[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
FOREIGN MILITARY SALES: PROCESS AND POLICY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 15, 2017
__________
Serial No. 115-35
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina AMI BERA, California
MO BROOKS, Alabama LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
PAUL COOK, California TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
TED S. YOHO, Florida DINA TITUS, Nevada
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois NORMA J. TORRES, California
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
DANIEL M. DONOVAN, Jr., New York THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York
Wisconsin TED LIEU, California
ANN WAGNER, Missouri
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
THOMAS A. GARRETT, Jr., Virginia
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade
TED POE, Texas, Chairman
JOE WILSON, South Carolina WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
DARRELL E. ISSA, California LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
PAUL COOK, California BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania DINA TITUS, Nevada
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York NORMA J. TORRES, California
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
THOMAS A. GARRETT, Jr., Virginia
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable Tina S. Kaidanow, Acting Assistant Secretary,
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State. 7
Vice Admiral Joseph Rixey, Director, U.S. Defense Security
Cooperation Agency............................................. 21
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Ted Poe, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Texas, and chairman, Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Nonproliferation, and Trade: Prepared statement................ 2
The Honorable William Keating, a Representative in Congress from
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts: Prepared statement.......... 5
The Honorable Tina S. Kaidanow: Prepared statement............... 10
Vice Admiral Joseph Rixey: Prepared statement.................... 23
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 52
Hearing minutes.................................................. 53
FOREIGN MILITARY SALES: PROCESS AND POLICY
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THURSDAY, JUNE 15, 2017
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:22 a.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Poe
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Poe. The subcommittee will come to order. Without
objection, all members may have 5 days to submit statements,
questions, extraneous materials, for the record, subject to the
length limitation in the rules.
I have an opening statement. It is an excellent statement,
but I am not going to give a statement at this time. I am going
to file it in the record due to the time constraints that our
two witnesses have today.
And so I will yield to the ranking member, Mr. Keating,
from Massachusetts, for his opening statement if he wishes to
give one.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Poe follows:]
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Mr. Keating. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will
just follow your lead. I know that our witnesses both have
scheduling issues on the back end of this.
And I just want to share, the chairman, in my view, at the
opening--frankly, not to keep mentioning this, but we can't
keep it out of our minds, at the same time, that our prayers
are with the victims of the shooting and the families that
occurred yesterday, and all those that we serve with that
suffered trauma from this. And a reminder across the whole
country that every day, people are suffering from this kind of
violence, and they are in our prayers as well.
So I will yield back, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Keating follows:]
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Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts for his
comments. And to add a comment to what he has said, we do a lot
of good things, I think, this subcommittee and other Foreign
Affairs subcommittees. And those good things almost always are
bipartisan. I mean, you can't get more bipartisan than Mr.
Keating from Massachusetts kind of being somewhat left of
center, and a Republican from Texas being a little right of
center. We don't even speak the same language. But yet we are
very bipartisan in here all the way through on both sides. And
I want to make that statement because you don't hear that much
here in Congress.
So, without objection, all witnesses' prepared statements
will be made part of the record. I will ask that each witness
please keep your presentation to no more than 5 minutes so the
members here can ask you questions. I will introduce each
witness and then give them time for their comments.
Ambassador Tina--tell me how to pronounce your name.
Ambassador Kaidanow. Kaidanow.
Mr. Poe. Ambassador Kaidanow is the Acting Assistant
Secretary of State for the Bureau of Political-Military
Affairs. In this position, the Ambassador manages the provision
of more than $5 billion in international security assistance,
bilateral transfers on commercial sales of U.S.-origin defense
equipment, international security agreements, and
implementation of the President's Export Control Reform
Initiative.
Vice Admiral Joseph Rixey is the Director of the Defense
Security Cooperation Agency. He previously served as the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for International Programs and
Director for the Navy International Programs Office.
I also understand, Admiral Rixey, that you are going to
retire. We object to that. And we still need you. But thank you
for your long service in the United States Navy and serving the
country.
Ambassador, we will start with you. You have 5 minutes for
your comments.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE TINA S. KAIDANOW, ACTING ASSISTANT
SECRETARY, BUREAU OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ambassador Kaidanow. Thank you, sir.
And let me also express at the top, on behalf of the entire
State Department and my colleagues--I am sure Admiral Rixey
will also express the same--but our deep sympathy and
condolences for those who were impacted by yesterday's
shooting. I think that was really startling for all of us. And
those of us who are so interactive at the State Department with
our colleagues here on the Hill, we feel it very, very deeply.
So, again, on behalf of the entire State Department, we wish
them well, and we hope that they all will have a speedy
recovery. So thank you.
Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Keating, committee members, I
do want to begin today, first of all, by thanking the committee
for holding this hearing and for joining us all here today.
It is right and it is proper that the Foreign Affairs
Committee, and this subcommittee in particular, conduct
oversight of U.S. arms transfer policy and procedures, because
each of these, in our view, is fundamentally an act of foreign
policy. In my testimony today, I will outline why this is the
case, and I will walk through the process and the policy
considerations by which the United States reaches a decision on
when to and when not to offer or authorize the transfer of
defense articles and services to a partner nation.
I am joined today, obviously, by Vice Admiral Joseph Rixey,
director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, DSCA. And
the partnership between the Departments of State and Defense,
and particularly between my Bureau of Political-Military
Affairs and DSCA, are stronger now than they ever have been,
which is really key to our effective decision-making and policy
implementation.
Admiral Rixey, as you said, will be retiring soon. And I
want to take this opportunity to thank him most sincerely--and
beg him, also, to stay--for the outstanding partnership that he
and his team have provided to us.
In my written testimony for this committee, I provide an
outline of how the arms transfer processes work in greater
detail. But before you today, I would like to highlight three
main points.
First, as I indicated at the outset, arms transfers
constitute an element of foreign policy. We, therefore, take
into account foreign policy considerations as we contemplate
each arms transfer or sale, including, specifically, the
appropriateness of the transfer in responding to U.S. and
recipient security needs, the degree to which the transfer
supports U.S. strategic foreign policy and defense interests
through increased access and influence, allied burden sharing
and interoperability, consistency with U.S. interests regarding
regional stability, the degree of protection afforded by the
recipient company to our sensitive technology, the risk that
significant change in the political or security situation of
the recipient country could lead to inappropriate end use or
transfer, and the likelihood that the recipient would use the
arms to commit human rights abuses or serious violations of
international humanitarian law or retransfer the arms to those
who would commit such abuses.
As a second key point, arms transfers support the U.S.
defense industrial base and they reduce the cost of procurement
for our own U.S. military. Purchases made through the foreign
military sales, known as the FMS system, often can be combined
with our Defense Department orders to reduce unit costs. Beyond
this, the U.S. defense industry directly employs over 1.7
million people across our Nation. These individuals and the
companies they work for represent a key part of American
entrepreneurship and innovation, maintaining the United States
as the world leader in the defense and aerospace sectors, and
helping to ensure that our Armed Forces sustain their military
edge.
