[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
PRISONERS OF THE PURGE: THE
VICTIMS OF TURKEY'S FAILING RULE OF LAW
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 15, 2017
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COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
HOUSE SENATE
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ROGER WICKER, Mississippi,
Co-Chairman Chairman
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida BENJAMIN L. CARDIN. Maryland
ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas CORY GARDNER, Colorado
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee MARCO RUBIO, Florida
RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois THOM TILLIS, North Carolina
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas TOM UDALL, New Mexico
GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island
Executive Branch Commissioners
Vacant, Department of State
Vacant, Department of Commerce
Vacant, Department of Defense
[ii]
PRISONERS OF THE PURGE: THE
VICTIMS OF TURKEY'S FAILING RULE OF LAW
----------
NOVEMBER 15, 2017
COMMISSIONERS
Page
Hon. Thom Tillis, Commissioner, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.......................................... 1
Hon. Michael C. Burgess, Commissioner, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.......................................... 3
Hon. Randy Hultgren, Commissioner, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.......................................... 5
Hon. Jeanne Shaheen, Commissioner, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.......................................... 21
Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, Ranking Member, Commission on Security
and Cooperation in Europe...................................... 28
Hon. John Boozman, Commissioner, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe
WITNESSES
Jonathan R. Cohen, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European
and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State................. 5
CeCe Heil, Executive Counsel, American Center for Law and Justice 15
Jacqueline Furnari, Daughter of Andrew Brunson................... 16
Nate Schenkkan, Director of the Nations in Transit Project,
Freedom House.................................................. 18
APPENDIX
Prepared statement of Hon. Thom Tillis........................... 33
Prepared statement of Hon. Chris Smith........................... 36
Prepared statement of Jonathan R. Cohen.......................... 38
Prepared statement of CeCe Heil.................................. 43
Prepared statement of Jacqueline Furnari......................... 45
Prepared statement of Nate Schenkkan............................. 48
[iii]
MATERIAL FOR THE RECORD
Questions submitted by Hon. Thom Tillis
to Jonathan R. Cohen......................................... 55
to CeCe Heil................................................. 60
to Nate Schenkkan............................................ 62
Questions submitted by Hon. Jeanne Shaheen
to Jonathan R. Cohen......................................... 65
Letter from Kubra Golge to Congress.............................. 68
Statement from the Committee of Concerned Scientists............. 69
Freedom House report on internet freedom in Turkey............... 74
PRISONERS OF THE PURGE: THE
VICTIMS OF TURKEY'S FAILING RULE OF LAW
----------
November 15, 2017
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Washington, DC
The hearing was held at 9:30 a.m. in Room 124, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Washington, DC, Hon. Thom Tillis,
Commissioner, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe,
presiding.
Commissioners present: Hon. Thom Tillis, Commissioner,
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; Hon. Michael
C. Burgess, Commissioner, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe; Hon. Randy Hultgren, Commissioner,
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; Hon. Jeanne
Shaheen, Commissioner, Commission on Security and Cooperation
in Europe; Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, Ranking Member, Commission
on Security and Cooperation in Europe; and Hon. John Boozman,
Commissioner, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
Witnesses present: Jonathan R. Cohen, Deputy Assistant
Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S.
Department of State; CeCe Heil, Executive Counsel, American
Center for Law and Justice; Jacqueline Furnari, Daughter of
Andrew Brunson; and Nate Schenkkan, Director of the Nations in
Transit Project, Freedom House.
HON. THOM TILLIS, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Mr. Tillis. Good morning, everyone. This hearing of the
Helsinki Commission will come to order.
I want to welcome everyone here to this Helsinki Commission
hearing titled ``Prisoners of the Purge: The Victims of
Turkey's Failing Rule of Law.'' I'm honored to be chairing this
hearing on behalf of Senator and Chairman Wicker.
As of today, an American pastor has spent 404 days in a
Turkish jail without a trial, without access to evidence
against him, the subject of a vicious smear campaign from the
Turkish press, and facing life in prison on fabricated charges
of being a terrorist and a coup plotter.
Elsewhere in Turkey, a Turkish-American NASA scientist has
spent 480 days in prison, much of it in solitary confinement,
on terrorism and espionage charges springing from a baseless
testimony of a disgruntled relative and a bizarre compilation
of circumstantial evidence, including a dollar bill seized from
his parents' home.
Today also marks 253 days behind bars for a veteran Turkish
employee of the U.S. consulate in Adana who stands accused of
terrorism for doing his job as he has for 30 years:
communicating on behalf of the United States Government with
local community
contacts.
These prisoners--Andrew Brunson, Serkan Golge, and Hamza
Ulucay--are the innocent victims of Turkey's collapsing rule of
law. With every passing day, the injustice of these detentions
compounds itself. For the Brunson family next week, another
Thanksgiving apart. For Kubra and her two young kids, another
day away from their home in Houston. For Hamza, another
inexplicable punishment for his dedication to the job he loves.
But the focus of this hearing is not personal, it's
principle. Just as Andrew, Serkan, and Hamza have been victims
of Turkey's failing rule of law, there are literally thousands
more like them behind bars today. Since imposing a state of
emergency nearly 16 months ago, the Turkish Government has
detained more than 60,000 people and fired or suspended upwards
of 100,000 others from their jobs. The so-called Decree Laws
authorizing these punitive measures do not establish any
evidentiary standard for application, thereby permitting wide-
scale abuse as seen in the cases I've highlighted.
Of course, context matters, and the Turkish Government
invokes its constitutional state of emergency provisions in the
wake of the July 2016 coup attempt, an unacceptable and violent
attack on the constitutional order of a NATO ally--an attack I
unequivocally condemn. But the question is not whether Turkey
has the right to pursue justice after such a national trauma:
the question is how it goes about it.
The Helsinki Commission has called this hearing today to
get to the bottom of the accumulating injustices under the
state of emergency. As a participating State of the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Turkey has
committed itself to upholding certain rule-of-law standards
even under extraordinary circumstances. Among these commitments
is the guarantee of equality before the law.
However, Turkey's commitment to this principle has been
called into serious question. Just two months ago, President
Erdogan proposed an outrageous swap: Andrew Brunson, a pastor,
``for a pastor'' in his words. If the United States would
circumvent its rule of law to extradite a free man, Erdogan
suggested, then Turkey would release a wrongfully imprisoned
one. Let us be clear about what President Erdogan proposed:
This is not justice; it's ransom. The United States should not
expect, much less accept, this sort of treatment from a NATO
ally.
The harassment and detention of our consulate staff has
also overstepped the bounds of diplomatic conduct among
partners. I was glad to see the State Department in the past
month impose some real cost for this behavior by suspending
non-immigrant visa services to Turkey. While the department
announced last week that it had resumed these services on a
limited basis and received assurances about the security of our
local employees, I hope that we are clear with Turkey that we
will not accept anything short of true and timely justice for
our detained consulate staff and our citizens behind bars.
I also hope that we will not tire in advocating for the
basic rights and freedoms of thousands of Turks impacted by
these sweeping purges--academics, mayors, legislators,
journalists, and human rights defenders among them.
Let me conclude by saying that it is in the interest of the
United States to have Turkey as a strong and reliable ally.
From strengthening NATO to fighting terrorism to resolving
conflicts in the Middle East, we have important work to do
together, and we will be more successful if we can work as
partners. The urgency of these tasks underscores the importance
of resolving distractions and rebuilding the trust we need to
achieve common objectives. And, as always, our partners are
strongest when they are rooted in shared principles.
We have two excellent panels of witnesses today to examine
these topics, and I'll introduce the panels separately. But I
would like to say at the outset that I am especially pleased to
have with us a State Department witness, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs Jonathan Cohen, to
provide the administration's perspective on these developments,
U.S. policy towards Turkey, and the future of the bilateral
relationship.
I'm also honored to have on our second panel Jacqueline
Furnari, Andrew Brunson's daughter, from my State of North
Carolina, and I understand a proud student of UNC Chapel Hill.
Before I introduce the panels, though, I'd like to offer my
fellow commissioners an opportunity to make opening statements.
HON. MICHAEL C. BURGESS, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON SECURITY
AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Mr. Burgess. Well, thank you, Senator Tillis. Thank you,
Secretary, for agreeing to be here this morning. And I want to
thank the Helsinki Commission for convening the hearing on what
has been a pressing issue since July of 2016.
Five days ago, Turkish and American leaders gathered at the
Republic's New York City consulate to commemorate the life and
legacy of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, one of modern history's great
reformers. Following the conclusion of World War I, Ataturk
sought to create a democracy based on the rule of law amidst
the ashes of the Ottoman Empire.
As with all democracies, the Republic of Turkey has had its
share of challenges and triumphs. Since its formation, Turkey
has balanced between its constitutional secularism and its
religious heritage. From the recognition of the Lausanne Treaty
in 1923, there have been concerns that the country's religious
population is under attack by its secularists. All the while,
fear that Turkey will fall back into a country dominated by
religious hardliners remains an inescapable concern. The
constant battle between the two extremes I'm certain has left
many Turks unsure of who or what will come next.
Most recently, the failed coup of July 2016--and I join
with Senator Tillis in condemning in the strongest possible
terms that activity--but that left the country clawing its
self-inflicted wounds. Though carried out by military groups
purportedly upholding Ataturk's original vision for the
country, it is hard to believe that the Republic's founder
would have supported open insurrection and violence in the
streets, clashes between military and civilians, or the
imprisonment of innocents.
The uprising resulted in a widespread response by President
Erdogan and his ruling Justice and Development Party.
Unfortunately, the crackdown has left nearly 50,000 people
incarcerated. And within this massive group are a dozen
American citizens, including Pastor Andrew Brunson and NASA
scientist Serkan Golge. These Americans, along with many of
their Turkish counterparts, have only a tenuous charge against
them: that they are agents and activists of Fethullah Gulen.
Mr. Gulen--a Muslim leader in teaching a tolerant, outward
approach to Islam--is yet another individual who the Turkish
Government has decided to indict with almost no evidence.
Despite an alliance between the Justice and Development Party
and the Gulenists at the onset of Mr. Erdogan's political
ascendancy, the two leaders suffered a breakdown in relations.
Following the failed coup, the Erdogan government leveled
charges against the cleric, claiming that he planned and
incited the attempted regime change. Mr. Gulen has been living
in self-imposed exile in Pennsylvania since 1999.
Though the Turkish Government submitted a formal request
for the extradition of Mr. Gulen, neither the State Department
nor the Justice Department has received any information that
would cause the United States to comply with this request. The
Turkish Government has repeated, and with no evidence made the
claim that Mr. Gulen funds schools, including some public
schools in my home State of Texas, to radicalize students
against the current Turkish Government.
Though I am opposed to much of what President Erdogan does,
I respect Turkish sovereignty and their self-determination.
However, when the president begins targeting American citizens,
especially our children, this is a bridge too far.
In another incident early this year, supporters of
President Erdogan, along with the president's own security,
violently attacked a group of peaceful protesters outside of
the Turkish ambassador's residence here in Washington, D.C. In
this country, we do not attack those we disagree with. We do
not start brawls to silence our detractors. In Turkey,
President Erdogan may be able to declare a perpetual state of
emergency and change the constitution to better suit his
desires, but Washington is not Ankara, and Massachusetts Avenue
is not an avenue in Turkey.
The ongoing effort by the Turkish Government to intimidate
Americans must end. The current detention of American citizens
became all the more clear when President Erdogan stated, ``You
have another pastor in your hands. Give him to us, and we will
put yours through the judiciary. We will give him to you.''
Despite the strong, enduring alliance between our two
countries, the United States cannot be expected to forego the
rule of law in our country in order to extract some hint of it
in another.
I hope we can come to an amicable solution on these
matters, but to do so it's going to take more than relying on
the trust and goodwill that has historically been built between
America and Turkey. It must require the adherence to the rule
of law. I hope we move toward accomplishing that today.
Thank you, Senator Tillis, for the recognition.
Mr. Tillis. Thank you, Congressman Burgess.
Congressman Hultgren.
HON. RANDY HULTGREN, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Mr. Hultgren. Thank you, Senator Tillis. Dr. Burgess, good
to be with you. Thank you so much to our witnesses.
I'll be very brief. I want to hear as much as I can. And I
apologize, Senator Tillis; I've got two markups over on the
House side, so I'm going to have to leave in a few minutes.
But I am passionate about fighting for people who are
suffering around the world, people who are being mistreated,
and especially when we see governments that are doing this
mistreatment. I'm such a proud member of the Helsinki
Commission, but also proud to be co-chairman of the Tom Lantos
Human Rights Commission. And so I want to do everything we
possibly can.
That's my hope out of this hearing: To hear what we can do
together--Senate, House, administration coming together to make
sure that we bring these people home. Pastor Brunson is top of
mind for me, but so many others that are suffering, that are
wrongfully accused in so many ways, and these governments
acting with what appears to be no accountability whatsoever.
And we need to do everything we can to change that.
So thanks again, Senator Tillis and the Helsinki
Commission, for holding this hearing. I look forward to working
with all of you, but also with our witnesses to see what we can
do to, again, bring these precious people home.
With that, I yield back.
Mr. Tillis. Thank you, Congressman.
Our first panel features Deputy Assistant Secretary Cohen.
He's been deputy assistant secretary for European and Eurasian
affairs, governing Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey, since August
2016. He previously served in Baghdad as deputy chief of
mission from 2014 to 2016, in Paris as the acting deputy chief
of mission from 2013 to 2014, and as counselor for political
affairs from 2011 to 2013.
Mr. Cohen, thank you for being here. You may proceed with
your opening statement.
JONATHAN R. COHEN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND ASIAN AFFAIRS,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Tillis, members of the Commission, thank you for
inviting me to testify this morning. Today's hearing is an
important opportunity to reaffirm the abiding U.S. interest in
and commitment to democracy, human rights, and rule of law in
Turkey. It's also an opportunity to underscore the enduring
strategic value of the U.S.-Turkey alliance, despite the
current strains in the bilateral relationship and the
challenges facing Turkey today.
Having spent the last 65 years as NATO allies, the United
States and Turkey have deep, complex relations. With the
second-largest military force in the alliance, a dynamic
economy, and a population of 80 million, Turkey's critical
position and regional clout have given Ankara significant
influence over issues of core U.S. interest over the years,
from Afghanistan to Iraq to the Balkans to Korea.
For example, from the early 1990s until 2003, Turkey
facilitated the no-fly zone over the Iraqi Kurdistan region,
allowing it to develop in peace and escape Saddam Hussein's
tyranny.
In Afghanistan, Turkey was a major troop contributor to the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), while also
providing use of its airspace and allowing the refueling of
U.S. aircraft on ISAF missions.
Turkey's an important partner in the Global Coalition to
Defeat ISIS, and provides critical bases for United States and
coalition military forces, from which we conduct precision
airstrikes; carry out intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance flights; maintain combat search and rescue
units; and resupply coalition forces.
We enjoy a robust and growing commercial relationship, a
wide array of educational and cultural exchanges, and a vibrant
foreign policy dialogue on issues ranging from Russian
aggression in Crimea to limiting Iranian influence in the
region to ending the war in Syria to the territorial integrity
and unity of Iraq. We deeply value Turkey's contributions to
global security.
The United States and Turkey need each other. As
Undersecretary of State Tom Shannon has said, ours is not a
partnership of convenience, nor of temporary interests; it's
one of conviction, a time-tested alliance built on the enduring
foundations of common interests and mutual respect. Our
partnership is the result of sustained diplomacy, continuous
high-level engagement between our governments to address
challenges, explore opportunities, and move forward on a wide
range of joint interests.
Since August, our presidents have had several phone
conversations and have met on the margins of the U.N. General
Assembly. Secretary Tillerson and Foreign Minister Cavusoglu
speak regularly to consult on Syria, Iraq, and other issues.
Our defense ministers have met twice since August. And of
course, Prime Minister Yildirim visited Washington just last
week to consult with Vice President Pence.
The United States-Turkey relationship extends beyond our
mutual interests in stability and security in the Balkans and
the Middle East. Both President Trump and President Erdogan
have committed to strengthening our trade and investment ties.
Our extensive exchanges of students, scientists, and
professionals ensure that our countries remain interconnected
on a people-to-people level, and provide valuable opportunities
for innovation and entrepreneurship, which are vital to our
knowledge-based economies.
Ankara seeks further improvement in each of these areas of
cooperation, and so do we. We will continue our efforts to
develop constructive dialogue with Turkey in order to maximize
the enduring benefits of our strategic alliance.
My remaining remarks today will focus on the United States
Government's concerns about Turkey's protracted state of
emergency, which has had negative effects on democracy and
democratic institutions, on human rights, and on rule of law.
Chief among those concerns is the security of and protection of
human rights and fundamental freedoms for U.S. citizens in
Turkey and locally employed staff at the U.S. Mission in
Turkey, a number of whom have been arrested on dubious
terrorism charges under the state of emergency.
As I highlight these concerns, it's in the context of
Turkey being a longtime friend and ally, and with deep empathy
and appreciation for the fact that on July 15th, 2016, Turkey
endured a traumatic coup d'etat attempt in which nearly 250
perished and thousands were wounded. The coup attempt was an
evil attack on the Turkish nation and a tragedy for Turks, who
bravely took to the streets to defend their democracy.
A few months after that, I stood in Turkey's Parliament
building, the Grand National Assembly, and observed the
destruction that Turkish Air Force F-16s had wrought on the
people's house, in which all political parties sit. The Turks
asked me to imagine the national trauma for us if such an
attack were to happen here on our Capitol dome. It was a moment
of profound impact for me. The Turkish nation was deeply shaken
by the coup attempt, and remains so.
It's to be expected that Turkey would--and we support its
efforts to--investigate and arrest those who directly
participated or materially aided in the planning, preparation,
and conduct of the coup attempt. The United States Government
is carefully reviewing material provided by Turkey related to
the Turkish Government's request that the United States
extradite Fethullah Gulen, and will give similarly careful
consideration to any new extradition requests related to the
coup attempt. We again underscore our willingness to assist
Turkish authorities in their investigation of the attempted
coup and support bringing to justice those who participated.
But now, more than a year later, a restrictive state of
emergency remains in place and appears to have been used
expansively to target many Turks with no connection to the coup
attempt. We were concerned to see Turkey extend the state of
emergency for a fifth time on October 17th for an additional
three months. The prolongation of the state of emergency has,
in the view of the U.S. Government, negatively impacted Turkish
democracy, rule of law, and respect for fundamental freedoms.
We call on the Turkish Government to expeditiously end the
state of emergency, release those not proven guilty of criminal
offenses, and cease the seemingly indiscriminate prosecution of
individuals--in many cases, individuals that appear to have
been targeted because they criticized the government, its
officials, or its policies, or have had contact with those who
did.
There have been dozens of U.S. citizens detained or delayed
by Turkish security services in some capacity since July 2016.
Several U.S. citizens, including U.S.-Turkish dual nationals,
remain in prison under the state of emergency, all facing what
we believe are dubious terrorism and coup attempt-related
charges.
