[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
ZIMBABWE AFTER MUGABE
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH,
GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 28, 2018
__________
Serial No. 115-114
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island
MO BROOKS, Alabama AMI BERA, California
PAUL COOK, California LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
RON DeSANTIS, Florida JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
TED S. YOHO, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois DINA TITUS, Nevada
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York NORMA J. TORRES, California
DANIEL M. DONOVAN, Jr., New York BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
Wisconsin ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York
ANN WAGNER, Missouri TED LIEU, California
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
THOMAS A. GARRETT, Jr., Virginia
JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
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Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and
International Organizations
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina KAREN BASS, California
DANIEL M. DONOVAN, Jr., New York AMI BERA, California
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
Wisconsin THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
THOMAS A. GARRETT, Jr., Virginia
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable Charles A. Ray (former U.S. Ambassador to Zimbabwe) 7
Ms. Elizabeth Lewis, regional deputy director, Africa Division,
International Republican Institute............................. 16
Mr. Ben Freeth, executive director, Mike Campbell Foundation..... 25
Chipo Dendere, Ph.D., visiting assistant professor, Amherst
College........................................................ 36
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Charles A. Ray: Prepared statement................. 12
Ms. Elizabeth Lewis: Prepared statement.......................... 19
Mr. Ben Freeth: Prepared statement............................... 27
Chipo Dendere, Ph.D.: Prepared statement......................... 39
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 62
Hearing minutes.................................................. 63
The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress
from the State of New Jersey, and chairman, Subcommittee on
Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International
Organizations:
Congressional Statement on the Importance of Property Rights in
Zimbabwe, by Craig J. Richardson, Ph.D....................... 64
The Campbell Case Timeline..................................... 72
ZIMBABWE AFTER MUGABE
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WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2018
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health,
Global Human Rights, and International Organizations,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:01 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher H.
Smith (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Smith. The hearing will come to order, and welcome to
all of you.
Today's hearing has been a long time in the making. For
some 37 years, since the birth of modern Zimbabwe, Robert
Mugabe has dominated the political landscape of this resource-
rich and promising country: First, as Prime Minister, then as
President, and always as strongman.
It was a 37-year rule which sadly betrayed the post-
colonial aspirations of freedom, one which was marked by
misrule, mismanagement, and mistreatment of Mugabe's fellow
citizens.
For many Zimbabweans, and for many years, envisioning a
Zimbabwe without Mugabe was considered a fool's errand.
Elections, some more flawed than others, had come and gone,
opportunities for reform fallen by the wayside. And through it
all, the domineering presence of one man haunted the dreams of
his countrymen.
Then in a matter of weeks, culminating last November, the
landscape changed. The once invincible ruler in October 2017
set into motion a series of events which left him not only
ousted from the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic
Front, or ZANU-PF, but pushed off his Presidential perch.
The drama began in earnest when Mugabe sought to prop up
his wife Grace's standing as his designated successor by
ousting one of his two Vice Presidents, Emmerson Mnangagwa,
presumably to elevate his wife to the position, while
simultaneously moving against Mnangagwa's allies in the
government and in ZANU-PF, promoting a younger generation
allied with Grace.
Mnangagwa was part of an older faction of ZANU-PF, the
generation that fought for liberation with roots and strong
connections in the military. As Rhodesian Bush War veterans and
political survivors, Mnangagwa and his comrades could draw upon
a reservoir of experience and cunning. They would not be so
easily pushed aside.
While Mugabe sought to tighten the reins of control in
favor of his wife and her allies, the other Vice President and
head of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces, Constantino Chiwenga, made
a bold statement on November 13, and I quote, ``. . . matters
of protecting our revolution, the military will not hesitate to
step in.''
This was declared treasonous, but before Chiwenga himself
could be arrested, the Zimbabwe Defence Forces did, in fact,
step in and confine the long-serving President to his quarters,
while taking control of key points around the country.
What followed were spontaneous popular demonstrations
against Robert Mugabe, indicating that the spell had been
broken. ZANU-PF convened a meeting which declared Mnangagwa to
be interim leader of the party. And in the face of impeachment
proceedings against Mugabe, the 93-year-old President
reluctantly stepped down, allowing Mnangagwa to assume the
vacancy.
This series of actions preserved the veneer of
constitutional process such that neither our country nor the
African Union could label the events that took place a coup.
Indeed, if it were a coup, it was a popularly supported one and
one which subsequently received high court ratification.
So where does that leave us? Who is Emmerson Mnangagwa, the
man who was sworn in as Zimbabwe's President on November 21?
Critics have called him the ``crocodile'' and recall his
role as Mugabe's right-hand man and confidante, including
during the brutal period in the early 1980s, when in the newly
independent nation, Mugabe waged an internal campaign of
repression against fellow revolutionary leader Joshua Nkomo,
killing thousands of ethnic minority individuals who were
followers of Nkomo.
During this time, Mugabe was assisted by military advisers
from East Germany and North Korea, and his Minister of State
Security, one Emmerson Mnangagwa.
Others more charitably admit that Mnangagwa was, indeed,
once the crocodile, but maintain that he has changed,
undergoing a religious conversion to evangelical Christianity.
Indeed, his rhetoric since acceding to power has been
reassuring, stating that he will restore democracy, rule of
law, economic prosperity, and trade, while addressing endemic
corruption.
On the issue of land tenure, he said he would end the
seizures of property that Mugabe had used to punish enemies and
reward cronies.
So they stand at a crossroads, perhaps facing a once-in-a-
lifetime opportunity where Zimbabwe can chart a new course.
Yet, we cannot forget and cannot be Pollyanish about it, nor
disregard the wise words of Pete Townshend, who once said:
``Meet the new boss. Same as the old boss. We won't get fooled
again.'' Hopefully, none of that will be true.
On the issue of land seizures, for example, one notes that
the newly retired general, as of December 28, 2017, the new
Vice President, Constantino Chiwenga, who issued the treasonous
challenge that led to Mugabe's ouster, is alleged to be a
beneficiary of Mugabe's past largesse with other people's land.
This is perhaps something which all of our witnesses today
might want to speak to and clarify.
Indeed, as we attempt to read the tea leaves and discern
what is in the future, we will be assisted by a stellar panel.
While the State Department is unable to send a witness due to
the immediacy of issues concerning the budget and Secretary of
State Tillerson's impending trip to Africa, we have with us a
former Ambassador of the United States, a very distinguished
one at that, to Zimbabwe, as well as one of the key
implementers of our democracy promotion policy in Zimbabwe.
We also have two Zimbabweans with us who are extremely
well-versed and involved in the contemporary events in the
country.
Today's hearing will look at the prospects for true
democratic and governance reform, as well as the potential
restoration of the rule of law. We truly hope that the arrival
of a new government signals an opportunity for establishing a
mutually beneficial relationship between the United States and
Zimbabwe, and as the near future unfolds, events will allow us
to reevaluate some of the sanctions that were imposed during
the Mugabe years.
I would like to yield to my good friend and ranking member,
Ms. Bass.
Okay. I will go to the chairman of the full committee.
Mr. Royce. I thank you. Congresswoman, thanks for allowing
me to make an opening statement as well. And let me thank the
both of you for your engagement on the continent, an engagement
that has been consistent. And now there are some new
opportunities.
I recall just about 20 years ago that I was in Harare and
Bulawayo, and the emotional feeling of listening to Morgan
Tsvangirai's supporters, and later him, speak about that issue
of human rights, and going back later and not being able to get
into the country, but having the opportunity to meet with some
of those who had been tortured or had gone through a lot. And
not just members of that Movement for Democratic Change. Also
some of the ZANU-PF members who I talked to who tried to speak
out. Tried to speak out.
And this is the problem of a society in which you have a
totalitarian aspect that takes hold. And slowly, economic
freedom erodes, opportunity erodes, and you have a situation
where people have absolutely no ability any longer to choose
their leaders or to choose the future for their country.
Now that is in play again. Now there is that opportunity.
And I know the international community and NGOs and those
concerned with leading on human rights have great hope at this
point in time.
We watched here on this committee as the regime stripped
away the opportunity that existed for people. But Zimbabwe, as
you all know, was once the breadbasket for the region. And we
had a Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act that we
passed here in 2001 in which we tried to shape events there.
But today we have got to be clearheaded, I think, as we
look at the prospects for democracy. Some members of the
current government did have a role in the oppressive and
violent policies that characterized the Mugabe regime. Some are
responsible for some of the worst abuses.
But on the other hand, we do have that opportunity. And we
have a lot of people in Zimbabwe today who have second thoughts
and are looking back at what happened and how it happened. And
I think a lot of those individuals are really determined to
make certain that Zimbabwe now has that chance to chart its
future.
We remember Morgan Tsvangirai, recently deceased of course,
but we remember him for his unwavering struggle. And I think
the July elections that are quickly approaching, this will be
an important test. I think the people of Zimbabwe, at this
point, it is their time. It is their opportunity.
But elections have got to be credible. They have got to be
peaceful. They must be transparent. I think the government must
take steps to combat corruption, to protect freedom of
expression, to end state-backed violence and intimidation, and
address other issues in terms of the rights of the people.
