[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
RUSSIA'S OCCUPATION OF GEORGIA AND
THE EROSION OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 17, 2018
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Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
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COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
HOUSE SENATE
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ROGER WICKER, Mississippi,
Co-Chairman Chairman
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida BENJAMIN L. CARDIN. Maryland
ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas CORY GARDNER, Colorado
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee MARCO RUBIO, Florida
RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois THOM TILLIS, North Carolina
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas TOM UDALL, New Mexico
GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island
EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
Vacant, Department of State
Vacant, Department of Commerce
Vacant, Department of Defense
[ii]
RUSSIA'S OCCUPATION OF GEORGIA AND THE
EROSION OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER
----------
July 17, 2018
COMMISSIONERS
Page
Hon. Roger F. Wicker, Chairman, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.......................................... 1
Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, Ranking Member, Commission on Security
and Cooperation in Europe...................................... 3
Hon. Christopher H. Smith, Co-Chairman, Commission on Security
and Cooperation in Europe...................................... 4
Hon. Gwen Moore, Commissioner, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.......................................... 15
Hon. Richard Hudson, Commissioner, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.......................................... 19
Hon. Randy Hultgren, Commissioner, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.......................................... 19
Hon. Sheila Jackson Lee, Commissioner, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.......................................... 22
Hon. Cory Gardner, Commissioner, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.......................................... 25
WITNESSES
David Bakradze, Ambassador of Georgia to the United States....... 6
Damon Wilson, Executive Vice President, Atlantic Council......... 8
Luke Coffey, Director of the Allison Center for Foreign Policy,
Heritage Foundation............................................ 11
APPENDIX
Prepared statement of Hon. Roger F. Wicker....................... 35
Prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Smith..................... 37
Prepared statement of Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin.................... 39
Prepared statement of Amb. David Bakradze........................ 41
Prepared statement of Damon Wilson............................... 45
Prepared statement of Luke Coffey................................ 50
RUSSIA'S OCCUPATION OF GEORGIA AND THE
EROSION OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER
----------
July 17, 2018
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Washington, DC
The hearing was held at 11:00 a.m. in Room 124, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Washington, DC, Hon. Roger F. Wicker,
Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe,
presiding.
Commissioners present: Hon. Roger F. Wicker, Chairman,
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; Hon.
Christopher H. Smith, Co-Chairman, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe; Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, Ranking Member,
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; Hon. Gwen
Moore, Commissioner, Commission on Security and Cooperation in
Europe; Hon. Richard Hudson, Commissioner, Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe; Hon. Randy Hultgren,
Commissioner, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe;
Hon. Sheila Jackson Lee, Commissioner, Commission on Security
and Cooperation in Europe; and Hon. Cory Gardner, Commissioner,
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
Witnesses present: David Bakradze, Ambassador of Georgia
to the United States; Damon Wilson, Executive Vice President,
Atlantic Council; and Luke Coffey, Director of the Allison
Center for Foreign Policy, Heritage Foundation.
HON. ROGER WICKER, CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Mr. Wicker. This hearing of the Helsinki Commission will
come to order. Good morning, and welcome to this hearing on
``Russia's Occupation of Georgia and the Erosion of the
International Order.'' As you know, the Helsinki Commission
monitors the compliance of OSCE-participating States to the
1975 Helsinki Final Act. In recent years, we have been
compelled to pay particular attention to Russia's clear, gross,
and uncorrected violations of all 10 principles of the OSCE's
founding document.
In August 2008, Russian armed forces invaded Georgia in
direct violation of the territorial integrity and political
independence of states. This initial invasion has sadly led to
10 years of occupation, affecting one-fifth of Georgia's
sovereign territory and causing incalculable political,
economic, and humanitarian cost. The invasion of Georgia
demonstrated that Vladimir Putin is ready and willing to use
his military and intelligence services to redraw international
borders and meddle in the internal affairs of a neighboring
state. Moreover, Mr. Putin clearly sought to sabotage Georgia's
progress toward membership in NATO, contravening the principle
that sovereign states have the right to freely join security
alliances of their choosing.
The response to the Kremlin's aggression against Georgia
was not enough to deter Mr. Putin from trying his hand again in
Ukraine in 2014. In fact, Georgia and Ukraine are only the two
most egregious examples of Russian challenges to the integrity
of our borders, our alliances, and our institutions over the
past decade. The Helsinki Commission is holding this hearing to
make sure the American people and the international community
do not lose sight of the continued illegal occupation of
Georgia, as well as its costs and implications. The experts
before us will help assess if the United States is doing
everything possible to restore Georgia's territorial integrity
and reverse Mr. Putin's assault on the borders of a neighboring
state and on the international order. We also intend to ensure
Georgia's contributions to our common security are recognized,
and that we continue to help it advance along its path to Euro-
Atlantic integration and full NATO membership.
Under my chairmanship, Ranking Member Cardin and I have
worked across the aisle to demonstrate the firm bipartisan
resolve of the U.S. Congress to restore Georgia's territorial
integrity and see the alliance make good on its promise of
membership. To that end, in March of last year we introduced
Senate Resolution 106, condemning Russia's continued occupation
and urging increased bilateral cooperation between the United
States and Georgia. More recently, ahead of last week's NATO
summit, Senator Cardin and I, along with Commissioners Tillis
and Shaheen, introduced Senate Resolution 557, underscoring the
strategic importance of NATO to the collective security of the
United States and the entire transatlantic region. This
resolution explicitly encourages all NATO member states to
clearly commit to further enlargement of the alliance,
including extending invitations to any aspirant country which
has met the conditions required to join NATO. I'm especially
looking forward to hearing how our panelists assess the
outcomes of the NATO summit.
Ladies and gentlemen, we will hear testimony this morning
from a distinguished panel who will provide valuable
perspectives on the current state of the conflict in Georgia,
prospects for its resolution, and recommendations for U.S.
policy. I am pleased to welcome Georgia's Ambassador David
Bakradze to testify before us this morning. In addition to his
firsthand experience in managing Georgia's strategic bilateral
relationship with the United States, Ambassador Bakradze has
worked at senior levels of Georgia Government to deepen
Tbilisi's Euro-Atlantic partnerships. Prior to his appointment
to Washington in 2016, the Ambassador served as state minister
of Georgia for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration.
Next we will hear from Damon Wilson, executive vice
president of the Atlantic Council. Mr. Wilson's areas of
expertise include NATO, transatlantic relations, Central and
Eastern Europe, and national security issues. At the time of
Russia's invasion of Georgia, Mr. Wilson was serving as special
assistant to President George W. Bush and senior director for
European Affairs at the National Security Council. In that
capacity, he played a leading role at a critical time in
managing interagency policy on NATO, the European Union,
Georgia, Ukraine, the Balkans, Eurasian energy security, and
Turkey.
Finally, we will hear from Luke Coffey, director of the
Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at the Heritage
Foundation. Mr. Coffey was named to his post in December 2015
and is responsible for directing policy research for the Middle
East, Africa, Russia, and the former Soviet Union, the western
hemisphere, and the Arctic region. What's left? Before joining
Heritage in 2012, he served at the U.K. Ministry of Defence as
senior special advisor to British Defence Secretary helping
shape British defense policy regarding transatlantic security,
NATO, the European Union, and Afghanistan.
I'll now recognize Senator Cardin for an opening statement,
to be followed by an opening statement by Co-Chairman Smith.
Senator Cardin.
HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, RANKING MEMBER, COMMISSION ON SECURITY
AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Mr. Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm more than willing
to defer to Co-Chairman Smith first, if you'd like.
Well, first, thank you all very much for convening this
hearing, Senator Wicker. And I thank our witnesses,
particularly the distinguished ambassador. It's a pleasure to
have you here. I think we should acknowledge that what happened
in 2008 with Russia's invasion of Georgia, it was done because
Russia's calculations, Mr. Putin's calculations at that time,
that under the circumstances he could get away with it, that
the reaction would be minimal from the international community.
And he looked at it as an opportunity to disrupt Georgia's
accession into Europe and into NATO.
And, quite frankly, it worked. He was able to do that. It's
not the first time he interfered. We know Russian troops in
Moldova have been able to stay there, making it much more
difficult for Moldova to be able to become a NATO member. And
we've seen it since in what Mr. Putin did in Ukraine with an
invasion and annexation of Crimea. And his calculations have
always been that if you let me get there, let me do it, I'm
going to do it, because his objective is to bring about lack of
unity within Europe and to compromise democratic institutions
or governments that depend upon democratic institutions.
So we should learn from this lesson of history. And I
mention that because Senator Wicker, as we were talking before
the hearing started, yesterday was an amazing moment in regards
to the Trump-Putin summit. And yes, there is no dispute, at
all, that Russia interfered in our elections in 2016. That's
not subject to any serious disagreement. And it is true that
Mr. Putin interfered in the European elections. That's
absolutely factually established. Six months ago, I authored a
report on behalf of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that
talked about Mr. Putin's design on democratic institutions and
talked about his asymmetric arsenal of weapons that includes
the use of cyber, that includes the use of military, that
includes the use of energy, that includes the use of
corruption. It includes all these tools in order to disrupt
democratic governments.
And that report points out very clearly, you give Mr. Putin
an opening, he'll take it. He'll take it as far as he can go.
And what really worries me about yesterday's press conference--
there's a lot of things that are concerning. I mean, to
discredit our own intelligence agencies to side with a dictator
rather than with our allies--I'd go on, and on, and on. But
it's a signal to Mr. Putin that you can attack the American
election and you have the president of the United States on
your side. So what happens in 2018? What happens with Mr. Putin
saying, well, it worked with elections, let's try something
else in the United States. Because I have a friend in the White
House that wants to establish a relationship with me that
allows me to do these nefarious activities against democratic
institutions.
And the report that we issued makes it very clear why Mr.
Putin is doing this. His corrupt system of government depends
upon corrupt governments. It can't--won't survive in
democratic-controlled governments. So it's in his interest, in
restoring the Soviet power, to bring down democratic
governments and to show as much lack of unity as possible among
the West. And he was involved in Brexit, and the list goes on,
and on, and on.
So I think we've got to learn our lesson from history. I
want to thank Senator Wicker. He's been a great leader on
bringing the Senate together on this issue. He mentioned the
resolution we did in 2017 on Georgia. It was a pleasure to join
you on that. Clear statement. Also, I might tell you, our
resolution that deals with NATO expansion was passed by the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Senator Gardner, of course,
was a major player in making sure that happened in the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee. So we've passed both of those
issues. As I'm sure everyone here is aware, we passed the
CAATSA statute, which made it very clear about taking action
against Russia as a result of their violations of the Helsinki
commitments.
And I was pleased to see at NATO that the Bucharest summit
document, that commits us to the full membership in Georgia in
NATO, was reaffirmed just in this most recent summit in NATO.
Despite some of the publicity that was brought about before and
during the NATO summit, the final document reinstates--or,
reemphasizes our commitment, Mr. Ambassador, to Georgia's full
membership in NATO. And we're committed to that. And we want
Mr. Putin to know that it's not up to him. It's up to the
people of Georgia. And it's up to the NATO partners.
Mr. Wicker. Thank you, Senator Cardin.
Co-Chairman Smith.
HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, CO-CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON SECURITY
AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
calling this important and very timely hearing.
Ten years ago, as a consequence of Russia's invasion of
Georgia, two of my constituents were trapped behind Russian
lines in South Ossetia. The girls, Ashley and Sophia, were 7
and 3 years old. Russia's land grab transformed the girls'
summer trip visit to their grandparents' home into a family
nightmare. Another young girl from my district was trapped in
Abkhazia. Again, what could have been a great visit with
grandmom turned out to be a horrifying experience. Matter of
fact, after we got her out I remember her telling us how she
was--and her grandmother--were prostrate on the floor of their
home, their flat, as Russian tanks rumbled right in front of
their home. So, again, a very, very frightening experience for
that young girl.
I arrived in Tbilisi on August 19th, 11 days after the
invasion, and worked with U.S. Ambassador John Tefft--who is
one of our finest and he went on, as we all know, to be our
ambassador to Russia--with French Ambassador Eric Fournier, who
also did a magnificent job, particularly on the girls. It was
he who, because they had the European Union presidency that
cycle, volunteered in direct request from us to go, and it took
6 hours through checkpoints to get to the two girls, put them
in the back of his limo, and bring them out safely. That would
be Sophia and Ashley.
We also met with the Red Cross and many others who were
working overtime to try to mitigate the damage brought about by
this terrible Putin invasion. Ashley and Sophia were soon
reunited with their parents in Howell, New Jersey. Then we
worked with the Red Cross to secure others. When other members
of Congress knew I was going, all of a sudden I had a portfolio
of family members, and every one of them we worked to
effectuate the release with our ambassador. And, one by one,
they all got out of what could have been a disastrous
situation.
As the first member of Congress to arrive in Georgia after
the invasion, I also met with President Saakashvili, also with
the prime minister, the Orthodox Patriarch Ilia II, and, of
course, many other Georgians of all walks of life, including at
an IDP camp. Despite Putin's aggression the people of Georgia
showed great courage, great resolve, and competence during the
national emergency. They were calm, even though time and again,
even while we were there, Russian troops got on the road to
Tbilisi in some kind of psychological move, only to turn back
after going several hundred yards. What I found so incredible
about the Georgians was their resiliency, their love for their
country, and their love for democracy.
Two years ago, along with the chairman, we were back in
Tbilisi for the annual meeting of the OSCE Parliamentary
Assembly. And several of us made a trip to the fence where the
Russians--at South Ossetia. It was just like the old Soviet
times. They stood there. They had a camera. They had a backlog
of trucks and cars that were trying to get into South Ossetia.
And when we arrived they took out the camera and with, what I
remember from the 1980s with the Soviets, just kept staring and
acting in a very defiant way. It was like the old times were
back, or perhaps have never left.
