[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 115-25]
MILITARY ASSESSMENT OF RUSSIAN
ACTIVITIES AND SECURITY CHALLENGES IN EUROPE
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 28, 2017
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
25-091 PDF WASHINGTON : 2017
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office,
http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center,
U.S. Government Publishing Office. Phone 202-512-1800, or 866-512-1800 (toll-free).
E-mail, [email protected].
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Fifteenth Congress
WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina ADAM SMITH, Washington
JOE WILSON, South Carolina ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
ROB BISHOP, Utah JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio RICK LARSEN, Washington
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama JIM COOPER, Tennessee
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado JOHN GARAMENDI, California
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia JACKIE SPEIER, California
DUNCAN HUNTER, California MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri BETO O'ROURKE, Texas
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
MO BROOKS, Alabama RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
PAUL COOK, California SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii
BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire
BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
SAM GRAVES, Missouri A. DONALD McEACHIN, Virginia
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California
MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland
STEPHEN KNIGHT, California STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida
STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma RO KHANNA, California
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee TOM O'HALLERAN, Arizona
RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
TRENT KELLY, Mississippi (Vacancy)
MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
MATT GAETZ, Florida
DON BACON, Nebraska
JIM BANKS, Indiana
LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
Robert L. Simmons II, Staff Director
Catherine Sendak, Professional Staff Member
Katy Quinn, Professional Staff Member
Britton Burkett, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 1
Thornberry, Hon. William M. ``Mac,'' a Representative from Texas,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.......................... 1
WITNESSES
Scaparrotti, GEN Curtis M., USA, Commander, United States
European Command............................................... 2
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Scaparrotti, GEN Curtis M.................................... 43
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Lamborn.................................................. 67
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Dr. Abraham.................................................. 71
Mr. Moulton.................................................. 71
Mr. Scott.................................................... 71
MILITARY ASSESSMENT OF RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES AND SECURITY CHALLENGES IN
EUROPE
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 28, 2017.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. ``Mac''
Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
The Chairman. Committee will come to order.
Last week the committee heard from experts on hybrid
warfare, which is also known by several other names. Today we
focus on one of the regions that has experienced many, if not
most, of the tactics that we had discussed.
From the little green men in Ukraine, to political
assassinations as recently as last week, to buying influence in
political parties, snap exercises to intimidate neighbors, and,
of course, cyberattacks of various kinds, Europe has seen all
of that and more.
Meanwhile, the Russians continue to invest in their nuclear
weapons, their anti-access/area-denial capability, and in a
variety of other capabilities designed to reduce or eliminate
any technological military advantage that the United States may
have had in the past. We know that one of their primary goals
is to divide and weaken NATO [North Atlantic Treaty
Organization], arguably the most successful military alliance
ever.
To discuss these issues today we are pleased to welcome
NATO Supreme Allied Commander and commander of the U.S.
European Command, General Curtis Scaparrotti, not for the first
time, but for the first time in this capacity.
Before turning to him, let me yield to Mr. Smith for any
comments he would like to make.
STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON,
RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And welcome, General. It is great to see you again. I
always appreciated your leadership out at Joint Base Lewis-
McChord when you were out there and appreciate your leadership
even more in Europe.
And I agree with the chairman's opening remarks, look
forward to your testimony.
But Europe is, you know, as great a challenge as we have
had since the end of the Cold War now. And I won't belabor the
point because we have all heard about it, but Russia is
reasserting itself not just in Eastern Europe but in many ways
in Western Europe, trying to influence elections, trying--
basically trying to undermine liberal democracy.
Vladimir Putin's goal is to make the world safe for
autocratic dictatorships and to undermine the values that we
hold dear in this country, which is representative democracy.
And he is doing that, frankly, on a very low budget using a lot
of cyber and a lot of intel operations, and I think we have to
get smarter about how we counter that. And a lot has been said
about that. I look forward to your comments.
Last thing I will say is, obviously the big question we
have is what should our presence be in Europe as a deterrent to
what Russia is doing? Because that, I think, should be the
goal.
Putin is not stupid. They are nowhere near as strong as
they were during the height of the Cold War. So basically he is
trying to have influence on the cheap, but the higher the cost
the less likely he is to engage in his destabilization efforts.
Does a larger presence by us in that region act as that
deterrent? And if so, what should that presence look like?
So those are some of the questions I know we need answered.
And obviously, you know, we want to reaffirm our commitment to
NATO and its enduring importance in all of our alliances in
Europe in terms of maintaining the peace and stability in the
world that we want.
With that, I yield back. I look forward to your testimony.
The Chairman. General, without objection your full written
statement will be made part of the record, and at this time you
are recognized for any comments you would like to make. Thanks
again for being here.
STATEMENT OF GEN CURTIS M. SCAPARROTTI, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND
General Scaparrotti. Well, thank you.
Chairman Thornberry and Ranking Member Smith and
distinguished members of the committee, I am honored to testify
today as the commander of the United States European Command.
On behalf of over 60,000 permanently signed service members as
well as civilians, contractors, and their families who serve
and represent our Nation in Europe, thank you for your support.
European theater remains critical to our national interest.
The transatlantic alliance gives us a unique advantage over our
adversaries: a united, capable warfighting alliance resolved in
its purpose and strengthened by shared values that have been
forged in battle.
EUCOM's [U.S. European Command's] relationship with NATO
and the 51 countries within our AOR [area of responsibility]
provides the United States with a network of willing partners
who support global operations and secure the international
rules-based order. Our security architecture provides more than
1 billion people a safeguarded transatlantic trade, which now
constitutes almost half of the world's GDP [gross domestic
product].
However, this security architecture is being tested, and
today we face the most dynamic European strategic environment
in recent history. Political volatility and economic
uncertainty are compounded by threats to our security system
that are transregional, multi-domain, and multifunctional.
In the east, a resurgent Russia has turned from partner to
antagonist as it seeks to reemerge as a global power. Countries
along Russia's periphery, including Ukraine and Georgia,
struggle against Moscow's malign activities and military
actions.
In the southeast, strategic drivers of instability converge
on key allies--especially Turkey, which has to simultaneously
manage Russia, terrorists, and refugee flows.
In the south, violent extremists and transnational criminal
elements spawn terror and corruption from North Africa to the
Middle East, while refugees flee to Europe in search of
security and opportunity.
And in the high north, Russia is reasserting its military
presence and positioning itself for strategic advantage in the
Arctic.
In response to these challenges, EUCOM has shifted its
focus from security cooperation and engagement to deterrence
and defense. Accordingly, we are adjusting our posture, plans,
and readiness so that we remain relevant to the threats we
face. In short, we are returning to our historic role as a
warfighting command focused on deterrence and defense.
EUCOM's transition would not be possible without
congressional support of the European Reassurance Initiative.
Thanks in large measure to ERI, over the last 12 months EUCOM
has made clear progress with an enhanced force presence,
complex exercises and training, infrastructure improvements,
increased pre-positioning of equipment and supplies, and
partner capacity-building throughout Europe.
But we cannot meet these challenges alone. In response to
Russian aggression EUCOM has continued to strengthen our
relationship with strategic allies and partners, including the
Baltic nations, Poland, Turkey, and Ukraine. EUCOM has also
strengthened ties with Israel, one of our closest allies.
Above all, EUCOM has supported the NATO alliance, which
remains, as Secretary Mattis said, ``the bedrock for our
transatlantic security.''
Thus, the EUCOM posture is growing stronger, and I remain
confident in our ability to affect this transition. But there
is much work to do.
We must not only match but outpace the modernization
advances of our adversaries. We must invest in the tools and
capabilities needed to increase effectiveness across the
spectrum of conflict. And we must ensure that we have a force
that is credible, agile, and relevant to the dynamic demands of
this theater.
To this end, EUCOM has identified the following focus
areas: ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance]
collection platforms to improve timely threat information and
strategic warning; land force capabilities to deter Russia from
further aggression; enhanced naval capabilities for
antisubmarine warfare, strike warfare, and amphibious
operations; pre-positioned equipment to increase our
responsiveness to crisis; and enhanced missile defense systems.
Let me conclude by again thanking this committee's members
and staff for their continued support of EUCOM, not only
through increased funding, but also by helping us articulate
the challenges that lie before us. Support from the other
leaders and, above all, from the public at home and across
Europe is vital [to] ensuring that we have a ready and a
relevant force.
This remains a pivotal time for EUCOM as we transition to
meet the demands of a dynamic security environment, and I
remain confident that through the strength of our alliances and
partnerships, and with the professionalism of our service
members, we will adapt and ensure that Europe remains whole,
free, and at peace.
Thank you.
And, Chairman, I look forward to the questions.
[The prepared statement of General Scaparrotti can be found
in the Appendix on page 43.]
The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
Both Mr. Smith and I mentioned some of the tactics Russia
has used, but can you step back for a second and summarize in,
obviously, this open session what they are doing with their
military capability? How and in what areas are they advancing
their capability, and how does it relate to us? Just kind of a
general picture of their military capabilities.
General Scaparrotti. Chairman, thank you.
I think if you look at their forces from what we know as
hybrid or asymmetric means, to conventional, to nuclear, they
are modernizing this force in every one of those categories.
Within the hybrid, for instance, we are well aware of their use
of cyber, their use of disinformation, or ``information
confrontation,'' as they call it. And, in fact, in recent
months they announced new elements within their force that
focus on information confrontation, information operations.
So they are focused on that and, in fact, I would add here
that when you look at their view of the spectrum of conflict,
unlike our view, theirs includes those activities below what we
would call the level of, or the threshold of, conflict. It
includes political provocation, information operations,
disinformation, cyber, et cetera. So it is a functional part
now of their doctrine, I believe, and they put it into play.
In the conventional realm they are upgrading the systems
that they have--their naval ships, their airplanes, et cetera--
as well as building new ones for the future. They have refitted
their aircraft and their ships for some of their newer
munitions, which are very capable.
Caliber [cruise missile] system, for instance, can be
placed on the ground, in the air, at sea, so it is a
multifunctional system, gives them, you know, long reach and
precision, et cetera. So that is how they are advancing in
their force.
Their nuclear forces, as well. Across all the areas they
have been increasing their capability, really refining their
capability from the old systems.
And one of the things you see that is disturbing is the
fact that they are using similar weapon systems that can either
be conventional or nuclear, which then makes it difficult for
us to clearly understand what they have employed. And then
secondly, within their doctrine again, they have made the
statement openly that they see a use for nuclear tactical
capabilities within what we would consider a conventional
conflict, which is very alarming.
So that is how I would--I would categorize their movement
at this time.
The Chairman. Okay.
Let me just remind all members that immediately following
this open hearing we will have a closed session with General
Scaparrotti where we can go into more detail on classified
matters. Again, that will be immediately upon the conclusion of
this open hearing.
Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Could you give us some idea of the importance of the
presence of U.S. troops in Europe as a deterrent to what Russia
is doing? And what size force do we have there now? What size
force do you think we should have? And how would that presence
help us to deter the activity that has been described?
General Scaparrotti. Well, first of all our presence there
is and always has been a very important component of the
alliance, the NATO--you know, NATO alliance, of which we are
one of 28 nations, as well as our partners in Europe.
We have the best military in the world. It works across
multi-domain, it is a joint functional force, and it provides a
critical element to our partners. It also, in operating with
them, builds interoperability which is essential, you know,
within the alliance itself.