The U.S. should see meaningful progress toward these
reforms before we revise our current policy, because we need a
little leverage in this. And I think the U.S. would be a
partner in all of these reform efforts. I think we will have
bipartisan support for that partnership. And I think it is
through these reforms that we will see again prosperity and
opportunity.
I am not sure I should say ``see again.'' I think maybe see
for the first time. Because Zimbabwe had a long, struggled,
tortured history. But finally, that chapter is over. And like
the previous chapters in that history, it has been tough on the
people of Zimbabwe.
So let's all of us do what we can do, but I appreciate
these witnesses traveling so far to testify.
I have got a meeting with an Ambassador here adjacent. But
I want to again thank you, Chris, Chairman, and thank you very
much, Congresswoman, for your engagement here.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Chairman Royce. Thank you
for taking the time from what I know is an extremely busy
schedule to be here. Your commitment and concern about Africa
is legendary. So thank you for being here.
I would like to now yield to Karen Bass again, the ranking
member, for any opening comments she might have.
Ms. Bass. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and ditto to the words that
you just said about our chairman and his long history of
support for Africa.
In November 2017, we all know that Robert Mugabe's 30-year
Presidency ended. The circumstances under which he left office
included a military operation, paramilitary proceedings,
preliminary proceedings to impeach him, and most importantly,
ordinary citizens dancing, cheering, and waving flags in the
streets.
Why would Zimbabweans march alongside the military
celebrating and demanding the resignation of Mugabe? Well,
there are a host of reasons. The answer is pretty simple. As
our witness Dr. Dendere will point out, for the first time
Zimbabweans felt a sense of hope. Hope for their political and
economic future.
There are many ways to read this current moment, and today
we will attempt to consider how the U.S. can best reengage the
Government of Zimbabwe. It will be tempting to tie everything
to the next elections, to focus on allowing international
observers, ensuring free, fair, and transparent elections to
make sure that elections take place this year. And although we
know this is important, normalizing relations with Zimbabwe
requires more than a good election.
First, we have to consider that while this is not exactly a
traditional military coup, it also wasn't a regular democratic
transition of power. The military has a long history of
partisanship with the ruling party interfering in the nation's
political electoral affairs in ways that adversely affected the
ability of citizens to vote freely. The partisanship of the
security forces' leadership has translated into abuses by these
forces against civil society, activists, journalists, and
members and supporters of the opposition political party the
Movement for Democratic Change.
The military played a key role in this transition and while
some citizens expressed support for the transition of power,
recent polling by the Afrobarometer shows that 69 percent of
Zimbabweans are against military rule and 75 percent prefer
democracy over any other form of government. This should give
the Mnangagwa government a sense of what their citizens want.
Going forward, it will be important for the military to
show that they will comply with the Constitution by staying out
of the electoral process. The military should have no role in
the upcoming political campaigns.
And I don't say this lightly. Everyone in this room is
well-aware that here in the U.S. we are going through our own
challenges with protecting U.S. electoral systems, including
dealing with external interference to voter suppression. It is
vitally important that countries not leave their political
systems vulnerable.
A key part of ensuring the credibility of Zimbabwe's
elections is to ensure that the electoral commission is
independent, impartial, and nonpartisan. It is also essential
that every citizen has the right to voice their views and
opinions individually and collectively; that they have the
ability to vote; that elections are free from violence; that
opposition parties are able to operate and campaign freely
without harassment; that the election is transparent; that the
institutions can operate independently; and that the military
does not engage in politics.
The current administration has an opportunity to break with
the past to set the country on a new course by strengthening
democratic institutions and rule of law, improving human rights
and civil liberties, including allowing freedom of assembly and
expression, and enacting economic and political reforms that
will better the lives of Zimbabwean citizens. But they also
have an opportunity to address many of the challenges that were
not resolved during Mugabe's Presidency so that the country can
truly enter a post-Mugabe era.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Ms. Bass.
I would now like to welcome our very, very distinguished
panel, beginning with Ambassador Charles Ray who served as U.S.
Ambassador to Zimbabwe as well as Cambodia.
Ambassador Ray retired in 2012--although he can't call what
he is doing now retirement. He is now more active than ever--
after a 30-year career in the U.S. Foreign Service that
included postings in China, Thailand, Sierra Leone, and
Vietnam. He also served as the first U.S. Consul General in Ho
Chi Minh City, Vietnam.
Prior to joining the Foreign Service, Ambassador Ray spent
20 years in the U.S. Army, retiring with the rank of major
during his Army career. He did two tours in Vietnam, served in
military intelligence, special operations, and public affairs,
with assignments in Germany, Korea, Vietnam, Panama, and the
United States.
Since his retirement, he has been a writer, lecturer, and
consultant, and has done research on leadership and ethics. He
is the author of more than 60 books of fiction and nonfiction.
Ambassador Ray is a member of the American Foreign Service
Association. He is on the board of directors of the American
Academy of Diplomacy and the Cold War Museum at Vint Hill,
Virginia, and is director of communications for the Association
of Black American Ambassadors.
We welcome your testimony, Mr. Ambassador, and thank you
for your service to our country, both in uniform and in the
Foreign Service.
We will then hear from Elizabeth Lewis, who is a regional
deputy director for Africa at the International Republican
Institute, or IRI, where she oversees field offices in 12
nations, including Zimbabwe. In her role at IRI she focuses on
the implementation of local governance, elections, conflict
mitigation, and civil society programs.
Since 2009 Ms. Lewis has managed IRI programs in sub-
Saharan Africa, specializing in the Horn and Southern African
regions. She observed Tunisia's December 2014 Presidential
runoff election, Nigeria's March 2015 general election, and
Ghana's December 2016 national elections.
Ms. Lewis has a BA in political science and economics from
St. Mary's College in Maryland and an MS in political economy
of late development from the London School of Economics and
Political Science.
Thank you for being here as well.
We will then hear from Ben Freeth, MBE. He is the executive
director of the Mike Campbell Foundation, an organization
fighting for human rights and property rights in Zimbabwe.
Together, with his late father-in-law, Mike Campbell, the
owner of Mount Carmel Farm in central Zimbabwe, Mr. Freeth took
President Robert Mugabe's government to court in the Southern
African Development Community's regional court, the SADC
Tribunal, contesting the regime's ongoing attempts to
unlawfully seize Mr. Campbell's farm and for engaging in racial
discrimination and violence against White commercial farmers
and their workers.
Mr. Campbell, his wife, and Mr. Freeth were abducted and
tortured in 2008 and later suffered the destruction of their
home by fire. Since 2011, Mr. Freeth has been involved in
initiatives to restore the SADC Tribunal after it was shut down
by the SADC head of state, thus denying individual citizens
access to the human rights court.
Mr. Freeth also works closely with Foundations for Farming,
an organization that provides training in conservation and
agriculture and teaches impoverished farm workers and others
how to feed their families.
We welcome back Mr. Freeth, who testified before this
subcommittee in 2015.
Then we will hear from Dr. Chipo Dendere, who is a
Zimbabwean political scientist currently serving as a
Consortium for Faculty Diversity fellow and visiting assistant
professor of political science at Amherst College.
Dr. Dendere's research expertise is in democracy,
elections, and migration, with a regional interest in African
politics. She writes about the impact of voter exit, migration,
and remittances on the survival of authoritarian regimes. Her
new research is on the role of technology and social media in
new democracies.
We welcome her testimony before the subcommittee and thank
her for being here as well.
Mr. Ambassador, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHARLES A. RAY (FORMER U.S.
AMBASSADOR TO ZIMBABWE)
Ambassador Ray. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ms. Bass. I am
very honored to be able to appear here today to discuss the
path forward in U.S.-Zimbabwe relations.
I served as U.S. Ambassador to Zimbabwe from 2009 to 2012,
during the period of the ZANU-PF/MDC coalition government, a
time of relative peace and a certain amount of economic
stability, but, unfortunately, also a time of lost
opportunities to put Zimbabwe on the path of a truly
representative government and a prosperous economy.
Most Americans probably know very little about Zimbabwe,
but for a brief time this past November it was again very
prominent in the American media. After several weeks of
increasing political turmoil, primarily within Mugabe's ruling
party, the First Vice President, Emmerson Mnangagwa, was
accused of disloyalty and sacked. He then fled to South Africa,
claiming that his life was in danger.
Around the same time, Mugabe's wife Grace began to appear
more and more in public, stating that she should be the one to
succeed the aging leader, statements that Mugabe, to his
discredit, did nothing to deny.
In an unprecedented for Zimbabwe move, General Constantine
Chiwenga, chief of the defence staff, made a public statement
that the military would not stand idly by and allow liberation
figures to be removed from the government or from the party.
He was accused of treason. But shortly thereafter, the
military made its move. It took control of key installations in
Harare, placed Mugabe and his family under effective house
arrest--although it was very quick to publicly state this is
not a coup. But as one opposition figure said, if it looks like
a duck and it walks like a duck, it is a duck.
Make no mistake about it, even though it was a palace coup
with the military moving against members of its own party or
the party that it supports, it was, in fact, a coup d'etat, a
relatively nonviolent one and done in a most unusual way.
