[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
EXAMINING THE SHIPMENT OF ILLICIT DRUGS IN INTERNATIONAL MAIL
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 7, 2017
__________
Serial No. 115-38
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
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Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
Trey Gowdy, South Carolina, Chairman
John J. Duncan, Jr., Tennessee Elijah E. Cummings, Maryland,
Darrell E. Issa, California Ranking Minority Member
Jim Jordan, Ohio Carolyn B. Maloney, New York
Mark Sanford, South Carolina Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Justin Amash, Michigan Columbia
Paul A. Gosar, Arizona Wm. Lacy Clay, Missouri
Scott DesJarlais, Tennessee Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts
Trey Gowdy, South Carolina Jim Cooper, Tennessee
Blake Farenthold, Texas Gerald E. Connolly, Virginia
Virginia Foxx, North Carolina Robin L. Kelly, Illinois
Thomas Massie, Kentucky Brenda L. Lawrence, Michigan
Mark Meadows, North Carolina Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
Ron DeSantis, Florida Stacey E. Plaskett, Virgin Islands
Dennis A. Ross, Florida Val Butler Demings, Florida
Mark Walker, North Carolina Raja Krishnamoorthi, Illinois
Rod Blum, Iowa Jamie Raskin, Maryland
Jody B. Hice, Georgia Peter Welch, Vermont
Steve Russell, Oklahoma Matt Cartwright, Pennsylvania
Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin Mark DeSaulnier, California
Will Hurd, Texas Jimmy Gomez, California
Gary J. Palmer, Alabama
James Comer, Kentucky
Paul Mitchell, Michigan
Greg Gianforte, Montana
Sheria Clarke, Staff Director
Robert Borden, Deputy Staff Director
William McKenna General Counsel
Mary Doocy, Counsel
Kiley Bidelman, Clerk
David Rapallo, Minority Staff Director
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Subcommittee on Government Operations
Mark Meadows, North Carolina, Chairman
Jody B. Hice, Georgia, Vice Chair Gerald E. Connolly, Virginia,
Jim Jordan, Ohio Ranking Minority Member
Mark Sanford, South Carolina Carolyn B. Maloney, New York
Thomas Massie, Kentucky Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Ron DeSantis, Florida Columbia
Dennis A. Ross, Florida Wm. Lacy Clay, Missouri
Rod Blum, Iowa Brenda L. Lawrence, Michigan
Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on September 7, 2017................................ 1
WITNESSES
The Hon. Gregory Thome, Director, Office of U.N. Specialized and
Technical Agencies, Bureau of International Organization
Affairs, U.S. Department of State
Oral Statement............................................... 5
Written Statement............................................ 7
Mr. Guy Cottrell, Chief Postal Inspector, United States Postal
Service
Oral Statement............................................... 11
Written Statement............................................ 13
Mr. Todd C. Owen, Executive Assistant Commissioner, Office of
Field Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Oral Statement............................................... 20
Written Statement............................................ 22
Ms. Lori Rectanus, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, U.S.
Government Accountability Office
Oral Statement............................................... 30
Written Statement............................................ 32
Ms. Tammy Whitcomb, Acting Inspector General, U.S. Postal
Service, Office of the Inspector General
Oral Statement............................................... 43
Written Statement............................................ 45
EXAMINING THE SHIPMENT OF ILLICIT DRUGS IN INTERNATIONAL MAIL
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Thursday, September 7, 2017
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Government Operations,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:12 p.m., in
Room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jody Hice
presiding.
Present: Representatives Hice, Meadows, Jordan, Blum,
Connolly, Norton, Clay, and Lawrence.
Mr. Hice. The Subcommittee on Government Operations will
come to order.
Let me first of all just say thank you for your patience,
all of you. Sometimes around here we never know when votes are
going to occur, and we thought we would be able to start around
2:00, so your patience is greatly appreciated. I am sure we
will have some other members show up along the way, but we will
go ahead and get started.
Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a
recess at any time.
Again, I welcome you here today to discuss this very
important issue. Last year, 62,000 Americans died from drug
overdoses. That is a staggering number. More than died in both
Vietnam and Iraq wars combined. The opioid crisis is the
deadliest drug epidemic in American history, and it only
continues to worsen.
In my home State of Georgia, opioids are the main cause of
overdose deaths. Almost as many Georgians die annually from
drug overdose as do from car accidents. In 2015, 55 of the
counties in Georgia out of 159 counties had a higher drug
overdose rate than the U.S. average. That is a significant
uptick from just 11 years ago when only 26 Georgia counties
were higher than the U.S. average.
In May, a mass overdose swept through Georgia, took a lot
of the hearts and emotions of the people of Georgia. There were
four people who died within a 48-hour period of time of taking
pills that they thought were Percocet. Tragically, this is only
one example of the many incidents that have occurred in recent
years due to our country's insatiable desire for drugs.
While the United States makes up about 5 percent of the
world's population, we consume an overwhelming share of the
world's pain medication. With any drug epidemic, supply
reduction is an essential element to drug control, be it
domestic or international.
When it comes to our nation's opioid epidemic, the ability
to purchase drugs with just one click of a computer and have
those drugs brought to this country is easy for most anyone to
accomplish. Americans are now able to easily purchase powerful
synthetic opioids, particularly from China, and have them
shipped straight to their doorstep here in the United States
via the United States Postal Service.
Despite the billions of dollars our country spends each
year on personnel, technology, and infrastructure to protect
our southern borders, the U.S. Postal Service allows
international packages to enter our country virtually
unchecked. Because the U.S. Postal Service is not required to
follow the same customs standards as its private competitors,
it has become an attractive courier for international drug
traffickers.
With the rise of e-commerce, the volume of inbound
international mail has exploded to hundreds of millions of
pieces each year. This massive volume, coupled with lax
security standards, has created a significant security
weakness, which often results in a failure to detect drugs
shipped through the Postal Service.
So, today, we are going to learn about how the U.S. Postal
Service's lax security standards have led to an influx of
illicit drugs entering our country. We will also explore ways
in which the U.S. Postal Service can close that security gap
between the mail service and the private competitors.
The U.S. Postal Service has already taken steps for which
we are grateful, such as increased collection of electronic
advanced data to heighten security of inbound international
mail. They have also embarked on pilot programs in partnership
with CBP to target certain mail for inspection. And while these
pilot programs are a step in the right direction, the postal
inspector general and GAO have found that there is substantial
room for improvement, so we look forward to their testimony
here today.
We will also hear from CBP and the U.S. Postal Inspection
Service about procedures that have been effective in thwarting
contraband from entering our country, as well as what
procedures could be effective in the future.
The majority of illicit synthetic opioids from China enter
the United States via the Postal Service under the terms
governed by the United Nations' Universal Postal Union Treaty.
Today, we will hear from the State Department about
international efforts to stop illicit drugs from being sent
through the mail.
As the number of Americans overdosing and dying from these
drugs continues to rise, it is important that we act now, so I
look forward to hearing from our witnesses today as we explore
how we can work together to stop the supply of illicit drugs
entering our country and better fight our nation's drug
epidemic.
Mr. Hice. When the ranking member arrives, he will be
allowed time for his opening statement, but for now, let me
introduce our panel of witnesses, after which each of you will
have an opportunity to give your opening statement.
I am pleased to welcome Mr. Gregory Thome, director of the
Office of U.N. Specialized and Technical Agencies at the State
Department; Mr. Guy Cottrell, is that correct?
Mr. Cottrell. Yes.
Mr. Hice. Chief postal inspector for the United States
Postal Service; Mr. Todd Owen, executive assistant commissioner
at the U.S. Customs and Border Protection agency; Ms. Lori
Rectanus, director for Physical Infrastructure Issues that the
Government Accountability Office; and Ms. Tammy Whitcomb,
acting inspector general for the United States Postal Service.
All of you, we welcome you here. And, Mr. Cottrell, I
understand that you have someone with you today, is that
correct?
Mr. Cottrell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hice. Okay. Could you please introduce that person?
Mr. Cottrell. Yes. It's Robert Raines. He is a postal
operations manager just in case there are any technical
operations questions.
Mr. Hice. Okay. And where is Robert?
Okay, sir. Thank you, and welcome.
Pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses will be sworn in
before they testify, so if you would please each of you rise
and raise your right hand.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Hice. The record will reflect that all witnesses have
answered in the affirmative.
Thank you, you may be seated.
Are you ready for your opening statement or do you want to
----
Mr. Connolly. I do. I do.
Mr. Hice. Okay. All right. Yes.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you.
Mr. Hice. All right. We are going to begin with your
opening statements in here in just a moment. The ranking
member, Mr. Connolly, has arrived, so I will yield to him for
his opening statement.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry to keep
people waiting. We had 10 votes, and I got a little delayed on
the Floor.
But thank you for having this hearing, and thank you all
for being here.
Opioid abuse is now one of the biggest public health
threats we face as a nation, and that threat is growing
exponentially and in a frightening way. According to data
released just a few days ago by the National Center of Health
Statistics, more than 64,000 Americans died from drug overdoses
in 2016. This figure is an increase of more than 20 percent
over the previous year. This data shows that synthetic opioids
like fentanyl now cause more deaths than any other type of
drug.
