[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
LOOKING NORTH: ASSESSING THE CURRENT THREAT AT THE U.S.-CANADA BORDER
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
BORDER AND
MARITIME SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 14, 2017
__________
Serial No. 115-38
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Mike Rogers, Alabama James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
John Katko, New York Filemon Vela, Texas
Will Hurd, Texas Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
Martha McSally, Arizona Kathleen M. Rice, New York
John Ratcliffe, Texas J. Luis Correa, California
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York Val Butler Demings, Florida
Mike Gallagher, Wisconsin Nanette Diaz Barragan, California
Clay Higgins, Louisiana
John H. Rutherford, Florida
Thomas A. Garrett, Jr., Virginia
Brian K. Fitzpatrick, Pennsylvania
Ron Estes, Kansas
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Steven S. Giaier, Deputy General Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY
Martha McSally, Arizona, Chairwoman
Lamar Smith, Texas Filemon Vela, Texas
Mike Rogers, Alabama Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina J. Luis Correa, California
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Val Butler Demings, Florida
Will Hurd, Texas Nanette Diaz Barragan, California
John H. Rutherford, Florida Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex (ex officio)
officio)
Paul L. Anstine, Subcommittee Staff Director
Alison B. Northrop, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director/Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Martha McSally, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Arizona, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Border
and Maritime Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Filemon Vela, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Border and
Maritime Security.............................................. 4
Witnesses
Mr. Michael Dougherty, Assistant Secretary for Border,
Immigration, and Trade Policy, Office of Strategy, Policy, and
Plans, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 7
Mr. Scott A. Luck, Acting Deputy Chief, U.S. Border Patrol, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 12
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 7
Mr. Kevin Kelly, Special Agent in Charge, U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 14
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 7
Dr. Michael Marchand, Chairman, Colville Business Council,
Testifying on Behalf of National Congress of American Indians:
Oral Statement................................................. 15
Prepared Statement............................................. 17
Appendix
Questions From Ranking Member Filemon Vela for Michael Dougherty. 37
Questions From Ranking Member Filemon Vela for Scott A. Luck..... 38
Questions From Ranking Member Filemon Vela for Kevin Kelly....... 41
LOOKING NORTH: ASSESSING THE CURRENT THREAT AT THE U.S.-CANADA BORDER
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Tuesday, November 14, 2017
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in
room HVC-210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Martha McSally
[Chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives McSally, Barletta, Hurt, Vela,
Correa, and Barragan.
Also present: Representatives Katko and Gallagher.
Ms. McSally. The Committee on Homeland Security's
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security will come to
order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to examine the threats
along our Nation's Northern Border.
First, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from New
York, Mr. Katko, a Member of the full committee, be permitted
to participate in today's subcommittee hearing.
Without objection, so ordered.
I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
When Congress talks about border security, it is usually in
reference to the Southwest Border where my community is.
However, we cannot ignore the threats we face along the
Northern Border.
At almost 4,000 miles long, including a long, liquid border
with the Great Lakes, our shared border with Canada is a
situational awareness challenge that requires a much different
strategy than that on the Southwest Border. To address these
challenges, DHS needs to develop a coherent Northern Border
strategy and implementation plan to protect our northern
frontier.
Last year, Congressman John Katko led Congressional efforts
to pass the Northern Border Threat Analysis Act. This
legislation required DHS to focus its attention on National
security threats that originate along our Northern Border. The
Department finally released a threat analysis this past summer
with plans to release the full strategy in January 2018, and an
implementation plan to follow that shortly thereafter.
Threats identified in the Northern Border analysis include
domestic Canadian terror plots and radicalized individuals
attempting to enter the United States illegally. Similar to the
Southern Border, transnational criminal organizations that
control the bidirectional flow of illicit drugs, such as
cocaine, heroin, fentanyl, ecstasy, and marijuana, also pose a
threat.
Customs and Border Protection and Immigration and Customs
Enforcement are the law enforcement agencies tasked with
securing the border and disrupting these transnational criminal
networks.
The report highlights the importance of CBP and ICE's law
enforcement partnerships with our Canadian counterparts,
stressing the need for close cooperation and intelligence
sharing to identify, track, prevent, and eventually interdict
illicit cross-border activity.
The United States has long maintained a close working
relationship with the Canadian Government to fight terrorism.
Recently, the Department has taken positive steps to ensure
that appropriate National security watch lists, such as the no-
fly and selectee lists, are shared with Canadian law
enforcement and that reciprocity is in place.
The threat analysis report also identifies significant gaps
in our capabilities along the Northern Border, including an
insufficient amount of technology and personnel that makes
achieving operational control and situational awareness nearly
impossible. Personnel shortfalls are no surprise to this
subcommittee. We are down almost 2,000 Border Patrol agents
Nation-wide and a similar number of CBP officers. On the
Northern Border, we are 10 percent below the authorized level,
despite the fact that the Northern Border is twice as long.
Surveillance technology shortfalls, coupled with a less-
than fully-staffed Border Patrol, leads to a lack of
operational control. That is a major vulnerability at our
Northern Border.
In fact, a 2010 GAO report found the level of operational
control along the Northern Border was at less than 2 percent.
That is unacceptable. We can only hope that in the last 7
years, operational control has improved exponentially. If not,
this is a huge problem.
Let me be clear. The bidirectional flow of drugs,
specifically the opioids like fentanyl and heroin, is one of
the greatest threats that we face with the Northern Border.
Fentanyl is now a leading cause of overdose deaths in the
United States. These drugs and their precursors are being
sourced from China and Mexico, and trafficked overland through
our international borders and showing up in neighborhoods all
over the United States.
The Drug Enforcement Agency attributes the flood of illicit
substances to smuggling routes that originate in Canada and
pass through the Northern Border. CBP and ICE's priority must
be to shut down these illicit pathways.
Drug seizures at and between the ports of entry along the
Northern Border are significantly lower than the number of ICE
HSI drug seizures within the Northern Border region. The
numbers just don't add up, so CBP must acquire the tools and
staffing levels necessary to identify and interdict these
harmful substances as they are smuggled in the legitimate
traffic that crosses the border every single day. TCOs are
active along the Northern Border and have the ability and
resources to move these drugs southbound into the United
States.
A 2015 special investigation published by the Vancouver Sun
reported that the Hells' Angels motorcycle gang controls many
of Canada's largest ports. If true, this is concerning, given
the ease with which drugs can be smuggled into Canada bound for
the United States. In order to stem the flow of illicit drugs
along our Northern Border, we must work with our partners to
defeat these transnational criminal organizations.
While the Northern Border threat analysis is the first step
in addressing the threats along the Northern Border, we expect
the strategy and implementation plan to not only identify gaps,
but also take concrete steps to close them.
Thanks for being here to discuss these threats that we face
at our Northern Border.
[The statement of Chairwoman McSally follows:]
Statement of Chairwoman Martha McSally
November 14, 2017
When Congress talks about border security, it is usually in
reference to the Southwest Border. However, we cannot ignore the
threats we face along the Northern Border.
At almost 4,000 miles long, and a multitude of different terrains,
our shared border with Canada is a situational awareness challenge that
requires a much different strategy than that of the Southwest Border.
To address these challenges, DHS needs to develop a coherent
Northern Border strategy and implementation plan to protect our
northern frontier.
Last year Congressman John Katko led Congressional efforts to pass
the Northern Border Threat Analysis Act. This legislation required DHS
to focus its attention on National security threats that originate
along our Northern Border.
The Department finally released a threat analysis this past summer,
with plans to release the full strategy in January 2018, and an
implementation plan to follow shortly thereafter.
Threats identified in the Northern border analysis include domestic
Canadian terror plots and radicalized individuals attempting to enter
the United States illegally. Similar to the Southern Border,
transnational criminal organizations that control the bi-directional
flow of illicit drugs such as cocaine, heroin, fentanyl, ecstasy, and
marijuana also pose a threat.
Customs and Border Protection and Immigration and Customs
Enforcement are the law enforcement agencies tasked with securing the
border and disrupting transnational criminal networks.
The report highlights the importance of CBP and ICE's law
enforcement partnerships with their Canadian counterparts, stressing
the need for close cooperation and intelligence sharing to identify,
track, prevent, and eventually interdict illicit cross-border activity.
The United States has long maintained a close working relationship
with the Canadian government to fight terrorism. Recently, the
Department has taken positive steps to ensure that appropriate National
security watch lists, such as the no-fly and selectee lists, are shared
with Canadian law enforcement and that reciprocity is in place.
The threat analysis report also identifies significant gaps in our
capabilities along the Northern Border including insufficient amount of
technology, personnel that makes achieving operational control and
situational awareness nearly impossible.
Personnel shortfalls are no surprise to this subcommittee. We are
down almost 2,000 Border Patrol agents Nation-wide, and a similar
number of CBP officers. On the Northern Border we are 10 percent below
the authorized level, despite the fact that the Northern Border is
twice as long.
Surveillance technology shortfalls coupled with a less-than fully-
staffed Border Patrol leads to a lack of operational control that is a
major vulnerability at our Northern Border. In fact, a 2010 GAO report
found that the level of operational control along the Northern Border
was at less than 2 percent.
This is unacceptable.
We can only hope that in the last 7 years, operational control has
improved exponentially. If not, this is a huge problem.
Let me be clear, the bi-directional flow of drugs, specifically
opioids like fentanyl and heroin, is the one of the greatest threats we
face on the Northern Border.
Fentanyl is now the leading cause of overdose deaths in the United
States. These drugs, and their precursors, are being sourced from China
and Mexico, trafficked over land through our international borders and
showing up in neighborhoods all over the United States.
The Drug Enforcement Agency attributes the flood of illicit
substances to smuggling routes that originate in Canada and pass
through the Northern Border.
CBP and ICE's priority must be to shut down these illicit pathways.
Drug seizures at and between ports of entry along the Northern
Border are significantly lower than the number of ICE-HSI drug seizures
within the Northern Border region. The numbers just don't add up. CBP
must acquire the tools and staffing levels necessary to identify and
interdict these harmful substances.
TCOs are active along our Northern Border and have the ability and
resources to move these drugs southbound into the United States. Even
more concerning, a 2015 Special Investigation published by the
Vancouver Sun reported that the Hell's Angels motorcycle gang controls
many of Canada's largest ports.
If true, this is concerning given the ease in which drugs can be
smuggled into Canada bound for the United States.
In order to stem the flow of illicit drugs along our Northern
Border, we must work with our partners to defeat transnational criminal
organizations.
While the Northern Border Threat Analysis is the first step in
addressing the threats along the Northern Border, we expect the
strategy and implementation plan to not only identify gaps but also
take concrete steps to close them.
Thank you for being here to discuss the threats we face at our
Northern Border.
Ms. McSally. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of
the subcommittee, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Vela, for any
statement he may have.
Mr. Vela. I thank the Chairwoman for holding today's
hearing to examine threats along the Northern Border.
With the launch of the 2011 Beyond the Border initiative,
Canada has been a critical partner in assisting the United
States in stemming the flow of narcotics through our Northern
Border, as well as identifying and keeping out those
individuals who pose a security risk. Nonetheless, I am
concerned that, over the last decade, resources have been
disproportionately focused on the Southern Border at the
expense of the Northern Border.
This past June, the Department of Homeland Security issued
a mandated report to Congress that assessed and identified
emerging threats and capability gaps in the air, land, and
maritime domains along our border with Canada. The findings of
this report are not unlike what we often see along the
Southwest Border. While the scale of the threats is different,
the nature of the threats is similar, and the capability gaps
identified are concerning.
As with our Southwest Border, the flow of narcotics between
and at ports of entry along our Northern Border pose a
significant public safety threat to our communities. As with
the Southwest Border, transnational criminal organizations move
significant amounts of narcotics in commercial cargo containers
through ports of entry.
I have mentioned several times in this Congress that
Customs and Border Protection staffing shortfalls, such as not
keeping an adequate number of CBP officers at our ports of
entry or assigning less Border Patrol agents to northern
sectors by a ratio of 1 to 9, exacerbate border security
threats.
As characterized by this report, the lack of situational
and domain awareness due to insufficient investment in
technology and infrastructure on our side of the Northern
Border is deeply concerning. The capability gaps identified in
this DHS report would in no way be acceptable or tolerable had
they been found along our Southwest Border.
Last month, this committee marked up and approved a flawed
bill that would authorize billions of taxpayer dollars for a
border wall along our Southwest Border. If we want DHS to
continue to build up our border security, we have a
responsibility to the American taxpayer to ensure that the
Department does so in a way that truly and meaningfully
maximizes our ability to mitigate risk, especially those risks
that are well-known and documented.
I look forward to hearing from our DHS witnesses today
about the trends and threats they have seen on the ground and
how we can better address and prevent the exploitation of our
Northern Border by transnational criminal organizations and
others who seek to do us harm.
I am pleased that we are joined today by Dr. Michael
Marchand, chairman of the Colville Business Council for
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation. I believe that
Dr. Marchand's experience and the broader Tribal perspective on
challenges along our Northern Border will greatly add to our
subcommittee's understanding of what our Tribal partners see as
a way forward in terms of border security.
This past summer, the National Congress of American Indians
held a day-long summit, and more than 70 participants attended,
with representation from 19 Tribal leaders from both the United
States and Canada, to discuss concerns at the United States-
Canadian border. I look forward to hearing more about this
summit and discussing what participants identified as
challenges and potential solutions.
Again, I thank the Chairwoman for holding today's hearing
to bring attention to this very important topic, and I thank
all of our witnesses for joining us today.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Ms. McSally. The gentleman yields back.
I ask unanimous consent the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr.
Gallagher, a Member of the full committee, be permitted to
participate in today's subcommittee hearing.
Without objection, so ordered.
The Members of the committee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
We are pleased to be joined today by four distinguished
witnesses to discuss this important topic. Mr. Michael
Dougherty is the assistant secretary for Border, Immigration,
and Trade Policy at the Department of Homeland Security. Mr.
Dougherty previously served in DHS as the Citizenship and
Immigration Services ombudsman, and is a senior policy adviser
for immigration with the Border and Transportation Security
Directorate. Mr. Dougherty's Federal experience also includes
serving as legislative counsel on the personal staff of Senator
Jon Kyl--where I was a legislative fellow, by the way, on that
staff--and on the staff of Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Technology, and Homeland Security within the Senate Judiciary
Committee.
Mr. Scott Luck is the acting deputy chief of the U.S.
Border Patrol. Mr. Luck was assigned to Douglas, Arizona, in my
district, for nearly 13 years before becoming the assistant
patrol agent in charge at the Santa Teresa Station within the
El Paso sector. In 2011, Mr. Luck returned to the El Paso
sector as the chief of the operations division, and 3 years
later he was named chief of the operations division for the
entire U.S. Border Patrol.
Mr. Kevin Kelly is the special agent in charge of Homeland
Security Investigation's Buffalo field office. He has served in
Federal law enforcement for 29 years. He supervises agents
across 48 counties in New York. Before his position at HSI,
special agent in charge of Buffalo, Kelly served as deputy
special agent in charge in both Buffalo and Newark, maintaining
operational and administrative oversight of our agents and
mission support staff.
Dr. Michael Marchand is the chairman of the Colville
Business Council, National Congress of American Indians, and
has served on the Colville Business Council for 17 years. Dr.
Marchand is experienced in reservation planning, managing
Tribal business projects, and community development.