Mugabe was allowed to meet with the press, to engage in a
phone conversation with the former President of South Africa,
and his meeting with the leader of the coup, with General
Chiwenga, at least on the surface, appeared to be very cordial,
and he was even allowed to call a cabinet meeting. But it was
still a change of government initiated by force of arms, rather
than through the ballot box.
However, how the military's actions in this case will be
dealt with I think is something for Zimbabweans to handle. For
the rest of the world, and for the U.S. in particular, I think
the key questions now are: Where is Zimbabwe going from here,
and what role should we play in that journey?
We should start, I think, with a bit of background on the
new interim President, Emmerson Mnangagwa. I think the question
on many minds is: Will he be any different from Mugabe?
He is, after all, someone who worked closely with Mugabe
for more than 37 years after the country's independence and
served as an intelligence officer during the war for
independence, and who, because of his actions in support of the
crackdown on the Ndebele political opposition in the 1980s and
MDC supporters in the 1990s, has earned the nickname ``the
crocodile.''
Prior to being appointed to the First Vice President
position, Mnangagwa served as Defence Minister and also as
Justice Minister. Though he lacks Mugabe's charisma, it appears
that he enjoys the firm support of many of the senior military
officials.
I think, moving forward, his first priority will be to
reassert control over ZANU-PF, a party that is fractured along
generational lines with many of those in their forties and
fifties, known as the G-40, supporting Grace Mugabe against the
older liberation era party members.
A united ZANU-PF is essential if the party is to retain
power. This won't be an easy task for Mnangagwa as the rift
between the two demographics was worsened by some of the
actions and rhetoric during September-November of last year.
The issue is further complicated by the presence of former
ZANU-PF number two Joice Mujuru. She was First Vice President
until she was canned a few years ago. She is now the head of
the People First or ZIM-PF Party.
Until Grace Mugabe engineered her ouster, she was in
competition with Mnangagwa to be Mugabe's successor. A veteran
of the liberation struggle, as a fighter with a fierce
reputation, she also enjoys some military support, although
probably not as much as Mnangagwa.
The second priority, I believe, will be to ensure ZANU-PF's
continued control of power in the country. If he can somehow
pull all of the factions together and overcome the possible
threat from Mujuru, he will have to decide whether or not to
proceed with elections in July 2018. I realize that he has
publicly stated that he will, but we will have to see what
really happens.
While violence and chicanery are still possibilities that
cannot be cavalierly dismissed, a united ZANU-PF is likely to
be able to do well against the current opposition party lineup.
The Movement for Democratic Change, or MDC, is still split
between the faction led by the late Morgan Tsvangirai, now with
an interim President, Nelson Chamisa, and the one led by
Welshman Ncube.
As the parties that pose the greatest challenge to ZANU-PF,
especially in the urban areas, if they were united, they would
surely do well, but it is unlikely that they will unite. The
remainder of the opposition parties, with the exception of
Joice Mujuru's party, will only take votes away from the two
MDCs, which is to ZANU-PF's advantage, unfortunately.
In the rural areas, ZANU-PF has, in the past at least, had
an advantage and Mnangagwa is sure to capitalize on this. So
while it is too early to predict that the 2018 elections will
be free, fair, and nonviolent, let's assume for a moment that
they will be. Where do we go from that point?
During my time as Ambassador to Zimbabwe, one of the most
frequent topics of conversation was U.S. sanctions. Put in
place in response to the violent land seizures and electoral
violence of the late 1990s, the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic
Recovery Act, or ZDERA, was passed in December 2001, and a
Presidential executive order targeting individuals and entities
involved in the violence and other anti-democratic acts was
issued in March 2003.
Both of these actions were intended to encourage a return
to democracy and representative government, something that had
not happened by the time of my arrival in 2009. After the MDC
won the 2008 elections, although without the necessary 51
percent majority, there was more violence. But under South
African pressure, a coalition government was formed.
That government, with the MDC in a decidedly subordinate
position to ZANU-PF, lasted until the 2014 elections in which
ZANU-PF got the required majority and subsequently formed a
government without the MDC.
The sanctions, in my view, were clearly not having the
desired effect, and Mugabe's party's hardliners were using
their existence as an excuse for every ill that the country
suffered. My response to the many questions of, ``When will the
sanctions be lifted?'' was, ``When there is a return to
nonviolent elections and democracy.''
In fact, during one of my final media interviews before I
departed in 2012, I said that sanctions were a response to a
violent electoral process. A credible electoral process free of
violence would make our current policy somewhat irrelevant.
If this year's elections are held, if they are determined
to be credible, and if there is no violence, the ball will be
in our court. If we truly want to see Zimbabwe develop to its
potential, we must be prepared to work with the winner of a
credible, nonviolent election regardless of the political
party.
Even if the election is credible and nonviolent, any new
government is almost certain to contain officials who bring a
lot of historical baggage with them to their positions. I
firmly believe, however, that we should in such a situation put
the past behind us and focus on the policy statement in the
introduction of ZDERA: ``It is the policy of the United States
to support the people of Zimbabwe in their struggle to effect
peaceful, democratic change, achieve broad-based and equitable
economic growth, and restore the rule of law.''
I leave development of the precise modalities of our
actions to the policymakers and the professionals in the
foreign and civil services of our foreign affairs agencies,
primarily State and AID, but I would offer a few humble
suggestions on a way forward.
First, I think we should instruct our Embassy in Harare to
make contact with Mnangagwa and his current government to
reiterate firmly our policy regarding sanctions and to inform
him that if upcoming elections are credible and nonviolent we
are prepared to recognize and work with the new government.
While we would continue to monitor the human rights
situation, our initial focus should be on actions to
reinvigorate the country's economy and empower the private
sector to revitalize the agricultural sector, and rebuild
stagnant industries with a view to creating meaningful
employment and broad economic security.
We should encourage the new government to develop an
investor-friendly climate, take steps to curb corruption, while
at the same time encourage American businesses to explore the
opportunities to increase two-way trade and investment.
You might note, I said nothing about lifting sanctions. I
think that that should be the stick. The carrot, I think, would
be our offer to deal with the government. The stick is, if they
don't deal, sanctions stay in place.
During my time as Ambassador, we experimented with a local
economic development program modeled on an Asian village
financing scheme that I encountered when I lived in Korea back
in the 1970s. Women in a few poor rural villages were taught to
organize local savings clubs in which deposits were loaned out
to members at low interest for income-producing ventures. These
programs, though they were known to the government, were
outside government control, and within months of establishment,
totally self-reliant.
Consideration should be given to implementing such a
program in rural and suburban communities throughout the
country. People who are economically self-sufficient are less
vulnerable to political exploitation.
The elephant in the room which can't be ignored is the
Zimbabwean military. Existing laws and regulation will limit
what we can do with the military. But for the long-term,
peaceful development of Zimbabwe, at some point we will have to
figure out a way to work with this institution.
Initially, I believe the primary focus should be on
inculcating in the military establishment an ethos of service
to the nation as a whole rather than identification with a
specific political party.
In my limited contact with senior military officials when I
was Ambassador, I was convinced that there exists within the
military establishment a small cadre of people who would like
to be professional and who would like to depoliticize the
institution. The challenge will be to identify those
individuals and develop effective ways of working with them.
One possibility, I think, might be to establish a working
relationship with the SADC peacekeeping academy, which happens
to be located in Harare, and allowing properly vetted
Zimbabwean military officials to participate in courses of
instruction on military professionalism.
Again, I leave it to State and Defense, working with
Congress, to determine if such a program could be implemented
and just how it should.
While I have in making these recommendations assumed that
elections will be held in July 2018 and assumed that they will
be credible and nonviolent, I must make clear at this point
that I am not making a prediction. I do believe that if
everyone in Zimbabwe approaches the coming months with an
earnest desire to see the country pull itself out of the
doldrums and take its rightful place in the region and in the
world, it can happen.
If it does happen, if everyone then puts the past behind
them and focuses on the future, a new and more vibrant Zimbabwe
can arise phoenix-like from the ashes.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Ray follows:]
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Mr. Smith. Thank you so very much, Ambassador Ray.
Ms. Lewis.
STATEMENT OF MS. ELIZABETH LEWIS, REGIONAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR,
AFRICA DIVISION, INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE
Ms. Lewis. Chairman Smith and Ranking Member Bass, it is an
honor to testify before you today on the upcoming elections in
Zimbabwe and the prospects for genuine democratic reform
following the end of President Mugabe's 37-year rule.
I work for the International Republican Institute, which is
a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization that is committed to
advancing freedom and democracy worldwide. Since the early
1990s, IRI has supported pro-democracy activists in their
struggle to bring real and lasting democratic reform to
Zimbabwe.
Over the course of the last few months, Zimbabwe has turned
a page in its history. On the evening of November 14, several
leaders within the Zimbabwe Defence Forces led a coup against
the government of President Robert Mugabe, which ended in his
resignation a few days later. Then, just 2 weeks ago today,
opposition leader and former Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai
succumbed to his battle with cancer.
The departure of both Mugabe and Tsvangirai has upset the
political order, and while some see the present situation as an
opportunity for positive change, it is also a very fragile
period for the country.
