[Senate Hearing 115-231]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 115-231
TESTIMONY FROM OUTSIDE EXPERTS ON
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A FUTURE
NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 2017
__________
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma JACK REED, Rhode Island
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi BILL NELSON, Florida
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
TOM COTTON, Arkansas JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
JONI ERNST, Iowa RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia TIM KAINE, Virginia
TED CRUZ, Texas ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
BEN SASSE, Nebraska ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
LUTHER STRANGE, Alabama GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
Christian D. Brose, Staff Director
Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
___________________________
November 30, 2017
Page
Testimony From Outside Experts on Recommendations for a Future 1
National Defense Strategy.
Eaglen, Mackenzie, Resident Fellow of the Marilyn Ware Center for 4
Security Studies, The American Enterprise Institute.
Karlin, Mara E., Ph.D., Associate Professor of the Practice of 17
Strategic Studies, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced
International Studies.
Spoehr, Lieutenant General Thomas W., U.S. Army, Ret., Director 21
of the Center for National Defense, Heritage Foundation.
Ochmanek, David A., Senior Defense Research Analyst, Rand 27
Corporation.
Mahnken, Thomas G., Ph.D., President and Chief Executive Officer, 36
Center for Strategic Budgetary Assessments.
(iii)
TESTIMONY FROM OUTSIDE EXPERTS ON
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A FUTURE
NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY
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THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 2017
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:32 a.m. in
Room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John
McCain (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Wicker, Fischer, Rounds,
Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue, Sasse, Reed, Nelson,
McCaskill, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono,
Kaine, King, Heinrich, Warren, and Peters.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman McCain. Good morning. The Senate Armed Services
Committee meets today to receive testimony from outside experts
on recommendations for a future National Defense Strategy.
We welcome our witnesses: Thomas Mahnken, president and CEO
of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments; David
Ochmanek, senior defense research analyst at the RAND
Corporation; Thomas Spoehr, director at the Heritage
Foundation; Mara E. Karlin, associate professor at the Johns
Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies; and Mackenzie
Eaglen, resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
Last year, this committee wrote into the National Defense
Authorization Act a requirement for the Secretary of Defense to
develop and implement a National Defense Strategy. The intent
of this document was to prioritize a set of goals and
articulate a strategy for the U.S. military to achieve
warfighting superiority over our adversaries. The National
Defense Strategy is part of this committee's broader effort to
help guide the Pentagon to develop a more strategic approach in
response to an increasingly dangerous world.
Today's hearing will afford us the opportunity to hear
recommendations from our distinguished panel of defense experts
on how the Secretary should rise to the challenge of crafting a
National Defense Strategy. We will look to you for advice on
how the department should best allocate its resources to
enhance the capacity and capability of the U.S. military in the
era of great-power competition.
To that end, we must begin by explicitly recognizing that
great-power competition is not a thing of the past. The post-
Cold War era is over.
Russia and China's rapid military modernization programs
present real challenges for the American way of the war.
Because of decisions we have made, and those we have failed to
make, our military advantages are eroding. Congress is far from
blameless, as we have, for years, prioritized politics over
strategy when it comes to our budgeting decisions.
Next, we must recognize that the window of opportunity to
reverse the erosion of our military advantage is rapidly
closing. Just as Congress has been part of this problem, so,
too, do we have an obligation to be part of the solution. We
must start doing our job again--pass budgets; go through the
normal appropriations process; and provide our military with
adequate, predictable funding.
As the negotiations on the budget deal to increase the
spending caps proceed, I know that members of this committee
will be advocates for a defense budget at the level that an
overwhelming bipartisan majority of Congress voted to authorize
in the NDAA, nearly $700 billion for the current fiscal year.
But we must be clear. We cannot buy our way out of our
current strategic problem. Even after Congress appropriates
adequate funds, the department will have a tough road to
reverse current trendlines. Restoring readiness, modernizing
the force, and reforming acquisition will all be necessary to
renew American power.
But ultimately, all of these efforts will be in vain
without clear strategic direction.
The Secretary of Defense and his civilian leadership team
must exercise real leadership when it comes to strategy,
planning, and force development. They will have to make
difficult choices and set clear priorities about the threats we
face and the missions we assign to our military. That is what
we have asked the department to do in the National Defense
Strategy.
As Secretary James Mattis and the rest of the Department of
Defense make those hard choices, and especially as they
identify necessary tradeoffs, they will find allies in this
chairman and this committee.
We ask our witnesses to help this committee and the
department think through these tough questions: How should the
National Defense Strategy focus on building an effective force
to counter threats from near-peer competitors, such as Russia
and China, as well as midlevel powers such as Iran and North
Korea? How should the NDS address the challenges of
counterterrorism and articulate a strategy for sustainable
security in the Middle East region? Even as we advocate for
increased defense spending, how do we realistically confront
hard choices about tradeoffs? Simply put, what must we do to
restore or enhance our ability to deter and defeat any
adversary in any scenario and across the spectrum of military
competition? How should we devote our finite taxpayer dollars
wisely to accomplish these goals?
Our global challenges have never been greater. Our
strategic environment has not been this competitive since the
Cold War. Without the margins of power we once enjoyed, we
cannot expect to do everything we want everywhere around the
globe. We must choose. We must prioritize. That is what the
National Defense Strategy must do.
I thank our witnesses for their attention to these
important issues and look forward to their testimony.
Senator Reed?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
holding the National Defense Strategy hearing. This strategy is
currently being developed by the Department of Defense, so this
is a crucial moment.
Let me welcome the witnesses. Your work has been important
to guide us in the past and will be very important as we move
through this process.
The Department of Defense faces many complicated and
rapidly evolving challenges. This is not the first time in our
Nation's history we have had to confront multiple threats from
abroad, but it is an incredibly dangerous and uncertain time.
Russia remains determined to reassert its influence around
the world, most recently by using malign influence and active
measures activities to undermine America's faith in our
electoral process, as well as other Western countries. North
Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile efforts are an immediate
and grave national security threat, and the U.S. continues to
grapple with the fact that there are no quick and certain
options. China continues to threaten the rules-based order in
the Asia-Pacific region by economic coercion of its smaller,
more vulnerable neighbors, and by undermining the freedom of
navigation. Iran continues their aggressive weapons development
activities, including ballistic missile development efforts,
while pursuing other destabilizing activities in the region.
Likewise, countering the security threat from the Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Iraq and Syria, and its
spread beyond the Middle East, must remain a high priority,
while at the same time we must build the capabilities of the
Afghan National Security Forces and deny any safe haven for
extremism.
Crafting a defense strategy that provides guidance to
policymakers on how to most effectively confront the
aforementioned challenges, and I would add challenges that are
emerging through artificial intelligence, autonomous vehicles,
and cyber innovations, is not a simple task.
In fact, during the fall of 2015 when this committee held a
series of hearings to evaluate potential revisions to the
Goldwater-Nichols Act, one of the predominant themes was that
the department suffered from a tyranny of consensus when
crafting defense strategy. In other words, too often, the
department is consumed by the need to foster agreement among
all interested parties regarding strategic policy goals rather
than focusing on the most critical and pressing threats facing
our country, along with the strategies necessary to thwart
those threats.
While consensus should not be discounted, crafting a
strategy that focuses on the lowest common denominator often
means difficult strategic choices and alternative policy
decisions are deferred.
To address this imbalance, this committee carefully
reviewed how the department crafts and generates strategy
documents. The fiscal year 2017 National Defense Authorization
Act included a provision mandating a new National Defense
Strategy intended to address the highest priority missions of
the department, the enduring threats facing our country and our
allies, and the strategies that the department will employ in
order to address those threats.
The committee understands that the department is working
diligently to finalize the National Defense Strategy by early
2018. To help inform the department's mission, I hope our
witnesses today will give their assessment of the threats
facing our country; the anticipated force posture required to
address those threats; the challenges confronting military
readiness and modernization; and, finally, the investments
necessary for the U.S. to retain overmatch capability against
near-peer competitors.
Finally, I believe the effectiveness of the National
Defense Strategy may be adversely impacted by circumstances
outside the control of senior civilian and military leadership
within the Department of Defense. While it does not fall within
the purview of this committee, I am deeply concerned about the
Department of State and the health of our Foreign Service.
Robust international alliances are critical to keeping our
country safe.
That requires a diplomatic corps ready and able to
coordinate closely with allies and partners. It is also
critical that they have the tools necessary to help partner
nations proactively across political and social challenges that
give rise to conflict and extremism. Rather than prioritize the
State Department's mission, the current administration has
sought draconian budget cuts that have devastated morale and
created a mass exodus of seasoned diplomats.
Let me be clear. Weakening the State Department makes the
Defense Department's mission that much more difficult. This
should be a concern for every member of the committee.
In addition, President Donald Trump has consistently shown
a fondness for foreign leaders who have been dismissive of core
American values like human rights and the rule of law. At the
same time, the President has discounted the importance of
longtime allies and the global order the United States helped
establish following World War II. As I have stated previously,
such actions tend to isolate the United States and weaken our
influence in the world, ultimately leading to uncertainty and
risk of miscalculation.
Therefore, I would be interested in the views of our
witnesses on these issues, as well as the current interagency
process for developing national security policy.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
We will begin with you, Ms. Eaglen.
STATEMENT OF MACKENZIE EAGLEN, RESIDENT FELLOW OF THE MARILYN
WARE CENTER FOR SECURITY STUDIES, THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE
INSTITUTE
Ms. Eaglen. Thank you, Chairman McCain, Ranking member.
Chairman McCain. Not with those jerks on your right.
[Laughter.]
Ms. Eaglen. Thanks for the chance to be here this morning
and to talk about the crisis of confidence in defense strategy-
making.
We can point to both parties, both administrations, both
branches of government, as you already outlined this morning,
Mr. Chairman, in your remarks. But the outcome today is that we
have a problem, and this is the last best chance to fix it.
So as the Pentagon has been slowly dialing down strategy
over the years and dialing up strategic risk, the pace of
operational tempo has remained largely the same, and there is a
disconnect between the reality as it is in the world and what
U.S. forces are told that they should be doing on paper.
Chairman McCain. Can you give us an example of that
disconnect?
Ms. Eaglen. Sure, Mr. Chairman. So, for example, in the
last administration [the Obama Administration], at the tail
end, there was strategic guidance that U.S. military
commitments in the Middle East would significantly lessen. The
administration spent the last 3 years focused, frankly, on
mostly fights in the Middle East, in Syria and Iraq and
elsewhere. But it is not limited to the last administration
either, I should say, this challenge.
The truth is that the reality as it is, Mr. Chairman, is as
you have outlined, both of you, the committee as a whole, in
this year's NDAA. It is that the Pentagon planning and the
force posture around the world is one of three theaters. It is
not about X wars or X-plus-one or one-plus-some-other-number.
But the truth is that the U.S. military focus and emphasis is
going to remain constant in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.
That is not going to change in the foreseeable future.
Chairman McCain. In the last year, would you say things
have improved or deteriorated?
Ms. Eaglen. Around the world?
Chairman McCain. Especially the Middle East.
Ms. Eaglen. I would say they have deteriorated, and the
challenge here, of course, is that we still have this gap in
strategy. It is okay, because it is the first year of the Trump
Administration, and so they are getting their bearings and
crafting it.
I think we will see more continuity than change, and a more
muscular status quo in the defense strategy. But that is what
concerns me, because we have a combination of a deteriorating
security situation and increased difficulty in our ability to
deal with it here in Washington, both at the Pentagon and up
here on Capitol Hill.
Chairman McCain. You saw the announcement that we were
going to stop arming the Kurds?
Ms. Eaglen. Yes.
Chairman McCain. What is that all about?
Ms. Eaglen. I do not know, Senator. I wish I was in the
mind of the administration on that question. It seems like it
warrants more public debate up here on Capitol Hill, for
certain, as a key ally.
Chairman McCain. Thank you. We can save time for question-
and-answer, but what do you think the impact of that is on the
Kurds?
Ms. Eaglen. Well, I think there are a variety of impacts
that could happen here that are all worrisome, all troublesome.
The first is, of course, who they will make their bets with,
who they will get in bed with that is not the United States or
our key allies.
So if they need to hedge their bets or cut their losses,
that is not in the favor of the interests that we are looking
for in the region. That is number one.
Number two is our credibility. We saw this with the
redline, but we have seen it in other presidential decisions,
again, spanning both parties. When we say we are going to do
one thing and we turn around and do something different, we
lose credibility. When we lose credibility, we cannot call upon
our friends and allies to help us when the next crisis happens.
I think it feeds into the narrative in the region that Russia
and Iran are gaining power and the United States is losing it.
Chairman McCain. The impact psychologically of 305
Egyptians getting killed in one raid?
Ms. Eaglen. It is really devastating. I think that, in
terms of Pentagon planning, this is one of the key challenges.
It is the balance between these ongoing, metastasizing terror
threats and all the other challenges that they have to face,
and putting what emphasis where, how much to push down on the
pedal or not, regarding counterterror efforts.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Eaglen follows:]
Prepared Statement by Mackenzie Eaglen
Thank you, Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished
members of the Committee on Armed Services for the opportunity to
evaluate how the Department of Defense should effectively develop and
implement a new National Defense Strategy.
stop repeating past mistakes
It's long past time for a new National Defense Strategy that seeks
to break the mold in honesty, clarity, conciseness, and fresh thinking.
Since the end of the Cold War, these documents have repeatedly served
as opportunities to redefine American force structure and interests
globally. Unfortunately, the most recent generation of strategies has
become increasingly unmoored from the strategic reality the country
faces. Since the end of the Cold War, the Pentagon's force-sizing
construct has gradually became muddled and watered down at each
iteration--from the aspirational objective of fighting two wars at once
to the declinist ``defeat-and-deny'' approach--without enough
substantive debate over the wisdom of the progressive abandonment of
the two-war standard.
Even before debt reduction became a Washington priority in 2011,
defense planning became increasingly divorced from global strategic
realities. American experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan exposed the
limited utility of a force-sizing construct based on wars. The
challenge in prosecuting two large stabilization and counterinsurgency
campaigns during the past decade-and-a-half laid bare the discrepancy
between our stated defense capabilities and our actual strength. The
wars that planners envisioned were not the ones the military was called
upon to fight.
A lack of definitional clarity and policy consensus about terms
like ``war,'' ``defeat,'' ``deny'' and even now ``deter'' is far from
the only problem with previous strategies. A combination of shrinking
global posture, force reductions, overly optimistic predictions about
the future, and a deteriorating security environment have led to a
crisis of confidence in defense strategy making. The Budget Control Act
further compounded the difficulty of aligning resources with strategy
through clear and thoughtful prioritization and adjudication between
tradeoffs. The need to build a defense program to fit declining
spending caps accelerated the reduction in relevance and scope of
Pentagon strategy documents.
Even with declining force-sizing constructs, U.S. forces have
largely continued to do all that they have done under previous super-
sized strategies. Consequentially, there is now a general dismissal of
strategy because the reductions in force structure proposed in each
iteration have not resulted in substantive changes in operations of the
force. Instead, the armed forces have been asked to do more with less
and continue to plan campaigns, conduct global counterterrorism,
reassure allies, and provide deterrence as operational tempos remain
unwaveringly high.
Meanwhile various missions and efforts are being shortchanged,
ignored or dropped altogether as the supply of American military power
is consistently outstripped by its demand. Some uniformed leaders would
argue that the challenge is broader, and that the real issue is a
military endstate-policy outcome incongruity that exists where
policymakers expect military power to achieve outcomes beyond its
scope. Both interpretations are correct, and each contributes to the
lack of credibility in new strategic guidance in the minds of its
consumers. This lack of faith in defense strategy making and planning
has contributed to America's global retreat and the worsening
international security situation.
crafting an impactful new defense strategy
The writers of the newest strategy need to face some hard truths.
Policymakers cannot wish away the need for strong
American presence in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. This includes
assuming America's commitments in the Middle East will go away, get
easier or eventually become a lesser burden on the military.
Constructing budgets and then divining strategies, as the
Budget Control Act has encouraged, is putting the cart before the
horse.
Pentagon reforms and efficiencies are noble goals and
should become standard operating procedure to encourage good
governance. But the belief that ongoing organizational changes will
result in tens of billions in potential savings that can be reinvested
elsewhere within the defense budget has yet to be proven.
An obsessive hunt for technological silver bullets could
be our military's ruin, not its salvation--if it comes at the expense
of medium-term needs.
To endure as a global power, the United States must never be in the
position--as it is now in danger of finding itself--of committing its
last reserves of military power to any single theater. Instead, force
planners need to grow the size of the armed forces using the
capabilities on hand. American forces must commit to permanent forward
presence where they can effectively deter threats before they rise to
the level of hostilities.
To facilitate these goals, the strategy should focus not only on
the need to decisively defeat our enemies, but also to support the
steady-state operations American forces undertake each day to deter our
adversaries and reassure our allies in priority theaters abroad.
What follows are various thoughts on how to break from a status quo
in defense planning that has failed policymakers and military leaders
alike, in order to construct a National Defense Strategy that is both
useful and able to be executed by our nation's armed forces:
The National Defense Strategy must answer what missions the
military should prioritize--by extension, it must clearly delineate
what it can stop doing. In the last decade, the United States military
outsourced airlifting of troops to Iraq to Russian companies, NASA
hitched rides into space also from Russia, Marines embarked on allied
ships for missions patrolling the African coast, cargo shipments to
Afghanistan were delayed due to inadequate lift during hurricane relief
efforts, a private contractor evacuated United States and Nigerian
troops after the recent ISIS ambush in Niger, and the Air Force has
outsourced ``red air'' adversary training aircraft to contractors. This
is just a sample of tasks that are being curtailed as the military
struggles with fewer resources and finds it cannot actually do ``more
with less.''