According to the Center for Health Statistics, death from
synthetic opioids doubled from 2015 to 2016 to just over
20,000. A New York Times headline this weekend proclaimed that
deaths from fentanyl have increased by 540 percent over the
last three years alone.
In my native State of Virginia, deaths from synthetic
opioids rose from 263 in 2015 to 692 one year later. And sadly,
Virginia is hardly alone among States in seeing deaths from
opioids double or triple in that time period.
Commission on Combating Drug Addiction and the Opioid
Crisis, headed by Governor Christie of New Jersey, recently
warned, and I quote, ``We are miserably losing this fight to
prevent fentanyl from entering our country and killing our
citizens. The commission emphasized to President Trump that
``The first and most urgent recommendation of the commission is
direct and completely within your control, Mr. President.
Declare a national emergency.'' President Trump held a news
conference in which he said the words the opioid crisis is an
emergency, but he hasn't declared it as such, a national
emergency.
Among many other thoughtful recommendations, the Christie
commission urged the government to intercept fentanyl and other
synthetic opioids in envelopes and packages at mail processing
distribution centers across the country. The Federal agency
responsible for preventing fentanyl from coming into this
country through international mail and express consignment
packages like FedEx and UPS is the Customs and Border
Protection agency. CBP is statutorily required, and I quote,
``to ensure the interdiction of persons and goods illegally
entering or exiting the United States.'' CBP inspects inbound
international mail received by the United States Postal
Service. CBP inspects inbound international express commercial
packages at express consignment carrier hubs.
According to data provided by CBP to our staff prior to
this hearing, the greatest increases in the rates of seizure of
fentanyl have been in the mail and express consignment
packages. Right now, however, CBP does not appear to know if it
is using the most effective tools to find fentanyl in
international mail and packages.
The GAO will warn us today that for one targeting method,
the use of advanced data on mail and express shipments, CBP has
not done the analysis necessary to evaluate its effectiveness
and this targeting method relative to other methods.
Troubling is that customs may not be using all available
data to target mail for inspection and investigation and may be
targeting only a small number of packages per day and may not
even be targeting whole classes of mail. In fact, using
existing data already collected by the Postal Service, the
Postal Service's inspector general recently linked a package
intercepted by CBP that contained fentanyl to hundreds of
additional packages that likely contained fentanyl but were
apparently allowed to enter into the United States. This could
point to a potentially much bigger problem wherein CBP is
failing systematically to uncover those illicit shipping
networks.
Given the urgent and growing threat that fentanyl and other
synthetic opioids pose to the United States, as well as the
recommendation of the Christie commission to increase our
ability to detect and interdict drugs inbound and international
mail and express consignments using enhanced technology, more
manpower, and expanded canine deployment, it is critical that
we ascertain which methods of interdicting drugs on inbound
mail and consignments are most effective and replicating them.
One thing is clear, however, and that is that President
Trump's proposed wall won't stop the most dangerous drugs from
coming into the United States. Effective targeting methods are
what we need and will have to be expanded and enhanced if we
are going to win this battle. I know we are going to do it on a
bipartisan basis.
I look forward to hearing from CBP particularly on how it
plans to address current deficiencies in its interdiction
efforts and lessons learned and help turn the tide of this
incredible public health crisis.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hice. I thank the gentleman.
The witnesses have been introduced and sworn in, so we are
ready for your opening testimonies. In order to allow time for
discussion, please limit your testimony to five minutes. Your
entire written testimony and statement will be made part of the
record.
As a reminder, two things: Press the button for your
microphone, and please pull your microphone up so that we can
hear you clearly as you are speaking. The clock in front of you
will show your time. It will turn yellow about 30 seconds, and
red, it is time to land the plane. So we are again glad to have
you.
And, Mr. Thome, you are recognized for five minutes.
WITNESS STATEMENTS
STATEMENT OF GREGORY THOME
Mr. Thome. Chairman Hice, Ranking Member Connolly, members
of the subcommittee, thank you for the invitation to appear
before you today to discuss the shipment of illicit drugs in
the international mail, as well as the differences between
international mail and private express shipments as they relate
to abuse of the mail by traffickers.
The Department of State take these matters very seriously.
And while international mail is only one of the avenues
traffickers may try to exploit, we are making concerted efforts
in cooperation with the U.S. Postal Service and U.S. CBP to
make reforms to the system of global mail exchange that will
improve security and support drug interdiction.
The Department has statutory responsibility for the
formulation, coordination, and oversight of international
postal policy. The Universal Postal Union, or UPU is the
principal venue where we discharge this responsibility, working
closely with both the Postal Service and American express
delivery services such as UPS and FedEx.
Like our partners, the Department is aware that the
exchange of advanced electronic data, or AED, can help mitigate
the risk posed by traffickers. However, in considering a policy
response that would best serve all stakeholders, it is
important to bear in mind the fundamental differences between
USPS and private express companies.
First, because of U.S. national treaty obligations as a
member of the UPU, USPS must receive mail items from 191
foreign postal operators. This means it has limited ability to
collect AED or otherwise control the mail items it receives
until they are tendered to it in the United States. Private
express companies, in contrast, control collection and delivery
of the items they transport, as well as the entire logistics
chain in between.
Second, USPS engages in international mail exchange as the
designated operator of the United States, meaning it cannot,
except in very rare cases, refuse mail, and it must guarantee
delivery to any address in the United States. Private express
companies, on the other hand, have no universal service
obligation and are free to pick and choose their customers,
accepting only the mail they judge to be reliable.
Third, there is a wide discrepancy between the ability to
collect AED. Express carriers can unilaterally impose data
collection requirements on their overseas customers whereas
USPS cannot and must instead convince 191 postal services of
the benefit and the security that providing AED will offer.
While these differences pose challenges, the good news is
that postal services worldwide are now eager and determined to
collect and exchange AED. Postal operators see that delays
caused by customs processing are a major impediment to their
ability to grow their business. They know they need to
interface more swiftly with mailers and transport companies,
and their customers increasingly demand the ability to track
packages in real time and to easily exchange merchandise. Use
of AED is the only solution to these business challenges.
The UPU has become a partner to the United States in
championing the increased use of AED both for business and
security reasons. In 2012, the U.S. successfully secured
amendments to the UPU convention that committed each member to
a security strategy that includes complying with requirements
for AED. Indeed, the UPUs recently adopted business plan calls
for all postal services worldwide to have the capability to
exchange data in place by the end of 2020. And we anticipate
that the UPU will give final approval for an advanced
electronic data messaging standard this October.
As significant as these achievements are, there are still
obstacles to overcome. The main impediment to widespread
exchange of AED is the very limited ability of most countries'
postal services to collect and transmit it. Many post offices
in the developing world do not have internet or even reliable
sources of electricity. This makes collection and transmission
of data for postal items extremely difficult. Even in developed
countries, most postal services do not yet have the needed
infrastructure for item-level data exchange. Indeed, few if any
countries now have the capacity to provide it for 100 percent
of their mail requiring customs declaration.
Nevertheless, the tide has turned. Postal services around
the world understand the need to incorporate AED into the
fabric of global mail exchange not just because the U.S. and
other countries are beginning to require it but because it is
essential to their business models. This is why USPS is
successfully expanding its network of pilot projects, and this
is why we are witnessing a rapid increase in the flow of AED
for premium products worldwide.
In closing, we are confident that the number of countries
able to provide AED and the proportion of their mail streams
that it covers will continue to grow. I want to assure the
subcommittee that the State Department will spare no effort in
working to further accelerate this process.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to answering
your questions.
[Prepared statement of Mr. Thome follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Hice. Thank you very much.
Mr. Cottrell, you are recognized for five minutes.
STATEMENT OF GUY COTTRELL
Mr. Cottrell. Good afternoon, Chairman Hice, Ranking Member
Connolly, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for
calling this hearing on drug trafficking and security standards
used by the U.S. Postal Service and private carriers. My name
is Guy Cottrell. I'm the chief postal inspector for the United
States Postal Inspection Service. In this role, I oversee the
law enforcement arm of the Postal Service. Our mission is to
support and protect the Postal Service and its employees,
infrastructure, and customers.
As one of America's oldest Federal law enforcement
organizations, the more than 2,700 men and women of the Postal
Inspection Service enforce the laws that defend the Nation's
mail system from illegal or dangerous use and ensure public
trust in the mail. To that end, the investigation of contraband
in international mail is among the highest priorities of the
Inspection Service, and we play an active role in the national
effort to address the problem of fentanyl and synthetic opioid
distribution. We work closely with Federal and local law
enforcement partners on criminal investigations, information-
sharing, and we used data analysis to target inbound
international mail.
We have continually evolved our methods, expanded
resources, and strengthened strategic law enforcement
partnerships. As a result, we have seen significant
improvements in our ability to seize fentanyl and synthetic
opioids from the mail. From fiscal year 2016 through August of
fiscal year 2017, we have achieved a 3-1/2-fold increase in
international parcel seizures and an eight-fold increase in
domestic parcel seizures related to synthetic opioids.