The witnesses' full written statements will appear in the
record.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Dougherty for 5 minutes to
testify.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL DOUGHERTY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR BORDER,
IMMIGRATION, AND TRADE POLICY, OFFICE OF STRATEGY, POLICY, AND
PLANS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Dougherty. Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela,
distinguished Members of the committee, and visiting Members,
thank you for the opportunity to appear today to discuss the
work that is being performed by the Department of Homeland
Security to address current threats along the border of the
U.S. and Canada.
As the subcommittee knows, the Northern Border Security
Review Act of 2016 required the Department to conduct an
analysis of terrorism and criminal threats along the Northern
Border, to identify improvements needed along that border to
prevent terrorist entry and to diminish crime, to identify gaps
in law policy and coordination between governments and law
enforcement agencies, and to determine whether preclearance and
preinspection operations at our ports of entry can help reduce
the threat of terrorism.
In response, the Department delivered the Northern Border
Threat Assessment report to Congress in August 2017. It was the
product of intensive and thoughtful work by numerous DHS
components, including a threat assessment from our Office of
Intelligence and Analysis.
In addition to data calls and a literature review, the
Department conducted a workshop that gathered information in a
structured way from a large number of experts, focusing on
those with personal operational experience across the Northern
Border in the land, sea, and maritime domains.
The report finds the primary homeland security threats on
the U.S.-Canadian border are from transnational criminal
organizations and unidentified home-grown violent extremists.
However, encounters with individuals associated with
transnational crime or terrorism remain infrequent.
Component data indicates that drug smuggling and illegal
migration activities remain low along the Northern Border,
especially in comparison with the Southern Border. Terrain,
weather, and distance are factors that constrain illegal travel
in remote areas of the border. However, it needs to be said
that mountainous and heavily forested terrain, heavy snows, and
the remote nature of much of the border also pose significant
operational challenges for DHS and its partner agencies.
While the Department has made strong progress in securing
the border, the report's preliminary capability assessment
indicates there are opportunities to enhance collaboration,
information sharing, domain awareness, and port-of-entry
infrastructure.
While preparing the threat assessment, DHS leadership
determined that it would be valuable to update the Department's
2012 Northern Border Strategy. The updated strategy is
currently being developed at DHS as a whole-of-DHS effort. It
conforms to the Department's new strategic planning guidance, a
robust set of standards that allow us to connect strategy
development to our resource allocation process. We are on track
to complete that strategy in early 2018.
There are three major focus areas for the strategy: To
enhance border security operations, to facilitate and safeguard
lawful trade and travel, and to promote cross-border
resilience. Within each focus area, the strategy will describe
prioritized activities critical to achieving our goals on the
Northern Border.
Some of those goals include enhancing situational and
operational awareness; improving information and intelligence
sharing, both inside DHS and with our partners; modernizing our
ports of entry, including the expansion of programs and
technologies to facilitate rapid processing of trade and travel
through the ports; enhancing cross-border response, recovery,
and resilience activities and capabilities; and improving DHS's
resourcing decisions based upon operational needs and projected
threats.
Within 180 days of the strategy's release, an accompanying
implementation plan will be developed that identifies the
sequence of activities DHS will take to achieve the strategy's
goals and objectives for the Northern Border.
These documents will enable DHS to conduct a formal
capability assessment and requirements generation process
through the Joint Requirements Council at the Department. This
effort will guide the Department's approach to making cost-
effective investments that will help make the U.S.-Canada
border more secure. We will, of course, continue to keep
Congress informed as this process moves forward.
I thank you for the opportunity to appear today, and I look
forward to taking your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Dougherty, Mr. Luck,
and Mr. Kelly follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement of Michael Dougherty, Scott A. Luck, and Kevin
Kelly
November 14, 2017
introduction
Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and distinguished Members
of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today to discuss the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) assessment
of threats on the Northern Border and our efforts to ensure its
security.
The U.S.-Canada border separates two friendly nations with a long
history of social, cultural, and economic ties, and a high volume of
cross-border trade and travel. At 5,525 miles, 1,500 of which are
shared by Alaska with British Columbia and the Yukon Territory in
Canada, the border is the longest bilateral land boundary in the world.
On average, more than 60 million international travelers and 27 million
vehicles are processed at the more than 120 land ports of entry (POEs)
and 17 ferry land crossings annually.
DHS has committed significant personnel to securing the Northern
Border. More than 2,000 U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) Agents, 4,700 U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Officers, 310 Agriculture
Specialists, 260 CBP Air and Marine (AMO) personnel, 1,300 U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Homeland Security
Investigations (HSI) Special Agents, and more than 8,000 United States
Coast Guard (USCG) personnel are currently stationed at or near the
U.S.-Canada border. The Department also continues to invest in force-
multiplying technological capabilities on the Northern Border,
including sensor networks, surveillance cameras and aircraft, and non-
intrusive inspection systems.
The Department's personnel work every day with their Canadian
counterparts and our State, local, Tribal, and Territorial (SLTT)
partners to ensure the border is secure. We do so by deploying a multi-
layered, risk-based approach to enhance the security of the Northern
Border, while facilitating the lawful flow of people and goods entering
the United States. This layered approach to security reduces the
Department's reliance on any single point or program, and leverages
close coordination with U.S. interagency partners and with our Canadian
counterparts to increase the security at our mutual border. Close
coordination with our partners ensures our zone of security extends
outward and that our physical border with Canada is not the first or
last line of defense, but one of many.
Northern Border Threat Assessment
In response to the reporting requirements set forth in the Northern
Border Security Review Act (Pub. L. 114-267), DHS delivered a Northern
Border Threat Assessment report to Congress in August 2017. To
undertake this assessment, DHS convened a broad working group composed
of representatives from DHS components with Northern Border-related
operational mission responsibilities, as well as DHS support
components. This working group, led by the DHS Office of Strategy,
Policy, and Plans (PLCY), included representatives from the Office of
Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), CBP, ICE, USCG, the Science and
Technology Directorate (S&T), the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
(DNDO), the Office of the General Counsel (OGC), the Office of
Partnership and Engagement (OPE), and the Office of Legislative Affairs
(OLA). The Joint Requirements Council (JRC) participated as an
observer.
The working group developed the assessment through four primary
methodologies: A formal threat analysis developed by I&A and component
intelligence elements; an open-source literature review; a component
data call and interviews; and an expert workshop of Departmental
subject-matter experts.
The report describes the current threat landscape on the U.S.-
Canada border, analyzing National security-related and other threats
across the air, land, and maritime domains. The report also provides a
high-level description of DHS operational capabilities on the Northern
Border, including a preliminary assessment of capability gaps and
challenges in legal authorities; cross-component cooperation;
coordination between SLTT law enforcement organizations; and
intelligence sharing.
counterterrorism
The Northern Border Threat Assessment indicates that potential
terror threats at the Northern Border are primarily from potential
home-grown terrorists in Canada who are not watch-listed, and who
believe they can enter the United States legally at Northern Border
POEs without suspicion. Watch-listed Canadians and third-country
nationals who are encountered at POEs may be determined to be
inadmissible and refused entry into the United States. Watch-listed
U.S. citizens and U.S. Lawful Permanent Residents departing Canada may
be subject to additional scrutiny at POEs before their entry into the
United States. Canada has been an effective partner in working with the
United States to keep foreign terrorist suspects from entering North
America, especially with initiatives undertaken as part of the 2011
U.S.-Canada Beyond the Border initiative.
Most watch-list encounters on the Northern Border occur at air and
land POEs. Apprehensions of individuals entering the United States from
Canada between POEs (present without admission from Canada, or PWA-CAN)
fluctuate year-to-year, but represent a very small fraction of overall
apprehensions in Northern Border sectors. Of the 2,283 individuals
apprehended by the USBP in Northern Border sectors in fiscal year 2016,
only 558 were PWA-CAN, with most of the remainder having crossed into
the United States across the Southern Border with Mexico. Apprehensions
of migrants from countries affected by terrorism or conflict who
illegally cross the border from Canada to the United States are very
rare.
The ICE/HSI National Security Investigations Division, National
Security Unit, Counterterrorism Section (NSID/NSU/CTS), acts as the
single point of service and coordination for all Joint Terrorism Task
Force (JTTF) international terrorism investigations. The NSID/NSU/CTS
also acts as the conduit point for threat streams and coordination with
Canadian Law Enforcement and Intelligence Agencies in their
counterterrorism efforts. ICE/HSI JTTF Special Agents and HSI Special
Agents in Canada continue to collaborate with Canadian law enforcement
and intelligence services, utilizing ICE/HSI authorities as appropriate
and advantageous, in investigations to combat terrorist activities in
North America and abroad.
Additionally, as part of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, ICE/HSI
conducts comprehensive visa screening, vetting, and investigative
activities through the ICE/HSI Visa Security Program (VSP). VSP
enhances visa security by providing in-depth screening, vetting, and
investigative capabilities with respect to counterterrorism and
criminal justice using the formal Department of State (DOS) visa
application process. Canadian applicants are subject to this program,
as well as third-country nationals present in Canada who apply for
visas to the United States. Currently, Canada vets all immigration,
visa, and refugee applications, screening applicant fingerprints
against DHS biometric holdings. On average, Canada conducts more than
400,000 biometric queries against DHS data. In fiscal year 2018, Canada
will increase biometric collection on all applicants, increasing the
total number of biometric queries to more than 3 million per year. The
United States began sending biometric queries to Canada in August 2016.
The Department works closely with Canada to offer Preclearance
screening in Calgary, Edmonton, Halifax, Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto,
Vancouver, and Winnipeg. Under the Preclearance operation, air
travelers to the United States go through full security screening and
vetting, and all inspections and admission checks are conducted before
passengers board the aircraft for the United States. These Preclearance
operations continue to strengthen our ability to identify terrorists,
criminals, and other National security threats prior to encountering
them on U.S. soil. Preclearance operations, now in six countries, place
the Nation's most effective law enforcement and counterterrorism asset,
a trained U.S. law enforcement professional, at foreign points of
departure to protect the traveling public.
As part of the Beyond the Border Action Plan with Canada, the
United States and Canada are also in the process of implementing a
biographic exchange of traveler records that constitutes a biographic
exit system on the shared border. Today, traveler records for all
lawful permanent residents and non-citizens of the United States and
Canada are exchanged in such a manner that land entries into one
country serve as exit records from the other. The current match rate of
Canadian records for travelers leaving the United States for Canada
against U.S. entry records for nonimmigrants is over 98 percent.
combating transnational criminal organizations
As part of the National Northern Border Counternarcotics Strategy,
DHS works closely with Canadian partners to substantially reduce the
flow of illicit drugs and drug proceeds along the Northern Border. The
Northern Border Threat Assessment indicates that the most common threat
to U.S. public safety along the Northern Border continues to be the bi-
directional flow of illicit drugs. This flow is often facilitated by
transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) operating on both sides of
the border, with networks that span beyond the United States and
Canada. In fiscal year 2016, CBP's Office of Field Operations reported
2,015 arrests at Northern Border land POEs, and 815 pounds in drug
seizures.
Reporting indicates that cocaine and methamphetamine move north
into Canada after transiting the United States from Mexico, while
smaller quantities of fentanyl, marijuana, and ecstasy flow south from
Canada into the United States. While Northern Border POE seizures of
methamphetamine and heroin are low, ICE investigative case reporting
indicates that trafficking of these drugs are still responsible for
significant social harm and public health and safety consequences at
the individual and community levels in specific Northern Border
communities such as Massena, NY.
To avoid detection by U.S. and Canadian law enforcement, TCOs
continually adapt their drug production, smuggling methods, and routes.
Illegal drugs are smuggled across the border via a number of modes
including personal vehicles, commercial trucks, buses, trains, vessels,
all-terrain vehicles, and snowmobiles. TCOs also recruit individuals at
and between POEs along the length of the border to carry drugs on their
person.
While the primary overland smuggling corridors used by TCOs are
areas in the vicinity of Blaine, Washington; Detroit, Michigan; and
Champlain and Buffalo, New York, TCOs have also utilized some Tribal
reservation lands adjoining the U.S.-Canada border. One example is the
St. Regis (Akwesasne) Mohawk Reservation in New York, which uniquely
spans both sides of the border and includes numerous waterways and
unguarded land border crossings, making it a potentially appealing
point of transit for TCOs to smuggle contraband for further
transshipment to major metropolitan areas in the United States. ICE/HSI
and CBP are working with local, State, Tribal, and Federal law
enforcement agencies to counter this threat, which is complicated by
the myriad jurisdictions along the border, unique maritime boundaries,
and short transit distances between the United States and Canada.
The topography along mountainous parts of the Northern Border is
occasionally exploited by smugglers flying private aircraft at low
altitude to evade radar detection, but there are no reports to suggest
that the tactic is employed on a large scale. Recently, ICE/HSI
successfully investigated Canadian TCOs that were using helicopters
capable of landing in remote sections of National forests on both sides
of the border to smuggle narcotics, bulk cash, and firearms in both
directions.
The unique nature of the maritime boundaries between the United
States and Canada presents challenges for law enforcement operations
while creating opportunities for TCOs to exploit. High-density
recreational boating traffic in waterways with shorelines in both
countries, along with myriad jurisdictions along the border, creates a
complex detection and enforcement environment. Joint investigations by
ICE/HSI and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in the
Pacific Northwest show numerous drug smuggling groups using maritime
routes in the Puget Sound, the Strait of Georgia, and the Strait of
Juan de Fuca. Maritime drug seizures have occurred over the past 10
years at numerous locations in the waters between Vancouver, British
Columbia, and Washington State. The USCG and Royal Canadian Mounted
Police (RCMP) operate the Integrated Cross-Border Maritime Law
Enforcement Operation (Shiprider) program, in which personnel from both
the United States and Canada jointly patrol shared waterways to detect
and prevent criminal activity, including smuggling. Shiprider is active
in five locations: Vancouver/Blaine, Windsor/Detroit, Kingston/
Alexandria Bay, Victoria/Port Angeles, and Niagara/Buffalo.
The Department maintains personnel on both sides of the Northern
Border to address threats posed by the illegal cross-border flow of
illegal or illicit goods and controlled dual-use commodities,
technology, and software. ICE/HSI has six Special Agent in Charge
offices located in Seattle, Denver, St. Paul, Detroit, Buffalo, and
Boston that are responsible for overseeing the investigation of
criminal activity with a nexus to the Northern Border of the United
States. In addition, ICE/HSI has Attache offices in Ottawa, Vancouver,
Toronto, and Montreal to facilitate coordination with our Canadian law
enforcement partners.
leveraging technology
DHS has greatly enhanced its technological capabilities on the
Northern Border. Between POEs, USBP has deployed Unattended Ground
Sensors and Imaging Unattended Ground Sensors; Persistent Ground
Surveillance Systems; Tactical Aerostat Systems; Slash Camera Poles;
mobile surveillance systems; remote video surveillance systems; and
Mobile Video Surveillance Systems. AMO has stationed 16 fixed-wing
aircraft, 24 rotary-wing manned aircraft, and three Unmanned Aircraft
Systems along the Northern Border to further support surveillance and
domain awareness activities. Collectively, the information gathered
from these systems contributes to a greater understanding of border
activities and enables more timely and effective responses from border
enforcement entities.
