[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE PERSISTENT THREAT: AL-QAEDA'S EVOLUTION AND RESILIENCE
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
COUNTERTERRORISM
AND INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 13, 2017
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Serial No. 115-21
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Mike Rogers, Alabama James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
John Katko, New York Filemon Vela, Texas
Will Hurd, Texas Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
Martha McSally, Arizona Kathleen M. Rice, New York
John Ratcliffe, Texas J. Luis Correa, California
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York Val Butler Demings, Florida
Mike Gallagher, Wisconsin Nanette Diaz Barragan, California
Clay Higgins, Louisiana
John H. Rutherford, Florida
Thomas A. Garrett, Jr., Virginia
Brian K. Fitzpatrick, Pennsylvania
Ron Estes, Kansas
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Kathleen Crooks Flynn, Deputy General Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Will Hurd, Texas William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Mike Gallagher, Wisconsin Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex (ex officio)
officio)
Mandy Bowers, Subcommittee Staff Director
Nicole Tisdale, Minority Staff Director/Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable Kathleen M. Rice, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
Witnesses
Ms. Katherine Zimmerman, Research Fellow, American Enterprise
Institute:
Oral Statement................................................. 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
Ms. Jennifer Cafarella, Lead Intelligence Planner, Institute for
the Study of War:
Oral Statement................................................. 16
Prepared Statement............................................. 18
Dr. Seth Jones, Director, International Security and Defense
Policy Center, Rand Corporation:
Oral Statement................................................. 25
Prepared Statement............................................. 27
Appendix
Questions From Honorable Mike Gallagher for Katherine Zimmerman.. 57
THE PERSISTENT THREAT: AL-QAEDA'S EVOLUTION AND RESILIENCE
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Thursday, July 13, 2017
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in
Room HVC-210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Peter T. King
(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives King, Perry, Hurd, Rice, Jackson
Lee, and Keating.
Mr. King. Good morning. The Committee on Homeland Security
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism Intelligence will come to
order. The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony from
three experts in al-Qaeda and global terrorism.
While the focus the past few years has primarily been on
ISIS, we cannot forget and must not forget that al-Qaeda still
has a global network intent on attacking the homeland.
I would like to welcome the Members of the subcommittee,
particularly Ranking Member Miss Rice, and express my
appreciation for the witnesses being here today, and I
recognize myself for an opening statement which I will keep
brief. I will ask that my full statement be inserted in the
record because I do want to get to the testimony.
Nine-eleven changed the world. All emphasis was focused on
al-Qaeda and an excellent job was done in those early years in
going after al-Qaeda and taking away their base in Afghanistan,
putting them on defense around the world and then culminating
in the killing of bin Laden in 2011.
But I think there has been a mistake made over the last
several years by people and this is not a partisan issue--it
involves both parties, it involves spokespeople in both
parties--is to emphasize ISIS. ISIS became the enemy. ISIS
became the face of Islamist terrorism.
The fact is during this time al-Qaeda was reconstituting.
It was reinforcing itself. Now where ISIS is certainly on the
verge of losing its attempted caliphate, it also is really on
its heels right now. It is definitely on defense.
But the fact is al-Qaeda, itself, al-Qaeda has been
selecting new, younger leadership. It has become more media-
savvy. It has positioned itself to, I think, in effect,
reassume its leadership position as ISIS goes down. So I really
look forward to the witnesses we are having here today. I think
that we have--again, in the United States we like the easy
answers.
Al-Qaeda was the enemy, we are going after al-Qaeda. Now
ISIS is the enemy, we are going after ISIS. The fact is al-
Qaeda is still there. Al-Qaeda is extremely dangerous, and so
again, I look forward to the testimony from the witnesses.
We had a brief chance to talk before, but again, I think
this hearing is particularly important because we now know how
we let our guard down before 9/11. I don't want us to ever let
our guard down again. That is a concern that I have as ISIS is
on the run and we sort-of take our eye off the ball of al-
Qaeda.
So with that, I look forward to hearing from the witnesses
the current state of al-Qaeda, an evaluation of their current
intent, capability, the leadership structure and their
affiliated networks. Again, this is a critical time, and let us
not make mistakes we have made in the past with claiming
victory too soon.
[The statement of Chairman King follows:]
Statement of Chairman Peter T. King
July 13, 2017
On September 11, 2001, the world at large was introduced to the
brutal, murderous, and morally bankrupt terrorist organization known as
al-Qaeda. Although some in the United States intelligence community had
been paying attention to their actions abroad before 9/11, the tragic
events of that Tuesday morning presented al-Qaeda's distorted world
view for everyone to see, at the cost of thousands of American lives.
In the time since those horrific attacks took place much has
changed: Wars have been fought and won, our National security apparatus
has been transformed, the Department of Homeland Security was created,
and legislation has been enacted to counter the menace posed by al-
Qaeda and its offshoots.
Some things, however, have not changed: The dedication and
professionalism of the members of the United States military, law
enforcement, and intelligence communities, the determination of the
American people to defeat terrorism wherever it is found, and,
unfortunately, the persistent threat posed by al-Qaeda.
Al-Qaeda has suffered severe defeats and setbacks in the nearly 16
years since America was attacked. From the 2011 raid on an Abbottabad
compound that brought justice to Osama bin Laden, to the continued,
sustained decimation of al-Qaeda senior leadership throughout the
world, to the increased collaboration and partnerships that have been
forged by the United States and our allies, al-Qaeda is under constant
and relentless attack.
In response to this pressure, al-Qaeda has demonstrated its
resilience and evolved: It has diffused its leadership structure across
the globe, franchised jihad with various affiliates, and metastasized
in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, Europe and North America.
The last several years have seen the creation, rise, and eventual
decline of ISIS, al-Qaeda's most potent knockoff. During these years
the shocking atrocities committed by ISIS in Syria, Iraq, Western
Europe, the United States, and elsewhere have monopolized much of the
attention focused on the global jihadist movement. However, al-Qaeda
has remained active during this time. They have selected new, younger
leadership, become more media savvy and positioned themselves as an
alternative to ISIS's brand of jihad.
In the face of the evolving threat posed by al-Qaeda, it is
essential that we examine the direction that the organization is
headed. This examination will help inform how Congress and the new
administration can respond and continue to pressure al-Qaeda and its
network of affiliated terrorists around the world, and ensure that
there are no safe havens where these murders can hide.
Today's hearing will feature testimony from a distinguished panel
of experts who have studied and analyzed the organizational and
operational functions of al-Qaeda. These professionals work for
institutions that have dedicated substantial resources to collecting
and processing information that can provide insight into the future
course that al-Qaeda may attempt to chart. This information, in turn,
can help us to make determinations about how we can best and most
effectively counter future al-Qaeda efforts, continue to keep the
pressure on al-Qaeda, and ultimately destroy the terror network.
I look forward to hearing from today's witnesses about the current
state of al-Qaeda, including an evaluation of their current intent,
capability, leadership structure, and affiliate network. This hearing
comes at a critical time as al-Qaeda is making efforts to once again
take leadership of the global jihadist movement.
Mr. King. So with that, I now recognize the gentlelady from
New York, Ranking Member Rice.
Miss Rice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing and thank you to the witnesses who are testifying
before us today. As we gather to discuss the evolution and the
current state of core al-Qaeda and its affiliates, we know that
there may be no clear-cut end to the war on terror, and
particularly the war on this particular group, at least no
clear end that we can see today.
But we also know that we have made real, significant
progress in this fight. In the 16 years since 9/11, the United
States, together with our allies and partners around the world,
have severely weakened al-Qaeda's leadership and significantly
reduced their power and operations here and abroad. As a New
Yorker, I join the Chairman as a New Yorker here. That means a
great deal to both of us.
I want to say how incredibly grateful I am for all those
who work so hard and sacrifice so much in this fight. First and
foremost, our fallen heroes, service members, veterans, and
military families, but also our diplomats and government
officials and policymakers, everyone who has come together and
done their part to defeat an enemy that has taken so many
innocent lives.
I think it is important to recognize that under the Obama
administration we saw the creation, evolution, and
implementation of effective counterterrorism policies that help
lead to the deaths of several key al-Qaeda leaders, most
notably, Osama bin Laden, among others. But there is no
partisanship when it comes to fighting terrorism.
While many of the tangible successes against core al-Qaeda
came under President Obama, there is no question that President
George W. Bush's administration helped to lay the groundwork
for that progress.
Days after the 9/11 attacks, President Bush reminded us
that while our war on terror would begin with al-Qaeda, it
would not end until every terrorist group that seeks to do us
harm was found and defeated.
I think it is fitting to remember that now, first because
we know that the threat from other terrorist groups has grown
in recent years, but also because al-Qaeda has not been
defeated. They have not given up, and that threat has not yet
been eliminated.
So now almost 7 months into the Trump administration, I
believe it is critically important for the new administration
to craft and implement real strategies for countering the
resurgence of al-Qaeda, as well as ISIS and other groups that
still pose a real, evolving threat to our homeland and to our
allies and interests abroad.
We need a serious comprehensive strategy across our entire
government. Fiery rhetoric and tough talk is not a
comprehensive strategy. Whether you agree with the policy
itself or not, I think we can all agree that a travel ban on a
few Muslim countries is not a comprehensive strategy and could
actually undermine our counterterrorism efforts by fueling
propaganda campaigns.
What we need is a serious, focused, long-term
counterterrorism strategy that builds on all that we have
learned over the past 16 years and guides us forward as we take
on the evolving threats that we face right now and in the years
ahead.
I sincerely hope that people within the administration are
working to create and implement such a strategy. I know that
our committee would welcome the opportunity to engage in that
process, and I look forward to hearing any input our witnesses
have on what some priorities and goals should be as we look to
the future of our counterterrorism efforts.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, again, and I yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member Rice follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Kathleen Rice
July 13, 2017
As we gather to discuss the evolution and the current state of core
al-Qaeda and its affiliates, we know that there may be no clear-cut end
to the war on terror, and particularly the war on this particular
group. At least no clear end that we can see today. But we also know
that we have made real, significant progress in this fight the 16 years
since 9/11. The United States, together with our allies and partners
around the world, have severely weakened al-Qaeda's leadership, and
significantly reduced their power and operations here and abroad.
As a New Yorker, that means a great deal to me. I want to say how
incredibly grateful I am for all those who all those who worked so hard
and sacrificed so much in this fight--first and foremost our fallen
heroes, service members, veterans and military families, but also our
diplomats, and government officials, and policymakers--everyone who has
come together and done their part to defeat an enemy that has taken so
many innocent lives.
I think it's important to recognize that under the Obama
administration, we saw the creation, evolution, and implementation of
effective counterterrorism policies that helped lead to the deaths of
several key al-Qaeda leaders, most notably Osama bin Laden, among
others.
But there is no partisanship when it comes to fighting terrorism.
And while many of the tangible successes against core al-Qaeda came
under President Obama, there's no question that President George W.
Bush's administration helped to lay the groundwork for that progress.
Days after the 9/11 attacks, President Bush reminded us that while
our war on terror would begin with al-Qaeda, it would not end until
every terrorist group that seeks to do us harm was found and defeated.
I think it's fitting to remember that now--first, because we know that
the threat from other terrorist groups has grown in recent years. But
also because al-Qaeda has not been defeated--they have not given up,
that threat has not been eliminated.
So now, almost 7 months into the Trump administration, I believe
it's critically important for the new administration to craft and
implement real strategies for countering the resurgence of al-Qaeda, as
well as ISIS and other groups that still pose a real and evolving
threat to our homeland and to our allies and interests abroad.
We need a serious, comprehensive strategy across our entire
Government. Fiery rhetoric and tough talk is not a comprehensive
strategy. Whether you agree with the policy itself or not, I think we
can all agree that a travel ban on a few Muslim countries is not a
comprehensive strategy--and could actually undermine our
counterterrorism efforts by fueling propaganda campaigns.
What we need is a serious, focused, long-term counterterrorism
strategy that builds on all that we've learned over the past 16 years,
and guides us forward as we take on the evolving threats that we face
right now and in the years ahead. I sincerely hope that people within
the administration are working to create and implement such a strategy,
I know that our committee would welcome the opportunity to engage in
that process, and I look forward to hearing any input our witnesses
have on what some priorities and goals should be as we look to the
future of our counterterrorism efforts.
Mr. King. Thank you, Miss Rice. Other Members of the
committee are reminded that opening statements may be submitted
for the record.
We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses
before us today on this vital topic. All the witnesses are
reminded that their written testimony will be submitted for the
record.
Our first witness is Katherine Zimmerman. Ms. Zimmerman is
a research fellow with the American Enterprise Institute which
she manages AEI's Critical Threats Project. As a senior al-
Qaeda analyst, she is a sought-after expert by major news
networks and print news.
She has written a number of articles for AEI and other
publications. She continues to be a great resource for the
committee. It is my pleasure to welcome Ms. Zimmerman back
before the subcommittee.
Ms. Zimmerman, thank you. You are recognized.
STATEMENT OF KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN, RESEARCH FELLOW, AMERICAN
ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE
Ms. Zimmerman. Chairman King, Ranking Member Rice, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you for this
opportunity to discuss the persistent threat from al-Qaeda.
U.S. strategy is setting the stage for al-Qaeda to lead the
Salafi-jihadi movement again.
Al-Qaeda has adapted and evolved to exploit our own
strategic weaknesses, and our strategy has changed little since
2001. U.S. policy no longer recognizes the seriousness of al-
Qaeda's threat.
The United States risks strategic surprise with al-Qaeda.
Nothing indicates that al-Qaeda has altered its long-term
objectives. Al-Qaeda's entrenchment into local conflicts is
dangerous for the United States because al-Qaeda seeks to alter
Muslim communities and unifying them under its name in its
violent struggle for Islam. Al-Qaeda is determined to bring war
to the United States.
Al-Qaeda is almost certainly refining and improving its
external attack capabilities in order to deploy them against
the United States at a future date. If current policy
continues, al-Qaeda will begin attacking the United States anew
with orders of magnitude, more resources, experience, and
capability than it did on 9/11.
I would like to highlight key points from my prepared
statement today: First, al-Qaeda's focus on local wars is not a
sign of its decline; second, the al-Qaeda network is robust
today; and third, on-going trends will strengthen al-Qaeda.
To my first point, the impression of al-Qaeda's weakness is
a deliberate pose. Senior al-Qaeda leadership rightly
determines that portraying global dissolution and publicly
embracing local fights would create confusion in Western minds
about al-Qaeda's strength and its threat to the United States.
In fact, the West's prioritization of the anti-ISIS fight
and the spread of civil wars and conflict in Muslim states gave
al-Qaeda the freedom of operation to focus on strategic
objective--the transformation of Muslim societies.
Al-Qaeda deliberately localized to build a popular support
base and key human terrain in the Muslim world. Al-Qaeda's
leaders have been incredibly focused on gaining popular
acceptance since the 1990's, but had failed repeatedly.
Al-Qaeda seized the opportunity presented by the break-down
of states and governance across the Muslim world after the Arab
Spring to finally win over the people. It seeks to buy support
with its rebranding, softening its image and focusing on the
local population.
It is doing so by delivering much-needed assistance to fill
governance gaps and by fighting alongside local militias in
defense of the community.
Al-Qaeda brings basic services, food, water, electricity,
justice and security, and military skills and expertise to
these communities, which accept al-Qaeda's presence based on a
short-term calculation to secure their own survival. This is
how al-Qaeda insinuates itself.
Al-Qaeda leadership made deliberate decisions to avoid
attempting large-scale attacks in the United States and Europe
and establishing Taliban-like governments. If accessed
correctly this posture would prevent additional Western
military action against it and further a narrative that it was
weak.
To my second point, the al-Qaeda network is strong today
and al-Qaeda's decentralized approach has made it more
resilient. Al-Qaeda obfuscates its relationships with local
groups to better achieve its objectives.
It is strengthening in each of the theaters in which it is
active. Al-Qaeda prioritizes Syria as the primary struggle
against Western and Russian aggression. It has used the
conditions created by the Syrian civil war and the anti-ISIS
fight to establish deep sanctuary in the northwest and position
itself to expand further. Al-Qaeda is poised to reenter Iraq as
ISIS weakens.
It is reconstituting in Afghanistan in concert with the
Afghan Taliban. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is set to
strengthen further in the context of the Yemeni civil war.
Al-Shabaab in Somalia serves as a key node between the
Middle East and Africa for the al-Qaeda network, and it is
gaining ground. Al-Shabaab remains a regional threat,
particularly to Kenya.
Al-Qaeda reconsolidated in the Maghreb and Sahel after the
rise of ISIS. It remains embedded in the insurgencies, and it
is looking to reassert itself in the Indian subcontinent
through the Punjab. Rising sectarian attacks in India might
help drive support to al-Qaeda.
The senior leadership is no longer concentrated in
Afghanistan-Pakistan, nor is it synonymous with what the Obama
administration once dubbed al-Qaeda core.
Al-Qaeda's senior leadership is found today in Syria,
Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and beyond. The old leadership
continues to provide strategic guidance, Ayman al-Zawahiri
issues overall direction to the network, and leadership
attrition has compelled al-Qaeda to reveal a deeper bench than
we knew it was there before.
But a new generation of al-Qaeda is also rising. Osama bin
Laden's son, Hamza, issued his first statement in August 2015
threatening attacks against the West. It also appears to be
developing new leaders inside of Syria, though al-Qaeda is
minimizing its public face for the time being. Affiliate
leaders throughout the world will serve to amplify al-Qaeda's
echo chamber.
To my third point, trends favor al-Qaeda's future. Synergy
among global trends will increase support for the Salafi-jihadi
movement. Al-Qaeda seeks to capture this support. Rising
sectarianism, not just Sunni-Shia, but Muslim and non-Muslim,
will polarize populations.
Anti-Muslim Brotherhood policies pushed by Egyptian
President Sisi and Emirati Crown Prince bin Zayed will almost
certainly feed extremism rather than eliminate it. Al-Qaeda
seeks to capture these disenchanted with the non-violent route.
Al-Qaeda may continue to attack Russian targets for
Russia's role in Syria. It may begin attacks against the
Emirates because of the Emirati role in Yemen, and it may also
start to focus on Egypt.
We need to understand that al-Qaeda is prepared for the
weakening of ISIS. ISIS galvanized a global movement and
inspired a wave of fight-in-place attacks in the West,
something al-Qaeda never did.
But al-Qaeda seeks to recruit these individuals to its own
movement and to capture the remnants of ISIS. Warningly, the
voices of pro-al-Qaeda ideologues have been amplified as a tool
against ISIS to promote a more moderate group in al-Qaeda.
Al-Qaeda's evolution ensures that it will threaten the
United States long-term and emerge stronger from the chaos that
has enveloped the Muslim world. The American policy decision
that al-Qaeda is not a priority threat gives al-Qaeda time and
space to stockpile resources and plan truly devastating attacks
of multiple types against the United States.
It is near impossible to guess when al-Qaeda will resume
attacks against the United States. Our history shows that we
have gotten it utterly wrong every time before. It is not
sufficient just to defeat al-Qaeda and ISIS.
The Salafi-jihadi movement predates both groups and will
generate another transnational organization if they are
defeated. The United States must move beyond focusing on the
groups and instead seek to weaken and defeat the global Salafi-
jihadi movement. I thank the subcommittee for its attention.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Zimmerman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Katherine Zimmerman
July 13, 2017
Chairman King, Ranking Member Rice, and distinguished Members,
thank you for the opportunity to testify before the committee on the
persistent threat from al-Qaeda.
U.S. strategy is setting the stage for al-Qaeda to lead the Salafi-
jihadi movement again when that movement is the strongest it has ever
been globally. Al-Qaeda has adapted and evolved as America focused
myopically on retaking two cities from the Islamic State of Iraq and al
Sham (ISIS). Al-Qaeda has become more resilient and ready to exploit
our own strategic weaknesses. It seized the opportunity presented by
conflicts in the Muslim world to advance its strategic objectives. It
has acted deliberately below the thresholds that would set off alarms
in Washington. It embedded itself in local insurgencies from Mali to
Syria to Afghanistan that will serve as a source of strength for the
global organization. The rise of the ISIS galvanized the Salafi-jihadi
movement globally, which will continue to strengthen al-Qaeda long
after ISIS is gone. America's strategy to counter al-Qaeda has remained
relatively unchanged since 2001 even as the organization has adapted.
The United States does not even recognize any more the seriousness of
the threat al-Qaeda poses.
al-qaeda's role as the vanguard force
Al-Qaeda sees itself as the vanguard of the Salafi-jihadi movement.
It does not seek to establish a state in the short term, unlike ISIS.
It aims, rather, to provide strategic guidance and capabilities to the
network of individuals, groups, and organizations that subscribe to the
Salafi-jihadi ideology and form the true base of the movement.
Al-Qaeda's objectives remain to unify the umma, Muslim community,
in a struggle to destroy current Muslim societies and build in their
stead what al-Qaeda considers to be true Islamic polities and
eventually, a caliphate. Al-Qaeda prioritizes the Muslim world rather
than attacking the West. It works hard to teach its religion to the
masses, having learned through experience that too-rapid imposition of
its views will alienate the population. It compares Muslims today to
children, who must first learn right from wrong before they can be held
accountable. Al-Qaeda senior leadership directed attacks against the
United States and the West to compel them to retreat from the Muslim
world and end their support for state governments, which al-Qaeda
believed would pave the way for the success of popular revolutions in
the name of Islam. Attacks against the West were always subordinate to
the larger aims al-Qaeda pursues in the Muslim world itself.
Salafi-jihadi ideology shapes al-Qaeda's global strategy and
operations in predictable ways. It holds that Islam must be revived in
rigid allegory to the initial spread of the religion (See Figure 1).
That allegory contains three primary phases: Mecca I, in which Mohammad
began to receive the Qur'an from Allah but was threatened and
persecuted in a hostile community; Medina, during which he emigrated to
a more favorable location and built the base of the religion and its
core followers; and Mecca II, when he returned to his original
community, gained the ascendancy, and began to expand the faith broadly
and rapidly. Al-Qaeda assesses the Salafi-jihadi movement to be in the
Medina phase of defensive jihad and gathering strength through
governance and building military capabilities. (ISIS, by contrast,
argues that the movement is in the Mecca II phase.) Like the Prophet
Mohammed during this period, al-Qaeda uses mediation and arbitration as
a mechanism to generate support in local communities.
figure 1.--the phases of the prophet's life and al-qaeda's strategy
Source.--Author.
Divisions weaken the umma, thus al-Qaeda rejects state nationalism
and judging the purity of Muslims, especially when facing a common
enemy. Al-Qaeda seeks to eradicate the Nation as a primary form of
identity for Muslims because al-Qaeda saw nationalism as part of the
failure of the mujahideen in the 1990's in Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and
Egypt. Ayman al-Zawahiri stated:
``The cause of Sham is the cause of the entire umma. . . .The enemy
seeks to transform the Jihad in Sham from a cause for the Muslim umma
to an exclusively nationalist Syrian cause, then turn the nationalist
cause to an issue of specific regions and localities, and finally
reduce this to an issue of a few cities, villages, and
neighborhoods.''\1\
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\1\ SITE Intelligence Group, ``AQ Leader Zawahiri Declares Syrian
Jihad an Issue Concerning All Muslims, Calls to Reject Nationalist
Sentiment,'' April 23, 2017, https://news.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-
News/aq-leader-zawahiri-declares-syrian-jihad-an-issue-concerning-all-
muslims-calls-to-reject-nationalist-sentiment.html.
Al-Qaeda also rejects the division that ISIS introduced to the
Salafi-jihadi movement because it distracted Muslims from fighting a
shared, common enemy.
Zawahiri's September 2013 guidance identified a military line of
effort against the United States and others to weaken their support for
Muslim governments and a political line of effort to both form and
cultivate the vanguard force and mobilize the masses in the name of
Islam.\2\ Zawahiri gave explicit guidelines for operational activities
and legitimate targets, which local affiliates have reinforced.\3\
Specifically, Zawahiri called for al-Qaeda to support the revolutions
of ``the oppressed against the oppressors'' regardless of whether the
groups are Muslim and to teach the revolutionaries Islam. Al-Qaeda
affiliates all follow this guidance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ SITE Intelligence Group, ``Zawahiri Gives General Guidelines
for Jihad Regarding Military, Propaganda,'' September 13, 2013, https:/
/news.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-News/zawahiri-gives-general-
guidelines-for-jihad-regarding-military-propaganda.html.
\3\ Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, for example, released a
substantial document that provided a ``Code of Conduct'' for mujahideen
in the Indian subcontinent. See SITE Intelligence Group, ``AQIS
Publishes Its `Code of Conduct,' Declares U.S. Citizens and Interests
in Pakistan Its `Foremost Priority,' '' June 25, 2017, https://
ent.siteintelgroup.com/statements/aqis-publishes-its-code-of-conduct-
declares-u-s-citizens-and-interests-in-pakistan-its-foremost-
priority.html.