Yet not all of these capabilities need to be restored--in some
instances, it may be more efficient to continue to outsource ancillary
assignments that don't necessarily require military forces to
prosecute. Instead of papering over these realities, the new strategy
should spell out explicitly what sacrifices the force could make, and
signal to allies and partners where they could be most helpful, in
order to allow the Department of Defense to concentrate on its most
critical missions.
Rosy assumptions need to go. Assumptions about international
affairs that underpinned the last administration's force planning--that
Europe would remain peaceful, that the United States was dangerously
overcommitted across the Middle East, and that a ``rebalance'' to East
Asia could be accomplished without a substantial increase in forces--
have all proven incorrect.
The new strategy also has to combat unrealistic assumptions about
the Department of Defense--such as the belief that reforms and
efficiencies will generate significant savings that can be reinvested
elsewhere in the defense budget, and that the Pentagon will certainly
become more innovative when money is tight.
Global force management is not a substitute for strategy. Because
campaigns can now occur across geographic boundaries and within
multiple domains of warfare at the same time, the default strategy-in-
motion has become global force management. Despite the flexibility it
generates, centrally-overseen crisis management is not a substitute for
strategy. The world is not one global combatant command, nor does any
one leader, commander, or service have the ability to manage complex
contingencies as if it were. The forthcoming strategy must restore
classic force planning and development to Pentagon processes and build
up a new generation of policymakers and uniformed leaders used to
operating within these constructs.
Claiming the ``five challenges'' of China, Russia, Iran, North
Korea, and persistent counterterrorism operations are all equally
important is not strategy--it is the absence of one. Former Defense
Secretary Ash Carter's list of five challenges--synonymous with the
Joint Chiefs' ``four-plus-one'' list--has persisted into this
administration. This construct identifies threats, but it needs to rank
their relative severity in order to have strategic meaning. Given the
finite supply of American defense capacity, not all of these threats
can receive the same amount of attention or bandwidth--nor should they.
Our force deployments must be rationalized to prevent the use of
capabilities intended for high-end wars or deterrence being worn down
in the long grind of ongoing anti-terror operations. Stealth aircraft
should not be performing fire support missions against the Taliban that
could be handled by robust army artillery, for example.
The Pentagon is bigger than a Department of War; it is a Department
of Defense. Fighting and winning the nation's wars is an essential
core mission of America's military. Preventing them is equally
important. Daily, the U.S. military is active in maintaining a regular
presence around the globe, cooperating with allies, and checking
potential aggression. These ``peacetime'' presence and steady state
activities are the most effective--and certainly the cheapest--use of
military power. The Pentagon must more accurately size the military to
not only fight and win multiple contingencies at once, but also to
conduct the multitude of routine missions, deployments, and forward
presence that advance and protect American interests overseas.
It's getting harder to differentiate between war and peace. The
force-sizing construct should reflect this reality. The dangers of
assuming Europe is a net producer of security became apparent the
moment Russia annexed Ukrainian sovereign territory. In a single
stroke, the Pentagon's last strategy was rendered moot. The rise of
ISIS further showcased the perils of American withdrawal from the
Middle East. Coupled with increasing Chinese and North Korean
bellicosity, three theaters are obviously vital considerations for
United States military planning, even if active hostilities involving
American troops are not underway in all of them simultaneously.
Each of the five challenges to American security is unique and
requires tailored responses to mitigate, even in peacetime. Ballistic
missile defenses have immense use against North Korea, but little
utility against ISIS. As each of our competitors focus on a particular
suite of niche capabilities--from Chinese maritime capabilities to
Russian land power and electronic warfare--America is in the unenviable
position of needing to respond to all of them. To manage the expense of
this endeavor, efficiencies must be found to deter and mitigate certain
threats within an acceptable margin of risk in order to concentrate
additional resources on more pressing ones.
The clearest example is terrorism, which is a relative threat and
not an existential one. The National Defense Strategy must recognize
that countering terrorism will be a generational struggle that can be
managed more gradually and cheaply than efforts to counter immediate
and monumental threats, such as North Korean ICBMs.
Organize for three theaters, not two wars. The degradation of the
two-war standard since the end of the Cold War has left the nation with
a one-plus-something strategy that is neither well understood nor
universally accepted by policymakers or service leaders. Planners
should size forces to maintain robust conventional and strategic
deterrents in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, and equip a force for
decision in the event deterrence fails. \1\ The National Defense
Strategy must make a clear distinction between the forces, capabilities
and posture required to prevent a war against a near-peer state versus
those needed to win one should it break out.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Thomas Donnelly, Gary Schmitt, Mackenzie Eaglen et al., To
Rebuild America's Military, American Enterprise Institute, 2015, http:/
/www.aei.org/publication/to-rebuild-americas-military/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While deterring further Russian and Chinese aggression requires
advanced aerospace capabilities, the principal presence missions would
fall on maritime forces in the Pacific and land forces in Europe. In
the Middle East, the situation is quite different; there is no
favorable status quo to defend. Securing our regional interest requires
not just presence, but an active effort to reverse the rising tide of
adversaries: Iran, ISIS, al Qaeda and its associates, and now Russia.
If we hope to remain safe and prosperous, America cannot swing among
these theaters, nor can we retreat to the continental United States.
This does not mean each theater requires the same amount of assets;
forces can and should be tailored to the needs of each.
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Conventional military deterrence is changing. The calculus of
deterrence is never certain as success is measured in the mindset of
the adversary, not by a simple count of troops, planes, or ships. Thus
as situations change, the U.S. military must possess both ample and
heavy operational reserves and the logistical ability to rapidly deploy
large and fully joint forces in times of crisis or conflict. This force
for decision would supplement forward forces to either bolster
deterrence or successfully prosecute a major conflict if it fails.
These forces must be of a size and quality to be operationally
decisive. Given the global interests of the United States and complex
and divergent terrains of Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, this
reinforcing force for decision must possess a wide array of
capabilities across the air, land, sea, space, and cyber domains. Such
a balanced ``capacity of capabilities'' is necessary to provide the
widest possible set of options to campaign planners (and the
president). Although the forward deployed forces in any given theater
can be more readily tailored to steady-state missions, in times of
crisis or conflict the need for effectiveness and overmatch supplants
the need for efficiency. In order to maintain the ability to intervene
both quickly and decisively, defense planners should favor maintain
active-duty, highly trained units in both the forward-deployed forces
and the force for decision based in the continental United States.
Development of new capabilities should concentrate on securing
tactical overmatch. Presence missions and train-and-advise efforts are
crucial to support our allies, but firepower is ultimately what deters
our foes. The new defense strategy should concisely outline the core
competencies required of each service by region and threat, and over
varying time horizons and levels of risk. It should concentrate
development of new capabilities to restore as much technological
overmatch as is possible. Planners should also seek opportunities to
generate efficiencies when possible. For example, introducing a series
of Armored Cavalry Regiments permanently stationed in Eastern Europe
comprised of combined arms units would not only provide a powerful
United States presence to counter Russia, but would allow regional
partners to better develop their domestic capabilities through
increased opportunities for bilateral training and exercises.
The American military needs more inter-service competition, not
less. In some respects, the individual services have become too
dependent on one another. Having the entire military rely on an
individual service as the sole provider of a given capability can
introduce risks and decrease the efficiency of U.S. forces. One obvious
example is the degradation of U.S. Army short range air defense
(SHORAD) and an overreliance on increasingly scant air force
interceptors to maintain air superiority. Competition among the
services--for missions and for resources, for example--is the key to
innovation. Beyond the advantage of having redundant tactical and
operational tools at hand in the event one fails or proves to be easily
countered, competition fosters a richer and more diverse discussion of
the nature of war and serves as a check on the American propensity to
rely too heavily on technological solutions to military problems. As
much as the new administration needs to put more forces in the field
and modernize weapons systems, its most important task may be to
rebuild the service's institutional capacities that are essential for
sustaining the breadth and depth of military leadership that global
power demands.
The Budget Control Act must no longer be the scapegoat. By
attributing most or all of the current force's problems to
sequestration and ignoring their historical context, policymakers
wrongly assume that solutions are simple (e.g., higher defense toplines
alone will solve the military's woes). The next National Defense
Strategy will need to account for two compounding problems. First, the
international situation is deteriorating. Second, our fiscal ability to
support all instruments of national power is declining. Higher spending
can alleviate the latter challenge, but new investments will need to be
tied to clear strategic goals in order to address the former. We cannot
repeat the mistakes of the early 2000s where billions were squandered
on cancelled research and development programs that fielded little to
nothing because they were not tied to the threats America faced.
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Investments must balance between the immediate needs of today, the
medium term, and wars of the 2030s. To alleviate strain on the current
force, it will need to grow. This expansion of capacity should be
undertaken immediately and with currently available equipment and
technology rather than forestalled in pursuit of tomorrow's super
weapons. Overly investing in near-term readiness and speculative
capabilities not only introduces a large amount of acquisition risk, it
also creates a dangerous situation where adversaries know we are weak
today and will be strong tomorrow. Facing this scenario, they would see
that it's better to strike now than later. In this way, more investment
in our military could worsen American security unless it is properly
managed to alleviate any potential gap in American readiness to deter
and, if necessary, defeat our foes. Policymakers must avoid a
``barbell'' investment strategy that deemphasizes the medium-term needs
of the 2020s.
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
repairing and rebuilding the armed forces by 2023
In my new report, Repair and Rebuild, I present a Future Years
Defense Program (FYDP) highlighting the needs of our Armed Forces over
the next five years in addition to the last official FYDP conducted by
the Obama Administration in 2017. \2\ While that report contains my
complete recommendations for a force sized for three theaters, the top
five programmatic priorities emphasized in the report can be summarized
as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Mackenzie Eaglen, Repair and Rebuild: Balancing New Military
Spending for a Three-Theater Strategy, American Enterprise Institute,
2017, http://www.aei.org/publication/repair-and-rebuild-balancing-new-
military-spending-for-a-three-theater-strategy/.
1. Embrace stealth and sensor fusion en masse.
Purchase an additional 316 F-35As above the 431
aircraft planned over the FYDP, accelerate crucial F-22 upgrades,
provide extra funding for the B-21 Raider, and expand that program of
record beyond 100 bombers.
2. Disperse power projection.
Procure an additional 64 F-35Bs above the 102 planned,
accelerate aviation-focused America-class production instead of
developing a light carrier, expand KC-130J procurement, and buy five
extra ESBs.
3. Allow the Navy to focus on sea control.
Free up destroyers and attack subs to focus on sea
control while accelerating new large surface combatant development.
Heavily invest in small surface combatants (with
unmanned craft) to conduct lower-end naval missions.
Expand ground-based ballistic missile defense capacity
to lessen burden on Navy surface combatants.
4. Build sustainable long-term fire support capacity.
Move away from using expensive, high-demand assets
(e.g. carriers, fourth-generation fighters, bombers) for fire support.
Expand and upgrade Army tube and rocket artillery to
improve organic fire support.
Expand Reaper buy and procure two wings of light attack
fighters for air support in permissive environments.
5. Increase Army lethality.
Upgrade Abrams, Bradley, Stryker, and Paladin at scale;
ensure LRPF fields on time; rapidly invest in electronic warfare; and
accelerate FVL helicopter replacements.
Expand United States Army Europe presence to
incorporate heavier units prepared to act as more than a tripwire in
the event of hostilities with Russia and otherwise capable of boosting
regional capabilities of partners through increased opportunities for
training and exercises.
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
If you will allow me to interrupt, since a quorum is now
present, I ask the committee to consider the nominations of
John Rood to be Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Randall
Schriver to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and
Pacific Affairs, and a list of 275 pending military
nominations.
All these nominations have been before the committee the
required length of time.
Is there a motion to favorably report these two civilian
nominations and list?
Senator Reed. So moved.
Chairman McCain. Is there a second?
All in favor, say aye.
[Chorus of ayes.]
The information referred to follows:
Military Nominations Pending with the Senate Armed Services Committee
Which are Proposed for the Committee's Consideration on November 30,
2017.
1. In the Air Force there are 14 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Dane V. Campbell) (Reference No. 951)
2. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Ashley R. Sellers) (Reference No. 956)
3. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Elias M. Chelala) (Reference No. 958)
4. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of brigadier
general (Douglas F. Stitt) (Reference No. 1116-2)
5. Capt. Michael E. Boyle, USN to be rear admiral (lower half)
(Reference No. 1124)
6. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Cathleen A. Labate) (Reference No. 1144)
7. In the Army there are 2 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Rebecca J. Cooper) (Reference No. 1147)
8. RADM Lisa M. Franchetti, USN to be vice admiral and Commander,
SIXTH Fleet/Commander, Task Force SIX/Commander, Striking and Support
Forces NATO/Deputy Commander, US Naval Forces Europe/Deputy Commander,
US Naval Forces Africa/Joint Force Maritime Component Commander Europe
(Reference No. 1192)
9. BG Arthur E. Jackman, Jr., USAFR to be major general
(Reference No. 1218)
10. BG Josef F. Schmid III, USAFR to be major general (Reference
No. 1219)
11. In the Air Force Reserve there are 12 appointments to the
grade of brigadier general (list begins with John M. Breazeale)
(Reference No. 1222)
12. Col. Darlow G. Botha, Jr., ANG to be brigadier general
(Reference No. 1225)
13. In the Air Force Reserve there are 2 appointments to the grade
of brigadier general (list begins with Steven J. deMilliano) (Reference
No. 1226)
14. In the Air Force Reserve there are 2 appointments to the grade
of brigadier general (list begins with Michele K. LaMontagne)
(Reference No. 1227)
15. In the Air Force Reserve there are 25 appointments to the
grade of brigadier general (list begins with Travis K. Acheson)
(Reference No. 1229)
16. In the Air Force Reserve there are 12 appointments to the
grade of major general (list begins with Ondra L. Berry) (Reference No.
1230)
17. In the Air Force Reserve there are 8 appointments to the grade
of major general (list begins with George M. Degnon) (Reference No.
1231)
18. In the Air Force Reserve there are 2 appointments to the grade
of major general (list begins with Douglas A. Farnham) (Reference No.
1232)
19. In the Air Force there are 69 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Joseph Benjamin Ahlers) (Reference No. 1234)
20. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Erika R. Woodson) (Reference No. 1236)
21. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Michael S. Stroud) (Reference No. 1237)
22. In the Air Force there are 17 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Lance A. Aiumopas) (Reference No. 1238)
23. In the Air Force Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade
of colonel (Robert Sarlay, Jr.) (Reference No. 1239)
24. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Brantley J. Combs) (Reference No. 1240)
25. In the Army there are 2 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Mark E. Query) (Reference No. 1241)
26. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Victor A. Pachecofowler) (Reference No. 1242)
27. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(James M. Brumit) (Reference No. 1243)
28. In the Air Force Reserve there are 88 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Richard G. Adams) (Reference No.
1253)
29. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(Melvin J. Nickell) (Reference No. 1254)
30. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Erica L. Herzog) (Reference No. 1255)
31. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(Adam W. Vanek) (Reference No. 1256)
32. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Jason Park) (Reference No. 1257)
33. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (John
T. Huckabay) (Reference No. 1258)
_______________________________________________________________________
TOTAL: 275
Chairman McCain. The motion carries.
Dr. Karlin, you are up.
STATEMENT OF MARA E. KARLIN, Ph.D., ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF THE
PRACTICE OF STRATEGIC STUDIES, JOHNS HOPKINS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Dr. Karlin. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Chairman McCain and
Ranking Member Reed and members of the committee. It is a real
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the National
Defense Strategy [NDS].
I have three points to make that cover the 2018 National
Defense Strategy, how the committee can shape future
strategies, and reconciling the last 15-plus years of war.
The 2018 National Defense Strategy should prioritize
preparing the future force for conflict with China and Russia
while limiting the stressors of countering violent nonstate
actors. To be sure, the U.S. military must be able to credibly
confront challenges across the spectrum of conflict, including
nuclear, high-end conventional, gray zone, and
counterterrorism.
While the United States military remains preeminent, the
imbalance is worsening. China and Russia are making it harder
for the United States to project power.
Our military generally operates under two principles:
fighting away games and maintaining unfair advantages. Both are
growing harder.
Steps like enhancing forward posture in Asia and Europe
will have real operational benefits, as will investments in
undersea; long-range strike; combat Air Force, particularly
modernizing fourth-generation aircraft and balancing the
portfolio more broadly; Counter Unmanned Autonomous Systems;
short-range air defenses; and munitions.
The U.S. military must lean forward to exploit the benefits
of emerging technologies, particularly artificial intelligence
and autonomy, but it must do so consonant with the American way
of war. Technology is changing how the U.S. military fights,
but not why it fights nor what it fights for.
As you read the next NDS, I urge you to consider the
following. Everybody, every service, every combatant command
cannot be a winner, and a classified strategy should be clear
about that tally.
The committee and those of us involved in defense strategy
and budgeting in recent years know sequestration's pernicious
damage. We have a special responsibility to ensure it is not a
partisan issue, but instead a bipartisan effort.
Second, the committee can shape future national defense
strategies in a few important ways regarding coherence,
assessment, and roles and missions. Changing the name of the
Quadrennial Defense Review to the National Defense Strategy was
a crucial first step for coherence. It will mitigate the
cacophony of guidance, which resulted in confusion over
strategic direction.
As a next step, the committee should consider codifying a
vision of the department's hierarchy of strategic guidance
documents, which includes a singular, overarching strategy
broken into classified documents for force development and
force employment.
Legislating an annual assessment of the defense strategy
was a critical step for this committee. Strategies will always
be flawed. Recognizing in which ways they require adjustment is
essential.
As a next step, the committee should consider codifying who
is involved in the assessment and how it is conducted to ensure
a broad, deep, and meaningful review.
The committee has, in its laudable exploration of
Goldwater-Nichols, begun an important conversation about roles
and missions. Broadening the chairman of the Joint Chiefs' role
to become a global integrator, and striking the right balance
between Defense Department, civilians, and military leaders in
producing and implementing strategy, can have profound
consequences for mil-mil and civil-mil relations.