At many Northern Border POEs, CBP utilizes Radio Frequency
Identification technology, next-generation license plate readers,
large-scale and small-scale imaging technologies, as well as a variety
of portable and hand-held technologies to assist officers and agents
with identifying threats. CBP also deploys approximately 4,565 pieces
of non-intrusive inspection and radiation detection equipment to assist
officers and agents with identifying threats, including concealed
people and narcotics.
partnerships and collaboration
DHS does not safeguard or operate along the Northern Border alone.
The Department has significant, on-going collaborative partnerships
with other Federal and SLTT partners, as well as with our Canadian
partners. Timely intelligence and law enforcement coordination and
information sharing with these partners is critical for successful
Northern Border operations.
For example, the Cross Border Law Enforcement Advisory Committee
(CBLE-AC) is a coordination effort designed by its members [CBP, the
Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), ICE, the RCMP, and USCG] to
provide executive-level strategic guidance to cross-border law
enforcement initiatives involving partnerships between U.S. and
Canadian law enforcement agencies. The CBLE-AC working group itself
enables those enforcement teams to report back to a body that allows
for a de-confliction mechanism. The CBLE-AC provides strategic guidance
to Border Enforcement Security Task Forces (BESTs), Integrated Border
Enforcement Teams (IBETs), Integrated Cross-Border Maritime Law
Enforcement Operations (Shiprider) teams, and other hybrid programs.
With regard to BEST, ICE/HSI maintains five along the Northern
Border: Blaine, Washington; Buffalo, New York; Detroit, Michigan; Port
Huron, Michigan; and Massena, New York. A key success element of this
program is the full-time co-location of U.S. and Canadian law
enforcement agencies, including at the Federal State, provincial,
Tribal, and local levels.
The BEST program has the authority to cross-designate Canadian law
enforcement officers as U.S. customs officers under Title 19 U.S.C.
Sec. 1401(i), permitting them to enforce the criminal laws of the
United States under the direction of ICE/HSI. These Canadian law
enforcement officers are provided with ICE/HSI task force officer
badges and credentials and, upon successful completion of ICE/HSI-
sponsored training, are authorized under the direction of ICE/HSI to
carry their agency-issued service weapons in the United States, make
arrests, and execute search warrants.
In 2017, USBP operationalized the Northern Border Coordination
Center (NBCC) at Selfridge Air National Guard Base, Michigan. The NBCC
is the central information repository for the Northern Border to
enhance intelligence capabilities and address intelligence gaps along
the Northern Border. The NBCC provides analysis of emerging Northern
Border threats and disseminates information to all CBP operational and
intelligence components, as well as other Federal, Tribal, State, and
local law enforcement agencies and our Canadian law enforcement
partners, to increase situational awareness and lay down the foundation
for a Northern Border common operating and intelligence picture.
Through these and other cooperative programs, such as the IBETs and
Shiprider, the United States and Canada continue to enhance cross-
border operational effectiveness and facilitate the successful
investigation and prosecution of transnational criminal conduct.
CBP is also cooperating with Canada beyond strictly operational
discussions. CBP's Office of Human Resources Management (HRM) engages
with Canada bilaterally, and through the Border Five construct, to
address the most pressing common human resources issues, such as
recruitment and hiring, work force well-being, resiliency, and employee
engagement strategies. Through this bilateral engagement, CBP/HRM and
Canadian Human Resources offices share information, best practices, and
lessons learned.
In addition, DHS maintains strong partnerships with several Tribes.
CBP and ICE/HSI continue to work with our Tribal partners to secure
travel between the United States and Canada by enhancing the security
of Tribal identification documents for members of Tribes recognized by
the Federal Government in order to strengthen border security while
facilitating legitimate travel. Under a memorandum of agreement, each
interested U.S. Tribe develops a secure photograph identification
document to be issued only to the Tribe's legitimate members who could
be either U.S. or Canadian citizens. These documents can be
electronically verified by CBP at POEs.
This September, CBP and the Pokagon Band of Potawatomi Indians
announced that the Band's Enhanced Tribal Card (ETC) is now an
acceptable travel document at land and sea POEs. To date, CBP has
signed memoranda of agreement with 18 Tribes: The Kootenai of Idaho,
the Pascua Yaqui of Arizona, the Seneca of New York, the Tohono O'odham
of Arizona, the Coquille of Oregon, the Hydaburg Cooperative
Association of Alaska, the Suquamish, Colville, Puyallup, Swinomish,
and Samish Tribes of Washington State, the Fond du Lac of Minnesota,
the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians of North Dakota, the
Pokagon Band of Potawatomi Indians of Michigan, the Kickapoo
Traditional Tribe of Texas, the Caddo Nation, Muscogee (Creek) Nation,
and the Absentee-Shawnee Tribe of Oklahoma.
DHS also continues to build cooperative law enforcement
relationships with several Tribes, and to support Tribal participation
in operational task forces. For example, the Akwesasne Mohawk Police
Service (AMPS) and the St. Regis Mohawk Tribal Police are robust
participants in the ICE/HSI-led BEST program and routinely collaborate
and exchange information with our agencies. Sharing information between
Tribal police and DHS components facilitates quick responses and a
safer, more secure Northern Border.
updating the dhs ``northern border strategy''
As an outcome of our efforts on the Northern Border Threat
Assessment report, former DHS Secretary John Kelly directed PLCY to
update the Department's 2012 Northern Border Strategy.
The updated strategy is being developed as a whole-of-DHS effort
and in accordance with the Department's Strategic Planning Guidance. It
will be a risk-informed strategy, structured as a nesting set of goals,
objectives, sub-objectives, and outcome statements. Within 180 days of
the Strategy's release, an accompanying implementation plan will be
developed, which will be used to ensure that the actions the Department
takes to execute the Strategy are achieving our desired end-states in a
cost-effective manner.
The updated Northern Border Strategy will have three primary focus
areas: (1) Enhancing border security operations; (2) facilitating and
safeguarding lawful trade and travel; and (3) promoting cross-border
resilience.
We expect to publish the updated Northern Border Strategy in
January 2018.
conclusion
Thank you for the opportunity to testify about the Department's
efforts to chart the way forward for the Northern Border.
We look forward to continuing to collaborate with you as we work to
safeguard the Northern Border from the threats our Nation faces while
also ensuring we manage the border in a way that facilitates the
economic activity critical to our Nation's prosperity.
We welcome your questions.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Dougherty.
The Chair now recognizes Chief Luck for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF SCOTT A. LUCK, ACTING DEPUTY CHIEF, U.S. BORDER
PATROL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Luck. Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela,
distinguished Members of the subcommittee, it is a privilege
and honor to appear before you today to discuss the role of
U.S. Customs and Border Protection in securing our Northern
Border.
As America's front-line border agency, CBP is responsible
for securing America's borders against threats, while
facilitating legal travel and trade. To do this, CBP has
deployed a multi-layered risk-based approach to enhance the
security of our borders, while facilitating the flow of lawful
people and goods entering the United States.
This layered approach to security reduces our reliance on
any single point or program that could be compromised. It also
extends our zone of security outward, ensuring that our
physical border is not the first or last line of defense but
one of many.
Along the Northern Border, CBP's efforts to pursue
operational control of the international boundary do not solely
rely upon a single enforcement tactic, but require a multi-
layered approach to border enforcement and security. This
strategy encompasses understanding the operating environment
through situational awareness, attempting to impede and deny
the illegal cross-border activity, and responding to and
bringing any incursions to a positive law enforcement
resolution, including delivering consequences as appropriate.
The CBP's pursuit of operational control along the Northern
Border uniquely requires a heightened focus on relationships
and partnerships with local law enforcement community outreach
and liaison efforts to increase situational awareness. This
intelligence-driven approach, which requires a whole-of-
Government leveraging of assets and resources, sees CBP
accomplishing its border security mission through risk-based
and targeted joint operations with local, State, Tribal, and
other Federal law enforcement partners, and will require civic
engagement in local communities, agile technology, and timely
information sharing.
The international boundary with Canada extends over 5,500
miles, across both land and water, including the border of
Alaska. It is often described as the longest, common non-
militarized border between any two countries. It separates two
friendly nations with a long history of social, cultural, and
economic ties that have contributed to a high volume of cross-
border trade and travel.
Along the Northern Border, there are large expanses of
rural and agricultural areas with ready-road access, as well as
large, open public spaces. Overall, a solid transportation
infrastructure exists which facilitates ease of access to and
egress from the border area. These areas present easy border-
crossing points. Thickly forested mountainous areas with
recreational trail networks also provide avenues and cover for
those seeking to cross the border illegally.
CBP has increased partnerships with Federal, State, local,
and Tribal law enforcement agencies, as well as in public and
private sectors. Coordination and cooperation among all
entities that have a stake in our mission has been and
continues to be paramount. This information sharing increases
understanding of evolving threats and provides the foundation
for law enforcement entities to exercise target enforcement in
the areas of greatest risk.
As actionable intelligence indicates that there may be a
shift in threat in smuggling activity from one geographic area
to another, CBP will adapt and shift resources to mitigate the
threat. This intelligence-driven approach prioritizes emerging
threats, vulnerabilities, and risks, greatly enhancing our
border security efforts.
U.S. Border Patrol has permanent positions in Canada that
are strategically located throughout the Northern Border to
provide the greatest operational benefit. These agents serve as
CBP representatives in their respective consulates, and serve
as direct liaisons to Canada Border Services Agency and Royal
Canadian Mounted Police agencies. The information flow and
collaboration with our Canadian counterparts provide CBP
operations and our law enforcement and diplomatic partners with
a more complete picture of the threats affecting the shared
U.S.-Canadian border.
These positions strengthen USBP law enforcement
partnerships and operational integration with our Canadian
partners and with the Northern Border sectors, benefiting
multiple joint operations and supporting multi-agency task
forces, like the Border Enforcement Security Task Force and the
integrated border enforcement teams.
Thanks to the support of Congress, CBP has greatly enhanced
our technological capabilities on the Northern Border at and
between our ports of entries. CBP has also committed
significant personnel securing the Northern Border, including
over 2,000 U.S. Border Patrol agents, 4,700 office of field
operations officers, 310 agricultural specialists, and 260 CBP
air and marine personnel.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify about CBP's
efforts to secure the Northern Border while facilitating the
flow of lawful trade and travel. In closing, I would like to
thank the men and women of the U.S. Border Patrol who work
tirelessly to keep America safe. I look forward to your
questions.
Ms. McSally. Thanks, Chief Luck.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Kelly for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF KEVIN KELLY, SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE, U.S.
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Kelly. Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and
distinguished Members, thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you today to discuss ICE Homeland Security
Investigations, HSI's efforts to improve security along our
Northern Border.
I am Kevin Kelly, the special agent in charge for HSI in
Buffalo, New York. I have been in Federal law enforcement for
29 years. I actually grew up in Buffalo and know these
communities and the complexities of the Northern Border. I also
know the problems encountered by other agencies that police the
Northern Border. Previously, I was assigned to the Southwest
Border, so I have a unique insight as to how transnational
criminal organizations, or TCOs, exploit our Nation's borders.
HSI leverages its broad authority and global footprint to
secure our borders. We work in close coordination with our
Federal law enforcement partners, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, the U.S. Coast Guard, and with our State, local,
Tribal, and international law enforcement partners as a force
multiplier.
Recently, I met with the sheriffs from St. Lawrence and
Franklin Counties, the chief of the St. Regis Mohawk Tribal
Police, and several local police chiefs along the Northern
Border and New York State, to coordinate investigative efforts
to combat transnational crime and address the emerging public
safety concerns. These critical meetings assist HSI in
addressing our partners' concerns and forge a unified strategy.
HSI has six special-agent-in-charge offices located along the
Northern Border that are responsible for overseeing the
investigation of criminal activity with a nexus to the Northern
Border. In addition, HSI has four attache offices in Canada to
facilitate coordination with our Canadian law enforcement
partners.
A key and successful element of HSI's initiatives along the
Northern Border is the participation of our U.S. and Canadian
partners on the HSI-led Border Enforcement Security Task Force,
or BEST. BEST is a mechanism to address cross-border crime. HSI
maintains seven BESTs along the Northern Border, which provides
a proven and flexible platform to investigate TCOs. BEST task
force officers undergo stringent training requirements in U.S.
laws and policies.
On the direction of HSI, they are given title 19 Customs
authority, issued HSI task force credentials, and are able to
enforce U.S. laws. Our Canadian TFOs drive into the United
States each day with their issued firearm and enforce both
Canadian and U.S. laws.
BESTs are successful because they eliminate the
international border as an obstacle. For example, HSI BEST
working with Peel Regional Police in Canada and other Canadian
partners disrupted and dismantled a TCO engaged in cocaine
smuggling. The investigation resulted in 14 arrests, the
seizure of 277 pounds of cocaine, 2 tractor trailers, and 3
handguns. This case represents the largest cocaine conspiracy
in the history of the western district of New York.
Another collaborative investigation, Operation Road Soda,
targeted a tobacco and cocaine-smuggling TCO that resulted in
56 arrests, 11 international controlled deliveries, 79 executed
search warrants, and the seizures of $1.8 million in Canadian
currency and $758,000 in U.S. currency, as well as a variety of
illicit drugs.
HSI's National Security Investigations Division coordinates
all JTTF international terrorism investigations and acts as the
conduit for threat streams in coordination with Canadian law
enforcement and intelligence agencies in their counterterrorism
efforts. Additionally, HSI conducts visa applicant screening
through the Visa Security Program, or VSP.
VSP enhances visa security by providing in-depth screening,
vetting, and investigative capabilities, utilizing
counterterrorism and criminal justice records to augment the
Department of State's visa application process. Canadian
citizens and third-country nationals present in Canada who
apply for U.S. visas are subject to VSP. Currently, Canada vets
all their immigration visa and refugee applicants' fingerprints
against DHS biometric holdings, conducting more than 400,000
queries against DHS data annually.
The Northern Border Threat Assessment indicated that the
most frequent threat to U.S. public safety along the Northern
Border continues to be bidirectional smuggling of illicit drugs
and bulk cash by TCOs.
HSI encounters a variety of distinct TCOs attempting to
exploit the Northern Border, from outlaw motorcycle gangs, to
East Indian and Asian organized crime syndicates, as well as
traditional organized crime.
One disturbing trend is the increasing importation of the
potent opioid fentanyl. This dangerous drug is secreted and
often mislabeled in small international parcels from China.
Once in the United States, the fentanyl is either left in its
pure form or mixed with heroin and other drugs and distributed
with frequently fatal results.
In closing, HSI is committing to using our unique
investigative authorities to secure our Northern Border. The
key to this effort is our continued coordination and
collaboration with our Federal, State, local, Tribal, and
international law enforcement partners.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify and, I welcome
your questions.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Kelly.
The Chair now recognizes Dr. Marchand for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL MARCHAND, CHAIRMAN, COLVILLE BUSINESS
COUNCIL, TESTIFYING ON BEHALF OF NATIONAL CONGRESS OF AMERICAN
INDIANS
Mr. Marchand. Good morning, Chairwoman McSally, Ranking
Member Vela, and Members of the subcommittee. My name is
Michael Marchand. I am chairman of the Colville Business
Council, the governing body of the Confederated Tribes of the
Colville Reservation. I am testifying today on behalf of the
National Congress of American Indians, the National Indian
organization of which Colville Tribes is a member.