Today we have about a little over 60,000 of all services
stationed in Europe. It provides a force that allows us to
deter today but, as you know, with this committee and ERI we
are looking to modernize that force to put us in a better
posture, particularly given Russia's modernization that they
are on that I just described.
We need a greater force there, I think, potentially in the
land component, either a rotational or rotational enduring
footprint of an armored division, for instance.
Within the Air Force we have a pretty good posture there, a
very capable posture. But again, they are looking forward to
adding, you know, fifth-generation aircraft, which are
important given the modernization, again, of Russia.
And with the Navy, again, an additional naval component on
rotation through Europe in order to deter, but specifically
with respect to antisubmarine warfare, which is an area of
concern with the Russians. We are still dominant in that
domain, but we have to continue to invest in order to properly
deter and also remain dominant.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. One last question: Specifically on
the Ukraine, what more could we be doing to help the Ukraine
both fight off the Russian insurgency in the East and then also
to strengthen their government, which I understand is, you
know, plagued by corruption and plagued by inefficiency and
that is part of the problem?
Because if Putin is unsuccessful in the Ukraine or if the
cost gets too high for his interference there I think that is,
you know, the best deterrent we could give to further activity
because that is sort of, you know, where--I don't know if it is
where he started, but it is certainly where he has had the most
public involvement. What more could we be doing in the Ukraine?
General Scaparrotti. Sir, I have been to Ukraine twice now,
both in their training area and out to the ATO [anti-terrorist
operation zone]. I would say first of all I am very impressed
with their military and its discipline. What we have provided
them in terms of our training capability as well as equipment
is being well used, and they are very eager in terms of their
ability to learn more.
So we presently are involved in reform of their government
and capacity-building within their security system. We need to
continue that.
I don't know that it is more; I think it is probably a
little better organization across the whole of government.
Within the training environment, what we do with other NATO
allies there is very effective.
Again, there, I have been out to it and seen it done over
the past year. I think better organization there would help.
There are things we can do to continue to refine it.
The Ukrainian forces are learning and they are getting
better, and we need to consistently adjust.
In terms of weaponry, I personally believe that we need to
consider lethal defensive weapons for Ukraine. They are
fighting a very lethal, tough enemy.
It is a Russian proxy, really, and the Russians provide
some of their newest equipment there in order to test it. They
have tested UAV [unmanned aerial vehicle] sensor-to-shooter
techniques, et cetera, which are lethal. And so we need to
continue to support them, in my view, to have the appropriate
weapons to defend Ukraine.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, General, thank you very much. I have had the
extraordinary opportunity to visit with you and I know
firsthand your extraordinary dedication and success, and it is
just heartwarming as the proud dad of three sons in the Army. I
particularly appreciate--even one in the Navy--we appreciate
you and just thank you so much.
With your service on the European Command and your previous
assignment, of all things, to United States Forces Korea, you
faced extraordinary challenges. Sadly, with the--so many
permanently assigned forces not in your command currently now,
how is this being addressed? And do you feel that we have
enough military assets regionally to properly deter Russian
aggression against the NATO alliance?
What other forces in particular do you need to properly
deter any aggression? In addition, would the presence of these
forces be accepted and welcomed in Europe?
General Scaparrotti. Well, thank you very much. It is good
to see you again.
And within Europe we can do our job today. We can deter the
Russian force that we see. We can counter terrorism, which is a
part--a key part of our mission. We can enable our partners.
But if you look at the environment today and how it is
evolving, and particularly the modernization I mentioned with
Russia and the creativity of our--of the terrorists that we
face as well, we need to ensure that we build a force that is
relevant to that threat and can continue to deter.
So for those things that I need, one, it is--you know, I
need intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in greater
numbers than I have now because to deter properly I have to be
able to have a good baseline of Russia in particular so that I
know when things change, I can posture my forces properly. So I
need increased ISR to have good indications and warning and be
able to set that posture properly over time.
Land force capabilities, which I mentioned earlier, but it
is particularly the enablers of an armored division, a fires
brigade, an engineer brigade, air defense, those kinds of
systems in the numbers that I need there and as we move
forward--now done on a rotational basis, but perhaps a
rotational enduring or some mix of that.
Increased naval capabilities. It would be helpful to have a
carrier support group and amphibious forces more than I have
them now. I have them rotational as they go to other combatant
commands. An increase of that would help us in deterrence; it
would help us reinforce our interoperability with our partners
and work with our partners.
And particularly I have noted ASW, antisubmarine warfare,
because of the advances that Russia in particular is making in
the undersea domain.
Enhanced missile defense. As we have seen every place in
the world, ballistic missiles are proliferating and that is a
very tough area.
And then finally, munitions, both modernization and
appropriate stockpile, so that I have what we need if
deterrence fails and we have to respond to crisis.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you for being so specific.
I am concerned that the military as a whole is facing a
stark readiness crisis. Funding for training, maintenance and
repair, new equipment, and future development of equipment has
been short.
Aside from the aforementioned additional forces you may
need, what shortfalls are you in particular seeing in your
command? Please assess the readiness, the challenges of the
European Command, and what resources are required to increase
readiness in your area of responsibility.
General Scaparrotti. Well, I think, first of all when it
comes to readiness I am fortunate in that particularly
rotational forces, both Air Force, Army, Navy, et cetera, they
are ready when they deploy. They come to me as a ready force.
And I would tell you that they depart as ready or more
ready when they leave Europe because of our ability and
training capacity there. So we are good in that area.
That is still, though, given the budget today and the
demand against the OPTEMPO [operations tempo], as well as
modernization that the services face, you know, increased
funding, particularly for our pilots, would increase their
capabilities within Europe. It would be helpful even at this
point to increase their capability to fly more. That is both
Army, that is Air Force as well.
When you go to our support within Europe, you know, we have
been underfunding all the facilities that support not only our
forces but support our families. And that is another area that
as we look at--it is function of readiness as well, and it is
something that today we don't fully fund and would be helpful
to the force, too.
Mr. Wilson. And I want to thank you.
Another question concluding, the European Deterrence
Initiative is very important, been very successful. And I know
the South Carolina Army National Guard is grateful that we had
a unit just leave for Poland, so thank you for your success.
The Chairman. General, just so I am clear, when you list
ISR, antisubmarine warfare, missile defense, those are things
you need more of, correct?
General Scaparrotti. They are things that I need more of.
And, we also, when we get into the classified section I can
talk to each of those in terms of capabilities and advancement
we need to make, given modernization of our adversaries.
The Chairman. Okay. Thank you. I just wanted to be clear.
General Scaparrotti. That is correct.
The Chairman. Ms. Gabbard.
Mr. Norcross.
She didn't want to.
I am sorry, you are good? You want to wait? Okay.
Ms. Hanabusa.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And thank you, General.
General, I am kind of curious, I mean, I was here for the
2014 QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review] and, you know, it is sort
of like how we set the tone, and I don't recall in that QDR or
the QDR before that that I had an opportunity to review--I was
not here for that--that there was a major concern about Russia.
And, matter of fact, I thought the philosophy was more
along the lines that we thought we could kind of bring them
around and they would become an ally of us. Then it seems like
something occurred and all of a sudden they are viewed by some
as our greatest threat.
So can you explain to me, General, how we go from thinking
that maybe they will maybe be part of NATO, and all of a sudden
it is like we have got to protect NATO and protect the 51
countries that are really part of EUCOM's AOR?
General Scaparrotti. Well, yes. I think prior to 2014--as I
said, the transition that we are making in Europe right now is
one from engagement and cooperation to deterrence and defense.
And we made that--what the real trigger was--I mean, we began
to see the modernization and where Russia was going prior to
that, but 2014 the annexation of Crimea, the occupation of
Ukraine, for instance, was enacted, clearly set out that we
have Russia as a competitor that is willing and did break
international law. And I think what you see in their activities
today often is pushing wherever they can against the
international norms.
They still occupy Ukraine and Georgia, for instance, with
troops without invitation. We have seen their activities in
cyber that are, at a minimal, criminal, in some cases: an
attack on the Ukrainian power grid; most recently, Latvia
believes they were a part of an attack on their government web
system; and then their attempt to influence or inside of our
election, and probably France and Germany, and others.
So I think, you know, if you look at their action it tells
us that we have a nation here that we need to be very sober
about. We don't seek conflict with them. Deterrence, in fact,
has its mission to prevent conflict or war. But at this point
Russia has not been very responsive to the international
community in advancing Ukraine, Crimea, et cetera.
Ms. Hanabusa. So, General, what is your strategy that you
would propose to this body as to what is necessary to prepare
for Russia, whatever they may or you may be afraid that they
are going to do? I think we like to have some sort of certainty
of what--you know, what do you think the most probable scenario
would be, and what is then what you need to have?
General Scaparrotti. Well, for example, I think Russia will
continue to press against the international norms. They want to
regain great power status, and the actions they are taking, in
their view, is to ensure that.
What we need to do is we need to demonstrate strength. We
need to be strong. That is what Russia respects.
They are opportunistic. Where they see weakness they will
take advantage of it when it is in their interest.
We need a whole-of-government approach to this. It is not,
in fact, the military is not the major part; it is the smaller
part of this. We exist as a postured force to really provide
muscle to our diplomacy, to information, to economics, et
cetera.
We need to invest in the capabilities to make sure that we
have a relevant force. A part of deterrence is, you know, the
capability, and the credibility, and the final thing is
communication. And I think communication with Russia is an
important part to play in this.
Finally, strengthen our partners.
Ms. Hanabusa. General, do you believe that the concept of
the triad and, you know, basically our nuclear forces is part
of that deterrence structure that you need to have in the
EUCOM?
General Scaparrotti. Yes, I do. I think the triad, as it
exists in a safe and credible nuclear deterrent, is very
important, particularly given Russia's capabilities.
Ms. Hanabusa. Do you think that is the only force that
Russia understands, or would respect, I guess is the word?
General Scaparrotti. Yes. I think that they do focus on the
strength of their opponent, and I think they are optimistic.
Where they see weakness and they believe that they can gain
their interest or objectives, they will move out on that.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, good to see you again. Thank you for your efforts
in keeping us safe and helping us to plan for the defense of
the United States and our allies.
Thank you for your strong statement on the issue of arming
Ukraine. Congress has passed very strong resolutions calling
for the same, including authorizing arming of Ukraine, so I
appreciate your assessment of that circumstance and the advice
that they bear investing in with the defensive armament.
As you know, I am very active in the NATO Parliamentary
Assembly. I appreciate your participation with NATO
Parliamentary Assembly. Several members of the Armed Services
Committee are very active in that.
You know, it gives us an opportunity to interface with
members of the various parliaments of the 28 nations. Recently
we had a group of parliamentarians into Washington and we
invited RAND in to conduct a military exercise based upon the
RAND Russia-Baltics report that exposed the vulnerability of
our Baltic NATO members. It was intriguing because a lot of the
time that we spent on the presentation was informing our
partners of Russia's current military posture, deployment, and
capability.
So I would like you to talk for a minute about how do you
keep our NATO partners informed, and is that a part of what you
have to do of informing our partners of Russia's posture and
the threat from Russia? Also then, if you would talk about if
you believe that the forward-stationing of an armored brigade
combat team in Europe on a permanent basis rather than
rotational would be helpful in your deterrence quest.