In authorizing the transfer of defense articles or
services, we take these considerations into account as well.
For each export, we examine the effect of the proposed transfer
on U.S. industry and defense industrial base, the risk of
revealing system vulnerabilities and adversely affecting U.S.
operational capabilities, and the availability of comparable
systems from foreign suppliers.
A third key point: The arms transfer process works. The
process is designed to review proposed sensitive transfers
while balancing a very complex range of policy, industrial, and
technological considerations. Even with all of that, the vast
majority of sales move through the process quickly and
efficiently. In some cases, certain considerations, for example
relating to technology security, human rights, or regional
balances of power, may slow or preclude the approval of a
transfer. Such cases comprise a very, very small percentage of
the overall caseload that we and our partners in DOD manage
every day, but they tend to include some of the most high-
profile cases.
I am often asked how we can, quote, deg. ``get to
yes faster.'' As Admiral Rixey will describe, the most
significant delays in the FMS system lie in the contracting and
the production processes. But on those very rare occasions when
a holdup involves the foreign policy part of this review, I
will say this: Better a lengthy decision process that moves
forward at the right time than a hasty process that puts
sensitive technology in the wrong hands, ultimately undermining
not only our security and foreign policy, but perhaps even our
own industrial technological advantage.
Of course, there are always areas in which we can improve.
We are working to complete the process of export control reform
so that we shift jurisdiction over those defense articles and
services that do not provide America with the specific
technological advantage from the State Department to the
Department of Commerce, where the process is a lot easier and
faster. This will free up a significant portion of industry
from unnecessary red tape and encourage innovation in our
defense sector.
We are also working with Admiral Rixey to improve the FMS
process, including through better educating and coordinating
the entire defense security cooperation workforce across both
the State Department and the Defense Department.
I will be happy to speak about these and any other
initiatives before you today and to answer any questions that
you may have about the arms transfer process. But just to
conclude these brief remarks and to emphasize one more time, I
am glad that this testimony is taking place, and specifically
here in this context, because the fact that the House Foreign
Affairs Committee has oversight of arms transfers speaks to the
essential role that such transfers play in the construct of our
foreign policy and the pursuit of our national security
interests.
Your committee's continued interest and concern is a
measure of the policy importance of these issues, and it tells
both the American people and the rest of the world, frankly,
that such transfers are not something the United States
Government takes lightly. I look forward to taking your
questions and also listening to any of your thoughts. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Kaidanow follows:]
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Mr. Poe. Thank you, Ambassador.
Admiral Rixey, you have 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL JOSEPH RIXEY, DIRECTOR, U.S. DEFENSE
SECURITY COOPERATION AGENCY
Admiral Rixey. Thank you, Chairman Poe, Ranking Member
Keating, and members of the committee. And before I get
started, in light of yesterday's events, I simply want to state
thank you for serving.
I am pleased to be here today in my capacity as the
director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, DSCA, to
discuss the overall health of the foreign military sales, known
as FMS. I am summarizing my written statement and ask that it
be submitted for the record.
Mr. Poe. Without objection.
Admiral Rixey. Under the offices of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy, DSCA leads the execution of the Security
Cooperation programs, a wide range of activities enabling a
full spectrum of capability the department seeks to provide its
foreign partners. FMS is the government-to-government process
through which the U.S. Government purchases defense articles,
training, and services on behalf of foreign governments
authorized in the Arms Export Control Act. FMS's longstanding
Security Cooperation program that supports partner and regional
security enhances military-to-military cooperation, enables
interoperability, and develops and maintains international
relationships. Through the FMS process, the U.S. Government
determines whether or not the sale is of mutual benefit to us
and the partner, whether the technology can and will be
protected, and whether the transfer is consistent with U.S.
conventional arms transfer policy.
The FMS system is actually a set of systems in which the
Department of State, Department of Defense, and Congress play
critical roles. The Department of Defense, in particular,
executes a number of different processes, including the
management of the FMS case life cycle, which is overseen by
DSCA; technology transfer reviews overseen by the Defense
Technology Security Administration; and the management of a
defense acquisition and logistics systems overseen by the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics, and the military departments.
This process, or a version of it, also serves as well in
the DOD Title 10 Building Partnership Capacity arena where the
process of building a case, validating a requirement, and
exercising our U.S.-acquisition system to deliver capability is
modeled on the FMS system.
I want to say clearly that, overall, the system is
performing very well. The United States continues to remain the
provider of choice for our international partners with 1,700
new cases implemented in Fiscal Year 2016 alone. These new
cases, combined with adjustments to existing programs, equated
to more than $33 billion in sales last year. This included over
$25 billion in cases funded by our partner nations' own funds
and approximately $8 billion in cases funded by DOD's Title 10
program or Department of State's appropriations. Most FMS cases
move through the process relatively quickly, but some may move
more slowly as we engage in deliberate review to ensure that
the necessary arms transfer criteria are met.
It should be noted that the validations required by the
Arms Export Control Act, such as foreign policy or technology
transfer reviews, occur regardless whether sales conducted via
FMS or direct commercial sales. When foreign partners choose
FMS, however, they are assured that their procurements are
executed with the same level of confidence as ours, and they
will be receiving a total package approach that includes
associated capabilities such as training, logistics, and
maintenance.
Though the system overall is performing well, DSCA is
working with DOD and interagency partners to continually
analyze the FMS process and target areas of improvement to keep
the FMS system responsive to partner needs and agile to support
foreign policy and national security objectives. Together with
our stakeholders, we have developed and are implementing a
robust set of initiatives captured in our 6-year plan, Vision
2020.
In addition, we are advancing key reforms directed by the
Fiscal Year 2017 National Defense Authorization Act. Our focus
is to improve the quality of the workforce through
professionalism, to ensure the right quantity of the workforce
is accomplishing our mission, and to build a more effective
requirements prioritization system to be responsive to the
global combatant commands while managing limited resources.
We have a continuous improvement culture and have
identified these priorities to address the mandates of the NDAA
to better enable the United States to remain the provider of
choice to our foreign partners, providing them with the full
spectrum of required capabilities to train for, maintain, and
sustain the products they receive through the FMS program. We
are also developing options to provide more transparency in the
process as it occurs to our FMS customers. The transparency
initiative was started to facilitate the improvement of the
timelines and the quality in the execution of FMS, through
greater transparency and communication, with regard to each
step of the process.
As I have noted, DSCA plays a key role, but we are only one
element of the broader U.S. Government system for FMS. My
intent today is to comment specifically on DSCA's contribution
to this mission both in terms of the programs we execute and
the initiatives we are championing, and at the same time
demonstrate the linkages and close coordination between us and
the larger FMS enterprise.