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Al-Qaeda has thus become less visible, less oppressive, and less
violent because its leaders have changed their approach, not because
the organization has become weaker. It has, on the contrary, grown much
stronger and in ways more dangerous than ever before.
the al-qaeda network today
Al-Qaeda deliberately ``localized'' to build a durable popular base
in key human terrain in the Muslim world. The conflicts that spiraled
out of control after the initial popular movements during the 2011 Arab
Spring did what al-Qaeda had never been able to do for itself: They
mobilized the Sunni populations against the state. Al-Qaeda seized the
opportunity and insinuated itself into the local insurgencies to hijack
and redirect them toward its own purposes. It intertwined its network
with the Salafi-jihadi base, which serves as a source of resilience and
strength for al-Qaeda. It eschewed directed attacks against Western
targets, assessing correctly that the absence of such attacks would
lead to the false narrative that it was weak and prevent additional
military action against its groups. Al-Qaeda is not in decline; it is
preparing to emerge from the shadows to carry forward the Salafi-jihadi
movement.
The conditions in the Muslim world empower al-Qaeda, ISIS, and the
Salafi-jihadi base. The collapse of five states since 2011--Iraq,
Syria, Yemen, Libya, and Mali--and the weakening of strong states such
as Egypt made Sunni populations vulnerable. Communities mobilized in
their own defense or as part of a popular insurgency. Al-Qaeda and the
Salafi-jihadi base support their efforts; have also filled governance
gaps, exacerbated by conflict; and have expanded into Sunni
communities. Rising sectarianism and the slow polarization of societies
from Africa to the India subcontinent created additional opportunities
for the Salafi-jihadi base to expand. Communities that had rejected
Salafi-jihadi ideology for decades now tolerate its presence as part of
a short-term calculus to survive.
The marbling of al-Qaeda in local movements sometimes creates the
appearance that local groups reject al-Qaeda as they break and reform
relations with it. However, the shifting and realignment within the
network is largely over organizational, rather than ideological,
differences. Normal personal power politics and operational-level
disagreements play a role in al-Qaeda's organizational relations, too.
These fractures must not be mistaken for overall weakness or
disintegration. Nor should the United States try to distinguish between
the globally-focused and locally-focused groups, as the Salafi-jihadi
ideology is inherently global in nature. The focus on the local
objectives advances the overall global objectives of the Salafi-jihadi
movement by design.
Counterargument: Al-Qaeda Is in Decline.--Serious and respectable
experts argue against the view outlined above. Daniel Byman, among
others, recently argued that al-Qaeda's strength has waned because of
its low operational pace, limited resources and popular support, and
backward slide in its own objectives.\4\ Yet he notes that even as al-
Qaeda declined, the Salafi-jihadi movement that it helped mobilize is
thriving. Byman based his assessment on the absence of a successful
mass-casualty attack in the West in the past 10 years and the focus of
the affiliates on local and regional objectives. He cited al-Qaeda
core's inability to attract recruits--now drawn to ISIS--and the core's
reliance on its affiliates for resources, rather than the reverse.
Byman further identified the rejection of al-Qaeda by popular clerics
as an indicator the group is failing. He noted, finally, that al-Qaeda
is in decline because the organization underestimated the effect that
the U.S. counterterrorism campaign and al-Qaeda's alienation from the
people had on the organization itself.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Daniel Byman, ``Judging al-Qaida's Record, Part 1: Is the
Organization in Decline?'' Lawfare blog, June 27, 2017, https://
lawfareblog.com/judging-al-qaedas-record-part-i-organization-decline.
\5\ Daniel Byman, ``Judging al-Qaida's Record, Part II: Why has al-
Qaida Declined?'' Lawfare blog, June 28, 2017, https://lawfareblog.com/
judging-al-qaedas-record-part-ii-why-has-al-qaeda-declined.
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Many analysts have interpreted al-Qaeda's localization, its
marbling in the local Salafi-jihadi base, as a strategic error that
will weaken the al-Qaeda organization in the long term. Charles Lister,
for example, cited al-Qaeda's dissolution of its affiliate in Syria,
Jabhat al-Nusra, and the concessions al-Qaeda leaders have made in
Syria to a local support base as constraints on al-Qaeda's activities
and an indicator that al-Qaeda will be absorbed into the local fight.
Lister argued that the shifts in Syria move what was al-Qaeda's
affiliate further outside of the al-Qaeda senior leadership's sphere,
breaking up what was once a global network.\6\ Al-Qaeda's deliberate
localization risks its ability to achieve its long-term objectives in
this view, as al-Qaeda groups compromise on ideology and strategy to
court local support. Al-Qaeda global will become a diluted version of
itself over time.
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\6\ See for example, Charles Lister, ``Al-Qaeda's Turning Against
Its Syrian Affiliate,'' Middle East Institute, May 18, 2017, http://
www.mei.edu/content/article/al-qaeda-s-turning-against-its-syrian-
affiliate.
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Al-Qaeda may indeed be in decline, but the evidence strongly
suggests otherwise. Al-Qaeda's leadership statements, its stated
objectives and strategy to achieve these objectives, and its
adaptations to new conditions lead to a different assessment.
Al-Qaeda Rising.--Al-Qaeda benefits from the rise of ISIS and the
conflicts that have swept through the Muslim world. It is positioned
itself across the Muslim world to recapture the leadership of the
Salafi-jihadi movement as pressure increases on ISIS. Al-Qaeda's shift
toward decentralized operations and the dispersal of its network built
resilience within the organization and adapted to pressures from U.S.-
led counterterrorism actions.\7\ It obfuscates is relationships with
the Salafi-jihadi base to better achieve local objectives and to
confound analysts and policymakers. Al-Qaeda gained local popular
support previously denied to it by the very population it sought to
influence and now governs communities by proxy to begin to restructure
society in pursuit of its long-term objectives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Katherine Zimmerman, ``The al-Qaeda Network: A New Framework
for Defining the Enemy,'' AEI's Critical Threats Project, September 10,
2013, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/the-al-qaeda-network-a-
new-framework-for-defining-the-enemy.
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ISIS has strengthened al-Qaeda. It has galvanized the global
Salafi-jihadi movement and drawn the West's attention. It has inspired
a wave of would-be recruits to conduct fight-in-place attacks in the
West, something al-Qaeda was never able to do. Competition between ISIS
and al-Qaeda is limited to the top echelons of the movement: Groups on
the ground deconflict and sometimes even cooperate. Should ISIS's
global network collapse, al-Qaeda will be able to capture the remnants
and incorporate ISIS's capabilities into its own organization. Al-Qaeda
casts itself as more moderate than ISIS, gaining acceptance in
populations that seek to defend themselves from ISIS. Finally, the
West's prioritization of the anti-ISIS fight and the spread of civil
wars and conflict in Muslim States gave al-Qaeda the freedom of
operation to focus on a strategic objective: The transformation of
Muslim societies.
Al-Qaeda's ``rebranding'' in the post-Arab Spring environment--the
softening of its image and focus on local populations--is intended to
buy support from the population. The shift signaled an inflection in
al-Qaeda's population-centric approach in which it began to use the
Salafi-jihadi base as a means to entrench itself in local contexts.
Zawahiri reinforced this approach when he took over the movement from
Osama bin Laden. Zawahiri experienced failure in Egypt in the 1990's as
the population rejected his Egyptian Islamic Jihad group completely.
This failure shapes Zawahiri's decision making. He is sensitive to the
requirement of gaining popular acceptance and thus continuously forbids
actions that could isolate al-Qaeda from the people. He recently
ordered groups not to attack even legitimate targets if the masses
would not understand the purpose of the action.\8\ Al-Qaeda seeks to
change the very fabric of Muslim society and cannot do so from a
position of isolation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ SITE Intelligence Group, ``AQIS Publishes Its `Code of
Conduct,' Declares U.S. Citizens and Interests in Pakistan Its
`Foremost Priority.' ''
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Al-Qaeda is aggressively working through the Salafi-jihadi base to
transform Sunni communities so that they willingly accept its ideology.
The spread of violence and collapse of order imperils communities.
Some, such as those in Syria, are under direct threat. These
communities now accept the presence of al-Qaeda and the Salafi-jihadi
base because their presence delivers much-needed assistance so that the
community can survive. Al-Qaeda insinuates itself indirectly through
the partners and proxies in the Salafi-jihadi base that focus on
meeting the needs of the community. Communities receive not only basic
assistance but also a sermon on Islam. The intent is to spread the
Salafi-jihadi ideology alongside good works. Al-Qaeda embeds itself
into local insurgencies by providing much-needed capabilities,
resources, or planning and then hijacks the insurgency toward its own
purpose. Al-Qaeda fills governance gaps in such a way as to deliver its
message alongside basic services. Al-Qaeda channels resources through
Salafi charities and organizations and elevates local Salafis to
positions of authority in communities to begin to transform the
governance system into one that meets al-Qaeda's requirements under
shari'a.
The impression of al-Qaeda's weakness is a deliberate pose. Senior
al-Qaeda leadership correctly assessed that portraying global
dissolution and publicly embracing local fights would create confusion
in Western minds about the threat al-Qaeda poses. The group seeks to
remain below the level of U.S. and Western policy redlines to pursue
its strategic objectives in the Muslim world without attracting Western
responses. Al-Qaeda has thus for the most part avoided attempting
large-scale attacks in the United States and Europe and establishing
Taliban-like governments. Al-Qaeda has messaged that it no longer
threatens the West, that it lacked centralized leadership, and that the
rise of ISIS crippled it.\9\ Al-Qaeda's prioritization of local fights
also exploits the reluctance in Western governments toward intervening
in local conflicts.
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\9\ Two top al-Qaeda ideologues, Abu Muhammad al Maqdisi and Abu
Qatada, discussed the weakening of al-Qaeda in a 2015 interview with
the Guardian. Shiv Malik et al., ``How ISIS Crippled al-Qaida,''
Guardian, June 10, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/10/
how-isis-crippled-al-qaida.
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Al-Qaeda today.--Al-Qaeda currently seeks to incite the umma to
undertake a global jihad to defend Muslims. Propaganda and media
material focuses on the arguments to fight Western and Russian
aggression against Muslims and on the need to unify against common
enemies. It tailors its message toward target audiences in Muslim lands
that are threatened and in the West. Al-Qaeda encourages those in
Muslims lands to support the mujahideen fighting in their defense by
whatever means possible. It tells Muslims in the West to mobilize and
conduct small-scale attacks against Jews, Americans, and NATO allies,
Russians, and those denigrating Islam. The group that conducted the
recent terrorist attack in St. Petersburg, Russia, claimed to have done
so on al-Qaeda's orders.
Al-Qaeda senior leadership (AQSL) no longer concentrates in the
Afghanistan-Pakistan theater. Neither is it any longer synonymous with
what the Obama administration dubbed ``al-Qaeda core''--the al-Qaeda
node in Afghanistan-Pakistan. This shift began in the early 2010's.
AQSL is now dispersed throughout al-Qaeda's network with strong
concentrations in Syria (primarily al-Qaeda's network that had been
based in Iran), Yemen, and Afghanistan-Pakistan. AQSL is comprised of
the senior leaders of al-Qaeda affiliates and veteran operatives,
including those who gained their freedom from prison during the Arab
Spring uprisings. The dispersion of the AQSL cadre creates certain
operational challenges, such as rapid coordination, but also
complicates Western efforts to eliminate the group.
Affiliate leadership still coordinates for strategic messaging. The
joint releases by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al-Qaeda
in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) are the strongest points of coordination.
These groups issued a joint statement eulogizing Omar Abdul Rahman (the
Blind Sheikh) 1 day after reports of his death surfaced and one
eulogizing Abu Khayr al Masri 4 days after his death. They may have
secure communications to coordinate these joint statements rapidly, or
the groups may emplace members with one another to approve such joint
statements. The echo of the same themes across affiliate leadership
statements during the same period is another sign of coordination.
Common talking points on ISIS and now on the global jihad and
authorized activities are the primary examples of this coordination.
Al-Qaeda could again take the helm of the Salafi-jihadi movement.
The core al-Qaeda leaders and groups remained part of the al-Qaeda
network and have rejected ISIS. The entrenchment of its affiliates into
local dynamics better positions al-Qaeda to capture the remnants of
ISIS as the global anti-ISIS coalition degrades it. Al-Qaeda is
strengthening in each of the theaters in which it is active.
Iraq and al Sham (Syria and Lebanon).--Al-Qaeda prioritizes the
Syrian theater as the primary struggle against Western and Russian
aggression. AQSL emphasizes the importance of the Syrian fight for all
Muslims. Senior al-Qaeda members operate in Syria to provide overall
strategic guidance to al-Qaeda's Syrian network. The United States
first identified these individuals as the ``Khorasan group'' and sought
to eliminate the cell.\10\ Al-Qaeda operatives who had been in Iran
began to base in Syria in 2013. Al-Qaeda secured the release of at
least five senior operatives in a prisoner swap with Iran for an
Iranian diplomat it captured in Yemen.\11\ These operatives then
traveled to Syria, among them al-Qaeda's chief of military operations,
Saif al Adel, and the late deputy leader Abu Khayr al Masri.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Katherine Zimmerman, ``The Khorasan Group: Syria's al-Qaeda
Threat,'' AEI's Critical Threats Project, September 23, 2014, https://
www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/the-khorasan-group-syrias-al-qaeda-
threat.
\11\ Iran reported that an Iranian operation freed its diplomat in
Yemen in March 2015. Details emerged in September 2015 of the swap. See
BBC, ``Iranian `Operation' in Yemen Freed Kidnapped Diplomat,'' March
5, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-31744613; and Adam
Goldman, ``Top al-Qaeda Operatives Freed in Prisoner Swap with Iran,''
Washington Post, September 18, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/top-al-qaeda-operatives-freed-in-prisoner-swap-
with-iran/2015/09/18/02bc58e2-5e0c-11e5-9757e4927-3f05f65_story.html.
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Al-Qaeda is strongest in Syria, where it has used the conditions
created by the Syrian civil war and Operation Inherent Resolve against
ISIS to establish deep sanctuary in the northwest and position itself
to expand farther into the Syrian theater. Al-Qaeda is consolidating
control over Idlib province, which it likely will retain uncontested in
the near term. Through Jabhat al-Nusra and Salafi-jihadi organizations
such as Ahrar al Sham, al-Qaeda co-opted the majority of Syria's
mainstream opposition into the Salafi-jihadi ranks, establishing itself
as the dominant force within the northern Syria's opposition.\12\ Al-
Qaeda has set conditions for the future establishment of an Islamic
emirate--not necessarily under al-Qaeda's name--that will secure al-
Qaeda's objective to build an Islamic polity in Syria. Ayman al-
Zawahiri explicitly referenced al-Qaeda's work toward establishing an
Islamic emirate in Syria in May 2016.\13\
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\12\ Jennifer Cafarella, Nicholas A. Heras, and Genevieve
Casagrande, ``Al-Qaeda is Gaining Strength in Syria,'' Foreign Policy,
September 1, 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/01/al-qaeda-is-
gaining-strength-in-syria/.
\13\ SITE Intelligence Group, ``Zawahiri Calls Fighters' Unity in
Syria a Matter of `Life and Death' in Audio,'' May 8, 2016, https://
news.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-News/zawahiri-calls-fighters-unity-in-
syria-a-matter-of-life-and-death-in-audio.html.
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The Syrian al-Qaeda network is one of the best-resourced nodes in
al-Qaeda because of Syria's primacy in the global theaters for jihad.
Syria remains a top destination for al-Qaeda's foreign-fighter flow,
creating a large foreign recruitment base. Al-Qaeda in Syria suffered
some financial hits because of its loss of control over oil fields, but
these losses will not likely affect its operations.\14\ It funnels
resources from groups in its network that receive external support
(especially from Qatar and Turkey), it receives donations from
individuals, conducts kidnappings for ransom, and also generates
resources through taxation and commercial enterprise.
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\14\ For a detailed account on financing into Syria, see Yaya J.
Fanusi and Alex Entz, ``Al-Qaeda's Branch in Syria: Financial
Assessment,'' Foundation for the Defense of Democracy, June 2017,
http://www.defenddemocracy.org/content/uploads/documents/CSIF_TFBB-
_AQIS.pdf.
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Zawahiri continues to see Iraq and al Sham as a single theater for
al-Qaeda and desires the al-Qaeda organization to reenter Iraq. He
argued for the treatment of Iraq and al Sham as a single theater during
the break with ISIS and continued to direct al-Qaeda support to the
Sunni in Iraq. Zawahiri called for Syrian mujahideen to reach out in
support of the Iraqi Sunni in an August 2016 statement:
``As for our brothers the heroes of Islam from the mujahideen of Sham,
I urge them to help their brothers in Iraq to reorganize themselves,
for their battle is one, and Sham is an extension of Iraq, and Iraq is
the bedrock of Sham.''\15\
\15\ SITE Intelligence Group, ``Zawahiri Urges Sunnis in Iraq to
Mount Long-Term Guerrilla War Against `New Safavid-Crusader
Occupation,' '' August 25, 2016.
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Al-Qaeda will reenter Iraq seeking to lead a Sunni insurgency as
ISIS weakens.
Afghanistan.--Al-Qaeda is reconstituting in Afghanistan in concert
with the Afghan Taliban, which provides sanctuary to al-Qaeda. AQSL,
such as Ayman al-Zawahiri and Hamza bin Laden, operates from the
Afghanistan-Pakistan region. Retaining al-Qaeda's sanctuary in
Afghanistan is a secondary but important effort for the global
organization because the victory against the Soviets in Afghanistan
remains al-Qaeda's crown jewel, proving that the mujahideen can defeat
a superpower. Al-Qaeda never fully lost its sanctuary in Pakistan and
used this base to project forward into Afghanistan again as the United
States drew down militarily.\16\ By 2015, al-Qaeda was running large
training camps inside Afghanistan.\17\ The United States began revising
its assessments of al-Qaeda's strength in Afghanistan based on the
discovery of these training camps.\18\ The United States killed senior
al-Qaeda leaders operating in Afghanistan in an October 2016 air
strike, their presence a telling indicator that al-Qaeda had returned
to the country.\19\
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\16\ Lauren McNally and Marvin G. Weinbaum, ``A Resilient al-Qaeda
in Afghanistan and Pakistan,'' Middle East Institute, August 2016,
http://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/publications/
PF18_Weinbaum_AQinAFPAK_web_1.pdf.
\17\ Bill Roggio, ``Afghanistan's Terrorist Resurgence: Al-Qaeda,
ISIS, and Beyond,'' testimony prepared for the House Foreign Affairs
Committee, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade,
April 27, 2017, http://www.longwarjournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/
04/Cover_Roggio-Afghanistan-testimony-April-2017-final-1.pdf.
\18\ According to remarks by Major General Jeff Buchanan, deputy
chief of staff for the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan in April
2016. Nick Paton Walsh, ``Al-Qaeda `Very Active' in Afghanistan: U.S.
Commander,'' CNN, April 13, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2016/04/13/
middleeast/afghanistan-al-qaeda/index.html.
\19\ US Department of Defense, ``Statement by Pentagon Press
Secretary Peter Cook on Strikes Against al-Qaida leaders in
Afghanistan,'' press release, December 19, 2016, https://
www.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-Release-View/Article/1033929/
statement-by-pentagon-press-secretary-peter-cook-on-strikes-against-al-
qaida-le/.
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Yemen.--Yemen serves as a critical safe haven to support al-Qaeda's
global operations and a cadre of senior leaders, and as the battlefield
for the religiously significant Arabian Peninsula. AQAP remains one of
al-Qaeda's premier nodes and is set to strengthen further in the
context of Yemen's civil war. AQAP facilitates global al-Qaeda
operations. AQAP-trained bombmakers went to Syria and Libya in 2011 and
2012. AQAP almost certainly provided the equipment or the expertise for
al-Shabaab's 2016 laptop bomb.\20\ Al-Qaeda leaders in Yemen, including
long-time veterans, provide strategic guidance alongside senior leaders
in Afghanistan-Pakistan to the global movement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Katherine Zimmerman, ``Did al Shabaab Get a Bomb on Plane? Or
Not?'' AEIdeas, February 5, 2016, http://www.aei.org/publication/did-
al-shabaab-get-a-bomb-on-a-plane-or-not/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The collapse of Yemen into civil war presented al-Qaeda with a
second chance to embed itself in the population.\21\ Al-Qaeda's
experiment with governance in 2011 failed after the group lost the
support of the population in which it was operating. It learned from
its errors. It used proxy groups drawn from the local population to
provide security and governance after that debacle, which ensured a
local face on al-Qaeda's efforts. These groups seized control of and
administered Yemen's third-largest port city for a year, making nearly
$2 million per day, and the populated areas that AQAP had controlled in
2011.\22\ An Emirati-led counterterrorism operation ended AQAP's
control of terrain, but AQAP's strength comes from its relationship
with the mobilized Sunni population in Yemen, not the land.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Katherine Zimmerman, ``AQAP: A Resurgent Threat,'' CTC
Sentinel, September 11, 2015, https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/aqap-a-
resurgent-threat.
\22\ Katherine Zimmerman, ``AQAP Expanding Behind Yemen's
Frontlines,'' AEI's Critical Threats Project, February 17, 2016,
https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/aqap-expanding-behind-yemens-
frontlines; and Noah Browning, Jonathan Saul, and Mohammed Ghobari,
``Al-Qaeda Still Reaping Oil Profits in Yemen Despite Battlefield
Reverses,'' Reuters, May 27, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
yemen-security-smuggling-idUSKCN0YI0Q2.
\23\ Katherine Zimmerman, ``AQAP Post-Arab Spring and the Islamic
State,'' in How al-Qaeda Survived Drones, Uprisings, and the Islamic
State, edited by Aaron Y. Zelin, Washington Institute, June 2017,
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/how-al-qaeda-
survived-drones-uprisings-and-the-islamic-state.
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East Africa.--Al-Qaeda affiliate al-Shabaab serves as a key link
between the Middle East and Africa for the al-Qaeda network and is
gaining ground in Somalia.\24\ Al-Shabaab still administers parts of
south-central Somalia and generates funding through taxation and
control over certain trade.\25\ It has increasingly projected force
back into Mogadishu, Somalia's capital, and into northern Kenya. Al-
Shabaab has also conducted multiple high-profile raids on military
bases in Somalia that decimated military units and restocked al-
Shabaab's military equipment. Its attraction is not its attacks against
the government or African Union peacekeeping forces, but rather its
competitive shadow government that appeals to disenfranchised
clans,\26\ which is how al-Shabaab expanded in Somalia originally. Al-
Shabaab could broaden its support base through its limited provision of
humanitarian aid as famine looms in Somalia.\27\ It seeks to influence
the Kenyan electorate and stoke tensions ahead of the August 2017
elections, which may result in political unrest in the country.
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\24\ Katherine Zimmerman, Jacqulyn Meyer Kantack, and Colin Lahiff,
``U.S. Counterterrorism Objectives in Somalia: Is Mission Failure
Likely,'' AEI's Critical Threats Project, March 1, 2017, https://
www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/us-counterterrorism-objectives-in-
somalia-is-mission-failure-likely.
\25\ Yaya J. Fanusi and Alex Entz, ``Al-Shabaab: Financial
Assessment,'' Foundation for Defense of Democracy, June 23, 2017,
http://www.defenddemocracy.org/content/uploads/documents/CSIF_TFBB_Al-
Shabaab_v05_web.pdf.
\26\ Tricia Bacon, ``This is Why al Shabaab Won't Be Going Away
Anytime Soon,'' Washington Post, July 6, 2017, https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/07/06/this-is-why-al-
shabaab-wont-be-going-away-any-time-soon/.
\27\ Jordan Indermeuhle, ``Al Shabaab's Humanitarian Assistance,''
AEI's Critical Threats Project, April 24, 2017, https://
www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/al-shabaabs-humanitarian-response.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sahel.--Al-Qaeda's network in the Sahel now operates under the name
Jama'a Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM), merging various Salafi-
jihadi groups that had been cooperating with al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda
targeted key human terrain in the Sahel in order to expand its base.
