[Senate Hearing 115-763]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 115-763
IMPLEMENTATION OF POSITIVE TRAIN CONTROL
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 1, 2018
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
39-878 PDF WASHINGTON : 2020
SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota, Chairman
ROGER WICKER, Mississippi BILL NELSON, Florida, Ranking
ROY BLUNT, Missouri MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
TED CRUZ, Texas AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JERRY MORAN, Kansas BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
DEAN HELLER, Nevada TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JAMES INHOFE, Oklahoma GARY PETERS, Michigan
MIKE LEE, Utah TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire
CORY GARDNER, Colorado CATHERINE CORTEZ MASTO, Nevada
TODD YOUNG, Indiana JON TESTER, Montana
Nick Rossi, Staff Director
Adrian Arnakis, Deputy Staff Director
Jason Van Beek, General Counsel
Kim Lipsky, Democratic Staff Director
Chris Day, Democratic Deputy Staff Director
Renae Black, Senior Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on March 1, 2018.................................... 1
Statement of Senator Thune....................................... 1
Prepared statement of Edward R. Hamberger, President and
Chief Executive Officer, Association of American Railroads. 67
Statement of Senator Nelson...................................... 3
Prepared statement........................................... 4
Statement of Senator Cantwell.................................... 47
Statement of Senator Hassan...................................... 49
Statement of Senator Klobuchar................................... 51
Statement of Senator Udall....................................... 53
Statement of Senator Blunt....................................... 54
Statement of Senator Peters...................................... 56
Letter dated February 28, 2018 from Gilda Z. Jacobs.......... 56
Statement of Senator Blumenthal.................................. 59
Statement of Senator Fischer..................................... 61
Statement of Senator Wicker...................................... 62
Statement of Senator Cortez Masto................................ 64
Witnesses
Susan Fleming, Director, Physical Infrastructure, Government
Accountability Office.......................................... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Hon. Barry J. DeWeese, Assistant Inspector General, Surface
Transportation Audits, U.S. Department of Transportation....... 25
Prepared statement........................................... 26
David L. Mayer, Chief Safety Officer, New York Metropolitan
Transportation Authority....................................... 33
Prepared statement........................................... 34
Richard Anderson, President and Chief Executive Officer, Amtrak.. 37
Prepared statement........................................... 39
Appendix
Response to written questions submitted to Susan Fleming by:
Hon. John Thune.............................................. 73
Hon. Bill Nelson............................................. 74
Response to written questions submitted to Hon. Barry J. DeWeese
by:
Hon. John Thune.............................................. 76
Hon. Bill Nelson............................................. 76
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 76
Response to written questions submitted to Richard Anderson by:
Hon. John Thune.............................................. 77
Hon. Roger F. Wicker......................................... 78
Hon. Bill Nelson............................................. 80
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 81
Hon. Richard Blumenthal...................................... 81
IMPLEMENTATION OF
POSITIVE TRAIN CONTROL
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THURSDAY, MARCH 1, 2018
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:18 a.m. in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. John Thune,
Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Thune [presiding], Wicker, Blunt, Heller,
Fischer, Gardner, Nelson, Cantwell, Klobuchar, Tester, Udall,
Blumenthal, Baldwin, Markey, Peters, Hassan, and Cortez Masto.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA
The Chairman. Good morning. We convene today's hearing at a
critical time for positive train control, or PTC,
implementation. The victims, families, and all those affected
by the overspeed derailment of Amtrak 501 in Washington and the
collision of Amtrak 91 in South Carolina remain in our thoughts
and our prayers. These accidents underscore the importance of
implementing PTC quickly, safely, and successfully.
And while tragic grade crossing collisions like the one
involving Amtrak Special Train 923 are not generally prevented
by PTC, reducing the number of such incidents remains another
important priority.
We are now about 10 months away from the December 31, 2018,
statutory deadline for PTC, and recent reports suggest many
railroads will not fully implement this safety technology by
the end of the year. More alarmingly, a new report from the
GAO, which I requested and which will be presented today, finds
7 to 19 commuter railroads are at risk for not even qualifying
for a limited extension to work out software, testing, and
interoperability issues.
The Positive Train Control Enforcement Implementation Act
passed by Congress and signed into law by President Obama in
October 2015 extended the original deadline of December 31,
2015, amid reports that no railroad could meet the deadline,
and many railroads were contemplating halting passenger rail
service or shipments of essential supplies for agricultural
production and water purification.
This Committee, on a bipartisan basis, took action to avert
a rail shutdown and set a realistic framework for
implementation. With this realistic framework in place,
railroads should be able to get the job done.
The law requires railroads to implement PTC by December 31,
2018, and allows a railroad to apply for an extension of up to
24 months to ensure that PTC works as intended if, and only if,
that railroad meets important milestones like full PTC hardware
installation, spectrum acquisition, and employee training, and
meets other milestones, such as implementing PTC on a specific
territory or initiating revenue service demonstration. For
Class 1 freight railroads and Amtrak, the bar is higher: PTC
must be implemented or in revenue service demonstration on a
majority of the required territories or route miles.
The law is clear: for each railroad, passenger or freight,
all PTC hardware must be on board or in the ground by December
31, 2018. The law also required revised PTC implementation
plans to include transparent annual metrics and provide a new
authority for the FRA to enforce those plans.
To date, FRA has initiated cases against 14 railroads that
failed to meet hardware installation milestones or adequately
report progress in a timely manner. If railroads do not comply
with the law by the year's end, I expect the FRA to take the
enforcement action needed to bring railroads into compliance.
Railroads should not count on any extensions to the statutory
framework that Congress passed in 2015.
To be sure, PTC installation is an enormously complex
undertaking. To implement PTC, railroads must develop, acquire,
and install new hardware components and complex software
systems that are able to communicate with other railroads.
There are different PTC systems, and each system has
different configurations, and yet they all must work seamlessly
across our Nation's interwoven rail network. There are a
limited number of PTC hardware suppliers, and there are a
limited number of individuals who have the technical expertise
to program that hardware. Simply put, PTC is not an off-the-
shelf technology, and a railroad can't simply flip a switch.
Understanding these challenges, the Federal Government has
provided substantial funding and financing to support for
implementation. A new report from the Department of
Transportation Office of Inspector General, which I requested,
which will be also released today, shows DOT has awarded nearly
$3 billion in grant and loan assistance with $2.3 billion
provided to date and another $600 million on the way. This
includes much of the $199 million that this Committee worked to
include in the FAST Act. For instance, this financial support
includes a $960 million loan and a nearly $100 million grant to
support the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, one of our
witnesses today.
While not all financial assistance should come from the
Federal Government with a significant amount of Federal support
not yet expended, it is critical that grant and loan recipients
deploy resources in a timely and efficient manner in advance of
the deadline.
I want to conclude my remarks by emphasizing what is at
stake here. Failing to comply with the law is not an option. If
commuter railroads do not meet the requirements of the law,
there is a real risk of halting or reducing service. If so,
millions of people who depend on commuter rail to get to work
each day or to visit a doctor or see a family member could see
their lives disrupted. Those entities that aren't on track need
to look at successful examples and recommit their organizations
to getting the job done.
I will now turn to Ranking Member Senator Nelson for any
opening remarks he might have.
Senator Nelson.
STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And before I address the topic at hand, I want to wonder,
what in the world is going on at the FRA? Because it was just
reported yesterday allegations by Politico that the acting head
safety regulator, Heath Hall, Heath Hall, of the Federal
Railroad Administration, is in a huge conflict because,
according to the report, throughout his tenure and even at the
time of the Washington State railroad crash, the Acting
Administrator was doing outside work as a public relations
consultant. This was a violation of his ethics agreement, and
it's very alarming for the safety of our railroads,
particularly as the agency is tasked with the oversight of the
positive train control implementation and its task with
responding to these tragic series of crashes that we've had.
Now to the issue at hand, I certainly appreciate the
Chairman for calling this hearing on positive train control. I
wish I could say that this technology was in place and working
so that we wouldn't have to keep having these deadly accidents,
but it's not the case. Instead, we're here again after another
tragic crash that has killed several people and injured dozens,
which could have been prevented with positive train control
technology.
In Washington State, an Amtrak train was speeding as it
rounded into a curve, and it derailed onto the highway below,
killing three people and injuring more than 60. The facts of
the case are eerily similar to the 2015 crash in Philadelphia,
where a speeding Amtrak derailed while traveling into a curve,
killing eight and injuring hundreds. And just last month, an
Amtrak train traveling in Florida was in a head-on collision
with a CSX freight train. The engineer and the train conductor
from Florida were killed in the collision, and more than 100
people were injured.
So these tragedies can be prevented, they should be
prevented, and that's why the industry must do a better job of
implementing positive train control and get it done quickly,
and that's why the U.S. Government ought to crack down. We've
heard for far too long from some in the industry that
implementing positive train control is a complex and expensive
process and that railroads have faced a series of challenges.
We've heard this over and over and over. But more and more
these arguments are becoming tiresome, especially in light of
the fact that the railroads have had 10 years to get this done.
Now, I know that railroads have had to overcome challenges,
but railroads like BNSF, SETPA commuter rail, and others have
made significant progress toward implementation, and they
should be applauded. But some railroads are way behind the
curve, and, shockingly, according to the DOT, a few have made
zero progress, and, unfortunately, that includes many railroads
in my state. Now, that's just simply unacceptable.
In 2015, none of the railroads were near completion. So the
railroads, the commuter rails, the states, the countless
others, requested an extension of positive train control, as
did the administration at the time in 2015. So reluctantly, we,
sitting at this dais, discussed it, we granted additional time,
but demanded real action, including completion of equipping the
locomotives and the tracks, significant testing and evidence
that their systems work, and new penalties for the Department
to ensure that the railroads are meeting their deadlines.
We provided $200 million in grant funding in addition to
the more than $2 billion in Federal support that had previously
been provided, and the effort was suppose to ensure that PTC
was going to be done this year. We heard repeatedly that given
a limited amount of time, railroads would be able to get the
PTC in place, yet here we go again, just what the Chairman has
said. And now it's become crystal clear that many of the
railroads simply have not lived up to their agreement.
And so I'm very--well, let me just say it this way, I'm not
inclined to give any more additional time because, do we want
more crashes that PTC could avoid? So it means that railroads
need to make sure that they're doing everything possible to
meet the 2018 deadline. States and the Department of
Transportation have got to come together to ensure all
available resources are being directed to this task. And,
finally, the Department must use its authority to hold
railroads' feet to the fire.
Madam Secretary, the Department of Transportation ought to
be cracking down. We have a responsibility to the traveling
public to learn from these tragic crashes. We've got a
responsibility to make sure that there is safety on the lines.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Nelson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Bill Nelson, U.S. Senator from Florida
I want to thank Chairman Thune for calling today's hearing on
positive train control.
We have met several times on this topic previously.
I wish I could say that this technology was in place and working,
so that we wouldn't have to keep having these deadly accidents.
Unfortunately, that is not the case.
Instead, we are here again after another tragic crash that killed
several people and injured dozens, and which could have been prevented
with positive train control technology.
In Washington State, an Amtrak train was speeding as it rounded
into a curve and derailed onto the highway below, killing three people
and injuring more than sixty.
The facts of this case are eerily similar to the 2015 crash in
Philadelphia, where a speeding Amtrak train derailed while traveling
into a curve, killing eight and injuring hundreds.
Just last month, an Amtrak train traveling to Florida was in a
head-on collision with a CSX freight train.
The engineer and a train conductor from Florida were killed in this
collision and more than a hundred people were injured.
These tragedies can be prevented.
And they should be prevented.
That's why the industry as a whole must do a better job of
implementing positive train control and get it done quickly.
We've heard for far too long from some in the industry that
implementing positive train control is a complex and expensive process
and that railroads have faced serious challenges during implementation.
But more and more these arguments are becoming tiresome, especially
in light of the fact that the railroads have had ten years already to
get this done.
I also know that many railroads have overcome these challenges.
Railroads like BNSF, Septa commuter rail, and others have made
significant progress toward implementation and I applaud them for their
work.
But some railroads are way behind the curve and, shockingly,
according to the Department of Transportation, a few have made almost
zero progress.
This includes railroads in my state of Florida.
This is unacceptable.
In many instances, it feels like deja vu.
In 2015, none of the railroads were near completion.
The railroads, commuter rails, states, and countless others,
including the Obama administration, requested an extension of the
positive train control deadline.
Reluctantly, Congress granted additional time, but demanded real
action from the railroads, including:
Completion of equipping the locomotives and tracks
Significant testing and evidence that their systems work,
and
New penalties for the department to ensure that railroads
are meeting their deadlines.
We also provided nearly 200 million dollars in grant funding, in
addition to the more than two billion dollars in Federal support that
had previously been provided.
That effort was supposed to ensure that PTC would be quickly
implemented.
We heard repeatedly that, given a limited amount of time, railroads
would be able to get positive train control in place.
Yet, here we are again.
And it's now become crystal clear that many railroads have not
lived up to their end of the bargain.
That's why I'm not inclined to give anyone additional time.
We simply must get this done.
That means railroads need to make sure that they are doing
everything possible to meet the 2018 deadline.
States and the Department of Transportation must come together to
ensure that all available resources are being directed to this task.
And finally, the department must use its authority to hold
railroads' feet to the fire.
We have a responsibility to the traveling public to learn from
these tragic crashes and to improve safety on our rail lines.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on how we can
meet that challenge.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
I want to welcome our panel of witnesses this morning and
thank them for their testimony in advance, and ask them to give
their opening statements.
We first have Ms. Susan Fleming, who is the Director of
Physical Infrastructure Issues at the Government Accountability
Office; Mr. Barry DeWeese, who is Assistant Inspector General,
Department of Transportation Office of the Inspector General;
Mr. David L. Mayer, who is the Chief Safety Officer for
Metropolitan Transportation Authority; and Mr. Richard
Anderson, who is President and CEO of Amtrak.
We'll start on my left, and your right, with Ms. Fleming.
And I would ask, if you can, to confine your oral remarks as
close to 5 minutes as possible. We'll make sure that your
entire statement is included in the record, and that will
maximize the opportunity for members to ask questions.
Ms. Fleming, welcome, and please proceed.
STATEMENT OF SUSAN FLEMING, DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE,
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Ms. Fleming. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Nelson, and members of the
Committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss commuter
railroads' implementation of positive train control, or PTC,
and FRA's oversight of that effort. Despite rail safety
improvements in recent years, additional accidents, including
multiple fatal accidents in the past 3 months, show that more
needs to be done.
PTC is not designed to and cannot prevent all rail
accidents. Nonetheless, successful implementation of PTC holds
significant promise in helping avoid certain types of
accidents, such as potentially catastrophic train-to-train
collisions or high-speed derailments. However, our broader
five-year body of work on PTC has found that implementation is
costly and complex, has been fraught with challenges, and
progress has been slow.
While the implementation of PTC involves numerous
stakeholders, my testimony today focuses on the 29 commuter
railroads that transport approximately 500 million passengers
each year, and FRA, which is charged with overseeing
implementation.
Turning to commuter railroads' implementation progress, we
found, based on third quarter 2017 data, that most of the
railroads reported progress in initial implementation
activities, such as installing equipment on trains alongside
tracks, acquiring radio spectrum, and employee training.
However, progress varied widely across individual railroads, in
part, because of their varying size and unique set of
circumstances. For example, equipping locomotives was one of
the areas of greatest variance. Thirteen had completed
equipment installation, while six had not yet started. The
remaining eight fell somewhere in between.
Significant work also remains for the majority of commuter
railroads to complete more technically complex and time-
consuming implementation activities, such as field testing
software and components, and revenue service demonstration,
which tests trains operating PTC as part of regular operations.
As of September, FRA had approved conditional certification for
two railroads and was reviewing two other safety plans.
Digging deeper, to estimate how many commuter railroads may
have insufficient time to meet the December deadline or to
qualify for an RSD-based extension, we analyzed commuter
railroad scheduled milestones for installing the back office
server and conducting field testing, which must be completed
before entering RSD. Based on railroads' experience to date,
and FRA's estimate of the amount of time it can take to
complete these steps, over half of commuter railroads may be at
risk of not meeting the December deadline or qualifying for an
RSD-based extension.
However, many factors could affect how many railroads are
ultimately at risk. For example, some schedules may slip while
others may benefit from applying lessons learned. FRA's
resources and capacity will also affect how quickly it can
review the increasing flow of submitted test plans, RSD
applications, and safety plans.
Speaking of FRA, I now want to turn to its role in helping
ensure PTC is successfully implemented. FRA has provided
substantial information to individual and groups of commuter
railroads as well as highly praised individual assistance.
However, we found two shortcomings with its approach. First,
FRA has used a largely informal and often reactive
communications approach. Second, many commuter railroads did
not fully understand the agency's planned approach for
reviewing and granting extensions or the criteria for applying
for an extension. The statutory provision allowing for other
alternative criteria approved by FRA instead of the RSD
criteria generated the most questions.
For the long term, we found that although FRA collects
individual railroads' progress information, it has not used
this information to prioritize resources using a risk-based
approach. This will be essential given the year-end deadline
approaching and anticipated significant increase in workload
and oversight responsibilities that will clearly stretch beyond
2020 and the yet to be tackled issue of interoperability.
In conclusion, there is no ignoring the fact that the clock
is ticking. Ten months and considerable work remains to either
complete implementation or apply for an extension. Even with
sustained commitment from all 25 commuter railroads that have
yet to file a safety plan, it is highly unlikely that all will
meet the extension or implementation deadline. Therefore, it is
critical that FRA implement our two recommendations: first, to
systematically communicate deadline extension criteria
information and its planned approach, including how it will
handle railroads that do not meet the deadline or extension
criteria; and, second, to use a risk-based approach to
prioritize its recommendations and workload. FRA agreed with
our recommendations.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement, and I would be
pleased to answer questions that you or other members of the
Committee may have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Fleming follows:]
Prepared Statement of Susan Fleming, Director, Physical Infrastructure,
United States Government Accountability Office
Many Commuter Railroads Still Have Significant Additional
Implementation Work and Opportunities Exist to
Provide Federal Assistance
What GAO Found
The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) is responsible for
overseeing railroads' (including commuter railroads') implementation of
positive train control (PTC) by December 31, 2018. PTC is a
communications-based train control system designed to prevent certain
types of accidents and involves the installation, integration, and
testing of hardware and software components. For example, railroads
must install equipment on locomotives and along the track, and complete
field testing, including revenue service demonstration (RSD)--an
advanced form of testing that occurs while trains operate in regular
service.
GAO's analysis of commuter railroads' PTC scheduled milestones for
two key activities necessary to meet the 2018 deadline or qualify for
an RSD-based extension (one of the statutory options) found that as
many as two-thirds of the 29 commuter railroads may not have allocated
sufficient time to complete these milestones. Specifically, in
comparing the commuter railroads' schedules to FRA's estimates of the
time required to complete these milestones and the experiences of
railroads that have already completed them, GAO's analysis found that
from 7 to 19 commuter railroads may not complete the milestones before
the 2018 implementation deadline or qualify for an RSD-based extension.
For example, FRA estimates that field testing (one of the milestones)
takes at least one year, but GAO found that 14 commuter railroads plan
to start this testing less than a year before the 2018 deadline,
increasing the potential risk that this milestone will not be
completed. However, FRA has the authority to establish alternative
criteria for an extension not based on RSD, and several other factors
can affect commuter railroads' planned and future progress. As a
result, the number of commuter railroads at risk of not meeting the
deadline or qualifying for an extension could increase or decrease in
the coming year.
FRA's PTC management and oversight includes monitoring commuter
railroads' progress, reviewing documentation, and sharing information
with them, but the agency has not systematically communicated
information or used a risk-based approach to help these railroads
prepare for the 2018 deadline or qualify for an extension. GAO found
that FRA has primarily used informal assistance, meetings with
individual railroads, and participation in industry-convened groups to
share information with commuter railroads, and in some cases the
information conveyed has been inconsistent according to industry
representatives. Some commuter railroads also told GAO that
clarification about the agency's planned process for reviewing and
approving extension requests would be helpful. Federal internal control
standards state that management should externally communicate the
necessary quality information to achieve its objectives. While FRA
officials have said they are working to identify additional ways to
convey extension-related information, they have not yet done so.
Moreover, although FRA receives information from commuter railroads on
their progress in implementing PTC, it has not used this information to
prioritize resources using a risk-based approach. With the year-end
2018 deadline approaching, and an anticipated significant increase in
FRA's workload, targeting resources to the greatest risk can help
better ensure that FRA effectively fulfills its oversight
responsibilities and provides commuter railroads the information they
need to prepare for the 2018 deadline or seek an extension.
______
Chairman Thune, Ranking Member Nelson, and Members of the
Committee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss our review of commuter
railroads' implementation of positive train control (PTC).
In the wake of rail accidents such as the 2008 Los Angeles,
California, collision between a commuter train and a freight train,
resulting in 25 deaths and over 100 injuries, legislation was enacted
requiring certain freight, intercity passenger, and commuter railroads
\1\ to implement PTC--a communications-based train control system
designed to help control train movements, including braking--by
December 31, 2015.\2\ While the safety of the rail industry has
improved in recent years, additional accidents, including the recent
Amtrak derailment in Washington state in late 2017, have demonstrated
the continued need for technological improvements that could help slow
or stop a train to reduce the risk of certain types of accidents such
as train-to-train collisions and derailments caused by exceeding safe
speeds.\3\ In total, 41 railroads, including 29 commuter railroads, are
currently required to implement PTC. Commuter railroads provide
approximately 490-million annual passenger trips over 8,440 miles of
track. Their size varies significantly, from rail lines providing
approximately one-million passenger trips a year to those providing
over 80 million.
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\1\ ``Commuter rail passenger transportation'' means short-haul
rail passenger transportation in metropolitan and suburban areas
usually having reduced fare, multiple-ride, and commuter tickets and
morning and evening peak period operations. 49 U.S.C. Sec. 24102(3).
\2\ The Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-432,
div. A, 122 Stat. 4848 (2008).
\3\ While the cause of the December 18, 2017, Amtrak derailment
near DuPont, Washington, is currently under investigation, the National
Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) initial review indicated that
speed may have been a factor. NTSB's preliminary report indicates the
final recorded speed was 78 miles per hour, while the authorized speed
heading into the curve where the derailment occurred was 30 mph.
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Our prior work on PTC implementation has found that it is a complex
and lengthy process.\4\ It requires the integration of various
components--including communication systems, hardware on locomotives
and along the side of the track, and software in centralized office
locations as well as onboard the train and along the track. In order to
implement PTC, railroads must design, produce, and install more than 20
major components that will ultimately communicate trains' locations,
movements, and speed, and then slow or stop a train that is not being
operated safely. Many of these components are new technologies being
designed and developed for PTC, and railroads must integrate them with
their existing systems. Full implementation of PTC involves a number of
steps, including but not limited to: equipment installation, testing,
certification, and achieving interoperability. Interoperability will
enable trains to move seamlessly across track owned by different
railroads with potentially different PTC systems. U.S. railroads often
operate their cars as ``tenants'' on the track of another railroad,
known as the ``host.'' The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) is
responsible for overseeing railroads' implementation of PTC.
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\4\ GAO, Positive Train Control: Additional Oversight Needed As
Most Railroads Do Not Expect to Meet 2015 Implementation Deadline, GAO-
15-739 (Washington, D.C., Sept. 4, 2015) and GAO, Positive Train
Control: Additional Authorities Could Benefit Implementation, GAO-13-
720 (Washington D.C., Aug. 16, 2013).
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As part of our body of work examining railroads' progress in
implementing PTC, we found in September 2015 that nearly all railroads
did not expect to meet the originally mandated deadline of December 31,
2015.\5\ In October 2015, Congress extended the deadline to December
31, 2018, and established criteria that would enable FRA to grant
railroads meeting certain requirements a further extension up to
2020.\6\
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\5\ GAO-15-739.
\6\ The Positive Train Control Enforcement and Implementation Act
of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-73, Sec. 1302, 129 Stat. 568, 576-582 (2015),
codified at 49 U.S.C. Sec. 20157.
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You requested that we examine commuter railroads' implementation of
PTC. This statement describes the results of our review and focuses on:
commuter railroads' progress in implementing PTC;
how many, if any, commuter railroads may be at risk of not
meeting the mandated PTC deadline or certain extension
criteria, and what factors may be affecting implementation
progress; and
the extent to which FRA's management and oversight approach
has helped ensure that commuter railroads either meet the
deadline or qualify for an extension.
To address these objectives, we reviewed applicable laws as well as
applicable FRA and PTC regulations, reports, and guidance. We also
interviewed FRA officials involved in PTC monitoring, enforcement, and
technical assistance. To describe commuter railroads' progress
implementing PTC, we reviewed the most recent available railroad
quarterly data that the 29 commuter railroads submitted to FRA that
outlines installation and implementation progress in selected areas as
of September 30, 2017. We assessed the reliability of the data in these
reports by reviewing them for anomalies, outliers, or missing
information, among other things. Based on these steps, we determined
that these data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes of
describing progress in PTC implementation. To identify railroads that
may be at risk of not meeting the PTC deadline or qualifying for
certain extension criteria, we collected additional information from
all 29 commuter railroads related to their planned schedules for key
implementation milestones. We then compared this information against
FRA estimates for how long these milestones may take and to the
experiences of commuter railroads that have already completed these
milestones. To obtain perspectives on factors that may affect
implementation progress and FRA's oversight approach, we interviewed
representatives from 19 commuter railroads. These selected railroads
include: (1) 14 railroads that according to FRA were identified in May
2017 as at risk of not meeting the 2018 full implementation deadline
and not completing statutory requirements necessary to receive a
deadline extension and (2) 5 other railroads that were further ahead
with implementation and that varied in geographic location and size of
rail system, among other factors. We also interviewed representatives
from all 7 of the Class I freight railroads,\7\ which are also required
to implement PTC; 5 major PTC equipment suppliers and contractors
identified by FRA; and 2 railroad industry associations. Information
from these interviews is not generalizable to all commuter railroads or
all PTC stakeholders but provide valuable insights into implementation
issues. Finally, we compared FRA's management and oversight approach to
Federal internal control standards related to communications and risk
assessment. Appendix I describes our scope and methodology in greater
detail.
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\7\ Freight railroads are classified by operating revenues. Class I
railroads are those carriers having annual carrier operating revenues
of $467 million or more.
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We conducted this performance audit from July 2017 to February 2018
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background
Under the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008, a PTC system must be
designed to prevent train-to-train collisions, derailments due to
excessive speed, incursions into work zone limits, and the movement of
a train through a switch left in the wrong position. Railroads may
implement any PTC system that meets these requirements, and the
majority of the 29 commuter railroads are implementing one of three
primary types of systems: the Interoperable Electronic Train Management
System (I-ETMS), the Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System, or
Enhanced Automated Train Control (E-ATC).\8\ PTC's intended safety
benefits can only be achieved when all required hardware has been
installed and tested, and a train is able to communicate continually
and in real time with the software and equipment of its own railroad
and also with that of other railroads operating on the same tracks.
Real-time communication is needed to account for changing track
conditions, which may, for example, include temporary speed
restrictions where railroad employees are conducting track maintenance.
Figure 1 illustrates how one system is intended to operate.
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\8\ Fifteen commuter railroads are implementing I-ETMS--the main
system used by freight railroads. Six commuter railroads--located
throughout the United States--are implementing E-ATC, and 5--on the
Northeast Corridor between Boston and Washington, D.C.--are
implementing forms of the Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System. Two
of the remaining commuter railroads are implementing different types of
PTC systems, and one has yet to determine what PTC system it will
implement.
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Figure 1: Basic Operation of the Interoperable Electronic Train
Management System (I-ETMS)
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Source: GAO./GAO-18-367T
PTC's multi-step implementation process can be grouped into three
primary phases (see fig.2). Each phase involves key activities for
railroads to complete--such as installing PTC equipment--as well as the
submission of key documents for FRA review and approval--such as test
plans. Based on railroad data reported to FRA, most commuter railroads
are currently in the second phase, which involves system design,
installation, and testing. According to a recent FRA presentation,
completing key activities within this phase is the near-term focus for
many commuter railroads.
Figure 2: Key Activities Railroads Must Complete to Implement Positive
Train Control (PTC)
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Source: GAO analysis of Federal Railroad Administration
information./GAO-18-367T.
According to FRA officials, railroads must complete certain
implementation steps sequentially, while other activities can be worked
on simultaneously; for example, railroads may work to finish installing
locomotive and wayside equipment while also beginning testing on an
initial track segment.\9\ Furthermore, based on railroads' PTC
implementation plans, the scale of implementation activities can vary
by railroad, based on the size of the railroad and the number of
components to be installed. For example, one relatively large commuter
railroad must install computer hardware on 528 locomotives and 789
wayside units along 218 route miles, while one relatively small
commuter railroad's installation is limited to 17 locomotives and 35
wayside units along 32 route miles.
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\9\ In this statement, we use the term locomotive generally to
refer to any of the variety of vehicles, such as cab cars and electric
multiple unit trains, that commuter railroads may need to equip.
Wayside units, located along the side of the track, include equipment
such as communication towers or poles, switch position monitors,
wayside radios, wayside interface units, and base station radios.