These issues require serious debate, consideration, and
active congressional involvement.
Finally, as the committee looks to the future, I urge you
to consider the recent past. Simply put, we all must reconcile
the inheritance of the last 15-plus years of war. The
opportunity costs are profound. They include a force whose
predominant experience has been countering terrorists and
insurgents; frayed equipment; a readiness crisis; a bias for
ground forces; muddled accountability; a disinterested American
public; a nadir of civil-military relations; and, above all,
neuralgia over the conflicts' loss of blood, treasure, and
inconclusive results.
I fear that all of our successors will look askance if we
do not meaningfully examine this inheritance.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Karlin follows:]
Prepared Statement by Mara Karlin, Ph.D.
Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and Members of the Committee,
thank you for this opportunity to appear before you today to discuss
recommendations for a future National Defense Strategy. The Committee's
leadership on this topic is essential, and I am grateful for the
opportunity to share my expertise and assist with your mission.
Today's global security landscape is littered with national
security challenges spanning the continuum of conflict. I would
characterize it as chaotic and competitive with power increasingly
dynamic and distributed. The nature of national security challenges is
diversifying considerably, and the technological landscape is evolving
in ways that diminish traditional U.S. strengths. While the U.S.
military generally operates under two key principles--fighting ``away''
games and maintaining unfair advantages--both are growing harder. Of
course, domestic disarray works to the advantage of those who seek to
harm America.
defense dilemmas:
As the Defense Department pulls together the 2018 National Defense
Strategy in an effort to outline the ambition and contours of the
future U.S. military, it is wrestling with the following dilemmas, many
of which will remain relevant for years to come:
Conflict Spectrum: The United States military must be
able to credibly confront challenges across the spectrum of conflict,
including nuclear, high-end conventional, gray zone, and counter-
terrorism. These potential challengers include China, Russia, North
Korea, Iran, and violent non-state actors (e.g.; ISIL 2.0; Hizballah).
It should prioritize countering the former while limiting the stressors
of the latter.
Regional Focus: The Asia-Pacific and Europe are the
priority theaters for the United States military as it competes with
rivals; however, the United States cannot remain a global power if it
dismisses other regions. China is the long-term challenge for the
United States given its consequential military modernization over two
decades. While the U.S. military remains preeminent, the imbalance is
worsening. China is making it harder for the United States military to
project power across Asia, and neither time nor geography work to the
United States advantage. \1\ Russia is a medium-term challenge for the
United States. Moscow's use of force in Europe and the Middle East has
been rotten, but more worrying is its military's modernization over the
last decade and its dangerous doctrine euphemistically known as
``escalate to deescalate.'' In reality, its doctrine is ``escalate to
escalate'' as no clear-eyed observer would consider limited nuclear use
de-escalatory. Moreover, the Russian way of war considers society and
military fair game, blurs the line between conflict and peace, and
wields cyber tools to sow doubt and faith in United States
institutions. In the wake of the 2011 uprisings, the Middle East will
remain fragile for decades to come. The counter-terrorism fight there
and in Africa will continue, degrading readiness. Containing the
regional chaos when and where possible, and limiting the toll it takes
on the military, should be a priority.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ RAND's Scorecards is the preeminent unclassified study of
Chinese military modernization. Heginbotham, Eric, et. al. The United
States-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving
Balance of Power, 1996-2017. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015.
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research--reports/RR392.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Today vs. Tomorrow: The U.S. military must be able to
counter near-term threats and exert U.S. presence globally while also
preserving readiness and modernizing the future force to effectively
fight and win future wars. It should prioritize the latter.
Nuclear vs. Conventional Investments: The U.S. military
must maintain a credible nuclear deterrent while not allowing it to
overwhelm investment in conventional capabilities. Nuclear weapons must
not be hived off in budget, strategy, or future force discussions;
trade space between the nuclear and conventional portfolios requires
meaningful adjudication.
Reliance on Allies/Partners: Allies and partners are the
United States' comparative global advantage. The U.S. military will
always fight alongside allies and key partners; however, some will be
more capable than others and the United States will perennially face an
expectations mismatch between our needs and capabilities, and theirs.
Inheritance from 15+ Years of War: The U.S. military must
reconcile all it has inherited from the longest period of war in United
States history, particularly given the inconclusive nature of the
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The opportunity costs of this
inheritance are profound. They include a force whose predominant
experience has been countering terrorists and insurgents; frayed
equipment; a readiness crisis; a bias for ground forces; muddled
accountability, a disinterested American public, a nadir of civil-
military relations; and, above all, neuralgia over the conflicts' loss
of blood, treasure, and limited results.
There is no binary answer to these dilemmas. Instead, the National
Defense Strategy (NDS) will invariably bet and hedge across them. I
urge the Committee to review the National Defense Strategy with an eye
toward efforts to make meaningful, not marginal, change. Everybody--
every service, every combatant command--cannot be a winner, and the
classified version of the NDS should be clear about that tally. The
U.S. military is facing serious modernization shortfalls that will only
grow uglier and it has spent 15+ years in conflicts that look
dramatically different from the future. It needs to catch up--fast. \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Excerpted from author's quote in Tony Bertuca, ``Pentagon team
working National Defense Strategy sizing up return to `two-war'
paradigm,'' Inside Defense, August 30, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To be sure, the resource picture has exacerbated these dilemmas.
This Committee and those of us involved in defense strategy and
budgeting in recent years know the pernicious damage that sequestration
has done. We have a special responsibility to ensure it is not a
partisan issue, but instead a bipartisan effort to rebuild the nation's
defenses in a prudent and practical manner.
force sizing and shaping considerations
The Committee should engage in a classified dialogue with the
Department to ensure it fully understands the future force's abilities.
The Committee should consider the following:
Scenario Selection. While the scenarios used to size and
shape the force are illustrative--not exhaustive--their contours are
crucial. They should align with U.S. national security interests and an
appropriate level of American strategic ambition, incorporating varying
challenges across the conflict spectrum while balancing between
likelihood and consequence.
Scenario Pairing: The U.S. military must be able to fight
and win multiple conflicts. Anything short of that is reckless. A force
that can only wage one conflict is effectively a zero-conflict force
since employing it would require the president to preclude any other
meaningful global engagement. In considering scenario pairing, their
separation in time and distance should be realistic (not least because
the theory behind preparing for simultaneous conflicts hasn't borne
fruit: an opportunistic aggressor has not taken advantage of U.S.
distraction to attack--indeed, the period since 2001 would have been an
ideal opportunity).
Scenario Execution: Scenario analysis must focus on how
the military will fight and win a conflict--jointly. Risk should be
delineated as specifically as possible, and underscore when and where
the force will face ``heart burn'' (an uglier conflict with higher
losses in blood and treasure) and ``heart attack'' (losing the
conflict).
Posture: The United States--thankfully--is generally far
from the conflicts it wages. Maintaining this distance requires the
U.S. military to be much closer, however. Forward posture enables a
rapid response when conflict erupts, can deter rivals or adversaries
from launching a conflict, and magnifies the force's capacity,
capability, and readiness. In the near-term, modest improvements in
forward posture in Asia and Europe will have significant operational
benefits. The United States military must be able to get anywhere
around the globe at any time, which in these regions increasingly
involves poking holes in Chinese and Russian attempts to impede United
States power projection.
Investments: Technology is changing how the U.S.
military fights, but not why it fights nor what it fights for. The U.S.
military must lean forward to exploit the benefits of emerging
technologies, particularly artificial intelligence and autonomy, but it
must do so responsibly by developing a shared understanding of its
prospects and how to field such systems consonant with the American way
of war. Key areas of investment for the future force should include
undersea, long-range strike, combat air force (particularly modernizing
4th generation aircraft and balancing the portfolio more broadly),
counter-unmanned autonomous systems, short range air defenses,
munitions, cyber resilience, and technology that facilitates operations
in contested environments with degraded communications.
strategic guidance coherence and assessment
I commend the Committee for changing the name of the Quadrennial
Defense Review to the National Defense Strategy, thereby making clear
to the entire national security apparatus that it represents the
governing guidance for the Defense Department. This crucial step will
mitigate the cacophony of strategies across the Department's guidance
landscape, which has resulted in confusion over strategic direction,
cherry-picking for parochial agendas, and discordant dialogue on the
strategy's implementation and efficacy. \3\ As a next step, the
Committee should consider codifying a vision of the Department's
hierarchy of strategic guidance documents along with which entity
should lead them. That framework should include a singular overarching
strategy broken into classified documents for force development and
force employment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Mara Karlin and Christopher Skaluba, ``Strategic Guidance for
Countering the Proliferation of Strategic Guidance,'' War on the Rocks,
July 20, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/07/strategic-guidance-
for-counteringthe-proliferation-of-strategic-guidance/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I also commend the Committee for legislating a new requirement for
the secretary of defense to annually assess the strategy and its
implementation. Strategies will always be flawed; recognizing in which
ways they require adjustment is crucial. As a next step, the Committee
should consider codifying who is involved in this assessment and how it
is conducted to ensure a broad, deep, and meaningful review. I
recommend an inclusive approach at the senior level, potentially using
the deputy secretary of defense and vice chairman of the joint chiefs'
regular forum with the Department's leadership (the deputy's management
action group). The assessment should be classified with unclassified
portions released at the secretary of defense's discretion, and should
diagnose the current state of affairs (and how it differs from earlier
expectations), and outline in what ways the Department's trajectory
will now shift.
roles and missions
The Committee has, in its laudable exploration of Goldwater-
Nichols, begun an important conversation about roles and missions. It
should continue to do so, particularly as it takes steps to enhance the
chairman of the joint chiefs of staff's role. Broadening his role to
include global integration can have profound consequences for mil-mil
and civil-mil relations. Similarly, the increasing resonance of the
term ``best military advice'' across the military merits reflection
about how its continued use is influencing defense strategy development
and civil-mil relations. \4\ These issues require serious debate and
consideration, and active Congressional involvement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ James Golby and Mara Karlin, ``Why `Best Military Advice' is
Bad for the Military--and Worse for Civilians,'' Orbis, Winter 2018
(forthcoming).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
questions to consider
As the Committee's Members review the next NDS and consider future
iterations, I urge you to consider the following questions:
1) What are the primary areas of debate and disagreement in
pulling together the NDS? Who are the winners and losers in the NDS?
2) In what ways does the NDS differ from the chairman of the
joint chiefs' National Military Strategy, and why? What's the right
balance between Defense Department civilians and military leaders in
producing and implementing strategy?
3) How does the Department plan to implement the NDS? How does
the Department plan to fulfill the Committee's annual requirement to
assess it and make course corrections as necessary?
4) In what ways does the NDS influence roles and missions?
5) How is the Department assessing the last 15+ years of
conflict and their impact on the force, including its biases,
structures, and processes?
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
General?
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL THOMAS W. SPOEHR, U.S. ARMY,
RET., DIRECTOR OF THE CENTER FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE, HERITAGE
FOUNDATION
General Spoehr. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Reed, distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for the
opportunity.
So, is the Pentagon on the cusp of producing a real defense
strategy, or will the forthcoming National Defense Strategy be
attractive, but no more than another coffee table book to put
in your office?
A real defense strategy----
Chairman McCain. How does it look?
General Spoehr. Based on history, sir, it is not looking
good. I am optimistic about the current leadership, and so I
would like to remain optimistic at this point.
A real defense strategy will provide clear priorities,
identify America's competitive advantages and how to capitalize
them, and how to deal with the world and the enemies it offers
as it is.
Since the 2014 Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Chinese
militarization of islands in the South China Sea starting in
2015, America has been operating without a real defense
strategy, thus the need for a new defense strategy could not be
more acute. But previous efforts have had decidedly mixed
results.
So what would contribute to the creation of a seminal
defense strategy that would guide our efforts for years to
come? Above all else, the strategy must lay out clear choices.
Strategies that articulate that we are going to do this and not
do that. U.S. defense strategies often fail by endeavoring to
be completely inclusive of all parties and valuing their
contributions equally.
Assuming the Congress succeeds in appropriating additional,
desperately needed defense funding in 2018 and beyond, the
Pentagon will still not be able to afford everything on its
vast wish list, as they must contend with crushing needs for
facility repairs and maintenance backlogs. Some capabilities,
some organizations, and some elements of infrastructure are not
as important as others, and a strategy should not pull back
from identifying those.
Turning to the contents of the strategy, as a prisoner of
my education at the Army War College, we like to talk about
strategy in terms of ends, ways, and means, so I will briefly
lay out some thoughts on those.
First, the ends, or the objectives. The strategy should
flow from a clear and understandable goal that the military
needs to be ready and able to defend America's interests with
decisive and overwhelming military strength.
The only logical and easily understood strategic construct
for the United States is to maintain the capability to engage
and win decisively in two major regional contingencies near
simultaneously. The basis for that construct is, fundamentally,
deterrence. If the adversaries know that America can engage in
two major fights with confidence, they will be less inclined to
take advantage of a United States committed elsewhere.
Now I would like to look at the ways, or the actions the
strategy should describe.
First, the strategy should call for more forward presence
for U.S. forces. The end of the Cold War led to massive
reductions in forward presence, but forward-stationed forces
demonstrate a resolve that no other action can make.
Second within the ways, the strategy should not propose
approaches that contradict the very fundamental nature of war.
The Obama Administration attempted this when they wishfully
prescribed in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review that our
forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale,
prolonged stability operations. United States history not
confined to Iraq and Afghanistan reflects that wars have a way
of drawing American forces into prolonged stability operations.
Simply put, it is foolhardy not to prepare and size our
forces for a type of operation which history tells us American
Presidents have repeatedly seen fit to engage the military,
even when it is not specifically prepared for it.
Third, to support the objective to counter terrorist and
violent extremist threats in the Middle East and elsewhere,
America should maintain certain lower end capabilities, such as
non-fifth-generation attack aircraft and advise-and-assist
capabilities, such as the Army's new Security Force Assistance
Brigades, which can allow us to conduct these operations at a
much lower overall cost.
Then finally within the ways, you should be able to see the
key competitive advantages that the United States brings to
win. America's unmatched ability to fight as a joint team
probably would rank as one of those. A well-nourished network
of alliances and partners would be another. I, personally, hope
not to see artificial intelligence, swarms of mini-drones,
robots, railguns, and directed energy weapons proposed as the
keys to our military's future success. That has become very
fashionable in Washington, DC, but these advantages are
transitory, and they cannot be relied upon to provide a long-
term, enduring advantage to the United States.
So I have talked about the ends and the ways. I would like
to close with the means, or the resources, if you will. Nothing
will doom a strategy quicker than an imbalance between the
ends, ways, and the means. That is exactly where we find
ourselves today, with the smallest military we have ever had in
75 years, equipped with rapidly aging weapons, and employed at
a very high operational pace, endeavoring to satisfy
undiminished global defense requirements.
Tragically, due to overuse, underfunding, and inattention,
American military capabilities have now markedly deteriorated
to a dangerously low level.
For example, the Air Force is now short over 1,000 fighter
pilots. Part of the reason for that crisis is dissatisfaction,
stemming from the fact that fighter pilots now fly less sorties
per week than they did during the hollow years of the Carter
Administration.
I draw your attention to the chart that should be attached
to my testimony. It shows the aircraft sorties per month
between now and the Carter Administration. Recent pilot
interviews with over 50 current fighter pilots confirm this
trend continues to today.
Recent tragic ship mishaps--why they are not flying more,
sir?
Chairman McCain. Why they are not happy?
General Spoehr. Most of the reason is they are not doing
the job they signed up to do. They came in to fly. They love to
fly. Now they are being told they will fly, but two times a
week. The rest of the week is taken up with administrative
duties, like the safety officer or the morale officer for their
squadron. That is not what they want to do.
Chairman McCain. So the answer is not money. It is ability
to fly.
General Spoehr. You are right, sir. But, of course, in some
cases, money helps the ability to fly.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
General Spoehr. Yes, sir.
Recent ship collisions, aircraft mishaps, submarine
maintenance backlogs, and an anemic Army modernization program
all reflect the results of what happens when a military tries
to accomplish global objectives with only a fraction of the
necessary resources.
Unfortunately, there are no shortcuts to rebuild the
military. It took us years to get in this position, and it is
going to take us years to get out of it.
I draw your attention to a second handout I provided, which
reflects Heritage research on the number of forces needed to
deal with two major regional contingencies compared to how the
military stands today. You will note, although Heritage
assesses that the Army needs 50 active brigade combat teams,
they only have 31. Of those 31, only 10 are ready, and out of
those 10, only 3 are ready to fight tonight. That is a serious
problem. It reflects a significant risk to America and its
interests.
My most important point that I would like to stress is the
strategy should be budget-informed and not budget-constrained.
There is a big difference.
The strategy should take a realistic look at the national
security threats facing the country and propose realistic
solutions to those threats. While acknowledging that the U.S.
cannot dedicate an infinite amount of resources to national
defense, the strategy should not fall victim to accepting the
views of the Office of Management and Budget or others as to
what can or should be spent on national defense.
Already, some advance the notion that because of structural
economic problems, the United States is unable to spend more on
defense even though spending on the Armed Forces stands at a
historic low percentage of the gross domestic product, 3.3
percent, and a historic low percentage of the Federal budget at
16 percent.
How many times, ladies and gentlemen, have you heard that
the United States spends more than the next six or eight
countries combined? Such arguments, however, fall apart very
quickly upon examination. No other country in the world needs
to accomplish as much as we do with our military. Second, a
huge amount of the difference in defense spending can be traced
down to purchasing power parity and other economic factors,
such as it only costs China about $300 million to build a ship
that in the United States costs over $1.5 billion.
Notwithstanding those facts, national interests and
objectives must always drive America's military requirements
and not cold financial calculations.