Iyad ag Ghali, JNIM's leader, not only heads al-Qaeda's associated
group in the Sahel, but is also a key smuggler and leader within the
Ifoghas Tuareg. Al-Qaeda embedded first within the 2012 Tuareg
insurgency in Mali and then helped stoke a Fulani insurgency in central
Mali.\28\ Its recruitment of Fulanis likely enabled al-Qaeda's attacks
against Western targets in Burkina Faso and the Ivory Coast. Salafi-
jihadi groups are reconstituting in northern Mali after the 2013 French
intervention. JNIM coordinates closely with AQIM and could be
subordinated to the al-Qaeda affiliate. A breakaway faction pledged to
ISIS in the Sahara, but its presence has not affected al-Qaeda's
activities. It is not clear whether al-Qaeda will restore relations
with Boko Haram, which has split with both factions cleaving to ISIS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ Alix Halloran and Katherine Zimmerman, ``Warning from the
Sahel: al-Qaeda's Resurgent Threat,'' AEI's Critical Threats Project,
September 1, 2016, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/warning-
from-the-sahel-al-qaedas-resurgent-threat.
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Maghreb.--ISIS and al-Qaeda compete for the loyalty of North
African groups. Al-Qaeda reunified in North Africa after the split with
ISIS, consolidating multiple splinter groups that had left AQIM since
2011 to avoid division in its ranks. Al-Qaeda aims to preserve its
sanctuaries and continue to capture foreign fight flows from the
region. These include positions in Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya. It is
not yet clear what al-Qaeda's play is with its dissolution of Ansar al
Sharia in Libya, but it may be a move similar to Jabhat al-Nusra's
dissolution in Syria that will permit al-Qaeda personnel to remain
accepted by the local populations. Al-Qaeda will almost certainly
benefit from Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el Sisi's crackdown on
political and violent Islamists in Egypt and in Libya. AQIM continues
to generate resources through smuggling and kidnappings for ransom that
it shares with JNIM and other members of the Salafi-jihadi base.
Indian Subcontinent.--The al-Qaeda presence in the Indian
subcontinent remains weak after Ayman al-Zawahiri announced the launch
of a new affiliate in September 2014.\29\ Al-Qaeda divides the
Pakistani theater by ethnic group. The Pashtun are part of its Khorasan
theater, which includes Afghanistan and Iran, and the Punjab are under
al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), which works through the
Indian Punjab and Bangladesh. A recent surge in propaganda from AQIS
leadership may indicate an attempt to revive the group.\30\
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\29\ Anurag Chandran, ``Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent: Almost
Forgotten,'' AEI's Critical Threats Project, September 3, 2015, https:/
/www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/al-qaeda-in-the-indian-subcontinent-
almost-forgotten.
\30\ Critical Threats Project, ``Threat Update,'' July 6, 2017,
https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/threat-update/update-and-
assessment-july-6-2017.
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al-qaeda's next generation
U.S. counterterrorism actions have significantly degraded the al-
Qaeda leadership cadre over the years. But targeted killing has only
had a short-term effect on the global organization. Al-Qaeda had a much
deeper bench than assumed in 2001 when the high-value targeting began
and has been able to generate a next generation of leaders who are
rising to the fore today. Al-Qaeda's ideology and the Salafi-jihadi
ideology provided the group's doctrine and strategy, which is exogenous
to any single individual.
The old generation continues to provide strategic guidance to the
Salafi-jihadi movement. The voices of pro-al-Qaeda ideologues, in fact,
have been amplified as a tool against ISIS. Abu Qatada and Abu Muhammad
al Maqdisi, for example, are active on the global stage to condemn
ISIS, but in the process, justify support for al-Qaeda's methods (even
as they portray al-Qaeda as weak). Ayman al-Zawahiri, whom many
dismissed as irrelevant and uncharismatic, still issues guidance to his
subordinates and addresses those living in Muslim lands to call them to
join the jihad. Operational tensions between field commanders and the
headquarters persist today, especially in Syria, as they did in the
2000's in Iraq. Zawahiri likewise might be elevating his former network
from his days leading the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Less visible but
still active is a cadre of senior leaders based in Syria and
Afghanistan-Pakistan such as Saif al Adel and others. Mokhtar
Belmokhtar, if he is still alive, is coordinating operations in the
Sahel.
Attrition at the leadership level compelled al-Qaeda to unmask
long-standing senior operatives who could speak with legitimacy on a
global platform. AQAP, which had lost its leader, deputy leader, and
religious officials in a year, released a video showcasing the depth of
its bench in Yemen in December 2015. Sheikh Ibrahim al Banna, who
served as AQAP's security chief, appeared in the video after keeping a
low profile because he was reported to have been killed in 2010. Al
Banna earned a degree from al Azhar University, giving him religious
credentials that add authority to his messages to all Muslim to embrace
jihad. Another individual in the video was Ibrahim al Qosi, a former
Guantanamo detainee released to Sudan who claimed to have been
operating from Yemen since December 2014. Al-Qaeda continues to
leverage individuals who had returned to the battlefield from
Guantanamo as a badge of honor.
A new generation of al-Qaeda is rising. Osama bin Laden had been
cultivating his son, Hamza, for years before his death. Al-Qaeda's al
Sahab media released a message from Hamza bin Laden for the first time
in August 2015.\31\ Hamza called for lone-wolf attacks in the West. His
continued focus on inciting attacks by Muslims living in the West,
alongside criticism of the Saudi Kingdom, seems to indicate that Hamza
is taking on his father's mantle. Al-Qaeda operatives released from
prison in the Arab Spring and after, such as Khaled Batarfi in Yemen,
have also taken an active role at a senior level. Zawahiri, likewise,
appears to be developing new leaders. Syrian al-Qaeda leader Abu
Muhammad al Julani\32\ and the senior operatives now heading Hay'at
Tahrir al Sham and Ahrar al Sham, may be new operational leaders whom
Zawahiri could elevate if need be. It seems, for the time being, that
Zawahiri is minimizing al-Qaeda's visible presence in Syria. Likewise,
affiliate leaders Ahmed Umar (Abu Ubaidah) of al Shabaab and Asim Umar
of AQIS will serve to amplify the al-Qaeda echo chamber.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ SITE Intelligence Group, ``Hamza bin Laden, Son of Usama,
Calls for Lone-Wolf Attacks in the West,'' August 14, 2015.
\32\ Jennifer Cafarella, ``The Threat of New al-Qaeda Leadership:
The Case of Syria's Abu Mohammed al-Joulani,'' Institute for the Study
of War, June 30, 2015.
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looking forward: al-qaeda's future threat
The United States risks strategic surprise with al-Qaeda. Nothing
indicates that al-Qaeda as a global organization has altered its long-
term objectives nor changed its position on how to achieve these
objectives. Al-Qaeda's entrenchment into local conflicts is dangerous
for the United States because al-Qaeda seeks to alter Muslim
communities and unify them under it in its violent struggle for Islam.
Global trends are also moving in al-Qaeda's favor such that it will
likely benefit from increasing sectarianism and polarization in the
Muslim world and even in the West. Al-Qaeda could reassume its position
as the vanguard force of a much-empowered Salafi-jihadi movement as
pressure increases on ISIS.
Al-Qaeda is almost certainly refining and improving its external
attack capabilities to be prepared to deploy them at a future date.
Ibrahim al Asiri, al-Qaeda's innovative bombmaker, remains at large and
has already trained others in his tradecraft. Al-Qaeda's external
attack capabilities are degraded because of United States and partnered
counterterrorism actions, but they have not been destroyed. The 2017
Worldwide Threats Assessments from Director of National Intelligence
Daniel Coats assesses that al-Qaeda still intends to conduct attacks
against the United States and the West, although the group's capability
to do so from the Afghanistan-Pakistan region has been degraded.\33\
However, al-Qaeda's affiliates in Syria and Yemen ``have preserved the
resources, manpower, safe haven, local influence, and operational
capabilities to continue to pose a threat,'' and al-Shabaab in Somalia
has the ``operational capabilities to pose a real threat to the
region.'' Al-Qaeda may continue to attack Russian targets for Russia's
role in Syria, may begin attacks against Emirati targets for the United
Arab Emirates' role in Yemen, and may also focus on Egypt.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ Daniel R. Coats, ``Worldwide Threat Assessment of the
Intelligence Community,'' Statement for the record before the U.S.
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, May 11, 2017, https://
www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/os-coats-
051117.pdf.
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Synergy among global trends will increase support for the Salafi-
jihadi movement overall, which al-Qaeda seeks to capture. Rising
sectarianism, not just between Sunni and Shi'a, but between Muslims and
non-Muslims, will polarize populations. Of concern are the reflections
today in places such as India, where far-right Hindu groups are
attacking Muslims for eating cow. Intercommunal sectarian violence
serves to bolster support for Salafi-jihadi groups. Closing political
space to Islamists and persecution of Salafis in the Muslim world will
also drive some of these individuals and factions toward violence to
achieve their aims or defend themselves. Al-Qaeda seeks to capture
those disenchanted with the nonviolent route, especially in Egypt,
Libya, and Yemen. The anti-Muslim Brotherhood policies pushed by
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el Sisi and Emirati Crown Prince
Mohammed bin Zayed will almost certainly feed extremism rather than
eliminate it.
Al-Qaeda is prepared for the weakening of ISIS. It has the position
inside Syria to expand into terrain liberated from ISIS, some of which
al-Qaeda had occupied before ISIS. Populations that had lived under
ISIS will be less likely to reject al-Qaeda's ideology, although both
are a far cry from mainstream Islam. The mass mobilization of Muslims
in the West will continue beyond the defeat of ISIS in Iraq and Syria.
Hamza bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders seek to recruit these
mobilized individuals under al-Qaeda's leadership.
Al-Qaeda's evolution and adaptation to conditions ensures that it
will threaten the United States long-term and emerge stronger from the
chaos that has enveloped the Muslim world. It is poised to take over
the reins of the Salafi-jihadi movement. Yet, it is not sufficient just
to defeat al-Qaeda and ISIS. The Salafi-jihadi movement predates both
groups and will generate another transnational organization if they are
defeated. Instead, the United States must move beyond focusing on the
groups and instead seek to weaken and defeat the global Salafi-jihadi
movement.
Mr. King. Thank you very much for your testimony.
Our second witnesses is Ms. Jennifer Cafarella. Ms.
Cafarella is the lead intelligence planner for the Institute
for the Study of War where she is responsible for shaping and
overseeing the development of ISW's plans and recommendations
on how to achieve U.S. objectives against enemies and
advisories and in conflict zones. She has focused on terror
groups in Syria and in the region, including al-Qaeda
affiliates.
Ms. Cafarella, thank you for being here today, and you are
recognized.
STATEMENT OF JENNIFER CAFARELLA, LEAD INTELLIGENCE PLANNER,
INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR
Ms. Cafarella. Chairman King, Ranking Member Rice, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you for
inviting me today. I am honored for the opportunity to testify
on a critical National security issue facing our Nation.
Despite efforts made thus far, America still does not
understand its enemy. The United States continues to fall
victim to strategic surprise at the hands of Sunni jihadist
groups.
The resurgence of ISIS was clear by at least mid-2013, but
the United States did not act until ISIS had seized Iraq's
second-largest city, beheaded Americans, launched a genocide
against an Iraqi minority and launched a blitz defensive that
threatened the survival of Baghdad.
The United States is now making the same mistake with al-
Qaeda, which is building armies in failed states while the
world focuses on ISIS. America's consistent inability to
identify and neutralize the threat as it emerges reflect a
failure to understand the nature of this enemy and the
requirements to defeat it.
Al-Qaeda and ISIS are elite military organizations pursuing
a religious war in defense of Sunni Muslim communities, which
they perceive to be under existential threat.
Their goals are the same: To restore what they believe to
be correct Islamic rule by tearing down the existing state
system, expelling external actors from the Muslim world, and
establishing Islamic governance in accordance with a
fundamentalist interpretation of the Quran. Both groups intend
to destroy the United States and the Western way of life.
Al-Qaeda differs from ISIS only on the practicalities of
how to pursue these goals. ISIS' strategy is one of massive and
sustained confrontation with the West that it calculates will
break America's will to fight, while activating Sunni Muslim
communities to join ISIS' war.
Al-Qaeda is pursuing long-term advantage, rather than
short-term wins. It is dedicating most of its efforts to
identifying and supporting local causes within vulnerable or
victimized Sunni Muslim communities in order to develop the
legitimacy, dependence, and trust that will allow it to
transform those communities over time into adherence of al-
Qaeda's ideology and supporters of its global religious war.
Its main effort is in Syria. Its initial reception in Syria
was largely that of a necessary evil. Syrians exploited al-
Qaeda's willingness to contribute to the war against the Assad
regime even though most disagreed with al-Qaeda's vision.
Al-Qaeda is molding the opposition with a combination of
infiltration, negotiated mergers, and discrete attacks against
moderate rebel groups. Al-Qaeda has thus far attacked and
destroyed four moderate U.S.-backed groups in northern Syria
and co-opted at least four more.
Al-Qaeda's contribution to the anti-Assad war effort
ensures that it will not face meaningful blowback for these
actions. Al-Qaeda's rise in Syria is in part a direct outcome
of the strategy of Bashar al Assad and his external backers,
Iran and Russia.
Assad has waged a campaign of deliberate slaughter against
the elements of the opposition that were willing to negotiate
with him, including chemical weapons, intentional targeting of
civilian infrastructure, and mass executions of political
prisoners.
His aim was to preclude a Western intervention by
eliminating any moderate opposition force that the United
States could reasonably support. His slogan was ``Assad, or we
burn the country,'' and that is exactly what he has done.
Al-Qaeda's rise has been quickest in northwestern Syria,
where the military campaign of the Assad regime and its
external backers has focused since Russia's intervention in
late 2015. The brutal siege and bombardment of opposition-held
neighborhoods of Aleppo in 2016, helped al-Qaeda finalize its
consolidation of power in northwestern Syria.
Al-Qaeda is now shifting its main effort to Daraa province
on the Israeli and Jordanian borders in order to replicate its
success in the north. Al-Qaeda's efforts make it a more, not
less, dangerous enemy to the United States.
Al-Qaeda is still developing external attack capability
from its safe havens. Al-Qaeda has deprioritized executing an
attack in order to avoid triggering an American response at
this time, but it is still preparing capability for the future.
It is innovating explosives, cultivating its own foreign
fighter population, and likely quietly developing its own
networks in Europe. Al-Qaeda's future global phase may be even
more effective than ISIS' current global campaign if al-Qaeda
manages to acquire popular support inside of Syria for that
world war.
America's current strategy is setting conditions that favor
al-Qaeda. The United States has taken no meaningful action to
contain al-Qaeda or slow its growth in Syria, aside from a
handful of airstrikes against leaders which have had little
effect on the organization's overall strength.
The United States has been ceding regional power to Iran
and Russia in order to focus on fighting ISIS, causing many
Syrians to perceive us to be de facto in support of Bashar al
Assad's war effort. It is not an unfair conclusion to make.
This perception lends legitimacy to al-Qaeda's narrative
that it and it alone is the source of protection for Syria's
rebelling population. Destroying al-Qaeda is necessary to
protect the American homeland, but al-Qaeda's local roots may
make that fight even harder than our current fight against
ISIS.
We at the Institute for the Study of War tested over 20
possible American ways forward in Syria, most of which failed
because they either strengthened or failed meaningfully to
weaken al-Qaeda's strength in Syria.
Al-Qaeda's core source of strength is a connection to the
rebelling population. We will not destroy al-Qaeda or protect
the American homeland until or unless we execute a counter-
Assad strategy in Syria that begins to address the core reasons
for this war to begin with and al-Qaeda's rise within it. I
thank the subcommittee for its attention.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Cafarella follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jennifer Cafarella
July 13, 2017
Chairman King, Ranking Member Rice, and distinguished Members of
this subcommittee, thank you for inviting me today. I am honored for
the opportunity to testify on a critical National security issue facing
our Nation.
Sixteen years after the September 11 attack, America still does not
understand its enemy. The United States continues to fall victim to
strategic surprise at the hands of Sunni jihadist groups. The
resurgence of the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Iraq and
its expansion into Syria was clear by at least mid-2013 but the United
States did not act until ISIS had seized Iraq's second-largest city,
beheaded Americans, launched a genocide against an Iraqi minority, and
launched a blitz offensive campaign that threatened the survival of
Baghdad.\1\ The United States has intervened against ISIS, but is
making the same mistake with al-Qaeda, which is building armies in
failed states while the world focuses on ISIS. America's consistent
inability to identify the threat as it emerges or to neutralize it
before it does places Americans at risk and drives up the cost of
protecting the homeland by conceding the strategic initiative to the
enemy. This pattern of American behavior is the outcome of a
fundamental failure to understand the nature of the jihadist movement
and the requirements to defeat it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Jessica Lewis, ``Al Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent,'' Institute for
the Study of War, September 2013, http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/
FA18/20131212/101591/HHRG-113-FA18-Wstate-LewisJ-20131212.pdf; Jessica
Lewis, ``Al Qaeda in Iraq's `Breaking the Walls' Campaign Achieves Its
Objectives at Abu Ghraib--2013 Iraq Update No. 30'', Institute for the
Study of War, July 28, 2013, http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2013/07/
al-qaeda-in-iraq-walls-campaign.html; Jessica Lewis, ``Further
Indications of al-Qaeda's Advance in Iraq: Iraq Update No. 39,'' ISW
Blogs, November 15, 2013, http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2013/11/
further-indications-of-al-qaedas.html; Jessica Lewis, ``ISIS in Iraq:
Battle Plan for Baghdad,'' Institute for the Study of War, June 27,
2014, http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2014/06/in-iraq-battle-plan-for-
baghdad-coming.html; Lauren Squires, Jessica Lewis, and ISW Iraq Team,
``Warning Intelligence Update: Baghdad,'' Institute for the Study of
War, July 23, 2014, http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2014/07/warning-
intelligence-update-bagdad.html; Jessica Lewis ``The Battle for
Baghdad: Scenarios,'' Institute for the Study of War, June 13, 2014,
http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2014/06/the-battle-for-baghdad-
scenarios.html.
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Al-Qaeda and ISIS are elite military organizations pursuing a
religious war in defense of Sunni Muslim communities, which they
perceive to be under existential threat.\2\ Their goals are the same:
To ``restore'' what they believe to be Allah's rule on earth by tearing
down the existing state system, expelling external forces from the
Muslim world, and establishing Islamic governance in accordance with a
fundamentalist interpretation of the Qur'an.\3\ Both groups intend to
destroy the United States and the Western way of life. Al-Qaeda differs
from ISIS only on the practicalities of how to pursue those goals.
ISIS's approach was to launch and sustain an immediate world war.
ISIS's strategy is one of massive and sustained confrontation against
the West that it calculates will break America's will to fight while
activating Sunni Muslim communities to join ISIS's war.\4\ ISIS
launched its world war before it had even seized Mosul, deploying
attack cells into Europe by at least January 2014.\5\ Mosul fell 6
months later.\6\ ISIS's strategy is an evolution of its predecessor's
shock and awe approach under Abu Mohammad al-Zarqawi, which ultimately
failed because it drove Iraq's Sunni community to support the United
States instead. The lesson ISIS learned was to go bigger and harder
next time, which it has done to devastating success.
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\2\ The then-leader of al-Qaeda's Syrian affiliate, Abu Mohammad al
Joulani, echoed this theme in a June 2015 interview with al Jazzera,
stating: ``Everything that is happening is a conspiracy against
Sunnis.'' Alessandria Masi, ``Jabhat al-Nusra leader interview: `no
solution' to ISIS, al-Qaeda tension in Syria, Americans joined Nusra
Front,'' International Business Times, June 3, 2015, http://
www.ibtimes.com/jabhat-al-nusra-leader-interview-no-solution-isis-al-
qaeda-tension-syria-americans-1951584.
\3\ Frederick Kagan, Kimberly Kagan, Jennifer Cafarella, Harleen
Gambhir, and Katherine Zimmerman, ``Al Qaeda and ISIS: Existential
Threats to the U.S. and Europe,'' Institute for the Study of War and
Critical Threats Project, January 2016, https://www.aei.org/wp-content/
uploads/2016/01/PLANEX_Report1_FINAL.pdf; Jennifer Cafarella, Harleen
Gambhir, and Katherine Zimmerman, ``Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS: Sources
of Strength,'' Institute for the Study of War and Critical Threats
Project, February 2016, https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/
jabhat_al_nusra_isis_sources_of_strength_report_three_final.pdf; ``
`They came to destroy': ISIS Crimes Against the Yazidis'', U.N. Human
Rights Council, June 15, 2016, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/
HRCouncil/CoISyria/A_HRC_32_CRP.2_- en.pdf.
\4\ ISIS's propaganda has illustrated this strategy. See: ``Dabiq
Issue 5,'' released in November 2014. Safe copy available from
Jihadology at: https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2015/02/the-islamic-
state-e2809cdc481biq-magazine-522.pdf; [ISIS article discussing
downfall of U.S. progress], July 3, 2017, available with subscription
from the SITE Intelligence Group at: https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/
Chatter/jihadist-explores-economic-military-implications-of-u-s-led-
coalition-against-is.html.
\5\ The first publically-known ISIS attack operative crossed into
Greece from Turkey in January 2014. Rukmini Callimachi, ``How ISIS
built the machinery of terror under Europe's gaze,'' The New York
Times, March 29, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/29/world/europe/
isis-attacks-paris-brussels.html?_r=0; ``Why Nice was an unsurprising
location for a terrorist attack,'' The Economist, June 15, 2016, http:/
/www.economist.com/news/europe/21702282-idyllic-mediterranean-beach-
town-has-severe-problem-islamist-radicalisation-why; Paul Cruikshank,
``Raid on ISIS suspect in the French Riviera,'' CNN, August 28, 2014,
http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/28/world/europe/france-suspected-isis-link/
index.html.
\6\ ``Recent chronology of the fall of Mosul,'' Institute for the
Study of War, June 10, 2014, http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2014/06/
recent-chronology-of-fall-of-mosul.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Al-Qaeda's strategy is more patient and insidious. Al-Qaeda is
pursuing long-term advantage rather than short-term wins. It intends
first to convince Sunni Muslim populations that its goals are
desirable, and then to bring that Sunni support to bear against the
West.\7\ Al-Qaeda is also preparing for its own world war by enlisting
as much of the Sunni Muslim community as it can before launching the
next phase. Al-Qaeda is dedicating most of its efforts to identifying
and supporting local causes within vulnerable or victimized Sunni
Muslim communities in order to develop the legitimacy, dependence, and
trust that will allow it to transform those communities over time into
adherents of al-Qaeda's ideology and supporters of its global religious
war.\8\ Al-Qaeda is vocal about denouncing ISIS's approach,\9\
primarily because opposing the tactics used by ISIS allows al-Qaeda to
appear moderate in comparison. Al-Qaeda has also been willing to
sacrifice its brand name in order to allow its affiliates to address
local concerns over the international perception of the al-Qaeda brand
name.\10\ Al-Qaeda's moderate image enables it to increase the overall
percentage of the Sunni Muslim community that supports jihadism by
converting people that would otherwise be alienated by ISIS's
brutality. Al-Qaeda intends to fold residual elements of ISIS's
fighting force and adherent population into its own in time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Jennifer Cafarella, ``Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria: an Islamic
State for al Qaeda,'' Institute for the Study of War, December 2014.
Copy available from author upon request.
\8\ Jennifer Cafarella, ``Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria: an Islamic
State for al Qaeda,'' Institute for the Study of War, December 2014.
Copy available from author upon request; [Zawahiri statement in support
of Syrian uprising as a way to create a state that defends Muslim
countries], February 11, 2012, available with subscription from the
SITE Intelligence Group at: https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Multimedia/
zawahiri-issues-video-in-support-of-syrian-uprising.- html.
\9\ [Zawahiri attacks ISIS for Creating and Maintaining Division],
August 29, 2016, available with subscription from the SITE Intelligence
Group at: https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Multimedia/zawahiri-calls-
fighters-to-unite-attacks-is-for-creating-and-maintaining-
division.html.
\10\ Jennifer Cafarella and Katherine Zimmerman, ``Avoiding al
Qaeda's Syrian trap: Jabhat al-Nusra's rebranding,'' Institute for the
Study of War and Critical Threats Project, July 29, 2016, http://
iswresearch.blogspot.com/2016/07/avoiding-al-qaedas-syria-trap-jabhat-
al.html.