I look forward to our witnesses today, learning from them
what might be done to mitigate the humanitarian suffering
caused by this new Iron Curtain. What can be done, because just
like--I'll never forget, one of the first things that I was a
part of with--and I was just there with him--but when President
Reagan had captive nations resolutions talking about the
Baltics, we said: We're not going to recognize the illegal--
just like Crimea--the illegal occupation of Lithuania, Latvia,
or Estonia. And if you looked at any American map, they were
not--they were independent. They were not part of the Soviet
Union. We need to have the same kind of resolve when South
Ossetia and Abkhazia and, of course, all parts of Ukraine,
including and especially the Crimea.
So I want to thank our distinguished witnesses for being
here. Yield back.
Mr. Wicker. Thank you very much for that fine opening
statement, to both of you.
Ambassador Bakradze, we'll begin with you. And if we have a
timekeeper, let's set the timer at 6 minutes and ask that the
witnesses summarize their testimony. Your full testimony will
be received, of course, in the record. But, Ambassador
Bakradze, we are delighted to have you and you may proceed.
DAVID BAKRADZE, AMBASSADOR OF GEORGIA TO THE UNITED STATES
Amb. Bakradze. Thank you very much, Chairman Wicker, Co-
Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Cardin, Senator Gardner, and
distinguished commissioners. Thank you for the opportunity to
testify at this hearing.
Today we are speaking about the violations of the OSCE
principles and commitments by the Russian Federation in the
illegally occupied regions of Georgia. And I feel like this is
a quite appropriate topic of discussion, not only because 10
years have passed since the Russia-Georgia War, when Russian
Federation invaded and occupied two Georgian regions, but also
because Russia continues its aggressive policy aimed at
redrawing the borders and retaining the so-called zones of
influence.
As Chairman Wicker, you have rightfully mentioned, this
undermines the security and peace in Europe and creates a very
dangerous environment that, if not appropriately countered, may
lead to developments in the region that will be hard to
reverse. In my remarks today, I will briefly introduce you to
the situation in the Georgian regions illegally occupied by the
Russian Federation. I would also like to draw your attention to
the humanitarian, social, and other costs that Russian
Federation and its occupation have imposed on people residing
in the occupied and adjacent areas. And I will conclude my
remarks highlighting the U.S. role.
Since 2008, the Russian Federation is in breach of full
spectrum of the principles of Helsinki Final Act of the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe--such as
sovereignty and territorial integrity, inviolability of
frontiers, refraining from the threat or use of force,
refraining from making each other's territory the object of
military occupation, refraining for any demand for or act of
seizure or occupation of territory of another state, the human
rights violations, and many, many more. Through these 10 years,
the Russian Federation has intensified its illegal steps toward
factual annexation of Georgian regions of Abkhazia and
Tskhinvali.
Moscow has further continued the implementation of so-
called integration treaties absorbing Georgia's occupied
regions into Russia's military, political, economic, and social
systems. In gross violation of all international obligations,
the Russian Federation reinforces its military presence and
occupation, having illegally stationed fully operational
military bases with 10,000 militaries, 3,000 FSB personnel,
sophisticated offensive weaponry, constantly conducting
military drills and violating Georgian airspace.
At the same time, Russian Federation intensifies the
installation of barbed wire fences and other kinds of
artificial barriers along the occupation line. The total length
of barriers reached 49 kilometers alongside the occupation line
in Abkhazia and 52 kilometers along the occupation line in
Tskhinvali region. Against this background, the EU monitoring
mission deployed in Georgia on the basis of the cease-fire
agreement is not allowed by the Russian Federation to enter the
occupied regions to fully implement its mandate throughout the
whole territory of Georgia.
The human rights situation remains alarming, with
fundamental rights of the local population infringed on daily
basis, against the backdrop of intensified ethnic
discrimination, restriction of free movement, illegal detention
and kidnappings, deprivation of property rights, prohibition of
education in native language, and other ethnically based
violations. The local population is deprived of minimal
safeguards for their lives. Murder of ethnic Georgians by the
representatives of occupation regime has become a dangerous
trend. We all remember the killings of Basharuli, Otkhozoria,
Tatunashvili. In all these cases, despite cooperation by the
government of Georgia in the relevant formats, the questions
still remain unanswered and the perpetrators unpunished.
This makes crystal clear that the occupation regimes in
Sukhumi and Tskhinvali not only strengthen this sense of
impunity, but also further encourage ethnically targeted
violence and crime against Georgian population. In this regard,
on the basis of the Resolution of the Parliament of Georgia,
the Otkhozoria-Tatunashvili List was adopted that includes the
persons convicted of gross human rights violations in the
occupied regions. The Georgian Government seeks from its
partners the imposition of sanctions on the persons included in
the list.
With these provocative steps, the Russian Federation tries
to undermine the efforts of Georgia and its international
partners for peaceful conflict resolution. Nevertheless,
throughout the last several years the government of Georgia has
been pursuing peaceful conflict resolution policy unwaveringly.
Unlike the Russian Federation, we remain in full compliance
with the EU-mediated 2008 cease-fire agreement. We have
reconfirmed our adherence to the non-use of force principle,
still awaiting further reciprocity from the Russian Federation.
We pursue the policy of dialog with the Russian Federation,
aimed at de-escalation of tensions.
Reconciliation and engagement policy remains our priority,
and we even reinvigorated efforts by presenting new
opportunities through the new peace initiative, A Step to a
Better Future. The document is distributed for your attention.
At the same time, international support is decisive in order to
succeed in the peaceful conflict resolution process. And I will
be happy to elaborate on this more during the question-and-
answer session.
While talking on the peaceful conflict resolution in
Georgia, I should emphasize that the United States has a
particular role in this process as our strategic partner and a
participant of Geneva international discussions. We greatly
value the U.S.-Georgia partnership and contribution of the
United States in peace and stability in Georgia. On a political
level, Georgia enjoys a widespread bipartisan support across
the U.S. Government, Congress, and the administration. The
Georgia-U.S. bilateral relation has never been stronger, and
continues to strengthen under the current administration, which
has repeatedly stated its opposition to the Russian occupation
of Georgian territories, as well as strong support for
Georgia's NATO integration.
The U.S. Congress has been always vocal on these very
important Georgia matters. In June, the bipartisan Georgia
Support Act was introduced in the U.S. Congress by Congressmen
Poe and Connolly. We greatly appreciate the recent bipartisan
resolution offered by Senators Perdue, Isakson, and Cardin,
marking the 100th anniversary of the first Democratic Republic
of Georgia. We appreciate inclusion of Georgia language
supporting territorial integrity issues in the Consolidated
Appropriations Act and National Defense Authorization Act.
It is the time that this political support is further
reinvigorated in practical steps, in order to ensure the
implementation of the cease-fire agreement and comprehensive,
peaceful settlement in my country. We believe, through
consistence and hard work, we can lay the ground for a lasting
peace and security in Georgia. In this regard, I would like to
emphasize the necessity of the peaceful conflict resolution to
be placed high in the international area, as well as in the
U.S. dialog with Russia. Strong leadership of the United States
is essential to reach progress in the resolution of the Russia-
Georgia conflict.
We deem it crucial that the international society doesn't
keep a blind eye on Russia's aggressive actions with regard to
the occupied territories of Georgia, and severe security and
humanitarian situation on this ground that this policy entails.
Firm stance of the international society, and particularly the
United States, is decisive to send a clear message to Russia
that this policy directed against sovereignty and territorial
integrity of Georgia is not acceptable.
Let me once again thank the commission for organizing this
hearing. And I'm looking forward to hearing from Luke Coffey
and Damon Wilson, who I thank wholeheartedly for their input
and long-time interest.
Thank you.
Mr. Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
Mr. Wilson.
DAMON WILSON, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, ATLANTIC COUNCIL
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Chairman Wicker, Co-Chairman Smith,
Ranking Member Cardin, and distinguished commissioners.
On April 3, 2008 at NATO's Bucharest summit, just over 10
years ago, the consensus among allies on how to build a Europe
whole and free fell apart. I was serving as senior director for
European affairs at the National Security Council at the time
and had a front row seat. In Bucharest, NATO leaders failed to
agree to offer a membership action plan to Georgia and to
Ukraine to help them better prepare to become allies. When
Washington and Berlin were unable to reach a deal, Central
European leaders stepped into the breach to push NATO to agree
that Georgia and Ukraine, ``will become members of NATO.''
Seemingly, leaders decided that NATO membership for Georgia
and Ukraine would be a question of when, not whether. Yet
today, 10 years on from Bucharest and 10 years on from the
subsequent Russian invasions of Georgia and then Ukraine, we
run the risk of our rhetoric becoming detached from reality.
We've agreed a vision, but we don't really have a strategy to
get there. Many allies have lost faith in this vision and we
run the risk of accepting an unstable gray zone of insecurity
in Europe's east.
Since 2008, we've witnessed a revanchist Kremlin, intent on
undoing the democratic gains of the post-cold war period,
reshaping the international order that allowed Europe to remain
peaceful and prosperous, and ensuring the domination of its
neighbors. The strategic environment has changed so
dramatically. As a result, our approach to Europe's east should
also change. We should, and can, correct the shortcomings of
Bucharest and reverse these Russian gains.
In many respects, this process has already begun. At the
just-
concluded NATO summit, we saw ally leaders invite the
government in Skopje to begin accession negotiations, paving
the way for the Republic of North Macedonia to become NATO's
30th member. And it was in Bucharest, after all, where NATO
failed to extend this invitation, opening a decade of
stagnation which Russia sought to exploit. Last week's decision
overcomes that failure. We can do the same with Georgia and
Ukraine.
With this decision, leaders recognize that enlargement is a
stabilizing factor. Enlargement advances U.S. interests as it
welcomes nations to our alliance which are willing and able to
assume the responsibility of becoming an ally, while also
ensuring that a new ally is more immunized from Russia's effort
to destabilize it. We've witnessed this formula in the Baltics.
While the region is tense today given Russia's aggressive
intimidation tactics, imagine what northeast Europe would look
like today if the Baltic States were not in NATO.
This logic applies to Georgia. The Russia-peddled paradigm
that enlargement is provocative is wrong. Leaving nations who
aspire to join the alliance in limbo is provocative, as it
temps Russia to extend its sphere of influence, either through
sowing chaos to ensure weak states, or occupation and
domination to ensure obedient neighbors. As history has shown,
this Russian strategy is not a recipe for stability but for
perpetual instability and potential conflict. Even the most
cynical grand bargain, consigning Russia and Georgia to
Russia's sphere of influence, would not be durable as it denies
the aspirations, the agency of the people of the nations
themselves. They have a say in their future. Witness the Rose
Revolution. Witness the Maidan.
To put today's dilemma in context, consider the Truman
administration decision to bring Greece and Turkey into NATO in
1952. Greece was emerging from a brutal civil war. Turkey
remained vulnerable as Stalin sought more reliable access to
the Mediterranean. Russia sought to topple the government in
Ankara during the Turkish Straits crisis, and we were waging
war on the Korean Peninsula. Yet, President Truman acted
decisively--first bilaterally and then through NATO--to anchor
Greece and Turkey in the West. Rapidly, U.S. diplomacy overcame
an obvious flashpoint and anchored a region bordering the
Soviet Union and NATO.
It is the absence of security for Georgia and Ukraine that
has tempted Russia to occupy and annex their territory.
Georgians and Ukrainians have done more than most to fight to
defend the principles of the alliance. Both spend well over 2
percent of their GDP on defense. Georgia is among the most
significant troop contributors to NATO and other international
missions. Ukraine has the most battle-tested forces of any
European nation. Both already act as allies.
Yet, NATO has handcuffed itself by abiding by the
principles developed in its 1995 study on enlargement and its
adoption of the Membership Action Plan [MAP] process in 1999.
The study on enlargement sets expectations that nations
aspiring to membership will resolve any territorial disputes
before entering the alliance. Allies adopted the MAP process to
help nations take the practical steps to better prepare to
become members. These policies were crafted in different--that
is, benign--geopolitical circumstances. They made great sense
then. Today, however, NATO's own policies incentivize Russia to
hold onto occupied territories as long-term insurance to
prevent enlargement.
In today's environment, MAP serves to signal to Russia that
the alliance is getting more serious about membership, without
yet being serious about membership. A MAP decision in many
respects begins a countdown clock which may put pressure on
Moscow to act to disrupt the neighbor's accession process
before it accedes, much like we witnessed in Montenegro. To
avoid this dynamic, we could update NATO's open-door policy for
today's new circumstances. Allies should make clear that their
commitment that there's no third-party veto over enlargement
means that Russian occupation will not serve as an obstacle to
membership. Allies should recognize that MAP is not a
requirement for membership, but rather instruments like the
NATO-Georgia Commission and its annual national plans provide
even more rigor in helping Georgia prepare.
There's significant precedence in determining where NATO's
security guarantee in Article 5 would apply. We've seen this
with West Germany. We've seen this during the debates of where
it would apply for France and Belgium in colonial days. In the
case of Georgia and Ukraine, the North Atlantic Council can
make clear that the Washington treaty does not apply to the
occupied territories, but without relinquishing allied
commitments to the nation's territorial integrity, and without
Tbilisi and Kyiv giving up their claims of sovereignty.
Today, Europe finds itself at the center of global
geopolitical competition. The circumstances mean that we cannot
be ambivalent. Precisely because of this tension the
elimination of gray zones of insecurity can help ensure durable
peace in Europe's east. Permitting these nations' aspirations
to be held hostage by Russian occupation and intimidation is a
recipe for instability and conflict in Europe. We should not
allow these nations, known as the captive nations for much of
the 20th century, to become known as the hostage nations of the
21st century. Rather, we should recognize that they stand on
the front line of freedom today and anchor them within our NATO
alliance to ensure a peace in Europe's east.
Thank you.
Mr. Wicker. Thank you very much.
Mr. Coffey.