Andrew Brunson, a United States citizen and Christian
pastor who has lived in Turkey for nearly 25 years, has been in
prison since October 7th, 2016. The outlandish charges against
Mr. Brunson include gathering state secrets for espionage,
attempting to overthrow the Turkish Parliament and government,
and attempting to change the constitutional order.
The United States consistently calls for Mr. Brunson's
release at the highest levels. President Trump, Vice President
Pence, and Secretary Tillerson have all raised his case
multiple times with their Turkish counterparts. On August 15th,
Secretary Tillerson publicly called for his release during the
International Religious Freedom Report rollout. Our embassy in
Ankara continues to engage on this case, and provides consular
services to Mr. Brunson and his family, meeting with him and
his wife on a regular basis.
We remain deeply concerned about the detention of all U.S.
citizens, including U.S.-Turkish dual nationals, who have been
arrested under the state of emergency. We will continue to
visit them when possible, raise their cases with our Turkish
counterparts, and seek a satisfactory resolution of their
cases.
In addition to the other U.S. citizens I've mentioned, it's
worth pausing to note that Henri Barkey, a highly respected
Turkish-American, has been subjected to a particularly vicious
and groundless series of attacks in the Turkish media, which
allege that he is the subject of criminal charges related to
the failed coup attempt last year. I want to state clearly that
there is absolutely no merit to the absurd idea that Henri
Barkey, who has served with distinction in various expert
capacities both inside and outside the United States
Government, had anything to do with the coup attempt, or that
he was acting to undermine the government of Turkey. Such
accusations set back our relationship with Turkey, and
undermine the credibility of the Turkish media as well as the
Turkish judicial process.
Under the state of emergency, the government of Turkey has
arrested two of U.S. Mission Turkey's locally employed staff on
what we believe are specious grounds. Longtime U.S. Consulate
Adana employee Hamza Ulucay has been in detention since
February 23rd, 2017. On October 5th, Turkish authorities
detained longtime Consulate Istanbul DEA local employee Metin
Topuz. It appears to us that Mr. Ulucay and Mr. Topuz were
arrested for maintaining legitimate contacts with Turkish
Government and local officials and others in the context of
their official duties on behalf of the U.S. Government.
The targeting of U.S. local staff, particularly those
responsible for law enforcement coordination, raised our
concern over Turkey's commitment to provide proper security for
facilities and personnel, leading to Mission Turkey's
suspension of non-immigrant visa services on October 8th. We
have received initial high-level assurances from the government
of Turkey that there are no additional local employees of our
Mission in Turkey under investigation. We have also received
initial assurances from the government of Turkey that our local
staff will not be detained or arrested for performing their
official duties, and that the Turkish authorities will inform
the U.S. Government in advance if the government of Turkey
intends to detain or arrest a member of our staff. Based on
these preliminary assurances, we determined that the security
posture had improved sufficiently to allow for the resumption
of limited visa services in Turkey.
However, Mr. Ulucay and Mr. Topuz remain in custody, and we
continue to have serious concerns about their cases. We'll
continue to engage with our Turkish counterparts to seek a
satisfactory resolution of these cases as well.
As a longtime ally and friend, we want Turkey to be the
best democratic partner it can be. We have long supported--and
we will continue to support--democratic development there,
because we believe that respect for the rule of law, judicial
independence, and fundamental freedoms are sources of strength
and expand our potential for partnership. We will continue our
constructive dialogue on the range of foreign policy and
bilateral challenges, and we will also continue providing the
assistance our imprisoned citizens and local employees need. We
will not rest until all of their cases are resolved.
Members of the Commission, thank you for your attention
today, and I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Cohen.
I am going to defer first to Congressman Hultgren, then
Congressman Burgess, so that they can get back to other
business. If you don't know what markups mean, that means the
chairman gets mad when you don't show up because they need a
quorum to get going forward, which is one of the reasons why
some of the Senate members may come in and out. Congressman
Hultgren.
Mr. Hultgren. Thank you, Senator.
And again, thank you for your service. Thanks for being
here today.
I'll be very brief because, again, as I mentioned, I'm
going to have to sneak out in a couple minutes, but wonder just
briefly if you could talk a little bit more about what we could
do as the Senate and the House, working in these specific
cases. You talked quite a bit about Pastor Brunson. I'm
grateful to hear that you've been able to provide consular
service to him and his family there, also with the dual citizen
NASA scientist Serkan Golge. I wonder if you could talk a
little bit more of what we can be doing to help, if anything,
especially for Pastor Brunson, to get that release as soon as
possible.
And then, as much as to the extent that the Privacy Act
restrictions allow you to answer, I wonder how many U.S.
citizens, including dual citizens, are currently detained in
Turkey on coup-
related charges. And do all of them have that same access to
consular service? And is there anything else we can do for
those people?
Mr. Cohen. Thank you for those questions, and let me start
with the last question first. Because I don't have Privacy Act
waivers, I can't be specific on the numbers, but we have fewer
than a dozen. I would say several, including U.S. citizens and
dual nationals.
The U.S. citizens were granted consular access quickly
after they were detained. The dual nationals were not. Turkey
does not consider dual nationals to be foreign citizens for
purposes of consular protections. We consider anyone who has
U.S. citizenship to be a U.S. citizen, and we pressed strongly
for access for them. We were granted access last month--
October--and we now, I believe, have access to all of the dual
nationals who are in custody.
Similarly, some of the people in custody had difficulty
getting access to legal counsel. After we pressed, we believe
that they all now have had access to legal counsel.
And this gets to the first part of your question, what you
all and what we all can continue doing to help. Engagement is
critical. The fact that the Senate and the House have sent
letters to Turkish officials expressing their concern is
important. I would encourage you, if you travel to Turkey, to
meet with Turkish officials and raise these issues; if you have
the opportunity here in Washington to meet with representatives
from the Turkish embassy, to do the same; or to meet with
Turkish officials when they come and visit.
I should say I was in Ankara last month working on this
basket of issues, and the approach that the Turkish officials
had was a constructive one. They want to get past this problem
as well. There are challenges on their side even for the people
with the best will, because they also have a legal system that
they have to navigate, and we have to be respectful of the
limitations on them.
But I would urge you to continue your engagement, and also
to continue comparing notes with the State Department and the
Department of Justice as we go forward.
Mr. Hultgren. Thank you. We will definitely do that, and
please stay in touch with us if there's anything else that
comes up that you think would be helpful. We want to do
anything we can to come together to get this done. So thank you
again.
Thank you, Senator Tillis and Dr. Burgess, for letting me
jump in front here a little bit.
Thank you.
Mr. Tillis. Thank you.
Congressman Burgess.
Mr. Burgess. Thank you, Senator Tillis. And again, thank
you for convening this hearing.
Secretary Cohen, thank you for your mention of Northern
Watch. My youngest child was a young airman back in 2000 and
was stationed at Incirlik and was part of that activity, and at
least through the eyes of a 19-year-old at the time was always
well-treated by the citizens of Incirlik. And he certainly
enjoyed his time there.
You mentioned that you're now able to visit the people who
are being held. Can you speak to the fact as to how you
perceive, or your staff perceives, the people who are being
held and how they're being treated? Is their physical condition
good?
Mr. Cohen. The reports that I've seen indicate that their
physical condition is acceptable. Again, I don't have Privacy
Act waivers for most of them----
Mr. Burgess. Sure.
Mr. Cohen.----so I can't get into the specifics. But the
concern is with detention, not so much the conditions of the
detention.
Mr. Burgess. I understand.
Mr. Cohen. There have been some instances where people were
detained in overcrowded facilities. In some cases they were
able to get moved to less-crowded facilities. So there have
been some improvements, and I want to acknowledge the
cooperation of the Turkish authorities in that regard as well.
Mr. Burgess. And in response to Mr. Hultgren's question,
you gave an answer of less than a dozen United States citizens
are being held. Does that include dual nationals in that
number?
Mr. Cohen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Burgess. OK.
Just to give context for people who may be watching and
unfamiliar with the situation, how is the crackdown that's
occurred in Turkey, how is that affecting the average Turkish
citizen? How are they dealing with that?
Mr. Cohen. I think it's hard to speak about the average
Turkish citizen. What I can say is that it has a chilling
effect on public discussion about politics, certainly. It has
had a chilling effect on the freedom of media, free expression,
civil society organizations, all the points that were mentioned
in the opening remarks by the members of the Commission. It's
palpable when you're in Turkey. You can feel that the nature of
public debate has been narrowed.
Mr. Burgess. Very diplomatically put. What--and, again,
forgive my lack of depth of knowledge of this--this state of
emergency, is that in place at the order of the Turkish
President, or is that the Turkish Parliament? Who has actually
enacted that state of emergency?
Mr. Cohen. If you'll bear with me, I have a little fact
sheet that I can go through.
Mr. Burgess. OK.
Mr. Cohen. The government decrees issued under the state of
emergency restrict suspects' access to legal assistance, allow
suspects to be held without charge for up to a month and, in
some cases, froze the assets of suspended or fired civil
servants and their family members. Human rights groups
documented some cases in which family members were held or
subjected to restrictions on their freedom of movement in lieu
of suspects who remained at large.
Under the state of emergency, detainees could be held
without charge for up to 30 days, but there were numerous
accounts of people waiting beyond the 30-day mark to be
formally charged. Bar associations reported that detainees had
difficulty gaining access to lawyers, both because government
decrees restricted lawyers' access to detainees in prisons,
especially those not provided by the state, such as legal aid
lawyers, and because many lawyers were reluctant to defend
individuals suspected of ties to the coup attempt.
A variety of sources reported instances of individuals
wrongfully detained for ties to the coup based on poison pen
allegations driven by personal or other rivalries. And the
state of emergency itself is extended by the Parliament,
proposed by the government.
Mr. Burgess. Those restrictions of rights, those were
applied to your two consular employees who were detained, or
still are detained?
Mr. Cohen. I don't have the detailed information on that,
but to the best of my knowledge they both have had access to
their legal counsel. Hamza Ulucay is actually on trial. So his
case has been brought to court on several occasions. I believe
his next hearing is in December. So he has been formally
charged. I'm not sure if Metin Topuz has been formally charged
yet or not.
Mr. Burgess. But still held?
Mr. Cohen. Yes, still held.
Mr. Burgess. That 30-day requirement has long since passed.
So under what authority has that been extended?
Mr. Cohen. Well, Metin was arrested on October 5th. So
we're still relatively close to the one-month mark. And I can
get back to you on whether or not the charges have been
formalized.
Mr. Burgess. And just, if you can--you may not be able to
do this, but for those two consular employees, you mentioned
assets have been frozen. Did that apply to our two consular
employees?
Mr. Cohen. I am not aware of that.
Mr. Burgess. All right. Thank you.
I realize this is asking for an editorial opinion. You may
not be able or at liberty to give it. But what would have to
happen for the Turkish Parliament to decide that it's no longer
necessary to impose these restrictions?
Mr. Cohen. When I asked this of Turks--and I'll rely on
what Turkish contacts have told me--they say given the breadth
of the conspiracy that was perceived to be behind the coup,
they believe they have more work yet to do before they end the
state of emergency. And they cannot point to a time on the
calendar when they believe that will be accomplished. To our
mind, the number of people that have been swept up in the
counter-coup is such, and the amount of time that has passed is
such, that it looks to us like the state of emergency has
exceeded its reasonable limits.
Mr. Burgess. Have they--and, again, forgive me for asking
something that may be just absolutely obvious--but have they
identified the one, two, or three critical points that they
need to see altered, changed?
Mr. Cohen. I think that's a question you'd have to address
to the Turks.
Mr. Burgess. OK.
Mr. Cohen. Sorry.
Mr. Burgess. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll gladly yield
back to you.
Mr. Tillis. Thank you, Congressman.
Mr. Cohen, to what extent is there any evidence to support
the Turkish administration's position that there were those in
the military associated with the Gulen movement that were
responsible for the coup?
Mr. Cohen. The military participation in the coup is the
most clear cut. It is indisputable that Turkish military
officers used Turkish military hardware against state
institutions and facilities on July 15th, 2016. So that's not
an issue of dispute. What gets into a less clear category is
who they were working with. And that is, I think, what is
behind the scope of the purchase that we've seen.
Mr. Tillis. I am interested in the current state of the
rule of law, particularly in light of the April 17th
constitutional referendum. Can you tell me a little bit about
what the current state of the rule of law is in Turkey?
Mr. Cohen. Well, the April 17th referendum was to make
changes to the constitution that transferred the state system
from a prime ministerial, parliamentary-based system to a
presidential system, putting more power in the executive. Those
changes don't go into effect until 2019. So it's too early yet
to be able to say how that will impact day-to-day life in
Turkey. But I can refer you to the Venice Commission report,
which suggests that Turkey will be losing a number of checks
and balances in its system by implementing these changes.
Mr. Tillis. To what extent do we really understand the mood
of the Turkish people with respect to these changes, the
current situation and future situation with these
constitutional changes. Do we do any polling to get some idea
of what the Turkish people think about this new change in
leadership?
Mr. Cohen. Yes, we do, as well as some very well-known
American institutions, like IRI, which is out there doing
excellent work in Turkey. But the best indicator, I think, is
the result of the referendum itself. It passed by the thinnest
possible majority, sort of 51 percent, which suggests that some
49 percent of the Turkish public has misgivings about the
changes.
Mr. Tillis. Can you tell me a little bit about the charges
against Mr. Brunson and Mr. Golge? And in your own opinion, the
reasons for their detainment and the charges brought against
them, and shed light on your own view, or the view of the
department, about the veracity of the charges?
Mr. Cohen. Well, as I said in my testimony, the charges
against Pastor Brunson include gathering state secrets for
espionage, attempting to overthrow the Turkish Parliament and
government, and attempting to change the constitutional order.
We do not believe there's any merit to any of these charges. We
believe Pastor Brunson is an innocent, wrongly accused.
Mr. Tillis. And on Mr. Golge?
Mr. Cohen. We don't have a Privacy Act waiver for Mr.
Golge, so I can't comment on his case. But we also have not
seen any indication that he's guilty of any criminal
wrongdoing.
Mr. Tillis. We have several questions that I want to submit
for the record, but we'll move to the next panel in a moment. I
have spent nine days in Turkey. I was there briefly for two
days last year, but was focused on the refugee camps. But about
2011, I was there for about nine days and it was a very
different Turkey. While the United States and several other
countries were going through a serious downturn in the economy,
there was just huge optimism in this country. We met with
chambers of commerce. We met with a lot of Turkish families,
spent time with Turkish families. That's when I learned you
never tell somebody their food looks good, because you'll be
eating most of what's on their plate. They're very good people.
They were very optimistic. How would you view the mood of the
Turkish people today?
Mr. Cohen. It's more tentative. As I mentioned in my
remarks, Turkey suffered a national trauma. And the sense of
that trauma permeates every aspect of society and it remains
palpable today, or after the coup attempt. That said, the
economy continues to grow at something like 5 percent, which is
an enviable growth rate. And the Turkish economy continues to
have great potential, including for American business. And I
would reference the prospective deal between Boeing and Turkish
Airways to sell some 40 Dreamliners, which is a deal worth over
$10 billion that would employ 25,000 Americans. So there's a
lot still to be accomplished in our bilateral economic
relationship. And the Turkish people will benefit from
continued economic growth, provided that it continues on the
path it's on.
Mr. Tillis. After that visit I hosted a delegation from
Kayseri. I was in Izmir, Ankara, Kayseri and Istanbul. And my
last city was Kayseri. And I spent a day with the mayor there,
and other members of Parliament who came back to visit me in my
then-capacity as Speaker of the House in North Carolina. And we
were all optimistic about building great business
relationships. I think the sooner we get past these sorts of
things--which do not make me inclined to do anything with
Turkey at this point in time--then we can get on to building
those great relationships that I think would be mutually
beneficial.
The last thing you mentioned about, in traveling to Turkey,
meeting with officials there--one question that I had is, we
met with several members of Parliament when we were in Ankara.
Are there any members of Parliament who are openly sympathetic
to our desire to have these people, who we think were
inappropriately detained, released?
Mr. Cohen. I suspect there are. I haven't had any
conversations since these arrests took place with any members
of Parliament which led to this line of conversation. But it's
an excellent question. I'll ask my colleagues in Ankara to see
if we can find out.
Mr. Tillis. I would like to do that. We had a very good
discussion with several members that were there. And I would
like to know that. Also, I'd like to know, if some of us were
to travel to Turkey, would we be allowed to meet with the
detainees?
Mr. Cohen. I hope so. That would be up to the Turkish legal
authorities. But we have facilitated Turkish official visitors
here having access to people that are incarcerated in the U.S.
So it's certainly something for which we would advocate.
Mr. Tillis. Well, we'll work with your office, because I
have an interest in going there. And I would have an interest
in seeking the opportunity to meet with the detainees and to
also identify any members of Parliament that we may be able to
meet with to really build a case for doing what I think is the
just and right thing.
Mr. Cohen, thank you for being here. We've got a number of
questions that the staff have prepared that I think would be
very helpful and instructive to the Commission in terms of our
path forward. So we'll submit them to you and would appreciate
your response. Thank you.
I should have said this to begin with, thank you for your
very long service to the country. And thank you for the very
enlightening testimony.
Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Senator.
And thank you, Commission.
Mr. Tillis. We will take a brief pause and transition to
the next panel.
[Recess.]
Mr. Tillis. Our second panel consists of three superb
witnesses.
First, we'll hear from CeCe Heil, Pastor Brunson's U.S.
attorney. Ms. Heil is executive senior counsel for the American
Center for Law and Justice, specializing in public policy and
global legal matters, including the United Nations. She manages
the ACLJ's global partners and heads a team of lawyers handling
cases in defense of life, protection of U.S. national security
interests, and dealing with Islamic extremism.
Then we'll hear from Jacqueline Furnari, Pastor Brunson's
daughter. Ms. Furnari is the 19-year-old daughter of Andrew
Brunson. She has two brothers, Jordan and Blaise. She's
currently earning her bachelor of science and business
administration from the Kenan-Flagler Business School at the
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. She expects to
graduate in December 2017, with a concentration in
entrepreneurship and operations management. Jacqueline was
raised in Izmir, Turkey, where her father served as pastor of
the Izmir Resurrection Church. In February Jacqueline married a
Blackhawk pilot in the U.S. Army--which is why I'm convinced
you're going to end up living in North Carolina after he
retires from distinguished service, Jacqueline.
Finally, we're going to hear from Nate Schenkkan. A long-
time Turkey expert who serves as project director for the
Nations in Transit, Freedom House's annual survey of democratic
governance in Central Europe and Eurasia. He previously served
as senior program officer for Freedom House's Eurasia programs,
covering Turkey and Central Asia. He was a lead researcher and
co-author of two Freedom House special reports, including ``The
Struggle for Turkey's Internet,'' and ``Democracy in Crisis:
Corruption, Media and Power in Turkey.''