In summary, there is room for optimism about the
opportunity the new defense strategy affords. Authoritatively
defining how the U.S. military will protect America's interests
and methods to be used is something that has not been done in
recent memory. Done correctly, it has a great chance of having
put the ends, ways, and means of our strategy back in balance.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of General Spoehr follows:]
Prepared Statement by Lieutenant General Thomas W. Spoehr
Lieutenant General Thomas Spoehr, U.S. Army, retired, served for 36
years in the Army until 2016. As the Director for the Center for
National Defense at The Heritage Foundation, Spoehr leads a team of
defense experts responsible for researching and forming policy
recommendations to promote a strong and enduring U.S. national defense.
As part of their efforts, they publish the annual authoritative Index
of U.S. Military Strength providing a comprehensive assessment of U.S.
military power and are currently engaged in the Rebuilding America's
Military Project (RAMP), designed to inform decisions regarding the
future direction of the U.S. military. While in uniform, Spoehr was
responsible for forming recommendations for the Army's annual fiscal
program, equipment investments and strategies, and the Army's business
strategy. In those roles, he participated in several Quadrennial
Defense Reviews, the development of the DOD's Defense Strategic
Guidance, and other strategies. In 2011 Spoehr served as Deputy
Commanding General-Support for United States Forces Iraq with
responsibilities for transition and logistics. The following is adapted
from an October 3, 2017, article published in War on the Rocks, titled:
``Rules for Getting Defense Strategy Right.''
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before this committee on
this important subject.
So, is the Pentagon on the cusp of generating a real defense
strategy? Or will the forthcoming National Defense Strategy (NDS) be
like so many strategic documents of the past: attractive, but of little
intrinsic value, like coffee-table books?
A real defense strategy would provide clear priorities, identify
America's competitive advantages and how to capitalize on them, and
deal with the world--and the enemies it offers as it is. Since the
August 2014 Russian invasion of the Ukraine, and the Chinese
militarization of man-made islands in the South China Sea in 2015-2016,
the United States has been operating without a relevant defense
strategy. Thus, the need for a new NDS could not be more acute, but
previous efforts have had decidedly mixed results. Will this one
succeed where others have failed? We are about to find out.
Done correctly, the NDS can put the United States on a sound
strategic footing. But a couple of challenges loom.
First, the Pentagon is writing the NDS in parallel with the White
House's development of the National Security Strategy (NSS). Even
though the writing teams are closely collaborating, it would be better
for them to be tackled sequentially.
The NSS should provide the framework for the NDS with sufficient
intervening time for the NSS to be digested and analyzed. Congress
should ensure that future national security and defense strategies are
separated by time in their development.
Second, the Pentagon's senior policy leadership team is only just
starting to arrive, with the Principal Deputy to the Under Secretary
for Policy only arriving in the last couple of weeks and the appointed
Under Secretary and relevant Assistant Secretary still not in place.
There is a capable team in place developing the strategy, but their
leaders missed the opportunity to weigh in on the strategy.
So, what would contribute to the creation of a seminal defense
strategy that can guide our defense efforts for years to come?
Above all else, the NDS must lay out clear choices. As Harvard
Business School professor Michael Porter puts it: ``Strategy is about
choices.'' Strategies articulate that we are going to ``do this, and
not this.'' American defense strategies often fail by endeavoring to be
completely inclusive of all parties and valuing their contributions
equally. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) fell in that
category. Every ``tribe'' successfully inserted their organizations as
a high priority into the document, which consequently was irrelevant
the moment it was signed.
Assuming that Congress succeeds in appropriating additional
desperately needed defense funding in 2018 and beyond, the Pentagon
still will not be able to afford everything on its vast ``wish lists,''
as the military must also contend with crushing needs for facility
repairs and maintenance backlogs. Some capabilities, organizations, and
elements of infrastructure are not as important as others, and the NDS
should not pull back from identifying those that are less critical for
success.
Turning to the contents of the NDS, I am a prisoner of my education
at the Army War College which instills that good strategy is comprised
of ends, ways, and means, each linked and in balance. Just to be clear,
the ``Ends'' represent the objectives you seek to accomplish, ``Ways''
the actions you will employ in the pursuit of the objectives, and
``Means'' the resources you require to execute the strategy. I will
therefore organize my comments in that manner.
first, the ends or objectives
The NDS should flow from a clear and understandable goal: The U.S.
military needs to be ready and able to defend America's interests with
decisive and overwhelming military strength.
The only logical and easily understood strategic construct for the
United States is to maintain the capability to engage and win
decisively in two major regional conflicts near simultaneously.
America's force-sizing construct has changed over time. During the peak
of the Cold War, the United States sought the ability to fight two and
a half wars simultaneously against the Soviet Union, China, and another
smaller adversary. Successive Administrations have modified this
construct based on their assessments of threats, national interests,
priorities, and perceptions of available resources. The real basis for
the two-war construct is deterrence. If adversaries know that America
can engage in two major fights with confidence, they will be less
inclined to take advantage of the United States or an ally committed
elsewhere.
Fortunately, the United States need not size its forces to take on
an adversary the size of the Soviet Union but instead a smaller, albeit
still very dangerous and capable, Russia. The bad news is that the
United States also needs to stand ready to deter and defeat China,
which is making massive investments in its military forces and has
chosen belligerence in Asia.
The NDS must not overlook the need to continue to remain engaged to
counter terrorist and violent extremist threats in the Middle East,
Africa, and South and Southeast Asia, as well as confront rogue regimes
such as North Korea and Iran.
when considering the ways, or the actions and methods to be employed
First, the NDS should call for more forward presence by U.S.
forces. The end of the Cold War led to massive reductions in the United
States military posture in Europe and elsewhere. These reductions were
not based on an empirical or strategic review of U.S. force
requirements, but rather on two factors: the opportunity to save money
and the politically less contentious choice to close overseas military
installations, not ones at home. Then-European Command Commander
General Philip Breedlove testified as much in 2015: ``[P]ermanently
stationed forces are a force multiplier that rotational deployments can
never match.'' If our goal is to deter war, we must demonstrate both
our will and capability. Forward stationed forces demonstrate both to
the degree that no other action can match. U.S. forces stationed abroad
should be configured, trained, and equipped to provide a real, versus
symbolic, warfighting capability.
Secondly, the NDS should not propose approaches that contradict the
very nature of war. The Obama Administration attempted this when it
wishfully prescribed in the 2014 QDR that ``our forces will no longer
be sized to conduct large-scale prolonged stability operations.''
United States history, not confined to Iraq and Afghanistan, reflects
the way wars have a way of drawing American forces into prolonged
stability operations. Critics correctly argue that some of these
stability operations were conducted by choice and that America should
be more judicious in deciding whether to enter into future conflicts
with the potential for stability operations. While appealing, such
reasoned arguments ignore the reality that modern conflict usually
presents either gradually, like Vietnam, or as crisis, such as Saddam's
invasion of Kuwait, and in neither case allowing for extended
deliberation of questions like ``How does this end?''
To put it simply, it is foolhardy not to prepare or size our forces
for a type of operation which history tells us American presidents have
repeatedly seen fit to engage the military, even when not specifically
prepared for it.
Third, to support the objective to counter terrorist and violent
extremist elements in the Middle East and elsewhere, the United States
should maintain certain ``low-end'' capabilities such as non-fifth
generation attack aircraft and Advise and Assist capabilities such as
the Army's new Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFAB) in order to
conduct these type operations at lower cost.
Finally, within the strategy, Washington should be able to see the
key competitive advantages that the United States intends to employ to
win. America's unmatched ability to fight as a joint team certainly
would rank as one. A strong and well-nourished network of alliances and
partners would certainly be another. I hope not to see artificial
intelligence, swarms of drones, robots, railguns, and directed energy
weapons proposed as the keys to our military's future success--as has
become fashionable--because the advantages those and other technologies
convey are transitory. They are important, but are not key U.S.
advantages for the long haul.
the means must be in balance to the ends and ways
Nothing will doom a strategy faster than an imbalance between the
ends, ways, and means. This is the situation we find ourselves in
today, with the smallest military we have had in seventy-five years,
equipped with rapidly aging weapons, and employed at a very high
operational pace endeavoring to satisfy our global defense objectives.
The NDS should chart the path to the development and maintenance of
a strong military with the ability to dominate likely opponents in all
domains: land, air, sea, space, and cyber. Tragically, due to overuse,
underfunding, and inattention, American military capabilities have now
markedly deteriorated to a dangerously low level. Fighter pilots now
fly less sorties per week than they did during the ``hollow'' years of
the Carter Administration. Recent tragic ship collisions, aircraft
mishaps, fighter pilot shortages, and reports on dilapidated shipyards
show what happens when a military tries to accomplish global objectives
with only a fraction of the necessary resources.
The NDS should acknowledge the growing gap between the military's
needs and what the nation has seen fit to resource. There are no
shortcuts to accomplish the rebuilding that is now necessary. The NDS
should acknowledge the true state of the military as it relates to the
broad requirements of protecting our national interests.
In that regard, it is critical that the NDS should be budget-
informed, not budget-constrained. There is a big difference. The
strategy should take a realistic view of the national security threats
facing the country and propose realistic ways and means to deter and
defeat those threats. While acknowledging the United States cannot
dedicate an infinite amount of resources to national defense, the
strategy should not fall victim to the trap of accepting the Office of
Management and Budget's views as the upper limit for what the country
should or can spend on its defense.
Already some seek to advance the notion that because of our
structural economic problems the United States will be unable to
increase defense spending, even though the spending on its armed forces
stands at a historically low percentage of both gross domestic product
(3.3 percent) and overall federal spending (16 percent). Skeptics
employ superficial spending comparisons between nations to argue the
United States already spends enough on defense.
How many times, for example, have you heard that the United States
spends more on its military than the next seven or eight countries
combined? You might take from that observation that Washington is
spending too much hard-earned taxpayer money on a bloated military, but
you would be wrong. Such arguments fall apart quickly on examination.
First, there is no other nation in the world that needs to accomplish
as much with its military as the United States. Washington depends on a
globally deployed force that upholds the pillars of the international
order by defending access to the commons, protecting trade routes (that
benefit the American people more than anyone else), and deterring those
who seek to disrupt peace and security. Therefore, the U.S. military
must be superior everywhere we are challenged. Second, some of the
difference in spending among nations can be traced to purchasing power
parity. For example, a ship that costs $1.2 billion to produce in the
United States may cost only $300 million in China. Notwithstanding
these factors, national interests and objectives must drive America's
military requirements, not cold financial calculations.
The NDS should find the balance between identifying the resources
that are required and acknowledging that tough resourcing choices are
still inevitable.
summary
It is a military maxim that nothing happens until someone is told
to do something. The NDS should therefore be directive, not just
descriptive. Strategic objectives should lend themselves to tracking,
and appropriate individuals should be held accountable. For example, if
one objective is to increase readiness, the strategy should specify how
much of a gain, by when, and who is responsible.
When Congress created the requirement for the NDS, it specified
that it should be classified, with an unclassified summary. That
direction is liberating, as the NDS can be more narrowly focused than
if it were forced to serve as both strategy and public relations tool.
Hopefully, the Pentagon embraces that aspect.
There is room for optimism about the opportunity the NDS affords.
Authoritatively defining how the U.S. military will protect America's
interests and the methods to be employed is something that has not been
done in recent memory. Done correctly, it has a great chance of helping
put the military back on a path to being a formidable force for the
foreseeable future.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
Mr. Ochmanek?
STATEMENT OF DAVID A. OCHMANEK, SENIOR DEFENSE RESEARCH
ANALYST, RAND CORPORATION
Mr. Ochmanek. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed.
I appreciate the opportunity to share with you insights about
what my colleagues and I at RAND have been learning from our
analyses and gaming.
DOD's development of a new defense strategy is an
opportunity to reverse adverse trends in the national security
environment and to develop a plan of action to reverse them.
But even a perfectly formulated strategy and plan will do
little to ameliorate our problems unless the department is
given more resources soon and on a sustained and predictable
basis.
Put simply, our forces today, and for some time, have been
given too little money with which to prepare for the missions
assigned to them.
You were all here when Chairman Martin Dempsey 4 years ago
testified on his views of the Quadrennial Defense Review from
2014. This is what he said: In the next 10 years, I expect the
risk of interstate conflict in East Asia to rise, the
vulnerability of our platforms and basing to increase, our
technology to erode, instability to persist in the Middle East,
and threats posed by violent extremist organizations to endure.
That was not a very optimistic view of the future, but that
was in January of 2014, before Russia had invaded Ukraine,
before the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) had overrun
large parts of Syria and Iraq, and before it was decided that
we were going to leave large contingents of United States
combat forces in Afghanistan.
So we were on the ragged edge in January 2014. The security
environment has deteriorated since then. Yet our resources are
still constrained by the Budget Control Act of 2011.
It should come as no surprise that, again and again, when
we run war games against China and Russia, United States forces
lack the capabilities they need to win. That is where we are
today.
Chairman McCain. The gap is widening.
Mr. Ochmanek. The gap is widening, without question.
Your invitation letter to this hearing asked us to provide
views on the new force-planning construct. That is easily done.
Top priority should be given to ensuring that United States
forces have the capability to defeat any single adversary,
including Russia and China. That probably sounds obvious, but
it is not actually what we are doing today. We do not set that
as a priority.
As resources permit, we should also have the capacity to
defeat a second adversary elsewhere. But pretending that you
can spread the peanut butter across all of these challenges and
have an adequately modernized force for the future is, as we
have seen, an illusion.
Again, the hard part, and the part that in the end will
determine the success or failure of our defense strategy and
program, will be generating the money needed to build a force
that can meet these requirements, and then applying those
resources in ways that do the most to move the needle against
our most capable adversaries.
The challenges that our adversaries pose are serious, but
they are not intractable. Just as our gaming shows that we lack
important capabilities with the programmed force, it also shows
that we have real opportunities to change that, not through
investments in highly exotic things like artificial
intelligence and robots, but here-and-now weapons that are
either available for purchase or very far along in the
development process. Let me give you some examples.
So to counter the anti-access/area denial threat, our
forces really need to be able to do two things. One, from the
outset of a war, reach into these contested land, maritime, and
air areas and kill things. Right? Kill the amphibious fleet
that could be invading Taiwan or the 30 battalion tactical
groups that could be coming from Russia into the Baltic States.
We have options to do that. The Long-Range Anti-Ship
Missile is one. Guided anti-armor weapons like the Sensor Fuzed
Weapon, which existed 20 years ago but we are only buying in
very small numbers, is another way to, again, move that needle.
Two, we need to strengthen our military posture in key
theaters. I agree with what the general said. You cannot fight
Russia and China with a purely expeditionary posture. You need
more combat power for it, particularly heavy armored forces on
NATO's eastern flank, but also stocks of advanced munitions,
mature command-and-control and communications infrastructures,
and more survivable bases.
Our bases could be subject to attack by hundreds of
accurate ballistic and cruise missiles. We have techniques and
investment priorities to address those threats, but we have not
had the resources to actually put them into the field.
Number three is improve capabilities to rapidly suppress
and destroy the enemy's air defenses. No one wants to fight in
a battlefield where you do not have air superiority. Our forces
in our games against Russia and China do not have that in the
opening phases of these wars, and we need to reinvest in ways
to kill the most sophisticated surface-to-air missiles, things
we lack today.
Finally, our forces have to be equipped and trained to
enable them to win the fight for information superiority. China
and Russia are investing heavily in capabilities that can
improve their understanding of the dynamic battlespace and to
deny us that understanding. Our forces have to have more
survivable sensor platforms, communication links, cyber
defenses, and cyber offensive systems.
Again, plenty of options exist for meeting these needs. It
is a question of investment.
The good news is that, for the most part, the additions to
the defense program that are called for are not major platforms
or new force structures, and they are not exotic, futuristic
Third Offset technologies.
The greatest leverage comes from things like advanced
munitions; more robust enablers, such as intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems and communication
links; posture, which is about where we place our assets and
how survivable our base infrastructures are. These sorts of
things tend to cost a lot less than major platforms and
increases in force structure.
To close, I believe we have it within our means,
technically, operationally, and financially, to field forces
that are capable of confronting even our most capable
adversaries with the prospect of defeat, if they choose
aggression. This is the gold standard of deterrence, and it is
the standard to which we should aspire.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify and I look forward
to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ochmanek follows:]
Prepared Statement by David Ochmanek \1\, The RAND Corporation \2\
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\1\ The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are
the author's alone and should not be interpreted as representing those
of the RAND Corporation or any of the sponsors of its research.
\2\ The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops
solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities
throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more
prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public
interest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Good morning Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, members of the
committee, and staff. I appreciate the opportunity to share with you
insights that my colleagues and I have gained from our analyses of
emerging threats to U.S. military operations. Nine months ago, I had
the honor of appearing before this committee to testify on the state of
the U.S. armed forces' ability to counter threats posed by the nation's
adversaries. On that occasion, like others who joined me on that day, I
pointed to some serious and growing gaps that war gaming and analysis
have identified in the capabilities of U.S. forces, voicing concerns
about the eroding credibility of U.S. security guarantees in the face
of these unfavorable trends. In the intervening months, I have seen
little to change my assessment of the situation.
The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD)'s efforts to develop a new
National Defense Strategy (NDS) and accompanying guidance to components
for force development are opportunities to reverse these trends, and it
will be important that the Department get these right. But even a
perfectly articulated NDS will do little to ameliorate the problem
unless the Department is given more resources soon and on a sustained
and predictable basis. Put simply, U.S. forces today and for some time
have been given too little money with which to prepare for the missions
assigned to them.
u.s. military capabilities: a summary assessment \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Research and analysis upon which this testimony draws is
documented, among other places, in David Ochmanek, Peter A. Wilson,
Brenna Allen, John Speed Meyers, and Carter C. Price, U.S. Military
Capabilities and Forces for a Dangerous World: Rethinking the U.S.