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According to FRA, full implementation of PTC is achieved when a
railroad's system is FRA-certified and interoperable, and all hardware,
software, and other components have been fully installed and in
operation on all route miles required to use PTC. The PTC system is
required to be interoperable, meaning the locomotives of any host
railroad and tenant railroad operating on the same track segment will
communicate with and respond to the PTC system, including uninterrupted
movements over property boundaries.\10\
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\10\ See 49 U.S.C. Sec. 20157. With certain exceptions, full
implementation requires all controlling locomotives to be equipped with
a fully operative and functioning onboard PTC apparatus, including the
controlling locomotives of each host railroad and each tenant railroad
operating on a PTC-equipped track segment. 49 C.F.R. Sec. 236.1006.
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In early 2016, railroads required to install PTC had to submit
revised implementation plans to FRA that included a schedule and
milestones for specific activities, such as installing locomotive and
wayside hardware, acquiring radio spectrum (if necessary), and training
employees who will have to use and operate PTC systems.\11\ Railroads
are required to report annually to FRA certain information on their
implementation progress.\12\ As part of overseeing railroads' PTC
implementation, FRA established a PTC Task Force in May 2015 to track
and monitor individual railroads' progress. Railroads are also required
to report quarterly to FRA on the status of PTC implementation in
several areas such as: locomotives equipped, employees trained,
territories where revenue service demonstration (RSD) has been
initiated, and route miles in PTC operation.\13\
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\11\ The Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 required that
railroads submit an implementation plan for installing PTC by April 16,
2010. When the PTC implementation deadline was extended to 2018 under
the PTC Enforcement and Implementation Act of 2015, railroads were
required to submit a revised implementation plan by January 27, 2016,
to outline how and when each railroad plans to achieve full PTC
implementation.
\12\ Each railroad is required to annually report to FRA on PTC
implementation progress in areas such as spectrum acquisition,
installation progress, and the total number of route miles where
revenue service demonstration has been initiated or PTC is in
operation. See 49 U.S.C. Sec. 20157(c)(1); 49 C.F.R.
Sec. 236.1009(a)(5).
\13\ To effectively monitor each railroad's progress implementing
PTC, FRA requires the submission of quarterly progress reports under
its investigative authorities. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 20107,
20902, 20157(c)(2); 49 C.F.R. Sec. 236.1009(h).
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FRA's oversight tools include assessing civil penalties if a
railroad fails to comply with legal requirements, including a
railroad's failure to comply with its implementation plan.\14\ FRA has
a national PTC director, designated PTC specialists in the 8 FRA
regions, and a few additional engineers and test monitors responsible
for overseeing technical and engineering aspects of implementation and
reviewing railroad submissions of documents and test requests. FRA
officials told us they conduct various types of PTC-related work
simultaneously, such as providing technical assistance to railroads,
addressing questions, and reviewing documentation submitted by
railroads. As railroads progress with testing and before completing
implementation, FRA must review and approve a safety plan for each
railroad and certify the PTC system.\15\
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\14\ 49 U.S.C. Sec. 20157(e).
\15\ 49 C.F.R. Sec. 236.1015.
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Commuter railroads that will not be able to implement a PTC system
by December 31, 2018, may receive a maximum 2-year extension if they
meet six criteria set forth in statute. Specifically, commuter
railroads must demonstrate, to the satisfaction of the Secretary of
Transportation, that they have: (1) installed all PTC system hardware;
(2) acquired all necessary spectrum;\16\ (3) completed required
employee training; (4) included in a revised implementation plan an
alternative schedule and sequence for implementing their PTC system as
soon as practicable; (5) certified to FRA that they will be in full
compliance with PTC requirements by the date provided in the
alternative schedule and sequence; and (6) either initiated RSD on at
least one territory \17\ required to have operations governed by a PTC
system or ``met any other criteria established by the Secretary.'' \18\
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\16\ Radio frequency spectrum is the medium for wireless
communications and supports a vast array of commercial and governmental
services. Commercial entities use radio frequency spectrum to provide a
variety of wireless services, including mobile voice and data, paging,
broadcast television and radio, and satellite services.
\17\ FRA defines a territory as an entire installation/track
segment as identified in a railroad's PTC implementation plan (e.g., a
track segment, territory, subdivision, district, etc.). See, e.g., 49
U.S.C. Sec. 20157(a)(3)(B)(vi); 49 C.F.R. Sec. Sec. 236.1003,
236.1011(a)(5).
\18\ These criteria are contained in 49 U.S.C.
Sec. 20157(a)(3)(B)(i)-(v), (vii).
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Progress Reported in Some Implementation Areas, but Significant Work
Remains
Most of the 29 commuter railroads have reported progress in some of
the key areas of PTC implementation that FRA monitors, such as
locomotive and wayside equipment installation, but the amount of
progress reported varies across individual railroads (see fig. 3
below).
Figure 3: Status of Commuter Railroads' Installation of Locomotive and
Wayside Equipment and Training of Employees Reported as of
September 30, 2017
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Source: GAO analysis of commuter railroad data submitted to the
Federal Railroad Administration./GAO-18-367T
a Two railroads reported over 100 percent of wayside
equipment installed, and three railroads reported over 100 percent of
employees trained. We included these railroads in the 91-100 percent
complete bin.
b Some commuter railroads reported that wayside
installation was not applicable because they operate as a tenant
railroad and that their host railroad is responsible for installing
wayside equipment.
Over half of the commuter railroads reported that they have made
substantial progress in some initial implementation activities, while
other railroads reported that they have made much more limited progress
or have yet to begin equipment installation or employee training. For
example, as of the end of September 2017:\19\
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\19\ Railroads submitted quarterly implementation progress
information to FRA for the period ending September 30, 2017. At the
time of our review, this was the most recent information available.
Locomotive Equipment Installation: 18 commuter railroads
reported 50 percent or more of their locomotive PTC equipment
was installed, and of these, 13 had completed installation. In
contrast, 6 railroads reported that they had not started
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installation of locomotive equipment.
Wayside Equipment Installation: 16 commuter railroads
reported 50 percent or more of their wayside PTC equipment was
installed, and half of them reported that they had completed
installation. In contrast, 7 reported that less than 20 percent
of this equipment was installed.
Employee Training: 11 commuter railroads reported completing
PTC training for 50 percent or more of their employees
requiring training. Of these, four reported that they had
completed employee training. Thirteen commuter railroads had
completed 10 percent or less of their employee training, and of
these, 11 reported that they had not started training their
employees. However, some commuter railroad representatives we
spoke with stated that they are waiting to conduct training
until their PTC system is closer to deployment. For example,
representatives from one railroad told us they are waiting to
conduct training so employees will be recently trained and
familiar with PTC as the system is rolled out.
Notably, commuter railroads reported that they have made the most
progress in obtaining spectrum, which allows PTC components to transmit
information about a train's movements and location. Specifically, 15 of
the 17 railroads that require spectrum reported that they have obtained
it.\20\ The two other railroads reported that they are in discussions
to obtain leased spectrum.\21\
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\20\ Twelve of the 29 commuter railroads do not require spectrum
because, for example, they are implementing a PTC system that does not
use spectrum or because they operate as a tenant-only railroad.
\21\ The 7 Class I railroads created a consortium--PTC 220 LLC--to
purchase radio frequency spectrum licenses that would address their
needs, and in some cases, the consortium can lease radio frequency
spectrum to non-Class I railroads for a fee. Most commuter railroads
installing the I-ETMS system have opted to lease spectrum from PTC 220
LLC.
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Beyond the initial implementation activities, much work remains for
the majority of commuter railroads to complete other key PTC activities
that will enable them to complete implementation. PTC implementation
requires many additional steps to integrate equipment and software
systems that go beyond installing equipment and training employees, and
the majority of commuter railroads reported that they continue to work
to complete these steps, which are technically complex and time
consuming. For example, as of the end of September 2017:
Locomotives Fully Equipped and PTC-Operable: Fifteen
commuter railroads reported that half or more of their
locomotives were fully equipped and PTC-operable, meaning that
all necessary onboard hardware and software is installed and
commissioned, and is capable of operating over a PTC-equipped
territory. Eight commuter railroads reported that none of their
locomotives were fully equipped and operable.
Field Testing: Thirteen railroads reported that they had
begun field testing--a key implementation milestone that
precedes RSD and allows railroads to assess how PTC components
and software function together.\22\ FRA officials said that the
testing phase can be a long and difficult process, as data
obtained during field testing must prove the functionality of
the system and be included as part of a railroad's application
to enter RSD.
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\22\ During the American Public Transportation Association's
Commuter Rail Summit in summer 2017, FRA noted that railroads should,
at that time, have been installing their systems as well as beginning
testing, based on the agency's anticipated time frames necessary to
complete the milestones necessary for an extension.
RSD: Following successful field testing, FRA may grant a
railroad approval to enter the next level of testing, RSD. In
RSD, testing is performed on trains operating PTC as part of
regular operations. According to FRA, RSD is the final phase of
testing that a railroad completes in order to validate and
verify its PTC system, and the results from RSD, along with
earlier testing, are to be included in the safety plan a
railroad submits to FRA. While six commuter railroads reported
that they have begun RSD,\23\ most had not yet reached this key
milestone--including some of the largest commuter railroads.
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\23\ As of the end of September 2017, six commuter railroads
reported that they had begun RSD on at least one track segment. Five of
these railroads reported that all of their track segments were in RSD,
while the other railroad reported that it had initiated RSD on 90
percent of its track segments.
Conditional Certification: Once FRA approves a railroad's
safety plan, the railroad receives a PTC system
certification.\24\ According to FRA officials, as of September
30, 2017, only two commuter railroads were conditionally
certified--meaning FRA has reviewed their safety plans and
granted conditional approval for PTC operations, and the
railroads are providing regular service in PTC operations--and
two additional commuter railroads had submitted a safety plan
for FRA review.\25\
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\24\ 49 C.F.R. Sec. Sec. 236.1009(d), 236.1015. A PTC safety plan
may include, among other things, a risk assessment, a hazard mitigation
analysis, and a complete description of the railroad's training plan
for employees and supervisors.
\25\ One of the two commuter railroads submitted its safety plan
jointly with the Class III railroad that provides freight service on
the line.
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Given the variation in commuter railroads' progress, especially
related to completing later-stage PTC activities such as testing and
developing safety plans, 13 of 29 commuter railroads told us they
planned to seek a deadline extension, and the remaining 16 told us they
do not intend to seek an extension. However, the number of commuter
railroads planning to seek an extension is subject to change before the
end of 2018.
Over Half of Commuter Railroads May Be at Risk of Not Meeting the 2018
Deadline or Criteria for RSD-based Extension, Though Numerous
Factors Create Uncertainty
Based on our analysis of the PTC schedules of the 29 commuter
railroads, over half may not have sufficient time to complete
activities needed to implement PTC by the end of 2018 or to qualify for
an extension of that deadline by meeting criteria based on initiating
RSD--for the purposes of this statement, referred to as an RSD-based
extension. In particular, our analysis focused on the time likely
needed for railroads to conduct RSD activities, because RSD is both the
final step of field testing required by the 2018 deadline as well as
one of the statutory options railroads have in seeking a deadline
extension. For our analysis, we compared the amount of time railroads
plan for completing two key milestones--installing the back office
server and conducting field testing--to the amount of time FRA
officials estimate is required for each milestone and to the
experiences of railroads that have already completed RSD. However, it
is important to recognize that numerous factors could affect railroads'
planned and future progress. For example, commuter railroads could face
delays due to unexpected issues with PTC components or FRA reviews of
documents submitted by the railroads.
Over Half of Commuter Railroads May Be at Risk
In May 2017, FRA sent letters to 14 commuter railroads and their
respective state departments of transportation and governors informing
the recipients that they had not installed at least 50 percent of their
required locomotive and wayside equipment. In these letters FRA raised
concerns that these railroads were at risk of not meeting the 2018
deadline and not completing requirements for a deadline extension.\26\
Subsequently, in January 2018, FRA applied a more stringent benchmark--
whether a railroad had installed at least 65 percent of all equipment--
and determined that 13 commuter railroads remained at risk.\27\ Using
this more stringent criterion, only one railroad had made enough
progress installing equipment to no longer be classified as at risk by
FRA.
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\26\ FRA used railroads' equipment installation data as of the end
of calendar year 2016 to make its determinations.
\27\ FRA used railroads' data as of the end of September 2017 to
make determinations, and our analysis confirmed this finding.
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In addition to FRA's benchmarks for equipment installation, for our
analysis we evaluated more broadly railroads' progress in completing
other implementation activities that follow equipment installation and
that FRA and stakeholders said are more difficult to achieve.
Specifically, we analyzed commuter railroads' planned schedules for two
key milestones to determine whether these railroads appear to have
built sufficient time into their implementation plans to complete these
and other activities by the 2018 deadline or to qualify for an RSD-
based extension.\28\ The two key milestones we examined, both of which
need to be completed before a railroad enters RSD, were:
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\28\ We assessed all commuter railroads against these milestones,
regardless of whether a railroad planned to seek an extension. As noted
above, railroads that do not plan to seek an extension have said that
they will conduct RSD as the final step of required field testing, and
railroads that do plan to seek an extension must by statute either
initiate RSD on at least one territory or meet any other alternative
criteria established by FRA. While these alternative criteria are not
required to be based on RSD, we used RSD as a benchmark for our
analysis based on FRA's three ``alternative criteria'' approvals to
date; all of which have used RSD-based criteria (RSD testing on a
segment of track versus RSD testing on an entire territory). According
to an FRA official, it approved these three requests for alternative
criteria because they were based on specific and quantifiable measures
that happened to be RSD but could have been other specific,
quantifiable measures.
installing the back office server (BOS) and associated
software necessary to connect and interface with wayside,
locomotive, and dispatch equipment (the BOS transmits and
receives data among this equipment that enables PTC to work);
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and
conducting field testing, in particular testing of installed
infrastructure and initial assessments of the PTC system's
overall functionality on trains that are not transporting
passengers or operating during regular passenger service.
Our analysis found that at least one quarter, and potentially up to
approximately two thirds, of commuter railroads may not have sufficient
time to enter RSD and, thus, may not meet the 2018 PTC implementation
deadline or qualify for an RSD-based extension. These railroads vary by
size and type of PTC system and by whether they plan to apply for a
deadline extension. Specifically, our analysis found the following:
Projection based on BOS status: Between 9 and 19 commuter
railroads appear to be at potential risk of not meeting the
2018 deadline or qualifying for an RSD-based extension based on
our analysis. Our analysis found that the 6 commuter railroads
already in RSD took an average of 10 months from installing the
BOS to starting RSD.\29\ However, the schedules of 9 railroads
indicate that they plan to install a BOS less than 10 months
before the 2018 deadline. We believe that given past experience
of other railroads, this places these 9 railroads at potential
risk. Moreover, FRA officials estimate that it can take 2 to 3
years for a railroad to install and prepare the BOS and
associated software to support testing and RSD. Using FRA's 2-
year installation estimate (which would require BOS
installation before January 1, 2017) further exacerbates the
potential risk of not meeting the deadline or of not qualifying
for any RSD-based extension for up to 19 railroads.
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\29\ The 6 railroads in RSD, on which we based one of our
comparisons, vary in system size and PTC implementation system, but
many of these railroads are relatively small based on the number of
track segments each operates. Specifically, 3 railroads have a single
track segment; 1 railroad has 3 track segments, and 2 railroads have 10
or more track segments. In addition, one of these railroads is a tenant
railroad and did not have to install wayside PTC equipment.
Projection based on time allowed to conduct field testing:
Based on our review of the planned schedules, between 7 and 14
railroads may not have built sufficient time into their plans
either to complete field testing ahead of the 2018 deadline or
to qualify for an RSD-based extension. Commuter railroads and
FRA officials told us that field testing is challenging and can
take a substantial amount of time due to, for example,
unanticipated issues and limited available track for testing
given regular passenger operations. On average, our analysis
found that the 6 commuter railroads already in RSD took 7
months to move from starting field testing to starting RSD.
However, 7 commuter railroads plan to start their field testing
less than 7 months before the 2018 deadline. This situation
raises concerns about their ability to conduct field testing
before the 2018 deadline. Moreover, FRA officials told us that
moving from the start of field testing to the start of RSD can
take between 1 and 3 years, averaging about 2 years, and that
most railroads under-estimate the amount of time needed for
testing. When we applied the lower end of FRA's estimate, we
found that it further increases the potential risk for 14
railroads that plan to start field testing less than a year
prior to the 2018 deadline. As a result, they could be at risk
of not meeting the 2018 deadline or qualifying for an RSD-based
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extension.
We used RSD as a benchmark for our analysis of key milestones based
on the importance of this benchmark in implementing PTC and on the
three RSD-based alternative criteria that FRA has approved to date.
While the three approved alternative criteria all include RSD, FRA has
broad authority to approve ``any other'' alternative criteria even if
not based on RSD, as noted above. One FRA official told us the agency
approved these three alternative criteria requests because they were
all based on specific, quantifiable measures, rather than because they
included RSD in particular. FRA officials stated that they have not
issued guidance on uniform alternative criteria because they will
strive for railroads to meet the criteria for a deadline extension that
are listed in statute and want the discretion to make determinations on
a case-by-case basis. In addition, FRA officials said they want to
ensure that each railroad's criteria are consistent with the statutory
requirements for final implementation by December 31, 2020. Because it
is unknown what alternative criteria FRA may establish in the coming
months, which may not include RSD, it is difficult to determine at this
time whether the railroads we found to be potentially at risk of not
qualifying for an RSD-based extension might be more or less likely to
qualify for an extension based on other, non-RSD criteria.
Many Factors May Affect Commuter Railroads' Ability to Meet the
Deadline or
Qualify for an Extension
Much uncertainty exists regarding railroads' ultimate
implementation progress and their ability to meet the 2018 deadline or
qualify for an extension. This uncertainty is due, in part, to the fact
that PTC is a new way of operating and involves technologies that are
more complex to implement than many other railroad capital projects.
Furthermore, a number of factors can affect commuter railroads' planned
and future progress, including unexpected setbacks installing PTC
components and resources and capacity issues. Below we highlight some
of the factors that that could affect implementation progress.
Limited Industry Expertise and Resources
Three out of five PTC contractors and suppliers and about half of
the commuter railroads we spoke with acknowledged that industrywide,
there are a limited number of individuals with PTC technical expertise
available to successfully implement the technology. This can affect the
ability of railroads and contractors to meet planned schedules. For
example, one large commuter railroad said it took a year and a half to
hire an internal expert to continue work on its PTC project. In
addition, five commuter railroads told us that they faced other issues
with their prime contractors missing their milestones; such issues,
going forward, could impact railroads' progress during the coming year.
Also, though most railroads we spoke to are relying on contractors,
some commuter railroads may lack the in-house resources and expertise
to plan and oversee a project as large and complex as PTC.
Representatives from three commuter railroads we interviewed noted that
PTC is not a traditional capital or construction project for a
railroad; therefore, it requires additional expertise. FRA officials
also stated that small commuter railroads may not have technical
capacity or expertise with large contracts for such complex projects,
especially given limited industry resources.
In addition to limited expertise and resources, some commuter
railroads told us they faced unexpected delays in obtaining PTC
equipment, such as radios, from the supplier. Some PTC equipment is
only available from a single provider, which can lead to delays
executing contracts and obtaining equipment. Three commuter railroads
we spoke with said they encountered issues executing contracts for PTC
radios, in particular negotiating unique liability requirements sought
by the only supplier of this equipment, which resulted in delays or
higher overall costs to the railroads. One railroad noted that
executing sole-source contracts for such circumstances is particularly
problematic for state and public agencies.
Interoperability and Host and Tenant Coordination
As noted above, PTC is being implemented by different types of
railroads using different systems, and achieving interoperability among
PTC systems can complicate implementation. For example, Northeast
Corridor railroads that are implementing versions of the Advanced Civil
Speed Enforcement System need interoperability with freight railroads
using I-ETMS. Even railroads that are installing the same PTC system
have to take significant steps to ensure that systems will communicate
and interoperate properly. In one case, a railroad told us that it is
equipping its locomotives with equipment for multiple PTC systems to
ensure that it can operate on various host railroads' tracks.
Some commuter railroads that only operate as tenants on other
railroads' tracks may be able to complete some PTC implementation work
more quickly, as these railroads may benefit from work the host
railroads already completed as they coordinate to implement PTC. For
example, representatives from one commuter railroad we spoke with said
they have to acquire and install PTC equipment on their locomotives but
rely on the host railroads to install the remainder of the necessary
PTC infrastructure. These tenant-only commuter railroads, however, have
to coordinate field testing and RSD with the host railroads.
Schedule Changes
Unexpected issues with components or technology can also require
additional time to complete certain activities, causing schedules to
slip. Such issues could affect railroads currently on schedule as well
as railroads pursuing aggressive schedules in an effort to overcome
late starts or early setbacks. For example, representatives from 10
railroads we spoke with said that installing the BOS and associated
software, and ensuring it functions properly, can pose a challenge. One
contractor told us that once the BOS is delivered to a railroad, a lot
of testing work remains, and unexpected issues inevitably arise during
testing, even if the BOS works according to all specifications.
Representatives from one railroad said that despite strong
organizational commitment to implementation and setting internal
targets for progress, their PTC project schedule slipped many times
over the course of implementation due to a variety of issues, including
on-going software updates that caused delays while also straining the
budget and burdening staff. Representatives from that commuter railroad
also noted that equipping vehicles with PTC components took three times
longer than originally expected (3 years instead of 1 year). However,
some railroads are looking for ways to accelerate implementation. For
example, representatives from one railroad said they made the difficult
decision to cut some weekend passenger service to accelerate wayside
equipment installation. Therefore, as representatives from one railroad
articulated, given the schedule slippage experienced by railroads
further along in implementation, railroads with aggressive schedules
would have a limited ability to accommodate any additional delays.
FRA's Resources and Capacity
As the 2018 deadline approaches and railroads progress with
implementation activities, the amount of documentation railroads will
submit to FRA for review and approval is likely to increase
significantly. For example, FRA reported in summer 2017 that it had
taken between 10 and 100 days to review each of the test requests it
received from railroads. As the 2018 deadline approaches, FRA will have
to review a considerable amount of additional test plans and procedures
as well as applications to begin RSD. In addition, FRA will have to
concurrently review any safety plans that are submitted by railroads
reaching the certification phase. At the American Public Transportation
Association's (APTA) Commuter Railroad Summit in June 2017, FRA
officials said that they expect each safety plan review--which involves
all the regional specialists and some contract personnel--to take
between 6 and 12 months to review. These plans are about 5,000 pages in
length. FRA officials told us that reviewing all of the safety plans in
a timely manner will be a challenge given staff resources. FRA has 12
technical staff dedicated to the review of railroads' PTC documentation
and monitoring of PTC testing. Representatives from 10 out of 19
commuter railroads we interviewed said they are concerned about FRA's
ability to review submitted documentation in a timely manner.
Lessons Learned
As railroads continue to progress with their projects and the
industry becomes more experienced with PTC, railroads could benefit
from lessons learned. For example, representatives from one railroad
that is implementing I-ETMS, the system all large Class I freight
railroads are implementing, told us that they anticipate being able to
capitalize on lessons learned from freight railroads that have operated
in RSD. By leveraging the freight railroads' experiences, one commuter
railroad hopes to address issues before testing, rather than during,
and therefore move more quickly through the testing process. If
commuter railroads are able to apply lessons learned from other
railroads' testing processes, then they may be able to accelerate their
implementation efforts. Railroads may also accelerate implementation
schedules as they become more adept at the overall testing process,
which involves submitting test documents to FRA and scheduling multiple
tests. This could potentially shorten the average time it takes a
railroad to complete one or more of the key milestones analyzed. The
two commuter railroads that have been conditionally certified told us
they have met with other commuter railroads informally and have shared
their project experiences as a way to facilitate information sharing.
FRA Monitors Railroads' Progress but Has Not Systematically
Communicated with Them or Prioritized Efforts
FRA Monitors Railroads' Implementation Progress, Reviews Documents, and
Shares PTC Information
Since 2015, FRA has assumed additional roles and responsibilities--
primarily through the PTC Task Force and regional PTC specialists--to
monitor railroads' implementation progress, review required
documentation, and share information about implementation steps and
activities.
Monitoring and Document Review: In response to a
recommendation in our September 2015 report, FRA began to
identify and collect additional information from the railroads
to enable it to effectively track and monitor railroads' PTC
progress.\30\ For example, in 2016, the PTC Task Force began
collecting quarterly progress data and monitoring railroads'
annual reports to track progress in meeting the PTC
implementation milestones set out in railroads' implementation
plans, such as locomotive equipment installed at the end of the
year.\31\ As previously noted, the Task Force used this
implementation progress data in May 2017 to identify 14
commuter railroads at risk of not meeting the 2018 deadline or
requirements for an extension. FRA also monitors railroads' PTC
implementation through meetings with railroad and industry
associations, visits to individual railroads, and reviewing and
commenting on PTC documentation submissions, such as requests
to begin field testing and RSD. FRA officials told us that they
monitor railroads' progress to determine how much commuter
railroads understand about the implementation process and to
trigger discussions between FRA and the railroads. Regional PTC
specialists are responsible for reviewing and approving
requests submitted by railroads preparing to test system
functionality as well as individual testing procedures
describing the specific equipment and movements involved in
each test.\32\ In addition, FRA officials told us that
assessing civil penalties and sending commuter railroads
letters of concern are the primary enforcement mechanisms they
have available to oversee PTC.\33\
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\30\ GAO-15-739.
\31\ The PTC Task Force is comprised of FRA data analysts and
subject matter experts responsible for PTC administrative and
programmatic support, including collecting and tracking railroads' PTC
data, managing documentation, and corresponding with railroads.
\32\ Railroads submit certain information to FRA before beginning
field testing for a PTC system, such as the date and location for the
proposed testing, the planned test procedures, and other information
for FRA's review and approval.
\33\ To date, FRA has initiated enforcement actions against 10
commuter railroads for either failure to complete one or more hardware-
installation milestones that a railroad scheduled to complete during
calendar year 2016, or for the failure to submit a timely annual PTC
progress report to FRA by the statutory deadline. Thus far, 8 commuter
railroads have paid or have agreed to pay civil penalties up to
$12,000.
Information Sharing: FRA officials said that they have
primarily used informal assistance and participation in group
meetings to convey information related to the implementation
process and specific milestones necessary to meet the 2018
deadline or qualify for an extension. FRA officials
acknowledged that they do not have the capacity to provide
frequent one-on-one assistance to all railroads given their
growing PTC workload and limited agency resources. As such, FRA
officials explained that in order to reach a wide audience
given the approaching deadline, their current focus is on
presentations at industry group meetings (e.g., APTA's Commuter
Rail Summit) and specific PTC systems user-group meetings.
FRA's regional PTC specialists told us they also provide
direction on technical aspects of PTC implementation and
testing, primarily by discussing issues at individual and
railroad-industry meetings and providing informal feedback on
commuter railroads' PTC documentation, such as testing
requests.
FRA Has Not Systematically Communicated Information to Help Railroads
Prepare for the 2018 Deadline or to Qualify for Extensions
While the majority of the railroad representatives we met with said
FRA officials were consistently available to discuss issues that arise
during day-to-day PTC implementation activities, the information
conveyed by these officials has sometimes been inconsistent. In
particular, FRA's heavy reliance on informal assistance and
participation in group meetings to convey information to commuter
railroads has led, at least on some occasions, to different or
inconsistent information being communicated in different meetings. For
example, representatives from one PTC equipment supplier said that FRA
has not consistently commented on different railroads' test plans, and
as a result, they have not been able to carry lessons learned on to
other railroads' plans. In addition, while FRA's officials said their
position has been consistent with the regulations stating that the host
railroad must submit a safety plan to FRA, representatives from one
railroad we met with said they had heard conflicting information from
FRA. For example, these railroad representatives told us that FRA
officials originally said commuter railroads that are only tenants on
other railroads needed to submit their own safety plans but later
stated at an industry association meeting that tenant railroads could
be included in the host railroads' plans.
In addition, commuter railroads have expressed a need for
additional clarification about the criteria for applying for an
extension. FRA officials also told us that they have received a lot of
questions from commuter railroads about the criteria for an extension
related to RSD or other alternative criteria. As noted above, to date,
FRA has approved alternative extension criteria for three railroads,
and in each case, the criteria involved RSD testing on a shorter track
segment.\34\ However, representatives from one contractor working with
several commuter railroads said it is unclear what ``alternative
criteria'' FRA will approve to receive an extension. In addition,
representatives from one commuter railroad stated that any opportunity
to clearly outline FRA's interpretation of the PTC requirements,
specifically the alternative extension criteria that could, for
example, allow for a shorter test segment, would enable railroads to
better position themselves to apply for an extension.
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\34\ FRA officials said that to date, they have directed railroads
with questions about qualifying for extensions to review the statutory
criteria as well as the alternative criteria the agency has approved to
date. An FRA official told us these approvals were based on the
railroads' proposing specific, quantifiable alternative criteria,
regardless of whether those involved RSD.