Ms. Heil, we'll recognize you first for your testimony.
MS. CECE HEIL, EXECUTIVE COUNSEL. AMERICAN CENTER FOR LAW AND
JUSTICE
Ms. Heil. Thank you, Senator Tillis, Representative
Burgess, for inviting me to speak before you today to discuss
the case of our client, Andrew Craig Brunson, who's a United
States citizen from North Carolina who is wrongfully imprisoned
in Turkey. Pastor Brunson has lived peacefully in Turkey for 23
years, serving as the pastor of the Izmir Resurrection Church,
and raising his family with no incident. But after the failed
coup attempt in July of 2016, President Erdogan started
arresting anyone he deemed a threat, which included Christians.
So on October 7th, 2016, Pastor Brunson was arrested as a
threat to national security and detained, pending deportation.
However, Pastor Brunson was never deported. He still sits
in a prison cell today, wondering if he's been forgotten, as
today marks the 404th day of his detention. And as unbelievable
as that may seem, given the current state of emergency and the
subsequent emergency decrees from Turkey, all protections
afforded in the Turkey constitution and with international
declarations and covenants to which Turkey is a member,
including the OSCE, all of those protections just disappear.
And as a result of the rapidly diminishing state of law in
Turkey, Pastor Brunson's file has been sealed, all of his
visits from his attorney are recorded, and he can literally be
held for up to seven years without ever being formal charged,
completely destroying any ability to prepare an adequate
defense, and obliterating all rights to due process.
So Pastor Brunson has remained languishing in a prison cell
with literally no end in sight. And while Pastor Brunson has
been in prison, he has lost over 50 pounds, he has lost
precious time with his family that can never be replaced. And,
worst of all, he has lost all hope, wondering why Turkey, a
NATO ally and a country that he has loved and served for over
two decades, has been able to hold held him hostage, an
innocent United States citizen, for over a year.
Pastor Brunson's plight has caught the attention of
hundreds of thousands of people across the world, and there's
been an unprecedented amount of demands for his release from
the highest level. As we've heard, President Trump has
repeatedly demanded his release. Vice President Pence has
repeated demanded his release. And Secretary Tillerson has
demanded his release. And actually, most of you on this panel
signed a bipartisan, bicameral letter that was sent to
President Erdogan, demanding his release.
And yet, on August 24, Turkey responds by levying
additional ridiculous accusations against Pastor Brunson, these
just as ludicrous as and disconcerting as the original. And
still, not one piece of evidence has been presented to support
any of the accusations against this innocent pastor. Pastor
Brunson maintains his innocence and denies all the accusations,
and reiterates that he has been in Turkey for the past 23 years
for one purpose, and one purpose only, and that was to tell
about Jesus Christ. So the question remains, why are they still
holding him?
And perhaps President Erdogan has given us the answer to
that question in his recent demands for a swap of Pastor
Brunson for either Fethullah Gulen or Reza Zarrab. So Pastor
Brunson has literally become a bargaining chip for Turkey,
proving that he is not a criminal to be prosecuted or convicted
but a political hostage that Erdogan wants to trade. Turkey is
our NATO ally, and we should be able to say, give us our
American, and they should give us our American. So we are
asking you today to demand that Turkey give us our innocent
American.
Thank you.
Mr. Tillis. Thank you, Ms. Heil.
Jacqueline.
MS. JACQUELINE FURNARI, DAUGHTER OF ANDREW BRUNSON
Ms. Furnari. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on
behalf of my father.
Having grown up in Turkey, it has been so hard for me to
understand the current state of events. My parents moved to
Turkey in 1993, so that's where my brothers and I grew up. In
fact, my brothers were raised there--they were born there. We
even went to Turkish grade school because my parents wanted us
to learn the language and feel comfortable in the culture. To
me, it was home. My family, school, and friends were in Turkey.
I grew up in the mix of Turkish and American culture, and loved
seeing the beauty in both. On holidays, we sometimes hung a
Turkish flag from our balcony, as our neighbors did. We loved
and respected the Turkish people, and my parents were dedicated
to serving them for as long as they could. My brothers and I
used to joke that we would have to bring our future children to
Turkey to see their grandparents.
As I grew up, I saw how my father poured himself into his
work, and how willing he was to sacrifice his needs and wants
for the sake of others. He believed--as I do--in a greater
purpose in life, and actively lived out his life with the
purpose of showing people the love and grace of God. He taught
this message in the home, too. My parents' continued commitment
to serving God and the people of Turkey was such a wonderful
example for my brothers and me to see. We were truly blessed to
be raised by such faithful parents.
I know my dad and his character as only a daughter can, and
I know the charges against him are absurd. My father is not an
armed terrorist trying to overthrow any government, my dad is a
pastor who went to Wheaton College, then on to seminary, and
got a Ph.D. in New Testament. He has selflessly served Turkey
for 24 years now. Everything in his life is centered on his
faith. For my family, who has loved, served, and prayed for
Turkey and its people, seeing these absurd charges brought
against my father has been an extremely painful experience. The
past year of our lives has been filled with uncertainty, worry,
tears, and countless unanswered questions.
My family kept assuming this situation would end soon. But
it kept dragging on, month after month. My brothers and I
didn't get to spend Christmas with my mom, because she was
scared of what might happen to us if we flew into Turkey. I
missed a last Christmas as a single woman with my family. I was
about to transition into a different phase of life, and I
wanted that one last family Christmas before things changed. In
February I got married. We didn't want to get married without
my parents present, but because my husband is in the military
we could not postpone it. We had received my dad's blessing,
but we felt so terrible about getting married while he was
imprisoned. Neither of my parents were there, and I will never
get that moment back.
For those of you who are fathers to daughters, I'm sure you
would want to walk your daughter down the aisle. My father
didn't get that. My husband and I decided to have a civil
ceremony and to postpone our wedding until my father is home.
I'm still waiting for my wedding. I'm still waiting to wear the
wedding dress that I got almost a year and half ago. I'm still
waiting for my dad to walk me down the aisle. And I'm still
waiting for that father-daughter dance.
I'm graduating from college in December. My dad doesn't
want to miss seeing graduate. He invested a lot in helping me
find a career path. However, unless a miracle happens, I will
be achieving yet another life milestone without my parents. In
his letters, my father says that the hardest part of his
imprisonment is missing out on being with his family. That is
what he most wants. He has missed his only daughter getting
married, and might miss my college graduation. He has missed
helping my older brother make career choices and witnessing his
accomplishments at Cornell. He has missed being with my younger
brother who has so badly needed his dad and mom in the last
year. These are the things that pain my dad the most, not being
able to be with us.
In August, I took a risk and flew to Turkey to visit my dad
and support my mom. I never really processed that visit because
it makes me too emotional. I will never forget any moment of
the day we got to visit. I remember hearing my dad's voice for
the first time in a year as they brought him into the room. I
remember how broken, tired, and desperate he sounded as he
tried to fight to meet in a room where he could hug and hold us
for the only hour he would have seen us the whole year. We
sobbed the entire visit. It was hard to fit words in because
the emotions were too strong and only led to more tears. It was
difficult to see my dad so broken, so thin, and so desperate.
He hated having his kids see him that way.
During my summer visit, he was already talking about how
fearful he was at facing the cold winter in that poorly
insulated prison. That he was already concerned about the
winter in the middle of August shows how hopeless he was. And
now, the cold that he feared so much has started. Seeing him in
that much pain broke me. He's been changed by this experience.
My whole family has been changed. In a recent visit with my
mother, my father said: I plead with the Lord to release me by
Christmas so I can be with our son in his last year in high
school and at our daughter's graduation before she moves to
Germany. But if I'm still here at Christmas, I'll thank God for
sending Jesus to be born. If I'm still here at New Year, I'll
thank him for helping me make it through this year. If I'm here
on my birthday I'll give thanks for the life I've lived.
My father is now dealing with anxiety and depression, but
he is handling his situation better than he was before. But we
still want so desperately for him not to have to face another
Christmas imprisoned. We want him to be home again, with his
family. My family has suffered greatly because of these absurd
and false charges. Please, make any and all efforts to secure
my dad's release and bring him home for Christmas. He's been
imprisoned falsely for far too long.
Mr. Tillis. Thank you, Ms. Furnari.
Mr. Schenkkan.
MR. NATE SCHENKKAN, DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONS IN TRANSIT PROJECT,
FREEDOM HOUSE
Mr. Schenkkan. Thank you. Senator Tillis, members of the
Commission, it's an honor to testify before you today. I'm
going to focus in my spoken testimony on some of the
developments in rule of law since the coup attempt. I know
we've covered some of this ground already. But I think, if
anything, we may be understating how severe the crisis is in
Turkey.
And I think that affects how we look ahead in the U.S.-
Turkish relationship, and how it needs to be approached. My
written testimony contains some more context about the state of
rule of law in Turkey prior to the coup attempt. So I ask that
you refer to that with questions on the matter.
Under the emergency rule for the last 16 months, some
150,000 people have passed through police custody on the basis
of terrorist offenses, membership of armed groups, or
involvement in the attempted coup. Of these, at least 62,000
have been arrested. One hundred and fifty-three journalists are
in prison. More than 111,000 people have been fired from public
service, which also means that they are placed on a blacklist,
which largely prevents them from finding private employment.
The state has also closed and seized institutions around
the country: 1,412 associations, 15 universities run by
foundations, 162 media outlets, 2,271 private educational
institutions, and 19 unions, 969 companies valued at roughly
$11 billion have been seized, 94 mayors have been removed from
office and replaced by appointed trustees, 10 members of
Parliament are in prison, two members of the Constitutional
Court were removed from office and arrested, along with 37
personnel of the Constitutional court, 4,240 judges and
prosecutors have been dismissed, 28 lawyers' associations or
law societies have been closed, at least 550 lawyers have been
arrested, and 1,400 lawyers are facing criminal prosecution.
As has been discussed, these emergency decrees under the
state of emergency reduced very important protections for those
accused or under investigation for crimes related to the coup
attempt or membership of terrorist groups. These have led to
increasing, and increasingly credible, reports of torture and
forced disappearances in detention, which was a problem
considered largely eradicated prior to the coup attempt in
Turkey.
Regarding the constitutional referendum and the changes, I
must respectfully disagree, slightly, with DAS Cohen regarding
the effect on rule of law. Yes, the changes do not go into
effect until 2019, but it is clear what that effect will be.
The referendum changes increase the president's control over
the judiciary. The president will have the power to appoint six
out of the 13 members of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors,
which controls the appointments of the judiciary. The remaining
appointments will be made by the Parliament which is currently,
of course, under majority control of the president's party. The
oversight role of the Constitutional Court has been downgraded,
as has that of the Council of State. In addition, of course, in
this shift to a presidential system, the prime ministership is
eliminated as an office and the president gains the power to
appoint ministers.
It's within this context and the ordeals of Pastor Brunson,
America's foreign service nationals, and tens of thousands of
Turkish citizens, including leaders of civil society like Osman
Kavala, that we need to understand this context of
deteriorating rule of law. The executive branch in Turkey is
constrained at this point neither by the balance of powers nor
by the rights of individuals when it chooses to use politicized
justice to achieve its political ends.
There will be three major elections in 2019 in Turkey.
There will be nationwide local elections in March,
parliamentary and presidential elections currently scheduled
simultaneously for November. Each of these will be extremely
important for President Erdogan's goal of remaining in power
and of retaining or, even better, strengthening his control
over the levers of the state. We should not expect an
improvement in the rule of law prior to the elections. It's not
in President Erdogan's interest, and it's not in the AKP's
interest to have the system work more fairly or more justly at
this time. Nor should we expect an improvement after the
elections, unfortunately. If President Erdogan and the AKP win,
they will continue their effort to consolidate a paternal
regime. If they lose even one election, they will have to
tighten the screws in order to maintain power. This is what
happened after the AKP lost its majority in Parliament in the
June 2015 general election. So this problem of rule of law in
Turkey is one that will be with us for a long time.
So let me say in that light a few words about United States
policy towards Turkey in this area, regarding rule of law. The
biggest problem is, first, that we treat it as something that
we believe can be solved soon, or solved quickly. Of course,
the first priority is returning U.S. citizens and protecting
American employees, foreign service nationals, from
persecution. But we need to recognize, no matter what the
outcome is of these cases, this is a durable problem that will
be with us. We need to recognize that the use of anti-
Americanism and anti-Westernism by President Erdogan and other
political leaders in Turkey is driven by a domestic political
dynamic. And nothing that the United States does is going to
change that.
Instead of starting from a position of seeking to solve the
problem of Turkey's political leaders taking anti-Western
stances for their political gain, we need to define clearly
first, for ourselves, what the United States core interests and
values are in our relationship with Turkey, and then articulate
policies to achieve those interests and values, including
taking measures with Turkey to enforce them if they're
threatened and violated. And I think there's been a lot of
progress on this in the last year.
We also, though, need to keep an eye on the medium and the
long term in Turkey, and what we want to see in Turkey. I
believe the United States has a long-term, strategic interest
in Turkey being a stable state, based on the rule of law, in
which political and ethnic minorities enjoy fundamental rights,
including the ability to participate fully in political
processes. The United States cannot make Turkey into such a
state. But this should be a key pillar for any U.S. strategic
vision for the Middle East, and one that can be supported
through measures taken now.
Some of those measures would include, first, using new
instruments, including the Global Magnitsky Act, to sanction
Turkish officials responsible for grave human rights
violations. And of course, the congressional role in collecting
those cases and forwarding them to the State Department can be
very important. Second, I believe Congress should mandate
funding for human rights defenders, civil society activists,
and journalists in Turkey. Congress should create a special
fund for those who support the country's future as a
democratic, rule-of-law state.
Third--and this is where I think most of the progress has
been in the last year--the United States can make clear that
the rule of law in the United States and the rights of American
citizens and employees of the U.S. Government are non-
negotiable in the relationship with Turkey. If Turkish
officials flout U.S. law, they will face criminal prosecution.
We've seen this already, I think, in the Reza Zarrab case,
which is one of the reasons why it's so important, beyond its
implications, of course, as simply enforcing U.S. laws. The Van
Hollen amendment is also an important step in this direction,
reinforcing the importance of United States laws by
underscoring that violations of our laws will affect U.S.
support and cooperation with Turkey.
We also have to do the same regarding American employees
and American citizens overseas. If the U.S. concludes that the
detention of an American citizen is not based on a legitimate,
criminal accusation, it should sanction officials responsible
for their detention. And this is why I support the Lankford-
Shaheen amendment, and why Freedom House supports it. The U.S.
must also stress that attacks on U.S. employees, including the
offensive conspiracy theory regarding Henri Barkey and the
imprisonment of foreign service nationals, will also result in
the continuation of visa restrictions or other punitive
measures, as needed. And I think Congress should be prepared to
request sanctions against individual officials responsible for
illegitimate detentions of U.S. employees.
There are no magic bullets for improving the U.S.-Turkey
relationship. There are diverging values between these two
allies. We should prepare for a very rocky short-term
relationship and take necessary measures to guard the U.S.'s
core interest and lay the groundwork for future improvements.
It's my hope that the United States will stand with the many
Turkish citizens working for democracy and rule of law in
Turkey, and that circumstances will one day to improve to allow
the bilateral relationship to return to a less tense basis.
Thank you.
Mr. Tillis. Congressman Burgess, would you like to ask any
questions before----
Mr. Burgess. I have to leave, but thank you.
Thank you for your testimony.
Mr. Tillis. Thank you.
Senator Shaheen.
HON. JEANNE SHAHEEN, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Mrs. Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all very much for being here and the work that
you're doing. And, Ms. Furnari, I'm sorry I pronounced your
name incorrectly, but no one should have to go through what
your family has gone through. And I think all of us are in
sympathy with your situation, and will do everything we can to
try and address it.
Mr. Schenkkan, I appreciated the opportunity to work with
you as we were working on the legislation with Senator Langford
and on trying to restore some of the funding to address the
efforts in Turkey around civil society. I wonder, in your
testimony you said that we should not expect any improvement in
the next few years. Can you talk about how matters could
further deteriorate?
Mr. Schenkkan. I may, yes. What I think we should expect,
unfortunately, in the short term politically, prior to the 2019
elections, is an expansion, in fact, of the prosecutions on
conspiracy theory grounds around the state of emergency. I
think it was asked in one of the earlier questions at what
point the Turkish Government would consider their response
adequate or to be finished regarding the coup attempt. I was in
Turkey a month after the coup attempt interviewing various
members of civil society, as well as politicians and others. At
that time, the most fervent hope, in August 2016, was that the
investigation of the coup attempt would remain within the
appropriate framework, and confine itself to the coup attempt.
It was already clear within two weeks after that, that it
was beyond that framework. And it has now spilled far, far, far
beyond that. Unfortunately, under the state of emergency and
under existing Turkish laws prior to the state of emergency,
there are virtually no limits to how far a prosecutor, with a
cooperative judge, may go in persecuting people for normal
interactions with others. It's a guilty by association system.
So the allegations currently being pressed against Osman
Kavala, whose case I mentioned, a very prominent civil society
leader, that involve Henri Barkey, former State Department
official--these allegations in and of themselves can expand to
include hundreds, maybe even thousands of people.
Unfortunately, we face a very severe conspiracy theory scenario
in Turkey.
Mrs. Shaheen. So, given what's happened, can you talk about
how that's affecting the Turkish economy, and to what extent
Erdogan is affected by--I don't want to say a downgrade--but a
worsening economic situation in the country?
Mr. Schenkkan. Yes. The economy is built on fragile ground.
The Turkish economy had previously been orienting itself more
and more towards an export-led approach, driven especially by
cultivating new markets in the Middle East, in the Balkans, in
Europe. Strained relations with Europe--that, again, President
Erdogan has cultivated for his own domestic political reasons--
have begun to affect economic relations and investments coming
from Europe. The strained relations with Russia that Turkey had
previously engaged in--although now there's been a detente--had
also contributed to undermining some of the bases for economic
development.
So while DAS Cohen mentioned the very strong growth rate
that Turkey currently posts, that's possibly based on some
meddling with the numbers, according to economists. They
changed how they calculate GDP recently. It also ignores the
very high inflation right now in Turkey, which is well over 10
percent, and may be quite higher when we talk about food
products which, of course, is the most important for the
largest part of the population. So economic issues are very
important for President Erdogan. He's looking for ways prior to
the 2019 election cycle to make sure that the average Turk, or
at least his core base, feels that the economy is working for
them. That requires some short term measures--as it has over
the past several years--that may not be best for the long term.
Mrs. Shaheen. Thank you. I see my time is up.
Mr. Tillis. If you have other questions, you're welcome
to----
Mrs. Shaheen. No, go ahead.
Mr. Tillis. I've been deferring to everybody to make sure
you had an opportunity. Thank you for attending.
Ms. Furnari, you spent so much time in Izmir, right? How
big is the congregation?
Ms. Furnari. The church congregation? The size varies.
