend against North Korean
capacities as they mature.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you.
One more question on NATO. I was stationed at Ramstein for
3 years, part of the NATO team. But we saw the combat parts of
the Army withdrawn, and now they have a rotating unit. And we
see very little--just a little bit of Navy power there. A lot
of our Air Force units have been withdrawn; it is probably
about half of what it was.
What do you think the future is there? I think we should be
putting more deterrence forces there to make a statement,
especially after what we are seeing with Putin. I would love to
have your thoughts on that.
Secretary Albright. I do think that we need to relook. We
have been sending some forces and our allies into the Baltics
and into Poland and kind of relooking at what has to be done. I
think the defense missile activities there are very important.
I also do think--I spent some time at the Munich Security
Conference talking to various defense ministers from the
Scandinavian countries, and they are very worried about what
the Russians are doing in terms of buzzing their ships and kind
of looking at what the naval aspect of this is, in addition to
what they are doing in following airplanes around.
So I think it has become an all-force kind of activity and
that we need to work with our NATO allies on the military part
of this.
Mr. Hadley. I agree.
Mr. Bacon. Well, thank you for your feedback.
And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Veasey.
Mr. Veasey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I wanted to ask you specifically about governance. One of
the things that we talk a lot about on this committee is
ungoverned spaces and how that can be breeding grounds for
radicalism around the world.
Do you think that within the State Department we need an
agency whose mission is first and foremost nation-building? And
I know that USAID [United States Agency for International
Development] does some of that, but if you look at USAID and
everything that they do, nation-building and governance, you
know, is kind of far down on their list.
And what I mean specifically by this is that you hire
people who have a specialty and a background in governance, so
we can get some of these places where we see this radicalism
forming up and go in there and start working with them at the
very beginning before it gets out of control and have people
that really know how to do this thing, and then let some of the
other things that USAID is doing, let those things take care of
themselves after they understand the basic fundamentals of
governance.
And I would love your opinion on that.
Secretary Albright. I do think that governance is
absolutely essential. And let me just say, I am chairman of the
board of the National Democratic Institute that is part of the
Endowment for Democracy that has been going on now for 35
years. It is in countries in partnership there with people in
order to work on governance issues at a local level, trying to
also strengthen the legislative branches within, rule of law, a
number of different things. Works often with USAID.
The State Department does have a section that works on
democracy and issues. Nation-building has kind of become a
four-letter word. I do think, however, it is very important to
think about what happens at the local levels so that people--by
the way, I actually believe we are all the same, that we want
to be able to make decisions about our own lives, and that
people need to have help in the nuts and bolts of governance,
of how they make their points. And it goes also with economic
development, because governance has to deliver. People want to
vote and eat.
And so the bottom line is there has to be some outside
organizations--NDI [National Democratic Institute], USIP Steve
has spoken about--that are kind of--help funded by the U.S.
Government and operate with those people that are in both the
State Department and USAID.
Mr. Hadley. I think you are exactly right. That is the
priority. Our report on the Middle East says basically it is a
crisis of governance and the failure of governance that created
disaffected populations, which were then very susceptible to
the siren call of the extremists.
The problem is helping countries get good governance is
hard. We have been at it a long time in Iraq and Afghanistan
with mixed success. We have to do some lessons learned, figure
out what works, what doesn't work. Corruption is a huge threat
in these places, in these fragile states, in these early
democracies. We don't really have a good formula for going
after and rooting out systemic corruption.
And, finally, you know, not every government is willing to
do the things required to provide good governance to their
people, and we have to triage a little bit and work with those
governments that get it.
It is one of the things we talked about in our report,
about more for more. We ought to be saying, if you are willing
to do the right things for your people, to invest in them, in
their education, provide good governance, we will help you. It
will be a good investment for a future of stability and peace.
But if governments are not willing to do that, we shouldn't
throw our money at them. So we are going to have to be tough-
minded on it.
But it is a really tough problem. It needs to be more a
priority. But we don't have--you know, we don't have the silver
bullets for helping to provide, you know, noncorrupt, good
governance to these fragile states.
Mr. Veasey. Thank you.
And one last question. Speaking of ungoverned territories,
I would like for you to just briefly characterize what you
think America's role should be in helping in places on the
continent of Africa. Because I am very worried about just some
of the, you know, early stages of radicalism that seem to be
there. It is not as bad as it is in the Middle East, but it is
certainly a growing threat there. And I wanted to know what you
thought about America's role in that continent.
Mr. Hadley. You know, one of the problems with, as we
talked earlier, the budgetary framework is it not only
overlooks what some of these agencies can do with our military
to bring peace in conflict zones, but it overlooks the role
these agencies play in preventive, in taking countries as--and
helping countries, as in Africa, which have ethnic divisions,
are under enormous pressure economically from climate change
and other things, and helping them stabilize their societies
and not let conflicts in the society become violent conflicts,
with all the consequences for refugees and suffering and the
like.
Those preventive tools avoid our need to use the military
end strength down the road when a fragile state has become a
conflict state. We underinvest in those at our peril.
Secretary Albright. Can I just have 1 minute on this?
I just was in Germany, and I went to visit the headquarters
of AFRICOM [United States Africa Command]. It is a very
interesting command because it not only has its military job
but it also does a lot of civilian activities with a civilian
deputy. And I think it is a very interesting model in terms of
how the military and the diplomats can work together.
They are operating in a number of African countries. They
have a base in Djibouti, but they also are able to kind of
combine--I think it is an interesting model to be looked at for
some of the commands.
Mr. Veasey. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Banks.
Mr. Banks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Albright, Mr. Hadley, thank you for being here.
Thank you for your service to our country.
Secretary Albright, as the father of three daughters, thank
you for the example that you provide to young women about how
they can impact--substantially have an impact on our world.
And my first question is for you. I appreciate your
emphatic opposition to the President's proposed budget cuts to
diplomatic programs at large. But can you talk more
specifically about the cuts to foreign military financing, what
that would do? Maybe give us either anecdotal or real examples
of what those cuts would cost, if those budget cuts were
enacted.
Secretary Albright. I have been very troubled by them,
actually, because it is a way to have influence over the
militaries in a number of different countries in terms of some
of the training that we do with them, also the IMET
[International Military Education and Training] programs in
terms of having a relationship with militaries in other
countries, and then having--I think it is useful sometimes to
condition the assistance in a way to them for behavioral--I
mean, we use tools in order to change the behavior of X of a
country. And I do think that the FMS [foreign military sales]
programs really do help in that, in terms of the interaction
between our military and the militaries in other countries, the
training that comes from that, the relationships, also the
movement in terms of joint procurement on a number of issues.
So I think cutting those is very dangerous also, because
they are--I like talking about the use-of-force tool, and it
has a lot of different gradations beyond just the size and
character of our military and the number of technology--the
equipment that we have. Some of it has a lot to do with the
relationships that are established by our military. And that is
where the FMS and IMET really come in.
Mr. Banks. Thank you.
Mr. Hadley, switching gears a little bit, you served for
President Bush during the last time that we passed an
authorization of military force in 2001 and 2002 against Al
Qaeda, the perpetrators of 9/11, and then Iraq in 2002.
Last week, I joined Senator Todd Young, also from Indiana,
in calling for a new AUMF [authorization for the use of
military force] that would specifically identify ISIS as a
target of that resolution. I wonder if you could comment on
that.
In heeding your call for Congress to be more active and
heed your call of your recommendations in both of your
testimonies today, could you comment specifically on whether or
not you view there to be a benefit from a new authorization of
military force?
