

CHINA'S REPRESSION AND INTERNMENT OF UYGHURS: U.S. POLICY RESPONSES

HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 26, 2018

Serial No. 115-164

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs



Available: <http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/>, <http://docs.house.gov/>,
or <http://www.Govinfo.gov>

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32-303PDF

WASHINGTON : 2018

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WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 2018

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:00 p.m., in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Yoho (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. YOHO. This hearing will come to order.

Good afternoon, and thank you all for joining us today for a topic that does not get the attention it deserves in Congress.

The word “dystopia” is frequently used to describe the Chinese Communist Party’s repression in the northwest of China. There is good reason for this. What’s happening there should be confined to science fiction but, unfortunately, it’s not.

The party calls this region Xinjiang, and those who live there sometimes refer to it as East Turkestan. The Uyghurs, a Turkic Muslim people, have historically been the region’s majority population and remain a plurality.

Xinjiang falls along the Silk Road. Its capital is closer to Kabul than Beijing, and it remains culturally and ethnically distinct from China.

The People’s Liberation Army brought Xinjiang into modern day’s People’s Republic of China in 1949 by invasion. Today, the party is seeking to eliminate Xinjiang’s uniqueness using methods ripped straight from fiction.

Authorities have turned the region into a high-tech militarized police state using cutting-edge technology to subject normal people to pervasive surveillance, including AI facial and voice recognition and forced genetic sampling.

Authorities compile vast amounts of data on individuals and assign them arbitrary scores, which can drastically alter their lives. In some areas, there are police outposts every few feet. Information, communication, and travel are restricted.

Astoundingly, about 1 million people are being detained in rapidly expanding networks of concentration camps where they are forced to undergo so-called political reeducation that can only be described as brainwashing, brutality, torture, and death.

For those who are targeted, even fleeing will not keep them safe. PRC authorities surveil them abroad and punish their families to coerce their silence or force their return.

The party has used the specter of terrorism to excuse its abuses and scapegoat the victims. But the truth is the victims are men and women, young and old, from every walk of life.

They are not targeted based on extremism. They are targeted based on their religion and ethnicity. The party's so-called strike hard campaigns are specifically intended to surveil, profile, punish, and round up the Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and any Turkic Muslim whose lives are distinct from the party's vision of what it means to be Chinese.

The CCP's—the Chinese Communist Party's—actions are transparently seeking to destroy normal Islamic religious practices, the Uyghur culture and language, and even the genetic concentration of Uyghur heritage in the Xinjiang.

Chillingly, the party says their objective is ethnic harmony. Ethnic harmony sounds nice. Based on their action, it seems that ethnic harmony means that no one is allowed to be different from the atheist, Mandarin-speaking, ardently socialist Han nation.

The greatest tragedy of the 20th century occurred when the world stood by as cruel nationalist parties targeted an ethnic minority as part of an evil plan to re-engineer society.

Whether it is the genocide of Rwanda, Sudan, or, as the full committee highlighted today, in Burma, the world has a poor record of stopping genocide or ethnic cleansing.

We did have that hearing this morning and it is just unconscionable that we talk about never again will we allow what happened under the Hitler regime, yet here we are, 70 years, roughly, later and it's happening over and over again.

It is my hope that we can help shine a light on what could be the next of these blights on humanity as another totalitarian regime is building crematoriums near its concentration camps.

We must speak out with the loudest possible voice. Can there be a clear warning sign? We have been down this road too many times. The sort of human rights violations that the CCP is perpetrating on a massive scale in this district should disqualify the PRC from global leadership.

Such abuses contravene the most fundamental rights and basic personal freedoms. Yet, China remains one of the world's most influential countries, and because of this, few on the international stage are willing to speak out about the PRC's repression and internment of the Uyghurs and others.

My hope is that today, with the assistance of our expert panel, we can begin to address this disparity and work toward options for the overdue U.S. policy response to this crisis.

And with that, members present will be permitted to submit written statements to be included in the official hearing record.

Without objection, the hearing record will remain open for 5 calendar days to allow statements, questions, and extraneous material for the record, subject to length limitations and rules, and the witnesses' written statements will be entered into the hearing.

I will now turn to the ranking member for any remarks he may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Yoho follows:]

China's Repression and Internment of Uyghurs: U.S. Policy Responses

Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific

House Committee on Foreign Affairs

Wednesday, September 26, 2018, 2:00 p.m.

Opening Statement of Chairman Ted Yoho

Good afternoon, and thank you all for joining us today for a topic that does not get the attention it deserves in Congress.

The word “dystopia” is frequently used today to describe the Chinese Communist Party’s repression in the northwest of China. There’s good reason for this—what’s happening there should be confined to science fiction.

The Party calls this region Xinjiang, and those who live there sometimes refer to it as East Turkestan. The Uyghurs, a Turkic Muslim people, have historically been the region’s majority population, and remain a plurality. Xinjiang falls along the Silk Road. Its capital city is closer to Kabul than Beijing, and it remains culturally and ethnically distinct from China. The People’s Liberation Army brought Xinjiang into the modern-day People’s Republic of China in 1949, by invasion.

Today, the Party is seeking to eliminate Xinjiang’s uniqueness, using methods ripped straight from fiction. Authorities have turned the region into a high-tech militarized police state, using cutting edge technologies to subject normal people to pervasive surveillance, including AI, facial and voice recognition, and forced genetic sampling. Authorities compile vast amounts of data on individuals and assign them arbitrary scores, which can drastically alter their lives. In some areas, there are police outposts every few feet. Information, communications, and travel are restricted.

Astoundingly, about a million people are being detained in a rapidly-expanding network of concentration camps, where they are forced to undergo so-called political re-education that can only be described as brainwashing. For those who are targeted, even fleeing will not keep them safe. PRC authorities surveil them abroad, and punish their families to coerce their silence or force their return.

The Party has used the specter of terrorism to excuse their abuses and scapegoat the victims. But the truth is, the victims are men and women, young and old, from every walk of life. They are not targeted based on extremism. They are targeted based on their religion and ethnicity.

The Party’s so-called “strike hard campaigns” are specifically intended to surveil, profile, punish, and round up Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and any Turkic Muslims whose lives are distinct from the Party’s vision of what it means to be Chinese. CCP actions are transparently seeking to

destroy normal Islamic religious practices, the Uyghur culture and language, and even the genetic concentration of Uyghur heritage in Xinjiang.

Chillingly, the Party says their objective is “ethnic harmony.” Based on their actions, it seems that “ethnic harmony” means that no one is allowed to be different from the atheist, Mandarin-speaking, ardently socialist Han nation.

The greatest tragedy of the 20th century occurred when the world stood by as a cruel nationalist party targeted an ethnic minority as part of an evil plan to re-engineer society. Whether it is the genocide in Rwanda, Sudan, or - as the Full Committee highlighted earlier today - in Burma, the world has a poor record of stopping genocide or ethnic cleansing. It is my hope that we can help shine a light on what could be the next of these blights on humanity. As another totalitarian regime is building crematoriums near its concentration camps, we must speak out with the loudest possible voice. Can there be a clearer warning sign?

The sort of human rights violations that the CCP is perpetrating on a massive scale in Xinjiang should disqualify the PRC from global leadership. Such abuses contravene the most fundamental human rights and basic personal freedoms. Yet China remains one of the world’s most influential countries, and because of this, few on the international stage are willing to speak out about the PRC’s repression and internment of Uyghurs and others.

My hope is that today, with the assistance of our expert panel, we can begin to address this disparity, and work towards options for the overdue U.S. policy response to this crisis.

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Today is a day when we focus in this room on China's war against Muslims. This morning in this room we heard how China is aiding Myanmar—Burma—and their military in the either genocide or close to genocide of the Rohingya and the ethnic cleansing of hundreds of thousands or 1 million individuals who have known no other home other than Burma.

And this afternoon, we focus on China's domestic policy. China is repressing its Uyghur population in the province of Xinjiang on a massive scale.

The Chinese Government has, as noted in a recent U.N. meeting, turned Xinjiang into something resembling a massive internment camp shrouded in secrecy—a sort of no-rights zone.

I look forward to learning more from our witnesses. What China is doing there is terrible. I don't know—I'd have to learn more—before I'd endorse the chairman's use of the words “extermination” or “crematorium.”

But, clearly, what we are seeing is hundreds of thousands, perhaps 1 million, being held in so-called reeducation camps.

The people running the government in Beijing are the sons—not so much the sons and daughters, but sons of those who were put into reeducation camps during the Cultural Revolution.

The fact that they would then turn and put 1 million people into reeducation camps, concentration camps, detention camps, in this case pretty much solely because of their ethnicity and religion, is absolutely outrageous.

An article in “Foreign Policy” noted that the official purpose of the internment camps is to “purify people's thoughts,” eliminate extremism, and to instill support for the Communist Party.

The idea that you could win friends among a people by interning them strikes me as bizarre. Beyond this forced indoctrination, the internment camps allow police to physically remove people from society and then say, well, nobody on the streets of Xinjiang opposes the Communist Party.

A report by Human Rights Watch mentions that in 2014 when China launched its so-called “strike hard” campaign against “violent terrorism,” the number of people arrested in Xinjiang has increased threefold compared to the previous 5-year period.

Chinese repression dramatically scaled up in 2016 when the Communist Party secretary in Tibet relocated to assume leadership in Xinjiang.

China is going after Uyghurs living abroad. There are accounts of Uyghurs being sent back by Middle East countries where they worked or lived in violation of international obligations, with these Middle Eastern countries knowing that those Uyghurs will be interned when they are sent back to the clutches of the Chinese Government.

Further, China suppresses the religious and cultural rights of Uyghurs, as Amnesty International points out. Its regulations on religious affairs ban many religious activities. This allows China to suppress basic religious rights.

The Chinese Government limits the use of the Uyghur language. China detains ethnic Uyghur writers and Web sites, editors, et

cetera. All these Chinese efforts to weaken could lead to the elimination of Uyghur cultural identity.

The ethnic balance in Xinjiang has changed dramatically. In 1949, that province was only 6 percent ethnic Chinese. Now it's 40 percent of the population and 75 percent of the capital.

It's time to call out China. In August, I joined the House and Senate colleagues in a letter to Secretaries Pompeo and Mnuchin regarding this issue.

We urged the application of the Global Magnitsky Act sanctions against senior Chinese officials who oversee mass detention of Uyghurs.

I called for sanctions against businesses assisting the Chinese officials in mass detention, and asked the State Department to condemn these abuses.

We ought to especially call out the Muslim countries that are saying nothing. Whether that be Turkey, Pakistan, the Gulf States, it is simply outrageous that they do so little to help the Rohingya and turn their back completely on the Uyghurs.

America should be given credit for protecting Muslims as we did in Bosnia and Kosovo. Now we are the number-one aid source for the Rohingya and we are the leading voice for the protection of Uyghurs.

And I notice that at the United Nations if Israel builds one apartment building—huge fireworks, whereas when China moved millions of ethnic Chinese into this province—not a peep. And I am not saying that every bit of construction done by Israel is consistent with a two-state solution.

But it is interesting to see how a single apartment building can cause Muslim nations to speak in the most extreme terms and then be silent on what China is doing, both in its own borders and with regard to the Rohingya.

I yield back.

Mr. YOHO. I think this meeting is important because we are going to bring that out, you know, the questions about whether or not there are crematoriums, is correct.

I think that'll come out in this. The Uyghurs, we know, prefer burial. China prefers cremation, and we will talk more about that.

But at this time, with no objections I'd like to turn to Ms. Comstock for opening remarks.

Ms. COMSTOCK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member. I really appreciate you holding this hearing today.

As both the chairman and ranking member have noted, this is something really important that needs a lot more attention. I am sorry that this doesn't get more attention. But I appreciate you making the record here today and exploring this further.

I certainly associate myself with all the remarks previously made and talk about the horrible atrocities occurring in northwest China where reports have surfaced that Uyghurs and Kazakhs have been detained in reeducation camps, forcing Muslims to renounce Islam and embrace the Communist Party.

Additionally, reports have been made by reporters that have made it into the region as well as those who escaped the camps and gone abroad—that Uyghurs are subject to torture, medical ne-

glect, solitary confinement, sleep deprivation, and other deadly forms of abuse at these reeducation camps.

As a member of the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission and as somebody who worked with my predecessor, Congressman Frank Wolf, who I know worked with both of you on these important issues, it is extremely important to me that we bring greater light to these human rights abuses internationally, and especially when they regard suppression of religious freedom.

One of my constituents is here today. Ferkat Jawdat is in attendance with his sisters and other members of his family. He is a U.S. citizen who has his home in Chantilly, Virginia, where he works for a government contractor providing support to the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, and we thank him for his service and we thank him for being here today. He also has a 1-year-old child, a daughter.

Thank you for being here today. However, his life has become a living nightmare since February 2018, when his mother was sent to one of these reeducation camps.

He now does not know about her whereabouts, when she will be released, or why she was taken. You can imagine that nightmare, Mr. Chairman, and that's why I thank you so much for having this hearing and highlighting this.

This is real to the people in my district and I know throughout the country. He worries that she is being tortured, or worse, fears that she may already have been killed.

We are working to bring this to the attention of Secretary Pompeo, Ambassador Branstad, and Ambassador Cui asking for answers regarding his mother.

We know he's not alone in his suffering. At least 1 million people have been detained in camps and Uyghurs account for 21 percent of the arrests, despite making up only 1.5 percent of the population. Clearly, this is a religious freedom issue and atrocity.

I am so grateful for this hearing today so that we can shed much-needed light on this issue and work to find real solutions to this problem and the very human and tragic outcomes that we are seeing here, and I thank you again for being here today.

Mr. YOHO. I thank the gentlelady for her comments, and this is something that we want to expose and the best way, you know, whenever these atrocities go on, is to expose them—expose them through witnesses, expose them through the media, and keep talking about them until we can get enough outrage from people to come out, you know, out of reeducation camps.

I think it's something that should scare us. I think we have all heard of George Orwell's book, "1984." He missed the mark by about 34 years. You know, he talked about this, and to hear what's going on. I just got back from Mongolia, South Korea, and Japan—I'm still not sure what country I'm in—but to hear what the Chinese wanted to do in the Asia Pacific region with the 5G network is something they can offer to other leaders of other countries and say, look, what we can do, we can monitor your systems, we can rank your systems to see if they are a good Communist Party member or a bad one, and if they don't reach a certain level we can send them to reeducation camps.

And I think that's going to come out more in this hearing, and so what I'd like to do now is—we are honored to have you guys here and we are going to have you guys here and we are going to have you—I am going to introduce you and then you'll have 5 minutes to speak, and I think you all know how to use the system there.

Turn your microphone on. The lights will go green, yellow, and red. It's 5 minutes.

And we have Dr. Adrian Zenz, a noted expert on China's policy toward minority groups—thank you for being here; Mr. Nury Turkel, chairman of the board at the Uyghur Human Rights Project; and Dr. Justin Jacobs, an associate professor in the Department of History at American University.

And before we start, does the gentleman from California have an opening statement?

Mr. ROHRBACHER. Yes, I do, and let me apologize. This is one of the more frustrating parts about being a Congressman. We have got three hearings, all of which are really important, at the same time.

Mr. YOHO. And I've got a bill on the floor I am supposed to be talking about. Don't worry about it. [Laughter.]

Mr. ROHRBACHER. Oh, my gosh. But the people—the Uyghurs and the people of China should get the message that we are willing. Even though we have really busy days we are not too busy to come here to talk about their plight and what's going on in China and the Muslims that are being murdered by the Government of Burma. They call it Myanmar now.

But we have that type of slaughter of Islam. You have the slaughter of Islam in China as well. We need to be—make sure that the Muslim population of the world knows that we are not against their religion and we are not against people who practice that religion.

We are against the radical Islamic terrorists who, basically, attack the United States. But people who live and have lived in their societies for a long time throughout the planet, when they are under attack, which is what's happening in China, we are on the side of those people, whatever their religion is, and in this case they happen to be Muslims.

And the Uyghurs have played a very important role over the years because we have known them. I've met them. They are a very respectable part of that culture in that part of the world.

But China, the Government of China today is behind, of course, the slaughter of the Muslims down in Burma and the Government of China, of course, is doing everything to do to stamp out the Uyghur movement in China.

So with that said, I hope that our friends throughout the world get the word and understand what's happening today. We care about Muslim people in China. We care about them in Burma. We care about them when they are under attack and it is not—and we don't want just war—this war mentality between Islam and Christianity.

So, Mr. Chairman, by holding this hearing today, I appreciate and I applaud you for sending this positive message toward this big

hunk of the world that we can work together to make it a better world and respect each other's rights.

So I will be running back and forth now between these two and three hearings that I am involved in. But I will be watching on the monitor when I am not here and reading your testimony otherwise.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher, and if you get a chance, talk on my bill on the House floor. [Laughter.]

Dr. Adrian Zenz, please go ahead.

STATEMENT OF ADRIAN ZENZ, PH.D., INDEPENDENT RESEARCHER

Mr. ZENZ. First, I would like to thank the chairman, the ranking member, and the other members of the subcommittee for inviting me to testify about the situation—what China refers to as the Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region.

The research performed by myself and others conclusively shows the existence of a large-scale extrajudicial detention network for the purpose of subjecting Xinjiang's Muslim minorities, but also some ethnic minority Christians, to intensive political reeducation and indoctrination procedures.

The evidence I gathered largely comes from the Chinese Government itself—reports, budgets, bids, recruitment notices, along with corroborating evidence from satellite images.

These are the account of my research findings including large-scale police recruitments and the installation of extensive surveillance networks, provided in the written statement.

All the information we have consistently points toward the fact that Xinjiang's unprecedented securitization and reeducation campaign was inaugurated by the region's party secretary, Chen Quanguo, in spring 2017.

In this campaign, up to 11 to 12 percent of Xinjiang's Muslim minority adult population has been detained in reeducation camps, at times referred to as "vocational skills training," or simply, "training institutions."

Public bid documents state that some of these so-called training facilities are heavily secured with high walls, fences, barbed wire, security cameras, reinforced doors and windows, and other security features typically found in detention centers or in prisons.

Recruitment notices likewise starting in spring 2017 indicate an unusually large intake of teachers for what is simply referred to as training facilities that only mandate a junior or senior secondary education, along with Chinese language skills.

Typically, vocational skills teachers in China as well as in Xinjiang are required to possess a tertiary degree in the relevant subject.

Overall, it is reasonable to assume that Xinjiang's current reeducation campaign exceeds the scale of the entire former national reeducation through labor system, a system that was abolished in 2013 because the government itself considered it to be no longer appropriate for a modern society governed by the rule of law.

It should be made clear that China has faced a credible terrorist threat from Uyghur resistance groups and that measures against

actual religious extremism are certainly in order for any nation facing such challenges.

However, China's extra-legal internment of large shares of Xinjiang's Muslim minority population is tearing apart the lives of hundreds of thousands of innocent people who have no splittist or extremist intentions and pursue harmless and appropriate cultural and religious practices.

Chen Quanguo's reeducation campaign is destroying the very fabric of Xinjiang's minority societies: Separating families, leaving children orphaned, instilling fear and resentment, and sowing the seeds of hate.