Depends on the week, depends on the year, honestly. I would
say, to the best of my knowledge, around 50 people. Some weeks
lower, some weeks higher.
Mr. Tillis. And in your time there, do you recall any time
where you felt like you were being harassed or targeted by
Turkish authorities, or your parents? Before the events that
led to your father's detainment?
Ms. Furnari. I would say there wasn't a feeling of that
from Turkish authorities. But I think about six or seven years
ago there was an attempt on my father's life by a gunman that
came to the church. So I did have that sense of some risk and
some fear and concern for my parents.
Mr. Tillis. And Mr. Cohen testified that from the State
Department's perspective, the conditions of your father's
detainment were adequate. And then Ms. Heil and you both
testified that he's lost 50 pounds in the 404 days that he's
been in confinement. How do you reconcile adequate facilities
with that outcome? And Ms. Heil, either you or Ms. Furnari. It
sounds like the conditions are not the least bit acceptable.
Ms. Heil. I would say the other situation that Mr. Cohen
also referenced was being kept in a cell that was overcrowded--
well, that was Pastor Brunson as well, because during a time of
his detention he was kept in a cell that was built for 8, but
had 22 prisoners in it. And of course, he's the only Christian.
So, being kept up all hours of the night, not being able to
walk outside, just the stress of not being able to sleep. And,
again, being the only Christian--just the verbal abuse and the
stress of missing his family have just led him to losing weight
and being beside himself, with no end in sight.
Mr. Tillis. Ms. Furnari, are you able to communicate with
him, either through written correspondence or through the
telephone?
Ms. Furnari. Yes, I have been able to send him letters.
Every once in a while, I get one from him. It's been very
difficult for him to bring himself to write, though, because it
reminds him of what he's missing out on.
Mr. Tillis. Ms. Heil, it almost seems to me that maybe from
the beginning of his apprehension that they viewed him as
possible trade bait for someone here in the United States. Do
you see anything that any reasonable person--have you seen any
evidence that would substantiate any of their reasons for
detainment that in a U.S. court would hold water at any level?
Ms. Heil. No. In fact, his file has been sealed under the
state of emergency, so no one has seen any evidence. So we have
no idea. We have heard that there is a secret witness, but
that's all. And every chance we've had, we've tried to demand
concrete evidence. But no one has seen any evidence. And he has
not been charged with any crime. He's still simply a suspect
being detained.
Mr. Tillis. Doesn't it defy logic that if the Turkish
Government and Erdogan had a compelling case against Mr.
Brunson that they would want to put that forth to really
communicate more effectively their basis for the illegal
detainment?
Ms. Heil. Certainly. If they had evidence to support their
accusations of the crimes, you would think that they would go
ahead and charge him and let the case proceed. But they have
not.
Mr. Tillis. Mr. Schenkkan, the referendum back in April of
2017--how have international observers judged the legitimacy of
that referendum?
Mr. Schenkkan. The OSCE had a long-term observation mission
in Turkey, as well as short-term observers, a full team. And
their appraisal was very negative, in the measured terms, of
course, that the OSCE monitors, ODIHR, typically uses.
Mr. Tillis. Yes, so you've got a referendum that passed by
the slimmest of margins, and then questions about the
legitimacy of the referendum to begin with. Is that fair to
characterize it that way?
Mr. Schenkkan. It's very fair.
Mr. Tillis. You mentioned something, I want you to go back
to it--I can't remember your precise words, but you were
talking about the seizure of certain businesses that equated to
the billions. Can you tell me a little bit about those
businesses and why they would have necessarily been targeted?
Mr. Schenkkan. Of course. The Turkish Government's position
is that the Fethullah Gulen organization, which they call
FETO--which is not a name that the network uses for itself, but
was provided by the Turkish Government in the last three
years--included large business interests. And so businesses and
businesses owned by affiliated businessmen were seized and
handed over to the treasury, and they will be gradually
auctioned off, again, in a process that is starting now.
In those auctions in the last 10 years, we have many
examples of this auction process taking place when companies go
into bankruptcy or are otherwise passed over into state hands.
These auction processes are very frequently, if not
universally, manipulated to ensure that especially strategic
interests in areas like media wind up in the hands of parties
friendly to President Erdogan and to his government.
Mr. Tillis. When I was in Turkey for that extended period a
few years ago, I had the opportunity to meet with the
ecumenical patriarch, Bartholomew. And interestingly enough, at
that time he was pretty optimistic that things were getting
better. What's the state of Christians in Turkey today?
Mr. Schenkkan. Well, I would have to say, first of all,
that like we say in freedom of the press issues, the death of
one journalist or the imprisonment of one journalist has a very
severe chilling effect. The imprisonment of one pastor has an
extremely severe chilling effect throughout a whole community.
Of course, the Orthodox and the Armenian communities in
Turkey have special legal constitutional protections under the
Lausanne Treaty, and in that sense also have a different
relationship with the authorities than do Protestant Christians
in Turkey. I think the main factor undergirding what's
happened--which is affecting all Christian communities,
including the official protected ones--is a very hard
nationalist turn of the last three years; that has President
Erdogan embarking on a very anti-Western and very Turkish
nationalist course in order to consolidate a different
political coalition than the one that had backed him in the
2000s. He increasingly needs to marginalize and to push out
ethnic minorities and religious minorities. And so the hate
speech against them has certainly increased.
Mr. Tillis. How much of Erdogan's behavior, do you think,
is rooted in his own belief of where he wants Turkey to go,
versus just reading the political tea leaves and trying to
maintain some order within the nation?
Mr. Schenkkan. It's one of the top questions among anyone
interested in Turkey. I think it is principally about the
political moment first and second about where he wants to go,
because where he wants to go falls within a very wide spectrum,
but where he wants to be when Turkey gets there--which is at
the very top--is always the same. And so Turkey can get to a
lot of different places with President Erdogan at the top, and
I think he's been maneuvering back and forth along different
options as the political dynamics and the geopolitical dynamics
change around him.
Mr. Tillis. I did also want to ask you just briefly, you
mentioned an amendment by Senator Van Hollen, I believe, and
you also mentioned the effort on the part of Senators Shaheen
and Lankford. What more should we be considering, beyond being
supportive of those measures, as specific actions of Congress?
Mr. Schenkkan. Correct. Regarding the U.S. employees,
foreign service nationals, I think we should be considering
either widening Senator Shaheen's and Senator Lankford's
amendment to include employees of the United States or adding a
separate amendment for that purpose, because I think where
we've arrived now--and it's correct, as DAS Cohen indicated in
his testimony--that there has been some progress in the past
couple of months, and in particular since the visa suspension,
that that got the attention of the Turkish authorities and
improved access to some detainees. It led to some changes
regarding the potential detention of a third foreign service
national.
That said, it hasn't led to the release of Serkan Golge, of
Pastor Brunson, or Metin Topuz, Hamza Ulucay. We're still just
back at the beginning, which is not a good situation. So I
think that it needs to continue to press forward. I think
that's one.
I think, two--and this is more about the medium term and
the longer term and how, I think, want to see Turkey as a
stable rule-of-law state that is more inclusive and more
democratic--there should be funding for civil society, for
journalists in Turkey. The U.S. Government typically has not
provided this kind of democracy and governance assistance for
Turkey, except in very small ways--through the party
institutes, through the occasional State Department Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor call. USAID does not do work
oriented inside of Turkey. There should be consideration for
whether there should be a special fund or other mechanism for
those who support a democratic rule-of-law state in Turkey.
Mr. Tillis. Thank you.
Senator Shaheen.
Mrs. Shaheen. First of all, let me go back to the coup. Has
there been any reliable information released from the Turkish
Government about who was responsible for the coup, who in the
United States we believe is objective and factual?
Mr. Schenkkan. Well, I can't speak for the United States
Government or how they are perceiving.
There are multiple trials currently going on of varying
relationship to the coup attempt. So you have some that are
very much on the periphery and that prosecutors have claimed
are connected to the coup attempt, like the case against Pastor
Brunson or against others, the case against Osman Kavala or
against the Amnesty International human rights defenders. All
of these mentioned the coup attempt and implied that these
people were somehow involved, but there was, obviously, no
evidence.
There's another set of cases involving officers, involving
military figures, as well as some civilians who are around the
military bases. Those cases are taking place. There is a
gradual buildup of evidence around what happened.
A couple of really severe problems with that.
Mrs. Shaheen. Yes, and I'm really asking not what happened,
who were the responsible for the events of that period.
Mr. Schenkkan. Yes.
Mrs. Shaheen. I'm more asking is there any evidence around
who was behind initiating that. The military--I haven't seen
anything that suggests the Gulen network was actually
responsible, but is there any evidence that's come out that
would suggest that?
Mr. Schenkkan. There is evidence that there were members of
the Gulen movement or network, some in the military and some
who were civilians, who participated in the coup attempt. What
their role was, whether they were the exclusive leaders or
whether they were co-participants along with members of other
factions in the military, is not yet clear, in my opinion. And
this is, obviously, hotly, hotly debated right now.
Mrs. Shaheen. Right.
Mr. Schenkkan. Second--and I would say this even more
strongly--there has been no genuine evidence offered of the
coup attempt being directed from Pennsylvania, which is of
course the implication, from Fethullah Gulen.
Mrs. Shaheen. Right.
Mr. Schenkkan. That evidence continues to be
circumstantial. It continues to be based on inference and not
based on something that would stand up, I would say, in a U.S.
court of law.
Mrs. Shaheen. And so what has been the impact of the recent
reports that someone associated with the current
administration, in the Trump administration, was meeting around
the potential to extradite or to send Gulen back to Turkey?
Mr. Schenkkan. Well, I think the biggest impact is that it
damaged the clear message that the U.S. needs to send and has
been working to send, that our system of rule of law is
inviolable. The implication that there could be a side deal
outside of the normal legal channels for the extradition or
rendition of an individual who's legally entitled to be
residing in the United States right now is very damaging. And
so I think it is very important that--and I think the State
Department has likely done this--we communicate that this is
not the way to go about business.
Mrs. Shaheen. And how much does it undercut that message
when we have the President embracing Erdogan and not raising
concerns about human rights issues in Turkey?
Mr. Schenkkan. I think it's a genuine issue that we want to
make sure that human rights issues remain at the forefront of
the agenda with Turkey. And we want them to remain there not
only because they're our values and because this is what we
stand for, but because this is in our strategic interest. This
is an important part of how the United States wants to see
events develop in the Middle East. Many of the issues that we
see ourselves grappling with in Syria, in Iraq, as well as in
the Balkans, have strong ties to the settlement and development
of a democratic rule-of-law society in Turkey.
Mrs. Shaheen. Nate, Turkey has played an important role in
NATO, and they have certainly been helpful in a number of the
conflicts where NATO has participated. Can you talk about what,
if anything, NATO might be able to do to address some of the
rule of law and other issues that are happening in Turkey right
now?
Mr. Schenkkan. Certainly, NATO remains principally a
military alliance. It is a military alliance----
Mrs. Shaheen. Right.
Mr. Schenkkan.----and it has military tasks that it
performs. The integrity of that relationship with Turkey has
also been threatened by these developments, and that is one of
the reasons why this is a strategic goal, to create democracy
and rule of law in Turkey.
I think the NATO relationship will primarily be of use in
this regard in that it is a means to communicate with Turkey
how seriously the United States takes these issues.
Mrs. Shaheen. And the EU, I assume.
Mr. Schenkkan. Yes, of course.
To indicate that the kind of cooperation within NATO that
Turkey will be involved in, and the level of Turkey's rank
within NATO and what it has access to and where it falls within
the hierarchy--because, of course, as such a large alliance,
there is a hierarchy--that connecting these two will help. And
I think it can be used in that way. I would not put on the
table any kind of withdrawal or any kind of exclusion of Turkey
from NATO, but----
Mrs. Shaheen. I would agree with that. I don't think that's
helpful.
Mr. Schenkkan. Yes. But within the alliance itself, there
continue to be very differing levels of cooperation. And I
think making sure that when the United States says we value
Turkey's strategic alliance and participation in NATO, what is
understood by that is: and that participation will increase,
along with improved cooperation on these other measures, rather
than ``and we will continue to participate no matter what, we
will continue to offer you the same access no matter what,''
would be an improvement.
Mrs. Shaheen. Finally, I would just say that one of the
things you point out--and I agree with this--is that we should
recognize in the United States that Erdogan's anti-Western,
anti-
Americanism message is about his own interests, and that
there's nothing that we can do that's going to change that
tide. I would just qualify that a little bit, because you then
go on to point out that, based on some of the proactive actions
that we've taken in the United States, it has changed Turkey's
behavior. And I would argue that we need to continue to look at
those proactive ways in which we can change Turkey's behavior,
and in some cases that means not only with incentives but also,
as we've done through the Van Hollen amendment, try to provide
some disincentives for Turkey, some penalties that they have to
expect in terms of how we deal with them, and that that's very
important for us to do. And as we look at how we deal with some
of the people that they've imprisoned, we ought to be thinking
about what ways we can invoke some of these incentives and
disincentives to try and influence their behavior in terms of
releasing those people who are improperly imprisoned.
Mr. Schenkkan. Absolutely. And I agree with how you
understood or reframed my point. I think what I was trying to
get at is we should not react on the basis of rhetoric and we
should not react on the basis of trying to assuage or placate
something that the Turkish Government is doing. We should act
on the basis of these are our interests, these are our values,
this is what we need to do to enforce them, because there's
been a shifting and a perception from the Turkish side that
maybe what were red lines are not red lines anymore. And those
need to be enforced.
Mrs. Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Tillis. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Cardin.
HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, RANKING MEMBER, COMMISSION ON SECURITY
AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Mr. Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for not
being here throughout the hearing. We have a little tax bill in
the Senate Finance Committee that we're bringing up. But I
wanted to stop by.
Thanks, Senator Tillis. Thanks, Senator Wicker; Senator
Shaheen, who is a key member of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee as it relates to this issue in Europe.
Our dilemma is this: Turkey is a very important strategic
partner of the United States. Its location is critically
important. It's critically important in regards to our campaign
against ISIS, and it's a NATO partner. All of the above. But we
ignore human rights and values at our own peril. If we don't
package our policies in Turkey based upon respect for human
rights of the Turkish citizens, it's going to be
counterproductive to United States national security interests.
And it's been really challenging. It's been challenging
under this administration because the Trump administration has
not been clear at times as to American values. That makes it
more complicated for us to stand up and say that we will not
tolerate the mass arrests and the violations of dissent being
tolerated in their country. So this is not an easy issue for us
to figure out how we need to proceed.
But we have direct problems when Turkey is purchasing its
military arms from Russia, which violates NATO uniformity and
consistency, and violates our sanction bill with Russia. We've
got to take action. You can't sit by and let those types of
activities occur without the United States being strongly
engaged on that issue.
I was in Europe this past weekend and had a conversation
with our German colleagues in regards to Turkey. There is
concern well beyond the United States on these issues.
So, Mr. Chairman, I don't have any specific questions for
the witnesses, but I just really wanted to thank the Helsinki
Commission for holding this hearing. I think this is extremely
important. We've got to get this right. We need Turkey. I would
suggest Turkey needs us. And their sensitivity on certain
issues is, quite frankly, beyond our understanding. But we do
stand for universal values, and they need to embrace a more
open way in which we can have those discussions as partners.
Thank you.
Mr. Tillis. Thank you, Senator Cardin.
Ms. Heil, we've had some questions about what more we can
do as a matter of policy, and some of the amendments we've
talked about already. But what more can we do to help you?
Ms. Heil. As has been mentioned before even when you
discontinue visa services out of Turkey, if there's any
opportunity for negotiation, that Pastor Brunson never be
forgotten as part of those negotiations.
As far as what will make Turkey respond, I think we would
defer to the administration and the State Department because
they have had direct negotiations and talks with Turkey, and
they would be in a better position to tell you what they think
would be helpful. But I would urge you to let them know how
important this issue is to you.
Mr. Tillis. Mr. Schenkkan, the discussion around the
challenges that Senator Cardin did a great job of summarizing--
on the one hand, they're an important ally in the fight on
terror, and they're actually host to tens of thousands of
refugees who are seeking refuge from the fighting in Syria. But
the President has publicly asked for the release of the
detainees. The Secretary of State has. What more should we ask
of the administration beyond the posture and the public
positions they've taken?
Mr. Schenkkan. I think that these issues of detention,
especially the treatment of American citizens first and
foremost, can be worked into other aspects of the relationship.
I think, as my co-
testifier was saying, there are many, many, many interactions
with the Turkish Government on a daily basis, on a bilateral
basis at the working level, of course. There are also many more
medium-level and then high-level interactions. And I think that
making it clear that this is not a matter of a single public
statement or two public statements--that this will affect the
NATO relationship, it will affect the security relationship--is
an important thing to communicate to Turkey, and to communicate
how it will affect that relationship going forward.
One of the things that we're seeing now regarding Turkey
due to the detention of American citizens, due to the charges
and conspiracy theories advanced about other Americans, is
fewer Americans, especially those who would be most interested
in working with Turkey--whether on a business basis or on a
foreign policy basis or in other areas--being unwilling to
travel there. And I think it's important that Turkey understand
they're going to lose a large generation of people who would
otherwise be very supportive and would be their allies if this
continues.
Mr. Tillis. Thank you.
Well, thank you all for your testimony. And, Ms. Furnari, I
look forward to your father being at your ceremony.
Ms. Furnari. Thank you.
Mr. Tillis. We're going to hold the record open till the
end of the week. We will have other members probably submit
questions for the record. I have some that we'll be submitting
to seek your input. But certainly, you have an invitation to
contact my office, with a North Carolinian illegally detained,
and all of the offices of the members of the Commission, to do
everything we can to continue to provide support.
So at this point we will adjourn the hearing. But we will
leave the record open through the end of the week. If you have
any other additional information you'd like to submit for the
record, we welcome you to do that.
And again, thank you again for your testimony and for being
here today. Commission's adjourned. [Sounds gavel.]
[Whereupon, at 11:06 a.m., the hearing ended.]
A P P E N D I X
=======================================================================
Prepared Statements
----------
Prepared Statement of Hon. Thom Tillis
This hearing of the Helsinki Commission will come to order.
Good morning and welcome to this Helsinki Commission
hearing titled ``Prisoners of the Purge: The Victims of
Turkey's Failing Rule of Law.'' I am honored to be chairing
this hearing on behalf of Chairman Wicker.
As of today, an American pastor has spent 404 days in a
Turkish jail without trial, without access to the evidence
against him, the subject of a vicious smear campaign in the
Turkish press, and facing life in prison on fabricated charges
of being a terrorist and coup-plotter.
Elsewhere in Turkey, a Turkish-American NASA scientist has
spent 480 days in prison--much of it in solitary confinement--
on terrorism and espionage charges springing from the baseless
testimony of a disgruntled relative and a bizarre compilation
of circumstantial evidence, including a dollar bill seized at
his parents' home.