Approach to Force Planning, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation,
RR1782-IRD, Forthcoming.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The security environment in which U.S. forces are operating and for
which they must prepare is, in important ways, more complex and more
demanding than the familiar post-Cold War world in which most of us
have formed our expectations about what constitutes an appropriate
level of investment in military power. \4\ To wit:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Research and analysis upon which this testimony draws is
documented, among other places, in David Ochmanek, Peter A. Wilson,
Brenna Allen, John Speed Meyers, and Carter C. Price, U.S. Military
Capabilities and Forces for a Dangerous World: Rethinking the U.S.
Approach to Force Planning, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation,
RR1782-RC, forthcoming.
United States force planning prior to Russia's attacks on
Ukraine did not take account of the need to deter large-scale
aggression against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
DOD has not moved quickly enough to provide the
capabilities and basing posture called for to meet the manifold
challenges posed by China's rapidly modernizing armed forces.
The prospect of nuclear weapons in the hands of North
Korea and, potentially, Iran poses challenges for which United States
forces do not currently have satisfactory answers.
United States forces face the prospect of a
geographically widespread campaign of indefinite duration against the
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Al Qaeda, and other violent
extremist groups.
As these threats have emerged and U.S. forces have engaged in
unremitting combat for 16 years, the nation has not committed the
resources called for to build and sustain the capabilities that the
forces need if they are to succeed in this more demanding environment.
As a result, the United States now fields forces that are, at once,
larger than needed to fight a single major war, failing to keep pace
with the modernizing forces of great-power adversaries, poorly postured
to meet key challenges in Europe and East Asia, and insufficiently
trained and ready to get the most operational utility from many of
DOD's active component units. Put more starkly, RAND's war games and
simulations suggest that U.S. forces could, under plausible
assumptions, lose the next war they are called upon to fight. \5\ In
light of this, it is a matter of increasing urgency that the nation
invest in new military capabilities, posture, and operational concepts
designed to meet the manifold challenges presented by U.S. adversaries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ For a succinct assessment of the military balance between
Russia and NATO and the prospects for a defense of the Baltics, see
David A. Shlapak and Michael W. Johnson, Reinforcing Deterrence on
NATO's Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics, Santa
Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1253-A, 2016. For an assessment of
trends in China's armed forces and their implications for United States
defense strategy and planning, see David Ochmanek, Sustaining United
States Leadership in the Asia-Pacific Region: Why a Strategy of Direct
Defense Against Antiaccess and Area Denial Threats Is Desirable and
Feasible, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, PE-142-OSD, 2015.
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Peer Adversaries and A2/AD Threats
The means that the United States' most capable adversaries--China
and Russia--use to create those challenges (ballistic and cruise
missiles, sophisticated air defenses, anti-satellite weapons, electro-
magnetic and cyber attacks, and so forth) are well known and do not
need to be repeated here. It is, however, important to understand how
U.S. and allied forces can and should be evolving their capabilities,
posture, and operational concepts to address these challenges.
Our research points to four independent but complementary lines of
capability development:
1. Damage, disrupt, and destroy the enemy's operational centers of
gravity in contested domains. Specifically, this means finding ways to
``reach into'' contested airspace and maritime zones to locate,
identify, engage, and attack the surface ships that would be part of a
Chinese invasion of Taiwan or the mechanized ground forces that would
constitute the spearhead of a Russian invasion of the Baltic states.
U.S. adversaries seek to use their anti-access/area denial (A2/AD)
capabilities to create a window of opportunity during which they hold
U.S. combat power at bay so that they can conduct campaigns of
aggression. The United States must be able to deny them this sanctuary
from the outset of a conflict, even before U.S. forces have suppressed
the enemy's A2/AD threats. This approach differs in important ways from
the joint operational concept that U.S. forces have used successfully
against less capable adversaries since Operation Desert Storm in 1991,
and implementing the approach will require new capabilities.
2. Strengthen U.S. military posture in key theaters. Since
Operation Desert Storm, U.S. forces have become accustomed to relying
heavily on an expeditionary approach to power projection, in which the
vast bulk of U.S. combat power employed in a conflict is deployed
forward following warning or the actual initiation of hostilities. This
approach is less appropriate for theaters in which U.S. and allied
forces face threats from highly capable adversaries, especially in NATO
member countries in Europe, where heavy ground forces will play
important roles in an effective defense. Strengthening posture also
means investing in base infrastructure that is more resilient in the
face of large-scale attacks by accurate ballistic and cruise missiles.
3. Improve capabilities to suppress and destroy enemy air
defenses. In every conflict since Korea, United States forces have
operated virtually without regard to the threat of enemy air attacks
and have enjoyed freedom of maneuver in enemy airspace, allowing them
to observe and attack targets of value to the enemy. Dense arrays of
modern, mobile, surface-to-air missile systems and modern fighter
aircraft give China and Russia the ability to deny United States forces
this crucial advantage, at least during the critical opening phase of a
conflict, and U.S. capabilities to counter these have not kept pace
with the threat. Adversaries' heavy investments in these defenses
reflect their fear of what modern air forces with precision weapons can
do on the battlefield. Accordingly, fielding improved capabilities to
suppress enemy air defenses should have outsized effects on deterrence
of aggression.
4. Win the fight for information superiority. Recognizing the
critical importance of accurate, timely information and agile command
and control in modern military operations, U.S. adversaries are
investing heavily in capabilities intended to improve their
understanding of the battlefield and to deny the United States the
same. These capabilities include space-based and airborne sensors,
robust communication systems and command facilities, electronic jamming
systems, anti-satellite weapons, and cyber weapons. This makes it
imperative that DOD invest in more survivable sensor platforms and
communication links, cyber defenses, and offensive systems. U.S.
forces, which have become accustomed to operating in environments that
pose no threats to their information superiority, must also find ways
to operate effectively in disrupted, ``low bandwidth'' environments.
Nuclear-Armed Regional Adversaries
Repeated war games consistently show that deterring a nuclear-armed
regional adversary, such as North Korea, poses unique challenges that
make it anything but a lesser-included case of deterring a more capable
adversary, such as Russia or China. Ironically, the relative weakness
of North Korea's conventional forces means that, in a conflict or deep
crisis, a North Korean leader may perceive that he and his regime have
little to lose in using nuclear weapons against military targets,
making it difficult to deter such use through the threat of retaliation
in-kind. This reality means that U.S. and allied forces are driven to
find ways to improve capabilities to prevent nuclear-armed regional
adversaries from effectively using their nuclear weapons. \6\ Given the
challenges associated with locating and destroying weapons in deep
underground facilities, hunting and destroying dispersed mobile
missiles, and intercepting ballistic missiles once launched, the United
States should not have high confidence in its nuclear prevention
capabilities today.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ See David Ochmanek and Lowell H. Schwartz, The Challenge of
Nuclear-Armed Regional Adversaries, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND
Corporation, MG-671-AF, 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Salafist-Jihadis and Other Violent Extremist Groups
Even as U.S. forces are faced with the need to quickly and
significantly ``raise their game'' vis-a-vis peer and nuclear-armed
regional adversaries, they must also continue with the ongoing fight
against the most threatening violent extremist groups, including the
Taliban in Afghanistan, ISIS in its various manifestations, and Al
Qaeda. A central tenet of U.S strategy against such groups has been to
keep them under constant pressure over long periods of time, so as to
keep them off-balance and to prevent them from effectively recruiting
and expanding their influence and power. Extensive experience in
battling such groups over the past 16 years has allowed U.S. and
partner forces to devise increasingly effective approaches to defeating
quasi-states, such as ISIS, and taking leadership cadres off of the
battlefield through targeted capture or kill operations. Key
capabilities in these fights going forward will be specialized forces
(often from the special operations community) to train, advise, and
assist partner forces; robust means for gathering and analyzing
intelligence about adversary groups; and more-affordable precision
attack capabilities that can dwell close to areas of ongoing operations
and deliver on-call fires against emerging targets. \7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ David Ochmanek, Andrew R. Hoehn, James T. Quinlivan, Seth G.
Jones, and Edward L. Warner III, America's Security Deficit: Addressing
the Imbalance Between Strategy and Resources in a Turbulent World:
Strategic Rethink, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1223-RC,
2015, pp. 26-27.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
crafting the national defense strategy and forces to implement it
Individually and in combination, the challenges outlined earlier
constitute an extremely demanding set of requirements for this nation's
armed forces. Those tasked with developing the new NDS and the forces
to implement it surely understand that a ``business as usual'' approach
to planning and resourcing U.S. forces will not suffice. New priorities
must be chosen and additional resources, focused on investments of
greatest relevance to those priorities, must be made available if the
nation is to reverse the decline in the credibility of its conventional
deterrent.
As a foundational step in this endeavor, DOD's leaders should
consider directing each component to build its force so that it can, as
part of a joint and combined operation, defeat any single adversary,
including the most capable of them. This may seem an obvious
requirement, but the fact is that, today, the United States should not
have confidence that the joint force can meet it. For several years
now, gaming and analysis of plausible future warfights have revealed
serious and growing shortfalls in the capabilities of programmed U.S.
forces. If not reversed, these adverse trends will have profound and
unavoidable strategic consequences.
A Revised Force Planning Construct
The following force planning construct would be consistent with the
approach advocated here:
1. Defend the homeland.
2. Deter and, if necessary, defeat aggression by any single
adversary state.
3. Sustain operations against selected violent extremist groups.
4. Deter opportunistic aggression by a second state adversary.
Inherent in the construct would be the requirement that DOD
components resource each of the four elements in descending order of
priority. That is, they would be directed to accept risk in elements 3
and 4 until it was judged that sufficient resources had been devoted to
elements 1 and 2 to achieve a reasonable degree of confidence that
those elements could be achieved.
The key to making this approach work is to size and equip each
major force element--Army combat brigades, Air Force and Marine Corps
fighter squadrons, Navy carrier strike groups, and so forth--so that it
can meet the demands posed by the most stressing scenario for that
force element. As examples, the Army's armored brigade combat teams
would be sized to meet the demands of their biggest fight (a Korea
scenario) but equipped to successfully combat their most sophisticated
foe (Russian ground forces), USAF fighter squadrons would be sized and
equipped to prevail against the largest and most capable threat they
face (Chinese forces), and so on. This would have the effect of
promoting force modernization as the highest priority for resourcing
while ensuring adequate capacity for at least one war--something that
has been lacking in U.S. force planning heretofore.
Investment Priorities
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the
Strategic Capabilities Office, service labs, and industry are
developing new capabilities that can address many, if not most, of the
operational challenges facing U.S. forces today and in the future. Much
can be done to reverse adverse trends by investing in near-term, here-
and-now systems and adapting key aspects of established operational
concepts. Attached at the end of this statement is a table summarizing
the types of military capabilities that gaming and analysis suggest can
do the most to strengthen the joint force's ability to defeat
aggression by the four state adversaries of greatest concern and to
support a sustained campaign against violent extremist organizations.
\8\ Highlights from that list, keyed to the four lines of capability
development and the non-peer adversaries outlined earlier, are as
follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ The research on which this testimony is drawn focused on
understanding and countering the threats posed by state adversaries
(such as China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran) and Salafist-Jihadi
groups. My work has not delved deeply into issues of the readiness of
U.S. forces or the stresses that high operational tempos may be
imposing on people and units. I have also not addressed the need to
recapitalize U.S. nuclear forces. The absence of recommendations in
these areas should not be taken as implying that investments there are
not warranted.
Damage, disrupt, destroy the enemy's operational centers
of gravity in contested domains. Develop and field sensors that can
survive and operate in the A2/AD environment. Examples include
unattended ground- and sea-based sensors; small, swarming unmanned
aerial vehicles; and stealthy air vehicles. Accelerate and expand
procurement of standoff weapons, such as the Joint Air-to-Surface
Standoff Missile--Extended Range (JASSM-ER), the Long-Range Anti-Ship
Missile (LRASM), and powered dispensers with guided anti-armor
munitions so that long-range bombers can effectively and survivably
attack key enemy targets from the outset of a conflict. Aggressively
explore options for lower-cost weapon delivery from undersea (e.g.,
large unmanned underwater vehicles). Defer plans to retire selected
cluster weapons until cost-effective replacements are available in
sufficient numbers.
Strengthen U.S. military posture in key theaters. Station
more U.S. heavy armored forces and artillery along NATO's northeastern
flank. Increase forward-based stocks of preferred munitions in both the
U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. European Command areas of responsibility.
Improve the resiliency of air bases with investments in low-cost
shelters, fuel bladders, and other passive protection measures, decoys,
and modern cruise missile defenses (e.g., Indirect Fire Protection
Capability Increment 2).
Improve capabilities to suppress and destroy enemy air
defenses. Accelerate development and fielding of a longer-range, fast-
flying, anti-radiation missile and a longer-range air-to-air missile.
Explore new concepts for disposable, stand-in jamming systems and
swarming, autonomous weapons.
Win the fight for information superiority. Continue to
explore ways to use civil-sector communications and imaging satellite
constellations in military operations. Continue to develop and test,
and begin to field, new systems that can enhance the resiliency of
selected military satellites, including through improved situational
awareness, maneuver, stealth, active defense, redundancy, and
responsive launch. Invest selectively in airborne and terrestrial
backups to key space-based capabilities. Expand anti-satellite
capacity, especially in systems (such as jammers and lasers) that can
disrupt or disable adversary satellites without creating debris. Added
investments in both defensive and offensive cyber capabilities can help
here. However, the gaming and analysis that I have seen provide little
hope that cyber alone can be decisive in defeating conventional
military aggression if deterrence fails.
Prevent nuclear use. Develop or adapt an air-to-air
missile and associated sensor suite for intercepting theater ballistic
missiles in boost-phase. Continue to explore options for improved
discover and tracking of nuclear weapons and mobile delivery vehicles.
Continue investments to improve the reliability of ground-based
interceptors to protect the United States.
Defeat Salafist-Jihadis and other violent extremist
groups. Continue to expand intelligence collection and analysis
capacity. Acquire two to three wings of light reconnaissance-attack
aircraft for more cost-effective air operations in permissive and semi-
permissive air defense environments. Continue to grow the end strength
of special operations forces (SOF) at a deliberate pace to ease the
tempo of operations experienced by these warriors.
contributions of allies and partners
Obviously, countering the threats that potential adversary states
pose is not solely a problem for the United States. In fact, it would
be unwise and infeasible for the United States to attempt to address
these challenges unilaterally. Allies and partners, particularly those
directly or indirectly threatened by adversary activities or in the
same region, have a strong interest in ensuring that their forces can
impose a high price on an aggressor and contribute effectively to
combined regional operations that the United States might lead.
A host of options--many of them rather low-cost and low-tech--are
available to allies and partners seeking to increase their
contributions to the common defense. Taiwan, for example, could
significantly strengthen its defenses against an invasion by investing
in short-range unmanned aerial vehicles, anti-ship cruise missiles,
shallow water mines, rocket artillery, mobile short-range air defenses,
and communications jamming gear. \9\ The government of the Philippines
could help U.S. forces to increase the resiliency of its base structure
by granting access to air bases on its territory and providing host
nation support services to deployed forces. The Baltic states could
invest in border monitoring and secure communication systems, while
other NATO allies could raise the readiness levels of their armored
maneuver forces. \10\ U.S. force planners should work closely with
allies and partners to identify ways in which their planned investments
and those of the United States can maximize complementarity and
interoperability.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Michael J. Lostumbo, ``A New Taiwan Strategy to Adapt to PLA
Precision Strike Capabilities,'' in Roger Cliff, Phillip C. Saunders,
and Scott Harold, eds., New Opportunities and Challenges for Taiwan's
Security, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, CF-279-OSD, 2011, pp.
127-136.
\10\ Andrew Radin, Hybrid Warfare in the Baltics: Threats and
Potential Responses, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1577-
AF, 2017, pp. 33-34.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I will also note that the additions to the defense program
described here are not, by and large, major platforms or new force
structures. Rather, what emerges from our gaming and analysis is the
value of investments in such things as advanced munitions; more-robust
enablers (such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
systems; communication links; and command and control nodes); posture,
which is about the placement of assets and the resiliency of base
infrastructures; and novel operating concepts. This is not to say that
adding force structure in some areas would not have value. Surely, many
elements of the force (not only SOF) have experienced excessively high
operations tempos. But, in general, investing in new ways to equip,
enable, and employ U.S. forces seems to offer the greatest leverage in
restoring credible conventional deterrence.
It is also worth noting that most of the force enhancements
highlighted here are not high-tech. Many, such as fuel bladders and
expedient aircraft shelters, are quite low-tech. Others (e.g., JASSM-
ER, guided anti-armor munitions, stationing additional ground forces on
NATO's eastern flank) are here-and-now capabilities in which
investments could be increased. Still others (e.g., longer-range anti-
radiation and air-to-air missiles, better exploitation of civil sector
satellites) involve adapting or integrating existing technologies into
new systems or new ways of operating. In short, we need not and should
not wait for the maturation of exotic new technologies in the Third
Offset or other long-term research and development initiatives before
investing in things that can make major differences in the ability of
U.S. forces to deter and defeat aggression by even the most capable
adversaries.
conclusion
The adverse trends in the relative military capabilities of U.S.
and adversary forces outlined here have been known to the defense
analytic community for some years now. Gaming and analysis have yielded
growing insight into promising approaches to addressing many of the
resulting challenges. The two things that are needed now are money and
focus--in particular, additional money to allow the Department to move
swiftly to develop, acquire, and field new systems and postures and a
focus on fielding capabilities that can make the greatest and most
enduring contributions to a robust defensive posture vis-a-vis China,
Russia, and other adversaries. The Trump Administration and the 115th
Congress have the opportunity to rectify the strategy-forces mismatch
that has arisen over the past several years and put the United States
back on a path toward fielding forces that can defeat any adversary.
