[Senate Hearing 115-738]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 115-738
GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JANUARY 25, 2018
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
39-552 PDF WASHINGTON : 2020
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma, Chairman JACK REED, Rhode Island
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi BILL NELSON, Florida
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
TOM COTTON, Arkansas JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
JONI ERNST, Iowa RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia TIM KAINE, Virginia
TED CRUZ, Texas ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
BEN SASSE, Nebraska ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
LUTHER STRANGE, Alabama GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
Christian D. Brose, Staff Director
Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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January 25, 2018
Page
Global Challenges and U.S. National Security Strategy............ 1
Kissinger, Dr. Henry A., Chairman of Kissinger Associates and 4
Former Secretary of State.
Shultz, Dr. George P., Thomas W. and Susan B. Ford Distinguished 12
Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, and Former
Secretary of State.
Armitage, Richard L., President, Armitage International and 17
Former Deputy Secretary of State.
(iii)
GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
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THURSDAY, JANUARY 25, 2018
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m. in
Room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M.
Inhofe, presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker,
Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Perdue, Sasse, Scott,
Reed, Nelson, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine,
King, Heinrich, and Warren.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Senator Inhofe. Our meeting will come to order.
The Senate Armed Services Committee meets this morning to
receive testimony on global challenges and the United States
national security strategy to meet those threats.
It is my honor to welcome our distinguished witnesses,
former Secretaries of State, Henry Kissinger and George Shultz,
and the former Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage.
Your careers of service have been just unbelievable, been
great, and we are so honored to have you folks here.
I want to begin by reading a brief welcome from our
Chairman McCain, who regrets that he is unable to be here for
today's hearing, and I am quoting him now.
He says, with the rising global challenges of an
increasingly complex and competitive strategic environment,
America needs the leadership, wisdom, and experience that only
statesmen of this stature can provide. This committee and this
nation thank you for your service, and we are grateful for your
continued voices of reason during these troubling times. We
look to you for the lessons of history as we all seek to secure
a safer, freer, and more prosperous world.
I guess one of the most enjoyable committee hearings that I
have experienced before was 3 years ago when we had a hearing
of the same. Both Secretaries Kissinger and Shultz were here. A
lot of the comments that you made were very prophetic. Here it
is 3 years later. A lot of these things have happened. So we
are looking forward to this.
Speaking on behalf of the entire committee, we all look
forward to having the chairman back soon. I am sure he will be.
Now more than ever, the challenges of today's world require
strategic vision. Each of you is uniquely qualified to help
this committee think through not only our present challenges
but also the strategy needed to meet them. The insights and
wisdom you offered then were discerning and have borne out in
the years since.
The Trump administration recently released a new national
security strategy [NSS] and a national defense strategy [NDS],
which emphasizes the priority of near-peer competition, the
danger of rogue nations, and the enduring threat of terrorism.
The national defense strategy is a frank and realistic view of
the global strategic environment. It offers a blueprint for
protecting our national interests and reestablishing America's
position as the undisputed leader of the free world, and it
shows a commitment to restoring our military advantage across
all domains and strengthening and expanding key alliances.
So we just ask each of you to help us think through the
strategy. The members of this committee are well aware that the
key to success of any strategy requires resources. We need to
cast aside partisan politics and pass an appropriation bill
while finding a way to fix the defense spending caps that have
decimated our military in terms of readiness and modernization.
So we thank you for your service and look forward to your
testimony.
Senator Reed?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to welcome Dr. Kissinger and Secretary Shultz
and Secretary Armitage. This is certainly a distinguished
panel, and we are grateful that you are here today. Each of you
have played a very important role in some of the most
monumental foreign policy decisions in our nation's history,
and on behalf of all the members of the committee, we look
forward to your testimony.
This morning's hearing on global challenges and U.S.
national security follows the release last week of the new
national defense strategy. This strategy, which supports the
President's recently released national security strategy,
states that the central challenge facing our nation is the
reemergence of long-term strategic competition with Russia and
China and that this competition replaces terrorism as the
primary concern in the U.S. national security.
Without question, Russia remains determined to reassert its
influence around the world, most recently by using malign
influence and active measures and activities to undermine the
American people's faith in our election process, as well as
other Western elections.
Likewise, China continues to threaten the rules-based order
in the Asia-Pacific region by economic coercion of its smaller,
more vulnerable neighbors and by undermining the freedom of
navigation.
Given the experience of our panel, I would welcome their
assessment of the strategic threat posed by both Russia and
China and what recommendations they have for how the United
States can counter these powers both militarily and by
utilizing other critical elements of national power.
Great power competition may be the current geostrategic
reality, but we must not neglect other equally complicated
challenges: North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile
efforts, our immediate and grave national security threat.
Likewise, Iran continues their aggressive weapons development
activities, including ballistic missile development efforts,
while pursuing other destabilizing activities in the region.
Finally, the United States must remain focused on countering
the security threat from the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
(ISIS) and its spread beyond the Middle East region while also
building the capabilities of the Afghan National Security
Forces and deny any safe haven for extremists.
In the coming weeks, this committee will hear directly from
Secretary Mattis and senior leaders in the Defense Department
on how the national defense strategy will address the threats
facing our nation. As we begin our review of the national
defense strategy, it would benefit this committee to get our
witnesses' assessment of the new strategy and whether it
strikes the appropriate balance between great power competition
and the ongoing threats posed by rogue regimes, terrorist
organizations, and other non-state actors and criminal
organizations.
Finally, the new strategy emphasizes a simple but key fact:
the importance of allies and partners. The esteemed panel
before us knows better than most that robust international
alliances are essential to keeping our country safe. The
national defense strategy unveiled last week puts a premium on
bolstering current alliances while pursuing new partners.
As I have stated many times, I am deeply concerned about
statements from President Donald Trump that have undercut
America's leadership position in the world, alienated our
longtime allies, and dismissed the global order the United
States helped established following World War II. These actions
isolate the United States and weaken our influence in the
world, ultimately leading to uncertainty and the risk of
miscalculation.
At the same time, the Trump administration has proposed
dramatic cuts to the State Department and career Foreign
Service officers are leaving the government at an alarming
rate. I am concerned we may seek to counter the ``whole of
nation'' strategies pursued by Russia and China simply by
reinvesting in our own comparative military advantage at the
expense of necessary investments in diplomacy and development
as essential tools of national power. Given our panel's
extensive experience cultivating allies and promoting
diplomacy, I would welcome their assessment of our current
alliances, what more can be done to sustain these critical
relationships, and the importance of non-military elements of
national power to our security.
Once again, I want to thank the witnesses for being here
and, more importantly, for their lifetime of service and
dedication to the United States of America.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Normally we ask our witnesses to confine their remarks to a
certain time. I would not be so presumptuous. Talk as long as
you want to.
[Laughter.]
Senator Inhofe. Dr. Kissinger, you are recognized. Thank
you so much for being here.
STATEMENT OF DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, CHAIRMAN OF KISSINGER
ASSOCIATES AND FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE
Dr. Kissinger. It is a great honor to have this
opportunity, and I would like to say one word about our
chairman who I have known for 50 years since he returned from
Vietnam. At that time, I had been in Hanoi and they had offered
to let me take him on my plane back to the United States. I
refused on the ground that nobody should get special treatment.
When I met him here at the White House, he came up to me and
said, ``Thank you for saving my honor.'' Senator McCain has
preserved the honor of our country as a great warrior but also
as someone who wherever the weak were threatened and the judged
were persecuted, he made it clear that America was on their
side and that he was not simply a warrior but a defender of our
values all over the world. So thank you particularly for this
occasion.
You have asked me to review the international situation,
and I have taken the liberty of submitting a statement to the
committee, and I will use my time here just to make a few
general points and then reply to your questions.
I would also like to say how meaningful it is to me to sit
next to my friend and mentor, George Shultz, from whom I have
learned so much, and Mr. Armitage, who has performed such great
national services.
I will deal with your query in three parts: the urgent,
exemplified by the North Korean nuclear challenge; the
intermediate, exemplified by the Middle East, especially Iran;
and the long term, to which the chairman referred, exemplified
by great power relationships and by the reentry of great power
politics as the key elements of international affairs.
The international situation facing the United States is
unprecedented. What is occurring is more than a coincidence of
individual crises. Rather, it is a systemic failure of world
order which is gathering momentum and which has led to an
erosion of the international system rather than its
consolidation, a rejection of territorial acquisition by force,
expansion of mutual trade benefits without coercion, which are
the hallmark of the existing system are all under some kind of
strain. Confounding this dynamism is the pace of technological
development whose extraordinary progress threatens to outstrip
our strategic and moral imagination and makes the strategic
equation tenuous unless major efforts are made to sustain it.
The most immediate challenge to international security is
posed by the evolution of the North Korean nuclear program.
Paradoxically, it is only after Pyongyang has achieved nuclear
and intercontinental missile testing breakthroughs, accompanied
by threatening assertions, U.S. and international measures to
deal with it have begun to be applied. That has raised the
possibility that, as in the case of Iran, an international
effort intended to prevent a radical regime from developing a
nuclear capability will culminate at the very point that that
regime is perfecting its capacity. For the second time in a
decade, an outcome that was widely considered unacceptable is
now on the verge of becoming irreversible.
My fundamental concern about the nuclear program of Korea
is not the threat it poses to the territory of the United
States, significant as it is. My most immediate concern is the
following. If North Korea still possesses a military nuclear
capability in some finite time, the impact on the proliferation
of nuclear weapons might be fundamental because if North Korea
could maintain its capability in the face of opposition by
China and the United States and the disapproval of the rest of
the world, other countries are bound to feel that this is the
way for achieving international prominence and the upper hand
in international disputes.
So, therefore, I think the denuclearization of North Korea
must be a fundamental objective. If it is not reached, we have
to prepare ourselves for the proliferation of weapons to other
countries which will create a new pattern of international
politics which will affect our concept of deterrence and a
possibility of deterrence and which will have to be carefully
examined and which this committee will want to address.
In the Middle East, we face the disintegration of the
international system as it has existed at the end of the First
World War and at the end of the Second World War. And every
country in the region is either a combatant or a theater of
conflict. And to me, the overriding concerns at the moment are
these.
We have successfully defeated the Islamic State in Iraq and
Syria (ISIS), but the question now is the succession, what
happens next. And I am concerned that in the territory once
occupied by ISIS, Iranian and Russian forces will become
dominant and we will see a belt emerging that goes from Tehran
to Beirut, therefore undermining the structure of the region
and creating a long-term challenge.
Finally, I want to refer to what has been identified by the
Trump administration as the dominant element now, the great
power relationship between the United States and China and
Russia. There is no doubt that the military capacity of China,
as well as its economic capacity, is growing, and there have
been challenges from Russia that have to be met especially in
Ukraine, Crimea, and Syria. This raises these fundamental
questions. What is the strategic relationship between these
countries vis-a-vis the prospect of peace? Is their strength
comparable enough to induce restraint? Are their values
compatible enough to encourage an agreed legitimacy? These are
the challenges that we face. The balance of power must be
maintained, but it is also necessary to attempt a strategic
dialogue that prevents the balance of power from having to be
tested. This is the key issue in the United States relationship
with Russia and China.
Let me conclude by stressing that I think that the
fundamental situation of the United States is strong, that we
have the capacity to meet these challenges. China has to deal
with significant domestic adjustments and it is possible that
it will balance those against the pressures that it can exert
outside. Russia is domestically also in considerable
difficulty. My basic point is that we can maintain a favorable
balance of power, but we must couple it with a political
structure in which the issue of war and peace can be used as a
diplomatic as well as a military expression. This is because
the evolution of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) is so great
and the challenges of technology are multiplying that both
elements of our national strategy must be stretched. And I am
confident that we can achieve these objectives in that spirit.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Kissinger follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed:
Thank you for the honor of appearing before this Committee. You
have asked me to comment on the international challenges facing the
United States and ``what from the standpoint of national strategy'' we
can do to best position ourselves ``to succeed'' in this ``competitive
global environment.'' I shall do so in three parts: the urgent,
exemplified by the North Korean nuclear challenge; the intermediate,
exemplified by the Middle East, especially Iran; and the long term,
exemplified by great power relationships.
The international situation facing the United States is
unprecedented. What is occurring is more than a coincidence of
individual crises across various geographies. Rather, it is a systemic
failure of world order which, after gathering momentum for nearly two
decades, is trending towards the international system's erosion rather
than its consolidation, whether in terms of respect for sovereignty,
rejection of territorial acquisition by force, expansion of mutually
beneficial trade without geoeconomic coercion, or encouragement of
human rights. In the absence of a shared concept among the major powers
expansive enough to accommodate divergent perspectives of our national
interests, partially derived from our diverse historical experiences,
traditional patterns of great power rivalry are returning. Complicating
this dynamic is the pace of technological development, whose
extraordinary progress threatens to outstrip our strategic and moral
imaginations--and in the field of artificial intelligence, may redefine
our consciousness altogether. This creates new potential for truly
catastrophic confrontations between nations.
north korea
The most immediate challenge to international peace and security is
posed by North Korea. Paradoxically, it is only after Pyongyang has
achieved nuclear and intercontinental missile breakthroughs,
accompanied by threatening assertions and demonstrations, that measures
to thwart these activities have begun to be applied. This has raised
the possibility that--as in the case of Iran--an international effort
intended to prevent a radical regime from developing a destabilizing
capability will coincide diplomatically with the regime perfecting that
very capacity. For the second time in a decade, an outcome that was
widely considered unacceptable is now on the verge of becoming
irreversible.