Today also marks 253 days behind bars for a veteran Turkish
employee of the U.S. Consulate in Adana who stands accused of
terrorism for doing his job as he has for over 30 years,
communicating on behalf of the U.S. Government with local
community contacts.
These prisoners--Andrew Brunson, Serkan Golge, and Hamza
Ulucay--are the innocent victims of Turkey's collapsing rule of
law.
With every passing day, the injustice of these detentions
compounds itself. For the Brunson family next week: another
Thanksgiving apart. For Kubra Golge and her two young kids:
another day away from their home in Houston. For Hamza, another
inexplicable punishment for his dedication to the job he loves.
But the focus of this hearing is not personal--it's
principle. Just as Andrew, Serkan, and Hamza have been victims
of Turkey's failing rule of law, there are literally thousands
more like them behind bars today.
Since imposing a state of emergency nearly 16 months ago,
the Turkish Government has detained more than 60,000 people and
fired or suspended upwards of 100,000 others from their jobs.
The so-called ``decree laws'' authorizing these punitive
measures do not establish any evidentiary standard for
application thereby permitting wide-scale abuse as seen in the
cases I've highlighted.
Of course, context matters, and the Turkish Government
invoked its constitutional state of emergency provisions in the
wake of the July 2016 coup attempt--an unacceptable and violent
attack on the constitutional order of a NATO ally--an attack I
unequivocally condemn. But the question is not whether Turkey
has the right to pursue justice after such a national trauma--
the question is how it goes about it.
The Helsinki Commission has called this hearing today to
get to the bottom of the accumulating injustices under the
state of emergency. As a participating State of the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Turkey has
committed itself to upholding certain rule of law standards
even under extraordinary circumstances. Among these commitments
is the guarantee of equality before the law.
However, Turkey's commitment to this principle has been
called into serious doubt. Just two months ago President
Erdogan proposed an outrageous swap involving Andrew Brunson--
``a pastor for a pastor'' in his words. If the United States
would circumvent its rule of law to extradite a free man,
Erdogan suggested, then Turkey would release a wrongfully
imprisoned one.
Let us be clear about what President Erdogan proposed: this
is not justice--this is ransom.
The United States should not expect--much less accept--this
sort of treatment from a NATO ally. The harassment and
detention of our consulate staffs has also overstepped the
bounds of diplomatic conduct among partners.
I was glad to see the State Department in the past month
impose some real costs for this behavior by suspending non-
immigrant visa services in Turkey.
While the Department announced last week that it had
resumed these services on a ``limited basis'' and received
assurances about the security of our local employees, I hope
that we are clear with Turkey that we will not accept anything
short of true and timely justice for our detained consulate
staff and our citizens behind bars. I also hope that we will
not tire in advocating for the basic rights and freedoms of the
thousands of Turks impacted by these sweeping purges:
academics, mayors, legislators, journalists, and human rights
defenders among them.
Let me conclude by saying that it is in the interest of the
United States to have Turkey as a strong and reliable ally.
From strengthening NATO to fighting terrorism to resolving
conflicts in the Middle East, we have important work to do
together and we will be more successful if we can work as
partners. The urgency of these tasks underscores the importance
of resolving distractions and rebuilding the trust we need to
achieve our common objectives.
And as always, our partnerships are strongest when they are
rooted in shared principles.
We have two excellent panels of witnesses today to examine
these topics. I will introduce the panels separately but I
would like to say at the outset that I am especially pleased to
have with us a State Department witness, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs Jonathan R. Cohen,
to provide the Administration's perspective on these
developments, U.S. policy toward Turkey, and the future of the
bilateral relationship. I am also honored to have on our second
panel Jacqueline Furnari, Andrew Brunson's daughter, from my
State of North Carolina.
Our first panel features Deputy Assistant Secretary Cohen.
He has been the Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and
Eurasian Affairs covering Cyprus, Greece and Turkey since
August 2016. He previously served in Baghdad as Deputy Chief of
Mission from 2014-2016, in Paris as the Acting Deputy Chief of
Mission from 2013 to 2014, and as the Minister Counselor for
Political Affairs from 2011 to 2013.
Mr. Cohen, thank you for being here. You may proceed with
your opening statement.
[Second Panel]
Our second panel consists of three superb witnesses.
First we will hear from CeCe Heil, Pastor Brunson's U.S.
attorney. Mrs. Heil is Executive Senior Counsel for the
American Center for Law and Justice, specializing in public
policy and global legal matters including the United Nations.
She manages the ACLJ's global partners and heads a team of
lawyers handling cases in defense of life, protection of US
National Security interests and dealing with Islamic extremism.
Next we will hear from Jacqueline Furnari, Pastor Brunson's
daughter. Mrs. Furnari is the 19-year-old daughter of Andrew
Brunson. She has two brothers: Jordan, 22, and Blaise, 16. She
is currently earning her Bachelor of Science in Business
Administration from the Kenan-Flagler Business School at the
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. She expects to
graduate in December 2017 with a concentration in
Entrepreneurship and Operations Management. Jacqueline was
raised in Izmir, Turkey, where her father served as pastor of
the Izmir Resurrection Church. In February, Jacqueline married
a Blackhawk pilot in the US Army.
Finally, we will hear from Nate Schenkkan, a longtime
Turkey expert who serves as Project Director for Nations in
Transit, Freedom House's annual survey of democratic governance
in Central Europe and Eurasia. He previously served as Senior
Program Officer for Freedom House's Eurasia programs, covering
Turkey and Central Asia. He was the lead researcher and co-
author of two Freedom House special reports including The
Struggle for Turkey's Internet and Democracy in Crisis:
Corruption, Media and Power in Turkey.
Prepared Statement of Hon. Chris Smith
Good morning. We will hear today about the catastrophic
breakdown of the rule of law in our NATO ally Turkey and its
personal consequences for several American citizens and
thousands of Turks.
A key matter before us today is the Turkish government's
apparent decision to hold hostage an innocent American pastor
in order to extort political concessions from the United
States. This ``hostage diplomacy,'' as it has been called, is
unacceptable when it is practiced by our enemies and appalling
from our supposed allies.
Pastor Andrew Brunson was detained over a year ago on
October 7, 2016. We know from Pastor Brunson's U.S. attorney,
CeCe Heil, that the Turkish Government prepared an order of
deportation on the day of his detention. The Turkish Government
could have easily expelled him from the country then and there,
bringing to an unjust close his 23 years of peaceful work in
Turkey but sparing him indefinite detention. And yet it chose
not to. Why was this order of deportation never executed?
Pastor Brunson's daughter, Jacqueline, will testify that
prior to her father's detention the ``worst case scenario for
Christian pastors who were not nationals in Turkey was
deportation.'' Again, why was Pastor Brunson not deported
consistent with this precedent?
In February, I joined 77 of my colleagues from the House
and Senate in writing to Turkish President Erdogan urging him
to release and then promptly deport Pastor Brunson. Nine months
have passed without any response to that letter.
In the past 13 months that Pastor Brunson has spent in jail
in Turkey, the President of the United States, the Vice
President, and the Secretary of State, among many others, have
interceded with the Turkish Government seeking his release. And
yet to this day, he languishes in a punishing legal limbo
without trial and without access to the evidence against him.
On September 28, President Erdogan publicly suggested
trading US-based Islamic cleric Fethullah Gulen for Pastor
Brunson. Rhetorically addressing the United States, Erdogan
declared in reference to Gulen ``you have one pastor as well.
Give him to us, then we will try him [Pastor Brunson] and give
him to you.''
With this statement, all doubt was removed as to why Turkey
has failed to release Pastor Brunson for more than a year.
Turkey is holding an American citizen hostage for a deal the
United States will never accept.
Sadly, this is not President Erdogan's only outrage against
an American citizen. In May, during an official visit to the
United States, Erdogan's personal security detail--or, more
appropriately, his goon squad--viciously attacked a group of
peaceful protesters in broad daylight outside the Turkish
Ambassador's residence in Washington, D.C. In the melee, 26-
year-old Ceren Borazan from my home state of New Jersey was
thrown to the ground, punched, kicked, and held in a chokehold
by a Turkish bodyguard who threatened her life. Video footage
shows President Erdogan calmly looking on at the brazen
violence. Even as 15 of his bodyguards have been charged in the
US for the assault and the United States has cancelled handgun
and ammunition sales to his security detail, President Erdogan
has never apologized.
I believe that we should examine the applicability of
individual sanctions against grave human rights abusers in
Turkey under the provisions of the International Religious
Freedom Act and the Global Magnitsky Human Rights
Accountability Act. These existing sanctions regimes, or a new
tailored set, should be used to hold to account those
responsible for the detention of Pastor Brunson and other cases
of prolonged and unjustified detention in Turkey.
Thank you to our witnesses for their presence here and in
particular to Pastor Brunson's daughter for her courage and
candor in testifying today before the Commission.
Prepared Statement of Jonathan R. Cohen
Chairman Wicker, Co-Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Cardin,
Ranking Member Hastings, Senator Tillis, and Members of the
Commission. Thank you for inviting me to testify this morning.
Today's hearing is an important opportunity to reaffirm the
abiding U.S. interest in and commitment to democracy, human
rights, and rule of law in Turkey. It is also an opportunity to
underscore the value of the U.S.-Turkey Alliance, despite the
current strains in the bilateral relationship and the
challenges facing Turkey today.
U.S.-Turkey Alliance
Having spent the last 65 years as NATO Allies, the United
States and Turkey have deep and complex relations. With the
second-
largest military force in the Alliance, a dynamic economy, and
a population of 80 million, Turkey's critical position and
regional clout have given Ankara significant influence on
issues of core U.S. interest over the years. For example, from
the early 1990s until 2003, Turkey facilitated the no-fly zone
over the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, allowing it to develop in
peace and escape Saddam Hussein's tyranny. In Afghanistan,
Turkey was a major troop contributor to the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF), while also providing use of
its airspace and allowing the refueling of U.S. aircraft on
ISAF missions. Our long history of allied military cooperation
also includes operations in Korea, the Balkans, and Somalia.
Apart from military affairs, we share many goals and
concerns. Like us, Turkey wants to limit Iranian and Russian
influence in its region; it supports a unified and sovereign
Iraq; and it remains a partner in efforts to resolve the war in
Syria. The Turkish government and people also deserve
recognition for the enormous hospitality they have displayed in
hosting more than three million Syrian refugees. We value
Turkey's efforts to foster regional stability and its
contributions to global security.
Turkey is an important partner in the Global Coalition to
Defeat ISIS and provides critical bases for U.S. and Coalition
military forces, from which we conduct precision airstrikes;
carry out intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
flights; maintain combat search and rescue units; and resupply
Coalition forces in closer proximity than possible from a U.S.
base in the Persian Gulf. Turkish forces were critical in
liberating key territory from ISIS along Turkey's southern
border and degrading ISIS's lines of communication to the
outside world. For our part, we underscore our commitment to
stand with Turkey against terrorist threats, including the PKK
and ISIS.
The U.S.-Turkey relationship extends beyond our mutual
interest in stability and security in the Balkans and the
Middle East. Both President Trump and President Erdogan have
committed to strengthening our trade and investment ties, as
underscored by discussions in September on our bilateral Trade
and Investment Framework Agreement. The recent proposal for
Boeing to provide Turkish Airlines with forty Dreamliner
passenger aircraft--a deal that, if finalized, is worth $10.8
billion and is expected to sustain 25,000 U.S. jobs--
illustrates the potential of our economic relationship. Our
extensive exchanges of students, scientists, and professionals
ensure our countries remain interconnected on a people-to-
people level and provide valuable opportunities for innovation
and entrepreneurship, which are vital to our knowledge-based
economies.
Ankara seeks further improvement in each of these areas of
cooperation--and so do we. We will continue our efforts to
develop constructive dialogue in order to maximize the enduring
benefits of our strategic alliance.
Democracy, Human Rights, and Rule of Law
In my remaining remarks today, I would like to focus on the
U.S. Government's concerns over Turkey's protracted state of
emergency, which has had negative effects on democracy and
democratic institutions, on human rights, and on rule of law.
Chief among those concerns is the security of and protection of
human rights and fundamental freedoms for U.S. citizens in
Turkey and locally employed staff at the U.S. Mission in
Turkey, a number of whom have been arrested on dubious
terrorism charges under the state of emergency.
As I highlight these concerns, it is in the context of
Turkey being a longtime friend and Ally, and with deep empathy
and appreciation for the fact that on July 15, 2016, Turkey
endured a traumatic coup d'etat attempt. We continue to support
Turkey's efforts to bring to justice those responsible for the
failed coup. It is in the national interest of both the United
States and Turkey for Turkey to be stable, democratic, and
prosperous. We continue to support Turkey's democratic
development and vigorously encourage application of the rule of
law, including due process, transparency, and judicial
independence.
The July 2016 attempted coup, in which nearly 250 perished
and thousands were wounded, was an evil attack on democracy and
a tragedy for Turks, who bravely took to the streets to defend
their democracy. A few months later, I stood in Turkey's
parliament building, the Grand National Assembly, and observed
the destruction that Turkish Air Force F-16s had wrought on the
people's house, in which all political parties sit. The Turks
asked me to imagine the national trauma if such an attack had
happened here on our Capitol dome. The Turkish nation was
shaken by the coup attempt and remains so.
It is to be expected that Turkey would--and we support its
efforts to--investigate and arrest those who directly
participated or materially aided in the planning, preparation,
and conduct of the coup attempt. The U.S. Government is
carefully reviewing material provided by Turkey related to the
Turkish Government's request that the United States extradite
Fethullah Gulen and will give similarly careful consideration
to any new extradition requests related to the coup attempt. We
again underscore our willingness to assist Turkish authorities
in their investigation of the attempted coup and support
bringing to justice those who participated.
Now, more than one year later, a restrictive state of
emergency remains in place and appears to have been used
expansively to target many Turks with no connection to the coup
attempt. We were concerned to see Turkey extend the state of
emergency for a fifth time on October 17 for an additional
three months.
The prolongation of the state of emergency has, in the view
of the U.S. Government, negatively impacted Turkish democracy,
rule of law, and respect for fundamental freedoms. The Turkish
government has expropriated nearly one thousand private
businesses and dismissed well over 100,000 from their jobs.
Tens of thousands have been arrested on terror-related charges.
Authorities have imprisoned a growing number of opposition
lawmakers, journalists, leading intellectuals, academics, civil
society activists, and respected human rights defenders--
including respected philanthropist Osman Kavala, Amnesty
International Turkey's Chairman Taner Kilic, and its recently
released Director Idil Eser. We call on the Turkish government
to expeditiously end the state of emergency, release those not
proven guilty of criminal offenses, expedite due process for
dismissed civil servants, and cease the seemingly
indiscriminate prosecution of individuals--in many cases,
individuals that appear to have been targeted because they
criticize the government, its officials, or its policies, or
have had contact with those who did.
As the Department of State has made clear in numerous press
statements since the coup attempt, these detentions and
prosecutions, often with little evidence, transparency, or
effective mechanism for redress, undermine confidence in the
rule of law in Turkey. The U.S. Mission in Turkey is closely
following these cases, monitoring trials, engaging with civil
society leaders, and working with like-minded partners to
underscore the importance of respect for rule of law and
individual rights, including fair trial guarantees. These
rights are enshrined in the Turkish Constitution and are part
of Turkey's international obligations and commitments.
Additionally, we have seen a worrisome diminishment in
freedom of the media and freedom of expression. Detentions of
journalists under emergency rule have effectively silenced most
independent media, most notably via the trial of 17 journalists
and media executives--four of whom remain in custody--for
Turkey's leading independent newspaper, Cumhuriyet. As we have
expressed publicly and to the Turkish government on numerous
occasions, curbs on freedom of expression, freedom of assembly
and association, and other fundamental freedoms erode the
foundations of democratic society, and are impediments to re-
establishing the social and legal underpinnings of state and
public security. Turkey benefits from having more engaged
voices, not fewer--even voices it may find controversial or
uncomfortable.
American Citizen Detentions
One of the Department of State's highest priorities is
assisting U.S. citizens abroad and providing all possible
consular services to U.S. citizens in need.
There have been dozens of U.S. citizens detained or delayed
by Turkish security services in some capacity since July 2016.
Several U.S. citizens, including U.S.-Turkish dual nationals,
remain in prison under the state of emergency, all facing
dubious terrorism and coup attempt-related charges.
As there is no international obligation to grant consular
access to dual nationals, and as Turkey does not consider U.S.-
Turkish dual nationals to be U.S. citizens for the purposes of
consular notification, we were long denied access to our dual
nationals detained under state of emergency provisions. After
sustained U.S. Government engagement, the Government of Turkey
for the first time granted us consular access to these dual
nationals in mid-October of this year. High-level conversations
continue to enhance cooperation and are yielding progress on a
range of legal issues.
Andrew Brunson, a U.S. citizen and Christian pastor who has
lived in Turkey for nearly 25 years, has been in prison since
October 7, 2016. Of the U.S. citizens now detained in Turkey
under the state of emergency, he has been held the longest
without a judicial hearing. The outlandish charges against Mr.
Brunson include gathering state secrets for espionage,
attempting to overthrow the Turkish parliament and government,
and attempting to change the constitutional order. The United
States consistently calls for Mr. Brunson's release at the
highest levels--President Trump, Vice President Pence, and
Secretary Tillerson have all raised his case multiple times
with their Turkish counterparts. On August 15, Secretary
Tillerson publicly called for his release during the
International Religious Freedom Report rollout. Our Embassy in
Ankara continues to engage on this case and provide consular
services to Mr. Brunson and his family, meeting with him and
his wife on a regular basis.
We remain deeply concerned about the detention of all U.S.
citizens, including U.S.-Turkish dual nationals, who have been
arrested under the state of emergency. We will continue to
visit them when possible, raise their cases with our Turkish
counterparts, and seek a satisfactory resolution of their
cases.
Locally Employed Staff and Visa Suspension
Under the state of emergency, the Government of Turkey
arrested two of U.S. Mission Turkey's locally employed staff on
what we believe are specious grounds. Longtime U.S. Consulate
Adana employee Hamza Ulucay has been in detention since
February 23, 2017. On October 5, Turkish authorities detained
longtime Consulate Istanbul DEA local employee Metin Topuz. A
number of other locally employed staff have come under
investigation, and one employee's wife and daughter were held
in jail without charges for nine days last month. The Turkish
government has leveled flimsy terrorism charges against both
Mr. Ulucay and Mr. Topuz. It appears they were arrested for
maintaining legitimate contacts with government officials and
others in the context of their official duties on behalf of the
U.S. Government. We have and will continue to push for their
release.
The targeting of U.S. local staff, particularly those
responsible for law enforcement coordination, raised our
concern over Turkey's commitment to providing proper security
for our diplomatic and consular facilities and personnel,
leading to Mission Turkey's suspension of non-immigrant visa
services on October 8. We have received initial high-level
assurances from the Government of Turkey that there are no
additional local employees of our Mission in Turkey under
investigation. We have also received initial assurances from
the Government of Turkey that our local staff will not be
detained or arrested for performing their official duties, and
that Turkish authorities will inform the U.S. Government in
advance if the Government of Turkey intends to detain or arrest
a member of our local staff.