Mr. Hadley. I do. I think it would be a good thing. I think
the American people need to know that the Congress of the
United States is behind this effort that the administration is
trying to mount.
So I think it is important both as a symbol of a national
commitment to deal with this problem, but it is also important
to rebalance a little bit this relationship between the
Congress and the President.
You know, in time of national crisis, power tends to move
towards the Presidency, and it is important, once the immediate
crisis is over, for that rebalance to be established. That is
what we need, I think, to be doing now.
Mr. Banks. Secretary Albright, do you have any comments on
that as well?
Secretary Albright. I do believe that there needs to be a
new AUMF, partially because it is needed but partially also
because of the discussion.
I fully agree with Steve. This is an Article I time. And
you are the representatives of the people, and it has to be
really a discussion so that people understand why--to answer
some of the questions about why has Afghanistan taken so long,
or general discussion but focused on the AUMF, I think, makes a
big difference.
Mr. Banks. Thank you.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. O'Rourke.
Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
At the time that we were fighting for and winning this
international world order that we have been talking about
today, we were also building many of the military installations
throughout this country to support that, including many in
Texas.
I was just at Dyess Air Force Base this weekend, and they
are operating out of airplane hangars for B-1 bombers that were
built 70 years ago. And to go inspect one of the B-1 bombers,
you actually had to wear a hardhat because there are pieces of
rebar that are falling from the ceiling.
You look at Fort Hood, and there are hundreds of millions
of dollars in deferred maintenance costs that we haven't paid
for and are just going to become more expensive the longer we
defer them. Billions of dollars just in the State of Texas
alone.
When you add to that this AUMF authorized in 2001 that has
not only been used to fight wars in Afghanistan, where we still
are today, but has been used in five other countries as well,
including Iraq and Syria, Libya, Somalia, and Yemen, the needs
that we have, the wars that we are currently fighting, the
projected costs to meet the threats that will come, none of
that seems sustainable to me. And I think the ranking member
used the word ``fantasy,'' that we are going to be able to pay
for and meet all the commitments that we have identified.
And when asked to help us make the tough choices, you have
talked about cutting entitlements; we have talked about raising
revenues, raising taxes. And I wonder, though, is there not a
tougher choice to be made about this world order and whether,
70-plus years in, it is sustainable and should not be
rethought.
It doesn't mean we stop being an indispensable country,
because I agree with the Secretary's conclusion on that. And it
doesn't mean that we have the leading role. But I don't know
that this trajectory is sustainable or that we should want to
sustain it.
And I join Mr. Banks, Mr. Jones, and others and the two of
you who have called for a new AUMF. I think that is part of
this. But can you talk about some bigger, tougher international
choices that we have to make? Or--and this is a conclusion that
a reasonable mind could come to--must we just muddle on along
this current path and do the best that we can?
Secretary Albright. Let me say, I do think that we have to
look at it from the perspective of what threatens the United
States. It is the job of the President to protect our people,
our territory, and our way of life. And it is the job of
Congress to be a part of that discussion, to fund it, to have
discussions about it, and to be a part of the decision of how
to protect our people.
I happen to believe that our people are most threatened
when there are various disasters happening, whether they are
terrorists or whether they are climate change or whether they
are people starving or whether they are refugees who are coming
and have become a part of a complicated political situation.
So I do think that we have a stake in not just thinking
about ourselves, that our security depends on what is happening
in other parts of the world.
I think that one of the answers here is to develop the
partners, the alliances. And I think the alliance structure is
something that has to be made to work, and the others have to
pay their fair share. We also need to think about how to
develop those forces in other countries that can help us,
whether they are those that work on the governance issues or on
various military issues.
We cannot operate in the world alone. And so that is the
part that I think we have to work on and decide that we are not
safer if we are isolated. An isolationist America is the most
dangerous thing for Americans as well as for the world.
Mr. O'Rourke. Mr. Hadley.
Mr. Hadley. Well, one--I will probably get myself in a
little trouble on this one, but one of the things about the
infrastructure that you talk about is we have more
infrastructure than we need, given the size of our current
military. And, you know, the BRAC [base realignment and
closure] process, I haven't followed it as closely as I
probably should; it seems to have broken down.
And one of the difficult issues is that Congress is going
to have to both hold the administration's feet to the fire in
terms of strategy and prioritization, but Congress is also
going to have to make some tough decisions about allowing for
this infrastructure to shrink to the size of what we really
need given the military we have today.
I think Madeleine would agree, the current conception of
the international order is not sustainable. That is why we say
it needs to be revised and revitalized. We may have made huge
investments in helping Europe, Japan, South Korea emerge to be
the healthy, prosperous societies they are. We helped China
integrate into the international system. We have seen the
growth of India. These countries need to be given a greater
role to play in the international system. But that, of course,
comes with some responsibilities, and part of that
responsibility is not only responsible action and constructive
action but also to foot some of the bill.
So I think there has to be a readjustment and a
rebalancing, a look at division of labor and division of
responsibilities. But if we step out from that process and do
not lead it, an international order that will emerge in the
traditional way--which is, it will benefit the big powers, like
Russia and China, at the expense of the little powers--that is
not the international order that we want, it is not the
international order that is in our interest, and it is not an
international order that will provide enduring peace and
security.
Mr. O'Rourke. I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. LoBiondo.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, Mr. Hadley, thank you for being here.
I want to turn back to the Middle East for a moment and the
situation with Israel and the PLO [Palestine Liberation
Organization]. Do you think it is an equal problem with
politics and economics or it is one more than another?
Secretary Albright. I think, actually, it has a lot to do
with both, and the economics part, I think, primarily on the
Palestinian side, in terms of questions as to how they are able
to function in a very difficult situation and feed their own
people and various aspects to do with that in terms of trying
to get more help in terms of them. And I do believe in a two-
state solution. And they need to begin--this is my view--to
create some of the institutional structures that would provide
for their people.
And, politically, it really is a problem in terms of the
various--it is as difficult a political situation as many of us
have seen, because the Palestinians do not have any--they are
divided among themselves between the Fatah and the Palestinian
Authority and Hamas and various problems, and, therefore, it is
hard for them to look at it in some way that doesn't then look
threatening to the Israelis.
Mr. LoBiondo. Well, let me just follow up for a minute. I
agree with you. But it seems to me, on the economic problem,
that a lot of the younger Palestinians that don't have much
hope for the future because they don't have jobs, it is easy to
recruit into some bad behavior; jobs would be something that
would be very helpful there, yes?
Secretary Albright. Yes, very much. And let me just say----
Mr. LoBiondo. Okay. So let me----
Secretary Albright. Sorry.
Mr. LoBiondo. Excuse me for interrupting. I don't want to
lose my chain of thought, which I tend to do sometimes.
So how much have the wealthy Arab nations contributed to
job creation? Everybody wants to blame Israel for the problem
there. Now, maybe I haven't followed this as closely as I
should have, but I am curious, do you know if they have? And if
they haven't, why aren't they being held accountable? They have
money for everything. Why wouldn't they help out Palestinians
in this effort?
Secretary Albright. I have to say I have also been
surprised about the lack of effort there. I do think that there
is beginning to be more of a sense among some of the Arab
nations that they have a greater responsibility. But I do think
that is one of the questions, in terms of why they have not
done more.
The other part, though, is that we are trying--I am
involved in something called the Middle East Investment
Initiative that is backed by OPIC [Overseas Private Investment
Corporation]. OPIC is another one of the agencies that is about
to be cut. So, in terms of trying to figure out how we get
economic assistance in there and then use it as a magnet so
that the Arabs help more.
