[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
SECURING AIR CARGO: INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND
PROTECTIVE SECURITY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 25, 2017
__________
Serial No. 115-24
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
27-978 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Mike Rogers, Alabama James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
John Katko, New York Filemon Vela, Texas
Will Hurd, Texas Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
Martha McSally, Arizona Kathleen M. Rice, New York
John Ratcliffe, Texas J. Luis Correa, California
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York Val Butler Demings, Florida
Mike Gallagher, Wisconsin Nanette Diaz Barragan, California
Clay Higgins, Louisiana
John H. Rutherford, Florida
Thomas A. Garrett, Jr., Virginia
Brian K. Fitzpatrick, Pennsylvania
Ron Estes, Kansas
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Kathleen Crooks Flynn, Deputy General Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND PROTECTIVE SECURITY
John Katko, New York, Chairman
Peter T. King, New York Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
Mike Rogers, Alabama William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Clay Higgins, Louisiana Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Brian K. Fitzpatrick, Pennsylvania Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Ron Estes, Kansas (ex officio)
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex
officio)
Krista P. Harvey, Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable John Katko, a Representative in Congress From the
State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation
and Protective Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Bonnie Watson Coleman, a Representative in Congress
From the State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Transportation and Protective Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 28
Witnesses
Mr. Stephen A. Alterman, President, Cargo Airline Association:
Oral Statement................................................. 9
Prepared Statement............................................. 11
Mr. Brandon Fried, Executive Director, Airforwarders Association:
Oral Statement................................................. 13
Prepared Statement............................................. 15
Mr. Michael C. Mullen, Executive Director, Express Association of
America:
Oral Statement................................................. 16
Prepared Statement............................................. 17
Mr. Bart Elias, Specialist in Aviation Policy, Resources,
Science, and Industry Division, Congressional Research Service,
Library of Congress:
Oral Statement................................................. 22
Prepared Statement............................................. 23
For the Record
The Honorable Bonnie Watson Coleman, a Representative in Congress
From the State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Transportation and Protective Security:
Statement of the Air Line Pilots Association, International.... 5
Appendix
Questions From Ranking Member Bonnie Watson Coleman for Stephen
A. Alterman.................................................... 39
Questions From Ranking Member Bonnie Watson Coleman for Brandon
Fried.......................................................... 40
Questions From Ranking Member Bonnie Watson Coleman for Michael
C. Mullen...................................................... 41
SECURING AIR CARGO: INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES
----------
Tuesday, July 25, 2017
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Transportation and
Protective Security,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:02 p.m., in
room HVC-210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. John Katko (Chairman
of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Katko, Watson Coleman, and Estes.
Also present: Representatives Higgins, Fitzpatrick,
Keating, and Thompson.
Mr. Katko. The Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee
on Transportation and Protective Security will come to order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to examine the current
challenges to air cargo security, and assess Homeland Security
policies and industry perspectives in order to better to
protect air cargo. I now recognize myself for an opening
statement.
Terrorists are relentless in their efforts to target
aviation. No matter how much we improve our security posture,
they are always willing to adjust and pursue new ways to hurt
us. As a recent laptop threat illustrates terrorists capability
and persistence to target aviation is still very real today.
Despite the creation of TSA and DHS and the major
improvements to passenger screening and security after 9/11,
our enemies have continued to find new avenues for attack.
However, we as a Nation have always faced these challenges
head-on and dedicated ourselves to harnessing innovation and
collaboration in order to mitigate the threat.
Our efforts to enhance cargo security demonstrate this
dedication and resilience. In October 2010, two explosive
devices concealed in cargo passages were discovered on separate
flights originating in Yemen and bound for the United States.
These explosives, disguised as printer cartridges, were
only found after being transported on both passenger and cargo
flights thanks to a tip from Saudi Arabian intelligence. We
know all too well what the threat to passenger aircraft can do
and has done to affect air travel in our global economy.
The 9/11 attacks led to major overhauls of our
transportation and aviation security sectors. Initially the
attacks were made less inclined to--made people less inclined
to travel and feel less confident in the Government's ability
to stay ahead of the numerous threats facing this country.
The potential impact is nearly identical for cargo
security. Terrorists do not discriminate between a passenger
plane and a cargo plane. They just want the image of a Western
plane being brought out of the skies. Their desired impact is
still the same; that it will change your way of life, instill
fear in the American people, and leave us questioning our
existing security infrastructure.
While bringing down a cargo plane may not lead to the same
number of casualties as a passenger plane, they can have a
broader impact on our open and free society, leading to more
regulations, slower supply chain operations, and major economic
damage.
Air cargo is crucial to the global economic engine--35
percent of the total world trade value is carried by air--35
percent. Over the next 20 years it is predicted that world air
cargo traffic will grow 4.2 percent per year.
Air cargo will remain a huge part of the modern globalized
economy, which is why it is absolutely paramount that we do all
we can to protect it. In order to continue our efforts to
protect and secure air cargo, the Government and industry must
work together and maintain a constant dialog.
While cooperation is essential through all aviation
security, it is especially important for cargo where every
security decision made has a direct impact on the economy. We
need the manufacturers, shippers, freight forwarders, and
everyone else involved in the supply chain to engage with
Congress and Homeland Security to explain how security
decisions are impacting their businesses and what else can be
done to address potential vulnerabilities.
I commend Homeland Security for working with industry and
seeking input as it aims to stay one step ahead of the threats
we face on a daily basis. While we in Congress often blame the
bureaucracy of the executive agencies, Homeland Security has
made a concerted effort to think creatively in the cargo
security space.
The certified cargo screening program and the use of K-9s
and technologies for domestic screening as well as the Air
Cargo Advanced Screening pilot program and the National Cargo
Security program for international screening, are evidence of
those innovative ways TSA is approaching air cargo security.
However, there is always more that can be done, and many
questions that need to be answered. Is TSA adapting fast enough
to the evolving security threats and economic issues involved
in air cargo? Are there new technologies that could improve
both security and supply chain speed?
Why are third-party K-9 teams not authorized for screening
cargo, especially where certain technologies are incapable?
This is where Congress can assist.
As you are all aware, this committee addressed many of
these issues in our bipartisan Homeland Security Authorization
bill that overwhelmingly passed the House last week. It is the
first reauthorization of Homeland Security ever.
The authorization bill mandates permanent implementation of
the Air Cargo Advanced Screening program, which will ensure
that customs and TSA have access to important security data and
enhanced screening, excuse me, enhanced ability, excuse me, to
protect against threats to air cargo.
The bill also direct TSA to issue standards for certifying
third-party K-9s for use in the air cargo sector. This will
expand the number of K-9s available for cargo screening and
enhance security in an operationally efficient manner.
We appreciate the input from all of our witnesses today as
we seek to improve the security of the homeland, especially the
air cargo sector. We believe these improvements in the Homeland
Security Authorization bill will have positive impacts on both
the security and efficiency of the air cargo sector.
But we know there are many more that can be addressed. We
ask all of our witnesses today to continue to do what you have
always done, and that is give us your honest feedback and
perspective on the challenges we face with air cargo and what
else can be done to improve both security and industry options.
I think I speak for myself and Mrs. Watson Coleman and
other Members of this committee that we always welcome your
input. It is only--we are here together to make this country a
safer place and that make our transportation system safer.
We must maintain an open dialog and continue to support a
strong collaboration between industry and Government in order
to successfully mitigate this very real threat. I thank all of
you for being here today and for your continued support and
engagement with this committee.
[The statement of Chairman Katko follows:]
Statement of Chairman John Katko
July 25, 2017
Terrorists are relentless in their efforts to target aviation. No
matter how much we improve our security posture, they are always
willing to adjust and pursue new ways to hurt us, and as the recent
laptop threat illustrates, terrorists' capability and persistence to
target aviation is still very real today.
Despite the creation of TSA and DHS--and the major improvements to
passenger screening and security after 9/11--our enemies have continued
to find new avenues for attack. However, we as a Nation have always
faced these challenges head-on, and dedicated ourselves to harnessing
innovation and collaboration in order to mitigate the threat. Our
efforts to enhance cargo security demonstrate this dedication and
resilience.
In October 2010, two explosive devices concealed in cargo packages
were discovered on separate flights originating in Yemen and bound for
the United States. These explosives--disguised as printer cartridges--
were only found after being transported on both passenger and cargo
flights, thanks to a tip from Saudi Arabian intelligence.
We know all too well what the threat to passenger aircraft can do,
and has done, to affect air travel and our global economy. The 9/11
attacks led to major overhauls of our transportation and aviation
security sectors. Initially, the attacks made people less inclined to
travel and feel less confident in the Government's ability to stay
ahead of the numerous threats facing the country.
The potential impact is nearly identical for cargo security.
Terrorists do not discriminate between a passenger plane and a cargo
plane. They just want the image of a Western plane being brought down.
And their desired impact is still the same--that it will change our way
of life, instill fear in the American people, and leave us questioning
our existing security infrastructure. While bringing down a cargo plane
may not lead to the same number of casualties as a passenger plane, it
can have a broader impact on our open and free society--leading to more
regulations, slower supply chain operations, and major economic damage.
Air cargo is crucial to the global economy. Thirty-five percent of
the total world trade value is carried by air. And over the next 20
years, it's predicted that world air cargo traffic will grow 4.2
percent per year. Air cargo will remain a huge part of the modern,
globalized economy, which is why it is absolutely paramount that we do
all we can to protect it.
In order to continue our efforts to protect and secure air cargo,
the Government and industry must work together and maintain a constant
dialogue. While cooperation is essential for all aviation security, it
is especially important for cargo, where every security decision made
has a direct impact on the economy. We need the manufacturers,
shippers, freight forwarders, and everyone else involved in the supply
chain to engage with Congress and DHS to explain how security decisions
are impacting their businesses and what else can be done to address
potential vulnerabilities.
I commend DHS for working with industry and seeking input as it
aims to stay one step ahead of the threats we face on a daily basis.
While we in Congress often blame the bureaucracy of the executive
agencies, DHS has made a concerted effort to think creatively in the
cargo security space. The Certified Cargo Screening Program and the use
of canines and technologies for domestic screening, as well as the Air
Cargo Advance Screening pilot program and the National Cargo Security
Program for international screening, are evidence of the innovative
ways TSA is approaching air cargo security.
However, there is always more that can be done and many questions
that need to be answered. Is TSA adapting fast enough to the evolving
security threats and economic issues involved in air cargo? Are there
new technologies that could improve both security and supply chain
speed? Why are third-party canine teams not authorized for screening
cargo, especially where certain technologies are incapable?
This is where Congress can assist. As you are all aware, this
committee addressed many of these issues in our bipartisan DHS
Authorization bill that overwhelmingly passed the House last week. The
Authorization bill mandates permanent implementation of the Air Cargo
Advance Screening program, which will ensure that CBP and TSA have
access to important security data and enhanced ability to protect
against threats to air cargo. The bill also directs TSA to issue
standards for certifying third-party canines for use in the air cargo
sector. This will expand the number of canines available for cargo
screening and enhance security in an operationally efficient manner. We
appreciate the input from all of our witnesses today as we seek to
improve the security of the homeland, especially the air cargo sector.
We believe these improvements in the DHS Authorization bill will
have positive impacts on both the security and efficiency of the air
cargo sector. But we know there may be more that can be addressed. We
ask all of our witnesses today to continue to do what you have always
done--give us your honest feedback and perspective on the challenges we
still face with air cargo and what else can be done to improve both
security and industry operations. We must maintain an open dialogue and
continue to support a strong collaboration between industry and
Government, in order to successfully mitigate this very real threat.
I thank all of you for being here today and for your continued
support and engagement with this committee.
Mr. Katko. Now, I am pleased to recognize the Ranking
Member of this subcommittee, the gentlelady from New Jersey, my
friend, Mrs. Watson Coleman for her opening statement.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Chairman Katko. Thank you
for holding today's hearing, and I would also like to thank our
witnesses for joining us today and sharing their expertise.
Today's topic, air cargo security, is not one that usually
receives a lot of headlines and attention, yet it is critical
to our economy.
In fact, according to the International Air Transport
Association, air cargo accounts for approximately 35 percent of
the value of all products that are traded world-wide.
An attack on our cargo industry could have devastating
effects on commerce. Since many cargo department shipments are
made and are placed in the belly of passenger planes, such an
attack could also result in significant loss of life.
Unfortunately, the lack of headlines surrounding air cargo
has not kept it hidden from our adversaries. As Chairman Katko
has stated, in 2010, terrorists attempted to hide bombs inside
printer cartridges that were shipped out of Yemen. Only a last-
minute intelligence tip from a foreign partner prevented these
explosives from flying on an aircraft bound for the United
States.
While no similar attempts against cargo have been reported
since 2010, terrorists continue to seek new ways to attack our
transportation systems. Given the threat, TSA must consistently
partner with industry stakeholders to enhance air cargo
security.
Next week will mark the 10th anniversary of one of the most
significant Homeland Security laws ever enacted, the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of
2007.
Our leader on this panel, Ranking Member Thompson, was the
author of this measure, that, among other things, required 100
percent screening of cargo on domestic and international in-
bound passenger flights within 3 years.
Complying with this mandate was a massive undertaking for
TSA and industry, and we should all be very proud that together
they were able to achieve compliance for domestic passenger
flights in 2010 and international inbound passenger flights in
2012.
The 10-year anniversary of the passage of the Implementing
9/11 Commission Act is a great time to reflect on how far we
have come and to be grateful that no attacks against our air
cargo system have been carried out.
However, we cannot rest on our laurels. We must constantly
improve our security to keep up with the evolving threat. We
must continue to prioritize the security of our transportation
systems and invest in security measures that really make a
difference, like those that help secure our cargo rather than
wasting billions on a border wall that will not improve
security.
Additionally, we cannot allow the attention we rightfully
pay to passenger security to come at the expense of focusing on
air cargo security. Just as the threat landscape constantly
evolves, so too does the nature of commerce.
The emergence of e-commerce sites like Amazon and eBay has
caused a seismic shift in not only how Americans buy goods, but
also their expectations about how quickly they will receive
them. This, of course, has huge implications for the air cargo
sector.
I will be interested in hearing from our witnesses on how
these changes are affecting air cargo security, as well as what
changes industry, TSA, and Congress should consider to improve
security.
I do believe it is important that we hear from all of our
stakeholders.
With that Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask unanimous
consent to submit testimony for the record from the Airline
Pilots Association.