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Representatives from some commuter railroads we met with were
likewise unclear about the agency's approach to reviewing and granting
extension requests. Representatives from three commuter railroads said
clarification of FRA's planned approach would be helpful as the
deadline approaches. According to FRA officials, the statute does not
set a deadline by which railroads have to apply for an extension, and
FRA has not set a deadline or indicated the latest date by which a
railroad should apply. Nonetheless, for railroads that do not comply
with PTC deadlines, FRA officials said they could impose civil
penalties for each day a railroad fails to implement a PTC system by
the applicable statutory deadline, but the agency has yet to determine
how it will handle railroads that do not meet the deadline or receive
an extension. With less than a year remaining before the 2018 deadline,
FRA officials stated that they anticipate their workload is likely to
increase as railroads submit additional documentation to review and
continue to progress with testing.\35\ More systematic communication
that delineates FRA's planned approach for the upcoming deadline and
extension process may be critical for the agency to efficiently use its
limited resources and convey consistent information to all the
railroads.
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\35\ In addition, FRA officials said they had begun exploring
options to validate the information railroads will submit to
demonstrate they have met the statutory requirements for installing PTC
equipment to qualify for an extension as the 2018 deadline approaches,
but the officials have yet to finalize an approach to verify railroads'
information.
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Standards for internal control in the Federal Government state that
management should externally communicate the quality information
necessary to achieve the entity's objectives. These standards also note
that management should select the appropriate form and method of
communication, so that information is communicated widely and on a
timely basis.\36\ As we have previously found, the particular form of
the agency's communication--for example, by oral presentation, written
guidance, or formal regulation--will depend on multiple factors
including the purpose and content of the specific communication and
applicable legal requirements.\37\ Moreover, internal control standards
indicate agencies should have standard processes in place to determine
which form of communication is appropriate in each case.\38\ FRA
officials told us that the agency could issue written guidance
explaining how it has decided to apply its deadline extension authority
and what type of information railroads will then need to submit to get
an extension. However, FRA officials stated this written guidance would
require time-consuming approval by the Office of Management and Budget
under the Paperwork Reduction Act, and would make timely issuance of
such guidance difficult. As noted, however, FRA may have the option to
use less formal, less time-consuming methods of communicating key
information about the extension process, such as webinars or conference
calls, to communicate information more systematically. FRA officials
acknowledged they are working to identify mechanisms such as these, but
they have yet to do so. Absent systematic communication articulating
the agency's planned approach for the extension process, railroads may
not have the information they need to effectively prepare for the
deadline or seek an extension.
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\36\ GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
GAO-14-704G (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2014).
\37\ GAO, Regulatory Guidance Processes: Selected Departments Could
Strengthen Internal Control and Dissemination Practices, GAO-15-368
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 16, 2015).
\38\ GAO-14-704G; GAO-15-368.
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FRA Has Made Limited Use of Implementation Progress to Prioritize
Efforts and Mitigate Risks
While FRA has taken steps to more closely monitor railroads'
implementation progress, the agency has not prioritized its efforts,
including its allocation of resources, based on an assessment of risk.
In its 2015 Railroad Accountability Plan, FRA stated that its PTC data
collection and monitoring efforts would allow the agency to inform,
among other things, its resource allocation and risk mitigation.\39\
While FRA has used its data to identify at-risk railroads, it has not
used this information to prioritize how to allocate its resources or
address risks. For example, as discussed earlier after reviewing
railroads' data on their progress in installing PTC equipment, FRA
notified 14 commuter railroads of their at-risk status in May 2017.
However, while FRA officials said that they hold regular meetings with
many--but not all--of the at-risk railroads, 9 of these 14 commuter
railroads said that the formal letter they received did not ultimately
trigger any change in the type of interaction they have with FRA. More
recently, in December 2017, the Secretary of Transportation notified
all railroads required to implement PTC by letter of the expectation
that all possible measures be taken to ensure implementation
requirements are met by the 2018 deadline. However, these letters made
no distinction between railroads--that is, the same letter was sent to
railroads with conditionally certified PTC systems and to railroads
that reported completing no training or installing no locomotive
equipment to date--nor did the letters describe how FRA's approach to
working with the railroads would respond to their particular
circumstances and risks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ FRA developed this plan as an internal document in response to
recommendations in GAO-15-739.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As noted above, FRA officials have stated that the agency does not
have the resources to meet more frequently with or provide additional
assistance to railroads. While the PTC Task Force helps monitor
railroads' progress, FRA still employs fewer than 12 individuals with
the requisite PTC expertise and experience to review technical
documents and help railroads implement PTC systems.\40\ In an
environment with limited agency resources, targeting agency efforts to
areas of the greatest risk or highest priority areas is one way to
leverage existing resources. According to standards for internal
control in the Federal Government, management should identify, analyze,
and respond to risks. In addition, FRA's Strategic Human Capital Plan
states that developments including the rapid introduction of new
technologies, such as PTC, demand that FRA continuously evaluate its
programs and resources to adapt to changing demands.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\ According to FRA officials, the technical and programmatic
staff and contractors supporting PTC implementation have recently
expanded, and a procurement is underway for additional contractors to
support PTC safety plan reviews.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, FRA has not fully leveraged the implementation progress
data that railroads' submit to the agency to identify and develop a
risk-based approach to prioritize agency actions. At present, it is
unclear whether the agency's priorities are, for example, to help the
largest commuter railroads meet the deadline or extension requirements,
push those railroads that are very close to full implementation, or
assist railroads that are in the earliest stages of their PTC project.
For example, one regional PTC specialist we met with said that if he
did not need to be reviewing documentation or observing railroads'
field testing, he could spend more time with at-risk railroads. By not
effectively targeting actions to help mitigate risks posed by railroads
most at risk of not meeting the PTC deadline or qualifying for an
extension, FRA misses the opportunity to leverage its limited resources
by providing direct assistance in the areas of greatest need.
Conclusions
Much progress has been made in implementing PTC by commuter
railroads. Nevertheless, about half of commuter railroads plan to apply
for an extension, and many of the railroads' planned schedules raise
questions about their ability to complete key implementation milestones
and qualify for RSD-based extensions prior to the 2018 deadline. As the
2018 deadline rapidly approaches, the need for clear information that
is systematically communicated to all railroads implementing PTC
becomes even more critical. FRA cannot expect to provide information
and guidance to railroads individually, and therefore, adopting a risk-
based communication strategy could help it more efficiently share
information in the coming year. Moreover, the information FRA collects
on railroads' progress has not been used to inform the agency's
resource allocation decisions. Using this information to better
allocate resources could help position FRA to better meet its
responsibility to monitor and oversee PTC implementation in the future.
Recommendations for Executive Action
We are making the following two recommendations to FRA:
The Administrator of FRA should identify and adopt a method
for systematically communicating information to railroads
regarding the deadline extension criteria and process.
(Recommendation 1)
The Administrator of FRA should develop an approach to use
the information gathered to prioritize the allocation of
resources to address the greatest risk. (Recommendation 2)
Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this statement to DOT for review and
comment. In its comments, reproduced in appendix II, the agency
concurred with our recommendations. DOT also provided technical
comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
Chairman Thune, Ranking Member Nelson, and Members of the
Committee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to
respond to any questions that you may have at this time.
______
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This statement examines commuter railroads' implementation of
positive train control (PTC). Specifically, this report addresses:
commuter railroads' progress in implementing PTC;
how many, if any, commuter railroads may be at risk of not
meeting the mandated PTC deadline or certain extension
criteria, and what factors may be affecting implementation
progress; and
the extent to which FRA's management and oversight approach
has helped ensure that commuter railroads either meet the
deadline or qualify for an extension.
To address these objectives, we reviewed the Rail Safety
Improvement Act of 2008, the Positive Train Control Enforcement and
Implementation Act of 2015, and applicable Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA) regulations, reports, and guidance. Our review
focused on the 29 railroads FRA officials identified as commuter
railroads required to implement PTC.\1\ We also reviewed previous GAO
work on PTC \2\ and applied Standards for Internal Control in the
Federal Government to FRA's role overseeing PTC implementation,
including the principles that management should externally communicate
the necessary quality information to achieve the entity's objectives
and that management should identify, analyze, and respond to risks.\3\
In addition, we interviewed representatives from 19 commuter railroads
to further understand their implementation progress, factors that may
be affecting progress, and the interviewees' perspectives on FRA's
management and oversight of PTC implementation. We selected the 19
railroads to include the 14 railroads that according to FRA were
identified in May 2017 as at risk of both not meeting the 2018
implementation deadline and not completing statutory requirements
necessary to receive a deadline extension, as well as 5 other railroads
that were further ahead with implementation and that varied in
geographic location and size of rail system, among other factors.
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\1\ Representatives of one of these railroads consider themselves
to be an intercity passenger railroad, but we included them in our
review because FRA tracks and monitors their progress among the
commuter railroads required to implement PTC.
\2\ GAO, Positive Train Control: Additional Oversight Needed As
Most Railroads Do Not Expect to Meet 2015 Implementation Deadline, GAO-
15-739 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 4, 2015), and GAO, Positive Train
Control: Additional Authorities Could Benefit Implementation, GAO-13-
720 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 16, 2013).
\3\ GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
GAO-14-704G (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2014).
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We met with relevant FRA officials involved in PTC monitoring,
enforcement, and technical assistance including the PTC Staff Director,
regional PTC specialists working in each of the FRA regions where
commuter railroads selected for interviews operate, and members of the
headquarters-based PTC Task Force. In addition, we met with FRA Office
of Railroad Safety specialists and engineers, among others. We also
interviewed representatives from all 7 of the Class I freight railroads
(which are also required to implement PTC), 5 major PTC equipment
suppliers and contractors identified by FRA, and representatives from 2
railroad industry associations--the Association of American Railroads
and the American Public Transportation Association--to obtain their
perspectives on commuter railroads' implementation of PTC, factors
affecting implementation progress, and FRA's PTC management and
oversight.\4\
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\4\ Freight railroads are classified by operating revenues. Class I
railroads are those carriers having annual carrier operating revenues
of $467 million or more. We interviewed all 7 Class I railroads
operating in the U.S.: BNSF Railway, CSX Corporation, Kansas City
Southern, Norfolk Southern, Union Pacific, Canadian National, and
Canadian Pacific. We met with the following PTC contractors and
suppliers: Ansaldo-STS, Alstom, Parsons, Siemens, and Wabtec.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To identify commuter railroads' progress in implementing PTC, we
reviewed railroads' third quarter progress reports submitted to FRA for
the period ending September 30, 2017.\5\ We reviewed the most recently
available quarterly data outlining the 29 commuter railroads'
installation and implementation progress in selected areas as of
September 30, 2017, including: locomotive equipment installed, wayside
equipment installed, employee training, locomotives fully equipped and
PTC-operable, spectrum obtained, the status of field testing, and
revenue service initiated. As necessary, we also reviewed the narrative
fields in the quarterly reports for additional context related to a
given railroad's implementation activities and the extent of progress
made in specific implementation areas. We assessed the data in these
reports by reviewing it for anomalies, outliers, or missing
information, and reviewing supporting narratives to ensure they aligned
with the reported data, among other things. Based on these steps, we
determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for our purpose
of describing railroads' progress implementing PTC. We also reviewed
other sources of information, such as PTC Implementation Plans,
railroads' 2016 annual progress reports, and interviews with railroad
representatives.
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\5\ The quarterly reports describe commuter railroads' installation
and implementation progress from July 1 to September 30, 2017, and were
due to FRA on October 31, 2017. In two cases, the quarterly reports
include data from both the tenant and host railroad.
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To assess progress on locomotive equipment installation and wayside
equipment installation, we compared the quantities installed to the
total quantities required for PTC implementation. Similarly, to assess
progress on employee training, we compared the number of employees
trained to the number of employees required to be trained for PTC
implementation. To assess progress in fully equipping locomotives to be
PTC-operable, we compared the quantity of locomotives that are fully
equipped and PTC-operable to the quantity required for PTC
implementation. To assess progress on obtaining spectrum, we reviewed
the quarterly update on spectrum. We concluded that a railroad had
obtained spectrum if, for one or more area or location, it reported
that spectrum was either (1) acquired but not available for use or (2)
acquired and available for use. We also reviewed the narrative, as
appropriate. For some railroads, we concluded that spectrum was not
applicable because they use a PTC system that does not require
spectrum, or because their host railroad is responsible for obtaining
spectrum. To assess progress on field testing, we reviewed the third
quarter status on installation and track-segment progress. We concluded
that a railroad initiated field testing if one or more of its segments
were reported as (1) testing or (2) operational/complete. To determine
which railroads initiated revenue service demonstration (RSD), we
reviewed the cumulative territories where RSD had been initiated. If
the railroad reported that one or more territories had initiated RSD,
we concluded that RSD had been initiated.\6\
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\6\ For two railroads which used outdated quarterly report forms,
we concluded that RSD was initiated if one or more route miles were in
testing or revenue service demonstration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, to determine which railroads anticipate completing
implementation before the December 31, 2018 deadline and which plan to
seek any RSD-based extension, we obtained information from all 29
commuter railroads to identify which railroads plan to implement PTC by
the 2018 deadline and which plan to submit an alternative schedule
(that is, a request for an extension) to implement PTC after the
December 31, 2018 deadline.
To identify commuter railroads at risk of meeting neither the PTC
deadline nor any RSD-based extension criteria, we first reviewed data
on railroads' progress installing PTC locomotive and wayside equipment.
We did this because FRA used such installation progress to identify 14
commuter railroads as being at risk and notified them via formal letter
in May 2017.\7\ To confirm FRA's identification of commuter railroads
that would be at risk based on an updated benchmark for the third
quarter of 2017--railroads with less than 65 percent of total hardware
installed--we analyzed railroads' reported locomotive and wayside
equipment installation status as of September 30, 2017 to determine the
percentage of total hardware installed for each commuter railroad.
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\7\ FRA identified 14 commuter railroads that, as of December 31,
2016, had installed less than 50 percent of all PTC system hardware
required for the railroads' PTC system, as specified in its revised PTC
Implementation Plan.
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To build on this analysis, we collected information from all 29
commuter railroads on their actual and planned schedules for key
implementation milestones. For the 19 commuter railroads we met with,
we collected this information as part of our interviews, and for the
remaining 10 commuter railroads, we collected this information by e-
mail using a standard data collection instrument. The key
implementation milestones covered procuring a prime contractor for PTC
implementation; applying for and entering field testing and RSD, which
is the final phase of field testing; installing the back office server
(BOS) and associated software; and completing PTC implementation. This
schedule information was collected between September 2017 and January
2018.
We compared the amount of time commuter railroads' planned for
completing two key milestones to the amount of time that FRA officials
estimate is required for each milestone and to the experiences of
railroads that already initiated RSD. The two milestones are as
follows:
Install the BOS and associated software necessary to connect
and interface with wayside, locomotive, and dispatch equipment.
Conduct field testing of installed infrastructure, which is
an initial assessment of the PTC system's overall functionality
on trains that are not transporting passengers or operating
during regular passenger service.
We selected these two milestones because (1) each milestone follows
equipment installation (which FRA had previously analyzed to assess
commuter railroads PTC implementation progress); (2) a railroad must
complete both to enter RSD; and (3) several interviewees, including PTC
contractors and suppliers and FRA officials, said these activities are
important project milestones that are complex and time consuming. We
calculated the amount of time a commuter railroad planned for each
milestone (with initiating RSD as the endpoint for each milestone), and
compared that amount of time to two benchmarks:\8\ first, the
anticipated length of time FRA officials said that the milestones have
taken or may take, and second, the average amount of time (in months)
that each milestone took the six commuter railroads that had started
RSD as of September 2017. Since we used two benchmarks, we present a
range of railroads that may not have sufficient time to complete these
milestones and thus may be at risk of not meeting the 2018 deadline or
qualifying for an RSD-based extension.\9\
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\8\ We assessed all commuter railroads against these milestones,
regardless of whether a railroad planned to seek an extension.
Railroads that do not plan to seek an extension have said that they
will conduct RSD as the final step of required field testing, making it
a meaningful milestone, and railroads that do plan to seek an extension
must by statute either initiate RSD on at least one territory or meet
any other alternative criteria established by FRA. While these
alternative criteria are not required to be based on RSD, we used RSD
as a benchmark for our analysis based FRA's three ``alternative
criteria'' approvals to date; all of which have used RSD-based criteria
(RSD testing on a segment of track versus RSD testing on an entire
territory). According to an FRA official, it approved these three
extensions because they were based on alternative, specific, and
quantifiable measures which happened to be RSD but could have been
other specific, quantifiable measures.
\9\ Two commuter railroads were seeking waivers or exemptions for
PTC, and neither railroad was able to share planned schedule
information for the milestones. Therefore, we included these two
railroads in our count of railroads that may be at risk for both
milestones, as FRA had not yet decided whether to approve either
railroad's request. In addition, two other commuter railroads that
operate only as tenants on other railroads' tracks were using the host
railroads BOS. Since these railroads lacked a date for installing a
BOS, we could not calculate the amount of time each planned for this
milestone. One of these railroads is operating PTC in RSD, so we did
not categorize it as at risk. The other railroad had begun functional
testing, so we categorized this railroad as at risk based for the more
stringent comparison.
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Appendix II: Agency Comments
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The Chairman. Thank you, Ms. Fleming.
Mr. DeWeese.
STATEMENT OF HON. BARRY J. DeWEESE, ASSISTANT
INSPECTOR GENERAL, SURFACE TRANSPORTATION AUDITS,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Mr. DeWeese. Chairman Thune, Ranking Member Nelson, and
members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to this
important hearing on positive train control, or PTC.
Several fatal rail crashes over the past decade have
heightened the need to implement PTC, one of the most complex
and costly safety mandates that the rail industry has
undertaken. The current deadline Congress has set for full
implementation is at the end of this year.
At this Committee's request, we are currently reviewing
Federal funding support for PTC and DOT's oversight of that
support. We plan to issue our full report this spring. And
today I will share observations on three aspects of our ongoing
review: one, the amount of Federal financial assistance for PTC
projects; two, DOT's oversight of Federal funds invested in
such projects; and, three, key funding challenges and concerns
as the rail industry implements PTC.
DOT has provided $2.9 billion to date for PTC
implementation through a combination of grants and loans. As of
September 30, 2017, $2.3 billion has been obligated. Rail
systems can receive support from multiple sources, and at the
time of our review, 29 rail systems have received Federal
assistance.
Our work also shows that PTC projects vary greatly,
depending on railroad type and recipients' needs. For example,
some recipients use their Federal funding to acquire wireless
communications equipment, while others buy onboard equipment
for locomotives. DOT's oversight of PTC funding varies as well,
depending on the type of funding or financial support.
Each DOT organization follows its existing oversight
mechanisms for grants or loans. In the case of formula grants,
the grantee has substantial discretion and flexibility on the
use of funds. Regardless of oversight method, DOT cannot
readily identify funding support or spending for PTC projects.
Some PTC funding may be part of a larger grant, in those cases,
recipients may not be required to capture or report PTC-
specific spending to DOT. This makes it hard to determine which
projects include PTC elements.
DOT's grant management systems also generally track
spending by broader budget codes, making it difficult to see
what portion of Federal awards went to PTC versus non-PTC
projects. Therefore, DOT currently relies, as did we, on the
recipients to provide more accurate information on PTC funds
when requested. Their financial systems typically captured more
detailed data on spending and budget line items.
Finally, we noted several funding challenges and concerns
as railroads deploy PTC. While the extended deadline for
implementation is fast approaching, not all of the funds
obligated have been spent. Only four recipients have actually
spent all of their provided funds, seven reported no
expenditures at the time of our review, and the rest reported
spending in the 50 to 75 percent range.
It is important to note, however, that PTC funding support
was provided at different points in time over the last decade,
making it challenging to compare spending across various rail
systems or to determine if the pace of spending has slowed
implementation.
In looking to the future, some recipients express concern
about what it will cost to operate and maintain PTC systems
once they are in place and how it will impact other safety
priorities or their operational budgets. In 2016, the American
Public Transportation Association estimated that operation and
maintenance costs would run about $100 million a year for
commuter railroads, but that long-term costs are still
uncertain.
A key watch item for DOT, Congress, and industry will be to
instill a sense of urgency to deliver PTC while limiting any
possible negative effects on the overall safety of the system.
We are committed to working with the Department and this
Committee to monitor the funding implications that could impact
the deployment of PTC.
This concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
address any questions from you or members of the Committee.
[The prepared statement of Mr. DeWeese follows:]
Prepared Statement of Barry J. DeWeese, Assistant Inspector General for
Surface Transportation Audits, U.S. Department of Transportation
Observations on Federal Funding Support for Positive Train Control
Implementation
Chairman Thune, Ranking Member Nelson, and Members of the
Committee:
Thank you for inviting me to this important hearing on positive
train control (PTC) implementation. We are all here today in the
interest of advancing safety to protect the traveling public. Over the
last decade, several fatal rail incidents led the U.S. rail industry
and congressional leaders to commit to implementing PTC on railways
nationwide. In 2008, Congress enacted this requirement and set a
deadline of December 31, 2015, through the Rail Safety Improvement Act
(RSIA),\1\ after a devastating crash between a commuter train and
freight train. Since that time, implementing PTC has been a priority
for industry and the Department of Transportation (DOT). Recent
accidents, such as the December 2017 derailment in Washington State
that resulted in 3 deaths and more than 60 injuries, have renewed
attention on this important issue and highlighted the difficulties in
carrying out this critical mandate by congressional deadlines.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Pub. L. No. 110-432 (2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Citing funding and technical challenges, the industry did not meet
the 2015 deadline, and Congress extended it by 3 years with the
possibility of an additional 2-year extension if a railroad meets the
statutory criteria set forth in the Positive Train Control Enforcement
and Implementation Act of 2015.\2\ Since the enactment of the RSIA, DOT
has been tasked with overseeing funding support for PTC implementation,
including grants and loans.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ 49 U.S. Code Sec. 20157.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
My testimony today is based on our ongoing work, conducted at the
request of this Committee, regarding Federal funding for PTC and the
Department's oversight of those funds and other financial support.
Specifically, my statement will provide our observations and
information to date on (1) the amount of Federal financial assistance
for PTC implementation and the types of projects, (2) the Department's
oversight of the Federal funds invested in PTC projects, and (3) key
funding challenges and concerns as rail systems implement PTC. We plan
to complete our audit work and issue to this committee our final report
with the agencies' responses in April 2018.
Summary
To reduce the number of rail crashes caused by human error, the
U.S. rail industry and Congress are working to implement PTC systems,
and DOT has provided $2.9 billion to date to implement PTC. However,
$2.3 billion had been obligated as of September 30, 2017, which was the
focus of our work since this was the actual amount available to
recipients for expenditure. PTC is an advanced communication-based
technology designed to prevent certain accidents caused by human error,
including train-to-train collisions and derailments caused by exceeding
safe speeds. However, PTC projects vary greatly based on the type of
railroad, the need for interoperability, and available communication
systems. The Department's financial oversight also varies, based on
funding sources and other factors, with each organization following its
own established oversight mechanisms. Our ongoing review has noted that
the Department's financial and grant management systems do not always
provide the detail necessary to identify PTC-specific costs. Instead
DOT relies on the rail systems to provide accurate information. We are
also finding that only a few funding recipients have used all of their
PTC funds despite the approaching mandate. Some funding recipients are
concerned about potential shortfalls in funding to operate and maintain
PTC, which could result in funds being shifted from other safety
priorities. These will be key watch items for the Department and
Congress--as rail systems move forward with PTC implementation--to
maintain a sense of urgency and ensure that there are no negative
effects on the safety of the system despite the improvements that PTC
can deliver.
Background
Since the 2008 fatal rail crash that led to the enactment of the
RSIA, several other fatal rail incidents have strengthened the
Department's commitment to implementing PTC nationwide (see table 1).
Table 1. Examples of PTC-Preventable Crashes
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date Location Incident
------------------------------------------------------------------------
September 2008 Chatsworth, CA A distracted engineer ran a
Metrolink train through a red
signal, causing a collision that
killed 25 and injured 135.
May 2011 Mineral Springs, NC Human error contributed to the
rear-end collision of two
freight trains, killing two crew
members and injuring two more
June 2012 Near Goodwell, OK Human inattentiveness contributed
to the collision of two freight
trains, killing three crew
members.
December 2013 Bronx, NY An engineer fell asleep and
caused a Metro-North passenger
train derailment that killed 4
and injured 61.
May 2015 Philadelphia, PA A distracted engineer accelerated
into a sharp curve, causing an
Amtrak derailment that killed 8
and injured 185.
December 2017 Near DuPont, WA A derailment caused 3 deaths and
over 60 injuries. The National
Transportation Safety Board's
investigation is expected to
last 12 to 24 months.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: OIG
The RSIA required Class I railroad main lines handling poisonous-
inhalation-hazard materials and any railroad main lines with regularly
scheduled intercity and commuter rail passenger service to fully
implement PTC.\3\ A fully functioning PTC system must be able to
precisely determine the location and speed of trains, warn train
operators about potential problems, and take action if the operator
does not respond to a warning. A PTC system is made up of more than 20
major components in various stages of development, which must then be
integrated and installed across the rail network.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The RSIA defines main lines as those carrying 5 million or more
gross tons of freight annually and authorizes the Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA) to define the term ``mainline'' by regulation for
passenger routes or segments over which limited or no freight railroad
operations occur.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) identified rail systems
\4\ as subject to congressional requirements for PTC implementation.
Subsequently, eight of these rail systems were granted a waiver from
the PTC statutory mandate, related to overarching FRA regulations for
safety rule waivers.\5\ Of the 41 rail systems still required to
implement PTC, per the statutory mandate, 25 are receiving Federal
financial support. Four others have chosen to implement PTC and also
receive Federal assistance--either because the rail system's future
operations will be subject to the statutory mandate or because the rail
system is a tenant railroad that operates on a track segment already
required to have PTC. By the end of Fiscal Year 2017, 29 rail systems
had received financial support from such sources as FRA, the Federal
Transit Administration (FTA), and the Build America Bureau (BAB).\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ For the purpose of our review, we refer to all direct
recipients of PTC funding as ``funding recipients'' and ``rail
systems,'' whether railroads, commuter rail, etc.
\5\ As implemented by 49 CFR 236.1019.
\6\ The enactment of the FAST Act led to the July 2016 creation of
BAB to oversee various grant and credit programs administered by the
Department. BAB is responsible monitoring and reviewing the Railroad
Rehabilitation and Improvement Financing (RRIF), Transportation
Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA), and Private Activity
Bonds (PAB) programs as well as the recently enacted Infrastructure for
Rebuilding America (INFRA) grant program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DOT Provided $2.9 Billion for PTC Projects, With Nearly $2.3 Billion
Obligated by End of Fiscal Year 2017
As of the end of Fiscal Year 2017,\7\ approximately 60 percent of
the U.S. rail systems required to implement PTC are receiving financial
support. Specifically, 29 rail systems have received Federal
assistance. According to estimates provided to us by the funding
recipients, DOT has provided $2.9 billion to date to implement PTC.
However, $2.3 billion had been obligated as of September 30, 2017,
which was the focus of our work since this was the actual amount
available to recipients for expenditure. Of this amount, the Department
has obligated $1.3 billion through various Federal grants, and the BAB
issued approximately $1 billion through a loan (see exhibit A). Funding
recipients rely on various departmental funding programs to support PTC
work, such as formula grants, discretionary grants, and loans.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ As requested, we reviewed DOT's funding and financing for
implementation of PTC since 2008. For timely reporting purposes, the
scope of this review includes funding that had been obligated by
September 30, 2017 (end of Fiscal Year 2017).
\8\ Formula grant programs are noncompetitive awards based on a
predetermined formula. Unlike a formula grant, a discretionary grant
awards funds on the basis of a competitive process. The Department
reviews applications, in part through a formal review process, in light
of the legislative and regulatory requirements and published selection
criteria established for a program. Additionally, the Department is
authorized to provide credit assistance, direct loans and loan
guarantees to finance development of railroad infrastructure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Federal funding grants ranged widely, depending on size of the rail
system, the quantity and scope of projects, or the amount of funding
requested. For example,
Providence and Worcester Railroad received just under $1
million for a single project to purchase and equip locomotives
with on-board kits.
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority received
approximately $181 million for a total of seven projects that
included installing signals, interlocking, and right-of-way
improvements throughout multiple rail lines.
On average, those using Federal funding grants received $36.1
million. In addition, two rail systems secured financial loans from the
Department--approximately $967 million went to the New York
Metropolitan Transportation Authority and, subsequent to the data
collection portion of our review, Massachusetts Bay Transportation
Authority borrowed $382 million.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ On December 8, 2017, BAB issued two loans to the Massachusetts
Bay Transportation Authority. One was a RRIF loan for $220 million, and
the other was a TIFIA loan for $162 million, for a total of $382
million.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A rail system can receive Federal support from multiple sources,
whether as a direct recipient or through another grantee. Some
railroads, such as Amtrak, receive funds both directly and indirectly.
At the end of Fiscal Year 2017, the 29 rail systems mentioned above had
received Federal assistance from 37 different funding recipients.