Distinguished committee members, I want to thank you again
for the opportunity to sit before you today, and I look forward
to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Rixey follows:]
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Mr. Poe. Thank you, Admiral.
The Chair is going to recognize members in the order that
they appeared. And I will reserve my questions till last.
So I will recognize the--without objection, I will
recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Mast, for 5 minutes
of questions.
Mr. Mast. Thank you, Chairman.
Thank you, Ambassador and Admiral, for your time and your
testimony. I want to get into a couple of quick questions on
the process for FMS, as I am sure you are well aware that is
what a lot of people want to talk about.
Can you outline for me a little bit just how the process
can be made a little bit more streamlined when we are talking
about just one U.S. competitor that is, you know, in there? Is
there a place that that can be streamlined when there is just
one U.S. contractor competing?
Admiral Rixey. Well, first of all, in my submitted
statement, I have two slides. The one is a Gantt chart. It
really is a graphical depiction of the Arms Export Control Act.
Mr. Poe. Is your microphone on, Admiral?
Admiral Rixey. What is that?
Mr. Poe. Microphone.
Admiral Rixey. I am sorry. I submitted two slides with my
statement. The first is a graphical representation of the Arms
Export Control Act. It is really nothing more than a Gantt
chart, critical path. There is a grid on it so that if we ever
discuss FMS systems or FMS programs, we can be very specific as
to where this program resides and how a case is particularly
managing and going through a system.
The second slide that I provided you is the full-spectrum
capability slide. At times throughout this testimony, I will be
referring back to those slides to explain the process in a
little better way.
As far as if a country requests a FMS case that goes sole
sourced, we will honor that request. And so we will process
that through the service acquisition community that will
execute that case. I think that is your question. If it is
requested by a partner, we will honor that sole-source
commitment.
Mr. Mast. So you don't see a place where we are getting in
the way there?
Admiral Rixey. No, not at all.
Mr. Mast. Can you outline for me a little bit, you know,
what would be the biggest concerns when you are looking to
determine whether something is an inappropriate sale? What
would be some of the examples? Or can you give me some specific
examples of when you have identified that--you know, you are
denying a sale because you thought it was inappropriate? Help
me understand that process.
Admiral Rixey. So, again, on that Gantt chart, you will see
that it is a graphical representation of the Arms Export
Control Act. There are three deliberate conversations that we
have to have. It is based on the Arms Export Control Act and,
actually, PPD-27. PPD-27--Presidential Policy Decision--has 13
considerations that we must make before we make a sale. I have
thinned that down to three.
The first is, is it of mutual benefit? The first
conversation we have is is it of mutual benefit. So we usually
ask that question of our combatant commanders and the country
team themselves.
The second deliberate conversation that we have is the
technology. Will the technology be protected? Will they
preserve it or will they have the agreements in place so that
they will protect it?
And, third, the third deliberate conversation is foreign
policy. For example, human rights or adherence to international
norms.
So those are the three conversations we have. COCOM on
mutual benefit in our industry--I am sorry--our country team in
the Embassy, the DTSA under Beth McCormick, who leads that
particular tech transfer and tech security foreign disclosure
review, and then, of course, we work with State in terms of a
foreign policy review.
Mr. Mast. And maybe this follow-on will go more to State.
Maybe it will stick with you, Admiral, but----
Admiral Rixey. Sure.
Mr. Mast [continuing]. How much are you consulting with
other intelligence agencies when you are making these
determinations as a part of that decision-making process?
Admiral Rixey. The whole interagency process is engaged
when we go through that deliberate conversation.
Mr. Mast. Okay. You have answered all my questions. I
appreciate it. It gave me a much better picture of what you are
doing there. Thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman from Florida.
I recognize the ranking member of the committee, Mr.
Keating, from Massachusetts.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for your testimony. I couldn't agree more with
both of the witnesses in their opening statements that this is
indeed a major foreign policy decision. Compared to some of the
other policy decisions we make as a country, this can indeed
have longer lasting consequences in many instances and have
just as many intended and unintended results. So I agree
wholeheartedly that these decisions can't be made in a vacuum.
And you really did a great job laying out the procedure. So I
am going to just put out two questions. And I know it will take
up more of the time. But I like to give witnesses the ability,
between both of you, to answer it.
And the first one is more specific, the Saudi commitments
that were made. Now, if you can just articulate what some of
the new commitments are and how they are different from the
prior promises that were, frankly, reneged upon by the king to
our country and, indeed, how they might entail changes in how
they deal with civilian casualties, and maybe giving more
assurances to coalition partners, follow those same policies
and commitments as their coalition partners.
And then the second one, if you could, is the fact that--I
said it is not done in a vacuum. What about our competitors,
the other countries that are, you know, selling weapons to
countries? You know, we know Russia, China, France, and I think
interoperability. You laid all the reasons out why we should be
where we are. But if you want to comment on the concerns you
might have about how they do this business.
So those are the two issues, the Saudi commitments and just
your own personal comments on how the other countries pursue
this, and some of the concerns you have about the way they go
about this as well.
Ambassador Kaidanow. Thank you, Congressman. I think we had
an opportunity, happily, earlier this week to brief some of you
on this set of issues related to Saudi Arabia. So I got into a
little bit more detail there than perhaps I can even here. But
I will say this. We clearly believe that there is an interest
in providing Saudi Arabia, but also some of the other countries
in the Gulf, with what they need in order to carry out what we
believe is both in our interests and theirs, and that is to
counter some very serious threats posed by Iran and some other
salient threats that we see in the Gulf region.
The President went not that long ago, obviously. We
concluded with the Saudis--and the admiral can speak to this in
greater detail even than I can--a large package of arms sales.
The rationale behind that, in most instances is, in fact, to
bolster the Saudi capabilities to do the kinds of things we
have asked them to do. The buckets, if you will, or the
elements of that package, are largely in maritime security, for
example, border security, the kinds of things that, arguably,
they really do need, and they need to improve by way of
capability in order to push back on the threats that they have.
It is a large package, obviously. It will have other
impacts that we can speak about. But, you know, the concerns
that people feel about Saudi and the Saudi-led coalition's
performance in Yemen are real. We share some of those concerns.
We have shared that with the Saudi Government over time, and
they have given us commitments that now, actually, I think have
been in the public domain, but a number of commitments that we
consider to be serious and credible, all of which are
important. For example, adherence to the laws of armed
conflict, vetting of targets. I mean----
Mr. Keating. Yeah. We were also assured in personal
meetings from the foreign minister of those changes as well. So
I hate to interrupt. We are running out of time.
Ambassador Kaidanow. No, please.
Mr. Keating. But if either of you want to comment on the
second question. You know, what are your concerns about the way
some of these other countries do their business, you know, in
terms of our own security here and the way they do it? I
suspect they don't do it in as thoughtful a way as our process.
But if you could take a little time--Mr. Chairman--to just do
that, to enlighten us on what the other countries are doing.