One note of caution: Fielding the sorts of capabilities I have
highlighted here should not, in most cases, be expected to restore to
U.S. forces the degree of overmatch that they enjoyed against regional
adversaries of the past, such as Iraq and Serbia. Any major conflict
involving China, Russia, or North Korea is bound to be a costly and
bloody affair. But I believe that it is within the United States'
means--technologically, operationally, and fiscally--to field forces
capable of confronting even the most capable adversaries with the
prospect of defeat if they choose aggression. That is the gold standard
of deterrence, and it is the standard to which I believe the United
States should aspire.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear before this
committee. I look forward to answering your questions.
Table. Priority Enhancements to U.S. Forces and Posture
China------------------------------ Accelerated development and-
fielding of a longer-range, fast-
flying, radar-homing air-tosurface
missile* and a longer-range air-to-
air missile*
Forward-based stocks of air-
delivered munitions, including
cruise missiles (e.g., JASSM and
JASSM-ER, LRASM)*, surface-to-air
missile suppression missiles (e.g.,
homing anti-radiation missile,
miniature air launched decoy)*, and
air-to-air missiles (e.g., AIM-9X
and AIM-120)*
Prepositioned equipment and
sustainment for ten to 15 platoons
of modern short-range air defense
systems (SHORADS) for cruise missile
defense
Additional base resiliency
investments, including airfield
damage repair assets and expedient
aircraft shelters, and personnel and
equipment to support highly
dispersed operations
Accelerated development of
the Next-Generation Jammer* . A high-
altitude, low-observable unmanned
aerial vehicle system*
More-resilient space-based
capabilities (achieved by dispersing
functions across increased numbers
of satellites and increasing the
maneuverability, stealth, and
``hardness'' of selected assets)*
Counter-space systems,
including kinetic and nonkinetic
(e.g., lasers, jammers) weapons*
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Russia *Items listed under
``China'' marked with an asterisk
Three heavy brigade combat
teams and their sustainment and
support elements forward based or
rotationally deployed in or near the
Baltic states
One Army fires brigade
permanently stationed in Poland,
with 30-day stock of artillery
rounds, and one additional fires
brigade set prepositioned
Forward-based stocks of
artillery and multiple launch rocket
system rounds, plus anti-tank guided
missiles
Forward-based stocks of air-
delivered anti-armor munitions
(e.g., SFW/P3I)
Eight to 12 platoons of
SHORADS forces stationed or
rotationally deployed in NATO Europe
Increased readiness and
employability of mechanized ground
forces of key NATO allies
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Iran Improved, forward-deployed
mine countermeasures
High-capacity close-in
defenses for surface vessels
------------------------------------------------------------------------
North Korea Improved ISR systems for
tracking nuclear weapons and
delivery systems
Exploratory development of
boost-phase ballistic missile
intercept systems
Continued investments to
improve the reliability and
effectiveness of the ground-based
intercept system to protect the
United States
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Salafist-Jihadi Improved intelligence
collection and analysis capabilities
and capacity
Groups Light reconnaissance and
attack aircraft
Gradually expanded SOF end
strength toward a goal of 75,000-
80,000
Powered exoskeleton, also
known as the Talon Project
Swarming and autonomous
unmanned vehicles
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SOURCE: Ochmanek et al., forthcoming.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
Dr. Mahnken?
STATEMENT OF THOMAS G. MAHNKEN, Ph.D., PRESIDENT AND CHIEF
EXECUTIVE OFFICER, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS
Dr. Mahnken. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
invitation to appear before you today to discuss the National
Defense Strategy (NDS).
The National Defense Strategy can serve as a powerful tool
to focus and organize the Department of Defense to ensure that
the United States maintains and bolsters its competitive
advantages in an increasingly challenging environment. In the
brief time I have, I would like to touch on six topics that the
NDS should address and then conclude with one topic that
undergirds them all.
First, the NDS should address the threats and challenges
the United States faces and determine the priority for
addressing them.
As has previously been mentioned, we find ourselves today,
once again, in a period of great-power competition with an
increasing possibility of great-power war. It is the most
consequential threat that we face, and failure to deter,
failure to prepare adequately for it, would have dire
consequences for the United States, our allies, and global
order. Because of that, I believe that preparing for great-
power competition and conflict should have the highest
priority.
At the same time, we face increasingly capable regional
foes, to include North Korea and Iran. So while great-power
competition and conflict should have the highest place, we also
need to stress test our forces against these regional threats.
Finally, now and for the foreseeable future, we will need
to wage a global counterinsurgency campaign against jihadist
terrorist groups. We need to acknowledge that reality and plan
accordingly.
Second, the NDS should provide both a global and a regional
look at U.S. defense strategy and set priorities there.
The reality is that the United States is a global power
with interests that span the world. Moreover, we face
competitors who are active not only in their backyards, in
their home regions, but also far beyond them. China is building
up its military not only in the Western Pacific but also is
active in the Middle East and Africa. Russia is not only using
force in Ukraine but also in Syria.
That having been said, not all regions carry the same
strategic weight.
Asia's strategic weight continues to grow, and it is
increasingly the locus of economic, military, and political
activity for the world. In my view, it is the most
consequential region.
Europe is also extremely important. Its strategic salience
has grown as threats to it and to American interests there have
increased.
The United States cannot afford to ignore the Middle East,
however much some may want to. History shows vividly that
failure to address terrorism and instability far from our
shores will eventually lead to those very same problems being
visited on us at home.
Third, the NDS should provide focus on spending priorities,
on readiness, force size, and modernization. The readiness
deficiencies of the U.S. Armed Forces are on stark display on
an all too regular basis, and Secretary of Defense Mattis
justifiably made improving readiness his first priority.
However, it has also become obvious that the Navy and the
Air Force are smaller than is prudent in an increasingly
competitive environment. Our forces, as has previously been
noted, are also in dire need of modernization after a long
hiatus.
While the United States was focused on defeating insurgents
in Iraq and Afghanistan, Russia and China were focused on
acquiring capabilities to defeat us. As a result, we find
ourselves a step behind in a number of key warfighting areas. I
would agree with what Dave Ochmanek said just before me.
Fourth, the NDS should balance the need to fight and win
wars with the need to deter and compete in peacetime. We must
prepare for both the reality of great-power competition and the
increasing possibility of great-power war.
One manifestation of the former is the development and
refinement by China and Russia of approaches to compete with us
below the threshold that they calculate will draw a major U.S.
response. We need to develop strategies to compete and win in
peacetime. Just as our competitors are using many tools to do
so, to include political warfare, information, economic
incentives, and so forth, so do we have many available to us.
What has all too often been lacking on our side, however, has
been the political will to use them, to incur risk, to
demonstrate our resolve, and, thus, to deter.
Fifth, the NDS should speak to how the United States can
work more effectively with our allies. Our allies represent a
long-term competitive advantage for the United States. We need
to devise ways to work more closely with them, to develop and
share capabilities more effectively with them, and to increase
interoperability.
Sixth, the NDS should put forward a force plan and
construct to guide and shape the size of U.S. forces. Here, I
would commend to you CSBA's recent Force Planning for the Era
of Great Power Competition, which explores the topic in depth.
But in my view, the force-planning construct should focus
on the need to both compete in peacetime with great powers but
also to fight and win a great-power war, if only to bolster
deterrence. The United States should also be able to do these
things while deterring or fighting a regional foe. The force-
planning construct should acknowledge the reality that the
United States will be engaged in a global counterinsurgency
campaign for the foreseeable future.
One of the keys to doing these things is likely to be
innovative operational concepts and capabilities, and here,
there is room for considerable creative thought and action.
Now, I have outlined six considerations for the NDS, and
the answers that the NDS provides to these six questions will
help answer one that is much greater and far more
consequential. And that is this: What role will the United
States play in coming decades? Will we continue to lead and
defend the international order, an order that has benefited us
greatly? Or will we retreat into a diminished role? Will we
compete? Or will we sit on the sidelines as states who seek to
reshape the world to their benefit and to our detriment take
the field?
If we answer in the affirmative, then we need to
acknowledge the magnitude of the task ahead. It will take time.
It will take resources, and it will take political will.
I, for one, hope the answer is in the affirmative and that
we muster what is needed for the competition that lies ahead of
us.
Thank you, and I await your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Mahnken follows:]
Prepared Statement by Thomas G. Mahnken
Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished members of
the Committee, thank you for your invitation to appear before you today
to discuss the National Defense Strategy.
This is a vitally important topic. In recent years, it has become
apparent that we are living in a world characterized by the reality of
great-power competition and the growing possibility of great-power war.
At the same time, the United States faces increasingly capable regional
rogues, such as North Korea and Iran, which possess or are developing
nuclear weapons and the ability to deliver them to great distances. We
also face the need, today and into the future, to wage a global
counterinsurgency campaign against jihadist terrorist groups. At the
same time, it has become painfully obvious that the United States
possesses limited resources--or more accurately limited political will
to muster the resources--to meet this increasingly competitive
environment.
The National Defense Strategy can serve as a powerful tool to focus
and organize the Department of Defense to ensure that the United States
maintains and bolsters its competitive advantages in an increasingly
challenging environment.
I would first like to discuss six topics topics that the NDS should
address, and conclude with one topic that undergirds them all.
First, the NDS should address the threats and challenges that the
United States faces and determine the priority for addressing them.
As I noted at the outset, we find ourselves today once again in a
period of great-power competition with an increasing possibility of
great-power war. It is the most consequential threat that we face, and
failure to deter and prepare adequately for it would have dire
consequences for the United States, our allies, and the global order.
Because of that, I believe that preparing for great-power competition
and conflict should have the highest priority.
At the same time, we face increasingly capable regional foes, to
include North Korea and Iran. We need to stress test our forces against
these threats.
Finally, now and for the foreseeable future, we will need to wage a
global counterinsurgency campaign against jihadist terrorist groups. We
need to acknowledge that reality and plan accordingly.
Second, the NDS should provide both a global and regional look at
U.S. defense strategy and set priorities there.
The United States is a global power, with interests that span the
world. Moreover, we face competitors who are active not only in their
home regions, but also far beyond them as well. China is not only
building up its military in the Western Pacific, but is also active in
the Middle East and Africa. Russia is not only using force in Ukraine,
but also in Syria. That having been said, not all regions carry the
same strategic weight.. Asia's strategic weight continues to grow, and
it is increasingly the locus of global economic, military, and
political activity. In my view, it is the most consequential region.
Europe is also extremely important. Its strategic salience has grown as
threats to it, and to American interests there, have increased. The
United States cannot afford to ignore the Middle East, however much
some may want to. History shows vividly that failure to address
terrorism and instability far from our shores will eventually lead to
those very same problems being visited on us at home.
Third, the NDS should provide focus on spending priorities on
readiness, force size, and modernization.
The readiness deficiencies of the U.S. armed forces are on stark
display on an all-too-regular basis, and Secretary of Defense Mattis
justifiably made improving readiness his first priority. However, it
has also become obvious that the Navy and Air Force are also smaller
than is prudent in an increasingly competitive environment. Our forces
are also in dire need of modernization after a long hiatus. While the
United States was focused on defeating insurgents in Iraq and
Afghanistan, Russia and China were focused on acquiring capabilities to
defeat us. As a result, we find ourselves a step behind in a number of
key warfighting areas.
Fourth, the NDS should balance the need to fight and win wars with
the need to deter and compete in peacetime.
We must prepare for both the reality of great-power competition and
the increasing possibility of great-power war. One manifestation of the
former is the development and refinement by China and Russia of
approaches to compete with us below the threshold that they calculate
will draw a major U.S. response. We need to develop strategies to
compete and win in peacetime. Just as our competitors are using many
tools to do so, so do we have many available to us. What has all too
often been lacking on our side, however, has the political will to use
them, to incur risk, to demonstrate our resolve, and thus to deter.
Fifth, the NDS should speak to how the United States can work more
effectively with our allies.
America's allies represent a long-term competitive advantage. We
need to devise ways to work more closely with them, to develop and
share capabilities more effectively with them, and to increase
interoperability.
Sixth, the NDS should put forward a force planning construct to
guide the shape and size of U.S. forces.
Here I would commend to you CSBA's recent Force Planning for the
Era of Great Power Competition, which explores the topic in depth.
In my view, this force planning construct should focus on the need
to both compete in peacetime with great powers, but also to fight and
win a great-power war, if only to bolster deterrence. The United States
should also be able to do these things while deterring or fighting a
regional foe. The force planning construct should acknowledge the
reality that the United States will be engaged in a global
counterinsurgency campaign for the foreseeable future. One of the keys
to doing these things is likely to be innovative operational concepts
and capabilities, and here there is room for considerable creative
thought and action.
In conclusion, the answers the NDS provides to these six questions
will help answer one that is much greater and more consequential, and
that is this: What role will the United States play in coming decades?
Will we continue to lead and defend the international order--an order
that has benefited us greatly--or will we retreat into a diminished
role? Will we compete, or will we sit on the sidelines as states who
seek to reshape the world to their benefit and our detriment take the
field? If we answer in the affirmative, then we need to acknowledge the
magnitude of the task ahead. It will take time, resources, and
political will.
I, for one, hope that we answer in the affirmative, and that we
muster what is needed for the competition that lies ahead of us.
About the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments
The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) is an
independent, nonpartisan policy research institute established to
promote innovative thinking and debate about national security strategy
and investment options. CSBA's analysis focuses on key questions
related to existing and emerging threats to U.S. national security, and
its goal is to enable policymakers to make informed decisions on
matters of strategy, security policy, and resource allocation.
Chairman McCain. Thank you, Doctor. This has been very
helpful to the committee, and I think we can discuss it in
light of the events of the last couple days, and I am talking
about North Korea's missile launch.
I know of no expert who believed that it would happen this
quickly and this high.
So we will begin with you, Ms. Eaglen.
Ms. Eaglen. So I think from the testimony here this
morning, there is a consensus that, actually, everyone up here
and on the committee actually knows what the Defense Department
needs to do. It is only if they will do it, whether or not they
will answer the questions honestly that we have outlined.
Of course, that includes North Korea, one of the big five
challenges, as coined by the last administration [the Obama
Administration] and endorsed by this one, which includes North
Korea.
Chairman McCain. Wouldn't you agree this is the first time
that there is a capability of hitting the United States of
America?
Ms. Eaglen. I would agree. I think the Air Force a couple
years ago may have been the only service that predicted
something along this timeline in classified reports.
But it has clearly shown its capability. As you mentioned,
Mr. Chairman, the trajectory, in particular, is what is
important. It is a wakeup call to remind the American people
and Congress, again, what we already know.
Every time we think it is going to take longer than it
does, it usually happens faster and more quickly.
So what can we do about it now? Some of the solutions that
we have talked about up here already, about basing and posture
and infrastructure, more missile defense in the region, and
other recommendations in detail are also in my testimony.
But the core assumption that things will take longer, that
others will mature slower than we hope because that is what is
in our plan and in our strategy, should be thrown out the
window.
Chairman McCain. So if you and I had been having this
discussion 2 years ago, you would not have predicted this?
Ms. Eaglen. I would say our track record as a country, as a
Defense Department, and as an intelligence community is dismal
in predicting what will happen and how quickly, not just the
occurrence of events like the Arab Spring, which was completely
not predicted at all, but also the timeline of capability
development by enemies and potential foes.
We have been wrong almost every single time, and it is
usually because it has been faster than we have predicted.
Chairman McCain. Dr. Karlin?
Dr. Karlin. Unfortunately, our options vis-a-vis North
Korea are terrible, and anyone who tells you differently is a
foolish optimist.
So what we need to do in the near term is we need to
rebuild our defenses, we need to----
Chairman McCain. You are talking about antimissile
capabilities?
Dr. Karlin. Writ large, absolutely, anti-missile
capabilities. We need to rebuild our readiness. We need to
improve our base posture, but also our resilience and dispersal
across Asia. Because if there is a conflict, we will see U.S.
bases in places like Guam, in places like South Korea, and in
places like Japan under heavy, heavy fire. We need to do all we
can to get close to our allies like Japan and South Korea.
Chairman McCain. I know you have seen the RAND study that
shows closure between their capabilities and ours. That is of
concern?
Dr. Karlin. Absolutely.
We need to find a way to minimize the toll that the Middle
East chaos will continue to take on our force. It is sucking
away readiness. It is prioritizing capacity over meaningful
capability. It is also not going away.
Chairman McCain. We are asking our servicemembers to work
100-hour workweeks.
General?
General Spoehr. Exactly right. I think 100 is probably a
low estimate for some of them, sir.
But I would concur with the panelists here. We need to
increase, as this committee and the House did, missile defense,
global midcourse defense interceptors in Alaska and California,
Aegis destroyers and cruisers.
We need to ensure that our stocks of precision-guided
munitions are where they need to be, in case we do have to do
one of those options, which would be unthinkable. But we need
to make sure we have enough Joint Direct Attack Munitions
(JDAMs) and small-diameter bombs to prosecute the war. Today, I
am not entirely certain that we have that.
We just need to ensure the fundamental readiness of our
Armed Forces. We need to make sure that our forces are ready,
if the President calls on them, to do what needs to be done,
sir.
Chairman McCain. One of the aspects of this that is so
frustrating to us is that, as predicted, the workweeks are
longer, the readiness suffers, the availability of aircraft
suffers, because that is the easy part. To ask any
servicemember to work a 100-hour workweek is sooner or later
going to have a significant effect on retention.
General Spoehr. Recruiting as well, sir, I would add. It is
a tough year, I think, for the Army and other services for
recruiting. If people see what we are asking of our
servicemembers, I think they will be less likely to join our
service.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
Mr. Ochmanek. Sir, without doubt, an intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) capability in the hands of the likes
of Kim Jong Un is a big deal. But the capability to hold at
risk U.S. forces, allied forces, and the populations of our
allies in South Korea and Japan with a nuclear weapon already
was a game-changer in that scenario. It drives us to----
Chairman McCain. Were you surprised at the capability that
Kim Jong Un has developed?