As independent sovereign governments, Tribes have the same
responsibilities for public safety and security of their
communities as States and local governments. Although now
considered a single Indian tribe, the Confederated Tribes of
the Colville Reservation is the confederation of 12 aboriginal
Tribes and bands from across eastern Washington State and
southern British Columbia, Canada.
The present-day Colville Reservation is slightly larger
than the State of Delaware, and covers approximately 1.4
million acres in north central Washington State. The northern
boundary of the Colville Reservation is approximately 70 miles
long and within 30 miles of the U.S.-Canadian border. The North
Half of the Colville Reservation, which was opened to non-
Indian settlement in the late 1800's, extends northward from
the existing boundary to the Canadian border. The Colville
Tribes and its Tribal members retain ownership of more than 160
tracts of land in the North Half, the largest of which are
either contiguous to or within 5 miles of the Canadian border.
The Colville Tribes exercises law enforcement and regulatory
jurisdiction over these lands, but is not alone in helping
protect the U.S. borders.
Tribes are first responders in many Tribal jurisdictions.
Tribal personnel are the only emergency response entity for
both the Tribal and non-Tribal community. This includes
firefighters, law enforcement, and medical emergency response.
Tribes also protect extensive critical infrastructure.
There is significant vital infrastructure located on or near
Tribal lands, including National communication network systems,
highway and rail lines, and dams, power transmission stations
and relays, oil and natural gas pipelines, dams, military
defense facilities, and operations.
Tribes protect the border from drug and immigration
smuggling. Approximately 40 Tribes are on or near the U.S.
international borders and have experienced cross-border drug
smuggling, including the Colville Tribes.
Recommendations: At the National Congress of American
Indians' 2017 annual conference, NCAI's membership adopted
resolution MKE-17-017, which makes several recommendations to
improve cross-border issues with Indian communities.
We suggest that the committee direct DHS to do the
following: Increase consultation and coordination with Tribal
governments. The DHS should work to increase compliance with
Executive Order 13175, which requires each agency to consult
with Tribal nations. There are dozens of provisions in the
various DHS authorizations that mistakenly categorize Tribes as
local governments, and therefore set the wrong legal framework
for the Federal-Tribal relationship for which Tribal DHS has
responsibility.
Directly empower Tribal responders. Currently, Tribes must
apply for nearly all DHS-granted programs through State
governments. This is unacceptable. Tribal governments should be
able to apply directly to and deal directly with DHS. Some of
these changes are legislative, but many of them are
administrative. DHS has misinterpreted the one grant Tribes
have been successful at ensuring direct access, the SHSGP. The
statute requires that at least or a minimum of 0.1 percent be
made available for Tribes. DHS, however, has been implementing
this as a ceiling with a maximum of 0.1 percent made available.
Create uniformity in DHS's acceptance to Tribal
governmental identification. There is no consistent agency-wide
recognition of Tribal governmental identification. This
oversight can be fixed administratively.
So I appreciate the opportunity to testify on these issues,
and I look forward to answering any questions you may have.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Marchand follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael Marchand
November 14, 2017
Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and Members of the
subcommittee, my name is Michael Marchand and I am the chairman of the
Colville Business Council, the governing body of the Confederated
Tribes of the Colville Reservation (``Colville Tribes'' or the
``CCT'').
background on ncai and the colville tribes
First, I would like to thank the subcommittee for the opportunity
to testify today on behalf of the National Congress of American Indians
(``NCAI''), the oldest and largest American Indian organization in the
United States, on this critically important topic. Tribal leaders
created NCAI in 1944 as a response to Federal termination and
assimilation policies that threatened the existence of American Indian
and Alaska Native tribes. Since then, NCAI has fought to preserve the
treaty rights and sovereign status of Tribal governments, while also
ensuring that Native people may fully participate in the political
system. As the most representative organization of American Indian
tribes, NCAI serves the broad interests of Tribal governments across
the Nation.
As independent sovereign governments, Tribes have the same
responsibilities for the public safety and security of their
communities as States and local governments. Although now considered a
single Indian Tribe, the Confederated Tribes of the Colville
Reservation is a confederation of 12 aboriginal Tribes and bands from
across eastern Washington State and southern British Columbia, Canada.
The present-day Colville Reservation is slightly larger than the State
of Delaware and covers approximately 1.4 million acres in north-central
Washington State.
The northern boundary of the Colville Reservation is approximately
70 miles long and within 30 miles of the U.S.-Canadian border. The
North Half of the Colville Reservation, which was opened to non-Indian
settlement in the late 1800's, extends northward from the existing
boundary to the Canadian border. The Colville Tribes and its Tribal
members retain ownership of more than 160 tracts of land in the North
Half, the largest of which are either contiguous to or within 5 miles
of the Canadian border. The Colville Tribes exercises law enforcement
and regulatory jurisdiction over these lands, but is not alone in
helping protect the U.S. borders.
Nearly 40 Tribes are located on or near the U.S. international
border between Canada and Mexico, and are often the only major
governmental presence in rural and isolated locations. For this reason,
Tribal governments have broad emergency and first responder
responsibilities, as well as extensive border responsibilities with
immigration and smuggling implications, all integral aspects of
homeland security.
indian tribes serve a critical role in securing our nation's borders
Tribes are First Responders
As touched upon briefly, in many jurisdictions along both borders,
Tribal personnel are the first and sole emergency response entity for
both Tribal and non-Tribal communities; this includes firefighters, law
enforcement, and medical emergency response. Many Tribes have built
significant emergency management infrastructure with highly-trained
personnel, and have critical contracts and agreements in place to
support their non-Native surrounding communities. Several Indian Tribes
have their own departments of Homeland Security or Emergency Response.
In addition to preparing for basic first responder duties, Tribes
also prepare their communities for incidents such as pandemic
outbreaks. Tribal law enforcement agencies work closely with the
Department of Homeland Security (``DHS''), the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and other U.S. and
Canadian Federal law enforcement, along with State, local, and
provincial police services, to secure their territories. The Blackfeet
Nation is a prime example, and this needs to be encouraged and
expanded, and of course funded. The fact that Tribal police services
are often first responders and at times the only responders along parts
of the Northern Border must be recognized.
Tribes Protect Extensive Critical Infrastructure
There is significant vital infrastructure located on and near
Tribal lands including National communications network systems, highway
and rail lines, dams, power transmission stations and relays, oil and
natural gas pipelines, and military defense facilities and operations.
The Fort Berthold Indian Reservation has several Minuteman missile
launch facilities located within its exterior borders as a strategic
element of the homeland security system. Also, the Grand Coulee Dam is
the largest electric power producing facility in the United States and
is situated on the Colville Indian Reservation, my home.
Tribes Protect the Border from Drug & Immigration Smuggling
As mentioned earlier, approximately 40 Tribes are on or near U.S.
international borders; many are in very remote areas of the border. For
the past decade, the U.S. Federal border enforcement strategy has
resulted in funneling illegal immigration and drug smuggling into more
remote areas. Unfortunately, those ``remote'' areas are often Indian
reservations. The substantial increase in the flow of people and drugs,
and the subsequent increase in crime and property damage, has been very
difficult for Tribal law enforcement and Tribal communities to address
with already limited resources. There has also been an irreversible
destruction of cultural and religious sites, and adverse environmental
impacts to Tribal lands.
The Colville Tribes has dealt and continues to deal with cross-
border smuggling activity from Canada. During the mid- to late 2000's,
numerous sightings of unmarked fixed-winged aircraft were reported on
or near the Colville Reservation. In one publicized incident, the
Colville Tribes' Natural Resources officers and officers of the Tribe's
police department seized an unmarked float plane from Canada that was
attempting to smuggle illegal drugs into the United States. After a
long chase, the officers ultimately captured the pilot and handed him
over to Federal law enforcement authorities as well as an estimated $2
million in illegal drugs that had been deposited by the plane. The U.S.
Border Patrol honored the Tribe's officers who participated in that
seizure.
Smugglers have found the Colville Reservation an attractive
thoroughfare for smuggling activity because of its remote location and
because at any given time, the Colville Tribe has a few as six law
enforcement officers (three police officers and three Natural Resources
Department officers) to patrol the entire 2,275 square-mile Colville
Reservation. The Tribe has reason to believe that smugglers exploit our
lack of resources by monitoring our radio frequencies and coordinating
their activities around our officers' movements.
needed reforms
The need to secure America's borders was prioritized following the
events of September 11, 2001. These efforts, however, have largely
failed to consider the Tribal lands and territories that extend beyond
the arbitrary borders placed throughout those lands. Despite what is
often a cooperative working relationship on law enforcement issues, the
DHS, CBP, Canada Border Services Agency, and other U.S.-Canada agencies
often disregard the concerns of Tribal communities and citizens located
along the Northern Border.
On August 21, 2017, more than 70 participants attended a day-long
Summit, with representation from 19 Tribal leaders from both the United
States and Canada, to discuss concerns at the United States-Canada
border. Tribal leaders shared the difficulties they face when crossing
the border, while touching on many contributing factors, such as the
unwillingness of border agents to accept Tribal government-issued
identification documents; excessive interrogation and harassment;
denial of entry for minor offenses; and the improper handling of sacred
or cultural items. All in attendance expressed a willingness to
continue working cooperatively with U.S. and Canadian border officials
toward strengthening border security, and in a manner that recognizes
Tribes as equal, sovereign governmental partners.
The Colville Tribes and other Tribes in Washington State can
empathize with these concerns. The homelands of the Okanogan and Arrow
Lakes bands of the Colville Tribes were on both sides of the U.S.-
Canadian border. We have relatives buried on the Canadian side and the
CCT recently secured a victory in Canadian courts that affirmed the
rights of Arrow Lakes members to hunt in their traditional territory.
Despite this, some of our members are prohibited from entering Canada
based on misdemeanor convictions or other minor offenses. Other Tribes,
like the Swinomish Indian Tribal Community, have experienced similar
difficulties when their members seek to enter Canada for ceremonial
purposes.
Tribes in the Northwest have also worked themselves to coordinate
on cross-border issues affecting our First Nations relatives. The Coast
Salish Gathering, held on September 29, 2017, provided an opportunity
for U.S. Tribal leaders and First Nation Chiefs, the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, and Environment Canada to build a collaborative body
for mutual understanding to solve cross-border environmental issues
facing our shared homelands.
Also, at its NCAI's 2017 annual conference, NCAI's membership
enacted a resolution stating that a coordinated, immediate, and on-
going engagement with both the United States and Canadian governments
is necessary in the following areas:
1. Improvement of both United States and Canadian (including
Alaska) border crossing policies and practices for Tribal
citizens;
2. Improvement of both United States and Canadian (including
Alaska) border security training and recognition of Tribal
identification credentials;
3. Implementation of the Jay Treaty provisions in Canada governing
border crossing for all Tribal members and First Nations
communities and removal of the 50 percent blood quantum
requirement in the United States; and
4. Improvement in education and cultural sensitivity by border
agents.
NCAI Resolution MKE-17-017 (Attached). Against this backdrop, NCAI
suggests that the committee direct DHS to do the following:
Increase Consultation and Coordination with Tribal Governments
The DHS must work to increase compliance with Executive Order 13175
which requires each Federal agency to consult with Tribal nations.
Further, there are dozens of provisions in various DHS authorizations
that mistakenly categorize Tribes as ``local governments'' and
therefore set the wrong legal framework for the Federal-Tribal
relationship. Instead, such provisions should acknowledge that DHS has
a trust relationship with Indian Tribes.
Directly Empower Tribal First Responders
Largely because of the erroneous categorization of Tribal
governments as ``local'' governments in DHS's authorizations, DHS has
set up an inappropriate infrastructure whereby Tribes are deemed
subsets of State governments for most purposes. Not only is this
erroneous, it is ineffective. DHS has essentially delegated homeland
security oversight to State governments that have little incentive and
no legal responsibility to ensure the security of Tribal communities.
Tribes do not want to be a gaping hole in the Nation's homeland
security infrastructure.
Currently Tribes must apply for nearly all DHS grants and programs
through State governments. This is unacceptable. Tribal governments
should be able to apply directly to and deal directly with DHS. Some of
these changes are legislative, but many of them are administrative. DHS
has misinterpreted the one grant Tribes have been successful at
ensuring direct access, the SHSGP. The statute requires that ``at
least'' (or a minimum) 0.1 percent of pertinent funding be made
available for Tribes. DHS, however, has implemented this as a ceiling,
with a maximum of 0.1 percent made available.
Create Uniformity in DHS's Acceptance of Tribal Governmental
Identification
Finally, there is no consistent agency-wide recognition of Tribal
governmental identification. TSA accepts Tribal IDs for domestic air
travel as long as they have a photo (but they have not yet put this
into regulations). The Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI)
accepts Tribal IDs for international land border crossing purposes, if
they have met certain security requirements. DHS has had very
inconsistent application of these rules. This oversight can be fixed
administratively.
In closing, I appreciate the opportunity to testify on these
important issues and look forward to answering any questions you may
have.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, Dr. Marchand.
I now recognize myself for 5 minutes for questions.
Chief Luck, I mentioned the 2010 GAO report saying that the
Northern Border had less than 2 percent operational control. Do
we have a new and updated assessment on the percentage of
situational awareness and percentage of operational control at
the Northern Border? If so, can you share that with us?
Mr. Luck. I don't think we have one right yet. We are
working on that to fold into the assessment that the DHS was
going to provide. We are providing input into that strategy.
Ms. McSally. Great. Generally, can you say, have things
improved since 2010? I mean, it is easy to go up from 2
percent, but--hopefully. I mean, have things gotten more
challenging? In general, based on what we have done since 2010,
have we increased our situational awareness and our operational
control? Is that your sense?
Mr. Luck. Yes, ma'am, that is my sense. We have put more
technology on the Northern Border.
Ms. McSally. Can you talk through kind-of what has happened
then in order to increase that?
Mr. Luck. Yes. So we have more RVSS systems in place for--
remote video surveillance systems, mainly around the Canadian--
around the ports of entry. So we are getting more situational
awareness there. We have radars in the Great Lakes in the
Buffalo sector where they are pinging off, and we are getting a
response out to those pings as they traverse the Great Lakes
and into the United States and those waters.
I will say that we do lack manpower, as you have noted and
I have noted as well. We are down about 200 positions on the
Northern Border, and we are working very feverishly to get the
Northern Border back staffed up. Our situational awareness we
need to improve, and we need to have a better response
capability to our efforts on the Northern Border.
The intelligence sharing that we have going on is very
good. We are now building a Northern Border coordination center
located in Selfridge Air Force Base in Detroit, Michigan. That
is going to be utilized as an intelligence hub of information
coming in and intelligence being analyzed by our analytical
support teams and then being dispersed back out to the sectors
and the command staff that needs that information.
So there has been some--they have agent portable systems.
They have some mobile surveillance equipment. We are trying--
and in the 5-year plan going forward, we want to add more of
what they have, and to include more detection for maritime
detection capability, dark--what is the word?--dark aircraft
for low-flying aircraft, detection capability out there in
those areas where we see that threat, and as well as more
detection capability along--and the use of FODs and fiber
optics that not only helps with our intrusions in our detection
capability, but also with our communications gaps we have.
Ms. McSally. Great. Thank you.