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Al-Qaeda's main effort is in Syria, which has become the world's
largest jihadist incubator. Al-Qaeda's intent in Syria is to embed
within the uprising against the regime of Syrian President Bashar al
Assad and to transform that uprising into a global religious
insurgency. Al-Qaeda deployed a small unit of fighters from Iraq to
Syria in order to grow an affiliate there after the uprising started in
2011.\11\ It initially hid its true goals in Syria in order to avoid
alienating what was then mostly a pro-democracy uprising.\12\ Al-
Qaeda's Syrian affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra, announced its formation in a
video on January 2012 but did not state its goal to establish an al-
Qaeda emirate in Syria that could become a future component of a global
al-Qaeda caliphate.\13\ Jabhat al-Nusra merely identified itself as an
Islamist group pursuing the ``return the rule of Allah to the
earth.''\14\ Al-Qaeda launched immediate and successful suicide attacks
against the Syrian regime that helped provide time and space for the
Syrian armed opposition to coalesce while al-Qaeda built its own
fighting force.\15\ Al-Qaeda's initial reception in Syria was largely
that of a necessary evil. Syrians exploited al-Qaeda's willingness to
contribute to the war against the Assad regime even though most
disagreed with al-Qaeda's vision for Syria. Al-Qaeda's ideology was a
problem for the future, while Assad was the here-and-now threat.\16\
This perception endures today, but the 6 years of horrific violence
that Syrians have endured makes it increasingly likely that al-Qaeda is
winning real local support for its goals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Tara John, ``Everything you need to know about the new Nusra
Front,'' Time Magazine, July 29, 2016, http://time.com/4428696/nusra-
front-syria-terror-al-qaeda/.
\12\ The main body of Syrian armed and political opposition groups
that emerged after the uprising began in 2011 united under an umbrella
titled the Syrian Opposition Coalition. This opposition body pursued a
diplomatic settlement with the Assad regime in accordance with the
United Nation's ``Geneva Communique'' that outlined a 6-point plan for
a political transition in Syria, released on June 30, 2012. The
communique called for a ``genuinely democratic and pluralistic'' Syrian
state. The strength and perceived legitimacy of the opposition groups
willing to adhere to this communique diminished over time as al-Qaeda
and like-minded groups rose within the opposition and the U.N.-backed
negotiations failed to make progress. ``Final Communique,'' U.N. Action
Group for Syria, June 30, 2012, http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/
Syria/FinalCommuniqueActionGroupforSyria.pdf. Genevieve Casagrande with
Jennifer Cafarella, ``The Syrian opposition's political demands,''
December 29, 2015, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/syrian-
opposition%E2%80%99s-political-demands; Devin Dwyer and Dana Hughes,
``Obama recognizes Syrian opposition group,'' ABC News, December 11,
2012, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/OTUS/exclusive-president-obama-
recognizes-syrian-opposition-group/story?id=17936599#.UMfDkawpCHA.
\13\ Jabhat al-Nusra was forced to issue a public statement
regarding its intent to establish an emirate after someone leaked audio
of Jabhat al-Nusra leader Abu Mohammad al Joulani discussing the
establishment of an emirate in Syria in July 2014. Jennifer Cafarella,
``Jabhat al-Nusra regroups after ISIS success in Iraq,'' Institute for
the Study of War, September 18, 2014, http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/
2014/09/jabhat-al-nusra-regroups-after-isis.html.
\14\ [Jabhat al-Nusra formation statement], January 23, 2012,
available with subscription from the SITE Intelligence Group at:
https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Multimedia/site-intel-group-1-23-12-mb-
jihad-levant-syria-video.html.
\15\ Jennifer Cafarella, ``Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria: an Islamic
State for al Qaeda,'' Institute for the Study of War, December 2014.
The first attack occurred in December 2011. Jabhat al-Nusra explained
its own rise in Syria in a June 2015 video titled ``Heirs of Glory''.
Copy of video available from author upon request. Thomas Joscelyn, ``Al
Nusrah Front celebrates 9/11 attacks in new video,'' The Long War
Journal, June 29, 2015, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/06/
al-nusrah-front-celebrates-911-attacks-in-new-video.php.
\16\ Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, ``Al-Qaida turns tide for rebels in battle
for eastern Syria,'' The Guardian, July 30, 2012, https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jul/30/al-qaida-rebels-battle-syria;
Sarah al Deeb and Bassem Mroe, ``Syria's Ceasefire Strengthens al Qaeda
Branch,'' Associated Press, May 29, 2016 https://apnews.com/
57bc8b0711074d74bd4b90bbf0292290/syrias-cease-fire-strengthens-al-
qaida-branch; [Creation of Mujahidin Shura Council-Deir al Zor],
YouTube video, May 25, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=yGrD9yzvHgM; Thomas Joscelyn, ``Aleppo-based rebel groups
reportedly unite behind Ahrar al Sham's former top leader,'' The Long
War Journal, February 20, 2016, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/
2016/02/zleppo-based-rebel-groups-unite-behind-ahrar-al-sham-former-
top-leader.php.
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Al-Qaeda is also dedicating resources to restructuring the Syrian
armed opposition under the leadership of its Syrian affiliate and
groups that adhere to a similar ideology. Al-Qaeda does not intend to
dominate the Syrian opposition outright because doing so risks
triggering backlash that could marginalize al-Qaeda within the
opposition.\17\ Al-Qaeda instead seeks to mold the opposition over time
using a combination of infiltration, negotiated mergers, and discrete
attacks against moderates. Al-Qaeda's operatives in Syria networked
into the leadership of Islamist groups such as Ahrar al Sham al
Islamiya that were close to al-Qaeda's ideology.\18\ Al-Qaeda's goal
was to ensure that Islamist groups became dominant within the
opposition and to influence the evolution of their goals to more
closely adhere to al-Qaeda's. Meanwhile, al-Qaeda has quietly dedicated
resources to purging elements of the Syrian armed opposition that
remain unwilling to support its ideology and discrediting the moderate
opposition's ideology. Al-Qaeda has attacked and destroyed four U.S.-
backed groups in northern Syria and co-opted at least four more since
early 2015.\19\ Al-Qaeda faces little real opposition to these measures
because its military support remains vital to the anti-Assad effort.
Al-Qaeda has grown increasingly bold as a result. Al-Qaeda now openly
describes its war in Syria as a personal obligation for Sunni Muslims,
making it a global war, and openly condemns moderate opposition groups
in its propaganda for betraying the Syrian people.\20\ Al-Qaeda's skill
and experience manipulating local populations and armed groups in Syria
makes it a formidable local actor.
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\17\ Al-Qaeda leader Aymen al-Zawahiri has consistently reinforced
this approach, including an early 2015 letter to Abu Mohammad Joulani.
[Zawahiri speaks on strategy in Syria], April 18, 2014, available with
subscription from the SITE Intelligence Group at: https://
ent.siteintelgroup.com/Multimedia/zawahiri-denies-changing-his-
ideology-speaks-in-interview-on-syrian-conflict-egypt-war-with-u-
s.html; Charles Lister, ``An internal struggle: al Qaeda's Syrian
affiliate is grappling with its identity,'' The Huffington Post, May
31, 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/charles-lister/an-internal-
struggle-al-q_b_7479730.html.
\18\ Jennifer Cafarella, Nicholas Heras, and Genevieve Casagrande,
``Al-Qaeda is gaining strength in Syria,'' Foreign Policy, September 1,
2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/01/al-qaeda-is-gaining-strength-
in-syria/.
\19\ The United States-backed groups that al-Qaeda has attacked and
destroyed are the 30th Division, Syrian Revolutionaries Front, Harakat
Hazm, and the 13th division. Al-Qaeda has absorbed the United States-
backed group Harakat Nour al Din al Zenki while driving Fastaqim Kama
Umirat, Kataib Thuwar al Sham, Jabhat al Shamiya-Western Sector, and
Jaysh al Mujahideen to merge underneath Syrian Salafi jihadi group
Ahrar al Sham. Luis Martinez, ``General Austin: only `4 or 5' U.S.-
trained Syrian rebels fighting ISIS,'' ABC News, September 16, 2015,
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/general-austin-us-trained-syrian-rebels-
fighting-isis/story?id=33802596; Jamie Dettmer, ``Main U.S.-backed
Syrian rebel group disbanding, joining Islamists,'' The Daily Beast,
March 1, 2015, http://www.thedailybeast.com/main-us-backed-syrian-
rebel-group-disbanding-joining-islamists; Dominique Soguel, ``In
northern Syria, is the US running out of rebel allies?'' Christian
Science Monitor, March 4, 2015, https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-
East/2015/0304/In-northern-Syria-is-the-US-running-out-of-rebel-allies-
video; Mariya Petkova, ``Syrian opposition factions join Ahrar al
Sham,'' Al Jazeera, January 26, 2017, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/
2017/01/syrian-opposition-factions-join-ahrar-al-sham-
170126133928474.html; [Agreement to end the clashes in Ma'arat al Numan
on dissolving Division 13], All4Syria, June 10, 2017, http://
www.all4syria.info/Archive/417500.
\20\ An example of Jabhat al-Nusra's use of the phrase ``fard
ayn'', or personal obligation, to describe its war in Syria can be
found in the first issue of its ar Risalah magazine, released in July
2015. A copy is available with subscription from the SITE Intelligence
Group at: https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/statements/anti-is-fighters-
in-syria-release-first-issue-of-english-magazine-al-risalah.html; [AQ
leader Zawahiri declares Syrian jihad an issue concerning all Muslims],
April 23, 2017, available with subscription from the SITE Intelligence
Group at: https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Multimedia/al-qaeda-aq-leader-
ayman-al-zawahiri-addressed-fighters-in-syria-urging-them-to-reject-
nationalist-sentiment-and-wage-a-protracted-guerrilla-war-against-the-
syrian-regime-and-called-on-musl.html.
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Al-Qaeda's rise in Syria is in large part a direct outcome of the
strategy of Syrian president Bashar al Assad and his external backers:
Iran and Russia. Assad quickly dismissed the opposition against him as
terrorist-infiltrated,\21\ and then intentionally fueled the jihadist
movement in Syria in order to make it true. He emptied Syrian prison of
Islamists and al Qaeda-linked convicts as the protest movement against
him gained strength in 2011 in order to create evidence of terrorist
involvement in the uprising.\22\ He has since waged a campaign of
deliberate slaughter against the elements of the opposition that were
willing to negotiate with him, including chemical weapons, the
intentional targeting of civilian infrastructure and mass executions of
political prisoners.\23\ His aim was to preclude a Western intervention
by eliminating any moderate opposition force that the United States
could reasonably support. His slogan is ``Assad or we burn the
country'',\24\ and that is exactly what he has done. Nearly half of
Syria's prewar population had been displaced by late 2014 according to
U.N. data.\25\ Three years later, the full scale of the damage is
increasingly difficult to measure. The International Monetary Fund and
the World Bank estimate that rebuilding Syria will cost up to $200
billion dollars.\26\ Assad and his backers now want the international
community to foot the bill while they continue their war.\27\
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\21\ Tim Lister, ``Al-Assad's speech: reheated promises salted with
threats,'' CNN, June 21, 2011, http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/
06/20/syria.assad/index.html; ``Transcript: ABC's Barbara Walters'
interview with Syrian President Bashar al Assad,'' ABC News, December
7, 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/International/transcript-abcs-barbara-
walters-interview-syrian-president-bashar/story?id=15099152.
\22\ Leila Fadel, ``Syria's Assad moves to allay fury after
security forces fire on protestors,'' The Washington Post, March 26,
2011, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/syrias-assad-moves-to-allay-
fury-after-security-forces-fire-on-protesters/2011/03/26/
AFFoZDdB_story.html?utm_- term=.3824551f9518; Simon Speakman Cordall,
``How Syria's Assad helped Forge ISIS,'' Newsweek, June 21, 2014,
http://www.newsweek.com/how-syrias-assad-helped-forge-isis-255631.
\23\ ``White House Press Release on ``Government Assessment of the
Syrian Government's Use of Chemical Weapons on August 21, 2013'', The
White House, August 30, 2013, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-
press-office/2013/08/30/government-assessment-syrian-government-s-use-
chemical-weapons-august-21; Judy Woodruff, ``Amnesty documents `human
slaughterhouse' in Assad's Syria,'' PBS, February 7, 2017, http://
www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/amnesty-documents-human-slaughterhouse-assads-
syria/; ``Bashar al-Assad's forces crush the resistance,'' The
Economist, December 17, 2016, https://www.economist.com/news/middle-
east-and-africa/21711738-fate-100000-civilians-terrifyingly-unclear;
Ben Taub, ``The Assad Files,'' The New Yorker, April 18, 2016, http://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/04/18/bashar-al-assads-war-crimes-
exposed.
\24\ ``Al-Telawi: Regime's Geneva II position `Assad or we burn the
country','' Syria Direct, January 21, 2014, http://syriadirect.org/
news/al-telawi-regime%E2%80%99s-geneva-ii-position-%E2%80%98assad-or-
we-burn-the-country%E2%80%99/; [Shabih burns a house and claims Assad
or we burn the country leadked], Zajil Network Youtube, August 31,
2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cDcTEL-tW6w; [Al Assad or we burn
the country], YouTube, August 26, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=EG-9yLA4W7I.
\25\ Adrian Edwards, ``Needs soar as number of Syrian refugees tops
3 million,'' U.N. High Commission for Refugees, August 29, 2014, http:/
/www.unhcr.org/53ff76c99.html.
\26\ Jeanne Gobat and Christina Kostial, ``Working paper: Syria's
Conflict Economy,'' International Monetary Fund, June 2016, https://
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2016/wp16123.pdf; Omer Karasapan,
``Rebuilding or Redefining Syria?'' Brookings Institution, February 13,
2017, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2017/02/13/
rebuilding-or-redefining-syria/.
\27\ ``Civil war has cost Syrian economy 226 billion dollars, says
World Bank,'' Daily Sabah, July 10, 2017, https://www.dailysabah.com/
syrian-crisis/2017/07/10/civil-war-has-cost-syrian-economy-226-billion-
dollars-says-world-bank; Tony Badran, ``Assad's Fundraiser at the World
Bank,'' Tablet, February 8, 2017, http://www.tabletmag.com/scroll/
224291/assads-fundraiser-at-the-world-bank; Tom Rollins, ``Syria's
reconstruction plans take shape,'' al-Monitor, May 22, 2017, http://
www.al-monitor.com/pulse/en/originals/2017/05/syria-war-reconstruction-
process-regime-opposition.html; ``The international community rises to
the challenges of conflicts and refugees in the MENA region,'' The
World Bank, July 5, 2016, http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/
2016/07/05/the-international-community-rises-to-the-challenges-of-
conflicts-and-refugees-in-the-mena-region.
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Al-Qaeda's rise has been quickest in northwestern Syria, where the
military campaign of the Assad regime and its external backers has
focused since Russia's intervention in September 2015.\28\ Russia's air
campaign in Syria has primarily targeted moderate, U.S.-backed elements
of the Syrian opposition. Russia has also conducted repeated,
intentional strikes against civilian infrastructure including
hospitals, schools, and mosques.\29\ The brutal siege and bombardment
of opposition-held neighborhoods of Aleppo City over the course of 2016
helped al-Qaeda finalize its consolidation of power in northwestern
Syria.\30\ Al-Qaeda played a prominent role defending the city,
managing to temporarily break through the siege in August.\31\ Al-
Qaeda's visible role in Aleppo further concretized its position at the
forefront of the Syrian opposition, while the eventual fall of Aleppo
to the regime and its backers ultimately assisted al-Qaeda's
consolidation by eliminating Syrian opposition groups inside the city
that had remained relatively more independent from al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda
has since transitioned into a governing phase in northwestern Syria.
Its activity there focuses on developing an ``economic office'' to
regulate and profit from the local economy and consolidating control
over service provision to include humanitarian aid.\32\ Al-Qaeda runs
numerous religious schools in the province that include schools for
children and for women, some of which have begun to don the Burqa in
accordance with al-Qaeda's ideology.\33\ Al-Qaeda is now shifting its
main effort south, to Dera'a Province on the Israeli and Jordanian
borders. Al-Qaeda deployed senior military commanders, political
leaders, and administrative officials to Dera'a Province in May
2017.\34\ Al-Qaeda intends to replicate its success in Idlib and
prepare to disrupt U.S. efforts to achieve a cease-fire in that area or
strengthen opposition groups that may be willing to fight al-Qaeda in
the future.
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\28\ Andrew Osborn and Phil Stewart, ``Russia begins Syria air
strikes in its biggest Mideast intervention in decades,'' Reuters,
September 30, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-
russia_idUSKCN0RU0MG20150930.
\29\ Genevieve Casagrande and Ellen Stockert, ``Russia's
unrelenting attacks on Syrian civilians,'' Institute for the Study of
War, April 29, 2017, http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2017/04/russias-
unrelenting-attacks-on-syrian.html.
\30\ Jonathan Mautner, ``Russian airstrikes in Syria: September 13-
October 11, 2016,'' Institute for the Study of War, http://
iswresearch.blogspot.com/2016/10/russian-airstrikes-in-syria-
september.html.
\31\ Genevieve Casagrande with Jennifer Cafarella, ``Opposition
forces launch offensive to break the siege of Aleppo,'' Institute for
the Study of War, August 3, 2016, http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2016/
08/opposition-forces-launch-offensive-to.html; Christopher Kozak,
``Opposition forces break siege of Aleppo City,'' Institute for the
Study of War, August 8, 2016, http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2016/08/
opposition-forces-break-siege-of-aleppo_19.html; Genevieve Casagrande
and Jennifer Cafarella, ``Syrian opposition launches second offensive
to break Aleppo siege,'' Institute for the Study of War, October 28,
2016, http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2016/10/syrian-opposition-
launches-second.html.
\32\ `` `Tahrir al Sham' Establishes Commission to Monitor Currency
Exchange Market,'' El Dorar, May 13, 2017, http://eldorar.com/node/
111399; Sam Heller, ``Syrian Jihadists Jeopardize Syrian Relief,'' The
Century Foundation, June 1, 2017, https://tcf.org/content/report/
syrian-jihadists-jeopardize-humanitarian-relief/.
\33\ [Ramadan in the Levant is Different! Vlog 18 Soraka al Makki],
Soraka al Makki YouTube video, June 14, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=Ug76Yg1Wqig; [Watch Hay'at Tahrir al Sham's broad security
operation in Idlib and countryside], HTS's Ibaa Channel YouTube, July
10, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FssSa7Ci69Y; ``HTS News in
Syria for June 13, 2017,'' June 13, 2017, available with subscription
from the SITE Intelligence Group at: https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/
HTS-News-in-Syria/hts-news-in-syria-for-june-13-2017.html.
\34\ ``Sources: `Tahrir al Sham' sends leaders from Idlib to
Dera'a,'' Enab Baladi, May 12, 2017, https://www.enabbaladi.net/
archives/149363#; ``Hay'at Tahrir al Sham sends new leader to Dera'a
from Idlib'' Shaam News Network, May 13, 2017, http://www.shaam.org/
news/syria-news/
%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%A6%D8%A9%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1%-D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B
4%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%82%-
D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9%D8%A7%-
D9%84%D9%89%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AF%-
D9%84%D8%A8.html; `` `Tahrir al Sham' confirms movement of some of its
leaders in Dera'a to create new operations `Ending the Lies of the
Regime','' Shaam News Network, May 15, 2017, http://www.shaam.org/news/
syrianews/%E2%80%9C%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B1-
%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%A7%D9%85%E2%80%9D%D8-
%AA%D8%A4%D9%83%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84%D9-
%82%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%85%D9%86%D9%87%D8%A7%D8-
%A5%D9%84%D9%89%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%AF%D9-
%81%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AC%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%B2%D9%84%D8%B9%D9-
%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9%E2-
%80%9C%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%B6%D9%85%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%B9%D8%A7-
%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85%E2%80%9D.html.
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Al-Qaeda's local support confers large military advantages. Unlike
ISIS, al-Qaeda does not need to allocate significant resources to
maintaining control over the population and purging its own ranks of
infiltrators.\35\ Al-Qaeda has freedom of operation throughout Syria's
rebel-held areas that allow it to maneuver and conduct logistical
support operations without much risk of disruption.\36\ The freedom of
operations enables al-Qaeda rapidly to shift assets across the
battlefield as the situation requires, further increasing the value of
its contribution to the opposition's war effort. It is extraordinarily
difficult for the United States to develop a strategy to destroy al-
Qaeda without declaring war on behalf of Assad against the Syrian
opposition. We at Institute for the Study of War tested over 20
possible U.S. courses of action in Syria, most of which failed because
they either strengthened or failed to weaken al-Qaeda.\37\ The key to
destroying al-Qaeda in Syria is to break its bond with the local
population. The United States will not break this link until and unless
the United States develops and executes as counter-Assad strategy in
Syria. Even then, a war against al-Qaeda will be costly.
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\35\ ``Sources: Jaysh Khalid executes military leaders accused of
assassinating previous leader,'' Enab Baladi, June 5, 2017, https://
www.enabbaladi.net/archives/154266; William McCants and Hassan Hassan,
``Experts weigh in (part 7): Is ISIS good at governing?'' Brookings
Institution, April 18, 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/
2016/04/18/experts-weigh-in-part-7-is-isis-good-at-governing/; Callum
Paton, ``War on Iraq: ISIS trapped families inside homes rigged with
bombs to use civilians as human shields,'' Newsweek, July 10, 2017,
http://www.newsweek.com/mosul-isis-welded-families-doors-shut-and-
rigged-homes-ieds-keep-civilians-634418.
\36\ Jennifer Cafarella, Kimberly Kagan, Frederick W. Kagan,
``America's Way Ahead in Syria,'' Institute for the Study of War and
Critical Threats Project, March 2017, https://www.criticalthreats.org/
wp-content/uploads/2017/03/ISW-CTP-Recommended-Course-of-Action-in-
Syria-and-Iraq-March-2017.pdf.
\37\ Jennifer Cafarella, Kimberly Kagan, Frederick W. Kagan,
``America's Way Ahead in Syria,'' Institute for the Study of War and
Critical Threats Project, March 2017, https://www.criticalthreats.org/
wp_content/uploads/2017/03/ISW-CTP-Recommended-Course-of-Action-in-
Syria-and-Iraq-March-2017.pdf.
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Al-Qaeda's current local efforts make it more--not less--dangerous
to the United States. Al-Qaeda is still developing external attack
capability from Syria as well as its other safe havens in Yemen and
Afghanistan.\38\ The bomb maker for Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,
Ibrahim al Asiri, has helped train al-Qaeda's Syrian affiliate in
advanced bomb-making techniques.\39\ The active planning of a cell of
al-Qaeda external attack operatives based in Syria known as the
``Khorasan group'' triggered a new campaign of U.S. airstrikes in Syria
beginning in September 2014.\40\ Al-Qaeda has since chosen temporarily
to deprioritize efforts to conduct major attacks in the West in order
to avoid provoking an American response that would deny al-Qaeda its
current freedom of operations. The then-leader of al-Qaeda's Syrian
affiliate stated in a May 2015 interview with Al Jazeera that he
received instructions from al-Qaeda leader Aymen al-Zawahiri not to
conduct attacks abroad.\41\ Al-Qaeda is still preparing capability for
the future, however. Al-Qaeda is cultivating its own foreign fighter
population in Syria and is likely quietly cultivating a new network in
Europe.\42\ Al-Qaeda is building up these capabilities while holding
them in reserve for its global phase yet to come. That phase may be
more effective than ISIS's current global campaign if al-Qaeda manages
to acquire a popular mandate from the Syrian rebelling population for a
global war.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ Jennifer Cafarella and Katherine Zimmerman, ``Warning update:
Al Qaeda's global attack campaign,'' Institute for the Study of War and
Critical Threats Project, November 6, 2016, http://
iswresearch.blogspot.com/2016/11/warning-update-al-qaedas-global-
attack.html.
\39\ Ewen MacAskill, ``The Saudi chemist sparking fears of
`invisible' bombs on transatlantic flights,'' The Guardian, July 3,
2014, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/03/al-qaida-bombmaker.
\40\ Jennifer Cafarella and Katherine Zimmerman, ``Warning update:
Al Qaeda's global attack campaign,'' Institute for the Study of War and
Critical Threats Project, November 6, 2016, http://
iswresearch.blogspot.com/2016/11/warning-update-al-qaedas-global-
attack.html.
\41\ ``Nusra leader: Our mission is to defeat Syrian regime,'' Al
Jazeera, May 28, 2015, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/05/nusra-
front-golani-assad-syria-hezbollah-isil-150528044857- 528.html.