Mr. LoBiondo. Yeah. Well, it seems to me that the wealthy
Arab nations could in a heartbeat help turn this around.
Mr. Hadley, what are your thoughts on this?
Mr. Hadley. I agree. And it was a source of frustration
when I was national security advisor and when Salam Fayyad was
Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority. He was trying to
build noncorrupt, good-governance institutions in the
Palestinian territories. It was a very hopeful thing. And I
would go around trying to encourage our Arab friends and allies
to support him, and they would dole out money in a teaspoon.
And I think it was a huge strategic blunder on their part.
But I think it has to be two things. I think the
Palestinians need to get back to building noncorrupt
governance, helping build the institutions of a Palestinian
state even before they have one. And the more they will do
themselves, the more we can press Israel to support it and the
Arab states to support it. It needs to be the two.
But I think the Arab states have largely been very
shortsighted about this and very stingy.
Mr. LoBiondo. Well, I totally agree. I appreciate your
response. And I just that think everyone is very quick to
condemn Israel for all the problems with the Palestinians, when
there are solutions that could be helpful that the Arab nations
are either choosing not to--which makes me wonder a little bit
about the whole situation.
But I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Moulton.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for being here. It is an honor to have you
before us. And the example of bipartisanship that you set is
one that we would do well to follow.
Recently, Vice Chairman [of the Joint Chiefs of Staff]
Selva confirmed that Russia is in direct violation of the INF
Treaty, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces. What should be
our response?
Secretary Albright. I happen to believe that we are not
using a tool here, in terms of taking an examination of what
they have done. We should call them on it, and we have not
really been doing that.
And it is clear that it is contributing to additional
problems in terms of the deployment, what it does to create a
sense of unease in Central and Eastern Europe among the
Baltics.
And then the Russians blame us for tit-for-tat, but the
bottom line is they haven't--from what I have seen, they have
been violating it, especially up in Kaliningrad. And so it is
one of the things that we have to--we should call them on it.
Mr. Hadley. I think Putin is a great opportunist. He looks
at vacuums and seizes opportunities and then kind of sees what
happens. And if he succeeds and if he is not resisted, he then
does a little bit more. And if he continues to succeed, is not
resisted, he does a little bit more.
So when he--whether it is in terms of agreements, whether
it is in terms of destabilizing his neighbors, whether it is in
terms of his own force buildup, we need to match him, not just
by calling him on it, but also taking concrete steps to counter
the benefit that he thinks he achieves by these actions and
then some, so that, in fact, he pays a price.
So we have to counter in our diplomacy, we need to call him
on it, but I think what we need to look at what we need to do
to counter the capability so that it does not--not only does it
not produce an advantage for him, but it actually results in
the situation being worse. I think that is the only way you are
going to deter this kind of behavior.
Ms. Moulton. And do you have any specific suggestions, Mr.
Hadley, as to how we can increase the price for Mr. Putin?
Mr. Hadley. Well, one of the things we could do is in terms
of missile defense and make it clear that, you know, we are
able to counter that cruise missile capability and deploy
against it if need be. That is one.
But, again, this is the task I would then give General
Mattis. So how do we counter this? Deprive it of military
utility and impose a price.
Mr. Moulton. If your analysis of Mr. Putin is correct,
which is consistent with other experts that I have heard on
Russia, then, given his interest in interfering in our
elections, if we do not have a robust, bipartisan response to
that, what would you expect him to do?
Mr. Hadley. He will do more of it. I mean, this was the
testimony that the Congress heard yesterday. And, certainly, we
need to figure out what was done and have a political,
diplomatic response.
But, you know, the thing that I feel is lost in this debate
is the old ``fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame
on me.'' If we do not mobilize to harden our electoral
infrastructure to make sure that it is safe and impervious to
cyber penetrations, whether by Russia or anybody else, shame on
us. We should never be in a position where we have this concern
that an outside power could manipulate our electoral process.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you.
Madam Secretary.
Secretary Albright. Well, I think that we have to remember
that he is a KGB [Committee for State Security] agent and
somebody that knows how to use propaganda and knows how to play
what I would say is a weak hand in a very strong way. And while
it is sad that we have to kind of return to the kind of
language that we used during the Cold War, I think we have to
be more vigilant.
And we have to build--I happen to agree with what NATO has
been doing, in terms of moving forces around and showing our
willingness. I obviously agree on the missile defense system.
But I also think that we have to understand that he has one
goal, which is to disaggregate what is the European Union, that
they really do not want that to exist. That cannot be our goal
so that we are helping him on that. We have to keep the
sanctions on. We have to use every tool that we have and
recognize that we have the strength to do something about it.
And I think that it is always hard in diplomacy in terms of
finding the areas where you can agree--because there are some
areas on the Middle East that we have been doing things
together--and then find the areas where we have to push back.
And we have not done that enough. And so I think we need to be
tough and recognize what has been going on here.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. Dr. Wenstrup.
Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I thank you both for being here. It is very refreshing
to hear from you. In a lot of ways, when you sit in front of
this committee, you are preaching to the choir on so many
issues. And it is, how do we get that sphere of influence to,
in particular, other Members of Congress, but the American
public as well?
You know, I couldn't agree with you more on so many of the
things you have said. It is a perfect time for this
conversation, I believe, with a new Congress, a new
administration. But we need to really define, I believe, what
our strategy is and what our principles are and then work in
the right direction. Rather than making a strategy based on a
budget, we make a budget based on a strategy.
And I think, as you have heard from a few veterans here
today, and we have our conversations, you are spot-on. Military
itself is not the answer, and diplomacy is key. Because we
would much rather not have to go to war. And once we are in
war, as an extension of politics for whatever reason--or,
hopefully, it is because our national security is threatened--
civil affairs can't do it all. That is not the long-term
answer. So all of these tools--economic, et cetera--we have to
continue to use.
As we seek for more funding in the areas that we agree
with, that you do need more in State [Department] than is being
proposed, in my opinion--how we use it is, of course, part of
it as well--I guess the trick is getting other people on board,
right? Because people may say, yeah, we want increases, but
then they are not necessarily willing to talk about how we need
to get increases to those areas.
Mandatory spending 50 years ago was at 34 percent; now it
is 68. When I am out talking to people in the public, they
think military is in mandatory spending. They have no idea how
this works. And we just can't keep doing this and squeezing,
squeezing, squeezing discretionary spending unless we embrace
the mandatory spending component. Our debt going on the rise,
and it is just money going out the door.
I think, you know, you touched on some things. Economic
growth is important. But we've got to address all of these, and
we've got to make the case to the American people. I consider
it a situation where we need you out there talking about this.
Because we are in somewhat a World War II-type state, where the
world is in a volatile position and things are breaking down
all over, and we need all of America to come together to
address where we need to be.
And I guess, you know, my question is, how can we drive
this conversation? I hope more Americans have a chance to
listen to the two of you when you are out talking about these
issues. But how in Congress can we help drive this a little bit
further and do it on a bipartisan basis like you are doing?
Secretary Albright. We don't have any problems talking.
And----
Dr. Wenstrup. Keep going.
Secretary Albright [continuing]. We have spent a lot of
time together, and I think we present a pretty good picture. I
do think we need to get out, but maybe there is some way that
we could have, kind of, common sorties out, in terms of where
some of us would go with some of you to your districts to talk
about it and really explain.
