[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
TERRORISM IN NORTH AFRICA: AN EXAMINATION OF THE THREAT
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
COUNTERTERRORISM
AND INTELLIGENCE
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 29, 2017
__________
Serial No. 115-11
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Mike Rogers, Alabama James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Filemon Vela, Texas
John Katko, New York Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
Will Hurd, Texas Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Martha McSally, Arizona J. Luis Correa, California
John Ratcliffe, Texas Val Butler Demings, Florida
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York Nanette Diaz Barragan, California
Mike Gallagher, Wisconsin
Clay Higgins, Louisiana
John H. Rutherford, Florida
Thomas A. Garrett, Jr., Virginia
Brian K. Fitzpatrick, Pennsylvania
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Kathleen Crooks Flynn, Deputy General Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Will Hurd, Texas William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Mike Gallagher, Wisconsin Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex (ex officio)
officio)
Mandy Bowers, Subcommittee Staff Director
Nicole Tisdale, Minority Staff Director/Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable Kathleen M. Rice, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
Witnesses
Mr. J. Peter Pham, Vice President for Research and Regional
Initiatives, Director for The Africa Center, Atlantic Council:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Mr. Geoff D. Porter, President, North Africa Risk Consulting,
Inc.:
Oral Statement................................................. 15
Prepared Statement............................................. 17
Mr. Laith Alkhouri, Co-Founder and Director, Flashpoint:
Oral Statement................................................. 25
Prepared Statement............................................. 27
Mr. Frederic Wehrey, Senior Fellow, Middle East Program, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace:
Oral Statement................................................. 37
Prepared Statement............................................. 39
Appendix
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for J. Peter
Pham........................................................... 55
Questions From Ranking Member Kathleen M. Rice for J. Peter Pham. 56
Questions From Representative Mike Gallagher for J. Peter Pham... 56
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Geoff D.
Porter......................................................... 58
Question From Ranking Member Kathleen M. Rice for Geoff D. Porter 58
Questions From Representative Mike Gallagher for Geoff D. Porter. 58
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Laith
Alkhouri....................................................... 59
Questions From Ranking Member Kathleen M. Rice for Laith Alkhouri 60
Questions From Representative Mike Gallagher for Laith Alkhouri.. 61
Question From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Frederic
Wehrey......................................................... 62
Question From Ranking Member Kathleen M. Rice for Frederic Wehrey 63
Questions From Representative Mike Gallagher for Frederic Wehrey. 63
TERRORISM IN NORTH AFRICA: AN EXAMINATION OF THE THREAT
----------
Wednesday, March 29, 2017
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in
room HVC-210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Peter T. King
(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives King, Hurd, Gallagher, Rice, and
Keating.
Mr. King. Good morning. The Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence will come to
order. The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony from
four experts on counterterrorism and terror groups in North
Africa.
I want to welcome Ranking Member Rice and any other Member
of the subcommittee that appears this morning. I understand
that several will be showing up. I express my appreciation to
the witnesses who have all traveled to be here today. I
recognize myself for an opening statement.
During today's hearing, we will focus on terror groups
operating in and across North Africa, their intent to attack
the United States, and their capability to do so. While Iraq
and Syria are the current epicenter of the Islamist extremist
movement, that certainly has not always been the case, nor will
it be in the future.
The threats posed by ISIS and al-Qaeda are dynamic and are
expected to increase as ISIS loses ground in Iraq and Syria,
and al-Qaeda seeks to reclaim its status as the leader of the
global jihadi movement. In this context, North Africa, which
sits on the edge of Europe, has emerged as an important theater
in the war on terror.
Al-Qaida and ISIS elements are increasingly active and
competitive, and have both expanded their reach deep into the
continent. Earlier this month, al-Qaeda factions in the Sahel
reconciled their internal disputes and formed a single movement
called the ``Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims,''
pledging their loyalty to AQIM leader, Abdelmalek Droukdel.
Additionally, the emergence of ISIS in the Greater Sahara,
which was informally recognized by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in
October 2016, confirmed the expansion of ISIS offshoots from
Tunisia, Libya, and Sinai into the Sahel. Terror groups
continue to reap the benefits of the permissive environment
created out of political instability and large swaths of
ungoverned space.
As of March 6 of this year, the State Department cautioned
that terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb and ISIS affiliates, are very active in North Africa,
have demonstrated the ability to conduct attacks in the region.
Tthe U.S. Government remains, ``highly concerned about possible
attacks against U.S. citizens, facilities, and businesses.''
The Long War Journal reports that al-Qaeda affiliates
launched over 250 attacks in the Maghreb and Sahel regions in
2016, a more than 150 percent increase from the reported 106
attacks in 2015.
Some argue that terror groups in the region are
nationalists and do not pose a threat to the United States.
However, 3 months ago, the Pentagon confirmed that airstrikes
on an ISIS stronghold in Libya were directed against,
``external plotters, who were actively planning operations
against our allies in Europe.''
Additionally, the return of thousands of battle-hardened
foreign fighters from Iraq and Syria to their home countries in
North Africa will likely elevate the threat level in the
region.
The goals for today's hearings are to get a status update
from you experts on the activities of the various terror
groups, and the possible threat they may pose to the United
States in the present and the future. Also to solicit your
expert advice on what is working in our counterterrorism
strategy and what more needs to be done as the Trump
administration is evaluating current efforts.
I want to thank all of you for your work in this field, for
appearing here today. I look forward to your testimony.
[The statement of Mr. King follows:]
Statement of Subcommittee Chairman Peter T. King
March 29, 2017
During today's hearing, we will focus on terror groups operating in
and across North Africa, their intent to attack the United States and
their capability to do so. While Iraq and Syria are the current
epicenter of the Islamist extremism movement, that certainly has not
always been the case nor will it be in the future.
The threat posed by ISIS and al-Qaeda are dynamic and are expected
to increase as ISIS loses ground in Iraq and Syria and al-Qaeda seeks
to reclaim its status as the leader of the global Jihadi movement.
In this context, North Africa, which sits on the edge of Europe,
has emerged as an important theatre in the war on terror.
Al-Qaeda and ISIS elements are increasingly active--and
competitive--and have both expanded their reach deep into the
continent. Earlier this month, al-Qaeda factions in the Sahel
reconciled their internal disputes and formed a single movement called
``Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims,'' pledging their loyalty
to AQIM leader, Abdelmalik Droukdel. Additionally, the emergence of
``ISIS in the Greater Sahara,'' which was informally recognized by Abu
Bakr al-Baghdadi in October 2016, confirmed the expansion of ISIS
offshoots from Tunisia, Libya, and the Sinai into the Sahel.
Terror groups continue to reap the benefits of the permissive
environment created out of political instability and large swaths of
ungoverned space. As of March 6, 2017, the State Department cautioned
that terrorist groups, including AQIM and ISIS affiliates, are very
active in North Africa, have demonstrated the capability to conduct
attacks in the region, and the U.S. Government remains ``highly
concerned about possible attacks against U.S. citizens, facilities, and
businesses.''
The Long War Journal reports that al-Qaeda affiliates launched over
250 attacks in the Maghreb and Sahel regions in 2016, a more than 150%
increase from the reported 106 attacks in 2015.
Some argue that terror groups in this region are nationalist and do
not pose a threat to the United States. However, 3 months ago, the
Pentagon confirmed that airstrikes on an ISIS stronghold in Libya were
directed against, ``external plotters, who were actively planning
operations against our allies in Europe.''
Additionally, the return of thousands of battle-hardened foreign
fighters from Iraq and Syria to their home countries in North Africa
will likely elevate the threat level in the region.
My goals for today's hearing are to get a status update from
experts on the activities of the various terror groups and the possible
threat they may pose to the United States in the present and future.
And to solicit your expert advice on what's working in our
counterterrorism strategy and what more needs to be done as the Trump
administration is evaluating current efforts.
I want to thank you all for your work in this field and for
appearing here today. I look forward to your testimony.
Mr. King. Now I present the Ranking Member, my colleague
from New York, Kathleen Rice. Miss Rice.
Miss Rice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing, and thank you to the witnesses for joining us here
today.
About 2 years ago I had the opportunity to travel to Africa
on a Congressional delegation that was led by Senator Kirsten
Gillibrand, and we were able to meet with government leaders
and security officials in Tunisia, Chad, Djibouti, Kenya, and
Senegal.
That trip was just a few months after I was sworn into
Congress and joined this committee. It was an instructive
experience for me because while groups like ISIS may have
dominated headlines at the time, as they often do now, it is
critical that we never lose sight of the fact that the threat
of terrorism doesn't start and stop with ISIS.
That trip made it clear to me that the threat of terrorism
emerging in Africa is very real and cannot be ignored or
overlooked until it generates more headlines. We need to
confront that threat head on, and our ability to do so depends
heavily on the strength of partnerships with leaders who fight
on the front lines against these terrorist groups every day.
We don't have to look far to see how serious a threat we
are dealing with in Africa, particularly in North Africa. A
truck bomb was detonated last year near a police training
college in Libya killing 60 policeman and wounding about 200
others.
A commercial plane bombing in Egypt in October 2015 killed
224 people. An attack at a tourist resort in Tunisia in June
2015 left 38 dead, and of course the attack on the U.S. embassy
and CIA annex in Benghazi, Libya, which left 4 U.S. citizens
dead, including the U.S. Ambassador to Libya, J. Christopher
Stevens.
While ISIS has taken credit for many recent attacks, al-
Qaeda operatives and other violent extremist groups have had a
presence in North Africa for almost 2 decades.
For example, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, AQIM, had
primarily operated in the northern coastal areas of Algeria and
in parts of the desert regions of southern Algeria, but in
recent years has expanded into Libya and Tunisia.
AQIM claimed responsibility for many terror attacks in the
region, and has been responsible for kidnappings for ransom and
smuggling. Most concerning, according to U.S. officials, AQIM
has focused on local and Western targets in North and West
Africa, including U.S. interests and personnel by often urging
supporters to target U.S. embassies and U.S. Ambassadors.
Earlier this month, the head of the U.S. Africa Command
testified before the Senate and characterized the instability
in Libya and North Africa as potentially the most significant
near-term threat to U.S. and allies' interests on the
continent.
Protecting our assets and people in this region is
absolutely a National security priority for our country right
now, but I am concerned that this administration doesn't seem
to recognize that.
President Trump's so-called America First budget seems to
put Africa last, proposing deep budget cuts to the continent.
In fact, many have speculated that confronting the threat of
terrorism in Libya and throughout the region will be a low
priority for this administration.
By proposing to cut the Department of State's international
affairs funding by one-third, President Trump has signaled that
he is not interested in maintaining long-standing international
partnerships, which are crucial for U.S. diplomacy and
development across the globe, including in North Africa.
As I said, I believe that our success in confronting the
threat in Africa depends on the success of our partners leading
this fight on the ground. And while President Trump may not
have a sophisticated understanding of the value of diplomacy,
we cannot allow that to jeopardize the partnerships we have
built in North Africa.
The terrorist threat to the U.S. homeland since 9/11 has
continued to evolve, and our counterterrorism policies must
evolve as well. They cannot be singularly focused on prevention
only within our borders.
It is imperative that the United States works with our
allies to improve counterterrorism and intelligence efforts in
North Africa, as well as investing in education, economic
development, and free and open civil societies in order to root
out many of the drivers of violent extremism in the region.
The level of U.S. funding, resources, and personnel
dedicated to these efforts must continue, if not increase, in
order to limit the risk and progress of terrorist groups in the
region.
Again, we cannot underestimate the value of building and
strengthening local and international partnerships to combat
terrorism and radicalization in North Africa. International
cooperation and partnerships are the foundation of our
counterterrorism efforts.
I look forward to a robust discussion with our witnesses
today about the threat of terrorism and radicalization in North
Africa and how we can shape U.S. policy to support our partners
and defeat our enemies.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member Rice follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Kathleen M. Rice
March 29, 2017
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. And thank you to
the witnesses for joining us today.
About 2 years ago, I had the opportunity to travel to Africa on a
Congressional delegation led by Senator Kirsten Gillibrand, and meet
with government leaders and security officials in Tunisia, Chad,
Djibouti, Kenya, and Senegal.
That trip was just a few months after I was sworn in to Congress
and joined this committee, and it was an instructive experience for me.
Because while groups like ISIS may have dominated headlines at the
time, as they often do now, it's critical that we never lose sight of
the fact that the threat of terrorism doesn't start and stop with ISIS.
That trip made it clear to me that the threat of terrorism emerging
in Africa is very real and cannot be ignored or overlooked until it
generates more headlines. We need to confront that threat head-on, and
our ability to do so depends heavily on the strength of partnerships
with leaders who fight on the front lines against these terrorist
groups every day.
We don't have to look far to see how serious of a threat we're
dealing with in Africa, particularly in North Africa.
A truck bomb was detonated last year near a police training college
in Libya, killing 60 policemen and wounding about 200 others. A
commercial plane bombing in Egypt in October 2015 killed 224 people. An
attack at a tourist resort in Tunisia in June 2015 left 38 dead. And of
course, the attack on the U.S. Embassy and CIA annex in Benghazi, Libya
which left four U.S. citizens dead, including the U.S. Ambassador to
Libya, J. Christopher Stevens.
While ISIS has taken credit for many recent attacks, al-Qaeda
operatives and other violent extremists groups have had a presence in
North Africa for almost 2 decades.
For example, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb--AQIM--had primarily
operated in the northern coastal areas of Algeria and in parts of the
desert regions of southern Algeria, but in recent years has expanded
into Libya and Tunisia.\1\ AQIM claimed responsibility for many terror
attacks in the region and has been responsible for kidnappings for
ransom and smuggling.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), National
Counterterrorism Center, https://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/aqim.html.
\2\ Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Al Murabitoun.
Alexis Arieff & Tomas F. Husted. Congressional Research Service. 25
November 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Most concerning, according to U.S. officials, AQIM has focused on
local and Western targets in North and West Africa, including U.S.
interests and personnel, by often urging supporters to target U.S.
embassies and U.S. ambassadors.\3\ \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Id.
\4\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Earlier this month, the head of the U.S. Africa Command, testified
before the Senate and characterized the instability in Libya and North
Africa as potentially ``the most significant near-term threat to U.S.
and allies' interests on the continent . . .''.
Protecting our assets and people in this region is absolutely a
National security priority for our country right now--but I'm concerned
that this administration doesn't seem to recognize that.
President Trump's so-called ``America First'' budget seems to put
Africa last, proposing deep budget cuts to the continent. In fact, many
have speculated that confronting the threat of terrorism in Libya and
throughout the region will be low priority for this administration.
By proposing to cut the Department of State's international affairs
funding by one third, President Trump has signaled that he is not
interested in maintaining longstanding international partnerships,
which are crucial for U.S. diplomacy and development across the globe,
including in North Africa.
As I said, I believe that our success in confronting the threat in
Africa depends on the success of our partners leading this fight on the
ground. And while President Trump may not have a sophisticated
understanding of the value of diplomacy, we cannot allow that to
jeopardize the partnerships we've built in North Africa.
The terrorist threat to the U.S. homeland since 9/11 has continued
to evolve, and our counterterrorism policies must evolve as well--they
cannot be singularly focused on prevention only within our borders.
It is imperative that the United States works with our allies to
improve counterterrorism and intelligence efforts in North Africa--as
well as investing in education, economic development, and free and open
civil societies--in order to root out many of the drivers of violent
extremism in the region.
The level of U.S. funding, resources, and personnel dedicated to
these efforts must continue, if not increase, in order to limit the
risk and progress of terrorist groups in the region.
Again, we cannot underestimate the value of building and
strengthening local and international partnerships to combat terrorism
and radicalization in North Africa. International cooperation and
partnerships are the foundation of our counterterrorism efforts.
I look forward to a robust discussion with our witnesses today
about the threat of terrorism and radicalization in North Africa and
how we can shape U.S. policy to support our partners and defeat our
enemies.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. King. Thank you, Ranking Member.
Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record. We are pleased to
have, as I mentioned before, a distinguished panel of witnesses
before us today on this important topic. All the witnesses are
reminded that their written statement will be submitted for the
record.
Our first witness is Dr. J. Peter Pham. Dr. Pham is vice
president for Research and Regional Initiatives at the Atlantic
Council, as well as director of the Council's Africa Center.
Prior to joining the council in 2011, Dr. Pham was a tenured
associate professor of justice studies, political science, and
Africana studies at James Madison University where he was
director of the Nelson Institute for International and Public
Affairs.
He is the author of more than 300 essays and books. He
contributes to a number of a publications and regularly appears
as a commentator on U.S. and international broadcasts and print
media.
Dr. Pham served as head of Africa and Development Issues
for the Presidential campaign of Senator McCain in 2008 and co-
chair of the Africa Policy team for the Presidential campaign
of Governor Romney in 2012. He currently serves as chair of the
Africa Working Group of the John Hay Initiative.
Dr. Pham has been a trusted advisor to this committee, and
has testified several times on critical security issues in
Africa. Dr. Pham, it is great to have you back, and you are now
recognized for your testimony.
STATEMENT OF J. PETER PHAM, VICE PRESIDENT FOR RESEARCH AND
REGIONAL INITIATIVES, DIRECTOR FOR THE AFRICA CENTER, ATLANTIC
COUNCIL
Mr. Pham. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Rice, and distinguished
Members of the subcommittee, I would like to begin by thanking
you not only for the specific opportunity to testify before you
today on the subject of terrorism in North Africa, but also for
the sustained attention which the U.S. House of
Representatives, and this panel in particular, has given to
this challenge.
In its oversight capacity, you have been very much ahead of
the curve over the course of the last decade-and-a-half, and it
has been my singular privilege to have contributed, however
modestly, to this important effort.
Since my esteemed colleagues will be delving deeply into
the threat in North Africa posed by al-Qaeda, the so-called
Islamic State and their affiliates, I will concentrate
primarily on the threat from North Africa, focusing on the
danger posed by these groups in and of themselves, as well as
in their competition with each other.
The continuing threat posed by the various jihadist groups
operating in the Sahel is the result of their exploitation of
local conflicts, including socioeconomic and political
marginalization, as well as the fragile condition of the many
states affected.
In some cases, setbacks spur the extremists to adapt new
strategies that result in renewed vigor. A good example being
the fragmentation of AQIM's organization in the Sahel in the
wake of the French-led intervention in Mali, and the subsequent
multiplication of factions, some of which are organized along
ethnic lines, that facilitate both the members blending into
local populations, and their making further inroads among them.
Arguably, the Sahel, rather than the Maghreb, where, with
the exception of Libya, there are strong states that have shown
their ability to resist al-Qaeda and ISIS encroachments, the
Sahel is the region in Africa most at risk; especially if
hordes of battle-hardened fighters return to the continent from
the short-lived caliphate in the Levant and linked up with
others of their ilk displaced from Sirte and other places on
the Mediterranean littoral, and increasingly make their way
into the Fezzan and other points south.
It is no accident that the Sahel is, if not the poorest,
certainly one of the poorest majority Muslim regions in the
world. It is also home to the largest expanse of contiguous
ungoverned spaces on the African continent.
Many of the governments in the region are weak in their
capacity to asset authority, much less provide real services
beyond their capital cities and a smattering of urban centers
is extremely limited.
These fragile states present the jihadist both a
vulnerability to exploit in the short term and an opportunity
to create a new hub for operations in the long term, a
characteristic shared not only by ISIS-aligned groups in
Africa, like Boko Haram, but also al-Qaeda affiliates on the
continent like AQIM and further afield, Somalia's al-Shabaab,
is their almost uncanny resilience founded in part on the
flexibility with which they can put aside differences and join
forces in ever shifting combinations.
Moreover, apparent splits among the extremist groups can
perversely lead to increased violence, heightening the threat.
For example, the much-valued schism within Boko Haram,
formally aligned with ISIS since early 2015, between those
militants loyal to long-time leader Abubakar Shekau and those
following Abu Musab al-Barnawi, whom ISIS appointed as the new
Governor of its West Africa province last August may, as I saw
in November when I traveled to the battle front in northeastern
Nigeria with former AFRICOM commander General Carter Ham and
others embedded within Nigerian armor units.
That this may be contributing to the intensification rather
than the diminution of violence as both factions try to outdo
each other in staging attacks, with al-Barnawi's faction
gaining momentum, not only because of the defeats of Shekau's
faction suffered at the hands of Nigerian forces, but also
because of foreign fighters and other resources flowing in
thanks to the ISIS affiliation.
A similar phenomenon may also be at work in the competition
between al-Qaeda-linked groups and ISIS in the Sahel. In late
October, for example, ISIS confirmed they had accepted the
allegiance of Abu Walid al-Sahrawi, a one-time commander within
AQIM's al-Murabitun, who along with a group of fighters pledged
themselves to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who designated them his
greater Sahara division.
What is interesting is that al-Sahrawi first made bay'a to
the self-styled caliph more than a year ago, but his oath of
fealty was only accepted after he carried out a string of
attacks in the border lands of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger.
This broad survey permits us to draw a number of
conclusions about U.S. response to terrorism in Africa and the
possible threats posed to U.S. persons and interests abroad, as
well as to the American homeland, especially from jihadists
coming out of North Africa and penetrating Europe.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and Members of the
subcommittee, there is no doubt that ISIS and al-Qaeda-
affiliated groups in the northern part of Africa are poised to
wreak considerable havoc across the continent as they seek to
regroup in the ungoverned spaces of the Sahel, threatening not
only the countries immediately impacted, but also affecting the
interests and security of the United States and its allies
across the region.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you and the Members of the
subcommittee for your attention. I look forward to your
questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Pham follows:]
Prepared Statement of J. Peter Pham
March 29, 2015
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Rice, distinguished Members of the
subcommittee: I would like to begin by thanking you not only for the
specific opportunity to testify before you today on the subject of
terrorism in North Africa, but also for the sustained attention the
U.S. House of Representatives has, in general, given to this challenge.
In its oversight capacity, the House has been very much ahead of the
curve over the course of the last decade-and-a-half and it has been my
singular privilege to have contributed, however modestly, to this
important effort.
It was at a 2005 briefing organized by the Subcommittee on
International Terrorism and Nonproliferation of the then-Committee on
International Relations, that al-Shabaab was first mentioned as a
threat not only to the security of Somalia, but also to the wider East
Africa region and, indeed, the United States. The following year, a
joint hearing of the same Subcommittee on International Terrorism and
Nonproliferation and the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights,
and International Operations was among the very first instances of
public recognition by one of the two political branches of our
government of the expanding crisis in the Horn of Africa occasioned by
the takeover of Somalia by Islamist forces, including al-Shabaab.
And, of course, it was this Subcommittee on Intelligence and
Counterterrorism of the Committee on Homeland Security that, in 2011,
convened the very first Congressional hearing on Boko Haram. I also had
the privilege of testifying on that occasion when, once again, the
Legislative branch used its oversight prerogatives to shine a light on
what was then a poorly understood threat. At that time, Boko Haram was
considered so obscure that the all the participants at the event, held
to discuss a bipartisan report by the subcommittee staff on the threat
posed by the militant group, could have convened in the proverbial
broom closet. Sadly, our analysis proved prescient and, rather than
fading away as some dismissively suggested that it would, Boko Haram
went on to pose an even greater menace, not only to Nigeria and its
people, but to their neighbors in West Africa as well as to
international security writ large.
In each of these cases and, indeed, others that could be cited,
there is a recurring trope that emerges time and again: Terrorism in
Africa generally gets short shrift and, when attention is focused on
specific groups or situations that appear to be emerging challenges,
the threat is either dismissed entirely or minimized--until the
``unthinkable'' happens and tragedy strikes.
the context of terrorism in africa and the threat to the united states
and its interests
In considering the dynamic threat posed by al-Qaeda, the so-called
Islamic State (ISIS), their various affiliates, and other jihadist
groups in Africa, it is worth recalling that Africa had been a theater
for terrorist operations, including those directed against the United
States, long before the attacks of September 11, 2001, on the homeland
focused attention on what had hitherto been regions seemingly
peripheral to the strategic landscape, at least as most American policy
makers and analysts perceived it.
If one takes as a definition of terrorism the broadly accepted
description offered by the United Nations General Assembly 1 year after
the East Africa bombings--``criminal acts intended or calculated to
provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or
particular persons for political purposes''--terrorism can be said to
be wide-spread in Africa, although it has largely been a domestic,
rather than transnational, affair. However, just because the majority
of actors and the incidents they are responsible for are domestic to
African countries does not mean that they cannot and do not evolve into
international threats when, in fact, that is the trajectory many, if
not most, aspire to and which quite a few have indeed succeeded in
achieving in recent years.
The first post-9/11 iteration of the National Security Strategy of
the United States of America, released a year after the attacks on the
American homeland, raised the specter that ``weak states . . . can pose
as great a danger to our National interests as strong states. Poverty
does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty,
weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to
terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders.''\1\
Extremism, however, requires opportunity if it is to translate radical
intentionality into terrorist effect. One leading African security
analyst succinctly summarized the situation in the following manner:
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\1\ The most recent iteration of the National Security Strategy of
the United States of America, released February 6, 2015, by the
previous administration couched U.S. strategic objectives in Africa
largely in terms of broader development goals, rather than traditional
security concerns which were emphasized in earlier documents: ``Africa
is rising. Many countries in Africa are making steady progress in
growing their economies, improving democratic governance and rule of
law, and supporting human rights and basic freedoms. Urbanization and a
burgeoning youth population are changing the region's demographics, and
young people are increasingly making their voices heard. But there are
still many countries where the transition to democracy is uneven and
slow with some leaders clinging to power. Corruption is endemic and
public health systems are broken in too many places. And too many
governments are responding to the expansion of civil society and free
press by passing laws and adopting policies that erode that progress.
On-going conflicts in Sudan, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, and the Central African Republic, as well as violent
extremists fighting governments in Somalia, Nigeria, and across the
Sahel all pose threats to innocent civilians, regional stability, and
our National security.''
``The opportunity targets presented by peacekeepers, aid and
humanitarian workers, donors and Western NGO's active in the continent
are lucrative targets of subnational terrorism and international
terrorism. Africa is also replete with potentially much higher-value
targets ranging from the massive oil investments (often by U.S.
companies) in the Gulf of Guinea to the burgeoning tourist industry in
South Africa.''\2\
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\2\ Jakkie Cilliers, ``Terrorism and Africa,'' African Security
Review 12, no. 4 (2003): 100.
Thus there is a very real terrorist risk to U.S. persons and
interests--a risk that is increasing with time if one looks at its
three constituent elements: Threat, the frequency or likelihood of
adverse events; vulnerability, the likelihood of success of a
particular threat category against a particular target; and cost, the
total impact of a particular threat experienced by a vulnerable target,
including both the ``hard costs'' of actual damages and the ``soft
costs'' to production, the markets, reputation, etc. In short, the
combination of these three factors--threat, vulnerability, and cost--
ought to elevate not inconsiderably the overall risk assessment in
Africa.