\42\ Al-Qaeda publishes propaganda to recruit foreign fighters that
is similar to ISIS's. Al-Qaeda has featured foreign fighter units in
its ar Risalah magazine. A prominent example is foreign fighters
belonging to the Turkistan Islamic Party that fight with al-Qaeda in
Syria. See the 3d issue of ar Risalah, available with subscription from
the SITE Intelligence Group at: https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/
Periodicals/mujahideen-of-shaam-publish-3rd-issue-of-english-magazine-
al-risalah.html
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America is pursuing a self-defeating strategy in Syria, ensuring
that the Syrian theater will remain a major jihadist recruitment center
for the foreseeable future. The United States has taken no meaningful
action to contain al-Qaeda or slow its growth aside from the handful of
airstrikes against al-Qaeda leaders in Syria, which have had
essentially no effect on the organization's strength. The U.S. campaign
against ISIS will fail to destroy the group under America's current
strategy, and is actually setting conditions that ultimately favor al-
Qaeda.\43\ The United States has been ceding regional power to Iran and
Russia, who view the United States as their enemy, in order to focus on
ISIS. Members of the Syrian opposition perceive the United States to be
de facto allied with Iran, Russia, and the Assad regime as a result,
and is not an unfair conclusion to make. This perception lends
legitimacy to al-Qaeda's narrative that al-Qaeda is the only source of
protection for the Syrian Sunni community. The United States has traded
all of this for a series of tactical victories against ISIS that will
most likely not endure. America's primary ground partner in Syria, the
Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) does not have the combat power to retake
the rest of ISIS-held terrain beyond Raqqa. America's reliance on the
SDF has put us in an indirect war with Turkey, a NATO ally, which views
the Syrian Kurdish People's Defense Forces (YPG) as a direct threat to
its national security because of the organization's links to the
Turkish domestic insurgency waged by the Kurdistan Worker's Party
(PKK).\44\ The United States has no discernable strategy for how to
seize the rest of ISIS-held terrain in Syria or to extricate ourselves
from an indirect war within NATO. There is a very real risk of al-Qaeda
resurgence in areas retaken from ISIS, moreover. Al-Qaeda is
positioning to exploit local discontent with SDF rule in Raqqa that is
likely to emerge due to the SDF's adherence to the YPG's political
ideology.\45\ All of these conditions undermine American National
security by favoring al-Qaeda in the long term, which places the United
States on a trajectory to fight an even worse war after ISIS.
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\43\ Jennifer Cafarella, Kimberly Kagan, Frederick W. Kagan,
``America's Way Ahead in Syria,'' Institute for the Study of War and
Critical Threats Project, March 2017, https://www.criticalthreats.org/
wp-content/uploads/2017/03/ISW-CTP-Recommended-Course-of-Action-in-
Syria-and-Iraq-March-2017.pdf.
\44\ Turkey intervened in Syria in September 2016 in order to block
and ultimately reverse the YPG's gains in northern Syria. Jennifer
Cafarella with Leah Danson, ``Turkish incursion into northern Syria
signals turning point in anti-ISIS fight,'' August 30, 2016, Institute
for the Study of War, http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2016/08/military-
situation-in-northern-syria.html.
\45\ Al-Qaeda-linked clerics in Syria have issued support for the
formation of new anti-YPG groups in eastern Syria, likely indicating
that al-Qaeda will participate in future military operations against
the YPG. @hxhassan, Twitter post, July 5, 2017, 3:13 p.m., https://
twitter.com/hxhassan/status/882693954013155328?refsrc=email&s=11.
Mr. King. Thank you very much. Our third witness, as I said
before, he is an old face. I didn't mean it that way, Seth.
Dr. Seth Jones, who has been before this committee a number
of times and has really been a great assistance to us. He is
the director of the International Security and Defense Policy
Center at the Rand Corporation and is an adjunct professor at
Johns Hopkins University.
He has served as the representative for the assistant
secretary of Defense for Special Operations, and before that as
an advisor the commanding general for U.S. Special Ops in
Afghanistan.
Dr. Jones is the author of a number of published books on
al-Qaeda, terrorism, and insurgencies, among other topics. Dr.
Jones is a very familiar face in Congress and continues to be a
valuable resource to this committee.
Dr. Jones, you are recognized for your testimony and
welcome back.
STATEMENT OF SETH JONES, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND
DEFENSE POLICY CENTER, RAND CORPORATION
Mr. Jones. Thank you, Chairman King, Ranking Member Rice,
and other distinguished Members of the subcommittee for
conducting this hearing and for inviting us to testify. I think
this is a very important hearing, particularly with the focus
predominantly on ISIS.
My testimony is gonna explore how al-Qaeda might rebound in
the future, though I would like to note from the beginning that
operatives from al-Qaeda, from ISIS, and other groups do move
around quite fluidly across various countries, regions, and
continents. So while we often like to talk about groups, and it
is easier to do this, there is a fair amount of fluidity among
Salafi-jihadists.
Since al-Qaeda's establishment in 1988, it is worth
remembering that al-Qaeda has expanded its portfolio and surged
in terrorist attacks in a series of waves. It also has suffered
reversals. I think it is important to understand historically
how it has weakened and in some cases expanded.
The first wave began in the 1990's and peaked around 2001
following the September 11 attacks. It was followed by a
reversal as al-Qaeda leaders and operatives were captured or
killed in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the United States and other
areas, and the Taliban regime was overthrown.
The second wave began to build around 2003, around the time
of the U.S. invasion, and was then characterized by spectacular
attacks across not just Iraq, but in Casablanca, London, the
relationship of the North African groups with al-Qaeda in
Madrid, and other countries, and it was followed by a reversal
around the type of time of the Anbar Awakening.
A third wave surged between 2007 and 2009 following the
rise of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen and the
activities of Anwar Al-Awlaki and was followed by a reversal by
a targeting campaign by the United States against senior
leaders, including Osama bin Laden in 2001, around that time
period.
Finally, the Arab Spring helped create the conditions for a
fourth wave of activity.
So that brings us to today. I think it is important to
understand that the current trajectory or even past
trajectories do not mean that is the way this organization will
persist in the future. What I would like to highlight are six
possible factors that could affect the rise or even decline of
al-Qaeda over the next several years.
First would be the unfortunate withdrawal of United States
or other Western forces, particularly special operations forces
from key battlefields, such as Iraq or Afghanistan or even the
small U.S. presence in Syria.
I think U.S. and other Western actions in these countries
have served as a check against some groups, and their removal,
I think as we saw in Iraq in 2011, would be extremely
counterproductive.
Second, I think another round of the Arab Spring or the
collapse of one or more key governments in the Arab world might
allow al-Qaeda or other groups to resurge. I think instability
in countries, like in Jordan or Saudi Arabia or Tunisia or
Egypt could present potential problems and allow groups to
establish sanctuary.
Most people, I should note, did not predict the first round
of the Arab Spring and a second round would be potentially
concerning for this subject.
Third, one or more events that highlight the oppression or
the perceived oppression of Muslims by Western governments
could increase the possibility of a resurgence. The uncensored
Abu-Ghraib photographs began to appear on jihadist websites and
were clearly used for recruitment purposes.
I think an overreaction by a Western government following a
terrorist attack on its soil could trigger a broader concern
about a war against Islam, which I think would be
counterproductive.
Fourth, the rise of a charismatic leader, as we have heard
as well, particularly by al-Qaeda, could help the organization
revitalize. I think as I have looked at the organization over
the past two decades or so, both bin Laden and al Awlaki were
successfully in many ways for inspiring would-be extremists.
Adam Gadahn from the United States was not. I think nor
has, in my view, Ayman al-Zawahiri been particularly effective
at inspiring people. But Hamza is an interesting case, whether
he could certainly inspire a new generation of al-Qaeda
recruits.
Fifth, I think a large-scale conventional deployment of
U.S. military forces to battlefields could increase the
possibility of a resurgence by al-Qaeda or other groups.
Then, finally, I think the collapse of the Islamic State,
and we are already seeing that to some degree, and the death of
charismatic leaders, like Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, could allow
groups like al-Qaeda to rejuvenate or at the very least
increase the possibility of some kind of a merger between
fighters under an umbrella, whether it is al-Qaeda or a newly-
named organization.
I think it is worth noting, in conclusion, that al-Qaeda is
a different organization than what we saw certainly a decade
ago or even 9/11, probably less centralized, in my view. It is
less focused for the moment on external operations.
That could clearly change. But I think Islamic extremism is
certainly here to stay, at least for the foreseeable future.
This will be a generational struggle. Thank you very much for
the opportunity to testify. I think we all look forward to the
discussion.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Jones follows:]
Prepared Statement of Seth G. Jones \1\ \2\
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\1\ The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are
the author's alone and should not be interpreted as representing those
of the RAND Corporation or any of the sponsors of its research.
\2\ The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops
solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities
throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier, and more
prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public
interest.
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July 13, 2017
Thank you Chairman King, Ranking Member Rice, and distinguished
Members of the subcommittee for inviting me to testify today. While the
U.S. public and news media has focused on the fight against the Islamic
State, it is worth re-examining the state of al-Qaeda (or ``the base''
in Arabic) and its threat to the U.S. homeland. After all, it was al-
Qaeda that conducted the 9/11 attacks and nearly pulled off several
attacks in the United States, including those led by Najibullah Zazi in
September 2009 and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab in December 2009.
Assessments of al-Qaeda vary considerably. Georgetown University
professor Bruce Hoffman argues that al-Qaeda has quietly preserved its
strength, expanded its footprint in countries like Syria and Yemen, and
positioned itself to take advantage of the potential collapse of the
Islamic State.\3\ Similarly, former Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) agent Ali Soufan contends that al-Qaeda ``has transformed itself
from a close-knit terrorist outfit with a handful of struggling
affiliates into a vast network of insurgent groups spread from
Southeast Asia to northwest Africa.''\4\ Daveed Gartenstein-Ross at the
Foundation for Defense of Democracies concludes that al-Qaeda has
``emerged stronger by pursuing a strategy of deliberate yet low-key
growth.''\5\ Others disagree. Georgetown University professor Daniel
Byman maintains that al-Qaeda has been in decline because of limited
popular support, effective counterterrorism efforts by the United
States and other countries, and al-Qaeda's killing of Muslim
civilians.\6\ My RAND colleague Brian Jenkins argues that al-Qaeda and
other groups have failed to conduct or inspire many attacks in the U.S.
homeland, partly because their extreme interpretation of Islam has not
gained traction among America's Muslims.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Bruce Hoffman, ``Al-Qaeda: Quietly and Patiently Rebuilding,''
The Cipher Brief, December 30, 2016.
\4\ Ali Soufan, ``The Resurgent Threat of al-Qaeda,'' Wall Street
Journal, April 21, 2017.
\5\ Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Nathaniel Barr, ``How Al-Qaeda
Survived the Islamic State Challenge,'' Current Trends in Islamist
Ideology, March 1, 2017.
\6\ Daniel Byman, ``Judging Al-Qaeda's Record, Part I: Is the
Organization in Decline?'' Lawfare, June 27, 2017. Also see Daniel
Byman, ``Judging Al-Qaeda's Record, Part II: Why Has Al-Qaeda
Declined?'' Lawfare, June 28, 2017.
\7\ Brian Michael Jenkins, ``Why Aren't There More Terrorist
Attacks Like the One in London?'' Fortune, June 7, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Instead of predicting whether al-Qaeda will strengthen or weaken
over the next several years--an exercise that is more guesswork than
science--my testimony will take a slightly different approach. I argue
that the ability of al-Qaeda or another Salafi-jihadist group to
resurge will likely be a result of several factors: The group's ability
to take advantage of a possible second wave of the Arab Spring; the
rise of a charismatic leader; the withdrawal of U.S. or other Western
forces from key counterterrorism battlefields; U.S. or other Western
actions that fuel a perception that the West is oppressing Muslims; and
the ability of al-Qaeda or others to co-opt extremists in the wake of
an Islamic State collapse.
I have divided this testimony into two main sections. The first
examines al-Qaeda's historical waves of activity, which highlight how
al-Qaeda has reshaped its network in the past after suffering setbacks.
The second section explores how al-Qaeda might rebound in the future.
al-qaeda's waves and reverses
Since al-Qaeda's establishment in 1988, there have been four
primary ``waves'' of al-Qaeda activity (surges in terrorist violence),
along with ``reverse waves'' (decreases in terrorist activity).\8\ The
first wave began in the 1990's and peaked in 2001 with the September 11
attacks. It was followed by a reversal, as al-Qaeda leaders and
operatives were captured or killed in Afghanistan, Pakistan, the United
States, and across the globe. A second wave began to build in 2003
after the U.S. invasion of Iraq and was characterized by spectacular
attacks across Iraq and in Casablanca, Madrid, London, and elsewhere.
But it was followed by a reverse wave; by 2006, al-Qaeda in Iraq had
been severely weakened, British and American intelligence agencies had
foiled several plots, and U.S. drone strikes had killed senior al-Qaeda
operatives in Pakistan. A third wave surged from 2007 to 2009 following
the rise of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and was followed by a
reverse wave with the 2011 death of Osama bin Laden and the deaths of
other senior leaders. Finally, the Arab Spring helped create the
conditions for a fourth wave of activity, as al-Qaeda affiliates
established a foothold or expanded their presence in Syria, Yemen,
Afghanistan, and Somalia. Most of the al-Qaeda attacks in the fourth
wave occurred in ``near enemy'' countries like Iraq, Syria, and
Somalia, not in the West.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ On terrorism waves, see David C. Rapoport, ``The Four Waves of
Modern Terrorism,'' in Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes, eds.,
Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy, Washington:
Georgetown University Press, 2004, p. 47; Seth G. Jones, Hunting in the
Shadows: The Pursuit of Al Qa'ida since 9/11, New York: W.W. Norton,
2012.
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First Wave
The first wave started in the late 1980's, as bin Laden, Ayman al-
Zawahiri, and other leaders established al-Qaeda during the anti-Soviet
jihad. In August 1988, a group of foreign fighters, who had trekked to
the region to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan, gathered in Peshawar,
Pakistan, to form a new organization. Called al-Qaeda al-Askariya
(``the military base''), the group included an advisory council and
membership requirements for those interested in joining.\9\ By the
early 1990's, Afghanistan had deteriorated into a civil war following
the departure of Soviet forces and the end of U.S. support to the
Afghan mujahideen. Some fighters dispersed to countries like Bosnia,
Algeria, Sudan, and Egypt, where they attempted to transform domestic
conflict into armed jihad, as bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders had
urged them to do.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Peter Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of Al
Qaida's Leader, New York: Free Press, 2006; Lawrence Wright, The
Looming Tower: Al-Qa'ida and the Road to
9/11, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006, p. 133. Also see the ``Tareekh
Osama'' (``Osama's history'') document presented in United States of
America v. Enaam M. Arnaout, United States District Court, Northern
District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
\10\ Thomas Hegghammer, ``The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters:
Islam and the Globalization of Jihad,'' International Security, Vol.
35, No. 3, Winter 2010/2011, pp. 53-94.
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Al-Qaeda leaders aimed to overthrow regimes in the Middle East (the
near enemy, or al-Adou al-Qareeb) to establish a pan-Islamic caliphate.
They also aimed to fight the United States and its allies (the far
enemy, or al-Adou al-Baeed) who supported these regimes.\11\ For al-
Qaeda, the United States was the most significant far enemy. In
February 1998, bin Laden, Zawahiri, and others published a fatwa to
kill Americans.\12\ Following a decade of preparation and organization,
al-Qaeda launched its first wave of violence against the United States
in the late 1990's. On August 7, 1998, al-Qaeda perpetrated
simultaneous attacks against the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Al-Qaeda operatives then bombed the USS Cole
on October 12, 2000, while it was refueling in Yemen. The attack killed
17 U.S. soldiers and injured 39 others. On September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda
pulled off its most audacious terrorist attack, as 19 operatives
hijacked four airplanes in the United States and killed nearly 3,000
people and wounded thousands more.
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\11\ On the establishment of a caliphate see, for example, Abu Bakr
Naji, The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage Through Which
the Ummah Will Pass, translated and published by the John M. Olin
Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University, May 23, 2006.
\12\ The text is the second fatwa originally published on February
23, 1998, to declare a holy war, or jihad, against the West and Israel.
It was signed by bin Laden; Zawahiri, then-head of al-Jihad; Rifai
Taha, leader of the Islamic Group; Sheikh Mir Hamzah, secretary of the
Jamiat-ul-Ulema of Pakistan; and Fazlul Rehman, leader of the Jihad
Movement in Bangladesh.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response, U.S. military and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
forces took aim at al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan,
which had provided sanctuary to bin Laden and other al-Qaeda
leaders.\13\ It was a remarkably effective campaign. Approximately 100
CIA officers, 350 special operations forces, and 15,000 Afghans--
running as many as 100 combat sorties per day--defeated a 50,000 to
60,000-man Taliban army as well as several thousand al-Qaeda
fighters.\14\ Al-Qaeda was severely weakened. The United States seized
over 20 terrorist training camps, killed thousands of enemy fighters,
and forced hundreds of al-Qaeda members and thousands of Taliban to
flee across the border into Pakistan or Iran. By December 2001, 3
months after the attacks, al-Qaeda was in disarray. A quarter of bin
Laden's top commanders had been killed or captured.\15\ Al-Qaeda's
first wave was on the wane.
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\13\ On the overthrow of the Taliban regime, see Gary Schroen,
First In: An Insider's Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on
Terror in Afghanistan, New York: Ballantine Books, 2005; Stephen
Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army
and Defense Policy, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S.
Army War College, 2002; Gary Berntsen and Ralph Pezzullo, Jawbreaker:
The Attack on Bin Laden and Al Qa'ida, New York: Crown Publishers,
2005; and Bob Woodward, Bush At War, New York: Simon and Schuster,
2002.
\14\ Berntsen and Pezzullo, 2005.
\15\ George Tenet with Bill Harlow, At the Center of the Storm: My
Years at the CIA, New York: HarperCollins, 2007, p. 187.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second Wave
In 2003, the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the subsequent insurgency
gave al-Qaeda new life. America's invasion galvanized al-Qaeda
sympathizers and helped launch the second wave of terrorism. One of al-
Qaeda's strongest allies in Iraq was Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who was born
in 1966 in Zarqa, Jordan. On October 17, 2004, Zarqawi released a
statement using the on-line Arabic magazine Mu'askar al-Battar,
swearing allegiance to bin Laden. Zarqawi advocated the subjugation of
Shia Muslims and creation of a world-wide caliphate governed by sharia
(Islamic law).\16\ By this time, Zarqawi's organization, which he
renamed al-Qaeda in Iraq, had roughly 15 brigades operating under its
banner, including two ``martyr'' brigades dedicated to suicide
operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Letter from Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi to al-Qaeda leaders, circa
January 2004. Released by the Harmony Project, Combating Terrorism
Center, West Point.
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Al-Qaeda's second wave of terrorism was now under way. In May 2003,
a group with ties to al-Qaeda killed 45 people in Casablanca during a
series of suicide bombings. The same week, al-Qaeda operatives were
involved in multiple attacks in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, killing 34 people
and wounding 60 others. In August, a suicide car bomb detonated in
front of a Marriott hotel in Jakarta, Indonesia, killing 13 and
wounding 149 others. In November, there were multiple attacks in
Istanbul, which killed over 40 people and wounded more than 750. Then
came the Madrid attacks. On March 11, 2004, North African terrorists
carried 13 improvised explosive devices concealed in blue sports bags
into the Alcala station in Madrid, Spain. The attack left 191 dead and
1,755 injured, up to that point the largest number of casualties from
an attack in continental Europe since World War II. The operatives were
not members of al-Qaeda, but they were inspired by its ideology and
activities. In addition, some of the Madrid attackers had connections
to al-Qaeda operatives, such as Hamza Rabi'a, al-Qaeda's head of
operations in Europe and North America.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Fernando Reinares, ``The Madrid Bombings and Global
Jihadism,'' Survival, Vol. 52, No. 2, April-May 2010, pp. 83-104;
``Islamist Website Confirms Death of Key Player in Spanish Train
Bombing,'' El Pais, May 8, 2010.
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The following year, al-Qaeda struck London. On July 7, four suicide
bombers trained by al-Qaeda operatives conducted attacks in central
London. Three were on London's subway system, the Underground, and one
was on the No. 30 double-decker bus traveling east from Marble Arch.
Roughly 56 people were killed, including the four suicide bombers, and
over 700 were injured. The ringleader, Mohammad Sidique Khan, had
trained in al-Qaeda-affiliated camps in Pakistan.\18\
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\18\ Intelligence and Security Committee, Report into the London
Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005, Cm 6785, London: The Stationery
Office, 2006; Intelligence and Security Committee, Could 7/7 Have Been
Prevented? Review of the Intelligence on the London Terrorist Attacks
on 7 July 2005, Cm 7617, London: The Stationery Office, May 2009; House
of Commons, Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on
7th July 2005, HC 1087, London: The Stationery Office, May 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Much like during the first wave, however, the tide eventually began
to turn. Zarqawi's brutality in Iraq was too much even for some al-
Qaeda leaders. Members of the U.S. Army's 1st Brigade of the 1st
Armored Division, Marines from the I and II Marine Expeditionary Force,
CIA operatives, U.S. Special Operations Forces, and a host of agencies
provided intelligence, firepower, and--ultimately--trust in local
Iraqis to stand up for themselves. The wide-spread Sunni Arab Iraqi
revolt against al-Qaeda in Iraq became known as the Sunni Arab
Awakening, or sahwah in Arabic. The Awakening, which highlighted the
end of al-Qaeda's second wave, resulted from a complex range of factors
like egregious al-Qaeda abuses of the Sunni population, tribal
infighting, criminal disputes, U.S. engagement, elite payoffs, and the
surge of U.S. military forces.\19\ Sunni Arabs joined anti-al-Qaeda
militia groups and helped identify al-Qaeda leaders for targeting. The
results of the Awakening were clear: Al-Qaeda lost control and support
of the Sunni population in Iraq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ For better insight into the Awakening, see Niel Smith and Sean
MacFarland, ``Anbar Awakens: The Tipping Point,'' Military Review,
2008, pp. 65-76; Timothy S. McWilliams and Curtis P. Wheeler, eds., Al-
Anbar Awakening Volume I: American Perspectives, U.S. Marines and
Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004-2009, Quantico, Va.: Marine Corps
University Press, 2009; and Gary W. Montgomery and Timothy S.
McWilliams, eds., Al-Anbar Awakening Volume II: Iraqi Perspectives From
Insurgency to Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004-2009, Quantico, Va.:
Marine Corps University Press, 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Third Wave
But al-Qaeda eventually mounted a third wave of terrorism after
establishing a new front in Yemen, aided by a charismatic Yemeni-
American operative named Anwar al-Awlaki. In January 2009, al-Qaeda
publicly announced that Saudi and Yemeni operatives had unified under
the banner of a single group in Yemen, which they named al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula.\20\ Awlaki settled in the Shabwah Governorate of
Yemen and ran his global jihadi enterprise.\21\ He developed a blog
(www.anwar-alawlaki.com), which was later shut down. He also improved
his Facebook and MySpace pages and posted on YouTube and other social
media forums to spread his jihadi message. ``The Internet has become a
great medium for spreading the call of Jihad and following the news of
the mujahideen,'' Awlaki wrote.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Video by Al Malahim Media Foundation, al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula, January 2009.
\21\ New York Police Department, Special Analysis: Anwar al-Awlaki,
New York: New York Police Department, Counterterrorism Bureau, December
2009.
\22\ Anwar al-Awlaki, ``44 Ways to Support Jihad,'' February 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
By 2009, al-Qaeda--with operatives inspired by individuals like
Awlaki--was plotting attacks in the United States. In June 2009,
Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad, who had changed his name from Carlos
Bledsoe, opened fire with a semiautomatic rifle on a military
recruiting center in Little Rock, Arkansas, killing one soldier and
wounding another. He had listened to Awlaki's sermons and spent time in
Yemen.\23\ On November 5, 2009, a U.S. Army major, Nidal Malik Hasan,
gunned down 13 people and wounded 43 others at Fort Hood, Texas. Hasan
had first met Awlaki in 2001 at the Dar al-Hijrah mosque in Falls
Church, Virginia, where Awlaki was the imam. Hasan and Awlaki exchanged
at least 18 emails that discussed the afterlife, the appropriate time
for violent jihad, and how to transfer funds abroad without being
noticed by law enforcement.\24\
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\23\ Tommy Hudson, ``Arrest of Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad,''
officer's report, June 1, 2009; Federal Bureau of Investigation, Arrest
of Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammed, Little Rock, Arkansas: Federal Bureau
of Investigation, June 2, 2009.
\24\ New York Police Department, Special Analysis: Anwar al-Awlaki,
New York: New York Police Department, Counterterrorism Bureau,
Terrorism Threat Analysis Group, 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Al-Qaeda then attempted to strike again. Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab,
who was born in Nigeria, met with Awlaki several times and attended a
training camp in the Shabwah region of Yemen. On December 24, 2009,
Abdulmutallab boarded Northwest Airlines Flight 253 in Amsterdam, the
Netherlands, which was scheduled to arrive in Detroit, Michigan, on
December 25. The flight carried 279 passengers and 11 crew members.