Nineteen received funding from FRA, 25 from FTA, 7 from both FRA and
FTA, and 1 was funded through a loan from BAB.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ This was the loan to the New York Metropolitan Transportation
Authority discussed above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rail systems were at different points of implementation when they
applied for Federal funding and may have used State or local money to
pay for some PTC-related projects. Projects vary greatly based on the
type of railroad, the need for interoperability,\11\ and available
communication systems. For example, some funding recipients may seek to
acquire wireless communications equipment, while others have obtained
financial assistance to purchase onboard equipment for locomotives. The
California High-Speed Train System is using awarded funds to produce a
detailed design development plan for implementing PTC in the Caltrain
corridor, which connects San Francisco and San Jose; the plan includes
identifying the necessary interoperable interfaces. The Nashville
Regional Transportation Authority received funding to cover its PTC-
related costs on the Music City Moves commuter rail line that operates
on the Nashville & Eastern Railroad. The two organizations have
established an agreement concerning their shared responsibilities
through September 2036.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Commuter railroads often run on tracks owned by Class I
freight railroads, as well as freights on commuter-owned track. All
tenant railroads equipped with PTC must be interoperable with the PTC
system installed by the host railroad.
\12\ We plan to issue our final report in April 2018; it will
include a description of all 54 PTC projects nationwide using Federal
funding support.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DOT's Oversight of Financial Support for PTC Varies
DOT's oversight of Federal support for PTC implementation is
generally dictated by the type of funding program, which is typical for
all projects supported by the Department (see table 2 below for a list
of grants, loans, and programs that support PTC implementation). Each
DOT organization follows its own established oversight mechanisms for
grant or loan procurement activities. These include a combination of
recurring reviews of financial reports; regular phone calls, meetings,
and e-mails with funding recipients; and onsite monitoring visits. In
addition, BAB monitors financial plans and reviews credit worthiness
throughout the span of a project to minimize the Federal Government's
risk.
While DOT relies on various oversight methods, those methods cannot
readily identify the funding support or the PTC projects on which the
funds were spent. With the exception of projects funded by the PTC-
specific grant programs authorized by the Fixing America's Surface
Transportation Act,\13\ DOT-awarded funds may support more than one
project or other activities in addition to PTC. Consequently, when PTC
is a component of a larger grant or loan, funding recipients may not be
required to capture or report PTC-specific expenditures to the
Department. This would be the case, for example, with Federal formula
funding, which is apportioned to States based on population and not
subject to DOT's discretion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Pub. Law No. 114-94 (2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, the Department's financial and grant management
systems do not always provide the granularity necessary to precisely
identify PTC costs. For example, grant management systems generally
track expenditures by broader budget codes like ``signals,'' which may
include signaling for PTC and non-PTC projects. As a result, it is
difficult for FRA and FTA to extract PTC-specific spending from Federal
awards for other types of activities, and the two agencies must rely on
the rail systems to provide more accurate and detailed information. We
obtained estimates from FRA and FTA on how much funding has been used
for PTC but found that either the grantees had provided the information
or the agencies' estimates were incorrect.
Officials at the rail systems confirmed that they have more
detailed information about expenditures and provided the information
used in our review. More specifically, we found that the grantees'
financial systems generally capture more data than DOT's grant
management systems regarding expenditures and budget line items, which
may include funding from local, State, and Federal entities. Each
funding recipient uses its own financial tracking mechanisms to
document all of its grants and issue reports to DOT agencies. These
mechanisms range from internal controls for price and cost analyses to
accounting software for tracking budgets, expenditures, and work
progress.
Table 2. Grants, Loans, and Programs That Have Funded PTC Implementation
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Funding or Financial Assistance
Program Oversight Agency Legal Citation
------------------------------------------------------------------------
8American Recovery and FRA Pub. L. 111-50
Reinvestment Act of 2009
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amtrak National Network Grant FRA 49 U.S.C. Sec.
24319
------------------------------------------------------------------------
8Fixed Guideway Modernization FTA 49 U.S.C. 53090
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FTA Revenue Bond FTA Sec. 3011 of Pub.
L. 105-178
------------------------------------------------------------------------
8High-Speed Intercity Passenger FRA Div. B, Pub. L. 110-
Rail Grant 4320
------------------------------------------------------------------------
New Starts FTA 49 U.S.C. 5309
------------------------------------------------------------------------
8PTC Implementation Grant FTA Sec. 3028 of FAST
Act,
Pub. L, 114-940
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Railroad Rehabilitation & BAB 45 U.S.C. 822
Improvement Financing (RRIF)
Loan
------------------------------------------------------------------------
8Railroad Safety Technology FRA 49 U.S.C. 201580
Grant
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Research and Development Grant FRA Pub. L. 115-31 and
previous
appropriations
acts
------------------------------------------------------------------------
8State of Good Repair Formula FTA 49 U.S.C. 53370
Grant
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Transportation Infrastructure BAB Sec. 2001 of FAST
Finance and Innovation Act Act,
(TIFIA) Loan Pub. L, 114-94
------------------------------------------------------------------------
8Transportation Investment FTA Pub. L. 115-31 and
Generating Economic Recovery previous
(TIGER) Grant appropriations
acts0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Urbanized Area Formula-- FTA 49 U.S.C. 5307
Economic Recovery
------------------------------------------------------------------------
8Urbanized Area Formula Grant FTA 49 U.S.C. 53070
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: OIG
Funding Recipients Are Concerned About Funding Shortfalls and Delays
While approximately $2.3 billion has been provided for PTC
projects, only 4 of 37 funding recipients have completely expended
their Federal funds--and the extended deadline for PTC implementation
is approaching at the end of this year. More than half of the
recipients reported spending over 50 percent of their funds, and about
40 percent reported spending over 75 percent.
It is important to note that funding and financial assistance was
made available at various points over the last decade, which makes it
challenging to compare spending at rail systems. For example, FRA's
Railroad Safety Technology Grants provided funds specifically for PTC
implementation--$50 million in Fiscal Year 2010, $11 million in Fiscal
Year 2015, and $25 million in Fiscal Year 2016. However, our analysis
noted that nearly $15 million of the $25 million awarded in August 2016
had not been obligated to the grantees.\14\ Similarly, out of the $197
million authorized for PTC implementation under the FAST Act,
approximately $190 million had not been obligated to the grantees, even
though award selections were announced last May. Since grantees have
yet to receive these dollars, we excluded unobligated grant awards from
our analysis of Federal funds provided to rail systems for PTC
implementation. Exhibit B provides the status of individual awards for
the Fiscal Year 2016 Rail Safety Technology and Fiscal Year 2017 FAST
Act grant programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ The scope of this review includes funding obligated by
September 30, 2017 (the end of Fiscal Year 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, some funding recipients are concerned about future
shortfalls and delays in grant funding to support PTC, which could
result in funds being shifted from other projects. Most funding
recipients stated general concerns about budgeting for PTC
implementation, which has led some to divert funds from other safety
priorities. Of the funding recipients we surveyed, 12 of 34 respondents
said PTC implementation was having a negative effect on other funding
priorities or general rail service. One recipient pointed out that the
$15.8 million in PTC-specific grants it received was minimal compared
to the $310 million in Federal and State funds it had to divert to
implement PTC, which delayed investment in state-of-good-repair
projects elsewhere in the system. According to the recipient, these
challenges reduced capital funds to a 15-year low.
Other funding recipients expressed concerns about the uncertainty
of ongoing operating and maintenance costs after PTC implementation and
how that will affect their operational budgets. In 2016 the American
Public Transportation Association estimated the operation and
maintenance of PTC would cost commuter railroads about $100 million a
year and stated that many rail systems were still uncertain about the
magnitude of future long-term costs. Officials at FRA and FTA said they
are aware of this concern, but they too are not sure whether additional
funding will be allocated to support ongoing operational and
maintenance costs after full PTC implementation.
Conclusion
PTC is one of the most complex and costly safety mandates ever
undertaken by the railroad industry. Recent accidents, although rare,
remind us that they can and do occur and have a profound impact on
lives and communities. While the U.S. rail industry and Congress are
committed to implementing PTC nationwide, progress has been slower than
anticipated, and ensuring that the rail industry has a sense of urgency
will be a key watch item for the Department. Given the potential impact
on safety projects throughout the Nation's rail systems, the Department
must also be mindful of industry concerns that the costs of operating
and maintaining the PTC system, once implemented, could crowd out other
safety-critical projects. We are committed to working with DOT and this
Committee to monitor the funding implications that could impact
railroads' deployment of PTC and expect to issue our final report in
April 2018.
This concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to answer any
questions you or other Committee Members may have.
______
Exhibit A. Estimates of Federal Funding and Financing Obligated for PTC
Implementation by End of FY 2017
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Estimated Total % Federal
Funding Recipients Cost of PTC FTA Funds FRA Funds Total Federal Funds
Implementation Funds Expended
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 Connecticut DOT $180,000,000 $144,055,237 $3,836,100 $147,891,337 17.5%
2 Maryland DOT $30,458,627 $9,476,056 $642,445 $10,118,501 77.0%
3 New York DOT $54,214,286 $-- $3,000,000 $3,000,000 0.0%
4 New York Metropolitan $1,063,000,000 $90,236,669 $6,597,000 $96,832,669 88.5%
Transportation Authority
5 Pennsylvania DOT $-- $7,034,353 $1,350,000 $8,384,353 50.4%
6 Southern California Regional Rail $240,365,079 $19,168,366 $9,005,446 $28,173,813 92.5%
Authority
7 Amtrak $232,800,000 $-- $187,820,938 $187,820,938 94.5%
8 California DOT $12,810,000 $-- $38,400,000 $38,400,000 86.1%
9 California High-Speed Rail $20,000,000 $-- $16,000,000 $16,000,000 99.0%
Authority
10 Fort Worth & Western Railroad $3,648,496 $-- $2,538,768 $2,538,767 20.0%
11 Illinois DOT $88,000,000 $-- $72,387,079 $72,387,079 93.2%
12 Michigan DOT $168,965,682 $-- $152,772,015 $152,772,015 100.0%
13 Missouri DOT $60,000,000 $-- $3,000,000 $3,000,000 0.0%
14 Providence & Worcester Railroad Co. $1,300,000 $-- $965,832 $965,832 0.0%
15 Kansas City Southern (KCS) Railway $300,000,000 $-- $1,867,449 $1,867,449 73.3%
Company, MO*
16 Twin Cities & Western Railroad $5,065,000 $-- $1,100,550 $1,100,550 0.0%
Company
17 Washington State DOT $7,909,170 $-- $6,382,182 $6,382,182 100.0%
18 Alaska Railroad Corporation $171,100,000 $77,211,524 $735,000 $77,946,524 89.5%
19 Dallas Area Rapid Transit (DART) $44,500,000 $12,500,000 $-- $12,500,000 0.0%
20 Denton County Transportation $20,000,000 $13,588,430 $-- $13,588,430 68.7%
Authority
21 Florida DOT (SFRTA) $73,500,000 $6,725,482 $-- $6,725,482 7.5%
22 Fort Worth Transportation Authority $-- $17,000,000 $-- $17,000,000 0.0%
23 Massachusetts Bay Transportation $492,028,418 $2,560,000 $-- $ 2,560,000 74.0%
Authority
24 Metra--Northeast Illinois Regional $385,879,609 $155,948,676 $-- $155,948,676 60.7%
Commuter Railroad Corporation
25 Minnesota DOT (Met Council) $4,400,000 $4,219,303 $-- $4,219,303 72.9%
26 Nashville Regional Transportation $25,000,000 $2,425,445 $-- $2,425,445 0.7%
Authority (RTA)
27 Northern Indiana Commuter $117,767,416 $11,073,177 $-- $11,073,177 75.5%
Transportation District (NICTD)
28 North County Transit District $87,292,969 $7,668,038 $-- $7,668,038 87.5%
29 Orange County Transportation $-- $4,147,427 $-- $4,147,427 57.9%
Authority
30 Peninsula Corridor Joint Powers $231,000,000 $27,433,269 $1,250,000 $28,683,269 96.5%
Board
31 Prince William County/Potomac and $14,192,000 $8,442,714 $-- $8,442,714 68.7%
Rappahannock Transportation
Commission
32 Regional Transportation District $22,682,612 $5,512,543 $-- $5,512,543 100.0%
(RTD)
33 Riverside County Transportation $5,100,000 $2,095,447 $-- $2,095,447 100.0%
Commission
34 San Joaquin Regional Rail $9,000,000 $6,400,868 $-- $6,400,868 52%
Commission (SJRRC)
35 Southeastern Pennsylvania $310,000,000 $187,271,060 $-- $187,271,060 95.6%
Transportation Authority (SEPTA)
36 Tri-County Metropolitan $14,000,000 $2,704,000 $-- $2,704,000 0.0%
Transportation District of Oregon
(TriMet)
37 Utah Transit Authority (UTA) $31,158,524 $3,520,000 $-- $3,520,000 0.0%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Grant Funding Totals $4,527,137,888 $822,618,085 $509,653,804 $1,332,271,888 76.45%
Grant Funding Totals, Without KCS $4,227,137,888 $822,618,085 $507,786,355 $1,330,404,439 76.46%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
USDOT Loans Issued for PTC-Related Projects
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
New York Metropolitan $967,100,000 $967,100,000 15.1%
Transportation Authority (RRIF)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Massachusetts Bay Transportation $162,000,000 $220,000,000 $382,000,000 0%**
Authority (TIFIA) (RRIF)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total with MTA Loan $4,527,137,888 $822,618,085 $1,476,753,803 $2,299,371,888 50.67%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total, Including Both Loans $4,527,137,888 $984,618,084 $1,696,753,803 $2,681,371,888 43.45%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total, Including Both Loans but Without KCS $4,227,137,888 $984,618,084 $1,694,886,355 $2,679,504,439 43%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Kansas City Southern is a Class I railroad that indicated it had received funding to enhance wireless communications capabilities in preparation for
PTC implementation, including a conversion from their analog system to a digital communications system.
** The TIFIA and RRIF loans to the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority were issued after the end of Fiscal Year 2017 and are therefore outside
the scope of our review. We provide these details to acknowledge that additional financing was issued.
* Source: OIG analysis of information provided by PTC funding recipients. Note: $- as an implementation cost indicates an entity that received funds on
behalf of a railroad operating within that State; e.g., Pennsylvania DOT does not own or operate its own railroad, but it received a grant from FTA
that was used for SEPTA's system. Entities whose implementation costs were less than the total funds received partially funded other rail projects;
e.g., California DOT provided funds to North County Transit District for Metrolink. Additionally, OIG noted several grants that were in process but
not awarded by the end of Fiscal Year 2017. For example, Capital Metro is in the process of being awarded $12,762,969 for PTC implementation, and New
Jersey Transit expects to receive an award of $10 million.
Exhibit B. Examples of PTC Grants Pending Obligation
During our analysis of FTA and FRA grant funding, we noted that a
number of recent PTC-specific grants had been announced but were not
documented in DOT's grant management systems. These grants had not yet
been officially obligated and were technically still in the award
process. We analyzed the status for grants in the two most recent
announcements for PTC-specific funding, Fiscal Year 2016 FRA Railroad
Technology Grants and Fiscal Year 2017 PTC Implementation Grants (see
tables B1 and B2). FTA and FRA explained that once allocations for
grants are made, the grantee must complete application requirements,
including those for environmental and program review at the agency.
Only when that work is completed can the grant be officially obligated.
The DOT agencies stressed that most grants are eligible for pre-award
authority, allowing pre-award expenditures on approved programs to be
reimbursed after the funds are obligated. However, it is important to
note that we did not include unobligated grants in our analysis since
grantees have yet to fully receive the funding.
Table B1. Status of FY 2016 Railroad Technology Grant Recipients
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Grantee State Grant Allocation Status
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 American Short Line and Regional R.R. Association DC $2,500,000 Not Obligated
2 Amtrak DC $2,640,000 Not Obligated
3 Caltrain CA $2,880,000 Not Obligated
4 Capital Metropolitan Transportation Auth. TX $3,000,000 Not Obligated
5 Fort Worth and Western Railroad TX $2,560,000 Obligated
6 Missouri DOT MO $3,000,000 Obligated
7 North Carolina DOT NC $771,070 Not Obligated
8 Providence and Worcester Railroad Co. MA $965,832 Obligated
9 Metrolink CA $2,400,000 Obligated
10 Sonoma-Marin Area Rail Transit/SMART CA $3,000,000 Not Obligated
11 Twin Cities and Western Railroad Co. MN $1,100,000 Obligated
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
$24,816,902 $14,791,070
Allocated Not Obligated
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: OIG
Table B2. Status of FY 2017 FAST Act PTC Funding Recipients
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Grantee State Grant Allocation Status
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 Capital Metropolitan Transportation Authority TX $9,760,000 Not Obligated
2 Florida DOT FL $1,840,000 Not Obligated
3 Illinois DOT IL $18,870,000 Not Obligated
4 Mass. Bay Transportation Authority MA $7,820,000 Not Obligated
5 Maryland Transportation Authority MD $9,440,000 Not Obligated
6 Missouri DOT MO $12,020,000 Not Obligated
7 New Jersey Transit NJ $10,000,000 Not Obligated
8 New York State DOT NY $33,750,000 Not Obligated
9 Oregon DOT OR $1,200,000 Not Obligated
10 Peninsula Corridor Joint Powers Board CA $21,680,000 Not Obligated
11 Regional Transportation Authority/Metra IL $20,200,000 Not Obligated
12 Rio Metro Transportation Authority NM $3,600,000 Not Obligated
13 South Florida Regional Transportation Authority FL $31,630,000 Not Obligated
14 Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority PA $5,800,000 Not Obligated
15 Southern California Regional Rail Authority CA $3,200,000 Not Obligated
16 Tri-County Metropolitan District of Oregon OR $2,700,000 Obligated
17 Utah Transit Authority UT $3,520,000 Obligated
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total $197,030,000 $190,810,000
Allocated Not Obligated
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Source: OIG
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. DeWeese.
Mr. Mayer.
STATEMENT OF DAVID L. MAYER, CHIEF SAFETY OFFICER, NEW YORK
METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY
Mr. Mayer. Chairman Thune, Ranking Member Nelson, and other
members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to be
here today. My name is David Mayer, and I am the Chief Safety
Officer of the New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority,
North America's largest transportation authority.
Prior to joining the MTA, I spent 23 years with the
National Transportation Safety Board, and from 2009 to 2014, I
was Managing Director, the senior career official, there. I
brought my two decades of experience in transportation safety
as part of ushering in a renewed safety focus across the MTA.
The MTA's two railroads, the Long Island Rail Road and
Metro-North Railroad, PTC implementation schedule calls for us
to meet all statutory requirements by the end of 2018. And
while there are significant risks and challenges to our
schedule, the MTA is working diligently to implement PTC in a
safe, incremental, and controlled rollout. Our railroads are
confident that they will continue to operate safely while PTC
is implemented.
Our commuter railroads are the Nation's busiest. With over
1,400 passenger trains per day, our railroads provide nearly
588,000 weekday trips. During peak periods, we dispatch trains
every 90 seconds at both Penn Station and Grand Central
Terminal. We have made significant progress in developing,
testing, purchasing, and installing PTC. We have embraced the
challenges of this effort and are working hard to mitigate
schedule risks.
PTC is not an off-the-shelf technology. There is no plug-
and-play PTC system. We are designing, testing, and installing
all at once, and we have to do this in a way that ensures we do
not create any new safety hazards.
Let me start by providing a snapshot of our status. Both
railroads operate with a high degree of safety because current
signal systems provide important safety protections, many of
which have been added in incrementally as we progress toward
full PTC.
One of the requirements of PTC is to prevent overspeed
derailments. Long Island already has overspeed protection on
its entire system, and Metro-North has had this protection at
critical curves and bridges. I'm pleased to tell you that as of
yesterday, all of Metro-North's territory has been equipped
with speed protection hardware, and properly equipped trains
are currently protected, and in the coming weeks, Metro-North
will extend this protection to all trains. In addition to
enforcing these permanent speed restrictions, once PTC is
operational, it will also enforce temporary speed restrictions.
Another PTC requirement is preventing trains from entering
work zones. Metro-North has implemented a system in 2013 that
meets this PTC requirement and has been heralded as a model for
the industry. Long Island will achieve this functionality once
PTC comes online.
Finally, PTC is intended to guard against train-to-train
collisions and the movement of a train over a misaligned
switch. At both railroads, existing systems provide these
protections for all trains operating over 15 miles per hour.
PTC will extend these protections for all speeds.
I will now discuss our implementation status, identify
risks to our schedule, and then outline our strategies to
mitigate those risks.
For the MTA's two railroads, we have secured 100 percent of
the radio spectrum we need. We have installed 80 percent of the
wayside hardware, and we have installed about 63 percent of the
railcar equipment needed for compliance. We have also trained
68 percent of the required personnel. The remainder of the
installation and training will be completed in time to support
revenue service demonstration.
Both railroads have begun testing and compiling
documentation in preparation for June applications to the FRA
to enter RSD, which is a period that will illuminate any
problems before beginning to systematically cut in PTC on the
rest of our network.
The MTA has set a highly aggressive, but achievable
schedule. We control only so much of the schedule. Railroads
around the country are simultaneously taxing a limited set of
specialized resources. Although not a Federal requirement, our
Board has maintained an independent third-party engineer to
identify risks and ways to reduce them. For example, we've
pressed our systems integrator to hire additional staff and to
expend additional resources to complete the required work.
In closing, PTC implementation at the MTA remains a vast
undertaking. Our schedule still faces significant risks and
technical challenges. We are working diligently every day to
overcome these risks and challenges. We thank the states of New
York and Connecticut and the Federal Government for helping us
marshal the necessary resources to move this enormous effort
across the finish line, including a $968 million loan sponsored
by the FRA.
The MTA is fully committed to operating safe and reliable
railroads. Although our challenges are significant and unique,
the MTA continues to aggressively work toward full PTC
compliance before December 31, 2018.
Thank you for giving us this opportunity to share with you
the MTA's efforts to bring the promise of PTC into reality.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mayer follows:]
Prepared Statement of David L. Mayer, Chief Safety Officer,
New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority
Chairman Thune, Ranking Member Nelson, and to other Members of the
Commerce Committee, thank you all for the opportunity to be here today.
My name is David Mayer and I am the Chief Safety Officer for the New
York Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), the Nation's largest
transportation network.
As Chief Safety Officer, I am tasked with crafting, implementing,
and overseeing a variety of safety initiatives at MTA's agencies,
working closely with agency Presidents and staff from across our
agencies. Prior to joining the MTA, I spent 23 years with the National
Transportation Safety Board and was Managing Director, the senior
career official, from 2009 to 2014. I was recruited to the MTA to use
my two decades of experience in the transportation safety field as part
of an effort to usher in a renewed focus on safety across the MTA
family agencies.
I am here today to share with you the status of implementation of
Positive Train Control (PTC) on the MTA's two commuter railroads: the
Long Island Rail Road (LIRR) and Metro-North Railroad (MNR). This
hearing is timely as just last week, MTA PTC implementation staff
updated the MTA Board on the remaining schedule and our progress to
meet the 2018 deadline. As stated to our Board, the MTA's schedule
calls for us to meet all statutory requirements by the end of 2018.
And while there are risks and challenges to our schedule, the MTA
is working diligently to implement PTC in a safe, incremental, and
controlled roll-out. Our approach to PTC implementation, coupled with
other safety and cultural enhancements, has already yielded safety
benefits. The LIRR and MNR are confident that they will continue to
operate safely as PTC is implemented on schedule.
MTA's two railroads are the Nation's busiest commuter railroads.
With over 1,400 revenue trains per day, the railroads provide nearly
588,000 trips on an average weekday morning, with a total of more than
177 million trips annually. These two railroads operate some 2,400 rail
cars along 1,381 track miles. The combined service territory spans
nearly 5,000 square miles fanning out from New York City, and it serves
a regional population of 15 million. Between the LIRR and MNR, we
support 2,200 train movements of both passenger and work trains each
day; this translates to as many as 303 trains per hour during peak
service. To put this in context, the LIRR and MNR provide more commuter
annual rail trips than the commuter rail agencies in Chicago,
Philadelphia, Boston, Salt Lake City, and Los Angeles combined.
Nowhere in this country has a fully designed PTC system been
implemented on passenger rail networks as large, complex, and with as
dense operations as the LIRR and MNR. During rush hour periods,
hundreds of trains move in close succession through a series of complex
switches and interlockings in Queens and the Bronx and into and out of
our terminals in Manhattan and Brooklyn. During peak periods, we
dispatch trains every 90 seconds at both Penn Station and Grand Central
Terminal.
MTA Service Area & PTC Landscape
The MTA has taken an aggressive design-build approach to the
development and implementation of PTC. The MTA has committed
approximately $1 billion to support the development, testing,
purchasing, and installation of PTC, and, significant progress has been
made at our railroads toward meeting the statutory PTC requirements.
PTC is not an 'off the shelf' technology; there is no plug-and-play
PTC system. The PTC statute requires specific PTC functions; each
railroad must design the technology from the ground up, prove that it
works as intended and test technology in a phased roll-out on a network
that is essentially running trains 24/7. And we have to ensure that we
do not introduce any new safety hazards that weren't present before. To
fulfill our statutory obligations, we are designing, testing, and
installing concurrently. There are significant challenges in this
design-build approach, but we have embraced these challenges and have
risk mitigation strategies to remain on schedule.
Let me start by providing the Committee with a snapshot of the
railroad's current signal systems, which already provide critical
protections against the types of accidents that PTC is intended to
prevent. I will then discuss our implementation status, identify high-
level risks to implementation and then outline our remaining schedule
and risk mitigation strategies.
MTA's Current Signal System Safety Benefits
Both Metro-North and LIRR already operate with a high degree of
safety because of functionality provided by their existing signal
systems. The railroad's PTC design is an overlay onto each railroads
existing signal systems and I would like to explain briefly the
protections already provided by our existing systems, and how PTC will
supplement those protections.
One of the primary goals of PTC is to prevent overspeed derailments
like the DuPont, Washington derailment last December. Since December
2013, both MNR and LIRR have lowered the maximum allowable speed
difference to no more than 20 mph at a number of critical locations.
LIRR's existing network is already protected against derailments caused
by overspeeding across its signaled network. I am pleased to tell you
that as of yesterday, all of MNR's territory in New York and
Connecticut has been equipped with Civil Speed Enforcement, and ACSES-
equipped trains are currently protected from derailments due to
exceeding permanent speed limits nine months ahead of the PTC deadline.
Once PTC is fully installed, it will additionally enforce temporary
speed restrictions, which is a layer of additional protection to the
railroads' already robust systems.
Another goal of PTC is the prevention of incursions into work
zones. MNR implemented a system known as its Enhanced Employee
Protection System, or EEPS, in 2013. This system, which won the APTA
Gold Award for Safety, has been heralded as an industry model and
already satisfies this portion of the PTC mandate at MNR. LIRR
currently has track blocking and will implement an electronic Roadway
Worker Protection System with PTC.
Finally, PTC is intended to guard against train to train collisions
and the movement of a train over a misaligned switch. At both
railroads, both of these risks are already mitigated by our existing
signal systems, which limit speeds at red stop signals and switches at
interlockings to 15 miles per hour. The additional functionality to be
provided by PTC will be to bring trains to a complete stop at these
locations.
Status of MTA's PTC Implementation
I would now like to describe our current implementation efforts of
the required PTC components. MTA's PTC design is overlaid onto our
existing signal systems, as I described above; the idea is to provide a
supplemental safety system, layered on top of the existing protections.
And railroad's PTC system must be fully interoperable with every other
railroad operating on the same network.
For the MTA's two railroads, we have installed 80 percent of the
wayside transponders and 87 percent of wayside interface units, 66
percent of the radio cases, and antennas necessary to transmit PTC
instructions to our trains. Both railroads have secured 100 percent of
the necessary radio spectrum. For on-board equipment, the railroads
have equipped 423 locomotives, or 56 percent. PTC will be installed in
control centers for both our railroads, and the Systems Integrator
(contractor) is continuing to develop and refine the software needed.
The MTA has also trained 68 percent of their train and engine crews,
rail traffic controllers, train maintenance personnel and signal
maintainers. Those trainings are scheduled to advance at an aggressive
pace and be completed by the end of 3rd Quarter 2018.
As the MTA advances its installation of these components, our
railroads are preparing to test pilot segments. The importance of pilot
testing cannot be overstated. Both railroads have begun pilot testing
in preparation for their application to the Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA) for Revenue Service Demonstration (RSD). Getting
the pilot lines into RSD is the most critical milestone that the
railroads now face. Both railroads intend to submit their RSD
applications to FRA this June. Both railroads have completed all
hardware installations on their respective pilot segments, and in the
months leading up to the filing of the applications, the railroads will
be working closely with the System Integrator to complete the
development of the core PTC software and to conduct site performance
testing. This will enable the railroads to compile the necessary
documentation to support the RSD Application and obtain FRA approval to
proceed.
Our schedule estimates FRA approval to allow RSD by the fall of
this year. At the present time, we do not know how long the RSD period
will last, but we are already engaged with FRA on our progress and the
assumptions in our approved PTC Implementation Plan. Once the FRA
determines that RSD has been successful, the railroads will be able to
implement PTC on the rest of their territory.
Implementation Risk Mitigation
The MTA has set a highly aggressive schedule to meet all the
statutory requirements for PTC but do not control all of the activities
of this schedule. Railroads around the country are taxing the resources
of a limited set of suppliers. When these suppliers' schedules slip,
our schedules slip. As the deadline approaches, railroads across the
country will be dependent on the FRA for timely review and approval of
our plans and documents.