And could you also give us just a brief discussion of how
you have seen that the European Reassurance Initiative, our
effort to pre-position equipment and to reassure our allies,
has transitioned over the past year.
Thank you.
General Scaparrotti. Well, first of all, it is one of my
responsibilities to work with our allies, both as EUCOM
commander to the 51 nations, but specifically as the SACEUR
[Supreme Allied Commander, Europe] and NATO command with the 28
nations.
We do that through a number of means: personal visits of
myself and other leaders; information to the North Atlantic
Council; exercises within the--within Europe, either with
partners and/or NATO. And we invite leadership--political
leadership, as well, to those.
And then finally, we do CMX, or a crisis management
exercise, that brings in the leadership in NATO about every
couple years, probably similar to what you experienced, in
order to inform them of not only the capability of our
adversaries, but the nature of war today.
You know, it is--decision space is much tighter.
Information moves much faster. Those are the kinds of things,
too, that I think it is helpful to discuss with the leadership.
Secondly, in terms of a--the rotational brigade, I would
prefer to have an enduring armed force in Europe. That is a
service decision. They provide right now is a rotational force;
I would prefer to have an enduring one because the force then
becomes accustomed to the environment, it forms relationships
with our allies, they become well known over the period of time
of several years that our service members are then stationed
there, and have a greater appreciation for the problem set.
And then finally, within ERI: ERI is advancing very well,
and thank this committee for your support of that. Without ERI
we would not be postured to deter today as I have said we are.
It is what has allowed us to improve that posture today
with a rotational brigade there with the ability to reinforce
NATO with one of the Enhanced Forward Presence [EFP] battle
groups from the U.S. and Poland, with additional support with
air and naval forces. We have used it to improve infrastructure
so that we can move forces into Europe and around Europe, and
station forces in a more flexible, agile way.
All of those things have made a significant difference, and
they also make a difference to our allies because we don't do
this alone. We do this as an--you know, as an alliance, and
just as our battle group will have a Romanian contingent with
it and others, that is common when we train in Europe, as well.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, General.
The aspect of informing our partners--it is very
interesting to me because this is their neighborhood, but yet
it seems like the United States still takes a lead on allowing
our European partners to understand what their threats are and
what the posture in the European arena is.
General Scaparrotti. Well, part of this--and I think it
isn't just Europe, you know, the environment has changed; the
nature of warfare has changed. And so it is easy sometimes not
to realize that and then realize what the impacts of those
changes are.
So that is the importance of doing the CMX, of getting out
and keeping our allies informed and then, you know, our--both
our military and our policy leaders have to also engage in that
so that they learn, as well, because this environment is
continuing to change and it has dramatically since 2014, for
instance.
Mr. Turner. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Carbajal.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
General Scaparrotti, you state that Russia is now the top
theater priority. The Secretary of Defense has stated that
Russia's aggressive actions have violated international law and
are destabilizing. The message to this committee has been
consistent: that Putin and the Russian Federation seek to
disrupt the international order and the cohesion of the
international organizations like NATO and EU [European Union].
You stated in your testimony that deterring Russia's--
deterring Russia requires a whole-of-government approach.
Unfortunately, I do not believe we have used a whole-of-
government approach, especially as this branch of government
has refused to investigate Russia's effort to disrupt this
country's democratic process.
General, there are not many who can supersede your
expertise on Russia. Today you have presented this committee
with strategies to confront the Russian threat militarily.
However, I am sure that you agree that it will take more than
just military strength to effectively combat a state that is
undermining and threatening democracies globally, including
America's.
General, can you provide this committee the type of whole-
of-government approach necessarily--or necessary to effectively
deter Russia?
General Scaparrotti. Thank you, sir.
Russia is an adversary that employs whole of government. We
see them work politically; we see them use economics as
leverage; we see them use information to influence
populations--some of that is disinformation, as well. And so
for us to be effective we have to respond across all those
domains, as well.
So as a government--and we did this during the Cold War--as
a government we had overarching objectives with respect to the
Soviet Union then, but we need overarching objectives today. We
need some lead agencies, like a lead agency in information,
that has authorities to integrate across the different agencies
in the government with respect to information. We need to
approach them economically with the same overarching
objectives.
So, you know, it is a very general description but that is
literally where we need to go, every agency focused on our
approach to Russia. And again, it is to influence them and not
to have conflict, but to avoid conflict with them and yet
protect our interests.
Mr. Carbajal. Do you find that we are being effective?
General Scaparrotti. I would say that we are not as
effective as we could be. We can organize, particularly as
whole of government, in a better way, and I believe we will. I
think that at least my leadership and what I know is focused on
that, and we have work to do.
So we can be more effective, particularly in the
information domain where, you know, we have, I think, very good
capability, good talent, creativity, and we just need to move
out on that a bit.
Mr. Carbajal. And not to make it so simplistic, but what
could this Congress do to address the highest priority that
perhaps is our weakest link in being more effective?
General Scaparrotti. Well, I think provide the leadership
in those objectives. Provide the leadership toward a, you know,
a cohesive, integrated governmental approach to this problem.
And then as you do, finance those efforts, as well.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. Thank you very much. I yield back,
Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Scaparrotti, thanks again. Appreciate you joining
us here, and thanks again for your service. It has always been
an honor to visit you when we have had the opportunity in
places like Korea and elsewhere.
I wanted to ask you about the mission of the Enhanced
Forward Presence battalions that are located in the Baltic
nations and Poland. Can you give us a little laydown about what
those units are there training and preparing to do? And do
these battalions effectively deter Russia? How does Russia look
at that with a total force presence there?
Obviously, with Russian forces along the border there in
the Baltic nations--as we visited the Baltic nations they are
deeply concerned about the presence of armor artillery units
and Russian troops stationed along the border.
Does our presence there with these Enhanced Forward
Presence units--is that a significant deterrence? And how do we
use those units in coordination with our allies, both in
training and in presence?
General Scaparrotti. The Enhanced Forward Presence is a--in
NATO terms they call it a battle group. It is a battalion task
force.
Mr. Wittman. Yes.
General Scaparrotti. But it is combined with--in Poland
with Polish troops. We have Romanian troops as a part of that,
and others. And we operate with Polish forces in the defense of
their nation.
It is under NATO operational control. It is a very
significant force. I think it has a significant impact on
deterrence.
This is a very strong commitment from the 28 nations of
NATO that they are--that they will honor Article 5, that an
attack on one nation is an attack on all. And so while some may
say, ``Well, it is four battalion task forces,'' it is four
battalion task forces but it is a statement that is backed by
28 nations and all of their capability--not just military, but
economic, informational, et cetera.
Russia does respect NATO. It is one of the reasons that
they are trying to undermine NATO and fracture it is because
they do respect NATO. So I think it is effective.
The last thing I want to say is, is that while we do focus
on a battle--a task force, it is connected to the other
domains. You know, we connect with our air, our maritime, and
those others that we can bring to bear. So we can fight it as
we fight today.
Mr. Wittman. As I visited there our allies express two
desires. One is increased U.S. presence as a permanent presence
there in the Baltic States. And, of course, we talked to them
about rotational presence, and I would try to convince them you
actually have more troops there on a rotational presence that
know your country and know operationally than you would if you
had just a battalion. But they are all about, let's have a
battalion presence there.
So I want to ask about how your conversations with our
allies have gone about their view of our commitment and that
element of presence. And then secondly, too, when Secretary
Mattis went there and had a heart-to-heart discussion about the
commitment that NATO nations need to make as far as funding
their militaries, give me your perspective on whether you see
that commitment growing.
Is it growing in the right ways to make sure that they are
working with us to create that presence and that deterrence?
And how important is it in the minds of many of our allies
there for that permanent presence, which, as you know, we have
moved away from since the days of the Cold War?
General Scaparrotti. First of all, I just visited each of
the Baltic countries a week ago, and in every country, as you
said, they asked for permanent presence of U.S. forces. And I
have said publicly that they have near-permanent presence of
U.S. forces. It is rotational, but it is enduring.
Mr. Wittman. Right.
General Scaparrotti. And we are committed to that as long
as these conditions exist.
The one upside of a rotational force is that we are
bringing rotational forces through and much more of our force
structure then becomes familiar with the environment----
Mr. Wittman. Yes.
General Scaparrotti [continuing]. The people, the
challenges, their allies in Europe. That is a benefit to it.
And so, for instance, from the Army chief of staff's
perspective that is very good for his force----
Mr. Wittman. Sure.
General Scaparrotti [continuing]. As you rotate different
units through.
Mr. Wittman. Yes.
General Scaparrotti. And that is good for us. If we had to
respond to a crisis we would certainly bring forces from the
States to reinforce us.
I think they understand that. I would just say they are
very appreciative of the United States contributions to their
defense. There is no question about that.
In terms of funding growth, we have seen a change in NATO
and a response. Last year was the first year that was--the
trend was not down in terms of percent of funding of GDP across
the 28 nations. It turned up.
This year it was an increase of 3.8 percent, I think it is,
but 22 nations have increased their budget this year.
I said I was just in the Baltics, for instance. Estonia
already meets the 2 percent; Lithuania and Latvia both told me
they will meet it by 2018 and probably go beyond that.
So countries are responding. What is important to this,
too, though, I would point out, is that we meet the 20 percent
agreement for modernization----
Mr. Wittman. Yes.
General Scaparrotti [continuing]. Because they have to be a
relevant force, as well.
Mr. Wittman. Right. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Brown.
Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, General, thank you for your presence here. Thank you
for your service and your leadership in Europe.
A few decades ago I had the privilege of serving with
180,000 or so Army personnel when we defended the Fulda Gap. We
won the Cold War.
A lot has changed since then. I participated in a lot of
interoperability exercises, Reforger and a number of others,
with, you know, French and British and German forces. And we
relied a lot on their infrastructure, particularly the
transportation and communication network.
My question has to do with that infrastructure. You
mentioned in your written testimony as well as, I think, you
briefly touched upon it today, that the expansion of the
alliance to include Central and European--Central and Eastern
European countries has made it a little more challenging with
the lack of a common transportation network.
So as you anticipate what could be a Russian aggression on
the eastern flank of NATO, could you briefly describe some of
the challenges that you would have in feasibly moving both U.S.
and NATO forces along or across multiple sovereign countries
and getting the permissions and the support--roads, bridges,
rail, and the like?
General Scaparrotti. Yes. In the days that you trained
there--and I trained there, as well--we had a very good basis
and understanding of the--of mobility, whether it is rail, air,
ground, bridge construction, weight that it would take. We had
a very good understanding of Europe and how to move our force.
Over the years of partnership, the last 20 years or so, we
began to atrophy that. We don't have as good an understanding
of our road networks, and particularly those nations that were
once a part of Warsaw Pact to the east that are now partners
with us.
So we are developing that and we are working that hard with
our partners. The alliance countries are doing a lot. Germany,
in particular, has been very helpful.
But we are having to take a look at do we have the rail
capacity? Are the bridges strong enough, and which ones can we
move across? Those kinds of things.
And with EFP and our rotational brigade, those two in
particular, we have been exercising that.
Final thing I would like to say is the allies contributed
to this. They are all becoming a part of mobility and
infrastructure that we need to have an agile force in Europe.
Mr. Brown. And can you state whether or not we currently
or--and if not, whether we should be making any investments in
that infrastructure, considering the security interests that we
have?
General Scaparrotti. We are currently making investments in
that, as well as our allies, and we should continue to do that.