In the name of combating terrorism, this campaign constitutes a monstrous crime against humanity on a scale and level of sophistication that has only rarely been witnessed in modern history.

Seasoned scholars who have studied the region for decades are appalled at what they perceive to be an unprecedented repression with unforeseeable long-term consequences.

My recommendations are as follows: Firstly, that the United States Government investigates whether American companies are involved in supplying technologies and products used in Chinese surveillance or other security-related systems that may also be deployed in Xinjiang. If so, the export of such products to China should be stopped.

Secondly, to sanction the responsible Chinese officials, for example, through the Global Magnitsky Act. The main effect of such sanctions may not necessarily be the sanctions themselves but the symbolic force they exert and the resulting increase in public awareness.

Thirdly, that the government would regularly and consistently speak up in regards to this issue in all relevant contexts.

Being aware of the fact that the suppression of core aspects of minority identities in Xinjiang is reflective of a wider campaign to systematically curtail social and religious freedoms among both minorities and the Han majority throughout China.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Zenz follows:]

FIRST PAGE FOR ALL WRITTEN TESTIMONY MATERIALS

Adrian Zenz

Expert and researcher on China's ethnic minorities. (The institutional affiliation is withheld as the institution has requested not to be mentioned in public in relation to this research.)

House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific: "China's Repression and Internment of Uyghurs- U.S. Policy Responses" September 26, 2018

Below is are excerpts from an academic paper co-authored by Adrian Zenz and James Leibold, submitted for publication, titled "Securitizing Xinjiang: Police Recruitment, Informal Policing and Ethnic Minority Co-optation".

The Scaffolding of Xinjiang's Police State

In this section, we combine our analysis of advertised security-related recruitment with a discussion of the wider securitization infrastructure in Xinjiang. Over the last decade there has been a steady and strategic growth of the police force in Xinjiang that is in our view best understood through five distinct stages of development: a) before the 2009 riots (2003-2008); b) response to the 2009 riots (2009-2011); c) expanded policing in the rural south (2012-2013); d) grid-style community policing and big data surveillance (2014-2015); and e) the massive expansion of surveillance manpower in tandem with the establishment of a dense convenience police station system under the XUAR's new Party Secretary Chen Quanguo (2016-2017).

Estimating the Base Level (2003-2008)

Despite claims that Wang Lequan ruled Xinjiang with an iron-fist during his fifteen-year tenure as Xinjiang Party Secretary (1994-2010),¹ advertised police recruitment was relatively small prior to 2009. This reflected China's overall security strategy, which at the time was more focused on large coastal cities.²

Xinjiang does not publish past or present numbers of active police officers. In order to establish a base level estimate we need to take recourse of total national staffing figures from the Ministry of Public Security, which rose from 1.6 million in 2002 to 2 million in 2011.³ If we estimate MPS staffing levels in 2007 at 1.75 million, an equivalent per capita count would yield a stock level of 28,600 police for Xinjiang. However, following Shichor's assessment, it

¹ Shan and Weng, 2011, 61.

² Greitens 2017.

³ Chen, 2015, 62.

is more likely that Xinjiang's per capita police count amounted to perhaps only 60-80 percent of the national average.⁴

Table 1 shows XUAR advertised police officer positions prior to 2009. The very low annual figures between 2003 and 2005 support a below-average stock level estimate compared to the rest of the country. Advertised positions increased rapidly in 2006 and 2007, even prior to the 2008 Tibetan uprising. The advertised 2008 intake nearly doubled compared to 2007, evidently a clear response to the emerging situation in the Tibetan regions and increased securitization across China in the lead up to the Beijing Olympic games.

Table 1: XUAR Police Officer (*renmin jingcha*) Recruitment (civil service system)

Year	2003 to 2005	2006	2007	2008
Advertised police officer positions	1,354 (451 annually)	1,099	1,547	2,919
Increase over previous year(s) (percent)	-	143.7	40.8	88.7

Responding to the 2009 Riots (2009–2011)

The 5 July 2009 riots in Urumqi surprised the nation. Top Party officials were shocked by the scale of the violence and their inability to quickly quell the unrest with the locally available security forces. The situation only stabilized after Beijing airlifted nearly 30,000 PAP and SPU units with a range of heavy equipment to Xinjiang from 31 cities across China.⁵

In response, Zhou Yongkang, the head of the CCP's Political and Legal Committee and a Politburo Standing Committee Member at the time, was dispatched to the region to coordinate the government's response,⁶ which included the first-ever local recruitment of SPU officers in Xinjiang. While SPUs existed in Xinjiang prior to 2009, their numbers were insufficient to deal with large-scale security threats. SPU forces are a highly effective but also relatively expensive strike force. Party officials also sought to expand the region's undermanned police force after Zhang Chunxian succeeded Wang Lequan as Party Secretary in April 2010. As a result, total security-related recruitment doubled from 8,647 advertised positions in 2006–2008 to 17,352 positions in 2009–2011, with most of these posts designated for major urban centers like Urumqi.

Expanded Policing and Surveillance in the Rural South (2012–13)

In January 2012, the region announced the recruitment of 8,000 new police officers in order to beef-up security ahead of the 18th CPC National Congress.⁷ The 2012 intake marked a

⁴ Shichor, 2004.

⁵ No author, 'Map of People's Armed Police Troops Dispatched to Xinjiang', China Digital Times, (2017), available at: <https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2009/07/map-of-peoples-armed-police-troops-dispatched-to-xinjiang> (accessed 15 December 2017); Dennis Blasko, *The Chinese Army Today*. New York: Routledge, 2012, p. 111.

⁶ No author, 'Protecting ethnic unity requires that action begins with every household *wethu minzu tuanjie yao cong meige jiating zuoqi*', People's Daily Overseas Edition, (2009), available at: http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrbwb/html/2009-07/11/content_293148.htm (accessed 18 December 2017).

⁷ No author, 'In 2012, Xinjiang plans to recruit over 8,000 new police officers, laying a solid grassroots police force foundation, *2012nian Xinjiang jihua xinzha 8000 duoming minjing hangshi jiceng jingli*', Tianshanwang news, (2012), available at: http://news.ts.cn/content/2012-02/01/content_6533128.htm (accessed 18 December 2017).

significant turn in Xinjiang's policing strategy. It advertised a total of 12,030 security-related positions, a 56 percent increase in adverts compared to 2009. About 7,700 of the 9,800 advertised police force positions were for so-called "police sub-station workers" (*jingwushi jingwu renyuán*), who were to man small, community-based police sub-stations (*jingwushi*) across the region. XUAR officials committed themselves to fully implementing the "one village, one policeman" (*yicun yijing*) scheme, which had been rolled out in various Eastern provinces during the early 2000s.⁸ Under this policy, a single sub-station police officer leads up to three assistant police staff in each rural village.⁹ The 2012 intake therefore initiated the establishment of a multi-tiered police force. Police sub-station officers are part of the formal police force, except that their employment occurs through the public instead of the civil service. Additionally, this intake marked the first time that Xinjiang advertised informally-employed assistant police officers, albeit at a fairly low number (955 positions).

Overall, 71 percent of the XUAR's 2012 police sub-station recruitment targeted regions with a Uyghur population share of 40 percent or higher; far more than in 2009, when only 40 percent of all security-related recruitment was aimed at such regions.

Grid-Style Community Policing and Big Data Surveillance (2014-2015)

In the wake of high-profile terror attacks in Xinjiang and elsewhere across China, which triggered Zhang Chunxian's "war on terror" declaration, the 2014 intake marked a decisive shift in Xinjiang's security strategy that is not reflected in numbers alone. On the one hand, it reinforced the trend toward large-scale, flexible police force expansion by advertising nearly 6,000 lower-tier assistant police positions. On the other, it introduced numerous new security-related recruitment categories in line with massive investments in high-tech surveillance and community-based policing.

One important aim of the 2014 intake was consequently an expansion of so-called "grid-style social management" (*shehui wanggehua guanli*). Grid management harnesses new surveillance technologies and big data analytics to comprehensively monitor activities within a discrete geometric zone.¹⁰ It was first trailed in Beijing and Shanghai during the early 2000s and gradually rolled out in frontier regions like Xinjiang and Tibet after the 2008-2009 unrest.¹¹ In Urumqi, for example, the city's 875 communities have been divided into 6,281 grids, each patrolled by a range of security personnel, including uniform police officers, assistant police and red-arnband volunteers, with an estimated 86,000 staff involved in grid management work.¹²

In order to provide the necessary manpower, XUAR officials began advertising for "patrol and prevention" (*xunluo fangkang*) and "grid patrol and prevention" (*wanggehua xunkang*)

⁸ Zi Yang, 'Rural China's Public Security Vacuum', *China Brief*, (2015), available at: <https://jamestown.org/program/rural-chinas-public-security-vacuum> (accessed 18 December 2017).

⁹ No author, 'In 2012, Xinjiang plans to recruit over 8,000 new police officers, laying a solid grassroots police force foundation, 2012nian Xinjiang jihua xinzhao 8000 duoming minjing hangshi jiceng jingli', *Tianshanwang news*, (2012), available at: http://news.ts.cn/content/2012-02/01/content_6533128.htm (accessed 18 December 2017).

¹⁰ Xie Yue, "The political logic of *weiwén* in contemporary China," *Issues & Studies*, 48.3 (2012), p. 3.

¹¹ No author, 'Xizang shixian wanggehua guanli quan fugai', *China Tibet News*, (2014), available at: <http://www.chinatibetnews.com/2014/1103/1364780.shtml> (accessed 8 February 2018); *Yaxinwang*, January 24, 2013

¹² No author, 'Hangye shendu baogao: changzhi jiu'an wei zhong, xinjiang anfang shichang zheng baofa', *Sohu Stocks*, (2017), available at: <http://q.stock.sohu.com/news/cn/098/300098/4930919.shtml> (accessed 18 December 2017). Wang Yajuan, "Weirao zongmubiao, wanshan wulumuqishi litihua shehui zhi'an fangkong tixi de sixiang," *Zhonggong wulumuqi shiwei dangxiao xuebao*, 2 (June 2017): 21.

staff. Most of these positions were poorly paid and hired on an informal (contract) basis, much like the category of assistant police, with clear overlaps in employment terms. At the same time, the XUAR also began to employ dedicated police technicians in an effort to beef-up smart surveillance capabilities. In 2014, security recruitment included, for the first time, video surveillance (*shipin jiankan*) staff, employed on a "public-service-like" basis as explained above. The evolution toward new surveillance-oriented, technology-focused security jobs continued in 2015 with the introduction of internet surveillance and prevention (*wangluo jiankan*) positions on top of the existing internet security (*wangluo anquan*) job category first introduced in 2009. In Urumqi alone, over 160,000 security cameras were installed by 2016, with 1,000 video surveillance staff to monitor them on a 24-hour basis.¹³ The massive financial investments associated with these new forms of digital surveillance are reflected in the region's fixed asset investment in "information transmission, software and information technology,"¹⁴ which doubled from 5.1 to 10.1 billion RMB between 2013 and 2014.¹⁵ In 2016, the figure reached 13.6 billion RMB and is scheduled (according to government plans) to reach a stunning 24 billion RMB in 2017. If achieved, this would represent 2.4 times the national average (on a per capita basis), more than double that of Guangdong province and 1.4 times that of Fujian province (2015 figures), catapulting Xinjiang to the very forefront of information technology development in China.

"Convenience Police Stations" and the Massive Expansion of Surveillance Manpower (2016-2017)

After Chen Quanguo became regional Party Secretary in August 2016, police recruitment increased exponentially, reaching levels that have never been seen before, either in Xinjiang or in China as a whole. In outlining his policy agenda in September 2016, Chen stressed the importance of "placing stability above all else,"¹⁶ and called on security officials to adopt a more proactive, systematic, and fine-grained approach in combatting the "three evil forces" of terrorism, extremism, and splittism.

During Chen's first 12 months in office, the XUAR advertised 100,680 security-related positions, representing a 13-fold increase over the average advert number of the years 2009 to 2015. Nearly all of these positions (97,629) were advertised for formal as well as assistant police forces. This compares to only 64,505 adverts (45,056 for police forces) during the decade between 2006 and the summer of 2016. Chen's unprecedented recruitment drive seeks to boost the Party-state's surveillance capabilities across all parts of Xinjiang, without a particular focus on potentially restive Uyghur regions. Between 2016 and 2017, only 35.5 percent of advertised positions were designated for regions with a Uyghur population of 40 percent or higher - below the XUAR's overall Uyghur population share of 47.9 percent (2015).

Notably, 86 percent of the new hires were assistant police positions, and most of them were directly associated with the construction of so-called "convenience police stations" (*bianmin jingwuzhan*) across the XUAR. In dense urban centers like Kashgar and Urumqi, these

¹³ Sun Yongge, 'Qianxi Wulumuqi shi shequ "sihua" guanli moshi', Journal of the CPC Urumqi committee, 2016, 9(3):15-18.

¹⁴ I.e. any investment in communication and communication technology.


¹⁵ Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook, 2016 table 4-12 and 2014, table 4-5, entry "信息传输、计算机服务和软件业固定资产投资". And <http://www.chyxx.com/industry/201708/546056.html> (accessed 18 December 2017).

¹⁶ No author, 'We must firmly carry out the governance strategy for Xinjiang of comrade Xi Jinping, the Party's general secretary *Jinjue guanche yi Xi Jinping tongzhi wei zong shuji de dang zhongyang zhijiang fanglue*', (2016), available at: http://news.ts.cn/content/2016-09/17/content_12285188.htm (accessed 18 December 2017).

stations can now be found every 300-500 meters, with Chen first pioneering this approach in the Tibetan Autonomous Region in 2011. As a key part of grid management infrastructure, each station is responsible for monitoring a dedicated zone.¹⁷ From job advert texts, it is clear that the primary duties of assistant police forces are extensive patrols (often 24-hour shifts) and manning the numerous new checkpoints that have been established across the region. *An academic who visited Xinjiang in April 2018 noted that "in Uyghur neighbourhoods in Urumqi, Turpan and Kashgar there was an exponential increase in the presence of Uyghur police officers (without firearms) patrolling the streets, working at convenience police stations and checking phones and IDs of Uyghur pedestrians and drivers."*¹⁸

While precise numbers are unclear, some have estimated that the XUAR government has built or renovated an estimated 7,300 of these stations across Xinjiang by March 2017, with hundreds more being commissioned in the subsequent months.¹⁹ Depending on their size, convenience police stations have a staffing quota of six to thirty security personnel, while current advertised recruitments stand at around 12-13 assistant police per station.²⁰ This suggests that Xinjiang's police recruitment drive will probably continue.

Figure 1: Total police recruitment by type of police force XUAR wide, 2006-2017



This latest wave of security-related recruitment completes what we can tentatively call a three-tier policing strategy in Xinjiang (Figure 1). The top tier consists of regular (PSB)

¹⁷ Wang, 2016, 68.

¹⁸ Email exchange with Darren Byler in September 2018.

¹⁹ No author, '7300ge Xinjiang bianmin fuwuzhan jizhong caigou nuan tong shebei Xinjiang, Energy News, (2017), available at: <http://www.energynews.com.cn/show-55-6480-1.html> (accessed 18 December 2017).

²⁰ Fu Qiang, 'Hetian 119 yituo bianmin jingwuzhan jianli 1130ge gudingshi xuanchuanzhan', Zhongguo xiaofang zaixian, (2017), available at: http://119.china.com.cn/shyxf/txt/2017-01/16/content_9290098.htm (accessed 18 December 2017). No author, 'Akesu diqu ge xian (shi) zipin renyuan zhaopin modi biao', Zhonggong jiaoyu, (2017), available at: <http://xj.offcn.com/html/2017/05/33305.html> (accessed 18 December 2017). The second source cited lists convenience police station staffing quotas in Aksu Prefecture as 20-30 staff, depending on whether the station has one, two or three floors. The first source reports six officers in each of the 1,130 convenience police stations in Hotan Prefecture.

police officers and the SPU police force. The middle tier is composed of sub-station police officers who form localized hubs of policing, often in rural and remote regions with low levels of previous securitization. Finally, the third and lowest tier consists of various types of assistant police staff, who provide a large amount of additional manpower at the local community level.

Measuring the Scale of Xinjiang's Police Force

To get an impression of the significance of these recruitment volumes, we attempt to compare police force figures for China as a whole and the XUAR on a per capita basis. As noted above, China's uniform police numbers were estimated at 2 million in 2011. Our estimate for a national stock figure in 2017 assumes that growth rates in recent years have been faster than during the period of 2002 to 2011, as regions other than the XUAR also recruited assistant police positions, although not nearly as many as the latter. We conservatively estimate the national 2017 stock figure at 2.625 million, or 212 per 100,000 of the population.²¹

For the XUAR, the total per capita figure is based on an estimated 2007 stock level of 21,480 or 75 percent of the national per capita average at that time. The XUAR 2017 stock level is assessed based on a conservative 75 percent recruitment rate estimate for all policing-related adverts between 2008 and August 2017, as well as an annual attrition rate of 3 percent due to retirement, death and other causes. This yields a total police stock figure of 112,886.²² The resulting per capita count is 478, 2.3 times that of the estimated national per capita figure (see Figure 2). In 2017, Xinjiang's per capita police figure is an estimated 17 percent higher than that of Hong Kong.²³ In addition, Xinjiang has very likely exceeded the per capita police count of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR), which stood at about 453 in 1989.²⁴ Since police officers only represent one component of the security state, such comparisons cannot be used to compare either the surveillance capabilities or the overall coercive capacity of each region's security state. They simply show the magnitude of Xinjiang's most recent police intakes.²⁵

Figure 2: All types of police forces except the People's Armed Police.


²¹ The XUAR population figure is from 2015 (source: Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook).

²² Calculated as 21,480 plus 105,029.

²³ Hong Kong police force ("disciplined officers") figure from August 31, 2017, resulting in a per capita police force figure of 409 (based on 2015 population data). Source: no author, 'Organisation structure', (2018), available at: http://www.police.gov.hk/ppp_en/01_about_us/os_chart.html (accessed 18 December 2017).

²⁴ Based on a count of 73,000 for the regular police force (*Volkspolizei*). Source: Glaessner, 1989, 158. When taking into account domestic security troops besides regular police forces, the GDR boasted an additional 22,500 personnel, or 140 per capita. Approx. 18,000 domestic police units (*Volkspolizei-Bereitschaften*) and 4,500 troops of the interior ministry (Glaessner, *ibid.*). Unfortunately, there is no reliable PAP troop size figure for Xinjiang. A BBC article put the figure at 70,000 in 2013, which would be 297 per capita, although anecdotal accounts cite troop figures of 200,000. Source: No author, 'Zhongguo junfang yaoqiu Xinjiang junren wujing jiaqiang jiebei', BBC Chinese, (2013), available at: http://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/china/2013/07/130707_xinjiang_military (accessed 9 February 2018). It is likely that the actual current PAP head count in Xinjiang is higher, but in either case, Xinjiang's per capita police count would considerably exceed that of the GDR.