Abdulmutallab wore a bomb in his underwear. The bomb ignited, injuring
Abdulmutallab and two other passengers, but the main charge failed to
go off and the airplane landed safely.\25\ It was a close call. But al-
Qaeda was undeterred. That same year, Najibullah Zazi, a U.S. citizen
from New York, met with senior al-Qaeda operatives in Pakistan. Zazi
agreed to execute one of al-Qaeda's boldest plots since September 11,
2001: A suicide attack on the New York City subway modeled, in part, on
the successful 2005 attack in London. The plot involved two other
Americans: Adis Medunjanin and Zarein Ahmedzay. Zazi conducted training
at al-Qaeda camps in Pakistan.\26\ Thanks to British and U.S.
intelligence and law enforcement agencies, Zazi's plot was thwarted.
The FBI arrested Zazi on September 19, 2009. On January 10, 2010, the
FBI arrested Adis Medunjanin and Zarein Ahmedzay.\27\
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\25\ United States of America v. Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, United
States District Court, Eastern District of Michigan, Criminal
Complaint, December 26, 2009.
\26\ U.S. Department of Justice, Zarein Ahmedzay Pleads Guilty to
Terror Violations in Connection with Al-Qaeda New York Subway Plot,
Washington: U.S. Department of Justice, April 23, 2010.
\27\ United States of America v. Ferid Imam, et al., United States
District Court, Eastern District of New York, Case 1:10-cr-00019-RJD,
Document 53, Superseding Indictment, July 7, 2010.
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By late 2010, however, the third wave began to decline because of
persistent U.S. action across the globe. U.S. strikes killed a number
of al-Qaeda allied leaders: External operations chief Saleh al-Somali
in Pakistan in December 2009, general manager Shaykh Sa'id al-Masri in
Pakistan in May 2010, senior al-Qaeda operations officer Abu `Abd al-
Rahman al-Najdi in Pakistan in September 2010, Abu Hamza al-Muhajir in
Iraq in April 2010, and Awlaki in Yemen in September 2011. The pace of
U.S. drone strikes increased under the Obama administration and
involved multiple U.S. intelligence agencies that recruited human
assets, intercepted electronic communications, and analyzed satellite
and other imagery. In May 2011, U.S. military and intelligence
operatives killed bin Laden, and Zawahiri took up his role as leader.
Fourth Wave
Around 2012, a fourth wave started as al-Qaeda took advantage of
the Arab uprisings and escalating wars in Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and
Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda also found itself in competition with the Islamic
State. Zawahiri remained al-Qaeda's leader, flanked by general manager
Abd al-Rahman al-Maghrebi and senior manager Abu Muhammad al-Masri. In
addition, a small number of al-Qaeda leaders remained in nearby Iran
with ties to the leadership, including Saif al-Adel and Abu Muhammad
al-Masri. But the core leadership had limited legitimacy and influence
over al-Qaeda's affiliates in Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia.
Most of al-Qaeda's power had trickled down to its affiliates.
In Syria, Jabhat al-Nusrah remained a key component of the
insurgency against the Syrian regime. In July 2016, Jabhat al-Nusrah
publicly announced a split with al-Qaeda, although in practice, Jabhat
al-Nusrah leaders, including Mohammed al-Jawlani, remained in close
contact with al-Qaeda. In January 2017, Jabhat al-Nusrah merged with
elements of Ahrar al-Sham and other jihadist groups to form Hay'at
Tahrir al-Sham, but the group continued to effectively function as al-
Qaeda's Syria branch.\28\ Al-Qaeda leaders urged Jabhat al-Nusrah and
other groups to conduct a guerrilla campaign against the Syrian regime
and establish sharia law in areas they controlled.\29\ From its base in
Syria, al-Qaeda plotted external attacks against Western targets,
though it failed to conduct an attack in the West.
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\28\ See, for example, U.S. Department of State, ``Rewards for
Justice: Reward Offer for Information on al-Nusrah Front Leader
Muhammad al-Jawlani,'' May 10, 2017.
\29\ Ayman al-Zawahiri, ``Sham Will Submit to None Except Allah,''
As-Sahab Media Foundation April 2017. The transcript and translation
are courtesy of the SITE Intelligence Group.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As civil war raged in Yemen, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
tried to expand its foothold in the Abyan, Marib, and Shabwah
Governorates. In April 2017, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula emir
Qasim al-Raymi outlined his strategy of fighting the Houthis and
building broad and deep support among Sunni groups and tribes in Yemen:
``By the grace of Allah, we fight [alongside] all Muslims in Yemen,
together with different Islamic groups. We fought with the Salafs
without exception. We fought with the Muslim Brotherhood and also our
brothers from the sons of tribes. We fought together with the public in
Aden and elsewhere. We participate with the Muslims in every
battle.''\30\
\30\ Thomas Joscelyn, ``AQAP Leader Discusses Complex War in
Yemen,'' Long War Journal, May 2, 2017.
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In September 2014, Zawahiri announced the creation of regional
affiliate al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, taking advantage of
sanctuaries in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh.\31\ As Zawahiri
argued, ``A new branch of al-Qaeda was established and is Qaida al-
Jihad in the Indian Subcontinent, seeking to raise the flag of jihad,
return the Islamic rule, and empowering the sharia of Allah across the
Indian subcontinent.''\32\ The group was led by Asim Umar, an Indian
and former member of Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami, a Pakistan-based
terrorist group with branches across the Indian subcontinent. Umar was
flanked by Abu Zar, his first deputy. In October 2015, U.S. and Afghan
forces targeted a large training camp in Kandahar Province, killing
over one hundred operatives linked to al-Qaeda in the Indian
Subcontinent.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ Ayman al-Zawahiri, audio message, September 2014.
\32\ Bill Roggio, ``Al Qaeda Opens Branch in the `Indian
Subcontinent,' '' Long War Journal, September 3, 2014.
\33\ Dan Lamothe, `` `Probably the Largest' Al-Qaeda Training Camp
Ever Destroyed in Afghanistan,'' Washington Post, October 30, 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
By 2017, al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent boasted several
hundred members and had cells in Afghanistan's Helmand, Kandahar,
Zabul, Paktika, Ghazni, and Nuristan Provinces. Al-Qaeda's presence in
Afghanistan was almost certainly larger and more expansive than 5 or
even 10 years before.\34\ This expansion may have been due partly to
Taliban advances in Afghanistan and al-Qaeda's relationship with
operatives from the Taliban and other groups, such as Tehreek-e-Taliban
Pakistan and Lashkar-e Jhangvi. Al-Qaeda operatives in Bangladesh were
particularly active, conducting a range of attacks. In addition, al-
Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent conducted a steady propaganda campaign
from its media arm, As-Sahab. However, the group conducted few attacks
in Afghanistan or Pakistan and was largely irrelevant in the Taliban-
led insurgency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ See Richard Esposito, Matthew Cole, and Brian Ross,
``President Obama's Secret: Only 100 al-Qaeda Now in Afghanistan,'' ABC
News, December 2, 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
how al-qaeda might return
Despite al-Qaeda's persistence, it has struggled to be relevant. It
remains a loose, overlapping, and fluid series of networks across
multiple regions. Zawahiri has been a controversial leader, who lacks
bin Laden's charisma and ability to inspire foot soldiers. As Zawahiri
emphasized in his ``General Guidelines for Jihad,'' published in 2013,
al-Qaeda's ``military work first targets the head of (international)
disbelief, America and its ally Israel, and second its local allies
that rule our countries.'' He explained that the ``purpose of targeting
America is to exhaust her and bleed her to death'' by, in part, baiting
the United States to overreact so that it suffered substantial human
and financial losses.\35\ But al-Qaeda has conducted few successful
attacks in the West over the past several years. One exception was in
France. Said and Cherif Kouachi, who trained in Yemen with al-Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula, were involved in the January 2015 attack against
the French satirical weekly newspaper Charlie Hebdo in Paris. The
attack killed 12 people and injured 11 others. Most of al-Qaeda's
violence has been directed at near-enemy targets in countries like
Syria, Yemen, and Somalia. In addition, al-Qaeda has failed to inspire
many attacks overseas, unlike the Islamic State.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ Ayman al-Zawahiri, ``General Guidelines for Jihad,'' Al-Sahab
Media Establishment, 2013.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is unclear whether al-Qaeda will be able to establish a fifth
wave that might include an increase in territorial control, recruits,
and global attacks. Several factors may impact the rise--or decline--of
al-Qaeda over the next several years. Most of these factors are outside
of al-Qaeda's control, though much would depend on how al-Qaeda or
other Salafi-jihadist groups responded to them.
First, the withdrawal of U.S. or other Western military forces--
particularly special operations forces, air power, or smaller numbers
of conventional military forces that train, advise, and assist foreign
partners--from jihadist battlefields might contribute to a resurgence
by al-Qaeda or other Salafi-jihadist groups. Examples include the
withdrawal of U.S. or other Western forces from Yemen, Afghanistan,
Syria, Iraq, Somalia, or Libya. U.S. actions in these countries,
however limited, have served as a check against al-Qaeda and other
terrorist organizations. The U.S. and Soviet exit from Afghanistan in
the late 1980's and early 1990's contributed to the country's further
deterioration and the rise of the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The U.S.
withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 contributed to a resurgence of al-Qaeda,
the rise of the Islamic State, and the spread of extremist ideology
across the region. Other American disengagements, such as Lebanon in
1984 and Somalia in 1994, contributed to further war after American
forces withdrew.
Second, another round of the Arab Spring or the collapse of one or
more governments in the Arab world might allow al-Qaeda or other
Salafi-jihadist groups to strengthen. Instability in some countries
(such as Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, or Egypt) or continuing war in
others (such as Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, or Somalia) could
provide al-Qaeda or other jihadist groups with key sanctuaries. Among
the most significant reasons for al-Qaeda's fourth wave was a weakening
of governance during the Arab Spring. According to World Bank data,
levels of political stability across the Middle East and North Africa
dropped by 8 percentage points from 2010 to 2015, government
effectiveness by 5 percentage points, regulatory control by 4
percentage points, rule of law by 4 percentage points, and control of
corruption by 4 percentage points. Levels were low across South Asian
countries like Afghanistan as well. Governance was virtually
nonexistent in countries that saw a rise in al-Qaeda and other Salafi-
jihadist activity.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators Data Set, accessed
May 11, 2017.
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Third, events that highlight the oppression of Muslims by Western
governments could increase the possibility of a resurgence by al-Qaeda
or other Salafi-jihadist groups. In 2004, the U.S. television show 60
Minutes II broke a story involving abuse and humiliation of Iraqi
inmates by a group of U.S. soldiers at the Abu Ghraib prison. The
uncensored Abu Ghraib photographs appeared on jihadist websites and
were used for recruitment purposes. A similar situation could be used
by Salafi-jihadist groups for propaganda. In addition, the United
States or other Western countries could over-react to a terrorist
attack on their soil and implement domestic policies that broadly
target Muslims and create a ``war against Islam.'' Such a development--
which occurred during World War II, when the United States relocated
approximately 120,000 Japanese, many of whom were American citizens, to
internment camps--could increase radicalization and recruitment for al-
Qaeda and other groups.
Fourth, the rise of a charismatic al-Qaeda leader might help al-
Qaeda revitalize. Bin Laden was an inspirational leader, as was Awlaki.
Fluent in English and adept at giving eloquent talks on Islam, Awlaki's
stirring lectures earned him a growing cadre of followers and inspired
numerous individuals to plot terrorist attacks. His lectures were
available on the internet, and his CDs were sold in Islamic bookstores
around the world. Awlaki operated his own blog and was active on
several social networking sites. Other al-Qaeda leaders, such as
Zawahiri, have been far less charismatic. But this could change. In
2016, al-Qaeda leaders began to promote one of bin Laden's sons, Hamza,
in their propaganda. In May 2017, al-Qaeda labeled Hamza bin Laden a
``shaykh,'' suggesting that they might be considering him for
leadership. While it is unclear whether Hamza bin Laden will emerge as
a charismatic leader, such a development could help increase global
support for the movement.
Fifth, large-scale deployment of U.S. or other Western military
conventional forces to key Islamic battlefields, however unlikely,
could increase the possibility of a resurgence by al-Qaeda or other
Salafi-jihadist groups. The U.S. deployment of conventional forces to
fight terrorists overseas has generally failed to stabilize countries
and has often been counterproductive.\37\ In Iraq, for instance, the
U.S. conventional presence contributed to radicalization. Large numbers
of U.S. forces in Muslim countries tend to facilitate terrorist
recruitment. Many of the extremists involved in U.S. homeland plots
after September 11, 2001--such as Jose Padilla, Nidal Hassan,
Najibullah Zazi, and Faisal Shahzad--were motivated, in part, by the
deployment of large numbers of U.S. combat troops in Muslim countries
and by a conviction, however erroneous, that Muslims were the helpless
victims of the United States.\38\ At the moment, it is unlikely that
the current administration or the U.S. population would support the
large-scale deployment of military forces to fight terrorism. But some
Americans might rethink this possibility after a major terrorist attack
on U.S. soil.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ Barry R. Posen, ``Pull Back: The Case for a Less Activist
Foreign Policy,'' Foreign Affairs, Vol. 92, No. 1, January/February
2013, pp. 116-128.
\38\ Seth G. Jones, Hunting in the Shadows: The Pursuit of Al
Qa'ida Since 9/11, New York: W.W. Norton, 2012.
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Sixth, the collapse of the Islamic State--particularly its core so-
called caliphate area of Iraq and Syria--and the death of charismatic
leaders like Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi might allow al-Qaeda or other groups
to rejuvenate. The further weakening or collapse of the Islamic State
could also increase the possibility of a merger between fighters loyal
to both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State under one umbrella--or even to
the emergence of a new group.\39\
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\39\ On the merger of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State see Bruce
Hoffman, ``The Coming ISIS-al Qaeda Merger,'' Foreign Affairs, March
29, 2016; and Soufan, 2017.
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conclusion
Over the course of its existence, al-Qaeda has faced numerous
challenges. One has been a failure to hold territory where the group or
its allies could impose their extreme interpretation of Islamic law.
Al-Qaeda leaders developed a close relationship with Mullah Omar's
Taliban in the 1990's and established a sanctuary in Afghanistan, only
to lose it by late 2001 after the 9/11 attacks. Al-Qaeda affiliates in
Yemen, Syria, Somalia, Algeria, and Mali also consistently failed to
hold territory because of poor leadership, incompetent governance,
limited local support, excessive violence, internal tensions, and other
factors. Another problem has been a lack of overall Muslim support. In
a brusque letter to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 2005, Zawahiri remarked
that ``we are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds'' of
Muslims.\40\ Yet bin Laden, Zawahiri, and other al-Qaeda leaders
consistently failed to translate this recognition into practice. Public
opinion polls show that Muslim views of al-Qaeda are consistently
negative. ``Strong majorities in most countries have unfavorable
opinions of the group, founded by Osama bin Laden more than a quarter
century ago,'' concluded one poll conducted in 14 Muslim countries.\41\
Al-Qaeda's lack of popular support has been a chronic problem.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\ Letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, July
9, 2005.
\41\ Pew Research Center, ``Concerns about Islamic Extremism on the
Rise in the Middle East,'' July 1, 2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Al-Qaeda is a different organization today than it was even a
decade ago. It is less centralized, less focused on external operations
(at least for the moment), and less popular. But the Islamic extremism
that al-Qaeda represents will not go away soon. The ideology will
likely survive in some form. Conflicts in the Middle East, Africa, and
Asia are likely to continue, with support from some terrorist networks
in the West. Al-Qaeda's leaders do not control the circumstances that
lead to its waves of resurgence, but rather position the al-Qaeda
enterprise to take advantage of these circumstances. It is unclear
whether al-Qaeda or other Salafi-jihadists will be able to rebound in
the future. And even if there is a resurgence, it could be led by al-
Qaeda, the Islamic State, a new organization, or a mix of Salafi-
jihadist groups. Such a revival will likely hinge on a group's ability
to take advantage of opportunities like the withdrawal of small numbers
of U.S. or other Western forces from key battlefields; a second wave of
the Arab Spring; a rising perception of U.S. or other Western
oppression of Muslims; the rise of a charismatic leader; a large-scale
conventional deployment of U.S. or other Western forces; or the
collapse of the Islamic State.
Mr. King. Thank you, Dr. Jones. I will start with the
questions. Maybe you can tell us what is known about Hamza bin
Laden other than being his father's son? Do we have any
analysis of him? Would he have support? Dr. Jones mentioned
that he has a certain charisma. But let me just--so you, Ms.
Zimmerman, any knowledge you have of Hamza bin Laden?
Ms. Zimmerman. I have only seen very limited knowledge, and
that is what has been contained in the released Abadabah
documents and how the al-Qaeda leadership was treating him. Bin
Laden kept him very much protected for fear that he would be
used against bin Laden.
We do see efforts to groom Hamza, so I think that you are
going to see him increasingly on the global stage. He had been
releasing one statement a year, and then we just saw two this
year.
So I think that we are gonna see him actually try to fill
the gap that pressure on ISIS has generated in terms of the
ISIS propaganda with Hamza calling a younger generation to
Islam.
Mr. King. Yes.
Ms. Cafarella.
Ms. Cafarella. Yes. I would add simply that we do have some
indications inside of Syria that al-Qaeda's local presence in
Syria is actually assisting in building the image of Hamza. We
have indications, for example, of al-Qaeda Syrian affiliate
Jabhat al-Nusra referencing Hamza in lessons to children in
Sharia camps.
So there have been--there is a video that comes to mind
immediately of little children, including foreign fighter
children in one of these camps, referencing Hamza as a model
for their own development.
Mr. King. OK.
Dr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. Well, we know that Hamza spent considerable time
after 9/11 in Iran, where some of al-Qaeda's management council
leaders were located. He would have interacted most likely
extensively with some of al-Qaeda's senior leaders in Iran,
including Saif al Adel, who was a colleague of Bin Laden's.
I think when you look around al-Qaeda right now, it
probably lacks a very strong inspirational leader. Across the
board it has got Muhammad al Jawlani in Syria. It has got some
senior officials in Yemen.
Bin Laden with his Arab background, may represent--Hamza
with his Arab background may represent someone that is more
inspirational across multiple fronts, which is what al-Qaeda is
trying to do.
But I think he is untested in many ways. So I think it is
unclear right now how well he is received by foot soldiers
across al-Qaeda's affiliates.
Mr. King. Are there any known competitors to him, any
rivals within the network?
Mr. Jones. Well, I would say there are senior rivals in the
organization. I mean just to take one, Saif al Adel served on
the inner shura for Bin Laden. He has most likely been residing
in Iran. He is Egyptian.
But whether he is a charismatic leader is certainly an open
question. But I think he would be somebody who would be
considered a replacement for Zawahiri if he were to be killed.
Mr. King. OK. Two areas where ISIS made very strong inroads
is in attracting foreign fighters and also in almost a
psychological use of the internet, seeing that they were able
to go beyond the ordinary base and even appeal to people on the
fringes of society. Does al-Qaeda--have they shown any ability
to carry on that way?
I will start with Ms. Zimmerman.
Ms. Zimmerman. Al-Qaeda's ability to recruit foreign
fighters is still much lower than that of ISIS, because al-
Qaeda hadn't weaponized the internet, as you noted. But al-
Qaeda has sustained its networks to draw in foreign fighters to
the various fights.
It is prioritizing the network into Syria, seeing that that
jihad against the Assad regime as the primary fight for the
defense of Muslims, and that is how al-Qaeda globally is
characterizing the Syrian fight. I expect that al-Qaeda is
still drawing on that population, and it has networks inside of
Europe, which I know that Jennifer can explain more fully.
I think that we are at risk of minimizing the concept that
these foreign fighters aren't going to go anywhere if ISIS
disappears, where a lot of them aren't mobilizing just for
ISIS. They are mobilizing, because they see the Salafi-jihadi
movement, the requirements to defend the Sunni as being
something obligatory upon themselves. ISIS' call right now is
loudest, but it is not the only one.
Mr. King. Ms. Cafarella.
Ms. Cafarella. Absolutely. So I would add one example,
which is that many of the foreign fighter units actually that
ISIS has been deploying against Europe, many of those were
originally al-Qaeda units and ended up flipping jerseys, so to
speak, after the schism between al-Qaeda and ISIS.
This is noteworthy in one particular way, insofar as we
have open-source information about the ISIS bombmakers in
Europe, the individuals actually building the explosives used
in the high-casualty attacks, such as Paris and Brussels.
Those bombmakers, in many instances, have been originally
trained by al-Qaeda as part of al-Qaeda's foreign fighter
program and local war effort inside of Syria. So I would
highlight that as a particular overlap and risk.
Al-Qaeda does still have its own foreign fighter units
inside of Syria that fight on the battlefield, are recruiting
and have actually begun to deploy back to their home countries.
I have less open-source information about active al-Qaeda
deployments into Europe, although I suspect that they are
there, in terms of foreign fighter returns.
But we do have instances, most notably the Turkistan
Islamic Party, which is the Uyghur foreign fighter group that
al-Qaeda inside of Syria has recruited, trained, and then begun
to deploy back home.
The way that al-Qaeda--my final point is the way that al-
Qaeda harnesses actually the media coverage of the Assad
regime's brutality is of particular concern.
So while al-Qaeda, as Katie noted, had not been as adept at
the social medial penetration and that kind of recruitment as
ISIS was, al-Qaeda with its moderate image has actually managed
to get its clerics on the BBC and in Western press and has
managed to influence local reporters inside of, for example,
rebel-held Aleppo, that very subtly championed the al-Qaeda
interpretation of events, while covering the brutality of the
Assad regime's war effort. I think that is a particular concern
moving forward.
Mr. King. Thank you.
Dr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. Just briefly, two points. One is that I think
al-Qaeda has had some trouble inspiring people in the West to
conduct attacks. Most of the individuals that I have looked at
that have conducted or plotted attacks have generally been
inspired by or at least have noted their inspiration by ISIS.
I think that, in part, reflects Zawahiri's less than
charismatic view and probably also reflects ISIS' control of
the caliphate, which attracted a number of individuals.
But I would highlight a couple of exceptions. One is Awlaki
still from the grave is inspiring individuals, and we can see
that in individuals that have plotted or conducted attacks in
the West.
There have been connections with Yemen, you know, the
Charlie Hebdo attacks. Cherif Kouachi did train with al-Qaeda
in Yemen. We see with the Boston bombings, and I think we would
see more recently cases where magazines like Inspire are
facilitating or helping people build crude bombs.
So I think there are ways that al-Qaeda certainly has
reached its hand in, even though it has not been, in my view,
as effective as ISIS in inspiring, to this date anyway.
Mr. King. Thank you.
Miss Rice.
Miss Rice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to start with you, Dr. Jones. You mentioned,
when you gave the list of six factors that could affect the
rise of al-Qaeda, you mentioned one or more events that
highlights the suppression of Muslims by the West.
I wonder if you can tell us what effect you think the
travel ban has on al-Qaeda's recruitment capabilities, and how
it relates to that one point that you made about actions of the
West that could give rise to the resurgence and continued power
of al-Qaeda?
Mr. Jones. Thanks. That is a good question. I think on the
travel ban, I think it is a little early to know the impact
that it has had. I mean, when you look at the jihadist social
media sites, it certainly has been highlighted by a certain
number of groups as a cause for attempting to inspire
individuals to conduct attacks. Whether and to what degree that
has been successful is unclear right now.
I still think it's important to consider a range of other
variables in looking, not just at the travel ban, but other
variables, like U.S. actions overseas pulling out or putting in
large numbers of forces.
I think my final point would be just in terms of the travel
ban itself, when you look at most plots and attacks in the
United States, and there was a pretty good report that came out
of G.W., George Washington University recently, most of these
had been done by individuals that did not come into the United
States as refugees. They were Americans that radicalized.
So there will be a large chunk of potential threats that
will be well outside of this ban. I would also note that the
range of countries not on it, that I think a range of us would
be concerned about, including Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Miss Rice. So this morning I was at a breakfast where we
spoke with the Afghanistan's Ambassador to the United States.
He was talking about how al-Qaeda, ISIS, a bunch of these
terrorist organizations are really truly alive and well in
Afghanistan. There are instances of them working together,
whereas maybe they didn't before.
They are not being so ideological maybe as you would think
that they would. They are not as much in competition as they
are trying to maybe work together.
So this is really a question to all three of you. This is
just in Afghanistan, but I am sure that, you know, obviously,
they are a joint presence in Syria and elsewhere. To what
extent do you see that? Is it competition? Is it coordination?
Is it a combination of the two, and how do we address that?
We can start with you, Ms. Zimmerman.
Ms. Zimmerman. It is an excellent question, and I actually
think that we have done a disservice to ourselves by talking
about the competition between al-Qaeda and ISIS because the
competition between the two groups is literally, is minor
ideological disagreements that are within the Salafi-jihadi
ideology.