So I want to talk about--I know that your testimony said,
both Mr. Dougherty and Chief Luck, that the risk of terrorist
organizations or others coming through the Northern Border is
not high. But if I am a bad guy and I would like to get into
America illegally, and I am a part of a terrorist organization,
and I have the choice of the Northern Border or the Southern
Border, which one is easier to execute? It would seem to me
that perhaps it is a little more geographically challenging and
perhaps due to procedures it would be a little tougher to come
through the Canada route, but the border is obviously less
focused on.
So can you talk about kind-of the vulnerabilities there,
north versus south? I think one of the reasons we are having
this hearing is to highlight the potential vulnerabilities in
the Northern. But, you know, where is it different from the
Southern Border? Because we talk a lot about the Southern
Border.
Mr. Dougherty, do you want to go first, or Chief Luck?
Mr. Dougherty. Pardon me, ma'am. If I can, I will defer to
the operators on this question. Thank you.
Ms. McSally. OK.
Mr. Luck. I will start by saying that there is a threat on
the Northern Border. I will be glad to give you a Classified
briefing on what those threats are. We are well aware of those
threats.
Threat isn't commensurate with flow, so we have to be
cognizant of what those threats are on the Northern Border. We
rely heavily on our partnerships with our Canadian
counterparts, our HSI partners, and all State, Federal, and
Tribal relations that we have.
The intelligence sharing is one of the best that I have
seen. I think they do it as good, if not better, than anywhere
else in the United States in as far as the relationship with
our Canadian counterparts. But we do have a gap that we need to
fill as far as that threat stream, and we are working on
getting the resources and the technology up there to assist
with that.
Ms. McSally. Mr. Kelly, you got anything to add?
Mr. Kelly. Sorry. I will say, you know, having worked both
the Northern and Southern Border, it is--there are targeted
areas of smuggling routes. They are going to use the same
routes that are--specifically have been traditionally
successful. To say that one is more so than the other, I don't
know if I would say that. But----
Ms. McSally. Well, they are different, for sure.
Mr. Kelly. They are very different, and we do have our
Achilles heel on the Northern Border for sure, as well as the
Southern Border.
Again, to echo what my colleagues have said, that is why we
rely on our BEST task forces, our Border Enforcement Security
Task Forces. Quite frankly, HSI can't do that job up there on
the Northern Border without our State, Federal, and Tribal
partners. It is critical for our mission. I don't think we do a
case up there where we don't have a State, local, or Tribal
officer working side-by-side with an HSI agent or a CBP officer
to try and deter and detect that flow.
Ms. McSally. Great. I am out of my time, so I am going to
now recognize Mr. Vela for questions for 5 minutes.
Mr. Vela. Thank you.
Mr. Luck, did I hear you say that the threat is not
commensurate with the flow?
Mr. Luck. Yes, sir.
Mr. Vela. What do you mean by that?
Mr. Luck. Just because there is a lot of activity on the
Southwest Border doesn't mean that that should be the focus for
everything that we do. So there is a threat on the Southwest
Border and there is a flow issue on the Southwest Border, but
there also is on the Northern Border that we cannot turn a
blind eye to, that we need to address.
Mr. Vela. Yes. I look forward to that Classified briefing
you mentioned, because there are other questions I think I
would like to ask, but I will hold off on those.
Dr. Marchand, in October, the National Congress of American
Indians adopted a policy resolution expressing its concerns
about the DHS's on-going operations along the Northern Border.
There was another resolution adopted shortly after the
President's Executive Order on immigration enforcement.
Considering many Tribal nations have members on both sides
of the border with Canada and many cross regularly for
cultural, religious, employment, and other purposes, DHS
operations affect these communities. How would you generally
grade the government-to-government coordination and
consultation between DHS and Tribes on the Northern Border? Can
you elaborate on where you think there is room for improvement?
Mr. Marchand. I think--my experience has been that it
varies over time and different personnel sometimes. But I
think, in general, that probably the communication is not good,
I wouldn't characterize it as that.
My Tribes, on initiative, we have set up meetings with our
local border people. We have been with the Canadian border
people. We have been less successful in kind of going higher up
the ladder, I guess. We have had requests out, but no
responses.
On a kind-of anecdotal basis, I hear stories of Tribal
members, in their words, getting harassed at the border for
different causes, like bringing their powwow regalia or eagle
feathers, things like that. Usually they tell me they are
allowed to cross, but they feel like they have been detained
and questioned unnecessarily long.
Just at a personal level, I recently crossed the border and
was held up for about 25 minutes. They said their computers
were down, they weren't working, but there was indication that
I had a traffic offense on my own record. They said--and like I
was trying to think of what that was, and then they were
accusing me of being a liar. I was really trying to search my
memory. What did I do, you know? After about 20 minutes, their
computers came back up, and he says, aha, we found out what it
is. You had a drunk driving offense when you were 18 years old.
I said, OK, that was 50 years ago. I forgot about that.
But things like that, you know what I mean, just more like
an inconvenience. I wasn't held up permanently, but kind-of
mostly that kind-of level of thing, I guess.
Mr. Vela. Don't feel too bad. The mayor of my hometown,
that exact same thing just happened to him in the Southern
Border.
Mr. Marchand. Yes. So--but a probably more serious one is
we have cross-border like marriages, things like that. Then if
you commit certain offenses in Canada, you can't go into
Canada. So we have problems like that where a spouse will have
to move to the United States or things like that.
Then it is kind-of complicated, but my Tribe, we have
traditional lands on both sides of the border. So we have
cemeteries up there. We have hunting rights up there, fishing
rights up there. But normal misdemeanor type things will bar
them from crossing the border, so then they lose those rights
up there.
So it seems like there must be a way to fix that better. We
are kind-of working on that. I think we need to meet more with
them and kind-of figure out ways to solve these issues, you
know.
But right now, they are not solved, especially with
hunting, because there is--since 9/11, there is a lot of
concern about firearms and guns, of course. But it is kind-of
hard to hunt without those, and so those kind of issues are
there. We don't want to commit terrorist activities, but we
would like to visit our homeland and shoot an elk or deer or
moose sometimes. So it is things like that.
Occasionally, we will get--I forget the question now, but
we will get other issues of smuggling, but it is not every day.
But sometimes there will be helicopters or planes, that sort of
thing, or even people.
Mr. Vela. So, Mr. Dougherty, following up on that point,
how does the Department address those cross-border cultural
issues that are so unique to tribes like Dr. Marchand's?
Mr. Dougherty. Sir, I think those are important to be aware
of, both on the Northern and the Southern Border. I will defer
to the operators as to the level of engagement that they have.
From a headquarters perspective, the ability to work with
Tribes is a recognized fact of life in doing anything that goes
on along the border where they are proximate to it. Our
instructions to them would be to work cooperatively and in a
friendly manner with the Tribes to share information and to
have joint operations take place.
I think--I was looking, sir, at an interdiction that
occurred on the water back in early September that involved
some U.S. citizens who were illegally moving tobacco from one
place to another. It was a small boat. It was a ship rider
operation for the Coast Guard. But the number of folks,
including a local Tribe, that were involved in that
apprehension, the cooperation that was required in order to
interdict that vessel and to prosecute it properly indicates
that we have to be working with all partners, including Tribes.
So while I defer to the operators on the day-to-day, sir,
from the Department perspective, they are extremely valuable
allies in border control.
Ms. McSally. We can go onto another round if you have got
some more questions.
OK. Great. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Barletta from
Pennsylvania.
Mr. Barletta. Thank you. Thank you all for being here today
to discuss the efforts to strengthen our Northern Border.
This is a very important topic, and I am pleased that we
now have a partner in the White House who is actively working
to ensure the safety of the American people, as President Trump
has clearly laid out a series of essential border and National
security priorities.
As we are all aware, the United States is experiencing a
deadly opioid epidemic that has devastated communities across
the country. In Pennsylvania alone, drug overdose deaths rose
by approximately 37 percent in 2016, according to the Drug
Enforcement Administration. Furthermore, since 2000, more than
300,000 Americans have died from overdoses involving opioids.
On the Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act, I worked
across the aisle to help find solutions for this National
emergency. In my own district, you know, we hosted opioid
forums where members of the community can come together to
share personal stories, and law enforcement and the medical
community can shed light on the dire situation that we are
currently experiencing. I am encouraged by President Trump's
recent actions to address this crisis, but there is still much
more work to be done here in Congress.
So my question is: Can any of you speak to how the
Department of Homeland Security is working to combat the flow
of illegal narcotics from Canada, in particular the smuggling
of opioids?
Mr. Luck. I will start, and I can tell you what CBP is
doing. We are interdictors, both at the ports and between the
ports, so we are enhancing our counternetwork operations as it
relates to the networks that are distributing these, and we are
enhancing our interdictive efforts.
So we want to disrupt the supply chain of that dangerous
chemical coming into the United States. So those are the
operational issues that we are focused on. Last, to make sure
that if our agents and officers come in contact with this
dangerous drug, that they are protected from it and what it
does.
So getting them the personal protective equipment as well
as the Narcan and the things that are used to bring somebody
back from an overdose, getting that in the right hands for our
special operations officers, our agents, and the people, and
primarily the folks at the checkpoints that will encounter the
traveling public more often.
Mr. Kelly. From the HSI's perspective, we are seeing a lot
of the fentanyl and carfentanyl and the analogs coming out of
China. Now, the Chinese have come to the table to try and stop
some of that from leaving their country, but they need to take
a more active role as well.
Another thing that we are seeing is these State and local
communities are--especially in the north country of New York
are hemorrhaging with opioid overdoses. It is really taxing.
The social services is taking away from the police services,
which is taking away from protecting their communities.
When I met with Sheriff Wells and Sheriff Mulverhill from
Franklin and St. Lawrence County, respectively, they echoed
that concern, that it is a huge problem and so much so that
they have seen a spike in foster care because parents are not
allowed--they can't take care of their kids. It is a problem.
As far as bidirectional flow from Canada, what we are
seeing is high-grade, hydroponic marijuana coming south into
the United States and cocaine going north. Recently, we did a
case where we busted up a ring about a week and a half ago out
of Syracuse, and they were smuggling--they were going pound for
pound for heroin and cocaine. It was very lucrative. So that is
what we are seeing going back and forth through those
countries.
Mr. Barletta. This is for anyone at the Department: How is
Homeland Security working with the Postal Service to improve
inspection services of packages from Canada?
Mr. Dougherty. So, sir, we are working on that right now.
The commission that was run by Governor Christie came out with
its report November 1. It had 56 recommendations in there.
One of those recommendations was to ensure that we get
advanced electronic data on international shipments coming from
high-risk regions to identify suppliers and distributors in the
United States. So that effort on our part is underway.
Of the 56 recommendations, of course, they asked that the
Department and law enforcement work harder to target drug
trafficking organizations, and that CBP and the Postal Service
use new detection capabilities for synthetic opioids. So as you
know, going into a mail facility with a dog is--you are sort-of
hoping, but at the same point what we probably need is an
automated system that can detect opioids in transit. But that
is an enormous number of packages.
If I may, sir, it seems to me that having gone to some of
those meetings on opioids at a fairly high level, the
President's interest in ending the opioid crisis is maybe one
of the major things that he thinks and talks about. So it is
very much a bipartisan effort. He has brought in pharmaceutical
companies and asked them, what can you do in terms of creating
an acute pain drug that will not essentially create dependency?
There is a sort-of a hook on some of these opioids. So how can
we remove that so we can get the pain treatment levels that we
need for individuals who are undergoing pain, but it doesn't
create any neural pathway to dependency. There is a lot of hope
in that community that they can do something valuable that
would help end the crisis.
So there is a lot of energy and interest on that, that--
because as you know, you are not probably going to be able to
law-enforcement your way out of this. It is going to be what we
do at the front end when we are treating individuals who have
acute pain issues.
Mr. Barletta. Thank you.
Thank you for calling this hearing.
Ms. McSally. The gentleman yields back.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Correa from California for 5
minutes.
Mr. Correa. Thank you, Chair Member McSally and Ranking
Member Vela. I thank you both for holding this hearing today to
assess the threat situation on the Northern Border, a topic
that I have highlighted in committee hearings in the past.
I also want to thank our witnesses for being here today. I
look forward to hearing from you where we actually need to
focus our resources to protect our country and to assure our
dollars, taxpayer dollars are not being wasted on campaign
promises.
With that being said, I am hearing your testimony today,
and this morning, I picked up the Washington Post. I don't know
if you picked it up yet. Front page story, ``Mexican
traffickers making New York City a fentanyl hub.'' You read
into this story, most of the smuggling is with the use of
vehicles, folks loading up a truck or a car and driving it
through. Here it talks about the Mexican border.
But as I am hearing, Chief Luck, you stated there is a lot
of ready-road access across the Northern Border, easy border
crossings. As we delve--these committees delve into the issue
of smuggling drugs, they are done through ports of entry. If
you talk to the folks, Southern Border, it is the ports of
entry. It is not folks putting on a backpack and sprinting, you
know, or doing marathons. It is trucks, it is vehicles full of
paraphernalia that drive across the borders.
If you talk to the folks at San Ysidro, the biggest border
crossing in terms of volume in the world, what they need over
there are more personnel, more machines, more dogs, because
they don't have enough inspectors, assets. So they do the
random checks. At those random checks, they hit big, big
shipments.
I am thinking to myself, gentlemen, do you have the
resources at the Northern Border to do proper inspections?
Again, fentanyl, China, Mexico, God knows where else it will
come from. This is essentially an issue where the bad guys are
trying to figure out what is the easiest way to score. To me,
that Northern Border, it is about 5,000, 6,000 miles, biggest
border in the world, versus 2,000 miles in the south. Same
terrain, very porous, same challenges.
So my question to all of you is: What resources do you
need, of course, to address the issue of more interdiction?
Also, somewhere there if you can talk about coordination,
because I believe, like Secretary Kelly said here in prior
testimony months ago, that if this stuff gets to the border,
you have essentially lost.
So how do you coordinate with the Mexicans, the Chinese,
Canadians, the Tribes in addressing these issues? I open it up
for anybody who wants to answer those questions.
Mr. Kelly. I will take it.
So from my perspective, you are correct. I will tell you
what we do up in the Northern Border in Buffalo area.
Everything is coordination with our State, local, and Federal
partners. Every time we do a fentanyl investigation or we have
our State and local--and then the one thing about fentanyl is
it is very volatile. If you encounter it, you have to have
proper protective gear. You have to have training on how to
handle it.
If you are asking me what I need, if you give me more, I
can do more, because every incident that impacts the----
Mr. Correa. So if you have more, you can interdict more on
the Northern Border?
Mr. Kelly. I can investigate more. Because what happens is,
when these groups exploit our borders, it falls to HSI to do
the criminal dismantlement and disruption of that TCO that is
exploiting our border.
So right now, my staffing levels are low, but HSI is
addressing it. But if you give me more, I can do more to
disrupt those organizations that not only disrupt--that only
target the Northern Border, but they--what we have seen--and I
will give you an example.
Last night, my agents in Buffalo interdicted 513 pounds of
marijuana that came up from the Mexican border. Why did it come
up? Because the price of the hydroponic marijuana from Canada
is getting too high in that area, so now there is a business
model where people are going to come in and try to undercut the
hydroponic marijuana coming into the western New York area. It
is another investigation that we are having.