The MTA is making every attempt to meet our schedule. Though not a
Federal requirement, we have retained a third-party independent
engineer work independently of our PTC implementation teams to identify
areas of schedule risk and actions to reduce or eliminate these risks.
We have pressed our Systems Integrator to hire additional staff and
expend additional resources to complete the integrated testing
necessary to prove the PTC system is safe and works as intended, and to
resolve any unknown technical issues that may occur during testing. FRA
staff have been and continue to be good partners in guiding the MTA in
the development of the RSD and all other PTC matters.
MTA PTC Development & Funding
Since the passage of the original PTC mandate, the MTA has worked
to meet regulatory milestones, collaborated with Amtrak and other
railroads on interoperability issues, worked to secure the required
spectrum, and competitively procured a System Integrator. The nearly
$500 million contract awarded to the SI encompasses the engineering,
design, and provision of all material components, wayside, onboard, and
communication equipment.
In 2015, U.S. DOT awarded a $968 million Railroad Rehabilitation
and Improvement Financing (RRIF) loan to the MTA. The loan, which at
the time was the largest ever awarded, is being used towards the
installation of PTC, as well as for funding signal upgrades to some
sections of non-signaled (dark) territory that were previously exempted
from PTC protections due to low traffic density. As the MTA is
committed to ensuring maximum safety, we are upgrading our dark
territories to bring PTC safety benefits to our entire network. Thus
far, the MTA has submitted approximately $350 million in reimbursable
expenditures for funding via the RRIF Loan and we will continue to
submit invoices twice a year as we accept delivery of PTC components
and as vendors continue to submit invoicing. As you know, RRIF is a
reimbursement based loan program; and per MTA's loan agreement,
repayment of the loan begins in 2018 and continues over the next 35
years.
Additional MTA Safety Initiatives
Though I have stated this before, it bears repeating: the MTA is
committed to operating its railroads safely and reliably. PTC, while a
promising life-saving technology, is only one important part of the
safety of our transportation network.
Despite a lack of Federal requirements, the MTA has developed and
implemented the first-in-the nation comprehensive sleep disorder
screening and treatment program. We plan to have screened every train
operator, bus operator, and locomotive engineer--about 17,000 employees
total--by the end of May 2018.
Our railroads have also implemented the Confidential Close Call
Reporting System (C3RS). As you know, C3RS is an FRA sponsored,
voluntary, confidential program allowing railroad employees to report
close calls. And this program is already providing safety tangible
safety improvements at both railroads.
Grade crossing safety has also been a major facet of the MTA's
safety efforts. The MTA has increased its grade crossing awareness
through public information campaigns and a partnership with Operation
Lifesaver, as well increased police enforcement for grade crossing
violations, and is currently performing a long-term study of the
conditions at our crossings. A key aspect of this work is an
unprecedented partnership with the local authorities responsible for
the roadways that cross our tracks. Through this partnership, we are
realizing important incremental safety improvements, one grade crossing
at a time.
Our safety program includes technological advancements that improve
safety, including on-board cameras and alerters on our trains, and
expanding track geometry programs to identify track problems before
derailments occur.
Conclusion
PTC implementation at the MTA remains a vast undertaking--one that
will not only make our system safer now but also long into the future.
To be sure, our work schedule still faces significant schedule risks
and technical challenges. We are working diligently every single day to
overcome these risks and challenges. By the time we are done, a billion
dollars will have been expended on this effort. We thank the States of
New York and Connecticut and the Federal Government for helping us
marshal the necessary resources to move this enormous effort across the
finish line, including a $968 million RRIF loan sponsored by the FRA.
The MTA continues to aggressively work toward full PTC compliance by
December 31, 2018, even though our challenges are significant and
unique. Thank you for giving us this opportunity to share with you and
the public the efforts of the MTA to bring the promise of PTC safety
into reality.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Mayer.
Mr. Anderson.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD ANDERSON, PRESIDENT
AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, AMTRAK
Mr. Anderson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
members of the Committee. My name is Richard Anderson. I began
serving as President and CEO of Amtrak on January 1, 2018,
following my tenure for 10 years as CEO and Executive Chairman
of Delta Air Lines; COO and CEO of Northwest Airlines;
President of Commercial Businesses at United Health Group; and
a state court prosecutor in Houston, Texas.
As the only Amtrak CEO without a background in rail, I
bring a different perspective. In 1971, many doubted that we'd
see passenger rail play such a large role in transportation in
America. Our services, our railroad, our infrastructures
support hundreds of millions of rail transportation trips a
year. It's also clear, as you look at our 47-year history, that
at times we've underinvested in rail travel and certainly some
safety aspects of the business.
Amtrak is essentially operated as a freight railroad
carrying passengers rather than a world-class passenger
transportation company. And while freight railroads have done a
great job in their business model of improving safety,
passenger rail must operate in America at a much higher
standard of care, and that means we need to implement in
America and establish a standard of a Safety Management System
based upon the FAA SMS program that's in place today in
aviation.
Recent incidents, including the terrible derailment of 501
near DuPont, Washington, and the collision of Train 91 in
Cayce, South Carolina, conclusively demonstrate the need for an
SMS system, as recommended by the NTSB, and we have commenced
implementation of SMS at Amtrak.
Getting to PTC, it's the most important aspect of the
Safety Management System, and it must be the safety standard
for all passenger rail in America. Without PTC, the system in
America for passenger trains is vulnerable to single points of
human failure. And today we train engineers to memorize routes,
trees, boulders, intersections, and signals, and the loss of
situational awareness or forgetting a single rule, forgetting
to throw a switch, we have no basic systems to act as a risk
mitigation for basic human error.
Amtrak is a leader in PTC. It's installed already on
virtually all of the Northeast Corridor. We're set to complete
installation on the tracks and equipment we own or control by
the December 31 deadline. For those areas of our network that
rely on tracks of other railroads, we are closely cooperating
with them as they progress on their own PTC installations.
Amtrak has to operate on 20 different railroads among three
different PTC systems. We're working with the railroads that
operate on Amtrak infrastructure to equip their rolling stock
with PTC on our railroad.
It has been a difficult undertaking for the industry, and
we are likely, and, in fact, I think we will, as a country,
confront scenarios where PTC is not operational by the deadline
you've established. First, some routes outside the Northeast
Corridor will face a situation where the host railroads can
apply for an alternative implementation schedule out to 2020
under the law. At Amtrak, through our SMS program, we have to
determine whether we continue to operate in non-PTC territory
and apply the principles of our Safety Management System to
mitigate those risks.
Second, there are host railroads, like Canadian National,
that appear unlikely to achieve sufficient progress to year's
end to apply for the implementation schedule. Some of this
isn't clear yet. For those route segments, we are required by
law to suspend service.
Third, a portion of our services will operate on routes
that receive mainline track exclusions, and actually Amtrak
will, even after the deadline, operate potentially on hundreds
of miles of track that are not required to have any PTC, and
among those are what are called dark railroads, where there are
no signal systems. We are reevaluating, in light of 501, 91,
506, 188, and 89, whether that really is a best practice if you
have a very high standard of care.
And, lastly, there may be railroads that operate over our
tracks which won't be commissioned, and under the present law,
Amtrak cannot permit noncompliant equipment on the railroad.
So I think we have some basic challenges, and I think that
it's highly probable that there will be parts of passenger rail
that are not going to be compliant by the deadline.
But, one, we should establish PTC as the standard for
passenger rail in America, including dark territory and
including covering the areas that are today excluded by the
law.
Second, all passenger railroads in America must be early
adopters of the Safety Management System promulgated in a
rulemaking now by FRA and consistent with Bob Sumwalt's
recommendations from NTSB.
Third, we need to apply SMS methodologies and determine how
we get to an equivalent level of safety for non-PTC and dark
railroads.
And, lastly, I think the Committee is going to be
challenged on how much discretion to give FRA in terms of the
implementation deadline, or there may be significant
cancellations of sort of necessary transportation. I know you
may not want to hear that, but it is the reality of when you
listen to all the testimony.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Anderson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard Anderson, President
and Chief Executive Officer, Amtrak
Good morning, and thank you Chairman Thune, Ranking Member Nelson,
and all of the members of this Committee for holding this hearing on
rail safety and Positive Train Control. My name is Richard Anderson,
and I serve as the President and Chief Executive Officer of Amtrak. My
term as CEO began January 1 and, prior to this, I served as Co-CEO with
Wick Moorman since July. Previously, I served as the CEO for Delta Air
Lines, CEO for Northwest Airlines, and the President of Commercial
Business at United Health Group.
Amtrak is committed to running the safest rail system for our
customers and our employees. We have seen what can be achieved when
stakeholders work together toward a common goal, as demonstrated by the
commercial aviation system which last year achieved the remarkable feat
of zero passenger fatalities. Amtrak has achieved strong results in the
past and can and must do the same again for the intercity passenger
rail industry.
Sadly, the recent incidents have demonstrated that we are far from
that goal today. Though the circumstances of each of these accidents
are quite different, the tragic derailment of Train 501 near DuPont,
Washington, the grade-crossing incident near Crozet, Virginia, which
impacted many of your colleagues, and most recently, the collision
between Amtrak Train 91 and a CSX freight passenger train near Cayce,
South Carolina remind us that there are still too many gaps in the U.S.
rail network's current safety systems.
I am here today to pledge to you that, despite these incidents,
Amtrak is a safe railroad that is becoming safer each day. All of us at
Amtrak are doing all that we can with the resources we have to make
sure that incidents like these don't occur again. I will chronical some
of the many steps we've taken in response to these varied incidents
and, more generally, describe our work to adopt a more predictive and
global approach to safety. I will also present areas where broader
policy discussion and greater resources are needed to strengthen safety
across the diverse network of freight and commuter railroads that host
the vast majority of Amtrak's route miles.
Positive Train Control
One of the most critical tools that the rail industry needs to
vastly improve safety is the prompt implementation of Positive Train
Control (PTC) technology. Amtrak is confident that the installation of
PTC on the required routes nationwide will make the entire U.S. rail
network safer for passengers, railroad employees, and the cities and
towns which the national rail network traverses.
Amtrak has long been a leader in the installation of PTC, having
already deployed systems almost universally where we control the tracks
including on most of the Northeast Corridor (NEC), the busiest railroad
in North America. As we've already pledged in a letter to
Transportation Secretary Chao, we are set to complete the installation
of PTC on the few remaining elements of the infrastructure we control
and on all of our equipment by the December 31, 2018 Federal deadline.
For the tracks we use but do not own or control, we are cooperating
with our freight and commuter host railroads as they advance their
obligations to complete PTC installations, which are required either
because of the presence of our trains or the haulage of certain
hazardous material. Additionally, the various freight and commuter
railroads that operate over Amtrak's infrastructure must equip their
rolling stock with PTC for use on our railroad and we are working
cooperatively with them to advance these tasks.
PTC in Context
Railway operations in the United States are complicated, with
multiple companies and agencies required to cooperate closely to ensure
the safe, reliable, timely operation of various types of trains across
differing networks. To integrate PTC into this complex environment has
been a significant undertaking for the industry and its suppliers.
While Amtrak has been eager to bring this technology online, it has
been a difficult process and has required the dedication of significant
resources, both in terms of funding and of our personnel.
To place PTC in its proper context, permit me to explain how PTC is
designed and how Amtrak operates. PTC relies on three interdependent
elements, all of which must be in place for the system to function. The
first includes equipment that must be installed on the locomotives by
owners and operators. Second, trackside equipment must be installed by
host railroads along the protected routes that monitor signals,
switches, and track circuits. Third, there are computer sys-tems,
called back office servers (BOS), which link the locomotives and the
trackside equipment while integrating more information about the
network. Additionally, each host railroad and rail operator must have a
BOS and it needs to be correctly integrated before the system can be
operational. All of this must be done in the proper sequence, and for
the carriers required to use the system, it must be achieved in
accordance with the timetables set by law.
Locomotive Installation
The first part of a PTC system is the equipment installed on
locomotives and cab cars, which monitors a train's position and speed
and activates braking as necessary to ensure compliance with speed
restriction and territorial limits. The complexity of our operations
requires Amtrak to use three different PTC systems across our network.
Since 2000, Amtrak's Northeast Corridor operations permitted to exceed
125 mph have depended on our first form of PTC called Advanced Civil
Speed Enforcement System, or ACSES. By the end of 2015, to meet the
original deadline of the 2008 Rail Safety Improvement Act, Amtrak had
enabled ACSES for all our loco-motives, cab cars and trainsets
operating on the NEC. For equipment that operates on a 98-mile stretch
of track Amtrak owns in Michigan and to permit higher speed operation
on the newly purchased and upgraded line owned by the State, we have
installed a second form of PTC equipment, called ITCS.
Finally, to operate across the other host railroads that make up 72
percent of the miles our trains travel, we are also installing a third
form of PTC in our locomotives to integrate with the I-ETMS system in
use by freight railroads. Having already PTC commissioned 338 units, we
are on target to have 447 Amtrak-owned units fully commissioned and
ready to operate before the December 31, 2018, deadline. Apart from our
locomotives and rolling stock, several of our state partners also own
their own equipment which we operate and maintain. Amtrak is working
with these owners and various suppliers to help achieve compliance
prior to year's end.
Trackside Equipment
The second part of a PTC system is the trackside equipment, which
monitors railroad track signals, switches, and track circuits. By law,
each railroad owner is responsible for installation of PTC equipment on
the tracks within their rights-of-way. Additionally, the hosts are
responsible for reporting their PTC trackside readiness schedule to the
Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). Amtrak is working with the host
railroads to develop an implementation schedule for PTC integration and
testing. While 13 out of 20 host railroads that will be using I-ETMS
have not provided a notice of intent to start PTC testing, the four
Class I railroads that own the majority of the track over which Amtrak
operates (BNSF, CSX, NS, and UP) have all provided letters of intent.
Regarding the trackside installations for which Amtrak is
responsible, Amtrak completed the ACSES PTC implementation on all but a
few miles near terminals and stations on the NEC in December 2015 and
on the Harrisburg Line during the first quarter of calendar year 2016.
On our Michigan Line, trackside PTC implementation on our segment was
fully completed in 2011 and the State-owned portion of our route to
Detroit will be completed by June 2018. Installation of the ACSES PTC
system on Amtrak's Springfield Line will be completed by late Fall 2018
and we will soon begin hardware installation on the portions of the
Hudson Line in New York which we control, with implementation expected
by December 31, 2018.
Back Office Servers (BOS)
The third part of a PTC system is the back office server, which
stores all information related to the rail network and trains, and
transmits authorization for individual train movements. Each host
railroad and each rail operator will have a BOS that enables the
necessary information exchanges. For a BOS to be operational, the
tenant who operates over a host railroad must establish a dedicated
two-way communication link between their BOS and the host BOS, a
process known in the field as federation. Amtrak's ACSES system does
not require a BOS, so Amtrak only needs a BOS for its ITCS system in
Michigan and its I-ETMS operations over freight hosts. Amtrak's BOS
will pass crew and train information to the host railroad system, as
well as to the locomotives themselves. Operability of Amtrak's BOS is
currently scheduled for April 2018, though we are looking to accelerate
its delivery through our vendors. Once it is operable, federation with
the BOS of each individual host railroad must commence before PTC
operations can occur.
Next Steps for PTC Implementation
While PTC relies on completing these three components, the next
vital steps in deploying PTC include testing and training. Once Amtrak
and a host have linked their BOS units, testing of the system will
proceed, beginning this spring, to verify functionality along with
system interoperability testing to ensure that all of the disparate
components work together correctly. As for training, Amtrak is
implementing a training plan for 1,300 locomotive engineers and 2,200
conductors that includes classroom training and, once the PTC system is
active, field training. We are taking steps as part of this training to
prepare our employees for what will likely be the phased deployment on
routes as different hosts and territories are brought online.
The industry as a whole is already moving forward, so it is
important to note that some of our partners will have PTC implemented
and operational in time for the December 2018 deadline. In this case,
we will continue to operate passenger rail service with the certainty
that operational PTC is on that route.
However, a phased implementation brings us to a number of
challenging policy questions facing Amtrak, FRA, Congress and the
various railroads we interact with across our network. It is now clear
that we are likely to encounter four different scenarios where PTC is
not yet operational by the end of the year.
First, there will be carriers that have made sufficient progress to
apply to FRA for an alternative PTC implementation schedule under the
law. In these instances, Amtrak's equipment will be ready for PTC
operation, but additional work, testing or approvals are still required
by the host railroad before the system is considered functional. We
believe a significant number of routes outside of the NEC will face
this situation. The question we must ask ourselves is whether we
continue to operate over such routes until PTC is turned on and if so,
what additional safety protections are appropriate to reduce risks?
Second, there will be carriers over which we operate who appear
unlikely to achieve sufficient progress to apply for an alternative PTC
implementation schedule by year's end. For any such route segments,
Amtrak will suspend operations until such time as the carrier becomes
com-pliant with the law.
Third, there are areas over which we operate for which there is an
FRA ``Mainline Track Exclusion'' in place exempting that segment from
the PTC requirements based on the low levels of freight and passenger
train traffic or the presence of low-speed operations, such as in yards
and terminals. We are currently reviewing our policy on operating
passenger trains on Exclusions to determine whether we have adequate
safety mitigation practices in place for each territory and in certain
areas, where signal systems are not in place, we will reconsider
whether we operate at all.
Lastly, there may be railroads that operate over Amtrak tracks in
the NEC which may not have sufficient PTC-commissioned rolling stock by
the December 31, 2018 deadline to operate normal services. Under the
present rules, Amtrak cannot permit non-compliant equipment to be used
over our railroad after the deadline and we will be working closely
with our partners and the FRA to determine the best way to address this
situation.
To be clear, Amtrak has not made any decisions to cease train
operations across our network or on any specific routes at this time.
Instead, we are going to thoroughly analyze each route on a case-by-
case basis and consider the appropriate strategies for enhancing safety
on such routes after the December 2018 deadline. In particular, as we
assess these routes, we know that some of them are shared with our
commuter partners who face their own challenges to reach the deadline.
We will assist our commuter partners, where we can, to reach the
deadline or to find viable alternatives to bridge the gap. It would not
be prudent to force more commuters onto our highways in already
congested urban regions; rail remains the best and safer solution.
While we work to meet this deadline, I think it's also important to
acknowledge the role that Federal funds have and will play in the
implementation of these systems for passenger and commuter rail. Amtrak
has certainly been the recipient of some of these funds and acknowledge
their critical role in allowing us to meet our deadlines. We are also
aware of the additional funding likely needed by our commuter partners
to help fully implement PTC as quickly as possible. In addition, there
will be an ongoing maintenance cost associated with PTC systems, which
for some may be a financial hardship in future years and could require
further Federal investment. We appreciate and acknowledge the important
role Federal funding has in improving rail safety.
As we prepare to operate in a PTC environment, I do think it is
worth noting that PTC was designed to address specific vulnerabilities
in train operations--train-to-train collisions, over-speed derailments,
incursions into work zones, and misaligned switches. Thus, PTC is not a
complete technology answer as there are events that PTC does not
address -such as when a car or truck crosses over tracks at a crossing,
certain track defects, or other incidents like rockslides.
I raise this not to take anything away from PTC and the important
capabilities it offers the rail industry, but simply to be clear about
how we cannot rely on PTC alone. Safety depends on the hard work and
vigilance of thousands of our trained and dedicated employees and on
the appropriate levels of investments being made in the network's
infrastructure. For instance, while the number of total U.S. train
accidents has declined by 14 percent over the past four years and
accidents involving passenger trains accounted for only 2.5 percent of
all accidents, according to the FRA rail safety database, grade
crossing and trespasser incidents remain high. In 2017, there were
1,880 grade crossing accidents involving 243 fatalities and a separate
552 trespasser fatalities. PTC will help protect against many of the
human factors-caused accidents that occur across the U.S. rail system,
but having made progress against this vulnerability, we must also turn
our attention and, the attention of the highway and motorist
communities, to the startling loss of life that occurs on a daily basis
when motorists and pedestrians occupy the right of way ahead of a
train.
Safety and Amtrak
Amtrak, as the Nation's intercity passenger rail carrier, has long
recognized our unique requirement to have strong protocols in place to
make riding the rails safe. In many areas, we go above and beyond FRA
requirements and industry practice. For example, Amtrak requires a full
annual physical evaluation for every engineer, including sleep apnea
screening, whereas FRA simply requires an exam once every three years.
Amtrak requires that newly promoted engineers are evaluated monthly for
their first year of service, whereas FRA has no special requirements
for evaluation of newly promoted engineers. Amtrak engineers and
conductors are required to attend annual training for recertification,
whereas FRA only requires full recertification every three years. In
addition, Amtrak's drug and alcohol testing protocols exceed Federal
requirements. Our testing regimen is so strenuous that employees
understand that a random drug test in the course of the year is not
just possible, it is likely.
We're also taking other steps, such as installing inward-facing
cameras. These cameras monitor locomotive and engineer performance and
are installed in Amtrak trains along routes in the Northeast, Midwest,
and West and we are actively working to install them on Amtrak trains
nationwide. Reviewing the data from these cameras, coupled with the
data from our efficiency testing programs, provides us an excellent
view of operational issues to be addressed in future training programs.
While many of these efforts draw on safety practices used by some
of our partners in the freight rail industry, since we are carrying
people, we believe we must also draw on the expertise of other safety-
critical industries. Our goal is to build upon our good practices and
take them to the next level to deliver the world-class safety that our
customers deserve and expect.
To put us on the path to reach that goal, just last month Amtrak
hired a new Executive Vice President and Chief Safety Officer, Ken
Hylander. Ken is a widely respected member of the transportation safety
community with more than thirty years of service--in addition to being
a former colleague of mine at Delta Airlines. Ken reports directly to
me to ensure his position has full authority and maximum impact. Amtrak
has consolidated several previously separate resources, including
System Safety, Compliance and Training, Environmental Compliance,
Sustainability, and Public Health underneath him.
Safety Management System (SMS)
Ken's primary objective will be to implement a Safety Management
Systems (SMS) to improve our safety culture. SMS will revitalize
Amtrak's safety programs by primarily strengthening hazard
identification and complimentary mitigation programs. An SMS is a
proactive risk management system, which will move us toward a more
predictive safety management method at an organizational level. Having
a safety culture that continually identifies, and mitigates, future
risk is the proven way to improve overall safety performance. It has
been a cornerstone of im-proving safety in many industries, including
aviation, health care, and energy--and it is also the right system for
Amtrak.
A positive safety culture means an organization that easily
facilitates and is receptive to safety discussions; that is committed
to and practices risk reduction; that recognizes and accepts a healthy
balance between centralized policy and procedure control and the value
of local knowledge. A safety culture requires the reporting of safety
issues at all levels. It is intolerant of recklessness and willful
disregard for safety practices and learns from its mistakes. Safety
culture emerges over time. Daily decisions and actual practice will
define our culture. A good safety culture and a successful SMS are
interdependent.
We will know as a company that we have arrived at a good SMS when
we (1) have better safety data available for decision making, (2) can
analyze safety risks before we do something, not after; and 3) have
closed-loop processes that find hazards, mitigates them, and verifies
efficacy. Additionally, our safety processes will be fully integrated
into our organizational decision-making and supported by strong
oversight to ensure compliance with the practices we want to implement.
At a personal level each Amtrak employee will know his or her role in
the safety process.
We know that implementation of an SMS is a significant
undertaking--it requires our organizational commitment. SMS demands
that all safety related procedures must be carefully documented,
universally understood, and unfailingly applied. SMS is designed to
advance that outcome by formalizing our knowledge into processes,
checklists, and governing documentation to improve consistency. Amtrak
believes the implementation of SMS will truly take our safety
performance to the highest level of service. These efforts are in line
with the NTSB's recommendation that Amtrak and our unions implement a
SMS Program and generally consistent with the Risk Reduction Program
approach mandated by this Committee in the 2008 Rail Safety Improvement
Act and required by FRA through the development of a System Safety
Program.
Conclusion
When the Amtrak board asked me to lead their railroad, they did so
with the expectation that I would bring an outsider's perspective to
the business. This mandate, combined with the events of the past few
months, compels me to examine our business practices and think
carefully about ways in which an elevated safety focus would alter how
we operate. Some of these changes have been made, and several more of
them are now underway. Let me present some ex-amples.
We are changing our policies on operating on host railroad
territories with temporarily inoperable signal systems. While we are
evaluating two different approaches, they both boil down to reducing
speed significantly in these circumstances in advance of known hazards.
While we see such a change as fully warranted, they may result in
operational impacts to our host railroads and our trains, and we will
need to work with our hosts to determine the best ways to minimize
those impacts.
Building on the changes to our operations when signals are
unavailable, Amtrak will change how we operate through sections of
track with no signals at all, so-called `dark territory,' which is also
exempted from the PTC mandate. Approximately 1 percent of our current
or planned routes transit through dark territory, totaling 222 miles in
Indiana, Maine, New York, Quebec, and Vermont. We believe it is time to
reevaluate the risks that accompany such operations and adopt a new
approach, particularly as the implementation of PTC will provide even
greater safety margins beyond traditional railroad signaling on the
vast majority of our routes. Based on hazard analyses and mitigation
options, the application of new technologies like switch position
indicators; altered operating practices; signal system and PTC
investments or rerouting or route abandonments may all be appropriate
for such dark territory. Working together with our host railroads and
local stakeholders, we need to quickly evaluate the risks and take the
necessary steps to ensure we don't leave sections of our network
unnecessarily vulnerable.
Amtrak is organizing a centralized standards, training, and quality
assurance organization for engineers and conductors moving away from a
former regional approach to training and safety oversight. Our aim is a
more robust, consistent, and unified approach to these issues, which
will serve as a vital resource across our network. Similarly,
immediately following the December derailment of Train 501, we adopted
a new policy that requires approval from the heads of our operations
and safety departments before our personnel operate over new or
modified routes. While Amtrak had general procedures for new routes
prior to that incident, they were managed regionally and we believe a
central review by our safety and operating experts and a single array
of consistent standards will strengthen outcomes.
A related initiative is the revamping of our trainmaster and road
foreman staffing to provide more support and training for our engineers
and conductors. These positions directly manage our front-line
employees who operate our trains and we are re-thinking our
qualification training standards and identifying the additional
resources--both manpower and technology--to enable our crews to benefit
from industry leading approaches to procedural and operational training
regimens. We will look carefully at how the commercial aviation
industry has applied simulation, and more recently, virtual reality as
well as augmented reality, to make our training more realistic and more
effective to serve our crews and customers better.
Strengthening safety is a continuous process. Amtrak's
responsibility is to lead safety across our industry and serve as good
stewards of the vital resources that we receive from Congress and the
Administration to help us implement these advancements. Likewise,
railroads alone can't solve all of the issues, as grade crossing and
trespasser accidents require a broader effort of local, state and
Federal stakeholders to educate motorist and pedestrians, better equip
vulnerable crossings, limit public access to rights of way and
strengthen enforcement.
I have great confidence in Amtrak's dedicated workforce and the
commitment I see across our company to becomes the safest passenger
railroad in North America, but there is work to be done to improve the
entire rail system. While the challenges described today are difficult,
they can be overcome. At Amtrak, we owe our customers nothing less.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today, and I
welcome your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Anderson.
Ms. Fleming, you testified that 7 to 19 commuter railroads
may not even hit the milestones necessary to qualify for an
extension beyond December 31, let alone fully implement PTC. I
want to drill down a ways to see what we can do to improve the
situation. What can these railroads be doing in the next 10
months to best advance PTC implementation?
Ms. Fleming. You know, I think, where possible, it's really
important to get management and the Board on board to make some
important decisions in order to keep moving forward. We've
heard from some of the railroads that are further along that
they've had to make service adjustments in order to finish
installation of equipment or to begin testing. We also heard
from some of the railroads that it's really important that the
railroad be actively involved in all phases of the project
rather than solely relying on your contractors.
And then I think the last thing would be is there are some
railroads that are further along, and there are opportunities
to take full advantage of user groups and industry forums to
capitalize on some of the best practices and lessons learned
from these railroads.
The Chairman. And do you think it's realistic that all that
get done in 10 months?
Ms. Fleming. You mean to meet the deadline?
The Chairman. Mm-hmm.
Ms. Fleming. Our analysis shows that no, that depending on
how you cut the data, as many as half of the railroads may not
meet the deadline or have enough time to meet the criteria to
qualify for an RSD extension.
So I think part of the problem is that some of the
railroads have some heavy lifting to do. They haven't begun the
second phase, which is really where you have to deal with some
of the complexity and time-consuming things, installing the
back office server, field testing. The railroads that have done
those things, on average, it could take them 7 to 10 months,
but from FRA's perspective, you're talking about 1 to 3 years.
So if these railroads haven't started tackling some of that,
the time is running out for them.
The Chairman. You also recommended that FRA improve its
communication with railroads and better prioritize its
resources and workload regarding PTC. And based on your
recommendations, I intend to send a letter to the new
Administrator of FRA inquiring about the agency's plan to
address the recommendation that you have raised in your report.
Ms. Fleming. I appreciate that.