And this last point is not lost upon those who wish us harm. Dating
back to at least the period when Osama bin Laden himself found refuge
in Sudan, the leading strategists of Islamist terrorism have speculated
about the potential opportunities to establish cells, recruit members,
obtain financing, and find safe haven offered by the weak governance
capacities and other vulnerabilities of African states. In fact, it has
been noted that al-Qaeda's first act against the United States came
several years before the embassy bombings when it attempted to insert
itself in the fight against the American-led humanitarian mission in
Somalia. Moreover, one of the most systematic expositions of the
particular allure of the continent to terrorists came from al-Qaeda's
on-line magazine, Sada al-Jihad (``Echo of Jihad''). The June 2006
issue of that publication featured an article by one Abu Azzam al-
Ansari entitled ``Al-Qaeda is Moving to Africa,'' in which the author
asserted:
``There is no doubt that al-Qaeda and the holy warriors appreciate the
significance of the African regions for the military campaigns against
the Crusaders. Many people sense that this continent has not yet found
its proper and expected role and the next stages of the conflict will
see Africa as the battlefield.''
With a certain analytical rigor, Abu Azzam then proceeded to
enumerate and evaluate what he perceived to be significant advantages
to al-Qaeda shifting terrorist operations to Africa, including: The
fact that jihadist doctrines have already been spread within the Muslim
communities of many African countries; the political and military
weakness of African governments; the wide availability of weapons; the
geographical position of Africa vis-a-vis international trade routes;
the proximity to old conflicts against ``Jews and Crusaders'' in the
Middle East as well as new ones like Darfur, where the author almost
gleefully welcomed the possibility of Western intervention; the poverty
of Africa which ``will enable the holy warriors to provide some finance
and welfare, thus, posting there some of their influential
operatives''; the technical and scientific skills that potential
African recruits would bring to the jihadist cause; the presence of
large Muslim communities, including ones already embroiled conflict
with Christians or adherents of traditional African religions; the
links to Europe through North Africa ``which facilitates the move from
there to carry out attacks''; and the fact that Africa has a wealth of
natural resources, including hydrocarbons and other raw materials,
which are ``very useful for the holy warriors in the intermediate and
long term.'' Abu Azzam concluded his assessment by sounding an ominous
note:
``In general, this continent has an immense significance. Whoever looks
at Africa can see that it does not enjoy the interest, efforts, and
activity it deserves in the war against the Crusaders. This is a
continent with many potential advantages and exploiting this potential
will greatly advance the jihad. It will promote achieving the expected
targets of Jihad. Africa is a fertile soil for the advance of jihad and
the jihadi cause.''
While much has been made by some academics about the supposed lack
of appeal which the jihadist ideology and approaches of al-Qaeda and
ISIS exercise among different African peoples and communities, it is my
contention that this analysis underestimates the attractive power of
the reputation of these jihadist movements, especially when the
extremist doctrine--for which years of ample propaganda by missionaries
funded from abroad has prepared the terrain, however intentionally or
unintentionally is associated with the apparent battlefield success--as
was the case, for example, early on for ISIS--and harnessed to local
grievances. In fact, the conflation of local concerns and global
narratives has been an important milestone in the evolution of various
African militant groups, providing the leaders with a platform
whereupon to seek support and legitimacy above and beyond the confines
of the struggle they had hitherto been engaged. This has clearly been
the case with the transformation of the Algerian Groupe Salafiste pour
la Predication et le Combat (GSPC, ``Salafist Group for Preaching and
Combat'') into al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)\3\ and Boko
Haram's decision to pledge allegiance to ISIS and brand itself as
Wilayat al Sudan al Gharbi (``[Islamic State] Province in the West Land
of the Blacks,'' or ``Islamic State West Africa Province,'' ISWAP).\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ See J. Peter Pham, ``Foreign Influences and Shifting Horizons:
The Ongoing Evolution of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,'' Orbis 55,
no. 2 (Spring 2011): 240-254; and idem, ``The Dangerous `Pragmatism' of
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,'' Journal of the Middle East and
Africa 2, no. 1 (January-June 2011): 15-29.
\4\ See idem, ``Boko Haram: The Strategic Evolution of the Islamic
State's West Africa Province,'' Journal of the Middle East and Africa
7, no. 1 (2016): 1-18.
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It was clearly a mistake for many a decade ago to have dismissed
Abu Azzam's analysis as devoid of operational effect and it would
certainly be foolhardy to do so now. In fact, we are here today not
only because this subcommittee has been commendably diligent in
maintaining its vigilance, but because, in point of fact, Abu Azzam was
very correct: Africa is indeed ``fertile soil for the advance of jihad
and the jihadi cause.''
the current threat from north africa
Since my esteemed colleagues whom the subcommittee has invited will
delve deeply into the threat in North Africa posed by al-Qaeda, ISIS,
and the affiliates, I will concentrate primarily on the threat from
North Africa, focusing on the danger posed by these groups in and of
themselves as well as in their competition with each other.
With respect to North Africa itself, the Maghreb is home to some of
the longest-running terrorist campaigns on the African continent, a
situation that has become all the more combustible in recent years with
the emergence of ISIS ``provinces'' amid the disintegration of Libya,
alongside preexisting groups like AQIM and still other Islamist bands
which emerged in the wake of the collapse of Muammar Gaddafi's
dictatorship. The presence of jihadist entities on the very shores of
the Mediterranean Sea is not just happenstance but also serves to
emphasize--as, no doubt, the terrorists intend to underscore--not only
the threat posed to the vital, but narrow, sea lanes nearby, but also
the proximity of the violence to Europe itself. It is certainly a point
that America and the other top advanced economies, when they convene
for the Group of Seven (G7) summit in May, which meeting is focused on
Africa this year, would do well to recall--and not simply, as some of
our European partners would like, discuss the challenges of migration.
Fortunately, commensurate with the challenges in this region, the
international community also has solid allies with which to work on not
just combatting terrorism, but countering its extremist roots. Notable
among these partners is Morocco, a long-standing ``major non-NATO
ally'' of the United States, whose aggressive, multi-pronged approach
to countering radical ideology and terrorism has much to commend it as
does the kingdom's efforts to assist other countries in North and West
Africa in the same fight. The potential of the U.S.-Morocco Framework
for Cooperation, signed during the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit in 2014
and aimed at developing Moroccan training experts as well as jointly
training civilian security and counterterrorism forces with other
partners in the Maghreb and the Sahel in recognizing a ``triangular''
approach, needs to be better appreciated and developed.
Beyond the Maghreb itself, the Sahel, the belt connecting North
Africa and West Africa, stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red
Sea and straddling ancient trade and migration routes, is an almost
ideal environment for extremist groups with transnational ambitions,
whether ISIS fighters smarting from defeats on the battlefields of Iraq
and Syria or al-Qaeda militants seeking to reassert the preeminence of
the organization within the global jihadist movement. The region is
strategically important for several reasons, including its role as a
bridge between the Arab Maghreb and black Sub-Saharan Africa as well as
its important energy reserves, both renewable and non-renewable, and
other natural resources. Moreover, the Sahel touches several
countries--including Algeria, Nigeria, and Sudan--with serious security
challenges of their own that could easily spill over their borders. In
fact, some scholars have argued that the Sahara and the Sahel form ``a
single space of movement'' which, for purposes of the geography of
terrorism, ``should be considered as a continuum, something that the
territorial approach of states and geopolitics prevents us from
understanding''\5\--a point which policy makers and analysts would do
well to take to heart. In point of fact, not only has the Sahel been
for centuries literally the conduit over which arms, fighters, and
ideologies have flowed back and forth across the Sahara, but it has
clearly emerged in recent times as a battlespace in its own right.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Olivier Walther and Denis Retaille, Sahara or Sahel? The Fuzzy
Geography of Terrorism in West Africa (Luxembourg: CEPS/INSTEAD, 2010),
11.
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The continuing threat posed by the various jihadist groups
operating in the Sahel is the result of their exploitation of local
conflicts, including social, economic, and political marginalization,
as well as the fragile condition of many of the states affected, which
is often manifested both in low capacity to resist overall and a
tendency toward ham-fisted responses that aggravate grievances. In some
cases, defeat spurs the extremists to adapt new strategies that result
in renewed vigor, a good example being the fragmentation of AQIM's
organization in the Sahel in the wake of the French-led intervention in
Mali and the subsequent multiplication of factions, some of which, like
the ethnic-Fulani (or Peul) Macina Liberation Front which freed nearly
a hundred detained militants in a jailbreak in early December, are
organized along ethnic lines that facilitate both the members' blending
into local populations and their making further inroads among them.\6\
In other instances, the manifest failure to achieve political
settlements propel the resurgence of otherwise weakened militant
groups.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ The rise in militancy among some Fulani is not limited to the
Sahel proper. There is growing evidence of a significant acceleration
in attacks in Nigeria's Middle Belt. See 21st Century Wilberforce
Initiative, Nigeria: Fractured and Forgotten (2016), available at
http://www.standwithnigeria.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Nigeria-
Fractured-and-Forgotten.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Arguably the Sahel, rather than the Maghreb where, with the
exception of Libya, there are strong states that have shown their
ability to resist not only al-Qaeda, but also ISIS, encroachments, is
the region in Africa most at risk, especially if hordes of battle-
hardened fighters return to the continent from the short-lived
``caliphate'' in the Levant and link up with others of their ilk
displaced from Sirte and other places on the Mediterranean littoral and
increasingly making their way to the Fezzan and other points south.
It is no accident that the Sahel is, if not the poorest, certainly
one of the poorest majority-Muslim regions in the world. It is also
home to the largest expanse of contiguous ungoverned spaces on the
African continent: Many of the governments in the region are weak and
their capacity to assert authority--much less provide real services--
beyond their capital cities and a smattering of urban centers is
extremely limited. These fragile states present the jihadists both a
vulnerability to exploit in the short term and an opportunity to create
a new hub for operations over the long term.
In Mali, for example, what started in late 2011 and early 2012 as a
rebellion by the disaffected Tuareg population led to the overthrow of
state authority in the country's three northernmost provinces with a
combined territory the size of France and, following the
marginalization of the ethnic separatists by their erstwhile allies
from several jihadist groups, the entire area falling under the sway of
AQIM. Only a timely French-led military intervention in early 2013
forestalled the total collapse of the Malian state, although again, the
situation remains fragile as the fact that the United Nations
peacekeeping mission in the country is the deadliest on-going blue-
helmeted operation in the world underscores. Despite being mauled by
Operation Serval and, subsequently, hounded by French and U.S. Special
Operations Forces in the region, AQIM has bounced back to stage a
series of deadly attacks last year, including spectacular hits on
luxury hotels in two neighboring countries, Burkina Faso and Cote
d'Ivoire, that had previously not been hit by terrorists. Burkina Faso
suffered another attack in mid-December, with 12 members of the
country's special anti-terrorism unit killed in an assault on a
military base near the Malian border. Even where they may not currently
pose an existential threat to the states affected, these attacks from
deep in the Sahel can nonetheless have a disproportionate impact on
their fortunes. Cote d'Ivoire may be heralded as Africa's new economic
powerhouse, with a diversified economy and growth in 2016 of 8.5
percent, the second-highest in the world, but more attacks like the one
in last year by AQIM can still scare off foreign investors who are just
beginning to discover the country's potential.
The stakes are even higher for country like Nigeria. Africa's most
populous country slipped into recession last year, losing the
distinction it gained only 3 years ago as the continent's biggest
economy, and continued insecurity from jihadist threats certainly do
not help. After years of ceding ground to Boko Haram, so much so that
by 2014 the group had consolidated its hold over a territory larger
than Belgium and proclaimed a self-styled ``emirate,'' the Nigerian
armed forces adopted a new strategy and began fighting back. While the
counterattack began in the waning days of former President Goodluck
Jonathan's administration, things really began to change after
Muhammadu Buhari, a retired major-general and former military ruler,
won a historic (and decisive) election victory over the incumbent in
March 2015, in part by promising to defeat the militants. Cashiering
his predecessor's military chiefs shortly after taking office, Buhari
installed new commanders, including a chief of army staff, Lieutenant-
General Tukur Yusuf Buratai, who is a native of Borno, the epicenter of
the insurgency, and moved command headquarters close to the fighting.
Since then, in concert with a multinational force from neighboring
countries, the Nigerian military has pursued an aggressive strategy,
combining an intensive air campaign with a surge of troops on the
ground, that gradually pushed Boko Haram out of the towns it had
previously occupied and, increasingly, in remote hideouts like ``Camp
Zero,'' the base in the remote Sambisa Forest that fell to government
forces 2 days before Christmas last year.
Along the way, as I had the opportunity to witness first-hand last
November when I toured the battlefront, the Nigerian army also took on
the task of not only providing security to the populations it liberated
from the militants' dominion, but also, until aid groups and
development organizations returned, providing humanitarian relief,
medical assistance, and even education and livelihood training. For
example, the civil-military operations carried out by battalion I spent
time with in Pulka, a key crossroads town just a few kilometers from
what were at the time Boko Haram positions in the Sambisa Forest, were
critical not only to the well-being of the community, but served to
rally the population to support the government's push against the
militant group.
Nevertheless, notwithstanding the success of the military
operations, Boko Haram remains a force to be reckoned with. In response
to the military defeats it has suffered, the militants shifted tactics,
expanding their use of suicide bombings, most of which have targeted
the civilian population. Meanwhile, the schism within Boko Haram,
formally aligned with ISIS since early 2015, between those loyal to
long-time leader Abubakar Shekau and those following Abu Musab al-
Barnawi, whom ISIS appointed as the new ``Governor'' (wali) of its
``province'' last August, may be contributing to the intensification,
rather than diminution, of violence as both factions try to outdo each
other in staging attacks. In fact, there are strong indications that
Barnawi's faction may be gaining momentum, aided not only by the
defeats Shekau's factions have suffered at the hands of Nigerian
forces, but also by fighters and other resources flowing to it thanks
to the ISIS affiliation. Furthermore, to the extent that the militants
have been weakened in Nigeria, they have spilled into neighboring
countries, causing Cameroon and Niger, for example, to rise in the 2016
edition of the Global Terrorism Index to 13th place and 16th place,
respectively.
A characteristic shared not only by ISIS-aligned groups in Africa
like Boko Haram, but also al-Qaeda affiliates on the continent like
AQIM and, further afield, Somalia's al-Shabaab, is their almost uncanny
resilience, founded in part on the flexibility with which they can put
aside differences and join forces in ever-shifting combinations. Just
earlier this month, for example, several jihadist factions operating in
Mali--Ansar Dine (``defenders of the faith''), the Sahara and al-
Murabitun (``people of the garrison'') branches of AQIM, and the Macina
Liberation Front--announced their merger and pledged their allegiance
to al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. The new group, named Jama'at
Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen (``group for the support of Islam and
Muslims''), is to be headed by an ``emir,'' Iyad ag Ghaly, formerly
leader of Ansar Dine and, before that, a leader in Tuareg rebellions
against the Malian government going back to the 1980's. A week later,
al-Zawahiri issued a statement of ``approval and blessing'' on the new
group and expressed his hope that it would constitute ``an impregnable
fortress against the enemies of Islam who have seen a reversal of the
fortunes of the partisans of Islam and jihad.''
While al-Qaeda-linked groups in the region have resisted ISIS
incursions into territory they have long viewed as their own, there
have been instances in which factions within the former have sought to
align themselves with the latter. In late October 2016, for example,
ISIS confirmed that it had accepted the allegiance of Abu Walid al-
Sahrawi, a former commander within al-Murabitun, who, along with 40 of
his fighters, pledged themselves to Abubakar al-Baghdadi, who
designated them his ``Greater Sahara'' division. What is interesting is
that al-Sahrawi first made bay`a to the self-styled caliph more than a
year earlier, but his oath of fealty was only accepted after he carried
out string of attacks in the borderlands of Burkina Faso, Mali, and
Niger. Thus an increase in violence could be the result as al-Qaeda and
ISIS literally compete to outdo each other in the Sahel in the hopes of
attracting recruits and other resources.
recommendations for a comprehensive u.s. response
This broad survey permits the drawing of several conclusions about
the U.S. response to terrorism in Africa and the possible threats posed
to U.S. persons and interests abroad as well as the American homeland,
especially from jihadists coming out of North Africa.
First, time and again, the mistake has been made to underestimate--
if not to discount entirely the threat faced. Part of this is
attributable to an analytical bias to limit future possibilities to
extrapolations from the past, a hermeneutical choice which ignores the
dynamic potential which many terrorist organizations, especially in
Africa, have exhibited time and again. Another part of the explanation
is even more basic: The sheer lack of resources for Africa-related
intelligence and analysis across the whole of the U.S. Government.
Given the geopolitical, economic, and security stakes, the failure to
invest more in dedicated institutions, personnel, training, and
strategic focus as well as materiel and other resources is incredibly
shortsighted.
Second, with the exception of the Department of Defense, across the
U.S. Government there is an artificial division of the continent that,
quite frankly, is rejected not only by Africans, but is also unhelpful,
a point I have consistently made.\7\ If one looks, for example, at the
North African States which are usually grouped with those in the Near
East, there are few compelling geopolitical, economic, or strategic
reasons to do so except perhaps for Egypt. In point of fact, the
overwhelming majority of the regional political, security, and
commercial links extending to and from the other four countries of the
Maghreb go north-south across the Sahara, not east-west toward the
Levant. The adhesion of Morocco to the African Union earlier this
year--itself the culmination of a long-time diplomatic effort and
economic engagement--as well as the kingdom's request to join the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) further reinforce
the case for treating Africa as a whole within the U.S. Government. The
reorganization of the National Security Council in the current
administration, with the transfer of responsibility for the Maghrebi
countries to the senior director for Africa, is a commendable move that
needs to be followed across the whole of government.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ See J. Peter Pham, A Measured US Strategy for the New Africa,
with a foreword by James L. Jones, Jr. (Washington, DC: Atlantic
Council, 2016), available at http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/
publications/reports/a-measured-us-strategy-for-the-new-africa.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Third, the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), the geographic command
responsible for implementing whatever military operations, including
counterterrorism operations, are eventually deemed necessary on the
African continent, whether by assisting African partners or taking
direct action, has since its establishment been hampered to varying
degrees by not-quite-adequate resources to carry out its ordinary
assigned mission, to say nothing of extraordinary challenges which have
arisen in recent years within its area of responsibility. While the
successive AFRICOM commanders have stewarded what they had heroically,
often adroitly juggling resources and priorities, clearly a more
sustainable approach is required, even in the current challenging
fiscal climate.
Fourth, even accepting the necessary economies in areas other than
military and homeland security as signaled in the administration's
recent budget blueprint, it is still nothing short of mind-boggling
that in Nigeria there is no U.S. diplomatic presence north of the
capital of Abuja, which is located in that country's geographical
center. Thus, the northern part of the West African country, home to
more than 90 million predominantly Muslim people who would, by
themselves, constitute Africa's third-most-populous country--and in the
middle of the geopolitically sensitive Sahel region at that--has been
entirely bereft of U.S. diplomatic presence (and the on-going
intelligence and other monitoring capabilities that come with such a
mission) ever since the consulate in Kaduna was closed in 1991, the
exception being on those rare occasions when, with appropriate security
assured, ad hoc forays from the embassy are authorized.
Fifth, closely related to terrorism is the danger posed by lack of
effective sovereignty that bedevils many African governments. Often the
challenge first manifests itself in criminality, whether in the form of
piracy and other brigandage or in that of trafficking, human or
material. Moreover, the Sahel has seen an explosion in narco-
trafficking, both in terms of transshipments bound for Europe and other
destinations and, even more worrisome, of deliveries for local
consumption. For the United States, all this means that increasing
vigilance against terrorism in Africa also requires greater investments
in law enforcement capabilities focused on the continent, including
enhanced analytical resources at home, more liaison personnel posted
abroad, and stepping up efforts to build the capacity of our partners
on the continent.
Sixth, as America's relationships--diplomatic, security, economic,
and cultural--with Africa as a whole and the individual countries on
the continent expand and deepen--a positive development to be sure--an
unfortunate downside is that the potential risk to U.S. persons and
interests as well as to the homeland necessarily increases. Quite
simply, the threats are there and, by its very nature, more engagement
also increases exposure and vulnerability. The answer is not to curtail
engagement since there are clear strategic imperatives for seeking to
build these links, but to ensure that adequate resources are mustered
to cope with the meet the rising demand across a whole range of sectors
from civil aviation to ports to customs and immigration, etc., for
intelligence about and security against threats originating in this
dynamic region.
Seventh, the challenge of African terrorism, especially out of
North Africa, and any derivative threat to the United States cannot be
addressed except in an integrated fashion, with solutions that embrace
a broader notion of human security writ large--encompassing social,
economic, and political development--which, often enough, also must
transcend national and other artificial boundaries. This obviously is
not and should not be a task for the United States alone, but is one
which it is in America's strategic interest to play its part.
conclusion
There is no doubt that ISIS--and al-Qaeda-affiliated groups in the
northern part of Africa are poised to wreak considerable havoc across
the continent as they seek to regroup in the ungoverned spaces of the
Sahel, threatening not only the countries immediately impacted, but
also affecting the interests and security of the United States and its
allies across the region.
Ironically, this comes at a time when the narrative on Africa in
the United States has increasingly shifted toward a greater focus on
the extraordinary opportunities on the continent. However, if this
momentum is to be maintained and those opportunities grasped, the
United States needs to redouble its own efforts and also work closely
with its African partners to manage the challenges and overcome
terrorism and other the threats to security which stand in the way to
an incredibly promising future. As the President has repeatedly
declared, halting the spread of radical Islamism and jihadist violence
should be a cornerstone of the foreign policy of the United States and
that ``all actions should be oriented around this goal, and any country
which shares this goal will be our ally.''
Mr. King. Dr. Pham, thank you once again for your testimony
and very much appreciate it.
Now our second witness is Dr. Geoff Porter. Dr. Porter is
the president of North Africa Risk Consulting, a political and
security risk analysis firm specializing exclusively in North
Africa.
From 2013 to 2016, Dr. Porter was an assistant professor at
the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. He has made more than
three dozen trips to Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, as well as
multiple trips to Libya before and after the 2011 revolution
that resulted in the overthrow of Colonel Gaddafi's regime.
Dr. Porter has also briefed U.S. Ambassadors to Algeria,
Tunisia, and Libya regarding political and security
developments in those countries prior to assuming their posts.
Dr. Porter, welcome you today, and you are recognized for
your testimony. Thank you very much.
STATEMENT OF GEOFF D. PORTER, PRESIDENT, NORTH AFRICA RISK
CONSULTING, INC.
Mr. Porter. Thank you, Chairman King.
Chairman King, Ranking Member Rice, distinguished Members
of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify
before you today. It is an honor to share with you my analysis
of the threat posed by North African terrorism to the homeland
and to U.S. National interests overseas.
Terrorism in North Africa in recent years is entirely
salafi jihadi in nature, or jihadi salafi in nature depending
on how you want to define that term. The goal of these jihadi
salafi organizations is to oust the political frameworks and
leadership in the nation-states in which they operate.
In addition, they want to erode the influence of the United
States and its European allies in North Africa. The persistence
of jihadi salafi terrorist organizations in North Africa poses
a direct threat to U.S. interests abroad and an indirect and
longer term threat to the homeland here in the United States.
Jihadi salafi terrorist groups in North Africa can be
divided into two large rubrics. There are those allied with al-
Qaeda and those that have pledged allegiance to the Islamic
State. For al-Qaeda-affiliated groups and the Islamic State
allies alike, the United States remains the enemy.
With its on-going operations in Tunisia and its regroupment
in the Sahara and the Sahel, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is
now the strongest terrorist organization in North Africa and
poses the greatest threat to U.S. National interests in the
region.
The Islamic State suffered a severe setback in North Africa
due to the loss of its bastion in Sirte, Libya. There
reportedly have been fewer squirters from the Sirte offensive
than anticipated. Those that did escape are dispersed
throughout Libya and northern Niger. In addition, there are
Islamic State sympathizers in Morocco and Mali.
Although North Africa and the Sahara are not strategic
regions for the United States, jihadi salafi terrorist
organizations threaten the United States in three ways. North
African terrorist organizations will target the U.S. Government
when they can. In addition to the U.S. diplomatic corps, the
United States has soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen in
North Africa who are high-value targets for jihadi salafi
terrorists.
In addition to government personnel, jihadi salafi groups
threaten U.S. citizens in North Africa. AQIM and the Islamic
State's willingness to kill civilians is well-documented. It is
due to a combination of vacationing patterns, limited U.S.
foreign direct investment in North Africa, and sheer luck that
more Americans have not been killed by salafi jihadi groups in
North Africa.
The operations of U.S. companies in North Africa are also
vulnerable to jihadi salafi terrorism. Numerous U.S. companies
have investments and activities in North Africa, particularly
in the oil and gas sector, but also in petrochemicals,
telecoms, defense, pharmaceuticals, and renewables.
A terrorist attack, regardless of whether it directly
targets a U.S. company or the private sector in general,
disrupts commercial activity and erodes value of U.S.
corporations.
Nevertheless, the threat posed by North African terrorist
organizations to Europe is greater than the threat they pose to
the United States because of geographic proximity, colonial
legacies, linguistic facility, and the commonality of dual
nationalities among European and North African countries.
Even so, like any other group around the globe, jihadi
salafis are mobile. What this means is that even though jihadi
salafi groups in North Africa may not pose a direct threat to
the United States because they do not have the operational
capacity to do so, or because it is not a strategic priority
for them, individual North African jihadi salafis can
contribute to the capabilities of other jihadi salafi groups
outside North Africa that do have the capacity and the
intention to target the United States.
Moreover, if groups are left unmolested, they will evolve
to the--and their capacity to plan and train will grow,
potentially to the point where attacking the U.S. homeland is
not out of reach.
Since 2013, the United States has employed a new model for
counterterrorism operations in North Africa that relies on
logistical and ISR support to allies, BPC programs, and the
limited use of SOF to advise, assist, and accompany local
forces, and find, fix, and finish high-value targets.
This approach's constant pressure slows the evolution of
terrorist groups and prevents them from gaining the
capabilities that could ultimately allow them to target the
homelands. Despite the new approach's advantages, military
solutions never eliminate terrorism.
It is equally important to address the underlying
conditions that lead to the emergence and continuation of
terrorist organizations in North Africa. One of the fundamental
drivers of jihadi salafi terrorism is the sense of injustice
and the belief that the implementation of a salafi
interpretation of Islam via jihad will ensure Muslim social
justice.
There is a justifiable and a quantifiable perception that
the playing field in North Africa, the Sahara, and the Sahel is
uneven. If injustice fuels the jihadi salafi narrative, then
that narrative burns bright in North Africa. Considering its
historical commitment to justice and good governance, the
United States should work through aid and development programs
to reduce North African deficits in those areas.
Removing terrorists from the battlefield downrange only
retards the group's evolution. To truly secure the homelands,
the United States must address the underlying causes of North
African terrorism, chief among of them injustice and lack of
rule of law. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Porter follows:]
Prepared Statement of Geoff D. Porter
March 29, 2017
Chairman King, Ranking Member Rice, and distinguished Members of
the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you
today. My name is Geoff Porter. I am the president of North Africa Risk
Consulting, the political and security risk analysis firm specializing
exclusively in North Africa. North Africa Risk Consulting provides
analysis of evolving political and security contexts in Algeria, Libya,
Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia to private sector corporations and
different U.S. Government agencies and departments. In addition, from
2013-2016, I was an assistant professor at the United States Military
Academy at West Point in the Department of Social Sciences and an
instructor with the Combating Terrorism Center. In my capacity as
president of North Africa Risk Consulting and previously as a faculty
member at West Point, I made more than three dozen trips to Morocco,
Algeria, and Tunisia, as well as multiple trips to Libya before and
after the 2011 revolution that resulted in the overthrow of Col.