We are seeing the Southern Border and the Northern Border
kind-of struggle with each other. On the Southern Border it is
one cartel controlling an area; on the Northern Border you have
multiple TCOs coming together and making an excellent business
model, coming together, joining forces, and exploiting the
Northern Border. That is our job to combat that. In that is
heroin, fentanyl, marijuana, cocaine, and everything going
bidirectional.
Mr. Correa. Mr. Luck, in terms of CBP personnel?
Mr. Luck. Yes, sir, you are right, CBP officers are down
about 1,500 officers. Border Patrol agents are down about
2,000. So we are trying to do whatever we can and to--the first
thing that I would say is that we have a good answer as it
relates to the Border Patrol with our operational relocation
program. That just closed. That announcement just closed, and
we should be sending more people up to the Northern Border to
get them to staffed to the 2,212 and above that. So that
resourcing is underway.
So for the first time we were able to do that and enhance
and get more Border Patrol agents from the Southwest Border up
to the Northern Border and then backfill those with trainees
coming from the Border Patrol Academy. So that is a good news
story as far as that goes.
But detection capability and technology is what we need the
most on the Northern Border, and more of that would help us
become more situationally aware of what is going on.
Mr. Correa. Thank you, gentlemen.
Go ahead.
Mr. Dougherty. Excuse me, sir, if I could. The strategy
that we are putting together, which is going to drive
acquisitions eventually, is going to include lots of input from
operators, such as the gentleman with us here today, to ensure
that we are getting capabilities, that if they work down on the
Southern Border to look into vehicles or to look into
containers, those things that are going to allow the Department
to make more seizures is going to be critical.
So the Joint Requirements Council that exists at the
Department of Homeland Security, the way that I like to style
it is the operator perspective drives the investment process
through transparent activity cross-component identifying gaps
and needs. We want to avoid error, we want to avoid delays, and
we don't want to waste money on equipment that doesn't work.
So you know, as our investments go into buying that
technology, it is going to be a very rigorous activity on the
part of the Department to make sure that it is efficacious and
it is supported by the operators.
Mr. Correa. Thank you.
Ms. McSally. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Katko from New York for 5
minutes.
Mr. Katko. I want to thank my colleagues, both of whom are
from the Southern Border, Vela and McSally, for having this
hearing. I appreciate very much you shedding light on this
issue.
Prior to coming to Congress, I was a Federal prosecutor for
20 years. I started out in El Paso at the Southwest Border
Initiative, and I saw first-hand what was going on down there.
But what shocked me after going through Puerto Rico and
then--for a couple years, then being up in the Northern Border
for 16 years is how much of a sieve the Northern Border is.
That is why I asked for the Northern Border threat assessment
through legislation, and it confirmed what I knew, that
virtually none of the border is secure, very little of it is
secure.
Then I hear from Mr. Luck today that they are down 200
positions, but I presume if you got those 200 positions back,
that you would be up to where you were before and that is
woefully inadequate to secure the Northern Border. Is that
right?
Mr. Luck. That is right. We are still trying to enhance and
get our agents back up there to where they need it.
Mr. Katko. I can tell you from my experiences on the
Northern Border that the problem became so acute in the
northern district that we had to relocate an office to the
Northern Border and staff it with multiple prosecutors just to
handle the flow of alien smuggling cases, drug trafficking
cases, and cigarette cases.
It is an incredibly acute problem that--it is hard to
understand, given what is going on on the Southern Border. But
I will remind people that there are an awful lot of terror
targets that live in Canada that have very close proximity to
the American border and have virtually a free pass to come into
the United States as well. Is that fair to say, Mr. Luck?
Mr. Luck. Yes, sir, that is a threat, and having those
large hubs close to the border within 100 miles and a lot of
the population nodes is a threat for us. That is why it is
important to have people in Canada. Those Border Patrol agents
that are assigned to the consulates are doing very good work in
relaying information and being at the tip of the spear when it
comes to that information sharing.
Mr. Katko. That is critically important of what we are
doing there. We need to continue to do that. It is no
indictment on our Canadian counterparts, because we have always
worked well with them, and I have too, but it is just a very
difficult situation.
Mr. Kelly, you are on the front lines up there in Buffalo,
and your sector also includes the northern district of New York
where I worked. Is it fair to say that that is still a well-
worn smuggling routes throughout the Northern Border and not
just the ports of entry?
Mr. Kelly. Absolutely.
Mr. Katko. OK. Could you give us just the nature of the
type of transnational criminal organizations that are up there?
I mean, I know from my own experience that Hells Angels
controls not just ports of entries, but, for example, the well-
worn smuggling routes through the Akwesasne Reservation, which
travels both sides of St. Lawrence.
So it is not just ports of entry where they are doing the
smuggling. Is that fair to say?
Mr. Kelly. That is absolutely fair to say.
Mr. Katko. Could you give us some ideas and some examples
of that?
Mr. Kelly. So what we are seeing is, is the outlaw
motorcycle gangs are traditional organized crime. They insulate
and isolate themselves from--and use 1-percenters or associates
to kind-of move their stuff up into some of the, for example,
the Akwesasne.
But, again, I want to stress, in my office in Messina, I
have a representative from the--the Akwesasne stretches both
sides. There is the Akwesasne Mohawk Police Service, which
services Canada, and then there is the St. Regis Tribal, which
services the United States. Both of them are members of the
Border Enforcement Security Task Force.
So we leverage a lot of our partnership with the Tribal to
go ahead and get that vulnerability. But it is my Achilles heel
and my AOR for smuggling.
Mr. Katko. Right. Is it fair to say that when St. Lawrence
freezes, they simply drive--smugglers will drive across remote
areas from Canada into the United States?
Mr. Kelly. Yes. There is an ice bridge, and it is a
vulnerability with snowmobiles and even vehicles at times going
back and forth in a free-flow direction of going both in and
out.
Mr. Katko. Now, is it fair to say, since the advent of the
hydroponic marijuana, which is very high-potent, high-quality
marijuana from Canada, gets as much as $2,500 a pound, and if
that is coming from Canada into the United States, is it fair
to say that they have now linked up--Hells Angels and others
have linked up with Mexican drug cartels to basically exchange
the hydroponic marijuana for cocaine?
Mr. Kelly. We have seen an increase in Mexican presence in
southern Ontario and in Canada. They are now basically cutting
the U.S. transit shipping routes and basically dealing with
Canada direct, meaning through either internal conspiracies on
airplanes or through the seaports, which, as you know, the
outlaw motorcycle gangs have a big stronghold with the ports,
the deports.
Mr. Katko. May I inquire of the Chair, are we going to have
another round of questioning?
OK. Great.
One last point this round. One of the last cases I did was
a seizure of, I think, 218 kilos of cocaine coming from the
Sinaloa cartel up through our district, up into Canada. It was
seized near the border. Is that representative of what you are
starting to see lately with respect to the drug trafficking?
Mr. Kelly. Absolutely. I mean, that just happened a week
and a half ago in Syracuse, you know. We took down about 24
kilos of cocaine that was basically, like I said before, the
hydroponic high-grade marijuana coming south from Canada and
the cocaine going north.
But what is even more disturbing is you have localized
TCOs, so these are guys and gals that kind-of get together,
break off, and form their own localized transcriminal
organization. They can move a little bit more freely because
they are not dependent upon the major TCOs that are running the
border.
So it is like a subset of TCOs that is operating in those
local communities, as you know, Syracuse, Oswego, and up and
down the I-81 corridor in New York State.
Thank you very much. I look forward to a second round.
Ms. McSally. Thanks. We are in the second round. I
recognize myself for 5 minutes. I want to pick up on that.
Again, just to be clear, you were talking about flow going
in both directions in the Northern Border. So the stuff that is
going from the United States to Canada, who is that being run
by? Is it primarily Mexican cartels that are present in the
United States, or is it some of these other subgroups?
Mr. Kelly. What we are seeing is, there is multiple TCOs in
Canada. So in the Buffalo area responsibility, I have Toronto
and Montreal, so basically, that accounts for 80 percent of the
Canadian populations within my jurisdiction of border.
So there is--after meeting with my Canadian counterparts--
there is Mexican presence that are moving cocaine into Canada.
There is also----
Ms. McSally. So just to be clear, Mexican cartel presence
in the United States in the northern communities moving----
Mr. Kelly. Right. Well, it is in Canada.
Ms. McSally. OK.
Mr. Kelly. So what they have done is essentially cut the
United States out of having to transship it through the United
States into Canada.
Ms. McSally. OK.
Mr. Kelly. It is like anything. It is a business model. It
is supply and demand. They demand is in Canada so they are
going to go ahead and get it. Our Southern Border has been, you
know, very effective in some parts. So these TCOs need to
figure out a way to get their drug up into Canada, and up into
their distribution points. They are business models. They are
business people. So when they get into Canada, you have
different organizations like East Asian--I mean, East Indian,
Asian-organized crime that are basically working together, like
basic TCOs coming together, like on the Southern Border, the
Sinaloa Cartel controls this corridor, and you won't get into
that corridor unless you either pay a fee, or you have a battle
between struggling cartels. The Northern Border, the TCOs are
coming together and forming partnerships because they know it
benefits each other, and it is more economically profitable for
them.
Ms. McSally. OK. Great. Thank you.
Mr. Dougherty, the Northern Border Threat Assessment Act is
what led to this document and the strategy you are doing. I
have similar legislation on the Southern Border Threat
Assessment Act. Can you speak to whether we could use a similar
one on the Southern Border, and are we going through that
process as we move our legislation along anyway?
Mr. Dougherty. Can I give you the standard response? We
stand by ready to give you technical assistance on any
legislation that you would like to bring----
Ms. McSally. But aside from legislative direction for it,
are you going through, in the Department, a similar Southern
Border threat assessment similar to what you are going through
in the Northern Border, or are you waiting for legislation to
make that happen?
Mr. Dougherty. I don't know if we are waiting for
legislation to make that happen. I think what we have got in
front of us is the Northern Border right now, and that is the
thing that led us to go to General Kelly and say: You know,
sir, this thing is 5 years old. We need to update it. So that
it is focused on the Northern Border.
Ms. McSally. Got it. Has it been a valuable process?
Sometimes we tell you guys to do things that take up a little
time, but it seems that it has been a valuable process for you
to go through to come to this, you know, this report and then
the follow-on strategy?
Mr. Dougherty. Yes. Yes. It is highly iterative. It gets
the Department to focus on things together. It is, as you know,
when we go to January and then we have got 180 days, where we
are going to be looking at the implementation plan and then we
are off, maybe even thinking about the budget in 2020 at that
point, it is not as fast as people would like it to be. But I
think that iterative process and the use of the joint
requirements council--and it is essentially new to the
Department per Secretary Johnson when he was here--that slows
things down, but I think it brings a level of fidelity and care
to acquisitions that is very useful to the Department.
Ms. McSally. OK, thanks.
Chief Luck, what is the biggest technology gap that you
have on the Northern Border right now?
Mr. Luck. I would say domain awareness. That is what we
need the most. We need to be able to see what is coming in, be
able to detect what is coming in, and then our response
capability is second to that.
Ms. McSally. Got it. Do you have any unmanned aerial
systems operating up there? If so, how many?
Mr. Luck. We have do have unmanned aerial vehicles up
there. They are giving us some situational awareness as well,
and we use them all the time. We have all the Northern Border's
sectors, with the exception of two that are getting collected
right now. The others should come on-line this fiscal year, and
then next fiscal year.
Ms. McSally. OK, great. You mentioned that coming into
contact with the Fentanyl can be obviously deadly and
dangerous.
I recently talked with some Border Patrol agents in my
community who mentioned that the line agents don't have access
to the Narcan, that it is only at the supervisor level;
whereas, the line agents would be the ones who most likely need
it for their safety or the safety of others. Is that something
that is being looked at to shift, because that seems like an
obvious thing, that they should have it right on them just like
first responders.
Mr. Luck. Yes, ma'am. They do. A lot of them do have the--
but there is not enough to go around, and we're purchasing more
to give to everyone.
Ms. McSally. Thanks. Ms. Barragan showed up so are you OK
with me----
Mr. Vela. Yes.
Ms. McSally. OK. The Chair now recognizes Ms. Barragan from
California for 5 minutes.
Ms. Barragan. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
The Northern Border is home to sovereign Tribal lands, and
as you mentioned in your testimony, Dr. Marchand, Tribal
personnel are the first and sole emergency responders for both
the Tribal and non-Tribal communities, along both borders,
Tribal law enforcement is struggling to adequately police drug
traffickers who use their reservations to cross the border.
Sophisticated traffickers are exploiting lack of Tribal law
enforcement resources by monitoring the radio frequencies and
coordinating the activities around officers' movements.
Do you feel you are getting the resources necessary to
effectively police illicit border activity?
Mr. Marchand. Just in general, no, we have very large
tracts of land, often it is regularly impassable lands,
mountains, and especially in winter. So very small police
forces. We have an area, large State, there are times we might
only have two officers in the whole entire area. We have a
couple dozen--and we do cooperate with local and drug task
forces and things, but getting bodies on the ground is real
difficult. There is not enough funding or people, I guess.
Ms. Barragan. Is that posing a security threat in not
having enough people there on the Northern Border there?
Mr. Marchand. I think it is. I don't know that it is huge
volumes of drugs, but we do have reports of like planes and
helicopters, and things like that, that did get in. Then even
if we knew they were there, it might take an hour for someone
to even drive there and/or get there, and by that time, they
are gone.
Ms. Barragan. What resources would you say are needed by
the Tribal law enforcement to better combat the drug
trafficking on the reservation?
Mr. Marchand. More police officers would be one thing. The
other thing is there is a lack of communication,
infrastructure, and so, we kind-of have a bare skeletal system
out there now, but if we get a natural disaster, like forest
fires or something, it can wipe out the whole systems in the
region for extended periods of time. So it is kind-of across-
the-board issues. There is funding and isolation, I guess. A
lot of the communities are pretty poor, not just Indian
communities, but we are isolated in rural communities so.
Ms. Barragan. OK. I apologize if this was already asked,
but I wanted to go back to, in October, the National Congress
of American Indians adopted a policy, resolution expressing,
among other issues, its concern about the Department of
Homeland Security's on-going operations along the Northern
Border, considering many Tribal nations have members on both
sides of the border with Canada, and they cross regularly for
cultural events, religious events. I am curious on how the DHS
operations are affecting the communities. I read about the NCAI
resolution adopted last month that made a mention of,
``excessive interrogation or harassment, denial of entry for
minor offenses, and the improper handling of sacred or cultural
items.''
Can you describe to the subcommittee what is going on, and
how DHS can better address these concerns?
Mr. Marchand. I guess I will start off by saying I think
things have improved. So I think there are protocols in place,
you will be asked specific questions, do you have sacred
objects or feathers, and that is kind-of standard statements I
will ask when we cross the border. So I think things have
gotten better. But also, it gets down to individual personnel,
you know, staff turns over and changes. So I think there is
always a need to keep constantly retraining people and
reintroducing it. It is not something where you do one training
and then it is fixed forever. It doesn't work like that, and
you need to keep it up, the cultural-sensitivity type things, I
guess.
Ms. Barragan. If there was one thing that you think DHS or
that this committee could do to help the situation that you
deal with, what would you say that is?