While the pressure campaign against North Korea appears to have
achieved gains in the last year, no breakthrough has taken place on the
essence of the matter: North Korea acquired nuclear weapons to assure
its regime's survival; in its view, to give them up would be tantamount
to suicide. North Korea's nuclear arsenal is often presented as a
threat to the territorial United States. But its most profound impact
will be on its neighbors in Asia. South Korea will reject an outcome
that leaves North Korea the only nuclear power on the Peninsula. For
its part, Japan will not live with either version of Korean nuclear
military power.
Successive American administrations have appealed to China to
``solve'' the problem by cutting off Pyongyang's supplies. China has
not done so because it could lead to the collapse of North Korea. In a
comparable situation in 1950, the proximity of Korea to major Chinese
population and industrial centers was sufficiently ominous to cause
China to intervene in the conflict. An agreement on the future of
Korea, perhaps by the revival of the established Six-Party Forum--or
failing that, energized by the United States and China--is the best
road to the denuclearization of the Peninsula and also, vis-`-vis Iran,
to the stability of the Middle East.
The widely discussed ``freeze for freeze'' scheme--halting North
Korean missile tests in return for abandoning defined Allied military
exercises--will not, however, fulfill this purpose or even advance it.
That would equate legitimate security operations with activities which
have been condemned by the UN Security Council for decades. And it
would encourage demands for additional restraints on, and perhaps the
dismantling of, America's alliances in the region. In its ultimate
sense, a freeze would legitimize North Korea's nuclear establishment as
well as the results of its previous tests.
Interim steps towards full denuclearization may well be part of an
eventual negotiation. But they need to be steps towards this ultimate
goal: the dismantlement of Pyongyang's existing arsenal. They must not
repeat the experience of the Vietnamese and Korean negotiations, which
were used as means to buy time to further pursue their adversarial
objectives.
the middle east
While North Korea poses the most immediate danger, the interacting
conflicts across the Middle East pose the most entrenched and
expanding. Almost every country is either a combatant or a battlefield
in one or more wars. The challenge in Asia is to maintain a generally
stable equilibrium; in the Middle East, it is to restore a legitimate
structure to a wide swath of territory where state authority has
deteriorated or dissolved.
Across the Middle East, the system of order that emerged from the
First World War is now in shambles. Conflicts are occurring on
ideological grounds, as between Shia and Sunni; between ethnic groups;
and against the state system. Four states have ceased to function as
sovereign: Syria, where a civil war, now in its seventh year, rages;
Iraq, where ISIS, though beaten back, continues to attempt to challenge
efforts to reconsolidate the state; Libya; and Yemen have all become
battlegrounds for factions and outside influences seeking to impose
their rule.
The multiplicity of contestants roils the region with ever-evolving
challenges. The world's war against ISIS is an illustration. Most non-
ISIS powers--including Shia Iran and leading Sunni states--agree that
ISIS must be destroyed. But the disposition of the territory regained
from ISIS presents a new challenge. If ISIS' former strongholds come to
be occupied by Iran's Revolutionary Guard or Shia militia subject to
it, the result will be a belt of Iranian influence stretching from
Tehran through Baghdad and Damascus all the way to Beirut. Tehran's
version of jihadism would replace the Islamic State's, and a restored
Iranian empire would emerge.
In this regard, Iran has become the key contemporary challenge in
the Middle East. Historically and politically, it has been the most
consistently cohesive power of the region, the only one which preserved
its language and historic culture during the Islamic conquest. Its
present impact results from its emergence, in the eyes of many of the
region's leaders, as a nuclear threshold state in the aftermath of the
JCPOA, a status seemingly conferred by that deal on Iran in 2015. Its
reach is further enhanced by the subtle and aggressive strategy of its
leadership: on one hand, defining Iran as a sovereign state within the
UN system subject to its restraints and obligations; but on the other,
identifying Iran as a revolutionary power attacking the existing world
order. In that capacity, Iran's proxies in Yemen, Lebanon, and Iraq
undermine or subsume existing governments.
Two measures should be taken by the United States and its allies:
to oppose Iranian hegemonic expansion; and to commit to preventing an
Iranian nuclear weapon. The first task has some similarities to
America's role in conducting and ending the Cold War. In the aftermath
of the Second World War, a group of historic countries confronted a
Soviet Union enhanced by the war and imbued with a revolutionary
ideology. Under American leadership, a coalition was formed that drew a
line defining the limit of Soviet expansion that would be tolerated,
eventually achieving containment and a negotiated end of the Cold War.
The enforcement of the JCPOA is the prerequisite to arresting
nuclear proliferation which, if spread across the Middle East and Asia,
will require recasting the system of deterrence that now exists. That
United States needs to make clear that beyond the enforcement of the
JCPOA, it will oppose the emergence of any Iranian nuclear military
capability. These steps are essential to shoring up and reshaping world
order.
great power relations
Beyond the issues of the moment looms the fundamental question of
world order. How does the conduct of the major countries affect the
prospects for peace? Is their strength comparable enough to induce
restraint? Are their values compatible enough to encourage an agreed
legitimacy?
Administration pronouncements--both in the National Security
Strategy statement and in comments by the Secretary of Defense--about
America's strategic future have identified China and Russia as
potential threats to the world's equilibrium and have defined America's
national security objectives as thwarting their designs.
The practical requirements of our stated defense policy, which I
endorse, do not exhaust the range of necessary security policies. If
history teaches any lesson, it is that calculations of balance of power
are not always unambiguous, especially in a period of rapid
technological change which characterizes our period. The outbreak of
World War I is a good example. The nations of Europe, in a crisis not
significantly different from several previously overcome, challenged
the existing equilibrium with consequences from which Europe has not
fully recovered in the century since.
In a world of admitted rivalry and competition, a balance of power
is necessary but not sufficient. The underlying question is whether a
renewed rivalry between major powers can be kept from culminating in
conflict. This presupposes an agreed concept of legitimacy or, at a
minimum, a quest for it.
For most of the past quarter-century, Americans assumed that post-
Cold War China and Russia would join the United States as pillars of
the liberal international order and that our shared challenges, such as
preventing nuclear proliferation and managing the global economy, would
facilitate our ever-closer cooperation. But we have been reminded that
our national interests, based on our diverse histories, do not
automatically converge, creating a need to manage our differences. A
new strategic concept of major power relations, which seeks both to
stabilize the military equation and shield the world from catastrophe,
is imperative. Two principles must guide this effort. I will say a few
words about each.
First, the balance of power must be maintained. This requires an
acute understanding of the principal elements of power, especially in
this era of accelerating change. It also requires answers to these
challenges: What threats are so central to American security that we
will resist them alone, if necessary? What threats will we deal with
only with allies? What challenges do not rise to the level of military
confrontation?
Second, balancing world power, while essential, must not constitute
the entirety of our policy. Today, the complexity, ambiguity, and
volatility of highly advanced weapons, combined with emerging cyber and
space-based technologies and artificial intelligence, would render a
conflict between major powers a catastrophe unique in human history.
The requirements of a balance which avoids such a conflict can be
sustained only by governments whose publics believe in their peaceful
purposes.
Our concept of major power relations must therefore include a
diplomacy of world order side by side with a military element. Such an
outcome presupposes that all parties' core interests are compatible, or
seek to be so, through continual dialogue as these interests evolve.
This policy also assumes strict reciprocity.
Never before has such a project been carried out in comparable
circumstances dealing with such vast potential consequences. But it is
our historic task. In this, China and Russia, though each possesses a
profound capacity to impact world order, pose different challenges.
China is a rising power, as a matter of both policy and historical
inevitability. Both it and the United States, an established power, are
obliged by necessity to undertake a reexamining of their historic
thinking. Not since it became a global power after World War II has
America had to contend with a geopolitical equal. And never in China's
centuries-long history has it conceived of a foreign nation as more
than a tributary to the centrality of its power and culture. Each
thinks of itself as exceptional, but differently: the United States
believes its values ultimately will be universally adopted. China
believes less in emulation than in the impact of a majestic example
that will motivate other societies to turn towards Beijing on the basis
of respect. The Belt and Road Initiative, by seeking to connect China
to Central Asia and eventually Europe, is an expression of this
thinking: it is a quest to shift the world's center of gravity.
With China, the challenge of world order involves the possibility
of enabling two different concepts of nationhood to exist at least
peacefully--and ideally cooperatively--side by side. American
presidents of both parties and Chinese leaders have, for the past
decades, sought cooperation at various summits. They have made some
progress but have been inhibited by differences in culture: America
seeking practical solutions to relatively short-term issues; China in
quest of longer perspectives. If the goal of developing a concept of
peaceful coevolution is not achieved, the risks of conflict may become
unmanageable.
russia
Russia exhibits occasionally a quest of naked dominion as vis-`-vis
Ukraine. Historically impelled by its geography--eleven time zones, few
natural defensive demarcations--Russia developed a definition of
absolute security that has driven it to seek to dominate its neighbors.
In recent decades, the collapse of the Soviet Union has led almost all
peoples at Russia's borderlands to reassert their independence. Many
sought to preserve their sovereignty by aligning with the West and
joining NATO.
I strongly supported NATO's expansion to countries that
traditionally were part of Europe's system of statehood. A special
issue has arisen, however, with respect to countries with historic,
cultural, and religious ties to both East and West, principally Georgia
and Ukraine.
The challenge of Russia is whether it is possible to develop a
concept of coexistence that addresses both the requirements of Europe's
defense and a stable security architecture for the lands adjacent to
it. Surely, the wisest course is to couple firm resistance of
transgressions against international order with prospects for Russian
participation in dialogues on international order. Rather than comprise
a permanent zone of confrontation, criteria should be sought for
Russia's geographic tangents to involve a zone of potential
cooperation.
Few countries in history have started more wars or caused more
turmoil than Russia in its quest for absolute security. But
paradoxically, it is also true that at several key points in the last
millennium, the balance of power in Europe has been preserved by
Russian effort and sacrifice--against the Mongols, then against the
Swedes, then Napoleon, then Hitler. While Russia's strength is our
current preoccupation, history suggests that Russian weakness, in the
final calculus, could produce its own dangers to world order by
unleashing an orgy of violence in the contest over control of the
territory east of the Urals.
the future of nato
The traditional patterns of the Atlantic Alliance, which was
established in a concerted effort to balance against a singular threat,
will not be easily applied to the world I just described. NATO was
formed in 1949 to protect its members from Soviet assault. It has since
evolved into a network of nations attempting to coalesce and react
jointly to destabilizing international crises outside the original
treaty area.
In the world I have just described, there will be a temptation for
Europe to maneuver between Asia and America, exploiting the
fluctuations which surround it. But the realities of demographics,
resources, technology, and capital continue to assure a decisive role
in the world for an engaged America and a Europe committed to Atlantic
principles. It will not, however, come about automatically. NATO's
contribution to world order requires it to be clear about its strategic
purposes. What outcomes, other than violations of its members'
sovereignty, does it seek to prevent, and by what means? What are its
strategic goals? By what means will it achieve them? To determine
whether a unified Atlantic outlook can be renewed and applied to this
new world is a key to long-range strategy.
conclusion
The United States must address all these questions at a moment when
many in the wider world believe Americans have voluntarily stepped back
from strong leadership, so no longer can be expected to shoulder the
burdens that come with an integrative, large-minded policy of support
for the international state system.
This is ironic. The reality is that America is in a strong
position. China has important domestic agenda considerations and does
not want attention to these disrupted by external conflict. Russian
actions in Eastern Europe and the Middle East have evoked reactions in
the direction of retrenchment. Iran's pursuit of empire is creating
countervailing forces that make possible its containment.
The stakes are high. The liberal world order, now some 300 to 400
years in development, has been the only truly international, indeed
global, structure open to all peoples everywhere. Uniquely, it is
procedural, not ideological. That means it is flexible, open,
cooperative, and able to make mid-course corrections as needed. But it
is not self-executing. America's initiatives and its integrative
approach will spell the difference between stability and calamity.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much, Dr. Kissinger.
We pause for a moment here. We have a quorum, and so I ask
the committee to consider a list of 1,056 pending military
nominations. All of these nominations have been before the
committee the required length of time.
Is there a motion to favorably report this list of 1,056
pending military nominations to the Senate?
Senator Reed. So moved.
Senator Inhofe. There is a motion.
Is there a second?
Senator Wicker. Second.
Senator Inhofe. All those in favor, say aye.