²⁵ Much of the surveillance of the GDR population was done through the Stasi, the GDR's secret service. A comparison to Xinjiang is not possible given that Chinese MSS head count figures are kept secret. In addition, state surveillance levels or capabilities comparisons cannot be adequately done across time. Today's China possesses advanced surveillance technologies that did not exist in 1989.



Even though assistant police recruitment has become a new trend throughout China, Xinjiang's recent recruitment drive is unprecedented in scale. Assistant police recruitment figures are difficult to assess with high accuracy due to highly scattered nature of these adverts. Even so, our compilation of assistant policing related adverts for January to September 2017 shows that on a per capita basis, Xinjiang advertised 40 times more positions than Fujian or Guangdong provinces, and nearly 90 times more than Zhejiang province (Table 2).

Table 2: Regional Comparison of Informal Police Recruitment

Region	Advertised assistant policing positions (Jan. - Sept. 2017)	Advertised positions per 100,000 of the population ²⁶
Xinjiang	69,667	300.8
Guangdong	8,005	7.4
Fujian	2,705	7.5
Zhejiang	1,732	3.5

The combination of low-skilled foot-soldiers stationed in and around convenience police stations together with high-tech surveillance equipment connected to an expanding information processing system has created "complete coverage," according to the XUAR 2018 work report, "without any chinks, blind spots, or blank spaces."²⁷ *Over the past decade, the focus of Xinjiang's security apparatus has shifted from responding to outbreaks of violence to preventing and even predicting where unrest might occur. During a 2017 inspection tour of Xinjiang, the Party's top security official Meng Jianzhu praised the rapid advancement of digital policing, calling for the "organic merger of modern technologies with counter-terrorism work, in order to push forward and deepen the use of big-data, AI and other technologies... [in] weiwen work."²⁸*

²⁶ Population data from the 2015 Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook.

²⁷ No author, 'Zhengfu gongzuo baogao,' Xinhua, (2018), available at http://news.ifeng.com/a/20180128/55540816_0.shtml (accessed 16 February 2018)

²⁸ No author, 'Meng Jianzhu: With full strength creating a new direction in social stability and lasting rule Meng Jianzhu: quanli kaichuang shehui wending he changzhi jiu'an xin junian', Xinhua, (2017), available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2017-08/28/c_1121557912.htm (accessed 19 December 2017).

Yet these official assessments overstate the capabilities of digital policing in Xinjiang at present. Despite massive investments in new technologies, surveillance work is still in many ways reliant on large-scale human resource recruitment. As visitors to the region have noted, the Party-state currently relies on a large numbers of unarmed informal police staff (not to mention private and volunteer security officials) to perform daily security tasks, such as monitoring CCTV feeds, conducting patrols, ID checks and scanning mobile phones for suspicious contents.²⁹

Minority Police Employment and Self-Policing

Average informal police wages in Uyghur majority regions are similar to those across the XUAR (Table 5). This is remarkable in light of the fact that there is a large disposable income gap between the Han-dominated, industrial north and the rural south. In 2016, for example, Kashgar prefecture's annual per capita disposable income amounted to 11,273 RMB,³⁰ 39 percent below the XUAR average. By comparison, the oil city of Karamay in the north had an annual per capita disposable income of 35,770 RMB.³¹

High-wage informal police positions that do not require a tertiary education represent a new career option for lesser-privileged minority populations. While outcome documents that list recruits by ethnicity are relatively rare, a non-representative sample of three assistant police recruitment drives in Kashgar prefecture in 2015 and 2016 shows that 83.2 percent of those hired were Uyghurs. Informant and visitor³² reports confirm that many new police positions in the South are being filled by ethnic minorities, many of whom appear to originate from the countryside.

According to several sources, many Uyghurs and other disenfranchised minorities have been entering the security forces since at least 2015/16 due to a lack of viable employment alternatives, but also because they thought it would protect from future persecutions.³³ Under Chen Quanguo, Uyghurs living in southern villages are facing far more stringent residential restrictions. For example, they cannot easily get a permit to live or work in urban centers. Accepting a police position is one way to escape this confinement, while securing stable, yet not unproblematic, employment.

Consequently, massive informal police recruitment kills two birds with a single stone for the Party-state: Not only does it flexibly enlarge the state's surveillance apparatus; it also provides

²⁹ Personal communication with Ben Dooley (AFP reporter) and other visitors to the region during 2017 and early 2018, along with corroborating statements from local informants.

³⁰ Computed as a weighted average of urban and rural disposable per capita incomes based on respective population shares.

³¹ No author, 'Kalamayishi 2016nian guomin jingji he shehui fazhan tongji gongbao', Karamay City Statistics Bureau, (2017), available at: http://www.kelamayi.com.cn/tzgg/content_1266024.htm (accessed 9 February 2018).

³² Visitors include visiting researchers, journalists and others on informal visits. Informants are Chinese citizens who reside in Xinjiang or who are in close contact with local residents from Xinjiang.

³³ Personal conversations with Darren Byler and Rune Steenberg Ryhe, who were citing examples from their local informant networks. Further confirmation comes from other sources, including other Western visitors.

well-paying jobs for impoverished minority populations, while getting ethnic groups to police their own people. Ethnic minorities have long served the CCP in China. However, the number of Uyghurs and other minorities recruited into the police force in Xinjiang far exceeds previous recruitment, and forms a key part of the current regime's security strategy. Moreover, Uyghur recruitment into the police force represents a large-scale employment creation strategy in a context where extreme securitization measures have negatively impacted other employment sectors and prompted those with better skills and educational levels to leave the region.

However, Uyghurs and other minorities who join the police forces have reportedly had to put up with an extremely demanding and stressful environment. Informants and visitors have noted that the police in Xinjiang suffer from health and social problems due to high pressure and frequent overtime. A substantial share of assistant police wages consists of performance-dependent bonuses, which are cut if performance goals are not met. Even worse, however, is the fact that minorities are reportedly unable to freely resign from police positions. According to several sources, those who seek to do so are threatened with detainment in re-education camps.³⁴ An assistant policeman from Kizilsu, a Kyrgyz minority region with a significant Uyghur population share, posted on a legal advice website that he wants to resign, but that his superior is threatening him with being sent to a re-education camp should he do so.³⁵

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³⁴ Zenz, 2018c.

³⁵ Source: china.findlaw.cn, February 3, 2018. The original link is no longer operational.

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Mr. YOHO. Thank you for your testimony.
Next, we will go to Mr. Turkel.

**STATEMENT OF MR. NURY TURKEL, CHAIRMAN OF THE
BOARD, UYGHUR HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT**

Mr. TURKEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and members of the subcommittee, for inviting me to attend this year. It's an honor to be here before you.

The Uyghur Human Rights Project commends the subcommittee for convening this hearing on the U.S. policy response.

We would also like to express our appreciation to the subcommittee members who have co-signed bipartisan letters calling for sanctions and urging pressure for the release of the relatives of Uyghur American citizens.

The human rights emergency facing Uyghur people in China requires an urgent response. For decades, the Chinese Government implemented policies of racial discrimination, and criminalization of Uyghurs' distinct ethnic and religious identity.

In the 2 years since the new party secretary took office, we have seen how these policies paved the way for the dehumanization of the Uyghur people. This should raise an urgent alarm about what is next for the Uyghur people in China.

It is also important to be clear about the Chinese Government's claim to be carrying out a counterterrorism campaign, which is nonsense.

Prior to 9/11, China's Government justified repressive policies by claiming to be fighting separatism. Hundreds of political prisoners were locked away for expressing their identity or peacefully protesting government abuse and corruption.

After 9/11, the same policies were suddenly recast as counterterrorism. Today, it's very clear that these policies have nothing to do with security concerns.

The most obvious evidence is the large-scale facilities being built to keep Uyghur children under state control from preschool age. As we speak, millions of Uyghurs don't know if they will ever see their parents, sons, daughters, their young nieces or nephews, ever again.

Finally, United States Government must respond vigorously to threats and retaliation against the American citizens of Uyghur origin on U.S. soil.

It is time to act. My recommendations for Congress are as follows.

One, to guide policy through the government we urge the subcommittee to introduce an abiding resolution endorsing an urgent U.S. policy response to the Uyghur crisis. The long overdue Uyghur Policy Act is needed to definitely state U.S. support for Uyghurs' civil and political rights and to mandate adequate measures to reverse the current crisis.

The Congress should also press for an immediate congressional fact-finding visit to the Uyghur region. Ambassador Branstad should personally lead efforts for the release of the Uyghur American citizens' relatives in China.

We also endorse the enforcement of the Magnitsky Act and going after the companies' individuals assisting with China's state security agencies.

Congress should also review U.S.-China law enforcement cooperation. American officials need to use this channel to vigorously raise the shocking treatment of Uyghurs by China's security forces.

Law enforcement agencies should also investigate threats and retaliations carried out against Uyghur Americans and other Uyghurs living in the United States.

The United States should publicly affirm its policy not to extradite or deport Uyghurs living in the U.S. and urge other governments to join Germany and Sweden by publicly announcing a halt to all deportation of Uyghurs to China.

Congress should appropriate funds to support Uyghur human rights and civil society groups working to advance human rights and environmental protection in their homeland.

The U.S. delegation at the United Nations should have strong congressional backing for vigorous action. China has been in the hot seat for its crimes against humanity in the Uyghur region exactly once in the last 19 months, which was August 10th at the CERD review panel in Geneva.

Going forward, the United States must field a strong delegation at China's UPR on November 6th.

Finally, we know of Uyghur students who cannot pay their tuition at American universities because their parents are detained in China. In this humanitarian urgency, Members of Congress should support these students' request for tuition waivers and scholarships.

In conclusion, I would like to reiterate my gratitude to the U.S. Congress for the bipartisan support and its effort to hold human rights abusers in China to account.

Thank you again for the opportunity to shine more light on the tragic situation facing the Uyghur people in China.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Turkel follows:]

**HEARING****CHINA'S REPRESSION AND INTERNMENT OF UYGHURS:
U.S. POLICY RESPONSES**

**Written Testimony of Nury Turkel
Chairman of the Board, Uyghur Human Rights Project**

House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific
September 26, 2018

The human rights emergency facing Uyghurs in China requires an urgent response. The mass internment of Uyghurs in camps across East Turkestan (officially named by the Chinese government as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region) is occurring as the Chinese government promotes itself globally as a model of governance and trade through the Belt and Road Initiative.

Over a million, and possibly more, Uyghurs have been interned out of a population of 11 million.¹ Credible reports of deaths in custody, torture, and systemic political indoctrination must propel the United States into action on behalf of the Uyghurs. In the words of scholar Rian Thum, “mass murder and genocide do not look like impossible outcomes.”²

The scale of the rights violations against the Uyghur people have been covered by brave reporters from a number of agencies, including *Radio Free Asia*, the *Wall Street Journal*, and the *New York Times*, among others. Academics, such as Adrian Zenz, have painstakingly uncovered the scale of the internment camp system. Extensive reports issued by Human Rights Watch and the Uyghur Human Rights Project document terrifying firsthand accounts of the camps and of the trauma inflicted on the Uyghur community.³

This testimony examines three analytical points emerging from these accounts. The first is an exploration of the motives behind China's internment campaign, including the threat it poses to democratic values. The second discusses the violation of Uyghur human rights in the context of China's counterterror policies and how Beijing has manipulated legitimate concerns over global security to justify its repression. The third point details China's export of repression targeting Uyghurs in the United States in a clear violation of

sovereignty. In closing, I offer recommendations to the committee regarding U.S. policy responses.

Mass Internment of Uyghurs – Chinese Government Motivations

Racial Discrimination: In a May 17, 2018 article, Georgetown University professor James Millward told Associated Press reporters: “Cultural cleansing is Beijing’s attempt to find a final solution to the Xinjiang problem.”⁴ The Chinese government has portrayed Uyghur ethnic distinctiveness as a threat to ordinary Chinese and the Uyghurs’ Islamic faith as a contagious disease.⁵ Sinification through Chinese language and culture sessions and compulsory denunciations of Uyghur culture and belief in Islam in the internment camps are justified as necessary measures in reducing this threat and in finding Beijing’s final solution.

State-led racial discrimination and criminalization of Islam and any expression of Uyghur identity and culture have affected all Uyghurs in the Uyghur homeland and China, as well as Uyghur Americans and hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs who live outside their home region. Uyghurs are routinely denied rooms in hotels or subjected to extra security checks when in transit. In addition, Han Chinese who have rented out rooms to Uyghurs have been punished by the Chinese authorities. Although the Chinese state has played an enabling role in normalizing discrimination against Uyghurs in Chinese society, it has also exploited a sense of racial superiority amongst Han Chinese to encourage racial bias. As University of Washington Anthropologist Stevan Harrell notes: “As long as such an innate, almost visceral Han sense of superiority remains, the actual program of the Communist project will be based on the unconscious assumption that Han ways are better, more modern ways.”⁶

Uyghurs outside the camps are forced to publicly demonstrate their adoption of majority-Han culture, as defined by the state. They have been required to perform contemporary Chinese dances, sing Communist “Red Songs,” wear pseudo-traditional Chinese robes, and celebrate Chinese New Year. They must attend mass rallies denouncing the “Three Evil Forces” and declaring loyalty to the Communist Party. They are required to attend.

Territorial Consolidation: Consolidation of borders has been an on-going project for the Chinese Communist Party since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China. In full knowledge that its claim over the lands of Tibetans, Mongols, and Uyghurs is based on the empire building of previous Chinese administrations, Chinese officials have moved to assimilate non-Han regions through a rewrite of indigenous histories and the exercise of diplomatic pressure to accept China’s current borders as having been fixed for centuries. As Robert D. Kaplan wrote in a September 16, 2018 commentary for *the Wall Street Journal*: “The repression of the Turkic Uighur Muslim community in western China—including the reported internment of up to a million people in secret camps—is a

key part of Beijing's new imperial policy. Only by understanding the dynamics of Chinese empire can one grasp this brutal campaign."⁷

The People's Republic of China's policies of territorial consolidation have for decades included the encouragement of Han settlers into historically and ethnically distinct regions such as Tibet and the Uyghur homeland. China has successfully managed this demographic transformation and "March West" through the instigation of political and economic initiatives. These include Open up the Northwest (1992), Western Development (2000), the Xinjiang Work Forums of 2010 and 2014, the establishment of the Shanghai Five (1996) and later the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (2001). The build up of infrastructure, investment and settlers encouraged by these initiatives have done little to significantly alter economic opportunities for Uyghurs, as they remain outside the planning, implementation and monitoring processes while their region undergoes transformation.

In a 2004 monograph, demographer Stanley Toops outlined the state-directed campaign to encourage Han Chinese to move to the Uyghur Autonomous Region, which relied creating a perception of frontier regions of China as having available resources and development opportunities. In addition, state "inducements and incentives" figured heavily in the migration policy.⁸ From 1990 to 2000, the number of Han Chinese grew to 7.5 million and by the 2010 census the figure had reached 8.8 million. From 1990 through 2012 (22 years in total), the number of Han Chinese increased by 4.3 million, while in the 37 years between 1953-90 the rise was 5.4 million. Since the beginning of Chinese Communist rule, the proportion of Uyghurs in the region has shrunk from 75 percent to 45 percent.

The redevelopment of Uyghur neighborhoods in the early 2010s, particularly in Kashgar, was a further physical manifestation of the state-managed alteration of Uyghur society. The demolition of traditional Uyghur architecture and replacement with buildings indistinguishable from eastern China represented not only a firm reminder to Uyghurs of Chinese colonization, but also eased the transition for settlers arriving from outside of the region. The mass internment campaign has taken this logic one step further. The disappearance of Uyghur homes has been followed by the disappearance of the people who once inhabited them.

Global Influence: Maintaining a firm grip on territories such as the Uyghur homeland is not only a state building enterprise, but also part of a bid to extend influence beyond borders. In a speech delivered at Nazarbayev University in Kazakhstan in September 2013, Chinese president Xi Jinping advanced the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), a trade proposal encompassing South Asia, Central Asia, Eurasia, Europe and the Middle East that would augment the role of the Uyghur homeland as China's primary land gateway to Eurasia. According to a state policy document, the region would serve "as a core area on the Silk Road Economic Belt."⁹ The SREB and the Maritime Silk Road (MSR) form an ambitious Chinese goal to place China at the center of global trade routes.

Collectively known as the Belt and Road, the initiative will project external influence in an attempt to establish China as a bona fide super power by 2050.

However, the Chinese government's maintenance of power in the Uyghur homeland to ensure Belt and Road corridors remain open is founded on fear and a level of state intrusion that would not be tolerated in democratic societies. For example, the government has sent Communist Party officials to live in Uyghur homes as part of the so-called "Becoming Family" campaign, which appears to be a pretext for gathering information on Uyghur families. Furthermore, the pervasive technological surveillance in general society, such as DNA collection, iris scans, and ubiquitous CCTV cameras, has created an open-air prison for Uyghurs outside the internment facilities. The relevance of this invasion into the privacy of Uyghurs' lives and homes is that this is the ideal of governance China is attempting to export facilitated through the Belt and Road Initiative. The open challenge to democratic values the 'China model' presents should not be underestimated.

China's Misleading 'Counterterrorism' Campaign

The 9/11 attacks on the United States marked a strategic shift in how China framed Uyghur dissent. Prior to September 11, 2001, Chinese authorities treated expressions of Uyghur opposition to repressive government policies as criminal acts of 'separatism' regardless of whether these were expressed peacefully or not. After 9/11, the same events were recast as 'terrorism.' The introduction of the term 'terrorism' into the Chinese government's discourse on Uyghurs was interpreted as a move to legitimize its repression of the Uyghur people. In regard to the support Chinese authorities' offered on the new 'terror' allegations scholar James Millward concludes, "careful scrutiny reveals problems with the evidence presented in both media and official sources."¹⁰

China has amended its legal framework to reflect this new discourse. Most recently, this has included the Counterterrorism Law on December 27, 2015 and the 2016 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Implementing Measures of the Counterterrorism Law of the Peoples Republic of China. Although one of China's motivations in introducing counterterror legislation was to garner international support for repressive measures, "Western countries (and particularly the U.S.) are reluctant to cooperate with China on anti-terrorism because China's definition of terrorism is shockingly broad."¹¹ In addition, China's search for legitimacy for its counterterror measures within the international community was hampered by a lack of transparency and cooperation as noted by the U.S. State Department.¹²

Chinese officials have claimed the internment of Uyghurs is about combatting 'terrorism' or 'extremism' and bringing stability to a volatile region. These claims cannot be sustained given an examination of scale of the campaign and the types of individuals interned. For example, the confinement of Uyghur children already separated from their interned parents into 're-education centers' stretches any credible definition of

counterterrorism. As one former instructor at one of these facilities for children told the Financial Times: “If both parents are in jail, the child will be sent to a re-education centre for ‘special children.’ The child is forbidden to go to school with the *normal* [author’s italics] children because the parents have a political problem.”¹³

The Financial Times article also described how the Chinese authorities were administering forcible separations of Uyghur children from their extended families. In one case, two children aged seven and nine were sent to a re-education center even though their grandparents wanted to take care of them. The report also described how one county in Kashgar Prefecture had built 18 new ‘orphanages’ in 2017 alone.¹⁴ In its recent report, Human Rights Watch detailed how Chinese authorities have forcibly taken children between the ages of five and 15 and placed them in ‘orphanages,’ while extended families were permitted to look after children under five years old.¹⁵

Exporting Repression Against Uyghurs Overseas

The Chinese government has long sought to control the narrative of Chinese politics within Chinese communities overseas through tools including the education departments of their embassies and consulates, using them to disrupt events held by activists on college campuses and elsewhere. For dissident groups, monitoring and control can take more direct forms. The targets of this harassment include Uyghur and Tibetan rights activists, Chinese democrats, Taiwanese independence advocates and Falun Gong practitioners. Together the Chinese authorities refer to these targeted groups as the “Five Poisons.”