They both share the same end-state, and it is the
leadership levels that are arguing over what the right strategy
is and how to pursue it, where the Islamic State believes that
you need to build a state at the same time as military conquest
and that the conditions are set today for that.
Al-Qaeda has a much longer-term strategy to build the
conditions in order to emerge victorious. I would say that
action against ISIS has somewhat validated al-Qaeda's strategy.
But at the lower levels, even at the group level, the
affiliate level, and certainly at the foot soldier level, it is
not an ideological competition. It is not a place where you can
draw a line between an ISIS fighter and al-Qaeda fighter.
Most of the local fighters are fighting in support of their
local community or because the group is paying them or because
it happens to be the only group that is acting against the
government or another source of grievance.
They are not as concerned with this idea of the Islamic
State or of the idea of al-Qaeda. Certainly, the foreign
fighters make a distinction, but the local fighters in each of
these conflicts don't.
What we saw after the rise of the Islamic State was that
the al-Qaeda network remained very cohesive. The groups that
were on the periphery, the ones that didn't fully share al-
Qaeda's strategic doctrine were the ones that split to ISIS not
because they thought that ISIS was better, but because ISIS had
delivered what they were looking for, delivered the caliphate,
and they had delivered it with access to resources.
So what we saw were fighters flipping inside of Yemen
because the ISIS fighters were making twice as much as the al-
Qaeda fighters were. We can see fighters flipping inside of
Libya and elsewhere, because to declare the caliphate in Sirte,
Libya, immediately generated attention to their cause and drew
in additional fighters.
We need to understand that both al-Qaeda and ISIS are part
of the same movement, which is on the rise, frankly, and that
if we were to just focus on the groups, we are going to end up
with the same problem of strengthening one over the other. That
is why we need to draw back and actually depress both al-Qaeda,
ISIS, and the movement writ large.
Mr. King. Ms. Cafarella.
Ms. Cafarella. Yes. Absolutely. Thank you for the question,
because I agree with Katie. I think it is a very, very real
important one, especially at this phase, as Mosul falls, and
Raqqa, hopefully, will follow.
The word, actually, I would use to describe al-Qaeda and
ISIS inside of Syria, but it scales globally, is deconflict.
Al-Qaeda deconflicts its operations with ISIS in order to
avoid, actually, expending resources fighting a near peer that
is pursuing the same goals.
So al-Qaeda actually was in control of most of southeastern
Syria along the Euphrates River Valley, southeast of Raqqa
City, the terrain that ISIS now controls in 2013.
In 2014 al-Qaeda basically handed that terrain over to ISIS
and withdrew in order to use its resources against the Assad
regime in western Syria rather than contest ISIS in
southeastern Syria. So I think that is a very good example,
actually, of the pragmatic decision making from al-Qaeda's
perspective.
The second is that al-Qaeda benefits from ISIS' existence
because ISIS' brutality allows al-Qaeda to seem moderate in
comparison. So al-Qaeda actually needs ISIS in some respects to
be as successful as al-Qaeda has been in pitching to Syrians,
but also disenfranchised Muslim communities elsewhere that,
hey, ISIS is extreme. We are just al-Qaeda. We are here to
defend you and your families.
That narrative is incredibly powerful. Without ISIS to
compare themselves to they would have a harder time with that
narrative. So I would highlight that for your consideration.
Miss Rice. Dr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. I agree with what my two colleagues have noted.
Two quick comments. One is I do think there is a fair amount of
both competition and cooperation on the competition side. To
take your Afghanistan example, ISIS was severely pushed back in
southern Afghanistan, in Helmand, and Farah Province.
Thanks to both the Taliban and al-Qaeda that were operating
in the south, that is in part because ISIS put on a pretty
serious ideological campaign in its magazines like ``Dabiq''
denigrating al-Qaeda. There was pretty intense competition, I
think there has been, to some degree, in the East, but we have
also seen deconfliction and cooperation.
I would note again in the Charlie Hebdo attack in France,
that included networks both with an ISIS connection. That is
Coulibaly, as well as with Kouachi, who had trained with al-
Qaeda. So there was cooperation in a major Western attack.
I think what it does suggest is when we have local groups
in these wars, whether it is Iraq or Syria or Afghanistan
filling this vacuum, these groups will fill it. That is my
concern.
Miss Rice. Well, I have gone well over my time. I am hoping
we are going to have a second round because I have a lot of
other questions, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. King. Mr. Perry.
Mr. Perry. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to the panel
for being here. There seems to be a great deal of pushback, at
least in some circles politically, against the idea that the
war on terror, if we can still use that terminology, is a clash
of civilizations, but that is exactly how our enemies frame it.
I think it is interesting that we choose our enemy's
framing of things when it suits our purposes, like the travel
ban, which to me is geographic and very pointed. It has nothing
to do with religion, but it is geographic. Then we disregard it
when it doesn't suit our purposes.
But I think a fair view of the two sides see that the two
cultures, our culture and their culture, is diametrically
opposed. I think that we probably at least can agree on that.
In any case, toxic religious ideology, in my opinion, can't be
apologized for without sacrificing lives on the altar of
political correctness.
So my question for you is this: How important to victory,
to eventual victory--and like you said it is gonna be around
for a long time, I think we recognize that as well--but how
important is it to victory in that we acknowledge and
effectively repudiate the toxic ideology, whether it is al-
Qaeda or ISIS and all the various different groups?
It is an ideology they are talking--ISIS to me, and al-
Qaeda or Boko Haram, that is methodology, right, not ideology?
But how important is it in repudiating the ideology fueling
radical or fundamentalists? Maybe it is not even radical? Some
people don't consider it radical, right? Fundamentalist, right?
These people are the ones that are following the Quran and
the radicals are the ones that are more secular in their mind,
right? So I would use fundamentalist Islamic terrorism. How
important to victory is that we acknowledge and effectively
repudiate? That is the question. Anybody? Everybody?
Mr. Jones. I think it is absolutely essential. I think the
challenge that the United States faces right now is that the
most talked about tool continues to be the military tool, which
is an important one. But I think this ideology will die, and I
think it will die eventually, only when it fails to recruit
individuals and bring them into its fold as supporters.
I think when you look at polling data for both ISIS and al-
Qaeda, what you see even in the Arab world, is very limited and
in most cases declining support for its extremist views across
large-scale populations. That is why I think it is important to
distinguish between these organizations and ideologies which
are a minority and larger populations.
But I think where there has been some success against these
groups, French efforts in Mali, and Rand has done some work on
that, Saudi efforts against al-Qaeda in the 2003, 2004 period
and then some efforts, including by the Jordanians to keep them
at bay. They have been effective at leveraging locals to push
back on the ideology and denigrate it.
I think that has been important, including getting former
members of the group to talk about what life was like while
they were members, or for those people in Mosul or Fallujah and
Ramadi who had to live under the Islamic State. I think that
stuff needs to get out there more.
Mr. Perry. Why doesn't the U.S. Government have its own
counterpart to something like Inspire or Dabiq, including those
things that we send out to those very same populations? Is that
a consideration? Do you know?
I mean maybe you are not the person to answer that
question, but it seems to me, that that would be like a minimum
part of a strategy that is outside of the military component.
Ms. Cafarella. Sure. I would add simply that I do think
countering the ideology is a necessary component of our
strategy. But I think it is far from sufficient, and I actually
would argue that it shouldn't be the main effort.
Look, the reason why ISIS and al-Qaeda have resurged--I am
going to focus on the Middle Eastern theater because that is
where I have studied this most closely.
The reason why ISIS was able to resurge in Iraq is not
first and foremost because of its ideology. It has because of
residual military capability that ISIS held on to when the
United States withdrew.
It is because the government of Nouri al Maliki executed a
series of very sectarian policies that alienated the Sunni
population. ISIS only actually resurged to the level of
strength to take major cities after a Sunni protest movement
against the government emerged, which was not ideological in
nature. But it was about countering repression and demanding
basic rights.
That is what ISIS hijacked. That is the core problem. It is
a reality problem at the root of even the ISIS phenomenon. I
don't mean to discount the importance, again, of engaging with
the ideology, but only to say that if we focus solely on the
ideology, we will fail to address the roots of the actual
problem.
Mr. Perry. So I am almost out of time for round one, but
since, in my opinion--and you are the expert, I am not. But
since ISIS didn't necessarily--the genesis isn't necessarily in
Iraq, but it is more in Syria, right, and then moved into Iraq,
didn't that sectarian situation with Maliki and the oppressive
policies toward the Sunnis just offer the opportunity for ISIS
to move into Iraq, take the territory, and continue with the
ideology as opposed to being that--I think in your argument you
are somewhat contending that that is the genesis of ISIS, where
I would contend it is not.
Ms. Cafarella. Sure, yes. So I would clarify only to say
that I do agree with you that the genesis of ISIS and why ISIS
is fighting is an ideological war. I am arguing that in order
to defeat ISIS we need to deprive it of civilian support----
Mr. Perry. Concur.
Ms. Cafarella [continuing]. Or civilian tolerance.
Mr. Perry. I----
Ms. Cafarella. And that that is decisive.
Mr. Perry. Just to clarify, there are folks that will tell
us as Americans that the reason the ideology exists is because
these people are impoverished and they don't have work----
Mr. King. Mr. Perry.
Mr. Perry [continuing]. Or they, you know?
Mr. King. I was going to give Ms. Zimmerman another chance
if she wanted to reply.
Mr. Perry. I just want to reject that theory. But thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Zimmerman.
Ms. Zimmerman. Thank you. I reject that theory as well,
Congressman. So I think that to answer both of your questions,
one, the United States shouldn't have the counter to Dabiq or
Inspire because it is not our role to inform what ideology is
correct.
I think that that voice is actually quite strong in the
Muslim majority world, where mainstream Islam rejects the
tenets held by these groups, by al-Qaeda and ISIS almost
entirely.
We are treating this ideology like it is new, and it is
not. It has been in existence since the 1960's. But it has
really only threatened the United States at the scale that it
has in Europe as well for the past 6 years, since the Arab
Spring and since we saw al-Qaeda and then the rise of ISIS
catapult Salafi-jihadism forward.
I actually have a report that I will leave with you. But it
looks at the reasons why this ideology is existing and how it
has been rejected repeatedly by Muslim societies for decades.
You can look at North Africa as a great example of societies
that had very strong groups that were pushed out once the
population was given a choice.
I think that this is where we do need to be looking at
countering the ideology for its foreign fighter recruitment. We
do need to be looking at the sectarian policies, but it is
really taking our strategy and reorienting it not on the enemy.
What can we do against the enemy? How can we prevent the enemy
from attacking us?
But how do we orient on the population? How do we make the
population free to choose again to reject this enemy? Because
it has rejected it time and again. That is why the Anbar
Awakening was successful.
That is why the Egyptian Islamic Jihad was pushed out of
Egypt. It is an ideology that is counter to what these Muslims
want. The reason it is gaining attraction is because they feel
like they are under threat.
Mr. Perry. So my time has expired.
Mr. King. OK.
Mr. Perry. I thank the Chair for his indulgence and hope
for Round 2. But I am going to contend some of your points, but
thank you for your input.
Mr. King. Ms. Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Sorry. Let me thank the witnesses for
their testimony. There might be two of us on this panel that
were here during the Iraq War. I would say, Ms. Cafarella, you
are right, if I pronounced your name correctly, it was the
aftermath of the Iraq War that some of us opposed.
But the removal of Saddam, that was a given, but then his
guard, who some might say desired to just work. When that was
completely banished and forbidden by our policies they were
driven in quotes, and I will use this terminology, ``into the
underground'' and became the fodder for ISIL or at least the
armored individuals for ISIL.
But as Sunnis you are right. The leadership of Iraq, rather
than try to embrace all of the Iraqi people, including the
Shiites and the Sunnis, get them working and got rid of all of
the civil servants that happened to be Sunni. Certainly there
probably should have been some vetting.
That added to, I think, what the mixture is that has
carried forward. Am I correct in your assessment on that or
your thoughts on that?
Ms. Cafarella. Yes, I would largely agree.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So let me say that my interests, both in
this committee and the work that we have to do, is the
protection of the homeland. I think that is our focus, albeit
that we are connected to the world. So I am going to ask
questions that if you will be kind enough to just yes or no.
Then I want to pursue some line of re-questioning Dr. Jones
with you. I thank all of you for your testimony.
Is it your belief that focusing our policy such that we
create the framework for protecting the homeland is crucial.
Ms. Zimmerman? I just need the yes on the record or no.
Ms. Zimmerman. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. All right.
Ms. Cafarella.
Ms. Cafarella. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Dr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you. So I want to ask the question.
Under the present climate that we have, hopefully, the success
that we have now with Mosul and moving ISIL out, though I think
they will find another cave to be in.
Dr. Jones, what is the extent of the potential of
recruitment on our shores? How active would ISIL attempt to be
on our shores with recruitment? Would they find that to be an
effective tool that they could penetrate some of our
populations and make them recruits?
Mr. Jones. Well, I think there is no question when you look
at what ISIS leaders have said, including what they have
published, that they would love to recruit individuals in the
U.S. homeland for either inspired or directed attacks. I think
their comments on this are unambiguous.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me not leave out al-Qaeda. Would they
also be in there because there are a number of subs--I call
them subsets or subcommittees, subgroups. Would they likewise
potentially engage in that?
Mr. Jones. Again, I think there is no question, like ISIS,
al-Qaeda would like to inspire attacks. I would just note that
the name of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's magazine is
Inspire for this very reason. It is written in English for this
very reason.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Then we have a point that I will be
getting to. I am on the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity. We have
been talking about it for a decade, as I know some of my
colleagues have as well. That is the new weaponry from my
perspective.
Right now, we are engaged in a vigorous discussion of
Russia's large footprint on this whole question of cyber
weaponry which is, obviously, taking resources not from--but
our intelligence community has to utilize resources what--for
an entity, a KGB, that we would normally just want to know that
we disagree, know that we have different political
philosophies.
We would like to find a common path, I assume, that we
could work on certain issues. But we are ramped up to shore
ourselves against a cyber weaponry that Russia is using,
elections and others.
Can you comment on the threat of cybersecurity, and the
imbalance or the difficulty of trying to shore up against
Russia's intrusion that then makes us either, and I don't want
to suggest it, but less attentive maybe on the issue of the
cyber weaponry that can be used by the likes of these various
known terrorist groups?
Dr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. Sure. I am not an expert on Russian cyber
operations. But the broader issue, there have been some efforts
by jihadist groups, including ones we are discussing here, to
conduct operations, cyber operations.
I still think the more serious threat along this line is
the inspiration or the attempted inspiration through social
media of individuals in the West, including in the United
States.
In part I think, happy to go in this direction if you want,
there is a much more serious partnership with the private
sector, I think, that needs to occur. Both on the attempted
inspiration, on the cyber side, as well as on communications
between groups through encrypted apps that is critical as well.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, what I would--I know that you would
not have all the expertise, but what I was suggesting is with
the resources that our intelligence community has being now
having to focus on Russia's attacks on us, then we have these
known terrorist groups that we should be focusing on as well.
You would agree with that?
Mr. Jones. I would certainly agree and think that there are
threats to the United States coming from both state and, in
this case, extremist actors.
Ms. Jackson Lee. My last question is, and I think you made
mention of this, and I think this is a very astute point that
you made. First of all, we cannot fight this with a--how should
I say it--a nonmilitary terminology, boatload of weapons or
fight conventional wars to end terrorism.
So the idea of countering violent extremism, both in terms
of potential recruits here in the United States, so young
people, or social network, how crucial is that that we not
abandon that in terms of protecting of the homeland?
Mr. Jones. I think it is absolutely an essential component
to protect the homeland. I have a piece in The Wall Street
Journal yesterday, which looks at the ISIS threat in Iraq. And
notes that ISIS has a Plan B and C to use some of the Sunni
grievances to continue to inspire people to conduct attacks.
So the military instrument is certainly a part of this. But
I think efforts by the FBI, the Department of Homeland
Security, and not just for monitoring individuals, but for
working with local communities in the United States to identify
potential extremists and to work with the United States to
protect their own cities and communities is essential.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, let me thank you very much. I look
forward to working with you because I think that that, the
spreading across this Nation in terms of provokers, provoking
Muslims, then the idea of people buying into I have to go for
the fight or I have to be part of this fight against America, I
think it is crucial that we engage in countering violent
extremism.
Thank all the witnesses for their work.
Mr. King. The gentleman, from Texas, Mr. Hurd.
Mr. Hurd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also would like to
thank you. There are many things that I have to do in the
course of a day. This was something that I wanted to do because
I follow and read all of our panelists and what they write
about. So thank you all for being here.
My first question is to you, Ms. Cafarella. When you talk
about how in Syria al-Qaeda is proving or showing that they are
the only group supporting the local population, I saw similar
things with Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad during my time
in Muzaffarabad, Pakistan.
That the United States needs to have an anti-Assad strategy
because Assad is the reason that there was a civil war. Assad
is the reason that ISIS grew in Syria. In your opinion, what
should be the tenets of an anti-Assad U.S. strategy?
Ms. Cafarella. Sure. Well, this is something that we have
explored in depth at the Institute for the Study of War
because, you know, I don't mean to imply actually that there is
an easy way forward. There is not.
We have allowed the situation to deteriorate so far that
there simply are no good options left. The Iranians have
forward-deployed to an unprecedented level, for example, inside
of Syria now, in addition to the Russian deployment.
So this is a very difficult problem to unriddle. All I can
say is that doing nothing has led us to where we are now. So
the status quo is simply not an option.
I actually would argue we are not currently on a path to
defeat ISIS. Because in Syria, for example, our partnered force
against ISIS, the Syrian Kurdish YPG and some associated Arabs,
are pursuing a political ideology that is antithetical to what
actually the local population was originally pursuing.
Raqqa was the first provincial capital to be liberated from
the Assad regime. We are now helping the Kurdish force in
placing new political ideology that it is an open question
whether the locals will even accept.
So we need to begin. But I would submit to you that we
actually need to begin by rectifying our on-going efforts
against ISIS as the first place. We are currently doing more
harm than good.
We need to reorient our anti-ISIS effort and develop a
larger regional, actually, and global strategy to contain the
Russians and Iranians in order to create opportunity, actually,
to set the kind of conditions we need to inside of Syria to
ever set conditions for either a negotiated end to this war or
some kind of interim, you know, actual cessation of hostilities
that endures. We have never been close to that outcome.
Mr. Hurd. Thank you. Did either one of the other panelists
have an opinion? Then great.
Then Dr. Jones, I will turn it over to you, or ask this
question. You talk about one of the things that will ensure al-
Qaeda's return to prominence is Arab Spring, you know, or the
collapse of another government in the Arab worlds.
Where are you most concerned of that happening? Where do
you think that is most likely to happen? I recognize the answer
may be the same for both but I am curious in your opinion
there.
Mr. Jones. Well again, I think it would be a concern to see
a second round. I don't think it would guarantee the return or
the resurgence of al-Qaeda, but would certainly increase the
probability of a resurgence by al-Qaeda or other groups.
I think there are a number of countries I am concerned
about, or would be concerned about, the war spilling over into
Jordan, but I think they have been pretty good so far, Egypt in
part, economic and other conditions triggering broad unrest.
The one I would highlight though would be based on its next
door and proximity to Libya is Tunisia. It is a country that
the United States has spent some efforts trying to stabilize.
It is the first and potentially the most important. It is
the first democratic country as part of the Arab Spring. It has
been under severe strain because of its location next to Libya
and the large number of returning foreign fighters coming there
from Iraq and Syria.
I think it is a very fragile situation right now. It would
be concerning. I think it would be headlined as the first
democratic state in the Arab Spring destabilizing.
Mr. Hurd. Thank you. I am going to slip in a final question
to you, Ms. Zimmerman. A question I often ask of folks that are
experienced in this area, what day do we celebrate when it
comes to the global war on terrorism or ending, I should say,
the global war on terrorism?
Ms. Zimmerman. Congressman, that is a very difficult
question, as you know. I don't think that we celebrate at the
defeat of ISIS. I don't think we celebrate at the defeat of al-
Qaeda in whatever form it is.
I think we celebrate when we have enabled the Muslim world
to stabilize and to reshape what is legitimate and responsive
governance in the failed states that we see, where that is the
de-escalation of conflict inside of Mali, inside of Libya, in
Somalia, in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan.
Preventing the collapse or the disintegration of the states
in Egypt, in Niger, in Tunisia, watching Algeria very closely,
looking at the Indian subcontinent because it is incredibly
restive but not reported on and, you know, recognizing that we
have key interests in the broader stability of the region.
I think that once we reduce the grievances, the popular
grievances that are different in all of these contexts, I
recognize. I am advocating a very complex and challenging
solution.
But once we recognize that those grievances are reduced, I
think then Salafi-jihadi movement moves back into the shadows
and then we can celebrate victory.
Mr. Hurd. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the time
I do not have.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Hurd, at least you acknowledge it.
The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Keating.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to thank the witnesses.
Dr. Jones, in your written testimony, you, in your
conclusion, you said al-Qaeda is a different organization today
than it was a decade ago. It is less centralized, less focused
on external operations.
One point you put in parentheses, at least for the moment,
and second, less popular. Can you first give us some examples
of what you think has made them less popular? Something that we
should be aware of and maybe try and build on?
Mr. Jones. Sure. The available--and it is limited polling
data from places, including Pew, indicates decreasing
popularity. So the question is why?
That may be partially a result of what some perceive as the
successes, at least up until recently, of ISIS in establishing
territorial control and declaring a caliphate, that unlike al-
Qaeda some had gravitated toward ISIS because they had
territory and substantial amounts of territory to show for it.
That may be one key reason. Obviously that is changing quickly.
Mr. Keating. Right. Well, thank you. A question, you know,
I traveled to Tunisia not too long ago. But I also have had
conversations anecdotally with non-government citizens, just to
try and get their view on things.
When it came to the Islamic State and pro rata, they are
probably the leading country in foreign fighters in terms of
their population, this person explained to me that there really
wasn't initially any radicalized view.
That the economy is so bad that there are no alternatives
and that ISIS would come in and be able to say, ``Well, we are
going to take care of your family if something happens to you.
We are going to support you.''
Do you think that that is--what is your opinion, all the
panelists, generally? Do you think that oftentimes it is really
the economic issues, no radicalization, and then that comes
later on when they are, you know, connected with these groups,
either al-Qaeda or ISIS in that respect?
I mean, how much of that is what your research shows what
happens? What comes first do you think?
Ms. Zimmerman. I don't think that radicalization comes
first for most of the fighters, with the exception of, I think,
Western foreign fighters where they are radicalized before they
leave. Within the context of the Arab Muslim fighters that flow
into ISIS and al-Qaeda, some have radicalized, some haven't,
but you are right to point out the differences.
I wouldn't say that poverty or unemployment or a youth
followage is actually causing the draw and the radicalization.
I think that both ISIS and to some degree al-Qaeda exploit the
gaps. They are able to use different ways to draw people in
where it is----
Mr. Keating. What kind of ways do you----
Ms. Zimmerman. It is the lack of opportunity, so it is the
salary. It is the ability for Boko Haram to pay fighters, young
males, enough money so that they can then leave Boko Haram and
get married.
Mr. Keating. Are they making good on those promises?
Ms. Zimmerman. They are, and this is, you know, there are
different reasons why people fight. It is to defend their
community, to defend their livelihood, and in Syria and Iraq
many times it is to defend their lives.
Ms. Cafarella. I would simply add that to say, you know,
one of the reasons why al-Qaeda is powerful on the ground is
often because it is viewed as less corrupt. In many instances
it is. So the Free Syrian Army suffered a lot of corruption and
mismanagement actually that provided an open door for al-Qaeda.
But the real rift, I think, in terms of transitioning from
pragmatic support to ideological support in Syria is actually
the sense of profound injustice that many Syrians feel for what
they have endured for the past over 6 years.
My concern is not first and foremost that al-Qaeda is going
to convince the entirety of the Syrian opposition to go to war
with America, but rather that the next step that al-Qaeda will
make is to convince Syrians not to fight against global
attacks----
Mr. Keating. You mean, like----
Ms. Cafarella [continuing]. That the Syrians do perceive--
--
Mr. Keating. Yes, with the AQAP, for instance, it was a
breakdown of local services and then al-Qaeda has been moving
into that offering that stability. Is that----
Ms. Cafarella. Absolutely.
Mr. Keating [continuing]. A concern in Syria, too, as
things break down?
Ms. Cafarella. Absolutely. So al-Qaeda does provide that
kind of civilian services, everything, but the thing I am
worried about in Syria is al-Qaeda resuming external attacks at
some point. And Syrians saying, well, we have been suffering
attacks for 6 years and nobody cared, so why should I care
whether al-Qaeda attacks abroad?