ZANU-PF remains in full control of Zimbabwe's governing
institutions and chose former Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa
to serve as the country's third President. Mnangagwa's
reputation precedes him, leaving many, including myself,
skeptical of the prospects for genuine democratic reform under
his leadership. One of his first acts as President, for
instance, was to appoint a 22-member cabinet that included
ZANU-PF hardliners and several military leaders who led the
coup to put him in power.
Meanwhile, Zimbabwe's fractured political opposition is
represented by several loose and evolving coalitions of
political parties from both the historical opposition,
including Tsvangirai's MDC-T, and defectors from ZANU-PF,
including Joice Mujuru.
To date, the three main opposition coalitions, which
include the MDC Alliance, the People's Rainbow Coalition, and
CODE, have been unable to unite under a single cohesive
electoral and governing coalition.
According to Zimbabwe's 2013 Constitution, barring a
dissolution of Parliament, the 2018 elections must occur
between July 23 and August 22. In recent statements, though,
President Mnangagwa indicated the elections would occur before
July and that they would be free, fair, credible, and free of
violence.
However, in observing the biometric voter registration
process that began on September 14, the Zimbabwe Election
Support Network, or ZESN, indicated that turnout for the
registration process was low, particularly among young people.
The group cited limited voter education, intimidation of
registrants, and misrepresentation of ID requirements as
contributing factors to low turnout.
The challenge of high rates of voter illiteracy must be
addressed through extensive voter education efforts in the
leadup to election day. However, the short and still
unannounced electoral timeline, combined with the challenges of
misinformation, fears of violence, and the historical legacy of
election fraud, makes all of this a significant undertaking.
Additionally, the environment in which campaigns and
elections occur must be conducive to genuine political
competition. For this to happen, several laws in Zimbabwe used
to limit freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of
the press, and also restrict access to information, must be
repealed or reformed to align with the 2013 Constitution.
Finally, the importance of a viable opposition capable of
competing in the electoral process cannot be understated. A
critical benchmark for the opposition in the coming elections
is the prevention of a supermajority in the National Assembly,
to prevent, among other things, amendments to the Constitution
that would restrict political space and fundamental freedoms or
grant additional powers to the Presidency.
It is vital that the U.S. stand by the Zimbabwean people in
the movement for democratic reform in this period of
transition, and with that goal in mind, I would like to offer
the following recommendations.
First, the United States must be ardent in its support for
free and fair elections. The citizen movements of last year are
evidence of the strong desire for genuine change. The current
government lacks electoral legitimacy and has a stated interest
in returning to a full constitutional order.
Considering this alignment of interests, the U.S. must
redouble its efforts to work with our Zimbabwean and regional
partners, namely, SADC and the African Union, to stand for
nothing less than a transition to democratic rule.
Relatedly, and over the longer term, the U.S. and our
democratic allies must provide support to foster a competitive
multiparty political system and the establishment of democratic
institutions in Zimbabwe. This would include judicial, criminal
justice, and security reform, opening the information space,
the full implementation of the 2013 Constitution, responsive
and participatory governance and service delivery, and a
legitimate truth and reconciliation process.
Third, the United States should be prepared for numerous
scenarios in a post-Mugabe era. ZANU-PF and the military
complex that plays an increasingly visible role in the
political party have everything to lose from a shift in the
power dynamics of the country. Political repression and
disregard for fundamental human and political rights is an
ongoing problem in Zimbabwe and we need to be vigilant under
the new dispensation in the leadup to and following elections.
And finally, the United States must hold the line with
targeted sanctions and within international financial
institutions. This is our strongest point of leverage in the
push for democratic reform and respect for fundamental human
rights and freedoms. Reforms must be required as a precondition
for lending and debt or sanctions relief.
I thank you for your time and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Lewis follows:]
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Mr. Smith. Ms. Lewis, thank you very much for your
recommendations and your testimony and your work. Thank you.
Mr. Freeth.
STATEMENT OF MR. BEN FREETH, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, MIKE CAMPBELL
FOUNDATION
Mr. Freeth. Thank you very much. It is a great honor to be
here once again in Washington, DC, and to be able to testify
straight out of Zimbabwe as to where we are at this point. And
it is really heartening to hear so much talk about the rule of
law and the importance of the rule of law in our country.
And I think when we look back and we see what has taken
place, with 25 percent of the population having left our
country, with the education systems, which were the best in
Africa, being trashed, with the social systems ending up in a
total state of disrepair, with the economy in total tatters,
with people queuing outside the banks just to try and withdraw
their money, we have to look at the cause of these things. And
the cause is the destruction of the rule of law and the
destruction of property rights.
So we have just had a coup. We are 100 days in, or
thereabouts, not quite. And where are we now? Are things
getting better? Are reforms taking place? And I think if we
listen to the rhetoric, it sounds all very good. There is a
massive charm offensive taking place at the moment and many
people are taken in by that charm offensive of the President
and others in trying to make it look as though things have
changed because the guy at the top has changed.
But when you look at it on the ground, unfortunately, not a
lot has yet changed. There is talk about 99-year leases on
land, but when you look at the small print, those 99-year
leases are actually only 90-day leases, and there is a clause
that allows government to cancel those leases with no notice in
90-days' time.
We are seeing talk about the rule of law coming back,
property rights coming back, but at this stage, we have seen no
laws actually changed. Even the Indigenization Act has not been
repealed.
We see the militarization of many parts of government. We
have obviously got the former Minister of State Security as the
President. We have got the former Minister of Defence, and
after that, of the Armed Forces, as the Vice President. We have
got the guy who was in charge of Fifth Brigade that massacred
20,000 people in Matabeleland as the Minister of Lands. And
then, within the civil service, there are many military figures
actually coming in, and within the Zimbabwe Electoral
Commission as well.
So we have got a situation where there is a huge amount of
charm, but we have still got the same situation on the ground.
So I think we have to look at that, and we have to look at what
needs to be done in order to restore rule of law and to restore
property rights.
And I think ZDERA was a very far-thinking program or act
that was put in place in December 2001, and I would like to
recommend very strongly that ZDERA does remain in place. One of
the aspects of ZDERA was respect for ownership and title to
property, one of the main issues relating to the destruction of
the economy.
And I believe that the judgment that came in from the SADC
Tribunal, an African solution to an African problem, this
tribunal that gave judgment in favor of property rights back in
2008, that should be incorporated within ZDERA so that it
becomes the international legal obligations, as per the SADC
treaty, should be brought in as part of ZDERA.
I think also we have talked a lot about free and fair
elections. It is absolutely imperative that there are people on
the ground observing now as to what is taking place in terms of
the militarization of ZEC, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission,
and of the intimidation that is going on in the rural areas
ahead of the election.
And I think the third thing that is so important is that
the SADC Tribunal, this court that was set up for the 280
million people in Southern Africa, is brought back into being.
And at this stage we have done an awful lot. We are actually
expecting a judgment tomorrow in South Africa regarding our
case against President Zuma for his part in destroying that
SADC Tribunal, and we expect a good judgment.
But we need to have other governments being brought to task
within the SADC region, or other heads of state, for their part
in signing a new protocol that takes away the rights of the
individual to be able to go to that court as a court of last
resort.
We hope for a better country, and I think a major step has
been taken with President Mugabe not being in place any longer
at the head. But we need the next step to be taken where the
rule of law is brought back, where democracy is able to take
place, and where human rights are respected along with property
rights.
I thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Freeth follows:]
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Mr. Smith. Thank you so very much, Mr. Freeth.
We now go to our fourth and final panelist, Dr. Dendere.
Thank you again for being here.
STATEMENT OF CHIPO DENDERE, PH.D., VISITING ASSISTANT
PROFESSOR, AMHERST COLLEGE
Ms. Dendere. Thank you, Chairman Smith and Ranking Member
Karen Bass, for the invitation to testify today.
The United States and Zimbabwe have had a long and
supportive relationship. The United States remains Zimbabwe's
biggest donor and has already given $1 billion in aid since
2001.
The ouster of Mr. Mugabe in November 2017 after a military-
led guardian coup that ended in his resignation is an outcome
that many of us would not have predicted. I believe I also
speak for my generation, those of us born after independence,
when I say the idea of a post-Mugabe Zimbabwe is quite surreal.
Mr. Mugabe's 37-year tenure was complex. While he made
significant improvements in welfare provisions, his
authoritarian rule resulted in much suffering, notably, the
1983 Matabeleland genocide and violence again political
opponents.
In response to the declining economy, at least 2 million
Zimbabweans emigrated. At least 80,000 of those found refuge in
the United States. Zimbabweans in the United States are highly
skilled and many of them have been educated at top
universities, including MIT, Harvard, and Yale.
Zimbabwean Americans have also made significant
contributions in the arts. For example, the brilliant ``Black
Panther'' actress Danai Gurira.
While Zimbabweans celebrated the change in the government,
this quickly turned into allowing the continued involvement of
the military in otherwise civilian affairs. When I flew into
the Harare International Airport in early December, soldiers
required everyone arriving to show our IDs. This was new for
Zimbabwe.
It is unlikely that an unreformed ZANU-PF government will
usher in a democratic system. It is also unlikely, following
the death of Morgan Tsvangirai, that a divided opposition
climate will spread democratic growth.