[The information follows:]
Statement of the Air Line Pilots Association, International
July 25, 2017
The Air Line Pilots Association, International (ALPA), represents
more than 57,000 professional airline pilots flying for 33 airlines in
the United States and Canada. ALPA is the world's largest pilot union
and the world's largest non-Governmental aviation safety organization.
We are the recognized voice of the airline piloting profession in North
America, with a history of safety and security advocacy spanning more
than 85 years. As the sole U.S. member of the International Federation
of Airline Pilots Associations (IFALPA), ALPA has the unique ability to
provide active airline pilot expertise to aviation safety and security
issues world-wide, and to incorporate an international dimension to
safety and security advocacy.
overview
We applaud the subcommittee's demonstrated interest in cargo
security by holding this hearing. ALPA was at the forefront of today's
adoption of risk-based security because airline pilots have a vested
interest in ensuring the safety and security of their flights to the
maximum, practical extent. Airline pilots feel a strong moral and
professional obligation to safeguard the millions of passengers and
tons of freight carried on their aircraft each year. Our members are
concerned that another successful, large-scale terrorist attack against
aviation could severely damage the North American and/or world's
economies and greatly harm, or even destroy, their profession and
livelihood.
In the world of cargo operations, however, the level of concern is
especially acute. Since September 11, 2001, and the establishment of
the Department of Homeland Security and its sister organization, the
Transportation Security Administration, there have been significant
improvements made to address security threats to passenger airline
operations. From the reinforcement of cockpit doors, advances in
screening technologies, to the expansion of the Federal Air Marshal
Service and other layers of security, passenger airline security
measures have been aggressively deployed to address emerging threats.
Unfortunately, the same cannot be said regarding all-cargo operations
which in many ways continue most of the same security measures that
were in place on September 11. This situation exists despite evidence
that, according to intelligence sources, terrorists continue to show
the desire to utilize cargo aircraft as a weapon against the United
States, and our allies.
On October 28, 2010, British police were called to the East
Midlands airport at 3:28 a.m. to check out a suspicious package that
was shipped aboard a UPS airplane. The parcel contained a printer with
an ink cartridge and protruding wires, and a circuit board partly
covered in a white powder; it was ultimately determined that the parcel
contained explosives. After further investigation, a plot originating
in Yemen was uncovered that included similar explosives loaded onto a
total of four cargo aircraft, which were to be used in a coordinated
attack.
At the recent Council for New American Security Conference,
Homeland Security Secretary John Kelly stated, ``The threat has not
diminished. In fact, I am concerned that we are seeing renewed interest
on the part of terrorist groups to go after the aviation sector--from
bombing aircraft to attacking airports on the ground.''
The threat continues to be real, ever-evolving, and is not focused
solely on passenger carriers.
needed cargo security improvements
All-cargo airlines fly the same types of aircraft, take off from
the same airports, use the same airspace, and fly over the same cities
as passenger aircraft. From both safety and security standpoints,
therefore, there is every reason to hold cargo operations to the same
standards as passenger operations.
The air-cargo supply chain is a complex, multi-faceted mechanism.
It begins when a shipper tenders goods for transport, and it
potentially involves numerous intermediary organizations such as
Indirect Air Carriers (IACs), freight forwarders, and other industry
personnel who accommodate the movement of goods. Ultimately, a shipment
is received by air carrier personnel, loaded on an airliner, and
delivered to its intended destination. An effective air-cargo
protective system must focus on the components of the entire supply
chain, and anticipate opportunities for, and provide reasonable
measures to prevent or interrupt, the perpetration of malicious acts.
Such a system must certify the integrity of the goods that are offered
and the reliability of the shipper, verify the trustworthiness and
proper training of all personnel who maintain access to shipments, and
ensure a reliable, secure operating environment as tendered goods move
through the system. Significant progress has been made in better
securing the portion of the air-cargo supply chain that is facilitated
by passenger airline operations, but there is considerably more work to
do in the all-cargo domain. Following are several areas in which we see
on-going threats and our recommendations for addressing them.
Fortified Cockpit Doors.--After September 11, 2001, the Federal
Government required existing and future passenger airliners, but not
all-cargo airliners, to be equipped with reinforced flight deck doors.
Notwithstanding this fact, some cargo airlines have voluntarily
installed hardened flight deck doors on their aircraft. Today, however,
a significant number of all-cargo airliners are still operated without
the benefits of hardened flight deck doors, leaving them without a
means of adequately separating the flight crew from personnel riding
aft of the bulkhead and potential cargo-hold stowaways. In fact, new
wide-body cargo airplanes are being built and delivered to all-cargo
operators without the protections afforded by the reinforced door. The
potential for a significant lapse in security due to these conditions
is magnified by the fact that all-cargo airliners frequently carry
third-party, non-crew personnel (known as ``supernumeraries''), such as
couriers and animal handlers. This situation is exacerbated by the fact
that all-cargo airliners and their cargo are not afforded the same
security protections as their passenger-carrying counterparts while on
the ground.
The lack of a mandate for reinforced flight deck doors on cargo
aircraft is hard to justify when the Government has stated that it
considers the hostile takeover of an all-cargo aircraft to be a
critical risk. Events in the post-9/11 era have proven that stowaways
represent a very real and significant threat to all-cargo airliners. To
deter those persons with malicious intent and impede their ability to
attack all-cargo flight crewmembers, gain access to aircraft controls,
or otherwise execute a hostile takeover of an all-cargo airliner,
physical barriers must be designed and installed to separate the all-
cargo airliner's flight deck from accessible passenger and cargo areas.
All-cargo flight decks must be clearly delineated and physically
protected in the same fashion as the flight decks of passenger
airliners, including the provision of reinforced flight deck doors and
enhanced flight deck access procedures for crew members.
All-Cargo Aircraft Security on the Ground.--The lack of protection
of all-cargo aircraft at airports is one of the most significant
differences between passenger and all-cargo security practices.
Employees at passenger airlines and around passenger terminals must go
through an extensive security process as well as security screening in
many instances to be granted authority to enter security identification
display areas (SIDA) unescorted. Flight ramps and gates for passenger
operations all fall within the SIDA. In contrast, ramp areas used by
cargo aircraft may not be required to be included in an airport
operator's SIDA, and if not, they are more easily accessible. In some
cases, they are protected solely by a locked door or a chain-link
fence, neither of which may be monitored. SIDA protections should be
mandated for air operations areas of all airports that support FAR Part
121 aircraft operations.
Criminal History Records Checks (CHRCs).--All-cargo operations face
security threats that are not always immediately apparent. For example,
all-cargo aircraft often carry live animals, and animal handlers
accompany them on the flight. In many circumstances, these handlers
carry tranquilizing drugs for use on the animals during flight. Most of
the animal handlers are not airline employees, and many are foreign
nationals, which limits the ability to conduct a criminal history
records check on these individuals. This creates a significant risk to
the cargo flight and crew when they are not protected from these
potential threats by an intrusion-resistant cockpit door. We believe
that any individual traveling on an all-cargo flight should be subject
to the same level of security vetting and screening as flight crew
members. Fingerprint-based Criminal History Records Checks (CHRCs)
should be conducted on all employees and agents of aircraft operators,
foreign air carriers, and indirect air carriers (IACs) in the United
States, who have unescorted access to FAR Part 121 all-cargo aircraft
and to cargo intended to be shipped on them.
All-Cargo Common Strategy.--Anti-hijacking procedures referred to
as the ``common strategy'' were created in the early 1970's by the FBI,
the FAA, airlines, and ALPA, and revised after 9/11. They are intended
to address all types of security threats encountered during passenger
and all-cargo operations, and are based on the premise that there will
be aircraft equipped with intrusion-resistant cockpit doors, properly
trained people, and procedures for handling direct security incidents
and threats. This approach is sound and provides for needed layers of
security, if all three measures are available. Unfortunately, for cargo
aircraft not equipped with these intrusion-resistant cockpit doors, the
tactics, techniques, and, therefore, procedures designed to provide
crews with sufficient time to react to threats to the cockpit are
meaningless. In addition, all-cargo flight crews are not required to be
trained in the common strategy to the same degree as passenger crews,
which defeats the purpose of the common strategy, which is intended to
be used by all crews during line operations. If the crew is not
properly trained and required to utilize the strategy, there is no way
it can be implemented effectively. ALPA believes an all-cargo common
strategy and training curriculum should be mandated for all-cargo
operations.
FOIA Protection for Security Reports.--While voluntary safety
reporting programs, including the Aviation Safety Action Program
(ASAP), have proven to be a significant benefit to the safety of our
industry, we do not yet have similar programs in place for front-line
employees to confidentially report security-related events and
incidents. Airline pilots and other front-line aviation employees are
well-suited to serve as the ``eyes and ears'' of the industry. They
know their workplace very well, they will recognize something that is
out of place or suspicious because of their intimate knowledge of the
aviation domain, and they want to help make aviation more secure.
Developing and implementing a security-focused enhancement to ASAP
would provide TSA and FAA with near real-time data that could be used
to identify security risks to our aviation system and enhancements to
mitigate those risks.
One of the impediments to developing and implementing confidential
reporting programs for security is the lack of protections from Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA) disclosure by TSA of voluntarily submitted
information. For FAA safety ASAP reports, the confidential data
submitted is exempted from FOIA disclosure per legislation in the
Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-264). That
exemption should be extended to TSA for confidential security-reporting
programs.
recommendations
Congress should ensure one level of safety and security for
all-cargo and passenger airline operations.
The FAA should mandate the installation of intrusion-
resistant flight deck doors on Part 121 all-cargo aircraft
manufactured after a specified date.
FAR Part 121 cargo operations should be required to be
conducted within a SIDA.
Congress should require TSA to implement all-cargo common
strategy training and procedures.
All animal handlers, escorts, or couriers traveling on all-
cargo aircraft should be subject to the same screening and
security procedures as flight deck crew members, including a
criminal history records check, or be restricted to operations
on aircraft equipped with intrusion-resistant doors.
Congress should expand the FOIA exemption already in force
for ASAP reports submitted to the FAA per the Federal Aviation
Reauthorization Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-264) to security-
related reports submitted to the TSA.
TSA, in collaboration with the FAA and industry partners,
should expand the use of the ASAP reporting process--along with
its enforcement protections for the reporting employee--to
specifically include security-related information from front-
line employees.
summary
ALPA appreciates the opportunity to provide this statement to the
subcommittee. The TSA has a difficult, thankless job in keeping
transportation secure, and support from Congress to bring all-cargo
airline security measures up to par with their passenger airline
counterparts is clearly needed. We stand ready to assist.
Mr. Katko. Without objection, so ordered.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you. Again I thank the witnesses
for being here, and I yield back the balance of my time.
[The statement of Ranking Member Watson Coleman follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bonnie Watson Coleman
July 25, 2017
Today's topic, air cargo security, is not one that usually receives
a lot of headlines and attention, yet it is critical to our economy. In
fact, according to the International Air Transport Association, air
cargo accounts for approximately 35% of the value of all products
traded world-wide.
An attack on our cargo industry could have devastating effects on
commerce, and since many cargo shipments are placed in the ``belly'' of
passenger planes, such an attack could also result in significant loss
of life.
Unfortunately, the lack of headlines surrounding air cargo has not
kept it hidden from our adversaries. In 2010, terrorists attempted to
hide bombs inside printer cartridges shipped out of Yemen. Only a last-
minute intelligence tip from a foreign partner prevented the explosives
from flying on aircraft bound for the United States. While no similar
attempts against cargo have been reported since 2010, terrorists
continue to seek new ways to attack our transportation systems.
Given the threat, TSA must consistently partner with industry
stakeholders to enhance air cargo security. Next week will mark the
tenth anniversary of one of the most significant homeland security laws
ever enacted--``The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
Act of 2007''.
Our leader on this panel, Ranking Member Thompson, was the author
of this measure that, among other things, required 100% screening of
cargo on domestic and international inbound passenger flights within 3
years. Complying with this mandate was a massive undertaking for TSA
and industry, and we should all be proud that, together, they were able
to achieve compliance for domestic passenger flights in 2010, and
international inbound passenger flights in 2012.
The 10-year anniversary of the passage of the Implementing 9/11
Commission Act is a great time to reflect on how far we have come and
be grateful that no attacks against our air cargo system have been
carried out.
However, we cannot rest on our laurels. We must constantly improve
our security to keep up with the evolving threat. We must continue to
prioritize the security of our transportation systems and invest in
security measures that really make a difference, like those that help
secure our cargo, rather than wasting billions on a border wall that
will not improve security.
Additionally, we cannot allow the attention we rightfully pay to
passenger security to come at the expense of focusing on air cargo
security. And just as the threat landscape constantly evolves, so too
does the nature of commerce.
The emergence of ``e-commerce'' sites like Amazon and eBay has
caused a seismic shift in not only how Americans buy goods but also
their expectations about how quickly they will receive them. This, of
course, has huge implications for the air cargo sector.
I will be interested to hear from our witnesses how these changes
are affecting air cargo security, as well as what changes industry,
TSA, and Congress should consider to improve security.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mrs. Watson Coleman. Other Members of
the subcommittee are reminded that opening statements may be
submitted for the record.
We are pleased to have a distinguished panel here to
testify before us today on this very important topic.
Let me remind the witnesses that their entire written
statements will appear in the record so there is no need to--if
it is a very long statement maybe you can abbreviate it a
little bit, but hopefully within 5 minutes to 10 minutes is
fine.
Our first witness it Mr. Stephen Alterman. Mr. Alterman
began his career in aviation in 1968 as a trial attorney at
Bureau of Enforcement for United States Civil Aeronautics Board
and was subsequently promoted to chief of the legal division.
Mr. Alterman joined the Cargo Airline Association in 1975 and
currently serves as its president.
In addition, Mr. Alterman is the chairman of the TSA
Aviation Security Advisory Committee, a member of the FAA
management advisory council and a member of the Department of
Transportation National Freight Advisory Committee.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Alterman for his opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN A. ALTERMAN, PRESIDENT, CARGO AIRLINE
ASSOCIATION
Mr. Alterman. Thank you, Chairman Katko, Ranking Member
Watson Coleman, Members of the subcommittee. I was going to
introduce myself, but I don't think I have to. Thank you Mr.
Katko.
Mr. Katko. You are very well-known by us anyway so that is
all right.
Mr. Alterman. That is what I was afraid of, Mr. Katko. The
all-cargo carriers and the customers in airports they serve are
a unique portion of the aviation marketplace.
Customers around the world depend on our services to
transport high-value, time-sensitive products such as medical
devices and related components of the medical supply chain,
computers and other electronics, automobile parts.