As we continue to utilize and develop our available
resources to identify illicit drugs located in the United
States and take appropriate action, we will continue to enhance
investigative techniques and data analytics to better forecast
and target incoming parcels in order to seize fentanyl and
synthetic opioids sent through the mail.
Mr. Chairman, the Postal Service, in collaboration with the
State Department and Customs and Border Protection, plays a
leadership role in advocating for the global collection and
exchange of advanced electronic data, or AED, on international
mail. Through negotiation and advocacy and by targeting those
countries of interest identified by customs which are known to
be sources of illicit opioids, inbound AED has grown rapidly in
the past few years.
Most international mail currently arrives in the United
States at one of five international service centers. The
Inspection Service's investigative authority begins once
inbound mail is released from the first point of entry by our
customs counterparts. While AED is used to strengthen our
investigations and identify trends, operation methodologies,
and potential suspects, we consider AED only one part of a
multilayered approach the Inspection Service takes regarding
contraband interdiction.
To be successful in thwarting the international drug trade,
cooperation and teamwork between law enforcement agencies is
critical. Information-sharing is an invaluable asset at the
importation and street level and everywhere in between.
Utilizing technology, maximizing the effectiveness of
operational processes, and infusing this information with real-
time intelligence is critical to the efforts of combating
fentanyl and synthetic opioid distribution.
For those items for which AED is furnished, customs has an
enhanced ability to target items for inspection. The Postal
Service currently receives data on a substantial amount of
inbound shipments, including those originating in China. The
percentage of inbound items with AED is expected to continue to
grow, especially as we expand partnerships with commercial
providers and as more countries develop their capacities.
Mr. Chairman, the Postal Inspection Service, working with
our law enforcement partners and Postal Service management, is
committed to preventing illicit items from entering the Nation
alongside legitimate commerce and communication. We stand
alongside those agencies that share our mission to combat
illegal drugs and contraband. We additionally concur with the
recommendations of the Government Accountability Office to
further assess the value of AED in support of national
investigation and interdiction efforts.
The Postal Service and the Postal Inspection Service will
continue to take all practicable measures to ensure the
security of our nation's mail and provide the American public
the best, most efficient service possible.
Again, I thank you for this opportunity to testify, and I
look forward to your questions.
[Prepared statement of Mr. Cottrell follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Hice. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Owen, you are recognized for five minutes.
STATEMENT OF TODD C. OWEN
Mr. Owen. Good afternoon. Vice Chairman Hice, Ranking
Member Connolly, distinguished members of the subcommittee,
thank you for the opportunity to appear today to discuss the
role of U.S. Customs and Border Protection in combating the
flow of dangerous illicit drugs into the United States
specifically through international mail and express courier
facilities.
Before I provide my formal comments on the topic of today's
hearing, I would first like to publicly recognize the men and
women of U.S. Customs and Border Protection who responded to
the Houston area in the aftermath of Hurricane Harvey to assist
in the rescue and recovery efforts. Over 600 CBP air and marine
interdiction agents, Border Patrol agents, and Customs and
Border Protection officers with 50 vessels and 25 aircraft
responded under very dangerous and very challenging conditions
and rescued 1,362 people. And as Hurricane Irma takes aim at
the U.S. mainland, CBP stands ready again to provide assistance
and any necessary rescue and recovery efforts.
As the unified border security agency of the United States,
CBP plays a critical role in our nation's efforts to keep
dangerous drugs from entering our communities. CBP's Office of
Field Operations interdicts drugs and other dangerous items at
our ports of entry, including multiple mail and express courier
facilities, by leveraging advanced data, automated targeting,
and intelligence-driven strategies, and using various types of
detection technology as part of our multilayered risk-based
approach to enhance the security of our borders.
In fiscal year 2016, across the Nation, CBP seized more
than 3.3 million pounds of narcotics. While most smuggling
attempts occur at the Southwest border ports of entry,
smuggling in the mail and express courier environments is a
growing threat, especially the smuggling of illicit synthetic
drugs such as fentanyl. Each day, over 1 million packages
arrive into our international mail and express courier
facilities. With the explosion of e-commerce, these volumes
continue to grow.
Upon arrival, every package is screened through radiation
detection equipment for the presence of radioactive materials.
And thanks to the support of Congress, CBP has made significant
investments and improvements in our targeting, detection, and
identification capabilities. These resources, along with
enhanced information-sharing agreements, and law enforcement
partnerships such as the one we have with the U.S. Postal
Service are critical components in CBP's ability to detect and
deter the entry of dangerous illicit drugs in international
mail and express courier environments.
Specific to the threat posed by fentanyl and other
synthetic opioids, so far this fiscal year in the mail and
express courier environments, CBP has made 242 seizures of
fentanyl, totaling almost 300 pounds. In contrast, in the land
environment, CBP has made 46 seizures totaling approximately
494 pounds. So while we encounter more fentanyl by weight in
the land environment, we make more seizures in the mail and
express consignment arenas. Furthermore, the average purity of
fentanyl in the mail and express environment is over 90
percent, whereas the average purity of fentanyl seized in the
land border environment is approximately 7 percent.
Because synthetic opioids represent significant health and
safety risks to our officers and our narcotics detection
canines, CBP has deployed throughout our ports of entry a full
suite of safety and personal protective equipment, as well as
naloxone, a potentially lifesaving drug used to immediately
counteract the effects of unintentional exposure.
In conclusion, CBP will continue to work with our law
enforcement partners, the international community, and our
international partners to refine and enhance the effectiveness
of our targeting, detection, and interdiction measures at all
ports of entry, including international mail and express
courier facilities.
Vice Chairman Hice, Ranking Member Connolly, distinguished
members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
testify today, and I look forward to your questions.
[Prepared statement of Mr. Owen follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Hice. Thank you very much.
Ms. Rectanus, you are recognized for five minutes.
STATEMENT OF LORI RECTANUS
Ms. Rectanus. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairman Hice,
Ranking Member Connolly, and members of the subcommittee. Thank
you for the invitation to be here to discuss our report that is
being released today. That report discussed the efforts that
CBP and the Postal Service were taking to use electronic
advanced data to enhance the security of international inbound
mail. CBP and the Postal Service deserve credit for their
efforts in this area, but we found they lacked the information
to know whether their efforts are fully achieving the intended
purposes.
For the last few years at the New York International
Service Center, CBP and the Postal Service have been testing
the effectiveness of targeting items based on electronic
advanced data. Through these pilots, CBP uses the data to
identify about 15 pieces of mail each day that the Postal
Service is supposed to set aside for inspection. Presenting
these mail pieces has proved challenging primarily because the
volume of mail received, how the items are shipped, and in some
cases the accuracy of the data provided.
The ISC receives thousands of large sacks of mail every
day, and each sack could contain hundreds of pieces of mail.
Employees must often manually sort through these sacks to find
the individual items. Such a time- and labor-intensive
understandably can miss things. Since the pilots began through
the end of 2016, the Postal Service was able to provide between
58 and 82 percent of the requested items. Recently, the Postal
Service has begun testing software and hardware to better
locate requested items.
Whether the pilots are meeting their goals, however, is
unknown because the agencies have not developed metrics for
what success looks like and what might be feasible. Such
analysis is particularly critical given the pilots expansion,
which will not only include additional locations but will
involve greater volumes of mail and associated resources.
On a broader scale, there remain unanswered questions about
whether the benefits of using electronic advanced data for
targeting outweigh the costs or the challenges associated with
getting the data.
Regarding benefits, officials report that using electronic
advanced data could increase efficiency, that is, allow CBP to
reduce the volume of mail to be inspected while achieving the
same or better seizure rates. However, while CBP has collected
data on seizure rates for the pilots, it doesn't have seizure
rates for other targeting methods, so we don't know how
targeting based on electronic advanced data compares to other
targeting methods.
Regarding costs, neither agency has fully assessed what
this effort has or could cost. The Postal Service reported that
it spent about $3 million on hardware and software upgrades and
additional personnel to identify the small amount of targeted
mail in the pilots. However, we don't know what additional
costs might be borne by designated postal operators to collect
or provide the information or what cost the Postal Service
could incur when collecting data from these foreign operators.
Moreover, the Postal Service has not estimated what expansion
might cost. Given the Postal Service's financial condition, it
would be good to have a better understanding of these costs
before proceeding and determining the best way to move forward.
A considerable challenge that needs to be addressed is that
the Postal Service cannot mandate the provision of this data or
guarantee its accuracy. We do recognize that in the last few
years the Postal Service has worked to increase the amount of
electronic advanced data, but it is still limited, and its
accuracy is unknown. If the amount or quality of the data is
limited, this could also impact the effectiveness targeting.
In conclusion, the rapid growth in international commerce
requires a thoughtful, well-reasoned approach that provides
assurance not only of efficient resource use but also of
enhanced mail security. Both CBP and the Postal Service agreed
with our recommendations to assess the pilots' performance and
evaluate the costs and benefits of using electronic advanced
data. We look forward to working with them in their efforts.
Chairman Hice and Ranking Member Connolly and members of
the subcommittee, this concludes my statement. I would be
pleased to answer any questions.
[Prepared statement of Ms. Rectanus follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Hice. Thank you very much.
Ms. Whitcomb, you are recognized for five minutes.