Muammar Qadhafi's regime. I have had the good fortune of having briefed
U.S. Ambassadors to Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya regarding political and
security developments in those countries prior to their assuming their
posts. It is a privilege and an honor to share my analysis of the
threat posed by terrorism in North Africa with you.
terrorism in north africa
Terrorism in North Africa in recent years is entirely jihadi salafi
in nature. Although there are differences among jihadi salafi terrorist
organizations, they all stem from an interpretation of Islam that
argues that there is a very narrow canon from which Islamic tenets and
duties should be derived and that among those tenets and obligations is
the duty to confront by any means necessary non-Muslims or Muslims that
these organizations deem to be insufficiently religious. The goal of
these jihadi salafi organizations is inherently political. They want to
oust the political leadership in the nation-states in which they
operate because that leadership does not share their same
interpretation of how political systems should operate. In addition,
they want to erode the influence of the United States and its European
allies in areas in which they operate.
The persistence of jihadi salafi terrorist organizations in North
Africa poses a direct threat to U.S. National interests overseas and an
indirect and longer-term threat to the homeland. For al-Qaeda
affiliated groups and Islamic State allies alike, the United States
remains the enemy.
Jihadi salafi terrorist groups in North Africa can be divided into
two large rubrics. There are those allied with al-Qaeda, which
continues to be led by Ayman al-Zawahiri. And there are those who have
pledged allegiance to the Islamic State under the leadership of Abu
Bakr al-Baghdadi. Tactical disagreements and different loyalties keep
these two groups apart, but there is slippage between them and
individuals and affiliates move back and forth.\1\
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\1\ Thomas, Dominique, ``Etat islamique vs. Al-Qaida : autopsie
d'une lutte fratricide,'' Politique etrangere, N. 1, printemps 2016.
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Defining North Africa
The definition of North Africa can vary from one institution to
another. For some U.S. agencies, North Africa includes not only the
conventional Maghreb countries (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco,
Tunisia), but also Saharan and Sahelian countries (Burkina Faso, Chad,
Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal). For the purposes of this examination of
the threat posed by terrorism in North Africa, the definition of North
Africa will be a hybrid of regional stakeholders' own definition of
North Africa as ``the Maghreb'' and North African terrorist
organizations' definition of their area of operations, which includes
Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Niger.\2\ This definition accommodates
the cross-border, transnational nature of terrorist organizations and
of the diplomatic and military approaches adopted to combat it by the
United States, France, and regional governments.
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\2\ http://www.maghrebarabe.org/ar/.
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Al-Qaeda and Affiliated Groups
In January 2017, al-Qaeda's regional affiliation, al-Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb, or AQIM, marked its 10th anniversary. AQIM emerged in
moment of desperation out of a pre-existing salafi nationalist
terrorist organization (the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, or
GSPC) that was increasingly without a viable mission.\3\ The GSPC was
dedicated to fighting the Algerian government allegedly in order to
restore the aborted 1991 legislative elections. By 2004, the government
and the Algerian population had moved on and were focused on restoring
peace and stability. The GSPC's leader in 2005, Abdelmalek Droukdel,
initiated the process whereby the GSPC first became formally affiliated
with al-Qaeda, and then in 2007 announced that it had become AQIM.\4\
Over the course of the last 10 years, AQIM's strategy, tactics, and
area of operations have evolved, responding to changes in the broader
jihadi movement and to political and security developments in the
region.
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\3\ Porter, Geoff D., ``AQIM Ten Years On,'' The Cipher Brief, 12
January 2017.
\4\ Tawil, Camille, Brothers in Arms: The Story of al-Qa`ida and
the Arab Jihadists (London: Saqi, 2011), trans. Robin Bray.
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Droukdel remains the organization's leader, but it has expanded its
operations beyond just Algeria to include a broad swath of North
Africa. In fact, its operations in Algeria itself are curtailed and the
group has struggled recently to remain relevant in the Algerian
context. That being said, as evinced by the 18 March 2016 attack
against the In Salah Gas asset at Krechba, AQIM retains some domestic
support in Algeria and still has the capacity to carry out episodic
strikes against high-value targets, especially far from urban centers
where security measures are less rigorous.\5\
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\5\ Hadjer Guenanfa, ``Attaque contre le site gazier de Krechba: la
piste d'un terroriste de la region,'' Tout sur l'Algerie, 22 March
2016.
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AQIM's evolution has not been seamless and the organization has
experienced schisms and leadership fracture. In particular, in 2012
Droukdel quarreled with one of his commanders in northern Mali, and
that commander, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, quit AQIM to form his own
organization, al-Mourabitoun, made up of AQIM fighters as well as
fighters from the Movement for Unity in Jihad in West Africa or MUJAO
(Fr. Mouvement pour l'unicite et le jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest.)\6\
Four months after its formation, a heavily-armed platoon of al-
Mourabitoun fighters attacked the Tigantourine Gas Plant at In Amenas
in Algeria. The attackers originated in northern Mali, transited
eastward across the country, passed through northeastern Niger, and
entered southwestern Libya where they staged their operation. The
attackers subsequently crossed Algeria's border and attacked the gas
facility. More than 3 dozen expatriates were killed at the site,
including 3 U.S. citizens.\7\
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\6\ Ould Salem, Lamine, Ben Laden du Sahara. Sur les traces du
jihadiste Mokhtar Belmokhtar (ed. de La Martiniere, 2014).
\7\ Statoil, In Amenas Investigation Report (2013).
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Following the In Amenas attack, al-Mourabitoun went to ground,
possibly as a result of having lost so many men in the attack, but also
because it was being doggedly hunted. From January 2013 to July 2014,
France had deployed roughly 4,000 troops as part of Operation Serval
whose objective was to stabilize northern Mali in the wake of a jihadi
salafi offensive. The French presence on the ground and its assets in
the air hindered Belmokhtar and al-Mourabitoun's movements.
In the aftermath of the 2011 Libyan revolution, AQIM also tried to
make inroads among jihadi salafi groups in Libya, including with Ansar
al-Sharia, the jihadi salafi group involved in the attack against the
U.S. compound in Benghazi.\8\ Belmokhtar was allegedly charged with
initiating relations between AQIM and Ansar al-Sharia.\9\ While
Belmokhtar's overtures were likely well-received, they did not result
in any operational coordination between AQIM and Ansar al-Sharia. Ansar
al-Sharia itself has since been absorbed into other jihadi salafi
organizations in Libya, including the Mujahids' Shura Council Darna and
the Mujahids' Shura Council Benghazi.\10\ Libya's descent into civil
war by late 2014 and the emergence of the Islamic State in Sirte in
2015 both undermined Ansar al-Sharia's on-going viability. As a result,
AQIM does not have a sustained presence in northern Libya. It is
likely, though, that al-Mourabitoun continue to have a limited presence
in southwestern Libya.\11\
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\8\ Rogers, Mike, and Ruppersberger, Dutch, Investigative Report on
the Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Facilities in Benghazi, Libya, September
11-12, 2012, U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence, 21 November 2014.
\9\ Remi Carayol, ``Mokhtar Belmokhtar, le parrain du Sahelistan,''
Jeune Afrique, 4 February 2015.
\10\ Lacher, Wolfram, ``Libya: A Jihadist Growth Market,'' in
Jihadism in Africa: local causes, regional expansion, international
alliances, Steinberg, Guido and Weber, Annette, eds. Stiftung
Wissenschaft und Politik-SWP-Deutsches Institut fur Internationale
Politik und Sicherheit, 2015.
\11\ ``al-Barghathi; 'Daech' yu'amalu 'ala `i'ada tajmu'a sufufahu
wa tamarkazatahu fi janub libiya,'' khabar libiya, 4 March 2017.
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While AQIM failed to maintain a presence in Libya, it has had
greater success with its Tunisian affiliate, the Uqba Ibn Nafi Brigade,
which was established by an emissary who had been sent to Tunisia by
Droukdel in 2011. The Uqba Ibn Nafi Brigade is contained in western
Tunisia along the border with Algeria and it closely adheres to AQIM's
tactics, techniques, and procedures, avoiding attacks on civilians and
targeting Tunisian security services.
In November of 2015, al-Mourabitoun rejoined AQIM, although a
faction of al-Mourabitoun led by Abu Walid al-Sahraoui had earlier
pledged allegiance to the Islamic State and created the Islamic State
of the Grand Sahara.\12\ The return of al-Mourabitoun was a triumph for
Droukdel and it reestablished AQIM's prominence as the leading jihadi
salafi organization in North Africa, the Sahara, and the Sahel.
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\12\ Memier, Marc, ``AQMI et al-Mourabitoun: Le djihad sahelien
reunifie'' Etudes de l'Ifri, January 2017.
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Droukdel has recently further consolidated AQIM's position in
Saharan and Sahelian countries. A communique on 2 March 2017 announced
the regrouping of disparate but related jihadi salafi groups in North
Africa. The announcement was made by Iyad Ag Ghali, the leader of Ansar
Dine, a local front for AQIM in Mali. Ag Ghali was accompanied by AQIM
commander Yahya Abu Hammam, al-Mourabitoun second-in-command Hassan al-
Ansari, Amadou Koufa, the leader of the Macina Brigade (Ansar Dine's
Peul battalion), and Abderrahmane Sanhaji, an AQIM legal scholar.\13\
Ag Ghali declared that the group was now ``Islam and Muslims' Victory
Group'' and that it remained loyal to al-Qaeda's leader Ayman Zawahiri
and AQIM's emir Abdelmalik Droukdel.\14\ With the regrouping, AQIM is
able to reestablish its unified presence in Algeria, Burkina Faso,
Chad, Libya, Mali, Niger, and Tunisia.\15\
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\13\ Mohamed Fall Oumere, ``De la naissance d'un nouveau
`djihadistan` au Sahel,'' Le Monde, 10 March 2017.
\14\ Amin Muhammad `Amad, ``ikhtiyar iyad agh ghali 'amiran li
jama'a 'jama'a nusrah al-islam wa al-muslimin,'' al-salam al-yum, 4
March 2017.
\15\ ``iyad agh ghali `mullah `umar' mantiqah al-sahil wa al-
sahra','' al-'akhbar al-mauritaniyah 6 March 2017.
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The Islamic State and Affiliated Groups
In 2013, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic State,
sent a mission to Libya to assess the possibility of establishing an
Islamic State presence in the country.\16\ By 2014, a coalition of
different jihadi salafi groups in Derna pledged allegiance to the
Islamic State and by June 2015, the Islamic State controlled most of
the central coastal city of Sirte.\17\ Reports regarding the number of
Islamic State fighters in Sirte varied considerably with some sources
citing 3,000 fighters and others as many as 12,000.\18\ While in
control of Sirte, the Islamic State tried to impose its own perverse
interpretation of Islamic law on the town's population, but the Islamic
State in Libya was never self-sufficient and remained dependent upon
the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria for financial support.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Porter, Geoff D. ``How Realistic is Libya as an Islamic State
`Fallback' '' CTC Sentinel, Vol. 9 Issue 3, March 2016.
\17\ Ibid.
\18\ Ibid.
\19\ Ibid.
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The Islamic State had also attempted to make inroads elsewhere in
North Africa. In September 2014, a new group, the Caliphate's Soldiers
in the Land of Algeria, captured a French tourist in the mountains to
the southeast of the capital Algiers. The group announced its
allegiance with the Islamic State and declared that it would kill its
hostage if its demands were not met. Algeria does not negotiate with
terrorists and the group murdered the Frenchman. While Algeria has
reckoned with AQIM for more than 10 years, it would not tolerate the
emergence of an Islamic State ally within its borders. By December
2014, Algerian security services had largely eradicated the group,
including eliminating its leader Khaled Abou Suleimane.\20\ There have
been intermittent attempts to carry out attacks in subsequent years by
individuals and cells claiming to be Islamic State members, but these
have been largely unsuccessful. The most recent attack in the eastern
Algerian city of Constantine was foiled.\21\
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\20\ Imene Brahimi, ``RECIT. Abdelmalek El Gouri: trois mois de
traque sans relache,'' Tout sur l'Algerie, 23 December 2014.
\21\ Faycal Metaoui, ``Attentat a Constantine: Le terroriste
abattu,'' El Watan, 26 February 2017.
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There was also an uneven attempt to establish an Islamic State
group in Tunisia which labeled itself the Caliphate's Soldiers. In
March 2015, three Islamic State gunmen attacked the Bardo Museum in
Tunis.\22\ The Islamic State also claimed responsibility for an attack
carried out by a lone gunman in June 2015 near the resort town of
Sousse and for an attack on the Presidential guard in Tunis,
Tunisia.\23\ In March 2016, there was a 3-day gun battle in the
Tunisian border town of Ben Guerdane that seems to have been
precipitated by the U.S. bombing of an Islamic State training camp in
Sabratha, Libya.\24\ Tunisian members of the Islamic State in Libya had
been planning to capture and hold Ben Guerdane but may have accelerated
their attack in the aftermath of the Sabratha bombing.
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\22\ ``Tunisie: les terrorists auraient ete formes par le groupe El
en Libye,'' RFI Afrique, 20 March 2015.
\23\ ``l'Etat islamique revendique l'attentat contre la police en
Tunisie,'' Le Monde, 25 November 2015.
\24\ Declan Walsh, Ben Hubbard, and Eric Schmitt, ``U.S. Bombing in
Libya Reveals Limits of Strategy Against ISIS,'' The New York Times, 19
February 2016.
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The battle of Ben Guerdane, however, underscores an important
aspect of the Islamic State threat in Tunisia: Almost all Islamic State
activities in Tunisia have had a Libyan component. Since the Ben
Guerdane assault and the Islamic State's subsequent loss of Sirte,
Libya, the Islamic State's activities in Tunisia have been more
sporadic and the group's capacity in Tunisia is diminished. Recent
Islamic State attacks in Tunisia have focused on the Tunisian security
services and Tunisia has not suffered a large-scale Islamic State
attack in more than a year.
At the same time, however, the Islamic State has expanded
southward, at least in name. In May 2015, a former MUJAO leader in
Mali, Adnane Abou Walid el-Sahraoui, who had joined al-Mourabitoun,
split with Belmokhtar, pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and
formed the Islamic State in the Grand Sahara.\25\ In the following
months, el-Sahraoui was quiet, some suspecting he had been wounded in a
clash with al-Mourabitoun loyalists.\26\ El-Sahraoui re-emerged in May
2016, threatening to undertake attacks against Morocco and U.N.
personnel stationed in the disputed territory of Western Sahara.\27\ No
such attack ever transpired and over the last 6 months el-Sahraoui's
group has carried out only a handful of small-scale attacks against
soft targets in Burkina Faso and Mali.
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\25\ ``Sahel: un chef d'Al-Mourabitoun prete allegegance a
l'organisation de l'Etat islamique,'' France24, 15 May 2015.
\26\ Aziz M., ``Urgent: L'emir d'al-Mourabitoun gravement blesse
dans des affrontements,'' El Watan, 17 June 2015.
\27\ Imad Stitou, ``Qui est Abou Walid as-Sahraoui qui menace de
terroriser le Maroc,'' Le Desk, 4 May 2016.
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El-Sahraoui's inability to hit Morocco is all the more curious
because there appears to be a deep well of sympathy for the Islamic
State in Morocco. Moroccans constituted the third-largest nationality
to join the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (smaller only than Saudi
Arabia and Tunisia).\28\ At home, Moroccan security services have
disrupted an Islamic State plot or arrested an alleged Islamic State
cell almost once a month, every month for the last 2 years. Why there
is so much support for the Islamic State in Morocco may be due to the
monarchy's overt effort to enforce a state version of Islam. Islamic
State supporters bristle at a monarch who they view as corrupt claiming
the mantle ``Commander of the Faithful'' and imposing an interpretation
of Islam on them.\29\ The Islamic State's Moroccan appeal extends
beyond Morocco's borders into Europe. The November 2015 Paris attacks
and the March 2016 Brussels attacks, both claimed by the Islamic State,
each had Moroccan elements.\30\
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\28\ Dodwell, Brian, Milton, Daniel, & Rassler, Don, The
Caliphate's Global Workforce: An Inside Look at the Islamic State's
Foreign Fighter Paper Trail, The Combating Terrorism Center at West
Point, April 2016.
\29\ Ilhem Rachidi, ``Mohamed Tozy: `Le Maroc a parie sur une sorte
de salafisme implicite','' Le Desk, 22 July 2016.
\30\ Paul Cruickshank, ``The inside story of the Paris and Brussels
attacks,'' CNN, 30 March 2016.
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assessing the threat
Jihadi salafi terrorist groups in North Africa undoubtedly pose a
threat to U.S. National interests overseas and, even though they pose
no immediate risk to U.S. homeland, they could threaten the homeland
over the longer term. Importantly, as is true of all terrorist
organizations, neither al-Qaeda allied groups nor Islamic State
affiliates distinguish between civilian and official targets. U.S.
Government personnel, U.S. citizens, and U.S. corporations are all seen
as legitimate targets.
The Threat to National Interests Overseas
With its on-going operations in Algeria and Tunisia and its
``regroupment'' in the Sahara and Sahel, AQIM is now the strongest
terrorist organization in North Africa with the biggest footprint and
poses the greatest threat to U.S. National interests in the region. Its
``regroupment'' theoretically allows it to eliminate redundancies among
formerly disparate groups, conserve and share resources, and coordinate
training and planning.
In contrast, the Islamic State suffered a severe setback in North
Africa due to the loss of its bastion in Sirte. There have reportedly
been fewer ``squirters'' from the Sirte offensive than anticipated and
smaller numbers of Islamic State fighters managed to escape the city
than was expected. Those that did escape are dispersed throughout Libya
and northern Niger. Their current capabilities are uncertain, but they
lost or expended a large amount of materiel in their campaign to defend
Sirte and in subsequent airstrikes against training camps and other
locations.\31\ In addition, it will take them time to establish
networks in new local communities that will enable them to function
more fluidly. That being said, there is no doubt that Islamic State
fighters cling to jihadi salafi ideology and still harbor a desire to
attack U.S. and U.S.-related targets. For the moment, though, Islamic
State attacks in North Africa will be more opportunistic than
calibrated.
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\31\ North Africa Risk Consulting, NARCO Analysis: Why the US
bombed ISIS in Libya, 19 January 2017.
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Although North Africa and the Sahara are not strategic regions for
the United States, there are three main categories where U.S. National
interest can be endangered by terrorist organizations: U.S. Government
personnel, U.S. private citizens, and U.S. businesses.
U.S. Government Personnel
In 2012, Ansar al-Sharia participated in an attack in Benghazi,
Libya that resulted in the deaths of four U.S. Government
personnel.\32\ Although the circumstances around the attack are
unlikely to be replicated elsewhere in North Africa, it was a sharp
reminder that North African terrorist organizations will target the
U.S. Government when they can. In addition to the U.S. diplomatic
corps, the United States has soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen in
North Africa who are high-value targets for jihadi salafi groups. The
risks to U.S. service members were underscored in an episode in
December 2015 during which a team of U.S. Special Forces was
interdicted by a Libyan militia.\33\ The militia was not a terrorist
organization and the team exfiltrated the country without further
incident, but the confrontation could have easily ended very
differently. Further to the south in Niger, a U.S. soldier died while
supporting Nigerien counterterrorism operations.\34\
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\32\ Op Cit., Ft. 7.
\33\ Chris Stephen, ``Secret US mission in Libya revealed after air
force posted pictures,'' The Guardian, 17 December 2015.
\34\ Alex Horton, ``Special Forces soldier dies in accident in
Niger,'' Stars and Stripes, 11 February 2017.
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U.S. Citizens
In addition to U.S. diplomats and members of the armed services,
the on-going presence of jihadi salafi groups in North Africa threatens
U.S. citizens in the region. AQIM and the Islamic State's willingness
to kill civilians is well-documented. In April 2011, a jihadi salafi
bomber in Marrakech, Morocco killed 17 civilians, including 15
Europeans.\35\ In January 2013, 37 expatriates were killed, including
three U.S. citizens, when al-Mourabitoun attacked the Tigantourine Gas
Facility at In Amenas, Algeria.\36\ In January 2015, a U.S. citizen
(and U.S. Marine veteran) was killed in an Islamic State attack in
Tripoli, Libya.\37\ In March 2015, Islamic State gunmen killed 22
civilians, including 21 from Europe, Japan, and Latin America, at the
Bardo Museum in Tunis, Tunisia.\38\ In June 2015, an Islamic State
gunman killed 38 civilians and wounded 37 at Port El Kantaoui, Tunisia.
The victims were predominantly from the United Kingdom.\39\ On 20
November 2015, AQIM and al-Mourabitoun attacked a hotel in Bamako,
Mali, killing 20 civilians, including a U.S. citizen.\40\ In January
2016, AQIM attacked a hotel and cafe in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso,
killing 30 civilians, including one U.S. citizen.\41\ In March 2016,
AQIM attacked a beachfront hotel in Grand-Bassam, Ivory Coast, killing
19 civilians.\42\ It is due to a combination of vacationing patterns,
limited U.S. foreign direct investment in the region, and luck that
more U.S. citizens have not been killed by jihadi salafi organizations
in North Africa over the last decade.
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\35\ ``Attentat de Marrakech: au moins six Francais tues'' Le
Monde, 29 April 2011.
\36\ Porter, Geoff D., ``The Eradicateurs'' Foreign Policy, 18
January 2013.
\37\ ``RIP to a friend--MARSOC Marine'' SOCNET, The Special
Operations Community Network.
\38\ Frida Dahmani, ``Attentat du Bardo: le musee de l'horreur,''
Jeune Afrique, 24 March 2015.
\39\ The Tunisia Inquests (2017).
\40\ ``L'attentat de Bamako reveille le spectre de
`l'insaisissable' Mokhtar Belmokhtar,'' France24 23 November 2015.
\41\ ``Ce que l'on sait de l'attaque terroriste a Ouagadougou,'' Le
Monde 15 January 2016.
\42\ ``Cote d'Ivoire: Aqmi devoile les objectifs de son attentat a
Grand-Bassam,'' RFI, 15 March 2016,
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U.S. Corporations
The operations of U.S. companies in North Africa are also
vulnerable to jihadi salafi terrorism.\43\ Numerous U.S. companies have
investments and activities in North Africa, particularly in the oil and
gas sector. ExxonMobil has oil and gas assets in Libya and Chad. A
consortium of three other prominent U.S. oil companies also operates in
Libya.\44\ Still other U.S. energy companies have assets in
Algeria.\45\ In addition, a U.S. energy company recently made a
promising gas discovery in Mauritania.\46\ U.S. companies are also
involved in other sectors throughout North Africa, including
petrochemicals, telecoms, defense, pharmaceuticals, and renewables.
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\43\ Porter, Geoff D., ``Terrorist Targeting of the Libyan Oil and
Gas Sector,'' CTC Sentinel, Vol. 8, Issue 2, February 2015.
\44\ U.S. Energy Information Administration, Libya, https://
www.eia.gov/beta/international/country.cfm?iso=LBY.
\45\ U.S. Energy Information Administration, Algeria, https://
www.eia.gov/beta/international/country.cfm?iso=DZA.
\46\ Michael Stothard, ``Gas find on Mauritania-Senegal border
comes with challenges,'' Financial Times, 15 April 2016.
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Although the value of U.S. corporate activity in North Africa is
dwarfed by that in Central America or South East Asia, North Africa is
nonetheless an important market that creates value for American
enterprises. A terrorist attack, regardless of whether it directly
targets U.S. companies or the private sector in general, disrupts
commercial activity and erodes value for U.S. corporations. There is
the possibility of the loss of life and the destruction of hard assets.
There are costs associated with lost productivity due to country
evacuations in the wake of terrorist attack. Finally, the existence of
a terrorist threat compels corporations to shoulder additional security
and insurance costs. If the threat is deemed serious enough, costs
become unsustainable and U.S. companies will abandon opportunities in
North Africa.
The Threat to the Homeland
Threat posed by North African terrorist organizations to Europe is
greater than the threat they pose to the United States. There are
multiple reasons for this having to do with geographic proximity,
colonial legacies, linguistic facility, and the commonality of dual-
nationality among European and North African countries.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\47\ Reinares, Fernando, ``Avatares del terrorismo yihadista en
Espana,'' Real Instituto Elcano, 3 February 2017.
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No terrorist organization in North Africa currently has the
capacity to undertake attacks in the United States. Jihadi salafi
terrorist organizations in many senses are no different than any other
organization, terrorist or otherwise. Jihadi salafi groups calculate
the most effective ways to allocate finite resources with the greatest
likelihood of success. In the case of North African terrorist
organizations, this means that if they do intend to carry out attacks
against targets outside their area of operations, then they are most
likely to attempt attacks in Europe. In fact, given the target-rich
environment in which they operate in North Africa and given the
proximity of Europe, jihadi salafi terrorist organizations in North
Africa are more likely to carry out attacks in North Africa and Europe
than they are in the United States.
Because of the historical legacy of colonial occupation by France,
North African jihadi salafis from Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco,
Niger, and Tunisia are likely to have greater familiarity with French
than English and are more likely to be able to establish networks among
North African diaspora communities in Europe than they are in the
United States. In fact, in a communique commending the formation of
``The Islam and Muslims' Victory Group'' earlier in March 2017,
Abdelmalek Droukdel, the commander of AQIM, declared that ``Muslims
want to export war from their lands to France.''\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\ ``AQMI menace `d'exporter la guerre en France,''
alakhbar.info, 17 March 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Similarly, because of Italy's colonial presence in Libya and the
subsequent U.K. presence after World War II, Libyan jihadi salafis are
more likely to have familiarity with and potential networks in Italy
and the United Kingdom rather than in the United States. Last, because
of its geographic proximity and because of the size of the Moroccan
diaspora population, Moroccan jihadi salafis are also more likely to
privilege Spanish over American targets.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\49\ ``Tres detenidos en Barcelona y Valencia en un Nuevo golpe
contra el yihadismo,'' El Pais, 22 March 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nevertheless, like any other group around the globe, jihadi salafis
are mobile. Individuals from one group in one region join another group
in another region. The 2009 plot to explode an airplane over Detroit,
Michigan was undertaken by a Nigerian from Kaduna who had joined al-
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen and was being directed by the
American Anwar al-Awlaki.\50\ In 2012, Libyans who had traveled to
Syria formed the Battar Brigade, which later pledged allegiance to the
Islamic State. They subsequently traveled back to Libya where they were
joined by an Islamic State delegation from Yemen and Saudi Arabia.\51\
Later in 2015 and 2016, Iraqis and Saudis traveled to Libya to oversee
the Islamic State's activities there.\52\ A recent video from Abu Bakr
Shekau, the embattled leader of Boko Haram in Nigeria, featured a
French speaker in predominantly Anglophone Nigeria, suggesting that
Boko Haram is recruiting in Francophone Sahelian countries.\53\ What
this means is that even though jihadi salafi groups in North Africa may
not pose a direct threat to the United States because they do not have
the operational capacity to hit the United States or because it is not
a strategic priority for them, individual North African and Saharan
jihadi salafis could contribute to the capabilities of other jihadi
salafi groups outside North Africa that do have the capacity and the
intention to target the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\ Peter Finn, ``Al-Awlaki directed Christmas `underwear bomber'
plot, Justice Department memo says,'' The Washington Post, 10 February
2012.