[Chorus of ayes.]
Senator Inhofe. Opposed, no.
[No response.]
Senator Inhofe. The ayes have it.
[The list of nominations considered and approved by the
committee follows:]
Military Nominations Pending with the Senate Armed Services Committee
Which are Proposed for the Committee's Consideration on January 25,
2018.
1. MG Scott D. Berrier, USA to be lieutenant general and Deputy
Chief of Staff, G-2, U.S. Army (Reference No. 1120)
2. BG Charles L. Plummer, USAF to be major general (Reference No.
1217)
3. Col. Sharon R. Bannister, USAF to be brigadier general
(Reference No. 1223)
4. In the Air Force there are 35 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Sarah E. Abel) (Reference No.
1233)
5. In the Navy there are 2 appointments to the grade of commander
(Paul F. Magoulick) (Reference No. 1244)
6. MG Jeffrey A. Rockwell, USAF to be lieutenant general and Judge
Advocate General of the Air Force (Reference No. 1295)
7. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
commander (Nicholas H. Steging, Jr.) (Reference No. 1303)
8. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
commander (Jonathan S. Durham) (Reference No. 1304)
9. In the Army there are 2 appointments to the grade of brigadier
general (list begins with Anthony R. Hale) (Reference No. 1320)
10. In the Air Force there are 2 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Brett L. Hedgepeth) (Reference No. 1321)
11. In the Air Force there are 2 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel and below (list begins with Joanna K. Kowalik)
(Reference No. 1322)
12. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Aleksandr Gutman) (Reference No. 1323)
13. In the Navy there are 3 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant commander (list begins with Laura C. Gilstrap) (Reference
No. 1324)
14. In the Air Force there are 19 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Trish M. Arno) (Reference No. 1427)
15. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Robert L. Ozburn) (Reference No. 1428)
16. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
commander (Todd D. Husty) (Reference No. 1429)
17. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
commander (Dawn M. Stankus) (Reference No. 1430)
18. In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of
major (Christopher N. Earley) (Reference No. 1431)
19. MG Eric J. Wesley, USA to be lieutenant general and Deputy
Commanding General, Futures/Director, Army Capabilities Integration
Center, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (Reference No. 1451)
20. MG Theodore D. Martin, USA to be lieutenant general and Deputy
Commanding General/Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
Command (Reference No. 1452)
21. Col. Susie S. Kuilan, USAR to be brigadier general (Reference
No. 1453)
22. MG Leslie C. Smith, USA to be lieutenant general and The
Inspector General, Office of the Secretary of the Army (Reference No.
1454)
23. RADM(lh) Johnny R. Wolfe, USN to be vice admiral and Director
for Strategic Systems Programs (Reference No. 1456)
24. Capt. John C. Ring, USN to be rear admiral (lower half)
(Reference No. 1457)
25. RADM(lh) Scott D. Conn, USN to be rear admiral (Reference No.
1458)
26. In the Air Force Reserve there are 8 appointments to the grade
of colonel (list begins with Jin Hwa Lee Frazier) (Reference No. 1460)
27. In the Air Force Reserve there are 12 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Corey L. Anderson) (Reference No.
1461)
28. In the Air Force Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade
of colonel (Michael C. Maine) (Reference No. 1462)
29. In the Air Force Reserve there are 4 appointments to the grade
of colonel (list begins with Melissa A. Day) (Reference No. 1463)
30. In the Air Force Reserve there are 8 appointments to the grade
of colonel (list begins with Matthew M. Bird) (Reference No. 1464)
31. In the Air Force Reserve there are 4 appointments to the grade
of colonel (list begins with Holly L. Brewer) (Reference No. 1465)
32. In the Air Force Reserve there are 119 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with John G. Andrade) (Reference No.
1466)
33. In the Air Force Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade
of colonel (Joshua M. Kovich) (Reference No. 1467)
34. In the Air Force Reserve there are 4 appointments to the grade
of colonel (list begins with David M. Dersch, Jr.) (Reference No. 1468)
35. In the Air Force Reserve there are 5 appointments to the grade
of colonel (list begins with Lance J. Kim) (Reference No. 1469)
36. In the Air Force Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade
of colonel (David L. Wells II) (Reference No. 1470)
37. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Jocelyn A. Leventhal) (Reference No. 1471)
38. In the Army Reserve there are 14 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Alyssa S. Adams) (Reference No. 1472)
39. In the Army Reserve there are 2 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Kenneth S. Katrosh) (Reference No. 1473)
40. In the Army there are 2 appointments to the grade of colonel
(list begins with Joseph Kloiber) (Reference No. 1474)
41. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(Erick C. Crews) (Reference No. 1475)
42. In the Army there are 3 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Michael C. Bradwick) (Reference No. 1476)
43. In the Army there are 5 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Zachary T. Busenbark) (Reference No. 1477)
44. In the Army there are 2 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Gabby V. Canceran) (Reference No. 1478)
45. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Adam T. Soto) (Reference No. 1479)
46. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(Philip J. Dacunto) (Reference No. 1480)
47. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Lyle A. Ourada) (Reference No. 1481)
48. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Sherry M. Kwon) (Reference No. 1482)
49. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
commander (Paul I. Ahn) (Reference No. 1485)
50. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
commander (Allen G. Gunn) (Reference No. 1486)
51. In the Marine Corps there are 4 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with William Doctor, Jr.) (Reference No. 1487)
52. In the Marine Corps there are 2 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Paulo T. Alves) (Reference No.
1490)
53. In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (Henry W. Soukup) (Reference No. 1492)
54. In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (William W. Inns III) (Reference No. 1493)
55. In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (Craig A. Elliott) (Reference No. 1496)
56. In the Marine Corps there are 3 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Bill W. Brooks, Jr.) (Reference
No. 1497)
57. In the Marine Corps there are 734 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Edward J. Abma) (Reference No. 1498)
58. In the Marine Corps there are 23 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Justin R. Anderson) (Reference No. 1499)
59. In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (Steven P. Hulse) (Reference No. 1500)
_______________________________________________________________________
TOTAL: 1,056
Secretary Shultz, thank you so much for being here.
STATEMENT OF DR. GEORGE P. SHULTZ, THOMAS W. AND SUSAN B. FORD
DISTINGUISHED FELLOW, HOOVER INSTITUTION, STANFORD UNIVERSITY,
AND FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE
Dr. Shultz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, I would like to pay tribute to Senator McCain. Like
Henry, I have known him a great, long time. He fought for his
country in combat. He endured terrible suffering and privation
as a prisoner of war, and he managed to handle himself with
dignity and pride.
Then he has served as a Senator and a presidential
candidate. I remember those days and the slogan ``country
first.'' That is John McCain. ``Country first,'' always.
So, Senator, I am sorry you are not here, but I want you to
know how much I admire how you have served our country.
I would like to express my appreciation to be testifying
alongside my two friends here, Henry Kissinger and Rich
Armitage.
And I take the occasion to particularly underline one of
the things that Henry brought out in his testimony, that is,
the concern we must have about nuclear proliferation. As you
remember in the Reagan period, we worked hard. President Reagan
thought nuclear weapons were immoral, and we worked hard to get
them reduced. And we had quite a lot of success. In those days,
people seemed to have an appreciation of what would be the
result of a nuclear weapon if it were ever used. I fear people
have lost that sense of dread. And now we see everything going
in the other direction, nuclear proliferation. The more
countries have nuclear weapons, the more likely it is one is
going to go off somewhere and the more fissile materials lying
around--anybody who gets fissile material can make a weapon
fairly easily. So this is a major problem. It can blow up the
world. So I think we have to get at it.
And the right way to start is what Henry said, is somehow
to be able to have a different kind of relationship with
Russia--after all, Russia and the United States have the bulk
of all the weapons--and then start a dialogue. I will have some
comments to make about Russia in a minute.
I distributed two things. Number one is a demographic
outline, and I want to speak about that. And I also distributed
a pre-publication book, and I am going to talk particularly
about two of the articles in the book. One is by T.J. Hammis, a
retired Marine Corps colonel. He is at the National Defense
University. Another is by Lucy Shapiro and her husband. Lucy is
a biologist. Her husband is a physicist at Stanford. Lucy is
the smartest person in any room she is in and she is also fun.
So sometime if you were looking for something really good, get
Lucy to come and testify and you would have a ball but you
would also learn something. But anyway, I am going to draw on
these two papers. So you have that book.
But I think my main point is that there are four major
forces acting in the world that are going to disrupt it greatly
and rapidly. And anything we do has to be aware of these
disruptions.
The first is demography. And this chart is one of the
things that just shows you briefly what is happening. You can
see the blue lines are 2015 to 2035, and then 2035 on out are
the golden lines. And you can see how things are shrinking
rapidly. Birthrates are falling. Longevity is rising. In a
sense we used to think of populations as being a lot of young
people and a few older people. Now it is totally reversed with
huge implications.
I think it is worth also noting the big declines coming in
the populations of China and Russia. I might say on Russia,
Russia's economy is not as big as Italy's and it has twice the
number of people. It shows you how poorly they are running
their economy, and their population is shrinking. And I think
in a sense we have Russia playing a weak hand aggressively, and
we need what I think of as a Pershing moment to put a stop sign
on that and then get on to talking.
So I think the first thing to notice is the world
population is changing. It is getting older. For the most part,
the places in the world that are seeing big increases in
population are mostly in Africa and some parts of Asia. These
are places where there are the big explosions of populations.
These are also places where the economies are not good and
where probably adverse conditions are most likely to arise. So
I think it is almost certain that there is going to be a big
effort for people to migrate away from those places, and how
the world is going to handle this large migration--we got to
start thinking about it. You cannot ignore it. So that is point
one.
Point two has to do with governance. We are surrounded by
information and communications. Information is everywhere. Some
of it is right. Some of it is wrong. Some of it is put out for
a purpose. Some of it is just neutral. It is hard to sort it
out. And diversity is everywhere. People can look at this
information. They can communicate. They can organize and they
do. So you have got a lot of government by protest of one kind
or another. We have to learn all over again how we govern over
diversity. Just as government is having a hard time, things
like nuclear proliferation come along that can only be dealt
with by intergovernmental cooperation. So this crisis in
government I think is a very important thing to address and try
to think through.
The third and fourth big changes have to do with
technology. The first is artificial intelligence, and the
second is what is called 3-D printing. It really should be
called additive manufacturing. But it is a big deal really
coming hard. So I am going to focus on what is happening with
this.
First, let me talk about the economy. What is happening as
a result of these forces is deglobalization. This is already
happening. This is not something for the future. The reason is
that it is becoming more and more possible to produce the
things you want close to where you are. So the advantages of
low labor costs are disappearing. And the more you produce
things near where you are, the less you need shipping and it
has a big impact on energy and it has a huge impact on the
countries that are providing low- cost labor and a huge impact
on places like ourselves which will wind up being able to
produce these things near where we are. It is a revolution. And
a revolution in the economy has all sorts of security
implications that need to be thought about. But this is a very
big deal.
Here is just a sample in terms of information: ``Over $700
billion in capital left developing economies, greatly exceeding
the $125 billion net outflows during the great recession. In
contrast, foreign direct investment into the United States is
growing rapidly. In 2016, FDI flows into the United States
reached $391 billion, more than double the $171 billion inflow
in 2014. Outflows in 2016 were only $299 billion. Thus in 2016,
the United States saw a net inflow of investment capital of
$192 billion. In 2015, the latest statistics available from the
Department of Commerce, nearly 70 percent of the FDI was
invested in the manufacturing sector. This is just by way of
putting an underline on the point that I was making.
Robotics, 3-D printing, and artificial intelligence are
driving manufacturers to reconsider not only how and what they
make but where they make it. The world is on the very front end
of a big shift from labor to automation. Robot sales are
expected to reach $400,000 annually in 2018. This estimate does
not account for the newly developed cobots, that is,
collaborative robots. They assist human workers and thus
dramatically increase human productivity.''
There are other things about all this that I will go into
which underline it.
``But the new technologies are bringing manufacturing back
to the United States. The United States has lost manufacturing
jobs every year from 1998 to 2009, a total of 8 million jobs.
Over the last 6 years, it regained about a million of them.
With the cost of living no longer a significant advantage, it
makes little sense to manufacture components in Southeast Asia,
assemble them in China, and then ship them to the rest of the
world when the same item can either be manufactured by robots
or printed where it will be used. So this is a huge revolution
taking place. It also underlines the enhanced ability to
protect your intellectual property because you do not have to
ship it around'' (``Technological change and the Fourth
Industrial Revolution.'' Beyond Disruption: Technology's
challenge to Governance, ed. George P. Shultz, Jim Hoagland,
and James Trimbie, Hoover Institution Press, 2018).
So that is the economic side.
``Now, fourth, the industrial revolution''--I am reading
now from Hammis' text--``will drive massive changes in the
economic, political, and social spheres and will inevitably
change warfare too. (``Technological change and the Fourth
Industrial Revolution'').
So you want to look at the dramatic improvements in nano-
energetics, artificial intelligence, drones, and 3-D printing.