STATEMENT OF TAMMY WHITCOMB
Ms. Whitcomb. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairman Hice,
Ranking Member Connolly, and members of the subcommittee.
The explosion of global e-commerce has led to rapid growth
in inbound international mail parcels. Unfortunately, illicit
drugs can hide within this traffic. There is a need for more
effective ways to monitor inbound mail and find high-risk
shipments. We believe data analytics can contribute to a
solution.
The Postal Service has been working with international
postal operators to increase the amount of advanced electronic
data it receives on parcels inbound to the United States. This
data includes information on the sender, addressee, and
contents of the mail piece. The Postal Service and U.S. Customs
and Border Protection are currently conducting a pilot using
this data, which allows CBP to target parcels more effectively
for inspection.
Last May, I testified before the Senate regarding the pilot
and our work in this area. During that hearing, concerns were
raised about the safety of postal employees who might be
exposed to parcels containing dangerous opioids. In July, our
office started to examine whether we could use advanced
electronic data to determine the risks to postal employees from
opioid parcels.
Coincidentally, at the same time, we joined a narcotics
trafficking investigation that appeared to involve a Postal
Service employee. The case was initiated because CBP had seized
a parcel containing the opioid fentanyl from an international
shipper to a U.S. address. The investigation remains ongoing.
However, this is the first investigation where we suspect that
a Postal Service employee facilitated the illegal distribution
of fentanyl.
Using evidence from this investigation, we searched the
advanced electronic data for more parcels sent from the same
international address. We found more than 450 additional
parcels sent between February and June of this year. The
parcels were destined for locations nationwide, and other
indicators suggested that many were suspicious.
We took the analysis a step further to see whether the U.S.
addresses that received these suspect parcels received other
international parcels, and we identified an additional
international shipper that sent parcels to some of the same
addresses. When we searched the data for the second shipper, we
found more than 2,400 additional parcels shipped between
February and June of 2017.
When we asked CBP, they confirmed they had seized a parcel
containing fentanyl from this second shipper earlier this year.
It appeared to us that the second shipper likely shared some
customers with the first shipper, and in fact, one U.S.
recipient received a total of 23 parcels from the two shippers.
Using data analytics, we were able to turn shipping data from
one fentanyl parcel into information about two suspect shippers
and more than 2,800 suspicious parcels.
While our analysis is still ongoing and providing new
insights daily, a number of opportunities are already clear.
Analyzing advanced electronic data, in combination with other
postal databases, could shine a spotlight on international drug
trafficking through the mail and facilitate prevention efforts
in the originating countries.
Additionally, in many instances, parcels from suspect
shippers can be identified while they are still in transit
between countries, which should help ensure that they are
seized at our border. And for those parcels that may get into
the domestic mail stream, analytics will help law enforcement
track down the individuals who are trafficking or receiving
these dangerous opioids.
All of these opportunities require resources and strong
collaboration between Federal agencies. We have already met
with representatives from CBP, the Drug Enforcement
Administration, the Department of Homeland Security Office of
Inspector General, the Postal Inspection Service, and the
Postal Service to share these discoveries and to discuss how to
work together in the future using analytics.
We believe this type of analysis is an exciting
breakthrough for investigating trafficking through the mail,
but there are a number of challenges ahead. First, more
resources are needed to capitalize on these techniques,
including more data experts and tools to generate leads and
more assistance from law enforcement to follow them up.
Second, although the amount of advanced electronic data is
growing, it is still not yet available for all inbound parcels.
Third, legal barriers to opening parcels may hinder
investigations given the volume of suspect parcels.
Finally, and most importantly, the successful use of
analytics requires moving beyond traditional case-by-case,
parcel-by-parcel investigative practices and instituting a
high-level strategic collaborative approach to stop drug
trafficking through the mail. If these challenges can be
solved, data analytics promises to help government and law
enforcement focus on the areas of greatest impact in order to
prevent these dangerous opioids from entering our country in
the future.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I'm happy to
answer any questions.
[Prepared statement of Ms. Whitcomb follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Hice. Thank you very much, and we will now begin our
time for members to ask questions. And I will begin by
recognizing myself for five minutes.
Ms. Whitcomb, how many pieces of inbound international mail
did the Postal Service receive last year?
Ms. Whitcomb. I believe the number is about 275 million
parcels received via inbound international mail.
Mr. Hice. Do you have any tracking information as to which
countries those come from?
Ms. Whitcomb. I think the Postal Service does. I don't know
if Mr. Cottrell may have some better information on that. I
don't personally have that with me today.
Mr. Hice. Okay. Mr. Cottrell, do you keep track of where
those come from?
Mr. Cottrell. The Postal Service does, sir. That's not my
arena, but we certainly can provide that information for you
afterwards.
Mr. Hice. Would they also keep track of any increase of
mail coming from a country?
Mr. Cottrell. Yes.
Mr. Hice. All right. So, over the last five years if an
increase is coming, say, from China, we would know about that?
Okay.
Mr. Owen. Yes, sir. If I could just add that, yes, the vast
majority of the 275 million parcels that came in last year are
coming from China, and that number continues to increase with
e-commerce.
Mr. Hice. Okay. Now, unlike--and I will go back, Ms.
Whitcomb, to you here. Unlike the Postal Service competitors,
the Postal Service, post office is not required to provide the
electronic advanced data to CBP for targeting purposes. Now, my
question is does this mean--how is this inbound mail sorted?
Does it have to be done by hand?
Ms. Whitcomb. How is it sorted?
Mr. Hice. Well, yes. When you are looking for a potential
target ----
Ms. Whitcomb. Right.
Mr. Hice.--how is that done?
Ms. Whitcomb. I believe that the Postal Service, as Ms.
Rectanus mentioned, has to look through parcels and sacks and
things like that when CBP requests a specific parcel to review.
And then the Postal Service has to locate that parcel and then
provide it to CBP.
Mr. Hice. But that has to be done by hand?
Ms. Whitcomb. I believe so. Is that correct?
Mr. Owen. Yes, sir, if I may, yes, it is a very manual
process. When all the international mail is received, the big
sacks first come through all the radiation detection equipment,
so that is the first step. After there are no radioactive
materials in any of the parcels, then we work to identify those
sacks in the mail that we want to see, and then those are
brought to us. We then send them through the x-ray systems, we
send them through the canines, we manually open them, so
without advanced data to target ahead of time, it is a very
manual, very labor-intensive process.
Mr. Hice. So that is a daunting task.
Mr. Owen. Yes, sir, it is.
Mr. Hice. Is there any way that you can possibly under that
scenario keep up with the requirement?
Mr. Owen. The volumes are very challenging. We of course
prioritize the incoming mail based on threat, and we devote our
resources to those that represent the greatest threat, but the
volume is overwhelming, yes, sir.
Mr. Hice. Okay. So you are not able to keep up with what is
required from CBP? I don't see any way.
Mr. Owen. But if ----
Mr. Hice. What percentage are you behind?
Mr. Owen. Oh, I don't think we have a number as to how much
we look at because of the different layers that we have, so
there is, again, advanced targeting when the data is available.
Those shipments will be placed on hold and physically presented
to us. And then again, we basically take sacks coming from a
particular country of interest and start running all of those
packages through x-rays, through the canines. We physically
open them, so it is--again, it's a very manual process to keep
up with the flows each day.
Mr. Hice. All right. So you can't consistently present all
the mail to CBP as required, correct?
Mr. Owen. No.
Mr. Hice. All right. So is there a memorandum of
understanding of what is supposed to occur? Mr. Cottrell, this
is probably best for you.
Mr. Cottrell. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I do have my operations
man Robert Raines. He can explain some of the inroads we've
made in automating some of these processes to try to make it a
little more manageable for customs.
Mr. Hice. Okay.
Mr. Raines. Yes, sir, so we've actually developed ----
Mr. Connolly. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Hice. Yes.
Mr. Connolly. Just one second. I have no objection at all
to the testimony of the gentleman. I just would remind you he
is not sworn in.
Mr. Hice. He was ----
Mr. Cottrell. He was sworn.
Mr. Hice. You were sworn in, yes.
Mr. Connolly. You were?
Mr. Raines. Yes.
Mr. Hice. He was recognized before ----
Mr. Connolly. Before I got in? Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Hice.--and was sworn in. Yes.
Mr. Connolly. Excuse me.
Mr. Hice. Thank you.
Mr. Raines. Since May, we've developed technology to scan
most of these parcels in large sacks, and we automatically run
them on automation equipment to sort them for CBP, and they--we
provide them with the single package they're looking for.
Mr. Hice. Okay. So is there a memorandum of understanding
that has been signed or will it be signed?
Mr. Raines. Yes, sir. It was signed.
Mr. Hice. Okay. Can you provide a copy of that to this
committee? All right.
Real quickly, let me go back to Mr. Cottrell here. I want
to go back to where I was getting to a little earlier in terms
of keeping track of countries and increased mail or whatever,
packages coming from China. What percentage would you have any
idea of incoming international mail comes from China?
Mr. Cottrell. I'm going to deflect that to Mr. Raines, too.
Mr. Raines. It's--a significant portion of mail does come
from China.