LUKE COFFEY, DIRECTOR OF THE ALLISON CENTER FOR FOREIGN POLICY,
HERITAGE FOUNDATION
Mr. Coffey. Thank you. Good morning Chairman Wicker, Co-
Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Cardin--who's stepped out it
seems--and distinguished commissioners. I'm honored to speak
here before your esteemed commission about ``Russia's
Occupation of Georgia and the Erosion of the International
Order.'' With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I will summarize
my prepared statement that has been submitted for the record.
In August 2008, while the world was fixated on the summer
Olympics in Beijing, a Russian invasion force passed through
the Roki Tunnel on the Russian-Georgian border. After 5 days of
fighting, the fighting finally stopped after a cease-fire
agreement was brokered by France. And a decade later, Russia is
still not in full compliance with the cease-fire agreement.
Today, thousands of Russian troops occupy the Georgian regions
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which together account for 20
percent of Georgia's internationally recognized territory. Mr.
Chairman, if a foreign army occupied the equivalent one-fifth
of the contiguous United States, it would be comparable to all
land west of the Rocky Mountains.
Ten years later, we should not forget that it was Russia
that invaded Georgia, not the other way around. In this case,
Russia is the aggressor and Georgia is the victim. I submit to
this Commission that Georgia is important for the United States
for three reasons. First, Georgia is a dependable ally. At the
height of the fighting, Georgia had more than 2,000 troops
serving in what was statistically one of the deadliest places
in Afghanistan, central Helmand Province. On a per capita
basis, Georgia has suffered more killed in combat there than
any other country that's contributed to the operation, yet they
only joined in any meaningful sense halfway through the
campaign. And today, it has almost 900 troops serving alongside
U.S. troops.
Second, Georgia's strategic location makes it important for
U.S. geopolitical interests in the broader Eurasian region.
Located in the South Caucasus, Georgia sits at a crucial
geographical and cultural crossroads that has been important
for strategic, military, economic and energy reasons for
centuries. Third, since regaining independence in 1991, after
the collapse of the Soviet Union, Georgia has been on a
successful journey toward democracy. It is an example for the
region. Have there been shortcomings and challenges along the
way? Yes. But as we know here in the United States, democracy
is a process and not a single event.
It is in America's interests that Georgia remains on this
path. Georgia's journey to NATO membership has been a long and,
at times, frustrating one. Even so, few countries in Europe
express as much enthusiasm for NATO as the Republic of Georgia.
It has the closest relationship with NATO that a country could
possibly have without being a full member. It has made good
progress. And in the words of NATO Secretary General
Stoltenberg, Georgia has all the practical tools to become a
member of NATO.
It is in America's interests to keep Georgia on this path
toward NATO membership. But looming over the NATO debates is
Russia. Russia's primary goal in Georgia is to keep it out of
the Euro-
Atlantic community. We must understand how President Putin sees
Russia's role in the world to understand why he does what he
does in a place like Georgia. His actions are often described
as cold war behavior, like we saw during the time of the Soviet
Union. But, Mr. Chairman, in my opinion, this is an incorrect
assessment. What we see today is an imperial Russia. We have a
21st century Russia with 19th century ambition. We're dealing
with Russia like it was before the revolution in 1917, during
the time of the czar.
During the cold war, the goal was to spread an ideology.
During imperial times, the goal was to maximize and spread
Russian influence using political, diplomatic, economic, and
military means. Therefore, Putin sees Russia's role in the
region through an imperial lens. Russia views the South
Caucasus as being in its natural sphere of influence, and it
stands ready to use military force in the region when necessary
to exert its influence. Since 2008, South Ossetia and Abkhazia
have essentially become large Russian military bases.
Mr. Chairman, over the years I have visited the line of
occupation on numerous times. This is a line that divides free
Georgia from occupied Georgia. It is a line that divides
communities, families, farms, and villages. Ten years after the
war, the Russian threat is still present. I have seen the
Russian flag flying on territory that the international
community considered to be the Republic of Georgia. Over the
years, Georgians have been abducted by Russian and separatist
authorities. Some have never come back. Hundreds of thousands
of people have been internally displaced. I have visited IDP
settlements in Georgia and I have heard the plight of these
people firsthand.
Russia has also implemented a policy of borderization in
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. As the ambassador said, this
includes constructing illegal fencing, so-called ``State
Border'' signs, and earthen barriers to separate communities
and divide the Georgian people further. In extreme cases,
Russia has even taken more territory by moving fences a few
yards at a time. This is Russia's creeping annexation. As you
can see from this map, research carried out by the Heritage
Foundation has found that since 2011 there has been 57 cases at
44 different locations of Russian borderization in Georgia.
In conclusion, Georgia represents the idea that each
country has the sovereign right to determine its own path and
to decide with whom it has relations and how and by whom it is
governed. In the case of Georgia, this shows why territorial
integrity must be respected, and why no outside actor--in this
case, Russia--should have a veto over membership with
organizations like the EU or NATO.
Mr. Chairman, in the middle of Tbilisi there's a bronze
statue of Ronald Reagan. The political reforms taking place
today in Georgia reflect Reagan's belief in democracy, free
markets, a strong national defense, and the importance of
individual liberty.
For the Georgians, the statue stands as a reminder of how
far they have come since the end of the cold war. For the West,
the statue is a reminder that the cold war did not just end,
but that it was won. And it was won because the ideas of free
markets, economic freedom, individual liberty, and a strong
national defense were much stronger than any army that the
Warsaw Pact or the Soviet Union could ever put to the field.
Georgia has shown a commitment to the U.S., it has shown a
commitment to NATO, it has shown a commitment to difficult
political, economic, and security reforms. And it has come a
long way since 1991. Now is not the time for the U.S. to turn
its back. I look forward to answering your questions. Thank
you.
Mr. Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Coffey. And thanks to all three
of our distinguished panelists for excellent testimony.
What I'm going to do is defer my questions until our House
members have had a chance to ask theirs. So I will recognize
Mr. Smith first, and then Ms. Moore.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for that
courtesy. And thank you for, again, pulling us together for
this very, very important hearing. Pardon me.
Mr. Wilson, if I could ask you, have the reasons why NATO
failed in Bucharest in 2008 to offer membership action--a
membership action plan to Georgia been overcome? What are the
remaining difficulties? And when do you think this will happen?
Second, if I could, the Georgian Parliament and the spirit
of the Belarus Democracy Act and of the Magnitsky Act in March
passed a resolution that calls on the Georgian Government to
work with international partners to impose travel bans on those
who are, quote, ``accused of murder, abduction, torture, and
inhuman treatment of Georgian citizens.'' How is that being
implemented? What would you recommend the Trump administration
and our European allies do to effectively implement that very
wise move?
And just one simple question, finally--how many ethnic
Georgians are still in the occupied lands of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia? And what is the state of their living conditions?
Mr. Wilson. Terrific, thank you, sir. Let me respond to the
first one in particular, and maybe defer to the ambassador on
the other two as well.
I worked for President Bush in 2008 and was involved in the
negotiations between Washington and Berlin on trying to get to
yes on a membership action plan for Georgia and Ukraine. They
were quite extensive, involving many conversations between the
chancellor of Germany and the president of the United States.
The German opposition at the time was based on a pretty
consistent articulation about the skepticism that Georgian
democratic institutions had matured sufficiently enough that
this was really in effect a country consistent with European
norms, one that would be welcome in the family.
To the Germans' credit, they did not make an argument about
Russia vis-a-vis their opposition to Georgia at the time. We
could not bridge that gap as much as we thought we might be
able to get there at Bucharest. We could not.
Mr. Smith. But the Bush administration tried?
Mr. Wilson. Quite, expended a tremendous amount of
political capital.
Mr. Smith. And did the model of Turkey being a NATO member
but not a part of the EU play into that at all?
Mr. Wilson. You know, I think--I think for--the chancellor
had a high degree of skepticism of the Georgian leadership and
Georgian institutions at the time. And was not willing to move
on this. It was really one of the first times within the
alliance that an opposition from an ally really led to a split
on a core strategy piece.
Now, in many respects, we've seen Georgia's democracy
continue to evolve pretty significantly since 2008. And I would
posit that the arguments that were presented in 2008 don't
really hold today. And yet, we don't see quite a lot of
enthusiasm from the allies. I think that underscores that
second point. Much of the unspoken opposition was about what to
do about Russia. The idea of enlargement in NATO had always
worked because we had a strategy of advancing some type of
strategic partnership with Russia--the permanent joint council,
the NATO-Russia council. In the time of President Bush, we were
working on a missile defense, a strategic deal which also did
not come to fruition.
So I think part of what many of the allies' concern is, the
issue of Russia today. And so if you look objectively across
the benchmarks, Georgia is well prepared, has exceeded many of
the benchmarks--as we watch Montenegro come in, as we see an
invitation to accession--the talks begin for Macedonia. Its
issue is geography and Russian occupation. And I think it's
therefore why I've tried to make the case that unless we change
our paradigm of thinking about it, if we accept the Russian
argument that enlargement is provocative, our allies will
object, we won't be bold enough to push. We have to recognize
that the absence of security here is actually what is going to
be a recipe for conflict and instability.
The inverse, enlargement to Georgia, much like the Baltic
States, would create predictable relationships, would stabilize
that situation. And there is precedence within the alliance in
saying that for now Article 5 does not apply to the occupied
territories of Georgia without sacrificing the principle of
sovereignty or territorial integrity. This will only be able to
come to fruition with U.S. leadership, because there will
remain allied reservations. Turkey and Greece only came into
the alliance at a very difficult time during the cold war
because of a decisive move from the Truman administration that
took what would have been a controversial decision and made it
momentous, but not controversial. That's the same as what
happened at the beginning of the Bush administration with the
Baltic States.
And so I think that's where we stand on enlargement today
with Georgia. I might defer to the ambassador on the specifics
about the parliament's actions and the Georgians in the
occupied territories.
Amb. Bakradze. Thank you very much for the question. Let me
start with the Otkhozoria-Tatunashvili List. Giga Otkhozoria
was cold-bloodedly killed at the occupation line. The person
who has committed this killing is identified, but not punished.
Tatunashvili, another Georgian, who was killed in the detention
center in Tskhinvali occupied region. For almost 30 days, the
body of the deceased wasn't returned. And when returned, it was
without internal organs.
These two cases demonstrate the brutality. And the
Parliament of Georgia has come up with a resolution which is
called Otkhozoria-Tatunashvili List, which those convicted in
the crimes in the occupied regions of Georgia. We appreciate
the very strong statement by the United States in this regard.
And just a month ago, during the visit of the speaker of the
Parliament of Georgia in the United States, the Congressmen Poe
and Connolly introduced the Georgia Support Act, that includes
the sanctions against people who committed these crimes in
Georgia's occupied regions. This is under discussion in the
Congress, and we would highly appreciate the strong support of
the Congress in this regard. The European Union has also
adopted a resolution with regards to Otkhozoria-Tatunashvili
List.
About the situation of the ethnic Georgians, there are
around more than 50,000 Georgians in the Abkhazia occupied
regions. And the people are deprived of simple human and
fundamental rights, including the right of education in their
native language. And that was forcing the children to cross the
occupational line and get education in the Georgia's controlled
regions. But closing of the checkpoints, limiting them from 6
to 2, is also depriving them of that right. And as it was
mentioned, on daily basis they suffer from different forms.
They don't benefit from the freedoms of free movement,
education, and all the basic rights.
Mr. Wicker. Thank you very much, Senator--I mean, Chairman
Smith.
Ms. Moore.
HON. GWEN MOORE, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Ms. Moore. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. It's really
good to be here. Good to see you. Thank you all. Please forgive
me if I have asked questions that you have already covered in
your testimony due to my tardiness this morning.
Very curious, the Trump administration has provided lethal
weapons to Georgia. And I want to know, has there been any
indication of their being on the verge of using them? Is there
any military or diplomatic advice that's being given to use or
not to use them? And do you anticipate that they'll be used to
stop the aggression?
Amb. Bakradze. Thank you very much. Georgia has pledged the
non-use of force, and only peaceful way of conflict resolution.
We benefit from the very close cooperation with the United
States on different issues. Starting with the Georgia Defense
and Readiness Program, that includes the training of Georgian
military by the U.S. officers. That includes cooperation and
exercises on yearly basis.
Ms. Moore. And so these weapons are being used purely for
exercises?
Amb. Bakradze. These weapons are defensive weapons. And
Georgia sees it this way. These programs strengthen Georgia's
territorial defense, Georgia's defense capabilities, and the
interoperability with NATO.
Ms. Moore. Thank you. We are seeing very clearly, according
to all of our intelligence agencies, a very sophisticated and
continued attack by the Russians on cybersecurity. To what
extent is Russia using cyber techniques to threaten Georgia's
critical infrastructure? Do we have any notion of that?
Amb. Bakradze. Well, Georgia has been subject to the
different forms of what we now call hybrid warfare throughout
the years. Russian market was closed totally for any kind of
Georgian product in 2006. The energy pipeline was blown up
during the severe winter. And in 2008, during the invasion
also, the cyberattack took place against all Georgian
governmental sites. And at that time, our close friend and
ally, Estonia, was with us, which has suffered the same attack
a year prior to that, to help us come out of that. Now we see--
and during the last year, Brussels summit, very strong
engagement and cooperation on cybersecurity with our friends
and allies in NATO. And Georgia is preparing itself for the
future.
Ms. Moore. Thank you. I think many parliamentarians in
Georgia are frustrated with delayed efforts to be able to join
the EU and NATO. Is there any indication, or is it your
opinion, that perhaps the United States is sort of slow-walking
the efforts--the sort of disengagement with NATO that we've
seen recently, and the EU, is somehow contaminating or slowing
the process of Georgia attaining that membership? Is there any
spillover, cross-contamination?
Amb. Bakradze. Thank you. We are as determined as ever.