Based on these preliminary assurances, we determined the
security posture had improved sufficiently to allow for the
resumption of limited visa services in Turkey. However, Mr.
Ulucay and Mr. Topuz remain in custody and we have serious
concerns about their cases. We will continue to engage with our
Turkish counterparts to seek a satisfactory resolution of these
cases, as well.
No Linkage Between Cases in U.S., Turkey
Some in the Turkish government have made efforts to equate
cases involving our local staff with the arrest in the United
States of a senior executive of Turkey's state-owned Halk Bank.
The two situations and contexts are very different and the U.S.
Government strongly objects to any effort to link them. The
executive, Mehmet Hakan Atilla, has been charged with
conspiring to evade U.S. sanctions against Iran. Our employees
were arrested on terrorism charges based on contact, in the
course of their official duties, with Turkish officials whom
the Turkish state now finds unpalatable.
Enduring U.S.-Turkey Relations
As a longtime Ally and friend, we want Turkey to be the
best democratic partner it can be. We have long supported--and
will continue to support--democratic development there, because
we believe that respect for the rule of law, judicial
independence, and fundamental freedoms are sources of strength
and expand our potential for partnership. We will also continue
providing the assistance our imprisoned citizens and local
employees need, and will not rest until all of their cases are
resolved.
Members of the Commission, thank you for your attention
today. I look forward to answering your questions.
Prepared Statement of CeCe Heil
Chairman Wicker, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Cardin,
Ranking Member Hastings, and distinguished Commissioners, thank
you for inviting me to speak before you today and for the
opportunity to highlight a case that warrants your careful
attention.
Andrew Craig Brunson is a United States citizen and pastor
from North Carolina. For over 23 years, Pastor Brunson has
lived peacefully in Turkey, serving as pastor of the Izmir
Resurrection church, and raising his family without incident.
Then, on October 7, 2016, Pastor Brunson arrived home to find a
written summons to report with his passport to a local police
station. Believing the summons was related to his routine
application for a renewal of his residence visa, Pastor Brunson
promptly reported to the Izmir police, only to be arrested and
informed that an order of deportation had been entered against
him, as he had suddenly been deemed a threat to national
security. He was to be held in the Harmandali Detention Centre
pending deportation. However, Pastor Brunson was never
deported; instead he remains unjustly incarcerated in Turkey,
wondering if he has been forgotten, as today marks the 404th
day of his detention. And just what crime has Pastor Brunson
committed? He literally has no idea, and has yet to be charged
with any crime.
As unbelievable as that may seem, under the current State
of Emergency in Turkey, and subsequent emergency decrees, all
protections afforded by Turkey's Constitution, or in
International Declarations and Covenants, including those
contained in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE), of which Turkey is a member, just disappear.
Despite President Erdogan's recent public declarations that
Turkey is indeed a state of laws, the fact that he has the sole
power to change the law at his whim, and remove any obligation
to be bound by it, wholly undermines those claims. As a result
of the rapidly diminishing rule of law, Pastor Brunson's file
has been sealed, all visits from his attorney are recorded, and
he can be held without any formal charges for up to 7 years,
completely destroying any ability to prepare an adequate
defense, and obliterating all rights to due process.
Accordingly, after his arrest, Pastor Brunson continued to
remain in detention at the Harmandali Centre, and was denied
access to an attorney until December 9th, 2016--over two months
later--when he was transferred in the middle of the night to a
high security prison in Izmir. At that time, he was informed
that he was being detained as a suspect, although evidence had
yet to be gathered, on the absurd grounds of Membership in an
Armed Terrorist Organization. The ensuing months were filled
with multiple appeals contesting his detention, which cited the
legal deficiencies of such a decision, and all of which were
summarily denied, even though no evidence has been set forth to
substantiate any crime. So, Pastor Brunson has remained,
languishing in a prison cell with no end in sight.
While in prison, Pastor Brunson has lived under inhumane
conditions, and has spent extended periods of time in a cell
meant for eight people, but which at times has held as many as
22 prisoners, of which Pastor Brunson is always the only
Christian. During his incarceration, Pastor Brunson has lost
over 50 pounds, he has lost precious time with his family that
can never be replaced, but worst of all, he has lost hope,
wondering why Turkey, a NATO ally and a country he loves and
has served for over 2 decades, has been able to hold held him
hostage, an innocent United States citizen, for over a year.
During this ordeal, Pastor Brunson's plight has caught the
attention of hundreds of thousands of people around the world
and there have been an unprecedented amount of high level
demands for Pastor Brunson's release. And yet, on August 24,
2017, the Turkish Government decided to levy new and additional
accusations against Pastor Brunson, these just as ludicrous as
and even more disconcerting than the original. They include,
Political or Military Espionage, Attempting to overthrow the
Government, Attempting to overthrow the Turkish Grand National
Assembly, and Attempting to overthrow the Constitutional Order,
with the last three not only carrying aggravated life
sentences, but requiring that the accused used force and
violence. And once again, no evidence has been put forth to
substantiate such ridiculous accusations. Pastor Brunson has
and continues to adamantly maintain his innocence and deny all
the accusations. He has reiterated that his sole purpose for
being in Turkey for the past 23 years was ``for one purpose
only. To tell about Jesus Christ.'' He has further stated that
he has ``done this openly, in front of the government.'' And so
the question remains, why are they still holding him?
Perhaps President Erdogan himself answered this question
when he recently demanded a swap of Pastor Brunson for
Fethullah Gulen, the cleric Erdogan blames for the failed coup
attempt in July of last year. So, Pastor Brunson's
incarceration has simply become a bargaining chip for Turkey.
However, I would submit that President Erdogan has mistakenly
been led to believe that Pastor Brunson's value lies simply as
a pawn in a swap. In reality, Pastor Brunson's greatest value
to Turkey lies in President Erdogan's approval of his immediate
release back to the U.S. as a sign of good will, and as a major
step toward restoring amicable relations between Turkey and the
United States; an invaluable move with immeasurable and long-
lasting benefits. We should use every effort to make sure that
President Erdogan gets that message.
Prepared Statement of Jacqueline Furnari
Chairman Wicker, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Cardin,
Ranking Member Hastings, and distinguished Commissioners, thank
you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of my father.
Having grown up in Turkey, it has been so hard for me to
understand the current state of events. My parents moved to
Turkey in 1993, so that's where my brothers and I grew up. In
fact, my brothers were born there. We even went to Turkish
grade school because my parents wanted us to learn the language
and feel comfortable in the culture. To me, it was home. My
family, school, and friends were in Turkey. I grew up in the
mix of Turkish and American culture, and loved seeing the
beauty in both. On holidays, we sometimes hung a Turkish flag
from our balcony, as our neighbors did. We loved and respected
the Turkish people, and my parents were dedicated to serving
the Turkish people for as long as they could. My brothers and I
used to joke that we would have to bring our future children to
Turkey to see their grandparents.
As I grew up, I saw how my father poured himself into his
work, and how willing he was to sacrifice his needs and wants
for the sake of others. He believed--as I do--in a greater
purpose in life, and actively lived out his life with the
purpose of showing people the love and grace of God. He taught
this message in the home, too. Their continued commitment to
serving God and the people of Turkey was such a wonderful
example for my brothers and me to see. We were truly blessed to
be raised by such faithful parents.
I know my dad and his character, as only a daughter can,
and I know the charges against him are absurd. My father is not
an armed terrorist trying to overthrow any government, my
father is a pastor who went to Wheaton College, then on to
seminary, and got a Ph.D. in New Testament. He has selflessly
served Turkey for 24 years now. Everything in his life is
centered on his faith. For my family, who has loved, served,
and prayed for Turkey and its people, seeing these absurd
charges brought against my father has been an extremely painful
experience.
Previously, the worst case scenario for Christian pastors,
who were not nationals, in Turkey was deportation, which is why
I never could have guessed my father would be imprisoned there
for over a year. This is unheard of. My family has been shocked
and deeply hurt during the past year. The past year of our
lives has been filled with uncertainty, worry, tears, and
countless unanswered questions.
I didn't even know when my parents were detained in October
last year. I only found out several days after the fact because
they took their phones and did not let them contact anyone. For
what felt like weeks, I was in a state of panic. This hadn't
happened before. I couldn't find out any information about what
the charges were. There was no communication for two weeks,
although we tried desperately to find out any information.
Then, my mother was released. I called her the moment I got her
message. I will never forget how shocked and brokenhearted she
was because my father was still detained and no one knew why.
My family kept assuming this situation would end soon. But
it kept dragging on, month after month. My brothers and I
didn't get to spend Christmas with my mom because she was
scared of what might happen to us if we flew into Turkey. I
missed a last Christmas as a single woman with my family. I was
about to transition into a different phase of life, and I
wanted that one last family Christmas before things changed.
In February I got married. We didn't want to get married
without my parents present, but because my husband is in the
military, we could not postpone it. We had received my father's
blessing, but we felt so terrible about getting married while
he was imprisoned. Neither of my parents were present when I
got married. I will never get that moment back. For those of
you who are fathers to daughters, I'm sure you would want to
walk your daughter down the aisle. My father didn't get that. I
didn't get that. My husband and I decided to have a civil
ceremony and to postpone our wedding ceremony until my father
is home. I'm still waiting for my wedding. I'm still waiting to
wear the wedding dress that I got almost a year and half ago.
I'm still waiting for my dad to walk me down the aisle. I'm
still waiting for that father-daughter dance.
I'm graduating from college in December. My dad doesn't
want to miss seeing me graduate. He invested a lot in helping
me find a career path. However, unless a miracle happens, I
will be achieving yet another life milestone without my
parents.
In his letters, my father says that the hardest part of his
imprisonment is missing out on being with his family. That is
what he most wants. He has missed his only daughter getting
married, and might miss my college graduation. He has missed
helping my older brother make career choices and witnessing his
accomplishments at Cornell. He has missed being with my younger
brother who has so badly needed his dad and mom in the last
year. These are the things that pain my dad the most, not being
able to be with us.
In August, I took a risk and flew to Turkey to visit my
father and support my mother. I never really processed that
visit because it makes me too emotional. I will never forget
any moment of the day we got to visit. I remember hearing my
dad's voice for the first time in a year as they brought him
into the room. I remember how broken, tired, and desperate he
sounded as he tried to fight to meet in a room where he could
hug and hold us for the only hour he would have seen us the
whole year. We sobbed the entire visit. It was hard to fit
words in because the emotions were too strong and only led to
more tears. It was hard to see my father so broken, so thin, so
desperate. He hated having us kids see him that way.
During my summer visit, he was already talking about how
fearful he was of facing the cold winter in that poorly
insulated prison. That he was already concerned about the
winter in the middle of August shows how hopeless he was. And
now, the cold that he feared so much has started. My father is
now dealing with anxiety and depression. Seeing him in that
much pain broke me. He's been changed by this experience. My
whole family has been changed.
In a recent visit with my mother, my father said ``I plead
with the Lord to release me by Christmas so I can be with our
son in his last year in high school and at our daughter's
graduation before she moves to Germany. But if I'm still here
at Christmas, I'll thank God for sending Jesus to be born. If
I'm still here at New Year, I'll thank him for helping me make
it through this year. If I'm here on my birthday, I won't be
like Job and curse the day I was born. I'll give thanks for the
life I've lived.'' My father is handling his situation better
than he was before. But we still want so desperately for him
not to have to face Christmas imprisoned again. We want him to
be home again, with his family.
My family has suffered greatly because of these absurd and
false charges. Please, make any and all efforts to secure my
father's release and bring him home for Christmas. He's been
falsely imprisoned for far too long.
Prepared Statement of Nate Schenkkan
We have heard today already about some of the ways in which
the erosion of the rule of law in Turkey has entrapped and
endangered Americans. I will speak today about the state of the
rule of law in Turkey, what to expect in the next few years,
and how the U.S. can rebalance its relationship with Turkey
around the rule of law. Modern Turkey's institutions have
always been weak in terms of democratic accountability and the
protection of human rights.
Modern Turkey's legal and constitutional tradition places
greater priority on the unity of the nation and the integrity
of the state than on the rights of the individual and the
separation of powers. There was a brief window in the 2000s
when Turkey sought to align with European Union standards,
during which Turkey made a number of cardinal reforms to
strengthen the independence of institutions and protect human
rights, but that was followed by a sustained attack on the rule
of law and democratic institutions for much of the last decade.
The partnership between the ruling AKP and the Gulen
movement that became entrenched during the 2000s did severe
damage to the judiciary through instrumentalized trials of
Kurdish activists, the military, media, and secular elites.
After the AKP and the Gulen movement fell out in late 2013, the
government turned on the judiciary in order to eliminate its
former allies.
Two changes stand out:
LIn February 2014, the government amended the law
on the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK), which
controls appointments to the judiciary, to strengthen the
Minister of Justice's role in the Council, including by
reassigning members of the Council. This reversed key reforms
to ensure the independence of the judiciary that the government
had supported in 2010.
LIn June 2014, the government established a new
institution called ``peace judgeships'' (Sulh Ceza
Hakimlikleri) with responsibility for so-called ``protective
measures,'' including approving pretrial detentions, and
removing content from the internet and closing internet
websites. These new peace judgeships lack appropriate
mechanisms for appeal and oversight, and have been a major
factor in the increased use of pretrial detention and internet
blocking in the period after 2014.
Following the coup attempt of July 2016, the government has
used the state of emergency to eradicate what it perceives as
sources of opposition, to subordinate the judiciary even
further, and to dismantle rule of law protections.
Turkey has been under emergency rule for 16 months. During
this time:
LSome 150,000 people have passed through police
custody on the basis of terrorist offenses, membership of armed
groups, or involvement in the attempted coup. Of those, at
least 62,000 have been arrested.
L153 journalists are in prison.
LMore than 111,000 people have been fired from
public service through emergency decrees without adequate due
process protections. They are effectively blacklisted, which
means they will be unable to find public employment and are
evicted from public housing; many if not most will not be able
to find private employment, either.
LThe state has also closed and seized institutions
around the country:
- 1,412 associations have been closed
- 15 universities run by foundations have been closed
- 162 media outlets have been closed, including 6 news
agencies, 48 newspapers, 20 magazines, 31 radio
stations, 28 TV stations, and 29 publishing houses
- 2,271 private educational institutions have been
closed
- 19 unions have been closed
- 969 companies valued at approximately $11 billion
have been seized
- 94 mayors have been removed and replaced by
``trustees'' appointed by Ankara
- 10 members of parliament are in prison, including the
co-leaders of the second-largest opposition party
L2 members of the Constitutional Court were
removed from their positions and arrested, along with 37
personnel of the court.
L183 staff were dismissed from the Supreme Court;
91 from the Council of State; and 153 from the General
Accounting Bureau
L4,240 judges and prosecutors have been dismissed
(2956 judges and 1284 prosecutors).
L28 lawyers' associations or law societies have
been closed
L550 lawyers have been arrested; 1,398 lawyers are
facing criminal prosecution.
LAt least 39 lawyers have already been sentenced
to prison
I give this long list in order to underscore the scale of
the transformation that is taking place in Turkey through the
post-coup attempt purge. The media, civic sector, legal
profession, and judiciary have been massively weakened,
crippled even, in these purges. This is a generational event.
These firings, arrests, and closures have largely been done on
the basis of guilt by association, without due process or
appropriate legal remedies.
Emergency decrees under the state of emergency also
significantly changed important protections for individuals
subject to investigation:
LSuspects could be held for up to 30 days without
access to a lawyer. A later emergency decree reduced this
length of time to 14 days.
LThe right to confidential conversations with a
lawyer and family members was suspended.
LThe prosecution was empowered reject the
defendant's choice of lawyer.
LA suspect's lawyer may have restricted access to
the case file.
These and other serious derogations from due process
protections have contributed to an environment in which there
are increasing reports of torture and forced disappearances in
detention.
In April 2017, Turkey approved in a referendum changes to
the constitution that will strengthen the presidency at the
expense of other branches of government, including the
judiciary. The referendum, held under a state of emergency with
media seized by the government, and journalists and opposition
leaders in prison, was neither free nor fair. There are
reasonable grounds to suspect that the government used fraud to
get it barely above the 50 percent threshold.
The referendum changes increased the president's control
over the judiciary by giving him power to appoint almost half
(6 out of 13) of the members of the Council of Judges and
Prosecutors. Others will be appointed by the parliament, which
currently is under control of the president's party, the AKP.
The oversight role of the Constitutional Court (Anayasa
Mahkemesi) has been downgraded, as has that of the Council of
State (Danistay). Other changes in the referendum strengthened
the president's powers over other branches, including through
powers to appoint and dismiss ministers, to dissolve
parliament, and to issue decrees with the force of law. This
has turned Turkey's system of governance into a ``super-
presidential'' system that is alien to democratic traditions.
It is within this context that we should understand the
ordeal that Pastor Brunson and his family have suffered, as
well as the treatment of tens of thousands of others under
arrest, including people like the arrested civil society leader
Osman Kavala and America's two detained foreign service
nationals, Metin Topuz and Hamza Ulucay. Having eliminated due
process protections and the separation of powers, the executive
branch is constrained neither by the balance of powers nor by
the rights of individuals.
Looking ahead
Turkey will hold three major elections in 2019: nationwide
local elections, scheduled for March, and the parliamentary and
presidential elections, both scheduled for November. Each of
these is extremely important for President Erdogan's goal of
remaining in power and retaining or even better strengthening
his control over the levers of the state. Erdogan and his AKP
no longer command the dominant big tent coalition of the 2000s
that combined business, Islamists, Kurds, and liberals. The big
tent has shrunk, and Erdogan's appeal is based now more on
patronage and appeals to Turkish nationalism, Islamic identity,
and Eurasianism. Regardless of what the U.S. and the EU do or
don't do, President Erdogan and the AKP need anti-Western and
nationalist appeals to keep his coalition together. Where the
appeals fail, repression and instrumentalization of the
judicial system will fill in the gaps.
For this reason, we should not expect an improvement in the
rule of law in Turkey in the next two years. It is not in
Erdogan's or the AKP's interest to make the system work more
fairly or more justly. Nor should we expect an improvement
after the elections. If Erdogan wins, he will continue his
efforts to consolidate a patronal regime. If he loses, he will
have to tighten the screws in order to maintain his grip on
power, just as he did after the AKP lost its majority in
parliament in the June 2015 general election. The problem of
rule of law in Turkey is a durable one that we will be dealing
with for a long time.
Conclusion and recommendations
1. The biggest problem with U.S. policy presently towards
Turkey is that it is driven by trying to figure out what will
placate Turkey, but more specifically, President Erdogan,
rather than by a clear definition of U.S. interests and values
in the relationship. This has given the inaccurate impressions
that the U.S. needs Erdogan more than Erdogan needs the U.S.