It is my expert opinion that additional government-to-
government aid and investment will not solve Zimbabwe's
problems in the absence of significant reforms that address
elections, corruption, and economic development.
While President Mnangagwa has stated his commitment to free
and fair elections, state media is heavily controlled by the
ruling party. Democracy cannot thrive when the media is
stifled. State institutions such as the police and the military
remain partisan. The peacefulness of the 2018 election is thus
at risk.
Zimbabwe's high youth unemployment has also created a
readily available marketplace of youth who can be paid to harm
others. Interparty violence is also a growing concern.
However, despite the restricted access to state media,
initiatives such as the Open Parly platform and BusStopTV, a
political satire group, have effectively utilized social media
and have a combined reach of over \1/2\ million citizens.
Voice of America remains an important media platform,
reaching nearly 700,000 citizens weekly. I recommend that the
United States continue providing funding for VOA and
independent media.
Zimbabwe loses between $1 billion to $2 billion from
corruption each year. President Mnangagwa has promised zero
tolerance of corruption. However, to date, corruption
investigations have targeted only those affiliated with the
losing pro-Mugabe faction of ZANU-PF. At least five members of
President Mnangagwa's cabinet have been implicated in
corruption worth billions of dollars.
Although President Mnangagwa recently announced that some
officials have heeded his call to return stolen funds and to
declare assets, no specifics have been shared about those
returns.
Corruption is an epidemic. For this reason, it is important
for the United States to engage the new government very
strongly and firmly on corruption.
ZANU-PF often blamed Zimbabwe's stunted economic growth on
economic sanctions, in particular the United States' Zimbabwe
Democracy and Economic Recovery Act, ZDERA. Lack of clarity on
both the Zimbabwe and U.S. investor side on the requirements of
ZDERA have had some negative implications on investment.
For example, Zimbabwean businesses have been denied credit
by American banks who are not clear on the policy requirements
under ZDERA. Clarity on the types of business-to-business
engagements acceptable within the confines of ZDERA is
required.
I also recommend that the United States reconsider
sanctions on state-owned businesses. Justifiably, the United
States has long been concerned with the links between ZANU-PF
and state enterprises. Indeed, much of the corruption has
occurred in the state-owned businesses.
However, it is my expert opinion that in the post-Mugabe
era, legislative independence has been bolstered and the
Parliament is now equipped to hold government officials to
account.
Regarding individual sanctions, the onus is on those listed
to prove their commitment to democracy. Many on the list have
allegedly committed horrible crimes against humanity. It would
be a greater injustice to lift these sanctions before a
thorough investigation has been conducted. Zimbabwe cannot have
economic growth that is divorced from addressing human rights
abuses.
Robert Mugabe's exit from politics is not enough to absolve
individual crimes. President Mnangagwa's motto is that Zimbabwe
is open for business. Zimbabwe has long been open for business,
but poor governance bottlenecked efforts by local and foreign
investors.
President Mnangagwa has said all the right things necessary
for a conducive business environment in Zimbabwe. The real test
will be whether he follows through on his promises. His
government has thus far made adjustments to unpopular policies,
including the Indigenization and Empowerment Act, which should
help increase investor confidence.
While the United States faces tough competition from China
and Russia in sourcing Zimbabwe's natural resources,
Zimbabweans that I have spoken to have indicated a preference
for American business. A democratic Zimbabwe and strengthened
U.S.-Zimbabwe economic partnership remains mutually beneficial
for the two countries.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Dendere follows:]
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Mr. Smith. Thank you. I thought you might have had one
final statement to make. I appreciate it.
Let me begin the questioning. First, maybe, Ambassador Ray,
if I go to you, but others who would like to answer these
questions, please do.
We know that Mnangagwa was obviously head of state security
and the CIO during some very, very brutal periods, hence, the
name ``crocodile,'' perhaps, but also people would suggest that
maybe he is a changed man today.
It is important to know, past sometimes is prologue. Far
too often it is prologue. I wonder, however, how many political
prisoners years-to-date have there been in Zimbabwe?
And if you could expound upon the use of torture. I have
authored four laws on torture victims. It is called the Torture
Victims Relief Act. And here in this room I have heard
testimony, as has my staff, as well as in countries all over
the world, at torture centers, as well as in prisons, the
Laogai, in Jakarta, the Soviet Union. The use of torture is
often endemic.
And Mr. Freeth--and, without objection, your full
statement, like all of your full statements, will be made a
part of the record--you have a picture of both you and Mike
Campbell, your father-in-law, who was killed by way of a
beating, and you with blood all over your face. And you point
out, obviously, that will be another question, about the SADC
courts--and, Ambassador, you might want to speak to that as
well--which were done away with in 2012.
Is that something that would come back? Is that something
that the Trump administration and the European Community and
especially the African countries need to say that needs to be
returned.
Legacy human rights issues are as important as current day
human rights issues. There is no statute of limitations on
torture and other kinds of horrific misdeeds or murder.
So if you could speak to that, if you would, as an opening.
And then I have some additional questions about the Dr.
Frist-Feingold legislation, which we have already heard a lot
of talk about, ZDERA, that had to do, obviously, with loans and
no more debt relief. And you may recall debt relief during
those years was one of the most popular issues around. Bono
certainly helped to make it very popular. But debt relief is
off the table when you are dealing within an abuser, abusing
country.
I think, Mr. Freeth, you at least alluded to or maybe you
even said how important it was that SADC restoration,
especially judgments, ought to be part of lifting of sanctions.
And maybe you want to speak to that as well.
Ambassador Ray. All right. Thank you, sir.
As to the number of prisoners, I am afraid I don't know--
either currently or historically, I don't know currently and
historically, if I was told. I have reached an age where my
brain cells don't retain such things.
On the issue of the SADC Tribunal, I would strongly suggest
that we reach out to whoever we can to encourage the return of
that. One of the issues and lectures I have given on Zimbabwe
over the last 6 years, one of the points I make repeatedly is
that a lot of the issues in Zimbabwe arise from historical
incidents that have never been resolved, going back, of course,
to Gukurahundi in the 1980s when some 20,000 Ndebele were
killed over a 2-year period. And I think it was by the fifth
brigade, which is trained by the North Koreans. But it even
goes beyond that. And a lot of these issues have just been
brushed under the rug. People don't like to talk about it.
One of the things I learned from my time in Cambodia in
dealing with the Khmer Rouge Tribunal is that, if nothing else,
creating a venue where these issues can be brought to light and
discussed. Whether they result in judicial punishment or not is
actually less important than having them officially and
formally acknowledged. So I would definitely argue that the
SADC Tribunal, or some similar institution, should be put in
place, and it should be a permanent institution to deal with
these issues, not just in Zimbabwe, but across the region as a
whole. South Africa has issues that are still unresolved that
need to be taken care of.
In terms of the issue of sanctions. You have the ZDERA on
the one hand, which addresses the country's debt and its
international loans. And if I am not mistaken, actually
Zimbabwe is not even eligible to apply for loans currently
because of its arrears to the international financial
institutions. And so leaving ZDERA in place, it is a handy tool
to have for later, but it has no impact.
Now, the other issue, the people often get confused between
ZDERA and the administrative sanctions, which came in 2 years
later. These, I think, are the real immediate stick that we can
use. But people have to understand that these sanctions are not
against the country in its entirety, but against specific
individuals and specific entities. I think a lot of people here
in the U.S. misunderstand that.
And it does not limit or prohibit commercial transactions.
I am still a firm believer in revitalizing and strengthening
the private sector as a counterweight against an out-of-control
government. One of the ways that ZANU-PF and the military and
security services manage to maintain such control is people
have no place else to turn. If you had a stronger private
sector, as we have seen in places like Korea, I was in Korea in
the 1970s when it was still a dictatorship. Watching the
development of a vibrant middle class, and of an economy that
was growing and creating jobs, has created a completely
different career. It went from a military dictatorship still
evolving, but it is now, I think, the 13th largest economy in
the world, and growing.
This, I believe, can be done in places like Africa as well.
Zimbabwe has the infrastructure. It has an educated population;
has an energetic population, when given the opportunity to act.
And if the private sector were invigorated and strengthened, I
think you could see eventually incrementally, over time,
changes in the right direction in the country.
Mr. Smith. Do we know where Mnangagwa stands on the SADC
issue?
Ambassador Ray. Mr. Chairman, I don't think anyone but
Mnangagwa knows where he stands on any issue.
Mr. Smith. But is it something you think we should press
with him?
Ambassador Ray. I think we should press with him the return
of the SADC Tribunal. As I said in my statement, we should
reach out now to this government and lay out our wishes, if you
will, or our vision for where things should go. And that, I
think, should be one of the things on the list of to-do items.
Mr. Smith. Okay. I appreciate that.
Would anyone else on the panel want to address any of those
questions?
Yes.
Mr. Freeth. Just briefly on the United Nations convention
against torture. Zimbabwe is one of the very, very few
countries around the world that has not signed that United
Nations convention against torture. It is one of the few blank
spots on the world map. And so, torture is able to take place
in Zimbabwe without that U.N. convention coming into being. So
that is something that we need to look at.
Mr. Smith. Yes.
Ms. Dendere. I was going to add that while the numbers are
the people have been arrested for political engagement unclear.