Mr. Hice. Like what does that mean, 10 percent, 20 percent,
just a guess?
Mr. Raines. No, it's larger than 20 percent.
Mr. Hice. Has that number increased over the last five
years?
Mr. Raines. Yes.
Mr. Hice. How much so?
Mr. Raines. It increases double digits every year.
Mr. Hice. Okay. Are there any other countries where we are
seeing increased ----
Mr. Raines. We see increases from other countries, not as
significant as China.
Mr. Hice. Okay. So there is something that would
potentially raise a red flag, what is going on, why are we
receiving more from China or is that standard?
Mr. Raines. I think it's a--there are a lot of low-value
items that get shipped from China, so we see, from an e-
commerce perspective, that that's a growing industry.
Mr. Hice. Okay. My time is expired. I will recognize the
ranking member, Mr. Connolly.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I must say to
the gentleman, I am very impressed with what you just said
about China. I knew it was big; I didn't know it was that big.
That is pretty impressive.
Is it not true that at most of the fentanyl coming into the
United States is coming from China?
Mr. Owen. Yes, sir. I could take that. The fentanyl that's
coming into the United States has two pathways. There is the
products that are coming from China that typically arrive
through the international mail and the express courier
facilities, and then there is the fentanyl that's coming from
Mexico that of course enters the Southwest border.
Mr. Connolly. And what would be the ratio would you say,
China versus Mexico as a source?
Mr. Owen. I'm not sure we have a ratio. The purity of what
is coming out of China is much, much more significant than the
----
Mr. Connolly. Right.
Mr. Owen.--purity of what is coming out of Mexico.
Mr. Connolly. And more lethal?
Mr. Owen. And more lethal, yes, sir.
Mr. Connolly. Yes. Okay. Thank you. While I got you, Mr.
Owen, the statutory responsibility and authority of CBP with
respect to interdiction of anything coming into the United
States is contained in section 211 of title 6 of the U.S. code,
is that correct?
Mr. Owen. I assume so sir, yes. I'm not sure the code, but
we do have the border search authority for everything that
comes in and leaves the United States, yes, sir.
Mr. Connolly. Right. It is not the Postal Service's
responsibility; it is yours?
Mr. Owen. It's our responsibility, yes, sir.
Mr. Connolly. That is right. So help us understand how it
works. When does the handoff go? How does that work? Once you
have done whatever you do, when does it become the Postal
Service's responsibility?
Mr. Owen. Once we clear the parcels, then it turns--becomes
domestic and it's turned over to the Postal Service, as with
all cargo. So all cargo, including the mail and parcels arrive
from foreign, they're presented to CBP for inspection. After we
inspect and release that cargo, it then gets turned over to the
carrier, in this case the Postal Service, to take it from
there.
Mr. Connolly. And to understand how we do it right now, we
have got five centers that receive mail from overseas?
Mr. Owen. We actually have nine international mail
facilities.
Mr. Connolly. Nine.
Mr. Owen. We call them something different, but yes ----
Mr. Connolly. Okay.
Mr. Owen.--there's nine facilities.
Mr. Connolly. And the volume is roughly about a million a
day?
Mr. Owen. About a million a day ----
Mr. Connolly. A million a day. That is ----
Mr. Owen.--between mail and express.
Mr. Connolly. Right.
Mr. Owen. Yes.
Mr. Connolly. Packages is a subset but a big part of the
subset, as Ms. Whitcomb points out.
Mr. Owen. Well, the mail in the Postal Service and the
express in the express courier facilities, the DHL, FedEx, UPS.
Mr. Connolly. All right. So you got these nine centers, but
you're not laboriously looking at every single piece at every
single center, right?
Mr. Owen. No.
Mr. Connolly. Right.
Mr. Owen. No, we are not.
Mr. Connolly. How does it work?
Mr. Owen. The way it works is, again, we perform a risk
assessment based on what's coming in, so if we have advanced
data, that data is run through our automated targeting system,
and it will bounce against different criteria that we have as
to help us identify those packages that are higher risk. If
those are high risk, we place them on hold, and whether it's
the Postal Service or the express consignment company and that
environment would present those packages to us.
Outside of the advanced data, the cargo from the mail that
does not currently have the data, again, it's a manual process
that is screened for radiation, put on x-ray conveyor belts. We
open things. The canines will run it, that manual process.
Mr. Connolly. Right. Now, and I am not making a judgment.
Based on what we've heard in the testimony, Ms. Whitcomb comes
along and says we got this new technique, analytics, that
actually is more efficient than the current system and gives us
a higher rate of probability of catching fentanyl, which, after
all, we all want done. Is that correct, Ms. Whitcomb? Have I
characterized part of what the conclusion of your testimony
would be?
Ms. Whitcomb. I would conclude that we believe that the
analytics that we did identified some ----
Mr. Connolly. Right.
Ms. Whitcomb.--additional process.
Mr. Connolly. But that's a technique not being used by CBP
across ----
Ms. Whitcomb. I'd--we are not the OIG that does oversight
for CBP, so I'm not sure exactly how they do their ----
Mr. Connolly. Mr. Owen?
Mr. Owen. Yes, we do that type of targeting, that type of
post-seizure analysis out at our national targeting center out
near Dulles Airport. We will take the variables from one
specific seizure and make connections to identify other high-
risk shipments and then take those appropriate actions.
Mr. Connolly. Right.
Mr. Owen. So whether we call it data analytics or post-
seizure analysis ----
Mr. Connolly. Right.
Mr. Owen.--it's work that we've been doing for some time
within U.S. Customs and Border Protection ----
Mr. Connolly. All right. But Ms. Whitcomb has testified
that they did something you didn't catch.
Mr. Owen. Based on the seizure that they worked, their
review did that, yes.
Mr. Connolly. Right. And, I mean, it was fairly impressive
data if it at all--again, I'm not trying to say yours is--I'm
trying to say, can we improve our detection? And it sounds like
what Ms. Whitcomb described, we are on to something. We can
make ourselves more efficient and make it may be less labor-
intensive, while having a better payoff in catching the
fentanyl coming into the country. Would you agree with that?
Mr. Owen. I would agree that based on post-seizure work,
making connections can help us be more effective, and that is
work that we are currently doing out at the national targeting
center, that we been doing for many, many years. We'd welcome a
visit from you, sir, or from any of the members here so we can
really get into the weeds and show you the great analytical
work, the counter-network work that we're doing out there.
Mr. Connolly. Where is this?
Mr. Owen. It's out near Dulles Airport, sir ----
Mr. Connolly. Oh ----
Mr. Owen.--so you're back there ----
Mr. Connolly.--it would be a welcome thing to have CBP ----
Mr. Owen. Yes.
Mr. Connolly.--meet with me a Dulles Airport. We are not
going there. You are now testifying before Congress.
Mr. Owen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Connolly. We will go where we want to go.
Mr. Owen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Connolly. But I won't go there. Okay. I think my time
is up.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Connolly. And you are very lucky, Mr. Owen.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Hice. I thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from Iowa, Mr. Blum, is recognized for five
minutes.
Mr. Blum. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to the
panelists for being here today. I appreciate your insights.
Mr. Owen, I believe you said--I wrote down here you said
this is a very manual process. You also said the backlog
continues to grow. How much of the process--I am from the
private sector, so I am interested in this. How much of the
process is manual today and how much is automated, whether
through analytics, technology? What are the percentages today?
Mr. Owen. Well, the percentages, if you look at last year's
data--so we received 275 million parcels in the mail. We
received another 98 million through the express courier
facilities. The 98 million we currently receive the advanced
information on, okay, so all of that is done through advanced
targeting. We have the systems controls to present the
shipments that we've identified as high risk to us.
Within the 275 million that we've been working with the
Postal Service on where we had very little advanced data a year
ago, we now have advanced data coming to us from 18 countries
and in particular from China, which is helping us to reduce
from that manual process to a more targeted process based on
the presence of that advanced data that we can analyze, place
holds on the shipment of concern.
Mr. Blum. That is the analytics portion of this, correct?
Mr. Owen. Yes. So the pendulum is definitely shifting from
where we had a much more of a manual process before we received
advanced data to less of a manual process as we receive data
now from 18 countries and growing.
Mr. Blum. Of the packages that are targeted, what
percentage--does every single one of those require manual
intervention?
Mr. Owen. Basically, yes. Every one ----
Mr. Blum. Every single one does?
Mr. Owen.--that is targeted has to be open and physically
inspected to determine what's inside. The typical seizure that
we see in these parcels in terms of fentanyl and opioids is a
baggie of 200 to 500 grams of white powder, so we're talking
very small seizures, less than half-a-pound, generally
manifested as something lawful and legitimate, aspirin, or
acetaminophen. We have to take the substances from those
baggies, those white powders, do some field testing to first
make an additional identification. Then, it needs to go to a
more structured laboratory within CBP or the DEA to make that
final determination as to what that white powder is. It can be
a very time-consuming process for each one of these half-a-
pound shipments that were we're seizing in the mail facilities.
Mr. Blum. So we want to obviously intercede in these
illicit drug shipments. What happens, though, when we do find
illicit drugs? Are we going back to the country of origin? Are
we trying to find and prosecute the people? Or is there so much
of this that that can't be done?