We have to have some agility. We won't know exactly how
things may roll out if there is a crisis nor where it may
happen. We are routinely not as good at being very precise in
that determination in the future.
So we have to develop infrastructure and mobility within
Europe that allows us a good deal of agility. And then we need
to train against that, as well, and exercise it.
Mr. Brown. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, good to see you again. Part of my questions
revolve around rail, the difference in the gauges, the fact
that our equipment is so large now that it won't go through
some of the tunnels that have been there for so long.
I will shift, then, to lift capacity--our large lift
capacity. If we can't get our equipment there by rail or by
tunnel, do we have the lift capacity, with the retirement of
the C-5s that we have had in the last couple of years, that we
would need? And do we have the ability to land those planes
with their weight where we would need the equipment?
General Scaparrotti. As you can imagine, we are looking at
all this with respect to our plans. STRATCOM [U.S. Strategic
Command] could probably give you the--or Transportation Command
could give you the best response to that, but as I have
conversed with them and we look at our plans, we can move. It
is little slower than I might like at this point.
I am concerned about the future, in terms of the investment
not only in military but also civilian ships and aircraft that
we routinely rely upon in a crisis. And in that area we need to
continue investment or we will continually meet greater
challenges here in the future, from what I have seen in our
planning.
Mr. Scott. Yes, sir. I am concerned about that, as well. I
think that the lift capacity, especially large lift capacity,
is something that we need to revisit.
We talked about the JSTARS [Joint Surveillance Target
Attack Radar System] in Europe. I have very serious concerns
about is the number of units we have go in for major overhauls,
major depot maintenance, that you would potentially end up with
a shortage of that. Do you see the demand for JSTARS
decreasing? And what effects are there if there is a moving
target indicator gap?
General Scaparrotti. This is particularly important against
a large force like Russia so that we do have good information,
we understand movement and change. That is how we build the
indications and warnings [I&W] and the ability to react
appropriately, so it is very important to us.
I am concerned about the reduction as we bring on new
aircraft, which we need to do. I do not have all that I would
like to have today to provide the I&W that I need in Europe.
Mr. Scott. As we discuss the upcoming budget, potential
decreases in funding to the State Department are a concern, I
think, of most of the people on this committee.
How much more difficult does this make your mission? And
what challenges do you face with these potential shortcomings
in the budget? And how does it potentially hurt our
partnerships in the region?
General Scaparrotti. Well, you know, I--in terms of where
the budget is at is not in--mine to comment on, but I would say
that, as I noted earlier, our problems--all the problems that
we face in Europe require a whole-of-government approach and
they require, you know, approach with partners in the same
fashion.
So if you look at how I counter transnational threats or
terrorism inside of Europe, military is a part of that; we have
that cell that runs that in EUCOM, but most of the work is done
by Treasury, State, and others across our agencies to complete
that work and enable us to do it.
And again, I think that in deterring Russia it is a whole-
of-government approach, as well. Diplomacy should be the
priority and we, as a military, with the right posture, provide
some muscle for diplomacy to work.
Mr. Scott. General, I appreciate your service. And with
that, Mr. Chairman, I yield the remainder of my time.
The Chairman. Mrs. Murphy.
Mrs. Murphy. General Scaparrotti, thank you for being here
today.
I want to start by noting that I have deep concerns about
the current administration's continued publicly questioning of
our alliances and the sanctity of the post-World War II
international order. I think it is a dangerous narrative that
reflects both an internal and external threat to our national
security.
Externally, the rise of Russian aggression in the--and
Russia's use of hybrid warfare tactics are directly intended to
erode the credibility of U.S. leadership in the world. And
internally here at home there is a growing sentiment that we
should withdraw from the world.
Isolationism resonates in our own country with people who
are worried about their livelihoods being taken away by
increasingly interconnected world and who are increasingly
weary of being involved in a protracted conflict overseas. But
this view is populist and perilous.
You know well, though, that our alliances help prevent
larger conflict around the world every day and shore up our
security at home. And in your testimony you have spoken a lot
about the successes of the European Reassurance Initiative, or
ERI, to reassure our allies and deter regional aggression.
What policies, authorities, capabilities have been
particularly useful in the success of ERI? And then what
authorities and investments do you still need to complement the
ERI efforts, especially in the emerging cyber domain?
General Scaparrotti. Yes, thank you very much.
In terms of ERI, the focal areas have been the rotational
force presence that we have, so it supports that rotational
brigade--armored brigade; it supports the rotational combat
aviation brigade; it supports our Enhanced Forward Presence,
the battle group in Poland.
It supports an expansion and pre-positioning of stops--
stocks of the airfields that we will have available to use day
to day and in a crisis. It provides the pre-positioning of
stocks for Army forces so that I can build combat power that is
not in Europe if I need to in a crisis.
It has enhanced our training and interoperability with our
allies. We are doing--I wouldn't say more necessarily; we are
doing better exercises that are integrated with allies and
reinforce interoperability that is relevant to the adversaries
that we will face.
It has helped us with antisubmarine warfare, for instance,
which is another area that I noted. So it is very important.
I would tell you, as I look to the future I will continue
to need it for those same reasons and more. But it will be
across all the services and it will tackle the correct posture
that I need and the capabilities that I need to deter Russia.
Finally, I didn't mention infrastructure, although I have
said it several times. It has been fundamental in making
infrastructure upgrades in airfields, bases, and other places
that enable the movement of not only our forces but the allies,
as well.
Mrs. Murphy. And then, given your experience as the
commander of U.S. Forces Korea, do you think that the ERI model
can be effectively exported to the Asia-Pacific region to deter
provocative and aggressive behavior from actors like North
Korea and China?
General Scaparrotti. You know, really it comes down to
specified funding. And to me it would be--it certainly could be
a concept used in the Pacific, but I think what is important,
and what is important even within ERI, is that we have, you
know, a predictable funding into the future because really, as
a military that is most helpful. It allows us to plan ahead and
set objectives in the future and know that we will be funded to
reach that and set the readiness that we need.
Mrs. Murphy. Thank you, sir. And I yield back the remainder
of my time.
The Chairman. Mr. Cook.
Mr. Cook. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is good to see you
again, General. I was there with Chris Gibson last summer.
Just like when we met in Korea, you are very, very candid.
Your comments about the U-2 in Korea and some of the last time
on readiness I thought gave us great insight into what is going
on.
We were there, one of things I was concerned about is--I
don't know how you sleep at night. I asked you the same thing,
I think, in Korea. I think you just have more nightmares in
this new job than the last one, but we won't go there--because
I have my own; I am in Congress.
Anyway, the pre-positions--I am concerned about obviously
the RAND study, the T-14, the modernization of the T-90, et
cetera, et cetera, et cetera. And when we were there we went
out and looked at some of the pre-positioning that had changed,
and obviously, like the gentleman that had asked you that
question about the Fulda Gap years ago, boy, we don't have that
many troops in our pre-positioned forces. We have to go a long,
long ways.
And looking at some of the warehouses and the condition, I
knew it was bad but I didn't think it was that bad. And can you
comment? Am I just being alarmist about one of 20 different
things and--but I share those--I don't think we are going to
have the lift, everything else, if we don't have pre-positioned
forces and equipment there. I think we are going to be behind
the power curve.
General Scaparrotti. We can deal with the challenges we
have today with the posture we have, but it is at increased
risk. And it is increased risk. If we have a conflict it is
going to be increased casualties, it is going to take more
time, et cetera.
I will sleep more comfortably as our posture improves. And
that is why ERI is so important; that is why getting, you know,
the pre-post stocks that you mentioned in place is important;
it is why, you know, the service chiefs are focused on
readiness today to ensure that we have got forces that are
ready for the challenges they face with a--you know, with a
peer like--with an adversary like Russia.
So we have got a good deal of work to do. In the closed
session I can be more frank about those things that are most
concerning to me.
Mr. Cook. I am going to switch gears a little. I am going
to put on partly a foreign affairs hat.
Montenegro, the vote yesterday was 98-2 in the Senate. It
looks like that is going forward. And from a military
standpoint I think you know about the designs of Russia on that
country and the importance of that country militarily and
politically in NATO. So I was optimistic.
How do you think the possibilities, whether that is going
to happen--and obviously this is going to give you another
nightmare or headache or what have you, but I was one of those
ones pushing for Montenegro.
General Scaparrotti. Well, I think we have two nations, one
of which is ours, to confirm that within the alliance, so I
expect fully that they will be. I think it is critical that
Montenegro does become a part of the alliance, as is planned.
For Russia, this is something they did not want to see
happen. As you know, they went to great lengths to try and
undermine Montenegro's accession to NATO.
So I think it is critical that this occurs. And I have said
before, I think that Russia has every objective of ensuring
that there is not another country that joins NATO in the
future. I think that is their objective.
Mr. Cook. Once again, I want to thank you so much. Looking
forward to seeing you again over there. And I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Suozzi.
Mr. Suozzi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, I want to add my voice to the chorus of praise for
the great work that you have devoted your life to, and we are
very grateful to you for your service, and you really do have
an awesome responsibility.
I am new to this and I am very concerned about the things
that aren't easy to measure. You know it is easier--and you are
doing a great job--to measure troop movements and hardware and
things like that, but in your testimony you talk about,
``Russia has employed a decades-long strategy of indirect
action to coerce, destabilize, and otherwise exercise a malign
influence over other nations.'' And you talk about the
neighboring states of Moldova and Georgia and the Balkans.
And then you say, ``Additional Russian activities short of
war range from disinformation to manipulation. Examples include
Russia's outright denial of involvement in the lead up to
Russia's occupation and attempted annexation of Crimea;
attempts to influence elections in the United States, France,
and elsewhere; its aggressive propaganda campaigns targeting
ethnic Russian populations among its neighbors; and cyber
activities directed against infrastructure in the Baltic
nations and the Ukraine.''
So everybody, I think, now agrees that Russia has been, you
know--Ukraine was easy to see and what they did there was such
a negative action; and the cyber threats, everybody agrees that
that is a big part of their strategy these days; propaganda,
influencing the media; Russian oligarchs spreading money around
in all different places of the world, from Ukraine to Europe--
European elections.
So when you talk about the whole-of-government approach,
they are not as easy to measure these different things that
they are doing.
I am a big advocate that we need to give some sort of punch
in the nose, some sort of clear manifestation that, ``We don't
like what you are doing,'' and we need to go after the
oligarchs with financial sanctions and try and pay more
attention to sending a clear message that you can't mess with
us that way.
What is the one thing that you would like to see the whole
of government--really not just related to more hardware, more
positioning of troops, more the things that you are advocating
for--what is the one thing you would like to see the rest of
government do to give them a strong message that you can't do
this to us or you are going to have to pay a price?
General Scaparrotti. Well, I think the whole-of-government
approach--I think one of the most important things we can do is
get organized in the information campaign.
Mr. Suozzi. Whose job is that?
General Scaparrotti. Well, you know, I think today the way
it rests is with State traditionally has that. We have the GEC
[Global Engagement Center]. But again, you know, they have to
be resourced. We as a government have to say----
Mr. Suozzi. This is a priority.
General Scaparrotti [continuing]. And it is a priority, and
provide the integration, provide them the authority to
integrate in a way that would have that effect.
But when you look at the way Russia is working today with
disinformation, even the way that they approach different
countries in Europe and in the public world on RT [Russian
international TV network], Russian TV, et cetera, we have to
compete in that environment. We have to compete in it.