Georgia during the last 4 years has benefited largely on all
the major directions of its foreign policy priorities--which is
European Union, which is NATO, and strategic partnership with
the United States. Georgia has signed the association
agreement. Georgia has deepened comprehensive free trade area
agreement with the European Union. And Georgia got the visa-
free travel with the European Union. These are the benefits
that not only the citizens of Georgia living in the government-
controlled territories, but also citizens living in the
occupied regions can benefit from. And this is an important
incentive, to share the benefits of Georgia's European
integration with our citizens in the occupied regions.
Georgia's public has a very strong support to EU and NATO
integration. By the very recent polls, this number remains with
70 to 75 percent with regards to NATO and European Union.
Georgia sees Europe and sees Western democratic way of
development as part of its identity, as part of its history.
And therefore, this way toward and this path toward the
European and Euro-Atlantic integration is beneficial itself.
And we are very optimistic that this, in time, will transform
into the full-fledged membership of Georgia into European Union
and into NATO, that Georgia is deserving.
With regards to the United States, throughout the years we
have been benefiting from the very strong bipartisan support of
the U.S. administrations, of the U.S. Congress. And under the
current administration, this relationship is stronger than
ever. We have last year benefited from the very strong
cooperation in defense and security, and at the political
level. And we believe that this relationship that throughout
the years transformed into the very solid strategic partnership
will gradually form a very strong alliance.
Mr. Wicker. Thank you. Thank you, Ms. Moore.
Ms. Moore. Thank you for your indulgence, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wicker. Thank you so much.
Mr. Wilson and Mr. Coffey, the consensus among NATO
supporters has been that membership would not--full membership
would not be offered to countries where there was a territorial
dispute. And both of you are arguing that we should put that
aside and expedite Georgia's membership in NATO. Is this a new
position for both the Atlantic Council and Heritage? How widely
is it being embraced among like organizations? And if you could
talk about that. And then I would ask the Ambassador also.
The concern has been that to bring Georgia in or Ukraine in
would be to freeze the lines where they are and, more or less,
to recognize that. So if you'd talk about that, and I think you
would acknowledge that this is a new position on your part. Mr.
Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Mr. Chairman, yes. This is a significant
conceptual evolution, yes. I offer this as my thinking rather
than presenting my institution's visions. It's my sense, rather
than the Atlantic Council. But the point is that we adopted
strategies for enlargement in the post-cold war period when we
had a peaceful, benign security environment. So it made sense.
I was part of the teams that did this. We said, look: If you
want to join our clubs of NATO and the EU, before you come into
the club you need to resolve your border disputes, your
territorial disputes. We didn't want the historic tensions that
we saw in Central Europe being imported into the alliance.
So we pushed for border treaties. We pushed for treaties of
friendship between the allies. And it was a great process that
actually helped build the ethos of former adversaries becoming
allies. It made sense in a benign environment. Flash forward.
We're no longer in a benign environment. We're in a very tense
geopolitical situation. So Russia sees NATO's policies of
saying that we won't take new members if they have territorial
disputes--that tells Moscow, OK, then I just need to have
territorial disputes and, by definition, I've used their rules
to create long-term insurance for me that NATO and the EU won't
come to my borders.
So what I'm arguing is that, yes, the United States needs
to lead the alliance through a conceptual reevaluation of how
we think about our enlargement strategy, our open door, to say
that we're going to say we will be willing to accept new
members, even if they have territorial disputes, with the
caveat that we will decide not to apply our security guarantee
to those occupied territories. Furthermore, I'm trying to make
the case that this isn't actually a new position, that there's
precedent within NATO. 1955 we brought in West Germany without
Germans giving up the sense of ultimate commitment to the idea
of sovereignty.
At the beginning of the alliance, France actually wrote
that the security guarantees would apply to Algeria, when they
said Algeria was part of our country. We had to actually
reverse that decision with the war of Algiers and Algerian
independence. The Belgians argued unsuccessfully to apply
Article 5 to their territory in the Belgian Congo. Today Spain
has cities--two cities--on the African continent, in Morocco,
for which we don't have NATO defense plans to guarantee.
My point is, is that this isn't radical. This is
recognizing that the policies that we set up in a benign
period, post-cold war period, the Russians are now manipulating
them by continuing to be incentivized to hold onto territory
because they know that means we won't proceed with enlargement.
So we have to change our own conception to say that doesn't
apply anymore. We're willing to take you, Georgia. But we won't
apply it to these occupied territories. And that will only
happen if the United States pushes for that way of thinking,
leads the alliance through that process and that consensus and
helps build support around that idea.
Mr. Wicker. Mr. Coffey, is your position yours or the
position of the Heritage Foundation?
Mr. Coffey. I believe, just like Damon, I speak on behalf
of myself today. However, it was in a Heritage Foundation
report back in February where I laid out in detail how this
proposal could work. The important distinction between Georgia
and Ukraine in this case is that Georgia has a non-use of force
pledge. Ukraine doesn't. Ukraine is fighting a war in the east.
Bullets are flying. Soldiers are dying. It's very kinetic.
Whereas with the situation in Georgia with the non-use of force
pledge, if you pledge not to use force to get the two occupied
regions back, then why would you need a security guarantee on
these two occupied regions?
Now, Mr. Chairman, I want to make very clear that if NATO
does go down this road--which I think with U.S. leadership it
should--it should be made very clear that this is not to
question Georgia's territorial integrity. In the event of my
proposal, which I'll submit the report for the record along
with a detailed article I wrote on the subject, all of Georgia
would be joining the alliance, but only the regions not under
Russian occupation would get the Article 5 security guarantee
until the conflict is resolved peacefully through a non-use of
force method, as the Georgian Government has said.
We should never--we, being the alliance--should never ask
the Georgian people to make a choice between NATO membership or
their territorial integrity. One of the things that first
attracted me to Georgia was the sense of pride the Georgians
have with their country, their history, their culture, their
identity. That goes back a millennia, two millennia. And I
suspect that well into the future, a thousand years from now
when NATO probably doesn't exist for whatever reason--hopefully
it'll be a good reason--the Georgian people will still be there
and they will still have their unique identity and culture and
way of life. So to me, it would not be worth it as a Georgian
to give up my territorial integrity to join NATO.
But thankfully, no one is asking them to do so. And the
proposal, as discussed, is not asking them to choose between
territorial integrity or NATO membership. But it's time that we
start getting creative on how we can get Georgia across the
finish line on this. Otherwise, as Damon pointed out, Russia
thinks that all they have to do to block a country from joining
NATO or the European Union is to invade and partially occupy.
And I think that's unsustainable.
Thank you.
HON. RICHARD HUDSON, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Mr. Hudson. Thank you.
And this time I'll recognize Mr. Hultgren for any questions
you might have.
HON. RANDY HULTGREN, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Mr. Hultgren. Thank you. Thank you all. It is--this is an
important ongoing topic. And especially just recognizing 10
years of occupation here and really seeking and searching for
the answers and solutions of what really would be effective
here.
I do want to follow up--and I apologize as well if there
were things that you discussed before I was able to get over to
the hearing. I apologize for that. But wondered if, just for my
own understanding, what would be the process for us to change
policy for us to be able to accept--you know, for Georgia to be
accepted into NATO, even though this conflict continues. What
practically has to happen and what changes it? And what
timeline potentially could that work in?
Mr. Coffey. Well, it would require U.S. leadership. That's
the bottom line. If the U.S. wants to lead on this, if the
Trump administration wants to lead on this in the same way the
Bush Administration did and spend the same amount of political
capital that Damon described during his tenure, then we could
really move the ball on this, I believe. The situation has
changed since 2008. And I think that over the years there's
been this sort of repetition of the stale argument that Georgia
can't join, Ukraine will never join, because they're partially
occupied. But there are ways around this. And I think it goes
back to leadership.
Mr. Hultgren. Can you flesh that out a little bit more for
me? What do you think the leadership needs to look like? Is it
resolutions? Is it hearings? What specifically do you think
ought that leadership to look like?
Mr. Coffey. Very clear and vocal public statement by the
President of the United States and members of his Cabinet that
they are going to pursue NATO's enlargement agenda with great
rigor. And was already said earlier in this hearing, NATO's
enlargement brings stability and prosperity, and then economic
development and economic prosperity to regions of Europe that
otherwise would not enjoy these things. And making the case not
only to the American public, but to our European allies who are
hesitant and to the European publics on why NATO is relevant
today, why it's a good thing that it adds new members when they
meet the criteria, and how we cannot allow a third party--in
this case, Russia--to essentially block the Euro-Atlantic
integration of certain European countries.
Mr. Hultgren. That's helpful.
Mr. Wilson. If I could just add a little bit----
Mr. Hultgren. If you would.
Mr. Wilson. It all begins, yes, with political will, but
let me unpack it if I were back in my old job as a diplomat. To
operationalize that political will, we--I would--we would want
to see the United States lead an effort to get a tasking to
come out of the North Atlantic Council to reexamine the open-
door policy, the enlargement strategy, so that there is a
conceptual policy reexamination of how we do enlargement.
Through that study, the United States could help shape that so
that it comes out that it removes the sense, the requirement
that territorial disputes by definition have to always be
resolved in advance of enlargement, and saying these egregious
cases, coupling that with a non-first use of force, that there
will be--the aspirant pledges not to use force first to resolve
these disputes. And you can see a recrafting almost adapting
the NATO study of enlargement from a peaceful post-cold war
period to now, a period of geopolitical competition, to make it
more relevant to today's security environment.
I'd say second, then have the North Atlantic Council
reexamine the process. When I was in government we created a
membership action plan to help countries prepare. There's no
reason it has to be part of that process. And I think the NAC
should recognize that Georgia has the tools necessary. It
doesn't need to wave a red flag before those that oppose
membership by requiring MAP as a next step, which is now a
diplomatic way of putting obstacles, barriers, and prolonging
the path. But then it does come back, once you've done the
homework, cleared out the underbrush, updated a policy, removed
the obstacles on paper--it still really does come down to a
political decision and a political will that will require our
allies to have confidence that the United States is leading on
this, just like Greece and Turkey.
The other allies didn't have the capacity to think that
they could play a real role with Greece and Turkey coming in.
They had to be assured that the United States was serious. In
fact, President Truman stepped forward bilaterally first. And
with such a decisive bilateral step forward, the allies were
willing to see the United States was serious, we'll come along
and make this a NATO decision. So it will--there is some
bureaucratic diplomatic process to unfold, which I would do
that homework to remove the excuses. But it will come back to
political will and American determination.
Mr. Coffey. If I may just quickly add to that--if you start
to see things changing with the opinions and the attitudes of
the administration on this issue--not to say that it hasn't
been good on Georgia. I mean, the U.S.-Georgian relationship
has thrived under the Trump administration, you could argue,
then you will see other European countries start to follow
suit. And the important thing that Damon just said about how
Truman led on that bilateral relationship with Turkey and
Greece at the time is important today because any future
membership of Georgia into NATO will be built on the foundation
of a strong U.S.-Georgia bilateral relationship. And I think
that's very important, that we don't lose that in the weeds--
that importance of that bilateral relationship.
Mr. Hultgren. Can I add on just real quickly, of what you
would all suggest? Certainly I think the step for NATO is
important and something I would support, and I think many of us
would, but also looking at OSCE and EU and how does this all
fit together, again, to address this ongoing occupation of
Georgia? Which is the best structure or grouping of structures,
do you think, to potentially push back on that? Any thoughts?
Mr. Wilson. I guess the configuration of this is that we
haven't made it uncomfortable for Russia to be occupying
territory. The status quo is actually pretty easy for them. And
so I think I'm arguing is that if we don't actually change our
policies, change our attitudes, we have to create a pain
threshold for occupation. Right now, we've incentivized
Russians troops to stay because they think we've basically come
to a stalemate. And, you know, they're comfortable with that.
We have to change what we're doing through NATO--I would argue
also EU would have to follow. But I would think it would only
follow. And then using the OSCE in a more assertive way, where
the Russians have a voice, so it's difficult. But we haven't
created pain points for the Russians through their occupation
right now. And how do we use all of our instruments of power--
diplomatic and otherwise--to create costs on the Russian
occupation--be they financial, be they political, and in some
cases be they security commitment side of this?
It does have a prerequisite that the allies have no doubt
about America's commitment to NATO. I think that's a
prerequisite to get all this right. And that's why I think the
Congress's voice on NATO this past week is really important.
Some of the rhetoric has caused questions. But I think that has
to be clear with our allies, they understand American
commitment to NATO first before they'd be ready to go down a
path of something that if there weren't political will would be
seen as risky. If there's a decisive attitude on the part of
the Americans, it reduces risk and actually provides a sense of
predictability and stability.
Mr. Hultgren. OK. Can I ask one more question, or no? Is
that all right?
Just quickly, Ambassador, maybe I'll address this to you.
And it really is in regards to some of the violations of Moscow
with the terms of the August 2008 cease-fire agreement, denying
humanitarian access to occupied areas. I wonder if you could
just briefly talk about how and when Moscow is hindering
humanitarian aid delivery and the work of international human
rights monitors. And specifically in that situation, what can
we do to make sure that aid, and these entities can get in to
deliver that aid?
Amb. Bakradze. Thank you very much. If I may, very briefly,
to respond to the previous question, and to say that Georgia is
as ready as any country can be to become a member of NATO. This
is important, because Georgia is already an enhanced
opportunity partner, Georgia is an aspirant country, Georgia is
spending 2 percent on defense spending, 20 percent of which are
on acquisitions. And is a willing and able partner to
contribute to the international security, as we have
demonstrated so far and as we have been standing together with
allies with the largest per capita contribution.
And I believe that with this administration we see a very
strong appreciation of that dedication by the Georgian people.
We see a forward-leaning position of the State Department and
the White House for the preparation of the Brussels summit. And
I would say that this is the first week after the Brussels
summit, which means this is the first week of the coming 2
years to prepare for the next summit. And we'll be working very
closely with the administration, with Congress, with
organizations like Atlantic Council, Heritage Foundation, to
build a strong case for Georgia's membership, that I believe
there is.