They are producing a revolution of small, smart, and cheap
weapons that will redefine the battlefield.
Open source literature says nano-aluminum created ultra
high burn rates which give nano-explosives four to ten times
the power of TNT. The obvious result, small platforms will
carry a very destructive power. Then you can put these small
platforms on drones'' (``Technological change and the Fourth
Industrial Revolution.'' Beyond Disruption: Technology's
challenge to Governance, ed. George P. Shultz, Jim Hoagland,
and James Trimbie, Hoover Institution Press, 2018)/ Drones can
be manufactured easily and you can have a great many of them
inexpensively. So then you can have a swarm armed with lethal
equipment. Any fixed target is a real target. So an airfield
where our Air Force stores planes is very vulnerable target. A
ship at anchor is a vulnerable target. So you have got to think
about that in terms of how you deploy.
``And in terms of drones, while such a system cannot be
jammed, it would only serve to get a drone--we are talking
about getting a drone to the area of where its target is, but
you would be sure it can hit a specific target. At that point,
the optical systems guided by artificial intelligence could use
on-board, multi-spectral imaging to find the target and guide
the weapons. It is exactly that autonomy that makes the
technologic convergence of threat today. Because such drones
will require no external input other than the signature of the
designed target, they will not be vulnerable to jamming. Not
requiring human intervention, the autonomous platforms will
also be able to operate in very large numbers''
(``Technological change and the Fourth Industrial
Revolution''). So that is a revolution in the way warfare will
be conducted.
You have all sorts of ways of enhancing the impact of the
weapon by explosively formed penetrators and by what they call
bringing the detonator, that is, learning how to hit something
that has a lot of explosives in it and blowing them up.
``Now, the Chinese are very much on to this. The Chinese
can transport, erect, and fire these fairly large drones, 9-
foot wing span, with a two-person crew. A similar size truck
can be configured to carry hundreds of Israeli hero size
drones. Thus the single battery of 10 trucks could launch
thousands of autonomous active hunters over a battlefield''
(``Technological change and the Fourth Industrial
Revolution''). So the Chinese know how they can--we have bases
in Japan, airfields. They can take them out. We have got to
learn how to disperse and change the way you deploy.
This makes domain denial much easier than domain usage. I
think there is a great lesson here for what we do in NATO to
contain Russia because you can deploy these things in boxes so
you do not even know what they are and on trucks and train
people to unload quickly and fire. So it is a huge deterrent
capability that is available and it is inexpensive enough so
that we can expect our allies to pitch in and get them for
themselves.
I might say on cyber--there was some mention of that
earlier. There is a big problem, but it is important to
remember that all networks have nodes in the real world. Some
of them are quite exposed. So we combine that fact with the
possibility of autonomous drones and maybe you can do something
about those nodes.
The creative use of swarms of autonomous drones to augment
current forces would strongly and relatively cheaply reinforce
NATO, as I said, that deterrence. If NATO assists frontline
states in fielding large numbers of inexpensive autonomous
drones that are pre-packaged in standard 20-foot containers,
the weapons can be stored in sites across the countries under
the control of reserve forces. If the weapons are pre-packaged
and stored, the national forces can quickly deploy the weapons
to delay a Russian advance.'' (``Technological change and the
Fourth Industrial Revolution.'')
What is happening is you have small, cheap, and highly
lethal replacing large, expensive platforms. This change is
coming about with great rapidity, and it is massively important
to take it into account in anything that you are thinking about
doing.
Now, let me turn to a completely different aspect of the
change that is going on. Excuse me for rattling around in my
papers.
Now I turn to Lucy's paper. She says, ``breakthrough
advances in the sequencing, decoding, and manipulation of
genomes of all organisms are occurring at the same time as
destructive changes in the world's ecosystem. We are in the
midst of the sixth grade extension which is predicted to
culminate in the elimination of about 30 percent of all ocean
corals''--that is going on now--``sharks and rays, 30 percent
of all freshwater mollusks, 25 percent of all mammals, 20
percent of all reptiles, and about 15 percent of all birds
currently alive'' (``Technological Change and Global Biological
Disequilibrium.'' Beyond Disruption: Technology's Challenge to
Governance, ed. George P. Shultz, Jim Hoagland, and James
Timbie, Hoover Institution Press, 2018). There is a gigantic
change taking place.
And tropical diseases are everywhere, and we are not
getting up to scale on our diagnostics of them and our
treatment capabilities.
We also, as Lucy brings out, know how to manipulate genes
in a way we never have before. So why are we not getting some
of these mosquitoes that do such much damage and fixing them so
they do not do so much damage. That can be done. This is all,
of course, happening as a result of the warming climate.
As Lucy says, climate change is the cause of the global
redistribution of infectious diseases'' (``Technological change
and Global Biological Disequilibrium''). So that is happening.
So she gives an example here. She refers to the worst
animal disease pandemic in U.S. history. ``That was back in
1914-1915 when 50 million domestic poultry in 21 states were
slaughtered'' (``Technological Change and Global Biological
Disequilibrium''). How does this happen?
``Global warming has shifted migratory bird flight paths
leading to an overlap of the south to north Asia-Pacific
flyway, the North American Pacific flyway to the Bering
Straits. The Arctic waters are warming faster than other
regions on earth so that the Bering Straits has become a
meeting and mingling spot for flocks following flyways that
formerly rarely mixed. DNA sequencing enable identification of
specific avian flu strains that were hitching a ride in these
mingling flocks as well as their sites of origin and their
mutation rates'' (``Technological Change and Global Biological
Disequilibrium''). So out of all this, we get big trouble.
Well, so my point--and I will not keep belaboring these
points, but I think it is quite apparent that what we are
seeing as a result of technological change in the biological
area is a new world, a very different world. It is going to be
de-globalized, and at the same time, there are weapons
available that will change the battlefield landscape.
We are on top of these things. So are the Chinese. I think
the Russians are probably a little less able, but nevertheless
can get these.
But going back to the nuclear problem that Henry mentioned,
somehow we have to get our arms around the nuclear
proliferation, and the way to do it is to put a stop sign in
front of Russia and have them come to their senses, then start
working with them on the nuclear matters, as well as other
things. From that, we can try to create a kind of joint
enterprise to work on this issue because it threatens mankind.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Secretary Shultz.
Secretary Armitage, nice to have you back.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD L. ARMITAGE, PRESIDENT, ARMITAGE
INTERNATIONAL AND FORMER DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE
Mr. Armitage. Thank you, sir. Acting Chairman Inhofe,
Ranking Member Reed, ladies and gentlemen.
Now I get it. I know what my job is here today. I am a
little like that fellow who followed Noah to the podium to talk
about my experiences in a recent rain shower.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Armitage. I do realize that your patience is in inverse
proportion to the length of my opening statement. I have been
here before. So if you would allow me to make only three
points.
The first, to join my distinguished colleagues to send all
best wishes and prayers to John McCain. I miss him and I miss
his voice, and I think it is important that he knows that.
Second, much to my amazement, the national security
strategy and the national defense strategy actually comported
with each other to a very high degree. And this is no small
chore, no small feat. Having participated in many of those
historically, they do not often comport. This does.
But I particularly want to call to note the national
defense strategy because I think it is a very clear-eyed, well
written, succinct document that accomplishes things. First of
all, it accomplishes a direction for the political appointees
in the Pentagon. They know what the President and the Secretary
of Defense want. They get it.
Second, it is a clear guidepost to our uniformed military
and our bureaucrats--and I mean that term in a positive sense--
who populate our Pentagon and beyond. They know what the
President's priorities are. And it is also very clear to you as
authorizers what the President's priorities are. Set curbs, if
you will, barriers along the street to show you what is
important and what is not as far as the President and the
Pentagon are concerned.
Finally, equally important is what that document does not
say. It does not say that we face an existential threat today.
It talks about peer competitors. I am all for competition. And
if we do our job as a military and diplomats, peer competitors
will not become adversaries and then enemies.
To be an existential threat, it seems to me you have to
have the capability to annihilate the United States and the
desire to do so. China has the capability. It does not have the
desire. She has too much skin in the game. Russia has the
capability. It does not have the desire. She prefers to use
other methods to undermine the United States in Eastern Europe
and Ukraine, et cetera. North Korea, Iran, they do not yet have
the capability and their intention, at least to me, is still
unknown. Now, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and
terrorist groups, they have got the intention to destroy us but
they do not have the capability. So we have got to keep our eye
on the ball, and the ball is to keep our peer competitors from
becoming enemies and adversaries.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Armitage follows:]
Prepared Statement by Richard L. Armitage
I am grateful for the opportunity to come before this committee to
discuss the national security challenges facing our country. I am
particularly honored to testify alongside Secretaries Kissinger and
Shultz, two of our nation's leading statesmen. I also want to thank
Chairman McCain and Ranking Member Reed for their leadership and to
wish Chairman McCain well in his current fight.
This hearing examines how policymakers can execute a coherent
strategy to address the threats facing the United States.
Unfortunately, the lack of consistency in recent U.S. foreign policy
has created uncertainty about America's role in the world. According to
a survey published by the Pew Research Center on June 26, 2017, global
confidence in the U.S. president fell from 64 percent to 22 percent in
just one year. Nature abhors a vacuum, so if our competitors believe
that the United States is stepping back, they will step forward.
We are already seeing concerning signs about the loss of American
leadership. A few months ago, Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Hsien
Loong came to Washington and warned that his counterparts might decide,
``I want to be friends with both the U.S. and the Chinese--and the
Chinese are ready, and I'll start with them.'' We must choose whether
the United States will accept the mantle of global leadership or cede
that responsibility. For my part, I believe it is critical that the
United States stay actively engaged to protect our interests around the
globe.
Regaining confidence in the United States will require a clear and
consistent approach to the challenges we face. In this regard, I find
parts of the recently released National Security and Defense Strategies
refreshing. The National Security Strategy does not mince words about
the challenges posed by China and Russia. The National Defense Strategy
makes its top priority ``the reemergence of long-term, strategic
competition'' with these states. This message was amplified by
Secretary Mattis's comment last week that ``Great power competition,
not terrorism, is now the primary focus of U.S. national security.''
Inconsistencies lie, however, in the difference between the
administration's words and deeds. Thus far, the administration's
approach to both China and Russia has been mixed. Under Xi Jinping,
China appears to be embracing authoritarian mercantilism. Beijing's
growing economic and military might have enabled greater assertiveness
in the South China Sea, more coercive practices against Taiwan, and
efforts to restructure geostrategic relationships across the Eurasian
continent. In my view, the administration missed a golden opportunity
to push back against China's destabilizing activities when the
President went to Beijing last fall.
Russia is far less capable than China, but its interference in the
U.S. elections and its activities in Eastern Europe are no less
serious. Once again, however, the administration has been far too
hesitant to call out Russia's efforts to undermine democracy both at
home and abroad.
Despite our ongoing efforts, terrorist groups, such as ISIS, will
continue to present a threat to the United States so long as the root
causes of terrorism remain. Terrorism is fed by youth bulges, lack of
opportunity, lack of women's empowerment, lack of political legitimacy,
ethnic strife, and sectarian rivalry. We will have to continue to
manage the threat from ISIS and other terror groups by addressing these
underlying dynamics while also upholding our core values and
principles.
The final set of challenges comes from rogue states. Although the
nuclear deal with Iran has limited Tehran's nuclear capabilities, Iran
continues to threaten regional security. I believe that the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action should have been followed by a series of
efforts to force Iran to cease other types of cancerous behavior, such
as support for terrorism. There is more work to be done in this regard,
and I urge the administration and members of Congress not to overlook
this equally necessary approach toward Iran.
North Korea also embraces an array of destabilizing activities. The
prospect that Kim Jong-un might be able to launch a nuclear-armed
missile against the continental United States requires renewed
cooperation with South Korea, Japan, and others. I believe that
deterrence and containment are the best approach, as long as they are
executed in coordination with our allies.
These challenges are real, but none yet rise to the level of an
existential threat. An existential threat requires not only the
capability to threaten our survival, but also the intent to carry out
that threat. Although China and Russia are the two most capable
competitors we face at present, I do not believe that they presently
possess that intent, and it should be our goal to dissuade them from
doing so. Iran, North Korea, and terrorist groups may desire to
undermine our system, but they do not yet have the capability to
threaten our way of life.
Even without an existential threat to our nation, we cannot sit
idle while our competitors advance. We must prioritize the threats we
face and then devote attention and resources appropriately. The
National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy set forth
China and Russia as the top tier concerns, but it remains to be seen
whether the administration is capable of working with Congress to pass
a defense budget that reflects this prioritization. Such an effort will
be critical to the United States' strategic standing.
We must also engage more deeply with our allies and partners.
President Eisenhower once noted, ``We could be the wealthiest and the
most mighty nation and still lose the battle of the world if we do not
help our world neighbors protect their freedom and advance their social
and economic progress.'' This is as true now as it was then, and we
must be vigilant that this basic underpinning of our national security
is not lost to the forces of isolationism.