In calendar 2016, the all-cargo segment of the industry
operated 89 percent of the domestic revenue ton-miles and 70.8
percent of the international RTMs. In operating these services,
the safety and security of our cargo, our facilities, aircraft,
employees, and the public are of utmost importance.
It is simply bad policy and bad business not to take these
issues seriously. In the area of security we strongly believe
that the best security is achieved when Government and industry
work together to identify vulnerabilities and to design and
implement mitigation strategies.
Over the past few years, TSA has moved in this direction,
and we look forward to working with the agency as the outcome-
based model of regulation matures.
At this point I want to thank this committee and the
committee staff, who sometimes go unnoticed, for H.R. 2825. I
actually wrote my testimony before the bill was enacted by the
full House and so I am not going to go into much detail on some
of the provisions there.
However I would like to thank them specifically on behalf
of our members for several measures in the bill. We thank you
for the third-party K-9 provisions of the bill, and we
enthusiastically support the language of it.
We also support a 5-year term for the administrator of the
TSA. When Admiral Pekoske is sworn in as the next administrator
of the TSA it will be the sixth administrator or acting
administrator that I have worked with as chair of ASAC in the
past 3 years.
That does not lead to much stability within the agency, and
I really strongly thank you for putting a 5-year term in and
hope that the Senate does the exact same thing.
In addition, and I know Mr. Mullen will talk about this in
more detail, the provisions on the Air Cargo Advanced Screening
project were definitely appreciated.
My written testimony goes into some detail, but it
basically mirrors the language of the provisions in H.R. 2825,
so thank you very much.
The third-party K-9 program is only one of many initiatives
that have been studied by ASAC over the past several years.
Another thanks and shout-out to the committee is that ASAC
is now a permanent committee and you fixed the one glitch in
the regulation by providing that the 2-year terms can be
extended if no new committee is actually formed at the end of
the 2-year terms. We really appreciate that.
The other portion of the legislation that we really
appreciate is the exemption from the Federal Advisory Committee
Act. For the first time after that legislation we were able to
meet in secret, not trying to hide things from the public, but
rather so we can discuss sensitive security issues without the
public being there. That has played a very big part in our
deliberations and enables us to do some really interesting
things.
The ASAC membership is diverse, with representatives from
virtually every segment of the aviation community, as well as
users and victims groups. The committee is supported by an
array of subcommittees and ad hoc working groups.
I just want to mention that our Air Cargo Subcommittee of
ASAC has been one of the most active subcommittees on the
committee and it has put forth many initiatives in the air
cargo sphere.
In addition, again as a result of legislation, ASAC's
relatively new Security Technology subcommittee has now been
charged with exploring potential innovative technologies
capable of performing improved screening of air cargo. They are
just beginning on that project, but we are looking forward to
their work.
I think, again going back to the 5-year term for the
administrator, it simply does not lead to stability in the
agency, and we really need that stability if we need to move
forward on these issues. Thank you very much, and I would be
obviously glad to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Alterman follows:]
Prepared Statment of Stephen A. Alterman
July 25, 2017
Chairman Katko, Ranking Member Coleman, and Members of the
subcommittee: Good morning. My name is Steve Alterman and I am the
president of the Cargo Airline Association, the Nation-wide
organization representing the interests of the all-cargo segment of the
aviation community.\1\ I also have the honor of currently serving as
the chairman of the Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC), the
Federal committee established by Congress to advise the TSA
administrator on issues relating to all areas of aviation security.
Thank you for inviting me to testify today.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Association members include direct air carriers ABX Air, Atlas
Air, Federal Express Corporation, Kalitta Air and United Parcel Service
Co., as well as Associate Members Amazon, DHL Express, Memphis Airport,
Louisville Airport, Ft. Wayne Airport, Columbus (OH) Airport, Spokane
Airport, and the Alaska Airport System.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The all-cargo carriers, and the customers and airports they serve,
are a unique portion of the aviation marketplace. Our member carriers
employ upwards of 1 million workers world-wide, account for over 10% of
the U.S. gross domestic product and approximately 4% of the world's
gross product. Annual revenues of our members top $100 billion.
Customers depend on our services to transport high-value, time-
sensitive, products such as medical devices and related components of
the medical supply chain, computers and other electronics, and
automobile parts. In calendar 2016, all-cargo carriers operated 89.0%
of domestic revenue ton miles (RTMs) and 70.8 percent of international
RTMs.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ FAA Aerospace Forecast, 2017-2037, March 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In operating these services, the safety and security of our cargo,
our facilities and aircraft, and our employees and the public are of
utmost importance. It is simply bad policy, and bad business, not to
take these issues seriously. In the area of security, we strongly
believe that the best security is achieved when Government and industry
work together to identify vulnerabilities and to design and implement
mitigation strategies. Over the past few years, TSA has also moved in
this direction and we look forward to working with the agency as the
outcome-based model of regulation matures.
Having said that, it is important to understand that perhaps the
most important element of providing effective security for the air
cargo supply chain is the timely sharing of intelligence information
both among Government agencies and between the Government and industry
stakeholders. Without this intelligence, it is difficult to design the
most effective counter-measures for identified threats. While progress
has also been made in this area, much more needs to be done and members
of our industry are in the forefront of this effort.
In terms of current specific challenges, probably the most pressing
current need for the all-cargo carriers as business and cargo screening
requirements expand is an ability to use third-party canines as a
primary means of screening. The technology to screen freight in a
manner consistent with the operational needs of the industry simply
does not today exist. However, the ``low-tech'' use of canines can fill
this gap. Since there are not enough canines owned by the TSA to
accomplish this objective, we continue to urge TSA to establish a
program whereby TSA would establish standards that would be used by
third-party vendors and certify other third-parties to ensure that the
vendors are, in fact, correctly applying the standards established. TSA
would also audit the process to ensure compliance with all applicable
requirements. The vendors could then provide the dogs to stakeholders
wishing to use them (at the carriers' expense). TSA has taken the first
steps in this direction, but the bureaucracy often moves slowly and our
needs are becoming more urgent. We therefore thank this committee for
including a third-party canine mandate in the DHS Authorization bill
(H.R. 2825) that overwhelming passed the House last week. We now look
forward to similar action in the Senate. The establishment of this
program would also be consistent with the recommendations of the ASAC
that has, on several occasions, urged TSA to move forward with the
program.
The third-party canine program is only one of many initiatives
studied by ASAC over the past several years. By way of history, while
ASAC has existed for many years, it was finally established as a
permanent advisory committee by Congress several years ago with the
passage of the Aviation Security Stakeholder Participation Act of 2014.
At that time, Congress also exempted ASAC from the provisions of the
Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), an exemption that has allowed
committee Members to discuss the details of security issues without the
fear of public disclosure of sensitive information. ASAC membership is
diverse with representatives from virtually every sector of the
aviation community, as well as user and accident victims' groups, and
the committee is supported by an array of subcommittees and ad hoc
working groups that study specific issues that are either self-
generated, requested by TSA, or sometimes required by Congress. One of
the most active subcommittees is our Air Cargo Subcommittee that has a
history of recommending important initiatives in the air cargo sphere.
In addition, ASAC's relatively new Security Technology Subcommittee has
been charged with exploring potential innovative technologies capable
of performing improved screening of air cargo.
Finally, I would like to offer one suggestion for Congressional
action in this session. In my opinion, one of the major impediments to
positive change within TSA is instability at the top of the
organization. In the last 3 years, there have been two administrators
and three acting administrators. When the new administrator is
confirmed, he will be the sixth head of the agency in the last 3 years.
To provide stability, and to allow the administrator the time to
implement changes that may be necessary, the TSA administrator should
be given a fixed 5-year term similar to that currently held by the
administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration. Such an action
would go a long way to providing the stability needed to accomplish the
very important objectives of the agency. Again, we thank this committee
for its action to make this goal a reality.
Thank you very much. I would be happy to answer any questions.
Mr. Katko. Thank you Mr. Alterman. Just to respond briefly,
I totally agree with you. The yeoman's work that staff on both
sides did. The minority staff did a terrific job and so did the
majority staff, and together they came up with, I think, a
truly groundbreaking bill to reauthorize Homeland Security and
its subsidiary agencies.
I think it is critically important to the function of all
of these places, all of these agencies going forward that they
had this reauthorization. I think that the 5-year term for the
administrator was probably one of the best provisions 'cause I
thought of it.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Katko. I am just kidding, I did think of it, but it is
an important provision just like many others. And I think
making ASAC a permanent part of our on-going processes here is
really important.
As you know, for the last 3 years ASAC has grown in
prominence and importance, and we routinely rely on your input.
We hope you continue to provide us that good leadership from
the ASAC, because it has been very good. So thank you with
that.
Now, we appreciate your testimony Mr. Alterman.
I would like to introduce our second witness, Mr. Brandon
Fried. Mr. Fried has more than 38 years of experience in the
air freight forwarding industry and was appointed as the
executive director of the Air Forwarders Association in 2005.
He also serves as a member of the TSA Aviation Security
Advisory Committee, the U.S. Department of Commerce committee
on supply chain competitiveness, and the Custom and Border
Protection Commercial Operations advisory committee. I defy you
to fit all that on one business card.
I now recognize Mr. Fried for his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF BRANDON FRIED, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, AIRFORWARDERS
ASSOCIATION
Mr. Fried. Chairman Katko, Ranking Member Watson Coleman,
and Members of the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity
to present the views of the Airforwarders Association on air
cargo security. The Airforwarders Association represents 250
air freight forwarders and supporting companies, employing tens
of thousands of employees and dedicated contractors.
Our members range from small businesses employing fewer
than 20 people to large firms employing well over a thousand.
Business models vary from domestic-only operations to world-
wide operations. Additionally, a few of our members operate
their own aircraft. In short, we are the travel agents for
cargo.
We move cargo throughout the United States and the world in
the most time and cost efficient manner, be it on aircraft,
truck, rail, or ship.
Security is at the forefront of our business. We work
closely with TSA since its inception, and we have committed
several million dollars over the past 16 years to ensure that
our role in the security supply chain is secure.
For example, our members have invested millions of dollars
in security screening equipment, secure systems and facilities,
employee background checks, maintaining compliance with the
known shipper management system and the indirect air carrier
management system, along with annual security training to
secure our portion of the global supply chain.
In short, we play an integral role to ensure the safety and
security of shipments traveling on both domestic and
international airlines. We take this role seriously. We know
that terrorists remain interested in airplanes and therefore
are looking for any possible vulnerabilities in the system.
Throughout the past 16 years we have rolled up our sleeves
to meet the requirements of the Aviation Transportation
Security Act, the 100 percent screening requirement for all
shipments on passenger planes, and finally the initiatives
following the 2010 Yemen incident, as referred to earlier. We
know what is at stake, and we will do our part.
So today I would like to focus on three key points. First,
the consistent interpretation of regulations being essential.
Our members operate facilities throughout the United States and
therefore many inspectors inspect our facilities.
Like any business investigated by the U.S. Government, we
rely on the consistent interpretation of regulations from
facility to facility. We understand that people are people and
100 percent consistency is not always attainable.
That is why we urge the new perspective TSA administrator,
when confirmed, to move the inspectors at TSA under the policy
division within the agency. Interpretation of policy and
implementation of policy should be joined at the hip.
At the end of the day, security deteriorates when operators
do not have a clear understanding of regulations due to
inconsistent policy interpretations. So a standardized form of
training is critical. Properly-trained employees are the
backbone of security, and our community has relied on the TSA
to provide training materials to assist the indirect air
carriers with the training requirements in the regulations.
But recently we have learned that the agency will no longer
provide this training curriculum. The absence of this
standardized educational tool will likely lead to stakeholder
confusion and misinterpretation of vital security elements
inherent in the program.
The known shipper program needs to be updated. Now, the
known shipper program traces its origin back to the Aviation
and Transportation Security Act, and in 2001 e-commerce was a
nascent industry. Per the Census Department, e-commerce had
almost $500 billion in U.S. retail sales over the past year.
Now, we are not advocating for the elimination of the known
shipper program, but we firmly believe that the known shipper
program needs to be reframed to reflect today's e-commerce
reality. So I would like to also comment on just a couple of
additional security items.
The attempted printer cartridge bombings of all-cargo
flights from Yemen in 2010 taught us that while 100 percent
physical screening of cargo is essential, such inspection does
not mean that our skies are 100 percent secure. We are
therefore supportive of the governments' air cargo advanced
screening, ACAS initiative, in which vital information from the
bill of lading is analyzed for threat assessment.
A few of our members have been participating in the on-
going voluntary ACAS pilot program. Our only comment is that
forwarders should not be the only ones required to submit data,
and this cache should be accessible through a readily available
Government portal.
Finally, we have long been supportive of additional tools
to the security toolbox. Private, third-party-provided K-9s for
air cargo screening is a relatively inexpensive tool that we
have long advocated for, and we are encouraged by the recent
developments signaling that third-party K-9s for air cargo
screening will finally become a reality.
However, Congress must assure that TSA receives the
necessary oversight funding to manage the program and hold the
agency accountable for its implementation. I would like to
thank you for the opportunity to share the Airforwarders
Association view today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fried follows:]
Prepared Statement of Brandon Fried
July 25, 2017
Chairman Katko, Ranking Member Watson Coleman, and Members of the
subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to present the views of
the Airforwarders Association (AfA) on air cargo security.
The Airforwarders Association (AfA) represents 250 airfreight
forwarders and supporting companies employing tens of thousands of
employees and dedicated contractors. Our members range from small
businesses employing fewer than 20 people to large firms employing well
over 1,000 and business models vary from domestic only operations to
world-wide operations. Additionally, a few of our members operate their
own aircraft. In short--[we are the travel agents for cargo]. We move
cargo throughout the United States and the world in the most time- and
cost-efficient manner be it on aircraft, truck, rail, or ship.
security is at the forefront of our business
We have worked closely with TSA since its inception, and we have
committed several million dollars over the past 16 years to ensure that
our role in the security chain is secure. For example, our members have
invested millions of dollars in security screening equipment; secure
systems and facilities, employee background checks, maintaining
compliance with the Known Shipper Management System and the Indirect
Air Carrier Management System along with annual security training to
secure our portion of the global supply chain. In short, we play an
integral role to ensure the safety and security of shipments traveling
on both domestic and international airlines. We take this role
seriously. We know that terrorists remain interested in airplanes and
therefore are looking for any possible vulnerabilities in the system.