Mr. Owen. When we will make the introductions, the first
effort that we take is with our criminal investigators, with
Homeland Security investigations, as well as with the postal
inspectors. We will then try to process that seizure where we
can result in an arrest of who was bringing that cargo into the
country.
With that as well, we also take the specifics from the
seizure and it goes into the analytical work that we've been
speaking of with the IG here as--to help identify further
targets down ----
Mr. Blum. You have this funnel of packages, and you winnow
it down by using analytics?
Mr. Owen. Yes.
Mr. Blum. Okay, now, to that portion of the funnel, can we
use technology so maybe every package doesn't need to be hand-
opened?
Mr. Owen. You know, that's ----
Mr. Blum. I mean, is that in the future or is that now that
we could be doing that?
Mr. Owen. That is the future. There--you know, the ideal
end-state for us is to have a technology that can look inside
the package without having to open it and identify if there's a
synthetic item in there, a concern to that part. There are
several manufacturers that are working on that type of
technology, so if we can have that technology that is automatic
that will give us an alert that we've got an issue of concern
within this package, that will be really a game-changer in this
space that we struggle with.
Mr. Blum. And that is being developed currently?
Mr. Owen. Yes, there are several manufacturers that are
working towards that end with ----
Mr. Blum. That would be a game-changer, would it not?
Mr. Owen. It would be a game-changer, yes, sir.
Mr. Blum. Last question, and if you already answered it, I
apologize. The only responsibility of the United States postal
system is to turn over, correct, or to present international
packages to CBP, correct? That has not been done to the extent
it is supposed to per policy? Am I correct in that statement? I
believe I am correct. I just want to know why.
Mr. Thome. That is not a policy, sir. It's our policy when
CBP asks for packages for presentation, we present it to them.
We've gotten much better, as we spoke before. When it was a
manual process, we had a little more difficulty in finding the
packages. But since we've automated that process, we've gotten
much better at presenting CBP the items that they're asking
for. And we continue to work and apply extra resources and
automation to make that better.
Mr. Blum. And I've got 13 seconds left, and I just want to
say that the United States Postal Service and CBP, I think you
both do amazing jobs. And I have toured many of the facilities,
and hats off to you. Keep up the good work.
And I yield back the time I do not have.
Mr. Hice. I thank the gentleman.
The chair now recognizes the gentlewoman from D.C., Ms.
Norton.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you for
this timely hearing.
I want to echo the words of my colleague about the work
that the Postal Service is doing and the improvements you have
made.
I am interested in the most effective way of capturing
illegal substances. I am concerned that we use 21st-century
technology. There was technology discussed I think by my
colleague in his question as well. I am very bothered by the
increase in overdose deaths from opioids. I mean, I saw the
heroin epidemic, I saw the crack cocaine, and this notion of
doubling deaths in a single year could not be more disturbing.
Commissioner Owen, has there not been an increase in the
amount of fentanyl seized in inbound international mail?
Mr. Owen. Yes, there has. We seized about 440 pounds last
year, and we're over 800 pounds so far this fiscal year.
Ms. Norton. So that is twice the seizures?
Mr. Owen. Yes. Yes.
Ms. Norton. And is that using technology?
Mr. Owen. Part of that is record-keeping because before
2016 we did not have special categories for the fentanyl.
Everything was considered an opioid, and the data would flow
into the opioid category. Based on what we started to see in
2015 and '16, we broke out that. So we have better record-
keeping, but ----
Ms. Norton. So you think it is record-keeping more than --
--
Mr. Owen. No, I think we can better capture what we are
seizing in terms of the fentanyl and the synthetics, but I
agree that there is much more coming in now than there had been
several years prior.
Ms. Norton. Now, you have also seen amounts, I understand--
I believe that was in your testimony--an amount seized at the
Southwest border but less than the increases in seizures in the
mail and express confinements. Is that the case?
Mr. Owen. Yes, the seizures from the Southwest border are
larger in quantity but fewer in number, whereas again the
seizures in mail and express are much more great in number but
very small quantities.
Ms. Norton. But they are purer?
Mr. Owen. They are more pure, yes, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. And what accounts for that?
Mr. Owen. The--because, again, these are chemical compounds
and there is the ability to make them to different strengths if
you will, so the products coming from China are much more pure,
much more dangerous than the products coming in from Mexico
right now.
Ms. Norton. Could you tell me how many officers are
assigned to examine mail at your facilities--at your
international mail facilities?
Mr. Owen. Yes, within the international mail facilities, we
have just over 200 officers that work. Again, the mail
facilities, of those nine, there are five that are significant
in volumes. The other four are very, very small.
Ms. Norton. Now, as I understand, officers are being
rotated away from the customs districts to go to the Southwest
border. Is that true?
Mr. Owen. We have struggling--we are struggling with
staffing issues in the Arizona ports of entry, as well as
Southern California, so on a 90-day basis, we have 150 officers
from around the country that are on temporary reassignment down
there.
Ms. Norton. So that such an officer cannot examine
international mail because he has been sent to the Southwest
border ----
Mr. Owen. Right, we have 20 field offices around the
country, and we take two to three from each field office each
90-day period, so it's a small impact to the individual
locations to support the activities on the Southwest border
that are struggling with their staffing challenges.
Ms. Norton. Now, again, I'm trying to find the best way to
get a hold of this problem, and I know that the President's
fiscal year 2018 budget requested $1.6 billion for construction
of a border wall. Now, the President has not formally declared
an emergency or asked Congress for emergency resources to deal
with the fentanyl crisis, so I suppose this question is for Ms.
Rectanus. Is that how you say your name? What effect will
building a southern wall have on stopping fentanyl being
shipped in the mail or through express carriers?
Ms. Rectanus. That is not an issue that we have explored,
so I would maybe refer that to my CBP colleague. GAO has not
done any analysis of that.
Ms. Norton. Well, I need to know, how does it get here, and
if there was a wall, would that have any effect in keeping
fentanyl from getting to the United States? Who can answer that
question, please?
Mr. Owen. As we take efforts to secure the Southwest
border, that will help prevent the narcotics coming in from
Mexico. And again, we do have Mexican fentanyl that's coming in
as well.
Ms. Norton. Yes, you do, and it is up to you to find the
most effective way to stop what amounts to an opioid crisis and
to suggest what is the most--we don't want to have hearings
that see a doubling every single year. I haven't seen a crisis
like this, and I have seen some terrible drug crises in my time
in Congress. So I would like you to--I would like--and I don't
know which of you is responsible to investigate what is the
best way to deter fentanyl coming into the United States and to
at least reduce the opioid deaths in our country, and I would
ask you to report back to the chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hice. I thank the gentlewoman. I now recognize the
distinguished chairman of this committee, who is sitting way
down there. He ought to be sitting here, but the gentleman from
North Carolina, Mr. Meadows.
Mr. Meadows. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for actually
conducting the hearing and obviously taking the leadership role
here as I was having to resolve something that actually
Congressman Heath Shuler and I worked for a long time. He was a
Member that held my seat, a Democrat, before I came, and we had
been working on something for five years and it got resolved
today, and so my apologies for not being here on time. But I
thank you for your leadership and your help.
So let me weigh in a little bit, I guess. You know, Mr.
Owen, you know, I have visited your facility in Dulles, as you
well know, and certainly have a lot of compliments on what you
do and the work that you do. We have got a crisis on our hands,
and we have got to figure a different way of dealing with this.
So I guess my question to you is if there is an unlimited
budget, which there is not, I mean, what would you do
differently today?
Mr. Owen. Well, if there was an unlimited budget ----
Mr. Meadows. Because--and let me tell you the reason why I
ask that because one of the questions when I was sitting here
listening to this you were saying, well, we're looking at that
post-seizure, and we're looking, you know, back from a
historical perspective. But you don't know what you haven't
caught, so, I mean, you know, how can we do that on the front
end instead of looking at it in retrospect? And all that is
great. I think you have to look at it from a historical
standpoint, but you don't know what you haven't caught, so what
do we need to do in terms of giving you tools to do this
better?
Mr. Owen. Well, I think the most fundamental is to continue
on the work that we're doing with the Postal Service to receive
the advanced information. By having the information ahead of
the shipments' arrival, we can do much greater targeting ----
Mr. Meadows. And what advanced information are you talking
about?
Mr. Owen. The advanced information as to the shipper of the
goods, the recipient of the goods, the description. There's
different data sets that we receive ----
Mr. Meadows. And why would you not have that? We currently
don't have that with many of the countries from the Postal
Service because of the international agreements as to the way
the data is governed. And the Postal Service and the State
Department could speak to that.
Mr. Meadows. Mr. Cottrell, I mean, why would they not have
that?
Mr. Cottrell. Well, we've made tremendous ----
Mr. Meadows. I mean, if I ship on anything else, you got to
have a sender and a receiver, so why would they not have that
with you?
Mr. Cottrell. The Postal Service is a leading proponent to
get more AED, Mr. Chairman, but we do--are faced with certain
constraints, as the State Department spoke to earlier. We don't
control what foreign posts mail into this country, so we have
taken great steps. The 18 to 20 large ----
Mr. Meadows. So you are saying it is the State Department's
problem? I want to make sure I am clear. We got all the experts
up there. I'm going to find out whose problem it is. Mr. Owen
says it is not his. He says it is somewhere else, so whose
problem is it?