In the new dispensation, as it has been called, they remain
quite a few people who are in prison for politically related
protests. And the numbers are quite alarming when you look at
women. But beyond that, there have been individuals who have
been disappeared during the Mugabe regime, and those
individuals we have not had any feedback from the government on
whether they have been increase. In particular, Itai Dzamara,
who disappeared a few years ago, President Mnangagwa at the
time was the minister of justice and promised that there was
going to be an inquiry and a hearing on where this man went,
because his family has not been able to grieve for him to or
bury him.
And so such incidents is--it is really important for the
government to address that. And if Itai Dzamara is alive, that
he should be released; and if, God forbid, he has passed on,
then his family deserves to know that as well.
Mr. Smith. Last week, I chaired a hearing with Marco Rubio
on Tibet. We cochair the China Commission. And from a trip
there, many trips there in the past from work on China since I
got elected to Congress in 1981, China is in a terrible,
terrible race to the bottom with North Korea on human rights
abuses. Xi Jinping has crushed religion, crushed NGOs that
don't really exist, but any semblance of an NGO. And the
consolidation of power harkens back to the Cultural Revolution.
We know that General Chiwenga was in Beijing immediately
prior the entire unfolding of the Mugabe situation. I wonder if
any of you have any insights as to where China was or might
have been in orchestrating or giving a wink or a push for his
ouster. And in terms of good or bad governance, what is China's
influence? We have had hearings on this subcommittee about
China's bad governance rule of law model that it promotes. It
is certainly not democracy. It is absolutely not human rights-
oriented. So if--perhaps, Ambassador, I think you are getting
ready to respond.
Ambassador Ray. Well, my experience with China, 4 years
serving in China, and 3 years of dealing with my Chinese
counterpart in Zimbabwe, first and foremost, what the Chinese
look for in countries like Zimbabwe is their version of
stability, because they are basically there to get access to
resources. I would, and this is a wild guess, say that I don't
think that necessarily it is Chinese-engineered or ordered or
orchestrated, the change in government. But I would be quite
surprised to find out that that was not part of the discussions
that Chiwenga had with his counterparts when he was in China,
and that the Chinese answer was probably ``Keep it simple. Get
it done.''
Mr. Smith. Okay.
Yes, Ms. Lewis.
Ms. Lewis. I think I would agree with Ambassador Ray that
while it may not have been an overt push for the coup, that I
am sure there was a seeking of approval or assertions that they
wouldn't resist the outcome.
I think more broadly, in looking at the Chinese development
model, it is much more exploitative looking for resources, but
also employment for Chinese workers. Chinese investment tends
to not benefit the African economies. And so we should also be
very aware and monitor Chinese actions.
Of course, we know that the Chinese have been supporting
the Mugabe regime for many years, hosting his birthday parties
very lavishly, recipients of elephants being exported, things
of that nature. And so it is certainly not a productive
relationship in the way that we would like to see for democracy
and human rights in Zimbabwe.
Mr. Freeth. Just very briefly on the Chinese.
It was quite interesting when, under President Mugabe, some
of their diamond claims were taken away from them in the
Marange diamond fields. And I happened to have breakfast with
the European Union Ambassador just after that, and I said, Have
you had any interaction with the Chinese Ambassador regarding
this situation where the diamond claims have been taken away?
And he said, Yes. And I asked, Well, what did the Chinese
Ambassador have to say? And he said, Well, normally the Chinese
Ambassador is inscrutable. But he said, In this case, it was
very clear that he was absolutely mad about what had taken
place.
So whether that had contributed to Mugabe falling out of
favor with the Chinese or not, we don't actually know. But they
are about whatever resources they can get out of a country, and
I don't--I suspect that that had something to do with it.
Mr. Smith. Let me just ask. One of the Achilles heels in
many elections everywhere is the election commission or
electoral commission.
What are the strengths or weakness, or is there an Achilles
heel with the ZEC in Zimbabwe, as far as you know? We have
raised this in hearing after hearing after hearing. If you
don't get that right, if you don't have free and fair going in,
people that will ensure that all the ballots are counted, that
all the candidates who could be eligible and meet the--you
know, a predetermined criteria are put on the ballot without
arbitrarily being excised. How would you assess the ZEC?
Secondly, the faith community, we know that on human
rights, they had spoken out, whether it be the Catholic Church
or the other Christian churches, very boldly on human rights
abuses. Your thoughts on that? I know that the Catholic Church
is talking about, you know, a sense of forgiveness because they
so desperately, I think, want to see a transition to an all-
inclusive Zimbabwe, where everyone really feels a part of it.
Your thoughts on the faith community and what role they should
play.
And, thirdly, we did invite, again, the administration to
be here. Ambassador Yamamoto would most likely be the person
who would be here to testify. And I think it is valid that they
did say that with the trip coming up with Secretary Tillerson,
he had to postpone. It is a matter of delay and not a ``I won't
show up.''
So we will have that hearing, but we are in a very tight
window, with the anticipation of this election coming up. I am
not sure how that gets pulled together in a credible way so
fast. And are the election monitors AU, European American,
others being invited to participate with, you know, on-the-
ground election monitoring in Zimbabwe?
Ms. Dendere. This is something I can speak to very
eloquently, because it is my area of expertise.
So the first thing is that election monitors will come on
invitation at the moment the President has indicated that the
European Union could likely monitor elections, that it could
monitor elections. But I think what is most important is what
you have already pointed out, too. What happens with the
Zimbabwe Electoral Commission? And this is where the new
dispensation could be a problem for ZANU-PF.
ZANU-PF was able to keep Robert Mugabe out because they had
the support of Zimbabweans. They had the support of Zimbabweans
because Zimbabweans are now primed to protest. In 2016, I was
at home, and I attended about five different protests. We got
tear-gassed, we were water-canned, and various things happened.
But in the last week, we saw ZEC announce something they
have never done before. They announced that we have had at
least 5.2 million people register to vote out of the expected 7
million. I think that the number is a little bit lower because
we don't have diaspora vote. Of those 5.2 million that have
registered to vote, 60 percent are young people under the ages
of 40. Now, it is going to be very difficult for ZEC to oversee
a stolen election. And I would show us back to the 2008
election.
The 2008 election, Zimbabweans knew that Morgan Tsvangirai
had won. The world knew that Morgan Tsvangirai had won because
what happened is that Zimbabweans were posting the results of
the election as it went on. So it is--for me, it is not so
important that we have physical monitors if the government puts
up pushback on that. What is really, really important is that
we support the civil service, the civil organizations that are
working on elections right now.
The young people, in particular, have created over 20
organizations that are training Zimbabweans every single day on
the importance of participating in elections. So the numbers
that we received yesterday that say 5.2 million people have
registered to vote are incredible.
Now, the question is will the election be violent-free? We
know that once there is violence, women, in particular, and
young men will withdraw from the political process.
Mr. Freeth. Just on not so much ZEC, but on the way that
the process takes place and intimidating people, particularly
in the rural areas where I absolutely come from. What happens
is the military, certainly in the 2008 election, came around in
the runoff election after Morgan Tsvangirai was persuaded to
have the runoff.
What happened was the military came around from ward to
ward, to every constituency. And at night, indoctrinated people
and used torture and violence against people in a very brutal
way so that by--and this is--this comes from China. This is a
Maoist system of intimidation. So the whole ward is brought
together in one central point, and everyone then is
indoctrinated through the night. Various people are then
pointed out as having sympathized in some way with the
opposition. And those people are then tortured publicly in
front of everyone else in the early hours of the morning.
Sometimes very brutally, sometimes to death in front of the
whole village within the ward.
And then morning comes, and everything is peaceful. But
what has happened also within that process is that, certainly,
in our area, what was happening was people were divided up into
groups of 10. And then each group of 10 had an order to go to
the polling booth. And so if you were in the third group of 10,
and you were third in your group of 10, you would be the 33rd
person to vote at that polling booth. That is how regimented it
was in 2008.
So what we need is not observers that are just going to be
there. We tried desperately to get the observers to come out
from Harare. They refused to come. They said it was too
dangerous for them to come out and actually witness these
pungwes, as they are called. We cannot have that kind of
situation happening again. At the moment what they are doing is
saying ``remember 2008.'' It is not happening yet, but we need
people to be brave enough from the international community to
come and witness this kind of system so that it cannot happen
in 2018.
Ms. Lewis. On the ZEC question. Looking at the historical
legacy of the institution, there will be considerable
challenges to holding a free, fair, and credible election. But
just a few points on where we stand with, at most, 5 months to
an election.
The voter registration exercise is continuing to be
ongoing, though the blitz has ended. There still remain voter
roll challenges, including deduplication auditing the list,
things that have not been completed. And the ZEC has not
published an operational plan to date for the elections, which
would also include things like procurement of ballot papers and
other very key technical elements of the electoral process.
We also have the challenge of a new chair of the commission
and despite some differing feelings about her personally, new
leadership in any electoral commission so close to an electoral
process is always a challenge.
And then, finally, African election commissions usually
require significant technical resources and the financial
resources to hold free, fair, and credible elections. And last
week, the AU did pledge to support that, because with only 5
months left at most, I think it is a real uphill battle for the
ZEC to be able to pull off a process that would meet
international standards.