\51\ Wehrey, Frederic, Alrababa`h, Ala`, ``Rising Out of Chaos: The
Islamic State in Libya,'' Carnegie Middle East Center, 5 March 2015.
\52\ Op. Cit. Ft. 16.
\53\ Allain Jules, ``Boko Haram: reapparition de Abubakar Shekau
qui accuse le Cameroun de `mensonge`,'' mamaafrika.tv, 17 March 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moreover, if groups are left unmolested, even if they do not
presently pose a direct threat to the U.S. homeland, they will evolve
and their capacity to plan and train will grow, potentially to the
point where attacking the U.S. homeland is no longer practically
infeasible. This was the case with al-Qaeda and Usama bin Laden in
Khartoum, Sudan in the 1990's and it is potentially the case today for
al-Qaeda and Islamic State groups in North Africa, the Sahara, and the
Sahel.\54\
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\54\ Wright, Lawrence, The Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to
9/11 (New York: Knopf, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
current counterterrorism approaches
In counterterrorism, there is no ``Mission Accomplished.'' There is
only ``continuing to accomplish the mission.'' There is no winning.
There is only managing the risk to tolerable levels. Doing that is
complicated, involving a continuum of military and non-military
solutions.
Military Counterterrorism Approaches in North Africa
Since 2013, the United States has employed a new model for
counterterrorism operations in North Africa and the Sahara and
Sahel.\55\ The model relies on logistical and intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance support to U.S. allies, building
partner capacity (BPC) programs, and the limited use of U.S. Special
Forces to advise, assist, and accompany local forces and pursue high-
value targets (HVTs).\56\ This approach has advantages and
disadvantages.
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\55\ Porter, Geoff D. and Sheehan, Michael, ``The Future Role of US
Counterterrorism Operations in Africa'' CTC Sentinel, Vol. 7, Issue 2,
February 2014.
\56\ Eric Schmitt, ``Using Special Forces Against Terrorism, Trump
Seeks to Avoid Big Ground Wars,'' The New York Times, 19 March 2017.
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Among its advantages, it is less costly than large scale military
deployments; it limits U.S. personnel exposure to risks on the ground;
it allows for the wider projection of U.S. power; and it is potentially
less diplomatically disruptive to the pursuit of other U.S. National
non-security related interests. By training local partners, it builds a
more enduring counterterrorism presence in the region. Perhaps most
importantly, this approach does not aim to eliminate terrorism or
defeat terrorist groups in North Africa: Its objective is to degrade
them. The constant pressure that results from this approach slows the
evolution of terrorist groups and prevents them from gaining the
capabilities that could ultimately allow them to target the homeland.
Nevertheless, there is no counterterrorism silver bullet and the
new model is not without its shortcomings. Although over the long run
leadership decapitation of terrorist groups and eliminating HVTs
quantifiably shortens a group's life span, they also can have
unintended consequences.\57\ For example, removing the leader of one
group can result in the merger of two groups that had previously been
hostile to one another, thereby creating a new group that has greater
capabilities than either of the two pre-existing groups.\58\
Alternately, eliminating HVTs and leadership decapitation can result in
schisms within terrorists organizations that can result in competition
for prominence among factions, a phenomenon known as
``outbidding.''\59\ One of the ways in which outbidding can manifest
itself is through an increased pace of terrorist attacks or more
``spectacular'' terrorist attacks. In short, eliminating HVTs or
leadership decapitation can inadvertently increase the lethality of a
terrorist organization in the near term.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\ Price, Bryan C., ``Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership
Decapitation Contributes to Counterterrorism,'' International Security,
Vol. 36, No. 4 (Spring 2012), pp. 9-46.
\58\ Porter, Geoff D., ``The Drone War Goes Awry in Africa,''
Foreign Policy, 20 January 2016.
\59\ Porter, Geoff D., ``Terrorist Outbidding: The In Amenas
Attack,'' CTC Sentinel, Vol. 8, Issue 5 (May 2015).
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A second problem with the new approach to counterterrorism in North
Africa is that BPC efforts need to be consistent and sustained in order
for them to work. Ad hoc or intermittent training engagements with
partner nations mean local forces retain some of the skills acquired
through BPC programs for a period of time, but there is no long-term
capacity improvement and the United States runs the risk of repeating
efforts ad infinitum.\60\
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\60\ Powelson, Simon J., Enduring Engagement Yes, Episodic
Engagement No: Lessons for SOF from Mali, Master's Thesis, Naval
Postgraduate School, December 2013.
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Last, the United States needs to be mindful that political
circumstances in partner countries may not be conducive to BPC. U.S.
training of local militaries that have poor reputations in host
countries or are politically problematic can contribute to broader
animosity toward the United States and fuel the jihadi salafi anti-
American narrative. For example, while U.S. efforts in Chad have
increased Chadian forces counterterrorism capabilities, it has come at
the cost of the United States being perceived as supporting President
Idriss Deby's authoritarian regime.\61\ In Niger's Diffa region, the
local population blames the deterioration of the security environment
as much on Boko Haram as on the abusive Nigerien forces combating the
terrorist group.\62\ The problem is more difficult in Libya where, in
the absence of a functioning government, it is hard to even identify
the proper military units to be trained.\63\
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\61\ Nickels, Benjamin P., and Shorey, Margot, ``Chad: A Precarious
Counterterrorism Partner,'' CTC Sentinel, Vol. 8, Issue 4 (April 2015).
\62\ Niger and Boko Haram: Beyond Counter-insurgency, International
Crisis Group, Report Number 245, 27 February 2017.
\63\ Carla Babb, ``Friend or Foe? Doubts Plague US Military in
Libya Training,'' Voice of America, 18 May 2016.
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Non-military Approaches to Countering Terrorism in North Africa
Despite the new counterterrorism approach's advantages, military
solutions are never enough to limit the threat that terrorism poses to
U.S. National interest abroad and to the homeland. It is equally
important to address the underlying conditions that lead to the
emergence and continuation of terrorist organizations in North Africa.
Because terrorism is by definition political and because jihadi salafi
terrorism is about destroying and reshaping political structures in
predominantly Muslim parts of the globe, it is critical to engage
regional political institutions to ensure that they are upholding the
obligations inherent in the state-society relationship.
Misunderstanding the political dimension or ignoring it entirely does a
disservice to counterterrorism efforts.
One of the fundamental drivers of jihadi salafi terrorism is the
perception of injustice and the belief that the implementation of a
salafi interpretation of Islam via jihad would ensure Muslims social
justice.\64\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\64\ Turner, John A., Religious Ideology and the Roots of Global
Jihad: Salafi Jihadism and International Order (New York: Springer,
2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There is quantitative evidence that indicates that North African,
Saharan, and Sahelian countries have a justice deficit. Excepting
Tunisia, all the countries in the region fall in the bottom half of
Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index 2016.\65\
Libya is ranked 170th of out 176 countries. Chad is 159th and Mali is
116. The World Justice Project's Rule of Law Index 2016 ranked Tunisia
58th out of 113 countries. Morocco was 60th, Burkina Faso 79th, and
Nigeria 96th.\66\ The 2016 Ibrahim Index of African Governance which
ranks Africa's 54 countries also indicates inadequate governance and
rule of law in North Africa.\67\ For its ``Overall Governance''
ranking, Libya was ranked 51 out of 54 countries. Chad was 48, Niger
27, Mali 25, and Algeria 20. There is a justifiable and overwhelming
perception that the playing field in North Africa, the Sahara, and
Sahel is uneven. If injustice fuels the jihadi salafi narrative, then
the narrative burns bright in North Africa and the Sahara.
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\65\ Corruption Perceptions Index 2016, Transparency International,
25 January 2017.
\66\ World Justice Project (WJP) Rule of Law Index 2016, The World
Justice Project (2016). Algeria, Libya, Chad, Niger, and Mali were not
included in the index because the World Justice Project was unable to
conduct household polling.
\67\ A Decade of African Governance 2006-2015: 2016 Ibrahim Index
of African Governance, Mo Ibrahim Foundation (October 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There is also quantifiable evidence that North African and Saharan
and Sahelian countries may not just be unwilling to ensure justice for
their populations, but they may be unable to. Every country in the
region is listed as being at risk according to the Fund for Peace's
Fragile States Index: Fragility in the World 2016.\68\ Even the most
stable countries in the region--Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia--receive
``Elevated Warnings.'' Chad's status is categorized as ``Very High
Alert,'' and Cameroon, Libya, Mali, and Niger are listed as ``Alerts.''
When states are fragile or they fail, they no longer have the capacity
to provide services ranging from education to security for their
populations. The collapse of governance, let alone implementing of good
governance, creates space for jihadi salafi terrorist groups to act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\68\ Messner, J.J., and Haken, Nate, et al. Fragile States Index
2016: The Book (June 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Considering its historical commitment to justice and good
governance, the United States should work to reduce North African
deficits in those areas. Military approaches to counterterrorism can
diminish existing threats but they cannot address the conditions that
allow terrorist groups to emerge, sustain themselves, or revitalize
themselves. Through aid and development programs, the United States can
shore up fragile North African and Saharan States. Doing so is as vital
a counterterrorism tool as are BPC programs and eliminating HVTs.
Mitigating the threat posed by North African jihadi salafi
terrorists to U.S. interests abroad and to the homeland requires a
nuanced combination of military and non-military approaches. North
African terrorist organizations do not presently pose a threat to the
homeland. However, removing terrorists from the battlefield downrange
only slows their groups' evolution. To truly secure the homeland, the
United States must address the underlying causes of North African
terrorism, chief among them injustice and rule of law.
Mr. King. Thank you, Dr. Porter.
Our next witness is Mr. Laith Alkhouri, who is a co-founder
and director of counterterrorism research at Flashpoint, which
is a business risk intelligence company. He directs
Flashpoint's jihadist threat intelligence service and serves as
the lead on all primary source research into deep and dark Web
networks used by terrorist groups.
He has researched and translated thousands of jihadist
documents and videos, analyzing jihadi terrorist activities
across the Middle East, North Africa, and central and Southeast
Asia. Mr. Alkhouri has presented his findings to several
Cabinet agencies, the Council on Foreign Relations, the New
York City Police Department, and a number of academic
institutions.
Mr. Alkhouri, thank you for being here today, and you are
recognized for your testimony. Thank you very much.
STATEMENT OF LAITH ALKHOURI, CO-FOUNDER AND DIRECTOR,
FLASHPOINT
Mr. Alkhouri. Thank you, Chairman King, Ranking Member
Rice, and distinguished committee Members.
Today, both al-Qaeda and ISIS operate in major parts of
North Africa and pose a significant threat. They also pose a
significant threat to Western civilians and interests.
Throughout the past decade, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb has
kidnapped and killed Westerners and attacked Western economic
interests.
Its record is heavy with such incidents starting as early
as 2007, including at least 16 incidents of kidnapping
Westerners at gunpoint, a number of whom were executed in
Algeria, Mauritania, Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, and other
countries.
AQIM poses a significant threat to gas and oil facilities
and hotels, among other Western economic interests. The most
notable example is the group's January 2013 hostage crisis at
the Tigantourine gas and oil extraction facility in Algeria's
In Amenas town where 3 Americans and over 2 dozen other Western
nationals employed there were killed. Other attacks targeted
hotels and killed Westerners in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Ivory
Coast in 2016.
Al-Qaeda has exponentially grown in North Africa and the
Sahel. This March, AQIM unified jihadi factions in north Mali
under its banner, effectively inflating its ranks across the
Sahel and Sahara at a time when many believe that it has
largely been diminished.
The emergence and rise of ISIS, arguably today's most
significant global threat, has amplified the pre-existing sense
of insecurity and instability. ISIS has captured significant
territory and aggressively expanded across Sirte, has heavily
operated in Derna, Benghazi, Tripoli, Misrata, and other cities
amid a political turmoil in Libya.
ISIS operates not only in Libya, but also in Algeria and
Tunisia, and it has killed dozens of tourists. It has set up
camps in Algeria in 2014 and networked with jihadist cells in
Tunisia, dispatching operatives to kill tourists in Tunisia.
Two of these attacks killed over 40 Westerners combined in
March and June 2015. It has recently launched its first suicide
bombing in Algeria.
ISIS has orchestrated and inspired attacks in the West. It
directed major terror attacks in Paris and Brussels and
inspired the worst mass shooting in U.S. history at the Pulse
Nightclub in Orlando, Florida.
Part of its M.O. is, yes, launching suicide bombing against
security forces, but importantly, its leadership's explicit
threats to and orchestration of attacks in Europe and the
United States are part of its branch in Libya's agenda.
Its branch in Libya has verbalized threats to the United
States. It not only expressed threats to attack beyond the
Mediterranean, but also vowed attacks in Washington and New
York in its official propaganda.
ISIS has exerted influence among jihadists in the West and
incited them to launch attacks. The group has influenced
radicals in the United States and Europe, who are encouraged to
attack in their home countries instead of actually join the
group on the ground. This has been explicitly encouraged by
ISIS leaders in official propaganda.
Libya is poised to become a launching pad for operations in
the West. As ISIS struggles to maintain control of its
territory in Iraq and Syria, it will likely up the ante in
inciting and plotting external operations in the West.
Its branch in Libya is poised to welcome many of its
foreign fighters already in its ranks in the Middle East, which
might turn Libya into the biggest ISIS camp for foreign
fighters outside of Iraq and Syria. Fighters from at least 10
nationalities so far have been fighting with ISIS in Libya,
featured in its propaganda.
Both groups seek to dominate the jihadi landscape with
mutual focus on Westerners. AQIM and ISIS oppose each other.
ISIS' emergence has not only exacerbated the terror threats but
also polarized the jihadi movement in the region, effectively
creating a competitive landscape that raises the threat
prospects against the West.
AQIM has concentrated on condemning France. Each group
seeks to reassert itself as the main jihadi leader in the
region, and both groups see Westerners as enemy No. 1.
ISIS has a more powerful recruitment strategy than AQIM.
While both groups pose a threat to the West, ISIS appears to
have developed a stronger radicalization and indoctrination
agenda than its competitor.
ISIS' external operations facilitators appear to have
developed a more inclusive and aggressive call to launch
attacks by all means necessary, unlike AQIM, which has not
heavily focused on calls for external attacks overseas.
The returnees to the United States and Europe, those who
have gained experience in militant tactics in ISIS camps, as
well as self-radicalized individuals, likely pose the most
significant jihadist threat to the West today. Thank you so
much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Alkhouri follows:]
Prepared Statement of Laith Alkhouri
March 29, 2017
introduction
North Africa has conventionally been the backyard of major al-Qaeda
terror activity, predominantly al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)--
and to this day the group poses a significant threat to the region and
to Western civilians and interests. The terror threats have created a
sense of insecurity in major parts of the region, and AQIM has been the
primary perpetrator. Indeed, it has a long record of bombing and
kidnapping attacks against Westerners, extending its reach from Algeria
to Tunisia, Mali, and other countries.
The region has also witnessed the emergence of The Islamic State
(ISIS/ISIL), further amplifying the preexisting sense of insecurity and
instability, particularly in light of its seizure of a major territory
in Libya. It has played the role of a de facto governing body in
Libya's Sirte City, affording it a comfortable launching pad for
attacks across other Libyan cities, and transnationally in Algeria and
Tunisia--and potentially in the West.
ISIS and AQIM are highly adversarial toward the West in general and
the United States in particular. They possess a long track record of
issuing threats and carrying out attacks aimed at Western civilians and
economic interests. Albeit both upholding the jihadist ideology, AQIM
and ISIS are highly oppositional toward each other. Their potential
competition for dominance drives each group to reassert its influence
over the jihadi landscape in North Africa, which significantly raises
the threat prospects against Westerners.
In addition, these groups thrive on being in the spotlight, and
targeting Westerners brings them considerable PR value. Looking at
today's jihadi landscape in North Africa and the record of these
groups, I believe that they will continue to pose a significant threat
to the West in the future, regionally and internationally.
picture of the threat
On March 6, 2017, al-Zalaqa Media Foundation, a jihadi media unit
affiliated with al-Qaeda, released a video featuring the leaders of the
Mali-based jihadi groups Ansar al-Dine, al-Murabitoune, Macina
Liberation Front, and the Sahara Region. In the video, Iyad Ag Ghali,
the top leader of Ansar al-Dine, announced the creation of ``The Group
for Support of Islam and Muslims,'' a new jihadi collective
encompassing the aforementioned groups, declaring the new collective's
allegiance to al-Qaeda's top leader Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri. Henceforth,
these groups will be operating under the umbrella of al-Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the terror group's North Africa and Sahel
faction.
On March 19, al-Qaeda Central Command issued a statement accepting
the pledge of allegiance, indicating that the new collective is:
an extension to what Qaida't al-Jihad [al-Qaeda] has taken as approach
since its inception, in uniting the Islamic Ummah, unifying its ranks,
to seek the establishment of Allah's Sharia, upholding justice, and
fighting injustice and tyranny; Allah has graced our brothers in the
jihadi groups in Mali to unite under the banner of one group.\1\
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\1\ https://justpaste.it/14mlp.
The latest announcement constitutes a new milestone in the growth
of al-Qaeda's presence and operations at a time when the group behind
the 9/11 attacks appears to have been significantly diminished.
Although al-Qaeda has been mostly decimated in large parts of
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen, its North Africa and Sahel networks
appear to have exponentially grown, increasing their tempo of terror
attacks and establishing links in North and West Africa.
Throughout most of its existence, AQIM operated in central-east and
northern Algeria, but in the past several years it has expanded its
operations to Tunisia and Mali, making AQIM one of the most active al-
Qaeda branches. In Tunisia, the group's faction ``Uqba bin Nafae'
Brigade''--designated a terrorist group by the Tunisian government--has
carried out a number of attacks against security forces, most notably
in the Chaambi Mountains, which overlook Kasserine City in west-central
Tunisia. In Mali, its faction al-Murabitoune--a group affiliated with
the notorious Mukhtar Belmokhtar's ``Signatories in Blood Brigade,''
responsible for the 2013 hostage crisis in In Amenas, Algeria--as well
as other jihadi groups, have merged under its leadership. On multiple
occasions, al-Murabitoune has kidnapped Westerners and targeted Western
economic interests.
AQIM has demonstrated its will and intent to target Western
nationals and interests. It has kidnapped and killed European and
American civilians, and targeted Western gas and oil extraction plants.
A number of the group's hostage operations were kidnap-for-ransom, and
reportedly brought the group significant sums of money.
Over the past 3 years, North Africa has witnessed the rise of the
Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL), most notably in Libya's Sirte City, and to a
lesser extent in the cities of Darna and Benghazi in northeastern
Libya. ISIS has also established a small branch in Algeria and
connected with jihadists in Tunisia. Unlike AQIM, whose attacks mostly
consist of hit-and-runs, kidnappings, and bombing operations, ISIS has
been able to capture territory and implement its form of governance in
Sirte, recruiting from the population under its rule, and conducting
beheadings in the largely arid Fezzan region in central Libya.
ISIS in North Africa continues to operate mostly in Libya. Security
forces have only recently succeeded in pushing the group to the
outskirts of Sirte and recapturing many of its vital sites. However,
recent reports suggest that ISIS is regrouping, and possibly gaining
enough manpower to recapture Sirte.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/21/world/africa/libya-
isis.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Both AQIM and ISIS's Libya faction have launched significant
operations in the past 2 years; such attacks garnered global attention
and positioned both groups as leaders of global jihad. AQIM fighters
have targeted multiple hotels and killed Western tourists and locals
alike in Mali, Ivory Coast, and Burkina Faso. Meanwhile, ISIS has
focused on targeting government forces and Christian laborers; it has
conducted gruesome beheadings of Egyptian Coptic and Ethiopian workers,
as well as multiple bombings in Tripoli. I believe that both groups
pose a threat to the West: AQIM's threat is directed at Western
nationals and interests in its primary operational territories, rarely,
if ever, targeting Western countries, while ISIS's threat to Western
homelands is significantly higher, via orchestrated and inspired
attacks.
will and intent to target the west
Al-Qaeda's top leader Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahiri has indicated that al-
Qaeda's main focus remains targeting the United States--most notably in
his 2013 manifesto, ``General Guidelines for Jihadi Work.''\3\
Zawahiri's manifesto laid out the military agenda for all al-Qaeda
affiliates--indeed, all jihadists--around the world. In other words,
his document dictated the priorities jihadi groups are meant to follow,
placing the United States at the top of al-Qaeda's military targets.
The document stated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ https://ia800408.us.archive.org/27/items/tawjeh_ayman/
tawjeh_ayman.pdf.
The military work is to target firstly the head of global infidels
America, and her ally Israel, and then her local allies who rule our
countries. Targeting America aims at exhausting and hemorrhaging it, in
order for it to end like the Soviet Union did, and isolate itself due
to its military, human, and economic losses, and subsequently ease its
grip on our countries, and its allies to begin falling one after
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
another.
ISIS leaders regularly and vocally urge the group's followers to
target the United States and Europe. Since 2014, the group has released
a range of missives and videos urging jihadists in the West to kill
Americans and Europeans. ISIS's late spokesman, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani,
made this a focal point of his speeches:
If you can kill a disbelieving American or European--especially the
spiteful and filthy French--or an Australian, or a Canadian, or any
other disbelievers waging war, including the citizens of the countries
that entered into a coalition against the Islamic State, then rely upon
Allah and kill him in any manner or way.\4\
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\4\ http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-urges-
more-attacks-on-western-disbelievers-9749512.html.
Moreover, ISIS features individuals in its propaganda who represent
and parrot the group's threats to the West and suggest that their goal
is to strike beyond North Africa, to ``conquer Rumiyah,'' in reference
to Europe and North America. In a February 2015 video released by ISIS
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
media in Libya, an English-speaking masked man threatened:
The sea you have hidden Sheikh Osama bin Laden's body in, we swear to
Allah, we will mix it with your blood.\5\
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\5\ http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/19/africa/libya-isis-executions-
ethiopian-christians/.
ISIS has inspired a number of attacks in the West--and capitalized
on these attacks with its official propaganda releases designed to
inspire even more attacks--including the Pulse Nightclub massacre in
Orlando, Florida. Furthermore, ISIS has orchestrated a number of deadly
attacks in Europe, including the November 2015 attacks at the Bataclan
theatre and the Stade de France in Paris, and the March 2016 attack at
Brussels' Zaventem Airport, among others.
isis and aqim are different
There are differences, however, between AQIM and ISIS, the most
obvious of which is their proclaimed ideological differences--
especially after Zawahiri disowned ISIS in February 2014.
Organizationally, AQIM is more decentralized in its approach and sees
North Africa and the Sahel as the primary geographic region for its
operations. Quite rarely does the group invite foreign fighters or
recruits from outside the Maghreb and Sahel regions into its ranks. Its
political statements have largely focused on ``tyrannical'' regimes in
Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and Mali and its aims are very much North
Africa-centric.
ISIS, on the other hand, including its branch in Libya, has
specifically called on Muslims to migrate to territories under its
control. Its ranks in Libya have swelled with the arrival of fighters
from Sudan, Somalia, Ghana, and Mali, among other countries. It has
operated in a more centralized fashion, consistently adhering to the
language and methodology of ISIS central command in Iraq and Syria. Its
messages mostly ignore the politics of North African countries, instead
concentrating on illustrating jihad in North Africa as part of the
overall structure of the proclaimed ``Caliphate,'' as provinces under
ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's rule. These messages specifically
urge jihadists to pledge allegiance to ISIS. When ISIS's propaganda has
focused on North and West Africa, it invites jihadists who are
operating in al-Qaeda's backyard to pledge allegiance to Baghdadi, the
self-proclaimed ``Caliph'' of the Islamic State.
AQIM's rhetoric has largely focused on France as its primary
nemesis, referring to the French invasion of Mali and France's
historical interest in North Africa. Meanwhile, ISIS's enemies are
lumped into one--what is referred to as ``Fustat al-Kufr,'' or ``the
party of infidels.''
al-qaeda in the islamic maghreb (aqim)
AQIM was formally established in February 2007. Its predecessor,
``The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat'' (GSPC), formally
pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda on September 11, 2006:\6\ it has sought
the establishment of Islamic Sharia governance and the targeting of
Western nationals and interests.
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\6\ http://www.aph.gov.au/parliamentary_business/committees/
house_of_representatives_- committees?url=pjcis/
aqap_6%20terrorist%20orgs/report/appendix%20e.pdf.
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GSPC's declaration of allegiance to al-Qaeda not only appears to
have transpired for the sake of relevancy; affiliating with al-Qaeda
effectively placed the group in the spotlight as the leader of jihadi
efforts across North Africa and the Sahel region. More importantly,
GSPC declared that its allegiance to Usama bin Laden was ``part of the
international jihad''\7\--in reference to al-Qaeda's 1998 declaration
of war on the United States. In other words, GSPC adhered to the
ideology of al-Qaeda, positioned itself as part of the global jihadi
movement, and as no longer exclusive to Algeria.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ http://www.aph.gov.au/parliamentary_business/committees/
house_of_representatives_- committees?url=pjcis/
aqap_6%20terrorist%20orgs/report/appendix%20e.pdf.
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Though it operates mostly in Algeria, AQIM portrayed itself as the
top jihadi group for North African jihadists--a point that it addressed
in numerous audio and video recordings. Led by Algerian national
Abdulmalik Droukdel (also known as Abu Musaab Abdulwadoud), many of
AQIM's operations have specifically targeted Western nationals and
interests, to include the kidnapping and killing of numerous Western
victims.
AQIM views North African governments as ``an extension'' of Western
powers and interests. The group believes that there is a new type of
imperialistic, ``Crusader'' campaign that aims at fighting and
uprooting Islam. Thus, for AQIM, targeting the governments of Algeria
and neighboring countries is in line with targeting U.S. and European
interests. The West, according to AQIM, must be confronted--and if not
directly, then through the targeting of its citizens and interests.
In a 2009 audio release titled ``A Message to Our Ummah in the
Islamic Maghreb,'' Abdulwadoud discussed these points, stating:
I return briefy to show the danger of the new imperialistic attack,
which is an extension to the old campaign, which aims to target our
Ummah in its dearest of spiritual components and even its existential
principles, and the principles of its continuity, and also to show the
dirty role of these apostate and traitor regimes in our Maghreb
countries for the interests of the countries that have imperialistic
goals and expansionist interests like America, the European Union, and
Israel, so perhaps that our Ummah would get ready and prepare to fight
its inevitable existential battle, that, if it does not fight today,
will inevitably fight it tomorrow.\8\
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\8\ https://archive.org/details/Archieve-to-almagreb-mojahdeen.
AQIM claims to fight the Algerian government because it views it as
``part of the declared Crusader campaign,'' in reference to the U.S.
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In a 2010 video, AQIM indicated that the
``evil government'' of Algeria is a direct participant in the
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``Crusader war,'' because it:
confessed to occupying Iraq via diplomatic representation; [by]
imprisoning and torturing the Muslim youths who join their brothers in
Iraq, [and] participating in the war on Somalia by sending military
supply aircraft in support of its Crusader masters . . . to appease the
American master.\9\
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\9\ https://archive.org/details/badrmagrib.
Zawahiri later underscored these points in his ``General Guidelines for
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Jihadi Work'' manifesto, stating:
In Algeria, where the American presence is small and unnoticeable, the
struggle against the regime is for the sake of weakening it and to
spread the jihadi influence across the Islamic Maghreb, the West
African Sahel, and South Saharan countries, and in these regions the
signs of [mujahideen] confrontation with the Americans and their allies
have started . . . [sic] All the mujahideen brothers should consider
targeting the Western Crusader Zionist coalition's interests in any
location in the world the most important of their duties, and to seek
it to the best of their ability.\10\
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\10\ https://ia800408.us.archive.org/27/items/tawjeh_ayman/
tawjeh_ayman.pdf.