Ambassador Kaidanow. We obviously have those concerns, sir.
And I think we try very hard to both monitor and also, then, to
hold accountable the countries that violate those
understandings. We belong to a number of different
nonproliferation regimes. Missile Control Technology Regime,
for example, is one of those. The idea is, again, to try and
hold them to certain standards, and when they are not holding
to those standards, hold them accountable.
I will say that, again, the American weapons systems remain
the weapons systems of choice all over the world. We want to
keep it that way. That is why we are trying to balance the
technology security aspect of what we do against the ability of
our defense industry, and the companies to do their business
overseas, and to be as effective as they can be in as wide an
array of countries----
Mr. Keating. Yeah. And I think the interoperability issue
is clearly an issue too because----
Ambassador Kaidanow. Yeah.
Mr. Keating [continuing]. Once they get these sales, and we
don't, the tendency will be other sales will follow that, and
these countries will have undue influences----
Ambassador Kaidanow. That is right.
Mr. Keating [continuing]. On areas we don't want them to
have.
Ambassador Kaidanow. Precisely.
Mr. Keating. All right. Well, thank you.
I yield back, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr.
Rohrabacher, for his questions.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me ask some specific questions about maybe some
specific deals or policies. Egypt had a policy in terms of our
sales of weapons to Egypt. It used to be where they would
spend--they would put 20 percent down on a piece of military
equipment, and then every year after that they would pay 20
percent. So after 5 years, they would pay for it, but they
would be able to use that weapon system in the meantime. Egypt,
as most of us know, on the front lines of the battle against
radical Islamic terrorism, they are, themselves, targets. And I
would say that if Egypt falls to a radical regime, the entire
Middle East will fall.
Now, have we resumed the policy that we had before, instead
of--I understand somewhere along the line, a few years ago, it
became cash on the barrelhead. You have got to pay for that
weapons system, all of it, on delivery. Which, of course, here
we have someone on the front lines, the actual point of the
spear of helping us fight radical Islam, and we are changing
our policies to make it more difficult for them to have a
weapons system. Has that been reversed yet or is that policy
still in place?
Admiral Rixey. Well, I think what you are referring to is
cash flow finance.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Yes.
Admiral Rixey. But that is an appropriated account under
foreign military finance. So it is not national funds from
Egypt. So it is the State fund that we would provide to Egypt.
We used to allow them cash flow finance, which means if we had
$1.3 billion coming in a particular year, they could initiate a
procurement of significant size because we knew the 1.3 was
going to come next year and the following year. So they would
have 3 to 4, 5 years of buying power.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right.
Admiral Rixey. That was removed. So now that we are just--
we will just take--we will not execute a case until the cash is
there as financed, or cash on the barrelhead, as you said. That
policy is still in place.
Mr. Rohrabacher. So we changed the policy to make it more
difficult for Egypt to obtain a weapons system.
Admiral Rixey. We changed the policy.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. Let me just note that, Mr. Chairman,
I hope we all are taking note that at a time when radical
Islamists are murdering people all over the world, bombs are
going off all over Egypt, I might say, which is on the front
lines, we change the policy to make it more difficult for Egypt
to have the weapons it needed in this struggle.
Let me ask you about Pakistan. I remember that a few years
ago, when our brave military went in and took out Osama bin
Laden, that there was a--that they had to go through all kinds
of machinations on what type of equipment, where to go. They
took a route to go get Osama bin Laden that was much more
dangerous, because they were afraid that they might be shot
down by the Pakistani Air Force for going into the airspace of
Pakistan.
What kind of planes would they have been shot down by?
Would they have been shot down by American airplanes?
Ambassador Kaidanow. Sir, I mean, it is a little difficult
for me to answer what is largely a hypothetical question.
I think what you are asking, though, is, you know, what
kind of a discussion and what kind of relationship we have with
Pakistan and ongoing. Is that what you are----
Mr. Rohrabacher. I am alluding to the fact that we have our
own military understanding that we can't trust them not to
shoot down our own people, and we have ended up giving them
modern weapon systems, and we continue to do so. Now, that is
not your fault. You are running a system and being directed by
political decisions.
But I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, that we need to go on
the record here, on this part of our Government, to say that we
are not going to be providing weapons to countries like
Pakistan that we are afraid will shoot down our own people. And
we know they are engaged in terrorism. We know what they have
done now. They still hold Dr. Afridi, the man who helped us
finger Osama bin Laden, the man who was responsible for
slaughtering 3,000 Americans. They still hold him in a dungeon.
Mr. Chairman, we should be facilitating our support and our
weapons systems to countries like Egypt that are fighting this
threat to Western civilization, to all of civilization. And we
should make it more difficult, not less difficult, for
countries like Pakistan to get their hands on American weapons.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman from California.
The Chair recognizes another member from California, the
gentlelady, Mrs. Torres, for her questions.
Mrs. Torres. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Just 2 hours
north of my colleague on the other side.
So thank you, both of you, for being here.
Ambassador Kaidanow, I want to go back to the question that
you were answering earlier as it relates to Saudi Arabia.
So President Trump recently announced that we had reached a
$110 billion arm deal with Saudi Arabia. Now, I know that there
is some questions about, you know, is that really $110 billion?
So we are not going to go through that today. But what are the
conditions that you mention? What are those conditions that
were placed on those weapons? You said that they--it was on
Open Source. I have not seen it, so I would like some
information.
Ambassador Kaidanow. I think some of it has been reported
in the press. In fact, I think this morning there was a piece
on the issue.
I would not call them conditions, just to be clear. I want
to sort of, again, give the understanding of--this is a
dialogue that we have been having with the Saudi Government,
and it is an important dialogue. I think they, themselves,
recognize that some of the elements of their performance in
Yemen have been problematic. They would like to improve those.
We need to help them improve that performance.
The way, again, that we would hope to do that, one of the
things that we recently notified to Congress is a $750 million
training package for their air force. The idea behind that is
very much to provide training on the law of armed conflict, to
give them experience with targeting and vetting of targets, the
kinds of things that, again, arguably, any military, but
certainly in a combat situation, you would want to have them be
more proficient at.
Mrs. Torres. More proficient at targeting so they don't
have so many civilian casualties?
Ambassador Kaidanow. That's correct. Specifically to try
and avoid civilian casualties. And that is important, you know,
from our standpoint, from the U.S. Government standpoint, from
theirs, I think, as well. And, increasingly, they acknowledge
that.
So, again, I don't want to call it conditions. What I want
to say is they have made commitments. I think those commitments
are important. And the idea here is, again, to help them do
some of that, because, in our view, it is better to engage and
then to give them that assistance than it is to simply stand
back and--because, you know, the situation in Yemen is very,
very challenging. The Saudis face a number of threats on their
border with Yemen. They also face a number of threats that
emanate from the Houthis who, you know, clearly are being
empowered by----
Mrs. Torres. You also talked about monitoring and holding
them accountable. So I want to ask you about the end-use
monitoring. What is the process for making sure that arms don't
end up in the wrong hands? Do you have the necessary resources,
database, and the personnel to carry out effective end-use
monitoring?