Mr. Cottrell. I think it is a combination, sir. It's us
working with the foreign post to ----
Mr. Meadows. The buck stops somewhere. Who does it stop
with? The State Department?
Mr. Cottrell. I'll let you answer, Mr. Thome, if you want.
Mr. Meadows. No, hold on. Let me make sure.
Mr. Cottrell. Sure.
Mr. Meadows. You are under oath. Is it your fault or is it
someone else's fault?
Mr. Cottrell. I don't know that it's anyone's fault, sir.
It's treaties that are in place that the United States has
entered into agreements.
Mr. Meadows. All right. So go ahead and weigh in at the
State Department.
Mr. Thome. Thank you ----
Mr. Meadows. Because I am having a hard time explaining to
my constituents back home when we have a fentanyl problem why
the State Department wouldn't look at this a little
differently. So we have got a treaty that is a problem?
Mr. Thome. I would echo a little bit what my Postal Service
colleague said. It's not really that it's anyone's ----
Mr. Meadows. It didn't work real well for your postal
colleague, so I don't know that I would echo it.
Mr. Thome. It's ----
Mr. Meadows. So go ahead.
Mr. Thome. It's not really the fault of any one on this
panel or any of the Federal agencies ----
Mr. Meadows. Well ----
Mr. Thome.--that are working this ----
Mr. Meadows. Well, then tell me whose fault it is because
we will get them in here and make sure that they are here
because I think that we have bipartisan interest on this
particular subject. So whose fault is it?
Mr. Thome. Well, the issue is that for the U.S. Postal
Service, according to our treaty obligations, they must accept
mail from foreign postal services. So unlike the express
service as a ----
Mr. Meadows. So we need to un-ratify the treaty?
Mr. Thome. No, it's not as much a question of the treaty
that causes us the problem. It's the question of the capacity
of the foreign posts to provide the data. Now, as I said in my
testimony ----
Mr. Meadows. Well, we don't have to receive that. I mean, I
have looked at it. I mean, it becomes a decision by the State
Department on what qualifies and what doesn't. Is that not
correct?
Mr. Thome. Well, as things stand right now, we accept the
mail from foreign postal services to facilitate the global
exchange of mail.
Mr. Meadows. And so as things stand right now, it is not
working. Are you required to do that?
Mr. Thome. As things stand right now in terms of the broad
mass of legitimate commerce, it is indeed working quite well
and expanding. We do need to focus on ----
Mr. Meadows. So you are saying a little bit of drugs along
with the regular commerce is okay. Is that your sworn testimony
here today?
Mr. Thome. I am certainly not saying that, sir.
Mr. Meadows. Well, that is what it sounded like.
Mr. Thome. What I'm saying is we need to now focus on
further convincing posts which are--and again, the time has
come ----
Mr. Meadows. So how do I do that? How does a Member of
Congress--because, listen, this isn't my first rodeo on this
issue, and I have got major issues with it both from a cost
standpoint and now from an oversight standpoint. So how do we
fix it? Because the Postal Service says it is not them. They
indicate that it is a joint State Department/postal system
issue. So I need to get to the bottom line. I mean, who do we
need to--do we need to have Secretary Tillerson in here to
figure out how to fix it?
Mr. Thome. Well, we are working already toward fixing it,
and we are working together to convince other Postal Services
that it's in their best interest to provide this ----
Mr. Meadows. So how ----
Mr. Thome.--and we're succeeding.
Mr. Meadows. And I appreciate the indulgence of the chair.
Give me one last question. How are we encouraging other people
to comply, other countries? How are we doing that?
Mr. Thome. There's two main avenues through which we do it.
One is that the U.S. Postal Service is increasingly entering
into bilateral agreements. I can't speak to those agreements
because they're ----
Mr. Meadows. Proprietary. Go ahead.
Mr. Thome.--proprietary. And then the other avenue is the
Universal Postal Union where we have been actively engaged in
helping countries expand their ability to provide this data.
Once upon a time, they were not interested in this, but that
has changed. They see the business model ----
Mr. Meadows. Okay. So let me close because I am out of
time. The message that you need to take back and I guess Mr.
Cottrell and I see my friends at the postal system there behind
you need to take back is the time for us kicking the can down
the road is over, all right? And we are going to get to the
bottom of it, and you need to take it to those entities and say
that now it is raised to the level of attention that we have
got to deal with it. And we are going to continue to bring you
back until we fix it. You tell me what you need from a resource
standpoint, but we are going to fix this problem or we are
going to take more severe action. Does that make sense? Is that
fair? So can both of you report back to this committee in 90
days with an action plan on how we are going to encourage those
others to comply?
All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hice. I thank the gentleman. And again, thank you for
your leadership in this subcommittee and the full committee as
a whole.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Missouri, Mr.
Clay, for five minutes.
Mr. Clay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The STOP Act would require the Postal Service to collect
and transmit the same kind of electronic data to customs as the
express consignment carriers already provide to customs. GAO
testified today that Customs and Border Patrol have not
evaluated the effectiveness of using electronic advanced data.
So the STOP Act is premature since it assumes the effectiveness
of using the data before a thorough evaluation of its use has
been performed.
But I think there are other problems with the STOP Act as
well. The STOP Act is based on a fundamental misunderstanding
of the differences between the Postal Service and consignment
carriers. Chief Cottrell, is it not true that, as the
designated postal operator for the United States Postal Service
is required by international treaty established by the
Universal Postal Union to accept and deliver mail that is
shipped to the U.S. from the nearly 200 member nations of the
UPU ----
Mr. Cottrell. Yes, Congressman.
Mr. Clay.--is that correct? Express consignment carriers
like UPS and FedEx are under no such requirement. They can
choose their customers and the packages that they are willing
to deliver. Isn't that right?
Mr. Cottrell. Yes, Congressman.
Mr. Clay. Okay. Isn't it also true that UPS and FedEx can
charge the delivery rates that they want to charge for shipping
packages, but the Postal Service must abide by the
international postal rates established by the UPU, is that
right?
Mr. Cottrell. That is correct, Congressman.
Mr. Clay. In addition, unlike UPS and FedEx, the Postal
Service does not decide whether or not to accept foreign
packages from mail, and foreign postal operators are the ones
who accept the packages that the Postal Service is obligated
under international agreement to deliver in the U.S., is that
correct?
Mr. Cottrell. Yes, Congressman.
Mr. Clay. While express consignment carriers can get the
data from their customer at the time they accept a package from
a foreign shipper, the Postal Service does not have the same
ability to collect that information at the time a package is
tendered. Isn't that right?
Mr. Cottrell. Yes, Congressman.
Mr. Clay. There is also a misunderstanding of the
authorities and duties of customs and the Postal Service.
Commissioner Owen, customs has the responsibility to, and I am
quoting from a statute, ``protect against the entry of
dangerous goods.'' Do I have that correct?
Mr. Owen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Clay. As a result, Customs and Border Patrol has a lot
of authority to search for and seize international mail and
packages. Isn't that correct?
Mr. Owen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Clay. For example, is Customs and Border Patrol
required to obtain a warrant prior to inspecting mail or
packages?
Mr. Owen. No, we are not. We have border search authority
that allows us to inspect anything crossing our borders.
Mr. Clay. Thank you for that response. And, Chief Cottrell,
under what circumstances may the Postal Service seize and open
mail packages for inspection?
Mr. Cottrell. We gain probable cause and we get a search
warrant from a Federal judge.
Mr. Clay. So you have to go through the due process of
getting a search warrant?
Mr. Cottrell. Yes, Congressman.
Mr. Clay. Okay. And this is also different from what
express consignment carriers can do, correct?
Mr. Cottrell. Yes, Congressman.
Mr. Clay. Don't they have the authority to inspect their
customers' packages to determine whether the package contains
what the customer says it does?
Mr. Cottrell. They create their own policies, yes, sir.
They can open their packages.
Mr. Clay. And that is different from the Postal Service?
Mr. Cottrell. It's different from mail, yes.
Mr. Clay. Given that the Postal Service and express
consignment carriers operate very differently, it does not make
sense to impose burdensome and impractical mandates on the
Postal Service in a misguided effort to seek parity between the
Postal Service and private carriers.
And so, Mr. Chairman, I think that the STOP Act may be
premature, especially if we don't have all of the information
we need to determine if we can--if the Postal Service can even
do what we want them to do. And so I would ask that we move
cautiously on any legislation that would impact the operation
of our Postal Service.
And with that, I yield back.
Mr. Hice. I thank the gentleman.
And the chair will recognize the gentlewoman from Michigan,
Mrs. Lawrence, for five minutes.
Mrs. Lawrence. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and my ranking member
who is here, for this hearing.
As we know, the opioid epidemic is one of the Nation's
foremost health crises. And coming from Michigan in 2015, I am
so passionate about this. There are 2,000--2,000--human beings
in my State overdosed on opioids, and that is a 13 percent
increase over the previous year.