Zawahiri sees Algeria, and North Africa in general, as a new front
to weaken the United States, but not necessarily a launching pad for
operations in the West. This is important because it underscores AQIM's
methodology: it is easier to target the West in AQIM's operational
reach than to train and dispatch operatives overseas.
targeting western civilians and interests
Although AQIM has not yet claimed responsibility for terrorist
operations in the West, it has underscored that one of its goals is to
target Western citizens and interests. Its narrative includes
grievances such as the ``French invasion of Mali,'' which the group
sees as part of the new ``Crusader imperialism.'' Indeed, of all the
Western nations, France is AQIM's primary adversary, a theme deeply
rooted in North Africa's history--and AQIM has expressed its grievances
against France's stance in North Africa since the group's inception.
AQIM's rhetoric, nonetheless, is confrontational toward the West at
large, as it views Western and ``Zionist'' influence as having
negatively impacted Muslims, portraying them as persecuted, threatened,
and targeted. Therefore, its selection of targets is not limited to
nationalistic borders, and its threat is not limited to French citizens
and interests.
AQIM sees its fight against the West as part of a larger battle;
this point is highlighted in a number of its communiques. In March
2016, AQIM claimed responsibility for the armed assault on the Grand
Bassam Hotel in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, which killed a number of
Westerners, including German and French nationals. In its claim of
responsibility, released after the attack,\11\ the group said:
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\11\ http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa_35798502.
The goal from these [operations] include a reminder to the Crusaders
that their continuous crimes against the Muslims and their Mujahideen
brothers will beg a response of targeting the leaders of their crimes
and their interests. Our message to the Western populaces is that our
actions are a response to the crimes of your armies and governments
against our Ummah in Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen,
Somalia, Libya, Mali, and Central Africa . . . you either leave us safe
in our homelands, or we will spill your security and the security of
your citizens.\12\
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\12\ https://telegram.me/Al_Andalus.
a threat to economic interests
Furthermore, AQIM poses a significant threat to Western economic
interests, most notably gas and oil plants and facilities. In January
2013, Mukhtar Belmokhtar's Signatories in Blood Brigade (also known as
al-Mulathamin) attacked the Tigantourine gas extraction facility in In
Amenas town, eastern Algeria, which is jointly operated by an Algerian
national company and BP/Statoil. The ensuing hostage crisis lasted for
over a day, and concluded with the death of over 30 hostages, including
American, British, Norwegian, and French nationals, among others.
Reports indicated that a number of the hostage-takers were Libyan and
Malian fighters, suggesting a higher level of transnational
coordination between AQIM's affliates.
A few months later, Belmokhtar's group attacked the French Uranium
mine Areva and nearby military barracks in Arlit town, in Niger's
northwestern city of Agadez. A spokesman for the group explained,
``[we] attacked France, [as well as] Niger because of its cooperation
with France,'' further underscoring AQIM's focus on targeting French
interests.\13\
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\13\ http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa_22637084.
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AQIM's threat to Western gas and oil companies was further
underscored in the March 2016 rocket attack on BP/Statoil facilities in
Algeria's In Saleh region. The group's statement referenced the In
Amenas attack 3 years earlier, and stated its will and intent to target
Western interests in the future, saying:
We chose the British Petroleum base in In Saleh area, and it is the
same company that we targeted at Tigantourine compound, to send,
through this operation, a number of messages . . . We announce to all
the Western companies that are investing in rock gas that we will
target you directly, and we will use every ability to repel you from
these projects that harm our environment, rejected in our society.\14\
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\14\ https://justpaste.it/Algeria_AQMI_2016.
AQIM's fixation on France came further into focus on March 17,
2017, when Abdulwadoud released an audio message in which he accepted
the allegiance from ``The Group for Support of Islam and Muslims'' and
addressed France, suggesting that the mujahideen will seek to strike in
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France:
[France's] injustice and aggression against the populaces and tribes of
the Sahel and Sahara will only increase these tribes' brotherhood,
coalescence, and unity . . . [they will] be determined to wage jihad
and resist against the aggressors, and this will only add to the
determination of Muslims to transfer the war from our land to her land
and from our cities to her cities so it can live in fear that our
people in the occupied lands are living.\15\
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\15\ https://soundcloud.com/user-903507653/8cg8ayogbe4v.
kidnapping operations \16\ \17\ \18\ \19\ \20\
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\16\ http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/Africa-Monitor/2011/
0119/AQIM-kidnapping-and-murder-a-brief-history.
\17\ http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/01/aqim-takes-
australian-couple-hostage-in-northern-burkina-faso.php.
\18\ http://www.gctat.org/analysis/29-ranoc/236-the-forgotten-
three-the-fate-of-aqim-timbuktu-hostages-and-their-captor-
belkacemzouadi.html.
\19\ http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/al-qaeda/11693716/
New-British-front-man-for-jihadist-videos-revealed.html.
\20\ http://af.reuters.com/article/maliNews/idAFL8N1500DA.
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AQIM's primary source of funding and influence is the kidnapping of
Westerners, going as far back as 2007. Kidnapping operations not only
provide major propaganda value, but also reportedly earn the group
significant sums of money, which it uses to finance various other
operations.
The incomplete list of AQIM kidnapping operations provided below
clearly demonstrates that the group is constantly pursuing Western
nationals. Since its inception, AQIM has kidnapped Westerners in
Mauritania, Niger, and Mali. The group has reportedly, at times,
negotiated with foreign governments to release hostages in exchange for
ransom sums. Some estimates indicate that by 2012, AQIM was making
about $3 million USD per hostage released.\21\ In other instances, the
group has demanded the release of militants from prison--a tactic that
has likely helped swell its ranks.
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\21\ https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/mali-al-qaeda-islamic-
maghrebs-ransom-revenue.
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On December 24, 2007, four French nationals were killed in
Mauritania. The Mauritanian government charged and sentenced
three AQIM members to death.
On February 22, 2008, Austrian citizens Wolfgang Ebner and
Andrea Kloiber were kidnapped in Tunisia and transferred to an
unknown location in Mali. They were reportedly released after a
ransom was paid.
On December 14, 2008, Canadian diplomats Robert Fowler and
Louis Guay were kidnapped in Niger, and later released on April
22, 2010.
On January 22, 2009, Edwin Dyer, Marianne Petzold, Gabriella
Greitner, and Werner Greiner were kidnapped in Mali near the
Niger border. AQIM killed Dyer on May 31 while reportedly
releasing the others after alleged AQIM members were released
from prison.
In June 2009, U.S. national Christopher Leggett was murdered
in Nouakchott, Mauritania.
On November 14, 2009, AQIM attempted to kidnap U.S. embassy
personnel in Tahoua, Niger.
On November 25, 2009, French citizen Pierre Camatte was
kidnapped in Mali near the Niger border. Mali released four
AQIM militants while AQIM released Camatte in return.
On November 29, 2009, Spanish citizens Albert Vilalta, Roque
Pascual, and Alicia Gamez were kidnapped near Nouadhibou,
Mauritania. AQIM later released Gamez after the Spanish
government allegedly paid a ransom. AQIM released Vilalta and
Pascual on August 22, 2010.
On December 18, 2009, Italian citizens Nicola Sergio Cicala
and Philomen Kabouree were kidnapped in Mauritania. AQIM later
released Cicala and Kabouree; it remains unclear whether a
ransom was paid.
On April 19, 2010, French citizen Michel Germaneau was
kidnapped in northern Niger and then moved to Mali. AQIM
demanded the release of its members from prison. French and
Mauritanian security forces raided AQIM members in Mali,
killing six of them. AQIM announced it had killed Germaneau on
July 25.
In September 2010, five French nationals were kidnapped in
northern Niger. AQIM still holds them hostage to this day.
In January 2011, French aid worker Antoine De Leocour and
French citizen Vincent Delory were kidnapped in Niger. De
Leocour and Delory were killed during a rescue attempt.
In 2011, AQIM kidnapped Swedish national Johan Gustaffson
and South African national Stephen McGowan. In 2012, they were
featured in an AQIM video with another hostage, Dutch national
Sjaak Rijke, who has since been rescued. In June 2015, the two
other hostages appeared in an AQIM video in which a British-
accented militant informed them that their governments were not
negotiating for their release.
In December 2015, Swiss nun Beatrice Stockley was kidnapped
from her residence in Timbuktu, Mali. Stockley was previously
kidnapped and released in 2012, but upon her return to Mali,
AQIM militants from the Sahara faction took her hostage and
accused her of conducting missionary campaigns.
In January 2016, an Australian couple--a doctor and his
wife--was kidnapped by AQIM militants following the terror
group's attack on a hotel in Burkina Faso. They were reportedly
kidnapped in the country's north and brought into Mali across
the border.
uqba bin nafae' brigade in tunisia
AQIM's affiliate in Tunisia appears to have begun operating in the
country in the summer of 2014. The group's operations have primarily
targeted security forces, namely in Kasserine City. In September 2014,
2 months after Uqba bin Nafae' militants targeted security forces in
Hanshir at-Talla in the Chaambi Mountains in west central Tunisia, a
spokesman for the group threatened the Tunisian government in a video,
stating:
Without introductions . . . O tyrants of Tunisia, await glad tidings of
what harm you, as the silence of the mujahideen of Uqba bin Nafea'
Brigade before your crimes will not last long.\22\
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\22\ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDwXDnoeJLc&feature=youtu.be.
The group has since carried out a range of attacks against police
and army units.
Additionally, there is evidence to suggest a higher level of
coordination between Tunisian and Algerian AQIM fighters. AQIM recently
released the bio of one of its since-killed Algerian commanders who
purportedly traveled between Tunisia and Algeria to coordinate with the
group's affiliates.
Although the Chaambi Mountains appear to be the group's main
hideout, a jihadi media unit known as Efriqia Media released a
statement in April 2015 indicating that Uqba bin Nafae' Brigade has:
cells and its soldiers are present on all the Tunisian soil and in its
various provinces, and has history in jihadi work and in training a big
number of Muslim youths and supplying weapons.\23\
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\23\ https://shamikh1.info/vb/showthread.php?t=235486.
Uqba bin Nafae' Brigade poses a serious threat to Tunisia's
stability, and should be considered a threat to Western nationals
traveling through inadequately governed areas of western Tunisia near
the Algerian border.
the islamic state (isis/isil) in libya \24\
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\24\ It is worth mentioning that this report does not discuss ISIS
in Egypt. ISIS's branch in Egypt's North Sinai is a highly active
group, and it has operated in that region for over five years
(previously allegiant to al-Qaeda). Most of its attacks have targeted
Israeli territories and Egyptian security forces. While the group does
not appear to have hosted foreign fighters or dispatched operatives to
the West, its targeting and downing of the Russian Metrojet Airliner in
October 2015 spotlighted the group as a serious threat to tourists and
the aviation industry. It is unlikely that ISIS in Egypt will be the
next destination for fighters from the West; however, Western tourists
and interests--especially in the North Sinai--are at risk from
potential attacks in the future.
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Previously known as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), the Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is the evolution of what was once known
as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). After expanding into Syria and rebelling
against al-Qaeda, ISIS shocked the world with scenes of brutality,
including the videotaped beheadings of at least three Americans. The
global terror group seized Raqqa, Syria and shortly thereafter took
control of Iraq's second largest city, Mosul. Over the course of
several months, the group seized control of cities, towns, and villages
in several Syrian and Iraqi provinces, and quickly expanded into the
schismatic political atmosphere of Libya.
In the spring of 2015, ISIS captured the city of Sirte, effectively
establishing a North African stronghold where it is able to host
fighters from other countries.\25\ \26\ The group established strong
fighting fronts in Darna and Benghazi and launched attacks targeting
Libyan Forces and rival rebel factions, as well as government buildings
in Tripoli and Misrata. Moreover, ISIS attempted and temporarily
succeeded in laying control over gas and oil plants.
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\25\ https://ia600405.us.archive.org/35/items/
jamalalqudsy_yahoo_20160530_1211/[ . . . ].gov.
\26\ https://ia801504.us.archive.org/28/items/rs_ta/r11.mp4.
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ISIS's branch in Libya--comprising ``Tripoli, Barqa and Fezzan''
provinces\27\--is arguably one of its strongest and most reliable
factions. The post-Qaddafi political turmoil in Libya has afforded ISIS
a more fiexible environment in which to operate, especially prior to
the creation of the Government of National Accord (GAN) in December
2015. Libyan Forces recently scored victories against ISIS in Sirte,
but the group is quickly regrouping and maintains a wide network of
operatives and large caches of weapons.
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\27\ Areas of ISIS operations in Libya: Fezzan (Phazania) region in
south west Libya is mostly a desert region. Barqa (Cyrenaica) Province
includes the cities of Darna and Benghazi. Tripoli denotes the capital
Tripoli, Sirte, and Misrata.
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the west as adversary
ISIS in Libya has not just been adversarial toward the Libyan
Forces; it has sent a direct message to the ``Crusaders'' with its
release of footage showing the grisly beheadings of 21 Egyptian
laborers in southwestern Libya. Released in February 2015, the video
featured an English-speaking masked militant whose message echoes
ISIS's will and intent to strike beyond North Africa:
You have seen us on the hills of al-Sham and on Dabiq's plains,
chopping off the heads of those carrying the cross who have been living
a long time, filled of spite against Islam and Muslims. And today,
we're in the south of Rome, on the land of Islam, Libya, sending
another message. O Crusaders, safety for you will be only wishes,
especially when you're fighting us altogether. Therefore, we will fight
you altogether.\28\
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\28\ http://justpaste.it/jfg4.
In April 2015, the same English-speaking fighter appears in a video
featuring the executions of two groups of Ethiopian Christian workers,
directing a message to the ``nations of the Cross,'' in reference to
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the West. His message was similar to the earlier one:
To the nations of the Cross, we're back again on the sands where the
companions of the Prophet have stepped on before, telling you Muslim
blood that was shed under the hands of your religion is not cheap. In
fact, their blood is the purest blood because there is a nation behind
them inherits revenge. And we swear to Allah . . . you will not have
safety even in your dreams until you embrace Islam.\29\
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\29\ https://dump.to/albayyinah.
Such threats to the West are in lieu of ISIS's main external
operations goals: To strike in the United States and Europe--goals that
its leaders verbalized the intent to accomplish on multiple occasions.
ISIS in Libya as an entity, however, does not appear to have succeeded
in orchestrating attacks in Western countries--at least not yet.
However, its operatives have targeted Western tourists, namely in
Tunisia.
Unlike AQIM, however, which operates in a more decentralized
fashion, ISIS is highly centralized and the goals of its Libyan faction
are not confined to North Africa. On a number of occasions, ISIS
fighters have appeared in videos to threaten (or even celebrate) an
attack and name other cities they wish to target. After the November
2015 attacks in Paris, ISIS in Libya released a video, titled ``From
Barqa to Paris,'' featuring fighters who vowed more attacks against
``Crusaders'' in the future. One foreign fighter, whose country of
origin was not specified, threatened:
France was the beginning, and tomorrow it will be in Washington, New
York, and Moscow . . . you will have no haven from our guns, bullets,
and explosives; we will come to you.\30\
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\30\ https://archive.org/details/WilayatBarqahFromBarqahToParis.
ISIS's targeting of Christians--whom ISIS deems a part of the
global ``Crusade''--is directly addressing the West and challenging
Western countries to intervene. If ISIS's operatives are unable to
strike overseas, the group appears to be urging Western armies to bring
to it a ground war--an action that would afford ISIS significant
attention and amplify its recruitment efforts. ISIS has used this
rhetoric since the U.S.-led coalition began its aerial campaign against
the group in Iraq and Syria.
isis in libya recruits foreign nationals
ISIS has reportedly recruited from more than 80 countries around
the world.\31\ Its branch in Libya brought in fighters from north,
west, and east Africa, and from across the Sahel region. ISIS in Libya
has featured fighters urging others to join its ranks, including those
from Mali, Somalia, Ghana, Mali, Tunisia, Nigeria, Egypt, and Sudan.
The group has also featured English-speakers, although their countries
of origin remain unknown.
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\31\ https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/27/world/middleeast/thousands-
enter-syria-to-join-isis-despite-global-efforts.html?_r=0.
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In a video from its media office in Tripoli, ISIS featured fighters
who addressed Muslims across Africa, urging them to pledge allegiance
and join ISIS:
Brothers, it is time to pledge allegiance to the state of the
Caliphate; I say to the youths, jihad is obligatory in our current
time, and I urge those from my brothers who have no excuse to depart
for jihad.\32\
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\32\ https://ia601301.us.archive.org/5/items/CopyOf001_20150910/
Copy%20of%20001%20-%20[sic].ogv.
Another fighter delivered a message to ``my brothers and sister
everywhere: we are now in the Islamic State, and I call upon you to
migrate to it.'' He called upon the Tuareg tribe in North Mali--the
tribe one of AQIM's most senior leaders, Iyad Ag Ghali, belongs to--to
``migrate to the Islamic State.''
Nonetheless, for ISIS, it has remained of critical importance to
strike in the West while simultaneously recruiting fighters to its
ranks. ISIS leadership believes that inspiring so-called ``lone
wolves'' to strike in the United States and Europe will generate higher
propaganda value. For ISIS, attacks in the West are preferable; they
turn the attention away from its losses in Iraq and Syria while
maintaining the spotlight on the group. Abu Muhammad al-Adnani
addressed this point in a May 2016 speech, in which he called on
jihadists in the West to launch operations in their home cities rather
than migrate to ISIS territory:
Open in their faces the door of jihad and return their deeds against
them in regret, and the smallest action you carry out in their
homelands is better and more favored by us from the biggest of actions
in our midst; it is more successful for us and more brutalizing to
them. And if one of you wishes and seeks to reach the Islamic State
[i.e. here in the Middle East], one of us wishes to be in your location
[i.e. in the West] to brutalize the Crusaders.\33\
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\33\ https://archive.org/download/KalemtSHabaan/
kalemt%20SHa%60baan.mp3.
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To justify the targeting of civilians, Adnani added:
We've heard that some of you cannot work [i.e. to attack] for being
unable to reach military targets, and is hesitant from targeting the
so-called civilians, avoiding them because he doubts the permissibility
and legitimacy. Know that in the heart of the warring Crusaders' lands
there is no immunity of blood and no presence to the so-called
innocents . . . at least from the notion of treating others in the same
way; their aircraft do not distinguish between our armed or unarmed,
man and woman. Know that targeting so-called civilians is more beloved
to us . . . more brutalizing and painful to them and more repulsing.
isis's resurgence in algeria
ISIS established a faction under the initial name of ``Jund al-
Khilafah in Algeria'' in September 2014, now called ``Algeria
Province.'' A week after declaring allegiance to Baghdadi, the faction
kidnapped and beheaded a French national. The group is believed to be
comprised of a few dozen members, and for the past 2 years it has
remained mostly inactive. That changed on March 2, 2017, when the group
launched its first suicide attack, targeting a police station in Bab
el-Kantara area of Constantine City in northeastern Algeria.
Although the faction remains in a fragile state and lacks
organizational support and a programmatic agenda, ISIS fighters in
Algeria--operating mostly in the vicinity of Tizi Ouzou--will likely
attempt to strike again, as they appear to be re-organizing their
ranks. The likely targets will continue to be security forces; however,
Western nationals traveling in certain parts of northern and eastern
Algeria could be easy targets for kidnapping operations.
isis operations in tunisia a main concern
ISIS has failed to seize territory and establish a strong fighting
front in Tunisia, though it has attracted many Tunisians to its ranks
in Iraq and Syria. This is partly due to the Tunisian government's
crackdown on jihadists, even those who have no allegiance to any
specific group, such as Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia, which has been
designated a terrorist group by the government.
Two significant ISIS attacks in Tunisia that targeted Westerners
took place in 2015; in March, two ISIS operatives attacked tourists
outside the Bardo Museum in Tunis City, killing a total of 22 people,
including Italian, French, Spanish, British, and Belgian nationals,
among others. The attacker, according to the Tunisian government,
trained with ISIS's branch in Libya, underscoring the threat ISIS in
Libya poses to Western nationals. Three months later, an ISIS operative
using an automatic rifle killed over 35 tourists, most of them British,
at a resort beach hotel in Port al-Kantaoui, north of Sousse City.\34\
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\34\ http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33304897.
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While fairly infrequent, these operations generate significant
media attention for the terror group; as ISIS continues to face
challenges in its Middle Eastern strongholds, ISIS-orchestrated attacks
against Westerners in Tunisia may be more likely in the future.
tackling the jihadist threat in north africa
According to various media reports, the emphasis of U.S. and
European counterterrorism operations in North Africa and the Sahel has
been limited. U.S. special forces have reportedly conducted a number of
air strikes and other operations against jihadists in Libya.
Part of the issue appears to be that the United States is
preoccupied with fighting ISIS in its main strongholds in Iraq and
Syria, likely viewing ISIS's Libya branch as a lesser threat vis-a-vis
Western nationals and interests. Another reason may be that U.S. and
European security forces see the greatest threat from ISIS to the West
as directly emerging from its Iraqi and Syrian strongholds--where the
group's top leadership is in hideout.
In other words, the conventional wisdom seems to be that ISIS
directs external operations from Iraq and Syria. While that might be
true today, there is a high likelihood that the group will decentralize
its command-and-control in the future, and its branch in Libya is
poised to become the main destination where many of its fighters will
end up. There is a higher likelihood that ISIS in Libya will fund and
direct external operations as its Syrian and Iraqi branches are under
immense pressure to defend what remains of the territory under their
control.
For AQIM, its affiliates in North Mali have recently coalesced into
one group; one of the new collective's key goals is to continue
fighting French forces in Gao and other places.
AQIM's Algeria faction--where its top leader Abdulwadoud is
believed to be hiding--has faced a number of setbacks over the past 2
years, and its operations have been highly subdued. This is part of the
reason for the increased activity from its factions in Mali and
Tunisia. It is thus imperative that Western governments provide further
military and intelligence support to Tunisian, Algerian, and Malian
forces as they tackle the jihadist activity in their respective
countries.
conclusions
Given AQIM and ISIS's respective records of targeting Westerners,
it is clear that both groups pose a significant threat. AQIM's focus
continues to be on targeting Western citizens and economic interests
mainly in North Africa and the Sahel regions. There is a significant
focus on France and its influence in North and West Africa, which may
be a driving force for North African jihadists in France to launch
attacks in the country on behalf of AQIM.
Gas and oil facilities have been AQIM's primary economic targets,
especially given that many Westerners work at these plants. AQIM's
preferred methods of attack against such sites will involve suicide
bombers, hostage taking, and rocket attacks. Though France appears to
be AQIM's primary adversary, the terror group has targeted various
Western nationals, and, while the viability of AQIM attacks in the
United States is low, its interest in targeting the U.S. homeland is
high--especially given that al-Qaeda's leadership has designated the
United States as al-Qaeda's primary target.
Notorious AQIM commander Mukhtar Belmokhtar--who was reported to
have been killed several times over the past 4 years--was confirmed
killed by senior al-Qaeda Central leader Hussam Abdulra'oof in an
October 2015 recording.\35\ Various reports indicate that he may have
been killed as early as June 2015 in Libya.\36\ His reported presence
in Libya is further indicative of transnational cooperation between
AQIM affiliates across North Africa.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ https://twitter.com/menastream/status/651179105832955905.
\36\ http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
africaandindianocean/libya/11674616/The-Uncatchable-one-eyed-jihadi-
MokhtarBelmokhtar.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
AQIM never confirmed Belmokhtar's death, but it is safe to say that
the commander left behind a powerful faction in the Sahel capable of
conducting attacks against Westerners for years to come.
It is worth noting that al-Qaeda and ISIS oppose each other--not
only ideologically, but also in their geographic areas of interest.
This does not mean, however, that jihadists allegiant to both groups do
not have room for cooperation. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest
that jihadists who are specifically inspired by both groups might find
a cooperative environment provided they have the same enemy. The
January 2015 attacks in Paris, France at the offices of the magazine
Charlie Hebdo by pro al-Qaeda operatives, and at a Kosher deli by a
pro-ISIS jihadist, pointed to some level of cooperation between the
perpetrators, particularly in obtaining weapons.
In light of the wave of ISIS-inspired and orchestrated attacks in
the United States and Europe in 2015 and 2016, and given the on-going
U.S.-led military mission in Iraq and Syria, the likelihood is that
ISIS will continue to incite, inspire, and plot similar attacks against
civilians and soft targets. Stabbing, ramming, armed assault, and
bombing attacks will likely continue to be the methods of choice for
future attackers.
ISIS's strongholds in Iraq and Syria are under siege. The group has
lost significant territory and in the coming months, it is poised to
lose Mosul and most of its control in Aleppo. Foreign fighters,
including those from the West who may not wish to go home, may end up
connecting with ISIS's faction in Libya, invigorating the group's North
Africa ranks. Fighters from at least ten nationalities so far have been
fighting with ISIS in Libya.
Given Libya's close proximity to Europe, ISIS fighters in Libya who
wish to target the West may travel to European countries instead of the
United States.
Furthermore, ISIS has expressed on multiple occasions its will and
intent to orchestrate attacks in the West, and its operations in Paris
and Brussels denote the group's ability to dispatch skilled fighters
with the know-how to plot and strike. The group has also exerted
influence among jihadists in the United States and Europe who are
encouraged to attack in their countries on behalf of the group, rather
than join ISIS's ranks.
Westerners traveling or residing in insecure areas of Libya,
Tunisia, and Algeria will likely continue to face threats from ISIS-
inspired and directed attacks.
ISIS appears to have a more powerful recruitment and indoctrination
strategy in the West than AQIM. ISIS's external operations facilitators
appear to have developed a more inclusive and aggressive call to target
the West by all means necessary--unlike AQIM, which has not focused on
calls for external attacks overseas.
Returnees to the United States and Europe--those who have gained
experience in militant tactics in ISIS camps--as well as self-
radicalized individuals, likely pose the most significant jihadist
threat to the West.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Alkhouri.
Our final witness is Dr. Frederic Wehrey. He is a senior
fellow in the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace. He specializes in post-conflict
transitions, armed groups, and identity politics with a focus
on Libya, North Africa, and the Gulf.
His commentary and articles appeared in numerous
publications. He routinely briefs U.S. and European government
officials on Middle East affairs. Dr. Wehrey is a 21-year
veteran of the active and reserve components of the U.S. Air
Force, with tours across the Middle East and North Africa.
Dr. Wehrey, you are recognized for your testimony. Thank
you.
STATEMENT OF FREDERIC WEHREY, SENIOR FELLOW, MIDDLE EAST
PROGRAM, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE
Mr. Wehrey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman King, Ranking Member Rice, committee Members, I am
grateful for this opportunity to speak with you today about the
extremist threat from North Africa. The challenge here is
especially dire given the numbers of fighters who fought abroad
with ISIS and al-Qaeda and who are now returning.
But beyond the threat of returning jihadists, it is the
weakness of states in the region that is the most important
driver of extremism. Many states here are increasingly unable
to meet the demands of their citizens and are facing mounting
economic pressures in an era of low oil prices.