And then I do think--I hate to bring this up, but the media
has to be brought into it. They have to be willing to do more
than take sound bites and to really have capable discussions
and try to figure out how to use the social media in something
other than tweets. And so using the new information technology
to get information out in some way.
The Russians are really good at trying--this is part of
what was going on, in terms of their capability of using
propaganda. We have to figure out how to tell the truth to our
people and also get foreigners mobilized with us.
Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you.
Mr. Hadley. We do talk, but we are disadvantaged in talking
to the American people because I am either part of the blob, if
you are an Obama person, or part of the swamp, if you are a
Trump person. And that disadvantages me, if not disqualifies
me, from talking to the American people.
We are here because you have to talk to the American
people. You actually know how to talk to the American people.
That is why you are elected and sitting here. I don't. So I
think this is a conversation that you have to lead in your
districts.
And if I could suggest one thing, it is a new media
environment. I mean, when President Trump is tweeting to his 16
million folks during the Comey hearing and Members of Congress
are reading the tweets and turning them into questions, this is
a new media environment.
And one of the challenges, I think, for you is how does the
Congress use this new technology and figure out how to better
communicate with the American people. Because we are still
using 20th-century approaches.
Thank you.
Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Mr. McEachin.
Mr. McEachin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I want to thank both of you all for your testimony
today and helping us struggle with some of these issues.
I have been a Congressman since January 2nd--or January
3rd, excuse me, and so my experience and my expertise is not
very much at this point. And so what I want to do with you all
today is just briefly test some assumptions that I am working
under and see if you all agree or disagree with those
assumptions.
One of those assumptions I think I learned in economics
101, or it might have been political science 101, which is
this: One does not do two things, go to war and cut taxes, at
the same time.
Assuming, without conceding--because you don't have to
concede this point for me yet--that we are at war, is this the
time for us to be engaging in tax cuts?
Secretary Albright. Well, we are in a certain kind of war,
I think, in a lot of different areas. Certainly, thinking about
places that could explode even more, I happen to think it is
not a time for tax cuts.
Mr. Hadley. I think the challenge we have, if we are going
to play the role we need to play in the world, is we need to
fix a lot of what is broken here at home. One is that we have
to show that our politics can actually, on a bipartisan basis,
solve some of the problems we face.
I think we also need to get our economy growing. We are
going to be in this struggle against terrorism for a long time.
I think we need to get the economy going. I am no economist.
People say that tax cuts are a way to get the economy going. I
don't know the answer to that. It has worked in the past.
But I think what we need is, to play our role in the world,
we have to have a robust economy, we need to show that our
politics can work and solve our social problems, and we need to
fix our brand.
We have been an example that democracy and free markets
brings prosperity and peace. People are beginning to wonder
about that. Our brand is in disrepair. And I think we don't fix
it until we get our economy fixed and, quite frankly, get our
politics fixed and then go to the world and--one, to the
American people and say, the model still works, and then we can
make a case that, by our engagement in the world, we are an
example worth following.
Mr. McEachin. Well, Mr. Hadley, let me explore what you
just said for just a moment, when you say that tax cuts can
cause the economy to grow, although, admittedly, you did
confess that you are not an economist----
Mr. Hadley. Yep.
Mr. McEachin [continuing]. And neither am I. But is it not
the case that, during the Bush years, the most recent Bush
years, President Bush decided to do away with the Clinton tax
increases, essentially absorb the surplus, put us into a
deficit, and went to war at the same time, and that is at least
part of the reason why we are struggling with our economy
today?
Mr. Hadley. Well, you know, I will try on the history on
this.
The tax cuts, the Bush tax cuts, I think the people around
President Bush believe that it produced a fairly sustained
period of economic growth and job growth. We did, of course,
hit the wall in the 2008 recession.
Second, we decided that, in order to maintain that growth,
we would not increase tax cuts. The judgments that were made
was that the deficits that we were running were manageable. And
how much of the Clinton-era surplus was real and how much it
was a paper surplus, I don't know.
Those were the judgments that were made. A lot of those
went out the window after the 2008 financial and economic
crisis. That is my understanding of the legacy during the Bush
period.
Mr. McEachin. Let me switch to another assumption that we
are working under. As I understand it, our national defense
policy is predicated upon being able to--and this is my
paraphrasing, so forgive me if it is inartful--being able to
fight two major conflicts simultaneously. That seems to make
some sense to me. And that then leads you to make certain
policy decisions, if you buy into that base assumption.
My question for the two of you all is: Is that a good
assumption in today's political climate, or should we be
operating under a different set of assumptions? That is, should
we really be prepared to fight two major wars simultaneously?
Secretary Albright. Let me just say President Obama, in the
national security strategy that he put forward and the various
Defense Department documents on this, moved away from that two-
and-a-half-war strategy and said that what we are going to have
to do is look at a lot of different kinds of conflicts, that
they are mixed.
And so, therefore, I think in terms of looking at the
defense budget generally and the foreign affairs budget, it is
harder, in many ways, because the conflicts are of a variety.
Some of them are asymmetrical. We have now seen Russia putting
much more pressure on. And we don't know exactly what the
Chinese are doing.
And so moving away specifically from the two and a half
doesn't mean that we don't have to think about larger
conflicts, but, in fact, there are a variety of conflicts that
have to be dealt with that make this much harder for you and
for explaining it to the American people.
Mr. McEachin. My time has expired. I yield back. And I
thank you both.
The Chairman. Ms. McSally.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Secretary Albright, Mr. Hadley.
Secretary Albright, as a woman who was in the military, I
just want to say thank you for breaking through barriers and
the example that you were as a pioneer for all of us.
And I want to thank you for something in particular. This
is the first time I have met you, so you probably don't know
this, but in 1995 I started a bit of a battle within the
military related to then making our American troops wear the
full abaya and headscarf in Saudi Arabia. And about 4\1/2\
years into this, you don't know it, but you went to Saudi
Arabia and didn't put it on, and that put a little boost into
my step for the fight that I had.
Eventually, we got legislation passed to overturn it, and
many State Department individuals there at the Embassy were
with me and cheering for me as I put my career on the line to
fight this fight.
But, again, you didn't know it, and I just wanted to tell
you now I really appreciated your example of being a strong
leader with grace but not, you know, conforming with seventh-
century norms, from my view. And I appreciate your example on
that.
I was at AFRICOM--you mentioned it previously--as part of
the initial team to stand it up. And we had a lot of great
expectations for the different kind of command that it was
going to be, with a civilian deputy and all that kind of
integrated stuff. But, in reality, we still operate, authorize,
and fund through our stovepipes of the agencies.
The civilian deputy was helpful. Certainly, most people, my
colleagues don't realize that, when we do building partnership
capacity, where the military is training our partners, that is
title 22 State Department money. That is not money that we
authorize here; it is not part of the defense bill. That is
critical for us when we are doing prevention activities. But
that is all funded through the State Department, even though
you look at military operators there.
But, you know, there is a lot of discussion about we need a
Goldwater-Nichols 2.0, we need to reorganize to have sort of
the three D's [development, defense, and diplomacy] more
integrated in how we operate. You know, none of that really
moved in any direction.
I just want your thoughts about some of those discussions
of further integrating across the board between these agencies
that are all critical for our international security.
Secretary Albright. Well, thank you very much for your
service. I have always admired our military and the women in
it, so thank you very much.
I do think that what needs to be looked at more is how--not
even talking about the money at the moment--how the State
Department and the Defense Department work together.