We have to show strength that also supports our values. I
think we ought to be very strong in our values in doing this,
as well, and I think that would have a great effect.
It is interesting because in many countries in the East,
even though they are doing all of this, there are countries
that the populace is not necessarily swayed by what they hear
from Russia.
Mr. Suozzi. Yes.
General Scaparrotti. That is not true in all of them. It
depends on where you are at, but it is interesting to me.
And yet, you know, if we made a greater--a, you know, a
greater effort in this area, I think we could see some good
benefit.
Mr. Suozzi. So you would like to see some more strength
from America as far as coordinating the information campaign,
preferably using the State Department as they have
traditionally done, to try and get this information out there
and then send a message clearly back to them.
General Scaparrotti. Absolutely, and to work with our
allies.
Mr. Suozzi. I have 59 more seconds in my time, but I just
wanted to say that, you know, I was speaking to the Italians.
The Italians' biggest concern of the whole world right now is
Libya. And, of course, that is the funnel where, you know, they
have closed off through Turkey and now everybody is coming up
through Libya.
What is it we should be doing to try and help stabilize
Libya or to try and create an environment where that is less of
a channel for people to be migrating from the rest of Africa
and the surrounding region?
General Scaparrotti. Well, Libya is not a part of EUCOM. It
is AFRICOM's [U.S. Africa Command's] domain.
What we are doing basically in EUCOM is to assist our
allies with both the refugees that come from there and their--
the challenges in Europe they have with that, as well as
countering the transnational threats that are coming out of the
instability in the north, as well.
Mr. Suozzi. But you are hearing the same concerns from the
Italians that that is their big concern is what is going on
Libya?
General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir. I mean, if you go to the
southern part of Europe the more imminent threat to them is--or
challenge--I wouldn't say it is a threat; it is a challenge--it
is the continued flow of refugees and the terrorist threat.
Those two are more prominent than Russia.
If you go to the east of Europe it is obviously Russia. But
all of those challenges are true for all the nations in Europe.
Mr. Suozzi. Thank you, General.
The Chairman. Mr. Kelly.
Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, General
Scaparrotti, for being here.
I have two questions so I would like to kind of contain the
first one to the first 2.5 minutes so I can get into the
second.
This committee has consistently supported ERI and now EDI
[European Deterrence Initiative]. In fact, last year we tried
to shift a large portion of the EDI to base budget funding.
One of the reasons is that by budgeting through OCO
[Overseas Contingency Operations] we don't have a complete FYDP
[Future Years Defense Program] for EDI so we can't plan and we
can't see how you are planning for these activities. In fact, I
can't think of much that would concern Putin more than to see a
5-year EDI plan and budget.
Can you provide the committee with your best military
advice on what an EDI FYDP would look like, broken down by
budget activity, before we mark up the fiscal year 2018 NDAA
[National Defense Authorization Act]?
General Scaparrotti. Sir, when we in EUCOM have produced
our request for ERI we have done it in a very deliberate
fashion based on the guidance from Congress as to what ERI's
purpose is across all of the services that support me and
EUCOM. And so it is a detailed list.
We scrubbed it against things like--you know, we questioned
ourselves: Is this something that really ought to be in base or
ought to be a service expense, not a part of ERI?
So I think we did a very faithful job of that and provided
it to OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense], and we can
certainly, you know, break that out in terms of we not only had
the categories but also the prioritization that we provided
OSD, as well. And assuming that there is no issue there, I can
tell you we have done the work.
Mr. Kelly. And you agree that it is much better to have a
5-year plan rather than a 1-year and we don't know what the
budget--baseline funding, as opposed to OCO, is much better for
us to plan and also shows our allies our commitment. Would you
agree, General?
General Scaparrotti. I, as I have said before, said that we
need predictable long-term budgeting so that we can plan out
ahead, as opposed to a year at a time.
Mr. Kelly. And thank you.
And I am an Old Guard member. I grew up in the 1980s. I
grew up as part of the Reforgers and all those things in
Europe.
When we had three ACRs [armored cavalry regiments], we had
2nd, 3rd and 11th--we may have had more--but those were our
screening forces. Those weren't even talking about the
divisions and corps behind them and our commitment to the
European theater.
We no longer have that. I actually visited Hohenfels near
Nuremberg last year and saw the difference in what it looked
like in the 1980s versus now.
I am also a big, strong proponent of the National Guard and
our Guard and Reserves. We have 8 National Guard divisions; we
have 32 BCTs [brigade combat teams], of which 10 are armored, I
believe, or heavy BCTs in the Guard and Reserve.
I also believe in what you said, General Scaparrotti, about
having that continuous force over there that the people know
and trust. So I think we need to look outside of how we have
always done things or how we look and project.
If we kept one heavy BCT that is an Active Component over
there and integrated a divisional rotation from the National
Guard of maybe two heavy and one light or, you know, one heavy
with another heavy plus a light, it gives training
opportunities to those division headquarters; it gives terrain
familiarity; it gives so many things.
What do you think about that, and including also like your
engineer and your ADA [air defense artillery] and your aviation
assets, to go with those Guard divisions on maybe a 5-year--one
division for 5 years--I mean for 1 year and then, you know,
through a 5-year cycle.
General Scaparrotti. Well, you know, as I have said before,
that is really a service function for them to determine. I make
the requirement.
There are a number of ways that--as you said, there are a
number of ways we can fulfill my requirement and there are pros
and cons of each. And, you know, as you noted, rotational units
provide a lot of experience to our force, and it provides a
force that then has knowledge of Europe. So those are the
advantages of that.
Mr. Kelly. And one other thing, I think you can look at
deployment, your RSOI [reception, staging, onward movement, and
integration], a little differently. Rather than having to send
a Guard unit that is 100 percent ready on day one, if you send
them to the European theater as a division those BCTs can
actually get those rotations at Hohenfels and other places
rather than at the NTC [National Training Center].
And so the end product is a completely trained and ready-
to-fight division and BCTs, as opposed to sending one over
there that is already ready. I think maybe you get to train and
be ready across the spectrum. Would you agree with that?
General Scaparrotti. What I need is a trained and ready
unit at the point of employment. So certainly we can use our
capabilities in Europe if that is the most efficient way to get
there.
And I would just add that, you know, the Guard plays an
important role in what we do in Europe every day. The
partnership that they have formed with each of the countries is
really quite remarkable--20-some years of relationship that
builds trust.
Mr. Kelly. Thank you. And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Gallego.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, General.
First off--and we will be switching direction a couple
times--do our European partners support the provision of lethal
defense equipment to Ukraine?
General Scaparrotti. I haven't discussed that specific
issue with most of our partners. As you know, there are some of
our allies in Europe that are supporting Ukraine; they train
right along beside us. So they are as convicted as we are in
supporting Ukraine and the protection of their sovereignty. I
can say that.
Mr. Gallego. And switching gears--thank you, General, for
that answer--how should we holistically approach deterrence in
our response to hybrid threats in Europe specifically from
Russia? Are other measures such as sanctions effective in
dealing with hybrid activity, or should we be looking at
potentially a military response for some level of hybrid
activity?
General Scaparrotti. First of all, I think, for instance,
you mentioned sanctions. Again, I think that a response to
Russia has to be a whole-of-government approach, and that is
the economic part of that that is important that we retain.
As I have said, I think demonstrating strength in every
area is significantly important with Russia. I think that we
have got to have the right posture of our military.
And when you look at deterrence you look at capability,
credibility, and then communication. And communication being,
do we communicate our intent and our objective, and does Russia
understand that so there is no miscalculation? And then a part
of that military is an enhanced missile defense, as well.
Mr. Gallego. I yield back my time.
The Chairman. Mr. Rogers.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, General, good to
see you again. Thanks for being here and thank you for your
service to our country.
I especially appreciated your comments earlier today about
the United States needs to provide some lethal force capability
to the Ukrainian military. I have been there twice and going
back next month, and they are begging for something to fight
with. And this is a life-or-death battle for them, so I
appreciate your candor on that.
I want to talk to you first about the INF [Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces Treaty]. In your best military
professional judgment, do you believe that Russia in the
foreseeable future will return to compliance with the INF
Treaty?
General Scaparrotti. I don't have any indication that they
will at this time.
Mr. Rogers. How much longer do you think that the United
States should continue to unilaterally comply with that treaty?
General Scaparrotti. Well, that is really a policy
decision. What I would say is that, from my perspective, is
that we have to respond to their violation of that treaty one
way or the other. We have to take steps; we have to address it.
But----
Mr. Rogers. What steps would you take?
General Scaparrotti [continuing]. It is a policy matter.
Mr. Rogers. What steps would you take? What would you
recommend to the President that we take?
General Scaparrotti. Well, first of all, I think we
confront them and then we consider what actions we might take
in terms of our capabilities in order to deal with the advance
that their violation of the treaty incurs--in other words, the
risk that we are taking because they are not following that
treaty and how do we respond to it.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. I want to turn to the nuclear weapons
ban. What are some of the military risks to the alliance and
our allies if NATO members sign onto and thus comply with the
draft of a U.N. [United Nations] nuclear weapons ban that is
currently being negotiated?
General Scaparrotti. My view is that the nuclear weapons
ban is just not realistic. I mean it is occurring in a world
where we have North Korea, in particular, who is in violation
of U.N. sanctions and resolutions--multiple ones--and show no
respect for the international community's directive; Russia,
who is also aggressively improving their modernization of their
nuclear weapons, et cetera.
So I think we are in a world today where that is just not
realistic at this point.
I think it is something that probably all of us would like
to see and, you know, a world without nuclear weapons. But I
don't think we are at the point to exercise that ban at this
time.
Mr. Rogers. Do you believe that it would be inconsistent
for NATO members who have signed on to the Warsaw Communique to
also sign on to that treaty?
General Scaparrotti. Again, that is each nation's sovereign
decision, but I think it would be.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Garamendi.
Mr. Garamendi. There are a lot of questions we ought to get
to here and probably quickly to the classified hearing, so I am
going to be very quick.
Our new President has created considerable concern about
the role of the United States vis-a-vis the European Union and
NATO. Has that uncertainty caused you problems in your work as
NATO--with NATO?
General Scaparrotti. No. Our mil-to-mil relationships
within the alliance are strong. We have continued to do what we
need to do as an alliance of military components to protect the
transatlantic region.
Mr. Garamendi. Is there clarity in your mind as to what the
administration's policy is with regard to NATO?
General Scaparrotti. The Secretary of Defense attended the
last defense ministers [meeting] and had sat through 2 days of
sessions and was very clear in terms of America's commitment to
NATO as well as in Munich at the Munich Security Conference.
And the Vice President spoke there, as well. So I think that
they were very clear in our commitment to NATO.
Mr. Garamendi. Well, that is not the entire story, is it?
There are other people that have commented in various ways.
General Scaparrotti. What I would say, Congressman, is that
there has been uncertainty throughout our election, et cetera,
that the Secretary and the Vice President spoke on behalf of
the administration. I do believe that Secretary Tillerson's
attendance at the foreign ministry--at the foreign ministers
conference coming up, as well as the President's attendance in
May, will reinforce our commitment.
Mr. Garamendi. Is it important in your work that there be
clarity from the administration with regard to its commitment
to NATO and Europe?
General Scaparrotti. Yes.