The Chairman. Mr. Mayer, according to your projections,
Metro-North and Long Island Rail Road are scheduled to have PTC
operating on all lines by December 31 of this year. And while I
appreciate the aggressive schedule, I want to make sure the
traveling public has a clear-eyed understanding of the
likelihood of this outcome. At this point, can you guarantee
that Metro-North and Long Island Rail Road will not file for an
extension from the December 31, 2018, deadline?
Mr. Mayer. Well, our schedule is a doable schedule, but as
I said in my remarks, it is a schedule that has risk. And as we
move forward through each stage, we don't know exactly what
we're going to encounter. We believe we can have all lines in
operation by the deadline, but if we don't, the schedule does
allow for or the law does allow for an alternative schedule
compliance, and we're certain that we can be able to meet that
if we have to.
The Chairman. Ms. Fleming, in follow-up to that question,
GAO studied how long certain steps take to implement PTC,
including the testing and demonstration phases. How does MTA's
schedule compare with the information that you learned in your
reviews and analysis?
Ms. Fleming. Quite frankly, it looks a little bit tight,
and I think it's because, again, having to tackle some of the
more complex, time-consuming activities, you know, I know that
they have a pretty ambitious schedule, but, you know, things
can happen, particularly as you start the testing phase. And,
again, FRA's own estimate on average puts railroads at about 2
years to complete that phase.
So I think it's ambitious, and it doesn't maybe account for
some of the glitches that you can find, the bugs that you can
find, through testing. And even installing the back office
server, we found that the railroads that are far along, it took
them at least 10 months on average, but, quite frankly, from
FRA's perspective, you're again looking at a couple years.
Mr. Mayer. Mr. Chairman, if I could add, we certainly don't
disagree that this is an extraordinarily aggressive and tight
schedule, and it has our challenges. That said, at least for
our railroads, as we enter revenue service demonstration, it
won't be the first time that we've been testing. I mentioned
that we're able to provide speed enforcement on both of our
railroads, and particularly Metro-North Railroad, we have been
testing for 2 years, and that's why we're able to incrementally
provide speed enforcement. I won't tell you that we won't
encounter problems when we add the back office server and we
move to full-up revenue service demonstration, but it gives us
some degree of confidence that other railroads may not have
about that phase.
The Chairman. Mr. Anderson, you stated that there may be
railroads that operate over Amtrak tracks in the Northeast
Corridor that will not have PTC on their locomotives, and you
stated that Amtrak cannot permit such locomotives to be used on
its tracks after the PTC deadline. Based on your understanding
of the progress of your tenant railroads, how likely is it that
Amtrak will prohibit these commuter railroad locomotives from
operating on its tracks?
Mr. Anderson. I think that the factual situation will arise
whether or not technically allowed to operate on the tracks.
And I think what we have to work on with some of those are
mitigation plans. We have some extra ACS-64 locomotives where
we could provide the propulsion and the T&E crews, but this
gets back to my point, that I think the reality is--and to your
question about what FRA is doing--Ron Batory is actually doing
a really good job pulling all the railroads in. We have another
two-day session with him on March 4 and 5, and really going
through every single milestone for each one of the railroads
that operate on Amtrak or where Amtrak operates off its own
infrastructure.
And I think we're going to get confronted, as a policy
question, with that issue. I mean, do you have a commuter
railroad that carries a couple hundred thousand people a day,
you know? Can you practically? And is it the right policy to
not have that railroad operate and put everybody on roads? So
the question is, What other mitigation steps can you take? What
things can we do, as a host, with our partners on the Corridor
to mitigate those issues and be certain that we still provide
safe operations?
The Chairman. Which commuter railroads do you think are
most at risk?
Mr. Anderson. I think Metro-North, NJT, are probably the
two that we understand, but we will know more as Ron Batory
works with us. And we're working very close with Metro-North.
We're working very close with NJT. We want to see them succeed.
That's our responsibility as a steward of that, of the
Northeast Corridor.
The Chairman. My time is expired.
Senator Nelson, I understand you want to defer to Senator
Cantwell.
Senator Nelson. Yes. Senator Cantwell is the one that
requested this hearing, so I want to defer my time for her and
just say at the outset that here we are, 3 years later,
confronting the same thing that we confronted 3 years ago, that
several railroads are not going to be ready, and it's going to
lead to more crashes. When is enough, enough?
The Chairman. Senator.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Senator Nelson. Thank you for
your indulgence.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for both you and the Ranking
Member organizing this hearing. And clearly the discussion of
positive train control and implementation has become a all too
live debate in the State of Washington with the horrific crash
that killed three people and injured 80 in the State of
Washington. So what the discussion you're having right now is
about how do we move forward in that same vein? I know, as it
relates to Washington State, the rail Amtrak uses in Washington
that is owned by BNSF will be compliant by the end of this
year. Is that right, Mr. Anderson?
Mr. Anderson. Yes, Senator, it will.
Senator Cantwell. So it will only be those, you know,
separately run tracks and the question on their compliance. Is
that correct?
Mr. Anderson. That's a correct statement.
Senator Cantwell. So on the line that was--where the
accident occurred, it's a question about whether they'll be
compliant.
Mr. Anderson. They will be PTC-compliant before the
deadline.
Senator Cantwell. OK. So if I could ask, because as this
discussion continues with the Committee about those sites that
are going to be compliant and noncompliant and where we're
going to run, if I could just show a picture--oh, it's already
there. This is the warning sign, right? It's like a highway, I
guess, in the sense of your exit is coming up, but in this
case, slow down to 30 miles an hour, right? They see that sign
at 2 miles, at 1 mile, at one half mile, and as the curve
starts, right? But I think in this case--well, we don't know
all the NTSB investigation will say, but instead of going 30,
they didn't have the situational awareness to--they didn't
observe this, and hit that curve on its maiden route at speeds
we think over 50 miles per hour above the limit. So this is
going to continue to be a real live discussion in other places.
Now, just to clarify, in this situation, under positive
train control, if they blew by this signal at more than 30
miles an hour, the train would be automatically slowed down or
stopped, is that correct?
Mr. Anderson. Correct.
Senator Cantwell. So that implementation, you wouldn't need
the situational awareness in that instance, but it is still
something that you would want to have implemented with your
engineers, is that correct?
Mr. Anderson. Correct. And actually we need to go further
than the PTC regulation and establish a standard of 100
percent. If you're a passenger and you get on a train in
America, you need to be PTC-compliant or PTC-equivalent. I just
don't think there's any other way to deal with the risk of
single human error. I walked that track the night after the
accident, and you see the curve and you see the signs, and it
really makes such a compelling case for PTC because we could
have avoided it.
Senator Cantwell. Well, I think that's what the Ranking
Member was just saying, that, yes, we should have mandated
something in 2015 that now we're going to discuss what's going
to happen when it's not in place by the end of the year for
certain tracks and services, right?
Mr. Anderson. Correct.
Senator Cantwell. And so I'm understanding your House
testimony that you doubted that Amtrak would operate on any
rail line that wasn't PTC functioning by the end of the year.
Mr. Anderson. Yes. That hasn't been very popular.
Senator Cantwell. And so does the Committee have a list of
that, of where those areas are?
Mr. Anderson. We can give you a list of those.
Senator Cantwell. OK.
Mr. Anderson. But, yes, we do have--and they touch my
estimate is probably somewhere between 300 to 700 miles of
track we operate on.
Senator Cantwell. And so just for the riding public on rail
services, not knowing where PTC exists and doesn't exist, what
is Amtrak going to do to increase the situational awareness
training that is important for those lines that don't have PTC?
Or is Amtrak just going to take a hard-and-fast line, no more
commuter rail transportation after December 31 without PTC?
Mr. Anderson. Look, that's the sort of Sisyphean problem,
which is on the one hand we support Amtrak assets and trains
and T&E crews and maintenance, we support probably a half a
billion trips a year, so it's an essential part of what we do.
On the other hand, it's not very comforting being the President
of Amtrak and running trains on dark railroads.
So I think the first thing is we have to--and after 501, we
immediately improved our oversight and hands-on engagement of
our road foremen in our crew briefing rooms. We've revamped our
operating procedures for commissioning new routes. It takes my
approval now to go through the gating process under our SMS for
a new route.
We have reduced headcount in the headquarters, and we're
going to redeploy those resources to the field for more road
foremen and assistant road foremen, and in our transportation
organization.
We put in new rules for operating on signal-suspended
railroads. And we're implementing well in advance of the FRA
deadlines a rail safety SMS program.
But we still remain exposed. And even after PTC--now, PTC
will be on the Defiance Bypass and all of the Cascades, but
even after that, and I can share with you, it's a great
question, the places where we, even after the deadline, if you
assumed every railroad complied with the rule, we are still
going to have significant sections of passenger rail operations
without PTC, and I think that is a level of risk that we
shouldn't be prepared to take as a railroad, and my Board at
Amtrak has taken that position.
Senator Cantwell. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know my
time has expired, but this certainly was a very costly incident
to the Pacific Northwest, and we--our sympathies are with the
families who have lost loved ones. The issue is that we need to
make sure that the traveling public is safe----
Mr. Anderson. Absolutely.
Senator Cantwell.--and that these, both situational
awareness and technologies, are at the best available--or the
assessment that you're just making is implemented.
Thank you.
Mr. Anderson. And we are deeply sorry to the communities in
Washington. And we have admitted all liability, and we are
generously settling those claims and covering all the costs for
the State of Washington.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cantwell.
Senator Hassan.
STATEMENT OF HON. MAGGIE HASSAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE
Senator Hassan. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And thank you to our
panelists this morning. I appreciate your being here very much
and the work you do very much.
I'll start with a question to Mr. Anderson and Mr. Mayer.
As you may know, the NTSB recently reported the undiagnosed
obstructive sleep apnea was a causal factor in two separate
commuter train derailments, in September 2016 and January 2017.
These two derailments collectively involved the injury of over
200 people and the death of one. The NTSB noted that the
Federal Rail Administration does not require medical screenings
for its safety-critical workers to guard against disorders such
as sleep apnea.
The lack of Federal standards and testing requirements
around this issue I think is reckless and has clearly led to
deaths and injuries in the rail sector. So we obviously need to
do something about it. I recently wrote a letter to FRA calling
on them to remedy this situation.
So, Mr. Anderson and Mr. Mayer, what steps are you taking
to protect rail workers and the commuters who depend on them
from harms caused by undiagnosed sleep apnea?
Mr. Anderson. Well, first, you're right. And so at Amtrak--
the FRA rule is a physical for an engineer every 3 years. Our
rule is every 1 year, and we require screening for sleep apnea;
when diagnosed, you're taken out of service. We want our
engineers to get the proper treatment. There are proper
treatments.
Senator Hassan. Yes.
Mr. Anderson. So we are big believers, from an SMS
standpoint again, our safety management system tells us we have
to mitigate the risk from sleep apnea, and so our program is
set up to do that.
Senator Hassan. Great. Thank you.
Mr. Mayer. We set up a program that we believe leads the
industry in this. We decided to screen all of our locomotive
engineers on both of our railroads as well train operators on
the New York City subway system, I realize not the subject of
this hearing----
Senator Hassan. Yes.
Mr. Mayer.--but that's thousands of individuals. We've been
on a very aggressive schedule to do this, just screen thousands
of individuals and make sure that they have the treatment that
they require. And we'll be having passed through and screened
every one of those job titles by the end of May.
Senator Hassan. That's good to hear. Thank you.
To Ms. Fleming, is this a problem that merits further
attention by the GAO?
Ms. Fleming. You know, it's not an area that we've looked
into, but we'd be happy to work with you and the Committee on
this issue. It sounds like a very important issue.
Senator Hassan. I think it is, especially because, as both
of these witnesses answered, there is also treatment for sleep
apnea.
Ms. Fleming. Right.
Senator Hassan. So it's not an either/or thing, we just
need to make sure we're identifying it and treating it.
Mr. Anderson, I wanted to follow up a little bit with you
on the issue of what happens to lines that may not be PTC-
compliant by the deadline. And in my case, I'm concerned about
lines in Vermont, which obviously serve constituents of mine in
New Hampshire and, as I understand it, are exempted from the
requirement.
So to follow up on some of the other questions you've
gotten, you testified before the House Transportation Committee
and stated that you doubted whether service would continue for
areas that did not have PTC in place by 2018. We've heard
concerns about how this could impact the Vermonter's service,
which travels through New Hampshire, and constituents are
obviously concerned.
So, again, is there a way that we can address safety
concerns, but also not take these lines, which were exempted
under the statute, out of service? They're so critical for
people in our states and businesses, too.
Mr. Anderson. Yes, Senator. And after you expressed that to
us, and after my testimony in the House, we have undertaken
under our SMS risk assessment program what steps we could take
in the short run----
Senator Hassan. Right.
Mr. Anderson.--to mitigate operations on dark railroads and
non-PTC railroads. I do think that--and we have an R&D project
underway at Amtrak to determine whether we can use technologies
from Europe that don't require as much trackside investment,
but would give us speed restrictions and signal location. And
there may be mitigation efforts like slow speeds coming up on
switches, requiring the conductor in dark territory to ride in
the front of the cab.
Senator Hassan. OK.
Mr. Anderson. So we are putting it through candidly as what
we did in aviation, and we're putting it through that same sort
of alternative means of compliance because we realize the
importance of our service. And the Vermonter is a really good
route for us.
Senator Hassan. Yes.
Mr. Anderson. So it's not one that economically or
otherwise you would ever be motivated to do anything to----
Senator Hassan. Right.
Mr. Anderson.--but as a practical matter, after you go to
Washington and walk down, you know, and sit at one of these
accident sites, it sharpens your focus.
Senator Hassan. Of course it does, and we are very glad for
that sharp focus. Thank you all very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Hassan.
Senator Klobuchar.
STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, welcome, Mr. Anderson.
I think I'll start with you, Ms. Fleming. While the FRA
collects information from commuter railroads on their progress
in implementing PTC, the GAO has found that the FRA is not
using this information to prioritize resources to those
railroads most likely to miss the deadline. I would think that
a risk-based approach would help with PTC implementation. What
specific information does the FRA need to collect that would
help target support where we need it the most?
Ms. Fleming. You know, I think that they really need to
consider, as a recommendation, to have--to use the information
that it collects and to apply more of a risk-based approach.
You know, they're going to be getting significant documentation
coming their way in the next months and leading up to 2020,
everything from test waivers, RSD applications, and safety
plans. To give you a sense of what that means, for now, it has
been taking FRA 10 to 100 days to review a test waiver, but the
safety plans are 5,000-plus pages, and they told us that they
won't be able to review more than two or three a year. So if
you do the math, that's pretty much a heavy lift.
And also it means the FRA needs to think about, you know,
what do they do? Do they then target the railroads that carry
the most passengers, work with them? Do they work with the
railroads that are close to being there and push them over the
hump? Or do they target their resources to work with the
railroads that are really struggling and may need more
handholding and some assistance so that they can kind of tackle
some of these challenges?
Senator Klobuchar. Mm-hmm. And what do you think they
should do?
Ms. Fleming. We are going to leave that up to them because
I think--you know, there are 12 PTC experts right now, and I
know FRA is looking to hire a few more. You know, we've heard
that the individualized, you know, attention, that one-on-one,
has been great, but there are only 12 folks, and there are a
lot of railroads that could use some guidance. And the other
recommendation really speaks to the fact that, again, it's more
of an informal reactive approach, and we think that the
downside of that is that there could be inconsistent
information be relayed, maybe even inaccurate information.
So they need to, at this juncture, have more of a
systematic communication with all the railroads in terms of,
what are they looking for in terms of the criteria, the
application process and the criteria for the extension. How are
they planning to review and approve these? I think railroads
just need a lot of good information right now.
Senator Klobuchar. OK. Mr. Anderson, a different topic that
I don't think has been focused on very much, and that's rail
crossing safety. And I know that you mentioned that in 2017
there were 1,880 grade crossing accidents. And while PTC we
know is very crucial safety technology, it's not always
equipped to handle those kinds of incidents at all, and we've
had a few of these in our state.
So what is Amtrak doing to address rail crossing safety?
Mr. Anderson. In our legend grant, we support the Federal
Highway program, which allocates about $250 million a year for
investment in rail crossing safety. This is the single biggest
safety issue for rail in America. Over 250 to 300 deaths a
year, and completely preventable with the right infrastructure
investment in rail crossing, and I think the work that the FRA
historically has done has been quite successful in terms of
driving down accidents at rail crossings. So it's something
that is a solved problem, we just have to put the investment in
the infrastructure.
Senator Klobuchar. So you would like to see investment help
with that.
Mr. Anderson. We did. We put it in our legend grant request
and endorsement of the Federal Highway programs for more
investment in grade crossings. What we should do is just a
Pareto analysis of the highest risk to the lowest risk, and
then just target investment after investment after investment
to just drive the number down.
Senator Klobuchar. OK. And by the way, thanks for your
leadership. I know there's a lot going on, and I appreciate you
stepping up.
Mr. Anderson. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you.
Mr. Anderson. Good to see you.
Senator Klobuchar. Good to see you. You still live in my
state, so there you go.
Mr. Anderson. I still do part-time.
Senator Klobuchar. He still does, yes. He loves our state
even when it's one degree.
[Laughter.]
Senator Klobuchar. Mr. Mayer, coming from a border state,
and as Co-Chair of the Canadian-U.S. Inter-Parliamentary Group,
I'm concerned about the level interoperability of rail safety
technology with Canadian rail operators, who have had a few
issues. Do you want to just briefly comment on this so I can--
Mr. Mayer? Thank you.
Mr. Mayer. We don't operate up into Canada, but
interoperability is extremely important to us. We should
track--we should corridor with Amtrak. Long Island Rail Road
operates over Amtrak tracks into and inside of Penn Station,
and our New Haven line on Metro-North territory functions as
the Northeast Corridor that Amtrak operates over. And so we are
committed to interoperability. We will be interoperability when
we bring PTC online, and we will find a way to continue to
operate together safely and legally.
Senator Klobuchar. All right. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Klobuchar.
Senator Udall, then Senator Blunt.
STATEMENT OF HON. TOM UDALL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO
Senator Udall. Thank you very much, Chairman Thune and
Ranking Member Nelson, for convening this hearing. We all know
there have been a number of accidents that could have been
prevented if appropriate safety measures had been in place, and
I think several of you have highlighted that in your testimony.
But even the best technology cannot prevent human error, both
on trains and abandoned vehicles on tracks.
I'm concerned about the ability of small commuter railroads
being able to sustain the cost for full implementation of
positive train control. However, every railroad, commuter or
freight, must operate with high safety standards to ensure the
protection of the public and the protection of railroad
employees.
Ms. Fleming, are low-risk railroads, like the Rio Metro
Rail Runner in New Mexico, able to operate safely under a risk
mitigation plan and without positive train control until they
are able to have a system operational?
Ms. Fleming. So what the risk mitigation strategy would lay
out, it's a plan for operating trains that would fall below the
threshold that requires positive train control. So it wouldn't
necessarily provide the same benefits as a fully operational
PTC system. And it allows the railroad to have a grace period.
So it basically allows them to operate under that plan, but
ultimately they still would be required to implement PTC at
some point.
Senator Udall. Thank you for that answer.
Mr. Anderson, in your testimony, you outlined the ways,
including training centralization, that Amtrak is improving its
safety culture. This is essential to ensure the safety of
workers and passengers alike. Can you clarify the timeframes
when these various actions will be operational?
Mr. Anderson. Thank you for the question. And I would start
out by offering that we have very--a really good workforce of
conductors and engineers that work really hard to operate a
safe railroad. We are--right now I hired an Executive Vice
President and Chief Safety Officer from the aviation industry,
reports directly to me, and it is a daily process now at
Amtrak. We have already implemented our new signal suspension
policies. We will shortly have completion of our engineer
qualification on new routes to address the issues that we had
in 501 out in Washington. So it's an ongoing process.
I will say that the SMS program, which is in an NPRM right
now with FRA, has a deadline of November, and we plan on filing
our SMS plan well in advance of November. This is imperative.
It's the single biggest priority we have at Amtrak right now.
Senator Udall. Thank you.
And, Mr. Mayer and Mr. Anderson, cybersecurity protection
measures are extremely important for all businesses, but
especially for transit systems, where a cyber intrusion could
cause death or extreme property destruction. What are the steps
that you are taking to prevent cyber attacks? And if you cannot
provide a complete answer now, you're welcome to respond in the
record.
Mr. Mayer. I can certainly tell you a little bit about
cybersecurity. First of all, I would point out that PTC is a
layer onto the engineer, so it can slow or stop trains, but it
is not a remote control capability for trains. So there's a
limited protection there just in the basic functionality. That
said, the FRA has strict cybersecurity rules for PTC
implementation, and I know our railroads are working very hard
with Amtrak as we implement a secure PTC solution. Amtrak was
the recipient of a grant from the FRA for cybersecurity
development for PTC. The consortium of railroads that are all
designing around the Amtrak system are working very hard to
ensure that our systems are secure, and we are using industry
best practices and NIST-approved encryption to roll this
technology out.
Senator Udall. Great. Mr. Anderson, I assume you agree with
most of that, right?
Mr. Anderson. I agree, and I'd like the chance to come
brief you because we have a lot of work underway on this.
Senator Udall. That would be great.
Just a quick final question. Each railroad system has
determined which PTC technology it will use. And there was no
Federal coordination in selecting software use. Can each of you
address how your systems will ensure that the technology
installed will be interoperable across technology platforms and
rail systems?
Mr. Mayer. The--Amtrak has been using its system for a
number of years, and so the railroads that interoperate with
Amtrak have chosen to develop systems that are based on the
Amtrak solution. Now, that's been a challenge. We've been able
to use about a third of the Amtrak solution right off the
shelf. Another third has needed a major rewrite. And a final
third is a complete ground-up software development project. But
that said, because we are all based on a common platform, and,
quite frankly, because our engineers and our technical staffs
speak with each other on a daily basis, we are confident that
we will arrive at an interoperable PTC solution across our
different railroads.
Senator Udall. Great. Thank you very much.
My time is exhausted. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Udall.
Senator Blunt.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROY BLUNT,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI
Senator Blunt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let's follow up on Senator Udall's question a little bit.
Mr. Anderson, you mentioned, I think, that you use 20
different railroads' track and three different systems--let's
follow up on what that you were asked and what Mr. Mayer sort
of commented on that. How do you make that work? Is there a
reasonable way to make those three different systems work? And
do you have the same equipment running on tracks where there is
more than one system? And just tell us a little bit about that
challenge.
Mr. Anderson. OK. So in the Northeast Corridor, it's an
Amtrak-developed system because of the speeds that operate on
the Acela, and it's called ACSES, and ACSES is the standard in
the Corridor. The freight railroads that operate in the
Corridor have to operate with ACSES, which is the Amtrak system
that's been around for a while, but they have also have
something called ETMS, which is the standard that the Class 1
freight railroads have established around the country, so
they're dual-equipped.
Because we run on catenary in the Corridor, the ACS-64
locomotives are electric, they stay in the Corridor. So that
equipment is dedicated there. In Michigan, we have a different
system, ICTS, because we run at higher speeds with passenger
rail, and that is just for the folks that operate or the
railroads that operate on the line zoned by Amtrak in the state
of Michigan--three routes in Michigan. We tend to have
dedicated locomotives rather than dual equipping----
Senator Blunt. And as long as you do that, do you think
that creates a long-term ability for you to deal with the
different systems on the different railroads----
Mr. Anderson. It does.
Senator Blunt. Different equipment is the answer?
Mr. Anderson. Well, ultimately, you would like
simplification in a single piece of equipment because if a
locomotive breaks down and you have another locomotive there,
you want to be able to substitute it, but if it doesn't have
the right equipment on it, you're not going to be able to. So
ultimately we will probably go through a process of dual
equipping, but for now, the way you can get to the deadline is
have--which we sort of dedicate different types of equipment to
different regions anyway. It will work practically for us to
have the third EMTS, which is the--I don't know if I got the
acronym right--is the system that the Class 1 freight railroads
use around the United States.
Senator Blunt. And how does the back office server relate
to all of this?
Mr. Anderson. The back office server is basically a
computer system that for Amtrak is operated by Rockwell
Collins. Rockwell Collins bought something called ARINC, which
is the company that connects airplanes in the sky, and----
Senator Blunt. You know something about that, too.
Mr. Anderson. Well, yes.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Anderson. Yes, I do. And so Amtrak, because we had to
federate, that is, have interoperability with so many
railroads, and on two different systems outside the Corridor.
ACSES doesn't have to federate, so ACSES in the Corridor runs
standalone. The other two, we rely on Rockwell Collins to
operate the basic server farm to federate all of the other
railroads that we operate on and to operate that server farm
for us so that the trains and the dispatchers all communicate.
If I were going to suggest one thing for the Committee that
could accelerate all this, get the presidents of Alstom,
Siemens, Wabtec, and Rockwell Collins, and put the four of them
right here because much of this technology that we're talking
about depends upon software development and hardware
development by those OEMs, and that's--those are the--those are
probably the biggest critical dependencies right now.
Senator Blunt. Thank you. Maybe the Chairman took down
notes as to future hearings we could have on this.
Mr. DeWeese, you mentioned that there was a substantial
lack of drawdown by some of the railroads on the money that
they have access to. Are you evaluated in any way from that?
What would be a reasonable amount of money still to be left
where they could be done by the end of the year? And what
clearly is a recipient of funds that has not drawn down funds
that would relate to them complying with the goal? Is there any
way there you're following up with the railroads that aren't
drawing down the funds they need?
Mr. DeWeese. I certainly think that the level of
expenditure is an indicator of something. You know, the scope
of our work, as I mentioned, was really trying to piece
together the puzzle of who got the money, you know, where did
it go, and sort of what is the level of expenditures and what
did they spend it on?
You know, our--we didn't do a deep dive into spending
habits. We didn't dive into the spending rates. It's a function
of many different things. It could be when they got the money.
So even though there is zero percent expenditure, it could be
that they only recently received their funds. We didn't do any
analysis to really show in the time that we had that even
someone who had spent 80 percent of their funds is going to
meet the deadline versus someone who has not spent that level
of funding.
It depends on the size of the railroad. It depends on the
types of projects, the size and scope of the projects that
we're talking about. Some railroads may have one project, and
they were able to spend their money quicker than another
railroad that may have multiple projects. So it's a function of
many different things.
And I think just the level of effort that it took, you
know, my team to really piece together the funding angle, we
really weren't able to do a deeper dive into some of the issues
that you're talking about, but I do think it's an important
one.
Senator Blunt. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Blunt.
Senator Peters.
STATEMENT OF HON. GARY PETERS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MICHIGAN
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to our witnesses for being here today to
discuss what is truly a very critical issue, and it's very
personal to me as well. On May 12, 2015, a very--some close
friends of mine, Gilda and John Jacobs, lost their daughter
Rachel on an Amtrak 188 derailment in Philadelphia, and she
sent a letter to the Committee for Committee members. And, Mr.
Chairman, I would like to enter this letter into the record
with unanimous consent.
The Chairman. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
February 28, 2018
Dear Committee Members:
As we do often, this weekend, my husband John and I visited the
grave of our daughter Rachel. And each time I go, I cry for her, her
now 5 year old son Jacob, her husband Todd, and my daughter, Jessica.
We all lost a part of ourselves, and our family, and the world mourns
her loss as well.
Rachel's life and the lives of 7 others were needlessly cut short
when the AMTRAK train they were riding on derailed May 12, 2015. And it
could have been prevented had PTC been installed and activated on the
tracks and train. It has been almost three years and yet more trains
have derailed, others passengers have died, and scores of others have
been injured. And yet PTC has not been installed or activated on all
passenger trains in our country. My anger is seething.
I want to quote the testimony of AMTRAK's CEO to the House of
Representatives' Transportation and Infrastructure Committee a few
weeks ago, in which he told Congressional members: ``[A]s a matter of
U.S. policy, PTC should be required for all passenger rail trips in
America.'' I agree wholeheartedly. Unfortunately and inexplicably, that
has not occurred.
I recognize that the Federal deadline is in place for the
implementation of PTC by the end of this year, with a potential
extension with FRA approval to the end of 2020. The railroad lobby has
been successful in extending the date for compliance once already and
will likely seek further extensions from you in the coming months. This
is totally unacceptable, wrong, and those requests should be denied.
Thousands of lives are in danger every single day and every hour that
passenger rail trains are permitted to continue to carry passengers on
rail lines that are unsafe. The passengers on board those trains could
be your child, your spouse, your mother, your colleague, your office
mate, and, as we saw again last month in Crozet, Virginia, you as
members of Congress.
I, for one, will never step foot on an AMTRAK train, nor should
you. They are clearly unsafe until this life-saving technology is
implemented. Without PTC, the question is now if another train
derailment will occur, but when. In fact, I believe that Congress
should mandate that passengers be informed whether or not PTC is
installed and activated on a train before a passenger boards a train
until all trains are in compliance.
Before my current job as CEO of a public policy nonprofit, I spent
30 years in local, county, and state government as an elected official.
I have held leadership positions in my caucuses, passed legislation,
knocked on thousands of doors, and met with thousands of people over
the years. I have been held accountable for my actions and the actions
of my colleagues. And that is the way it should be.