Mr. Ochmanek. No, sir. We started gaming the consequences
of a potentially nuclear-armed North Korea in 2001. We learned
a lot about the options available to him and the behavior of a
leader like that under the stress of conflict. We are not
optimistic about the ability to deter nuclear use once conflict
breaks out on the Korean Peninsula.
So it drives us to want capabilities to actually prevent
him from using those weapons, shooting down the missiles before
they leave North Korean airspace, killing them on the ground
before they can be launched. That is going to require some
investment and some new capabilities.
Chairman McCain. Dr. Mahnken?
Dr. Mahnken. Mr. Chairman, the situation with North Korea,
to my mind, just is the most recent demonstration of the allure
of wishful thinking. So I would agree with David Ochmanek. I
mean, it should not be a surprise that North Korea is where it
is now. But we have spent decades first imagining that North
Korea was just going to collapse on its own, then imagining
that they would not be able to master nuclear weapons, then
imagining that they would not be able to master the ability to
deliver them over longer ranges.
We are where we are, but I think we need to pay attention
to this allure, which still exists, of wishful thinking, to
imagine a world as we wish it was, not the world as it is.
As far as North Korea is concerned, I think we are going to
have to be more active in deterring North Korea. We are also
going to need to be more active in reassuring our allies. In
the end, that may prove to be the more difficult of the two
tasks. As we go about it----
Chairman McCain. After yesterday's news, I would agree.
Dr. Mahnken. Yes. No, we need to talk to them very
forthrightly about what their concerns are, what would reassure
them, and what we can do to help.
But all through this, I want to go back to priorities and
focus. We shouldn't let ourselves get distracted overly by
this. North Korea is a concern. It is a threat. But it is a
less consequential threat than the challenges we face from
China and from Russia.
So my view is, again, we start with the biggest threats,
and then we look. We stress test dealing with North Korea and
others in that context.
Chairman McCain. But you would agree that this test has
proven that they can hit the United States of America.
Dr. Mahnken. They will seek to derive every benefit from
that. So the talk of negotiations with the North Koreans now is
coming more and more onto the table. I could expect all sorts
of fallout from that.
They are competing with us. Historically, they have done a
pretty good job of it. We need to be aware of that.
Chairman McCain. I am taking way too much time, but how can
a country with the 125th largest economy be able to acquire
this capability and pose a direct threat to the United States
of America?
Dr. Mahnken. They are focused, right? Their economy is not
focused on the well-being of their people. It is focused on the
military.
North Korea has derived a lot of benefits, historically,
from being able to threaten its neighbors. It has derived
economic benefits, food aid, and so forth. So they have every
motivation to continue this type of behavior, because it is
paid off for them in the past.
Chairman McCain. Jack?
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for your very, very thoughtful and insightful
comments.
One of the issues, I think, that resonates in everything
you said is a perennial question in Washington: Do budgets
drive strategy, or does strategy drive budgets? Most times,
budgets drive strategy. So let's talk about budgets.
Dr. Mahnken, stepping back and looking at the unavoidable
costs, as I like to call them, we are talking about renovating
the triad. We have to do that. It is not an option. We want to
build a 355-ship Navy. We have to increase end-strength,
because otherwise we are going to have sailors working 100
hours a week and other things like that.
What is the cost of that over a 10-year period, in your
view?
Dr. Mahnken. There are various estimates out there, right?
But I think it is going to--well, there is the cost if we go
back to doing business as we should, not ruling by continuing
resolution, but actually passing budgets. I would say that the
American taxpayer's dollar will actually get substantially
more----
Senator Reed. I concur, but what is the rough cost? Let's
say we get our act together and we do this.
Dr. Mahnken. It is going to require a sustained commitment,
sustained increases over----
Senator Reed. Over a trillion dollars over 10 years?
Dr. Mahnken. I would want to take a closer look at it. But
the cost is substantial. The cost is substantial.
We are digging out of a long period of underinvestment.
That is why I concluded the way I did. It will require the
political will. It is not an economic issue. It is ultimately
an issue of----
Senator Reed. I concur with you.
Mr. Ochmanek, what is your estimate for these unavoidable
costs over a decade?
Mr. Ochmanek. Senator Reed, in the Pentagon, planners
talked about the capability-capacity-readiness triangle. You
have to pay attention to all three of those things. My
colleagues and I at RAND have been focused on the capability
side, so I cannot talk authoritatively to the bills that need
to be paid in readiness and about capacity.
But on the capability side, to buy the sorts of preferred
munitions, ISR platforms, base resiliency, communications sets,
et cetera, we are talking on the order of $20 to $30 billion a
year above what we are spending now sustained through the 10
years, 12 years----
Senator Reed. So, roughly, just for the portion of
capabilities you describe, that is $300 billion, roughly?
Mr. Ochmanek. Yes, sir. That order of magnitude.
Senator Reed. Then you add readiness, and you add something
else. So we are bumping up pretty quickly to around $1
trillion, perhaps.
Mr. Ochmanek. It is conceivable. If you want to buy a
bigger force as well as----
Senator Reed. Well, I think based on General Spoehr's
comments about the readiness issue, recruiting issue,
operational issue, I think we need a bigger force.
So what is your ballpark figure, General?
General Spoehr. It is absolutely over $1 trillion for the
nuclear triad plus to get to the 355-ship Navy, sir.
The only thing I would balance that against is the cost to
rebuild a city like Kansas City, or something like that,
recovering from a nuclear strike.
Then I would echo what General Milley often says, and that
is that it is a huge cost to fight a war. The only thing more
costly than that is to fight and to lose.
Senator Reed. So we are talking roughly $1 trillion to get
ready, and even that might not prevent an enemy from inflicting
damage upon us.
Dr. Karlin, quickly, and Ms. Eaglen.
Dr. Karlin. I would agree with my fellow panelists. But I
might urge you to question if we do want to build a bigger
force in the near term, because of the opportunity costs. A
355-ship Navy would be terrific if it is a 355-ship Navy that
can fight and win wars. If it is very capacity-heavy, can only
exert presence, and will not be helpful if we have a conflict
with China, with Russia, with North Korea, I, perhaps, might
not prioritize it in the near term.
Senator Reed. Ma'am?
Ms. Eaglen. I would agree with the budget assessments and
yours, Senator, that it is roughly $1 trillion to restore all
three legs of the stool, readiness, capacity, capability. If
you have to trim those costs, the most likely one is people.
Senator Reed. That was good neighborly advice. We are
former neighbors.
My rough sense, too, is that if we really are serious about
this, and we want strategy to drive our policy, it is about $1
trillion over 10 years. We cannot avoid it.
That is why I find it, let me say, ironic that in the next
few days we might contemplate borrowing $1.5 trillion to
provide tax cuts rather than investing--we have to borrow it;
we do not have the money--$1 trillion for the defense of the
United States. Because after we put ourselves $1.5 trillion
further in the hole, the ability of this country and the
willingness of people to go again to the ATM is going to be
severely constrained.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Ernst?
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you to our panelists for being here today. This has
been a very enlightening conversation.
Mr. Ochmanek, I would like to start with you please, sir.
Your focus is military force planning and through a traditional
defense lens. Most analysts have viewed Europe as primarily
land-centric and the Asia-Pacific as more maritime-centric.
However, in recent meetings, I had an Army general that told me
about the importance of land forces in Asia, as well as a
maritime expert discussing naval deficiencies in Europe.
So in light of that observation, how do we properly posture
the joint force in these two regions to make sure that our
adversaries are forced to reckon with us as a multidomain
force?
Mr. Ochmanek. Senator Ernst, I spent the early part of my
career in the Air Force. So if I may, I would offer the view
that a fight against China is primarily an air-maritime fight;
a fight against Russia in defending NATO would be an air-land
fight. But, absolutely, there are roles for naval forces in
Europe and roles for ground forces in the Pacific.
Our priorities for posture are as follows. In Europe, you
want more U.S. heavy forces on the ground near the eastern
flank of the NATO alliance every day. We have taken some steps
in that regard with our allies to do that, but more is
required. Something like three heavy brigades available all the
time, as well as artillery in place to counter the Russian land
forces, would be very appropriate.
In both theaters, Europe and Asia, we need to pay attention
to the fact that our air bases and sea bases will be under
attack from the outset of the conflict. When we fight Iraq,
when we fight Serbia, we are used to having our air bases and
rear areas in sanctuary. Russia and China will ensure that that
is not the case.
So buying cruise missile defenses, for example, should be a
high priority for both theaters. Buying fairly prosaic things
like runway repair assets; shelters for airplanes that are
transportable, they are called expedient shelters; fuel
bladders, so that if they attack our fuel tanks, we still have
fuel to put in our jets; and positioning preferred munitions
forward in hardened storage bunkers. These things, again, are
not high-tech, but they can make a big difference in the
survivability and effectiveness of our force in conflict.
Senator Ernst. Very good. I appreciate that.
Going back to that eastern flank in Europe, then, I have
had conflicting opinions on whether the rotational force that
we have there now is adequate or whether we need to have a more
permanent force structure. What would your opinion be?
Mr. Ochmanek. Forward-stationing versus rotation is
basically a question of efficiency. If you forward-base the
force permanently, you only need to pay for that force,
although you have to build some infrastructure for it. Rotating
the force means having probably two units in reserve to sustain
the rotation.
So on an efficiency basis, generally, if the politics of
the region permit, and in NATO they do, forward-stationing
would be more cost-effective.
Senator Ernst. Okay. Thank you for that opinion.
Then, Mr. Ochmanek, as well, as chair of the Emerging
Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee, I have oversight of
unconventional warfare, and I am particularly concerned about
Russia's activity in the gray zone, especially against Ukraine
and other allies in Europe's eastern flank.
What is your assessment of the United States' current
strategy to counter unconventional warfare and the growing
security challenges in the gray zone posed by our adversaries
like Russia and perhaps other near-peer competitors?
Mr. Ochmanek. Senator, we are doing a lot with our NATO
allies to beef up their, if I can call it that, resilience to
gray zone and subversion kinds of threats.
Our special forces work a lot with the special forces of
the three Baltic States, for example. We have created special
cyber units to help our allies and partners do a better job of
detecting and attributing cyberattacks, and defending against
those.
There is a lot more that can be done, but I know the
department is cognizant of this sort of threat and is working
on a variety of ways to counter it.
Senator Ernst. Absolutely.
My time is expiring. Thank you very much for being here
today.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman McCain. Senator King?
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to follow up on the point that Senator Reed made.
Each of you testified that the cost over and above the
current budget to modernize the military and to get us to a
place where we should be, and we all agree around this table
that we should be, is around $1 trillion or something over $1
trillion.
The Senator used the word ``ironic.'' I use the word
``preposterous'' that later today or tomorrow, we are going to
pass a bill that is going to take between a minimum of $1.5
trillion and probably more like $2.2 trillion once the cuts are
extended, which everyone knows they will be, out of the budget,
which I believe will make it flat impossible to do the work
that you are suggesting is necessary for us to do. The
implications of what we are doing today or tomorrow to try to
achieve the level of defense of this country that you all have
told us is absolutely necessary, it just cannot happen.
So that is not a question. That is an observation.
I want to move now to the question. I am somewhat
astonished and disappointed that not a single one of you talked
about anything other than military hardware. Defending the
national security of the United States involves a continuum, it
seems to me, that goes from diplomacy to war. War is the most
expensive and least desirable of those outcomes.
I think of Afghanistan. Our success there will ultimately
depend upon the success of the government in Afghanistan to
gain the confidence of its people.
In Iraq, the relationship between the Government of Iraq
and the Kurds and the Sunni population is going to determine
whether Iraq, ultimately, is a successful state.
North Korea, the solution to North Korea lies through
diplomacy with China. I think everyone appreciates and
understands that.
The reason Iran is not North Korea today is because of the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) that was passed 2
years ago. Otherwise we would be, according to the intelligence
services, we would be dealing with an Iran with a nuclear
weapon today, about 2 years from when we passed that bill.
Israel, Palestine, a major flashpoint in terms of conflict
in the Middle East, is all about diplomacy.
Don't we have to talk about that as part of a National
Defense Strategy? This is the tyranny--we are the Armed
Services Committee, and we have a Foreign Affairs, Foreign
Relations Committee. But that is part of the strategy. I am
very disappointed that that is not part of the discussion.
Dr. Karlin, talk to me about this.
Right now, by the way, under the current dispensation, this
part of the strategy--that is, diplomacy--is being drastically
downgraded. Budgets cut at the State Department. We do not have
an Ambassador to South Korea, for example, or even a nominee.
Dr. Karlin, talk to me about this problem.
Dr. Karlin. Sir, unfortunately, you are spot on.
When you look at the senior diplomats who have left the
State Department in the last year, it is almost equal to about
30 percent of the U.S. general officer or flag officer corps. I
suspect if about 30 percent of the general officers or flag
officers left, this committee would be having a set of really
serious hearings. Unfortunately, that is not just a today
problem. That is a real future problem.
I also suspect that if you asked most of us, as much as we
want more money for defense, we would be delighted if that
could go to the State Department. What will probably keep
happening is that we will see an increased neutering of the
State Department and of diplomacy more broadly.
Senator King. By the way, what is going on now with people
leaving and being driven out, I understand it is already
reflecting itself in people who are applying for the Foreign
Service.
Dr. Karlin. Yes.
Senator King. Applications are down something like 30
percent.
Dr. Karlin. Indeed. I think it was actually about 50
percent. It is pretty substantial. So this has really long-
ranging consequences for the future of American national
security.
As you know, no one takes these jobs for the money. They
take these jobs because they want to help make the world
better. If they do not see that opportunity, they will go do
something else.
So it is really profoundly worrying across-the-board. I
think a lot of us are not really terribly sure what to do about
it.
But what will likely happen is, you will see the State
Department get increasingly neutered. Everyone will turn to the
Pentagon and ask the military to fill those roles. The military
will salute, and they will try to fill those roles. But they
are not as capable to do so.
Moreover, there will be a real opportunity cost. Because
they will not actually be focused on fighting and winning wars
or preparing for the future. They will be trying to be pseudo-
diplomats.
Senator King. Dr. Mahnken, do you have a thought on this
point?
Dr. Mahnken. Diplomacy is undoubtedly important.
Senator King. It is not undoubtedly important. It is
important.
Dr. Mahnken. I had the pleasure of working for a Secretary
of Defense who worked very hard to increase the size of the
State Department.
However, diplomacy is much more effective when it is backed
by credible military power. Nor can diplomacy be a substitute
for the military.
Senator King. I am certainly not asserting that.
Dr. Mahnken. Yes.
Senator King. But what I am asserting is that, if you have
two pieces here, we are talking about strengthening one while
the other is atrophying before our eyes. I think that is a
serious national security concern.
Dr. Mahnken. I would agree. I think, unfortunately, it has
been a long-term trend across administrations, both in terms of
funding of the State Department and attracting the best and the
brightest. I think it is an issue that needs to be addressed.
Senator King. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Peters?
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to each of our witnesses today.
Again, really thoughtful testimony. I appreciate the
discussion. I want to get into a little more discussion on an
area that I think there is some disagreement on the panel.
But before I do that, I want to concur with my colleagues
who have already spoken about the cost of doing what is going
to be necessary to secure the future of this country. I hope
that every one of the members of the Armed Services Committee
really takes to heart what he or she heard today, that we may
be talking about a $1 trillion additional investment. A vote
taken later today or tomorrow that cuts $1.4 trillion or more,
depending on what number you look at, is fundamentally
inconsistent with what we heard today.
So I am hoping every member of this committee, in
particular, will understand where we are.
We obviously face significant current threats, which all of
you have articulated very clearly. But there are also future
threats that are going to evolve. One thing that really stuck
with me in talking with Secretary Mattis was he was very clear
that he believed his success on the battlefield was really as a
result of decisions that were made 10 years prior to when he
was engaged in that role. We need to be thinking forward as to
what that world is going to look like in 10 years.
We know that we are probably on the cusp of one of the most
exciting and perhaps frightening both times of human history in
terms of technological advances that are coming very, very
rapidly.
In my home State with automation and self-driving cars, a
couple years ago, people thought it was fantasy. It is going to
be reality very soon, which will transform the auto industry in
every way as big as when the first car came off the assembly
line. It is going to have implications, through artificial
intelligence (AI), of every single industry you can possibly
imagine.
You have nanotechnology. We have synthetic biology. We have
additive manufacturing.
The only thing we know for sure is, 10 years from now, this
world will look dramatically different than it does today. That
means the future of warfare is likely to also look dramatically
different than it does today.
So I have heard a couple folks say that we shouldn't be
looking at AI and some of these other technologies, so I am
going to want some clarification on that because, as Ms. Eaglen
said, everything seems to happen quicker than people
anticipate.
We had AI recently beat the international Go champion. That
sounds kind of trivial, but it is a game that was thought to be
uniquely human, and it would be at least a decade before AI
would have the capability of doing that. It did it.
AI systems are now creating encryption systems on their
own.
I mean, this is incredibly fascinating. But it is certainly
one that we have to be ahead of the curve, because other
countries are doing it.
So, Ms. Karlin, my first question to you, because you
brought up how we have to be particularly leaning forward when
it comes to exploiting these technologies and concerned about
our adversaries, will you tell me why it is important that we
lean in, in AI and these technologies, and we have to be
thinking about that, too?
Dr. Karlin. Absolutely, sir. We should lean in because
there will be opportunities in that field, but above all, our
adversaries and competitors are also pursuing them rigorously.
So we need to know, if we engage in a potential conflict in the
future with countries like Russia or China, they are going full
steam ahead in the AI field.
In fact, there was a piece in the New York Times recently
about how China is really planning to dominate that field in
about 10 years. So if we are not thinking about the
opportunities it offers us, we need to know what challenges it
will also present.