Mr. Smith. Ms. Bass.
Ambassador Ray. The only thing that I would----
Mr. Smith. Oh.
Ms. Bass. Go ahead.
Ambassador Ray. Well, the only thing that I would add to
that, I think having the international observers on the ground
is important. But, as I learned in Sierra Leone in the 1990 and
1996 elections there, the real important check on a lot of
these issues is having local observers who are on the ground
who understand the culture and the language, but also, that
they have the freedom and ability to communicate what they see.
And this is something that, particularly in Zimbabwe, is
important, and that is, people having free access to means of
communication, the ability to freely assemble and to get
messages out.
One of the things that we did when I was there as
Ambassador, we were forced to do because of the hardliners'
determination that I would not meet with too many groups of
young people, is we started convening electronic meetings,
which they found impossible to control or to interdict. This is
an issue, I think, that needs to be looked at. Almost every
Zimbabwean over the age of 16 has a smartphone with internet
access and onboard camera. Mobilizing these people to observe
and report, I think, would go a long way to at least
discouraging some of the more egregious actions.
Ms. Bass. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Following up on this, I believe, Ms. Lewis, you mentioned
that the civil service organizations that are in--or that might
have been Dr. Dendere. But the importance of, instead of having
out-of-the-country election observers, having people who are
there.
So my question was is IRI on the ground now? And if so, are
you doing the training with Zimbabweans? And if not, are you
planning to?
Ms. Lewis. In terms of observations, we have not--I don't
believe, any American organizations have been accredited. I
know that that is something that the Embassy is engaging on.
However, we are conducting programming focused on civic and
voter education, mainly through Zimbabwean partners. And, IRI,
in general, would say that this kind of partnership with
Zimbabweans to have local solutions to local problems is a
priority. There are some really fantastic local organizations
engaging in civic and voter education on the ground.
I think one of the challenges they face is the very
dramatic shift in the political landscape that has happened.
And so, there are opportunities that exist that didn't exist a
couple of months ago, perhaps you could say. And so, being able
to help them mobilize mainly with resources, I think, is
something that the U.S. and other international and regional
partners need to look at in the months leading up this
electoral process to make sure that Zimbabweans are fully aware
of their rights and choices on election day.
Ms. Bass. Thank you.
Dr. Dendere, what more do you think is needed in terms of
potential support from us?
Ms. Dendere. I think strengthening the independence media,
which I mentioned earlier. Access to information is really
critical. For example, with Voice of America, I am often
invited to be a panelist. And what I really like is that Voice
of America allows Zimbabweans from very remote areas to call
in. We have also seen a lot of participation through what is up
on other social media platforms. But the internet is very
expensive. But young people have come up with very creative
ways to reach wider audiences. So these are things that
certainly need to be taken care of.
And I think Mr. Freeth is absolutely right that in rural
areas where the fear of violence is very real, a lot of people
still remember what happened before independence. They remember
the violence of both the Smith regime and even the guerillas
that we were fighting for freedom. So I think being able to
work with organizations that educate people and their rights,
how to report to the police when violence has occurred, and
also how to hold the police accountable.
So this is a really good time to work with the police,
because the police is kind of on the outs. Their faction lost
in the ZANU-PF war, so the government will be quite eager to
hold them to account.
Ms. Bass. So what do you think the prospects are for
keeping the internet intact during this whole--you know, during
the elections, whether or not it would be shut down?
Ms. Dendere. So----
Ms. Bass. Whether access would be shut--well, you know,
that this happened in?
Ms. Dendere. Yes. In 2016, Pastor Evan Mawarire and others,
going back to Chairman Smith's question on religious
organizations. Pastor Evan Mawarire and others called us
together and called for a shutdown. We woke up in the morning.
No one had any plans to leave home.
I went for a run. I came back, and my phone wasn't working.
But this is the brilliance of having a country of young people.
As I was trying to figure out how to get online, people were
wondering, Why aren't you online? And someone sent me a text
message that said the internet is not working. They said, Well,
do you know what VPN is?
And even as we think about China as a problematic partner,
young people in China were actually the ones sending VPN codes
to young people in Zimbabwe.
Ms. Bass. Wow. Really?
Ms. Dendere. So within an hour, we were all back online. We
had figured out--I still don't know how to use the VPN, but my
16-year-old niece had put VPN on my phone. The shutdown was
going on. And so--and even in my new research, I have been
looking at the incidence of shutting down the internet across
African countries, if the OPI has learned how to do that.
But I think what also works with Zimbabwe is that the
government officials really like being online. One of the first
things that President Mnangagwa did when he came into office
was to legitimize his Facebook page. So he had a live video. He
had a live video and Twitter.
So the way internet works is that they cannot shut it down
for the rest of the country and keep it for themselves. So we
just hope that their passion for being online will outweigh
their needs to restrict our access for the rest of the country.
Ms. Bass. That is very hopeful. That is a very hopeful
sign.
Mr. Freeth, did you have something you wanted to add to
that?
Mr. Freeth. Not really. I think the big difference between
2008 elections and 2018 is this very thing, that everyone now
has got a cell phone. Yes, in 2016, we all had that same
experience, and it was incredible how people got around it, and
how suddenly we were all able to be online when they are trying
to switch us all off. So people make a plan. We are a country
of people that make a plan.
Ms. Bass. Well, you mentioned in your opening comments
something about a decision that was going to be signed
tomorrow, and I didn't know what you were referring to.
Mr. Freeth. That is a decision in South Africa in the high
court of South Africa from the judge president and two other
judges who--we took a case against President Zuma, along with
the law society and various other legal groups which aims to
show that President Zuma's actions in signing away--or signing
the new protocol to the SADC Tribunal which takes away the
individual's rights to go to the SADC Tribunal makes the SADC
Tribunal into an interstate court. So if Zambia and Zimbabwe
had a dispute over an island in the Zambezi, for example, it
could possibly be used for an interstate dispute.
But that wasn't what the original protocol was all about.
It wasn't what the SADC Treaty was all about. It is not what
SADC, which is there to promote human rights, rule of law, and
democracy is all about. And so when President Zuma signed that
bit of paper, he did it without the cabinets' approval, without
Parliament even looking at it, without a consultation of the
people of South Africa.
So we took a case against President Zuma to say that he
acted unconstitutionally; that he acted against the SADC
Treaty; that he had acted irrationally, in fact. And we are
going to get that judgment tomorrow, and we are very hopeful
that it will be a good judgment and it will set the tone for
other SADC countries to then say, you are right, South Africa.
Our President also did the same thing, and it was irrational
and unconstitutional against the SADC Treaty.
Ms. Bass. Thank you.
Ambassador Ray, thinking about moving forward in U.S.
policy, you know, you made a few comments about the carrot and
stick. You talked about actions that I believe we could take to
invigorate the economy, but you also specifically said you
didn't see lifting sanctions. So I wanted to just ask you about
that. I mean, you said, you know, the possibility of it if
things got better. But, for example, we have travel sanctions
against Mnangagwa. So what if the election is determined to be
fair and free, should that be lifted? And then, how do we move
our policy forward to help reinvigorate the economy if we also
have the economic sanctions? You talked about the Korean
example. And if we promoted something like that in Zimbabwe,
then how would it be overseen?
So I kind of wanted you to talk about, more specifically,
how we would move forward in changing our policy as things
develop, hopefully in a positive direction, in Zimbabwe.
Ambassador Ray. Well, I will take the issue of sanctions
first.
The administrative sanctions against certain individuals,
and Mnangagwa is on that list of individuals, seizes their
assets here in the U.S., bank accounts and property, and limits
their travel to the U.S., other than for U.N. events. I think--
--
Ms. Bass. What about coming here to meet with the State
Department?
Ambassador Ray. I am sorry?
Ms. Bass. What about--the human events is one thing. But
what if he were to come here?
Ambassador Ray. There are--the way it worked when I was
there, if a Zimbabwean official was in New York at the U.N.,
and wanted to meet with someone in the State Department here in
Washington, they apply for a special permission to do that.
There are--it is a convoluted process, but there are ways to
work it.
While I am against a wholesale lifting of all of the
sanctions, one of the things I argued vehemently for when I was
Ambassador is a more flexible administrative sanctions regime.
And I think that is what we should look at in case the election
is free and fair, and we have a President Mnangagwa in July or
August 2018, to allow a more--an easier process to enable us to
engage him to the degree we should to try be able to push him
in the direction we want him to go.
And so, there is nothing in the administrative sanctions
that says we cannot say--for example, say to a person, You are
the President of the country. You can travel to Washington. You
can travel to New York. And I think that is probably one way
that we can, shall we say, tighten the screw.
I once said to someone when I was asked if I was averse to
twisting arms, I said, No, but I have to be able to take the
hand first before I can twist the arm. And so I think we need
to look at that.
And other sanctions, when I talk about reinvigorating, or
invigorating, if you will, the private sector, actually, the
sanctions regime except for the fact that a couple of
Zimbabwe's banks are on the list, shouldn't have an impact on
that. There is a certain amount of two-way trade currently
existing between our countries, and there are--I think FedEx,
or one of the big packaging companies has a presence there.