The U.S. should recognize that Erdogan's use of anti-
Americanism and anti-Westernism is driven by a specific
domestic political dynamic, and nothing the United States does
will change this.
2. Instead of starting from the position of seeking to
solve the problem of anti-Western actions and rhetoric from
Turkey's political leaders, the U.S. should define clearly
first for itself what its core interests and values are in its
relationship with Turkey, and then articulate policies to
achieve these interests, including by taking measures with
Turkey to enforce those interests and values if they are
threatened or violated.
3. I believe the U.S. has a long-term, strategic interest
in Turkey being a stable state based on the rule of law, in
which political and ethnic minorities enjoy fundamental rights,
including the ability to participate fully in political
processes. I believe this strategic interest is of equal
importance to the immediate interest of keeping Turkey in NATO.
While the U.S. cannot make Turkey into such a state, this
should be a key pillar of any U.S. strategic vision for the
Middle East, and one that can be supported through measures
taken now.
First, the U.S. should consider the use of
additional instruments, including Global Magnitsky
sanctions on Turkish officials responsible for grave
human rights violations. Congress should make use of
its lawful role in forwarding such cases and requesting
the State Department's official review of evidence. The
compilation of such cases will play an important role
in any future transition in Turkey towards a more just
and inclusive regime.
Second, both Congress and the State Department
should provide funding for human rights defenders,
civil society activists, and journalists in Turkey.
Statements of support are welcome, but Congress should
take the next step. Congress should create a special
fund for Turkish civil society and independent media,
and make a priority support for the tens of millions of
Turkish citizens who see the country's future as a
democratic, rule of law state.
Third, the United States should make clear
that the following items are not up for transaction in
the U.S.-Turkey relationship:
The rule of law in the United States. Attempts to
change the outcome of judicial processes in the United
States with disregard for normal diplomatic and legal
channels, as has occurred with the hiring of American
lobbyists on behalf of Reza Zarrab and the attempt to
make the extradition of Fethullah Gulen a political and
not evidentiary issue, will damage the U.S.-Turkey
relationship. Similarly, if Turkish officials flout
U.S. law, they will face criminal prosecution. The
prosecution of Reza Zarrab and Turkish officials for
the flagrant violation of the sanctions regime on Iran
is an important signal that violations of U.S. laws
will be punished. On a lesser scale but also important
is the prosecution of individuals and presidential
bodyguards who assaulted protesters at Sheridan Circle
in May. The Van Hollen amendment to SFOPS reinforces
this principle by underscoring that such criminal
actions may affect U.S. support and cooperation with
Turkey.
American citizens and employees of the U.S. Government.
The U.S. will protect its citizens accused of crimes
overseas, and insist on both consular access to them
and access for them to lawyers of their choosing. If it
concludes the detention of an American citizen is not
based on a legitimate criminal accusation, it should
sanction officials responsible for their detention.
This is why the Lankford-Shaheen amendment to SFOPS is
a good idea. The U.S. should also stress that the
offensive conspiracy theory put forward by prosecutors
and pro-government media about former State Department
official Henri Barkey will have consequences for
bilateral relations, and make clear it will protect its
employees, including non-Americans, from undue and
illegitimate criminal prosecution. The continuing
detention of two of our foreign service nationals
should result in the continuation of visa restrictions
and other punitive measures as needed. Congress should
also request sanctions against individual officials
responsible for the illegitimate detention of U.S.
employees.
These are practical recommendations for strengthening U.S.
Turkey policy, but they are not a magic bullet. We should
prepare ourselves for a very rocky short-term relationship, and
take the necessary measures to protect the U.S.'s core
interests. The U.S.-Turkey relationship is of great
consequence. It is my hope that the U.S. will stand with the
many Turkish citizens working for true democracy and rule of
law in Turkey, and that circumstances will one day improve to
allow the bilateral relationship to return to a less tense
basis.
Thank you.
M A T E R I A L F O R
T H E R E C O R D
=======================================================================
Questions for the Record Submitted by Hon. Thom Tillis to Jonathan R.
Cohen
Question 1:
In recent months, Turkey has withdrawn from three ``Human
Dimension'' meetings of the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) because of its objections to the
participation of a U.S.-registered NGO it considers to be
associated with the Gulen movement. Ankara is engaged in a
campaign to block such NGOs from participating in other UN and
OSCE events. Turkey has also withdrawn its major contributor
status from the Council of Europe after the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) awarded the Vaclav
Havel Human Rights Prize 2017 to someone Turkey considers
associated with Gulen. How is the United States responding to
these actions?
Answer 1:
The State Department is concerned about recent Turkish
government actions that have complicated operations at the
OSCE, and by Turkey's announcement that it would withdraw its
major contribution status from the Council of Europe. Civil
society participation is a cornerstone of these organizations
and a critical part of many events, including the OSCE's Human
Dimension Implementation Meeting. We have raised this issue at
high levels with the Government of Turkey, emphasizing the
importance of international organizations in preserving
stability and facilitating international cooperation, and
encouraging Turkey to share any evidence that might help the
international community respond to its concerns.
The Austrian Chairperson-in-Office of the OSCE formed a
``reflection group'' led by the Swiss delegation to discuss
Turkey's concerns. The U.S. delegation is a part of this group,
which has met several times and continues to seek a resolution.
We are also closely monitoring Turkey's recent actions in
the Council of Europe and engaging allies in the organization
on how its member states and the Council itself will respond.
Turkey's full participation, including upholding its human
rights, democracy, and rule of law commitments under the
European convention and maintaining its major donor
contribution, is important to the credibility and operations of
the organization and of significant benefit to Turkey.
Question 2:
What human rights and rule of law-focused training or
capacity building programs does the U.S. Government provide to
Turkish government institutions, particularly the judiciary and
law enforcement, if any?
Answer 2:
At present, the Department of State's targeted programming
in Turkey prioritizes work with civil society and other diverse
stakeholders in support of human rights and fundamental
freedoms. These programs contribute to safeguarding rule of
law, government transparency, and public awareness of
government policy and practices. We would be happy to provide
further details in a classified setting.
Question 3:
To the extent that Privacy Act restrictions allow you to
answer, does the State Department have consular access to all
U.S. citizens detained on coup-related charges in Turkey,
including dual citizens? Are you satisfied with the degree of
consular access? Do all of these individuals have access to
legal counsel?
Answer 3:
In mid-October, after sustained U.S. Government engagement,
the Government of Turkey granted the Department of State
consular access to dual nationals after we permitted a senior
Turkish official to meet with arrested U.S.-Turkish dual
nationals in the United States. Our subsequent requests for
follow-up consular access to U.S.-Turkish dual national
detainees are pending with the Turkish government. We
appreciate the consular access that we have received, and
encourage the Turkish government to continue to allow regular
consular access to U.S. citizens who also hold Turkish
citizenship. Due to the requirements of the Privacy Act, we are
unable to comment on access to legal counsel.
Question 4:
While Turkey is not required by the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations to provide consular access to dual US-
Turkish citizens, what sort of consular access to dual US
citizens does the United States receive in other NATO
countries?
Answer 4:
Although not legally required to do so under international
law, other NATO partners--as a courtesy--generally give us
consular notification of detention and access to dual U.S.
nationals detained abroad in their respective countries when
requested by the U.S. citizen. Such notification and access,
however, can be inconsistent when the detained individual's
U.S. citizenship is unknown to the country of detention and/or
the individual does not request access.
Question 5:
Has Pastor Brunson been formally charged?
Answer 5:
Pastor Brunson's arrest warrant contains five charges:
membership in the armed terrorist organization ``FETO,''
military espionage, attempt to overthrow or thwart the
government of the Republic of Turkey, attempt to overthrow or
thwart the Parliament of the Republic of Turkey, and attempt to
overthrow the constitutional order of the Republic of Turkey.
It is our understanding that the prosecutor is still preparing
an indictment against Pastor Brunson. Under Turkey's current
state of emergency provisions, an individual may be held in
detention for up to five years without an indictment.
Question 6:
What is the Administration's reaction to statements from
President Erdogan seeming to imply an interest in an exchange
of Andrew Brunson for Fethullah Gulen?
Answer 6:
U.S. officials have clearly and at senior levels
categorically rejected any linkage between the arrest of Andrew
Brunson and Turkey's extradition request for Fethullah Gulen.
The two situations and contexts are very different and the U.S.
Government strongly objects to any effort to connect them.
Question 7:
Do you support proposed appropriations legislation for
FY2018 that would require the State Department to identify and,
in certain cases, possibly deny visas to senior Turkish
officials linked by credible information to ``wrongful
prolonged detention'' of U.S. citizens? Why or why not?
Answer 7:
One of the highest priorities of the Department of State is
the safety and security of our citizens traveling and living
abroad, particularly in cases where they have been wrongfully
detained. The State Department supports the proposed
appropriations legislation with a recommendation to modify the
language in Section 7046(d) to mirror the waiver language in
7046(e). The restrictions target elements of the Government of
Turkey that have engaged in activities against U.S. interests.
Section 7046(d) targets the Presidential Guard, several members
of which have been indicted in relation to the violent
incidents in May 2017 at Sheridan Circle. Section 7046(e)
targets yet to be identified individuals responsible for the
unlawful detention of American citizens. The Department
recommends replacing the certification requirement in 7046(d)
with a waiver authority similar to that contained in 7046(e) to
provide the Secretary of State greater flexibility to respond
to changing conditions.
Question 8:
What is the Administration doing on behalf of detained U.S.
consulate employees Hamza Ulucay and Metin Topuz regarding
their treatment, visitation rights, due process, and possible
release? Do they have access to legal counsel? Are they
charged? Are the family members of any U.S. Mission locally
employed staff currently detained or facing other official
penalties?
Answer 8:
U.S. Government officials have raised multiple times and at
the highest levels the cases of U.S. Consulate Istanbul
employee Metin Topuz and U.S. Consulate Adana employee Hamza
Ulucay, including with President Erdogan, Prime Minister Binali
Yildirim, and a range of other Turkish officials. We continue
to do so as we seek a satisfactory outcome of these cases.
Despite initial delays, Mission Turkey engagement helped
facilitate access to legal counsel for both Mr. Topuz and Mr.
Ulucay. Both have been charged and Mr. Ulucay's trial is
ongoing; his next hearing is scheduled for December 27. Our
engagement is ongoing to ensure satisfactory treatment and
visitation rights are maintained. Though the wife and daughter
of a third Mission Turkey local employee were held without
charges for nine days in October, they have since been released
and no other Mission Turkey local staff or their family members
are in detention.
Question 9:
Are there any members of the Turkish parliament who are
openly sympathetic to our desire to release the U.S. citizens
and consulate employees who have been unjustly detained?
Answer 9:
Some members of Turkey's opposition parties have criticized
the Government of Turkey's actions against our locally employed
staff. However, there has been no sustained public support from
any party or any singular figure, likely in part due to fear
that open association with the United States on these sensitive
matters could prompt political or legal reprisals.
Question 10:
What, if anything, does the resumption of visa services
mean for existing cases against local Turkish employees of the
U.S. government and U.S. citizens arrested under the state of
emergency? Under what conditions do you expect full visa
services to resume?
Answer 10:
We implemented the suspension of non-immigrant visa
services out of concern over the Government of Turkey's
commitment to the safety and security of our diplomatic and
consular personnel and facilities. We have subsequently
received initial high-level assurances from the Government of
Turkey that there are no additional local employees of our
Mission in Turkey under investigation, that our local staff
will not be detained or arrested for performing their official
duties, and that Turkish authorities will inform the U.S.
government in advance if the Government of Turkey intends to
detain or arrest a member of our local staff. Based on these
preliminary assurances, we determined the security posture had
improved sufficiently to allow for the resumption of limited
non-immigrant visa services in Turkey.
With Mr. Ulucay and Mr. Topuz still in custody, our
concerns about the safety and security of our personnel and
facilities remain. We will continue engaging our Turkish
counterparts to seek a satisfactory resolution of these cases.
Resumption of full visa services will depend on our assessment
of the Government of Turkey's commitment to the safety and
security of our diplomatic and consular personnel and
facilities.
Question 11:
What core U.S. interests are at stake in the U.S-Turkey
relationship?
Answer 11:
Turkey is a key NATO Ally and a valuable contributor to the
Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. Turkey has the second-largest
military in the Alliance, a dynamic economy, a population of 80
million, and control over key energy transit pipelines and
routes. Its critical position and regional clout have given
Ankara significant influence on issues of core U.S. interest
over the years--from Korea to the Balkans to Iraq to
Afghanistan.
Turkey provides critical bases for U.S. and Coalition
military forces, from which we conduct precision airstrikes
against ISIS; carry out intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance flights; maintain combat search and rescue
units; and resupply Coalition forces.
We share a growing commercial relationship, a wide array of
educational and cultural exchanges, strong scientific
cooperation, and a valuable foreign policy dialogue on issues
ranging from Russian aggression in Crimea, to ending the war in
Syria, to ensuring the territorial unity of Iraq. Turkey and
the United States also maintain a strong defense trade
relationship that currently supports upwards of $9 billion in
defense sales.
Question 12:
What is the State Department's assessment of the
information Turkey has supplied to justify the extradition of
Fethullah Gulen? Where does the extradition request currently
stand? What are the next steps for an extradition request?
Answer 12:
The information Turkey has provided to justify the
extradition of Fethullah Gulen, reviewed by the Department of
State and the Department of Justice, has not yet met the
standard required for probable cause. We remain in close touch
with Turkish authorities to ensure they understand the
requirements for extradition under U.S. law and our bilateral
extradition treaty. On November 20, 2017, Turkey provided
additional materials related to its provisional arrest request
for Mr. Gulen. The Department of State and the Department of
Justice are in the process of reviewing these materials.
Questions for the Record Submitted by Hon. Thom Tillis to CeCe Heil
Question 1:
Based on your familiarity with Andrew Brunson's case, why
do you believe he was detained last year?
Answer 1:
Andrew Brunson's detention on October 7, 2016 is indeed
perplexing. He had lived peacefully in Turkey for 23 years
without any incident with Turkish authorities. Therefore, the
only supposition one can make is that Pastor Brunson's
detention was a part of the purge President Erdogan implemented
after the failed coup attempt in July, 2016, just a few months
before Pastor Brunson's detention. Furthermore, the ridiculous
nature of the allegations, as well as President Erdogan's
recent requests to trade Pastor Brunson, seem to support the
supposition that Pastor Brunson's arrest and continued
detention is purely political in nature.
Question 2:
Has Pastor Brunson been formally charged?
Answer 2:
Pastor Brunson has not been formally charged. He is being
detained as a suspect, pending an investigation that has gone
on for over a year. Meanwhile, his file has been sealed and
there has been no access to any alleged evidence.
Question 3:
Do Turkish authorities give any explanation for the delay
in beginning Andrew Brunson's trial? What court proceedings has
he undergone in the past 13 months?
Answer 3:
According to the most recent court document, to which we
have access, the Chief Public Prosecutor's Office is still
conducting a judicial investigation, which remains at the
evidence gathering stage, and Pastor Brunson is being detained
as a suspect pending that investigation. The court proceedings
have only consisted of detention hearings and appeals, as there
have yet to be any formal charges.
Question 4:
To the extent you are familiar, what is Andrew Brunson's
legal representation in Turkey? What challenges does his
Turkish representation face?
Answer 4:
I stay in direct contact with Pastor Brunson's attorney in
Turkey, Ismail Cem Halavurt. As there is no current legal
proceeding occurring, the most that Mr. Halavurt can do is to
continue to file appeals regarding Pastor Brunson's detention
pending the investigation. One can only imagine the legal and
political challenges of defending an innocent American pastor
with a sealed file, who has been turned into a Turkish
political prisoner.
Question 5:
Are you aware of any other Christian ministers who have
been targeted by the Turkish Government in connection with the
failed coup?
Answer 5:
Yes, according to the Association of Protestant Churches in
Turkey, there were several Christian ministers from the United
States and other countries who were accused of being a ``threat
to national security'' and were denied entry or detained and
deported, after the failed coup attempt in July of 2016.
Question 6:
Please describe the conditions of Andrew Brunson's
detention. How often is he allowed outside of his cell?
Answer 6:
Pastor Brunson is only allowed outside of his cell once a
week for his visitation time, as well as once a month for a
phone call and a visit from the U.S. Embassy, should one occur.
Questions for the Record Submitted by Hon. Thom Tillis to Nate
Schenkkan
Question 1:
You describe the changes to Turkey's judiciary as a
``generational event.'' What prolonged effects do you foresee
of these changes for Turkey's governmental institutions,
business climate, and society?
Answer 1:
In terms of governmental institutions, the narrow approval
of the constitutional referendum of April 2017 means that
Turkey is shifting to a ``super-presidential'' system. Under
this system, which will go into full effect after the 2019
elections, the presidency's powers vis-a-vis the legislative
and judicial branches of government will increase. The position
of prime minister will be abolished, and the president will
appoint and dismiss vice presidents and ministers, the
appointment of which the parliament may not veto (in
distinction from the United States, where cabinet appointments
are subject to Senate confirmation). The president may issue
decrees vaguely defined as ``on matters related to executive
power,'' may dismiss parliament, and may declare a state of
emergency. The president will be able to appoint almost half of
the Council of Judges and Prosecutors and will exercise
disproportionate influence over the judiciary.
There have also been negative de facto changes to local
governance in Turkey. Turkey's local governance has two levels:
governors appointed by Ankara, and mayors directly elected by
citizens of municipalities. Due to the large size of some of
Turkey's cities, mayoralties have been among the most powerful
political positions in the country; President Erdogan built his
career as mayor of Istanbul. A previous round of reforms
increased the powers of mayors in order to strengthen local
governance and initiate decentralization. Following the
resumption of conflict in the southeast, however, the
government has de facto rolled back these changes, using
extraordinary powers to remove dozens of mayors, mostly from
Kurdish-affiliated parties, and replace them with appointed
``trustees.'' In addition, President Erdogan has recently used
political pressure to force out of office the most powerful
mayors of his party, including those of Istanbul and Ankara.
The model is similar to that of President Putin in Russia, who
has restored direct elections for governors, but regularly
removes governors prior to elections in order to install
appointees who then will have an incumbent advantage.
The cumulative effect of the changes of the last four years
is that Turkey's governmental institutions are becoming
consolidated into a pyramid of influence with the president at
the top--the famous ``power vertical'' of the Russian case.
While the president, as in any system, may still face political
constraints, the institutional constraints that distinguish a
functioning democracy from an authoritarian system have largely
been hollowed out.
In terms of the business climate, this consolidation
increases political risk for investors. Politically guided
expropriation and punitive tax inspections are now established
tools of this government, and investors and businesses that run
afoul of the government may face direct sanctions, for which
they will have minimal recourse due to the absence of rule of
law. More broadly, the loss of institutional independence
affects Turkey's economic policy-making. The constitutional
reforms give the president the power to draft the central
government budget, and President Erdogan has repeatedly
attacked the Central Bank's independence in recent years. In
particular, he has pressured the bank to lower interest rates,
in contradiction to orthodox advice that insists on keeping
rates higher to limit inflation. The downside risks of
unaccountable and unprofessional fiscal and macroeconomic
policies are growing with consolidation and the elimination of
institutional checks on the president.