With regards to the situation in the occupied regions,
Russia has been violating the many norms of the Helsinki Final
Act, but also its own commitments taken during 2008 cease-fire
agreement. If I may just underline that OSCE is a member of the
Georgia international discussions. And we believe there is a
potential to reach progress on the core items, like non-use of
force commitment by the Russian Federation, like implementation
of the principles and establishment of international security
arrangements on the ground--something that was also part of the
six-point cease-fire agreement. And the dignified return of
IDPs to their homes.
Implementation of cease-fire agreement by the Russian
Federation with including the withdrawal of forces to the pre-
war position. This was also the commitment taken by the Russian
Federation that it has unfortunately not fulfilled. I think
Geneva international discussions, the very strong presence of
the OSCE, the participation of the United States and European
Union, our partners, will be important to find the ground to
advance in this process of peaceful conflict resolution.
Mr. Hultgren. Thank you all so much.
Chairman, thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you.
And this time I'll recognize the gentlelady from Texas, Ms.
Jackson Lee, for any questions you might have.
HON. SHEILA JACKSON LEE, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON SECURITY
AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And let
me thank the chairman and ranking members of our United States
Commission on Security and Cooperation and the U.S. Helsinki
Commission. Let me thank the witnesses as well. And thank you
for your service.
I think this is probably a more important hearing than we
might have expected in the context of which we are here today.
I just left a Judiciary Committee hearing and serve on Homeland
Security. And we will be meeting this week as well. So,
Ambassador, let me thank you for your presence here. And let me
join in acknowledging that you live in a challenging
neighborhood. And the very fact that Georgia has committed to a
non-aggressive posture as it relates to disputed territories
speaks volumes for what I believe is your commitment to
democracy. Tell me, how dangerous is your neighborhood, Mr.
Ambassador?
Amb. Bakradze. It's as dangerous as you can get. But
despite that, I thank you for the recognition----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me particularly focus--Mr. Ambassador,
let me focus on how dangerous your neighborhood is. How
dangerous is your neighborhood with Russia being one of your
neighbors in particular? Let me just focus on that
relationship.
Amb. Bakradze. Thank you very much. Thank you for
recognizing that despite the difficult neighborhood, despite
the 20 percent of Georgian regions being occupied, Georgia is a
very committed partner of the United States, of the European
Union. Georgia has proved that a small nation can be a strong
contributor to the regional security that we are, can be a
model country for the democratic transformation as we are. And
reliable and loyal ally for the United States that we are.
It is difficult. And with the support of the United States,
of our European friends, we have managed to live in the very
difficult neighborhood, being subject of the different forms--
starting from invasion, from cyberattacks, propaganda that
takes place----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Coming from where, sir?
Amb. Bakradze. From the region that is--and from the
country that is subject to the Russian invasion. After the
collapse of Soviet Union in the beginning of 1990s, the Russia-
fueled separatist movement started to take place in Georgia,
that has caused different processes including the
passportization of people living in the occupied regions in the
end of 1990s, including the energy shutdowns, including the
blockades, including the cyberwarfare and informational
propaganda. So throughout these years, we have maintained a
very strong support to Georgia's choice of being the part of
the Europe, being a part of the organizations that believe in
the liberties and democratic development.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Specifically, if I might----
Amb. Bakradze. European Union and NATO.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you. Specifically, if I might, how
does Russia exert malign influence today in Georgian politics
and society?
Amb. Bakradze. The Russian Federation on weekly basis, we
face the building of razor-wire fences inside Georgia's
territory. The length of the artificial barriers, which
includes the razor-wire fences, are 52 kilometers on the
occupation line with Tskhinvali region, which is 49 kilometers
at the occupation line with Abkhazia. The Abkhazia region,
Russian Federation and the--[inaudible]--from the occupation
regime takes place on weekly basis. The murders that I've
described previously have taken place on numerous times. And
this engagement, these efforts by the Russian Federation, of
course, disrupt Georgia, disrupt its internal political
stability.
Despite that, we have managed to create enough stability in
Georgia to manage and during the past 5 years advance on
Georgia's European integration process, signed association
agreement, free trade agreement, started visa-free travel with
the European Union, advance on the NATO membership. And as
Damon Wilson mentioned, Georgia already has all practical
tools. And this is recognized by the NATO. And probably Georgia
doesn't need any additional tools to prepare for the membership
and to advance our bilateral relationship with the United
States, which is our strategic partner, and which we believe in
time and gradually will become our strategic ally.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, let me be very clear as I pose one
or two more questions. You are obviously in the posture of
having the building blocks and the indices and the check marks
that it takes to get into NATO membership. Is that your
statement here today, Ambassador, that you have made all of the
steps toward the requirements for NATO membership?
Amb. Bakradze. Yes, we have.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And you continue to be a democratic
nation.
Amb. Bakradze. Yes, we are.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And what you relayed to me that is on the
record now is the intrusions and the undermining of your
sovereign nation.
Amb. Bakradze. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And you've indicated that the perpetrator
of that is Russia.
Amb. Bakradze. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Is that under the present leadership of
President Putin?
Amb. Bakradze. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me also raise the point of the
creative thinking that I heard as I walked in about creating a
carve out or an exception for nations that have territorial
disputes and having NATO in its effort to be fair to draw in
those who desire to be part of the European network and NATO to
look at that. And is that, Mr. Ambassador, what you would hope
that you could be considered with the principles that you have,
but recognizing that the dispute has not been generated by
Georgia, or at least it is not something that's going to be
readily resolved, but you are ready to be in NATO? Is that the
point you're making?
Amb. Bakradze. Dispute has never been initiated by Georgia.
And Georgia's NATO integration and membership is not directed
against any other country.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me ask you, Mr. Wilson--and let me
thank you for your work. And you worked on--I believe, for my
fellow Texan. I think you might have worked for Mr. President
George W. Bush. And certainly we know the secretary of state at
that moment. And they certainly were strong supporters of NATO.
What do you surmise is the impact of the press conference
on yesterday?
Mr. Wilson. To be frank, the press conference yesterday is
a challenge to, I think, what is important in this region. The
Russians have assaulted Georgia in many ways--from an invasion,
through hybrid tactics, through intervention in their politics,
their media, fueling stories against the United States. The
Russians are able to succeed if there is a sense that the
United States is ambivalent, not deeply engaged, and that the
European partners are not with us there. And so coming out of
this NATO summit, coming out of our meetings with the European
Union, these things have consequences for the small nations
around who depend on a sense of unity out of the Western
nations--the United States with its allies and the
transatlantic community--because it's a united approach in a
country like Georgia. That's where we're able to push back on
this malign Russian influence.
It's not clear to me that there was any specific
conversation about these issues. I don't know the details. But
I do think it's important that Russian occupation in Georgia,
certainly its actions in Ukraine, be a constant issue that we
raise with them. Again, President Putin has to feel that there
is a cost for his behavior against his nations. And I think
we've got to do as much as possible--whether it's raising these
in private meetings or having policies that actually raise the
physical financial security costs of their occupation, that
that needs to be part of our quiver.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you think--what are Georgia's prospects
for membership in NATO, from your perspective? And are we doing
enough as the United States? As much as the Ambassador's been
very gracious, what can we do as a strong supporter of NATO?
Mr. Wilson. I think we've had two good things that help in
this equation. I think it's been remarkable the strength of the
voices coming out of the U.S. Congress that have been
consistent in a bipartisan fashion in support of Georgia. And I
think that sends important signals to our allies. And so thank
all of you for being part of that. Second, we really have
advanced and developed a security and defense relationship with
Georgia that's quite significant. We used to be quite nervous
about supporting Georgia's territorial defense. The United
States is now providing the kind of lethal defensive weapons
Georgia needs to make clear that it can actually help protect
its own. I think those are two good steps.
I think we do need to take a step further than that. I
think we have to help the allies imagine how we actually
deliver on the promise of the Bucharest summit that they will
be allies one day. Right now, essentially, we're stuck because
everybody assumes: Russian occupation, we can't advance. We
have to change that paradigm to understand that it is only with
enlargement to Georgia that we provide a network of stability
and predictability in this region. It is our ambivalence or
uncertainty, unwillingness to do this which will only tempt
Russia to play games and actually is a recipe for conflict.
And I think Americans have to lead that conceptual
evolution so that it becomes actually policy evolution. We're
not there yet, and I think that's what I'd like to see the
United States more on.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me just conclude and just say thank
you. I think the Congress should go on record as a strong
supporter of NATO, and strongly encouraging the admission of
Georgia. And I know Ukraine is likewise in the same posture.
And I do think that we should speak long, eloquently, and
definitively against the inappropriate and disgraceful
presentation yesterday. We are for NATO. On our own personal
note, we understand the invasion in our own elections. And we
should say that. And anyone who represents us internationally
should say that as well.
But I believe that what Russia says is that we provoke them
by admitting a nation like Georgia. And I would say that
Georgia is peaceful, NATO is peaceful--except for its provision
to protect. And we should continue to do the North American and
European peaceful relations with all the countries that want
peace in this world.
I yield back.
Mr. Hudson. Thank the gentlelady.
At this point, I'll recognize the senator for Colorado, Mr.
Cory Gardner.
HON. CORY GARDNER, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Mr. Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much.
And I would note, with some agitation, that my colleague in the
House has reached the chairmanship before I ever will, so--
[laughter]--it's great to see you here. To both of you here,
thank you.
Ambassador, it was great to see you in the office a couple
of weeks ago with the speaker. I thank you very much for the
visit. The speaker of the Georgian Parliament was there. And
I'm grateful for the opportunity to engage in a conversation
that is incredibly important. I'm going to ask a question,
Ambassador. I don't know that it's appropriate to be directed
to you, but it certainly is to Mr. Coffey and Mr. Wilson.
A couple of months ago I wrote an op-ed in The New York
Times. And it was titled, ``Is Russia Sponsoring Terrorism?''
And the gist of the editorial--the op-ed that I wrote--was
about Russia's activities. Russia has invaded its neighbors,
Georgia and Ukraine. Russia supports the murderous regime of
Bashar al-Assad and our enemies in Afghanistan. Russia is
engaged in information warfare against the United States and
our allies around the globe. Russia has meddled in the U.S.
elections and attempted interference in other elections around
the globe. Russia has now carried out a nerve agent attack on
allied soil.
Just considering such a toxic label for Russia ought to be
cause enough for Vladimir Putin. Should the United States--
should the U.S. Congress pass legislation asking the State
Department to consider whether we should add Russia to the
state sponsor of terror list, Mr. Coffey?
Mr. Coffey. Well, I think it's beyond a shadow of a doubt
that Russia enables terrorism and terrorist states to act. I
mean, the diplomatic top cover it gives Iran on the
international stage has huge implications for U.S. interests in
the Middle East and the broader region. It's also puzzling from
a historical point of view, when you look at the fraught
relationship that imperial Russia had with the Persian empire,
where for centuries these two entities were often at
competition if not conflict with one another, that today
Vladimir Putin would do Tehran's bidding for it on the
international stage. I'm not quite sure, at the end of the day,
what Moscow thinks it's going to get out of it.
But, yes, I mean--the downing of MH17, which happened 4
years ago today, 298 innocent civilians killed over the skies
of eastern Ukraine, just a couple of weeks ago the British
citizen killed in Salisbury--the list goes on and on. And we
should not be fooled into thinking the President Putin is going
to be part of the solution. He likes to inject himself into
these problems so that he then becomes part of the solution.
And Syria is a great example of that. But I could tell you, the
U.S. and Russia have the same common goals in Syria in the same
way that a robber and a customer have the same common goals in
a bank. And we should go into any engagement, any meeting, any
summit with Vladimir Putin with our eyes wide open, because
nothing--since 1999, when he first came to power--indicates
that he can be a trustworthy partner for the United States.
Mr. Gardner. Thank you. Mr. Wilson. The legislation that
I've introduced would require the State Department to make such
a determination in 90 days. Should Congress take up that
legislation and pass legislation to require the State
Department to consider naming Russia a state sponsor of terror?
Mr. Wilson. I think it's a very useful step for two
factors. One, it helps us establish the sense that we're going
to speak truth, we're going to speak clearly about the threat
we face, a country that's been involved in the downing of MH17
and the Skripal attacks. At the Atlantic Council we've hosted
nearly every dissident that has been poisoned and survived on
our stage. And we should recognize that and speak clearly about
the threat that we face. And so I think, one, congressional
discussion of this is a way for the United States to project
clearly the understanding of the threat and challenge that we
face from a KGB agent who's managing Russia out of the Kremlin
right now.
Second, I also think it creates the right kind of pressure
on the administration and the types of works that we need to be
taking forward. I think there is always scope, potentially, for
an element if dialog, even with some of our adversaries, under
the right circumstances. But the right circumstances mean that
you come with eyes wide open and you speak clearly at what's
happening. We had a problem with Georgia and Ukraine before, in
which a lot of international officials were afraid to say
Ukraine has been invaded, a simple statement which the American
people can understand. And I think the utility of what you're
pushing here in Congress is plain English about the threat and
challenge that we see, so that it helps us shape more informed
decisions on our policy and our outcomes.
Mr. Gardner. Thank you to all three of you. Ambassador,
thank you. And if you would care to comment?
Amb. Bakradze. Yes. In Georgia's case, what we definitely
see is the Russian Federation being an occupier. And that
Russia has military--fully functioning military bases in
Georgia, 10,000 troops, 3,000 FSB border guards. And that is
why Georgia has no diplomatic relations with the Russian
Federation. So we have the issues that we believe we can start
solving with our citizens residing in the occupied regions. And
as a country which believes in the peaceful resolution of this
process, we believe that we will spare no efforts, together
with our partners, to move to that direction.
Mr. Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Thank you all.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you, Senator.