The Chinese government has also tried to influence and put pressure on foreign governments to label Uyghurs as ‘terrorists’ and to prevent their free movement, even after they have become citizens of other countries. As China builds closer security relationships with countries around the world, including in Central and South Asia and the Middle East, these countries have used their own security forces to attempt to shut down political activities among Uyghurs in their nations, or even detain and deport Uyghurs living legally in their territory.

The goal of the Chinese government’s harassment is to discourage and disrupt political activism among Uyghurs living abroad, replicating the system of control that exists in their homeland. Threatening retaliation against family members who remain within the borders of China is one of the Chinese government’s primary tools. This retaliation can include everything from their family members being prevented from leaving China by being denied passports, to putting their jobs and educations at risk, to being subjected to imprisonment or internment in a camp. These tactics undermine Uyghurs’ ability to enjoy their legal rights even after they leave China.

The families of U.S. citizens and Radio Free Asia (RFA) journalists, Gulchehra Hoja, Shohret Hoshur, Mamatjan Juma, Jilil Kashgari, Kurban Niyaz, and Eset Sulaiman, who have been at the forefront of exposing the extent and conditions of the internment camps,

have been targeted by the Chinese government in a bid to silence independent reporting. The journalists went public to describe how Chinese authorities have arbitrarily detained family members in internment camps.

In total, 24 of Gulchehra Hoja's relatives in Urumchi and Ghulja have been detained in internment camps, including her brother Kaiser Abduqeyum who was detained in October 2017 and has since disappeared. At least nine of Shohret Hoshur's relatives are in one of four camps located in Qorghas county. China has previously attempted to intimidate RFA journalist Shohret Hoshur. Three of Hoshur's brothers in Urumchi were detained in 2014 and 2015. The arrests came after Hoshur published a series of articles on the unrest in East Turkestan that exposed vulnerabilities in state narratives. Two of Mamatjan Juma's brothers are in internment camps, one in Kashgar and the other in Urumchi. Seven of Jilil Kashgary's family members are in internment camps. His nephew Nurmemet, who had studied in Egypt for two years, was detained in Ghulja. Both Kurban Niyaz, and Eset Sulaiman have lost touch with their families.

This kind of harassment and punishment had touched the lives of many Uyghur-American families. The family of human rights activist Rebiya Kadeer has frequently been harassed by the Chinese government since her arrest in East Turkestan in 1999. Amnesty International issued an Urgent Action in November 2017 describing how up to 30 of her relatives have been detained in internment camps. Amnesty wrote her relatives are at "high risk of torture and other ill-treatment."¹⁶ Furthermore, the wife and daughter-in-law of Mr. Juret Nizamuddin have been in detention since their return to China from the U.S. His wife simply disappeared while his daughter-in-law was sentenced to eight years of imprisonment.

Recommendations

It is time to act. UHRP urges the Congress to take these steps:

Policy and Congressional Initiatives

1. Pass a binding resolution endorsing an urgent U.S. policy response on the Uyghur crisis, including the steps below.
2. Press for an urgent Congressional fact-finding visit to the Uyghur region, and other cities where Uyghur detainees are being transported. Announce the request publicly. Urge every Member who visits China to request access to the Uyghur region, and specifically the detention centers.
3. Join the Senate in urging U.S. Ambassador to China Terry Branstad to personally lead efforts for the release of the relatives of Radio Free Asia reporters and all those held in extra-judicial detention. He should be asked to uphold the pledge made in his confirmation hearing "to represent American values to the leadership of China and the Chinese people at large; values that include upholding human rights for all."

4. Press for sanctions on Chinese officials responsible for severe human rights violations, including visa bans, freezing assets, and exclusion from international banking, under the provisions of the Global Magnitsky Act and other sanctions authority. Deterring an escalation of rights abuses requires that abusers pay a price for their crimes. Those most responsible should be held accountable, particularly Regional Party Secretary Chen Quanguo and United Front official Hu Lianhe, as well as Regional Deputy Party Secretaries Shohret Zakir, XPCC1 Party Committee Secretary Sun Jinlong, XPCC Commander Peng Jiarui, XPCC Regional United Front Department head Shawket Imin, and Xinjiang Politics and Law Commission head Zhu Hailun.
5. Adopt a Uyghur Policy Act that defines the United States government's support for the Uyghurs' civil and political rights, including their right to maintain their distinct cultural identity. U.S. policy on Tibet, Taiwan, and Hong Kong is guided by specific, formal policies.¹⁷ Given the current crisis, it is past time for the United States to follow a similar approach for the Uyghurs.
6. Press for expedited enforcement of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations and Export Administration Regulations to prevent private U.S. individuals and companies from providing security training, materiel, and surveillance equipment and technology to Chinese state security agencies and affiliated entities, particularly those that have a role in repressing ethnic and religious minorities in China.¹⁸
7. Request law-enforcement agencies to investigate threats and retaliation carried out against Uyghur U.S. citizens and against all Uyghurs on U.S. soil.
8. Publicly affirm U.S. policy not to extradite or deport Uyghurs living in the U.S. Urge other governments to join Germany and Sweden in publicly announcing a halt to all deportations of Uyghurs to China.
9. In line with recommendations in the CECC 2017 Annual Report, ensure that U.S. government-supported digital security training and capacity-building efforts include Uyghur human rights advocates in the U.S., Europe, Turkey, and Asia.
10. Increase funding to support Uyghur, Tibetan, and Mongol civil society groups working to advance human rights and environmental protection in their homelands, through U.S. foreign assistance funding and by encouraging additional support from both UN and non-governmental sources.
11. Appropriate funds for documentation and casework to address the plight of Uyghur refugees and asylum seekers in the region and throughout the world.
12. In the context of the U.S.-China Joint Liaison Group on Law Enforcement Cooperation, led on the China side by State Councilor and Minister of Public Security Guo Shengkun, ensure that U.S. officials are fully briefed on the Uyghur situation and

empowered to vigorously pursue U.S. policy objectives regarding the treatment of Uyghurs, refoulement across international borders, and Chinese police entities' responsibility for violations of international law and China's Constitution and laws.

13. In the context of U.S.-China technical and legal collaboration on environmental protection, ensure that U.S. officials are fully briefed on the detentions of environmental rights defenders in the Uyghur Region, and empowered to vigorously pursue their release.
14. Investigate the relationship of U.S.-invested development projects with Chinese state entities implementing extra-legal "de-extremification" measures. U.S. companies with operations in the Uyghur region include Peabody International, Halliburton¹⁹ and the NBA.²⁰ Urge other countries to pursue similar investigations.
15. Support Ambassador Nikki Haley and the U.S. United Nations delegation to:
 - a. Field a strong U.S. delegation at China's Universal Periodic Review in Geneva on November 6.
 - b. Organize a joint statement by like-minded countries on the severe violations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the Uyghur Region of China.
 - c. Raise the issue in the context of UN Security Council Resolution 2150 (2014), particularly the statement of Deputy Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations Wang Min, who noted that "Preventing genocide also required that Governments protect their civilians and that all parties abide by humanitarian law. For its part, the international community should acquire a deep understanding of the situation on the ground, as well as strengthen coordination efforts for protecting civilians."
 - d. Create a contact group of like-minded countries to coordinate action on the unprecedented scale of secret extra-judicial detentions and wide-scale separation of children from their parents within a targeted ethnic group.
 - e. Make a formal request for an investigation by H.E. Adama Dieng, Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide.
16. Members of Congress should commend universities that waive tuition for Uyghur students who are stranded in the U.S., unable to return home, and unable to pay fees due to their parents' detention in China.

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- ⁹ National Development and Reform Commission. (2015). *Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st -Century Maritime Silk Road*. [online]. Available at: https://reconasiaproducton.s3.amazonaws.com/media/filer_public/e0/22/e0228017-7463-46fc-9094-0465a6f1ca23/vision_and_actions_on_jointly_building_silk_road_economic_belt_and_21stcentury_maritime_silk_road.pdf [Accessed 19 Sep. 2018].
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Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Mr. Turkel.
Dr. Jacobs.

STATEMENT OF JUSTIN JACOBS, PH.D., ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

Mr. JACOBS. Distinguished members of the committee, thank you for holding this hearing on China's policies in Xinjiang and for inviting me to testify.

From 1949 to 2001, the Chinese Communist Party generally regarded the mostly Muslim population of the Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region as deserving of some form of cultural autonomy within China.

These longstanding views have come under sustained assault over the past 15 years, during which time China has been gradually accelerating its policies of cultural assimilation, intrusive surveillance, and unlawful detention of the Uyghur ethnic group, with the devastating intensification of the more coercive aspects of these measures in the past 2 to 3 years.

Since 2009, a series of violent incidents appears to have convinced the Chinese Communist leadership that it must solve its so-called Uyghur problem in Xinjiang once and for all.

The result is the oppressive security apparatus, arbitrary system of indefinite detention, and coercive assimilationist measures now on display in Xinjiang, all of which have been institutionalized and normalized in the past 2 years.

Ever since the appointment of Chen Quanguo as party secretary of Xinjiang in 2016, surveillance and assimilationist policies previously tested in Chen's prior posting to Tibet have been greatly expanded and accelerated in Xinjiang.

With regard to cultural assimilation, the elimination of bilingual education in minority languages such as Uyghur, a policy previously applied only at the university level, has now been instituted in primary and secondary schools as well.

The state also provides new financial incentives for Han men to marry Uyghur women, and Uyghurs who wish to sell their property must apply for government permission to do so.

Mosques are frequently closed down without explanation and Islamic insignia, such as the crescent moon, have been removed from those that remain open.

The euphemistic political reeducation schools are now believed to be responsible for the arbitrary and indefinite incarceration of anywhere from several hundred thousand up to 1 million Uyghurs, or between 3 to 10 percent of the entire population. It is clear that all members of the Uyghur ethnic group are being considered for mass internment in these camps. Leaked documents and press reports reveal the existence of mandatory quotas for internment.

Chen Quanguo and Beijing appear to be committed to the permanent institutionalization and further expansion of these reeducation camps, with evidence of massive construction projects continuing to leak to the outside world.

Chinese leaders believe that their approach in Xinjiang is working. As a result, we should not expect to see any voluntary re-

trenchment or scaling back of the new measures on the part of Beijing.

Indeed, this frightening dystopia did not originate in Xinjiang and it will not end in Xinjiang. The United States is uniquely positioned to take on a global leadership role concerning this crisis.

Not only have the major global powers mostly failed to confront China on its treatment of the Uyghur people, but even the leaders of majority Muslim countries have until recently tended to shy away from raising the issue with Beijing.

Going forward, I believe that there are four policy options that may help to ameliorate a few of the worst abuses of the system and encourage Beijing to reevaluate its role in perpetuating the human rights crisis on a scale not seen in China since the days of Mao Zedong.

First, in accordance with the Magnitsky Act, the United States should consider the adoption of sanctions against key members of the Chinese Communist Party associated with the implementation of the excessive and indiscriminate policies in Xinjiang.

Second, the United States should call for the release of the hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs who have been unlawfully and arbitrarily detained in the so-called “political reeducation schools” and other extralegal facilities in Xinjiang.

Third, the United States should urge the Chinese Communist leadership to avoid excessive and indiscriminate incarceration and surveillance measures that target entire religious and ethnic groups within China.

And fourth, the United States should encourage China to uphold the provisions in its own constitution that provide for the cultural, linguistic, and religious autonomy of its minority groups.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and committee members, for your attention and consideration.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jacobs follows:]

China's Repression and Internment of Uyghurs: U.S. Policy Responses

Testimony of Justin M. Jacobs
Associate Professor of History
American University

Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific

September 26, 2018

Chairman Yoho, Ranking Member Sherman, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for holding this hearing on China's policies in Xinjiang and for inviting me to testify.

For the past fifteen years, China has been gradually intensifying its policies of coercive assimilation, intrusive surveillance, and unlawful detention of the Uyghur ethnic group in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. From 1949 to 2001, the Chinese Communist Party generally regarded the mostly Muslim population of Xinjiang as deserving of some form of cultural autonomy within China. The Uyghurs were designated as one of the largest of China's fifty-six officially recognized ethnic groups, with various social, economic, and educational benefits made available to its members in order to help reinforce this autonomy. Using multiculturalist policies adapted from the Soviet Union, China went to great lengths both to institutionalize and to celebrate the inclusion of a distinct Uyghur ethnic group within the modern Chinese state. It was widely acknowledged that the Uyghurs were a Turkic-speaking Muslim people, and that the preservation of their cultural identities constituted evidence of a tolerant and progressive Chinese leadership.

These longstanding views have come under sustained assault over the past fifteen years, with a devastating intensification of the more coercive aspects of Beijing's new approach in the past two to three years. Since 2001, Beijing has been able to take advantage of the U.S. "global war on terrorism" to conduct its own parallel "war" on any group of people it chooses to associate with terrorism in China. Chief among these groups are the Uyghurs, whom Beijing often identifies with various "East Turkestan" independence movements. Because China's suppression of "East Turkestan" groups has been largely focused on Muslim peoples within Xinjiang, it has long escaped close international scrutiny.

This lack of international scrutiny changed in 2009, when an attempt by the Chinese police in Urumchi to break up the peaceful demonstrations of Uyghur demonstrators prompted riots and bloodshed between Uyghurs and Han. Then, from 2013 to 2015, a series of violent insurrections broke out in cities throughout Xinjiang and China, including a car attack at Tiananmen Square and a mass knifing incident in Kunming. Taken together, these incidents appear to have convinced the Chinese Communist leadership that the "Uyghur problem" in Xinjiang must be solved once and for all.

The result is the oppressive security apparatus, arbitrary system of indefinite detention, and coercive assimilationist measures now on display in Xinjiang, all of which have been institutionalized and normalized in the past two to three years. Ever since the appointment of Chen Quanguo as Party Secretary of Xinjiang in 2016, surveillance and assimilationist policies previously tested in Chen's prior posting to Tibet have been greatly expanded and intensified in Xinjiang.

With regard to cultural assimilation, the elimination of bilingual education in minority languages such as Uyghur, a policy previously applied only at the university level, has now been instituted in primary and secondary schools as well. The state also provides new financial incentives for Han men to marry Uyghur women, and Uyghurs who wish to sell their property must apply for government permission to do so. (If they live in a complex where Han are few, they will be required to sell their property to Han buyers.) Mosques are frequently closed down without explanation, and Islamic insignia, such as the crescent moon, have been removed from those that remain open. Muslim restaurants have been required to remove references to "halal" food and are not allowed to advertise their establishments as "Muslim."

With regard to intrusive surveillance and unlawful detention, the euphemistic "political re-education schools" are now believed to be responsible for the arbitrary and indefinite incarceration of anywhere from several hundred thousand up to a million Uyghurs. (There are approximately ten million Uyghurs in Xinjiang today, meaning that those who have been detained may represent up to 10% of the entire Uyghur population.) Only Uyghurs and other Muslim minority groups in Xinjiang are being put into these camps, with the reasons for incarceration ranging from anything as simple as receiving an international phone call to growing a beard.

It is clear that the entire Uyghur population is being considered for mass internment in these camps: leaked documents and press reports reveal the existence of mandatory quotas for internment, and some Han officials even go so far as to describe the utility of these camps as similar to spraying herbicide indiscriminately over an entire plot of grass in order to kill just the weeds. And it is not only the camps that are tasked with this mission: major cities in Xinjiang are now saturated with police inspection kiosks every several hundred meters, while the regular prison system has also admitted a disproportionately large number of Uyghurs. These aggressive and extralegal detentions have created deep trauma within Uyghur communities. Nearly every Uyghur knows someone who has been sent to one of these camps, a realization that has prompted the repetition of a chilling phrase throughout the region: *adem yoq* ("everybody's gone").

Chen Quanguo and Beijing appear to be committed to the permanent institutionalization and further expansion of these re-education camps, with evidence of massive construction projects continuing to leak to the outside world. Not only that, but the state has also succeeded in integrating large numbers of Uyghurs into the very same security apparatus that has detained up to ten percent of the rest of the Uyghur population. In other words, many Uyghur families have become perversely dependent upon the existence of the

camps and the security forces associated with the new policy environment. In tandem with the cultural assimilationist policies outlined above, the Chinese state has apparently managed to “naturalize” the application of its coercive power in Xinjiang, to the extent that many Uyghur families now obtain a portion of their household income from the same system that deprives them of their least pliable members.

Chinese leaders believe that their approach in Xinjiang is working. Unlike the West, which is viewed as stumbling from one Muslim-associated political disaster to the next, Chinese policymakers have issued statements declaring their belief that by such means China has managed to avoid its own “Libya” or “Syria.” The official line, which many of China’s top politicians and scholars seem to have genuinely embraced, is that the problems in Xinjiang stem directly from the same “global exportation of radical Islam” that has long afflicted Western states. Beijing’s heavy-handed and authoritarian approach to the situation in Xinjiang is viewed as a policymaking innovation that has already achieved more effective results than anything Western democracies have tried.

Precisely because Xi Jinping and Chen Quanguo believe that their approach in Xinjiang is working, we should not expect any voluntary retrenchment or scaling back of the new measures on the part of Beijing. The coercive security state currently entrenched in Xinjiang did not originate in Xinjiang—it was first tested out on a smaller scale in Tibet, and then exported and further developed in Xinjiang. Indeed, reliable evidence suggests that China has already begun to expand on its “success” in Xinjiang and is currently implementing similar policies among Chinese-speaking Muslims in the neighboring provinces of Gansu and Ningxia. Beijing has even passed newly restrictive regulations that are applicable to the practice of all religions anywhere in China, policies that are described as facilitating the “sinification” of religion.

Outside of China, the same technology used to intrude on the lives of Xinjiang’s Uyghurs has already been exported to Zimbabwe and Ecuador. We can reasonably expect that other countries will soon join this list. Few of them, however, will be capable of maintaining the same degree of oversight and indoctrination that has allowed China to implement these measures so effectively. As a result, it is likely that the exportation of the technological and ideological foundation for China’s repressive policies in Xinjiang elsewhere will lead not to terrified compliance, as seems to be the case in Xinjiang, but rather to increased resistance and political instability among the targeted population in other parts of the world.