So one of the things I want to be clear about because my
colleague seems to be pointing the finger at the Postal Service
that compliance and a sense of urgency in addressing this issue
is not where it should be. Ladies and gentlemen, this crisis
has forced all of us in law enforcement and those of us who are
in the State Department and customs to reevaluate, based on the
increase in numbers we are seeing and the human part of this
that has equated to overdose and unfortunately deaths in our
country.
Now, one of the things my colleague did a great job
outlining, there is an international treaty. And what we all
know as the 192-member countries called the Universal Postal
Union, the UPU. And being a member of that is not something
that the Postal Service unilaterally or independently decided
to join. It is a requirement as a Federal agency to be in
compliance. So one of the areas we need to look at because we
do need to have focus on this is through the State Department.
That is our treaties and responsibility and limitations that is
required of us by the UPU. The Postal Service must comply to
those regulations as a Federal agency.
And while we are bipartisan in saying we must look at new
processes and are we being efficient, without being in mind, I
would like to ask a question of Mr. Owen. Can you comment,
because we are using CBP's EDA. That is what we are using,
right, to screen our parcels. Am I correct?
Mr. Owen. The advanced ED ----
Mrs. Lawrence. EAD.
Mr. Owen. EAD, the electronic ----
Mrs. Lawrence. You are using that right now. That is your
process?
Mr. Owen. Yes, we screen the advanced electronic
information to identify those shipments ----
Mrs. Lawrence. Okay.
Mr. Owen.--that are at greater risk, yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Lawrence. Can you comment, is this the most efficient
process? Has there been any recommendations--when is the last
time you had an evaluation to see if we are using the best
technology in comparison to other targeting techniques?
Because, obviously, we can't keep using the same processes
considering the impact and the vast seriousness of this issue.
Mr. Owen. We are constantly refining our targeting systems
with new information, new sources of information, different
capabilities that are out there than what had been there
several years ago. So our targeting has gotten much, much
stronger over the last several years to identify those
shipments, be it in mail or the land border or the seaports
that pose the greater risk. So we continue to strengthen our
targeting and analytical capabilities that we have so that our
resources are being directed where they're most effective.
Mrs. Lawrence. One of the things I want to say here at this
hearing--and I am going to ask the same question of you Ms.
Whitcomb--is that so often we will have the representatives of
an organization come before us and paint us a picture that we
are doing a great job with the resources we have, but after the
hearing, we will hear a different story--if we had the ability
to use new technology, if we had the funding--and that is
something that I really want to push your agency to be honest
with us.
There has been a request for you to report back to this
committee how can we be more efficient. So through the Postal
Service, through the State Department, through the Inspection
Service, be honest with us. This is not an attack of you as an
organization. This is a bipartisan effort to attack this
problem. And unless you are honest and provide us with the
information, we cannot move forward. So I want to ask the same
question of the Postal Service. What can we do? Are there new
technologies? How can we use the resources that we are
expecting in the Postal Service to address this issue?
Ms. Whitcomb. Based on the work that we've done, we believe
that data analytics are a really important part of a solution
to this problem. The data, the advanced electronic data, you
have heard from the panelists, that is growing. We're getting
more and more of that data, and I know that CBP, the Inspection
Service, and our office are looking at how we can use that data
and how we can use analytics layered onto that data to identify
these parcels before they ever get into the mail stream, even
possibly before they ever leave the originating country. If we
can do that, I think there are some real opportunities there to
stop these really dangerous opioids from entering the country.
So I think there's an opportunity to collaborate among the
panelists that you see here and even others to work together on
identifying the best way to use data analytics to address this
problem.
Mrs. Lawrence. My time is up, and I will yield back to the
chair saying that I want us as a committee to direct a
collaboration so that we can have all these parties, not
individual silos. How can they collaborate because they can't
exist alone so that we can move forward in Congress and
supporting a collaborative effort to attack this issue. Thank
you so much.
Mr. Hice. I thank the gentlewoman.
Just before we close, let me just ask a couple of just real
quick questions. Mr. Cottrell, is the Postal Service working
with the recommendations from the GAO?
Mr. Cottrell. We were directed to work with customs to set
up the metrics and evaluate the effectiveness of the AED in our
investigative processes, so we will be working with Mr. Owen
and his team.
Mr. Hice. Specifically towards those recommendations?
Mr. Cottrell. Yes.
Mr. Hice. Okay. And, Ms. Rectanus, let me just real
quickly, in your report you discussed two pilot programs at the
New York International Service Center. In both those pilot
programs USPS agreed to provide EAD to CBP for certain mail.
One of those pilots--explain what percentage UPS successfully
provided to the CBP for targeting?
Ms. Rectanus. Sure. There are two pilots. The first pilot,
we--when we looked at the presentation data, it did seem like
Postal Service had gotten better over the period of time
ultimately averaging about 80 percent ----
Mr. Hice. Okay. What was the other one?
Ms. Rectanus.--of the packages presented. The other pilot,
when we looked at the data monthly, it really varied, but they
average about 58 percent over this period.
Mr. Hice. Why the discrepancy?
Ms. Rectanus. Excuse me?
Mr. Hice. Why a discrepancy between the two?
Ms. Rectanus. I think--well, part of it probably had to do
with the type and the level of data that they were getting from
the countries that were involved in those pilots, and I think
partly also it was volume and it was the type of product I
think that was involved that allowed the Postal Service to be
able better to identify the particular packages. And again,
they are only--they were only asking for 5 or 10 packages from
each of those pilots, so it wasn't a huge number either.
Mr. Hice. Okay. Now, in 2016, we all know the Postal
Service reported like $5.6 billion loss, 10 consecutive years
now with a loss. In light of this, just curiosity between the
two of you, has USPS and CBP, have you considered the cost and
the benefits, analysis of increased electronic data?
Mr. Owen. No, that again is one of the recommendations that
both agencies agreed with that we need to do more of that to
take--make sure we're being effective with the data that is
being provided. So we both did concur with those
recommendations from GAO.
Mr. Hice. Okay. So that discussion is going to be underway?
Mr. Owen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hice. Okay.
Mr. Owen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hice. All right. With that, I am going to yield the
final two minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina.
Mr. Meadows. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
So let me do two clarify things. Is it Mr. Thome? Is that--
what?
Mr. Thome. Thome.
Mr. Meadows. Thome. All right. Mr. Thome, the next
Universal Postal Union meeting is where and when?
Mr. Thome. The next UPU Congress is an extraordinary
Congress in Ethiopia in 2018.
Mr. Meadows. All right. So would it not be appropriate to
get a couple of members of this committee to go with you and
accompany you to that particular meeting? Is that something
that you can arrange?
Mr. Thome. I certainly could add you to our delegation, and
you'd be more than welcome.
Mr. Meadows. All right. So if you would reach out to the
committee there on doing that.
Mr. Cottrell, is the postal system willing to provide all
their postal data so that we can do--retroactively look at all
these cases? And are you currently doing that?
Mr. Cottrell. Yes, sir. The Postal Service currently
provides over 90 percent AED for our outbound product.
Mr. Meadows. All right. And so from GAO perspective, what
more needs to be done there?
Ms. Rectanus. As far as the cost and benefits and sort of
looking at the pilots' performance, our focus was really given
the Postal Service's financial situation and this small
percentage of their revenue and volume that come from
international mail, albeit growing. What we wanted was some
kind of united conversation between the folks to say what is
feasible? What do we think is really effective and what do we
think is--sort of is the juice worth the squeeze?
Given that--right now, the pilots have been very, very
small, and there is a very small number of pieces of mail and
packages that have been involved, so we would want them to
identify what percentage of mail should the Postal Service be
able to present to CBP, and if they aren't, then why not, and
kind of get that figured out before we expand it fully and move
on with getting more advanced data if we're not ready to use it
yet.
Mr. Meadows. So, Mr. Cottrell, what percentage is
reasonable?
Mr. Cottrell. I want to make sure I'm understanding your
question.
Mr. Meadows. Well, I mean, you just heard what she said. I
mean, we've got small pilots. I mean, at what percentage of
deliverables would be a reasonable percentage?
Mr. Cottrell. We're providing everything we get, which, as
of July, was about 40 percent, to customs, so it's up to us and
customs to work together to identify as much as we can and then
work to pull that out and get it in front of customs.
Mr. Meadows. I think we are talking over each other. I will
follow up. I am assuming that I see a very receptive nod from
behind you, and so we will work through that together.
Here is the interesting thing, and I will close with this.
We need better collaboration between the entities. To suggest
that one group is responsible and another one is not is like
telling TSA and all the international travel we have coming in
here that it is okay to let a terrorist come in from some
foreign country just because we have an agreement with them,
Mr. Thome.
So what we have to do is--this is taking people's lives.
Let's treat it that way and start to work with better
collaboration. Does that make sense for all of you to do that?
Are you committed to do that? Anyone not?
Let the record reflect everybody answered in the
affirmative. I will yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Hice. I thank the gentleman.
I would like to again extend a thank you to all our
witnesses for taking time to appear here before this
subcommittee today and particularly for your patience during
the voting series.
The hearing record will remain open for two weeks for any
member to submit a written opening statement or questions for
the record.
If there is no further business, without objection, the
subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:39 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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