Yet the inaction of Congress, the lack of oversight and
accountability, and the failure to insist that passenger trains
accelerate the installation and implementation of safety equipment have
caused more death and human destruction. The responsibility of this
oversight rests on the shoulders of each and every senator and
representative who took an oath to serve the public.
Please step up to do what is right. Don't let my daughter's death
be in vain. Please protect the public from deadly foot dragging. Do not
let the railroad lobby convince you that it is too costly or too
difficult to do the right thing now.
There are human lives behind the decisions and indecisions you
make.
Sincerely,
Gilda Z. Jacobs
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I think it's important. It's a letter that will be
entered into the record, but I would like to read the first two
paragraphs, if I may, for the Committee members.
``Dear Committee Members,'' and this is written by Gilda
Jacobs, ``as we do often, this weekend my husband, John, and I
visited the grave of our daughter, Rachel. And each time I go I
cry for her, her now 5-year-old son, Jacob, her husband, Todd,
and my daughter Jessica. We all lost part of ourselves and our
family, and the world mourns her loss as well.''
``Rachel's life and the lives of seven others were
needlessly cut short when the Amtrak train they were riding on
derailed May 12, 2015, and it could have been prevented had PTC
been installed and activated on the tracks and train. It has
been almost 3 years, and yet more trains have derailed, other
passengers have died, and scores of others have been injured,
and yet PTC has not been installed or activated on all
passenger trains in our country. My anger is seething.''
I think we can all relate to that and share that anger as
well.
Mr. Anderson, I know you're new in the position at Amtrak,
and I know you care deeply about each and every passenger that
rides on your train as well, and you've expressed that here
today as well as in a previous hearing. But I think your
viewpoint on this is particularly insightful now, coming from
the airline industry, and I know as a leader in the airline
industry, you focused on safety, and the airline industry now
has an enviable record when it comes to safety.
You have always given very candid assessments of the
situation. I'm going to ask you to give a very candid
assessment today. As you come into this industry and you look
at how PTC has not been moving forward, the industry
continually comes forward, says, ``We need more time,'' ``We
need more time,'' what do you think is going on, and why has
the railroad industry not been able to do this when we have
seen successes in aviation?
Mr. Anderson. I think, speaking for passenger railroad and
being new to Amtrak, is what I said in my remarks, which is we
tend to think of ourselves as a freight railroad that carries
passengers rather than a world-class passenger railroad modeled
after the great passenger railroads around the world. And when
you take that approach and you take the approach that we had in
aviation with the SMS systems that have been at the core of
driving the improvements in aviation--and how the SMS systems
in aviation got started was in the mid nineties, there were a
series of accidents from about 1993 to 1997, and as a result of
that, we made huge investments in technology and in SMS
systems.
And I think what we have to do in the industry is stop
thinking of ourselves as an extension of the freight railroad
industry. They do a really good job, and their safety record is
improving, but we carry passengers, and that's a much higher
standard of care. And I don't think the industry has focused on
having that same commitment to safety management systems and
compliance.
Senator Peters. So they haven't had the commitment. Do you
believe they've had the time to do that?
Mr. Anderson. I believe we have had the time. I mean, we
went through these sorts of exercises in aviation with
controlled flight into terrain, wind shear warning systems,
collision avoidance systems in midair, which were the three big
drivers of issues in aviation. All three of them got solved
with technology that we installed in the cockpits of all
airplanes.
Senator Peters. So the industry has had the time, they've
have an extension, they may be asking for more time, as we
heard from Ms. Fleming, half of the railroads aren't going to
be compliant, but yet there seems not to be a focus. And it
doesn't seem to be a resource issue.
Mr. DeWeese, you mentioned that many of them have not--in
fact, only a few funding recipients have used their PTC funds.
So they're not spending the money. They have the time. Then is
this a question of commitment? And if there's a lack of
commitment, that is a serious, serious problem, when we have
people dying on our railroads. So the industry is going to need
to answer to that.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Peters.
Senator Blumenthal.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BLUMENTHAL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
And I want to thank the Chairman for his very strong words
and strongly expressed admonition at the beginning of this
hearing about the urgency of this system and his stated
intention to contact appropriate Federal authorities about the
GAO report. In fact, I was very disappointed in a response from
the Secretary of Transportation to a letter that I led with 14
of my colleagues demanding answers regarding DOT's enforcement
plan about positive train control. All she really said was that
the Department was, quote, considering all options.
The industry needs to know that there will be penalties,
that enforcement will be rigorous, that, in effect, there will
be no tolerance for delay, and that the six criteria that have
to be met are not some expanded timeline, they are conditions
that will be interpreted narrowly and specifically. If they
have no such warning, then the prediction made by one member of
the Long Island Rail Committee just last week, Mitchell Pally,
said he would be, quote, significantly surprised if DOT and FRA
levy fines in the event of a failure to meet the deadline. If
that's the mindset of the industry, it will be a self-
fulfilling prophesy, and we cannot allow an additional delay
after all these years.
I was really alarmed, Ms. Fleming, by the GAO report, which
said that there was a risk, to use your word----
Ms. Fleming. Mm-hmm.
Senator Blumenthal.--of two-thirds of the commuter
railroads failing to meet those deadlines. I am not sure what
you meant by ``risk,'' but for me, it means that on the present
trajectory, they will not meet those deadlines because of the
information and data that you provided in the report.
With respect to MTA, last week MTA's project lead for PTC
implementation, Debbie Chin, announced, quote, Our plan is to
get it done by the end of the year. But Metro-North also
announced that you're just 61 percent complete overall, leaving
many of your customers--and I am a very active one, in fact,
I'm going to be riding the train home tonight hopefully--
whether, in fact, you're going to meet the deadline.
I would like a commitment from you that you will meet the
2018 deadline, and that Metro-North will have positive train
control implemented, in operation, by then.
Mr. Mayer. Senator, first of all, our schedule calls for us
to meet the deadline. We believe our schedule is achievable, as
Ms. Fleming testified, and as we agree, there are significant
schedule risks, but right now, it's our intent and our plan to
meet the deadline.
I testified earlier that on the railroad that you and I
both ride on a frequent basis, we have over--thanks to 2 years
of testing, we have cut in civil speed enforcement capabilities
on all of the Metro-North lines, and later in the month, we'll
be enforcing speed limits, and that's incremental----
Senator Blumenthal. You would agree with me that this
technology has been proven over the years?
Mr. Mayer. No, sir. It's not off-the-shelf technology. It
hasn't been proven. We're proving it every day of the week that
we test it and build it.
Senator Blumenthal. And what would prevent you from
achieving that end of your deadline?
Mr. Mayer. Our most important challenges are the delivery
of software. There's been a lot of talk here about office
software to make the portions of the PTC system that are
dependent on software communicate and operate. So our biggest
challenge is software. And we also heard some discussion from
Ms. Fleming about the time it may take the FRA to approve the
applications.
Senator Blumenthal. This system has been implemented
elsewhere, correct?
Mr. Mayer. Our operations are very different than
elsewhere. We are the densest railroads in the country.
Senator Blumenthal. But the same kinds of systems should be
applicable regardless of how dense the systems are, wouldn't
you agree?
Mr. Mayer. No. The railroads, although we look very
similar, we are extremely different in signal systems,
communication capabilities, and operational control.
Senator Blumenthal. And are you on a path to completing
whatever software issues have arisen?
Mr. Mayer. We believe so, sir. That's a major deliverable
from our systems integrator, and we have encouraged them to
hire staff. Our own engineers are assisting with them. They are
reaching out to programmers around the world and are doing
everything that we know how to motivate them to deliver.
Senator Blumenthal. Is that the major obstacle to your
completing the system on time?
Mr. Mayer. Yes. If we were testifying a year ago, we might
talk about hardware and delivery of that, but the main obstacle
that we're facing is software and ultimately FRA approval.
Senator Blumenthal. Well, I would like a detailed report
and a meeting with Metro-North on those obstacles, what you are
doing to meet and overcome those obstacles, what resources, if
any, additionally are necessary, and why you would not meet the
end-of-year deadline? I don't want to hear in 6 months that
you're not meeting it.
Mr. Mayer. We look forward to meeting with you, Senator.
Senator Blumenthal. And I might just say, finally, this
system, positive train control, is not a new system. It is a
proven technology. It has been around for years and years.
There may be software challenges in Metro-North's sphere, but
those challenges also have been around for years and years.
It's not like we're discovering a new planet here or a new kind
of equipment. I think, in my view, and, frankly, in the view of
many of your customers, there will be no excuse for Metro-North
failing to meet that 2018 deadline.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Fischer.
STATEMENT OF HON. DEB FISCHER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Fleming, in your testimony, you noted that the field
testing phase can be a long and difficult process. In your
discussions with Class 1 and other railroads, can you talk
about some of the events or unseen circumstances that could
delay and extend field testing or revenue service
demonstration? Can you elaborate on some of that?
Ms. Fleming. So the six railroads that are at RSD, for
them, the average was 7 months, but FRA's estimate is field
testing could take an average of 2 years. And I think until you
go through that, you don't know what bugs there will be and how
to work through that.
Some railroads have made the tough decision to suspend
operations and to conduct that testing around the clock. So I
think, you know, you don't know kind of what you're going to be
coming up against until you start going through that. So I
think each railroad, it has been kind of a tricky phase of
implementation.
Senator Fischer. Can you give us some examples, though, on
what events could delay that implementation? What are some of
those unseen circumstances that delay it?
Ms. Fleming. You know, can I provide that for the record?
Because I think I'm going to have to go through our work papers
a little bit more and get some good examples for you.
Senator Fischer. OK. That would be great. Thank you.
Also, the FRA appears to be taking an approach to PTC
implementation that says railroads that have completed all PTC
component installation and actually operate PTC for trains
across their networks cannot be considered fully PTC-compliant
and, therefore, must request a PTC extension because of the
slower progress of other railroads to use their network. In
other words, a railroad that finishes everything within their
control would need to file for an extension even if they were
using PTC for their trains and have the capability of
communicating with other railroads.
Do you believe that the FRA may consider a railroad fully
implemented, not when the railroad itself has met the
requirements within its control, but when all operations on a
track are PTC-compliant regardless of who is responsible?
Ms. Fleming. To be honest, it's unclear, and I think that's
another area where FRA really needs to articulate, what does it
plan to do come January 2019? We've asked them, and we didn't
get a satisfactory answer. And I think it's important
information that the railroads need to understand. What does
that mean come January, if you've kind of dotted your i's and
crossed your t's, but some of the other folks that you share
tracks with haven't? And I think they owe it to the railroads
at this point, since we're approaching the deadline, to answer
some of those questions that railroads have.
Senator Fischer. Do you think there would be benefits if
the FRA, instead of the railroads, to be quoted, early
adopters, if they're allowed and reasonably comply with the law
beginning in 2018?
Ms. Fleming. You know, again, I think that's something the
FRA should consider and to think about. Does that make sense?
Does that meet their criteria?
They also, quite frankly, have at their fingertips where
they can use alternative criteria that is not RSD-based, and I
think that's another area that railroads are like, ''Well, what
does that look like? What does that mean?`` And so FRA, I
think, needs to, you know, work with the railroads and try to
help them understand, what are examples of that? what would
meet their threshold?
So they have some options at their fingertips, but they
haven't done a good job of articulating what that means.
Senator Fischer. Do you have any suggestions on how we can
encourage FRA to do that?
Ms. Fleming. I think the Chairman announced today that he's
planning to send a letter, and I think that may be a good
opportunity to seek out some of the clarifications that we all
have.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
Mr. DeWeese, in your report, you noted that two commuter
railroads utilize the Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement
Financing loans to implement the PTC technology. However, those
programs--the program has billions in loan authority provided
by Congress that could have been used for PTC. So why is the
RRIF funding not being used more extensively for positive train
control?
Mr. DeWeese. Thank you for the question. It wasn't a
question certainly that we asked as part of the scope of this
effort, but we have done work in this before in the last few
years, and I think it's a number of factors that are at play
here. I think it could be the lengthy application review
process. As you know, that can go anywhere from 90 days to
many, many months. It can also be the costs that are involved.
I mean, there are loan application fees and credit risk
premiums that have to be paid, and that could be--that could
discourage some of your smaller commuter railroads for applying
for these loans.
The Class 1s may rely on their capital budgets to be able
to finance, you know, some of the investment projects, so you
may not see them, you know, applying for these loans. But we
certainly reported years ago that, you know, a way to
streamline the process. The Build America Bureau, you know,
sort of was intended to consolidate all these credit programs
and to streamline the process and put procedures in place. I
think that's to be determined, quite frankly. And, you know, we
have work that we're going to be planning. I know GAO, too, is
going to be looking at the Bureau. So maybe together we'll be
able to figure that out and look at how they plan to do
oversight of these programs.
Senator Fischer. OK. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
Senator Wicker.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER F. WICKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSISSIPPI
Senator Wicker. Thank you. And I guess members of the panel
realize that many members of this Committee have two other
hearings scheduled at the same time, and so we've been coming
in and out. But thank you for your patience and being here.
Let me just observe generally. We've had some pretty
explicit statements on the part of the Committee Chairman and
also the Ranking Member, and I understand the testimony today
has not been particularly encouraging about our ability, our
collective ability, to have this requirement fulfilled by the
end of the year.
I do think the Chairman and Ranking Member's statements
indicate that, on behalf of the Congress, they're trying to say
that patience is running out. And, I mean, clearly we're going
to try not to shut down train traffic around the country at a
date certain, but we need whoever to understand that we need to
get the attention of those responsible and get a timetable that
will work and avoid, if I might say, a train wreck coming
either figuratively or literally. So I thank Chairman Thune and
Ranking Member Nelson for going ahead and being explicit there.
I might as well ask about an area of particular importance
to me, which is Amtrak from Mobile to New Orleans.
You know, the Southern Rail Commission, Mr. Anderson, had
hoped for a longer route, and it seems, though, that the real
interest there and the real possibility for making it work
sooner is to take this real heavily populated area, I mean,
Mobile is a major city. The gulf coast of Mississippi is
heavily populated. And New Orleans, of course, is one of the
major cities of the South in terms of population and potential
traffic. So the Commission has trimmed its proposal to that.
And so I'm just hoping that you can give me some
encouragement about making that actually work. I think if the
schedule can accommodate passengers and accommodate the public,
and if the trains are reliable and they run on time, this could
be a winner because the population is there.
So how is PTC going between New Orleans and Mobile? When
will it be complete? What impact will it have on Amtrak? And
also I understand you talked about this, but are we OK with the
interoperability of the freight and passenger technology on
PTC?
Mr. Anderson. The interoperability piece with the four
large Class 1 freights is going well. We've actually federated
or are in the process of what's called federating, which is
hooking our system up to their system so it speaks to our
locomotives. That process is going well, particularly well with
BNSF and Union Pacific; they've been real leaders. And it----
Senator Wicker. Not particularly well with whom?
Mr. Anderson. Well, it's going--it's going better with them
because they're moving along, but Norfolk Southern has done a
good job with us, and we still have some work to do with CSX.
So----
Senator Wicker. We certainly want to encourage CSX to be
part of that----
Mr. Anderson. We do. Now, let me get to your question.
Look, I actually think that well-timed, well-run service
between New Orleans and Mobile is a winner, especially if it's
both ways, three times, four times a day. Those are big
population centers. I'm from the gulf coast. I live on the gulf
coast. So I'm familiar with that part of the world. It would
work.
The problem is until our preference rights and incremental
cost rights under the 1971 statute that created Amtrak are
properly enforced--you know, right now the question for
reintroduction of that service from CSX was $2 billion.
So the challenge we have in all of these markets where we
have routes like that that make good sense, we've never been
able to get the preference right that Amtrak has on the
freights enforced, and we've never been able to really get them
to think straight about true incremental costs because that's
what Congress said in 1971.
Senator Wicker. You say the law is there, it's just not
enforced?
Mr. Anderson. It has never been enforced.
Senator Wicker. And whose responsibility is it to enforce
that law?
Mr. Anderson. Hopefully yours.
Senator Wicker. Well, we are the legislative branch. Who
is--what is the enforcement office?
Mr. Anderson. STB.
Senator Wicker. OK.
Mr. Anderson. And we'd like a private right of action under
the statute.
Senator Wicker. So the statute would have to be amended.
The law is there, but it's not as you would like it to be.
Mr. Anderson. The law is there, but since 1971, there has
never been any effective enforcement over the preference
action. That's why the long distance service that Amtrak runs
at massive delays.
Senator Wicker. And so the Surface Transportation Board, if
they were of a mind to, could enforce it as an agency, but you
would like some sort of cause of action provided for in the
statute.
Mr. Anderson. Correct.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Senator Cortez Masto.
STATEMENT OF HON. CATHERINE CORTEZ MASTO,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEVADA
Senator Cortez Masto. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And like Senator Wicker, I appreciate your patience with us
coming in and out. That's why your testimonies are so
important. Your written testimonies as well are very helpful.
And thank you for being here today.
I know that my colleagues who manage the congressional
transportation appropriations, namely, Senators Collins and
Reed, have recently written to Secretary Chao about the need to
get moving and spending down millions in Fiscal Year 2017
funding to help facilitate progress on the PTC at the FRA. As a
matter of course, the FRA reported to our staffs that there are
only eight railroads with conditionally certified PTC safety
plans, four more under review, and more than 25 who haven't
even submitted.
So, Mr. Anderson or Mr. Mayer, what is the average size and
complexity of either these PTC safety or implementation plans
generally? Can you talk about that?
Mr. Mayer. So our railroads have submitted PTC
implementation plans. Our next step will be in the months ahead
as we submit revenue service demonstration applications. And,
as Ms. Fleming testified, they are extremely complicated, long
documents. But we are running tests now, collecting data, and
making plans to be able to file those applications. We've also
had recent interactions with the FRA that's helped us to
understand exactly what's going to be required of us.
Senator Cortez Masto. And so talk a little bit about that
because, how long does it take? Does it take the experts at the
FRA a while to review and certify them?
Mr. Mayer. For our revenue service demonstration
application, we have allowed 8 weeks in our schedule, and the
FRA has told us they will make every effort to do that, but we
will need them to hold up that end in order to be able to stay
on schedule.
Senator Cortez Masto. And is there a time-frame that you
can point to that normally this takes to get through it?
Mr. Mayer. We've never been through it before, so I can't
answer that.
Ms. Fleming. I can answer that.
Senator Cortez Masto. OK, please.
Ms. Fleming. For test waivers, it's taking FRA anywhere
from 10 days to 100 days, but for the safety plans, which can
be 5,000 pages or more, they said they can only review two or
three a year.
Senator Cortez Masto. OK. OK. Thank you.
So let me follow up. Ms. Fleming, your testimony also
underscored the fact that the FRA lacks a clear extension
review and appeal process. So then I would ask Mr. DeWeese and
Ms. Fleming, can you outline the progress that you've seen in
staffing up the necessary personnel and experts internally at
the FRA and whether it has been sufficient to help facilitate a
faster progress on certification of PTC on the national network
where it's required?
Ms. Fleming. So my understanding, there are 12 PTC experts
right now. That's not a lot, particularly given that we see in
the next 10 months plus going into next year their workload and
capacity really coming into play. They're going to be starting
to get the test waivers, the RSD applications, the safety
plans. So we have suggested that they really consider
prioritizing, having a risk-based approach, figuring out,
``Where do we put the resources? What's the best bang for the
buck? Do we go after the railroads that have the largest
passengers? Do we go after the railroads that are really
struggling and have a long ways to go? Do we go after the
railroads that maybe just need a push to go over the wall?''
And so we leave it up to them, but we really think, you
know, with just having 12 people in-house, with all of these
documents and approval processes coming their way, they're
going to really need to think about their approach.
Senator Cortez Masto. And has the administration's hiring
freeze had an impact on why there are only 12 people in-house?
Ms. Fleming. You know, I think it has been this way for a
while. This is--it's hard to get these folks. There are a
limited number of PTC experts out there.
Senator Cortez Masto. OK.
Ms. Fleming. And so I just don't think that there's a long
queue of people that you can draw from.
Senator Cortez Masto. OK. And can I ask--I know I've heard
the narrative that there is some--plenty of Federal funding has
been made available to the railroads, and we've heard that
today, and we're not making fast enough progress on PTC.
Mr. Mayer, would you agree with that sentiment?
Mr. Mayer. Yes. We are grateful for the RRIF loans
sponsored by the FRA in the State of Connecticut and the State
of New York. We have a significant amount of money available to
us to complete our work. We have submitted invoices in the
amount of about a third of those funds and will draw down and
then begin to pay back that loan.
Our problem, honestly, is not really money, and more money
wouldn't help us move faster. Our bottleneck is, as was just
alluded to, the lack of qualified talent, the lack of PTC
expertise. Every railroad in the country is looking for that
same small pool of talent, and we're working with our systems
integrator to creatively tap the talent that exists to help us
develop the software that's necessary.
Senator Cortez Masto. Thank you. I appreciate that.
I notice my time is up. I'll submit the rest of my
questions for the record.
Thank you again for being here.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cortez Masto.
We have others here. I would like to just, if I might, ask
a question and maybe direct this, principally at least, to Mr.
Mayer and Mr. Anderson.
But we've talked a lot about the role of the FRA in this,
and I'm wondering what additional guidance or information, if
any, from FRA would be helpful for you as you continue to meet
the implementation requirements?
Mr. Mayer. You know, as I just mentioned, we have recently
received some clarification and some informal assistance from
the FRA to help us understand the road ahead for us. It has
been very helpful.
Our main concern at this point is FRA resourcing to
receive, process, and approve our revenue service demonstration
application. The time-frame is going to be very tight, but if
there's anything that this Committee can do to help them tap
into additional resources, either new hires or perhaps even
talent within the Department of Transportation and other modal
administrations, that may be helpful.
Mr. Anderson. I agree with that. You could have everything
installed and be operating in revenue service, but we've got to
truncate that time that FRA is going to take in order to
certify because if it's 6 to 8 weeks at the end, that's--you
know, we're 10 months out. That's number one.
Number two, Ron Batory is leading an effort industrywide to
have everyone in on a regular basis in his office where we go
through, hours at a time, line by line, installations all over
the country in that effort. He needs to--he's done a good job
of it, and he's got to spearhead it for the whole industry.
The Chairman. Unfortunately, he should have been there
about 6 months ago in the job, but I've heard this reiterated,
in response to questions that have been posed by members of the
Committee, but this is a very complex and challenging
undertaking, we all agree with that. But it sounds like, if I
heard correctly, the most challenging aspect remaining for full
implementation is software. At least that's okay. And it sounds
like you've talked a little bit about how you plan to overcome
that challenge. Good.
Anything else to add before we wrap up?
Mr. Mayer. You know, one thing that I would add--and thank
you, Senator--is, you know, we've heard a lot about commitment.
We understand that this Committee and the Congress in general
is committed to PTC implementation. We heard a little talk
about the MTA board of directors.
I would want to end by pointing out that our Board of
Directors is extremely clear that PTC is a very, very high
priority and absolutely essential for us to bring online and
further provide for the safety of our customers. And that
commitment extends to our chairman, our managing director, our
two railroad presidents, and the entire implementation team. We
are working as hard as we can possibly work to bring the
promise of PTC into reality.
The Chairman. And we hope we will continue that. I mean, I
think you heard today us convey the sense of urgency that we
attach to getting implementation done in accordance with the
requirement and the deadline. So let us know as this moves
forward, and I'm going to be consulting, obviously, with the
FRA, but what additional help you might need, if there's
anything that this Committee or the Congress can do.
I'm going to ask unanimous consent to insert a statement
for the record, from the Association of American Railroads on
the implementation of PTC.
[The information referred to follows:]
Prepared Statement of Edward R. Hamberger, President and Chief
Executive Officer, Association of American Railroads
On behalf of the Association of American Railroads (AAR), thank you
for the opportunity to discuss positive train control (PTC). AAR
members account for the vast majority of North American freight
railroad mileage, employees, and revenue.
In this testimony, I will review what positive train control is and
what it is meant to do; the progress railroads have made in the
development and implementation of this technology; and what to expect
going forward. While other railroad entities use each Class I
railroad's tracks--Amtrak, commuter railroads, and shortlines--my focus
will be on Class I freight railroads and their PTC operations.
The bottom line is that by December 31, 2018, all Class Is will
have completed PTC installation, just as Congress required. Further, by
the end of this year PTC will be in operation on the vast majority--
approximately 80 percent--of Class I PTC route-miles network wide, with
some Class I railroads planning to be fully implemented on their
networks. Between 2018 and 2020, remaining Class I railroads will be
completing PTC implementation, consistent with statute. All railroads
will continue their work on resolving technical operational challenges
that will inevitably rise, which Congress anticipated and specifically
provided protection for in its 2015 law. They also will be addressing
perhaps the biggest challenge of PTC implementation: interoperability
with each other and with their tenant passenger and shortline
railroads.
What is Positive Train Control?
``Positive train control'' (PTC) describes technologies designed to
automatically stop a train before certain accidents caused by human
error occur. Under the Rail Safety Improvement
Act of 2008 (RSIA), passenger railroads and Class I freight
railroads are required to install PTC on main lines used to transport
passengers or toxic-by-inhalation (TIH) materials.\1\
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\1\ TIH materials are gases or liquids, such as chlorine and
anhydrous ammonia, which are especially hazardous if released into the
atmosphere.
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Specifically, PTC as mandated by the RSIA must be designed to
prevent four major types of train accidents: train-to-train collisions;
derailments caused by excessive speed; unauthorized incursions by
trains onto sections of track where maintenance activities are taking
place; and the movement of a train through a track switch left in the
wrong position.\2\ The PTC system now being installed to meet this
statutory mandate is an overlay system, designed to be failsafe and
meant to supplement, rather than replace, existing methods of
operation.
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\2\ A switch is the infrastructure that controls the path of trains
where two sets of tracks diverge or converge.
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Positive Train Control is an Unprecedented Technological Challenge
To work as it should, a PTC system must be able to determine the
precise location, direction, and speed of trains; warn train operators
of potential problems; and take immediate action if the operator fails
to act after a warning is provided by the PTC system. For example, if a
train operator fails to begin stopping a train before a stop signal or
slowing down for a speed-restricted area, the PTC system will override
the operator and apply the brakes automatically before the train passes
the stop signal or enters the speed-restricted area.
A PTC system consists of three main elements that are integrated by
a fourth critical element, the wireless data communications system. An
onboard or locomotive system monitors a train's position and speed and
activates braking as necessary to enforce speed restrictions and
unauthorized train movements; a wayside system monitors railroad track
signals, switches, and track circuits to communicate data on this local
infrastructure needed to permit the onboard system to authorize
movement of a locomotive; and a back office server stores all
information related to the rail network and trains operating across it
(e.g., speed restrictions, movement authorities, train compositions,
etc.) and transmits this information to individual locomotive onboard
enforcement systems. Finally, all of these are integrated by a wireless
data communications system that must move massive amounts of
information back and forth between the back office servers, the wayside
equipment, and the locomotive's on-board computers.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Such a system requires highly complex technologies able to analyze
and incorporate the huge number of variables that affect train
operations. A simple example: the length of time it takes to stop a
freight train depends on train speed, terrain, the weight and length of
the train, the number and distribution of locomotives and loaded and
empty freight cars on the train, and other factors. During the
operation of a single train over a single operating segment of track
known as a sub-division, the length of time and the distance needed to
stop that train may change 100 or more times due to changes in the
factors mentioned above. A PTC system must be able to take all of these
factors into account automatically, reliably, accurately and in real
time in order to safely stop the train wherever it may be along its
route.
PTC development and implementation constitute an unprecedented
technological challenge. Some of the development and installation tasks
associated with the Class I railroads' efforts include:
A complete physical survey and highly precise geo-mapping of
the more than 54,000 route-miles on which PTC technology will
be installed, including more than 450,000 field assets along
the right-of-way (e.g., mileposts, curves, rail and highway
grade crossings, switches, signals, track vertical profiles and
horizontal geometry).
Installing more than 28,500 custom-designed ``wayside
interface units'' (WIU) that provide the mechanism for
transmitting information from signal and switch locations along
the right-of-way to locomotives and railroad facilities.
Installing PTC technology on more than 17,200 Class I
locomotives.\3\
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\3\ As just one example of the magnitude of the PTC implementation
effort, it takes about one person working for about one month to
install all of the necessary PTC equipment on a single locomotive. It
will take approximately 1,400 staff-years to install PTC on all of the
Class I locomotives that require it.
Installing PTC technology on nearly 2,100 switches in non-
signaled territory and completing signal replacement projects,
including upgrades to PTC-compatible signal technology, at some
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14,500 locations.
Developing, producing, and deploying a new radio system
specifically designed for the massive data transmission
requirements of PTC at tens of thousands of base stations and
trackside locations, and on more than 17,200 locomotives.
Developing back office systems and upgrading and integrating
dispatching software to incorporate the data and precision
required for PTC systems.