The United States is uniquely positioned to take on a global leadership role concerning the human rights crisis currently unfolding in Xinjiang. Not only have the major global powers mostly failed to confront China on its treatment of the Uyghur people, but even the leaders of majority Muslim countries have until recently tended to shy away from raising the issue with Beijing. No Middle Eastern country has taken up the cause of the Muslims in China, nor have any of the Central Asian republics situated along Xinjiang’s western border attempted to lobby publicly on behalf of their Turkic-speaking cousins. The reason is simple: most of the world’s countries are grossly dependent on maintaining

a positive economic and trade relationship with China, and to speak up on Xinjiang is to risk endangering that relationship.

As such, the United States is one of the few countries capable of calling sustained global attention to what is happening in Xinjiang. As China plunges headlong into a cynical retrenchment and betrayal of its own prior policies of multicultural and multi-confessional tolerance, the United States can take the opportunity to champion the integrity and importance of these values and position itself as a defender of the rights of religious minorities. The conviction of many Chinese leaders that their policies in Xinjiang represent an unmitigated success story may waver if they begin to encounter a global backlash. Though growing media attention to the situation in Xinjiang has finally forced some of these same leaders to issue defensive statements about the situation in Xinjiang, Beijing has yet to be forced to reckon with the consequences of its actions.

Historians of the future will pass a harsh judgment upon the Communist leadership of China for its current policies toward the Uyghurs in Xinjiang. The following policy recommendations may help to ameliorate a few of the worst abuses of the system and encourage Beijing to re-evaluate its role in perpetuating a human rights crisis of a scale not seen in China since the days of Mao Zedong:

- In accordance with the Magnitsky Act, the United States should consider the adoption of sanctions against key members of the Chinese Communist Party associated with the implementation of the excessive and indiscriminate policies in Xinjiang.
- The United States should call for the release of the hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs who have been unlawfully and arbitrarily detained in the so-called “political re-education schools” and other extra-legal facilities in Xinjiang.
- The United States should urge the Chinese Communist leadership to avoid excessive and indiscriminate incarceration and surveillance measures that target entire religious and ethnic groups within China.
- The United States should encourage China to uphold the provisions in its own constitution that provide for the cultural, linguistic, and religious autonomy of its minority groups.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and committee members, for your attention and consideration.

Mr. YOHO. I appreciate all of your comments, and I think your last statement is how China's constitution says they should incorporate all this and they should be doing all this, but as we see over and over again, China leads by lie, deceit, and coercion.

They say one thing, they do something else. It's like when they were telling President Obama in the Rose Garden that, we are not militarizing the South China Sea on reclaimed lands that we cannot call islands because islands denote ownership—it's reclaimed lands—that we are not militarizing them, and we see over and over again they speak deception while they do underhanded things.

Very dangerous place to be, and, again, I can't think of anything more Orwellian on the planet than what China is doing.

I think you guys have all seen this Radio Free Asia report—Xinjiang rapidly building crematoriums to extinguish Uyghur funeral traditions—to extinguish Uyghur funeral traditions. It's a very disturbing report when you read through this about what they are doing.

It says, amid concerns over expansion of the burial management centers in XUAR, or Xinjiang, a job posting listed on the official government Web site for the region's capital, Urumqi, last month called for 50 security personnel with above average health who are physically and mentally fit, exceptionally brave, to work in the crematorium located in the city's district for a salary of more than 8,000 yen and that is the U.S. equivalent of \$1,215 per month.

I think it's kind of interesting—50 security personnel of above average health who are physically and mentally fit to work in a crematorium.

I think what we are seeing here is a repeat of what we've seen too many times in history, and shame on us, shame on the free world, to turn a blind eye and not stand up to this.

And how do you stand up to it? Can one nation stand up to it, or does it take the world community realizing this, define it for what it is? And, again, we've seen this in Syria—400,000-plus people have been slaughtered.

We see what's going on with the Rohingya being slaughtered, and we see what China is doing, stepping up to create a pure race. Hitler wanted the Aryan race, obviously, and then we see Xi Jinping, clearly articulated underlying in the Xinjiang region where he said the aim of liberating thought is to better standardize thought.

Then he goes on and says in the speech at the nineteenth CCP National Congress he addressed the need for ethnic harmony to keep China on a path to success—ethnic harmony—we must do more to safeguard China's sovereignty, security, and development interests and staunchly oppose all attempts to split China or undermine its ethnic unity and social harmony and stability.

And I think those are very clear things. They want everybody thinking the same way on the same page, and that would be awesome if we could do that in every culture.

And if you believe in what we stand for in this country with our Constitution—that rights come from a Creator, not from government—that we institute government—we, the people, do—to protect our God-given rights, wherein the Chinese party they view the role of the citizen to serve the Communist Party.

There is no higher authority in life in China than the Communist Party, and those that aren't following what the Chinese Communist Party says need to be sent to re-thought camps or reeducation camps and, henceforth, it requires to have crematoriums for those that don't and so they can extinguish that.

What is the PRC's vision for ethnic harmony? We'll start with you, Dr. Zenz. Am I off on this or are we seeing a repeat of Adolph Hitler, in a different language?

Mr. ZENZ. My personal opinion on this issue, Mr. Chairman, is that China considers itself as a multi-ethnic nation or even empire in the past and under current CCP leadership.

It's a superficially diverse multi-ethnic Chinese nation under the leadership of Chinese culture. In this context, China does not have any interest to destroy or eliminate an ethnic group but, rather, to integrate and to assimilate.

It's my belief that we are not looking at an intentional genocide in terms of the large-scale killing of an ethnic group. What I perceive is very—what I perceive is very consistent with a Communist practice to try to change a people.

Here we see a Communist attempt to change a people particularly away from religion, which is not only limited to Uyghurs but also to other religious groups in other parts of China.

With the Uyghurs it's being done with particular intensity due to the sensitive location and the fact that violent incidents have occurred.

And on the second line we also see an attempt to ethnically and linguistically assimilate a people into the core culture of the Chinese nation, which is the Han Chinese culture, which permits a certain remnant of ethnic culture to remain.

People can speak their language, to an extent. They can keep harmless cultural customs, although the space for that has been shrinking under the current Chinese regime. There was much more space for this under previous Chinese regimes.¹²¹As a result, I believe we are looking at these camps at political reeducation. These camps will naturally have higher mortality rates due to their conditions.

People who are sick and elderly or suffer from mental conditions will, naturally, die quicker. We will have, therefore, higher mortality rates due to the conditions of these camps.

I do not believe that there is an intent to systematically move into mass killing. Of course, I can be proven wrong. But if you ask my opinion, that's what it is.

I also believe that the crematoria that are being built that you refer to, all of China is moving toward cremation by 2020, not just Xinjiang.

Of course, this has some very convenient side effects besides saving room, of course, in a country with a high population density, although Xinjiang autonomous region does not have a high population density.

It does restrict and eliminate religious practice related to funerals. Many religions, of course, including Islam have very important funeral rites of spiritual and religious importance.

So this is another way to encroach upon a territory occupied by religion, and another aspect is, of course, if people do die in reedu-

cation camps or the detention facilities, it is very convenient to cremate them because you do not have anybody attending the funeral. You can then choose to tell and inform the family members at a later stage.

Mr. YOHO. Let me—let me stop you there for the sake of time.

Mr. ZENZ. Yes. I am done, in any case.

Mr. YOHO. Okay. Thank you, and I appreciate that and I want to come back to that.

At this time, we'll go to the ranking member, Mr. Sherman.

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. I am glad that—when I heard crematorium next to concentration or internment camps, one hearkens back to the Nazis where they were not cremating those who had died, they were using crematoriums in order to kill.

That being said, Dr. Zenz, are there funerals and burials taking place in the province now or are they forcing Uyghurs to use cremation instead?

Mr. ZENZ. I think there is limited empirical information on the matter. But the evidence we have would be consistent with what is being sought to be implemented in the rest of the nation to shift toward cremation.

Mr. SHERMAN. Push people in that direction.

Mr. ZENZ. Yes, which is forced. Which is forced. It's not voluntary, and particular in Xinjiang.

Mr. SHERMAN. So I guess someone will be buried today who died of natural causes, but another family might be pushed into accepting cremation as opposed to burial or Islamic burial?

Mr. ZENZ. That is very much the trend, especially in Xinjiang. Yes.

Mr. SHERMAN. Yeah, I'm talking only in Xinjiang.

Mr. ZENZ. Yes.

Mr. SHERMAN. I don't know which witness to ask, but Turkey used to be an advocate for what is called East Turkmenistan. Is Turkey continuing to advocate for the Uyghurs or have they backed off? Does anyone know?

Mr. TURKEL?

Mr. TURKEL. I would be happy to answer that question. Before addressing your important question, I would like to point out the unstated goal of the Chinese Government under this claim that they're working to achieve social stability.

In any—under any wildest imagination you don't achieve social stability by calling somebody's ethnicity or ethnic cultural appreciation as a tumor, religion as a mental disease. It makes no sense in any—

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. If you could focus on my question.

Mr. TURKEL. And then in addressing your question, Turkey has been historically—was historically supportive of the Uyghur struggle for cultural, linguistic, and historic reasons.

In 2009, the current Turkish President said that he thinks what is happening in East Turkestan is sort of genocide, knowing the genocide word is a very sensitive word in Turkey.

But in the last couple years, the Turkish Government has taken a 180 degree turn—has become very close to the Chinese Government. Specifically, they signed an extradition treaty and also the

Turkish foreign minister in Beijing stated that Turkey will not be allowed for anti-China activities.

Having said that, if you flip through any newspapers published in Turkey, you will be hard-pressed to find anything on the ongoing madness in East Turkestan today.

Mr. SHERMAN. So they've gone from supportive to deliberately influencing their newspapers to not even report what China is doing to the—to these Turkic peoples.

What about Pakistan? Have they been willing to speak out for the Uyghurs?

Mr. TURKEL. Pakistan has also had a horrible history of collaborating with China.

Mr. SHERMAN. Which Muslim government or—

Mr. TURKEL. Unfortunately—

Mr. SHERMAN [continuing]. A government of a Muslim country has been the loudest and most dedicated to protecting the Uyghurs?

Mr. TURKEL. Unfortunately, none, as we speak. Only Malaysian leader Anwar Ibrahim recently expressed concern. That's pretty much about it.

Mr. SHERMAN. Expressed concern. But none of them have sanctioned any Chinese leaders?

Mr. TURKEL. None, unfortunately.

Mr. SHERMAN. Or sanctioned Chinese businesses? Which religious customs or rights is China prohibiting?

Mr. TURKEL. The—China's Government sanctions pretty much everything related to Islam, especially in the last 19 months.

Mr. SHERMAN. So if you don't eat during daylight in Ramadan, what will they do to you?

Mr. TURKEL. Foreign Policy magazine listed 48 ways that you'd be considered an extremist in the eyes of the Chinese Government under this new draconian rule of regulation imposed April 2017 that sanctioned a normal beard, adherence to Islamic diet—

Mr. SHERMAN. You mean eating halal food makes you an Islamic extremist?

Mr. TURKEL. This is under their new regulation. There are policy papers that have been written. Reports have been published on this particular issue. Foreign Policy magazine lists 48 behaviors that you and I—

Mr. SHERMAN. And the Foreign Policy magazine is translating a Chinese regulation—

Mr. TURKEL. That's correct.

Mr. SHERMAN [continuing]. That says you can—you are classified an Islamic extremist and subject to internment if you eat halal food?

Mr. TURKEL. Even greeting in an Islamic way. Today, Uyghur families cannot even say "salaam alaikum" as part of their culture.

Mr. SHERMAN. So they're, basically, prohibiting the practice of Islam while not allowing perhaps a vague Islamic cultural identity and the Muslim nations of the world lift not a finger.

Mr. TURKEL. That's the ironic world that we find ourselves today, unfortunately.

Mr. SHERMAN. I yield back.

Mr. YOHO. Next, we'll go to Mr. Rohrabacher from California.

Mr. ROHRBACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Let me ask the panel, didn't Mao have a period of time after he took over where he—was it “let a thousand flowers bloom” or something like that? Do you remember what I am talking about?

And, apparently, there was—in order to calm people down about this new power structure in China it came off as if the—well, it's not going to be so bad after all, and then when all the flowers began to bloom, meaning all the people became—coming out and expressing what they really believed about communism and about life, he had mass arrests and after that they had, of course, that effort that happened in the '60s where they just—a cultural revolution and just wiped all those people out who had exposed themselves to something other than the Communist ideology.

Well, what it sounds like to me is that what we have now—let 1,000 flowers bloom—I was right. Okay. What we seem to be having now and what you're describing is that the Chinese Government is going through another period where it is clamping down in order to stamp out those forces in society, especially those containing religion like the Uyghurs have that part of their culture—they're trying to stamp that out in order to secure that they—themselves from any opposition based on that cultural difference.

Does that pretty well sound like we are going through that phase? It sounds like to me, especially when we hear your testimony talking about how there are relocation camps and there are—there is an infrastructure being built to brutally eliminate the Uyghur tradition in that part of China—just eliminate it from the world.

And so thank you for being here and giving us those details, and I was listening to what you had to say and I would say it's frightening but it's consistent with what, frankly, those of us who've been worrying about China and the Communist Government of China, although, I don't even know if you can call it a Communist government.

It's just a vicious, one of the most iron-fisted dictatorships in the world. And whether or not—how they think about Marx or Lenin is irrelevant to that.

However, when you have a group that might be opposing that who has a religious conviction the Uyghurs are finding that out now.

But you have had—the Falun Gong, as you know, have had a very peaceful oriented philosophy—a spiritualist type philosophy. They're being brutally repressed, being murdered and their organs are sold to Westerners at times, and then, as I say, we got the—is it Rohingya down in Burma.

The Chinese are actually the ones who have organized and armed the Burmese Government and the military to go down there and commit the genocide—the genocide that is taking place with the Rohingya.

So I hope that we get the attention of some of the people and, number one, your suggestions, whichever one it was, about activating the Magnitsky Act—it's a good idea—when you have people committing crimes against humanity.

I disagreed with the title, Magnitsky, but I certainly agreed with the substance of what that act was all about and is all about. We

should do that. We should actually—and but most importantly, your testimony is as well.

Mr. Chairman—because we've got to make sure American corporations aren't involved with providing the technology needed for this repression—this wave of repression to succeed in China and some of our own companies need to be held accountable.

One last question—we are mentioning countries that have stepped forward. Has not Albania stepped forward and taken in a group of Uyghurs or am I mistaken about that?

Mr. TURKEL. Thank you very much. May I address your question?

Good to see you, Congressman Rohrabacher. We've known each other quite a long time.

Albania has not stepped up. Albania took some Uyghurs being detained in Guantanamo years ago.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right.

Mr. TURKEL. But Kosovo, interestingly enough, after the Ministerial that Secretary Pompeo organized several weeks ago, is one of the countries, along with the U.K., Canada, and the United States, to sign on the joint statement. That's the only Muslim country—

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. So Kosovo has but—

Mr. TURKEL. Not Albania.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. But Albania has not?

Mr. TURKEL. Not yet.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So—okay, I will check that out. Let me just note that I've been told a number of times that Albania and the Kosovars have been done but Albania was—in particular was mentioned to me. So we'll look into that.

Mr. Chairman, that may be something the committee can verify and I appreciate that information.

Mr. TURKEL. Thank you.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this hearing today. I am going to run to that other hearing and then to the vote and then to the other thing.

So sorry I can't stay for the whole thing.

Mr. YOHO. You will be in shape at the end of the day. [Laughter.]

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay.

Mr. YOHO. So where do we go from here? Again, we don't normally have people comment. If you can give just one comment, and this is the only time we are going to do it. So don't anybody else raise your hand, and keep it short, please.

[Off-microphone comment.]

Mr. YOHO. Let me address that after Mr. Chabot. Thank you.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be very brief. I am trying to do two things at once here. I apologize. I was in the back room with a meeting with some folks from Puerto Rico.

Again, I apologize, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for letting us go next. Let me begin by just saying, having served as the chair of this subcommittee for a number of years and having travelled through the Asia-Pacific region a number of times, I think many of us are very aware of China's terrible human rights record and the case in Xinjiang is truly Orwellian.

Uyghurs are routinely subjected to the most extreme and, really, absurd surveillance. They face random checks, restricted freedom of movement, and they cannot travel abroad.

Worse, authorities have made extensive use of video surveillance, facial recognition, and artificial intelligence to track every Uyghur's every move.

Most dystopian of all, authorities also maintain detailed records on Uyghurs including DNA samples, eye scans, and blood types.

Unfortunately, Beijing has spread its repression well beyond Xinjiang. Uyghurs around the world, including here in America, often face threats to their families at home unless they comply with Chinese authorities' demands and help monitor fellow Uyghurs.

Beijing claims to be worried about terrorism. But every country faces counterterrorism challenges without locking up over 1 million people. And the bottom line is Beijing is terrorizing their Uyghur population and it's just unacceptable.

So just a couple of questions and I would welcome any of the gentlemen here to respond. Over the past couple of years, the situation in Xinjiang has worsened considerably and we know that China's economic influence is quite comprehensive and can be pretty daunting, and Mr. Sherman got in this to some extent but I would like to go a little bit further.

And I would ask to what extent has this influence caused other countries, particularly the—some of the larger Muslim population countries to overlook or refrain from public criticism of China's treatment of the Uyghurs?

And I would offer that to anybody who might—Mr. Turkel, you might be the best person because you touched on it before.

Mr. TURKEL. There are a couple of possible ways to answer that question.

One is to those Muslim countries, it appears that the Uyghurs happen to be the wrong type of Muslim to show sympathy.

Mr. CHABOT. You said the wrong kind of Muslim?

Mr. TURKEL. Yes, and then the other possibility is that China happens to be the wrong type of adversary for them to take on.

And then finally, this committee holds a hearing about the Chinese coercive influence campaign that have been very effective in the Muslim countries. There was a question about Pakistan. Pakistan has been very supportive of Chinese efforts to silence the Pakistani Uyghur citizens even.

And in the Gulf States, particularly UAE, Egypt, has a horrible track record of deporting Uyghur students, which has been also reported by various media outlets, and in Malaysia, in a previous administration, has also deported some Uyghurs.

In the refugees issues they have been very, very cooperative with the Chinese Government. But on the moral issues, they have been looking the other way.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, and I think I've got time for one more question, Mr. Chairman.

It's my understanding that some members of the Uyghur diaspora have been targeted by Chinese authorities and I would ask how have Chinese authorities sought to co-opt or coerce or punish members of the Uyghur diaspora around the world and particularly here in the United States?

Mr. TURKEL. They use two different methods. One, they use the remaining family members in China as leverage against the free Uyghurs who have citizenship in Europe and North America.

So by using their family members, they silence public criticism. And then we had also recently Voice of America did a report on a public event here in Washington, DC. It specifically states that none of the Uyghurs who spoke with the reporter were comfortable disclosing their names.

I can assure you that many Uyghurs today living and breathing in this free country are afraid of coming to this hearing.