Throughout the past 16 years, we have rolled up our sleeves to meet the
requirements of Aviation Transportation Security Act, the 100 percent
screening requirement for all shipments on passenger planes and finally
the initiatives following the 2010 Yemen incident. We know what is at
stake and we will do our part.
Today I would like to focus on three key points.
consistent interpretation of regulations is essential
Our members operate facilities throughout the United States, and
therefore many inspectors inspect the facilities. Like any business
investigated by the United States Government, we rely on the consistent
interpretation of regulations from facility to facility. We understand
that people are people and 100 percent consistency is not attainable.
That is why we urge the new prospective administrator when confirmed to
move the inspectors under the policy division at TSA. Interpretation of
policy and implementation of policy should be joined at the hip. At the
end of the day, security deteriorates when operators do not have a
clear understanding of regulations due to inconsistent policy
interpretations.
standardized form of training is critical
Properly-trained employees are the backbone of security. Our
community has relied on the TSA to provide training materials to assist
Indirect Air Carriers with the training requirements in the regulations
but recently we have learned that the agency will no longer provide
this training curriculum. The absence of this standardized educational
tool will likely lead to stakeholder confusion and misinterpretation of
vital security elements inherent in the program.
known shipper program needs to be updated
The Known Shipper program traces its origin to the Aviation
Transportation Security Act. In 2001, e-commerce was a nascent
industry. Per the Census Department--e-commerce had almost $500 billion
of U.S. retail sales over the past year. We are not advocating for the
elimination of Known Shipper, but we firmly believe that the Known
Shipper program needs to be reframed to reflect today's e-commerce
reality.
I would also like to comment on a couple additional security items.
The attempted printer cartridge bombings of all-cargo flights from
Yemen in 2010 taught us that while 100 percent physical screening of
cargo is essential, such inspection does not mean our skies are 100
percent secure. We are therefore supportive of the Government's Air
Cargo Advanced Screening (ACAS) initiative in which vital information
from the Bill of Lading analyzed for threat assessment. A few our
members have participated in the on-going Voluntary ACAS pilot. Our
only comment is that forwarders should not be the only ones required to
submit data and this task should be accessible through a readily-
available Government portal.
Finally, we have long been supportive of adding additional tools to
the security toolbox. Private, third-party-provided canines for air
cargo screening is a relatively inexpensive tool that we have long
advocated for, and we are encouraged by the recent developments
signaling that third-party canines for air cargo screening will finally
become a reality. However, Congress must assure that TSA receives the
necessary oversight funding to manage the program and hold the agency
accountable for its swift implementation.
Thank you for this opportunity to share the Airforwarders view.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Fried. We appreciate you being
here as well and taking the time out of your busy schedule.
Our third witness is Michael Mullen, executive director of
the Express Association of America. Prior to joining the EAA,
Mr. Mullen was the assistant commissioner for International
Affairs and Trade Relations at U.S. Customs and Border
Protection where he served from 2004-2009.
Earlier, he was a senior associate at Booz Allen Hamilton
and a director of nonprofit organizations focusing on trade
issues in the Asia-Pacific region. Mr. Mullen concluded a 20-
year career as a Navy officer, for which we are grateful, with
an assignment as an assistant naval attache at the U.S. embassy
in Tokyo.
Sir, thank you for your service again, and I now recognize
you for your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL C. MULLEN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, EXPRESS
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA
Mr. Mullen. Chairman Katko, and Ranking Member Watson
Coleman, and Members of the subcommittee, I want to focus my
testimony today on a critically important development in air
cargo security in the past decade, the Air Cargo Advanced
Screening or ACAS pilot program.
ACAS was born out of the terrorist attack on air cargo
supply chains in late 2010, as both the Chairman and the
Ranking Member mentioned. It was started by the three members
of the Express Association of America, DHL, FedEx, and UPS.
ACAS now has 20 members, including passenger airlines,
heavy cargo airlines, and freight forwarders. These companies
voluntarily provide a subset of manifest information to Customs
and Border Protection and TSA as early as possible in the
supply chain.
CBP assesses this data to identify high-risk shipments for
threats to aviation--80 percent of the air cargo entering the
United States today is covered by ACAS members.
The Government has analyzed ACAS data on over 440 million
shipments in the last 6.5 years. Any shipments considered
higher-risk are subjective to screening in accordance with TSA
regulations. To date, no threats to aviation have been
detected.
TSA, CBP, and DHS have been discussing a draft ACAS
regulation over the past few years, but have yet to issue a
proposed rule. The ACAS pilot was extended last week until July
2018.
We believe some important lessons have been learned from
the pilot that we would like to see incorporated into the
regulation. Several of these were addressed in the Homeland
Security reauthorization, to which I also want to add my
appreciation. That was an excellent piece of legislation from
our viewpoint.
So these lessons include, first, when industry and
Government truly work together as partners, the results are
dramatic. ACAS has been called the best public-private
partnership in history. Both sides work together to develop a
solution that was operationally feasible for industry, while
satisfying Government's security requirements. The process has
become known as co-creation.
Second, the 7 ACAS data elements are sufficient for risk
targeting. Government agencies should seek to minimize required
data elements to those they truly need to perform their
mission.
Third, the data provided for ACAS is raw data, and we have
learned that small errors do not substantially affect the value
of the information for targeting purposes.
Fourth, ACAS targeting and risk assessment are done from a
centralized location. This approach is far better than allowing
individual ports to conduct their own targeting, which can lead
to a lack of consistency.
Fifth, ACAS members can complete the necessary actions in
response to a request for screening at an operationally optimum
point in the supply chain. That has great value in reducing the
commercial impacts in terms of additional costs or delays.
Sixth, because ACAS data is provided early in the supply
chain and the Government accepts that it is raw data, no
penalties are applied in ACAS for data timeliness or accuracy.
While industry accepts that an ACAS regulation may include
penalties, they should only apply in cases of gross negligence
or fraud.
ACAS has proven Government can place a high level of trust
in its industry partners. Government should not now start
handing out parking tickets for minor data discrepancies.
Seventh, Government intelligence regarding a specific
shipment must be shared with the private sector so screeners
know what they are looking for.
Eighth, air cargo operators are highly motivated to ensure
their systems are not targeted by a terrorist weapon and have
made major investments in creating a secure aviation network
which is based on multiple layers of Government regulations and
their own corporate security measures. ACAS is just one more
layer in that process.
Finally, international harmonization is critical for
ensuring effective aviation security. The U.S. Government
should seek alignment with international organizations in other
countries to develop common standards and procedures for
providing advance shipment data so that the private sector is
not presented with dozens of different requirements.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mullen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael C. Mullen
July 25, 2017
This testimony is provided by the Express Association of America
(EAA) on behalf of EAA members DHL, FedEx Express, and UPS, the three
largest express delivery service providers in the world, providing fast
and reliable service to the United States and more than 200 other
countries and territories. These three companies have estimated annual
revenues in excess of $200 billion, employ more than 1.1 million
people, utilize more than 1,700 aircraft, and deliver more than 30
million packages each day.
EAA will focus its testimony on the contribution of the Air Cargo
Advance Screening (ACAS) project to air cargo security. In October
2010, the all-cargo aircraft industry and larger supply chain was a
target of a terrorist attack out of Yemen. The ACAS pilot was created
as a response to this incident and has demonstrated that a close
partnership with industry across Government agency jurisdictions in
development and execution of new security measures can improve the
safety and security of global networks while minimizing negative
operational and economic impacts. First developed with express carriers
in late 2010, ACAS has expanded to include passenger air carriers, all-
cargo carriers, and freight forwarders, and now includes 20 fully
operational members, covering 80 percent of the air cargo shipments
entering the United States. The ACAS project has been highly successful
and has screened over 440 million shipments without detecting any
imminent threats to aviation. Several key lessons have been learned
during the pilot, and any rulemaking effort to formalize ACAS through
regulation should consider these lessons, as follows:
industry and government working together as partners
Seeking industry input before proposed rulemakings are drafted
allows for broader operational impacts to be considered in order to
improve effectiveness. This further minimizes the defensive posture or
even anxiety as the private sector faces a Government ``mandate.'' The
absence of penalties during the ACAS pilot phase further reduced
``threshold anxiety'' as a barrier to participation. Additionally, the
coordination between TSA and CBP enabled industry to accept that the
U.S. Government had a unified approach and industry would not be
subjected to differing rules and requirements.
Going Forward
Penalties should only be imposed in cases of gross negligence or
willful circumvention of the rules, and not for the timeliness or
accuracy of information (for reasons outlined immediately below).
Similar to the move from transaction-based to account-based management
of trade parties found in other customs' spheres, the overall
compliance level of the ACAS transmitter should be a key factor in the
penalty scheme that is developed. This would be consistent with the
spirit of trusted partnership that has been the core of the success of
the ACAS effort.
Further, CBP and TSA must both be included in ACAS discussions with
industry in order to ensure the unity of effort across the U.S.
Government and avoid duplicative and even contradictory approaches.
7+1 data is effective to target risk
Separation of shipment and transport data was a necessary
precondition to providing information earlier in the supply chain. The
information on the shipment transmitted for ACAS (seven data elements
plus the bill number--called ``7+1 data'') is available much earlier
than other data required for customs clearance, and ``Risk-Based
Targeting'' against this 7+1 data set has proven effective with risk
assessment sufficient to identify a shipment of interest. Mandating
additional transport data such as master airway bill routings or flight
numbers, full automated manifest system information, harmonized tariff
system (HTS) numbers or any other commercial data as part of the
advanced security filing not only fails to significantly improve
targeting, but would also challenge the operational feasibility to
provide data in a timely manner. Further, the pilot has shown:
1. Data provided for ACAS can be ``raw data'' where typographical
or other clerical errors do not substantially affect the
targeting capabilities.
2. The 7+1 data set is sufficient to determine whether or not a
shipment is a potential threat to aviation security. Upon
analysis of the 7+1 data set, if a particular shipment is of
concern, then additional data can be requested on a shipment-
specific basis or additional screening can be required. This
screening can be conducted early in the supply chain due to the
submission time line for ACAS data. In the majority of cases,
shipments already have been screened as a result of standard
security program and other requirements, and the results of
that screening can satisfy the ACAS referral.
3. The centralized approach to targeting, risk assessment,
selection, and referrals for additional screening can be
successfully run through joint CBP/TSA teams coordinating all
aspects of this process from a single location. This
coordination and information sharing between the agencies could
be strengthened.
4. ACAS pilot participants can manage the requests for data and
physical screening successfully from a central, corporate
inspection system, without requiring requests to be filed with
field office locations, thereby improving timeliness,
consistency, and accuracy of response.
5. The private-sector parties can complete the necessary actions in
the event of a referral at an operationally optimum point in
the supply chain, thereby reducing the commercial impacts in
terms of cost and delays. If the Government has a question
about the ACAS data or the data is incomplete, the shipment
keeps moving while the additional data is being provided and/or
the question is being answered.
6. Any expansion of the ACAS data set beyond the 7+1 elements would
be inconsistent with the WTO SAFE Framework on air cargo
security.
Going Forward
Future initiatives looking at advanced cargo data should:
Recognize that raw, 7+1 shipment data can effectively target
risk without requiring data elements needed for other customs
functions.
Specify the last point of departure of the flight that
delivers the shipment to the United States as the deadline for
submission of the data. Choosing any other deadline for data
submission will add unnecessary complexity and is likely to
affect operational feasibility, as shipment routing is often
not known at origin.
Accept that shipment-specific data is sufficiently accurate
to determine any potential threat by the shipment, and shipper-
based approaches associated with a shipper's volume are often
not feasible in the advanced data context due to the timeliness
of information and the need of the carriers to segregate
shipments based on the shipper before building the pallets or
other unit load devices (ULD). Further, shipper-based
determinations are often redundant, and the shipment has
already been singled out for screening prior to the shipper-
based determination.
Express carriers have a centralized database for tracking
the results of shipment screening, that includes screening
caused by ACAS referrals, which could be made available to TSA
for auditing purposes. Based on this information, TSA could
provide exemptions to standard security program screening
requirements for some ACAS participants.
acas analysis is limited to security
While it is tempting to use advanced data for other purposes, the
success of ACAS has been in part driven by the common goal to prevent a
bomb from entering the network. This singular focus of utilizing air
cargo advanced data for security risk assessment remains the top
priority among private- and public-sector participants. Regulatory risk
assessment to interdict IPR violations, illegal drugs or other
controlled substance trafficking, or other trade functions can and
should be the focus of CBP officers upon arrival in the United States.
Any attempt to expand the ACAS scope to achieve the simultaneous
completion of both security and regulatory risk assessments pre-
departure would undermine achieving the primary goal of protecting the
supply chain against terrorist attacks.
Going Forward
This singular focus on security must be maintained for ACAS.
flexibility is critical for effectiveness
Three distinct types of flexibility needed:
1. IT Systems Can and Should Be Flexible
ACAS has demonstrated that data can be transmitted via
multiple types of IT systems and in various formats. This
flexibility in the interface reduces the barrier to
participation and avoids unnecessary costs and time delays
associated with updating a company's IT system.
Furthermore, the flexibility reduces the risk of
competitive disadvantages arising from existing differences
in the functionality and capacity of corporate IT systems.
Where a ``dual filing'' approach is taken with a separate
ACAS filer and carrier, a rapid confirmation for the
carrier of ACAS submission and the shipment's security
status is important. The timeliness of verification across
systems is most difficult with time-definite shipments, yet
this is also the most essential.
The differing business models of express/integrated and
non-express/conventional will require that the IT system
provide different functionality for these, in particular
with regard to security status messaging.
Going Forward
The final IT filing system developed for ACAS must remain flexible.
It should continue to accommodate multiple data submission formats and
provide for the return messaging options required by some business
models of the entities utilizing the system.
2. Screening Methods and Locations Need to Adapt to Country and
Operational Limitations
The screening is being conducted outside U.S. borders,
often well before the U.S. jurisdiction to control and
mandate screening. This provides a screening and security
level far greater than the United States could mandate and
helps ensure the security of cargo movements throughout the
entire supply chain, not just from the last point of
departure. However, this also understands that there may be
challenges to screening with a particular method at every
point globally.
The screening method available at a particular country
early in the supply chain may not offer AT X-ray, and the
shipment should be allowed to be physically screened by
other appropriate methods as approved at that location or
allowed to move to the next point at which the cargo could
be screened.