Senator Peters. Thank you.
General and Mr. Ochmanek, I think you both mentioned in
your testimony, correct me if I'm wrong, these kind of trends
are a fad now to talk about. AI, we shouldn't be talking about
that. If you would just tell me more about what your thinking
is, that would be very helpful.
General Spoehr. Yes, sir. I mean, I do not mean to imply
that AI and things like that are not important, and they are,
and we need to keep up with the technology. But they cannot
substitute for a ready and capable force.
So for example, you can have all the artificial
intelligence and swarms of mini-drones, but it does not
replace, for example, a soldier on a street corner in a
contested city or a destroyer on-station in the South China
Sea. You cannot substitute high-end technology for presence and
the ability to deter on-station.
Senator Peters. I would say, I do not know if anyone is
arguing that we have a substitute. It is an understanding that
it leverages it. In fact, AI systems working with a soldier on
that street corner can be incredibly powerful.
So we have to do both, is my understanding.
Mr. Ochmanek, I know you mentioned it as well in your
testimony.
Mr. Ochmanek. Yes. Thank you, Senator, for the opportunity
to clarify that.
My point was that we need not and should not wait for the
maturation of exotic Third Offset technologies to begin filling
serious gaps in our capabilities today. We have to, of course,
continue to invest in that Research and Development (R&D) and
those future systems, but at the same time, there are mature
technologies, available systems today, that can go a long way
toward addressing the threats that we face.
I would hate to see us again delay needed investments now
while we wait for this next generation of capability.
Thank you.
Senator Peters. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to each of you for being here.
Let me just echo the concerns that have been raised by my
colleagues about what passing this tax bill will do to our
ability to deal with so many other priorities that we have in
this country, particularly defense. I think it is a nonstarter
to think we are going to pass a $1.5 trillion tax bill and have
another $1 trillion in the next 10 years for defense. So I
think several of you have said we are trying to define the
world the way we want it to look. Well, I think that is a
situation of defining the world the way we want it to look, as
opposed to the way it is.
I very much appreciated you, Dr. Karlin, and I think it
was, I am not sure, maybe Mr. Ochmanek, who talked about the
need to prioritize what we are doing. Part of a strategy is
saying there are some things we can do and some things that we
cannot do.
I found it distressing to hear most of you continue to talk
about, or as I understood your testimony, to talk about
conflict in the future the way we have looked at conflict in
the past. While you pointed out that there were going to be
differences in terms of what you are suggesting we need to do
through the Department of Defense, it did not sound like major
differences in terms of what we ought to be thinking.
Mr. Ochmanek, I think you were the first person to talk
about the importance of information and cyber. As I look at
what we are facing in the future and think about how we have
seen warfare change through Russia and China and Iran and the
terrorist groups, our ability to compete on information and
cyber has been woefully lacking. We do not seem to have,
notwithstanding what is in the National Defense Authorization
Act (NDAA) that we have passed, to begin to address that.
We do not seem to have a strategy in either of these areas
that is comprehensive, that is cross-government, that has
everybody pulling at the same rate.
So I wonder, Mr. Ochmanek, you talked about special cyber
units. I am not aware that we have special cyber units. So
maybe you could delineate that a little bit and tell us more
about those special cyber units.
Mr. Ochmanek. I would be happy to, Senator. I am not an
expert in cyber, but I am aware that, some years ago, we
started creating small teams of cyber experts that both work
here in the United States and deploy abroad to work hand-in-
glove with partners. This includes actual day-to-day operations
on their nets, to monitor traffic coming in, teach techniques
about how to attribute the source of attacks, which, of course,
is very important to how you respond, and also how to use cyber
as a tool to enable other military operations.
That is about as much as I can share with you in this
forum. But there is a lot of activity going on here and with
our allies abroad in that area.
Senator Shaheen. Well, I appreciate that. But I will tell
you, we have had people before this committee, and I have had
the chance to ask the question about who is in charge of those
operations, and I have not been able to get anybody so far to
tell me who is in charge.
Do you know the answer to that?
Mr. Ochmanek. I would not speculate on it.
Senator Shaheen. Does anybody else know the answer to that?
General Spoehr. The commander of USCYBERCOM, Senator.
Senator Shaheen. Well, in fact, I was told that is not
where the center is. If you would look at, government-wide, how
we are responding to cyber threats and disinformation, that is
not where that command is placed.
General Spoehr. I would agree. For the whole-of-government,
U.S. Federal response, he is not in charge of that aspect.
Senator Shaheen. Do you know who is?
General Spoehr. Other than the President, ma'am, I do not.
Senator Shaheen. I think that is exactly right. We do not
have someone who is in charge. Yet we are dealing with, as you
all point out, not just regional threats, terrorist groups, but
nation-states who are superpowers, again, where they have made
a major focus in these two areas, and we are not on the playing
field, at this point.
So I would hope, as you are making recommendations about
what we need to be looking at in a National Defense Strategy,
that they should be major pieces of that National Defense
Strategy.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Warren?
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to our witnesses for being here today for this
important topic.
There has been a lot of debate about the relationship
between the budget and the strategy, whether we should have a
budget-driven strategy or a strategy-driven budget. But I think
it is not just about how much money we spend, but how we spend
that money.
According to many estimates, the Russians spend about $70
billion annually on their defense budget. That means they are
spending about one-tenth of what this committee authorized for
the Pentagon in 2018. But they have parlayed their investment
into a whole lot of disruption all around the world, and one
way they have done that is through leveraging asymmetric power.
Things like gray zone warfare in the Crimea, cyberattacks on
elections here in the United States.
Similarly, the Chinese have invested in areas where they
believe they have a relative advantage, areas like space or
anti-access/area denial.
So, Dr. Karlin, I want to ask, how should any new defense
strategy take into account these kinds of asymmetric
investments, both at the low end and the high end of the
spectrum?
Dr. Karlin. Thank you for that question.
If I might first start with your point on the Russians, one
thing to recall is that the Russians do not have to think
globally the way that the United States does. That is part of
why things get a little more complicated.
Senator Warren. Fair enough, but let me just point out,
they are having an impact globally.
Dr. Karlin. Quite profoundly, indeed. I mean, when we look
at them going into Syria, I do not think that had been in
anyone's paradigm, that a country would actually want to become
involved militarily in what was occurring in Syria. As you
know, ma'am, the options changed considerably the minute they
started to do so.
So in terms of thinking about asymmetric warfare, I think
the Defense Department has very much put it on the priority
list in recent years.
The irony is, from a Russian and Chinese perspective, we
actually conduct gray zone warfare all the time. What they see
as our use of special operations forces, what they see as our
use of drone strikes, what they see even as the U.S. free media
is all considered gray zone warfare, which is, of course,
ironic since I suspect none of us would actually put any of
those efforts into that category.
So gray zone warfare as the Russian and as the Chinese
think about it does not play to our comparative advantage. The
U.S. military operates legally. The U.S. military will use its
members in uniform. We will not have them go out and become
like little green men the way the Russians will. That is
something we should be proud of, in terms of how we operate.
So as I think about how we can be more effective, it comes
more down to how we are managing the force rather than
developing the force. We do not need a whole lot of new whiz-
bang gizmos to actually compete well. What we need to do is do
more snap exercises. We need to take steps to show that, at any
time, the U.S. military can get anywhere and anyplace, to
remind countries like Russia and China that the U.S. military
is preeminent.
Senator Warren. So I am a little frustrated with this. Even
if Congress provided a $700 billion budget tomorrow, it would
be several years before the Navy reached 355 ships or DOD could
deploy 2,000 F-35 fighter jets. Let's face it, in the short
term, the U.S. will be operating with something like our
current size and structure.
This is important to acknowledge, because the services'
readiness challenges, like the recent collisions in the Seventh
Fleet, indicate that after 16 years of combat, we may currently
be badly overstretched.
So, Dr. Karlin, in your previous role at the Pentagon, you
were responsible for helping make the tradeoffs across the
services among the geographic commands and between the near-
term and long-term investments. So I do not want to just hear
that we need to prioritize.
What I am trying to ask is a more systemic question. That
is, how do we go about this process of prioritizing, of
assessing risk, and making tradeoffs in a disciplined way?
Dr. Karlin. Absolutely. I would urge the committee to have
a classified hearing with those who are working on the National
Defense Strategy about what the force-planning construct says,
because that is exactly what the process is. What happens is
the department tries to assess what the future looks like.
Based on that, it looks at the conflicts that are most
worrisome in that future, and you can imagine what those are.
Based on those conflicts, it says, across the entire
department, ``Combatant command services, how do you fight that
conflict? What do we do?'' Then it has to adjudicate, and that
involves a lot of betting and hedging, because we will probably
call it wrong, as we often do, and then try to put money toward
that situation. That ends up being a rather significant
negotiated process, where, to placate some corners, perhaps
some will win, and some will not lose as much as they need to.
This is also, as I said earlier, I think the committee
needs to have--you know, one of the great decisions of this
committee recently was to make the National Defense Strategy
classified. That will allow a serious conversation about who
wins and who loses, and why those occurred.
Senator Warren. I just have to say, when we are talking
about words like ``strategic decisions,'' hearing you answer
with a word like ``placate'' makes me very uneasy.
I just want to underline that I think we need to be focused
on not just the inputs, the number of ships or marines or
aircraft, but also on the outputs, the goals we are trying to
achieve with the force we have. I think that means thinking
creatively and expanding our own use of asymmetric tactics and
leveraging our 21st century technologies here.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Inhofe?
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I had to be at another meeting, so I did not get in all the
opening statements, and I did not hear all the questions.
But to me, I think we ought to, just in my narrow view,
what we need to be talking about right now is what happened
last Tuesday.
I think most people here know who James Woolsey is. You may
not know. He is from my City of Tulsa, Oklahoma, and we have
been good friends for a long time. He said way back in 1993,
this is a quote that he made, he said, ``We have slain a large
dragon,'' the Soviet Union, ``but we live now in a jungle with
a bewildering variety of poisonous snakes.'' That was his
quote.
He said, the most vexing of those poisonous snakes has
proven to be North Korea--this is 1993--and despite China and
Russia representing the greatest threats to military supremacy,
many experts have agreed with me that North Korea is the most
imminent threat.
I understand that Dr. Mahnken, perhaps, did not agree with
this when this statement came out.
But David Wright said, and this was pretty well-publicized,
on Tuesday afternoon--he is an analyst in the Union of
Concerned Scientists. He wrote that Tuesday's test indicates
that, ``Such a missile would have more than enough
range to reach Washington, D.C., and, in fact, any part of
the continental United States.'' Then, of course, you heard the
statements by General Mattis.
So I consider this to be--it is going to have to really be
addressed in a very heavy way. I would say, other than the
statement that was made by Dr. Mahnken, the rest of you, do you
pretty much agree that, in terms of imminent threat, [North
Korea] would be the most imminent threat right now?
Is that yes for you guys? Okay, thank you.
Dr. Mahnken. Senator, I would actually also agree with that
statement.
Senator Inhofe. Would you?
Dr. Mahnken. In terms of imminent, yes. The point that I
made earlier was about most consequential over the long term.
Senator Inhofe. Okay, well, this is an imminent threat, and
that is why I wanted to word it that way.
I would like to ask each one of you, should this be
included in our strategic framework of the new National Defense
Strategy? If so, how?
Let's go ahead and start with you.
Dr. Mahnken. In my view, we should really start by looking
at the challenges that we face from great-power competitors,
from Russia and China. We should figure out the force
requirements there.
Senator Inhofe. Okay.
Dr. Mahnken. Then what we should do is stress test that
force posture against threats like North Korea. It very well
may be that you would have some special requirements that would
come out for having to deter North Korea that might not emerge
from the previous case.
Senator Inhofe. Okay, I am running out of time here.
Just kind of a quick answer and ideas you might have.
Mr. Ochmanek. Yes, sir. North Korea absolutely needs to be
a consideration in our National Defense Strategy, and we should
focus our efforts in dealing with it on improving our
capabilities to actually prevent them from using and delivering
a nuclear weapon, specifically with a ballistic missile.
Senator Inhofe. General?
General Spoehr. Sir, I would say that the National Defense
Strategy does not have the luxury of having a single threat
like a great power. It is going to have to consider terrorism,
rogue nations such as North Korea and Iran, and the smaller
threats from terrorism. So, yes, I think you are right. It has
to consider these threats.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. Any other comments?
Dr. Karlin. Absolutely, sir. It has for years.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. Very good.
The other thing, and I might go just a little bit over
here. It is no secret that our readiness has eroded over the
past 8 years. Budget cuts, sequestration, we have had a lot of
meetings on this of this committee, and the idea that our
President had a policy that he did not want to put anything in
that would take care of sequestration in the military unless
you put an equal amount in other programs, which I disagreed
with, a lot of people on this committee did agree with that.
But how would you prioritize the capability gaps
confronting the military when compared to Russia and China? The
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Dunford, said, in just a
few years, if we do not change our trajectory, we will lose our
qualitative and quantitative competitive advantage. That is a
very disturbing statement.
Any comments, in this remaining time, that you would make
concerning prioritizing that capability gap when we are looking
at the somewhat starvation period we went through at the same
time of the very ambitious programs of both Russia and China.
Senator Inhofe. Start with Ms. Eaglen.
Ms. Eaglen. Yes, sir. I would step back for a moment and
offer some principles, because there is no doubt we are
depending on the capability set or even the domain. It is
differing by service and domain. But I would just get back to
Senator Warren's comments that mass and attrition are back as
force-planning principles. I think we need to consider that
when we are looking at our capability gaps against China and
Russia, in particular.
Then we are on the wrong side of the cost exchange ratio.
This is something Dr. Mahnken has written about with the NDS in
2008. It is something we have all thought about up here on the
committee.
But those were two fundamental principles I would return to
the defense strategy to address your question.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. Any other comments on that?
Dr. Karlin. To the extent possible, we should double down
on areas of strength like undersea. That is particularly
valuable vis-a-vis China and Russia. Our ability to conduct
long-range strike, our short-range air defenses, balancing our
Air Force more broadly, being cognizant that we are not going
to have all the F-35s one might want, instead being able to
mature fourth-generation aircraft, missile defense also being
critical.
But in particular, we do need to recognize that the
conflicts of the future are going to be uglier than what we
faced in the last 15 or so years. While we have thought about
Iraq and Afghanistan as big conflicts in some way, they are
really not, when we begin to envision what a potential war with
Russia or China might look like.
Senator Inhofe. I cannot think of anything uglier than an
ICBM coming.
My time has expired. But I want to compliment you, General,
on a statement that you made. It is one sentence. I will read
it. ``This is the situation we find ourselves in today with the
smallest military we have had in 75 years equipped with rapidly
aging weapons and employed at a very high operational pace,
endeavoring to satisfy our global defense objectives.'' Good
statement.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Blumenthal?
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for being here today. Let me begin by joining
a number of my colleagues in expressing regret, I guess is the
understatement of the morning, about the tax
plan that the United States Senate may approve in the next
24 hours, which would increase our debt astronomically and
probably undercut most of the very insightful suggestions that
you have made.
I am reminded that a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, I think it was Mike Mullen, said that the greatest
threat to our national security is our national debt. The
greatest threat to our national security is our national debt.
It has implications across the spectrum of American life
that undermine our will to defend ourselves and to invest the
kinds of resources that are necessary to build a national
defense that is worthy of the greatest Nation in the history of
the world.
The national debt is not about just numbers, it is about
faces, General, the young men and women who we recruit to serve
and sacrifice for our Nation. You know better than any of us
who are in the room today, except perhaps for the chairman and
the ranking member who have served with such distinction in our
armed services. So to the extent that you have a voice in this
process, I would urge you to use it and hope that you will.
There has been very little mention of the attack by Russia
on the United States of America.
Is there anyone on this panel who questions that Russia
attacked the United States, in fact, attacked our elections and
our democracy in 2016?
I take it by your silence that you agree. In fact, of
course, the intelligence community is unanimous on that point.
I would wonder whether anyone on this panel believes that
we have responded sufficiently to make Russia pay a price for
that aggression, a real attack on our democracy. Have we made
Russia pay a price for that attack?
Again, I would take it that you all agree that the answer
is no.
In fact, this administration, in my view, has failed to
oppose, condemn, or hold Russian President Vladimir Putin
accountable for that attack, or the invasion of Ukraine, or
intervention in Syria.
The lack of an articulated, clear strategy on Russia belies
the commitment of blood and treasure, as the United States is
doing now in so many parts of the world without sufficient
resources. In fact, General Waldhauser of AFRICOM came to
testify before us in March of this year and said, ``Only
approximately 20 to 30 percent of Africa Command's ISR
requirements are met,'' referring to intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance.
We are failing to support right now, not 10 years from now,
but right now, the troops that we have deployed around the
world.
In my view, the investment of cyber--Senator Shaheen
referred to it in terms of the command. But is there anybody on
this panel who feels that we are investing sufficiently in
cyber right now?
Again, I take it that your silence indicates you agree, we
are insufficiently investing in cyber where $1 trillion is
unnecessary to have an impact. Far less dollars are necessary
to defend against the kinds of threats that we see in cyber,
including most prominently from Russia, China, and North Korea,
but all kinds of asymmetric threats as well.
So my time is expiring. But we have focused on the dollars
necessary, the dollars versus the strategy. I would suggest
that a much more focused and deliberate strategy is necessary
in many parts of the world and in many parts of our defense.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. I thank the Senator. Could I just point
out that when you are having your enlisted people working 100-
hour workweeks, you cannot dismiss that, and I am sure that you
are clearly aware of that.
Senator Blumenthal. I am not only aware, Mr. Chairman, but
I very much support the comments that you made about it.
Chairman McCain. I thank you.
Anything else? Anyone would like to correct the record?
Well, this has been very helpful, this hearing. I thank all
the witnesses.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:12 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
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