Mr. Marchand. One of our pressing issues right now is just
ID cards getting across the border. We are in the process of
nearing completion of our new Tribal IDs, but those things are
kind-of a barrier. Some of our people will get passports,
things like that, which I think are the best, but they cost
some money, and a lot of our people don't have jobs or money.
So even our Tribal ID cards, we are going to be charging some
money for the enhanced ones. That is kind-of a barrier. Maybe a
few hundred dollars isn't a lot for the average American, but
if you are out of work, it can be a lot of money. So those
types of things are a problem.
Ms. Barragan. Thank you. I yield back.
Ms. McSally. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Vela.
Mr. Vela. Yes, this is probably something for Mr. Dougherty
or Mr. Kelly to address. I became curious as we were sitting
here about the whole idea of terrorist threats in the Southern
and the Northern Borders. I really am not in a position to know
whether what I am about to read is reliable or not, but I ran
into this.
It says ``Southern FBI terrorists Screening Center, monthly
domestic and counter reports dating from April 2014 to August
2016, detailed a number, type, and location of encounters with
known or suspected terrorists across the United States. The
encounters are based on information in various watch list
databases, and all seven reports the numbers of encounters land
border crossings were higher in northern States than in
southern States.''
Do you care to address that?
Mr. Kelly. I mean, like anything, his, we work with our
Joint Terrorism Task Force. I have agents assigned there full-
time. There is an information flow. I guess I am not
understanding the full context of the question, but can you----
Mr. Vela. Well, it is a report that I ran into on-line, and
I was just curious if you had access to that same information?
Mr. Kelly. We do. We have a very good information flow with
our Canadian partners, especially on the counterterrorism side.
We meet with the FBI monthly. I have intel people that are--the
information is flowing back and forth between us and the
Canadians. That much I can tell you. It is one of those things
that happens, it happens daily up there.
Mr. Vela. Well, maybe this is something that we can best
address in that Classified setting.
Mr. Kelly. Right. There is a lot of high-side stuff we
can't get into here, but I can assure you it is being done by
both us and our Joint Terrorism Task Force partners.
Mr. Vela. Thank you.
Ms. McSally. The Chair will now recognize Mr. Katko for 5
minutes.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Chairman. Getting back to a couple of
things here.
First of all, Mr. Dougherty, in the Northern Border Threat
Assessment, it gives some statistics as to the seizures on the
Northern Border. Is that fair to say, without getting into the
details?
Mr. Dougherty. I am sorry, sir?
Mr. Katko. It gives some statistics as to the amount of
drug seizures on the Northern Border?
Mr. Dougherty. I believe that is correct. Yes, sir.
Mr. Katko. Do you know if that takes into account any
seizures that happens south of the border in the inland of New
York State, for example, or elsewhere, that are attributed to
the border seizures?
Mr. Dougherty. I can't answer the question because I don't
know. I assume that we are basically just looking at activities
that are occurring in the operational area of the border and
the POEs.
Mr. Katko. Thank you.
Now, Mr. Kelly, with respect to the seizures, I take it you
have been involved in many cases, as have I, where the vast
majority of drug seizures along the Northern Border happened
past the border, is that fair to say?
Mr. Kelly. That is fair to say.
Mr. Katko. Give us some examples. I gave you one of 218
kilos of cocaine. You gave me another one of 34, but how often
do seizures that are border-related happen at the border
compared to certain ones that happen----
Mr. Kelly. It varies on the kind of investigation that we
are doing, but I know our State and local partners are running
into it a lot as well.
Like I said before, we work jointly with them, and our job
is to kind-of build that conspiracy and build that case against
that TCO exploiting it, but it does happen on a fairly regular
basis. Again, it is my Achilles Heel, not knowing everything
that comes on and off, the Akwesasne at any given point. But,
again, we have made some great inroads with our Tribal police.
We have made some great inroads with the elders and the
Tribals. I met with the subchief and I have recently been
invited to Tribal Council to try and foster a better
relationship with law enforcement.
Again, I can't do that without my partnerships with the
Tribal.
Mr. Katko. Yes. I appreciate what you are saying about the
Akwesasne. Again, it straddles both sides of the Saint Lawrence
River, which straddles the Canadian-U.S. border. While the vast
majority of people on the Akwesasne are great law-abiding
people, there is a significant minority within the Akwesasne
that are involved in the drug trafficking, alien smuggling, and
the gun running, and every other darn thing up there. I mean, I
remember going down rivers on Border Patrol boats and looking
at a series of modest homes on the reservations interspersed
with multimillion-dollar mansions, which clearly were made with
drug trafficking.
To Dr. Marchand's point with jurisdictional issues under
American law, usually if the house was built with drug
trafficking money, you could seize the home, but you can't on
the reservation. You can seize the home but you can't seize the
land. So you can't do anything about it.
So it raises unique law enforcement problems for us on the
Northern Border that I am not sure like that anywhere else in
the country.
Is it fair to say--I want to drill down a little bit
farther, on the drug trafficking routes--well on drug
trafficking routes on the Akwesasne, but elsewhere on the
Northern Border; are they also being exploited by alien
traffickers?
Mr. Kelly. Yes.
Mr. Katko. Can you give us some examples of some of the
alien cases? Like I did one, for example, where they seem more
ethnically-based than they do on the Southern Border.
Mr. Kelly. Right.
Mr. Katko. For example, Eastern European folks come in----
Mr. Kelly. We had a Polish smuggling ring in Buffalo----
Mr. Katko. Right.
Mr. Kelly [continuing]. Exactly the same thing, that was
exploiting the openness of the Akwesasne. I know out West they
had the same situation in Detroit as well, where they were
exploiting some of the open borders to move back and forth to
the countries.
Mr. Katko. Is that a concern to you, the alien smuggling?
Mr. Kelly. It is.
Mr. Katko. Why?
Mr. Kelly. It is a concern because it is movement of people
that we don't know who they are or what they are or why they
are coming or why they are going. It is a disturbing trend. In
my experience, most alien smugglers will stay to their true
tested routes and standards and methods and, you know, they
tend to stay the course on their smuggling routes.
Mr. Katko. Now, with the development of more of the Mexican
cartels locating in Canada, is there concern from any of you,
Mr. Luck perhaps, or Mr. Dougherty, or any of you, that as we
put more pressure on the Southern Border and as they try and
secure the Southern Border, that there is going to be more
transshipment of drugs and humans through the Northern Border?
Mr. Luck. Yes, it is. We see more and more links now from
the Southwest Border to the Northern Border. So, there is
connections there. We run cases with his on those ones that are
transporting criminal aliens and narcotics from the Southwest
Border into those areas close to the Canadian border, and have
hubs designated for that purpose.
It is important that we share that information. That is the
reason why we are starting up that Northern Border Coordination
Center, to link all of those things together so that as this
keeps going forward and we get more and more of this traffic
connected to the Southwest Border, we can exploit that, and we
can address it.
Mr. Katko. The last question that I will ask--and I
appreciate your indulgence, Chairman--obviously, lack of
adequate personnel on the Northern Border, to me, pretty acute,
and I saw it for years. Wave a wand. This is your moment to
give your ask. What is your ask for the Northern Border as far
as personnel and equipment and surveillance, and what have you?
Mr. Luck. I would like to get more----
Mr. Katko. Don't tell me build a wall.
Mr. Luck. You won't hear that from us.
Mr. Katko. OK. All right.
Mr. Luck. We would like to get more technology up there. We
would also, and I would be remiss if I didn't say, we have
facility issues on the Northern Border.
There is facilities that have been woefully neglected over
the past 10 years. Niagara Falls in your district, Niagara
Falls, and Champlain stations, they are in vast need of repair
and new facilities.
So those are the things that go first. To give the agents
somewhere to go to to work out of is important, and to have the
systems that they can run checks with. In those areas, they are
bursting at the seams in some of those areas, and they are not
adequate for what we need. So that, personnel, and technology
is what we need on the Northern Border.
Mr. Katko. Anyone want to add anything else?
Mr. Kelly. Like anything, sir, I could use more
investigative groups, more appropriations, and direct line
funding for us to get equipment. Like, for example, TruNarc is
a system we use to identify drugs without having to touch it.
You know, those run anywhere from $50,000 to $75,000 just for
one unit. What that does is it stores all the analogs and it is
a PPE, it is an officer safety thing. So like anything, and I
keep echoing this, if you give me more, his can definitely do
more.
Mr. Katko. OK. Thank you. Of course, you could use more
prosecutors, right? Right?
Mr. Kelly. That is the back end of it, sir, is we have to,
you know, and you know better than anybody, we have to
prosecute the people that we arrest.
Mr. Katko. Yes.
Mr. Kelly. That is another issue.
Mr. Katko. Well, I appreciate the Chairwoman's indulgence.
This is an issue that I have seen for front line for a long
time and it is not going away. As we put more pressure on the
Southern Border, I think the Northern Border is going to be
more of an issue. Let's not forget the Millennium bomber came
through Canada, Vancouver, into the United States, and there
have been many other threats on our Northern Border. There is
the CSX train that was targeted from Montreal to down to New
York City for a terrorist act not too long ago, and many, many
others. So we have to recognize that the Northern Border is a
threat just like the Southern Border is. I would argue, in some
respects, because of its lack of attention, it is more of a
threat. With that, I yield back.
Ms. McSally. The gentleman's time is well expired.
I want to thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony,
and the Members for their questions.
Members of the committee may have some additional questions
for the witness, and we will ask you respond to these in
writing. Pursuant to committee rule VII(D), the hearing record
will be held open for 10 days.
Without objection, the committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:24 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Ranking Member Filemon Vela for Michael Dougherty
Question 1a. As you know, section 102(c) of the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (``IIRIRA''), as
amended, gave the Secretary of Homeland Security authority to waive
laws to expedite the construction of a border wall.
Is it the Department's judgment that the Secretary continues to
have authority to waive all laws to build a border wall? Does this
authority extend to sovereign Tribal lands as well?
Question 1b. Does the Department intend to do so? Please explain.
Answer. Section 102(a) of IIRIRA remains in effect and authorizes
the Secretary to construct ``physical barriers and roads (including the
removal of obstacles to detection of illegal entrants) in the vicinity
of the United States border to deter illegal crossings in areas of high
illegal entry into the United States.'' Section 102 does not
specifically exclude any land, including Tribal land, from coverage,
provided such land is ``in the vicinity of the United States border.''
Section 102(c) of the IIRIRA also remains in effect and authorizes
the Secretary to ``waive all legal requirements [the] Secretary, in
[the] Secretary's sole discretion, determines necessary to ensure
expeditious construction . . . ''. Thus, the Department does believe
that the Secretary has the necessary authority. The President has
requested funding for construction of additional barriers and roads in
the vicinity of the border. If Congress provides such funding, the
Department will assess whether expeditious construction of those
barriers or roads warrants requesting the Secretary to issue waivers of
legal requirements as authorized by section 102(c).
Question 2a. The legislation that mandated the Northern Border
Threat Analysis requires the Secretary to examine in its report to
Congress, among other factors, the technology needs and challenges as
well as the personnel needs and challenges along the Northern Border.
However, the report does not provide specifics as to what kind of
technology is needed on the Northern Border or how many additional CBP
officers are needed at our Northern Border ports of entry.
Why were these requirements not included in the report? Do you
believe the report fulfills the statutory mandate?
Answer. The report notes that technology that improves domain and
situational awareness is a general capability need for the Northern
Border. The report also describes personnel challenges on the Northern
Border. However, to make fiscally sound investment decisions that
improve security on the Northern Border, the Department elected to
first update our Northern Border Strategy and write an implementation
plan. As part of that process, DHS intends to conduct an analysis to
identify gaps to achieving the Strategy's defined end-states and
recommend specific actions needed to fill them. Recommendations may
include additional personnel, new technology, doctrine changes, or
other measures.
Question 2b. How many additional CBP officers are needed to fully
staff CBP ports of entry on the Northern Border?
Answer. As of December 9, 2017, 97 percent of the authorized CBP
officer positions on the Northern Border were filled. This equates to
only 130 unfilled CBP officer positions across the entire Northern
Border. However, there are key ports and stations, especially in Maine,
Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota, and Vermont that have faced staffing
challenges.
In an effort to fill staffing gaps along the Northern Border,
recruitment incentives have been approved for the following Northern
Border locations: Jackman/Coburn Gore and Houlton, Maine; Grand
Portage, Minnesota; Sweetgrass and Raymond, Montana; Massena, New York;
Pembina and Portal, North Dakota; Beecher Falls and Norton, Vermont;
and Oroville, Washington. Relocation incentives can technically be used
for positions anywhere, but they have primarily been used for positions
at Northern Border locations with staffing challenges.
Question 3. The report states that an updated Northern Border
Strategy will be delivered 180 days from the issuance of the June
report. Will the strategy be delivered on time?
Answer. As DHS leadership has indicated in previous testimonies to
Congress, DHS intends to have a final version of the Northern Border
Strategy completed in January 2018. However, public release of the
document may take longer, depending on clearance processes. Upon
request, DHS will offer Congressional briefings once the strategy is
complete.
Questions From Ranking Member Filemon Vela for Scott A. Luck
Question 1a. The Northern Border Threat Analysis details some of
the same challenges facing agents in the Southern Border, such as
terrain, weather, and remoteness. There are also communications issues
and greater gaps in domain awareness due to limited surveillance
capabilities across the vast Northern Border. These gaps are largely
due to a lack of personnel, technology, and infrastructure on the
Northern Border as compared to the Southern Border, where we have
invested billions of dollars in cameras, sensors, radar system,
physical barriers, and additional agents in recent years.
With TCOs and other adversaries constantly evolving, at what point
does it make sense to stop dedicating virtually all our border security
resources to the Southern Border and begin addressing Northern Border
vulnerabilities?
Answer. The U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) evaluates all threats to the
borders and prioritizes the deployment of available resources to areas
of highest risk, not to a specific geographic area such as Northern
versus Southern Border. Because the frequency and severity of cross-
border illicit activity along the U.S.-Canadian border is very low
compared to cross-border illicit activity along the U.S.-Mexico border,
resources deployed to the Northern Border are focused more on
increasing our situational awareness and detection capability through
investments in surveillance, sensors, and geospatial capabilities than
on impedance and denial and enforcement assets between ports of entry.
The USBP continues to invest in Northern Border operations albeit
to a lesser extent than the Southern Border; it is commensurate with
what we know to be the threat today. We have expanded strategic
partnerships with State, local, and foreign law enforcement agencies.
This includes establishing and staffing the Northern Border
Coordination Center (NBCC). USBP has increased domain awareness
technology such as radar and cameras and will continue to assess and
better understand the Northern Border's potential for risk, based on
identified vulnerabilities and associated threats. Should threat
profiles change, or exigent circumstance exist, the USBP retains the
ability to surge into areas where and when needed through increased
investment in impedance and denial and enforcement resources.
Question 1b. Have you considered fencing, walls, or any physical
barriers for the Northern Border?
Answer. CBP is considering all options, including fencing, walls,
and physical barriers for use on the Northern Border. Note that any
physical barrier constructed along the U.S.-Canada land border must not
interfere with the 6 meter (20 foot) clear vista maintained under
treaty by the International Boundary Commission.
Question 1c. Why or why not?