It also is unclear whether the President himself will support the
approach that his administration has identified. Although the National
Security Strategy discusses the importance of ``pursuit of shared
interests, values, and aspirations,'' the President has at times
undermined these concepts.
My view is that the United States must maintain a leadership role
in the world both in word and deed. The United States--along with its
allies and partners--has the strength, wisdom, and experience to lead.
The world needs a renewed U.S. commitment to global security,
prosperity, and values. The time is now for our leaders to take on the
mantle of leadership, and I look forward to discussing with you how the
United States might do so.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
We have a full house here and so I am going to be very
brief. But one of the things that came across very clear from
all of you, comparing our problems today with the problems of
the past. We have threats that we have not had before. All of
you have served with Director Clapper, the former Director of
National Intelligence. The quote that he has given us--and I am
sure you are aware of that--``looking back over now more than a
half century in intelligence, I have not experienced a time
when we have been beset by more crises and threats around the
globe.'' And then we have our Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff who even suggests that we are losing our qualitative and
quantitative advantage. So it is very frightening.
So I would just like to ask each one of you. Secretary
Armitage, you were very specific on the national defense
strategy that came out from President Donald Trump and
specifically the two-three strategy. Would anyone like to
elaborate any more on their support or non-support of that
strategy that just came out in January 2018?
Dr. Shultz. Like Rich, I am very impressed with what they
laid out, but I think it does not adequately address the fact
of the huge change that is taking place in de-globalization and
a new kind of weaponry that is coming about and what the
implications of that are. Those things need to get factored in.
I am sure they will.
We had the privilege of having Jim Mattis at Stanford's
Hoover Institution for about 3 years. His office was around the
corner from mine. So whenever I would see his light on, I would
go, sit down, and start talking. He is one wonderful man. He is
smart. He is into everything. He knows what is going on. If you
ask him his opinion, he tells you what it is right between the
eyes. There is no ambiguity about it.
Senator Inhofe. I think you both do that.
Dr. Shultz. He is a jewel and I am sure he is into all
this.
Senator Inhofe. Any other comments on the two-three? Yes,
Secretary Armitage.
Mr. Armitage. Yes, sir. Two comments.
First of all, on the qualitative and quantitative edge that
we are losing, well, is it no wonder? We are marching and
countermarching all up and down Europe, Afghanistan, and Iraq
for a long time. We really run these folks ragged in my view.
Africa now. So it is no question that we are losing our
training edge, our qualitative edge. The equipment is being run
into the ground. So I think the military leadership of the
United States, the Secretary of Defense, and you all ought to
think through this problem to make sure that we are deploying
people that we really need to deploy and we are keeping people
at home that we need to keep at home.
Second, I want to dispute to a tiny degree the fact that
this is the messiest and most disorderly world we have ever
seen. I think with 40 million refugees after World War II and
40 million dead, someone might say no, it was pretty bad. Here
is a man who participated in the Pacific in that conflict, and
he can tell you personally. So it is messy and it is
disorderly, but is it the worst it has ever been? I am not
sure. Maybe it seems worse because there are questions in the
international community about whether the United States is
going to take our traditional lead as we have for the past 70
years.
Senator Inhofe. And while you have the floor, just one
brief answer to this on the nuclear strategy. We have had a
hearing recently and it has been obvious to everyone--and you
all three remember this--that China and Russia have been
modernizing their nuclear arsenals while we have been sitting
around not doing anything on ours. If you look at our nuclear
triad, all three legs are aging. Do you have any comments to
make on your recommendation as to what we should be doing right
now? Any one of you.
Dr. Shultz. I am a great believer in the tremendous
importance of getting rid of nuclear weapons, but I think the
way to do that is, as long as there are nuclear weapons, the
United States must have a robust, secure, and safe arsenal to
use for deterrence and for a basis from which to negotiate
down.
Senator Inhofe. We really have not been doing any
modernization since you guys were at the helm. So that is the
only point I wanted to make. Do you agree with that?
Dr. Shultz. Well, I read what I guess was an early
version--somehow it was sent to me--of the national security
strategy. And I liked the beginning of it because it talked
about our commitment to getting rid of nuclear weapons. But as
you read on, it almost sounded a little bit as though there
might be this or that occasion where we would use nuclear
weapons. And this notion of using them that is spreading around
is deeply disturbing to me because of the consequences.
You remember the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident was
vast damage. I remember the first meeting I had with Gorbachev
after that. I found that he had asked the same question I had.
What is the distinction between what happened at Chernobyl and
what would have happened if a nuclear weapon had been dropped
there? Answer: nuclear weapon much more devastating. So you
could sense the utter destructiveness of these things.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Reed?
Senator Reed. Thank you all, gentlemen, for the
extraordinary testimony and again for your service to the
nation. All have reflected the importance of diplomacy and also
the multifaceted challenges we face. They are not simply in the
military dimension. There are environmental issues. There are
demographic issues. Secretary Shultz has made that very clear.
Can you comment--and you might begin, Secretary Shultz, and
then I will ask Secretary Kissinger and Secretary Armitage. Our
whole-of-government approach to these problems--is it adequate
at the moment?
Dr. Shultz. Well, it has been over a quarter of a century
since I have been here. I come occasionally to testify. But
what is going on--I know having run four departments, that if
you are not there, you really do not have a good idea of what
is going on.
But I think the challenge is really tremendous to
coordinate efforts and they need to certainly be coordinated.
And my impression is--it is an impression--that since the
Defense Department people can actually go and do something,
there is a tendency to rely on them probably more than we
should and we should delegate other people to do more of their
share. But that is just an impression.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Dr. Kissinger, do you have any comments about the whole-of-
government approach in terms of how well we are doing?
Dr. Kissinger. The challenge we face at this moment is
determining what our national objectives are and how to reach
them in a strategic manner. The Defense Department statement
about our objectives seems to me very adequate and expresses
the necessity. But I would like to point out as a student of
history that if one relies entirely on abstract military
planning without having thought through the political
consequences, one may find oneself in an irreversible position.
None of the leaders who started World War I would have done so
if they had known what the end result would be like. So when
weapons are being procured, which in principle I favor
strongly, one should also relate them to a military strategy
that one is prepared to implement, and a diplomatic strategy
that looks for the creation of a system of world order by which
you can determine the nature of the challenges and the extent
to which they can be opposed.
On the diplomatic side, I think we need a more systematic
approach to what we are attempting to do. On the military side,
I support what the Defense Department is trying to do. And I
agree with the objectives that have been stated with respect to
North Korea and with the Middle East, but they have been, up to
now, conducted in a fragmentary rather than a coherent manner.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Dr. Kissinger.
Secretary Armitage, please.
Mr. Armitage. Just briefly, sir. The whole-of- government
sounds great, but in order to have a whole-of- government
approach, you have to have buy-in by all the leadership and you
have to have an inventory of what your arrows are to put in
your quiver. I do not think we have got that.
Second, you have to have resources, and it does not seem to
me you can have a whole-of-government approach if you resource
the State Department in an insufficient way. If it was not for
the Congress, we would be down 30 percent in the State
Department instead of the 10 percent that the State Department
is down now.
Finally, the whole-of-government approach has to embrace
friends and allies. For us to do everything alone is wrong in
my view. So it has to be seen that a whole-of-government is
also diplomacy, is also getting coalitions together of allies,
likeminded people, et cetera.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Dr. Shultz. I think that was a very important point that
Rich made. It is not only us but our allies that we have to
work with.
Senator Reed. Thank you all very much.
Just a point. You have all signaled that the proliferation
issue is absolutely critical, and Korea, if it continues on its
projection, raises huge proliferation problems. That may be a
way in which we can get the Chinese and the Russians and us to
work together because my sense is that they too fear a
proliferation problem. But I will leave that to the next round,
if there is a next round.
Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Wicker?
Senator Wicker. Thank you, gentlemen. This has really been
wonderful, very, very valuable to members like me.
Dr. Kissinger, let me ask about NATO in a statement that
you made. After you follow up, I will ask our other two
witnesses to comment. You say NATO needs to be clear about its
strategic purposes. What outcomes other than violations of
territorial integrity does NATO seek to prevent? What do you
suggest should be the answer to that question among NATO
members?
Dr. Kissinger. The challenge that NATO faces now seems to
me to be this. For 300 years, Europe was the designer of the
international system and provided the leadership in the
structure of the world, the United States in those periods
standing apart. At the end of World War II, Europe was
devastated, and the United States undertook the leadership of
bringing together these various nations and guaranteeing their
territorial integrity. The challenge was primarily conceived to
be from the Soviet Union as a military attack on Europe.
Europe under the Marshall Plan recovered economically its
capacity to act as a civil society. But it has not regained its
leadership in international politics. Therefore, at the same
time, the challenges have altered from the attack from the
Soviet Union to a series of crises around the world that have
potential dangers but not immediately overwhelming dangers. So
it requires a higher degree of assessment.
So NATO has constantly been faced with a series of what are
called out-of-the-area problems which are central in many ways
to the overall equation but not central to how they conceive it
domestically. So it is important, and I support strongly the
Trump administration in that effort to give Europe a more
active role in some of the issues that I outlined with my
colleagues.
Senator Wicker. Is Ukraine one of those out-of-the- area or
in-the-area problems? And what is the definition of success
there, sir?
Dr. Kissinger. That is exactly the issue. For Russia
historically, Ukraine has been part of their territory at least
for 400 years. On the other hand, it is tied in many respects
to Europe. So I personally, which is a minority view--I have
thought it was unwise to try to include Ukraine in NATO, but it
is also impossible to let it exist as a satellite of Russia.
So the way I express that issue is this. If the security
border of Europe is the eastern border of Ukraine, it is within
300 miles of Moscow and will create tensions with Russia. If it
is on the western border of Ukraine, it is at the border of
Poland, Hungary, Romania, the Baltic States, and that is
unacceptable for Europe and the United States. So, therefore,
is it possible to have a Ukraine solution in which Ukraine is
free in the political and economic field to relate itself to
its preferences, something like Finland, without the NATO
participation?
In any event, Russia has to adhere to the Minsk Agreement
because it cannot claim Ukrainian territory by force. But
Ukraine is sort of at the borderline of this conception. It
should be politically and economically where it wants to be.
The question is can one think of a military arrangement there
that is not directly confrontational.
Senator Wicker. The chair has told me that I can ask one of
you to follow up. So, Mr. Armitage, would you care to follow up
on that?
Mr. Armitage. From my point of view, Senator, the most
important thing that we can do for NATO, first of all, is make
sure they have a full understanding of the ironclad nature of
NATO's Article 5, the affection that we have for article 5. And
we have to be credible in that. In return, it seems to me NATO
has got to do something. It is not just 2 percent of GDP. I
read recently that the British have no warships right now, that
they are outside of their ports. They are in post. I think I am
correct to say the German submarine fleet is either inoperable
or nearly so. This is not acceptable. So in exchange for an
article 5 commitment by the United States, I think we have got
to get a commitment that they will stand up their capabilities.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you all very much for being here and for your
years of service to the country.
Dr. Shultz, I could not agree more with the discussion
about the impact of technology and artificial intelligence and
how that will affect warfare.
My concern is, as we look at the potential for change in
that area, how do we engage with the defense industrial base,
which has been I think sometimes reluctant to acknowledge the
need to move. And when we have weapon systems that are very
expensive and have started down the road to development, how do
we make that switch in a way that allows us to keep up with
this evolving technology?
Dr. Shultz. Well, I suppose we have to start taking action
and creating our banks of 3-D printers and start using them.
And the obvious fact that small, cheap, and many is better than
a few very expensive and vulnerable--just that logic has to
pervade and we have to change.
Senator Shaheen. I share the concern about nuclear
proliferation and where we are now and what appears to be
moving closer to a nuclear war in some way. Not just in how we
respond to what is happening in North Korea but as we look at
modernization of our nuclear weapons, the move to smaller nukes
and this whole Russian idea that has been put forward that we
can escalate to deescalate by the use of small nuclear weapons.
How should we think about responding to that threat? Because
that does seem to be gaining some credibility in military
circles.
Dr. Shultz. Well, a nuclear weapon is a nuclear weapon. You
use a small one. Then you go to a bigger one. I think nuclear
weapons are nuclear weapons, and we need to draw the line
there. And one of the alarming things to me is this notion that
we can have something called a small nuclear weapon, which I
understand the Russians are doing, and that somehow that is
usable. Your mind goes to the idea that, yes, nuclear weapons
become usable, and then we are really in trouble because a big
nuclear exchange can wipe out the world.
I have a great friend in San Francisco named Bill Swing. He
is the retired Episcopal bishop of California. And he started
something really terrific called the United Religions
Initiative. And he made a statement about a year ago. I tried
to get him to publish it, but he would not do it.
But he said when you put your hand on the Bible and swear
to be President of the United States, that is the least of it.
When you put your hand on the nuclear button and you can start
something that might kill a million people, you are not
President anymore. You are God. And who are we to say we are
God?