Ambassador Kaidanow. Thank you for the question. The State
Department has a program that it utilizes for end-use
monitoring, but that is also amplified or supplemented by other
programs at DOD and so forth. So it is not simply a function of
what the State Department does.
We have a Blue Lantern program, it is called, that we
utilize to ensure that there are ample checks, especially on
the most sensitive weapon systems that we provide to some of
our partners. We utilize some of our folks overseas in our
Embassies to do some of those checking. Sometimes it is via the
defense----
Mrs. Torres. We have very limited time. Maybe we can follow
up if there is some database----
Ambassador Kaidanow. Absolutely.
Mrs. Torres [continuing]. Somewhere were you have--you
know, where those weapons have fallen into the wrong hands,
what have you done to either get them back or destroy them.
Let's talk about Mexico. I have been very concerned about
the illegal trafficking of the arms into Mexico. A lot of these
arms are ending up in the wrong hands, gun traffickers and
violent criminals, narcotraffickers. Given the widespread
problems with corruption in Mexico, should we also be concerned
about what is happening with guns that we sell into Mexico? How
do we know we are selling to the right people?
Ambassador Kaidanow. Well, again, and without getting into
it too much here and offering up a specific briefing if you
would like it on some of those issues. I think we do--we look
very carefully at the end users who receive some of the weapons
that we approve for sale.
Mrs. Torres. Specifically, the corrupt police and military
units.
Ambassador Kaidanow. We look at the end-use recipients in
any arms sale that we do, especially if it comes through the
State Department. And, you know, there are some sales,
obviously, that will eventually move again outside of our
realm. But to the extent that it comes through because it is of
a quality or a quantity that moves through the State Department
for approval, we absolutely look to----
Mrs. Torres. What happens when we find out, as in the state
of Guerrero, that these weapons are ending up in the hands of
narcotraffickers? What happens?
Ambassador Kaidanow. Congresswoman, I would defer you
probably to a more detailed briefing on all of the
particularities of what we do with regard to Mexico, if that's
all right, because I think there is a lot to talk about that.
Mrs. Torres. I ran out of time, so thank you.
Ambassador Kaidanow. Sure.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentlelady from California and for her
line of questioning.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr.
Perry.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador, Admiral, great to see you.
Ambassador, I want to continue the conversation that we
had, I think it was last week, regarding the Saudi Arabian arms
deal and the other side of the ledger, so to speak. So it might
be a little bit off topic, but I think it is instructional.
So the context is that I am concerned about how much the
export of Wahhabism was part of the deal, as you will recall.
And so just to set the context, by 2013, 75 percent of North
American Islamic centers relied on Wahhabi preachers who
promote anti-Western ideas in person and online through sermons
and through Saudi-produced literature. We think, since 1979,
Saudi Arabia has engaged in a fairly persistent campaign of
exporting that ideology throughout the world, spending about $4
billion annually on mosque, madrassas, preachers, students, and
textbooks. I am interested in their sincerity, I guess, and how
we monitor--what our metrics are in monitoring their efficacy
adhering to their commitments. And so to further set the
context, despite assurances that it would reform its
educational curriculum by 2008--so this goes back nearly a
decade. Let me just read some excerpts of current textbooks.
A 12th grade textbook professes that treachery, betrayal,
and the denunciation of covenants are among the attributes of
Jews. An 11th grade textbook teaches that cosmopolitan
universities in the Middle East, such as the American
universities in Beirut and Cairo, are examples of a modern-day
crusade by Christians against Islam. And a 10th grade textbook
on jurisprudence suggests that the most important debate about
homosexuals is how best to execute them, whereas ISIS itself
has used these textbooks issued by Saudi Arabia, their ministry
of education, in its schools that it controls in Iraq and
Syria.
To the best of your ability, in this setting, can you tell
me who in the department--is there one person or is there a
portion of the department, is there a crew that is going to
monitor the efficacy of their pledge, so to speak? I
understand, in talking to the Secretary yesterday, that they
have pledged to change the textbooks and supply their
organizations with those textbooks and also pull back current
textbooks. That is what I understand, right, in this new global
center for combating extremist ideology.
But I want to know, because we have been promised before,
and we are tired of helping this sometimes ally when they don't
seem to be really doing things in what is the United States's
best interest, and if we are going to sell them things that
they want and that we want them to have, they don't want to
uphold their end of the deal. But, unfortunately, while I love
the Reagan doctrine of trust but verify, in this instance, I
prefer verify and then trust.
So what can you tell me about who is going to be monitoring
that and how we are going to gauge their efficacy and what the
penalties are for failure?
Ambassador Kaidanow. Sir, thanks for the question. I will
say that, in the first instance--and, of course, these issues
that you have mentioned I think are of concern to us just like
they are of concern to you. But I will tell you that, you know,
in almost every instance, the people on the ground that we have
there are the ones that are the closest to this, and they are
the ones that monitor it. So our folks in our Embassy there are
the ones that are responsible for looking at, you know, whether
the Saudis live up to the commitments, again, the promises that
they have made.
With regard to, you know, the State Department at large, we
have a Bureau of Eurasian Affairs that, you know, again,
concerns itself with these issues specifically. We also have
public affairs people who look at this and the whole question
of the promulgation of extremism through social media, through
other means. These are the kinds of things that we preoccupy
ourselves.
Mr. Perry. Do we literally have someone in Saudi Arabia
that is going to be at the receiving dock checking in X amount
or tons or skids, pallets, what have you, of old textbooks to
prove that they either came back, or do we have someone in the
United States that is working with the Department of State to
visit these places where the textbooks were issued to see the
new ones come and the old ones go? Are we taking the Saudis'
word for it? Because, apparently, we did since 2008. And you
can see what we have gotten, which is very little. As a matter
of fact, it has gone the other direction, in my opinion.
How are we verifying it specifically? And if you don't know
and you got to get back to me later, I accept that. But I want
to know the answer to that question.
Ambassador Kaidanow. Understood, sir. And, no, I could not
tell you sitting here, you know, whether we have an individual
who is doing something like that. But I am happy to get back to
you with an answer.
Mr. Perry. All right. I think that we are all interested in
that answer, and I think it is important to our national
security in moving forward with this deal, as well within the
answer, with the chairman's indulgence, the consequences to the
adherence of this agreement for failure to live up to their
commitment. Thank you.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman from Pennsylvania for his
line of questioning.
Without objection, we have with us also Mr. Lieu from
California, not a member of the subcommittee but a member of
Foreign Affairs. The Chair will recognize him for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lieu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, ranking member, for
letting me participate in this hearing. And thank you,
Ambassador Kaidanow and Admiral Rixey, for your public service.