When there is a U.S. Government-recognized National Cargo
Screening Program (NCSP) of another government's cargo
security program, the NCSP recognized screening methods can
be effectively applied to mitigate risk. The NCSP methods
were--by definition--already accepted by TSA as offering a
level of security commensurate with the United States, and
local screeners cannot be trained to apply differing
screening standards whether it is getting a U.S.-ACAS-based
screening referral or a locally-based screening referral.
Going Forward
The United States should continue to allow cargo selected for ACAS
referral screening to be screened at the most operationally feasible
location and allow the local screening standards to be applied for a
screening referral when the cargo is in an NCSP recognized country.
These National Cargo Security Program recognitions have become a
critical facilitator of seamless cargo movement through major transit
hubs.
3. Operational Requirements Need To Be Flexible Based On Different
Business Models
The air cargo industry is not one-size-fits-all; the
regulations and programs should not be either. Challenges
and opportunities differ between business models, and the
system can be flexible regarding who transmits the data and
when. While the jointly-held overriding goal is to
intercept a high-risk shipment as early as possible, data
can be transmitted by multiple partners, depending on who
may be in possession of the shipment data. No specific time
limit is necessary, as long as data can be transmitted in
raw form as soon as available. Further, Government
targeters have the ability to prioritize shipment reviews
based on the urgency/timeliness of the shipment itself,
thereby helping to address concerns for last-minute
shipments in the just-in-time supply chain.
Going Forward
The Government must continue to recognize the different components
and business models in the larger air cargo industry and avoid putting
burdens on all segments that are not appropriate for individual
segments. This includes ensuring that the screening referral goes to
the party who filed the ACAS data--even if that party is a forwarder
and not a carrier--in order to ensure the timely interception of a
suspect shipment.
information sharing remains key
The private sector is providing shipment-level data to the
Government. At the same time, any Government-held intelligence of
concern regarding a specific shipment must be shared with the private-
sector ACAS participants when appropriate. When a screening referral
has been issued, CBP/TSA have been able to provide specific
intelligence as to why that shipment is targeted and what screeners
should look for on that specific shipment if there is a specific
threat. Although there has been some hesitance to provide broader
intelligence sharing with the private sector, use of other Government
bodies, such as the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
(ODNI), could be utilized more effectively to include both domestic and
international parties involved in the ACAS system.
Going Forward
Information sharing should include:
ACAS participants should be provided with specific concerns
for that shipment, thereby improving their detection capability
on a targeted shipment.
For a shipment that rises to the level of a DNL, the carrier
in possession of the shipment must be given all information to
quickly identify and isolate both that shipment and others in
the network that may be similar.
Other ACAS participants must also be made privy to the full
information--for them to identify and isolate similar high-risk
shipments.
Finally, a secure means to provide broader threat
information to the appropriately-selected security staff within
the ACAS carrier is needed. It would improve internal risk
targeting prior to a shipment ever entering the network. This
type of ``bridge line'' conference call can and should be
tested with industry more effectively.
the air cargo network is highly secure
Air cargo operators are highly motivated to ensure their systems
are not targeted by a terrorist weapon and have made major investments
in creating a secure aviation network based on multiple layers both
from Government regulations and additional corporate security measures.
Of the hundreds of millions of shipments screened through ACAS over a
period of nearly 7 years, less than one-half of 1 percent has required
additional measures to verify the contents, and no terrorist threats
have been detected. This indicates that existing measures are working
effectively to deter attempts to exploit the network for terrorist
purposes.
Going Forward
Before any new regulations are proposed to improve the security of
what is already a very secure air cargo system, Government agencies
should conduct a cost/benefit appraisal, consider the operational
impacts and weigh those against the marginal increase in security. This
is the backbone of ``Risk-Based Security.''
international harmonization is critical for long-term effectiveness
Most of the industry partners involved in the ACAS pilot are
operating on a global scale. There are several initiatives similar to
ACAS being discussed in multiple countries. It is vital that the U.S.
Government seek early alignment with international organizations and
other partners/countries to develop internationally recognized
standards, procedures, and processes for advanced shipment data
provision to minimize the level of variability of systems and
requirements and avoid duplication of data submission and security risk
assessment where possible.
Going Forward
It is vital to develop a common global solution that recognizes and
supports the different air cargo business models and to achieve mutual
recognition of security programs and risk assessment results. The
global solution should harmonize data requirements and eliminate
duplication by ensuring shipment data is only submitted to one country
for a single security risk assessment that is accepted by partners with
whom that country has a mutual recognition agreement. This will allow
international trade partners to share information globally and quickly,
both reducing unnecessary cost and complexity while improving
Governments' risk assessment capabilities.
Mr. Katko. Thank you Mr. Mullen. There are several things I
will be following up with you on during my questioning, and we
appreciate you for being here as well.
I always admire anyone who has served in the military. I
just swore my son in as a second lieutenant, so he is embarking
on his career now, and he will be going to Fort Benning,
Georgia next month to start the infantry officer training
stuff. He could have been a pilot, but he decided he wanted to
do infantry instead. So there goes listening to your old man, I
guess, right?
Mr. Mullen. Right.
Mr. Katko. So our fourth witness is Mr. Bart Elias,
specialist in aviation policy at the Congressional Research
Service. Mr. Elias received his Ph.D. from Georgia Tech in 1994
and spent the next 5 years at the Air Force Research
Laboratory.
In 1999, he became an aviation human performance
investigator at the National Transportation Safety Board, where
he worked on several major accident investigations, including
the crash of John F. Kennedy, Jr.'s private plane.
In addition to his work with CRS, Mr. Elias has also served
on the Transportation Research Board's Committee on Aviation
Security and Emergency Management, chairing its subcommittee on
aviation safety.
I now recognize Mr. Elias for his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF BART ELIAS, SPECIALIST IN AVIATION POLICY,
RESOURCES, SCIENCE, AND INDUSTRY DIVISION, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
Mr. Elias. Chairman Katko, Ranking Member Thompson, Ranking
Member Watson Coleman, and Members of the subcommittee, thank
you for the opportunity to testify today on the topic of air
cargo security.
The air cargo industry serves business and consumer demand
for the transport of the high-value and time-critical goods.
Forecasts project continued growth at air cargo over the next
two decades, spurred by expanding global economy and the growth
of e-commerce. My remarks today will focus on four key aspects
of air cargo security: Insider threats, risk-based targeting of
shipments, physical screening, and in-flight protection from
explosives.
Insiders, individuals with access to and detailed knowledge
of the air cargo system, pose a vexing threat. Adding to the
challenge is the fact that the air cargo system and air cargo
is often stored and prepared for shipment at off-airport
facilities that arrives in airports in bulk.
Complex supply chains involve large numbers of individuals
who handle and transport cargo, as well as individuals
responsible for routing and tracking shipments. Historically,
these supply chains have been infiltrated by organized crime
and there is some concern that terrorist networks could
likewise infiltrate airports, distribution centers, and ground
transportation and operations.
Efforts to address insider threats have focused on worker
vetting. Recent statutory changes allow for more detailed
records checks of certain cargo workers, but systematic reviews
of the process and available options to improve vetting
techniques may be beneficial.
Vetting of shippers and shipments is another key element of
the multi-layered approach to air cargo security. The known
shipper program serves as the primary means for vetting
shipments. Only consignments received from known shippers can
fly aboard passenger airplanes.
In addition, Customs and Border Protection utilizes its
automated targeting system to evaluate inbound international
cargo. Building on this, CBP and TSA continues to pilot test
the Air Cargo Advanced Screening or ACAS system.
Under this system, freight forwarders and airlines
voluntarily submit key data elements of cargo manifests for
pre-departure vetting. While the ultimate objective is to
develop uniform regulations for advanced cargo screening,
progress has been relatively slow, despite favorable views of
the concept and active industry participation.
Last year, the Aviation Security Advisory Committee
expressed concern that after more than 5 years of testing, the
system had still not been fully developed. In its view, TSA had
not devoted adequate staffing and resources to the project.
In 2007, the 9/11 Act mandated 100 percent screening of air
cargo placed on passenger flights. Mandatory screening is
primarily accomplished under the voluntary certified cargo
screening program. This program has been widely viewed by
industry as a successful example of a voluntary initiative that
addresses statutory requirements while providing flexibility to
address industry-specific challenges.
However, projected future growth in air cargo may pose a
challenge, especially if facilities do not appropriately plan
for it. If cargo shipments spike, some facilities may have
difficulty acquiring additional screening equipment promptly.
Industry growth could create opportunities to upgrade
screening technologies and streamline processes, but it also
introduces investment risks if cargo activity later falls off.
Another option under consideration is the possible use of
TSA-approved third-party explosives-detection K-9 teams to
screen air cargo. While many in industry support the idea, TSA
put the concept on hold after a 2011 pilot project failed to
demonstrate reliable results.
TSA is currently re-evaluating available options, and it is
premature to say whether private K-9 teams could help address
air cargo screening needs effectively.
Finally, the 9/11 Commission recommended deployment of at
least one hardened cargo container on every passenger aircraft.
This concept was widely regarded as being too costly and too
complex to implement, but new technologies may make it
practical.
For example, light-weight bomb-resistant bags have been
successfully tested in the United Kingdom. This may address the
weight concerns associated with designs tested and certified in
the United States over a decade ago.
In summary, while a comprehensive framework for air cargo
security exists in the United States, several elements of this
framework, including the Air Cargo Advanced Screening System
remain incomplete.
This concludes my prepared statement, and I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Elias follows:]
Prepared Statement of Bart Elias
July 25, 2017
Chairman Katko, Ranking Member Watson Coleman, and Members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the
topic of air cargo security on behalf of the Congressional Research
Service (CRS). In accordance with our enabling statutes, CRS does not
advocate policy or take a position on legislation.
The air cargo industry serves business and consumer demand for the
domestic and international transport of high-value and time-critical
goods. The air cargo industry has experienced somewhat of a slump over
the past decade, but recent data show that it has largely recovered.
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and others anticipate it will
experience growth over the next two decades spurred by an expanding
global economy and the growth of e-commerce.\1\ Data from the first
quarter of 2017 show that, by weight, domestic and U.S.-international
air cargo shipments are up almost 8 percent from last year, and
international shipments between the United States and both the Asia-
Pacific region and Latin America are each up over 10 percent.\2\
Renewed growth in the air cargo industry will likely pose security
challenges, but could also present opportunities for implementing more
effective air cargo security measures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Federal Aviation Administration, FAA Aerospace Forecast: Fiscal
Years 2017-2037, https://www.faa.gov/data_research/aviation/
aerospace_forecasts/media/FY2017-37_FAA_Aero- space_Forecast.pdf;
Boeing Company, World Air Cargo Forecast 2016-2017, http://
www.boeing.com/commercial/market/cargo-forecast.
\2\ U.S. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation
Statistics, Air Cargo Summary Data, https://www.transtats.bts.gov/
freight.asp?pn=0&display=data2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Existing multi-layered approaches to air cargo security incorporate
access controls, surveillance and physical security measures, physical
screening of cargo shipments, supply chain security measures (such as
tamper-evident and tamper-resistant packaging), shipper vetting, and
air cargo worker vetting.
My remarks will focus on four areas: Insider threats; risk-based
targeting of shipments; physical screening; and in-flight protection
from explosives.
insider threats
Insiders, individuals with access to detailed knowledge of the air
cargo system, pose a vexing threat to aviation security. Adding to the
challenge is the fact that air cargo is often stored and prepared for
shipment at off-airport facilities and arrives at airports in bulk.
This complex supply chain involves large numbers of individuals who
handle and transport cargo prior to its loading, as well as individuals
responsible for the routing and tracking of shipments. Historically, in
the United States, these air cargo supply chains have been infiltrated
by organized criminal elements conducting systematic theft and
smuggling operations. There is concern among some that terrorist
networks could similarly infiltrate airports, distribution centers, and
ground transport operations to gather information about possible
weaknesses and exploit vulnerabilities in the air cargo supply chain.
Regulations promulgated in 2006 mandate access restrictions to
cargo aircraft and cargo operations areas and are designed to deter
individuals from introducing weapons, explosives, and other threats
into the system, but 100 percent physical screening of air cargo
workers has been widely regarded as too costly, complex, and inflexible
to meet the demands of air cargo and airport operations. Consequently,
efforts to address insider threats have focused on worker vetting. This
includes all regulated air cargo workers employed by airports,
airlines, and freight forwarders, as well as employees of
manufacturers, warehouses, distribution centers, and so on, that
voluntarily participate in the Transportation Security Administration's
(TSA's) Certified Cargo Screening Program.
Enhancing vetting capabilities through more detailed lookbacks and
periodic reviews of cargo workers' potential ties to criminal activity
and terrorism could potentially enhance threat detection. Recent
statutory changes allow for more detailed records checks of certain
cargo workers,\3\ but systematic reviews of the process and available
options to improve vetting techniques might be beneficial.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ See the FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016, Pub.
L. 114-190.
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risk-based vetting of shipments
In addition to vetting air cargo workers, vetting of shippers and
shipments serves as another key element in the multi-layered approach
to air cargo security. The known shipper program, first developed in
the mid-1990's and refined in 2006, continues to serve as the primary
means for vetting shipments: Only consignments received from known
shippers can fly aboard passenger airplanes. In addition, Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) utilizes its Automated Targeting System to
evaluate in-bound international cargo and select cargo for inspection.
Building on this, CBP and TSA continue to pilot test the Air Cargo
Advance Screening (ACAS) system, under which freight forwarders and
airlines voluntarily submit key data elements of cargo manifests for
pre-departure vetting. Based on results of the pilot program, CBP and
TSA are seeking to identify the appropriate data elements to require
and to determine how much advance notice they need in order to identify
shipments that require closer scrutiny.
The ACAS pilot program began in 2010. In July 2016, CBP extended it
for an additional year.\4\ While the ultimate objective is to develop
uniform regulations for advance cargo screening, progress has been
relatively slow, despite favorable views of the concept and active
industry participation. Last year, the Aviation Security Advisory
Committee, a group of industry advisers to TSA, expressed concern that,
after more than 5 years of pilot testing, the system had still not been
fully developed. In the committee's view, TSA had not devoted adequate
staffing and resources to the project.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, ``Extension of the Air
Cargo Advance Screening (ACAS) Pilot Program,'' 81 Federal Register
47812-47813, July 22, 2016.