Mr. Keating. Yes. Just a quick question that hasn't been I
don't think asked, quickly, Bangladesh. What are your concerns
with Bangladesh? We don't hear that much about that, but I
think it is a concern.
Mr. Jones. I think there is no question it is a concern if
you look at the increasing levels of violence that have been
perpetrated by groups associated with al-Qaeda in the Indian
subcontinent, as well as ISIS in Bangladesh.
We have a range of the conditions. We have already talked
about on this committee, on this panel, weak governance,
economic challenges, opportunities for fighters, and its
proximity to both Pakistan and Afghanistan active war zones
that make Bangladesh of concern.
Mr. Keating. Thank you. Any other comments?
Ms. Zimmerman. I just want to offer one anecdote, which is
the centrality of the Syrian conflict in all of these war zones
where an NGO worker relayed to me a story of why he asked
Muslims in Bangladesh why there is radicalization.
The response they got back was not jobs or unemployment or
questions about the government. But the question was what is
the United States doing in Syria? I think that we do need to
recognize the ripple effect that our actions have had in terms
of the perception that we have abandoned the Sunni inside of
Syria.
Mr. Keating. Well, thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chair.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Keating.
We will go for a second round of questions. Is that OK with
you? Great, OK. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11 and
certainly in several years afterwards, al-Qaeda was definitely
the center of the jihad world.
Today, assuming ISIS, you know, continues to decline, what
is al-Qaeda's relationship with AQAP, with Boko Haram, with al-
Shabaab and other groups that may be in the jihadist world?
Mr. Jones. Well, I can start. I mean, the core has clearly
been weakened. I think there has been some movement of some of
the key people from Pakistan into Afghanistan to take advantage
of some territory that has been taken by the Taliban and other
groups.
I would say there is a fair amount of autonomy that exists
with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. There are still some
strategic guidance, I would say, from senior leaders in South
Asia, including Ayman al Zawahiri. al-Shabaab, very concerning
links between its intelligence and external operations unit the
Amniyat and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
Al-Shabaab is mostly regional, but it continues to have a
close relationship with al-Qaeda to some degree and al-Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula.
Boko Haram is an interesting story. It has been, more
recently it has rebranded itself as ISIS in West Africa, but
Boko Haram is--there are a lot of divergences there. Bin Laden
had historically, we know, had conversations with senior Boko
Haram leaders.
Whether Boko Haram switches at some point is an interesting
question. But the bigger picture, I would say, is that the role
of a core or a central al-Qaeda is, in my view, fairly limited
right now.
Most of the operational planning and the day-to-day
activity is handled in Yemen. It is handled in Somalia. It is
handled in Syria and other locations, rather than being guided,
certainly implemented like a screwdriver from the Afghan-
Pakistan region.
Mr. King. Yes, Ms. Zimmerman.
Ms. Zimmerman. I would like to echo Seth's thoughts and lay
out that the way that I see the al-Qaeda affiliate nodes today
is somewhat mirroring and replicating the capabilities that the
core once had where they are all able or seeking the capability
to conduct external attacks. They do run day-to-day.
There are relationships that run between the groups, not
just al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and Yemen and al-Shabaab
in Somalia, but from al-Shabaab across the Sahara into the
Maghreb and the Sahel. There is a self-supporting network where
there is movement of personnel, resources, funding, expertise
throughout the al-Qaeda network.
That is something that our strategy of pushing hard against
one group, the group that is the most threatening to the United
States has not recognized. That a lot of the resources move
elsewhere.
Right now, the resources are flowing into Syria and that is
why the Syrian jihad has been so strong from the al-Qaeda
perspective, but we are looking at conditions where it will be
able to use the safe havens it has in Africa in particular to
reconstitute globally and push forward.
I think there is resilience within the network that we just
haven't recognized.
Ms. Cafarella. I would simply add briefly that the
affiliates are also coordinating with each other so you often
get joint statements actually by Sharia figures and, you know,
religious clerics within AQIM, AQAP, and Nusra inside of Syria.
So they are also developing out that echelon and enabling it to
communicate and coordinate with less oversight and input,
actually, from the senior leadership echelon.
Mr. King. Thank you. I don't have much time left, and you
may want to get back to me in writing on this, but we talk
about Syria and if ISIS is defeated or if ISIS is vanquished
there, what is the optimal realistic result for Syria?
I don't want to be impinging on the turf of the Department
of Foreign Affairs Committee, but from the extent of
marginalizing al-Qaeda, of reducing al-Qaeda, what is the most
we can realistically hope for if there is such a thing as a
final settlement in Syria?
Ms. Cafarella. Sure. I would say briefly it depends first
and foremost on what time line you are talking. So I think my
concern is that the United States will try to pursue a Syria-
wide outcome in the next 5 years that I do not assess is
possible, actually, to achieve. So I think we have to be very
humble about how much influence we currently have.
Mr. King. Are you saying--OK. Even in 5 years you don't see
it?
Ms. Cafarella. Even in 5 years, yes, because look, we still
have a ground war against ISIS, which is going to take years,
and we haven't even started operations against al-Qaeda. We
haven't even started operations to contain the Iranians or
undertaken any effort really to do that. So we are a very long
way.
But I do want to leave you with a hopeful note, which is
that it took over----
Mr. King. I have been waiting all morning for one.
[Laughter.]
Ms. Cafarella. Yes. It took over 6 years of absolutely
horrific violence----
Mr. King. Right.
Ms. Cafarella [continuing]. Against the Syrian population
almost completely unchecked for us to have this big of a
jihadist problem. That is good. This was originally a pro-
democracy uprising. It took insane conditions that these
populations were living under until these groups, these
ideological groups, were able to grow this strong.
That does give me hope actually that it is possible to
change this, recognizing how far we have come and how far we
have yet to go, but giving, you know, giving that hope where it
is due.
Mr. King. OK.
Dr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. I think in terms of optimal cases, I think if
one is looking at trying to dampen down the terrorist threat,
so that is ISIS and to some degree al-Qaeda through Jabhat al-
Nusra, a situation where U.S. efforts between Raqqa and Deir
Ezzor along the Euphrates River Valley, that ISIS loses
territory, and what gets put in place are organizations that
are most likely to be sub-state actors, Kurdish, Sunni Arab,
that effectively do not allow notable nodes of Jabhat al-Nusra
or other fighters into that area.
The Syrian regime continues to operate against Idlib and
other areas where we have al-Nusra. So that would mean a
dampening both in the East and the West against ISIS.
The concern is that the United States will with its special
operations forces continue to work with the SDF and then leave
after ISIS loses its territory, and in its place we may go back
to 2013 where we will see a pushback into that area from rebels
that have been mostly focusing on the west of Syria, Nusra, or
other organizations.
That would be my worst outcome is a move to fill that back
into that vacuum. So part of this hinges on who stays in play
along the Euphrates River Valley.
Mr. King. OK.
Miss Rice.
Miss Rice. So the common theme here, and really this is not
a political statement because I was, you know, pretty critical
of the previous administration's lack of a plan in Syria. That
is just continuing with this administration, so this is not a
Republican or Democratic thing.
We have got to come up with a plan. But one of the
overwhelming themes that, you know, I hear from this panel is
that it is clear that terrorist organizations are able to
flourish in areas that lack strong governmental institutions.
We are dealing with a budget now where the present
administration wants to cut the State Department's budget by 30
percent, and we have a Secretary of State who is saying I am
fine with that.
So that causes me great concern in a number of areas
because here we are talking about--you know, Ms. Zimmerman, you
talked before about how al-Qaeda is very, very good at going
into local communities and providing them life services, right,
water, food, electricity to gain their loyalty.
I juxtapose that to Dr. Jones, your comment before and your
list of things that could actually make things worse is you
quote a recurrent theme that large-scale conventional
deployment of U.S. troops to a battlefield could aid in
increasing the strength of these terrorist organizations.
So if that is going to make it worse, and a lack of
American presence, i.e., money, personnel, nongovernmental
organizations that are supported by our money, how do you
square that?
I mean, you know, Mattis himself said if you take away the
budget of the State Department and you decimate that, then I am
just going to have to buy more bullets, basically.
Again, this is not a political statement. You know, we have
to figure out exactly what the mix is. It is not just, solely
either/or, right? You have to show that you have a strong and
ready military.
But I think the first step should be investing like al-
Qaeda is in these local communities so that we can strengthen
them where they are and so we can address the issue that way.
So this is, like, that was just a mini therapy session
right there, me just getting my confusion here about what we
do? What do we do with this, and I would ask all three of you,
who are all obviously very learned in this area, if you could
just give us a little insight and your thoughts about that?
Ms. Zimmerman. Well, you have laid out the challenges very
well, and I think it is a big problem. It is part of the
strategic weaknesses that I referenced that al-Qaeda is
exploiting where U.S. personnel have withdrawn from areas that
are insecure and they are made insecure partially by the
presence of these groups, or the departure of American
personnel enables the arrival of these groups into the space.
I think that we do need to add some robust support to the
State Department for its efforts. I think that we also need to
pressure the State Department to start accepting more risk for
its personnel.
We are in an era today where our diplomats are only active
inside of an embassy behind a wall. It means that they are not
talking to the power brokers that are involved in the conflict.
They don't understand what is going on on the ground. Our
embassy for Yemen is, I have heard, fewer than 20 people. That
means that we don't have enough people to talk to the Yemenis
who are looking for a resolution to the civil war.
Everyone knows the conflict in Yemen doesn't have a
military resolution to it. Everyone knows that the Yemenis are
looking for that political solution and that meanwhile al-Qaeda
is growing inside of Yemen. Yet we are not actively shaping the
space for that dialog to happen.
In terms of addressing the places where al-Qaeda is
delivering services, I think that I just want to reframe it
from governmental institutions, which is obviously how our
government works, state-to-state to government institutions and
look at it from governance where a lot of these local
communities have systems to mediate conflict, have systems to
ensure that the population doesn't starve.
So the robustness and resilience within the community
itself is reliant upon governance and not the government
institution inside.
It needs to be a dual track where we both strengthen the
governmental institutions because that is how we are able to
transfer capabilities and fundamentally resourcing. One of the
reasons Yemen didn't make it through the Arab Spring was
because its own institutions were so weak it could only absorb
so much aid.
The challenges that it had helped catapult it back into
civil war, but also the governance at the bottom level where,
you know, particularly in Yemen we saw local populations asking
for support against al-Qaeda.
Because they were not the state there was no actor that
stepped in besides al-Qaeda to support them. That is the place
that we really need to find how to operate in that gray space.
Ms. Cafarella. I would add just briefly that it matters not
just if we have, you know, a State Department effort, but also
what we do with it. So I am going to give you one positive and
one very negative impact that the United States has had inside
of Syria through that effort.
The positive one is that we have been doing a lot of
programming, actually, in rebel-held Syria to support civil
society and local NGO's, you know, and political groups that
are connected to the moderate opposition.
That investment is very important because it did slow al-
Qaeda down. It was not enough to defeat al-Qaeda, but it was
very important in keeping alive that thread within the
opposition that al-Qaeda and Assad and the Russians and the
Iranians have all been trying desperately to destroy. So that
is a positive.
The negative thing is that the United States had been
backing the Geneva process for a negotiated settlement of the
war long after it became clear that the Geneva process would
never actually result in a negotiated settlement to the war
because Assad has never had any intent to negotiate.
The longer he has held on, the more the terrorist threat
has been real and the less power those opposition figures
willing to come to the table have had.
Actually investing in the Geneva process as long as we did
actually made true the al-Qaeda narrative that Syrians should
never expect the West to be helpful even in negotiations, that
Syrians can only expect to experience war. So I would highlight
that actually as a damaging use of State Department resources.
Mr. Jones. Just briefly, I think State and USAID have made
vital contributions. I have worked in past government lives
with organizations like OTI and USAID that I think are very
effective at local levels. I would add to several of the
comments already being made that a range of the locations we
are talking about right now, where we have al-Qaeda concerns,
take Somalia, we don't even have an embassy.
Miss Rice. Right.
Mr. Jones. Our embassy is based out of Nairobi, Kenya,
nearby. So this is risk aversion that if we are to get serious
about this we need people on the ground in the range of these
areas that aren't just military people.
My last comment is, again, I would also say that this does
not always have to be us. I find it somewhat disturbing, for
example, in Libya that our European allies have not stepped up
as much as I think they can, particularly after connections
between the Manchester attacks and Libya itself.
We have got the Italians, French, British equities at stake
in Libya. So in some cases I think these are allies who should
also, including their development agencies, that should be
stepping up.
Miss Rice. Well, but I totally agree with you there, but
this, what looks to be an American recession from Europe and
NATO and engagement at all feeds right into what you are
talking about. If we are not there, why should they be, you
know--oy.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. King. Mr. Perry.
Mr. Perry. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. So, you know, I have to
apologize up-front, but I have got to go into a little
editorial before I ask you a couple of questions. I am thinking
about, you know, the context of the conversation is al-Qaeda
and ostensibly the Department of Homeland Security exists
because of the actions of al-Qaeda.
Dr. Jones, you talked about we won't know the effects of
the travel ban for some time, but there is this contention, so
to speak, that the travel ban leads to recruiting.
I have got a news flash for everybody, but I don't really
think it is a news flash for you folks. Everything we do, the
fact that we are is a recruiting tool. So you can ascribe or
assign any portion of anything we do as Americans to
recruiting.
You know, I read a book called ``America Alone'' about 10
years ago about the demographics of Europe, right, and how it
was already lost 10 years ago. Now we are seeing the fruits of
the labor of their policies and their actions.
I think the travel ban seeks to--a geographic travel ban
seeks to provide some time and space to ensure that the vetting
process is correct so that we don't wholesale as Europe has
done, import the essential elements, right?
You said that the attacks on America haven't come from the
refugees or the people that have come directly. Well, in
Europe, at some point they could say the same thing, but years
on, years on, with Sharia courts, with no-go zones, this is
what they have fostered. This is what they have sown, right?
So what America is saying and what the travel ban is
saying, we want to take a breath, make sure we are doing the
right things so we don't sow those seeds, right? That is to me
what that is about.
Ms. Zimmerman, I couldn't agree with you more that America
shouldn't be the one that provides the counter to Dabiq and
Inspire, but your contention that the Muslim world is opposed
to this and that they have been vocal in that, maybe they have
been to some extent, but in my opinion it hasn't been
successful or we wouldn't be here, right?
When I think about Saudi Arabia, Wahhabism, Salafism, and
the wholesale exportation and funding of that, and let us not
just pick on the Sunnis.
You know, the Shia and the Knife Intifada and the
publications and so on and so forth, somebody has got to lead.
Apparently these folks aren't, or if they are they are doing a
poor job at it. We are suffering the consequences.
That is my point. But I get some of your points. I just
wanted to give the counter to that.
Moving on to a couple questions here. Al-Qaeda in Iraq once
there is a vacuum, once ISIS is fully defeated or generally
defeated in Iraq and Iran's Shia component seeks to re-
establish its network for guns and for ammunition and supplies
through Syria and so on and so forth.
Is al-Qaeda going to play in that space? Did they care? Are
they going to try and reserve some of that? Or are they just
going to allow Iran to have that wholesale, just as a
curiosity? What can we expect? Do you know?
Ms. Cafarella. I do expect al-Qaeda will attempt to exploit
that because, look, we have defeated ISIS in Mosul. There
remains a lot to go actually to defeat ISIS. It still holds
cities.
But we haven't actually addressed the core grievances,
again, that originally gave rise to ISIS. So it is unclear to
me whether Muslawi Sunni civilians are going to trust the
government in Baghdad now. That still remains to be seen.
That is still a vacuum, and al-Qaeda will attempt to
exploit it. So you have al-Qaeda clerics, for example, in Syria
already discussing the Iraqi government among the list of the
enemies of the Sunni people. So I think that is a given. Where,
how and when they are able to activate that capability I think
remains to be seen.
Mr. Perry. Fair enough. In the context of the whole hearing
generally, we have the perception--I do at least, and I just
want you to verify it if you can, because I have heard from
other people in your community. Al-Qaeda is at least as strong
if not stronger from an operation--maybe not operationally, but
organizationally their affiliates around the globe, et cetera,
as it was on September 11, 2001. Is that true or not true?
Ms. Cafarella. I would say it is true and even worse
because, again, at least in Syria they are perceived
increasingly as having the moral high ground. That is a
capability that they didn't have at the same scale.
Mr. Perry. OK. Finally, al-Qaeda and the Muslim
Brotherhood, does anybody want to make the connection? I put
this in the context of the Holy Land Foundation investigation
and trial, the unindicted co-conspirators and the fact that
those folks were let go and in many respects, at least in many
opinions, they have reconstituted themselves doing the same
things under different names in Illinois.
So I just want to see if there is a context that you want
to inform the audience about regarding al-Qaeda and the Muslim
Brotherhood?
Mr. Jones. Yes, just briefly, two comments. One is most of
the areas where I see al-Qaeda or its affiliates operate I
don't see a major coordinated relationship, particularly
between senior members of the organization and the brotherhood.
I have seen al-Qaeda operate with other groups, including
Salafi-jihadist groups. But when I look around Iraq and
Afghanistan and Syria and Libya, I don't see a notable, what I
call, partnership.
But let me just say that there is, and I think all of us
have said this here, a lot of fluidity among extremist groups
across Africa, north, east, West Africa, the Middle East and
into South Asia. So we do see partnerships among extremist
groups, whether it is al-Qaeda, ISIS, the brotherhood and
others.
Mr. Perry. Like, just so in that context, even though it
might not be the strongest of bonds and maybe it is fluid and
maybe it is a little here and a little there, there is a stark
difference.
There is a great contrast between people, whether they are
in the Muslim Brotherhood who collaborate even loosely with
terrorists and terrorist organizations and nations, nation-
states, individuals, organizations, who eschew that, who don't
get involved at all.
So my point would be even a loose connection is problematic
because the Muslim Brotherhood, you know, we can't get a
declaration that they are a problem here in Congress because,
oh, I don't know. Not a big fan of the king of Jordan, but he
has got to work with those people, like, you know, because they
are in his, you know, in his government.
That is his problem. I think the United States ought to
take a stand. They are wandering around our country and they
have this loose affiliation. How long do we wait until there is
a strong affiliation? Do we wait? How is that in our best
interest?
That is my position, but if you have got something to
countervail that, I would certainly like to hear that because I
don't want to be wrong, but I think I am right. Do you have
anything to offer?
Ms. Zimmerman. I think that not directly on that point, I
think the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Qaeda and ISIS disagree
primarily on the means to achieve their end-state. So the
advantage is that the Muslim Brotherhood seeks to use only
political means.
When you look at the Salafi ideology that both groups are
part of, that is a high minority within the Muslim world. There
are very few Salafis percentage-wise. The Muslim Brotherhood
has not been able to gain additional support.
The risk that I see in isolating the Muslim Brotherhood, in
removing the political track for resistance, is that you then
give those who believe that this is what they should be doing
the only option of violence. That actually drives support to
the other end of the spectrum.
I think that we can look at the events in Egypt and the
discussions that we are seeing, not at the old guard within the
Muslim Brotherhood remain anti-, against the use of violence,
but the younger generations that didn't see the failures that
violence brings are starting to talk about it a little bit
more.
Mr. Perry. So I don't want to be difficult for the sake of
being difficult----
Mr. King. The time of the gentleman has expired, so if you
could wrap it up, OK?
Mr. Perry. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman.
It seems to me that the critical and pivotal component was
is that they all seek the same ends, but different means. I
don't want to get to the end for any of them for Western
civilization and for the United States and saying that if we
isolate them it will push them toward violence.
I am not necessarily wishing to isolate them. I am wishing
to identify them for what they are and what their means are.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield.
Mr. King. OK. First I want to thank the witnesses for their
testimony. This was one of the most interesting, and I think we
will agree, hearings we have had. Just like you said that al-
Awlaki in some ways is ruling from the grave and I think many
people thought that al-Qaeda was in the grave. Actually they
are alive and unfortunately well.
So I want to thank you for your testimony. Expect to be
called back again in the future if you don't mind. We would
love to have you back. Anyway, Members of the subcommittee may
submit additional questions to witnesses, and I would ask you
to respond to those in writing. Pursuant to committee rule
VII(D), the hearing record will be held open for 10 days.
Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned. Thank
you very much.
[Whereupon, at 11:41 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Honorable Mike Gallagher for Katherine Zimmerman
Question 1. Ms. Zimmerman, in your opening remarks you stated that
al-Qaeda ``has acted deliberately below the thresholds that would set
off alarms in Washington.'' Doesn't the very nature of this threat mean
that Washington needs to rethink what those thresholds are when it
comes to the activities of transnational terrorist organizations?
Answer. Yes, the thresholds policy makers set to trigger an
American response to transnational threat groups are insufficient.
Smart adversaries such as al-Qaeda and even Russia understand and
operate below the threshold, all the while strengthening and pursuing
their own objectives. Al-Qaeda and others have learned to mask their
threat to the United States by engaging in low-level activities that do
not seem to affect American interests directly. However, the sum of
these activities places these transnational groups directly in
opposition to American interests.
The United States must both retain the thresholds that when met
trigger an immediate and decisive response and lower its threshold
against groups that are shaping an environment counter to American
interests. Specifically, the United States should clearly identify and
define as enemy all groups and individuals that subscribe to the
Salafi-jihadi ideology and act to eliminate the threat they pose to the
United States and the West as well as to limit their influence. The
United States should work to prevent Salafi-jihadi groups from shaping
the local environments to their benefit.
These actions must be part of a comprehensive strategy against the
Salafi-jihadi base and are not necessarily defined as focused on the
enemy or requiring the use of force. In fact, it is possible to weaken
al-Qaeda, ISIS, and other like-minded transnational organizations by
breaking their ties to local communities, which requires focusing on
the people and not the enemy.
Question 2. While ISIS seeks to recruit followers of all stripes,
al-Qaeda is known for having a stricter standard for recruiting
members. How, if at all, has AQ changed its recruitment strategy in
recent years? Do any of you believe AQ will need to change its
recruiting to compete for influence with ISIS fighters in failed states
like Libya and Yemen?
Answer. Al-Qaeda's strict standards for recruits remain, though al-
Qaeda has adopted a battlefield posture that enables it to attract
fighters who operate in its interest, but who do not become full-blown
members. It fields insurgent force commanders who lead militias
comprised of local fighters who do not necessarily subscribe to al-
Qaeda's global vision, or in certain cases, its ideology. Ansar al-
Sharia in Yemen is an example of one such insurgent force that included
non-al-Qaeda fighters. The integration of al-Qaeda elsewhere into the
local insurgency, such as Syria and Mali, creates a network of al-Qaeda
operatives across multiple groups. These individuals help shape the
group's actions to be in the interest of al-Qaeda, but group membership
does not require the same sort of vetting that membership of al-Qaeda
requires.
Al-Qaeda will increase its efforts to capture the foreign fighter
flows to direct them to key battlefields--Syria, Afghanistan, Yemen,
and Libya--as ISIS weakens in Iraq and Syria. The influx of foreign
fighters will strengthen al-Qaeda further and expand its capacity to
conduct attacks in the West.
Al-Qaeda's recruitment in failed states like Libya and Yemen will
increasingly target non-violent Islamists and Salafis in order to
capture a broader segment of the population. The loss of political
space coupled with targeted campaigns against political Islamists and
Salafis threatens the prospect of these groups in any future state.
They are threatened, and al-Qaeda will exploit their fears to recruit
individuals into the Salafi-jihadi camp, where the slogan is ``bullets,
not ballots'' for Islam.
Question 3. Does ISIS have the resources or willingness to
challenge al-Qaeda in Yemen given the on-going exodus of ISIS fighters
from Iraq and Syria?
Answer. ISIS does not have the resources to challenge al-Qaeda in
Yemen. It is unlikely to be able to do so even should ISIS leadership
prioritize the Yemeni theater. Skilled ISIS fighters from Iraq and
Syria could surge ISIS' capabilities and resources in Yemen should they
enter the Yemeni battlefield. These fighters would restore ISIS to at
least the strength at which it was operating in 2015-2016, enabling
ISIS to resume mass-casualty attacks, especially in southern Yemen. But
ISIS did not pose a serious threat to al-Qaeda's position in Yemen even
at its height.
Al-Qaeda's source of strength in Yemen is its relationship with
local communities, which al-Qaeda has cultivated for over two decades.
Al-Qaeda's composition as a Yemeni organization willing to defend and
protect local communities makes the population more willing to tolerate
al-Qaeda's presence, even while rejecting its ideology. ISIS is
unlikely to generate popular support because it operates outside of
customary law ('urf) and because it targets groups that the local
communities do not necessarily see as legitimate targets, such as
unarmed police recruits.
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