I think that what has happened since 2000 is that a lot of
State Department activities were transferred to the Pentagon,
partially because we were at war. And so one of the questions,
no matter what, is: What is the job of the State Department,
and under what circumstances do they do it, and how do they
cooperate? So that, I think, does need to be looked at.
I also do think that the funding of it is obviously very
important, in terms of where the money is also brings some of
the influence in creating the strategy. But it has to be
relooked at. Because it is very hard often--and you see it in
the AFRICOM thing--of how to separate what is a military
activity and what is a purely civilian one. What happens if
there are security issues about how the civilian operators are
able to work in a dangerous atmosphere; then how AFRICOM, for
instance, works with peacekeeping operations. There are so many
new things that need to be looked at.
But I was fascinated by, kind of, a step forward that it
had taken in terms of how the command structures work. But I
think this requires a major discussion both inside the
government and also on the outside and Congress' role in it.
Ms. McSally. Thank you.
And I will just say--Mr. Hadley, I would like to hear your
thoughts. I mean, we had great hopes for how that was going to
play itself out. In reality, it helped us kind of better
understand the different tribes and the different roles and
maybe coordinate a little better. But, in reality, the deputy
there from the State Department didn't really have any
authorities within the State Department, just had
relationships. And it was, like, a lot of basically liaison
officers. It helped educate us so that we could better
understand better courses of action, but, really, those
stovepipes and those tribes remain.
So, Mr. Hadley, any thoughts----
Secretary Albright. Can I just add one thing?
Ms. McSally. Yes.
Secretary Albright. There were criticisms of it that, in
fact, it militarized democracy, kind of, activities, when I
think there actually is a way to make it cooperative.
Ms. McSally. Great.
Mr. Hadley, any thoughts?
Mr. Hadley. Yeah, I think we are in a--a need for a
strategic relook. And, you know, two conventional wars, that
was an idea that came 15, 20 years ago, and for the last 15
years, we have been fighting nonconventional wars. I don't know
if it makes any sense. This integration the chairman talked
about, you talked about, of the State and Defense, the
nonmilitary and the military, how do we do that, we need to
relook at it again.
I think what we really need--and I would hope this Congress
and committee would take the lead--is a step-back look. What is
the context in which we are operating? What are our assumptions
about the world that we face? What is our strategy then for
achieving our objectives in that context? Then, you know, what
are the implementing policies we need? And then what is the
organization we need to fit that strategy? And then how do you
resource it in a way that is sensible?
We need a strategic relook, given the 15 years we have been
through. And now is a good time to do it, with the new Congress
and new administration.
Ms. McSally. Great. Thank you.
I am over my time.
The Chairman. Ms. Rosen.
Ms. Rosen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith.
And I thank you so much for being here today and your
thoughtful and experienced answers. It is really wonderful.
So I want to go back to yesterday's confirmation from
Director Comey that the Trump campaign is under investigation
for possible Russian collusion and that President Trump's
claims of wiretapping are indeed false.
Can you tell me how you see that that impacts U.S.
credibility in the world, Secretary Albright?
Secretary Albright. I think it raises a lot of questions
with our friends and allies in terms of how we operate. But I
think that they have been critical of some of the ways that we
have been doing things, and it plays into a whole theory about
what is this administration about.
I think the hearings and everything are going to go on a
while. It is a little hard to figure out where they are going
to go. But I do think the testimony yesterday really spoke for
itself, and I think it will have an effect in the way that we
are viewed, since we see ourselves as a country that operates
by the rule of law.
Ms. Rosen. And do you think that will jeopardize our
security and the willingness especially of our NATO allies to
work with us?
Secretary Albright. I think not so much that, but I do
think some of the issues in terms of our issues already with
the British intelligence community. And a lot of sharing
intelligence and things is based on trust, and so I think that
is going to have to be rebuilt through the various Cabinet
Secretaries.
Mr. Hadley. Look, there is--Director Comey said the
investigation is ongoing. We need to let the investigation run
its course and see what it yields. We need to get to the bottom
of these allegations, no doubt about it.
I think it is manageable with our allies. We shock our
allies quite frequently these days, over the last decade or
two, and I think it will survive.
But I think we have to recognize that, while we need to get
to the bottom of this, it is a huge distraction from real
issues that the administration and the Congress need to
address. It is taking a lot of oxygen out of the system. And we
have to get to the bottom of it, but we are going to pay a
price, because it is distracting us from real work that needs
to be done.
Ms. Rosen. Thank you. I appreciate your answers.
And I yield back my time.
The Chairman. Mr. Conaway.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you both for being here.
Stephen, in your history review, you left out the impact
that the collapse of the dot-com era had on the economy and
those make-believe or fictitious surpluses that were projected
at that point in time. So just add that to your narrative next
time that you get a chance to answer that question.
I am intrigued by this idea that it is time to redo, kind
of, the strategy, the world order, whatever the phraseology is,
you know, that we have enjoyed for 70 years. That one was done
in the face of the Soviet Union being on the other side, and
its acolytes were a part of that, and it was successful
throughout that timeframe.
As we set the new one--you mentioned a couple of new
emerging powers, India and China--how would we do that, with
Russia in effect taking the Soviet Union's place as a force on
the other side; China, who is operating outside the rule of
law, particularly in the South China Sea and the things that
they are doing, the mischief that they are creating around and
the things that are going on, their lack of impact on North
Korea, other things.
India certainly would be--the world's largest democracy
would be one that you would think would join some sort of an
order that the United States would be the leader of or be of
significant impact on it.
Can we do that? We did it once with the Soviets. Can we do
it again, with adding both the Chinese and the Russians out
there, versus what the rest of the world would be trying to do?
Can you walk us--your thoughts on that? Both of you, please.
Mr. Hadley. Yeah. I think Russia is going to be very tough.
I think Russia really has convinced itself that this
international order was just a fig-leaf cover for advancing
American interests at everybody else's expense. I think that is
wrong analysis, but I think that is their analysis.
China, on the other, is more ambivalent. The Chinese I have
talked to understand that China has benefited enormously by
participating in that international system for the last 30
years, in terms of its prosperity and the like. So I think they
would be loathe to overturn it, but they do want a role in it.
They want a role in setting the rules.
And that is why it was important, I think, that we finally
agreed to the change in the IMF [International Monetary Fund]
rules that gave China, for example, more votes and more of a
role. I know it will be controversial.
I would do things--I would try to send China the signal
that they can be at the table in revising and revitalizing this
order if they play in a responsible way. I would, for example,
have had us join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank that
they proposed. Why? Because I want to make sure that it is
really used to encourage development of the neighborhood and
not just to extend China's influence. The best way to do that
is for us, our friends and allies, to be a part of it and
condition it. And it would send the message to China that, if
they have ideas for revising and revitalizing the international
order, great, we are willing to participate.
I think China we can still bring into a revitalized order,
and I think very much India we can do so. So I am hopeful that
we can pull this off, but it is a challenge.
Mr. Conaway. Madam Albright.
Secretary Albright. I do think it is worth really giving it
some larger thought, because the post-World War II era was
totally different, as was the post-Cold War era. And the
question is, to what extent does one bring these countries in
in order to have a discussion where they don't like the fact
that we are deciding what the order is?
I mean, I heard that an awful lot from the Russians after
the end of the Cold War, that we didn't respect them enough. It
is hard to respect them when they, in fact, are, you know,
taking over pieces of countries and threatening them with cyber
activities.
The Chinese themselves never felt that they were part of
the post-World War II order. That was the Nationalist
government, not the Communist one. And so the question is
whether we really would have the energy and the interest to
resummon something like Bretton Woods agreements, I mean,
really begin to look at things in a very large way.