We've got a few more minutes. If you'll indulge me, I'll
have a few questions for you as well. I appreciate how much
time you've given us today, very important topic. What are
lessons that we can learn from Georgia's experience as a target
of Russian hybrid warfare? And I represent Fort Bragg in North
Carolina, home of special forces and airborne. And those folks
know a little bit about hybrid warfare. But it seems to me,
this has been a textbook example of the use of hybrid warfare
both in Georgia and in Ukraine. What can we learn from those
experiences? What might be Vladimir Putin's next target for a
similar invasion or hybrid warfare operations? And what should
the United States be doing to anticipate and deter that threat?
And I would just open that up to the entire panel.
Mr. Coffey. Great. On the first point about what can be
done to counter hybrid warfare, this is a very challenging
question because, first, no one's--there's not one commonly
accepted definition of hybrid warfare. We all sort of know what
it is but when you ask, well, define it, you get slight
variations. But I would say that there are three things that a
country can do to make itself more insular or protect it
against the hybrid threat. The first one is good governance at
the local and at the national level. If people feel like
they're governed well and governed fairly, then they become
less susceptible to active measures like propaganda and
influence operations.
The second one is economic freedom. If countries enjoy
economic freedom and economic prosperity, and people feel like
that they have options in life and that their kids can have a
better future, they become less susceptible as well. And a
great example of this is Narva, Estonia, where more than 90
percent of the population on the border--in Narva, a city on
the border on Estonia and Russia--are Russian speaking. But
polling has shown that, you know, they do not want a repeat of
Crimea in Narva, because they know their situation's better off
being a part of Estonia.
And a third way to counter hybrid warfare and hybrid
threats is a very respected and well-trained and professional
security force. And I mean intelligence services. I mean law
enforcement at the local level, at the national level. If
people feel like they're treated fairly and they're protected,
then I think they become less susceptible to the hybrid threat.
On your second question, it's always risky as a think tank
analyst to predict the next move. But I could--I don't have to
take a leap from reality to see a situation where Russia
antagonizes or exploits some of the social cleavages in the
Armenian section of Georgia. Or I would keep an eye on
Gagauzia, which is an ethnically Turkic but religious Christian
Orthodox community in southern Moldova that borders southwest
Ukraine, where they have very strong connections to Russia
historically, culturally, and have had a pro-Russian governor
recently elected.
And these are areas that, you know, Putin can tinker around
and meddle with to cause problems for us. And we need to be
aware that it's not just South Ossetia or Abkhazia or Crimea or
Luhansk or Donetsk. There are many places, many options for
Vladimir Putin.
Mr. Wilson. I might just add, as someone who grew up in
Buies Creek, North Carolina, not far from Fort Bragg, it's a
pleasure to be here with you.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you.
Mr. Wilson. A great area. But we have seen Russian hybrid
strategy is asymmetric. So the premise of a hybrid strategy is
that the Russians understand they can't really face us down in
the Baltic States very easily in a traditional hard security
way. They're not going to take us head on. So the premise of
this is they're going to look for soft targets where they can
play to cleavage issues and undermine from within and minimize
their fingerprints. So Luke spoke to many of the elements that
are required to create the resilience of societies. I think one
of the biggest and most important things is a common
understanding of what Russian tactics and strategy is, so that
your population is informed and less vulnerable to that kind of
manipulation, and governments that are actually equipped to
understand and respond to that. It's when our own political
divisions allow--you know, cause complication, having clarity
on the challenge posed from Russia, which becomes a problem.
In Georgia, we've seen--you know, because it's not in NATO,
soft target in that sense, cleavage issues. We've seen them
play out--gay marriage, other things--to try to associate these
controversial social issues as being associated with the West,
to create cleavages, to play on what are, you know, naturally
tumultuous politics in democratic Georgia--which, in many
democracies, how they can exacerbate some of those things. And
so I think that's a particular concern. An awareness that it's
happening, strategies that actually can stand up against it
based on the credibility of the institutions. And this is where
Georgia has some work to do. The confidence in its
institutions, regardless of who's in charge, to be able to
protect the state. And I think there's still work to be done in
that front.
And your last part--I do think we need to pay attention as
we have a series of elections unfolding. You know, Vladimir
Putin wants to win the easy way in his neighborhood. He
doesn't--you know, Ukraine has become a cost for him. So by
being able to undermine these states from within through use of
corruption--I think corruption has become purely a major
national security issue for the United States and our allies--
is going to look to actually play the levers in Ukraine as it
faces major elections coming up. Particularly in Moldova this
fall, where there is a highly competitive Russia-favorable
party that's in play. These become the easier means for him to
actually use his means to exert influence. And I think that's
where we need to be vigilant in helping to expose the
strategies underway, both strategically and tactically, and
helping many of these new democracies withstand that type of
pressure.
Amb. Bakradze. Well, Senator, thank you for the question. I
come from the country which for 70 years lived under the Soviet
Union and therefore sometimes, more often, we recognize the
propaganda when we see it. And therefore, there may be some
stronger and more resilience in Georgia that one might think.
And I think the small country advancing in many directions is a
good demonstration of that.
Let me put what my co-panelists described in Georgia's
perspective, how do we leverage our bilateral relations and
transform it into the opportunity for the confidence and trust
building in the war-torn societies that I think is a very
important one. Presenting alternatives, because our citizens in
the occupied regions are also subject to Russian propaganda
that reminds them of the war period and tries to aggravate the
situation which is already very difficult. So presenting
opportunities, presenting alternatives, sharing the benefits of
the democratic development of the country--that includes the
free health care that we were doing, that includes the visa-
free travel with the European Union, free trade with the
European Union.
And also I want to use this opportunity to express
gratitude for the USAID support that has brought the small and
medium enterprises projects in 41 villages adjacent to the
occupation line, to give the possibility to co-work with the
societies that are divided by the occupation line. Also, with
the new initiative that is peace initiative for the better
future, I believe that educational possibilities for our
citizens in the occupied regions can be a very significant
part, as well as the trade opportunities. And I want to thank
also Millennium Challenge and their efforts in the education
system in Georgia. And I believe that with these opportunities
that we present, we build the trust that are divided. That is
unfortunately--and the confidence that is unfortunately
shattered throughout years.
And I believe that with new opportunities as we advance our
defense and security cooperation, as well as the possibility
for the more stronger trade relationships--including through
the free trade agreement--we believe this will expand the new
alternatives and possibilities to our citizens living on both
sides of the occupation line.
Mr. Hudson. I appreciate that very much. I know we're over
time, but if I could just follow up with--just put a little
more detail on the record here. As we've talked about Russian
propaganda, we've talked about interference through cyber,
there's also been threats to infrastructure, pipelines, major
transit routes--could you maybe give us some examples of what
Russia's doing in Georgia to undermine this critical
infrastructure? And what are they doing with cyber? And maybe
an example of some Russian propaganda that you're seeing?
Amb. Bakradze. Russian cyber was more active during the
2008 invasion, when all the major governmental websites were
targeted. And the Estonians have helped us a lot in overcoming
this challenge.
When it comes to propaganda, it always differs. It differs
not only from country to country, but even within small country
of Georgia it is different from one region to another.
Mr. Hudson. They're very sophisticated on how they----
Amb. Bakradze. Because--yes. Because they capitalize on
fears, disillusionments, frustrations, disappointments of the
societies. And therefore, our strategy is always very tailored.
I, in my previous capacity as a state minister, I used to
coordinate the work of the government on strategic
communication to counter propaganda. The target of the Russian
Federation is not to present alternative of Russia to the West,
but to bring the anti-Western narrative in public and find the
weak points where it should build. So our target was and
maintains to be maintaining a strong support toward Georgia's
European Union and NATO integration process. That, we are
managing to do.
Now, coordinating the work of the government, of the
parliament, of the civil society, of the media organizations,
and only marginal groups that suffer from the Russian influence
cannot counter the very strong stance of the public that
believes in Georgia's European and Euro-Atlantic future. Some
examples you have asked, but I believe that when it comes to
Georgia's European integration, that has been a target of the
Russian propaganda. It always tries to on the one hand show
that Georgia's reforms, that sometimes are not very popular,
but on the way to Georgia's European integration are all in
vain and futile, because it doesn't bring the tangible result.
And therefore, bringing the result is critically important to
counter that argument.
And on the other side, to--as Damon has mentioned also--on
the other side, to show that this integration process is going
against Georgia's traditional values. That, of course, is not
true and has nothing--and no basis to exist in Georgian
society. So our effort is working with all the major
organizations and the institutions, and explaining and helping
them to understand what Russia is doing, to clarifying their
methods, and maintaining a strong support to EU and NATO.
Mr. Hudson. All right. Thank you for that. And with that,
Mr. Chairman, I'll yield the gavel and my time to you, sir.
Mr. Wicker. Well, thank you very much to all of our
witnesses. I think it's been a very productive hearing. And
before we adjourn, let me just say that it's important at this
10-year anniversary of the invasion for the Congress and the
general public to continue to shine the light of day on the
facts and to call international attention to this violation of
international law and the OSCE principles.
And, Mr. Ambassador, I want to congratulate Georgia on the
progress that you're making in the rule of law and independent
judiciary, and all of the things that we look for in countries
that we'd like to join the Western alliance.
We're not going to forget you. We're going to continue
speaking out about this. And we're going to be guided by the
testimony of all three of these outstanding witnesses today.
So, with that, unless there's anything further, we'll adjourn
this hearing with the thanks of the commission.
[Whereupon, at 12:43 p.m., the hearing ended.]
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A P P E N D I X
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Prepared Statements
----------
Prepared Statement of Hon. Roger Wicker, Chairman, Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe
This hearing of the Helsinki Commission will come to order.
Good morning and welcome to this hearing on ``Russia's
Occupation of Georgia and the Erosion of the International
Order.''
As you know, the Helsinki Commission monitors the
compliance of OSCE participating States to the 1975 Helsinki
Final Act. In recent years, we have been compelled to pay
particular attention to Russia's clear, gross, and uncorrected
violations of all ten principles of the OSCE's founding
document.
In August 2008, Russian armed forces invaded Georgia in
direct violation of the territorial integrity and political
independence of states. This initial invasion has led to,
sadly, ten years of occupation, affecting a fifth of Georgia's
sovereign territory and causing incalculable political,
economic, and humanitarian costs.
The invasion of Georgia demonstrated that Vladimir Putin is
ready and willing to use his military and intelligence services
to redraw international borders and meddle in the internal
affairs of a neighboring state. Moreover, Putin clearly sought
to sabotage Georgia's progress toward membership in NATO,
contravening the principle that sovereign states have the right
to freely join security alliances of their choosing.
The response to the Kremlin's aggression against Georgia
was not enough to deter Putin from trying his hand again in
Ukraine in 2014. In fact, Georgia and Ukraine are only the two
most egregious examples of Russian challenges to the integrity
of our borders, our alliances, and our institutions over the
past decade.
The Helsinki Commission is holding this hearing to make
sure the American people and the international community do not
lose sight of the continued illegal occupation of Georgia--as
well as its costs and implications. The experts before us will
help assess if the United States is doing everything possible
to restore Georgia's territorial integrity and reverse Putin's
assault on the borders of a neighboring state and on the
international order.
We also aim to ensure Georgia's contributions to our common
security are recognized and that we continue to help it advance
along its path to Euro-Atlantic integration and full NATO
membership.
Under my chairmanship, Ranking Member Cardin and I have
worked across the aisle to demonstrate the firm, bipartisan
resolve of the United States Congress to restore Georgia's
territorial integrity and see the alliance make good on its
promise of membership.
To that end, in March of last year, we introduced Senate
Resolution 106 condemning Russia's continuing occupation and
urging increased bilateral cooperation between the U.S. and
Georgia.
More recently, ahead of last week's NATO summit, Senator
Cardin and I--along with Commissioners Tillis and Shaheen--
introduced Senate Resolution 557, underscoring the strategic
importance of NATO to the collective security of the United
States and the entire transatlantic region. This resolution
explicitly ``encourages all NATO member states to clearly
commit to further enlargement of the alliance, including
extending invitations to any aspirant country which has met the
conditions required to join NATO.'' I am especially looking
forward to hearing how our panelists assess the outcomes of the
NATO Summit.
Ladies and gentlemen, we will hear testimony this morning
from a distinguished panel who will provide valuable
perspectives on the current state of the conflict in Georgia,
prospects for its resolution, and recommendations for U.S.
policy.
I am particularly pleased to welcome Georgia's Ambassador
David Bakradze to testify before us this morning. In addition
to his firsthand experience managing Georgia's strategic
bilateral relationship with the United States, Ambassador
Bakradze has worked at senior levels of Georgia's government to
deepen Tbilisi's Euro-Atlantic partnerships. Prior to his
appointment to Washington in 2016, Ambassador Bakradze served
as the State Minister of Georgia for European and Euro-Atlantic
Integration.
Next, we will hear from Damon Wilson, Executive Vice
President of the Atlantic Council. Mr. Wilson's areas of
expertise include NATO, transatlantic relations, Central and
Eastern Europe, and national security issues. At the time of
Russia's invasion of Georgia, Mr. Wilson was serving as special
assistant to President George W. Bush and senior director for
European Affairs at the National Security Council. In that
capacity, he played a leading role at a critical time in
managing interagency policy on NATO, the European Union,
Georgia, Ukraine, the Balkans, Eurasian energy security, and
Turkey.
Finally, we will hear from Luke Coffey, Director of the
Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at the Heritage
Foundation. Mr. Coffey was named to his post in December 2015
and is responsible for directing policy research for the Middle
East, Africa, Russia and the former Soviet Union, the Western
Hemisphere, and the Arctic region. Before joining Heritage in
2012, he served at the UK Ministry of Defence as senior special
adviser to the British Defence Secretary, helping shape British
defense policy vis-a-vis transatlantic security, NATO, the
European Union, and Afghanistan.
Thank you all for being with us this morning. Ambassador
Bakradze, you may proceed with your opening statement.
Prepared Statement of Hon. Christopher H. Smith, Co-Chairman,
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am grateful to Chairman Wicker for holding this hearing
because it is critical that we remember what happened in
Georgia ten years ago and how little has changed since.