We have had prior meetings on Saudi Arabia, so I would like
to ask some questions for the record. As you know, the U.S. has
been assisting Saudi Arabia in its war in Yemen. I don't have a
problem with helping our ally Saudi Arabia, but many Members of
Congress, on a bipartisan, bicameral basis, do have a
significant problem when the Saudi-led military coalition is
committing war crimes in Yemen.
I served in active duty in the Air Force. I am aware that,
in the fog of war, you can make mistakes. Maybe three, four,
five errant air strikes. I get that. But we are talking about
dozens and dozens and dozens of reports from Human Rights
Watch, Amnesty International, the U.N. have documented over 70
unlawful air strikes by the Saudi-led coalition. And this is as
of last year. Who knows what it has done since then. And these
are air strikes nowhere near military targets.
It freaked out our State Department so much that last year
our State Department's lawyers initiated a review to see if
U.S. personnel or others would be liable for aiding and
abetting war crimes. The State Department stopped a sale of
precision-guided munitions. The State Department this year has
reversed.
So I would like to know what conditions have changed from,
basically, last November to now that caused that reversal.
Ambassador Kaidanow. As you pointed out, Congressman, I
think this has been an ongoing evaluation. In other words--and
as I said at the outset of my testimony, it is always a balance
between the national security interest that we face and our
allies face as against other considerations, many of which you
just laid out, I think, very coherently.
With respect to Saudi and the coalition-led effort in
Yemen, I think, again, the Saudis themselves have recognized
that some of the aspects of how they have pursued that campaign
are problematic. I think over time, their awareness of that has
grown. I think their willingness and their ability to address
some of those issues has grown. We have seen that both in the
commitments they are willing to make to us as well as, again,
in their willingness to accept some of the assistance that we
can provide in order to help them do the things that, arguably,
would improve their performance.
Again, as I said, they need to fully, and they have, commit
to following the laws of armed conflict. They need to improve
their vetting process for targeting and doing the kinds of
things that we all know that need to be done, especially those
of us who have done this kind of work previously. They need to
be much more careful with their rules of engagement. These are
the kinds of things they have to do.
Mr. Lieu. Have the Saudis made those commitments to the
United States in writing?
Ambassador Kaidanow. They have made commitments to us that
we--again, that we have outlined for you, and we will----
Mr. Lieu. Could you give the committee the commitments they
have made?
Ambassador Kaidanow. We can definitely walk you through
those commitments, absolutely.
Mr. Lieu. Okay. Thank you.
I would like to now shift to Qatar. As you know, last week,
the President of the United States, through a series of tweets,
accused Qatar of funding terrorism. The President essentially
supported the blockade of Qatar led by Saudi Arabia and other
Gulf nations. I am also reading reports that the United States
just agreed to sell Qatar $12 billion worth of weapons,
airplanes.
Is that true that we are selling them $12 billion worth of
fighter jets?
Ambassador Kaidanow. The fighter jet sale has been an
ongoing deliberation and consideration for quite a while. Yes,
the contract has just been signed for the sale.
Mr. Lieu. And I don't mean to be facetious with this, but
does the President know that?
Ambassador Kaidanow. I believe so.
Mr. Lieu. Okay. How do you square that sale, what the
President has been saying about Qatar, since you said arm sales
are an element of foreign policy?
Ambassador Kaidanow. Absolutely. Yeah. Again, this goes
back to the consideration of the wider array of foreign policy
issues as regards the Gulf more broadly. It is not simply a
question of the things that we concern ourselves with with
regard to the extremism and so forth. Qatar needs to do some
more things. The President, Secretary has made that clear. And
we have made that clear to the Qataris. By the same token, the
Qataris and the Gulf countries, as a whole, face certain
threats from Iran, from other sources, but primarily from Iran,
that they need to address through means that we can assist them
with. These fighter sales are designed to address those kinds
of threats.
So I think you can easily, you know, understand why we have
to do multiple things at the same time.
Mr. Lieu. So thank you. So I don't take a position on this,
because I need to find out more about it, my only point is that
it is really confusing to world leaders, the Members of
Congress, when the Trump administration does two exactly
opposite things. And it is my hope that, as the administration
grows and learns, that the administration stops doing that.
And with that, I yield back.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair recognizes another gentleman from California,
Colonel Cook, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Cook. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Ambassador, it is good to see you again. You are spending
far too much time here. This very, very complicated business
that we are talking about. You know, I am a historian and, go
back, you read about Roosevelt and Churchill and who they were
supporting in World War II. Sometimes the lines between enemy
and friend was very, very complicated, how you could support
the Soviets, some of the things that they did under the Stalin
regime, and yet we are saying how much--you can go on and on
and on. And I think a lot of these things weigh into the
equation. Who is your enemy this week and--very, very
complicated.
I do want to talk about the NATO arena and the dependence
of many of our allies, Eastern European, quite frankly, on
Soviet style equipment, both armor and air, that we have not
weaned them off--maybe that is a bad phrase. But because of
parts, because of systems, they still have to go back to the
new Russia for those things that they had for years. And until
they become a total member of NATO, in terms of our military
equipment and everything else, I think it diminishes their
capability as a true ally.
And if you could address that question right now, because
it doesn't seem like a big priority, and yet countries there,
they have been with us and everything else. But we expect them
to come to the fight, when and if the Russians come across,
such as the Rand study that was envisioned.
Ambassador Kaidanow. Right. Thank you, sir, for the
question. I would, first of all, just reassert our deep
commitment to our NATO partners, as well as to our partners
that are not necessarily members of the NATO but who are allies
of ours and friends that we work with extensively. And in a
number of cases, we obviously provide either assistance to
them, grant assistance sometimes in that form, or in other
forms.
Intraoperability, as you have indicated, is a huge, big
issue for us. I highlighted it as one of the factors, you know,
that we take into consideration when we make these decisions. I
can't emphasize enough how much work we do with a number of our
European partners, both within NATO and outside NATO, to
ensure, again, that what you are talking about precisely takes
place, that their weapon systems are modernized, that they are
interoperable with ours, and to the extent that, again, that we
need to provide assistance for them to do it, that we give them
that.
Mr. Cook. Yeah. I think sometimes when we criticize our
NATO partners for not meeting their 2 percent, I think if we
are going to put all this pressure on them, and the fact that
we are going to come, you know, to their aid if they are
attacked, I think we have got to have--NATO standards applies
to foreign military sales, at least my perspective. Other
countries, obviously Saudi Arabia, some of the others, it gets
dicey because of some of the political considerations. Egypt, I
thought were a bit heavy-handed. I know that still talking
about the Morsi government, and everything like that, and the
change by el-Sisi. But, of course, they did the same thing.
They went right back to buying Russian military equipment
because of what happened.