\5\ Aviation Security Advisory Committee, Meeting Minutes, February
29, 2016, https://www.tsa.gov/sites/default/files/
asac_meeting_minutes_29feb2016-508.pdf
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cargo screening
The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007
(Pub. L. 110-53) mandated 100 percent screening of air cargo placed on
passenger flights. In contrast to its functional role in airline
passenger and baggage screening, TSA serves primarily in a regulatory
capacity with respect to air cargo screening. Mandatory screening is
primarily accomplished by airlines and freight forwarders, as well as
manufacturers, shippers, and cargo consolidators that are certified by
TSA under the voluntary Certified Cargo Screening Program. TSA approves
and oversees participants in this program and conducts security threat
assessments of workers who handle air cargo shipments at certified
facilities. The program has been widely viewed by industry as a
successful example of a voluntary initiative that addresses the
statutory requirements while providing adequate flexibility to address
industry-specific challenges. However, projected future growth in air
cargo may pose a challenge to this layer of security in particular,
especially if facilities do not appropriately plan for it. If cargo
shipments spike, some of these privately-owned facilities may have
difficulty acquiring additional screening equipment to meet increased
demand in the near term. Industry growth could create opportunities to
upgrade screening technologies and streamline processes, but it also
introduces investment risks if cargo activity later falls off.
Another option under consideration is the certification and
deployment of TSA-approved third-party explosives detection canine
teams to screen air cargo. While many in industry support the idea, TSA
had put the concept on hold after results from a 2011 pilot project
failed to demonstrate reliable conformity to TSA performance standards
among canine teams provided by outside contractors.\6\ TSA is currently
re-evaluating available options to take advantage of third-party canine
teams, and it is premature to say whether this approach may provide a
viable means to address cargo screening needs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Transportation Security Administration, Canine Teams
Effectiveness for Securing Transportation Systems, Statement by Melanie
Harvey and Annmarie Lontz before the House Committee on Homeland
Security, Transportation Security Subcommittee, June 24, 2014, https://
www.tsa.gov/news/testimony/2014/06/24/canine-teams-effectiveness-
securing-transportation-systems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
in-flight measures
The majority of security experts believe that the most meaningful
air cargo security measures involve identifying threats through risk-
based measures and physical screening before explosives or incendiary
devices can be placed on an aircraft.\7\ However, it may also be
possible to limit the damage from a device that might go undetected and
be loaded into a cargo hold. The 9/11 Commission recommended the
deployment of at least one hardened cargo container on every passenger
aircraft,\8\ but doing so was widely regarded as being too costly and
too complex to implement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ See, for example, U.S. Government Accountability Office,
Aviation Security: Actions Needed to Address Challenges and Potential
Vulnerabilities Related to Securing In-bound Air Cargo, GAO-12-632,
June 11, 2012, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-632; International
Air Transport Association, Recommended Practice 1630: Air Cargo
Security, http://www.iata.org/whatwedo/cargo/security/documents/csc-
recommended-practice1630.pdf.
\8\ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
States, The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 393, https://9-11commission.gov/
report/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alternative approaches for explosive containment may be further
evaluated. For example, lighter-weight bomb-resistant bags that can
absorb the energy of an explosion have been successfully tested in the
United Kingdom.\9\ This technology may address the weight concerns
associated with the hardened unit loading device designs that were
tested and certified in the United States over a decade ago.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ David Shukman, ``Aircraft `Bomb Bag' Limits On-Board Explosion
Impact,'' BBC News, July 24, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/science-
environment-33650713.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
conclusion
In summary, while a comprehensive framework for air cargo security
exists in the United States, several elements of this framework,
including the Air Cargo Advance Screening system, remain incomplete. In
addition, there are potential opportunities to improve the vetting of
air cargo employees, refine risk-based approaches to identify and
appropriately screen high-risk cargo, and improve the likelihood that
an aircraft can survive an explosion or in-flight fire.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Elias, I appreciate your
testimony. I am particularly interested in following up with
you either during the hearing today or at some point afterwards
about the problem I see with new technologies from the time the
idea is born until the time they get them on the front lines to
help out.
I think there is still applied mentality in the bottleneck
that is within Homeland Security's real problem and perhaps you
could shed some light on that for us, if we have time today.
But I do appreciate your testimony.
I want to recognize the Ranking Member Mr. Thompson, who is
here with us today. In a moment he will be asking questions as
well.
I now recognize myself for 5 minutes of questions.
Mr. Mullen, I think I will begin with you. You mentioned
something that I am always interested in and that is the
public-private partnerships. I think that increases
dramatically the efficiencies of Government by basically
providing user tools and getting the heck out of the way and
just providing appropriate oversight.
I want to talk to you about the Air Cargo Advanced
Screening pilot program. I stress the word pilot because, it
has been a pilot program for way too long.
I would to like hear your opinions on, you know, by taking
away that and just making it part of our overall apparatus that
we requested in the authorization bill that came out of the
House, what that will do to benefit, if anything, with the
program?
Mr. Mullen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Well, ACAS was unique
in the way it was created because what the Yemen bomb plot
indicated was that our existing regulation, which was the Trade
Act of 2002 that required manifest information to be submitted
4 hours before the arrival of the aircraft, was not adequate.
That would have been way too late if those bombs hadn't
been discovered the way they were when they were still over in
Europe and the Middle East. So essentially CBP and TSA
presented that problem to industry and said we need this
information earlier or we need a subset of the data on each
shipment earlier than we are getting it now. But they allowed
industry to devise the most effective approach to providing
that information earlier.
The thing was, the flexibility the Government adopted was
also very important. Many different members have joined ACAS,
and the Government has been able to adopt a flexible I.T.
approach with each company where they can adapt their ability
to receive the data to the capability of the industry to submit
it.
So I think the measures that are outlined in the Homeland
Security reauthorization are enormously important. But what is
going to be required to make it work is that willingness to,
you know, treat each other as co-equals, as trusted partners
going forward, and Government's ability to adapt, which is
essentially an industry solution to a security problem.
Mr. Katko. Well, thank you, Mr. Mullen and I couldn't agree
more. I trust that going forward if we are successful in
getting this authorization passed out of the Senate and signed
into law and that this becomes a permanent entity, that you
will continue to interact with us to keep us abreast of issues
that we need to address, if any going forward.
Mr. Fried, I appreciate your testimony as well, and, you
know, just talk about the National cargo security program in
general, but in particular the known shipper program and the
indirect air carrier program. Are there any improvements that
can be made to those programs that we should be aware of or
that we need to address, which we haven't?
Mr. Fried. As I stated in my testimony, I believe that the
known shipper program has to be streamlined to reflect today's
economic and electronic realities. E-commerce didn't exist a
number of years ago.
So we want to be able to get as many shippers as possible
onto these planes, because you have got to remember that all
cargo is now screened on the piece level, physically screened.
But at the same time if the known shipper management system
can't quickly accommodate these transactions, that is where we
have some issues.
So we need to get a group together, maybe a joint task
force from TSA and stakeholders, in coming up with ways to
streamline the management system so that we can get more of
these shippers on planes.
Mr. Katko. All right, thank you very much.
Mr. Elias, briefly, as I only have a minute left, we do
have a little time, I have been vitally concerned since I have
been in Congress about the stop-gap, if you will, the
bottleneck, I should say, of getting technology from idea to
implementation--it has just been a mess at Homeland Security.
I see so many vendors out there and so many people with
great ideas. Either it is the RFP process, which is like Lucy
holding the football and pulling it away from Charlie Brown at
the last second, they keep changing the RFPs down the road.
They are not--the willingness not to think outside the box as
much as they should.
So could you comment on some of that and what you think we
could do moving forward to help expedite that process in the
cargo security arena?
Mr. Elias. In terms of expediting the process, that may be
difficult in the context of Federal acquisition law. But I will
comment in general on the air cargo industry in that the CCSP
in particular is a system where there is a list that TSA
provides of approved screening equipment that the industry then
purchases for screening the cargo.
That may offer an opportunity for some flexibilities in
terms of the ability for TSA to more quickly identify approved
screening equipment, as opposed to going through the full
Federal acquisition process.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Elias.
Then my time is up, but I will just note, Mr. Alterman, I
haven't forgotten about you. My time is up, but I do want to
thank you again for all you have contributed over the years to
the industry.
I hope you remain a robust member of the ASAC for a long
time because your input has been very valuable and the input I
have received back from the ACAS committee as a whole since I
have been Chairman of this subcommittee has been
extraordinarily helpful.
So bottom line, just keep it up, OK?
Mr. Alterman. Thank you.
Mr. Katko. All right. You are welcome.
The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of the Homeland
Security Committee as a whole, Mr. Thompson, for his questions.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I
would like to submit my written testimony for the record.
Mr. Katko. Without objection, so ordered.
[The statement of Mr. Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
July 25, 2017
DHS Secretary John Kelly has described the threat to aviation as
``sophisticated'' and ``very real.'' I concur with Secretary Kelly's
assessment of the aviation threat. That said, the demands of the ever-
evolving threat environment demand that TSA not only give significant
attention to passenger screening but also be vigilant about other
aviation security threats--such as those related to air cargo.
The threat to air cargo came into full view in 2010 when al-Qaeda
in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) designed a plot in which explosives
hidden within printer cartridges were to be detonated on U.S.-bound
aircraft. If successful, this plot would have killed innocent people
and caused catastrophic economic disruption.
As AQAP explained in its on-line magazine, Inspire, ``It is such a
good bargain . . . to spread fear amongst the enemy and keep him on his
toes in exchange of a few months of work and a few thousand bucks.''
Well before the 2010 AQAP air cargo plot, Congress recognized the
need to bolster air cargo security. Next week will mark the tenth
anniversary of the enactment of the Implementing Recommendations of the
9/11 Commission Act of 2007, legislation I authored that then-President
George W. Bush signed into law. A key provision of this comprehensive
homeland security law was a mandate that all cargo on domestic and
international in-bound passenger planes be screened.
TSA and the stakeholder community deserve a lot of credit for
coming together to develop an approach to implementation that, since
2012, has kept air passengers secure from the threat of a cargo-based
explosion. While I have been pleased with all that was done to achieve
the mandate, more must be done.
It is my hope that today's hearing will be a part of an on-going
conversation that will help us identify opportunities where TSA can
work better with cargo stakeholders to further enhance security and
operations.
Mr. Thompson. You know, I think this is a watershed moment
for air cargo screening in this country. When we first talked
about it, people said it can't be done. You know, I refused to
believe it then, and I think now we have done a very good job
at not only keeping security uppermost, but we have also been
able to keep commerce moving in the process.
So, I think Congress was right to mandate the 100 percent.
It just took us a little while to get there but, nonetheless we
are there.
So I guess the question that I have, and then I will start
with Mr. Elias is, what transformation have you seen from the
beginning to now that is you think important for this committee
to understand? What is the take-away going forward for us to
continue this effort?
Mr. Elias. Well, I think some of the transformation that
you describe really does reflect your view of the notion that
it was impossible or improbable to accomplish 100 percent
screening. Before it was enacted, I know talking to folks in
industry, that there was real concern that how were we going to
accomplish this?
There was a transformation to a view where now we have been
faced with this mandate what do we need to do to work together
to meet the requirements and at the same time meet the
industry-specific needs to keep cargo moving through the
system.
You know, that was a process that took a few years. You
know, domestically it probably took on the order of 3 years to
accomplish and closer to 5 years to work with our international
partners to accomplish that.
But, you know, moving forward, as you said it has been a
bit of a transformation in terms of the view of how the
screening could work effectively in the comprehensive multi-
layered approach to air cargo security.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you. I guess to other members of the
panel, you have kind-of seen that metamorphosis of where we are
now. Can you give us, Mr. Alterman, and going forward, your
opinion?
Mr. Alterman. Yes. Thank you very much for the question.
One of the things that I have noticed, and I agree with Mr.
Elias, but one of the things that Yemen taught us was that the
key element in air cargo security, indeed on all security, is
good intelligence. That plot would not have been resolved
without the Saudis giving us good intelligence.
One of the things that has happened over the last few years
is that the ability to share intelligence information both
among the Government agencies and between Government agencies
and the industry, has become crucially important, perhaps more
important than anything else that we can do from a regulatory
standpoint.
So what we discovered as a result of Yemen and the years
following is there are a whole number of organizations in the
U.S. Government with intelligence oversight. They don't always
talk to each other.
To be perfectly honest, TSA cannot tell us what they don't
know. So we have to make sure that the intra-Government
relationships on intelligence sharing get to the people who can
share it with the industry.
The second part of that is that TSA must be able and
willing to share that information with key people and the
members of their stakeholder community. Because it doesn't do
any good for TSA to have that intelligence information if it is
not transmitted to the people who can actually act on that in
the industry.
Again, that goes back to some of the first things that
Chairman Katko said, and that is that security works best when
industry and Government work together to identify the issues
and then design the mitigation strategies for that.
It is crucially important in the intelligence area. We need
the Government to get the information to the TSA. The TSA must
not only say here is the information, they must work with the
stakeholders to say what is the result of this information, and
how can we mitigate it?
Don't just put on, you know, here is the information and
here is what you shall do. Again, it goes back to a cooperative
agreement.
But I think what I have discovered in going back to your
question, was the advancement of intelligence information and
the recognition that intelligence is so crucial, really needs
to come to the forefront.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you. My time is up. At some point I
would love to hear that response from the other two panelists.
Mr. Katko. We have some leeway, Mr. Thompson, so please go
ahead.
Mr. Thompson. OK.
Mr. Fried, if you would like to take a chance?
Mr. Fried. Thank you, Mr. Thompson. You know, the certified
cargo screening program is a shining example of success born
out of both Government and private partnerships working
together because we knew that failure was not an option.
So we had to make this 100 percent screening mandate work.
For the past 7 years or so we have been screening using this
risk-based multi-layered approach, and it has worked. So we
have physical screening and it is throughout the United States
on, as you said, flights leaving and coming and everywhere.
But I think within TSA, I agree with what Mr. Alterman just
said about the need for information sharing. But I also think
it is incumbent upon TSA to provide swifter policy
interpretation within our industry, so that we are not left
guessing on the stakeholder side as to how to interpret
policies that are coming out of the agency. That is
particularly concerning to us, because obviously safety is at
stake.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
Mr. Mullen.
Mr. Mullen. Congressman, I would just note that the results
of the Yemen incident really served to highlight the enormously
robust security programs that members of the air cargo industry
had in place for decades. It ranges from employee vetting and
training, through screening of shipments from high-risk
countries, to a whole range of measures that those companies
use to protect their own assets and their brand.
The measures like ACASS add an additional layer to those,
but it has been effective because there was already a very
solid foundation--100 percent screening was feasible because a
lot of these companies were already screening all the shipments
coming from certain high-threat countries.