Faced with rising, expectations and diminished futures,
some youth in the region have fallen prey to the appeal of
jihad peddled by ISIS and al-Qaeda. Critiques of corruption,
social injustice, and police abuses feature prominently in the
jihadists' appeal.
Heavy-handed policies by North African governments have
often fueled the very radicalism they purport to quash. Added
to this are the region's ungoverned spaces and porous borders
where extremists have negotiated access with marginalized
tribes or co-opted smuggling networks.
Finally, a key enabler of jihadism is the outbreak of armed
conflict. Any time there is an insurgency or civil war, we can
expect to see transnational jihadists arrive, often with
superior motivation, funding, and firepower.
I will focus my remarks on Libya, a country that embodies
many of these afflictions and that I visited repeatedly over
the past several years, including Sirte last year. It is a
failed state that presents the most immediate extremist
challenge.
Despite the successful Libyan-led campaign against ISIS in
Sirte and other successes in the west and the east last year,
the country remains at risk. Scattered ISIS members are
regrouping in Sabratha near the Tunisian border, in cells in
and around the capital of Tripoli, and in the south where they
have easy transit into the Sahel.
Also, some al-Qaeda-affiliated fighters who defected to
ISIS are now returning back to a reconstituted and expanded al-
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. But more importantly, I want to
emphasize that it is Libya's worsening political crisis that
has pushed it to the brink of open conflict, and this could
create a vacuum for terrorists to reemerge.
The recent campaign against ISIS has helped embolden
General Khalifa Haftar and his forces in the east to push for
national domination, capturing oil facilities, and threatening
to topple the U.N.-backed government in Tripoli. If this were
to happen, it would invariably throw the country into civil
war, creating yet another vacuum for ISIS, al-Qaeda, or some
new permutation of jihadism to emerge.
It is a looming danger, Mr. Chairman, that demands a
redoubling of diplomatic engagement by the United States. This
could entail several efforts; first, deterring moves toward
escalation by exerting pressure on the warring parties to
include the threat of sanctions; second, brokering a dialog
among regional and concerned states with interests in Libya.
But beyond the task of forging a new political compact in
Libya, the United States must stand ready to assist the
capacity of whatever Libyan government emerges.
This should focus on the following areas: Rationalizing the
oil-driven economy and diversifying to other sources of income;
training the army and police; reforming defense institutions;
and especially promoting the rule of law, especially in
prisons, which we know are incubators of violent extremism.
The United States also has an opportunity to re-engage with
Libya society in areas like municipal governance, civil society
organizations, media, and education. But proposed cuts to
American foreign aid programs on this front would deprive us of
this opportunity. So, too, would a ban on Libyan visitors to
the States.
Counterterrorism efforts in Libya, whether ISR, border
control, direct action, or training and equipping of local
forces must always reinforce the building of inclusive, durable
governance.
The United States must also ensure that any
counterterrorism engagement with local Libyan groups does not
inadvertently worsen conflict by privileging one faction over
another.
Mr. Chairman, committee Members, my travels to Libya have
left me with a strong appreciation for Libyans' resilience. The
political fissures that wrack the country are not unbridgeable.
Contrary to some alarmist accounts, Libya has not fallen to
extremism. But the United States needs to act now to avert a
looming crisis that could have far-reaching effects for its
interests beyond the country's borders.
Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you here today.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Wehrey follows:]
Prepared Statement of Frederic Wehrey
March 29, 2017
Chairman King, Ranking Member Rice, committee Members, I am
grateful for this opportunity to speak with you today about the
extremist threat from North Africa.
At the intersection of the Middle East, Africa, and Europe, the
countries of North Africa and the Maghreb comprise a vitally important
region that casts a long shadow on surrounding areas and, especially,
on the security of the Mediterranean basin. The extremist challenge
from this region is especially dire given the numbers of fighters who
went to Iraq and Syria to fight with the self-proclaimed Islamic State
in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and al-Qaeda and who are now returning.
But beyond the threat of returning jihadists, it is the weakness of
states in the region that presents the most significant and long-term
driver of extremism. Since the Arab uprisings in 2011, most states in
the region are now significantly weaker, unable to meet the basic
demands of their citizens, and facing mounting economic pressures in an
era of sustained low oil prices.
Beset by fraying social contracts, the dashed hopes of the Arab
Spring, and diminished opportunities for employment, some youth of the
region have fallen prey to the appeal of jihad peddled by the Islamic
State and al-Qaeda. The jihadists' critiques of state-led corruption
and the abuses of the judiciary and police have also resonated
strongly; heavy-handed government policies have often fueled the very
radicalism they purport to quash. Added to this are broad swathes of
ungoverned land and porous borders, where extremists have established
logistical hubs and training camps, often negotiating access with
marginalized tribal communities or co-opting existing smuggling
networks.
Finally, a key enabler of jihadism is state collapse and the
outbreak of open armed conflict. Anywhere there is an established
insurgency or civil war, we can expect the emergence of transnational
jihadists who insert themselves among and within the warring parties
and often recruit combatants to their ranks through superior funding,
ideological motivation, and firepower.
I will focus my remarks on Libya, a failed state that embodies a
witches' brew of these afflictions and that poses the most immediate
extremist challenge. Despite the successful Libyan-led campaign against
the ISIS stronghold in Sirte, along with other successes by different
Libyan armed groups against ISIS pockets in the West and East, the
country remains at risk. Scattered ISIS members are regrouping and al-
Qaeda-affiliated fighters who defected to ISIS are now returning back
to al-Qaeda-linked groups, more experienced and battle-hardened. Vast
portions of its southern deserts remain a thoroughfare for the movement
of fighters and arms to the Sahel and beyond.
But more importantly, Libya's worsening political conflict, fueled
in part by regional meddling and a contest for oil resources, has
pushed it to the brink of civil war. This disastrous outcome would
provide yet another opening for ISIS, al-Qaeda, or some new permutation
to arise.
To prevent such a scenario, Mr. Chairman, it is important the
United States, working in tandem with the Europeans and regional
states, redouble its diplomatic efforts to find a durable and inclusive
political solution to Libya's conflict. At the same time, it should be
ready to assist on a broad array of functions, to include the
rebuilding the security sector, diversifying Libya's economy, advancing
the rule of law, and supporting civil society. Any near-term
counterterrorism (CT) actions inside Libya should reinforce the longer-
term goals of political unity and inclusive governance, and great care
should be taken to ensure that CT engagement does not inadvertently
worsen factional conflict by privileging one group over another.
My remarks draw from visits to Libya over last 2 years to areas of
conflict marked by a jihadist presence: Sirte, Benghazi, Sabratha,
Tripoli, and southern Libya.
how jihadism grew in libya
Libya has a long-standing tradition of jihadism stretching back to
the Qadhafi era that saw waves of volunteers going to Afghanistan and
then Iraq, where some developed ties to al-Qaeda and what would later
become al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and ISIS. These migrations belie the
popular notion that Qadhafi kept a lid on extremism: To the contrary,
economic neglect and repression at home helped fuel radicalization
among certain neighborhoods and communities, whose participation in
jihad on foreign battlefields was in some sense a transference of their
frustrations against the regime.
In 2011 and 2012, scores of Libyan youths went to Syria and Iraq,
some of whom returned to establish the nucleus of the Islamic State in
the eastern city of Derna, displacing existing Islamist armed groups.
From there, the group spread to the city of Sirte, in the oil-rich
center of Libya and established cells in Sabratha to the west, Tripoli,
as well as attaching itself to existing Islamist and jihadist
combatants in Benghazi. It then set about implementing the draconian
style of governance it had practiced in Raqqa and Mosul, assaulting oil
facilities to hasten the demise of the State, and attacking the
facilities of police and militias who posed a threat. The Islamic
State's leadership soon directed foreign aspirates to proceed directly
to its North African outpost rather than Syria and Iraq. Foreigners
played a crucial role in its expansion in Libya, especially jihadists
from Tunisia (some of whom arrived to train for subsequent attacks
against their homeland), the Mahreb and the Sahel, and military and
governance advisors from Iraq and the Gulf.
It is important to note two dynamics about the rise of ISIS in
Libya that have strong implications for the future of jihadism in
Libya.
First, Islamist and jihadist communities after the 2011 revolution
engaged in a series of fierce debates about strategies and priorities,
to include whether to affiliate themselves with the post-Qadhafi State
and to participate in elections, and whether and when to use violence.
Developments in neighboring states, namely the closing of political
space and military-led crackdown on political Islamists in Egypt,
strongly influenced the outcomes of those debates in favor of more
anti-state and radical actors. At home, a number of developments swayed
the debate as well. The most important of these was the outbreak of
open armed conflict in Libya in 2014 between the so-called Dawn and
Dignity camp, abetted by opposing blocs of regional states (Turkey and
Qatar for the former; Egypt, the UAE, and Jordan for the latter)
provided further space for the rise of radical jihadists, especially
the Islamic State, to expand. For nearly 2 years, the two opposing Dawn
and Dignity factions were more focused on fighting each other than on
dealing with the extremist menace that gathered in their midst.
Second, the Islamic State in Libya won support among communities
and tribes that had been politically marginalized in the post-Qadhafi
political order or threatened by local rivals. This was especially
apparent in Sirte, a city that had suffered after the revolution
because of its affiliation with the Qadhafi regime. Here, members of
historically loyalist tribes, the Warfalla and Qadhadhafa, welcomed the
Islamic State as a form of self-protection against abuses from the
neighboring city of Misrata, which had assaulted Sirte at the end of
the revolution and exacted revenge against it inhabitants. Similarly,
some local Islamist militias in Benghazi cooperated with the Islamic
State on the battlefield because they faced a shared enemy, the self-
styled Libyan National Army (LNA) forces of General Khalifa Hifter.
Finally, jihadists from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and other
groups based in the Sahel have exploited weak governance and dire
economic conditions in Tuerag tribal areas of southern Libya for
logistics and training. Their fighters draw upon a long history of
local knowledge stretching back to Sahelian insurgencies of the 1990's
and Algeria's civil war. After the revolution, these groups established
links with local armed groups and jihadists in the north, particularly
the northeast in Benghazi, Derna, and Ajdabiya. Ansar al-Sharia trained
fighters loyal to the seasoned Algerian jihadist Mukhtar Belmokhtar,
prior to their January 2013 attack on the Tiguentourine gas facility in
Amenas, Algeria.
Local sympathizers and collaborators in southwestern Libya have
facilitated some of this transnational presence and movement. That
said, the Tuaregs' political and communal opponents in Libya have often
exaggerated the depth and scope of extremist penetration, particularly
in town of Ubari and farther west. The jihadist presence is mostly
logistical and the result of weak administrative and police control in
the south, rather than wide-spread support. Where jihadi relationships
exist with local armed groups and smugglers, it is often transactional,
resulting from a shared interest in keeping borders uncontrolled. Aside
from this presence, the penetration of radical ideology into Libyan
Tuareg communities or into the south's social fabric more broadly is
minimal.
Taken in sum, these three dynamics underscore the fact that the
radical jihadist current in Libya is neither constant nor immutable. It
ebbs or expands according to the local economic and political
conditions, government capacity, and conflict in the country. This is
why American engagement with a broad range of tools is so important in
denying jihadists the chance to remerge.
risks of renewed conflict and resurgent jihadism
Last fall, Libyan forces loosely affiliated to a U.N.-backed
Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli, backed by American
airpower and Western special operations, scored a hard-won victory
against the ISIS stronghold in the central city of Sirte. Elsewhere
across the country, Libyans ejected ISIS cells and fighters from Derna
and Benghazi in the east, from Tripoli, and from the town of Sabratha
near the Tunisian border.
Today, ISIS is no longer a territorial force in Libya in any
meaningful sense. That said, its demise presents a number of dangers.
First, remnants of ISIS could still reconstitute themselves and sow
trouble. Already, fighters have fled to the desert valleys south of
Sirte, where they've tried to regroup in small encampments like the one
the United States bombed on January 18 of this year. The group is said
to have a residual presence around the western town of Sabratha, a
long-time hub for Tunisian jihadists, and its clandestine cells are
still capable of attacking in and around the Tripoli, already wracked
by intra-militia fighting. This poses a potential danger for the return
of foreign embassies and businesses to the capital.
Beyond these specific threats, Libya remains an attractive host to
jihadism, whether from ISIS, al-Qaeda, or some new variant. The
conditions are ripe: A long legacy of jihad, economic despair, a
governance vacuum, and worsening polarization that could leave some
communities feeling as if they have no recourse but violence. Some
tribes in Sirte, such as the Qadhadhafa and Warfalla, see the Misratan-
led victory against ISIS as less of a liberation and more of a
conquest--and it was their grievances against Misratan domination that
gave ISIS its opening in the first place.
Most importantly, though, the struggle against the Islamic State
has given way to a renewed National-level conflict. Western diplomats
had hoped that fighting ISIS could serve as a springboard for political
unity among these warring camps.
In fact, the opposite has happened.
Local campaigns against ISIS across the country were pell-mell and
carried out by disparate and hostile armed groups without any unifying
government authority. For example, rival jihadists in Derna ejected the
Islamic State, and in the western coastal town of Sabratha, local
militias involved in migrant trafficking helped lead the campaign. In
Sirte, the militias from the powerful city of Misrata that defeated
ISIS were only loosely tethered to the GNA in Tripoli--and many in fact
fiercely opposed it. Now that ISIS is gone, some have turned their guns
on the GNA.
In Benghazi, Hifter's LNA has largely defeated ISIS and other
jihadist groups but, in the process, it severely ruptured the city's
social fabric, displacing thousands of families and unleashing
exclusionary forces such as tribalism and ultraconservative Salafism.
Across the east, Hifter has replaced elected municipal councils with
military governments and cracked down on civil society and freedom of
the press. Disturbing evidence has surfaced of war crimes committed by
soldiers under his command, such as the exhumation and abuse of enemy
corpses and summary executions of both combatant prisoners and
civilians. None of this is a recipe for enduring stability or success
against radicalism. And indeed, Islamists evicted by his campaign have
already waged attacks against his forces outside of Benghazi and in the
oil crescent.
Most ominously, though, the campaign against ISIS has helped
embolden Hifter and his supporters to make a renewed push for National
domination with the capture of major oil facilities in Sirte (though
not uncontested) and repeated threats to invade Tripoli.
This looming danger, Mr. Chairman, demands immediate engagement
from the United States. Having expended considerable military effort in
helping Libyan forces wrest territory from the Islamic State last year,
the United States should now turn its attention to ensuring the country
does not slip into civil war and building a cohesive government, while
at the same time dealing with residual and emerging jihadist pockets.
what can the united states do?
Sticking to the mantra of supporting the GNA in Tripoli, as
Washington and Western governments have done over the past year, is no
longer a viable option. But neither is the seemingly easy solution of
backing a military strongman such as Hifter.
Hifter has no realistic prospect of stabilizing Libya through
military rule. His Libyan National Army is neither national nor an
army. Even in the east, the bulk of the LNA's forces are drawn from
civilian fighters--militias of varying backgrounds that are
increasingly disguised as formal army units. In the west and south, the
LNA units have a distinctly tribal composition, provoking suspicion
among neighboring communities that view them as little more than tribal
militias. Because of their geographic concentration in the east, they
are not useful partners in tackling the flow of migrant smuggling,
which is mostly based along a western strip of coast stretching from
Misrata to the Tunisian border.
The idea that Hifter's forces could take over Tripoli and rebuild
the Libyan State is thus highly implausible. Indeed, encouraging Hifter
to expand his reach toward Tripoli risks triggering a war over the
capital that could drag on for years. With a third of the country's
population living in the greater Tripoli area, such a conflict could
cause displacement and humanitarian suffering on a scale not seen to
date in Libya. It would also offer opportunities for jihadist
mobilization. Non-Islamist armed groups in Tripoli would join forces
with Islamist-leaning fighters to confront Hifter. As in the case of
Benghazi, the most extreme and irreconcilable jihadist elements would
invariably rise to the fore.
Even if Hifter were able to establish control over Tripoli, his
rule would cause more, not less, radicalization. Like Egypt's al-Sisi,
Hifter makes no distinction between ISIS, al-Qaeda, and the Muslim
Brotherhood (whose Libyan branch has supported the GNA's formation).
His stated goal of killing, jailing, or exiling Islamists of all types
risks provoking moderate, pro-state Islamists into going underground
and allying themselves with radical jihadists. Meanwhile, doctrinaire
Salafis promoted and encouraged by Hifter--who preach absolute loyalty
to a sitting ruler--would further extend their influence, and enforce
their harsh interpretation of Sharia law more widely.
In sum, unification through military action is not realistic in
Libya. Instead, the United States, in conjunction with regional states,
should support a renewed push for a political settlement. This requires
a number of things.
First, it necessitates the deterrence of any moves toward military
escalation by exerting credible pressure on the warring parties, to
include the threat of sanctions and exclusion from any future security
assistance.
Second, it requires rebuilding the negotiating architecture, with
regional states taking the lead. The challenge will be brokering a
common platform for dialog among states with vested interests in Libya.
How to deal with an increasingly assertive Russia will pose a
particular difficulty. Recent initiatives by regional states like
Tunisia and Algeria should be encouraged, but they need to be
transferred into a more coherent framework. A small group of states,
closely coordinating with each other, could act as mediators and,
eventually, witnesses and guarantors to an agreement.
The U.S. role in such a process could be to provide strong and
explicit support for the mediating consortium. Most importantly, it
would require putting pressure on the regional states still backing
Hifter like the Emirates and Egypt and, more recently, Russia. Every
effort should be made to broker a deal that includes the general within
the framework of a civilian-controlled military. But if Hifter proves
recalcitrant, the United States must be willing to push his regional
and international backers to end their support.
Beyond the Herculean task of forging a political compact, the
United States faces the enormous task of helping whatever new Libyan
government emerges to succeed by delivering on basic services,
security, and, especially, economic growth.
An immediate priority is securing the capital of Tripoli, which
means reaching an agreement among militias to remove their forces and
heavy weaponry outside civilian areas, and to make way for a protection
force that can be built up over time with training and support from the
outside. Another imperative is safeguarding key strategic assets like
oil facilities, airports, and ports from factional conflict. Here, a
number of options could be explored such as an agreement for de-
militarization or protection by a neutral, third-party force.
The new Libyan government will need enormous help on the economic
front, in setting up an equitable and rational system for the dispersal
of oil revenues to employees and to municipalities, while working to
diversify to other sectors. The development of alternative livelihood
sources is especially important in countering migrant smuggling,
especially in the south, where young men are drawn into smuggling
networks because of the absence of alternatives.
The judicial sector is another key area of assistance, along with
prisons, particularly with regard to captured Islamic State fighters
and jihadists returning from abroad. Many are currently incarcerated in
militia-run prisons with little or no judicial oversight, where they
are reportedly tortured or subjected to religious rehabilitation
programs that, by themselves do not prevent recidivism. Local
communities and, especially, meaningful opportunities for employment or
education provide the best hopes for post-prison reintegration.
The challenge of rebuilding Libya's police and army will likely be
a multi-year and even decades-long investment, given the decrepit state
of the regular army under Qadhafi's long reign and the plethora of
armed groups today. A training effort in 2013-14 by the United States,
Britain, Turkey, and Italy to build a national army--the so-called
general purpose force--failed in part because the Libyan government was
divided among itself, with some factions favoring militias and because
there was no unified military structure or institutions for recruits to
join. Those recruits that did complete the training returned to Libya
and were either put on leave or melted back into militias.
Future training programs risk repeating these mistakes, unless the
new government agrees on a roadmap for building a unified and
professional military, delineating its geographic divisions and
functions, while at the same time formulating strategy for demobilizing
and re-integrating militias. This requires a degree of political
consensus, which Libya has hitherto lacked. Once that is reached, the
United States can assist in helping Libyan defense institutions in such
areas as planning, payroll, and logistics through an intense advisory
effort, possibly under the auspices of an expanded Defense Institution
Reform Initiative (DIRI).
Mr. Chairman, the United States also has an enormous opportunity to
re-engage with Libyan society through assistance on municipal level
governance, civil society, media, and education. These sorts of
programs are an important corollary to the development of formal
political, security, and economic institutions which, given their
decrepit condition under Qadhafi, is likely to be a generational
endeavor. And Libya possesses enormous human capital that could benefit
from such engagement, itself a cause for guarded optimism: A literate
and educated population, small in size, geographically concentrated,
and largely lacking in the stark and sometimes existential ethnic,
sectarian, and linguistic divides that afflict other Middle Eastern
states. But proposed cuts to American foreign aid programs on this
front would deprive us of this opportunity, with likely damaging
results for future stability.
On a similar note, I would like to add that the ban on the travel
of Libyan citizens to the United States is not only morally
reprehensible, but self-defeating with regard to goals in the country.
It deprives the United States to opportunities for important
engagements and exchanges with visiting scholars, students, officials,
and citizens--engagements that are all the more important since Libya
is closed off to American diplomats. But more importantly, it
represents a profound betrayal of American values and of the hopes
ordinary Libyans attached to America ever since the 2011 intervention.
Mr. Chairman, in my repeated travels to Libya I've enjoyed the
hospitality and protection of countless Libyans. In Sirte, Sabratha,
Tripoli, and Benghazi, I've seen first-hand the sacrifices Libyan young
men made in battling the Islamic State. Despite popular depictions, the
vast majority of Libyans have rejected extremism in all of its forms. I
therefore urge the immediate repeal of this law, for Libya and the
other affected countries.
Mr. Chairman, committee Members, I thank you for the opportunity to
testify today, and I look forward to your questions.
Mr. King. Thank you, Dr. Wehrey. Appreciate it very much.
I will begin with my questioning. Which of the groups do
you think represents the most dangerous, long-term threat to
the United States between ISIS and al-Qaeda?
Dr. Porter.
Mr. Porter. I have asked this question multiple times, and
I also asked it to my cadets when I was teaching at West Point,
and it comes down to the different strategies that the
different groups employ, whether it is the Islamic State or its
affiliates around the world or al-Qaeda.
In my opinion, while the Islamic State is burning very
brightly, it is also burning very quickly. Al-Qaeda has
employed a more conservative, longer-term strategy and is
likely to be more enduring of an organization than the Islamic
State will be.
It is more likely--Mr. Alkhouri mentions that there is a
less rigorous recruiting process for al-Qaeda. I would argue
that it is less aggressive in its recruiting because it is more
selective in its recruiting. The membership of al-Qaeda, I
think, is more capable than the membership of the Islamic State
over the longer term.
So in North Africa, the more enduring threat to the United
States and to U.S. National interests overseas is without a
doubt al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and not the Islamic
State.
Mr. King. Dr. Pham.
Mr. Pham. I would pick up where my friend, Dr. Porter, left
off and say that I would agree with him. In the Sahel and parts
south, what we see is al-Qaeda embedding itself within, picking
up local grievances, local groups and multiplying, where
necessary, local front groups that the identities shift.
For example, the Peul or Fulani peoples of the region, who
straddle the entire region, have increasingly seen and
witnessed an al-Qaeda-linked group emerge, the Macina
Liberation Front, which has now merged into this group that you
cited earlier, Mr. Chairman, this group for the support of
Islam and Muslims, but still also operates independently at
times when convenient.
Attacks not only in Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, but we are
seeing increasingly attacks in Nigeria and even parts farther
south than the Boko Haram have, targeting largely predominately
Christian communities in Nigeria.
Mr. King. Mr. Alkhouri.
Mr. Alkhouri. I believe both of them pose a significant
threat. I think, though, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb poses
a bigger threat to Western civilians and interests in the
region, meaning in North Africa, the Sahel, and the Sahara. But
I believe in the long term, ISIS' message has really been
extremely disseminated across the West a lot, a much more
powerful message than AQIM.
In 2015 alone, ISIS released between 750 to 800 videos,
unlike AQIM which released only a couple of dozen of them.
These videos have largely concentrated on indoctrinating
individuals in the West and inciting them. These videos will
continue to be a recruitment tool, an indoctrination tool for
Westerners for decades to come.
So I believe that ISIS, in the long term, its message is a
lot more aggressive in targeting the West than al-Qaeda's.
Mr. King. Dr. Wehrey.
Mr. Wehrey. Well, just to second what was said, I think
AQIM poses the more enduring threat, I think because of its
focus on embedding in societies in this region and its focus on
governance. But I would just caution that much of this is
transactional. So, again, I think its maneuverability is
somewhat limited on what kind of groups it can co-opt.
Certainly, it is a threat to American interests in the
Sahel in West Africa. In Libya, at least, I would argue ISIS
could try to stage a comeback through spectacular attacks,
especially if there is any return of Western embassies or the
United Nations to the capital. ISIS could try to make its
presence known through attacks there.
Mr. King. Thank you.
Again, I would ask the four of you, how significant is the
recruiting on-line propaganda in this region? How would you
compare what al-Qaeda is doing there and ISIS compared to on-
line in the rest of the world, you know, as far as targeting?
Mr. Alkhouri.
Mr. Alkhouri. I believe, as I mentioned earlier, ISIS has a
much more aggressive call for attacks, and its operations on-
line, essentially, I would say, when looking at AQIM's
operations on-line, it has only two channels that operate on-
line. Their followers are only in the low hundreds.
When I look at ISIS channels on-line, they have over 50 of
them, and they operate, you know, across encrypted-messaging
platforms as well as the deep, dark web.
I have been following ISIS' operations on-line since its
inception. I would say that it has really dominated the
internet, not only in its dissemination of propaganda, but
actually its use of technology to incite others, provide them
with advice on how to evade scrutiny and essentially operate
very comfortably in the West.
So I would say ISIS has a much more dominating presence
online than al-Qaeda or al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.
Mr. King. Anybody else want to comment?
Dr. Pham.
Mr. Pham. I would agree with Mr. Alkhouri that on-line, but
I would caution the subcommittee that on-line is just one
dimension of media. Where al-Qaeda perhaps has an advantage as
an ideology and its ideological roots is the fact that it is
built on a matrix that has been developed over years of foreign
money, foreign influence, mosques, and social networks.
So in many respects, this is an area where on-line is one
thing, but we have very low literacy rates as well. So access
to the internet is lower and so there are other ways of social
messaging that we should be aware of.
Mr. King. Dr. Porter.
Mr. Porter. In fact, Dr. Pham took the words right out of
my mouth. I think, you know, when we think about the on-line
recruitment among Islamic State or al-Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb in North Africa, we have to bear in mind that internet
penetration rates in the Sahel, and particularly in Niger,
Chad, Mali, and especially in northern Mali and northern Niger,
are low.
That is going to be a natural or inherent barrier for
Islamic State or al-Qaeda on-line recruitment methods in those
regions. As Dr. Pham also pointed out, there are other
mechanisms on the ground that these organizations can use to
generate followers.
Now conversely, internet penetration rates, despite the
instability and turmoil in Libya, are fairly good. Likewise,
internet penetration rates in Morocco are also very good, which
comes part and parcel of Morocco's economic development.
So it poses a double-edged sword. On the one hand, you have
economic opportunities generated by telecommunications
developments, but on the other hand, you know, you have the
risk posed by on-line communications and on-line recruitment.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. King. OK.
Dr. Wehrey.
Mr. Wehrey. Just to echo what was said, I think the, you
know, on-line penetration and also, you know, media in general
can sort of sensitize people. But I think the ultimate
recruitment, and this is stemming from a lot of the interviews
I have done in Libya, is really based on social groups and sort
of neighborhood influences.