Ford has a presence there. Cargill is there. Coca-Cola is
there. And several other American companies have presence in
Zimbabwe, have investments in Zimbabwe. They are not that huge.
But I think that if we looked at ways to strengthen the
private sector contacts between nonsanctioned economic entities
in Zimbabwe, and commercial entities here, you create a
stronger middle class, which is a little harder to intimidate
and to coerce.
Ms. Bass. Thank you very much--oh, I am sorry.
Go ahead.
Ms. Lewis. Just to add one thing, in terms of the
sanctions, in looking at, perhaps, some relief in that area, it
is important that these elections be considered free, fair, and
credible. But that is not the end point of, you know, what our
conditions should be. Elections are just one point in the
democratic process and the reform process. There are many, many
other areas of governance and policy in Zimbabwe that need to
be looked at to help ensure us that we are on the right path
moving forward.
Really, the elections we should be concerned about are the
ones after the 2018 elections, when there is a more conducive
political environment to free and fair competition. And so we
should keep----
Ms. Bass. Well, I agree with you in terms of these
elections. As a matter of fact, in my opening comments, I
stated that. Specifically, the reason why I asked is because of
the President and because he is specifically named.
But having said that, what is our policy moving forward?
How do we--I mean, I would like to be hopeful. If it doesn't
turn out in a hopeful way, then clearly we can stay with the
status quo. But if it does, what is the pathway and what is the
best thing for us to do?
Ambassador Ray. I think that is why it is important that we
engage, because in order to achieve this, everyone on the
Zimbabwean side and on our side has to have a clear
understanding of what it is we are asking or demanding, if you
will, they do.
Ms. Bass. Exactly.
Ambassador Ray. And so that is why I think our application
of the sanctions to individuals needs to be flexible to enable
the degree of engagement that can achieve that. We need to sit
down with them--well, we need to sit down with ourselves first
and decide just what it is we want them to do----
Ms. Bass. Right.
Ambassador Ray [continuing]. So that we don't ask them for
more than they are capable of giving but that we don't fall
into the trap of accepting from them less than they are capable
of giving.
Ms. Bass. Right.
Thank you. Thank you very much.
Mr. Smith. And on that last point, Mr. Ambassador, that is
exactly why we are having this hearing. We wanted to hear from
four experts, people who have lived it and are knowledgeable,
so that we could hopefully craft a good response. And our next
hearing will be with the administration.
Before you go, I do have just two final questions.
If the other three panelists, if you would like to speak to
the issue of the faith-based community, the clergy, what role
they are playing. You know, in DR Congo, and I have been there,
as a matter of fact, Greg Simpkins, who is now at USAID now--
Greg, we miss you--we have been to the DR Congo together, and I
can tell you that the church plays a major role in elections,
not just things of the spirit, humanitarian efforts, human
rights advocacy, which they do so superbly well, but also, they
do great work in the election area. Is that something that they
are being brought in to in Zimbabwe?
And, secondly, Zimbabwe gets a ``not free'' designation
from Freedom House when it comes to press freedoms. Have you
seen any amelioration of that stranglehold that Mugabe had on
the media of all kinds? Is there maybe an opening, a little bit
more independence, the ability of an editor to write an
editorial that is more critical without fear, because that
would be certainly a very positive trend line?
Anybody want to address this?
Ambassador Ray. I can't really speak too authoritatively to
the circumstances after I left in 2012. 2009 to 2012, there was
a little modification of the press space. There were a number
of independent newspapers, not very super performers but at
least they were there. There was at least one, perhaps two,
radio stations that were independent.
Where there was an absolute government iron fist was on
televised--on television. One TV network in the entire country
controlled by the government. So it was a mixed bag. I mean,
you had independent print journals that weren't, in my opinion,
very professional. You had a state-controlled newspaper. The
only thing you could trust were the sports scores. The radio--I
think, a lot of Zimbabweans, even in ZANU-PF, got a lot of
their credible news from VOA and BBC.
So there is a lot of work to be done there. And, again, I
think, this goes to the whole issue of invigorating the private
sector, because in order to be effective, the newspapers, the
radio, or to set up an independent TV network, it requires
money. And if you have a reasonably affluent middle class, you
have a private sector that is growing, then you have the source
of funds to be able to create these things. A lot of the
independent newspapers, for example, were the toys of some
wealthy Zimbabwean who had an ax to grind, and that is just not
a--that is not a recipe for a very good professional
independent press.
Ms. Dendere. So on the faith-based communities, it is
interesting to talk about the faith-based communities and
corruption in one hand. So in my statement, I say that the
single biggest problem for Zimbabwe is corruption. And how does
this relate to the church?
Over the last 5 years, we have seen an increase in
evangelical changes that sometimes have 5,000 to 10,000 people
showing up. But what we have also seen is that the church has
been used as a football, in some ways, between the ZANU-PF
factions. So in the last week, we have seen one of the most
popular young prophets now being brought in on acts of
corruption.
Where I saw some green light was at Morgan Tsvangirai's
funeral, where members of the Methodist church spoke very
openly and said things that we haven't heard from the church in
a long time. They say that since 2009, they were very involved
in engaging with Morgan Tsvangirai on the unity government. We
also saw Father Korneri (ph) playing an important role during
the coup/non coup situation in November.
So I think when the government does not punish people for
speaking up, then even the church will be strengthened. But as
long as Zimbabwe doesn't address its corruption, then every
sector from the church to the media to the banks is in serious
trouble, because now you had churches that were being used to
funnel funds outside for ZANU-PF people. And then you can't say
with certainty whether this church actually represents the
interests of the people, or whether the church represents the
interest of the individuals.
So corruption is very epidemic, and it now affects every
single facet of Zimbabwean life in very problematic ways. And
so if we are able to address that, that could be a solution.
And then on the independent media, the media is not free
and fair. The Herald still controls the media. I doubt that
they would publish that someone like--something that I would
write, right? They wouldn't publish that regardless of how I
feel about the government. And I think that is a problem.
At the same time, we also have a lot of print media. But as
the Ambassador has said, sometimes the quality is problematic.
But I do want to highlight that the U.S. Embassy in Zimbabwe is
doing amazing work working with journalists already. And as we
transition to the next Ambassador, I hope that those programs
will continue to receive funding. Beyond the work that the
United States is doing, independent journalists have also been
training themselves and being very engaged. But, again everyone
I have spoken to is really worried that once this phase has
passed, and if the government starts to feel that they are
under threat, then maybe this veneer of freedom that we are
seeing might be taken away so that--I mean, we are not sure
what would happen with that.
Mr. Smith. Yes.
Mr. Freeth. I think you can be sure that the state media
will report us all in the Herald and other more radical
newspapers like the Patriot tomorrow or in the coming days. It
is a foregone conclusion.
As far as faith-based communities are concerned, the
Christian community in Zimbabwe is huge. And there is no
politician that can draw people like the churches can draw
people. And so there has been a kind of--over the years, there
has been--people have lost all kind of faith, as it were, in
political transition. And it is the churches that have become
the area of focus for people. And so, when Pastor Evan rose up
and started for the first time as a church leader speaking out
strongly, people just flocked to him. And what happened in July
2016 was one of the most phenomenal things that I have ever
been a part of.
In the past, the church has been very afraid. But I think
that cloak of fear is being gradually thrown off. And there are
church leaders that are starting to stand up for justice issues
and starting to talk about justice issues for the first time.
And I think this needs to be really encouraged in a major way.
I think it is exciting. I think it is very important that the
church is able to be the moral voice of the nation, and I think
it is starting to happen.
Mr. Smith. I thank all of you for your tremendous
testimony. Hopefully, we can take this and really have an
impact in terms of policy, because your insights have been
outstanding.
I would just note parenthetically that Greg Simpkins,
again, who is here, used to be our chief of staff on the
subcommittee, and now Piero, who is our general counsel. In
2015, they were in Zimbabwe and were called American spies by
the media. You know, it reminds me, when I was in China on one
of my human rights trips, Wei Jingsheng, the father of the
democracy world movement, who spent about 20 years in the
gulag, the loud guys they call it there, tortured horribly in
China. When I met with him when he was let out briefly before
getting rearrested, they interrogated him and said I was a CIA
spy. One big lie. I mean, I am a Member of Congress. They're
top staffers who have a huge impact. We do have a CIA, but we
are not part of it. But it is amazing how they think that
somehow it is a slur. And it is just like a boomerang that says
what kind of media are you that would do that?
Without objection, we have a number of testimonies for the
record. This is from Craig Richardson, Dr. Richardson, and also
the timeline of Mike Campbell, which has been provided, of
course, in the Campbell case. Without objection, these will be
made a part of the record. And if our distinguished witnesses
would like to add anything to the record, please do. Just send
it to us, and we will include it, because we want it to be as
thorough as possible.
Thank you so very much. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:45 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Material Submitted for the Record
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Material submitted for the record by the Honorable Christopher H.
Smith, a Representative in Congress from the State of New Jersey, and
chairman, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights,
and International Organizations
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Material submitted for the record by the Honorable Christopher H.
Smith, a Representative in Congress from the State of New Jersey, and
chairman, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights,
and International Organizations
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Note: The preceding document has not been printed here in full but may
be found at http://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/
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