The weapons are immoral, as President Reagan said many
times. And we need to get rid of them.
Personally I think the way to get rid of them is, on the
one hand, maintain our strength of our arsenal, but then we
need to somehow get rearranged with Russia.
Personally I am very interested in Henry's comments on the
Ukraine, but Russia signed an agreement when Ukraine got rid of
its nuclear weapons that it would respect Ukraine's borders.
They signed that. They totally ignored it. They do not even
refer to it. We should not accept that. And it seems to me with
these new kind of weaponry, we can change the situation in
Ukraine and maybe that is the place where we could have what I
call a Pershing moment.
A Pershing moment for me is in the Cold War, the Soviets
had intermediate range weapons that could hit Europe, Japan,
and China, but not us. Their diplomatic ploy was that we would
use our intercontinental missiles to defend our allies and risk
using their intercontinental missile on us.
So we had a deal with NATO that we would negotiate, and if
we could not agree, we would deploy intermediate range weapons
in Europe. And we knew we were negotiating just as much with
Europeans as we were with the Soviets because putting a nuclear
weapon on your territory is not very comfortable.
At any rate, the negotiation was conducted. President
Reagan did a very good job on it. When we came to the end, we
deployed cruise missiles in Britain with Margaret's help and in
Italy with Andreotti's help.
But then came the big deal. Ballistic missiles were called
Pershings in Germany. And here is where the alliance came in.
Everybody supported the Germans. It was very controversial. The
Russians pulled out of negotiations. They did everything to fan
war talk, but the Pershings got deployed. That was the turning
point in the Cold War, and it showed the Russians something
special.
There was a little side story if I could just take a
minute. Nancy Reagan was my pal, and she was to fix me up with
a Hollywood starlet at a White House dinner. So I got to dance
with Ginger Rogers and stuff like that.
But anyway, after the deployment of the Pershings,
gradually things softened. And I could go to the President and
say, Mr. President, out of four different capitals in Europe, a
Soviet diplomat has come up to one of our embassies and said
virtually the same thing, which we think boils down to--Gromyko
was invited to Washington. When he comes to the general
assembly in September, he will accept. In other words, the
Soviets blinked.
I said maybe you want to think this over because Jimmy
Carter canceled these when they went into Afghanistan and they
are still there. He said I do not have to think it over. Let us
get them here. So it was a huge event.
And I went to Nancy and I said, Nancy, what is going to
happen is Gromyko is going to come to the Oval Office. We will
have a meeting, probably a fairly long one, and we will all
walk down the colonnade to the mansion that is your home. And
there is some stand-around time in their working lunch. So it
would be a nice touch if you were there for the stand-around
time. You are the hostess. It would be warm. So she agreed.
So Gromyko, as soon as he sees Nancy, knows she is
influential. So he makes a beeline for her. And before long, he
says does your husband want peace. And Nancy said, of course,
my husband wants peace. Then he said, well, then every night
before he goes to sleep, whisper in his ear, ``peace''. He was
a little taller than she was. So she put her hands on his
shoulder and pulled him down so he had to bend his knees. She
said I will whisper it in your ear, peace. I said, Nancy, we
just won the Cold War.
That was a Pershing moment, and I think we need another
Pershing moment to get the Soviets to see there is a stop sign
here and there is another path to peace. After all, they are
staggering. Their economy is a mess. Their demography is a
mess. They have really tough troubles in the Caucasus. So a
different arrangement would benefit them greatly. Then we could
start once again down the road talking about nuclear weapons.
This time maybe we can have a inclusive joint enterprise of
some kind to really get after this subject.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Cotton?
Senator Cotton. Thank you, gentlemen, for your appearance
today and your service to our country, not least in your youth
in the armed forces of the United States.
Dr. Kissinger, I want to return to a point that you raised
in your opening statement as well as your written testimony. I
will just repeat it. You point out a paradox, a possibility
that in North Korea, as in Iran, an international effort
intended to prevent a radical regime from developing a
destabilizing capability will coincide diplomatically with the
regime perfecting that very capacity for the second time in a
decade. An outcome that was widely considered unacceptable is
now on the verge of becoming irreversible.
Would you elaborate on why you think that is the case and
what we could learn from the situation?
Dr. Kissinger. With respect to North Korea, it is the idea
that there might be a negotiation based on a freeze for freeze.
The concern I had with the Iranian agreement was that it
legitimized the eventual emergence of Iran as a nuclear power.
It only delayed it by some years. The situation with North
Korea is even more acute because Iran did not yet have a
nuclear weapon, but if one negotiates a freeze of the existing
situation, one has thereby legitimized a Korean military
capability. If that is established, other countries in the
region, confronting their own security problems, are likely to
come to the conclusion that it is safe to proceed with their
nuclear programs. That then we would face a totally new
situation where in a region in which there are considerable
tensions, there is also an accumulation of nuclear weapons.
Once that line is crossed, as George Shultz pointed out, you
are then in a world in which we have no experience about
escalation, where it is difficult to establish the principles.
This would then start, in my opinion, a sequence of events in
which some countries would resist this and other countries
would insist on it.
So, therefore, I think the denuclearization of North Korea,
which is not a direct, overwhelming threat to us, is important
for the evolution of the international strategy with respect to
nonproliferation. Therefore, we need to make a distinction
between measures that might relieve the immediate tension make
an ultimate crisis all the more severe and measures that need
to be taken or could be taken to face the issue of the
denuclearization of Korea. All the more so, the problem of Iran
is just down the road under the existing deals. That is my
basic point.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
Dr. Shultz, in your conversation about four disruptive
forces, the first one you mentioned was demography and
migration. Another eminent historian, Walter Russell Mead, who
has testified in front of this panel before, published an op-ed
in the ``Wall Street Journal'' a couple of days ago stressing
that even though has been a source of controversy in United
States, on which we understandably focus as Americans--we just
had a 3-day government shutdown about immigration. The issue
was a very contentious one in our campaign. It also is very
contentious in Europe. In the elections in Germany last year,
the SPD and the CDU had their lowest performance since World
War II. Alternative for Germany, one seat in the Bundestag for
the first time. And we have seen the rise of similar parties
and politicians in Sweden and Austria and Czechia, Slovakia,
Poland, Hungary, and so forth.
What ought Western leaders be doing to better manage the
challenges posed by demographic change in migration patterns?
Dr. Shultz. I should think the first effort should be to do
everything we can to see that the places people are coming from
are made more habitable so they do not leave. And we have lots
of things that we could do that would accomplish that goal.
But then we have to reflect in our own case how beneficial
immigration has been for this country. I went to a session in
San Francisco the other night where we were celebrating our old
mint there, and it was Alexander Hamilton's birthday. We were
all talking about how wonderful Alexander Hamilton was as the
first Secretary of the Treasury. He was an immigrant. Henry
Kissinger is an immigrant. Einstein was an immigrant. So we
have benefited greatly. I dare say everybody in this room is
either an immigrant or descended from one.
So we need to be looking carefully at our borders and have
a sensible immigration policy. People in these places--there
may be people that are perfectly okay for us. But I think the
first thing is to do everything possible to help them have
places where they want to stay.
Senator Cotton. Thank you all, gentlemen.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Heinrich?
Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman.
Secretary Shultz, you mentioned the coming changes from
artificial intelligence, from additive manufacturing. And
another rapidly changing part of our world, as you know, is the
energy field. And you have been a strong voice for American
leadership, a conservative voice for addressing climate and
energy. But at the moment, we find ourselves in a position
where the White House has obviously pulled back from the Paris
Accord. They are implementing protectionist policies with
regard to clean energy deployment in our country.
So I am curious as to your thoughts on what you believe
America's posture with regard to climate leadership in the
world and implementation of a clean energy strategy should look
like.
Dr. Shultz. Well, just as we have a threat throughout the
world from nuclear weapons, we have a threat that is global
from the warming climate. The paper by Lucy Shapiro that I read
from shows on the biological side some of those threats, but
there are many others.
I think there are two things that should be done that will
help a lot.
Number one, a lot of people object to all these
regulations, the government telling you to do this, do not do
that, and so forth. All right, let us get rid of all that. Let
us put in place a revenue neutral carbon tax. Put a price out
there and let the market decide. So in the program that I have
been working on with Tom Stevenson, who is here, we would start
with a $40 a ton tax and make it revenue neutral. So you would
pass the money back to, let us say, everybody who has a Social
Security number. So they would make it a progressive tax and it
would not have any fiscal drag. It would sort out people and
get them to pay incentives they need to go for things that are
low in carbon.
The other thing that I think is very important is to
maintain a respectful government program supporting energy
Research and Development (R&D). And it does not have to be
huge. I am the chairman of MIT's Energy Advisory Board. They
have a big program at MIT, and I have more or less the same
role at Stanford. So I listen to what these guys are doing. And
the R&D results are dramatic. As a result of their R&D, our
solar costs are way down. Fracking was a result of R&D. And
this can be very productive. So we want to keep that going.
A while ago we had an exchange at these two universities.
We brought about 12 MIT scientists to Stanford, and we had
about the same number. We had 2 days of talk about what we
called game-changers. And at MIT, we did the same thing.
Then we came to Washington and John Boehner, who was then
Speaker, set us up with the Republicans on the House Energy
Committee. These are supposed to be the bad guys. It turned out
that selling them energy R&D was a piece of cake. And somebody
said, here is a great idea. Let us have the government go into
business and exploit it. You lost everybody, including me. So
let us have the government stay out of the business but support
the energy R&D. And I think that has broad support.
There are things that are on the cusp right now that are
very important. Of course, the holy grail is to get to a large
scale storage of electricity. If we can do that, not only would
you have an impact on solar and wind in the intermittency
problem, but you also have some security because our grid is so
vulnerable to attack. If we have some storage, to rely on that,
that would be good.
But anyway, the R&D is very important. You pair R&D with a
revenue-neutral carbon tax and I think you have the kind of
program that will work.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you for your thoughts on that
subject.
My next question is for any of you to address. I am really
concerned about some of the statistics we are seeing out of the
State Department right now in terms of being able to attract
talent and losing folks from that pool at rates we just have
not seen before. You know, just attracting people for entry
level positions--we are at about a quarter of what we were a
couple of years ago. There are problems with the seasoned pool
as well.
What should we be doing to address that?
Mr. Armitage. I will give it a go, Senator.
The A-100 class, or the entry classes that we have in the
State Department are down. People read the papers. They hear
the news. They think they are not particularly welcome in the
Trump administration.
But the real impact of this of what is going on now will
really be felt in about 15 years. As Deputy Secretary, I had a
chair of the D Committee. The D Committee makes the decisions
on who we are going to put forward as ambassadors to different
posts. And I was having trouble toward the end of my tenure as
Deputy Secretary because of a previous slowdown in the
accession to the State Department, the A-100 class. We did not
have a sufficient number of head and shoulders diplomats that I
felt comfortable putting into leadership positions.
So we have got to change the attitude. I think that
attitude needs to start with our President and stop talking
about deep state and taking ownership of everything. Anyone who
served in the military--Senator Reed will tell you this--we
learned everything we ever needed to know in the first general
order, which cautions young sentries to take charge of all--
this post and all government property in sight, and stay on
this post. That is all you need to know. And that is the
position I think our President has to take and our Secretary of
State has to take.
Dr. Shultz. I would like to say a word not only on behalf
of the Foreign Service, but the career people generally. In
1969, I became Secretary of Labor, and I was told that it was
an impossible job for a Republican because the Labor Department
staff was a wholly owned subsidiary of the American Federation
of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO). We
brought in a really top notch bunch of people and the
bureaucracy knocked themselves out for us. We made friends with
George Meany, but still they were there to serve.
I found the same thing when I was Director of OMB, same
thing in the Treasury, the same thing in the State Department.
The Foreign Service people are able, they are trained, they are
experienced. They have been worked with, particularly by the
Director of Foreign Service, to move them around to get the
right kind of experience. They are invaluable.
I agree particularly with Rich's point. The future is the
new people, and it takes time to bring them in, to train them,
and to give them experiences. You cannot learn from just
reading something. You have got to have experience, move around
and learn things from that. So it is essential.
Dr. Kissinger. I would like to make a point here.
I agree what George Shultz has said about the quality of
the Foreign Service and also what my other colleague had said
about the impact of current decisions 10 years down the road.
But I do think the State Department needs a combination of
reorganization and rethinking in one respect. The military are
used to deal with strategy because they have to have an
ultimate objective. So the Pentagon is organized to make
decisions in a conceptual framework. The State Department is
more organized to have conversations. Various officials and
Foreign Service officers in their experience abroad much of the
time have to deal with immediate, current problems, and so they
have a tendency to look for the immediate solution and not so
much for the strategic outcome. Of course, there are great
exceptions.
So I would think a reorganization of the State Department
that leads more systematically to strategic thinking and less
preoccupation with the very immediate problems would be highly
desirable. And it is no reflection on the people that are there
now. That has to do with the nature of foreign policy as it has
evolved.