You look at al-Qaeda groups like Ansar al-Sharia, they were
very effective in promoting a certain culture with youth camps,
social works, and from there it was an easy path to armed
jihad.
Mr. King. Thanks.
Miss Rice.
Miss Rice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Porter, I would just like to start with you. You had
said in your testimony that the greatest threat in North Africa
is injustice and the lack of rule of law, or, you know, or
commitment to justice and the rule of law are foundations of
any properly functioning government.
All last year we heard a lot of America first, America
first, and it has yet to be seen how that is going to translate
from a campaign slogan to a governing party. But what effect is
that going to have on how receptive people in North Africa are
going to be to our intervention there in the various different
ways that we intervene?
Mr. Porter. Thank you, ma'am. It is a very pertinent and,
to be frank, difficult question. I think depending on the types
of programs that the United States initiates overseas in, and
particularly in North Africa, which is the subject of today's
subcommittee hearing, for the most part, U.S. engagement in the
region is positively received.
It is received well by the Chadian armed forces, the
Nigerian armed forces, the Malian armed forces. So military aid
is welcomed by those host countries, and I think that has
yielded dividends in counterterrorism campaigns in North Africa
and the Sahel.
In addition, parallel to that, the United States aid
programs and development programs through USAID and through
State Department are also well-received. They pay dividends in
a different way.
I think, you know, one of the things that we should
emphasize here today, and speaking more broadly about the
current budgetary environments on the current foreign policy
environment in Washington, is that, as I said in my testimony,
there is no strictly military solution to counterterrorism.
That removing terrorists from the battlefield only slows the
group's evolution. It does not eliminate the group.
What eliminates the group is changing the conditions on the
ground. The military does not do that, and nor should they. It
is not their job. That job falls to State Department. I think
this is as important a component of counterterrorism as the
military is. Thank you very much, ma'am.
Miss Rice. So that leads to my next question, that the
Trump administration has proposed a 28 percent cut to the State
Department, which would devastate foreign aid programs. What
say you about that? I mean what effect is that going to have on
the non-military programs that you were just talking about?
Mr. Porter. A negative one.
Miss Rice. How do we address that? How do we make the point
that--I mean there are members of the administration, the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, who have talked
about this. In what ways, how is this being received, if at
all, by the countries that you are talking about that rely on
foreign aid from the United States? What is their take on this?
Mr. Porter. To the best of my knowledge, ma'am, there is a
sense of anxiety among North African capitals about what the
retreat of U.S. State Department programs, USAID programs in
their countries will have. In particular, there are concerns in
Tunisia about the good governance programs that the United
States is supporting there.
There are concerns in Morocco. Morocco does have a constant
battle against Islamic State supporters within their own
borders. To Morocco's credit, it is doing a very good job on
the counterterrorism front, but it needs help on rule of law
and good governance issues. Likewise, Algeria, and then the
Sahel states even more so.
So this will have a deleterious effect on the good
governance rule of law environment, and I think it will
aggravate the sense of social injustice that upon which salafi
jihadi groups feed. Thank you, ma'am.
Miss Rice. Thank you.
Dr. Wehrey, a question for you. How valuable is a strong
European Union, right? We are talking today about the threat
not just to the United States, to the terrorism that is going
on and growing in North Africa, but also to Europe. In your
opinion, how important is a strong European Union? Or is it not
to kind of combatting, doing their part to combat terrorism in
the North African region?
Mr. Wehrey. Thank you, ma'am. I think it is, you know,
absolutely essential and especially in a place like Libya where
the United States can't bear the burden on its own. I mean,
after the 2011 revolution, the European countries had a number
of, you know, programs to address various aspects of Libya's
governance and security. They are now engaged on the border
issue.
But I think, and this speaks to your previous question, I
think they do require some U.S. leadership behind them. So the
United States can lend certain capabilities here, which is why,
to echo what Dr. Porter said, it is so important that we stay
involved. But, no, I mean the European Union is absolutely
essential.
Miss Rice. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. King. Mr. Keating from Massachusetts.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You had mentioned before that this is more of a direct
threat to Europe. Could you comment particularly on threats to
Europe directly from this area, particularly southern Europe,
where countries like Italy, most of the migration is coming
from Northern Africa?
Could you really, any of you, or all of you hopefully,
comment on what the nature of those threats are? What the
United States and what our allies there can do to try and
counter that?
Mr. Porter. Sir, thank you. Thank you for your question. As
I said in my oral testimony, the threat posed by jihadi salafi
organizations in North Africa to Europe is much greater than
that posed to the United States simply because of geographic
proximity.
You know, when I brief the FBI or ICE, a couple throwaway
facts, you know, the Strait of Gibraltar separating Morocco
from southern Spain at its narrowest is 8 kilometers wide. A
flight from Algiers, the capital of Algeria, to Marseille,
which is the second largest French city, is about the same
length and time as the New York-D.C. shuttle.
So North Africa is in Europe's backyard. That poses a grave
concern for European countries, especially those on the shores
of the Mediterranean.
I do want to address what I think is a red herring, which
is the fear that salafi jihadi terrorists will embed themselves
with refugees or immigrants trying to cross the Mediterranean
and illegally penetrate Europe's borders.
You know, on the one hand, Islamic State and al-Qaeda in
the Islamic Maghreb have sufficient resources not to have to
throw themselves into a rickety dinghy and try and cross the
Mediterranean. They can easily buy a plane ticket with a clean
passport from a third-party country. There is no need to take
the risk of trying to cross the Mediterranean.
In addition, Islamic State and al-Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb have likely supporters in Europe. Many of those
supporters, as we have seen in the case of the Paris attacks,
the Brussels attacks, the Nice attacks, have connections to the
North African diaspora in Europe.
So the threat, I think, is substantial, even with the fluid
movement of peoples back and forth across the Mediterranean,
but not necessarily through illegal channels and more and more
likely through legal channels such as airplane tickets,
ferries, and car crossings. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Keating. Anyone else want to comment on that threat in
Europe?
Mr. Pham. Sir, thank you for your question. I would add to
what Dr. Porter said, also, highlight the threat to European
interests and personnel, including military and diplomatic
personnel throughout this region in the region itself.
In particular, France has--our allies there have a
tremendous network of business and other contacts in the region
that are there. The French lead the peacekeeping efforts in
Mali.
There are German units, even Swedish units in Mali, which
has turned into the bloodiest U.N. peacekeeping operation
anywhere, the deadliest because of the on-going instability in
the northern part of the country.
So I would add that there is the threat there. Many of the
victims in the al-Qaeda-linked attacks in Cote d'Ivoire,
Burkina Faso, Mali were European citizens. So there is a threat
to Europeans in that area.
One other low note I would add to that is there is the
downside of the North African diaspora in Europe, but there is
also the upside that some of the North African countries,
Morocco in particular, have extraordinarily capable, not only
counterterrorism but counter-radicalization programs driven not
just by security services but by religious leaders and social
networks, that help not only in their own country, but
throughout this region, and increasingly, even reaching back to
Europe as well.
Mr. Keating. OK. Just a comment that yesterday in the
Foreign Affairs Committee we had a hearing regarding the
budget, the foreign aid budget. I share a very optimistic view
that the present budget will not be the budget that we will
endorse or support here in the House. That is a bipartisan
statement yesterday, and a very strong one.
But what about the role with our kind of assistance on
empowering women in these regions to a greater extent? We have
found in many areas that that is more successful, the money
gets where it should, goes to the health and goes toward
children. Does anyone want to comment on how spearheading some
of those funds empowering women to be more involved in that
area could be successful?
Mr. Porter. I think it should be duly noted that you are
asking a question about empowering women to an all-male panel.
But----
Mr. Keating. Well----
Mr. Porter [continuing]. I will do my best.
Mr. Keating. Well, maybe that is part of the problem that--
--
Mr. Porter. Roger that, sir.
Mr. Keating [continuing]. That we should be better prepared
to answer those things as men. But go ahead.
Mr. Porter. Or there should be more women sitting on this
side of the table. But, sir, thank you very much for your
question.
Yes, I think it is 100 percent correct, and I saw some
information yesterday that there is a quantifiable decreased
likelihood of terrorist attacks or the emergence of jihadi
salafi groups in countries in which women are more fully
integrated into the economic and public and government life of
the country. I can get you further statistics to support that.
Mr. Keating. OK.
Mr. Porter. I just don't have off the top of my head, sir.
Mr. Keating. Yes. We have some and I would appreciate any
more.
Yes, sir.
Mr. Pham. Just in the case of Libya, our support to women's
civil society groups after the revolution, and the support of
other countries, I think, was absolutely essential in creating
a sort of momentum against armed groups and a counterweight to
violence.
So you see a lot of the civil protests against militias,
not necessarily against--against extremists, too, but against--
militias were, in fact, led by women's groups. So I think it is
tremendously empowering.
The other dimension is in a lot of these marginalized
communities, especially in the south where young men fall prey
to extremism or get involved in smuggling, I mean women's, you
know, roles can be incredibly useful, I think, in sort of
curtailing that impulse.
Again, with returning jihadists, we can't just throw them
all in prison. There has to be some sort of integration program
into their communities after justice is served. So there again
I think women's groups can play an essential role here.
Mr. Keating. I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. King. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Hurd.
Mr. Hurd. Thank you, Chairman, and thank you all for being
here. This is an important topic. I actually only have one
question, and it is a 30,000-foot view question, and I would
love to hear everybody's opinion on it.
Dr. Pham, maybe we start with you and just go down the
line? When it comes specifically to terrorism in North Africa,
what day do we celebrate? What day do we get to raise our hands
and say we won?
Can we imprison and kill everyone? I don't think so. So
help me understand what is that end-point, that end-state that
if we achieve we are going to say we solved the problem? Is
that a fair question?
Dr. Wehrey, you want to? It seemed like you are ready to
answer. We can maybe start with you and go down the other way.
Mr. Wehrey. Sure. I think it is an excellent question. I
think we need to be very surgical and discrete in terms of
identifying, you know, what groups really pose a threat to us
because I think in a lot of these countries, you have
traditions of religious conservatism. You have militancy. This
has been going back decades. Now on top of that, you have these
named terrorist groups, ISIS and al-Qaeda.
You know, the question is these groups are very good at
marbling into one another, and the question is how do we defeat
those groups that matter to us? I think, you know, the question
really is have we eliminated groups that have both the will and
the capacity to threaten the interests of our allies, the
economic interests, the personnel of our allies?
Now, are we going to defeat, ``extremism'' in places like
eastern Libya? We are not. Or are we going to completely, you
know, eliminate illiberal extremist ideology in some of these
places? We are not.
So again, I don't think there is ever going to be a day
where we are going to declare, you know, victory. We shouldn't
widen the circle to the extent that we are involved in this
sort of never-ending war.
Mr. Alkhouri. Thank you for the question. The question is
whether we are tackling terrorist groups and the word
terrorism, or are we talking about extremism, because I believe
extremism is a much bigger issue.
I think that terrorist groups really capitalize on the
issue of extremism that they have a lot of people have been
bred up with, you know, for many years, and it doesn't take him
long to get that extremism up and get these individuals to
actually carry out acts of terrorism.
But I think part of the solution, or at least the way I see
it, that economic opportunities are a major part of the
solution. I think that the region, North Africa and the Sahel
at large, there is a high unemployment rate in many of these
places, especially in Libya.
If we look at de-radicalization programs, they essentially
do not exist. We are not only talking about de-radicalization
programs, meaning individuals who have already been radicalized
and you put them through programs, but also we are talking
about the necessity for anti-radicalization programs, programs
that should exist prior to individuals actually having gone to
the, you know, off that threshold.
We are also talking about society building, and I think
that is extremely important because they don't want to just see
programs dedicated to, you know, to potential radical
individuals, but also the society at large.
If we are missing vital, you know, basic necessities in
certain societies, then specific groups can capitalize on that,
provide these necessities or these basic needs to the
individuals in this society, and then, you know, take advantage
of that, indoctrinate them and so on.
Finally, I would say a major part of cutting off these
groups is cutting off their finances. I think that the United
States has succeeded in large part in cutting off the finances
of al-Qaeda and ISIS.
But also this is a problem that we keep seeing as
individuals are dealing with digital currency, as individuals
are still taking advantage of the banking system and taking
advantage of fraud. We are seeing a nexus between jihadist
terrorist groups and cyber-criminal groups. So that would be
essential to tackle that problem.
Mr. Porter. Sir, thank you for your question. You know, as
I said in my written testimony, you know, in counterterrorism
there is no mission accomplished. There is just continuing to
accomplish the mission. There is no winning. There is just
mitigating the risk to what we consider to be a tolerable
level. That is it.
I mean, combatting terrorism is hard. Counterterrorism is
hard. The solutions exist along a continuum of military
approaches and non-military approaches. You know, I think, you
know, we have seen some progress in some North African
countries. The threat is not uniform across North Africa.
I don't think any country, and I don't mean to be facetious
or to treat your question glibly, but I don't think any
country, despite the successes that it is making in combatting
terrorism, ever celebrates. I think a prime example of this is
Algeria, which has struggled with terrorism since the 1990's.
During the 1990's, terrorism was an egregious and horrible
problem that left more than 150,000 dead. Today, when you
travel to Algeria, especially in and around the capital, but
also along the coast, you rarely think about terrorism.
Now, is that celebratory, or is that cause for a
celebration? No, but it is a satisfactory outcome. Does
terrorism still exist in Algeria? Yes, to a severely mitigated
extent.
So I think, you know, it is a continuous and on-going and
difficult process where there is no victory. There is just a
satisfactory outcome. Thank you, sir, for your question.
Mr. Pham. Just very briefly, sir, I would make two points.
First, I think we are not going to have success, as my
colleagues have said, but what we can do successfully is to
lower the risk by lowering first the threat, the frequency and
likelihood of these events, the vulnerability, the likelihood
that when these events occur, they will be successful and
lowering the costs of each event, even if successful, exerts.
We can do that by helping our allies, which leads me to my
second point, which is that I think one measure of a successful
policy in the region is the extent to which we can have
governments in place that are legitimate in the eyes of their
people.
Legitimacy does not mean necessarily, although it is often
expressed as such, but not necessarily electoral, winning
majorities at the ballot box.
It is governments that are accepted by their people that
provide basic security and services and can exert control to a
large measure across their National territory. It is a long
road to that, but it is certainly a significant step toward de-
risking.
Mr. King. Mr. Gallagher.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to all our panelists for joining us today. One
question that has come up with increasing frequency is the
question of whether or not we designate the Muslim Brotherhood
in Egypt as part of a broader strategy of getting tougher on
terrorism.
Obviously, the Muslim Brotherhood is not a monolithic
organization, but it has goals that are antithetical to our own
foreign policy. It espouses the establishment of a global
caliphate. Its charter says that death in the way of Allah is
the ultimate end for its members.
Help us think through, sort-of, the second and third order
effects of designation. Would that enhance our counterterrorism
effort in Egypt and more broadly across North Africa and indeed
the Middle East as well? For the entire panel?
Mr. Porter. Well, thank you for your question. Just to
begin quite simply, if you increase the number of terrorists by
designating people that were not previously terrorists, then
you make your counterterrorism problem more difficult.
But I think a more nuanced answer is that I am not entirely
convinced that the threshold for designating a group a
terrorist group is that they are antithetical to the U.S.
foreign policy overseas. In addition, there is, as you also
mentioned, the Muslim Brotherhood is a nuanced group that does
embrace a range of ideologies and is engaged in a range of
activities throughout North Africa.
In terms of second and third order effects of designation
of the Muslim Brotherhood as a foreign terrorist organization,
I was speaking with a client yesterday, and I was speaking with
another client last week who have businesses. These are U.S.
companies with businesses in North Africa that employ foreign
nationals on their staff and to whom they pay salaries.
It is guaranteed in our conversations with these
representatives of these companies, it is guaranteed that among
their staff overseas are members of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Designating the Muslim Brotherhood as an FTO would then leave
these U.S. corporations vulnerable to accusations of material
support for terrorism.
In addition, it would raise the bar extensively for U.S.
corporations doing business overseas in terms of KYC, again,
running the risk of exposing U.S. corporations to material
support for terrorism.
So I think the implications, particularly for U.S. foreign
direction overseas are enormous, in addition to the fact that I
don't think the Muslim Brotherhood genuinely qualifies as a
foreign terrorist organization. But thank you, sir, for your
question.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you.
Can I go to Dr. Wehrey just because we had many a
productive debate and discussion when I was but a lowly staffer
on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Tunisia and Libya?
So I would be interested in your thoughts on the topic.
Mr. Wehrey. Well, I think the second- and third-order
effects I think would be, quite frankly, catastrophic,
especially in a place like Libya where the Muslim Brotherhood
is backing the U.N.-backed Government of National Accord in
Tripoli, through which we are working to counter ISIS.
I think designating it would create a whole new class of
political losers in Libya, people that are shut out of the
political process, and that is a prime recruiting pool for
ISIS. So I think it would actually widen the circle of
terrorists that we are trying to combat.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you.
Dr. Pham, quickly since my time is expiring and since I
apologize for being late to the hearing, given your extensive
work in Africa and given some conversations we have had at, you
know, putting Africa in the front view versus the rearview
mirror, has there anything that hasn't been discussed today
about terrorism in Africa, or an area that we are not paying
enough attention to that you think we should pay more attention
to on this subcommittee?
Mr. Pham. Thank you very much, Mr. Gallagher, for that
question. I think two things that we need to pay more attention
to. One is the seamless nature and throughout this hearing, my
fellow panelists and I have discussed how things have moved
north-south from the Mediterranean shore down into Africa.
Department of Defense treats all of Africa as a whole.
Since 20 of January, so does the National Security Council. It
makes sense. Threats move north-south. Economics works in the
same direction, but the rest of the whole of government still
draws a line and a lot falls through that chasm in the middle.
The second point I would make is that we would do well to
work with partners. We have got effective partners in the
region, but we don't always work and coordinate.
Morocco, for example, has a highly effective counter-
radicalization program. Mr. Keating earlier asked about women.
Morocco trained--it is the only Muslim country that requires
the training of a quota of women religious leaders and
scholars.
It has agreements with countries throughout the region to
train imams in moderate forms of Islam as a counter to the
Muslim Brotherhood or more radical forms. So working with them
should be a part of our agenda.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you.
Thank you, gentlemen. Appreciate your time.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Gallagher.
Let me thank all the witnesses for their valuable testimony
and the Members for their questions. The Members of this
subcommittee may have some additional questions to the
witnesses. I will ask you to respond to those in writing.
Miss Rice, do you have any----
Miss Rice. No.
Mr. King. OK. Pursuant to committee rule VII(D), the
hearing record will be held open for 10 days. Without
objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:09 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for J. Peter Pham
Question 1a. Economic and political insecurity seems to be a common
occurrence across North Africa. In your opinion, how does this regional
and state fragmentation pose long-term challenges for the United
States?
Question 1b. How can the United States and its allies in the region
disrupt the recruiting efforts of local al-Qaeda and the Islamic State
affiliates that take advantage of this turmoil?
Answer. The Maghreb and the adjacent Sahel are textbook examples of
the threat that weak states can present to the international community
in general and, more specifically, to the interests of United States
and its allies. The region is an almost ideal environment for extremist
groups with transnational ambitions, whether ISIS fighters smarting
from defeats on the battlefields of Iraq and Syria or al-Qaeda
militants seeking to reassert the preeminence of their organization
within the global jihadist movement. The challenge posed by the various
militant groups operating in the Sahel is directly linked to their
ability to exploit myriad local conflicts, including social, economic,
and political marginalization, as well as the fragile condition of many
of the states in the region.
As I noted in my prepared statement, the challenge posed by these
jihadist groups and their efforts to recruit in this region cannot be
countered except in an integrated fashion, with solutions that embrace
a broader notion of human security writ large, encompassing social,
economic, and political development. Moreover, to be effective, these
solutions also must transcend national and other artificial boundaries
that cut across the region. Obviously, this is not--and should not be--
a task just for the United States, but is one which it is in America's
strategic interest to play its part and, indeed lead.
Question 2. In your opinion, what is the most important base of the
Islamic State and al-Qaeda in North Africa?
Answer. The Sahel, rather than the Maghreb--where, with the
exception of Libya, there are strong states that have shown their
ability to resist not only al-Qaeda, but also ISIS, encroachments--is
the most promising base for affiliates of both the so-called Islamic
State and al-Qaeda, especially as fighters return to Africa from the
Levant and link up with others of their ilk displaced from Sirte and
other places on the Mediterranean littoral and make their way to the
Fezzan and other points south.
Question 3. How would you measure the extent of Islamic State and
al-Qaeda fighters that have fled fighting zones in the Middle East to
North Africa?
Answer. The countries of the Maghreb, especially Tunisia, have
contributed foreign fighters to the battlefields of Syria and Iraq at
higher rates per capita than almost any others. Thus one can expect
that the defeat of ISIS in Syria and Iraq will lead many of those
militants who survive to make their way back to Africa and many of
these will, in turn, find the Sahel a particularly opportune
environment. The Sahel is one of the poorest majority-Muslim regions in
the world. It is also home to the largest expanse of contiguous
ungoverned spaces on the African continent: Many of the governments in
the region are weak and their capacity to assert authority--much less
provide real services--beyond their capital cities and a smattering of
urban centers is extremely limited at best. These fragile states
present the returning jihadists both a tempting vulnerability to
exploit in the short term and a tantalizing opportunity to create a new
hub for operations over the long term.
Question 4. The United States spends a great deal on training and
equipment for allies to help combat terrorism. In your opinion, which
countries in the region should the United States be focusing most of
its efforts on?
Question 4a. Is this a more cost-effective option than deploying
U.S. forces and limit the need for future U.S. intervention?
Answer. While compelling cases can be made for U.S. cooperation
with almost every country in the region, two stand out for their
strategic significance. Given its population (the largest in Africa,
including both the continent's largest Muslim and Christian
communities) and its economic importance (the second-largest economy on
the continent, having lost the No. 1 slot to South Africa last year due
to a recession), Nigeria is without a doubt a pivotal country on whose
security and stability not only the Sahel, but much of West Africa
depends.
Also important is Morocco, a long-standing ``major non-NATO ally''
of the United States. Morocco's whose aggressive, multi-pronged
approach to countering radical ideology and terrorism has much to
commend it as does the kingdom's efforts to assist other countries in
North and West Africa in the same fight. The potential of the U.S.-
Morocco Framework for Cooperation, signed during the U.S.-Africa
Leaders Summit in 2014 and aimed at developing Moroccan training
experts as well as jointly training civilian security and
counterterrorism forces with other partners in the Maghreb and the
Sahel in recognizing a ``triangular'' approach, needs to be better
appreciated and developed. The North African country is an instance of
where some resources can have a multiplier effect.
Questions From Ranking Member Kathleen M. Rice for J. Peter Pham
Question 1. What are your opinions on the President's travel ban
and its potential effects in North Africa?
Answer. The only North African country affected by the travel ban
is Libya, where the practical effects may be somewhat limited at the
current time: The country has three self-styled ``governments''
competing for power as well as numerous other factions, without even
counting the jihadist groups linked to ISIS or al-Qaeda. Even apart
from the advisability or not of the travel ban as a policy, one
question that needs to be asked is how in the very constrained
circumstances of a country like that the consular functions, including
the vetting of potential travelers, can even be carried out effectively
enough to assure that anyone granted entry into the United States does
not, in fact, pose a threat to our citizens and homeland. Much of the
work done by the dedicated men and women of the Foreign Service is art,
not science. And I wonder whether they have the access necessary to
form correct judgments in cases where security limits their access to
the community.
Question 2. On March 9, 2017, General Thomas D. Waldhauser, head of
U.S. Africa Command, acknowledged in his testimony to the Senate Armed
Services Committee that there have been signs of Russian security and
political interference inside of Libya. In your opinion, how does this
affect U.S.-led and U.S.-backed operations currently in Libya?
Answer. I do not have access to the information that General
Waldhauser has at his disposal, but clearly security and military
interference by Russia--or any outside country not allied with us--
further complicates an already fraught situation and, potentially,
undermines both the leverage that the United States and our partners
have as well as our overall strategic objectives.
Questions From Representative Mike Gallagher for J. Peter Pham
Question 1a. Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti is our largest permanent
military installation in Africa and is critical to our counterterrorism
operations throughout Africa, as well as the Middle East. Just a few
miles away, a Chinese naval base is being constructed and is slated for
completion this summer. Publicly, Chinese officials maintain this base
is strictly to aid their anti-piracy missions and is not a base, but
rather a ``logistical support facility.'' During a briefing with
reporters on March 27, AFRICOM Commander and Marine Corps Gen. Thomas
Waldhauser said, ``There are some very significant operational security
concerns,'' in response to a question about the new Chinese base. This
is China's first permanent overseas military outpost, which carries
added significance. How can this new proximity to the Chinese affect
our CT missions in the region?
Question 1b. How will their foreign policy goals conflict with our
own?
Answer. Not only do I share General Waldhauser's preoccupation
about what he described diplomatically as ``some very significant
operational security concerns'' about the Chinese ``logistical support
facility,'' but I would go a step further and say that the placement of
mainland China's first overseas military base in Djibouti represents a
strategic revolution in the country's military posture in the region.
Not only will the proximity of Chinese forces permit them to have a
literal front-row seat to our counterterrorism and other operations out
of Camp Lemonier--and those of our French allies nearby as well as the
anti-piracy efforts of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, also based in
the vicinity--but the location also affords them significant advantages
in the region. Consider, for example, the Shaanxi Y-8, the workhorse
reconnaissance aircraft deployed by Chinese forces, has an effective
range of approximately 2,500 kilometers without refueling; from
Djibouti, Chinese planes can cover the entirety of the Arabian
Peninsula, almost to the Syrian and Iraqi borders with Turkey, to the
northeast; all of Egypt, Sudan, South Sudan, and most of eastern Libya,
to the northwest; half of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the
west and all the way to the Mozambique Channel to the south; and most
of the western Indian Ocean to the east.
Question 2a. AFRICOM has been partnering with Tunisian military and
intelligence assets to improve their CT&I capabilities and help secure
their borders. However, according to the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, somewhere between 6,000-7,000 Tunisians have
travelled to Syria and Iraq to join rebel and terrorist groups in those
conflict zones. The Wall Street Journal reports that ``As many as
15,000 others have been barred from international travel because
Tunisia's government suspects them of planning to follow suit.''
Another report, citing a U.S. CT official in Tunisia, says as many as
1,000 Tunisians are under domestic surveillance within the country.
Given these numbers, how can we expect the Tunisians to adequately
address these issues and implement a successful CT strategy?
Question 2b. What more can we do to implement and improve upon
AFRICOM's existing partnership with Tunisia?
Answer. Not only has Tunisia sent more fighters to join the so-
called Islamic State than any other country, but Tunisians have also
gone abroad to join al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and other jihadist
groups. Moreover, these fighters have already begun to focus their
attacks on their own homeland, with the country being hit by more than
50 terrorist attacks in the last 3 years, many coming from militants
operating in Libya. While the Africa Command has been trying to build
up the capabilities of our Tunisian partners, who were designated a
``major non-NATO ally'' in 2015, the military effort alone will not
suffice for the scale of the challenge faced. The country's police
forces and judicial system also need strengthening. The government also
lacks a comprehensive counter-radicalization program, to say nothing of
mechanisms for deradicalization and reintegration. Here Tunisia may
benefit from help from neighbors like Morocco, which have much more
mature efforts in this regard.