So that is the key going forward, is the Government and
industry continue to work together that way while recognizing
the very good foundation that we have in place already.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
I appreciate the Chair's indulgence. Thank you.
Mr. Katko. Certainly, Mr. Thompson.
The Chair welcomes to the committee the gentleman from
Kansas, Mr. Estes, and recognizes him for his 5 minutes of
questioning.
Mr. Estes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The previous question
asked by Mr. Thompson kind-of centered around one of the
questions that I wanted to start with is, you know, what are
additional resources that TSA maybe particularly needs?
So I don't know if there are other things, tools, or
techniques out there. Can you embellish upon that?
Maybe just open it up for all of you to start with, Mr.
Alterman?
Mr. Alterman. Yes, and I am not sure additional resources,
although they always help, you know, probably the personnel
policies and organization of TSA is probably none of my
business, but it does relate to the question you asked.
That is that once upon a time at TSA, we had an Air Cargo
Division that concentrated on air cargo and we had scores of
people working in it. That has shifted away so we don't have
that organization anymore.
More than additional resources, I think there should be
concentration of recognizing the unique place that air cargo
plays in the world. One of the ACAS recommendations a while
back was to reconstitute the air cargo office within the Office
of Security Policy and Industry Engagement.
I am not sure it needs 40 people, but I sure as heck think
that what we really need within TSA is a shifting of
priorities. Brandon hit on this, you know, on a more specific
basis.
But I really think that we need an office of air cargo
policy that brings together all the disparate people within TSA
that work on air cargo so we don't wind up with different
policies and different interpretations of the same policy. That
reorganization type of operation would do a tremendous amount
to increase air cargo security.
Mr. Fried. Mr. Estes, I would agree with what Mr. Alterman
just said. I would also tell you that, you know, air cargo is
seemingly a simple business, but it is fraught with complexity.
You do need people who are focused and dedicated to the
workings of air cargo. To just mix them in with this general
aviation umbrella, I think, does air cargo a disservice, and I
think it does air cargo security a disservice as well.
Mr. Estes. Mr. Mullen.
Mr. Mullen. Congressman, I would just add that I think
there are some novel approaches to focusing the existing
Government resources a little bit better than we are doing
right now.
CBP has a personnel shortfall right now, but they have
developed a program where the private sector can come to them
and propose projects where the private sector provides some
resources. It might be office space. It might be overtime
salaries. There is a range of things that the private sector
can provide, and CBP will work with them to provide their
officers to focus inspection activities in a certain area at a
certain time, perhaps weekends or off hours.
So I think it is programs like that where the Government
can work with industry to focus the existing resources a little
bit more effectively.
Mr. Estes. Mr. Elias, did you have any thoughts as well
along the same lines?
Mr. Elias. Just some brief thoughts really to build on
that, just to leverage some of the capabilities of industry to
work with TSA. As I mentioned before in response to Chairman
Katko's comment, within the CCSP, there may be some
opportunities to look at things like novel approaches to
screening technology, those types of things, through
partnership with industry.
Mr. Estes. Thank you. My next question, maybe it is one
that is already well-understood by the other committee Members,
but coming from a new Member. We talked a little bit about the
third-party K-9 program, and how that is being added in.
I guess I will ask you, Mr. Alterman, since you brought it
up first is, what were some of the specific things that we were
wanting to see accomplished with that that wasn't being done
now internally?
Mr. Alterman. Well, historically at TSA there has been a
pushback against allowing third-party K-9s to screen cargo. TSA
has a cadre of wonderful dogs, but there aren't enough of them,
and they are TSA dogs. There has always been a pushback from
the agency about doing a third-party K-9 program.
They have moved somewhat in the direction of allowing this,
but your legislation, I think, pushed it over the edge. What
they are doing now, at least on our last meeting with them, is
exactly what the language of the 2825 says.
You know, the devil is always in the details. We don't know
exactly what the program is going to look like when it comes
out of the other end of the sausage grinder, but we have been
told that it will conform to the language of the act.
We are a little concerned that things never move fast
enough within Government agencies, and TSA in particular, and
we are a little concerned that the details may be concerning.
We had a meeting with them, and they promised to show us where
they were going before they actually started implementing it.
We haven't heard back from them, but the good news was that
I did speak to someone who said they were going to try to have
a program in place by October 1 of this year, which is very
aggressive and very good if they actually do it.
The industry continues to be in a show-me state because of
the traditional reluctance to do this. But with the help of the
legislation, and hopefully when the Senate gets around to doing
the same thing, we think that we are on the right path there. I
think that we are overcoming the reluctance.
Mr. Estes. Thank you. It is interesting you mentioned the
sausage-making process. I was informed on the floor today, that
using that terminology to talk about our legislative process
denigrates sausages.
So, you know, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Estes.
The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member Mrs. Watson
Coleman for 5 minutes of questions.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
each for your information. It is very helpful to me. I have so
many questions regarding this issue. I want to start with this.
This is for all three of you actually.
I would like to hear from the three members of the private
sector witnesses about the security of our cargo screening
system. Because it appears to me that the approach TSA takes in
addressing cargo security relies a lot on effective
communication and coordination among industry and TSA and a
limited degree of oversight.
So one could argue that, given the nature of the threat,
there should be more agency oversight and compliance
inspections of cargo security screening. I would appreciate it
if the three of you could briefly tell me now, or for the
record, why this system we have in place is effective at
preventing successful attacks via cargo, and what, if any more,
should we be doing?
I also want you to know that I am very impressed, and very
concerned, about the disbursement of the sort-of functions
throughout TSA, if something that seems to belong in one sort-
of centralized location, and would love for someone to tell me
when and why that happened if you could? Thank you.
Mr. Fried. Mrs. Watson Coleman, I can probably address the
oversight issue at the TSA. I would tell you that, you know,
that TSA has 500 cargo inspectors out in the field overseeing
approximately 4,000 indirect air carriers and freight
forwarders.
So most of or all of our members and freight forwarders
throughout the United States, see the TSA personnel on a very
frequent basis, both through the front door and through the
back door, testing our facilities making sure they are
hardened, making sure that our securities are, in fact, secure.
So there is a tremendous amount of oversight, especially in
the certified cargo screening program. They are constantly
coming in looking at our video tapes, looking at the screening
process itself. I----
Mrs. Watson Coleman. [Inaudible.]
Mr. Fried. It could range from several times a week to a
few times a month. It depends on how they see fit. And----
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Some agents--are they not looking at
smaller facilities or how are they deciding where to
concentrate their effort if they have only got 500?
Mr. Fried. Well, and I didn't mean to imply that there are
those indirect air carriers that are not supervised or not
overseen or checked. They are checked on, I assume, a random
basis. I don't know exactly what the algorithm is within TSA's
inspection force, but I can tell you they are frequent visitors
to our facilities.
So I, you know, the oversight I think is there. But what we
really need to be doing is focusing on ways to increase the
amount of technology that is out there, improve--as an example,
right now, I don't know if you knew this or not, but there is
no technology in existence that TSA has validated and
certified, that will screen many types of commodities on a
pallet.
So that is one of the reasons why we have to move forward
very quickly to make sure that these K-9s are, in fact,
provided on a third-party basis to the stakeholders, to the
forwarders, so that we can begin this screening in that
fashion. We assume that there will be very aggressive TSA
oversight.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. What do you think is the biggest
problem getting these K-9s that can be trained? I mean, I read
the sort-of information and briefing on it, and it seemed like
TSA just didn't find K-9s that met the grade. Why is that?
Mr. Fried. Well, I could tell you--I can't speak to
whatever happened prior to this in the pilot program for a
number of years ago. But I can tell you that there is a robust
industry of K-9 providers out there that are ready to train to
TSA standards.
There is a pretty large number of dogs ready to go
throughout wherever needed. So, you know, once again, the
private sector can come in and assist the TSA.
Now what is causing the delay? I think that, you know, this
is something that the TSA is reluctant to release out of its
control because obviously they have had such strict oversight
over these K-9s for a number of years.
But I think that over time, their confidence will build
that in fact the private sector can rise to the occasion and by
the way, even exceed the standards.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Let me ask you one quick question. I
know that other two gentlemen didn't get a chance to respond to
my question. Who mentioned the bomb bags?
Mr. Fried. You mean the containers?
Mr. Elias. That was me.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Well, the word was bags. So I just
wanted to know what was that, how does that work, and what is
the problem with having that used here if it has been
determined to be effective?
Mr. Elias. So that is on-going research in the United
Kingdom on bomb bags. They are about an inch thick, soft-sided
bags that can contain an explosion on-board an aircraft. They
have done demonstrations that that has been effective on old
aircraft parked in the United Kingdom.
So in my testimony I mentioned that the last time the
United States has looked at the hardened cargo container
technology was essentially a decade ago, building off of FAA
research. The TSA followed up with that based on a legislative
mandate in 2004. So, you know, this U.K. technology seems
promising so it may be something worthy of reexamining.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Mr. Chairman, I just have a lot of
questions that I had to do with the, sort-of, chain of custody
of things that ultimately get on airplanes, and I would just
love to hear, and perhaps you could send that to us, what your
ideas are to ensure that that sort-of chain of custody is
secure and that we can be confident that this is working the
way it is supposed to be.
With that I yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Katko. No, I think that is a particularly good point
given the perceived technological advances by the bad guys,
right? So it is something we should definitely be noteworthy of
and I look forward to hearing your responses on that as well.
You can have 10 legislative days in which to send that back. I
would appreciate it.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr.
Higgins, for 5 minutes of questions.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mullen, is cargo ever transferred from a dedicated
cargo flight onto a commercial passenger flight in order to
arrive at perhaps a smaller airport with no dedicated cargo
terminal?
Mr. Mullen. Yes, sir. That happens routinely.
Mr. Higgins. OK.
Mr. Chairman on December 21, 1988, and I thank the Ranking
Member earlier for speaking on the amount of time we have been
talking about this. On December 21, 1988, Pan-Am flight 103 was
blown from the sky over Lockerbie, Scotland by the placement of
a Semtex bomb in luggage transferred from--the flight went from
Helsinki through Frankfurt to London and was en route to New
York. Two hundred and seventy people died, 259 crew and
passengers and 11 on the ground where the wreckage fell.
Two weeks prior to that attack, the FAA received a detailed
warning. This is what the investigation disclosed is what I am
sharing today. A detailed warning describing the attack
precisely as it took place. It was taken very seriously by the
FAA and all the airlines were warned.
Pan-Am itself began collecting a $5 security surcharge
promising and I quote: ``A program that will screen passengers,
employees, airport facilities, baggage, and aircraft with
unrelenting thoroughness.'' This was almost 30 years ago, and
yet we still discuss it today.
So I would ask my question to you Mr. Elias, given your
background and your area of specialty, sir. Considering the
modern capability to digitally construct and shape Semtex
plastic explosives, it seems to me that the detection of the
chemical compound itself for plastic explosives has to be our
goal.
What can Department of Homeland Security do to enhance the
industry's ability to detect plastic explosives and as a 14-
year cop, I am a great believer in K-9s. I think you are right,
sir.
Mr. Fried you mentioned that there is a robust industry of
K-9 providers. These dogs can be trained. They can be deployed
rather inexpensively compared to some of the technologies out
there.
But Mr. Elias, I defer to your greater wisdom here, sir,
and I ask you your response?
Mr. Elias. So your question really gets at the use of
technology and what technologies are adopted, as well as
alternatives to technologies, such as K-9 teams and how they
could work in concert with each other.
Mr. Higgins. To detect plastic explosive, yes, sir.
Mr. Elias. To detect explosives, yes, absolutely, plastic
and other explosives. So explosive trace detection technologies
certainly have the capability to look at those chemical
signatures of various different explosives.
K-9s certainly can be trained to do similar tasks. So the
use of both of those technologies can augment other methods,
such as explosives detection systems which work on matter
density and so forth, to look at explosives without looking at
the chemical aspects of those explosives.
So there is a host of technologies available. We really
haven't gotten to the point to really field any other
technologies other than those trace technologies, although
there are some technologies that have been in the laboratory
for years. They just haven't been seen as feasible to really
move out into the field.
The K-9 teams certainly are seen as one potential option
for looking at ways to detect chemical traces in the
explosives.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you for that answer.
Mr. Fried.
Mr. Fried. Mr. Higgins, I am a graduate of Syracuse
University and several students were on Pan-Am 103 returning
from their semester abroad in Europe.
Mr. Higgins. I am sorry for that pain, sir.
Mr. Fried. As were we in the Syracuse community. I would
tell you that there is not a day that goes by that we don't
think of Pan-Am 103.
I would also say that this is a risk-based multi-layered
approach to security. There is not one magic bullet to actually
detect every single threat. That is why everything has got to
be working in concert--all these tools. I think that K-9s are a
very viable tool that needs to be implemented as soon as
possible.
But technology is constantly evolving and that is one of
the reasons why TSA has got to use an aggressive approach to
making sure they are considering every new piece of technology
possible and making those new technologies available in the
field so that they can work in concert with these K-9s when
necessary.
Mr. Higgins. Mr. Fried, that was a thoughtful and
comprehensive answer.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Fried. Thank you.
Mr. Katko. Thank you. Mr. Fried, I must know that I am very
happy to hear that you are from Syracuse University, as am I.
So----
Mr. Fried. Thank you.
Mr. Katko [continuing]. Great minds think alike I guess,
right.
Mr. Fried. Jim Boeheim was hired in my freshman year.
Mr. Katko. Is that right?
Mr. Fried. Actually my sophomore year.
Mr. Katko. You are dating yourself. I hope----
Mr. Fried. I am dating myself.
Mr. Katko. I hope you didn't dress as poorly as he has over
the years. He has gotten better lately, but I would like to
thank all of you for your testimony today.
It has been very helpful. It has been long past due for
this subcommittee to pay attention to air cargo from a
committee standpoint. We pay attention to it every day, but
talking about it in this setting is very, very important, and I
appreciate all of your testimonies. It is a very impressive
panel.
I want to echo what I said earlier and that is this is not
a one-time deal. We routinely rely on you all feeding
information to our committee's staffs and for us to shape
policy and shape laws and accordingly. So please keep up the
interaction between all of us.
I applaud you on the public-private partnerships. I applaud
you on doing a terrific job in carrying out Ranking Member
Thompson's mandate from years ago. I mean, I think it was his
legislation that started this.
And good for him, and I wish he was here for me to throw a
compliment at him cause I don't do it very often.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. I will let him know.