In terms of society at large, one of the most important
long-term effects of the purge will be brain drain. The
pressure on businesses, universities, media outlets, and civil
society associations is driving some of Turkey's best human
capital to leave, or causing Turkish citizens studying and
working abroad to remain outside of the country.
Question 2:
What recourse do individuals who lost their jobs and
shuttered organizations have to appeal these decisions? Are you
aware of individuals or organizations who have managed to
reverse these decisions?
Answer 2:
An extremely small number of individuals--as of August 31,
2017, it was 1,852 out of 113,000 people purged, less than 2
percent--have been reinstated into public service via later
emergency decrees, for reasons that remain unclear. Even for
these individuals, there remains the stigma of having initially
been purged, and the damage of having lost their jobs and
possibly housing for what could have been several months.
Similarly, a very small number of associations and media
outlets have had their closures reversed under unclear reasons.
For the 98 percent of purged individuals who are not
reinstated, because they were fired through being named
individually in decrees issued under the state of emergency,
the dismissals have the force of law and cannot be reviewed by
the regular court system. Due to the large number of complaints
about dismissals filed directly to the Constitutional Court,
and under international pressure, the government said in
January 2017 it would create a special commission to review
cases. Tens of thousands of purged individuals have already
applied to the commission for review, but it is unclear on what
timeline the commission will review cases; it has yet to issue
any decisions, and has only started receiving appeals this
summer. With potentially over 100,000 appeals, it could take
years for the commission to review all cases.
On the basis of the commission's formation, both the
Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR) have ruled that domestic remedies have not yet been
exhausted, and therefore that they cannot hear appeals
concerning the purges. Human rights defenders in Turkey have
strongly objected to the ECtHR decision to consider the
commission an effective domestic remedy, given that five of its
seven of its members are appointed by the government, which
issued the emergency decrees in the first place, and the other
two are appointed by the Council of Judges and Prosecutors,
which has itself been a target of the purges.
Questions for the Record Submitted by Hon. Jeanne Shaheen to Jonathan
R. Cohen
Question 1:
You were recently in Turkey to discuss the aftermath of the
U.S.'s decision to not process visas until the Turks assured
the safety of Embassy officials from arrest and shared more
information on potential security threats. How did these
conversations go? It is our understanding that in the period
that the United State stopped processing non-resident visas for
Turks, Turkey made some headway on other issues, which we don't
have to detail in an open setting. Do you feel this signals the
need for a new approach to Turkey?
Answer 1:
My October visit to Ankara resulted in progress that
allowed for the November resumption of limited non-immigrant
visa services, which were suspended due to security concerns.
My discussions with Turkish officials led to assurances from
the Government of Turkey that there are no additional local
employees of our Mission in Turkey under investigation, that
our local staff will not be detained or arrested for performing
their official duties, and that Turkish authorities will inform
the U.S. government in advance if the Government of Turkey
intends to detain or arrest a member of our local staff. Based
on these preliminary assurances, we determined the security
posture had improved sufficiently to allow for the resumption
of limited visa services in Turkey.
However, Mr. Ulucay and Mr. Topuz remain in custody and we
continue to work tirelessly to secure a satisfactory resolution
of these cases.
Our relationship with Turkey has always been complex.
Despite current strains in the relationship, Turkey is a NATO
Ally and valued partner. We will continue to cooperate with
Turkey in areas where we share common goals and concerns and we
will continue engaging Turkey's leadership in areas where we
have disagreements.
Question 2:
Fifty percent of Turkey's population spoke out against
Erdogan centralization of power through the April 2017
referendum. How is the U.S. government engaging with these
Turks and building bridges to those who are not necessarily in
the Turkish government or security structures? What is the full
U.S. contribution to developing civil society in Turkey (please
breakdown according to account/program)? I appreciate that the
funding was restored, but could you explain why the decision
was made earlier this year to eliminate the minimal amount of
funding that the U.S. devotes to help bolster Turkish civil
society? This is concerning particularly since President
Erdogan is targeting and jailing prominent leaders in Turkey's
civil society.
Answer 2:
The quality of Turkey's democracy, in which civil society
plays a vital role, matters deeply to the United States. We
regularly engage Turkey's leadership about our concerns over
the government's targeting of civil society groups and leaders.
We also use a broad range of traditional State Department
Public Diplomacy and other tools and programs promoting civil
society and democracy in Turkey. The Mission Turkey Public
Diplomacy Section administers an active small grants program,
providing grants to Turkish civil society organizations that
support issues such as freedom of expression, countering
violent extremism, understanding of democratic values and rule
of law, entrepreneurship, women's rights, and STEM education.
Grants have supported visits from U.S. experts, extracurricular
activities for high school and university students, film
festivals, cultural programs, and a host of other programs.
Although these grants are relatively small in dollar value,
they provide much needed support to strengthen Turkey's civil
society and underscore U.S. commitment to upholding democratic
values in Turkey.
Through engagements with Turkey's government and other
tools, the Department of State has also worked to enhance and
protect fundamental freedoms, including: supporting the human
rights of particularly threatened or at-risk communities;
freedom of speech and the media; promoting transparency and
accountability; and enhancing legal frameworks to protect human
rights. The Department would be pleased to provide further
details in a classified setting.
Question 3:
Nate Schenkkan testified to the need for U.S. assistance to
Turkish civil society. Since Turkey does not have a USAID
mission, what is the best way to administer such assistance?
Can there be parallels found in the way the U.S. administers
assistance to civil society groups in other areas without a
USAID mission that are also hostile to the U.S., like Russia?
Which civil society groups are in the most need? Is the EU
providing assistance to Turkish civil society?
Answer 3:
The Department of State implements programs worldwide
focused on advancing democracy and human rights priorities,
including breaking barriers that limit access to free and
credible information, combatting threats against journalists,
promoting freedom of religion and conscience, and addressing
the shrinking space for civil society as a means to promote
long-term stability. The European Union also provides civil
society assistance in Turkey.
The Department's programs operate in closed and closing
environments around the world, including in some of the most
restrictive and hostile operating environments. We work closely
with our implementing partners to continually evaluate and
adjust programmatic approaches and operating procedures, and we
apply lessons-learned from our experiences in other countries.
All of our programs require risk mitigation strategies and
contingency plans to ensure both safety of our participants and
ability to adapt to worsening situations.
The Department would be pleased to provide further details
in a classified setting regarding lessons learned from
implementing programs in other non-USAID presence countries,
and how our programs could assist civil society and help to
address human rights concerns in Turkey.
Question 4:
Given the mass arrests in Turkey, do you feel that Turkish-
Americans who may have been critical of the Turkish government
should visit Turkey at this time? Is it safe for those who have
been public about their criticisms? When do you think these
Turkish-Americans should know that their safety may be in
jeopardy? Do travel warnings to Turkey reflect the risks to
Turkish-Americans?
Answer 4:
The most recent Turkey travel warning, issued on September
28, 2017, recommends that all U.S. citizens carefully consider
the need to travel to Turkey at this time. The travel warning
notes that under the state of emergency, security forces have
expanded powers, including the authority to detain any person
at any time. It also notes that the Turkish government has at
times restricted political gatherings, scrutinized non-
governmental organizations, restricted internet access, and
blocked media content. The travel warning informs Turkish
Americans that consular access to detained U.S. citizens who
hold Turkish nationality may be denied and that Turkish
authorities have legally banned some U.S. citizens, most of
whom are dual U.S.-Turkish nationals, from departing Turkey.
Letter from Kubra Golge to Congress
November 15, 2017
Dear Congressmen:
My husband, Serkan Golge, and I and our two small children
are dual U.S.-Turkish citizens. Until my husband's arrest last
year, we were residents of Houston, Texas, where my husband had
been working as a senior research scientist at the NASA Johnson
Space Center. In July 2016, while we were visiting Serkan's
family for a few days in Turkey, he was suddenly taken into
custody as we were packing to return home to Houston. Like
hundreds of others in Turkey, he has been charged with
membership in the movement founded by Islamic cleric Fethullah
Gulen. Because President Erdogan has accused Mr. Gulen of
ordering followers of his movement to carry out the attempted
coup last year, the Gulen movement is now considered a
terrorist organization. Serkan's trial began in April 2017, and
his fifth hearing is scheduled for this Friday.
There is no credible evidence to support the charges
against my husband. Some law enforcement officers claim that
possession of a U.S. $1 bill can indicate membership in the
Gulen movement. I do not understand why a U.S. citizen having a
$1 can be considered criminal. I am very afraid that my husband
is not receiving a fair trial. There is an atmosphere of fear
in Turkey. Lawyers who defend people charged with connections
to Gulen risk losing their jobs, as do the judges hearing these
cases. Serkan has been imprisoned for more than 15 months--much
of that time in solitary confinement--and his health is
deteriorating. He has high blood pressure and kidney stones.
This situation is unbearable for me and my children. We worry
about Serkan's poor health. Although I am not accused of any
wrongdoing, the police have told me that I am not allowed to
leave Turkey. My children are only seven and two years old, and
I am afraid that I won't be able to protect them if they or I
are threatened by the authorities. We simply want to go home
and feel safe again.
I respectfully ask for you to look into our untenable
situation and help us in any way that you can. Thank you for
your kind attention to this important human rights matter.
Sincerely,
Kubra Golge
Statement on the Status of Academics and Scientists in
Turkey from the Committee of Concerned Scientists,
November 15, 2017
HISTORY:
Good morning distinguished members, Congressmen and women,
and guests. The Committee of Concerned Scientists (``CCS''),
has been working with scientists and academics in Turkey for a
very long time. Since January 2016 requests for our assistance
have increased dramatically from this country. Problems for
this population, from Turkey, have escalated as they have been
the target of the Erdogan government's recriminations for the
most recent coup attempt.
The Committee of Concerned Scientists has been advocating
for the human rights of scientists, physicians, engineers and
academics since February 1974. Prior to that, many of our
members were actively involved with the Russian Refusnik
movement, which assisted scientists in communist countries get
materials and information they needed; as well as helping them
to get their work out of their respective countries and made
available to the scientific world-at-large. Additionally,
several of our Board members are Nobel Laureates. Currently,
CCS works with scientists, academics, physicians and engineers
whose human rights have been violated. At this point in time,
Turkey is well on its way to making it to the top of the list
of countries that are involved in human rights violations.
The current actions of the government of Turkey, in its
sweeping purge of dissent, both real and imagined, is crippling
the credibility and integrity of Turkey's academic and
scientific institutions, and doing real damage to the Turkish
economy and the Turkish state. The May 2017 assault by
bodyguards of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on peaceful
protestors in Washington, D.C., demonstrates how Turkish
repression has the potential to spill across borders, and the
detention of scores of Turkish scholars who are either resident
in, or citizens of, European countries or the United States
demonstrates how Turkey's continuing attack on academia is a
significant threat to scholarship throughout the OSCE region.
The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (U.S.
Helsinki Commission) is uniquely positioned to make a
difference, and we urge the Commission to make it a top
priority to confront this challenge.
There was evidence of civil unrest in Turkey in January of
2016, when a Peace Petition was published accusing the Erdogan
government of carrying out heavy-handed operations against
Turkey's Kurdish population. It was signed by more than 1,000
academics. At that time, the existence of such a petition upset
Erdogan and the ruling AKP Party. The government began taking
retribution against the academics who signed the petition.
Hundreds of academics who signed the petition were either
terminated from their positions at universities, or were
detained when police raided their homes and/or offices.
Shortly thereafter, an attempted coup took place on July
15, 2016. Since that time the government has mounted a
widespread purge in the name of security. On the night of the
coup attempt, 234 persons were killed and more than 2,000 were
injured. Erdogan was away from the seat of government at that
time but was informed, and mounted a defense, ultimately
thwarting the coup attempt.
The government then declared a state of emergency,
suspended the rule of law (which continues to this day--over a
year later) and blamed the coup on Fethullah Gulen, who earlier
had been Erdogan's ally. The relationship has deteriorated into
an extremely contentious one, causing Gulen to retreat from
Turkey and live in exile in the United States. (Gulen continues
to deny any involvement in this coup attempt.) It appears that
the academics and scientists who signed the Peace Petition back
in January have been lumped into the class of those considered
against the state, and therefore, ``terrorists'' or supporters
of terrorists.
As of August 2017, 50,000 people have been arrested, and
150,000 have lost their jobs or been suspended. Of those, 7,500
are academics and college administrators, with 60,000 students
being displaced. Hundreds have been arrested and jailed,
awaiting outcomes of lengthy investigations and trials. Many
have been charged and released while awaiting trial. Under
these circumstances, those released have had to relinquish
their passports, making it impossible for them to leave the
country.
To add to their problems, when they apply for new jobs
employers are notified that they were terminated by decree, so
nobody is willing to hire them. In addition, they are banned
from civil service positions. Supporting themselves and their
families has become difficult to impossible. The Executive
Director of Scholars at Risk, Robert Quinn, has noted that
these actions against higher education institutions, scholars,
staff and students strongly suggest retaliation for the non-
violent exercise of academic freedom, freedom of expression and
freedom of association. This is especially true of actions
against individuals based solely on their public endorsement of
the Academics for Peace petition or their alleged affinity for
the so-called Gulenist movement.
PROBLEMS FOR ACADEMICS/SCIENTISTS:
LLoss of jobs
LLoss of tenure
LLoss of freedom
LCriminal charges
LInability to Pursue Studies
LInability to Provide for Self/Family
LInability to Leave Country--Jailed within country
borders or passport seized
LInability to Enter Country
LMissing family events (weddings, graduations,
births, funerals, etc.)
L Long periods of detention
LLong periods awaiting trials
LLabeled as traitors and terrorists
LNames end up on decree lists, virtually ending
life as once lived
LGrowing number of classes and courses without
instructors
Prominent Cases of Scientists/Academics Impacted:
Istar Gozaydin:
A professor of Sociology from Gediz University and a
founder of Turkey's branch of the Helsinki Citizens' Assembly,
Istar Gozaydin was detained and arrested in December 2016 on
vague terrorism-related charges. She started a hunger strike,
and one hundred days after her detention she was released, but
barred from traveling, and she is expected to return to court
to face charges of ``being a member of a terrorist
organization.''
Muzzafer Kaya, Esra Mungan and Kivanc Ersoy:
The government of Turkey was cracking down on dissent,
human rights and academic freedom, well before the July 2016
coup attempt. A Peace Petition, signed by over 1,000 academics
and read out at a press conference in January 2016, drew a
swift and brutal response from the government of Turkey, with
27 academics suspended and at least 30 dismissed from their
jobs. All the signers of the Peace Petition were placed under
investigation, perversely, for crimes of ``terrorism''. By
March 2016, three academics--Muzzafer Kaya (social work), Esra
Mungan (psychology), and Kivanc Ersoy (mathematics)--had been
arrested for ``making terrorist propaganda''. They have had
been arrested for ``making terrorist propaganda''. They have
had five hearings and are awaiting a sixth in December while
the court considers a request from the prosecutor in the case
to change to charges to ``insulting the Turkish nation''.
Serkan Golge:
A Turkish-American scientist who works for NASA, Serkan
Golge has been detained since July 2016 and placed in solitary
confinement after an estranged family member reported him for
spying. Has since been charged with being a supporter of Gulen.
Nuriye Gulmen and Semih Ozakca:
After the July 2016 coup attempt, the crackdown on academia
intensified. Like thousands of other scholars and academic
professionals, professor of literature Gulmen and an elementary
school teacher Ozakca were summarily dismissed from their jobs
in November 2016, without explanation. Exercising their right
to protest, they began a hunger strike in March 2017, and in
May they were detained on absurd charges of ``membership in a
terrorist organization'' and ``propaganda for a terrorist
organization''. Ozakca was ordered released on October 20
(though required to wear an electronic monitor), but Gulmen
remains imprisoned. On November 8, their lawyer, who is also
the president of the Progressive Lawyers' Association (CHD),
Selcuk Kozagacli, was also detained, and on Monday was remanded
to prison, also charged with membership in a terrorist
organization. Their case illustrates the uncompromising
intolerance of dissent and complete disdain for human rights
that has overtaken the Turkish government. Its ongoing purge
has destroyed tens of thousands of promising academic careers.
Ismail Kul:
Many scholars have been arrested by the government of
Turkey because of perceived connections to Fethullah Gulen, the
U.S. based expat alleged by the Turkish government to bear
responsibility for the July 2016 coup attempt. Some Turkish-
American academics have been detained and are clearly being
held as bargaining chips in the Turkish government's quest to
have Gulen extradited back to Turkey. Ismail Kul, a U.S.-based
chemistry professor at Widener University in Delaware, was
arrested in August 2016, and has been in detention ever since,
because he had met Fethullah Gulen. This, despite the fact that
it was Ahmet Aydin, a prominent member of the current ruling
Justice and Development Party (AKP) of Turkey who had
introduced Professor Kul to Gulen. This cynical effort to
detain academics and scholars on such flimsy pretexts, all for
the purpose of facilitating a trade for Gulen, is cruel and
profoundly unjust, and it is destroying innocent lives.
Ahmet Turan Ozcerit:
An Associate professor at Sakarya University's Faculty of
Computer and Information Science, Ahmet Turan Ozcerit was
arrested and detained for 13 months. He was eventually release
after being diagnosed with liver and intestinal cancer.
There are just stories, after stories, after stories of
professors and scientists who have lost their jobs, are being
detained, and have been arrested and charged as members of
``terrorist'' organizations.
Action for the Helsinki Commission, Congresspersons,
Citizens
The ongoing systematic and ruthless degrading of Turkey's
academic and scientific institutions is a profound tragedy, not
just for Turkey, but for the whole OSCE region, and indeed the
world. It is vital that action be taken to reverse this trend
and restore Turkey to its rightful place as an indispensable
player on the global scientific and academic stage. We urge the
U.S. Helsinki Commission to make the current assault of
science, scholarship, and basic human rights in Turkey a top
priority.
We urge the Commission to develop and promote policies that
will protect the rights of Turkish scientists and scholars to
travel within the OSCE region, and to proactively work to
ensure that academics at risk in Turkey are able to relocate
safely to other OSCE countries where they can continue their
scholarly pursuits.
We urge the Commission to actively engage all OSCE
governments to demand that the government of Turkey respect the
human rights of scholars and scientists, including the rights
to freedom of speech, assembly, and belief; as well as the
rights to travel and enjoy basic academic freedoms. The
government of Turkey must also be called upon in the strongest
possible terms to end the use of torture, arbitrary detention,
and unfair trials.
We urge the Commission to work with OSCE governments to
bring about a just resolution in the cases of the scholars
mentioned above, as well as the thousands of other Turkish
scholars and scientists who have been unjustly imprisoned or
wrongfully dismissed from their academic institutions.
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