And I think, as you rightly pointed out, we have to take
that variable into consideration. And we can argue all day
about Saudi Arabia and Egypt and everything else. But NATO, we
cannot criticize them. If they are having a tough time meeting
the 2 percent, then we are not going to ensure that we do
something to make sure that that is streamlined.
Admiral, would you comment on the short time I have left?
Admiral Rixey. Well, we will honor any letter of request
for capability. So I am seeing on my travels a desire to move
away from Russian equipment and into NATO standard-type
equipment. So we are prepared to execute if requested.
Mr. Cook. Okay. I yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman from California, Colonel
Cook.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr.
Garrett, for his questions.
Mr. Garrett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank the members
of the panel for being here.
Generally, Mr. Chairman, when I ask a series of questions,
there is an answer that I am driving at; that is not case
today.
Understanding the importance of what you all do, of what
FMS does, and what the DSCA does, our office publicly stated a
policy that we think that this Nation should adhere to very
early after being elected, and that is first to seek peace and
stability in the world and, second, not to arm people who might
later find themselves using those weapons against the United
States or our allies.
There are literally dozens and dozens of nations, if you
cover the gamut from main battle tanks to small arms, to whom
we supply arms. And I don't necessarily object to that on its
face. In fact, I think, in many instances, it is important to
do. But I would ask you both--and this is a tough question--if
you were forced to sort of predict a horrible worst-case
scenario where U.S. weaponry was turned on U.S. forces or our
allies, in what nation that we currently sell weapons to might
that occur?
Because the answer can't be, oh, it could never happen. I
will tell you--and I know I am burning my own time here. I grew
up watching terror movements, watching government upheaval
where the foreign fighters were armed with Soviet-Style
weaponry. And it has galled me for the last decade as we see
ISIS and AQAP and other elements in Humvees like the one I
drove in, with rifles like the one I carried, firing weapon
systems like the ones that our soldiers operate. It strikes me
as a bad outcome.
So where might we see that again? And then I will give you
a redemption clause, and how might we avoid that?
Ambassador Kaidanow. I think it is a really important
question, frankly. And I also think that it is, you know, a
highly sensitive question. In other words, you know, how do you
gauge that? You are asking, you know, a very difficult question
to kind of get at.
I would say, at least when I think about it, and given the
time that I have been doing this job, I worry perhaps a little
bit less about some of the existing technology and what we have
already provided. What I think about is the cutting-edge
technology. The things that arguably, anyway, we have to be
super careful about when we provide to other nations. And these
are really open questions. I mean, we have to sit there and
really think about, do we provide certain kinds of technology
to certain partners, given some of our concerns, given the
question as to whether those technologies will be adequately
protected? And we don't take that lightly. I can just tell
you----
Mr. Garrett. I am going to interrupt, and I am not doing it
to be rude.
Ambassador Kaidanow. No, no.
Mr. Garrett. It is a real hard question, given the
professional nature of your individual responsibilities. And I
don't want to get anybody in trouble here.
There are two ways this could happen, and maybe this will
help you. It could happen because the nation state to whom we
sold the weapons turns on us. Or it could happen, as it did in
Iraq, because the nation state to whom we provided the weapons
with the best of intentions abandoned those weapons and they
fell into the hands of people who sought to do us and our
allies harm.
Ambassador Kaidanow. Yes.
Mr. Garrett. Where might that be a possibility?
Ambassador Kaidanow. I mean, you have highlighted places
where, you know, in theory, that is possible. And there are
places across the globe where we have, again, provided things,
and you cannot always predict what will happen with regard to a
government's stability or whether, you know, the next
government will somehow find it in their interest, you know, to
somehow do something against our interest.
But, again, I worry a little bit less about that with
respect to the things already provided. I am now looking
forward at the question of, you know, emerging technologies,
how do we control for some of that in a very important
environment in which we want American companies to have the
ability to sell, and yet we also want to protect those
technologies and not have them turned against our own forces.
These are salient questions.
Mr. Garrett. Admiral Rixey?
Admiral Rixey. Well, I certainly don't want to speculate in
this open forum. So if you will allow me, I will take that back
to the Pentagon and get you a classified brief or something of
that nature.
Mr. Garrett. I would be delighted. I anticipate that you
will proactively reach out to my office. I look forward to it.
Thank you.
I would yield back.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr.
Zeldin.
Mr. Zeldin. Well, thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to
both of our witnesses for being here.
Ambassador, just for way of background, how long have you
been in your current position, just so I know?
Ambassador Kaidanow. I have been in the principal deputy
slot since February of last year. So February 2016.
Mr. Zeldin. Okay. And what were you doing just before that?
Ambassador Kaidanow. I was the State Department coordinator
for counterterrorism.
Mr. Zeldin. Okay. Were you involved in all--because I just
have some questions about the FMS-related transaction between
the United States and Iran. Were you involved in that?
Ambassador Kaidanow. No.
Mr. Zeldin. Would you be able to answer any questions about
that?
Ambassador Kaidanow. Probably not in this setting.
Mr. Zeldin. Well, let me try.
Ambassador Kaidanow. Sure.
Mr. Zeldin. When was the United States' claim against
Iran--our claims against Iran--I am sorry.
When did the United States stop disputing our claims
against Iran?
Ambassador Kaidanow. Again, sir, just because this--I think
this addresses a broader set of issues than I am necessarily
responsible for in my portfolio at the State Department. I
would offer, again, a briefing, if you would like it, on those
specific issues.
Mr. Zeldin. Okay. For decades, the United States was
disputing that we owed Iran money for the sale. Do you know
when we stopped disputing whether we owed that money?
Ambassador Kaidanow. Sir, I don't have the history of all
that in front of me right this minute. So, no, I would prefer
to get back to you on the specifics.
Mr. Zeldin. Okay. Do you know why we paid in cash?
Ambassador Kaidanow. Again, this goes a little bit beyond
my portfolio, so I really would prefer to give you a more
detailed answer.
Mr. Zeldin. You would be able to answer these questions,
though, in another setting?
Ambassador Kaidanow. We will, obviously, provide you any
information we can.
Mr. Zeldin. And you would be able to bring someone to that
setting who would be able to answer what you might not be able
to answer?
Ambassador Kaidanow. We will do that.
Mr. Zeldin. Do you know why the payment was made at the
same time as the release of the American hostages?
Ambassador Kaidanow. Sir, I can't answer, I think, any
differently than I already have.
Mr. Zeldin. All right. Just, I guess, procedurally, is
there anything the way we handled this entire exchange over the
course of decades that you think the United States can learn a
lesson and handle it better going forward?
Ambassador Kaidanow. Again, given the fact that, you know,
we are not addressing in great detail the way that the issues
unfolded, I think it would be probably better to discuss that
in a briefing.