Question 3. The Libya-Italy migrant route was described in late
2016 as the major migrant route into Europe, surpassing the notorious
path from Turkey to Greece that was used by approximately 850,000
migrants in 2015. In light of this, what is your assessment of the
threat of ISIS or other extremists exploiting this heavily-used migrant
route by blending in with the hundreds of thousands of refugees
crossing the Mediterranean, and either launching an attack in Europe or
travelling to the United States?
Answer. While I would not rule out the possibility that migrant
routes, especially the Libya-Italy passage where the overwhelmed
Italian authorities seem to have taken a laissez-faire attitude of
passing the challenge onward, may be exploited by ISIS and other
jihadist groups to infiltrate terrorists into Europe and beyond, I
would be much more concerned about the reach that these extremists
already enjoy in diaspora communities in Europe, from whence they have
already recruited and to which fighters may be returning.
Question 4. President Trump's proposed budget includes significant
cuts to the State Department as well as USAID. In his posture statement
in early March before the Senate Armed Services Committee, AFRICOM
commander Gen. Waldhauser specifically praised these two arms of our
non-military foreign policy, saying, ``Diplomacy and development are
key efforts, and our partnership with the Department of State and USAID
is key to achieve enduring success.'' As it specifically relates to
North Africa, what programs have these two agencies put in place to aid
our CT efforts in that region?
Answer. Once again, General Waldhauser has succinctly made the
point. While AFRICOM certainly needs adequate resources to meet the
extraordinary challenges which have arisen in recent years within its
area of responsibility, it can only do so as part of a whole-of-
government approach with both diplomatic and development components.
For example, as I noted in my prepared statement, it is still nothing
short of mind-boggling that in Nigeria there is no U.S. diplomatic
presence north of the capital of Abuja, thus leaving the northern part
of the country--an area that is home to more than 90 million
predominantly Muslim people who would, by themselves, constitute
Africa's third most-populous country--entirely without of an American
diplomatic presence (and the on-going intelligence and other monitoring
capabilities that come with such a mission).
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Geoff D. Porter
Question 1a. Economic and political insecurity seems to be a common
occurrence across North Africa. In your opinion, how does this regional
and State fragmentation pose long-term challenges for the United
States?
Question 1b. How can the United States and its allies in the region
disrupt the recruiting efforts of local al-Qaeda and the Islamic State
affiliates that take advantage of this turmoil?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. In your opinion, what is the most important base of the
Islamic State and al-Qaeda in North Africa?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. How would you measure the extent of Islamic State and
al-Qaeda fighters that have fled fighting zones in the Middle East to
North Africa?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4. The United States spends a great deal on training and
equipment for allies to help combat terrorism. In your opinion, which
countries in the region should the United States be focusing most of
its efforts on?
Question 4b. Is this a more cost-effective option than deploying
U.S. forces and limit the need for future U.S. intervention?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question From Ranking Member Kathleen M. Rice for Geoff D. Porter
Question. What are your opinions on the President's travel ban and
its potential effects in North Africa?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Representative Mike Gallagher for Geoff D. Porter
Question 1a. Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti is our largest permanent
military installation in Africa and is critical to our counterterrorism
operations throughout Africa, as well as the Middle East. Just a few
miles away, a Chinese naval base is being constructed and is slated for
completion this summer. Publicly, Chinese officials maintain this base
is strictly to aid their anti-piracy missions and is not a base, but
rather a ``logistical support facility.'' During a briefing with
reporters on March 27, AFRICOM Commander and Marine Corps Gen. Thomas
Waldhauser said, ``There are some very significant operational security
concerns,'' in response to a question about the new Chinese base. This
is China's first permanent overseas military outpost, which carries
added significance. How can this new proximity to the Chinese affect
our CT missions in the region?
Question 1b. How will their foreign policy goals conflict with our
own?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2a. AFRICOM has been partnering with Tunisian military and
intelligence assets to improve their CT&I capabilities and help secure
their borders. However, according to the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, somewhere between 6,000-7,000 Tunisians have
travelled to Syria and Iraq to join rebel and terrorist groups in those
conflict zones. The Wall Street Journal reports that ``As many as
15,000 others have been barred from international travel because
Tunisia's government suspects them of planning to follow suit.''
Another report, citing a U.S. CT official in Tunisia, says as many as
1,000 Tunisians are under domestic surveillance within the country.
Given these numbers, how can we expect the Tunisians to adequately
address these issues and implement a successful CT strategy?
Question 2b. What more can we do to implement and improve upon
AFRICOM's existing partnership with Tunisia?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. The Libya-Italy migrant route was described in late
2016 as the major migrant route into Europe, surpassing the notorious
path from Turkey to Greece that was used by approximately 850,000
migrants in 2015. In light of this, what is your assessment of the
threat of ISIS or other extremists exploiting this heavily-used migrant
route by blending in with the hundreds of thousands of refugees
crossing the Mediterranean, and either launching an attack in Europe or
travelling to the United States?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4. President Trump's proposed budget includes significant
cuts to the State Department as well as USAID. In his posture statement
in early March before the Senate Armed Services Committee, AFRICOM
commander Gen. Waldhauser specifically praised these two arms of our
non-military foreign policy, saying, ``Diplomacy and development are
key efforts, and our partnership with the Department of State and USAID
is key to achieve enduring success.'' As it specifically relates to
North Africa, what programs have these two agencies put in place to aid
our CT efforts in that region?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Laith Alkhouri
Question 1a. Economic and political insecurity seems to be a common
occurrence across North Africa. In your opinion, how does this regional
and state fragmentation pose long-term challenges for the United
States?
Answer. Socioeconomic and political insecurities contribute to the
marginalization of many individuals in North Africa; regional and state
fragmentation adds extra layers of uncertainty and creates mistrust
between locals and governing bodies. Terror groups like al-Qaeda and
ISIS have capitalized on these factors, in many ways offering a sense
of belonging to individuals who have suffered socioeconomic struggles
and political marginalization. The concepts of brotherhood and
connectedness around one goal are powerful images that ISIS exploits to
recruit individuals who feel they do not have a purpose. When terror-
affiliated networks take control of towns--running schools, traffic,
and prisons--they are able to conduct grassroots indoctrination. ISIS's
Libya faction acted for 2 years as a de facto governing body until the
recent victories of the Libyan government.
Question 1b. How can the United States and its allies in the region
disrupt the recruiting efforts of local al-Qaeda and the Islamic State
affiliates that take advantage of this turmoil?
Answer. The approach of the United States and its allies toward
counter-terrorism in North Africa has largely relied upon regional
governments with minimal direct intervention; however, it is not clear
whether the current policy will pivot towards militarily addressing
ISIS affiliates outside Iraq and Syria. On April 26, 2017, the United
States conducted an operation against ISIS positions in Afghanistan, in
which two U.S. soldiers were killed. The operation came 2 weeks after
the United States dropped the Massive Ordnance Air Blast (MOAB) on ISIS
positions in the same district, Achin, in Nangarhar Province. This
denotes a potential increase in operations against ISIS outside its
Middle East territory. It remains to be seen whether this targeting
might expand to include North Africa and the Sahel.
Animosity toward the United States is at the epicenter of the
terror groups' campaigns in North Africa and the Sahel. Many among the
youth that ISIS governed are at great risk of becoming extremists and
committing violence against the United States or its interests abroad.
Furthermore, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) poses a great
threat regionally, especially towards soft targets.
Question 2. In your opinion, what is the most important base of the
Islamic State and al-Qaeda in North Africa?
Answer. As ISIS has been struggling to maintain control over
territory--having already lost several key cities, with more poised to
fall--its central operations command likely moved to more secure
territory. ISIS's top spokesman, for example, was killed in Aleppo,
Syria, while top aides to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi were killed in Raqqa,
Syria and Anbar, Iraq, among other places. Today, ISIS's so-called
``Euphrates Province''--the group's only transnational territory,
spanning from al-Bukamal in eastern Syria to al-Qa'im in western Iraq--
is a main route for fighter and weapons smuggling. It is likely that
ISIS commanders, and possibly leadership, are present in that area.
Question 3. How would you measure the extent of Islamic State and
al-Qaeda fighters that have fled fighting zones in the Middle East to
North Africa?
Answer. It is likely that hundreds of ISIS foreign fighters have
changed their positions, been killed in battle, or attempted--with a
number possibly succeeding--to return home. North Africa has produced
thousands of fighters for ISIS; some returnees, in my opinion, pose a
significant risk to National security. The United States has a more
sophisticated tracking system of potential returnees than many other
countries; in a number of cases, U.S. law enforcement has prevented
individuals who were in the process of joining ISIS from doing so. For
example, in 2015, U.S. authorities stopped two men from a three-man
cell in New York, namely Akhror Saidakhmetov and Abdurasul Juraboev,
from joining ISIS prior to their departure. The higher risk stems from
individuals who specifically return home with plans to fundraise,
organize, or execute terrorist attacks.
Question 4a. The United States spends a great deal on training and
equipment for allies to help combat terrorism. In your opinion, which
countries in the region should the United States be focusing most of
its efforts on?
Answer. In my opinion, the United States should dedicate critical
counter-terrorism aid to Libya, Mali, and Nigeria. These countries have
struggled with the persistent threat of terror groups, which have, at
various points, captured and controlled territory in these countries.
Question 4b. Is this a more cost-effective option than deploying
U.S. forces and limit the need for future U.S. intervention?
Answer. While cost-effective analysis of interventionist engagement
is outside my field of expertise, I'd add that U.S. military
intervention in North Africa can and will create significant backlash
from the regional populaces, which could in turn highly jeopardize U.S.
relations with allies in North Africa. Joint intelligence and military
tactics are avenues to better address certain terrorist threats, and
incorporating anti-radicalization strategies may help diminish the
effect of jihadist propaganda and lessen its influence.
Question 5. In your testimony, you stated that the Islamic State
has not been able to establish a strong presence in Tunisia due to the
government cracking down on terrorist activity. In your opinion, what
is Tunisia doing that could be equally applied to other countries in
North Africa to deter and defeat the terror threat?
Answer. After two ISIS attacks took place in Tunisia in 2015,
killing and wounding dozens of tourists, the Tunisian government
adopted a new strategy that aims to significantly diminish the threat
of terrorism. This strategy involves prevention through intelligence
gathering, amplification of the security and law enforcement
apparatuses, and implementing a judicial process to swiftly prosecute
suspected terrorists. In addition, al-Qaeda's militants in the Chaambi
Mountains appear to have been forced to significantly reduce the number
of their attacks, given their confinement to a small area in central-
west Tunisia. Although the long-term effects of the government's
strategy remain to be seen, in the short term, the country has
experienced fewer terrorist plots and attacks from 2016 until today;
for now, this framework appears to be working for Tunisia. In theory,
Tunisia's counter-terrorism strategy could be applied to other
countries in the region; however, schismatic political environments,
such as that in Libya, will create obstacles to implementing an
effective strategy.
Questions From Ranking Member Kathleen M. Rice for Laith Alkhouri
Question 1. What are your opinions on the President's travel ban
and its potential effects in North Africa?
Answer. President Trump's travel ban, in my opinion, does not have
a positive effect on countering the threat of terrorism at home or
abroad. In more ways than one, the ban has likely created regional
distrust toward the United States as a world leader, and has likely
contributed to the marginalization of regional governments who highly
depend on U.S. leadership in foreign policy and military engagements.
The ban sends a message of divisiveness to populaces who view--or once
viewed--the United States as the country of immigrants, tolerance, and
human rights. The ban can only add to the gap between the United States
and regional countries and their populaces. Bridging this gap would
require a tremendous leadership role by the current administration.
Question 2. Several countries in North Africa have an abundance of
resources such as oil reserves. Over the years, there have been reports
of terror groups controlling oil fields and kidnapping or extorting
engineers across the region. What security recommendations would you
make to the United States and its allies to better protect foreign
workers and economic interests from this common terror method?
Answer. There are a number of procedures and measures that would
likely contribute to countering the terror threat against foreign
employees and economic interests in North Africa. I recommend the
following:
Intelligence gathering and coordination with local and State
security apparatuses. Information regarding the terror
landscape in certain cities and towns, particularly in remote
areas in which a number of gas and oil plants are located, is
crucial to understanding which groups operate in which areas,
and what their ideologies and goals are. This includes
identifying gaps in preexisting security measures--whether
increasing the number of guards, equipping security forces with
new technology, and/or amplifying the number of confidential
human intelligence sources. The latter is critical in gathering
information on the plans and movements of terror networks.
Increase coordination with embassies and consulates in host
countries. Coordinating with regional governments in regards to
security gaps is imperative; it offers country representatives
an idea of what sort of aid and military assistance regional
forces need in order to prevent any potential attacks.
Empowering and enhancing the capabilities of regional
governments' quick response teams--or Quick Reaction Forces
(QRFs)--is essential to addressing terror incidents. There will
likely be a lag time in U.S. security forces responding to
terror incidents where Americans might be at risk. As such,
local forces must be empowered and enabled to tackle terror
incidents as they unfold, setting the stage for American and
allied forces to swiftly intervene.
It is vital to create trust, or bridge the trust gap, with locals
and regional forces; in many ways, this can help QRFs in obtaining
critical information prior to and in the early stages of terror
incidents.
Questions From Representative Mike Gallagher for Laith Alkhouri
Question 1a. Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti is our largest permanent
military installation in Africa and is critical to our counterterrorism
operations throughout Africa, as well as the Middle East. Just a few
miles away, a Chinese naval base is being constructed and is slated for
completion this summer. Publicly, Chinese officials maintain this base
is strictly to aid their anti-piracy missions and is not a base, but
rather a ``logistical support facility.'' During a briefing with
reporters on March 27, AFRICOM Commander and Marine Corps Gen. Thomas
Waldhauser said, ``There are some very significant operational security
concerns,'' in response to a question about the new Chinese base. This
is China's first permanent overseas military outpost, which carries
added significance. How can this new proximity to the Chinese affect
our CT missions in the region?
Answer. China's construction of its first naval base overseas
suggests that its goals revolve around protecting its current and
future economic interests; China has heavily invested in Africa at
large, and thousands of Chinese workers are employed across North
Africa and the Sahel region. The security concerns here revolve around
intelligence gathering and military responses toward issues and
incidents concerning both the United States and China, i.e., responding
to incidents taking place in locations where American and Chinese
workers might be present. This is a potential scenario in which
conflicts may arise; however, looking at the larger picture, the
likelihood is that U.S. counter-terrorism missions in the regions will
not be impacted by the presence of the Chinese base, at least in the
short term. The U.S. mission is more entrenched in the region due to
its longer presence. In other words, the proximity to the Chinese will
have very little to no effect on the U.S. mission at this time.
Question 1b. How will their foreign policy goals conflict with our
own?
Answer. The new Chinese base is likely not the country's last in
the region. China's military expansion in an area that is critical to
the interests of the United States is somewhat disconcerting; it begs
the question of whether Beijing aims to assert and advance Chinese
military prowess in the region, and whether this could potentially
overshadow U.S. missions. It also presents the question of whether the
Chinese mission will in any way conduct counterintelligence and spy
activities that might affect, or directly target, the U.S. mission.
Question 2a. AFRICOM has been partnering with Tunisian military and
intelligence assets to improve their CT&I capabilities and help secure
their borders. However, according to the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, somewhere between 6,000-7,000 Tunisians have
travelled to Syria and Iraq to join rebel and terrorist groups in those
conflict zones. The Wall Street Journal reports that ``As many as
15,000 others have been barred from international travel because
Tunisia's government suspects them of planning to follow suit.''
Another report, citing a U.S. CT official in Tunisia, says as many as
1,000 Tunisians are under domestic surveillance within the country.
Given these numbers, how can we expect the Tunisians to adequately
address these issues and implement a successful CT strategy?
Question 2b. What more can we do to implement and improve upon
AFRICOM's existing partnership with Tunisia?
Answer. Tunisia's counter-terrorism procedures since mid-2016
appear to have been successful at subduing the rise of jihadism and
diminishing the number of terror plots and attacks. The terrorism
threat facing Tunisia from jihadi returnees is likely going to be the
country's primary security concern over the next 6 months, due to both
the high number of Tunisians who joined ISIS in Iraq and Syria, as well
as the potential deployment of Tunisian terror operatives who joined
ISIS in Libya back home. We can expect that terror suspects will slip
through the cracks and possibly plot attacks in Tunisia. We should
advise the Tunisian government to have the following steps in place to
adequately address the terror concerns:
Coordination with regional governments whose borders have
been used as travel routes or crossing points into Iraq and
Syria, such as Turkey, and soliciting updates on any Tunisian
nationals traveling in and out of Turkey.
Enhancing border and customs apparatuses to intercept
Tunisians who have spent considerable periods of time in Iraq
and Syria and investigating the purpose of their trips;
monitoring the activities of individuals inside Tunisia who
have connected with Tunisians in Iraq and Syria; and
legislation that would lead to the arrests and prosecution of
suspects found to be providing material support to terrorist
groups.
Coordination with North African governments, particularly
Algeria and Libya, to secure borders through which terror
suspects and operatives might cross.
Question 3. The Libya-Italy migrant route was described in late
2016 as the major migrant route into Europe, surpassing the notorious
path from Turkey to Greece that was used by approximately 850,000
migrants in 2015. In light of this, what is your assessment of the
threat of ISIS or other extremists exploiting this heavily-used migrant
route by blending in with the hundreds of thousands of refugees
crossing the Mediterranean, and either launching an attack in Europe or
travelling to the United States?
Answer. Migrant routes are of immense interest to terror groups,
but the threat from terror group operatives and extremists posing as
migrants has been minimal. Part of the reason is that it takes a long
period of time for migrants to prepare their papers, and they must pass
through a stringent process before they can settle in Western
countries. Terror groups do not appear to have developed such a nuanced
strategy, instead relying on ad hoc attacks and self-radicalized
individuals. This, however, does not mean that ISIS might not exploit
these routes in the future. Reasonably, terror operatives might pass
into the West undetected and potentially plot an attack, but the degree
to which these routes could be exploited is insignificant when compared
to ISIS-orchestrated and inspired attacks that partly rely on
communication between ISIS apparatuses in the Middle East and potential
Western radicals at home. The threat from the latter scenario is
significantly higher.
Question 4. President Trump's proposed budget includes significant
cuts to the State Department as well as USAID. In his posture statement
in early March before the Senate Armed Services Committee, AFRICOM
commander Gen. Waldhauser specifically praised these two arms of our
non-military foreign policy, saying, ``Diplomacy and development are
key efforts, and our partnership with the Department of State and USAID
is key to achieve enduring success.'' As it specifically relates to
North Africa, what programs have these two agencies put in place to aid
our CT efforts in that region?
Answer. One of USAID's main counterterrorism policies is the ``The
Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency,'' which aims
at identifying and tackling conduits of violent extremism. This policy
includes educational programs, women and youth empowerment, and working
with local communities to address approaches to better governance,
among others. Part of the program is the Maghreb-Sahel Capacity
Building for Countering Violent Extremism (CVE), which in many ways
helps in grassroots anti-radicalization efforts. USAID's efforts will
prove critical in areas where violent extremists have become
entrenched; helping the local populations understand and ultimately
reject violent extremist ideologies is critical.
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Frederic Wehrey
Question 1. In your testimony, you noted that the Islamic State in
Libya no longer remains a territorial force, however, you believe that
this presents us with many challenges. Can you further explain those
challenges and how the Islamic State can still create acts of terror in
Libya? How should the United States respond?
Answer. The self-proclaimed Islamic State in Libya has dispersed to
scattered ``pools'' of militants in the country's desert interior and
in several Western cities. The possibility of these networks regrouping
into operational cells and conducting attacks remains high.
Specifically, the Islamic State may seek to demonstrate its continued
presence and viability through a high-visibility attack. Such an attack
would likely be aimed at eroding the already weak authority of the
Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli, either by attacking the
Government itself or a commercial entity. Police and military
facilities, oil and energy infrastructure, and foreign commercial
interests are all possible targets. Should Western diplomats and
multilateral organizations return to the capital, those too would be at
risk. Presently, the best strategy for disruption of such attacks by
clandestine networks is one rooted in intelligence and investigation.
The United States and its Western allies should provide assistance and
training to GNA-controlled policing bodies. In tandem, robust and
persistent surveillance of Libya's vast interior and potential
terrorist lines of supply or encampments can prevent the Islamic State
from regrouping and reconstituting itself.
Question 2a. Economic and political insecurity seems to be a common
occurrence across North Africa. In your opinion, how does regional and
state fragmentation pose long-term challenges for the United States?
Answer. The United States should continue to adopt a holistic,
whole-of-Government approach to counterterrorism that addresses the
social and economic grievances fueling jihadism. A huge part of the
jihadist appeal focuses on state-led corruption and abuses in the
judicial sector--these areas need to be part of the United States and
allied assistance effort. Train-and-equip programs and border security
are only one part of the broader challenge.
Question 2b. How can the United States and its allies in the region
disrupt the recruiting efforts of local al-Qaeda and the Islamic State
affiliates that take advantage of this turmoil?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. In your opinion, what is the most important base of the
Islamic State and al-Qaeda in North Africa?
Answer. The most important base for al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
remains the southwest corner of Libya, Algeria, and Niger. This
uncontrolled region has long offered the group a logistics pipeline,
safe haven, and a space to train. The Islamic State's North African
presence was significantly degraded after the Libyan-led campaign last
summer and fall and the U.S. strike outside of Sirte in January 2017.
That said, Libya offers the Islamic State the most promising space to
regroup.
Question 4. How would you measure the extent of the Islamic State
and al-Qaeda fighters that have fled fighting zones in the Middle East
to North Africa?
Answer. In key countries, my estimates based on official, host-
country estimates and reliable open source reporting indicates roughly
200-500 returnees for Morocco and Libya and up to 1,000-1,500 for
Tunisia alone. The number from Algeria is small--63 according to a 2015
Algerian government figure. I would assess the number of total
returnees to be about 2,000-2,500 in total for the Maghreb, excluding
Egypt.
Question 5a. The United States spends a great deal on training and
equipment for allies to help combat terrorism. In your opinion, which
countries in the region should the United States be focusing most of
its efforts on?
Answer. Tunisia should be a focus given the numbers of Tunisian
youth who have joined the Islamic State and al-Qaeda. In tandem,
counterterrorism assistance to the Sahelian countries to the south--
namely Chad and Niger--remains vital. This remains a cost-effective
strategy, provided it is accompanied by broader efforts to reform host-
nation institutions, rule-of-law, and especially address the economic
and social grievances that fuel jihadism. Simply providing unit-level
training and more weapons to local partners will not be enough: These
states have serious problems at the level of ministries,
interoperability, prisons, judiciaries, and, especially, in meeting the
aspirations of their increasingly restive youth populations.
Question 5b. Is this a more cost-effective option than deploying
U.S. forces and limit the need for future U.S. intervention?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question From Ranking Member Kathleen M. Rice for Frederic Wehrey
Question. What are your opinions on the President's travel ban and
its potential effects in North Africa?
Answer. Any attempt to ban travelers to the United States using
blanket criteria such as country of origin or religion, or via
excessive and intrusive vetting will have a counter-productive effect
on the broader fight against terrorism. It deprives the United States
access to vital sources of influence and information--the people of the
region. It also plays into the hands of the jihadists' narrative of an
anti-Islamic West.
Questions From Representative Mike Gallagher for Frederic Wehrey
Question 1a. Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti is our largest permanent
military instillation in Africa and is critical to our counterterrorism
operations throughout Africa, as well as the Middle East. Just a few
miles away, a Chinese naval base is being constructed and is slated for
completion this summer. Publicly, Chinese officials maintain this base
is strictly to aid their anti-piracy missions and is not a base, but
rather a ``logistical support facility.'' During a briefing with
reporters on March 27, AFRICOM Commander and Marine Corps Gen. Thomas
Waldhauser said, ``There are some very significant operational security
concerns,'' in response to a question about the new Chinese base. This
is China's first permanent overseas military outpost, which carries
added significance. How can this new proximity to the Chinese affect
our CT missions in the region?
Question 1b. How will their foreign policy goals conflict with our
own?
Answer. The Chinese facility does not pose an immediate threat to
American counterterrorism partnerships and missions in Africa, aside
from operational security challenges. Insofar as the base represents
another step in China's expanding presence in Africa, it adds to
growing concerns about Beijing's mercantilist, blank-check support for
authoritarian rulers on the continent, which runs counter to the United
State's aim of promoting the rule of law, transparency, and
accountability--all important facets of a holistic counterterrorism
strategy.
Question 2a. AFRICOM has been partnering with Tunisian military and
intelligence assets to improve their CT&I capabilities and help secure
their borders. However, according to the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, somewhere between 6,000-7,000 Tunisians have
travelled to Syria and Iraq to join rebel and terrorist groups in those
conflict zones. The Wall Street Journal reports that ``As many as
15,000 others have been barred from international travel because
Tunisia's government suspects them of planning to follow suit.''
Another report, citing a U.S. CT official in Tunisia, says as many as
1,000 Tunisians are under domestic surveillance within the country.
Given these numbers, how can we expect the Tunisians to adequately
address these issues and implement a successful CT strategy?
Question 2b. What more can we do to implement and improve upon
AFRICOM's existing partnership with Tunisia?
Answer. Tunisia desperately needs a broad-based strategy for
addressing these returnees, which includes freeing up space in prisons
and more importantly devising a rehabilitation program that relies on
community influencers, family, and vocational training. AFRICOM's
existing programs have focused on five lines of effort: Air-ground
capacity, counterterrorism, intelligence, border security, and defense
institution building, to include the development of a National military
strategy. Tunisia still needs more assistance in terms of joint
cooperation among the different services, intelligence fusion, and de-
confliction between the ministries of defense and interior. AFRICOM's
assistance should be closely synchronized with those of other agencies,
whether under the framework of the Security Governance Initiative (SGI)
or some revised, whole-of-Government framework.
Question 3. The Libya-Italy migrant route was described in late
2016 as the major migrant route into Europe, surpassing the notorious
path from Turkey to Greece that was used by approximately 850,000
migrants in 2015. In light of this, what is your assessment of the
threat ISIS or other extremists exploiting this heavily-used migrant
route by blending in with the hundreds of thousands of refugees
crossing the Mediterranean, and either launching an attack in Europe or
travelling to the United States?
Answer. I believe it is unlikely that the Islamic State or other
extremists will try to infiltrate the flow of migrants traversing the
Mediterranean because of the extreme risks of the crossing and because
most of their attacks in Europe and America have been conducted by
home-grown extremists.
Question 4. President Trump's proposed budget includes significant
cuts to the State Department as well as USAID. In his posture statement
in early March before the Senate Armed Services Committee, AFRICOM
commander Gen. Waldhauser specifically praised these two arms of our
non-military foreign policy, saying ``Diplomacy and development are key
efforts, and our partnership with the Department of State and USAID is
key to achieve enduring success.'' As it specifically related to North
Africa, what programs have these two agencies put in place to aid out
CT efforts in that region?
Answer. USAID's jobs training and matching program has been an
effective tool addressing radicalization in Tunisia. Similar community-
level outreach programs have been effective in Libya, especially
municipal-level aid, entrepreneurship, and small-business development.
Broader support to civil society forms an important deterrent and
counterweight to the jihadists' narrative and appeal.
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