Mr. Garamendi. Well, we will hopefully have that in the
near future.
Down into the weeds for a few moments, you mentioned the
issue of being able to move material and troops and the role of
the civilian organizations in doing that. We have a hearing
coming up at the end of this week with TRANSCOM [U.S.
Transportation Command], and specifically on the issue of
ships, the Ready Reserve, and the MSP [Maritime Security
Program].
Do you see the--are--do we have sufficient ships, planes,
to address any contingency that you might face as your role in
EUCOM?
General Scaparrotti. Again, that is best answered by them,
but I can tell you from my experience in the past year and a
half that they and I have concern about particularly our
civilian support in both ships and air, and that we have to
invest in those.
I haven't recently sat down with them to get the actual
facts, but that is my view in dealing with the planning that we
are--we have done.
Mr. Garamendi. Well, your last two commands have been at
the far ends of the world, so you would know. I think I will
let it go at that point.
Thank you, and I yield back my time.
The Chairman. Ms. Stefanik.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
General Scaparrotti, for your leadership.
You and I have had the opportunity to discuss the
importance of countering Russian propaganda and malign
influence in the information space, and during our last
conversation you mentioned the Russia Information Group, which
is a working-level interagency group to counter Russian
aggression. And I am pleased to see the efforts of this group
and the State Department's Global Engagement Center.
But my question for you is: What aren't we doing that we
need to be doing in this area to more effectively counter
Russian propaganda? We discussed a lot of the improvements that
have been made in terms of grappling with this issue, but what
more do we need to be doing?
General Scaparrotti. Well, I think, you know, we do have a
structure. We have the group that you mentioned, for instance,
that is multiagency, et cetera.
But we actually have to, you know, provide it direction and
resourcing on a larger scale than has been done to this point.
That is the first thing.
Second thing is I think we have to be more direct in our
values and our messaging. If we think back to Voice of America,
there is--in Europe today there are those in the eastern
countries that tell me that they recall when they were in the
Warsaw Pact hearing Voice of America and the difference it
made. Those are the kind of things we need to do on a greater
scale than we are doing today.
Ms. Stefanik. So let me ask you this: As you know, in last
year's NDAA we expanded the mandate of the Global Engagement
Center, which is within the State Department, to include state-
sponsored entities of propaganda such as Russia. How can we
empower the Global Engagement Center? And a larger question is,
is that the right coordinating body within the State
Department?
General Scaparrotti. Again, I think whether that is the
right coordinating body I think is probably best determined by
the State Department, not I. I really can't tell you best how
they should organize for this.
But I think it is a good start. It is an agency that we
know we can go to that is empowered within State to conduct
this mission.
And so, again, my experience with it is that this is on a
much smaller scale than we need today. We have an opportunity
here, I think, to focus on this. And perhaps with a new
administration, et cetera, we can begin to empower that more
and reinforce it.
And whether that is exactly the way it should be, I think
we will see as time goes on.
Ms. Stefanik. You mentioned in your response to some of the
other questions the importance of working with our partners.
What can we do to better leverage more the NATO Strategic
Communication Center of Excellence in Latvia, similar to the
way that EUCOM and NATO leverage the NATO Special Operations
Headquarters?
General Scaparrotti. Yes. We in EUCOM are actually
connecting with that node. We in EUCOM are connecting with EU
and NATO, for instance.
So what we are trying to do is form nodes, and on the cyber
side that is a very important one in Estonia. And then, through
that, reinforce this network that defeats a network, so to
speak. That is what we have to do. And so we are working--I
mean, that is one of our basic models within EUCOM to empower
that.
And, on the NATO side, they have approved a strategic
direction, is what I would call it there, that enables parts of
our chain of command within NATO to link with EUCOM's command.
So I think there are the beginnings of this. We just need
to begin to reinforce it and develop it.
Ms. Stefanik. And my last question is, 2 years ago in the
fiscal year 2016 NDAA this committee noted concern about hybrid
and unconventional threats and directed DOD to submit a
strategy for countering unconventional and hybrid threats.
Unfortunately, the DOD has yet to submit or even begin to
coordinate with other government agencies.
In our language in the NDAA we also noted that, quote,
``Most state sponsors of unconventional warfare, such as Russia
and Iran, have doctrinally linked conventional warfare,
economic warfare, cyber warfare, information operations,
intelligence operations, and other activities seamlessly in an
effort to undermine U.S. national security objectives and the
objectives of U.S. allies alike.''
First, do you agree with this assessment still and the need
to develop such a comprehensive whole-of-government strategy?
And second, in terms of countering hybrid warfare, are we any
closer to linking all of our tools and capabilities?
General Scaparrotti. I agree that we have to have a
holistic, whole-of-government strategy, as you stated. I think
we are closer. I think we, you know, we are not sitting still;
we are making progress.
And particularly, I can speak to the military side of this.
As I said, we are working with our allies through established
nodes. Our special operations forces, in particular, are very
good at this and they are active, not only in what they can
provide us in this domain but also building capacity with our
allies.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. General, welcome.
I have a question to clarify some Pentagon math I am trying
to figure out. It goes--and maybe you can help--it goes back to
your comments about wanting a division in EUCOM. So I am trying
to figure out, were you suggesting that you wanted an
additional brigade on top of the two brigades to get to a
division, or are you suggesting an additional division on top
of two brigades?
General Scaparrotti. Yes. I am suggesting an additional
division, because what I need is I need armored and mech
[mechanized] brigades. The two I have there today are, you
know, a cavalry, light cav, as well as an airborne infantry
brigade combat team.
Mr. Larsen. Yes. And then along with that, a headquarters,
presumably?
General Scaparrotti. Yes, and the enablers. But the reason
a division is so important is because it is at that level you
can then have the command and control, communications,
capability to integrate the different domains in the way we
fight. And then that division brings the enablers, like
appropriate artillery, engineers, air defense, et cetera, that
fill out a proper defense.
Mr. Larsen. And then does that--does your concept then come
with additional pre-positioned forces--or equipment, that is,
pre-positioned equipment? Are we looking at supporting the
division with pre-po or equipment coming with the division
itself?
General Scaparrotti. Today the pre-position stocks that we
are building are an integral part of that division so that it
would--so that people would fly over, fall in on, and I would
have a division filling that out. So that is the plan today.
The plan today is a rotational brigade, and then a pre-po that
provides the remainder of the resources.
Mr. Larsen. All right, thanks. Thanks for clarifying that.
Appreciate it. Pentagon math, sometimes pretty easy.
Can you talk about a little bit the high north? There are
some comments in your written testimony on Russia's investment
in its area of the Arctic, which there is some rational basis
to that because as the ice recedes they no longer--nor can much
of anyone--rely on the ice to sort of protect your surface.
We are active in the Arctic Council--the U.S., along with
Russia and Norway and five other countries, as active members
of the Arctic Council, and a lot of observers, as well. Just
kind of what--since it is mentioned in your written testimony
about the high north, what do you suggest from a EUCOM
perspective, or even from a NATO perspective, would be an
appropriate response?
General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir. I agree that, you know, we
have typically looked at the Arctic as a place for commerce, a
peaceful place, not a militarized part of the world. And what I
see today is Russia refurbishing some of its older bases. They
are placing in radar, ground forces, et cetera, that could
potentially influence the free flow of trade in the Northern
Sea Route.
I think our concern is that--they certainly, as you said,
you know, that trade route follows most closely to their----
Mr. Larsen. Right.
General Scaparrotti [continuing]. You know, to their
border. So they have the right to take steps that most
countries would take to secure that.
I think most of our influence is whether they are taking
steps that would influence, then, internationally accepted free
flow of trade in the North Sea or along the North Sea Route.
Secondly, I am concerned about the high north because their
Northern Fleet operates out of there, and they are building
capabilities in that, as well, that, just as we did in the Cold
War, we have to properly deter and be aware of.
Mr. Larsen. Yes, that is great. Thank you very much. I
yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Knight.
Mr. Knight. Thanks, General.
I just have a couple brief questions. I was one of those
Grafenwoehr, Reforger, Fulda Gap kind of guys. And looking at
the map here, just a quick question to kind of help us
understand.
As we were there in the 1980s and there was a totally
different aspect of having 50 posts over there and, you know, I
don't how many hundred thousand troops were there, compared to
today, when NATO is so much different and we have so many more
countries that we are working with.
When I was over there with the chairman a couple years ago
we were watching Polish soldiers and we were in Romania and it
was very enlightening to me to watch the Poles and the
Americans work together, and it was just easy to see the
symbiotic relationship that they had there.
Tell me how that works. When we are doing three rotations,
either a unit is there, a unit is coming home, or a unit is
preparing to go. How does that work well when we are talking
about Polish soldiers and Romanian, that we can work together
and use them for certain areas that we couldn't back in the
1980s, obviously, because of the change to NATO?
General Scaparrotti. Well, sir, first thing I think about
is the fact that, as you mentioned, our allies in NATO and in
Europe, not just--but our partners as well as those 28 nations,
you know, they have been overseas with us in Iraq, in
Afghanistan, in other areas--Bosnia, Herzegovina, et cetera.
Over the years we have developed relationships and we have
refined interoperability.
Secondly, we are a force that is used to deploy. I mean,
our--all of our military forces, of all services, are good at
expeditionary operations and routinely deploying and falling in
with host nations, with allies. We have really developed this,
and I think that makes a difference. It is what you are talking
about.
And so when you see the ease that we work with the Poles,
for instance--you mentioned them. I served with the Polish
elements in central Iraq; I served with them both tours in
Afghanistan. I know many of their leaders. Our forces are used
to working together. So when we fall in we know how to
communicate, we know how to make those linkages, et cetera.
Mr. Knight. Yes, and I am going to yield back here, Mr.
Chairman, but I think that that is one of the most important
things to our military right now is our connections to the
allies and our connections over the last 20 years or more, even
going back to the early 1990s, where we have been in combat
with a lot of these folks and we have seen how they react and
we have been training with them and they have been training
with us. So it is a very close relationship.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, General,
for your testimony.
Just want to follow up on Mr. Larsen's questions regarding
the high north and the Arctic. I mean, you described, I think
very pointedly, the upgrade in terms of military facilities
that Russia is engaged in in that part of the world.
There is another aspect, I think, which I wanted to focus
on a second, which is that they have actually filed a pretty
aggressive claim through UNCLOS [United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea], in terms of continental shelf rights. And
I just wondered if you could sort of talk about that in terms
of, again, your concerns about making sure, you know, maritime
freedom of the seas continues.
And, of course, as I think you are probably expecting, I
just wanted to ask whether you think the U.S. should actually
stop handcuffing itself and ratify that treaty so we can get
into these kinds of claims--international claims process.
General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir. First of all, I don't know
the details of their claim, but that is obviously one of the
concerns that we have about this for the future. And I do
believe that we should be a part of the UNCLOS Treaty.
We adhere to those--to the international norms today
already, as most nations do. That simply gives us an actual
seat at the table and a vote legally, et cetera.
Mr. Courtney. I mean, as we found out with the South China
Sea, we actually were not even allowed standing to participate
in that ruling----
General Scaparrotti. Right.
Mr. Courtney [continuing]. Which, again, had just huge
consequences in terms of our country's military, you know,
posture, et cetera.
So you have also mentioned, you know, again, the focus that
you are engaged in in terms of antisubmarine warfare in your
opening remarks and a couple other questions.