Answer. The demonstrated effectiveness of walls or wall systems
along the Southern Border makes them a potential solution for any part
of the border where impeding or denying illicit cross-border activity
is an operational requirement. When assessing the need for barriers at
or along the Northern Border, the USBP will apply the same level of
analysis and rigor as it did along the Southern Border, and deploy
barrier solutions at those locations where they make sense. Similarly,
we must assess the ability of other solutions (e.g., technology,
signage, and improved communications) to improve border security as
well. Typically, we have found that there is no single solution to
border security. Border security requires an array of capabilities
provided by an appropriate mix of technology, infrastructure, and
personnel. However, risk-based approaches to deploying resources are
essential, and the resources must first be directed to areas of the
border where threat, risk, and activity levels are most immediate.
While this focus is not intended to diminish the nature of the threat
we face on the Northern Border, the relatively high levels of activity
on the Southern Border, combined with resource limitations, continue to
require a focus on the Southwest Border.
Question 2a. One significant difference along our Northern Border
is the partnership U.S. law enforcement has with Canadian counterparts,
including the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and Canada Border
Services Agency (CBSA).
How would you characterize Border Patrol's relationship with the
RCMP, CBSA, provincial police, and other Canadian counterparts?
Answer. The USBP maintains close collaborative relationships with
RCMP, CBSA, provincial police, and other Canadian law enforcement
counterparts.
The USBP employs regional representatives in Canada to enhance
existing efforts to close and mitigate information and intelligence
gaps along the shared international border. USBP regional
representatives coordinate bilateral law enforcement efforts through
U.S. consulates and the U.S. embassy and engage with Canadian agencies
on securing the shared border.
The Cross Border Law Enforcement Advisory Committee (CBLEAC)
further enhances bi-national cooperation. The CBLEAC provides
executive-level guidance to cross-border law enforcement initiatives
involving partnerships between United States and Canadian law
enforcement agencies along our shared border. The core partners of the
CBLEAC are CBP/USBP, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement-Homeland
Security Investigations, U.S. Coast Guard, RCMP, and CBSA.
Question 2b. Can you describe what the day-to-day interaction is in
the field between Border Patrol's Northern Border sectors and law
enforcement on the Canadian side?
Answer. The Border Patrol's area of operation (AOR) along the
Northern Border is divided into eight sectors that encompass the States
along the Northern Border and Great Lakes: Blaine, Spokane, Havre,
Grand Forks, Swanton, Detroit, Buffalo, and Houlton Sectors.
Through liaison activities and intelligence sharing, USBP sectors
have worked closely with Canadian law enforcement agencies for decades.
Relationships were forged through years of working closely together
along the shared border between the United States and Canada. The USBP
sectors work in conjunction with our CBP regional representatives in
Canada to establish, develop, and maintain open communications and
mutual respect between foreign and domestic law enforcement
counterparts.
USBP sectors are also integral members of the Integrated Border
Enforcement Teams (IBET) along the Northern Border. The IBET mission is
``to enhance border integrity and security at our shared border between
the ports of entry by identifying, investigating, and interdicting
persons and organizations that pose a threat to national security or
are engaged in other organized criminal activity.''
IBETs are multi-disciplinary, multi-agency intelligence-driven
enforcement teams. They work in land, air, and marine environments
``between the ports of entry'' along the Canada/United States border
while respecting the laws and jurisdiction of each nation. While the
focus is ``between the ports'' they work closely with Canada Border
Services Agency (CBSA) personnel at the ports of entry''.
Question 2c. How is your current information sharing and
cooperation with Canadian counterparts?
Answer. Information sharing and cooperation with Canadian
counterparts is robust and strong, but the United States and Canada are
continuously working to make improvements where they are needed. The
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) regularly coordinates with its
Canadian partners to share information, including information on those
who pose a threat to either country. The United States and Canada are
working toward full implementation of the third phase of the Entry/Exit
program, which exchanges biographic entry data on travelers in the land
environment so that documented entry into one country serves as an exit
record from the other country. While the program currently applies only
to all third-country nationals at the U.S.-Canada land border, it will
be expanded to include U.S. and Canadian citizens once the necessary
legislation is passed in Canada. In addition, pursuant to the Visa and
Immigration Information Sharing Treaty, the two countries share
biometric and biographic visa and immigration information on third-
country nationals. Canada queries all asylum, refugee, and visa
applicants against U.S. biometric information, thereby providing a
greater amount of information with which to make a decision.
The U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) leverages U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) representatives in Canada to enhance existing efforts
to close and mitigate information and intelligence gaps along our
shared land border. Currently, there are six Border Patrol agents
posted as CBP representatives in Canada (Toronto, Winnipeg, Vancouver,
Montreal, and Ottawa). USBP agents are embedded with the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police (RCMP) and Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) as they
represent CBP during engagements with Canadian agencies related to the
shared land border between designated Ports of Entry (POEs). Other
agencies, including United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS) and U.S. Coast Guard, also have employees embedded within
Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada and the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police respectively.
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Homeland Security
Investigations (HSI) maintains four offices within Canada (Ottawa,
Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver) with a current presence of 17 total
positions (including Special Agents and support staff). These offices
regularly liaise with Canadian Federal, provincial, and local agencies
to support ICE HSI domestic investigations with ties to Canada, as well
as to promote joint bilateral investigations with a goal to disrupt,
dismantle, and deter illicit trade, travel, and finance perpetrated by
transnational criminal organizations and/or individuals that threaten
the National security and economic integrity of both countries. Within
Canada's national capital of Ottawa, ICE HSI is currently the only U.S.
law enforcement agency that maintains a part-time liaison position
assigned to the RCMP's National Child Exploitation Coordination Centre,
and ICE HSI also maintains a part-time presence within the RCMP's
Border Integrity Unit along with representatives from USBP and U.S.
Coast Guard (USCG). In addition to regular interaction with Canadian
partners, all four ICE HSI offices are actively involved in several
task forces, working groups, and integrated teams established within
their respective regional areas of responsibility that exist to
prioritize and target significant threats such as the fentanyl/opioid
epidemic, the on-line exploitation of minors, and transnational
organized crime groups.
ICE HSI in Canada will also at times serve as a liaison between ICE
Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) and CBSA pursuant to the
facilitation of individuals being removed from the United States to
Canada following the completion of removal proceedings in the United
States. ICE ERO and CBSA will often exchange information in regards to
changes to detention/removal policies and procedures, inland
enforcement statistics, as well as challenges and best practices when
engaging with recalcitrant countries for removals.
The United States and Canada are working to expand joint law
enforcement initiatives along the border. To this end, a Cross-Border
Law Enforcement Advisory Committee (CBLEAC) was created in 2015 and
continues to meet bi-annually, to provide executive-level guidance to
all cross-border law enforcement initiatives involving partnerships
between United States and Canadian law enforcement agencies along our
shared border. CBLEAC is designed to allow flexibility and unity of
effort in a resource-constrained environment. CBLEAC services all
cross-border law enforcement groups, task forces, teams, and units that
are created by joint partnerships between the core agencies (CBP, U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Coast Guard (USCG),
RCMP, and CBSA) and other stakeholders in the law enforcement
community, including other Federal, State, provincial, Tribal, local,
and municipal agencies.
ICE HSI also deploys numerous Border Enforcement Security Task
Forces (BESTs) to land, seaport, and airport POEs. Created by ICE HSI
in 2005, BESTs use a collaborative approach to identify, disrupt, and
dismantle transnational criminal organizations by co-locating and
cross-designating investigative assets of Federal, State, local,
Tribal, and international law enforcement partners at key locations on
the border. There are 57 BESTs Nation-wide, comprised of over 1,200
members from over 150 law enforcement agencies. Currently, ICE HSI has
5 BESTs along the Northern Border in Blaine, Washington; Buffalo, New
York; Massena, New York; Detroit, Michigan; and Port Huron, Michigan.
These 5 BESTs consist of over 100 participants. In addition to Federal,
State, local, and Tribal agencies, each of these BESTs includes
Canadian law enforcement partners.
Additionally, there are 12 Integrated Border Enforcement Team
(IBET) regions operating along the Northern Border. IBETs, comprised of
both U.S. and Canadian personnel, enhance shared border integrity and
security between designated POEs by providing a mobile and integrated
interdiction response capability. Each IBET enhances border security by
identifying, investigating, and interdicting individuals and
organizations that pose a threat to National security or are engaged in
other organized criminal activity, such as drug trafficking. IBETs are
comprised of representatives from five core agencies with law
enforcement responsibilities at the shared border: ICE, CBP, USCG,
RCMP, and CBSA. IBETs are an interdiction-based, coordination mechanism
where the member agencies meet frequently to de-conflict targets, plan
joint operations, conduct joint training, and interact. They can also
activate mirror patrols for interdiction as deemed appropriate or
required.
In addition to these efforts, the USCG and RCMP collaborate under
the Integrated Cross-border Maritime Law Enforcement Operations
program, otherwise known as Shiprider. This program enables the RCMP
and USCG to become designated ``shipriders'' who can then conduct
patrols on each other's vessels within the territorial waters of both
countries. Used along with intelligence and investigative-driven
operations, it provides a seamless law enforcement process that is less
taxing on personnel and resources while providing more efficient and
effective response to criminal activity in territorial waters The
Shiprider program diminishes the ability of drug traffickers to use the
international border as a way to evade pursuit by either U.S. or
Canadian law enforcement officers. As of May 2016, there are Shiprider
operations in Vancouver, BC/Blaine, WA; Windsor, ON/Detroit, MI;
Kingston, ON/Alexandria Bay, NY; and Victoria, BC/Port Angeles, WA.
In 2017, USBP stood up a Northern Border Coordination Center (NBCC)
in Detroit, Michigan at the Selfridge Air National Guard Base. The NBCC
was established to collaboratively strengthen risk-informed and
intelligence-driven law enforcement efforts that enhance operational
integration with domestic and international partners. The NBCC provides
a common threat picture to enhance CBP's bi-national approach to
developing timely, relevant, predictive, and actionable intelligence.
The NBCC intends to connect with the RCMP, CBSA, and other Canadian law
enforcement partners to better share information and collaborate on
shared threats and targets.
Question 2d. Where is there room for improvement?
Answer. Through international treaties, bilateral Memorandums of
Understanding (MOUs), and other agreements and arrangements, the United
States and Canada have developed an efficient and effective joint
border enforcement posture to enhance the security of both our
countries. This posture includes efforts within, at, and away from our
borders. However, some legal obstacles remain that, if addressed
through Canadian legislation, could enhance U.S. security at the
perimeter and along the Northern Border. The lack of agreed-upon
privileges and immunities for some U.S. law enforcement officials,
including U.S. Border Patrol and ICE HSI agents, has hindered efforts
to commence joint patrols and coordinated joint investigations with
Canadian authorities in the land environment in Canada. Addressing this
issue could also enable preventative joint patrols and coordinated
joint investigations with Canadian authorities in Canada, enhancing the
ability of U.S. law enforcement officials to interdict malicious actors
or illicit goods at the earliest possible point.
Questions From Ranking Member Filemon Vela for Kevin Kelly
Question 1. There are six ICE HSI Special Agents in Charge offices
with areas of responsibility along the Northern Border. The Northern
Border Threat Analysis report states there are insufficient resources
to cover the expansive Northern Border. Some might argue we are
planning to build multi-billion dollar border walls while failing to
provide basic security resources to the Northern Border.
Can you talk about the inadequate facilities and the out-of-date
interoperable hand-held and vehicle communications systems your folks
have to struggle with? How does this impact joint agency operations
given the number of jurisdictions at play to the north?
Answer. The Northern Border poses unique challenges for effective
tactical radio communications and supporting infrastructure. The U.S.
land border with Canada is approximately 3,100 miles long, generally
sparsely populated, and with a topography that includes mountain ranges
and the Great Lakes. In general, law enforcement radio communications
must take place in a direct line of sight between two radios, across a
maximum distance of about 7 miles. To communicate over greater
distances, the signal must be relayed between a series of repeater
stations, each covering an area of about 2,800 square miles, or a 30-
mile radius from the tower. Networks of such repeaters are the
framework of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE)
communications infrastructure. ICE Homeland Security Investigations
(HSI) does have some capability through HSI Mobile Command Centers to
provide limited communications support in such areas with adequate lead
time.
ICE HSI has obtained frequencies to use near the Northern Border;
however, these frequencies must be coordinated with and approved by the
Canadian Government. In addition, these same frequencies only address
some of the current gaps along the border. Without additional funding,
the entire border cannot be covered. Federal agencies must obtain
approval from the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration and the Canadian Government in order to obtain
frequencies assigned for use along the Canadian Border. This results in
significant delays in obtaining new radio channels necessary to get
systems up and running. The coordination often results in the
requirement that program radios operate at lower power levels than are
typically used by ICE HSI, which reduces the range of the radios.
ICE HSI currently has very high frequency (VHF) radios that are
Project 25-compliant (compliant with current standards for public
safety multiband radio communications) and provide interoperability
with other Federal agencies within DHS. ICE HSI's radios are also
compatible with those of almost all Federal agencies outside of DHS,
with the exception of U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, which
operates in the ultra-high frequency (UHF) band. Communications
capabilities of State and local agencies in both the United States and
in Canada vary; and making systems interoperable would require ICE to
purchase multi-band radios capable of operation in the VHF, UHF, and
800 megahertz bands. These radios cost approximately $6,500 each.
Question 2. Even with insufficient resources, ICE made 5,009
criminal arrests, 665 administrative arrests, 103 human smuggling
arrests, and 509 human trafficking arrests along the Northern Border in
fiscal year 2016. ICE Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) seized 369
pounds of cocaine, 400 pounds of heroin, 424 pounds of marijuana, 392
pounds of methamphetamines, 1,618 weapons, and $20,717.73 in the same
year.
To the extent you can in this setting, could you talk about any
recent trends regarding criminal activity on the Northern Border, in
particular the rise of outlaw motorcycle gangs?
Answer. A persistent threat to U.S. public safety continues to be
the bi-directional flow of drugs. Transnational criminal organizations
(TCOs) continually adapt their drug production, smuggling methods, and
routes to avoid detection by U.S. and Canadian law enforcement and to
meet consumer demands in both countries.
One such adaptation is the suspected alignment of traditional
organized crime groups (e.g. La Cosa Nostra, Mexican Cartels, etc.)
with outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMGs) in Southern Ontario. The OMGs have
been infiltrating the workforces at Canadian seaports and airports in
order to facilitate the smuggling of contraband through these critical
infrastructures with minimal exposure to their criminal organization.
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Homeland Security
Investigations Buffalo has encountered OMGs operating as TCOs, and
moving their contraband through the Northern Border. The OMGs in
Southern Ontario have suspected business relationships with Mexican
drug trafficking organizations.
The topography along mountainous parts of the Northern Border is
occasionally exploited by smugglers flying private aircraft at low
altitude to evade radar detection. There are numerous small airports,
unmanned airstrips, and lakes throughout these rural areas that provide
smugglers the opportunity to make short-duration, low-altitude flights
through sparsely-populated areas, thereby further reducing their
chances of detection. While the region remains vulnerable to tactics
that use general aviation aircraft to transport illicit cargo to or
from Canada, there are no reports indicating that the tactics are
employed on a large scale.
The unique nature of the maritime boundaries between the United
States and Canada create a conducive environment for TCOs to traffic
drugs, people, and other contraband. High-density recreational boating
traffic, short transit distances between countries, and close proximity
to Tribal reservation lands create a complex problem set for law
enforcement.
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