Mr. Katko. All right. It is on the record so he should make
a record of it. But I do thank you for it, and I do thank Mrs.
Watson Coleman as always and all of the Members of the
committee and the staff, who did a great job on this.
Let's keep moving on this and if there is legislation that
you need for us to take a look at of course it is our job to do
that and please keep it coming. The last thing I can say is go
orange. Thank you very much.
So Members of the committee may have some additional
questions for the witnesses. We will ask you to respond to
those in writing. Pursuant to committee rule VII(D), the
hearing record will be held open for 10 days.
Without objection the subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:12 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Ranking Member Bonnie Watson Coleman for Stephen A.
Alterman
Question 1. The Government's approach to securing air cargo relies
significantly on effective communication and coordination among
industry stakeholders and the TSA, and the TSA has limited resources to
ensure compliance and oversight. Please provide your thoughts on the
effectiveness of the current construct for air cargo security. Should
TSA increase its resources for compliance and oversight? What more can
be done to ensure effective communication, coordination, and oversight?
Answer. The Cargo Airline Association agrees that effective
communication and coordination between industry stakeholders and TSA is
essential in today's security environment. This communication and
coordination is especially important in an era of diminishing
resources.
This question can be broken down into two separate components--the
communication and coordination piece and the oversight issue. With
respect to the ``current construct for air cargo security'', as we
noted in oral testimony, policy affecting air cargo has largely been
spread across the agency rather than being centralized in one place.
This dispersion of policy responsibility has often led to conflicting
interpretations of TSA policy leaving industry caught in the middle of
internal agency struggles. This problem has been exacerbated by the
disbanding several years ago of the Air Cargo Office within the Office
of Security Policy and Industry Engagement (OSPIE). We believe that,
without this office, effective air cargo policy gets lost among other
competing interests. While we understand that re-creating the office
with the scores of personnel previously employed is probably not viable
in today's environment, we strongly believe that an Air Cargo
Operations and Policy Office, dedicated to working with industry
stakeholders, would go a long way toward a better understanding of the
industry and a more secure air cargo supply chain.
In terms of TSA's oversight function, in our opinion the key is not
more resources, but rather the continued development of a program for
non-punitive information sharing that will allow TSA to develop data on
potential security gaps and to work with industry on mitigation
strategies. Coupled with more robust intelligence sharing both among
Government agencies and between Government and industry, this
cooperative effort will provide the best air cargo security.
Question 2. How does the cargo industry and TSA ensure a secure
chain of custody for air cargo as it transits through the supply chain
prior to loading on aircraft? What more can be done to ensure a secure
chain of custody?
Answer. The security of the air cargo supply chain is governed by
the various Standard Security Programs governing industry operations.
The specific provisions are considered Sensitive Security Information
(SSI) and cannot be divulged in a public context. Therefore, this
question is more appropriately addressed to TSA who can provide the
information on a confidential basis.
Having said that, it is important to note that the air cargo
industry is composed of a number of diverse entities all of which play
a role in securing the supply chain. Because of the diversity of
operations, each entity (passenger airlines, all-cargo airlines and air
freight forwarders) operates under a separate security program tailored
to specific threats. Where the operations of these entities intersect,
the various programs contain provisions that provide security
requirements for the transfer of freight among the parties.
In terms of possible improvements, the various programs should be
reviewed with a view to making them more outcome-based and tailored to
specific company operational requirements. As a practical matter, ``one
size does not fit all'' prescriptive programs across a broad spectrum
of the industry are less effective than risk-based programs designed
for each company in the supply chain. One way of accomplishing this
objective would be for TSA to establish the outcomes necessary and
having each company develop the specific ways that they would comply--
with TSA approving each company's methodology.
Question 3. The rise of e-commerce business has affected the cargo
industry significantly in recent years. How has the rise of e-commerce
business impacted air cargo security, and what changes should be made
to current security programs to reflect these changes in the industry?
Answer. The rise of e-commerce has radically altered the buying
habits of consumers around the world. On-line purchases have meant
significantly more freight moving through the air cargo supply chains.
While the industry has adequately adapted to this influx of traffic,
there are two enhancements that can be made as we move forward. Both of
these enhancements were described in some detail in oral testimony of
the industry witnesses.
First, in order to deal with increasing volumes and regulatory
requirements, the use of third-party canines for the primary screening
of air cargo is absolutely essential. Canines have consistently proven
effective in such screening in international markets and these private
canines can provide an extra level of security for all supply chains.
TSA is in the process of developing such a program and the recently
passed H.R. 2825 also would require a viable third-party canine
program. A rapid deployment of this ``low-tech'' screening method is
extremely important.
Second, the Air Cargo Advance Screening (ACAS) program where
companies submit shipment information for analysis as early as possible
in the supply chain should be made fully operational as soon as
possible. The program has been in a pilot stage for over 6 years and
full implementation should be a Government priority. Indeed,
consideration should be given to expanding ACAS, now an international
program, to domestic operations.
Questions From Ranking Member Bonnie Watson Coleman for Brandon Fried
Question 1. How does the cargo industry and TSA ensure a secure
chain of custody for air cargo as it transits through the supply chain
before loading on aircraft? What more can be done to ensure a secure
chain of custody?
Answer. Freight forwarder members of the Airforwarders Association
are governed by the Indirect Air Carrier Standard Security Program when
securing their cargo as it transits through the supply chain before
loading on aircraft. Specific provisions of the program are considered
Sensitive Security Information (SSI) and cannot be divulged in the
public context.
Members of the Airforwarders Association have been ensuring the
safe transit of air cargo through a complex supply chain for many
years. However, more needs to be done, especially regarding our
interaction with the Transportation Security Administration.
For example, as mentioned in my recent testimony, the air cargo
supply chain is comprised of many complexities more fully understood by
those individuals who have had extensive industry experience. For this
reason, we feel that TSA should reestablish a stand-alone air cargo
division within the agency, comprised of personnel who are industry-
educated and capable of engaging stakeholders in the development of
sound policy positions which can be quickly understood and applied.
There are over 4,000 TSA-certified Indirect Air Carriers throughout
the United States utilizing the air cargo supply chain daily and
abiding by the agency security program. Many participants require the
uniform and consistent understanding of the provisions and requirements
included within the security program itself. TSA should, therefore,
develop and provide standard training modules with appropriate testing
elements to assure this knowledge consistency throughout the Indirect
Air Carrier community. Consistent use of TSA authored standard training
and testing modules and, in many cases, hiring third parties to help
manage the process, allows Indirect Air Carriers to know that any
individual who has received TSA-provided training has received
instruction that comports with TSA's interpretation of the Indirect Air
Carrier Standard Security Program. This structure promotes air cargo
security by providing uniformity of practice and procedure.
Also, TSA should expedite the implementation of private, third-
party-provided canine teams allowed for use by forwarders, airlines,
and other entities participating in the Certified Cargo Screening
Program. While technology is useful in screening most cargo, many
commodities, due to an irregular shape, size, and volume cannot be
screened using conventional tools. Therefore, using trained and
certified canines to perform the task is not only faster but more
efficient.
Question 2. The rise of e-commerce business has affected the cargo
industry significantly in recent years. How has the rise of e-commerce
business impacted air cargo security and what changes should be made to
current security programs to reflect these changes in the industry?
Answer. The increase of shipments ordered on-line by consumers is
steadily growing each day, and the Known Shipper Program must be
changed to streamline and address the new reality of these
transactions. TSA should work with industry to accomplish necessary
modifications in the Known Shipper requirements by naming a joint task
force, comprised of industry experts and agency personnel that can re-
frame the program while providing the necessary knowledge about the
sender required for safe transportation.
Also, we urge the Department of Homeland Security to release its
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for the Air Cargo Advance Screening
Program (ACAS) as soon as possible. Often, knowing who is doing the
shipping, receiving, and describing the shipment is as important as
physical screening itself. ACAS focuses on import traffic to the United
States where TSA's influence and oversight are less direct than with
U.S. export and domestic shipments. TSA's focus is understandably and
rightfully on the ``last point of departure'' and not the actual origin
of the cargo which could be anywhere in the world. Our current air
cargo supply chain is secured through a successful risk-based, multi-
layered approach and ACAS provides an additional and efficient layer.
Finally, using private, third-party canines to assist in the
screening of air cargo mentioned previously is essential. Canines have
consistently been proven effective in providing screening in
international markets and using this seemingly ``low-tech'' solution
can provide an effective level of additional security to address the e-
commerce challenge.
Questions From Ranking Member Bonnie Watson Coleman for Michael C.
Mullen
Question 1. The Government's approach to securing air cargo relies
significantly on effective communication and coordination among
industry stakeholders and the TSA, and the TSA has limited resources to
ensure compliance and oversight. Please provide your thoughts on the
effectiveness of the current construct for air cargo security. Should
TSA increase its resources for compliance and oversight? What more can
be done to ensure effective communication, coordination, and oversight?
Answer. The question has two parts. The first is communication and
coordination, and the second is compliance and oversight. In performing
these two functions, different groups within TSA would be affected. TSA
needs to increase resources devoted to coordination and communication
by reestablishing the Air Cargo Policy Division that was disbanded
several years ago. Without a dedicated group focusing on air cargo, the
communication and coordination between industry and TSA has been
greatly weakened. This has resulted in TSA implementing policies in
response to security incidents without consultation with industry,
causing confusion and challenges to the industry that could be easily
avoided with close coordination.
TSA resources dedicated to compliance and oversight are considered
adequate and need to be maintained. One EAA member had nearly 550
audits, visits, or contacts from TSA inspectors in the first 6 months
of this year at its station locations. Only five of these visits
resulted in a letter of investigation noting a discrepancy, which is a
compliant rate above 99%. This clearly is a level of oversight
sufficient to ensure a company is fully compliant with the regulations.
TSA's own reviews and analysis show that the all-cargo industry is very
effective in complying with TSA regulations. Outcome-focused compliance
(OFC), the new process that TSA is implementing, is definitely the way
to move forward for future compliance needs and will create a new level
of cooperation with industry. TSA should continue to work closely with
the industry to develop OFC policies that enhance security and do not
impede the flow of legitimate commerce.
Question 2. How does the air cargo industry and TSA ensure a secure
chain of custody for air cargo as it transits through the supply chain
prior to loading on aircraft? What more can be done to ensure a secure
chain of custody?
Answer. Express consignment operators (ECO) operate a ``closed
loop'' system. The carriers are governed by multiple regulations,
depending on the country of origin and the carriers' individual TSA
Security Plan. When a shipment is received, there are a variety of
multi-tiered controls that are utilized. These include: Accepting
shipments at a customer location or an ECO facility by a direct
employee or authorized representative; requiring employees and agents
to be vetted through a thorough pre-employment background check, such
as a Security Threat Assessment (STA) or Secure Identification Display
Area (SIDA) badging process, or a vetting process approved by the
Appropriate Authority in the respective country; training all employees
in security measures as required by the TSA and the local government.
Additionally, after cargo is accepted, a variety of controls exist
that enhance the secure chain of custody, such as: Cargo traveling in a
locked and monitored vehicle until it reaches an ECO facility; ECO
facilities protected by access control systems, on-site security
guards, and/or closed-circuit television; physical screening by X-ray,
explosive trace detection (ETD), physical search, or other acceptable
means that are approved by the local Government overseas, virtual
vetting of shipments based on data; radiation screening prior to being
shipped to the United States; suspicious package screening and
reporting to the appropriate authorities; tracking shipments through an
electronic scanning system that constantly updates the location and
status of the shipment as it moves through an ECO network. ECOs adhere
to all cargo acceptance, control, custody, and transfer measures
outlined in the TSA Security Program, including the required ID checks
of customers and continual TSA audits of ECO locations and staff to
ensure compliance with the regulations.
ECOs transfer a small percentage of cargo to passenger air
carriers, which is screened prior to transporting according to TSA
standards for passenger carriers. This cargo is either screened at the
passenger aircraft operator's facility or screened at one of the ECO
Certified Cargo Screening Facilities (CCSF). CCSF locations are ``on
airport,'' so the freight is screened via X-ray or ETD and then moved
in a sealed container under escort. The freight never leaves the SIDA
after it is screened.
ECOs go above and beyond the requirements in the TSA Security
Programs and historically have dedicated enormous resources to ensuring
secure supply chains in order to protect their people, property,
shipments, and brand every day. TSA and other Government security
measures are additional layers on top of the major investments in
security the express industry already has made. The security record of
the express industry is a testament to the effectiveness of these
systems.
Question 3. The rise of e-commerce business has affected the cargo
industry significantly in recent years. How has the rise of e-commerce
business impacted air cargo security, and what changes should be made
to current security programs to reflect changes in the industry?
Answer. E-commerce is a global phenomenon that has provided new
opportunities for small entrepreneurs to access a world-wide
marketplace for their goods. Always a leader in innovation, the United
States is benefitting from the growth of e-commerce as our
entrepreneurs find new markets for their products and our consumers
have access to the highest-quality goods at the best price. Micro,
small, and medium enterprises have been the primary beneficiaries of
the boom in e-commerce and have become the primary creators of new jobs
in the U.S. economy. Moreover, numerous manufacturing processes rely on
e-commerce to ensure timely supply of components and parts.
Government plays a key role in ensuring e-commerce continues to
thrive by adopting facilitative policies to expedite the clearance of
goods across the border, while maintaining the security and safety
controls that interdict security threats and prevent illicit goods from
entering U.S. commerce. An important step the U.S. Government took to
achieve these goals was the passage of the Trade Facilitation and Trade
Enforcement Act (TFTEA) of 2015.
E-commerce is in most respects no different from traditional
commerce in terms of maintaining strict security controls and clearing
the shipments as they come across our border. The data ECOs provide on
every shipment to the Government indicates there is no evidence that e-
commerce traders are more prone to engage in fraud, counterfeiting,
smuggling, or other illicit behaviors than is the case with all trade.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection has developed a robust and highly
reliable targeting system, based on manifest information, to interdict
such security threats and illegal activities, and it is being applied
to e-commerce shipments every day, very effectively. Express
consignment operators have invested millions of dollars to comply with
TSA security programs and support CBP's and their own targeting efforts
against the full range of potential security threats and illicit goods,
and these investments are demonstrating a high level of effectiveness.
A vital part of these investments has been the Air Cargo Advance
Screening (ACAS) program, which I described in my oral and written
testimony. This program is providing data to the Government as early as
possible in the supply chain on every shipment carried by its
participants. ACAS has been in a pilot stage for over 6 years and
should be implemented in regulations now.
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