I guess what I would like to ask is the Office of Naval
Intelligence has a document which is unclassified, the Russian
Navy Historic Transition, which sort of walks through some of
the new shipbuilding activity that Russia is engaged in.
So in terms of, you know, we--you are saying we need to
have antisubmarine activity. Why? I mean, what are they doing
with submarines?
General Scaparrotti. We remain dominant and--you know, as
we have been in that arena.
My point is we can't be comforted by that. They are
producing several different classes of new submarines. They are
very capable and will challenge us, and so we--and we do have
plans to increase ours, but we need to continue to invest in
that, as well as those other systems that help us with
antisubmarine warfare. And I can talk to that in more detail in
a closed session, as well.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you. Because again, as the--this
unclassified document makes clear, I mean, just based on
Russia's geography, I mean, the submarine force is the backbone
of the Russian navy. It is just where they, you know, where
they are situated, that is the platform that can get them out
into international waters. Isn't that correct?
General Scaparrotti. That is true. The other thing I would
point out is the systems that they are placing on them today
gives them good reach from wherever they are located, as well.
Black Sea, et cetera.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Bacon.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And it is an honor to have you here today. Thank you for
your leadership and your hard work, and thanks for bringing
your
J-5/8, one of the smartest guys I know. Good to have him here.
I wanted to just start off by saying I second your desire
to put more ground forces in Europe. I think we need it for
deterrence. I think it is needed to reassure our Polish and
Baltic friends, in particular.
One of the most important missions that you have, in my
view, too, is the ballistic missile defense mission that we are
doing with Israel right now. Can you give us an update where we
are at with that? Are we at a status quo? Are we building onto
it? What else do you need for that important mission?
General Scaparrotti. Israel, as I said in my comments, is
one of our--it is a special ally, but it is one of our closest
in Europe. Our staff has very regular and a routine exchange of
intelligence and discussions with them. I mean, it is
remarkable.
We are just now going through another one of our exercises,
and a part of that is the missile defense so that we stay
trained as partners in that mission.
That mission is very solid. We continue to train on it; we
continue to increase capabilities. The Israelis continue to
increase their capabilities, as well.
I do have some needs with respect to that. I am very
confident of our ability to support Israel, but I have some
needs with respect to that, and I can talk about that in a
closed session more specifically.
Mr. Bacon. One of the concerns I had--and I was part of
that mission early on down at Ramstein--is the mismatch between
Iran's capabilities versus how to defend. And a lot of this
defense becomes really deterrence or counterstrike so that they
fear, you know, doing the first strike. But that takes a lot of
coordination with CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command].
How is that coordination with two different COCOMS
[combatant commands] where that seam is right there?
General Scaparrotti. An experienced question from having
dealt with this seam, but actually, it works very well. We have
done integrated planning now any place that we have that the
seams, you know, interfere with a plan or be a subject of a
plan.
So the dynamic of this environment that we live in, where
virtually everything that any one of our COCOMs deals with is
multiregional, it has some connection across their border, we
have become much more agile at working with each other. I am
very confident of our relationship with COCOM, actually, with
CENTCOM in particular.
Mr. Bacon. One last question. We want to expand our
presence in EUCOM, but yet we are still--we are continuing to
reduce our infrastructure there. And when I came in in 1985, I
think we have cut our presence in Europe by over half, maybe
two-thirds even.
And when I was the commander at Ramstein I note that we
were continuing to find bases that we wanted to close. Is it
prudent to continue to close multiple bases in Europe while we
are trying to expand and expand deterrence with Russia?
General Scaparrotti. Yes. We have actually taken a look at
this since I have been in command; I am sure that General
Breedlove did before me.
A good many of those that we had planned for closure I
agree with moving on. We have got about 15 left now; there are
some of those that we are looking at that I think is worth
another look, given the dynamics of the day, because we have
got to get our posture right.
So I think holistically, as a program, it was profitable,
but there are some of those today that we are going to take a
look at that remain.
Mr. Bacon. Okay. I appreciate that you are re-looking at
that. My instinct tells me we are cutting too much. At the same
time realizing that we want to expand, it just doesn't make
sense. So thank you.
Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. Ms. Speier.
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, I have got to tell you, your presentation here is
so compelling, and I really appreciate the clarity with which
you spelled out the infractions--maybe that is too timid a word
to use--but the infractions that Russia has engaged in over
these many years. Have you had the opportunity to brief the
President?
General Scaparrotti. I have not.
Ms. Speier. If you were in a position to brief the
President and were asked, would you recommend that the
President condemn these violations by Russia, in terms of the
INF Treaty and the CFE Treaty [Treaty on Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe]?
General Scaparrotti. Well, I think, you know, first of all,
I give best military advice on our military activity, et
cetera. That would be a decision that the President would have
to make.
Ms. Speier. No, I understand that. But do you think that
the conduct by Russia rises to the level that would suggest
that we speak out publicly about Russia's engagement in so many
areas that border Russia?
General Scaparrotti. I would say personally that I believe
that we should confront the Russians on the violations, et
cetera. I have said that publicly, and that would be consistent
with my personal opinion or advice.
Ms. Speier. Do you think that they have engaged in enough
bad behavior that we should impose greater sanctions on them?
General Scaparrotti. Again, I think that is something that
is considered holistically, but I think that there is--that
more, probably, we need to do across the entire government in
order to have the proper influence on Russia.
Ms. Speier. You have spent a fair amount of time, certainly
last week and I believe today as well, when you testified in
the Senate about the Russian information warfare campaigns that
they have engaged in. And I couldn't agree with you more. I
think that we have been asleep at the switch in terms of, you
know, showing a countervailing force to their misinformation.
Do you think that in order to kind of beef up our efforts,
besides funding Voice of America to a greater degree, what else
would you recommend that we do?
General Scaparrotti. Well, I think that we have to within
our government determine a lead agency that is empowered to
integrate the remainder of our government in the information
sphere; and then resource, whatever that resourcing level would
be, in order to get our message out in a way that is at a level
that it has influence.
I just don't think that we are organized to do what we are
capable of doing, in terms of the information and the message
that we send. And this isn't just about a message to Russia.
This is actually about assurance to our allies, et cetera.
Ms. Speier. There has been some misinformation, I think,
that has been offered up regarding the New START Treaty
[Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] with Russia. Do you think it
is a bad deal?
General Scaparrotti. As I look back on the treaties and
understanding why they were put in place, I think they are
actually productive. What we need is to ensure that everyone
that is a part of the treaty adheres to the treaty, and then if
they don't we decide what steps ought to be taken, as opposed
to--in another words, we have to acknowledge whether the treaty
is actually in force.
You know, for CFE the Russians have said--I think about
2011 or so they said that they were setting it aside. So these
are things that we need to come together and address.
Ms. Speier. There was an article in the New York Times, a
huge spread, yesterday on, ``is our military big enough,'' and
showed, you know, how some of our greatest adversaries, Russia
being one, spend $60 billion a year on its military and we
spend $540 billion. There was a lot of interesting commentary
in that piece about--by persons arguing that, you know, you
build up a force when you are going to war.
Do you have any comments about that piece? Did you read it?
And if you haven't, I would really be interested in you going
through it and giving us some advice on what you agree with and
what you don't.
General Scaparrotti. All right, thank you. I haven't read
it, but I would--I will read it and I will provide you a
response if you would like.
Ms. Speier. Great. Thank you. I yield back.
[The information referred to was not available at the time
of printing.]
The Chairman. Mr. O'Halleran.
Mr. O'Halleran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, General,
thank you and your command for all you do for our Nation.
I have a question. I am going to go back to Turkey here for
a little bit. You made a statement that Turkey has long been
and remains an ally of the United States. That word
``remains,'' why did you put that in there?
General Scaparrotti. It just happened to--I put it in there
because they remain an ally. To be frank, you know, there is
some concern about their drift, given some of the drift to
authoritarianism. I would tell you that they remain a close
ally with us.
I have spent a good deal of time in Turkey. I have a good
relationship with their chief of defense and we are focused on
transparency with them, on supporting them in their objectives
as well as ours, with respect to countering terrorism and the
coalition efforts in Syria. So that is going well, but I do
have concern.
Mr. O'Halleran. Okay. And your statement also identifies
that it--that Turkey maintains a complicated relationship with
Russia. Given its position in the Black Sea, and with Syria and
Iran and the--its internal conflicts, and everything else that
is going on in that area, along with its Russian issues, what
is the status of the U.S. military relationship with Turkey,
which I think you answered a little bit? What are the
challenges moving forward? And what are the implications, given
the Russian actions in the region?
General Scaparrotti. Again, our mil-to-mil relationship is
very good, and despite the attempted coup and the many
challenges they face, they have been very committed to both the
support of and protection of our forces that operate out of
Turkey and are important to our coalition efforts.
Of the challenges that we have, certainly we see all the
challenges there that we see in Europe. I mean they have an
internal insurgency, a terrorist fight against PKK [Kurdistan
Workers' Party]. They have the refugee issue, about 3 million.
And then they have a conflict on their border, where we
have troops and are operating as well as Russia, Iran, and
others. That is a challenge. And that is part of what we spend
a good deal of time on, making sure that we are transparent
with each other, we understand each other's objectives and
figure out how we can be complementary in that.
But it is probably the most difficult problem set I have
seen in my career, frankly.
Mr. O'Halleran. And I am sure we can go in further on that,
but the--I have sat here and listened to the word ``State'' or
``State Department'' mentioned many times and, you know, we
have a cut proposed by the President in the State Department
budget. What is the importance of the State Department in your
role and your ability to complete your mission?
General Scaparrotti. Well, the State Department as well as
the other agencies are fundamental to what I do in Europe.
Again, I strongly believe in a whole-of-government approach. I
think that we lead with diplomacy in the State Department, that
the military's posture there is to--intent is to give muscle to
that diplomacy.
You know, our intent is that we never have to employ our
military in a conflict in Europe, that we prevent conflict. And
to do that we need a strong diplomatic corps.
Mr. O'Halleran. And I guess that is the--just a comment,
that is the issue in my head that is problematic as far as any
cuts to the State Department, given the other issues that we
have in the world and the need for us to maintain strong
relationships with all these countries, and especially
countries like Turkey, which are so complicated.
And I yield. Thank you, General.
The Chairman. Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, thank you for your testimony here today and thank
you for your great service to our Nation. I regret that I
couldn't be here for the early part of the hearing. I was in a
competing hearing on--dealing with cybersecurity issues, which
is another important topic of national security importance.
But I thank you again for your testimony. So I apologize if
some of the things I may have--I may ask have already been
covered, but let me get to it.
So, General, I understand that Secretary Tillerson has
recently decided to forgo meeting with his NATO counterparts in
April and instead travel to Russia later in the month. You
know, I wanted to get your perspective on what does this say to
our NATO allies that our Secretary of State is choosing to
visit with Russia--a nation, by the way, that has meddled in
our elections and possibly colluded with the administration--
rather than meet with them?
General Scaparrotti. Well, as always, you know, when NATO
meets, particularly for the foreign ministers conferences, you
know, they welcome the United States representative there as
one of the central members. It is my understanding now that the
meeting will be on the 31st of March and the--NATO agreed with
the United States to find a date that was good for all allies.
And so at least my last report, I expect that we will have
the foreign ministers on the 31st of March and Secretary
Tillerson will be in attendance.