I do think that the way the world is--besides, the United
States doesn't want to run the world. We prefer to have
partners in it. And so, as an academic, I think it would be
kind of--or track two, to begin to think about some different
world order here where we ask the others to be participants in
creating it.
At the moment, we are not in that position. We are
deterring Russia, and we are trying to figure out what China's
role is, as they now say that they are more liberal,
capitalistic, and are moving into a vacuum that we have left.
So there are real problems that are out there, but I think,
as an academic practitioner, I think it would be interesting to
see whether there is some way to have a new conference on a new
world order.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you for your thoughts. I appreciate it.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Ms. Shea-Porter.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Thank you.
And thank you both for being here.
I have been a member of this committee for 6 years, and the
conversation has obviously changed quite a bit. But what I am
concerned about--we were looking at the state of readiness for
our military all the way through this era. But what I am really
concerned about is that our domestic tax policies absolutely
conflict with our military needs or our perceived military
needs and our role around the world.
You know, this is tax season, and so I am seeing ads,
``Cheat Uncle Sam legally.'' You know, ``Here is a way to avoid
paying a single penny.'' And I feel that people don't
understand that if we are going to fulfill our responsibilities
that we have to look at that side too, that we can't ignore the
fact that we have to pay for this, we can't continue to drive
up our debt.
And this is a challenge that is not just here for this
committee and not just for Congress but, actually, around the
world.
But shifting--I just had to say that this has been, you
know, an issue for me and certainly all of us who try to figure
out how to pay for what we need and to make sure that we stay
strong.
But shifting, I know, Mr. Hadley, that you said that we
need to do a strategic relook with this administration. But
this administration has given us all pause and concern.
We take a look at former National Security Advisor Flynn,
who didn't register as a foreign agent, who clearly was very
close to Putin and to others. And we see others--and we see the
President's family with financial ties, and we don't know what
they are.
I don't feel confident that there is going to be another
strategic relook from this administration. So I think it falls
on the rest of us to be talking about these issues.
And I have been briefed a number of times about this, but
here is what I want to ask both of you: What is going to be the
right response?
We know that Russia has been active in Europe, and we know
that they have had the same kind of propaganda tools and
efforts in, like, Brexit and also in elections for democracies,
countries that are democracies. And so we are sitting there
looking outward and then back inward because of our own
problems, and I see Russia very engaged in other people's
elections, not just ours.
So what is our proper response?
And, Secretary Albright, you talked about using some tools,
but what tools do we have? I mean, I turn on television, you
know, in a hotel, and there is Russian television sending out a
propaganda message all the time.
So could you expand on that? And how much do we alert the
world about their engagement--you know, Putin's engagement,
literally, throughout democracies in Europe?
Secretary Albright. I think we need to think about how we
reengage in terms of pressing our values system and explaining
who we are. And we used to have a system through Radio Free
Europe and a variety of radios, Voice of America. And I think
we need to begin to rethink again what public diplomacy is
about. It is not propaganda. It is actually telling the truth.
Propaganda is not telling the truth. And I think that we need
to figure out how to expand our voice and how to make clear to
the American people that it is worth spending the money on it,
frankly. That is part of the problem.
Russia, today, is a very clever mechanism. They are
actually doing a lot of broadcasting around the United States,
and there are Americans, Larry King, for instance, who
participate in it. It is a propaganda machine. And I think the
bottom line is we need to figure out how to get our voice out
there again.
I think the main thing that we have to think about is how
to explain to the American people that our safety and security
depends on a different--that we can't wall ourselves off from
things, that we have to be a part of this, and that what Putin
wants more than anything is to have our democracy be so
confused that we don't pay any attention to what he is doing,
and he just keeps kind of moving into the vacuum and pushing
there.
And so we can't allow the vacuum to exist, and we need to
go back to some of the public diplomacy methods that we have
developed.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Thank you.
Mr. Hadley.
Mr. Hadley. I agree with that.
I think in terms of what Putin is doing in elections, we
have to expose it, particularly in Europe. We need to shame him
for it. And then, hopefully, the Europeans will show in their
response that they are willing to stand up to it, and he will
conclude that, actually, his interference made it worse for him
rather than better.
But we have to recognize that Russia is trying to discredit
democracy and discredit our system of government through fake
news and faux think tanks. And we need to expose that, and then
we need to push back by exporting truth. We used to be in the
business of exporting truth. We need to get back into it.
Look, the administration did tap in to some nerve of the
American people, some discontent of the American people, and it
needs to be addressed. There are Cabinet Secretaries, I think,
who can be participants in this process. But I think the
strategic relook, I would like to see Congress take the lead,
and I think you can get a response from the administration. But
I think it would be good for Congress to lead this one.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Thank you.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Ms. Stefanik.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to both of our witnesses.
Secretary Albright, it is an honor to meet you for the
first time.
And, Mr. Hadley, it is great to see you. You are a great
friend and served as such a role model in the Bush
administration.
I wanted to pick up on the line of questioning that some of
my colleagues asked.
When we consider this strategic relook and the context in
which we operate, in a 21st-century global construct, what has
changed over my lifetime and in even over the past 5 years is
the use of technology. And this is tied in to Ms. Shea-Porter's
questions. We have seen Russia increasingly utilize hybrid
warfare through propaganda, through influence campaigns,
through shaping media coverage.
Do you assess that we are adequately prepared to counter
that propaganda by exporting the truth?
Secretary Albright. I don't think we are. You would think
that we would be ahead in this particular aspect, but we have
not, I think, taken advantage enough of the great innovative
spirit of Americans and somehow link it to what the needs of
the government are.
And, in fact, that relationship between the government and
the private sector on this, I think, is a very complicated one
that needs to be explored in a way that it doesn't put
censorship in but does, in fact, create a better tool out of
it. I am not an expert on this, but there is some missing piece
here that we have not in fact taken advantage of.
Ms. Stefanik. So that is what I am interested in. I chair
the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee, and we have
hosted a number of roundtables and hearings on this threat of
hybrid warfare and what steps we need to take to adequately
counter it.
We used to have a U.S. Information Agency. Currently,
today, we have what is called the Global Engagement Center
within the Department of State.
I would like to get your guidance as to what specific steps
we should be taking in the short term in this Congress and then
in the longer term.
Mr. Hadley. So I think you have it exactly right. It is
ironic that both the terrorists and extremists and the
authoritarians like Russia are taking technology that we
innovated and produced and using it to beat us in the public
space every single day, day in, day out. We have to counter it.
And I think what your subcommittee can do--there are a lot
of views of some people that, well, we need to go back to what
we did in the Cold War. But the context has changed, and the
technology has changed. And the question is, can we use that in
an innovative way to get out ahead of it?
For example, there was an article in the press that said
that there are broadcasts now being made against the Lord's
Army in Central Africa, this gruesome group that has been
kidnapping children and sex slaves and all the rest for 15
years, broadcasting statements by members of that group from
their family asking them to go home, and flying over the
territory where they operate and broadcasting these messages.
And it is having the effect; people are leaving the Lord's
Resistance Army and going back to their villages. That is the
kind of innovative thing that we ought to be doing.
And I think what we need to do is not restore what we had
in the Cold War but figure out how we can leapfrog and use the
technology in a creative way to do the exporting of truth in a
more effective way, more effective than actually the
authoritarians and the extremists.
I don't know the solution, but your subcommittee could
really bring in the witnesses to develop a toolkit for 21st-
century information operations, if you will.