Dr. Shultz. Would that not mean, Henry, to do everything
you can to improve the stature of the policy and planning
staff? That is, they are supposed to be the people thinking
strategically with the Secretary. And through the years, there
have been some outstanding times of that, some not so good, but
that is a key ingredient.
Dr. Kissinger. Well, I tried to solve the problem to some
extent by making sure that every action decision also went
through the policy and planning staff, that the Department
understood this. But I also think in the training of the
Foreign Service officers and in the issues which they are asked
to address, there is some more systematic opportunity to deal
with grand strategy in addition to what they already do well,
which is the day-to- day management.
Senator Heinrich. I am afraid, Mr. Chair, we could use some
lessons in short-term versus long-term strategy as well.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Rounds?
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you all for your very distinguished
service to our country.
I am just curious. I would like to begin with Secretary
Shultz and then if either of you other gentlemen have a thought
on it, I would appreciate it.
With regard to nuclear deterrence and the approach that we
have taken specifically with regard to Russia, there appears to
be a thought within the Russian military that there is an
interest in being able to escalate in order to deescalate and
the use of low-yield nuclear weapons in some cases,
particularly in their region. My question is in your analysis,
which is the greater deterrent force that should be brought to
bear. Should we have the overwhelming force of a high-yield
capability only, or should we have both the high-yield
capability as well as the ability to respond in like kind?
Would the Russians take the threat of an immediate retaliation
to be greater if we had both options available to us?
Dr. Shultz. Well, as I said earlier, it seems to me the
idea of a low-yield nuclear weapon is kind of a mirage. It is a
nuclear weapon. It has all kinds of aspects to it. Even a low-
yield weapon would have huge damage immediately and radiation
and so on. It invites escalation. So my own opinion is I hate
to see people start figuring out how they can use nuclear
weapons--that is what it amounts to--because their use is so
potentially devastating. You get an escalation going and a
nuclear exchange going, and it can be ruinous to the world very
easily.
Senator Rounds. Would you disagree with an analysis that
concludes that Russia would actually use a low-yield nuclear
weapon as a response to a conventional conflict?
Dr. Shultz. What the Russians will do I do not know. I read
that they are developing what they call a low-yield weapon. I
think it is a mirage. But if they wind up using one, it is
going to lead to an escalation, and maybe the best deterrent is
for them to know that.
But I think the better way to go about it with Russia is to
put a stop sign to the kind of thing they have been doing and
say, now let us get back to where we can talk together in a
sensible way. And we were able to do that before and we had
very fruitful exchanges with the Soviets, not just with Mikhail
Gorbachev but across the board and we got a lot accomplished as
a result. And I think if we were able to get back to that kind
of thing, then this time we could reach out to others and try
to really move the ball ahead on getting rid of these weapons.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
Mr. Armitage?
Mr. Armitage. Just a historical tidbit, sir. We actually
manned portable nuclear weapons at one time in our inventory,
but we came to the conclusion that a nuclear weapon is a
nuclear weapon. We also had a great deal of success, Secretary
Shultz particularly, in the INF discussions in 1983 with the
Germans when we wanted INF weapons, tactical nukes to blunt a
Soviet thrust through the Fulda Gap. So this has been up and
down the flagpole several different times, and I think the
Russians and the Americans come to the same conclusion. A
nuclear weapon is a nuclear weapon. You cannot control it.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
I am just curious. Today we have talked about a number of
different locations that are hotspots today. We have talked
about Europe. We have talked about the South Pacific with
China, the Middle East. And yet, during this entire discussion,
there has been no discussion about the continent of Africa or
the continent of South America. I am curious in regard to our
diplomatic efforts and so forth and the opportunities that are
there. I think about it because I know that Senator Inhofe has
been one of those individuals who has been very active in
Africa, having made 156 different country visits to Africa that
I am aware of. The emphasis that is there--it seems to me that
we are wide open for the opportunity for not only goodwill but
for the creation of cooperative partnerships there in both
South America and in Africa. I would like your thoughts in
terms of the importance of those two continents and why it is,
in the middle of a strategic discussion, we have not mentioned
either one of them so far.
Dr. Shultz. I think your point is right on. As I said
earlier, I think in the African countries, that is where the
explosion of population is likely to come from, and I think,
for various reasons, that is where the migration is likely to
come from. If we have constructive relationships there, maybe
we can help create the conditions where people are less anxious
to leave, and that is, I think, probably the best way of
dealing with the migration issue. So I agree with you.
As far as South America and Central America and Mexico are
concerned, I remember when I took office, President Reagan
said, foreign policy starts in our neighborhood. If you buy a
house, you look at the house, but you also say what is the
neighborhood. And if it is a good neighborhood, you will buy
the house. If it is not, you will not.
So we worked very hard to bring Mexico into North America,
and finally with NAFTA, Mexico became part of North America.
And that worked wonderfully not only in economic terms but it
gave you the basis for talking about many, many other things:
terrorism problems, environmental problems, all kinds of little
issues that come along. You develop a friendly, easy-handed
relationship. The three amigos comes to mind.
So all of this is very positive about our neighborhood, and
it has been a very hard thing for me to see us denouncing
Mexico and trying to break it up because this is our
neighborhood. This is where we live and we are working well.
And we worry about--we say, oh, their drug gangs are coming
over here. Where do the drug gangs come from? They come from
the war on drugs in the United States. That is where the money
comes from. That is where the guns come from. That is where the
incentive comes from. So I think we ought to look at the war on
drugs ourselves, and what we are doing. At the same time,
obviously, our neighborhood deserves attention and not just
Mexico but Central America and South America. There are some
good things happening, some bad things happening down south,
but this is where we live.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. My time has----
Dr. Kissinger. Could I make a point on the nuclear weapons
issue?
Senator Rounds. Yes.
Dr. Kissinger. I have been part of this discussion since
1950, and my original reaction to the problems of massive
retaliation was to see whether tactical nuclear weapons might
provide a substitute or an alternative. And at that time, I
came to the conclusion that has been presented here that the
distinction could not be drawn in any manner that was workable
at the time.
Now we are moving into an area in which apparently
relatively smaller tactical weapons are being considered by
opponents. It is not a course I would recommend as our
preferred solution. But the issue will arise if this happens,
if this becomes the technology, and if our only response then
is an all-out nuclear war, that we will face again the same
dilemmas we had with the massive retaliation concept.
So while I would like to maintain a dividing line between
nuclear and non-nuclear weapons and while it would be highly
desirable if some agreements could be made to enforce this, if
the technology develops in such a way that other major
countries possess them, we should think carefully before we put
ourselves in a position where our only response is an all-out
nuclear strike.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, gentlemen.
Senator Inhofe. Senator King?
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Kissinger, it is an honor to have you here and thank
you for your service and providing wisdom today.
Mr. Armitage talked about China having the means but not
the desire to attack us. My question is to you, based upon your
long years of study of China and the book you wrote on China,
what does China want?
Dr. Kissinger. Of course, this develops out of a long
culture. This is my assessment based on my observations.
We in the Western tradition think that for a country to be
dominant, it has to conquer regions and occupy them. I think
the Chinese historical view is that the Chinese, while they
will use force, are thinking that their impact is through the
magnitude of their culture, the signs of their achievements,
and that they will attempt to impose respect rather than do it
through a series of military confrontations. But it will also
be backed by a force with which they can demonstrate the
penalty of opposition.
So if you look at their conflicts in the communist period
with India, with Vietnam, and to some extent with us, they have
always been aimed at some dramatic demonstrations, followed by
some negotiation that then benefits.
So I think the Chinese at this moment are proceeding by
their cultural pattern. The Belt and Road concept is an attempt
to restructure Eurasia but not entirely or largely by military
conquest but through a performance that will lead these
countries to look at China as the central kingdom. For us, the
problem is hegemony by any one country over Eurasia is a
potential threat to our security.
So the issue in my mind is, is it possible to have such a
competition by political means with the backing of the military
force that may be needed? But for that, we first have to know
what we consider threats to our security, how we convey that to
China.
In China, in my opinion now, there are probably two schools
of thought: one that believes that a general conflict would
risk everything that they have achieved and would even, in the
long run, be very difficult to manage; and another one that
thinks that America is basically on the decline. Therefore, no
attention needs to be paid to our strategic concerns and that
they can simply plow ahead not in a military way primarily but
in a way that challenges the their system. That seems to me to
be the key issue in our relationship with China.
I think it is of great importance that we attempt a
conversation, a permanent relationship in which we decide we
will not settle our conflicts by military means, that we will
take account of the other's point of view. We will also make
clear that if our central interests are touched, in the end a
conflict will happen.
So this is partly a philosophical problem, and it depends
on how we conduct our dialogue in this period when both
countries are evolving in a new direction. China, after several
hundred years, is reentering the international system. America
is dealing not only with what we have discussed here, but I
have been very much concerned with the impact of artificial
intelligence and the whole evolution of science in which the
scientists are running way ahead of what the political world
has been able to absorb. How to master those trends seems to me
the key issue in the China relationship, and I cannot conceive
of a war between China and the United States. It will not do to
the world what World War I did to Europe. So that should be in
the minds of both leaders, but it may not be. And if it is not,
then we will have to look to our interests and we must always
have the capability to prevail in such a conflict.
Senator King. I now understand why generations of United
States Presidents have sought your counsel. That was brilliant
and I appreciate it. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator King.
Senator Scott?
Senator Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
the panel for being here this morning.
Dr. Shultz, thank you for your service to our country. I
was very interested in your comments about threats that we have
not seen before. I think specifically about your comments new
threats would be small, smart, cheap, and very lethal. I
combined together your comments about drones with new
technology and then new gene editing advancements carrying
unique and specific biological weapons.
How do we create a national defense strategy around these
new emerging threats the world has never seen before?
Dr. Shultz. I think it is a very hard question, and in our
own little work at Stanford's Hoover Institution, we are trying
to address it. We are trying to say to ourselves what is going
to be the impact of this on us. What is going to be the impact
on Russia and China, on Iran, and so on, and South America,
around the world? And after we try to think our way through
those things, then how we position ourselves in this new kind
of world to be effective, to be effective in advancing our
interests and taking care of our own population.
But the threat of pandemics coming from climate change, as
Lucy Shapiro brings out in her paper--read that paper. I read
that paper and I called her up. I said, Lucy, I just read your
paper. I am shivering. It is very compelling stuff. But there
are also things that you can do with this new technology that
she talks about that will help us. So I think we ought to be
pursuing these things very aggressively.
Senator Scott. Thank you, sir. I certainly would allude to
the chairman Dr. Shultz's comments about perhaps having Lucy
Shapiro come talk to us about the importance of the new gene
editing opportunities whether it is Clustered Regularly
Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats (CRISPR) or CAS-9 and
other new avenues that we will have to explore in the future.
Dr. Kissinger, I would love to ask you a question.
Dr. Shultz. I want to underline, Mr. Chairman, that you
ought to get Lucy to come here and talk. She is so smart, but
she is so much fun. She will just light up the place, but you
also are going to learn a lot from her.
Senator Scott. You guys have been very engaging and also
very intelligent. So thank you for being here.
Dr. Kissinger, this morning I had the privilege of having
breakfast with one of your high school mates, Chairman Alan
Greenspan, who said hello.
My question for you, sir, is would you talk a little bit
about the utility of economic sanctions against Russia,
specifically energy sanctions, as a way of impacting their
aggressive behavior.
Dr. Kissinger. Russia is in my view not a strong country.
Russia is a weak country with a large military establishment
and a very determined leader. Russia has presented historically
a dual challenge to itself and to the world. It covers 11 time
zones. It is involved in every region of the world. It has no
natural borders. So it has always attempted to expand to extend
its security belt.
On the other hand, at crucial moments in human history, it
stood up to the Mongols, to the Swedes, to the French, and to
the Germans and preserved the equilibrium of the world by the
willingness of its people to suffer for their independence.
So when I talk about Russia, I try to recognize both of
these aspects. We need a cooperative Russia for the peace of
the world because of its reach. But we want to put an end to an
aggressive Russia that seeks to impose its domination on
neighboring countries. So one always faces this dual concern.
Russia being weak, sanctions are, of course, a normal
weapon. One cannot accept the notion that Russia has a right to
alter the shape of the Ukraine by its own unilateral position.
But one's effort should be not to break up Russia, but to
retain Russia in the system in some fashion.
So I would have agreed with the concept of sanctions, but
now I would also think how to bring Russia back into a
community of nations concept or even a cooperative relationship
with the United States.
I met Putin 15 years ago, and at that time, the issue was
the abrogation of the missile defense agreement in which I had
been involved. And at that time, this was a month before 9/11.
Putin said I am not so interested in the missile defense
agreement. I am interested in radical Islam, and I want to know
whether it is possible to have a strategic partnership with
America going from Tehran to Macedonia. So that sort of thing
is always in the back of their mind, but there is also in the
front of their mind the environment.