So the Chinese export of its oppression and the psychological damage—emotional damage, the crippling anxiety that they have caused is immeasurable in various communities, particularly in the Western societies.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, if I could just conclude. I mean, I think what was just said, it's very disturbing when one considers that people would be fearful—people living here in the United States would be fearful to come to a hearing before the United States Congress because of what might happen across the globe to their relatives back home and I think that the administration ought to look into this and we ought to do everything possible to make sure that people know that in the United States it truly is a place to be free and one ought not to have to worry about their relatives being harmed back home from the PRC or anybody else.

I yield back.

Mr. YOHO. No, I think you're very spot on. But, you know, you look at the long arm—the reach of the Chinese Government now with the intelligence they have, with the technology, and then looking to the future, when we get closer to perfecting artificial intelligence and then put in quantum computing, that'll be light years of where we are today. The control they can have on society over here for the people back home, as you just said, they'll be afraid to speak up.

And I find it very disturbing because, again, we've seen this throughout history. You know, if you don't fall in line with the government, we want you to report and we want you to report your neighbors.

On these so-called reeducation camps—and the only place I know of them in modern time were in Nazi Germany, in North Korea, and now we see them in China—have you guys talked to many people that have every come out of the reeducation camp?

I mean, what is the average time in a reeducation camp and how many people come out?

Mr. Turkel.

Mr. TURKEL. Not many. Not many. We have only a handful of former detainees who have been speaking with Western media. There is a Kazakh citizen who has been testifying and told us the stories of an 11-month ordeal.

He's a Kazakh citizen travelling in China and he came up and described his experience in those camps, and his parents had been taken away, and he apparently could not continue to live in Kazakhstan—recently had been relocated to Turkey, and Radio Free Asia recently went to Turkey to interview the actual victims

of those detention facilities and their accounts have been heart-wrenching—going through tortuous condemnation, denunciation, renunciation of their identity, watching so-called anti-separatist videos praising Xi Jinping, singing Red songs, very poor health conditions, diet.

Even today—last night I read a Radio Free Asia report about a 31-, 32-year-old young woman who died in one of those detention facilities. And earlier, Radio Free Asia also reported an 82-year-old Islamic scholar who was apparently tortured to death in prison, and, as reported recently, his entire family had been taken away.

And one thing that we need to point out here—the Chinese Government is attacking Uyghur intellectuals.

Mr. YOHO. Sure.

Mr. TURKEL. Elites, business leaders, musicians, athletes. Just reported last night again by Radio Free Asia, the vice president of Xinjiang University, president—former president of Xinjiang Medical University, and the four top officials at Kashgar University all have been taken away.

And the person who is in charge of educational affairs reportedly, by Radio Free Asia, received the death penalty, which is—I literally cannot come up with a better word—

Mr. YOHO. It's just hard to comprehend.

Dr. Jacobs, anybody else, have any comments on that? Dr. Zenz?

Mr. ZENZ. If I may go ahead—I would add to this that the information we have on this is fairly limited. But what we do have is very consistent. The information is consistent that people go in. More and more people go in. Very few people go out. Numbers are increasing.

I should also point out that in 2014 and 2015, the reeducation system for de-extremification grouped Uyghurs into four groups, and the most hardened, stubborn, and dangerous received 20 days of reeducation.

These days, it's unread of that anybody would be detained on no crime at all, no suspicion, no charge, no nothing whatsoever, and be released in—as quickly as 20 days. It's unheard of.

Mr. YOHO. Yes. I just find it extremely frightening.

Dr. Jacobs, do you have any other comments?

Mr. JACOBS. The only other evidence that we've had are from people who have come out and they then toed the party line as well and you will get this utopian account of how great the camps are.

Mr. YOHO. Right.

Mr. JACOBS. And they'll come out saying, you know, this is necessary. The only way you're going to get contrary testimony to that is by people who have been able to leave China and are not afraid of family members back home suffering repercussions.

Mr. YOHO. Right. I want to address our audience back there that wanted to make a statement. Unfortunately, I can't do that because we didn't have prior permission from both sides.

We'll be happy to get a statement that we can enter into this and maybe read it at a future one. Not to slight you or anything, but we are—you know, we checked on the rules and I can't do that.

You know, again, I just don't want to sound like a broken record. We've seen this too many times in history and we see what China is trying to do to create a one China, one mind set, one culture.

Yet, they're going after the people of Tibet, trying to rewrite history, trying to erase that culture. We've seen that in other parts of China—trying to erase that, and we see that with the Uyghurs.

We see where they're going with this new technology to get people to toe the line. If you don't toe the line, you go to the reeducation camps. The way we understand it there has been over 1 million people put into these.

We know the party elites that don't toe the party line are put into reeducation camps and we know they have over 1 million of those. But very few come out. It's like that song of the Eagles, "Hotel California"—you can check in but you can't check out.

And, you know, the thought that we are repeating those atrocities of the past are very disturbing and with the DNA and the retinal scans and things that they're tracking people, there's a U.S. company—Thermo Fisher—I understand that's involved in genetic testing equipment used for forced tests.

Do you guys have any ideas of what Congress should do with any company that is involved in having their equipment involved in this? Sanction them, being—you know, get the word to them, don't participate?

Dr. Zenz.

Mr. ZENZ. I think some companies may not fully realize what is going on or what it means to sell equipment to Xinjiang. Maybe they should be realizing by now. But I think the first item would be a significant awareness raising in the public and amongst, of course, companies.

Elevate the issue, and then issue relevant decisions on it. But I think especially the publicity—the awareness—and also the cost involved.

Mr. YOHO. No, I think that's a great idea and that's something that we can do on this committee, and if you guys are aware of any companies involved in their equipment being used in this, and it's like you said—they may not even know.

But if we can get that to them and bring an attention to this, I would think our companies would say, you're not using our equipment.

I find this shocking, you know. This is deeper than I thought—the control that China is doing—and, you know, some of the reports I read that they talk about there is no higher power than the Chinese Government—no deity, nothing else.

And I am so glad that we are in this country where we realize our rights come from a Creator, not from the government, and that China wants to turn everybody into a policing state and then they have the technology to make sure that they can follow through with that.

What we plan to do on this committee, and it's happened so many times, the information we deem from you will go into resolutions, letters to the different companies—different entities that are involved in this, and we've got some good results out of this.

You know, we've got the Cambodia Democracy Act that the cronies around Hun Sen said would never go anywhere. Their media attacked us. Yet, that bill got passed here in the House and we are going to continue to do things like that.

The DPRK Act, the Taiwan Travel Act—those are all things that came out of committee hearings like this, that we put pressure on those countries and we are going to continue to do that.

Again, I just find this very disturbing and I hope anybody that's listening to this that's in this audience, you see George Orwell's "1984." It is here and it is real, and this is the beginning of something that could be really catastrophic for the rest of the world and I think this is something that we need to get the message out for the family members that are here.

You're practicing Uyghurs and you have family members either left in China that are going through this process. You know, stay strong. Keep the word out there. Keep us—keep us informed.

It's shining the light on it through committee hearings like this, getting on the news, and I know you put yourself at risk or your family at risk. But if we go down the road and we do nothing, we will look back and have the regrets, and we just want to make sure we don't make those regrets of the past.

With that, this meeting is adjourned. I appreciate everybody being here and thank you for your input.

[Whereupon, at 3:26 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128

Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific
Ted Yoho (R-FL), Chairman

September 19, 2018

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, to be held by the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building (and available live on the Committee website at <http://www.ForeignAffairs.house.gov>):

DATE: Wednesday, September 26, 2018

TIME: 2:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: China's Repression and Internment of Uyghurs: U.S. Policy Responses

WITNESSES: Adrian Zenz, Ph.D.
Independent Researcher

Mr. Nury Turkel
Chairman of the Board
Uyghur Human Rights Project

Justin Jacobs, Ph.D.
Associate Professor
Department of History
American University

By Direction of the Chairman

The Committee on Foreign Affairs seeks to make its facilities accessible to persons with disabilities. If you are in need of special accommodations, please call 202/225-5021 at least four business days in advance of the event, whenever practicable. Questions with regard to special accommodations in general (including availability of Committee materials in alternative formats and assistive listening devices) may be directed to the Committee.



COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON Asia and the Pacific HEARING

Day Wednesday Date September 26, 2018 Room 2172

Starting Time 2:15 pm Ending Time 3:30 pm

Recesses (to) (to) (to) (to) (to) (to)

Presiding Member(s)

Rep. Yoho

Check all of the following that apply:

Open Session

Executive (closed) Session

Televised

Electronically Recorded (taped)

Stenographic Record

TITLE OF HEARING:

China's Repression and Internment of Uyghurs: U.S. Policy Responses

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:

Reps. Yoho, Rohrabacher, Chabot

Rep. Sherman

NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: (Mark with an * if they are not members of full committee.)

*Rep. Comstock**

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes No

(If "no", please list below and include title, agency, department, or organization.)

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements submitted for the record.)

SFR - Yoho (On Behalf of Amnesty International)

SFR - Connolly

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE _____

or
TIME ADJOURNED 3:30


Subcommittee Staff Associate

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE TED S. YOHO, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC



CHINA: “WHERE ARE THEY?”

TIME FOR ANSWERS ABOUT MASS DETENTIONS IN THE
XINJIANG UIGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION

Amnesty International is a global movement of more than 7 million people who campaign for a world where human rights are enjoyed by all.

Our vision is for every person to enjoy all the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights standards.

We are independent of any government, political ideology, economic interest or religion and are funded mainly by our membership and public donations.

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First published in 2018
by Amnesty International Ltd
Peter Benenson House, 1 Easton Street
London WC1X 0DW, UK

Index: ASA 17/9113/2018
Original language: English
amnesty.org



Cover photo: Family members of ethnic Kazakhs share photos of missing relatives they believe have been detained in "transformation-through-education" centres in China's Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, Almaty, Kazakhstan, September 2018.
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
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INTRODUCTION

Located in China's far northwest, the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) is a huge, sparsely populated area encompassing vast semi-desert steppes in the north and severe desert basins ringed by historic oasis towns in the south. Roughly three times the size of France, the area covered by the XUAR was renowned over centuries for the ancient Silk Road and its flourishing conduit of trade and culture between China and the rest of the world.

That history made the XUAR one of the most ethnically diverse regions in China. More than half of the region's population of 22 million people belong to mostly Turkic and predominantly Muslim ethnic groups, including Uighurs (around 10 million), Kazakhs (around 1.5 million) and other populations whose languages, cultures and ways of life vary distinctly from those of the Han who are the majority in "interior" China.

Rich in coal, natural gas and oil and sharing borders with eight different countries, the XUAR is intertwined with many of China's economic, strategic and foreign policy goals. But decades of inter-ethnic tensions have led to cycles of sporadic violence and heavy-handed repression. China's leaders now consider stability in the XUAR vital to the success of the "Belt and Road Initiative", a massive global infrastructure development programme aimed at strengthening China's links to Central Asia and beyond.¹



Map of the People's Republic of China showing the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region in yellow.

¹ D. Tweed, "China's New Silk Road," *Bloomberg*, 23 August 2018, www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/china-s-silk-road

Today, however, the world's attention has focused on the XUAR for other reasons. Over recent months, disturbing details have emerged from the region describing intrusive surveillance, arbitrary detention, political indoctrination and forced cultural assimilation being carried out there on a massive scale and targeting the region's Uighurs, Kazakhs and other predominantly Muslim peoples. In concluding observations to its August 2018 review of China, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD Committee) expressed alarm about reports of arbitrary, prolonged and incommunicado mass detention of Uighurs and other predominantly Muslim minorities under the pretext of countering terrorism and religious extremism.²

The picture of what is happening in the XUAR is gradually coming into focus, but as the Chinese government has long barred any form of meaningful independent investigation in the region, much remains unknown. In recent months Amnesty International has spoken with more than 100 people across four continents who say they have lost touch with relatives and friends inside the XUAR and fear that they have been detained. The secretive and undocumented way people are going missing there makes it nearly impossible to trace or confirm the whereabouts of any particular individual. Amnesty International has begun to collect accounts from affected individuals, and these accounts corroborate many of the details that are being reported by others.

At this point, our concern about recent developments in the XUAR demands that we urgently speak out and call on the Chinese authorities to begin providing credible answers to questions about the current crackdown.

Among all those questions, perhaps most urgent is one all those family members who've reached out to us want answered more than any other. On behalf of the missing inside the XUAR and the people worldwide who care about them, it is that question we are now asking the Chinese government in a strong, unified voice: "Where are They?"

NOTE ON HOW THIS BRIEFING WAS PREPARED

Investigating sensitive human rights issues in the XUAR has always been exceptionally difficult. Diplomats and UN human rights experts typically only gain access to the region through visits carefully managed and controlled by the local authorities. Foreign reporters are routinely followed and harassed by security officials.³ Some have even been expelled or denied work visas for investigations in the XUAR.⁴ Locals are often reluctant to share information with outsiders, fearing repercussions. It is extremely difficult under such conditions to collect and present accurate evidence of human rights violations that may be taking place.

Amnesty International has been closely following the reporting of media organizations and other NGOs about the situation in the XUAR. Our organization has not independently verified many of the descriptions of the detention system that have been reported so far through on the ground investigations in the XUAR. We initially conducted remote interviews with eight individuals who contacted us for help locating relatives or friends. In September 2018, we collected testimonies from more than 100 ethnic Kazakhs originally from the XUAR during a four-day visit to Kazakhstan. Based on these interviews and the reporting of others, we are sufficiently convinced that the detention system in the XUAR exists and that further action needs to be taken to investigate it.

Most of the interviews with the Kazakhs in this briefing were arranged by Sarikzhan Bilash and Rydyrah Orzadyi who founded the organization Atajurt (Атажурт), which helps to document the cases of Chinese-born Kazakhs living in Kazakhstan who have lost contact with relatives who are either detained in "political re-education camps", under house arrest or have had their passports confiscated by the Chinese authorities.

Except where otherwise noted, all interviewees consented to the use of their full names and the names of relatives missing or presumed detained.

² Concluding Observations of UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: China, UN Doc. CERD/C/CHN/CO/14-17, para. 40. See also Amnesty International, *China: Systematic repression of ethnic minorities laid bare in UN findings* (Press release, 30 August 2018), www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/08/china-systematic-repression-of-ethnic-minorities-laid-bare-in-un-findings/

³ "Harassment of journalists in China: reporters covering Xinjiang prevented from conducting interviews", Foreign Correspondents Club of Hong Kong, www.fccchk.org/harassment-of-journalists-in-china-reporters-covering-xinjiang-prevented-from-conducting-interviews/

⁴ M. Forsythe, "China Says It Will Expel French Journalist," *New York Times*, 19 January 2018, www.nytimes.com/2018/01/19/world/asia/china-says-it-will-expel-french-journalist.html; A. Ramzy & E. Wong, "China Forces Out BuzzFeed Journalist," *New York Times*, 24 August 2018, www.nytimes.com/2018/08/23/world/asia/china-buzzfeed-reporter.html

FAMILIES FEARING THE WORST


“When will the nightmare start again? What can I do? Who is going to care about us?”

Uighur journalist Gulchehra Hoja, on the detentions her family has faced in the XUAR, 13 March 2018

For months, relatives of the missing kept their anguish largely to themselves. They hoped that loss of contact with loved ones back home would be temporary, and they feared making things worse if they sought outside attention. Now, with no clear end in sight for their worries, more and more are willing to speak up and share what they know.

They come from the diaspora of Uighur emigrants and refugees who have settled across the world and the thousands of Chinese-born Kazakhs who have taken up residence in neighbouring Kazakhstan, having until very recently been able to travel relatively freely back and forth between the two countries.

BOTA'S ACCOUNT: “I WANT TO SEE MY FATHER AGAIN”



Bota Kussaiyn, 26, holds a photo of her father, Kussaiyn Sagymbai, who was detained in a political “re-education” camp in the XUAR after returning to China from Kazakhstan to seek medical treatment, September 2018. © Amnesty International.

Bota Kussaiyn, a Kazakh student studying at Moscow State University, last spoke with her father in November 2017. Originally from the XUAR, their family had re-settled in Kazakhstan in 2013. A leg ailment led Bota’s father, **Kussaiyn Sagymbai**, to return to the XUAR for medical treatment.

Bota’s father told her that local police had confiscated his passport without giving any reason. Three months later, her mother who had stayed behind in Kazakhstan learned from relatives back in the XUAR that her father was in a political “re-education” camp in E’m’in County, across the Kazakhstan

border in the northwestern part of the XUAR, but the family did not know the exact location where he was being held.

Those relatives were so afraid that further contact might put them under suspicion that they stopped communicating with her mother altogether after that.

"My father is an ordinary citizen. We were a happy family before he was detained. We laughed together. We can't laugh any more, and we can't sleep at night. We live in fear every day. It has done great harm to my mother. We don't know where he is. We don't even know if he's still alive. I want to see my father again."

(Online interview, 29 August 2018 and interview in Kazakhstan, 7 September 2018)

To avoid arousing such suspicion, Uighurs, Kazakhs and others inside the XUAR have been cutting ties with friends and family living outside China. They warn acquaintances not to call and delete outside contacts from social media applications.⁵ The resulting communications vacuum only intensifies the information black hole that the XUAR has become. When you lose all contact with loved ones back home, how do you know whether it is because they are intentionally avoiding you for self-protection or because they have been taken away by the authorities? Unable to get reliable information from home, many Uighurs and Kazakhs living abroad inevitably fear the worst.

AKEDA'S ACCOUNT: WORRIES FOR MOTHER, PROMINENT UIGHUR SCHOLAR NOW MISSING



*Uighur scholar Rahile Dawut, undated photograph at Oxford University.
© Private*

Akeda (who asked to be identified only by her first name) last spoke with her mother, **Rahile Dawut**, in December 2017. She now fears her mother, a prominent Uighur scholar, has been detained at a "re-education" camp in the XUAR.⁶ When Akeda, who is studying in the USA, contacted relatives and her mother's students back in China, no one was able to provide her with any information.

"I am scared for my mom. I am really concerned about her health and safety," Akeda told Amnesty International by email. "She is an honest and assiduous teacher. She dedicated all her life [to] teaching and research. I can't think of any reason why she should suffer."

(Email correspondence with Amnesty International, 3 September 2018)

⁵ N. VanderKlippe, "Uighurs around the World Feel New Pressure as China Increases Its Focus on Those Abroad," *The Globe and Mail*, 29 October 2017, www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/uighurs-around-the-world-feel-new-pressure-as-china-increases-its-focus-on-thoseabroad/article36759591/

⁶ C. Buckley & A. Ramzy, "Star Scholar Disappears as Crackdown Engulfs Western China", *New York Times*, 10 August 2018, www.nytimes.com/2018/08/10/world/asia/china-xinjiang-rahile-dawut.html

Adding to the pressure on those living abroad are aggressive efforts by Chinese security officials to recruit spies in overseas communities.⁷ Those targeted are reportedly threatened that if they do not cooperate, family members back in the XUAR will be detained. If they do cooperate, on the other hand, they receive promises that family members will be treated leniently.