Mr. Chairman, I speak from some experience. Ten years ago--
in the immediate aftermath of Russia's invasion of Georgia--I
traveled to Tbilisi because the young daughters of two of my
constituents were trapped in the conflict zone, frightened, and
unable to return home. In terrifying fashion, the Kremlin's
violent land grab had cut short the young girls' summer trip to
visit their grandparents.
On the ground, I worked with US Ambassador John Tefft,
French Ambassador Eric Fournier, the Red Cross, and others to
secure the girls' safe evacuation. Seven-year-old Ashley and
three-year-old Sophia were soon reunited with their parents in
Howell, New Jersey. Working with the Red Cross in Georgia in
the weeks after my trip, we secured the relocation and
evacuation of at least three other American children from areas
ravaged by Russia's aggression.
The experience of these children speaks to the human
insecurity that Vladimir Putin's Russia has inflicted on
countless families in the past decade, from Tskhinvali/South
Ossetia, to Sevastopol, to Salisbury.
Russia's actions have, again and again, laid bare the costs
of war: lost lives, separated families, psychological trauma,
and emotional pain. The disastrous economic effects of war only
compound these humanitarian and social scars.
It is for these reasons that the use of force by states is
strictly circumscribed in international charters, such as the
Helsinki Final Act, which form the cornerstone of our present
day international order. Russia continues to violate that order
on a continuing basis.
A decade after its illegal invasion of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia, Russia:
Lcontinues to occupy a fifth of Georgia's
sovereign territory;
Lremains in violation of key provisions of the
2008 ceasefire agreement, including the withdrawal of Russian
forces and humanitarian access to the conflict area; and
Lenforces an internal administrative boundary line
within Georgia that keeps tens of thousands of internally
displaced Georgians from returning home.
Make no mistake: Vladimir Putin's Russia has spent the last
ten years in flagrant violation of all ten principles of the
Helsinki Final Act and its behavior has only gotten worse.
In Georgia, the Kremlin has gone from recognizing the so-
called ``independence'' of South Ossetia and Abkhazia to
advancing their de facto annexation.
Meanwhile, de facto authorities have intensified
restrictions on Georgian language instruction in schools,
escalating their Russification campaign to displace Georgian
culture from the occupied territories entirely.
More worryingly still, Vladimir Putin has since expanded
his use of hybrid warfare, foreign occupation, and violent
repression to redraw international borders, disrupt Western
alliances, and interfere in democratic processes.
Clearly we have not done enough to deter Russian
aggression. Doing more means strengthening our allies and
alliances. I applaud the Trump Administration's decision in
November to provide anti-tank weaponry to Georgia, just as I
have supported the Administration's decision to do so in
Ukraine.
But the most visible sign of U.S. solidarity would be to
extend an invitation to NATO. Georgia has spent the ten years
since the 2008 Bucharest Summit in limbo regarding its
membership in the alliance. I look forward to hearing from our
witnesses today how they view the results of the just-concluded
NATO Summit on this point.
Clearly, Congress, and this Commission, have demonstrated
time and again that they stand with Georgia in the face of this
Russian occupation and the human tragedy it continues to
inflict on an innocent population. For example, I was proud in
2016 to co-sponsor House resolution 660 expressing support for
Georgia's territorial integrity, which passed in an
overwhelming 410-6 vote.
We look to today's witnesses to help us understand what
more we can and should be done to help alleviate the suffering,
bring the Russian occupation to an end, and restore Georgia's
territorial integrity.
Prepared Statement of Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, Ranking Member,
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Thank you, Chairman Wicker. Thank you for holding this
hearing on Russia's continuing violation of the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Georgia and for your leadership of the
Helsinki Commission.
As Chairman Wicker mentioned, the goals of restoring
Georgia's territorial integrity and seeing its full integration
into NATO have been matters of robust bipartisan agreement on
the Helsinki Commission and in the United States Congress more
broadly.
As Ranking Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
last year I commissioned a Minority Staff report detailing two
decades of Vladimir Putin's assault on democratic institutions,
universal values, and the rule of law across Europe and inside
Russia. The report titled ``Putin's Asymmetrical Assault on
Democracy in Russia and Europe: Implications for U.S. National
Security'' was released in January and draws critical lessons
from case studies of Russian aggression. The Kremlin's 2008
invasion of Georgia was a watershed in this regard, revealing
how the Russian Federation under Putin's influence harbors
utter contempt for international borders and the independence
of states when these principles prove inconvenient.
The Georgia section of the Committee's staff report draws
three important ``lessons learned'' from the 2008 invasion and
subsequent occupation:
LFirst: Hybrid War is Here to Stay. Russia honed
its multi-pronged conventional and cyber warfare strategy in
its assault on Georgia. This is the same playbook we saw Putin
use in his occupation and attempted annexation of parts of
Ukraine in 2014. The United States must learn to anticipate,
repel, and punish this kind of activity given Russia's growing
foothold in Syria and perennial threat to Western allies in
Europe, particularly the Baltics.
LSecond: The Asymmetric Assault is Flexible.
Russia's occupation is not static. To this day, Putin's Kremlin
deploys disinformation campaigns, pseudo NGOs, and political
interference to wield influence over Georgian domestic affairs.
We must remain vigilant to defend our institutions and those of
our allies.
LFinally: Western Commitment is Key. U.S. and EU
support have helped Georgia counteract Russia's military
aggression and political interference but more needs to be
done. Of chief importance is the need for NATO to honor its
commitment at the 2008 Bucharest Summit to facilitate Georgia's
full membership in the alliance. This serves not just Georgia's
interest, but U.S. national security and the collective
security of the entire European community.
I welcome our witnesses' comments on these ``lessons
learned'' from our report. In particular, I would appreciate
your recommendations for additional forms of U.S. and allied
support that would help Georgia defend its territory and
democratic institutions.
As the author of the Magnitsky Act, I was also interested
to learn of Georgia's recent adoption of a Magnitsky-inspired
sanctions bill that seeks to penalize Ossetian and Abkhaz human
rights violators. I would like to the see the United States
review the possibility of applying U.S. visa bans on some of
the perpetrators identified under Georgia's Otkhozoria-
Tatunashvili Act as a sign of solidarity.
I thank our witnesses for being with us today, and
particularly Georgian Ambassador David Bakradze for his
distinguished service to his country.
Prepared Statement of Ambassador David Bakradze
Introduction
Chairman Wicker, Co-Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Cardin,
Ranking Member Hastings, and distinguished Commissioners, thank
you for the opportunity to testify at this hearing.
Today we are speaking about violations of the OSCE
principles and commitments by the Russian Federation in the
illegally occupied regions of Georgia.
And I feel that this is a quite appropriate topic of
discussion not only because ten years have passed since the
Russia-Georgia war, when the Russian Federation invaded my
country and occupied two Georgian regions of Abkhazia and
Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, but also because Russia
continues its aggressive policy aimed at redrawing the borders
and retaining the so-called zones of influence.
As Chairman Wicker has very rightly pointed out, this
undermines the security and peace in Europe and creates a very
dangerous environment that if not appropriately countered may
lead to developments in the region that will be hard to
reverse.
In my remarks today I will brief you about the situation in
the Georgian regions illegally occupied by the Russian
Federation. I would also like to draw your attention to the
humanitarian, social, and other costs that Russian occupation
has imposed on people residing in the occupied and adjacent
areas. And I will conclude my remarks highlighting the U.S.
role in reinforcing Georgia's efforts for preserving
sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as successful
reconciliation and confidence-building.
Main Points
It should be mentioned from the outset that since 2008 the
Russian Federation is in breach of full spectrum of principles
of the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe, such as:
Lsovereignty and territorial integrity;
inviolability of frontiers;
Lrefraining from the threat or use of force;
Lrefraining from making each other's territory the
object of military occupation;
Lrefraining from any demand for, or act of,
seizure and usurpation of territory of another State;
Lthe human rights and fundamental freedoms, and
etc.
Russia's Illegal Military Presence
Through these ten years, the Russian Federation has
intensified its illegal steps towards factual annexation of
Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region/South
Ossetia. Moscow has further continued the implementation of so-
called ``integration treaties'', absorbing Georgia's occupied
regions into Russia's military, political, economic and social
systems.
In gross violations of all the international obligations,
the Russian Federation reinforces its illegal military presence
in the occupied regions of Georgia having illegally stationed
fully operational military bases [with up to 10,000 militaries
and 3,000 FSB personnel and sophisticated offensive weaponry],
constantly conducting military drills [as part of the exercises
of its Southern Military District] and violating Georgian
airspace with its UAVs and military helicopters.
At the same time, Russian Federation intensifies the
installation of barbed wire fences and other kinds of
artificial barriers along the occupation line. The total length
of the barriers has reached 49 km along the occupation line in
Abkhazia region and 52 km along the occupation line in
Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia.
Against this background, the EU Monitoring Mission deployed
in Georgia on the basis of the Ceasefire Agreement is not
allowed by the Russian Federation to enter the occupied Regions
to fully implement its mandate throughout the whole territory
of Georgia.
Human Rights Violations
The Human Rights situation remains alarming, with
fundamental rights of the local population infringed on a daily
basis. Against the backdrop of intensified ethnic
discrimination, restrictions on free movement, illegal
detentions and kidnappings, deprivation of property rights,
prohibition of education in native language and other
ethnically based violations, the local population is deprived
of minimal safeguards for their lives. This is particularly
alarming given that international human rights mechanisms are
not allowed to these regions of Georgia. As a result of several
waves of ethnic cleansing since close to half a million people
have been expelled from their homes to become IDPs and
refugees. And they are deprived of their right to return to
their homes in safety and dignity. Worth to note that since the
August 2008 war 53 Georgian villages and 35.000 houses have
been burned and ruined.
Murder of ethnic Georgians by the representatives of the
occupation regimes has become a dangerous trend. We all
remember the killings of David Basharuli, Giga Otkhozoria and
Archil Tatunashvili. In all these cases, despite cooperation by
the government of Georgia in the relevant formats, the
questions still remain unanswered and the perpetrators
unpunished. This makes crystal clear that the Russian
occupation regimes in Sokhumi and Tskhinvali not only
strengthen the sense of impunity, but also further encourage
ethnically targeted violence and crime against the Georgian
population.
In that regard on the basis of the Resolution of the
Parliament of Georgia the ``Otkhozoria-Tatunashvili List'' was
adopted that includes the persons accused and convicted of
gross human rights violations in the occupied regions. Georgian
Government seeks from its partners the imposition of sanctions
on persons included in the List. To be very clear, the aim of
this List is to end impunity and prevent further aggravation of
the human rights situation in Georgia's occupied territories
that represent ``black holes,'' an inaccessible place for
international human rights watchdogs and humanitarian
organizations.
Georgia's Peaceful Conflict Resolution Policy
With these provocative steps the Russian federation tries
to make the international community cope with its version of
``new realities'' and undermine the efforts of Georgia and its
international partners for peaceful conflict resolution.
Nevertheless, throughout these ten years since the 2008
Russia-Georgia war and occupation by the Russian Federation of
two Georgian regions, the Government of Georgia has been
pursuing peaceful conflict resolution policy unwaveringly:
LWe remain in full compliance with the EU mediated
12 August 2008 Ceasefire Agreement;
LWe have reconfirmed our adherence to the non-use
of force principle at various levels numerously and have
implemented this commitment, still awaiting for the reciprocity
from the Russian Federation;
LWe pursue the policy of dialogue with the Russian
Federation aimed at de-escalation of tensions;
LWe remain committed to result-oriented engagement
in the Geneva International Discussions and do our utmost to
solve security and humanitarian problems of conflict-affected
population;
LReconciliation and engagement policy remains our
priority and we have even reinvigorated our efforts by
presenting new opportunities through the new peace initiative
``A Step to a Better Future''. These proposals are aimed at
improving the humanitarian, social, and economic conditions of
conflict-affected population, and fostering people-to-people
contacts and confidence building between the communities
divided by war and occupation lines.
At the same time let me underline here that international
support is decisive in order to succeed in the peaceful
conflict resolution process. We need to be determined and
consistent to effectively cope with the destructive policy of
the Russian Federation. In this respect we believe that the
further work needs to be done in the following directions:
LWe need to reinvigorate our efforts both within
the GID in order to reach progress on the core items like non-
use of force commitment and implementation of this principle,
the establishment of international security arrangements on the
ground, and the return of IDPs and refugees, and outside this
format as well.
LImplementation of the Ceasefire agreement by the
Russian Federation, including withdrawal of its forces to the
pre-war positions and creation of the international security
mechanisms on the ground is essential to ensure lasting peace
and security, as well as reconciliation of divided societies.
Elaboration of concrete implementing steps would help advance
this process.
LWe need to urge the Russian Federation as a power
exercising effective control in the occupied regions to cease
the human rights violations, ensure the implementation of the
right of the IDPs and refugees to return to their homes in
safety and dignity and allow international human rights
monitors to address and prevent further alarming developments
in the occupied regions.
LIn that regard I should also underline that
imposing sanctions on the individuals included in
the``Otkhozoria-Tatunashvili List'' by the international
society would be an important step preventing the grave human
rights violations in the occupied territories where the
Government of Georgia is deprived of the possibility to
exercise its legitimate jurisdiction.
LWe need to further intensify our efforts in order
to ensure the unimpeded access of the EU Monitoring Mission as
well as international human rights monitors and humanitarian
organizations to the occupied regions of Georgia.
The U.S. Role and Conclusion
While talking on the peaceful conflict resolution in
Georgia, I should emphasize that the United States has a
particular role in this process as a strategic partner to
Georgia and a participant of the Geneva International
Discussions. We greatly value the U.S.-Georgia strategic
partnership and the contribution of the U.S. peace and
stability in Georgia. The impact of the U.S. assistance is
significant on the ground.
On a political level, U.S. support has been extremely
important in reinforcing Georgia's sovereignty and territorial
integrity. The voice of the U.S. Congress has been always vocal
on these very important to Georgia matters and we have been
truly enjoying a very strong bipartisan support for years.