So my answer to your question is I would reluctantly have
agreed to sanctions. I would now look for a way to see whether
we can restore a meaningful dialogue in the context that I
mentioned, even keeping in mind some of the absolutely
unacceptable things they did during our election campaign which
have to be precluded. But I would now think in the
restructuring of the world that I tried to indicate, we should
make an effort to have a dialogue with Russia.
Senator Scott. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Warren?
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
our witnesses for being here today and for your history of
service.
Secretary Shultz, Secretary Kissinger, you, along with
former Secretary of Defense Bill Perry and former Senate Armed
Services Committee chairman Sam Nunn, have formed a group of
former senior national security officials who have warned about
the risk of nuclear proliferation. Together you have called for
a global effort to reliance on nuclear weapons. In 2007, the
four of you wrote we endorse setting the goal of a world free
of nuclear weapons and working energetically on the actions
required to achieve that goal.
Now, today in this hearing, we have talked about Russia and
Russia's nuclear policy, but I want to ask about America's
nuclear policy. In the coming weeks, the Trump administration
will release its nuclear policy review, which is rumored to
call for new nuclear weapons capability, more usable nukes, and
expanded conditions under which the United States would
contemplate using a nuclear weapon.
Secretary Shultz, do you continue to believe that the
United States should reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons,
and if so, why do you believe that would be in our national
security interests?
Dr. Shultz. I think the use of nuclear weapons would
promote an exchange and would be devastating to our planet. So
I continue to believe that we should be trying to eliminate
them. We were getting there for a while, and now that has all
stopped. And now our problem is proliferation. So this is a new
problem. We have to work at it and work at it hard.
Senator Warren. Thank you.
Specifically, you have recommended to change the posture of
our deployed weapons to increase warning time and to eliminate
the class of short-range nuclear weapons that are designed to
be forward deployed. How would taking these steps reduce the
risk of miscalculation that could lead to a nuclear exchange?
Dr. Shultz. Well, actually the intermediate range nuclear
weapons we did deploy in the Reagan period and particularly the
ones we deployed in Germany, the Pershings, I think was the
turning point in the Cold War. But we agreed with the then-
Soviets to eliminate them. So that whole class of weapons was
eliminated.
I read now that the Russians are in the process of
violating that agreement. I have no knowledge, just what I read
in the papers about it. And I think that is an ominous
development.
But I agree very much with what Henry was saying earlier,
that we need to somehow put a stop sign to the aggressive
behavior of Russia and try to include them in a constructive
dialogue which we could then expand to other countries and try
to get a joint enterprise going that would have the objective
of getting nuclear weapons out of the world.
Senator Warren. Thank you. That is very helpful. I
appreciate your answer.
There is one other topic I would like to ask you about.
Last year, the Trump administration sought a significant cut to
the funding for the Department of State, and many of us are
concerned about reports of turmoil at the State Department, low
morale, ambassadorships that have been left unfilled, senior
career diplomats who are resigning in large numbers. I know
that Senator Reed asked about morale at the State Department,
but I want to ask the question from a different point of view.
The world still looks to the United States for leadership,
and I am concerned that we are increasingly not there to answer
the call. So let me ask, Secretary Kissinger and Secretary
Shultz, what impact does the Trump administration's apparent
downsizing of the State Department have on our national
security and on advancing our interests around the world? Would
you like to start, Dr. Kissinger?
Dr. Kissinger. I do not look at the State Department
primarily in terms of its size. I would look at it in terms of
its missions. And, of course, its missions should be to supply
us with a correct analysis of where we are functioning, of
developing a group of people that can think strategically side
by side with the Pentagon. So this must have a minimum size,
and I would not make downsizing in the abstract a principle
objective.
When one looks at the organization chart of the State
Department, there are a lot of special assistants and sort of
technical assignments that can probably be dispensed with. I
have not thought that the size of the State Department as the
principal obstacle to foreign policy.
Senator Warren. Dr. Shultz? I am sorry.
Dr. Kissinger. I think we should staff it to the level that
we think is needed for our general foreign policy. I think this
year it is too dramatic.
Senator Warren. Thank you.
Secretary Shultz?
Dr. Shultz. You told me, Rich, earlier when we discussed
this that the cuts that were proposed have not been gone
through and that the Congress has limited them greatly, which I
welcome. But I think it is essential that we have a strong
Foreign Service to do the kind of analytical work that Henry
was talking about and have the capacity in the field to
execute. Execution is key. A strong analytical group.
When I was Secretary, I added a lot of work on the security
side. In an odd way, as an economist, I had a little council of
economic advisors (CEA) added because it seemed to me I was
getting from people who knew a lot about subjects, something
that did not have economic analysis in it. So we had a little
CEA in the State Department. But those are just small
organizational rearrangements.
But I think we need a strong State Department. And as Rich
was saying earlier, it is particularly important to have a
strong inflow of talent because these are the people 10, 15
years from now that you will be looking to. We have got to
bring them in, train them, give them experiences. They are not
going to learn from books. They have got to have experience out
in the field, and that is what they get. So that is essential
to keep going.
Senator Warren. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Warren.
Senator Warren. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Sullivan?
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for your decades of service and for
being here. I apologize. The only thing that was going to keep
me away from this hearing was my presiding duties over the
Senate. So I just had to go preside for the last hour, but I am
glad I made it back in time to ask a few questions. So it is
great to see all of you again.
For really the whole panel maybe, our two former
Secretaries of State, there has been a lot of focus, Dr.
Kissinger, as you mentioned in your testimony, on the immediate
challenge of North Korea. The Trump administration has pretty
much put out a red line. I think they have called it that.
Maybe they have not called it that, but they are not going to
allow North Korea to have the capability of an intercontinental
ballistic missile with the nuclear weapon on top. And yet, that
red line has either already been crossed in terms of some intel
analysts or is going to be crossed soon. So it has led to a
discussion among many policy officials and military experts on
what is really in some people's view a coming fork in the road,
that if that is the policy of the administration, that they are
not going to allow that. And yet, North Korea either has it or
is going to have it very soon. The fork in the road is either
some kind of preemptive military option to prevent that
capability with all its inherent risks or in increasingly tight
sanctions regime perhaps with a naval blockade that would
address clamping down on North Korea even more with China's
help, hopefully, and addressing the issue that you mentioned,
Dr. Kissinger, of proliferation.
Could you just in your expertise, for all the witnesses
today, give us your sense on that fork in the road. Is that a
false choice? How would you be thinking about that issue
particularly given that this administration has said we are not
going to allow this? And yet, it looks like it is going to
happen soon.
Dr. Kissinger. In terms of the analysis, we will hit that
fork in the road. The temptation to deal with it with a
preemptive attack is strong, and the argument is rational. But
I have seen no public statement by any leading official. But in
any event, my own thinking, I would be very concerned by a
unilateral American war at the borders of China and Russia in
which we are not supported by a significant part of the world,
or at least of the Asian world. If China took an unqualified
opposition to the nuclear program and they joined the program
with us, I think it should be possible to develop the sort of
sanctions and pressures that are irresistible. That would be my
preferred course.
On the other hand, if it turns out that neither is
available, then we better get used to the fact that South
Korea, in my opinion, will not accept being the only Korea that
has no nuclear weapons, that that will lead to similar trends
in Japan, and then we are living in a new world in which
technically competent countries with adequate command
structures are possessing nuclear weapons in an area in which
there are considerable national disagreements. That is a new
world, which will require new thinking by us. And it will also
require a rethinking, I believe, of our whole deterrent posture
because right now our deterrent posture basically assumes one
major enemy. But when you deal with a world in which there will
be multiple possibilities of conflicts in which we are engaged
so that we cannot hold back our strategic weapons for one
decisive thing and we will have to rethink it. I do not know
yet in which way. This is why I think this little country
[North Korea] by itself cannot present an overwhelming threat
to us in a way that presents a key issue right now.
I support the Trump administration's objective, but when we
get to your question, we have to do some prayerful thinking
because that will be to fight a war at the border of China and
Russia without some agreement with them alone, that is a big
decision. And I am telling you my doubts and my thinking. I
agree with bringing pressure on North Korea, and I agree with
the statements the administration has made up to now. I have
not stated this publicly before, but if you ask me directly
what do I think of a war with Korea, this is what I think.
Senator Sullivan. Secretary Shultz, Secretary Armitage, do
you have thoughts on that very important question?
Dr. Shultz. Henry has given a very thoughtful statement.
I would say be careful with red lines. I remember at the
start of World War II, I was a boot in the Marine Corps. I
remember the day the sergeant handed me my rifle. He said take
good care of this rifle. This is your best friend. And remember
one thing. Never point this rifle at anybody unless you are
willing to pull the trigger. No empty threats. Empty threats
destroy you. So I would be very careful in drawing red lines
that imply that if somebody messes with them, there is going to
be a nuclear war.
I agree entirely with Henry here that we should be working
with China and perhaps, Russia, but particularly China. As it
dawns on everybody that what is potentially happening here is
exactly what Henry said that there is going to be a
proliferation of nuclear weapons all through Asia, and that is
not very comfortable for China. And I think if we could work
constructively with China on this, we just might get something
done.
I know it has been a while, but my own experience with
China, like Henry's, has been that you can work constructively
with the Chinese. After all, they are losing population. They
have plenty of problems. Their GDP per capita is not high, and
they want to raise it. And they are not going to raise it by
turning their back on the rest of the world. They are going to
raise it by interacting and being part of it.
Senator Sullivan. Mr. Secretary?
Mr. Armitage. Senator Sullivan, I am in the position of a
guy who says that everything that can be said has been said,
just not by me. So I am going to forgo the temptation.
Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chairman, may I seek the indulgence
of you and the witnesses for one final question?
Senator Inhofe. Yes.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Dr. Kissinger, you mentioned with regard to China, the rise
of China. And the insights in your testimony when you mentioned
that China in its centuries-long history has never conceived of
a foreign nation as more than a tributary to the centrality of
its power and culture.
I was wondering in that regard--there is an issue that a
number of us have been focused on. It is the basic principle of
reciprocity. It seems that increasingly in our relationship
with China, us and other countries, that there seems to be a
lack of reciprocity in how they operate and how we operate.
Meaning that there are many things that China does here in our
country that if you were an American citizen, an American
diplomat, an American journalist, an American company, you
could not do the same thing in China. You know, that goes
across a broad spectrum of foreign direct investment. They come
here. They buy American companies in all kinds of sectors. We
could not do that over there. They have thousands of so-called
journalists in our country. We could not do that over there.
Could you comment just on this issue, given your decades-
long experience with China, and how this issue of reciprocity,
which a number of us are starting to focus on as a key
principle in our relationship, should be something that we
could do, but it does not seem something that they currently
seem interested in? Does that reflect your comments in your
testimony about China never really perceiving a foreign nation
as an equal in the long history of that country.
Dr. Kissinger. The history of a country sort of forms its
character to some extent. China did not have a foreign ministry
until 1911. Before 1911, foreign policy was conducted by
something called the Ministry of Rituals, which placed the
foreign country in a hierarchy vis-a-vis China. So it is part
of their thinking, of their experience.
On the other hand, we have seen that President Xi Jinping
at Davos last year presented a sort of global view, and I
believe China has understood that in this world the principles
of sovereignty and equality will be the governing ones. But in
the natural analysis, to some extent, it is in the back of
their mind. In my experience, I think the Chinese are
compulsive students and they analyze each problem with enormous
care.
So to your question, our approach is usually pragmatic. We
want a solution to a problem. The Chinese approach is usually
no problem gets finally solved. Every solution is an admissions
ticket to another problem. So the issue between us when we talk
is how do you marry the conceptual approach of the Chinese with
the pragmatic approach. I think that the Chinese are very
confident now of their achievements. At the same time, I
believe it likely that the leadership realizes that it is very
difficult, if not impossible, for them to carry out the
domestic changes in an atmosphere of Cold War with the United
States. And therefore, I have believed that at least an attempt
should be made to see whether we could come to some
understanding of the limits of our conduct towards each other
and, where possible, where we can operate cooperatively.
But if you look at the One Belt One Road initiative, if it
progresses, it goes across many great civilizations, and not
all of them are going to adhere to that automatically. So there
should be an occasion for the United States to develop its
concept, and the Chinese with theirs with a lot of flexibility
given the scope. But when there is no flexibility and a contest
occurs, we have to be aware of the fact that it would have
catastrophic consequences for the world and that it is hard to
see who can win with modern weapons, with new weapons that one
has no experience with, with weapons like George has described.
This is what drives my thinking on China. I recognize that
by their scope and their history, they are a powerful force in
the world. We cannot abolish that. We have to be sure that we
understand what our role is in the world and develop a long-
range dialogue that does not change every 4 years and the
capacity to deal with it. And a part of that, of course, is
that any lasting structure must have reciprocity, maybe not in
every individual field, but the perception of the chief actors
has to be that the relationship is reciprocal.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
This has been just overwhelming to us to be able to hear
from you. This was actually better than it was back in 2015. So
I thank you very much for your patience and for your wisdom.
You have done a great service to America. Thank you so much.
We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:22 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
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