Ms. Stefanik. One of the pieces of feedback we have heard
is a challenge when you have a whole-of-government approach
with multiple agencies engaged is the pace of the 24/7 news
cycle and the fact that, at any given moment, a tweet can come
out and that is heard around the world.
How do we structure an agency, whether it is the Global
Engagement Center or something else, that is able to overcome
just the pace of how information works in the 21st century?
Secretary Albright. I think it is very hard.
And, basically, let me just say on USIA [United States
Information Agency], I am the one that had it abolished,
because Senator Helms had suggested it, but it also made sense
in terms of bringing it more into the Department instead of
something that was just so independent that it couldn't react
in a way or have something to do with what our overall policies
were.
So I do think that there needs to be some way that the
departments themselves are involved in it. Definitely should
not go back to Cold War, because different technology exists.
But I think that the hardest part is the rapidity of the
information and how it is dealt with. And I am surprised that
we have not developed our technology enough to deal with that.
But, also, because we have a free press, it makes it harder
than--I mean, Russia today, it is a part of their government,
and so they are able to direct what it is supposed to do.
But I think you are on the right track. I would be very
happy to be involved in discussions with you if it is helpful.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you. And my time has expired, but I
will follow up. Thanks.
The Chairman. Ms. Hanabusa.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Mr. Hadley and Secretary Albright.
I want to talk about your joint memo. Because I think your
joint memo is telling us very clearly, if we would read it
carefully, that, though Secretary Albright has said she doesn't
like isms, isolationism is a major force that we are going to
have to deal with.
And, in addition to that, the whole concept of the
international order, which we can't sustain, but,
notwithstanding, something that has effectively worked for 70
years, is something that we all have to look at.
And you, of course, conclude by saying that Congress has to
start a national debate regarding America's role in the world.
And you take that to the continued references by Secretary
Albright throughout these hearings today about Article I,
section 8, which is Congress' role.
Having said all of that, the concern that I have is that
there is probably no stronger policy statement than what the
budget represents and, of course, what the appropriations are.
We have almost a schizophrenic, in my opinion, statement, which
is an increase in defense of 10 percent, which is about $54
billion, which represents, of course, the need to raise the--or
ignore sequestration; a cut in the non-defense categories,
which, of course, includes State. And how can you have both? To
me, it is like you can have isolationism with an increase in
defense, depending on where it goes. But you can also augment
isolationism by simply refusing to fund State.
And by doing the both, I think that what I am concerned
about is, we can talk about these different points, but the
overarching theme in all of this seems to be, from your paper,
that we have hit a critical crossroads, and we have to decide
it, and you have tasked Congress with saying, okay, go out
there and have this discussion. I am not sure that Congress can
have this discussion effectively if our budget posture or our
policy statement is really as schizophrenic as I see it.
So what I would like to hear from the both of you is
whether or not I have misread what you are saying. Because it
seems to me that this is a very critical point that we are at.
And I would like both of you to comment, if you will.
Mr. Hadley. I don't think you have misread us. I think what
you have pointed out is we have some strategic confusion going
on, and we have started with a budget before we have a clearly
articulated strategy. And what we are saying and what the
chairman was saying earlier, we have to go the other direction.
We have to start with a strategy, and then we can use it to set
our budget priorities. But we are doing it--we got it just
reversed. And it results in exactly the kind of inconsistency
you were talking about. So I think you read us absolutely
right.
Secretary Albright. I am fascinated that you asked it that
particular way, because the thing is, we have been working on
this Middle East Strategy Task Force for about a year. We had
no idea who the next President was going to be.
What we had said was that our approach to the Middle East
had been, kind of, Band-Aids and fire drills and that we really
needed to take a much deeper look at the Middle East in terms
of what was happening internationally, in terms of what was in
our U.S. national interest. We looked at various things of
trying to create a regional organization so that it wasn't just
us giving money to the Middle East. There were green shoots
there that needed to be supported.
President Trump got elected, and the budget debate, all of
a sudden, was put in on top of it. So it made it look more
schizophrenic than our initial plan, which is an example of the
fact that if something is considered only from the budget
perspective, to let the budget drive the strategy is the
problem.
And the question--and I think you have raised it in a right
way--is now how we bring this together. Because our approach to
here was: The defense clearly had to be, we had a part on that,
and we talked about standby forces, but we also talked about
the need of what the State Department provides, which is to
make sure that there is not an environment that creates the
terrorists and disequilibrium everywhere.
But I think we are at a breakpoint in the way that the
international system works. We need to see this as an
opportunity to really think through what needs to be done in
the future. It is a huge time for this, and I think that we
welcome your role in it and would love to play a part in it.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back, and thank you very much.
The Chairman. Mr. Khanna.
Mr. Khanna. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your patience in
allowing every member on the committee to ask a question.
Secretary Albright, Mr. Hadley, thank you for your service.
A few days ago, Senator McCain said of Senator Rand Paul
that he was working for Vladimir Putin. And this is because of
Senator Paul's principled opposition to Montenegro being part
of NATO.
Given our country's own history with McCarthyism, are you
concerned about that kind of rhetoric from senior political
leaders and its potential to fan another Cold War?
Secretary Albright. I have to say that what makes me sad is
about the lack of discussion that has gone on, the civility of
how we talk to each other and how we recognize that we are
entitled to have different opinions.
And in my testimony that I gave here, I talked about not
having been born in this country. And, Mr. Chairman, you spoke
about what an incredible country it is. And I love to go to
naturalization ceremonies. And I can't swear people in because
I am not an officer of the law, but I can give them their
naturalization certificate. And, all of a sudden, I heard this
person say, ``Oh, my God, can you imagine a refugee got a
naturalization certificate from the Secretary of State?'' And I
said, ``Can you imagine that a refugee is the Secretary of
State?''
And what this country has been about is civil discourse and
the capability of understanding each other's differences. And
so, while it may feel good at a particular moment to be nasty
to somebody, it doesn't prove where we are.
And I do think that, given the discussion here today, we
are recognizing more and more that we are at some kind of a
turning point in the world system.
And if I may just throw in some other large issue, the
social contract is broken. That is what taxes are about. People
gave up their individual rights in order to be protected by a
government and to have services. We are not talking about that.
Who owes what to whom? And that is the basic discussion that we
should be having.
And I do think that having a discourse where we respect
each other's differences is what has to happen.
Mr. Hadley. And that is why we would like the Congress and,
in particular, this committee, which has a tradition of
bipartisanship, to be leading this national dialogue, not just
in Washington but out in the country, so that the country can
see that Republicans and Democrats in this Congress and in this
committee can deal with each other with mutual respect and
civility and have a substantive conversation on issues that
really matter for the peace and security of the country.
So our view is we would like to do it on the merits, but we
would also like to do it to model a model of right behavior in
front of the American people.
Mr. Khanna. I appreciate those responses.
And, Secretary Albright, I of course have great admiration
for your story and your career.
To this point, though, of civil disagreement, you know,
Secretary Perry had a different view on NATO, and he had said
that he thought that the NATO expansion should be slower than
it was.
Do you both, having seen the last 20 years, think there is
anything we could have done to have avoided the confrontation
we now have with Russia or anything we can do going forward?
Secretary Albright. I think that a mistake was made at the
end of the Cold War when we said that we had won the Cold War.
They lost the Cold War. And that is not just a semantic
difference. The system failed.
The Clinton administration was in office when we did the
first tranche of NATO expansion. It was the right thing to do
because these countries wanted to be part of a European system.