In June, bipartisan Georgia Support Act was introduced in
the U.S. Congress by Co-Chairmen of the Georgia Caucus, U.S.
Congressmen Ted Poe (R-TX) and Gerald Connolly (D-VA). We also
greatly appreciate the recent bipartisan resolution authored by
Senators Perdue, Isakson, and Cardin marking the 100th
anniversary of the First Democratic Republic of Georgia.
It is the time that this political support is further
reinvigorated in the concrete work and practical steps in order
to ensure the implementation of Ceasefire Agreement and
comprehensive peaceful settlement in my country, which is a
role model for the South Caucasus and a wider region. We
believe through consistence and hard work we can lay the ground
for lasting peace and security in Georgia. In that regard, I
would like to emphasize the necessity of the peaceful conflict
resolution to be placed high in the international as well as in
the US dialogue with Russia. Strong leadership of the United
States is essential to reach progress in the resolution of the
Russia-Georgia conflict.
We deem it crucial that the United States together with the
international society does not keep a blind eye on Russia's
aggressive actions with regards to the occupied territory of
Georgia and severe security and humanitarian situation on the
ground that this policy entails. Firm stance of the
international society, and particularly the US, is decisive to
send a clear message to Russia that this policy directed
against sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia is not
acceptable.
Let me once again thank the Commission for holding this
hearing.
I will stop here and will gladly take questions afterward.
Prepared Statement of Damon M. Wilson, Executive Vice President,
Atlantic Council
A New Strategy for NATO Enlargement to Ensure Peace in Europe
Chairman Wicker, Co-Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Cardin,
Ranking Member Hastings, and distinguished Commissioners:
On April 3, 2008, at NATO's Bucharest Summit, just over 10
years ago, the consensus among allies on how to build a Europe
whole and free fell apart. I was serving as Senior Director for
European Affairs at the National Security Council at the time,
and had a front row seat for what turned out to be a summit
nearly as unscripted as the one we just witnessed in Brussels.
In Bucharest, NATO leaders failed to agree to offer
Membership Action Plans (MAP) to Georgia and Ukraine to help
them prepare to become allies. Rather, in the wake of
inconclusive diplomacy to reach an agreement, particularly
between Washington and Berlin, Central European leaders stepped
into the breach, to push NATO to agree that Georgia and
Ukraine, ``will become members of NATO.'' Seemingly, leaders
decided that NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine would be a
question of when, not whether.
Yet, today, ten years on from Bucharest and the subsequent
Russian invasions of Georgia and Ukraine, we run the risk of
our rhetoric not keeping pace with reality. We have agreed a
vision, but we do not now have a strategy to get there. As a
consequence, many allies have lost faith in the vision and we
run the risk of accepting an unstable grey zone of insecurity
in Europe's East.
This is in part because Russia under Vladimir Putin has
evolved from embracing the possibility of partnership with the
West to advancing a reality of confrontation with NATO, the
United States, and especially Russia's neighbors.
In the wake of the Bucharest summit, recognizing the
potential vulnerability of Georgia and Ukraine, US diplomacy
went into overdrive. We launched the US-Georgia and US-Ukraine
Charters on Strategic Partnership to bolster bilateral ties.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice led an effort to intensify
the moribund diplomatic talks on Russia's occupied territories
and visited Tbilisi to advance diplomacy and caution against
conflict. Yet Russia continued to pursue a dual policy of
``creeping annexation''--that is, taking steps that tightened
its grip on the territories of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali
region of South Ossetia--even as it obfuscated and undermined
the diplomatic tracks intended to seek compromise and
resolution.
We felt the full consequences in August 2008 as Russian
forces attacked and then invaded Georgia, coming within mere
miles of Tbilisi.
The Bucharest Summit and this subsequent invasion ended our
strategy of advancing a Europe whole and free. This vision had
proven wildly successful ever since President George W. Bush's
1989 address in Mainz, Germany laying out this concept. Our
success rested on three mutually-reinforcing pillars:
LBuilding a strategic partnership with Russia,
first through the Permanent Joint Council and then the NATO-
Russia Council;
LEnabling former adversaries to become allies
through NATO enlargement, with four successive post-Cold War
rounds; and
LFacilitating a deepening of European integration
as the European Community became the European Union, adopted
the Euro, and followed NATO with its own enlargement.
These advances happened in a parallel, cyclical fashion.
Each step making the next step viable. It was at Bucharest and
the subsequent invasion of Georgia when Putin acted to disrupt
this process. Indeed, as early as February 2007 at the Munich
Security Conference, Putin stunned Western audiences by
speaking clearly about his rejection of the order in Europe and
began to reposition the West as an adversary of Russia. His
resolve to oppose the West weakened the resolve of the Alliance
to advance the West at Bucharest.
Since 2008, we have witnessed a revanchist Kremlin, intent
on undoing the gains of the post-Cold War period, reshaping the
international order that allowed Europe to remain peaceful and
prosperous, and ensuring the domination of its neighbors.
The strategic environment has now changed dramatically and
sufficiently that our approach to Georgia and Ukraine should
change as well.
The first significant shift among allies is that they all
now recognize the challenge posed by a revanchist Russia. The
annexation of Crimea, the invasion of eastern Ukraine, and the
continued fighting has driven home among all our allies the
nature of the threat that European security and the
international order faces if left unchecked. This is why last
week's NATO summit continued to adopt strong defense and
deterrence measures.
This new understanding opens the way for the Alliance to
adopt a new approach to Europe's East to correct the mistakes
of Bucharest and to ensure that we have a strategy so that our
rhetoric becomes reality.
This process has already begun. At the just-concluded NATO
Summit, allied leaders invited the government in Skopje to
begin accession negotiations, paving the way for the Republic
of North Macedonia to become NATO's 30th member upon finalizing
the name deal between Skopje and Athens. It was in Bucharest
where NATO failed to extend this invitation, opening a decade
of stagnation that led to a crisis in the Western Balkan
nation. Last week's decision, overcomes that failure.
We can do the same with Georgia and eventually Ukraine.
We witnessed in this Brussels Summit that despite
transatlantic tensions and division, there was consensus on
enlargement. This is significant because this consensus allowed
NATO to meet the Bucharest commitment to extend an invitation
as soon as Athens and Skopje reached a deal on the name issue.
This decision also ensures we will eliminate any security
vacuum in the Western Balkans.
We witnessed what a decade of indecision produced in the
Western Balkans: democratic erosion and economic stagnation
within the country, combined with stepped-up Russian influence.
Enlargement is a stabilizing factor. Enlargement advances
US interests as it welcomes nations to our alliance which are
willing to assume the responsibility of becoming an ally, while
also ensuring that the new ally is immunized from Russia's
efforts to destabilize it.
We have witnessed the same formula in the Baltic states.
Once considered too controversial to consider as NATO members,
enlargement brought stability and security to the nations,
giving them confidence to develop predictable, normal relations
with Russia. While the region is tense today given Russia's
aggressive intimidation tactics, imagine what Northeast Europe
would look like if the Baltic states were not in NATO. Our
crisis in Europe's East would not be confined to Ukraine's
East.
This logic applies to Georgia today.
The Russia-pedaled paradigm that enlargement is provocative
is wrong. Leaving nations, whose people aspire to join the
alliance, in limbo over time is provocative as it tempts Russia
to extend its influence--its sphere of influence--either
through sowing chaos to ensure weak states or occupation and
domination to ensure obedient neighbors.
As history has shown, this Russian strategy is not a recipe
for stability, but for perpetual instability and potential
conflict. Even the most cynical grand bargain consigning
Georgia and Ukraine to Russia's sphere of influence would not
be durable as it denies the aspirations and agency of the
people of the nations themselves. They have a say in their
future. Witness the Rose Revolution and subsequent democratic
transitions in Georgia. Witness the Maidan and continued
resistance to occupation in the east.
It is easy to argue that we are in a period of tension with
Putin's Russia today, so why make things worse by considering
enlargement to Georgia and eventually Ukraine?
To put today's dilemma facing us in perspective consider
the 1950s. Europe was only beginning to recover from the
devastation of World War II. Greece was emerging from a brutal
civil war that ended in 1949. Turkey remained weak and
vulnerable to Soviet probing as Joseph Stalin sought more
reliable access to the Mediterranean. Indeed, Russia sought to
topple the government in Ankara during the Turkish Straits
Crisis. Furthermore, these two nations--much like France and
Germany in Western Europe--had been historic adversaries in
Southeast Europe.
Furthermore, the Truman administration was facing a world
in which the Soviets had attained the atomic bomb, the West was
witnessing a Soviet advance in Europe and globally, and
tensions were mounting on the Korean peninsula. Yet President
Truman stepped in decisively--first bilaterally and then
through NATO--to anchor Greece and Turkey together in the West.
Rapidly, US diplomacy overcame an obvious flashpoint and
anchored a region bordering the Soviet Union in NATO. Imagine
what would have happened in this region during the Cold War
without Greece and Turkey as allies.
Jump forward to today. It is the absence of security for
Georgia and Ukraine that has tempted Russia to occupy and annex
their territory. Russia aims to keep these neighbors at best in
a permanent grey zone, and at worst under its domination.
Article 10 of the Washington Treaty makes clear that allies
by unanimous agreement may invite any European state ``in a
position to further the principles of this Treaty and to
contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area.''
Georgians and Ukrainians have done more than most to fight
to defend the principles of the Alliance. They are also
prepared to be serious contributors. Both spend well over 2
percent of their GDP on defense. Georgia is among the most
significant troop contributors to NATO and other international
missions. Ukraine has the most battled-tested forces of any
European nation. And both are already acting as allies, joining
NATO and the European Union on major policy decisions.
Yet NATO has handcuffed itself by abiding by the principles
developed in its 1995 Study on Enlargement and its adoption of
the MAP process in 1999. The study on enlargement sets
expectations that nations aspiring to membership will resolve
any territorial disputes before entering the alliance. Allies
adopted the MAP process to help nations take the practical
steps to better prepare to become members.
NATO needs to reexamine these policies. These policies were
crafted in different--that is, benign--geopolitical
circumstances. They made great sense then. Today, however,
NATO's own policies only incentivize Russia to hold on to
occupied territories as long-term insurance to prevent NATO or
for that matter EU enlargement.
Similarly, in today's environment, MAP only serves to
signal to Russia that the Alliance is getting more serious
about membership, without yet being serious about membership. A
MAP decision in many respects begins a countdown clock which
may put pressure on Moscow to act to disrupt the neighbor's
accession process before it accedes, much like we witnessed in
Montenegro with the October 2016 Russian-backed attempted coup
in the run-up to its accession to NATO.
To avoid this dynamic, NATO needs to reexamine and update
its Open Door policy for today's new circumstances. Doing so
should be coupled with NATO efforts to maintain dialogue with
Russia and to provide and seek greater transparency.
Allies should make clear that their commitment that there
is no third-party veto over enlargement decision means that
Russian occupation will not serve as an obstacle to membership.
Allies should also recognize that a Membership Action Plan is
not a requirement for membership. Rather instruments like the
NATO-Georgia Commission and its Annual National Plans provide
even more rigor in helping Georgia prepare. Indeed, NATO
Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said in December 2016,
``Georgia has all the practical tools to become a member of
NATO.''
Yes, this is tricky, but it is doable. Historians of NATO
know well the debates on how, when, and where NATO's security
guarantee in Article 5 would apply--an attack on one will be
considered as an attack on all. In 1955, West Germany became
part of NATO without the Germans relinquishing their commitment
to eventual unification. France argued successfully for Article
5 to include Algeria, a decision the North Atlantic Council had
to later reverse. Belgium argued unsuccessfully to apply the
treaty to its holdings in the Belgian Congo. Today, Spain
governs territory on mainland Africa, the cities of Ceuta and
Melilla in Morocco, but there is no expectation that this
territory is part of the Alliance's defense plans.
In the case of Georgia and eventually Ukraine, the North
Atlantic Council can make clear that the Washington Treaty does
not apply to the occupied territories, but without
relinquishing Allied commitment to the nations' territorial
integrity and without Tbilisi or Kyiv giving up their claims of
sovereignty.
There is a benefit to acting decisively. Such a strategy
can only advance with American leadership. Much like the Truman
administration, a serious US bilateral commitment to Greece and
Turkey assured the other allies of our commitment and made the
NATO decision, while a momentous one, not a controversial one.
Today, Europe finds itself again at the center of global
geological competition. The circumstances require that we not
be ambivalent. Deterrence is about the psychology and the
perception of your adversary, as much as about military
capabilities and plans. The premise of our defense of the
Baltic states is deterrence, backed up by planning and now some
modest forces. The same can apply for Georgia.
The post-World War II formula for US strategy in Europe was
that NATO security guarantees would allow for stronger
political cooperation among former adversaries and provide a
framework of confidence for economic growth and integration.
That formula worked dramatically well, and it remains valid.
My ideas seem counterintuitive at a time of transatlantic
divisions and heightened tension with Russia. Yet a big
transatlantic project could help anchor the alliance. This
strategy would also anchor Turkey more firmly within the West.
It would provide Russia a more predictable set of neighbors. It
would remove grey zones that tempt a revanchist Kremlin.
Precisely because of geopolitical tension, the elimination of
grey zones of insecurity can help ensure durable peace in
Europe's East.
At the Atlantic Council, we believe that we must work
alongside our allies and partners to secure the future while
recognizing our failure--witness Ukraine, witness Syria--will
open the door to less benevolent forces or violent chaos.
This maxim applies more than ever today in how to think
about Georgia and its future relationship with NATO.
Permitting these nations' aspirations to be held hostage by
Russian occupation and intimidation is a recipe for instability
and conflict in Europe. We cannot allow these nations, known as
captive nations for much of the 20th century, to become known
as hostage nations in the 21st century. Rather, we should
recognize that they stand on the frontline of freedom and
anchor them within our NATO alliance to ensure peace in
Europe's East.
Thank you.
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