Mr. Langevin. Very good. Thank you for that update.
General Scaparrotti. Thank you.
Mr. Langevin. So, General, I know that we just sort of
touched on this topic with my colleague who just spoke before I
did, but following the President's release of his skinny
budget--so I am highly concerned about the potential cuts to
the State Department budget, which proposes a 28 percent
reduction from last year's levels.
We spend money through the State Department and USAID [U.S.
Agency for International Development] in order to further
international diplomatic relations so that we might avoid and
prevent war. So with a cut like that, what effects do these
cuts have in the EUCOM arena, and how will they hinder our
allies as we collectively seek to deter an aggressive and
unruly Russia?
General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir. I can't comment on the cuts
themselves or the impact that might have in Europe. State
Department will determine that.
But I have said here that the importance of the State
Department and the work that we do in European Command is just
fundamental.
I have a deputy, for instance, my senior POLAD [Foreign
Policy Advisor], is an ambassador and plays a significant role
in my headquarters, as do--as does State and all the embassies
in all of our missions in Europe. So I think it is paramount
that we maintain the capacity to continue to work as a team.
Mr. Langevin. Okay. General, something that is probably
often overlooked is that EUCOM is the primary resourcer of
personnel and equipment to AFRICOM, which is a growing area of
security challenges, if you will. And how does that draw of
resources, is that hindering your ability to do your job in the
EUCOM arena? And are we not properly resourcing the AFRICOM
arena at this point?
General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir. The relationship between I
and AFRICOM is actually quite good. We do share component
commands, and often we deploy forces in support of AFRICOM's
operations, so it is working.
It does impact from time to time on my mission as well as
General Waldhauser's, because we have a force that is pulled in
two different directions at times.
My greatest concern is making sure that we understand risk,
I and General Waldhauser, with the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs, that when we deploy forces that haven't been planned
for, say a response to a potential crisis or a mission in
AFRICOM, that I can verbalize the impact on the EUCOM
commission and that we as leaders understand the risk that we
are taking in that regard.
That is another way of saying that I think we do need more
force structure there. This is working okay. It is a good
working relationship. But it does from time to time put a
strain on our force and its readiness.
Mr. Langevin. All right. Is your assessment that we are too
often taking too much risk in----
General Scaparrotti. No, not too often taking too much
risk. There have been a couple of times in the year that I have
been in command, probably two, that I was concerned enough that
I, you know, that we had a discussion and I had a discussion
with the Chairman and we--so that we all understood and made
the appropriate decision. And so I am confident that we can
make the right decision and not take unnecessary risk, but that
is--so that gives you an idea of how often that comes up in a
year's time.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, General. I have other questions
that I will submit for the record. But I will yield back. Thank
you.
The Chairman. Mr. Lamborn.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General. And I am going to make this real brief
and ask you to answer for the record so that we can keep our
schedule moving along here today and also because elements of
your answer might be more appropriate in a closed setting.
But I represent Fort Carson, which has an armored brigade
combat team over in the Baltics and Bulgaria and Poland. They
are doing a great job. They are rotational as opposed to
enduring, like you were saying earlier, but I think it has
great promise for the future.
But what are the challenges that we are learning from this
extended rotation as far as infrastructure and host country
capacity and things like that? That is a sensitive topic that I
will just take for the record.
And then also, what are our readiness challenges that we
are learning and that we need to improve on from a funding
standpoint?
I hope to go over and see these great troops later this
spring, but if you could supply those answers for the record I
would appreciate it.
General Scaparrotti. I will. Thank you.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 67.]
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you so much.
The Chairman. General, we haven't really today touched on
your role in dealing with the terrorism threat in Europe. Could
you just touch on that briefly?
General Scaparrotti. It is one of the central challenges,
Chairman, in Europe and with our allies today. In EUCOM we
formed a cell as a part of the headquarters that addresses
counter--transnational threats to counter those. It is
multiagency; it is not just military.
And our concept is a tri-nodal concept of where we are
building a relationship with EU, and particularly the Europol,
and through the EU nations as well as NATO with a headquarters
in JFC [Allied Joint Force Command] Naples, and then with our
other partners, as well, outside of NATO, to really strengthen
that network.
Everything from information and intelligence sharing,
analysis of the transnational threats as, you know, as well as
capability--sharing capabilities, building partner capacity, et
cetera.
It struck me as I was there that we have, particularly
within the alliance, an organization with headquarters,
processes, troops if needed, ready-made in order to form a
response to this. And all 28 nations in NATO are part of the
coalition to fight ISIS today, so I think it fits well and it
is one of the key things that we do in Europe.
The Chairman. And on the 28 nation, did I understand you
earlier to say that 22 of the 28 nations are increasing their
defense spending this year?
General Scaparrotti. That is correct, 22, and 10 within
the--there is a 20 percent mandate toward modernization. Ten
nations have met that as we go into the year. So that is good
news. We expect to see that improving, as well, as we go
forward.
The Chairman. And you have had several questions today
about the European Reassurance Initiative and any investments
we are making in infrastructure and so forth to make that work.
Are the Eastern European nations making investments toward that
goal as well?
General Scaparrotti. Yes, Chairman, they are. In every
country they have invested themselves in facilities to support
our mechanized and armored units, in terms of motor pools, et
cetera. Barracks facilities, also transportation hubs for the
movement of forces.
And so they have also invested. And I think it underscores
the importance that they see in our efforts as well as NATO's
Enhanced Forward Presence.
The Chairman. Finally, just a comment. General, today you
have gotten a number of questions about Russian violations of
the INF Treaty and you have also gotten a number of questions
about information warfare, for lack of a better expression.
Both are subjects of some frustration for me. I wrote
numerous letters and had numerous briefings on the INF Treaty
violations to try to get the Obama administration to take this
more seriously, to call the Russians' hands, to have an
adequate response. And for some reason they were reluctant to
do so.
On information warfare, Mr. Smith and I have been pushing a
whole-of-government approach to being more engaged in this ever
since the Bush administration, when it became clear that the
terrorists were doing a better job than we in information
warfare, through the Obama administration.
I am glad to have more people engaged in these issues. We
have got some new converts now.
But my point is I want to encourage you to continue to have
a strong voice within the military and, because of your--both
of your hats, within the government at large. Because for
whatever motivation, our government needs to take treaty
violations more seriously and to develop better capability on
information warfare. I think you can help.
We will certainly be pushing that, as well. And as I say, I
am glad to have some new converts to those causes.
With that, this hearing will stand adjourned. And in
roughly 5 minutes or so, if it is okay with you, we will get
back together upstairs in a classified session.
Thanks.
[Whereupon, at 12:00 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
March 28, 2017
=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 28, 2017
=======================================================================
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
=======================================================================
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
March 28, 2017
=======================================================================
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN
General Scaparrotti. As the first of continuous ``heel-to-toe''
rotations of heavy brigades to deploy a full armor equipment set and
personnel from the United States to Europe, we are continuously
learning specific infrastructure challenges. We are testing logistical
networks, transportation routes, host nation capacity, infrastructure,
and the supporting capabilities of the NATO Force Integration Units
through a series of multi-national exercises and the simultaneous
rotation of the inbound 2/1 rABCT and outbound 3/4 rABCT in September
2017. So far we have validated transportation issues such as limited
access to rail and the low availability of EU compliant trucks and
trailers. ERI investments from FY15-FY17 funded upgrades to several
rail heads, vehicle maintenance facilities and training areas with
several projects already complete or currently underway. ERI also
funded improvements at several airfields that will enable the
deployment and positioning of combat and mobility airpower. With our
NATO partners, we continue to focus on rapid mobility, capturing
lessons learned, and identifying gaps at airfields, seaports, rail,
transportation, storage and distribution centers, and life support
areas. Finally, ERI is also funding meaningful exercises for the rABCT
that facilitates extensive exercising with Allies which maintains the
brigade's readiness at a high level. [See page 36.]
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 28, 2017
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
Mr. Scott. The E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
(JSTARS) plays a critical national security role supporting combatant
commands around the globe. In your previous position as Commander of
U.S. Forces Korea you had personal experience with the weapon system
and expressed its value in your Korean theater. With its ability to
sweep large areas with its wide area surveillance radar and ability to
provide responsive on-scene command and control with its battle
management crew, it detects potential adversary movements and vectors
other scarce ISR or strike platforms directly to a potential target,
increasing their effectiveness exponentially. The Air Force is
currently pursuing a recapitalization of the JSTARS to replace the
aging fleet. With the growing threats in your theater, and experience
employing the JSTARS in another part of the world, would you please
characterize the contribution the JSTARS would bring to your current
warfighting mission? Realizing there is currently insufficient JSTARS
capacity to meet combatant command requirements, are you concerned
there may be an increased gap in capacity if we remove current
capability from the force structure prior to transitioning to the
recapitalized system?
General Scaparrotti. As our strategy and military activities evolve
from engagement and assurance to deterrence and defense, the
surveillance capability provided by JSTARS and similar platforms become
more important. This capability provides needed Indications and Warning
of Russian troop movements along NATO's eastern border and is key to
our readiness to counter Russia. As with all high demand, low density
Airborne ISR capabilities, requirements far outstrip capacity,
therefore any decreases in ISR assets would increase the delta between
requirements and ability for those requirements to be satisfied.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOULTON
Mr. Moulton. European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) has been an
important policy to provide support to our allies and counter Russia.
However, I am concerned that deployments of ground troops, aircraft
squadrons--while critically necessary--are not sufficient in themselves
to counter Russia's insidious hybrid warfare. How can we better tailor
ERI to address this? Particularly, covert influence and information
warfare--how can we provide additional or new legislative authority or
budgetary resources to ensure these methods of Russian influence are
countered?
General Scaparrotti. The Information Operations program is one of
the EUCOM commander's most powerful tools to challenge an adversaries
disinformation and propaganda, expose the false narratives that
accompany ``hybrid warfare,'' counter violent extremist messaging, and
share the information environment prior to and during a crisis. We
currently do not need any new legislative authorities and are working
Information Operations requirement through our established ERI process
to ensure we use these funds in the best areas to get the desired
result. The best way to counter this type of warfare is thru a whole of
government approach. We are actively participating in the interagency,
State Department led, Russia Information Group (RIG) which is looking
at new ways to counter Russia's massive hybrid warfare campaign.
Outcomes from this interagency working group may result in the need for
new authorities or budget resources.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. ABRAHAM
Dr. Abraham. With last year's coup attempt in Turkey and the
potential for political instability ahead of this year's April
presidential referendum there, what are some of the challenges you have
faced and expect to face with U.S. and coalition basing access to
Incirlik Air Base? Have we faced similar access issues with other
allies who experienced political instability in the past?
General Scaparrotti. Last year's coup attempt in Turkey created
several initial challenges for EUCOM. These included cutting power and
fuel supplies to Incirlik AB that were all quickly resolved. Presently,
we do not expect the Turkish political situation will play a persistent
role with regards to Allied access at Incirlik AB. For the purposes of
flexibility, we have assessed alternative basing options, not only for
Incirlik AB but throughout the EUCOM AOR. While EUCOM is prepared to
shift our assets from Incirlik if required, we are working closely with
Turkish military and political leadership to ensure a long, continued
basing and access relationship with our Turkish Ally. Access challenges
are not limited to Turkey, and we have been required to work through
freedom of movement and access issues with forward based troops in many
of our Allies throughout the years.
[all]