And it was not against Russia. And I specifically spoke to
President Yeltsin, and I said, this is not against you, and, at
some point, you might be able to be members as part of a new
system.
And what has happened is I think that Putin has
deliberately tried to figure out how to make sure that it is
viewed as a threat to them, when it was never set up in the
post-Cold War period as a threat to them. So I don't think we
have done anything wrong. I think that Putin needs an enemy,
and that is what he has been doing.
Mr. Khanna. I yield back my time.
The Chairman. If you all will indulge me with one last
question.
Madam Secretary, we started talking about your story, and I
think about the World War II experience, how that shaped this
country. The Cold War experience has helped shape our
institutions and our approaches to things.
I believe more than two-thirds of the Congress was not in
office on 9/11. So you think about memory and events that shape
us, but yet you have these students coming through your
classroom all the time. What is your reflection on their view
of the world, and how do they see things?
Secretary Albright. I think that they are actually a very
forward-looking group of young people who have an understanding
that they need to acquire the knowledge to deal with a
completely different world.
I do have to say that when I tell stories about the Clinton
administration it is a little bit like teaching about Napoleon.
And so the, kind of, memories that they have don't exist. They
have come up in a very different era. And the way that they see
things a lot, in terms of technology, what can be done.
I teach at Georgetown in the School of Foreign Service. So
that is a very--it has a lot of foreign students in it, which,
by the way, if I may say, is one of the strengths of our
university systems, is that they are able to have foreign
students. And what troubles me about the ban and various
aspects of it is that colleges are now wondering if the foreign
students can come in and if they can stay. And it will be a
loss to our students in terms of specifically the question you
asked. Because the next generation is going to deal in a world
where we will, in fact, be dealing with a number of different
countries, number of different ethnic and religious groups
within an international system, and my students very much want
to be a part of things.
I have to admit we are having a little bit of a hard time
this semester, because I teach about decision making, and I can
talk about what decision making--I do talk about the Bush
administration and about the Obama administration. And I tell
my students, you have to decide now for yourselves how the
decision-making process is working.
But they are very eager. And if I might just say, over the
weekend, we do a role-play, and we are dealing with North
Korea. So I will let you know what we come up with.
The Chairman. We are looking for answers, that is for sure.
Mr. Hadley, do you have any reflections on collective
memory in our future?
Mr. Hadley. It is one of the problems--I was talking to
some Europeans--Europe has, because the young people in Europe
have no recollection, of course, of World War II and that
history in the first half of the 20th century. So they don't
know really why the EU [European Union] came about.
And I think we have the same problem in the United States.
We have generations of people who have taken the international
order for granted, don't understand how it came to be and what
value it has provided.
So there is a huge educational role, which, again, is why
we come back to a national debate that you folks would lead.
The Chairman. Okay. I took your charge. I understand.
Thank you all very much, not only for being here today but
for, both of you, your continuing involvement in the affairs of
the country.
The hearing stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:22 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 21, 2017
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 21, 2017
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[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 21, 2017
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Mr. Langevin. U.S. leadership abroad in this day and age depends
not only on our ability to defend ourselves from physical attack, but
also from cyberattack. Combating the challenges posed by cyber is a
global problem and is impossible to do alone. Developing acceptable
behavior in cyberspace can improve stability and provide a foundation
for international action when those norms are violated. How can we
promote like-minded countries working together to advance international
norms and responsible behaviors in cyberspace? Have actions the United
States has taken--such as the response to the Russian interference in
our presidential elections--been helpful in that regard?
Secretary Albright and Mr. Hadley. We would like to extend our
thanks once again for the opportunity to testify before you and your
colleagues on the House Committee on Armed Services on March 21, 2017.
We were grateful for your time, for your thoughtful questions, and for
the spirit of bipartisanship in which you received us.
We have received the questions for the record that you have
submitted to us. While we share your interest in these important
issues, we regret that we are not well positioned to provide answers.
Many of the questions deal with government programs with which we have
not been directly associated for years since leaving government. An
administration witness may be a better source of information. We would
be delighted to discuss other issues raised in the hearing with you at
any time.
We are deeply appreciative of the Congress's role in helping to
craft American foreign policy at this unsettled global time, and we
once again thank you and the Committee for your efforts on behalf of
our country.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO
Ms. Bordallo. How would you propose we should counter North Korean
and Chinese aggression in the Pacific region? North Korea is in the
news lately and their continued missile tests are a significant concern
and have garnered a lot of attention. At the same time China continues
to aggressively pursue their own agenda without any regard to
international law. In your opinion, how do we address these alarming
but different threats to the Pacific? How can we employ a whole-of-
government approach that will address both of these threats?
Secretary Albright and Mr. Hadley. We would like to extend our
thanks once again for the opportunity to testify before you and your
colleagues on the House Committee on Armed Services on March 21, 2017.
We were grateful for your time, for your thoughtful questions, and for
the spirit of bipartisanship in which you received us.
We have received the questions for the record that you have
submitted to us. While we share your interest in these important
issues, we regret that we are not well positioned to provide answers.
Many of the questions deal with government programs with which we have
not been directly associated for years since leaving government. An
administration witness may be a better source of information. We would
be delighted to discuss other issues raised in the hearing with you at
any time.
We are deeply appreciative of the Congress's role in helping to
craft American foreign policy at this unsettled global time, and we
once again thank you and the Committee for your efforts on behalf of
our country.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS
Mr. Franks. Which country do you believe is our #1 geopolitical foe
right now?
Who was our #1 geopolitical foe in 2012?
Secretary Albright and Mr. Hadley. We would like to extend our
thanks once again for the opportunity to testify before you and your
colleagues on the House Committee on Armed Services on March 21, 2017.
We were grateful for your time, for your thoughtful questions, and for
the spirit of bipartisanship in which you received us.
We have received the questions for the record that you have
submitted to us. While we share your interest in these important
issues, we regret that we are not well positioned to provide answers.
Many of the questions deal with government programs with which we have
not been directly associated for years since leaving government. An
administration witness may be a better source of information. We would
be delighted to discuss other issues raised in the hearing with you at
any time.
We are deeply appreciative of the Congress's role in helping to
craft American foreign policy at this unsettled global time, and we
once again thank you and the Committee for your efforts on behalf of
our country.
Mr. Franks. Part 1: Do you believe peoples from religious or ethnic
minorities who the State Department has officially identified as being
targeted for genocide should be given preference for being granted
refugee status and admitted to the United States as refugees?
--Christians and Yezidis have been officially recognized by the
State Department as being the target of genocide in Syria and Iraq--the
Islamic State has specifically targeted them for extermination based
upon their religious beliefs.
Part 2: Should Christians and Yezidis fleeing the Islamic State be
given preference for being granted refugee status and admitted to the
United States as refugees?
Secretary Albright and Mr. Hadley. We would like to extend our
thanks once again for the opportunity to testify before you and your
colleagues on the House Committee on Armed Services on March 21, 2017.
We were grateful for your time, for your thoughtful questions, and for
the spirit of bipartisanship in which you received us.
We have received the questions for the record that you have
submitted to us. While we share your interest in these important
issues, we regret that we are not well positioned to provide answers.
Many of the questions deal with government programs with which we have
not been directly associated for years since leaving government. An
administration witness may be a better source of information. We would
be delighted to discuss other issues raised in the hearing with you at
any time.
We are deeply appreciative of the Congress's role in helping to
craft American foreign policy at this unsettled global time, and we
once again thank you and the Committee for your efforts on behalf of
our country.
[all]