Mr. Zeldin. There was a lot of concern here in Congress
over, you know, many aspects of that exchange, historically
speaking. When it happened, Iran was--they were canceling
orders, and we ended up--the United States had parts that we
were in the process of putting together. Iran takes over our
Embassy. And everything that happens there at that point in
time, you can make an argument of whether or not we would have
owed them anything then.
But then there are these disputes, over the course of the
years ahead, to be settled out in court or out of court, both
the United States against Iran and Iran against the United
States. And we were disputing whether or not we had owed this
money to Iran. Yet what appears to me as a Member of Congress,
and I know for many of my colleagues and for much of the
American public, it seemed a bit odd that a position that the
United States had for decades, that out of nowhere, we see the
United States making a payment for the full principal amount, a
generous interest amount, and it had to be delivered on a cash
pallet to the Iranians at the same exact time as the Iranians
releasing American prisoners. And it was the position of the
administration that that was a coincidence and that one thing
had absolutely nothing to do with the other. And I would be
really interested in getting filled in on, if there is another,
you know, 99 percent of the story that we are not familiar
with, I would loved to be briefed up on it.
But without that information, I find it incredibly hard to
believe that that was anything other than a ransom payment. And
I find it hard to believe that I would be able to take the
position that it was a coincidence. But also as it relates to,
you know, our policies--lessons learned, our policies going
forward--I don't know whether or not we even had owed the
money. And that was a whole other dispute that was consistent--
I say my position was consistent with U.S. position for
decades.
So I certainly would appreciate that, Chairman, if we would
have that opportunity to fill in the gaps that still exist.
I yield back.
Mr. Poe. I appreciate the questions from the gentleman from
New York and the gentleman from Virginia. I intend to figure
out a way that we can have a classified briefing from you all
on the issues raised by the gentleman from New York and
Virginia and the gentleman from California as well.
I recognize myself for a line of questions.
We are all aware of the Turkish security detail that
assaulted peaceful protesters on American soil and tried to
prevent them from exercising constitutional rights of the right
to assemble and to free speech. And I am still mad about that.
I think other Members of Congress are as well.
The U.S. has a plan to sell small arms to security details
like the Turkish goons that assaulted Americans. The chairman
has written a letter to Secretary Tillerson asking to stop that
sale until this is resolved about the assault. Where are we on
that, Ambassador?
Ambassador Kaidanow. Sir, thank you for the question. I
think you have expressed concerns. We have some similar
concerns that we expressed directly to our Turkish friends and
colleagues. But this sale is one that obviously is going to
have to be looked at and reviewed. It is still in the process
of review, given the fact that now the law enforcement process
is in play. Rather than sort of give you an end state, I would
like to just come back to you soon and give you an update on
where we are with it. But it is still in review. It has not----
Mr. Poe. You understand, as oversight on this issue,
members of the Foreign Affairs Committee, through the chairman,
have said suspend those sales till this is resolved and the
folks that committed these crimes against Americans on American
soil is resolved. I think that is atrocious that that would
ever occur. So that is our position. And we hope that you will
suspend those sales until this is done.
This whole concept of sales to foreign countries, hopefully
folks that are friendly to us, is complicated, because the idea
that if we don't sell to country X, then they are going to go
buy from the Russians, the Chinese, whoever they can get these
weapon systems from. It is a political issue, but it is also a
security issue for the U.S. to have partners that look to us
rather than look to the Russians or the Chinese. I understand
that.
Let's talk about Lebanon. We are in the process of selling
weapons to Lebanon. Reports are the Lebanese Government gives
those small arms to Hezbollah, a terrorist group. Where are we
on that? How do we know that Lebanon--those arms don't end up
in the possession of Hezbollah, a terrorist group in Lebanon
and now in other countries as well?
Ambassador or Admiral, either one of you. How do we know
that is not going to happen?
Ambassador Kaidanow. Thank you again for the question. So
we are very resolute in supporting the Lebanese armed forces.
Those armed forces we regard as the most important guarantor,
if you will, of Lebanese sovereigty and the ability of Lebanon
as a country to maintain its integrity. We consider that very
important with regard to what is going on in the region now,
given the threat of ISIS or Daesh, given the threat of Iran
extending its arc of influence through----
Mr. Poe. I get that. How do we know they don't end up in
the possession of Hezbollah?
Ambassador Kaidanow. We are watching very, very carefully.
Extremely carefully. And we are confident, thus far, that no
weapons have been transferred from the Lebanese Government or
the Lebanese armed forces into the hands of those who should
not get it, including Hezbollah.
Mr. Poe. Do you have a comment, Admiral?
Admiral Rixey. Well, sir, we would, of course, execute our
Golden Sentry program and end-use monitoring in that country to
ensure that that does not happen.
Mr. Poe. I want to turn to Pakistan. We have been having
the issue with Pakistan whether they are loyal or playing us
for years on the issue of aid to Pakistan and sales to
Pakistan. As mentioned by the gentleman from California, Mr.
Rohrabacher, when we went in to get Osama bin Laden, we were
concerned about the Pakistanis scrambling F-16s that we made
and sold to the Pakistanis so that they wouldn't shoot down
Americans who were doing the job of taking out this terrorist.
I personally think Pakistan plays the United States,
because they turn to China if we don't help them. I understand
all that. They have nuclear weapons, and we want to have a
relationship with them so that they don't look to China. I get
all that. But are we doing anything different on sales to
Pakistan to make sure those sales of whatever it is aren't used
against us directly or used against us indirectly because of
the military helping the Taliban in Afghanistan where we have
our troops, and those weapons could be used against the United
States? Are we doing anything different to make sure that
doesn't happen or are we still using the same formula?
Ambassador Kaidanow. No. I mean, I think what we applied to
Pakistan is what we applied to a number of our partner
countries. But with Pakistan, we have a robust end-use
monitoring program, extremely robust, to ensure that the items
that we provide for them are used appropriately and within the
boundaries of what we have asked them to accomplish.
We, as you say, regard Pakistan as an important partner on
counterterrorism issues. They will be essential in bringing the
Afghan Taliban to the table for peace talks. There are a number
of things where we need their cooperation and their assistance.
And we do want to help them on the counterterrorism front. But
on the other hand, again, we have very big concerns that we
continuously front with them on support for Haqqani, on support
for other things. This has been made clear to the Pakistani
Government at the highest level.
Mr. Poe. Admiral, you don't want to comment?
Admiral Rixey. I defer to State.
Mr. Poe. All right. I am out of time.
I will mention to the subcommittee and to the witnesses, I
appreciate you all being here. We will figure out a way to have
a classified briefing, because we have gone about halfway on
the questions that we are asking. Many Members of Congress want
a bottom-line answer to the questions that they ask about the
different countries during their questioning here in open
forum. So we will work on that.
I thank both of you for being here. I know you all have
time constraints. I was just making sure there is not anybody
else here.
The subcommittee is adjourned. Thank you very much. I thank
the members for being here.
[Whereupon, at 11:32 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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