Not knowing who among the community living overseas might be reporting back to security authorities in China plants seeds of suspicion and distrust that take root and further feed the sense of isolation and fear. The omnipresence of these feelings is contributing to a growing crisis of despair and depression among the diaspora community, according to a clinical social worker who has surveyed Uighurs living abroad.⁸



NURSHAT'S ACCOUNT: TEENAGE DAUGHTER, SON BOTH GONE MISSING

Nurshat Mamish went to Kazakhstan in November 2017 and is now a Kazakhstani citizen. She appeared heartbroken when she told Amnesty International that her 13-year-old daughter, **Dinara Yergali**, had gone missing after returning to Zhaosu County, XUAR, in March 2018. A month earlier, Dinara had gone to Kazakhstan to stay with her mother, but she returned when relatives back in Xinjiang warned Nurshat that other family members would be in trouble if she and her family did not return immediately.

Dinara did not want to leave her mother, but Nurshat and her family had her return, thinking that nothing would happen to a 13-year-old girl and it might reduce pressure on other family members. Now, however, Dinara's whereabouts are unknown and her family fears she has been detained.

Two months before Dinara went missing, Nurshat's 24-year-old son **Yerbol Yergaliuli** called from the XUAR to say that he had been detained. He, too, had been planning to join the family in Kazakhstan, but now Nurshat has no idea where he is.

Having lost track of two children, Nurshat now says she can only hope that they will soon be allowed to travel to Kazakhstan to reunite as a family.

(Interview with Amnesty International, Almaty, Kazakhstan, 8 September 2018)

Uighurs overseas also fear what might happen to them if they return to the XUAR. Those with the right to reside in other countries at least have the ability to stay where they are. But students on short-term visas or people seeking asylum in other countries do not always have that option. In 2017, more than 200 Uighur students were detained in Egypt, of whom at least 22 were forced to return to China.⁹ To date, there is no news of their whereabouts. Even amid growing reports of the ongoing repression in the XUAR, an immigration panel in Sweden initially denied asylum to a Uighur family of four who were seeking to rebuild their lives in safety there.¹⁰

States have an obligation under international law to comply with the principle of *non-refoulement* by ensuring that people are not returned, either directly or indirectly, to a country where there is a real risk of serious human rights violations or abuses.

⁷ M. Rajagopalan, "They Thought They'd Left the Surveillance State Behind. They Were Wrong." *BuzzFeed News*, 9 July 2018, www.buzzfeednews.com/article/meghara/china-uyghur-spies-surveillance


⁸ N. VanderKlippe, "Uighurs around the World Feel New Pressure as China Increases Its Focus on Those Abroad."

Amnesty International, *Urgent Action: More Uighur Students at Risk of Forcible Return* (Index: MDE 12/6848/2017).

¹⁰ J. Olsson, "Sweden about to deport a Uighur family to Xinjiang", *INDEUJING.se*, 5 September 2018, inbeijing.se/bulletin/2018/09/05/Sweden-about-to-deport-a-uyghur-family-to-xinjiang/

NOTE: The preceding document has not been printed here in full but may be found at <https://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=108718>

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE TED S. YOHO, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC



September 26, 2018

Rep. Ted Yoho, Chair
Asia and the Pacific Subcommittee
511 Cannon House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

Rep. Sherman, Ranking Member
Asia and the Pacific Subcommittee
2181 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

Re: September 26 hearing on “China’s Repression and Internment of Uyghurs: U.S. Policy Responses”

Dear Chairman Yoho, Ranking Member Sherman, and Members of the Subcommittee:

On behalf of Amnesty International USA and our more than two million supporters and members nationwide, we submit this statement for the hearing record.

Over the past year Chinese authorities have intensified their crackdown on Uyghurs, Kazakhs and other predominantly Muslim ethnic groups, through mass internment, intrusive surveillance, political indoctrination, and forced cultural assimilation. Most of the detainees’ families have been kept in the dark about their loved ones’ fate and are often too frightened to speak out. China must end its campaign of systematic repression and shed light on the fate of up to one million predominantly Muslim people arbitrarily detained in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (“XUAR”).

On September 24, 2018, Amnesty International published a new briefing titled, *China: Where are they? Time for answers about mass detentions in Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region*, which documents the plight of people who have lost touch with relatives and friends inside the XUAR. Amnesty International interviewed more than 100 people outside of China whose relatives in XUAR are still missing, as well as individuals who were tortured while in detention camps there.

While Amnesty International has not had access to these centers and has not independently verified the reports, we believe that they are credible. Satellite imagery,

documents made public by local government organs, and a major intensification of the state security apparatus throughout Xinjiang all point to what has been documented in many personal anecdotes. Those who have travelled or have family abroad, along with those who are religiously observant, have expressed the slightest criticism of the Chinese government, or have expressed an interest in preserving the Uyghur language and culture have all faced pressure from the authorities, along with their families and associates. The Chinese government acknowledges the detention of Uighurs but claims they are in technical training institutes; however, their whereabouts are unknown, and any information is nearly impossible to gather.

Mass detention camps began appearing in 2014, spreading at an alarming rate across Xinjiang province since then. In its 2018 review of China, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD Committee) expressed concern over human rights violations in XUAR. Lack of information remains a paramount challenge in investigating the issue, but the CERD Committee estimates that there are “anywhere between several hundred thousand and just over one million” people have been detained. The legal process regarding these camps is questionable, as there are no trials, lawyers, or opportunities to appeal the decision throughout the entire ordeal. Individuals live in fear of being exposed and cut communication with family members in hopes of securing their safety.

For example, Kairat Samarkan was sent to a detention camp in October 2017 after he returned to the XUAR following a short visit to neighboring Kazakhstan. Police told him he was detained because he was accused of having dual citizenship and had betrayed China. He was detained for over three months. Kairat told Amnesty International that he was hooded, forcibly shackled on his arms and legs, and was forced to stand in a fixed position for 12 hours. He described that there were nearly 6,000 people held in the same camp, where they were forced to sing political songs and study speeches of the Chinese Communist Party. They could not talk to each other and were forced to chant “Long live Xi Jinping” before meals. Kairat told Amnesty International that the detention abuses drove him to attempt suicide, shortly before his release. Kairat's story is just one of many heartbreaking interviews we conducted to document the human rights abuses going on in Xinjiang.

Ethnic tensions in XUAR have long persisted but only recently has such information been steadily exposed to the international community, and the situation is nothing less than

urgent. Veiled by the pretext of countering terrorism and religious extremism, Chinese authorities are operating under secrecy and denial of human rights abuses against ethnic Muslim groups.

Those who resist or fail to show enough progress reportedly face punishments ranging from verbal abuse to food deprivation, solitary confinement, beatings and use of restraints and stress positions. There have been reports of deaths inside the facilities, including suicides of those unable to bear the mistreatment.

While only pieces of the deterioration of human rights in Xinjiang are known, they demand recognition and truth from the Chinese government. Cultural alienation, censorship, and forced disappearances are well documented in the testimonies of witnesses and reliable evidence gathered by Amnesty International in September 2018.

Intrusively detailed biometric data from XUAR's residents such as fingerprints, DNA and voice samples, and 360-degree body imagery permeate the region with each passing day. Mosques are no exception, as facial recognition software is said to be installed. Uyghurs have been forced to download a government designed application on their phones that tracks all of their activities; failure to do so could get one sent to the internment camps. Since 2014, surveillance has spread rapidly and is one of the most sophisticated in the world with "national security" as a justification for the government's actions, resulting in the "Regulation on De-Extremification" in XUAR. XUAR's party secretary, Chen Quanguo, is a leading figure in characterizing it as a "no rights zone," according to CERD Co-Rapporteur Gay McDougall. In 2016, Chen increased the size of police and security personnel and presence of high-tech surveillance systems to restrict mobility that aimed to specifically target ethnic Muslims.

The Chinese government is negligent in failing to protect its people according to international legal standards. China's Constitution, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, Cultural Rights, to which China is a state party, prohibit discrimination based on ethnicity, language, and religion.


Congress should impress on the Administration and the Chinese government the importance of fulfilling its human rights commitments to the international community

and its own people. In particular, Congress should insist that the government of China undertake the following actions:

- Call on the Chinese government to immediately close all political education camps in Xinjiang and release all individuals held, and end the Strike Hard Campaign
- Urge the U.S. Administration to participate in China's 2018 Universal Periodic Review, send a high-level delegation, and raise concerns about Xinjiang.
- Every Congressional delegation that visits China should request access to the Uighur region and specifically to the detention centers. Congressional delegations that focus on economic ties should condition their visits on access.
- Request law enforcement agencies investigate threats and retaliation carried out against Uighur U.S. citizens and against all Uighurs on U.S. soil.
- Affirm U.S. policy that it will cease, in accordance with their obligations under international law, all forced transfer, directly or indirectly, to China of Uighurs, Kazakhs or other Chinese nationals from XUAR, if they would face a real risk of serious human rights violations.
- Appropriate funds for documentation, casework, evidence collection and preservation to address the plight of Uighur refugees and asylum seekers in the region and throughout the world.
- Support assistance for civil society organizations that focus on Uighur human rights work in the space of capacity building, culture preservation, legal aid, and rehabilitation.

For more information, please contact Francisco Bencosme by phone at: (202) 845-5075 or email at: fbencosme@aiusa.org.

Sincerely,



Francisco Bencosme
Advocacy Manager for Asia
Advocacy and Government Affairs

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY ADRIAN ZENZ, PH.D., INDEPENDENT RESEARCHER

By Adrian Zenz - Version of this paper accepted for publication by the journal Central Asian Survey

"Thoroughly Reforming Them Towards a Healthy Heart Attitude"

- China's Political Re-Education Campaign in Xinjiang¹

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Updated September 6, 2018

**This is the accepted version of the article published by Central Asian Survey at
<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02634937.2018.1507997>**

Abstract

Since spring 2017, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in China has witnessed the emergence of an unprecedented reeducation campaign. According to media and informant reports, untold thousands of Uyghurs and other Muslims have been and are being detained in clandestine political re-education facilities, with major implications for society, local economics and ethnic relations. Considering that the Chinese state is currently denying the very existence of these facilities, this paper investigates publicly available evidence from official sources, including government websites, media reports and other Chinese internet sources. First, it briefly charts the history and present context of political re-education. Second, it looks at the recent evolution of re-education in Xinjiang in the context of 'de-extremification' work. Finally, it evaluates detailed empirical evidence pertaining to the present re-education drive. With Xinjiang as the 'core hub' of the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing appears determined to pursue a definitive solution to the Uyghur question.

Since summer 2017, troubling reports emerged about large-scale internments of Muslims (Uyghurs, Kazakhs and Kyrgyz) in China's northwest Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). By the end of the year, reports emerged that some ethnic minority townships had detained up to 10 percent of the entire population, and that in the Uyghur-dominated Kashgar Prefecture alone, numbers of interned persons had reached 120,000 (*The Guardian*, January 25, 2018).

¹ The author is grateful to: anonymous informants for their helpful contributions; James Millward, for encouraging the author to submit this article to this journal; and Joanne Smith Finley, Tom Cliff, Rian Thum, Kurban Niyaz and three anonymous peer reviewers for their helpful comments and corrections.

Despite increasing media coverage starting in late 2017, the Chinese government has denied the very existence of Xinjiang's re-education camps. In February 2018, during an interview with the Almaty Tengrinews, Zhang Wei, China's Consul General in Kazakhstan, claimed that "we do not have such an idea in China" (AKIPress, 2018). Similarly, in a May 2018 response to a press comment request, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that it "had not heard" of such a situation (Shih, 2018). Since then, the *Global Times*, the CCP's English-language mouthpiece, reported that over a million residents especially in southern Xinjiang have been subject to "government-organized occupational education programs" as a "poverty alleviation" measure (2018a). Subsequently, it published an article on the education of imprisoned "religious extremists" in order to curb extremism (2018b). Notably, however, neither of these pieces acknowledges the existence of a large-scale extra-judicial detention system designed to indoctrinate large swaths of the general population.

There is mounting anecdotal and eyewitness evidence on re-education from Western news outlets (Dooley, 2018; Chin, 2017; Shih, 2017, 2018). This article demonstrates that one can find also a substantial body of PRC governmental sources, produced for a domestic audience, that prove the existence of the camps. Official public tenders indicate the construction of such facilities on city, county, township and village levels. Based on the available documentary evidence, we can surmise that the region's current re-education system exceeds the size of China's entire former "education through labour" system that was officially abolished in 2013.

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Government and state media reports show that re-education efforts among especially the Uyghur population began in late 2013 and gradually became more institutionalised. However, it was not until spring 2017, under the auspices of the XUAR's new Party Secretary Chen Quanguo, that the scale of these internments reached unprecedented levels. Under Chen, Muslim majority regions are being assigned detention quotas, resulting in the internment of large swaths of Muslim populations without due process. Rather than representing court-sanctioned criminal punishments, official documents portray re-education in terms akin to free medical treatment of a dangerous addiction to religious ideology. Re-education reports often cite "transformation success rates" to demonstrate this "treatment's" effectiveness. Drawing on Foucault, Sean Roberts argued that the state has been framing the Uyghur population almost as a biological threat to society that must be contained through physical separation, surveillance and detention (Roberts, 2018). This article suggests that Chen Quanguo's re-education drive epitomises the "biopolitics" of China's "war on terror".

Xinjiang is China's largest administrative unit, strategically located along a 5,600 kilometre border with eight nations. It has long been a strategic zone of intercultural contact and conflict. Since the creation of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has spent billions of dollars asserting its sovereignty and authority over this remote region. However, the intensification of Beijing's integrationist project, notably in the wake of the Great Western Development Initiative that was inaugurated in 2000, has also led to increased resistance, especially among the native Uyghur population (Bequelin, 2004). After the September 11, 2001 terror attack on the World Trade Center, China launched its own "war on terror" against Uyghur Muslim separatism. In particular, the 2008 Lhasa uprising and the 2009

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Ürümchi riots raised the specter of a Soviet-style ethnic implosion, which further emboldened state advocates of an integrationist minority policy approach (Millward, 2009). Rather than decreasing ethnic tensions, these assimilationist tendencies have increased Uyghur feelings of cultural insecurity (see Smith Finley in this Special Issue). Xinjiang's ethnic relations are further complicated by the fact that Beijing has to take a tough stance against any hint of minority separatism in order to appease the region's Han, which in 2015 constituted 37 percent of the population (Cliff, 2016).

Since the inception of Xi Jinping's ambitious "Belt and Road Initiative" in late 2013, stability maintenance (*weiwen*; 维稳) in this volatile region has become an even greater priority. Xinjiang became a "core region" (*hexin qu*; 核心区) in the BRI, just at a time when deadly acts of resistance there were reaching a peak (Clarke, 2016). After the suicide car bombing in Beijing's Tian'anmen square (October 2013), the train station stabbing in Kunming (March 2014) and the market bombing in Urumqi (April 2014), Chinese President Xi Jinping responded with a call for "walls made of copper and steel" and "nets spread from the earth to the sky" to capture these terrorists (*China Daily*, 2014). Under Secretary Chen Quanguo, who was drafted into the region in late August 2016, the XUAR embarked on a massive human and technological securitization drive that turned the region into one of the most heavily fortified and policed regions in the world (Zenz and Leibold, 2017).

Firstly, this article briefly charts the context of political re-education in China. Secondly, it looks at the evolution of re-education in Xinjiang in the context of "de-extremification" work. Then, it evaluates the unprecedented re-education drive initiated by Chen

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Quanguo. Lastly, the article presents detailed empirical information on current re-education facilities in their various guises.

Political Re-Education in China

The concept of re-education has a long history in Communist China. In the 1950s, the state established the so-called "reform through labour" (*laodong gaizao*; 劳动改造), commonly referred to as *laogai* (Seymour and Anderson, 1998). The *laogai* system is part of the formal prison system, and inmates are convicted through legal proceedings. In contrast, the "re-education through labour" system (*laodong jiaoyang*; 劳动教养) or in short *laojiao* was established in 1957 as an administrative penalty and internment system. Anyone could be sentenced to *laojiao* by the public security agencies without trials or legal procedures (Mühlhahn, 2009). Revived in the 1980s, *laojiao* was widely used for dissidents, petitioners or petty criminals. Even family members or employers could recommend persons for re-education (Laogai Research Foundation, 2008, 17). Both the leadership under Xi Jinping and the population felt that sending people into such camps without legal proceedings, merely at the whims of local police authorities, was no longer appropriate in a modern society governed by the rule of law. A pertinent example is the case of Tang Hui, who was placed into *laojiao* in 2012 for protesting the lenient sentences given to those who had forced her daughter into prostitution, causing considerable public outrage (Green, 2014). Since their abolishment, many *laojiao* facilities have become centres for coercive isolated detoxification treatments given to drug addicts (*qiangzhi geli jiedu*; 强制隔离戒毒) (Sina News, 2013).

In the early 2000s, another term for re-education emerged. In order to convert Falun Gong followers away from their spiritual pursuits, the state initiated so-called

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"transformation through education" (*jiaoyu zhuanhua*; 教育转化) classes (Tong, 2009, 106). The Chinese term *zhuanhua*, which effectively turns "education" into (political) re-education, literally means to "transform" or to "convert". It is also used to describe the chemical process of isomerization by which one molecule is transformed into another. A state media report from 2001 describes the initiation of Falun Gong-related "re-education classes" (*jiaoyu zhuanhua xuexiban*; 教育转化学习班) throughout the country, including Xinjiang's Ürümchi (Renminwang, 2001).

Besides combating the Falun Gong, the state also employs "transformation through education" in educational contexts. So-called "problem students" are subjected to "transformation through education", although this often takes place in regular school contexts and only sometimes in closed training contexts or dedicated institutions. Finally, "transformation through education" is a common concept in the context of China's coercive isolated detoxification.

Political Re-Education in Contrast to Other Forms of Internment

Akin to re-education through labour (*laojiao*), political re-education in Xinjiang is an extrajudicial procedure that does not replace criminal punishment or reform through labour (*laogai*). The region's re-education facility network therefore operates alongside the regular prison and detention system.

For example, an official report on Dunbar Village (Kashgar Prefecture) distinguishes between: a) convicts who have been sentenced (*panxing*; 判刑, i.e. to prison), b) suspects who have been detained (*shouya*; 收押, i.e. in detention centres, awaiting judgment), and c) those in political re-education (*jiaoyu zhuanhua ren yuan*; 教育转化人员) (Liu, 2017).

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Similarly, sources with close acquaintances in Xinjiang told the author that detained suspects there may be first placed in detention centres (*kanshousuo*; 看守所) in order to evaluate whether they will be sent to political re-education or to prison (see also Shih, 2018).

Typically, the use of the term "transformation through education" in Xinjiang is restricted to: a) political re-education of the general population (especially of Muslim minorities), b) political re-education of cadres (especially so-called "two-faced persons" *liangmianren*; 两面人), and c) persons detained for coerced detoxification (XUAR Food and Drug Inspection and Management Bureau, 2017). Occasionally, it is also applied to those in prison, usually in connection with the concept of "de-extremification" (and therefore presumably in regard to sentenced "religious extremists"). However, the more common term for the re-education of those sentenced to prison terms is *jiaoyu gaizao* (教育改造), akin to "reform through labour" (*laodong gaizao*).

In terms of the different facility names, reform through labour typically takes place in prisons (*jianyu*; 监狱) while the former re-education through labour system was located in re-education "facilities" or "camps" (*laojiaosuo*; 劳教所). In contrast, Xinjiang's contemporary political re-education drive is conducted through a network of "transformation through education" "centres" (*zhongxin*; 中心), "bases" (*jidi*; 基地) and "schools" (*xuexiao*; 学校) (compare Table 1). Locals often refer to re-education internment as "attending/entering class" (*jin xuexiban*; 进学习班), or "getting an education" (*shoudao jiaoyu*; 受到教育).

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Despite some exceptions, these distinct uses and terminologies have aided the author's task of identifying material related to the political re-education of Muslim populations in Xinjiang.

The Inception of "De-Extremification" through Re-Education in Xinjiang

It was not until 2014 that the "transformation through education" concept in Xinjiang came to be used in wider contexts than the Falun Gong, Party discipline or drug addict rehabilitation. Prior to that year, public references to "transformation through education" in the context of combating religious extremism and stability maintenance are very rare. A district in Turpan City, a majority Uyghur region, reported in August 2013 that it was undertaking "transformation through education work" (*jiaoyu zhuanhua gongzuo*; 教育转化工作) in order to deal with "four special types of people" (*sizhong teshu renqun*; 四种特殊人群), including young men who grow beards (Turpan City Party Net, 2013). Transformation through education goals were determined on a case-by-case basis and implemented through home visits and vocational training rather than internment in dedicated facilities. Back then, re-education efforts concentrated on a limited number of "focus persons" (*zhongdianren*; 重点人).

The increasingly widespread application of "transformation through education" to Uyghur or Muslim population groups arose in tandem with the "de-extremification" (*qu jiduanhua*; 去极端化) campaign. The phrase "de-extremification" was first mentioned by Xinjiang's former Party secretary Zhang Chunxian at a January 2012 meeting in Khotān Prefecture and de-extremification measures became local legislation in April 2015 (Phoenix Information, 2015). On April 1, 2017, the region then enacted a comprehensive

"de-extremification ordinance" (Xinjiang weiwu'er zizhiqu qujiduanhua tiaoli; 新疆维吾尔自治区去极端化条例).
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Chen Quanguo: The Strongman Behind Beijing's Securitization Strategy in Tibet and Xinjiang

Publication: China Brief Volume: 17 Issue: 12

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Over the last year, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) Party Secretary Chen Quanguo (• • •) has dramatically increased the police presence in Xinjiang by advertising over 90,000 new police and security-related positions. [1] This soldier-turned-politician is little known outside of China, but within China he has gained a reputation as an ethnic policy innovator, pioneering a range of new methods for securing Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule over Uyghurs, Tibetans and other ethnic minorities in western China.

Born into a poor family in rural Henan province, Chen worked his way up the CCP ladder, serving first under Premier Li Keqiang in his native Henan, before becoming Party Secretary of neighboring Hebei province. In 2011, he was handed the difficult task of ruling the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR), which had once again erupted into violence in 2008. During his five years in Tibet, he restored stability through the construction a sophisticated network of surveillance and control. After being transferred to the XUAR in August 2016, he quickly rolled out the same securitization strategy, accomplishing in a single year what took him five years in the TAR.

In Tibet and now Xinjiang, Chen Quanguo lifted a strategy directly from the imperial playbook, with past colonial powers like England and Japan enlisting "native" populations to watch over their own people. Ethnic minorities have long served the CCP in China. However, the numbers of Uyghurs and Tibetans that have been recruited into China's security apparatus under Chen far exceed public recruitments during the preceding decade and are potentially setting a historic record.

Chen Quanguo's Policing Strategy in Tibet

Within two months of assuming power in Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) in August 2011, Chen Quanguo rolled out his first and perhaps most effective security innovation, the so-called convenience police stations (• • • • •), street-corner bulwarks for community-based policing. In October 2011, the TAR advertised 2,500 police positions, with 458 of them designated for Lhasa's new convenience police stations (Xueyu jiaoyu (http://www.chinagwy.org/html/xwsz/zyxw/201110/21_32722.html), October 21, 2011). By August 2012, Lhasa had established 161 of these concrete structures with a distance of no more than 500 meters between stations (Ministry of Public Security (<http://www.mps.gov.cn/n2255079/n2255804/n2255808/c3872620/content.html>), August 12, 2012).

This dense network of surveillance is at the heart of what Party officials call "grid-style social management" (• • • • • • • •), a practice that segments urban communities into geometric zones so that security staff can systematically observe all activities with the aid of new technologies (ChinaChange (<https://chinachange.org/2013/08/08/the-urban-grid-management-and-police-state-in-china-a-brief-overview/>), August 8, 2013; China Brief, August 17 ([https://jamestown.org/program/managing-the-state-social-](https://jamestown.org/program/managing-the-state-social-credit-surveillance-and-the-ccps-plan-for-china/)

[credit-surveillance-and-the-ccps-plan-for-china/?mc_cid=7a4a69b76e&mc_eid=574bf7e508](#)). The system relies on big data analytics, connecting a network of CCTV cameras with police databases to achieve enhanced, even automated surveillance. Grid management was first trialed in Beijing in 2004 (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (http://www.casn.cn/sf/bwsf_gl/201312/t20131205_895684.shtml), October 28, 2013). Chen's implementation of the convenience police station network in China's West is probably the most sophisticated implementation yet.

By 2016, the TAR had established over 700 of these stations throughout all urban and semi-urban centers (News.163.com (<http://news.163.com/16/0304/17/BHB2970J00014AED.html>), March 4, 2016). In order to man them, regional authorities dramatically increased security recruitment. Between 2007 and the summer of 2011, the TAR advertised 2,830 positions for all types of police officers. Between 2008–2009, annual police recruitment averaged 866 positions, already a steep increase over the 260 positions advertised in 2007 before the Lhasa riots. However, after Chen Quanguo assumed office, recruitment skyrocketed. Between the autumn of 2011 and 2016, the TAR advertised 12,313 policing-related positions — over four times as many positions as the preceding five years.

Chen Quanguo Applies His Security Strategy to Xinjiang

During Chen Quanguo's five-year rule in Tibet, this previously restive minority region experienced no major incidents of unrest. Only eight of the 150 self-immolation incidents (a form of protest) occurred in the TAR, with no self-immolations or other incidents of major social unrest reported in the region after 2012 (International Campaign for Tibet (<https://www.savetibet.org/resources/fact-sheets/self-immolations-by-tibetans/>), [accessed August 30]). Chen's performance was praised in the Chinese language media, with one report noting that "TAR society maintained stability, with no major reported incidents of unrest, whereas [such incidents] did occur in the surrounding Tibetan regions" (Phoenix Information (http://news.ifeng.com/a/20160829/49857646_0.shtml), August 29, 2016).

Chen's firm grip on stability in Tibet did not go unnoticed in Beijing. While there was talk of replacing former XUAR Party Secretary Zhang Chunxian with a close ally of Xi Jinping, Chen Quanguo emerged as a capable and politically reliable candidate in 2016 (Aboluowang (<http://www.aboluowang.com/2014/0418/389372.html>), April 18, 2014). By proving himself with a difficult ethnic portfolio and being one of the first senior Party officials to speak of Xi Jinping as "core" of the Party leadership, Chen gained Xi's confidence (Wenxuecheng (<http://www.wenxuecity.com/news/2016/08/31/5554203.html>), August 31, 2016). He will likely be rewarded with a seat on the Politburo at the 19th Party Congress.

At the time of Chen's new appointment, Xinjiang represented a far greater security concern for Beijing than the TAR. Under his predecessors, Xinjiang had already considerably ramped up the recruitment of police and other security officers in response to the 5 July 2009 riots in

Urumqi. Between 2003–2008, Xinjiang advertised about 5,800 such positions, yet these intakes multiplied to nearly 40,000 between 2009 and July 2016. On average, police adverts increased from just below 1,000 to nearly 5,000 positions per year. As described in more detail in our previous article, this recruitment drive relied increasingly on contract-based positions outside the formal civil service system (*China Brief* (<https://jamestown.org/program/xinjiangs-rapidly-evolving-security-state/>), March 14). This strategy enabled a cost-efficient expansion of the police force. It leveraged the limited manpower of formal and better-equipped regular police (• • • •) and special police units (• •) through the establishment of a new underclass of poorly-trained and (traditionally) lower-paid assistant police (• • or • •).

Between August 2016 and July 2017, Chen Quanguo pushed this multi-tiered policing system to its logical conclusion. Within the space of a single year, Xinjiang advertised 90,866 security-related positions—nearly twelve times the number advertised in 2009 following the Urumqi riots. The vast majority of these jobs (95 percent) were assistant police positions associated with the establishment of an estimated 7,500 convenience police stations across Xinjiang (*Energy News* (<http://www.energynews.com.cn/show-55-6480-1.html>), January 12). [2] Depending on their size, convenience police stations have a staffing quota of six to thirty security personnel, while current advertised recruitments stand at around 12 assistant police per station. This suggests that Chen’s recruitment drive will likely continue into next year (*Zhongguo xiaofang Zaixian* (http://119.china.com.cn/shyxf/txt/2017-01/16/content_9290098.htm), January 16, 2017; *Zhonggong jiaoyu* (<http://xj.offcn.com/html/2017/05/33305.html>), May 9). [3]




Figure 1. Source: XUAR civil service, public service, and other public job announcements. "Surveillance" pertains to various positions related to internet and video surveillance systems. Formal police positions also include security-related civil service positions in the court, justice and prison systems.

Comparing Chen's Security Buildup in Xinjiang and Tibet

How do these astonishing figures in Xinjiang compare to the TAR? The larger recruitment and police station figures for Xinjiang are not surprising, considering that the XUAR's population in 2015 stood at 23.2 million, more than seven times the TAR's 3.2 million.

Xinjiang is also Beijing's top domestic security concern at present. First, Uyghur resistance and fear of "Islamic extremism" are now viewed as a far greater threat to CCP rule than Tibetan unrest. Second, stability in Xinjiang is crucial to the success of Xi Jinping's signature One Belt, One Road (• • • •) initiative, with Xinjiang reemerging as a "core region" (• • •) and strategic crossroad for trade and investment opportunities in Central and South Asia, as well as Europe and the Middle East (*Xinhua* (http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2015-06/04/c_1115516846.htm), June 4, 2015).

When comparing figures for the two regions per capita, the available data indicates that the XUAR might now have considerably more convenience police stations per capita than the TAR: 323 versus the TAR's 216 per 100,000 of the population. On the other hand, the TAR

advertised 400 policing-related positions per 100,000 of its population during Chen Quanguo's rule there, while Xinjiang advertised 394 such positions. [4] Yet the security build-up in Xinjiang is continuing, and likely to surpass the level achieved in the TAR as early as September this year. That said, the sheer number of positions advertised in the XUAR during such a short period of time is apparently making it increasingly difficult to attract new applicants. [5]

Unrest in Tibetan regions has been much more sporadic since 2008, with most acts being limited to self-harm. Uyghur militants, on the other hand, have carried out a string of deadly attacks on local police stations and other public settings that have resulted in thousands of deaths since 2009. Most notably, a series of high-profile terror attacks outside the XUAR, including a suicide car bombing in Beijing (October 2013) and the train station stabbing in Kunming (March 2014) seriously unnerved the Chinese populace and prompted the central government to take an even tougher stance.

After the April 2014 Urumqi market bombing, which left 43 dead and over 90 injured, Xi Jinping announced a nationwide counter-terrorism campaign. Xinjiang Party Secretary Zhang Chunxian called for a "people's war on terror", while Xi spoke of the need to build "walls made of copper and steel" (People's Daily (<http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/0526/c1001-25062091.html>), May 26, 2014; Xinhua (http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-05/29/c_133371780.htm), May 29, 2014). The concurring rise of Xi's Belt and Road Initiative, whose land route relies on Xinjiang as the primary traffic hub, further elevated the importance of the region's security.

In response, advertised police recruitments in 2014 and 2015 increased rapidly in Xinjiang. They significantly exceeded the per capita count of the 2009 intake following the Urumqi riots, being three to four times as high as in 2007-08, 2010-11 or 2013. However, as Figure 2 reveals, this build up for Zhang's 'war on terror' was actually quite minor when compared to the massive increase in advertised policing positions under Chen Quanguo (2016/17).




Figure 2. Population figures are from 2012 (sources: TAR/XUAR Statistical Yearbooks).

On the surface, Chen Quanguo's strategy seems to be producing results. As in Tibet, there have been no major incidents of ethnic unrest or violence since the establishment of the convenience police stations, with the last major incident occurring in September 2015 when a stabbing at a coal mine in southern Xinjiang left 50 dead. Since then, there have only been comparatively minor and apparently unpremeditated knife attacks. In fact, the XUAR's new network of convenience police stations were praised for the quick response to a stabbing in Pishan County in February 2017, despite the fact that five innocent bystanders were killed before armed police shot dead three assailants ([Sina \(http://news.sina.com.cn/c/nd/2017-02-23/doc-ifyavwcv8527136.shtml\)](http://news.sina.com.cn/c/nd/2017-02-23/doc-ifyavwcv8527136.shtml), February 22). While limits on reporting from the region preclude any reliable statistical accounts of incidents in Xinjiang, it seems less-than-likely that any major incident would go completely unnoticed.

Securitization as Employment Strategy

Chen Quanguo's securitization strategy achieves two stability maintenance (• •) goals at the same time: the construction of a dense network of police surveillance, and a range of new employment opportunities in a region where stable, well-remunerated jobs are still relatively scarce. Our analyses of recruitment documents indicate that Tibetans have benefited significantly from Chen's job bonanza. Based on the available data, we estimate

that between 2012 and 2016 about 77 percent of applicants who either obtained or were close to obtaining a government job were Tibetan. **[8]** While this share is lower than the overall Tibetan population share of 90.5 percent, it exceeds the share of Tibetans among all TAR university graduates (only tertiary graduates are eligible to apply for formal government jobs). **[9]**

Even though Chen has not replicated the full employment promise in Xinjiang, security-related work is now the single most important source of new jobs. Growth in “urban non-private units,” a technical term that refers to stable, well-remunerated posts in a) public institutions and b) larger private corporations, slowed down considerably in 2014 and 2015 compared to previous years. **[10]** Excluding employment in public institutions, Xinjiang’s private corporate sector by itself virtually stagnated during that period. Key sectors such as manufacturing, mining, construction, and transportation actually saw a reduction in employment. This is likely a negative side effect of the region’s exorbitant new security measures. A local businessman told us that Chen’s security measures have resulted in numerous businesses going bankrupt, even in the wealthier north. As a consequence, investors are said to be withdrawing their capital, and qualified employees are leaving the region. Official data reflects this trend. In 2016, XUAR fixed-asset investment from private investors fell by 22 percent or nearly 100 billion RMB, a sharp reversal compared to several years of double-digit growth. After years of double-digit growth that trumped the national average, Xinjiang’s per capita GDP declined by 1.4 percent in 2015 and only grew by a tiny 1 percent in 2016, now far below the national figures. **[11]**

In this precarious situation, Chen’s security recruitment drive is more than compensating for the employment trough in other sectors. Between 2014 and 2015, Xinjiang’s entire private corporate employment sector added only 38,000 jobs. **[12]** This is less than half the nearly 91,000 security-related positions advertised during Chen’s first year in Xinjiang. While lower-tier security jobs typically pay much lower salaries than corporate private sector work, their pay levels are increasing significantly in Xinjiang. In 2017, they averaged around 4,700 RMB/month, only 13 percent below the region’s average public institutional and corporate private sector wage level of 5,386 RMB/month (2016). These assistant police jobs now pay substantially more than the average non-corporate private sector wage of 3,133 RMB/month for Xinjiang and 3,300 RMB/month for China (both 2015). **[13]** Furthermore, they now come with a standard set of social benefits, the so-called “five insurances” (• • • • •) of age, medical, unemployment, injury and maternity insurance. And in the current political environment, these contract-based positions are likely very secure. In 2017, 27 percent of them even offered salaries and benefits commensurate with formal government employment, with others permitting recruits to apply for entry into the formal police service after two or three years.

As in the TAR, Xinjiang’s ethnic minorities (including Uyghurs) have been able to secure a large proportion of these new security positions. Whereas formal government (or corporate private sector) employment mandates that applicants must hold a university degree,

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Statement for the Record

Congressman Gerry Connolly

AP Subcommittee Hearing: "China's Repression and Internment of Uyghurs: U.S. Policy Responses" September 26, 2018

The Chinese government escalated its suppression of Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) since late 2016. Not only are the human rights of millions of individuals being abused, but American journalists and their family members are also in peril. The Trump Administration must call on the Chinese government to cease these repressive policies and release those in arbitrary detention immediately.

According to human rights groups, during the past year, the Chinese government has detained more than one million residents of XUAR, including Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities, in "political re-education camps" or forced them to attend mandatory re-education sessions in their villages. The 2017 Department of State Trafficking in Persons Report on China found that government officials sent men, women, and children to forced labor camps and separated them from family members. According to Ambassador Kelley Currie, the U.S. Representative to the U.N. Economic and Social Council, U.S. permanent residents and family members of U.S. citizens are among those in the detention centers in Xinjiang.

In addition to "political re-education", the Chinese government has undertaken a dramatic expansion of its compulsory biometric collection program and implemented a widespread crackdown on free expression. According to Human Rights Watch, the Chinese government mandated the collection of millions of DNA samples, retina scans, and voice prints in XUAR for all those individuals who "authorities consider threatening to regime stability – and their family members." Officials routinely subject innocent individuals involved in the peaceful expression of political and religious views to arbitrary arrest, confinement, harassment, and expedited judicial procedures—all in the name of combatting supposed terrorism and extremism.

China has directly targeted six U.S.-based journalists, including several of my own constituents, with Radio Free Asia's (RFA) Uyghur Service. RFA is one of five media networks under the United States Agency for Global Media. Its Uyghur-language news service provides roughly 12 million of China's mostly Muslim, Turkic-speaking Uyghur population with trustworthy, accurate news on the deteriorating human rights situation in China's XUAR.

RFA's journalists, most of them U.S. citizens and all residents of Virginia, have relatives in China—including elderly parents—who have been detained, jailed, or forcibly disappeared in what appears to be an act of direct retaliation against these U.S. journalists for their work in exposing the unfolding humanitarian crisis in Xinjiang. These cases represent a concerted effort to interfere with Radio Free Asia's congressionally mandated mission of bringing free press to closed societies.

In light of this ongoing humanitarian crisis, I recently led a letter with my Republican colleague Steve Chabot urging Secretary Pompeo to raise this urgent issue with his Chinese counterpart, seek answers as to the whereabouts and well-being of the missing, detained, and jailed relatives, and appeal for these individuals to be released at every opportunity. We also requested a briefing from the Department of State by September 30, 2018 with an update on these cases. Thus far, we have not received a response. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses how Congress can ensure accountability for these human rights abuses and stop this alarming situation in Xinjiang.