In all these areas, Class I railroads have already made tremendous
progress. Figure 2 has details on the status of Class I PTC
installations at the end of 2017.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Additionally, as shown in Figure 3, at the end of 2017, the Class I
railroads already had in operation more than 30,000 route-miles, or 56
percent, of the 54,000 route-miles that will eventually be equipped
with PTC. To be clear, each Class I railroad will install 100 percent
of PTC wayside, back office, and locomotive hardware and complete all
required training by the end of 2018 and expect to have nearly 80
percent of required PTC route-miles operational by the end of 2018.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The AAR estimates that, as of the end of 2017, freight railroads
together have spent more than $8 billion--of their own funds, not
taxpayer funds--on PTC development and deployment, and expect to spend
more than $10 billion by the time PTC is fully operational nationwide.
This does not include the hundreds of millions of additional dollars
needed each year to maintain the railroads' PTC systems once they are
initially installed.
Testing and Validation is Essential for Safe Operation and Full
Interoperability
From the outset, railroads' efforts were focused on development and
testing of technology that could meet the requirements of the RSIA,
particularly those related to interoperability, and that could be
scaled to the huge requirements of a nationwide system. For example,
production and installation of the new radios--necessary to meet PTC's
immense communication demands--became possible only after a long period
of development and testing. Essential software and hardware for many
PTC components had to be developed and deployed, and then rigorously
tested. Only after technology is actually installed and exposed to the
rigors of day-to-day operations can the task of testing each of the
individual parts, and the system as a whole, be completed under real
world conditions.
This task is made particularly complex by the need to ensure that
PTC systems are fully and seamlessly interoperable across all of the
Nation's major railroads. It is not unusual for one railroad's
locomotives to operate on another railroad's tracks. When that happens,
the ``tenant'' locomotives must be able to communicate with, and
respond to conditions on, the ``host'' PTC system. Put another way, a
CSX locomotive must behave like a Norfolk Southern locomotive when it
is traveling on NS track; a BNSF locomotive must be compatible with
Union Pacific's PTC system when it is on UP track, and so on. All the
while, each railroad has its own operating rules designed to address
specific conditions on its property, all consistent with FRA
regulations, but further adding to this complexity. Ensuring this
interoperability has been a significant challenge.
Interoperability appears to also have been a significant problem in
Europe where the European Union's first ``interoperability directive''
was published in 2001. It was not until 2016 that sufficient technical
progress in either hardware or software had been made to allow the
first deployment of an early stage, interoperable system. However, much
work remains to be done to cure both technical and institutional
problems that keep their current technology from being fully equivalent
to that required under U.S. statute. To date, only 2,400 miles of track
in the EU are equipped with this new generation technology. The EU does
not expect that a 30,000-mile ``core'' network will be deployed before
2030; a full build out over 73,000 miles of the most densely used
portions of the European network is not expected to be completed before
2050.\4\,\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ European Court of Auditors, Special Report No. 13, A Single
European Rail Traffic Management System: Will the Political Choice Ever
Become Reality? European Union, Luxembourg, July 2017.
\5\ European Commission, Delivering an Effective and Interoperable
European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS)--The Way Ahead,
Commission Staff Working Document, Brussels, November 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is critical that the huge number of potential failure points in
PTC systems be identified, isolated, and corrected. By necessity, a
mature, well-functioning PTC system is enormously complex, and it is
not realistic to think it will perform flawlessly day in and day out,
especially upon initial implementation. That is precisely why testing,
first in a simulated environment and then under real-world operating
conditions, is so important. Unfortunately, the failure of a single
part within a complex PTC system can mean the system does not work as
it should. When that happens, the fail-safe nature of PTC means that
trains are not able to operate normally on affected rail lines until
the failure is corrected, a situation railroads are facing today as
they proceed toward PTC implementation. U.S. railroads are working hard
to limit negative impacts on their customers associated with PTC
rollouts, but these impacts will be a fact of rail life particularly
until the system fully matures.
Every day, as railroads finalize their PTC installation and expand
PTC operations, additional accident avoidance becomes possible.
However, as other train control systems implemented in other countries
demonstrate, there is risk in improperly designed, installed, or
operated PTC systems. This is not just a speculative concern. Since
2008, there have been a number of incidents worldwide in which
accidents resulting in deaths and injuries occurred on rail lines that
had PTC-like systems. Insufficient testing of PTC design or equipment
has been identified as the cause in two high profile accidents
involving significant fatalities.\6\,\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ In 2011 a pair of trains on a high-speed line in China equipped
with a PTC-like system collided, resulting in 40 deaths and 192
injuries. Investigation of cause revealed that installation of a
Japanese ``off-the-shelf'' PTC-like system had failed to recognize and
accommodate local operating conditions and rules and had not been
properly adapted to the dispatching and train management processes used
on the Chinese line.
\7\ In 2013 a high-speed train in Spain derailed while exceeding
the speed limit on a sharp curve at the end of the high-speed section
of the railway, killing 79 passengers and injuring 139. The high-speed
portion of the route was equipped with a PTC-like system, but failed to
warn the locomotive engineer of the speed-restricted curve and also
failed to take action to slow the train. Investigation of cause
determined that the failure of the system to intercede was due to both
design flaws and a failure of the operational components of the system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These concerns make it essential that a railroad's first priority
must be to implement PTC correctly, and to test and validate it
thoroughly.
Conclusion
Railroads have devoted enormous human and financial resources to
develop a functioning and reliable PTC system, and progress to date has
been substantial. Class I railroads remain committed to safely
implementing PTC as quickly as feasible. By the end of 2018, each Class
I railroad will have implemented PTC or initiated revenue service
demonstration on, at a minimum, 51 percent of its required PTC route-
miles or subdivisions; have 100 percent of the necessary wayside, back
office, and locomotive hardware installations completed; have all
required spectrum in place; and have all required employee training
completed.
In addition, network-wide approximately 80 percent of required PTC
route-miles are expected to be operational by the end of 2018. While
several Class I railroads plan to be fully implemented by the end of
this year, all Class I railroads will be fully implemented no later
than 2020. In the meantime, Class I railroads will continue to work
with each other and their tenant passenger and shortline railroad
partners to successfully achieve full interoperability, which is the
largest remaining challenge to a fully implemented national PTC system.
The Chairman. We will keep the hearing record open for a
couple of weeks. And I know there are members who have
indicated a desire to submit questions for the record. So if
our witnesses could respond as quickly as possible to those so
that we can close the record out, it would be greatly
appreciated.
Thank you all for this. I think this is an important
hearing, a timely hearing, and a very important update for us
in terms of what's happening with respect to this very
important safety issue.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. John Thune to
Susan Fleming
Question. The Committee is aware that some Class I railroads may
require their tenant short line railroads to have PTC-equipped
locomotives when operating any of the Class I's lines equipped with
PTC, potentially prior to the applicable statutory or regulatory
deadlines. While the most recent GAO engagement focused on commuter
railroads, we understand GAO has interviewed short line railroads
representative in connection with some of its past work on PTC.
a. Does the GAO have any data on this issue, including how many
short line railroads are impacted?
Answer. GAO has not conducted recent work related to short line
railroads' PTC implementation efforts, and we do not have any data
directly related to this issue.
From our understanding, Class Is can determine whether one of their
connecting short lines must install onboard PTC equipment, depending on
the working arrangement between the Class I and short line. Given this,
an unknown number of short line railroads may be installing PTC
components as directed by Class Is.
FRA's appears to be tracking implementation progress for a few
short line railroads. For example, the Q4 2017 data from quarterly and
annual reports available on FRA's website includes: (https://
www.fra.dot.gov/app/ptcprogress/2017q4)
Alaska
Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis
Kansas City Terminal
Belt Railway
Portland and Western (also covers TriMet)
b. What potential challenges do short line railroads face in
meeting these requirements?
Answer. In GAO-15-739, we reported that according to FRA, 10
smaller--or Class II/III--railroads are required by RSIA to implement
PTC because they support passenger traffic. Of these, GAO interviewed
Alaska, Belt Railway of Chicago, Kansas City Terminal, Nashville and
Eastern, New Orleans Public Belt, Pan Am Railways, Portland and
Western, Saratoga and North Creek, Terminal Rail of Saint Louis. We
also interviewed three Class II/III railroads that are not required by
statute to implement PTC on their track, but are equipping locomotives
with PTC because they will run on PTC-equipped track. Some Class II/III
railroads are being required to equip their locomotives with PTC
because they are a tenant and their host railroad has indicated they
must equip.
In GAO-15-739, representatives of one Class II/III railroad
indicated to us that they will use their Class I host railroad's back
office system, but others indicated they may have to develop their own;
this may be costly and these railroads may lack in-house resources to
maintain such systems. Representatives also told us that they are
exploring the use of a virtual back office that would be shared among
several railroads and managed by a third party.
In GAO-15-739, three of the Class II/III railroads and 1 commuter
railroad we interviewed said that they have received limited guidance
and instruction from their Class I host railroads regarding the extent
to which they need to equip with PTC and when they should be equipped,
making it difficult for them to begin PTC implementation. However,
three Class II/III railroads and thee commuter railroads stated their
Class I railroad hosts were communicating with them and, in some cases,
had been helpful in addressing vendor issues. FRA officials told us
that FRA will not get involved in this issue because it is a commercial
arrangement between two private entities.
c. To your knowledge, has the Department of Transportation assessed
the potential for freight rail service disruptions if short line
railroads do not meet these deadlines?
Answer. We have not conducted recent work focused on specific
actions taken by DOT related to short line railroads' implementation of
PTC. The scope of our review was focused on commuter railroads'
implementation progress and DOT's management and oversight of their PTC
implementation. DOT, via a December 2017 letter from Secretary Chao to
all the Class I railroads, intercity passenger railroads, and state and
local transit authorities, stressed the urgency and importance of
safely implementing PTC systems in the upcoming year to meet the
December 31, 2018 deadline. Given this, the agency does not appear to
be focused on short line railroads' implementation at this time.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Bill Nelson to
Susan Fleming
Implementation Status. Ms. Fleming, you took a deep dive look into
how consumer railroads are working to implement positive train control.
Question 1. How concerned are you about the status of
implementation by these railroads?
Answer. We found that most of the 29 commuter railroads
implementing PTC have reported progress in some of the areas of initial
implementation that the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) monitors,
such as locomotive and wayside equipment installation, but the amount
of progress reported varies across individual railroads. However,
beyond the initial implementation activities, much work remains for the
majority of commuter railroads to complete other key PTC activities
that will enable them to complete implementation such as field testing
and interoperability. Based on our analysis, some of the commuter
railroads that told us they did not plan to seek an extension beyond
2018 appear to be at risk of not meeting the requirements to qualify
for an extension, let alone complete implementation before the end of
2018.
Commuter railroads unable to implement a PTC system by December 31,
2018, may receive a maximum 2-year extension if they meet certain
statutory criteria. Based on our analysis of the PTC schedules of the
29 commuter railroads, we found that over half may not have sufficient
time to complete activities needed to implement PTC by the end of 2018
or to qualify for an extension of that deadline by meeting criteria
based on initiating revenue service demonstration (RSD).
GAO's analysis of commuter railroads' PTC scheduled milestones for
two key activities necessary to meet the 2018 deadline or qualify for
an RSD-based extension (one of the statutory options) found that as
many as two-thirds of the 29 commuter railroads may not have allocated
sufficient time to complete these milestones. Specifically, in
comparing the commuter railroads' schedules to FRA's estimates of the
time required to complete these milestones and the experiences of
railroads that have already completed them, GAO's analysis found that
from 7 to 19 commuter railroads may not complete the milestones before
the 2018 implementation deadline or qualify for an extension.
Question 2. What challenges led to this point? Why were some
railroads able to make such progress and others were not?
Answer. A number of factors can affect the progress of commuter
railroads' implementation of PTC, including limited industry expertise
and resources, or unexpected schedule changes. In addition, PTC
implementation is a complex and lengthy process. It requires the
integration of various components, many of which are new technologies
that must be integrated with existing systems. About half of the
commuter railroads we spoke with acknowledged that industrywide, there
are a limited number of individuals with PTC technical expertise
available to successfully implement the technology, which can affect
the ability of railroads and contractors to meet planned schedules. In
addition, some commuter railroads told us they faced unexpected delays
in obtaining PTC equipment, such as radios, from the supplier. Some PTC
equipment is only available from a single provider, which can lead to
delays executing contracts and obtaining equipment.
Unexpected issues with components or technology can also require
additional time to complete certain activities, causing schedules to
slip. Such issues could affect railroads currently on schedule as well
as railroads pursuing aggressive schedules in an effort to overcome
late starts or early setbacks. For example, representatives from one
railroad said that despite strong organizational commitment to
implementation and setting internal targets for progress, their PTC
project schedule slipped many times over the course of implementation
due to a variety of issues, including on-going software updates that
caused delays while also straining the budget and burdening staff.
For those railroads that have made more progress with
implementation, we heard that early commitment from agency leadership
and support from the board to implement PTC helped encourage progress
throughout the project and enabled management to make tough decisions
to constantly progress. Officials from one of these railroads told us
they made difficult decisions that would enable them to move forward
with the overall project.
Question 3. Does implementation of positive train control by any of
the Florida railroads raise particular concern for you?
Answer. In January 2018, Sunrail and TriRail were both identified
among the 13 commuter railroads FRA identified as at risk of not
meeting the 2018 deadline and not completing requirements for a
deadline extension. FRA made these determinations based on whether a
railroad had installed at least 65 percent of all equipment as of the
end of September 2017. Florida East Coast Railway/All Aboard Florida
was not identified as at risk by FRA, but the railroad has had multiple
fatal grade crossing accidents in the last year.
Much uncertainty exists regarding railroads' ultimate
implementation progress and their ability to meet the 2018 deadline or
qualify for an extension. This uncertainty is due, in part, to the fact
that PTC is a new way of operating and involves technologies that are
more complex to implement than many other railroad capital projects.
Furthermore, a number of factors can affect commuter railroads' planned
and future progress, including unexpected setbacks installing PTC
components and resources and capacity issues.
DOT Oversight. Ms. Fleming, the Department of Transportation should
be providing clear and consistent guidance to railroads, particularly
as they near the deadline.
Question 4. How is the Department doing at this task?
Answer. We found that FRA monitors railroads' PTC implementation
progress, but has not systematically communicated information to help
them prepare for the 2018 deadline or to qualify for extensions. Since
2015, FRA has assumed additional roles and responsibilities--primarily
through the PTC Task Force and regional PTC specialists--to monitor
railroads' implementation progress, review required documentation, and
share information about implementation steps and activities. While the
majority of the railroad representatives we met with said FRA officials
were consistently available to discuss issues that arise during day-to-
day PTC implementation activities, the information conveyed by these
officials has sometimes been inconsistent. Commuter railroads also
expressed a need for additional clarification about the criteria for
applying for an extension, and representatives from some commuter
railroads we met with were unclear about the agency's approach to
reviewing and granting extension requests.
In addition, FRA has made limited use of implementation progress
information to prioritize its efforts and mitigate risks. FRA has not
fully leveraged the implementation progress data that railroads' submit
to the agency to identify and develop a risk-based approach to
prioritize agency actions. At present, it is unclear whether the
agency's priorities are, for example, to help the largest commuter
railroads meet the deadline or extension requirements, push those
railroads that are very close to full implementation, or assist
railroads that are in the earliest stages of their PTC project. By not
effectively targeting actions to help mitigate risks posed by railroads
most at risk of not meeting the PTC deadline or qualifying for an
extension, FRA misses the opportunity to leverage its limited resources
by providing direct assistance in the areas of greatest need.
Question 5. What more could be done by the Department to assist
commuter railroads--especially those that are falling behind?
Answer. As the 2018 deadline rapidly approaches, the need for clear
information that is systematically communicated to all railroads
implementing PTC becomes even more critical. FRA cannot expect to
provide information and guidance to railroads individually, and
therefore, adopting a risk-based communication strategy could help it
more efficiently share information in the coming year. Moreover, the
information FRA collects on railroads' progress has not been used to
inform the agency's resource allocation decisions. Using this
information to better allocate resources could help position FRA to
better meet its responsibility to monitor and oversee PTC
implementation in the future. Given this, GAO recommended that FRA: 1)
identify and adopt a method for systematically communicating
information to railroads regarding the deadline extension criteria and
process, and 2) develop an approach to use the information gathered to
prioritize the allocation of resources to address the greatest risk.
Grade Crossing Safety. My state continues to top the list for
grade-crossing collisions and fatalities. In recent months, we have
seen a renewed problem with grade crossing safety following the start
of higher speed rail service.
Question 6. What steps should we be taking to better address grade
crossing safety?
Answer. During the course of our PTC review, we did not conduct the
work necessary to answer this question. GAO has ongoing work in the
area of grade crossing safety, and anticipates issuing a final product
in Fall 2018.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. John Thune to
Hon. Barry J. DeWeese
Question. The Committee is aware that some Class I railroads may
require their tenant short line railroads to have PTC-equipped
locomotives when operating any of the Class I's lines equipped with
PTC, potentially prior to the applicable statutory or regulatory
deadlines. Did any short line railroads that received Federal funding
raise this issue to DOT OIG?
Answer. OIG did not receive any tenant railroad responses
indicating that host railroads had set additional deadlines for their
PTC implementation; however, our line of questioning focused primarily
on decisions related to the use and access of funding. During our
information gathering, we did note three railroads that were not
independently subject to the congressional requirement were
implementing PTC because their host railroads were doing so. In
addition, some tenant railroads mentioned that their host railroads'
technical specifications and the need for interoperability would
ultimately impact the types of equipment they purchase.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Bill Nelson to
Hon. Barry J. DeWeese
Funding for Positive Train Control. Mr. DeWeese, you found that the
Federal Government has provided more than two billion dollars in
support to help implement positive train control. Yet, some believe
that much more is needed to help commuter railroads.
Question 1. Is funding a challenge for commuter railroads? What
kind of additional support might they need?
Answer. Our recent audit identified the amount of Federal funding
provided to implement positive train control; we did not assess future
needs. While the commuter railroads we contacted did not identify
funding as a challenge to meeting the December 2018 congressional
deadline, they did express concern about costs that will arise after
full PTC implementation. Those costs, as well as the potential for
funding shortfalls, remain uncertain and will be key watch items going
forward. We will continue to work with the Department and Congress to
monitor funding implications that could impact railroads' deployment
and sustainment of PTC.
Grade Crossing Safety. My state continues to top the list for
grade-crossing collisions and fatalities. In recent months, we have
seen a renewed problem with grade crossing safety following the start
of higher speed rail service.
Question 2. What steps should we be taking to better address grade
crossing safety?
Answer. We share your concern. While our office has not studied
this topic in recent years, we are currently planning an audit to
assess the Department's progress in advancing grade crossing safety. We
will reach out to your staff as we finalize our audit objectives.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Hon. Barry J. DeWeese
Speed Limit Action Plans. Mr. DeWeese, the FAST Act requires
passenger railroads to come up with speed limit action plans for any
place there is a speed reduction of 20 miles-per-hour or greater. Speed
limit action plans are meant to help prevent incidents like the Amtrak
Cascade Train 501 derailment in DuPont, WA by creating numerous
warnings for the engineer that they need to reduce their speed.
Question 1. Do you know if the Department of Transportation
approved Amtrak's speed action plan for the curve in DuPont, WA?
Answer. At this time, we do not have information on the
Department's approval process or the status of Amtrak's speed action
plan for the curve in DuPont, WA.
Highway-Rail Grade Crossing Safety. I would like to address the
topic of safety issue, highway-rail grade crossings. The City of
Lakewood sits on the new Point Defiance Bypass Rail line where the
DuPont derailment occurred.
The city has 7 grade crossings within its city limits. They are
understandably concerned about safety at these crossings given that
over 30 percent of rail related fatalities occur at grade crossings.
Question 2. Mr. DeWeese, In November 2016, the FRA released their
model for state highway-rail grade crossing action plans. The FAST Act
requires the FRA to create a rule requiring state to submit their
action plans. Can you update me on the status of this rule?
Answer. While we have reviewed grade crossing safety in the past,
our office has not studied this topic in recent years. In the next few
months, we will initiate an audit that will assess FRA's progress in
advancing grade crossing safety, and we will be in a better position to
provide an update at that time. We will reach out to your staff as we
finalize our audit approach.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John Thune to
Richard Anderson
Question 1. As you noted, many commuter rail passengers ride on
trains that use the Northeast Corridor or connect to Amtrak trains.
a. Could you provide a comprehensive overview of Amtrak's
interactions and planning to date with each commuter railroad that may
not fully implement PTC by December 31, 2018 or qualify for an
extension?
Answer. Amtrak has regular communication with the commuter
railroads that use our infrastructure or on which we are a tenant
through a cross-departmental approach aimed at allowing us to
understand and prepare for likely outcomes as implementation and
installation of positive train control (PTC) progresses throughout the
year. As progress is made in PTC implementation, we adjust our planning
and options based on the needs of Amtrak and individual commuter
railroads and maintain strong coordination across our 46 state network
through focused oversight of our Assistant Vice President of
Operations.
More specifically, Amtrak's Engineering Department works with
commuter railroads on a weekly and often daily basis. They discuss way-
side installation, boundary locations and testing of the PTC system.
This is important since all responsible parties need to be involved in
testing to allow our equipment and teams to communicate effectively.
The Amtrak Mechanical Department works on a monthly or more
frequent basis with the various commuter agencies to ensure there is
regular progress on installation of relevant on-board hardware
installed in the locomotives. Amtrak Operations also communicates
monthly with the commuter agencies to monitor and update progress with
implementation and installation of the overall PTC system.
At this point in time, we are confident that most commuter agencies
relevant to the Amtrak network will qualify for extensions.
b. From both a safety and business perspective, could you speak in
more detail to what you see as the impact of potential service cuts on
the overall transportation network in the region?
Answer. At this time, Amtrak continues to assess the readiness of
its commuter tenants on the Northeast Corridor and is working closely
with all agencies to progress forward with implementation. We are not
yet prepared to make any definitive statements on the outcome of their
efforts to implement PTC and any impacts on past service this year as
much of the necessary work is scheduled to be achieved this fall.
c. What information, if any, has FRA provided to you on how it
expects to handle a tenant or connecting railroad not meeting the
statutory deadline?
Answer. Amtrak continues to have regular discussions with FRA on
how hosts manage PTC implementation with tenants and connecting
railroads. The FRA's PTC symposiums have helped facilitate
communication between tenants and hosts as well as clarifying
expectations.
d. What guidance, if any, has FRA provided to you on how it expects
Amtrak to handle a tenant or connecting railroad not meeting the
statutory deadline?
Answer. Amtrak continues to have regular discussions with FRA on
how hosts manage PTC implementation with tenants and connecting
railroads, but have not received official guidance on this matter.
Question 2. As you know, Amtrak operates over host railroad track
where a host railroad may not implement PTC by December 31, 2018, or
qualify for an extension. Following-up on a commitment at the hearing,
please provide a list of the services, routes, or lines which may cease
at the end of the year due to a host railroad not fully implementing
PTC or not meeting the statutory deadline, and please detail the
likelihood and underlying issues relevant for the decision.
Answer. There has been significant progress since the hearing on
locations where Amtrak had concerns about a host's implementation
schedule or ability to qualify for extensions or exemptions. Since the
hearing, many of these concerns have been addressed and we have
received significant information from hosts to confirm compliance or
exemptions have been filed in accordance to the law.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Roger F. Wicker to
Richard Anderson
Question 1. Mr. Anderson, in your testimony you stated that ``well
timed, well run service between New Orleans and Mobile is a winner''. I
agree. You further stated that, ``the question for reintroduction of
that service from CSX was $2 billion''. As you know, the Gulf Coast
Working Group, created by Congress in the FAST Act, identified the
preliminary capital cost estimates for restoring service to Orlando, FL
to be $117,672,000, with annual operating cost estimates at $5,480,000
for the long-distance route and $6,970,000 for a twice daily State-
supported route between New Orleans, LA and Mobile, AL. Amtrak was part
of the working group and supported its conclusion.
Congress, in S. Rept 115-138, the Appropriations Committee report
accompanying S. 1655, the FY18 Senate Transportation, Housing, and
Urban Development Appropriations Act, endorsed the findings of the Gulf
Coast Working Group when it stated the following:
Gulf Coast Rail Service.--Section 11304 of the FAST Act
required the Gulf Coast Working Group [GCWG], consisting of
FRA, Amtrak, the Southern Rail Commission [SRC], railroad
carriers, State and local governments, and others, to evaluate
all options for restoring passenger rail service in the gulf
coast region, select a preferred option for service, develop an
inventory and cost estimate of capital projects to restore
service, and identify Federal and non-Federal funding to
restore service. The GCWG report, released on July 17, 2017,
identified the preferred options as a daily long-distance route
that extends Amtrak's existing City of New Orleans service from
New Orleans, Louisiana to Orlando, Florida and a new daily
State-supported route from New Orleans, Louisiana to Mobile,
Alabama. The preliminary capital cost estimates for restoring
service is $117,672,000, with annual operating cost estimates
at $5,480,000 for the long-distance route and $4,000,000 for
the State-supported route. These cost estimates are dwarfed by
the $2,300,000,000 estimate previously determined by industry,
which also raised concerns with on-time performance [OTP]
requirements and delays at drawbridges. The Committee believes
the GCWG report more accurately reflects these concerns and is
a more realistic cost estimate, but directs Amtrak and DOT to
continue working with the host railroad and the Coast Guard to
refine cost estimates.
a. Is your testimony in agreement with the Gulf Coast Working Group
and Amtrak staff or is it supporting the CSX assessment?
Answer. My testimony was a reference to the wide gap, as also noted
by the Appropriations Committee report, between CSX's proposal and the
GCWG report. Like the Appropriations Committee, Amtrak believes that
the GCWG report is a more accurate and realistic assessment of the host
railroad-related challenges and solutions.
Question 2. Mr. Anderson, during the hearing, you further stated
that Amtrak's ``preference'' and ``incremental cost rights'' are not
properly enforced.
a. Please describe the impact of lack of enforcement of these
rights on restored service between New Orleans, LA and Mobile, AL.
Answer. Lack of enforcement of Amtrak's rights, in particular
preference over freight transportation, has led to a severe
deterioration in the on time performance of Amtrak service. The largest
cause of delay to Amtrak trains on host railroads is Freight Train
Interference, typically caused by a freight railroad requiring an
Amtrak passenger train to wait so that its freight trains can operate
first. Host railroads often choose to delay Amtrak trains with hundreds
of passengers on them in favor of their trains carrying coal, garbage,
crude oil, empty freight cars, or any freight that the host chooses to
prioritize. Very often, a host railroad will make Amtrak passengers
follow the same slow freight train for more than 50 or even 100 miles.
During FY 2017, Amtrak trains were delayed by freight trains on
host railroads almost 100,000 times. These delays totaled more than one
million minutes (or 17,500 hours). These delays, which continue to
increase at an alarming rate, threaten the viability of major portions
of Amtrak's network and therefore threaten Amtrak's capability to
expand service at all, including in the New Orleans-Mobile corridor.
Moreover, a New Orleans-Mobile service will not be successful if
our customers, and your constituents, experience such delays on a
regular basis.
b. Please describe your plan for addressing this issue.
Answer. Amtrak continues to exercise every available opportunity to
collaborate with willing hosts to share data and otherwise work
together to identify and address delays--whether due to Freight Train
Interference or other factors. However, for such efforts to be fully
successful, host railroads must be motivated to run Amtrak well.
Unfortunately, this currently is not the case with some host railroads.
Current law prevents Amtrak from taking action in response to host
railroad violations of Amtrak's preference rights. Amtrak's FY2019
Legislative and Grant Request to Congress includes a proposal to
correct this problem by allowing Amtrak a private right of action with
respect to preference, so that Amtrak can protect its rights just as
any other company would if its rights were being violated.
Question 3. Mr. Anderson: As you know, Senator Cochran and I, along
with our colleagues from Louisiana and Alabama, are working to restore
passenger rail service along the Gulf Coast. The Southern Rail
Commission is currently pursuing a state-supported route between New
Orleans, LA and Mobile, AL to restart service along the gulf coast. The
long term goal is ultimately to add the long distance route to Orlando,
FL.
a. It is my understanding that Positive Train Control (PTC) will be
in place between New Orleans, LA and Mobile, AL on time. Please confirm
whether this is true and, if not, please provide specific information
about remaining gaps in installing PTC along this corridor.
Answer. The New Orleans to Mobile segment is not owned by Amtrak,
but this is our understanding as well. The host railroad, CSX, should
be able to provide an update on progress for implementation.
b. It is also my understanding that PTC may not be installed by the
deadline on track that is east of Mobile, AL and which may one day be
part of the long distance route to Orlando, FL. Can you confirm that a
state-supported route from New Orleans, LA to Mobile, AL would not be
impacted by the status of PTC on track east of Mobile, AL?
Answer. This segment is also not owned by Amtrak, but this is our
understanding as well. The host railroad, CSX, should be able to
provide an update on progress for implementation. You are correct that
the status of PTC implementation east of Mobile will not impacts the
potential State Support service we are seeking to advance with the SRC
to the west.
Question 4. Recently, Politico reported that a spokesman for the
freight railroad Canadian National stated the railroad was scheduled to
complete installation of PTC on time. The spokesman further stated that
``the City of New Orleans corridor will be the first completed, and
multiple subdivisions in the corridor are in revenue service
demonstration.''
a. Can you confirm that this is correct?
Answer. This segment is not owned by Amtrak. The host railroad,
Canadian National, should be able to provide an update on progress for
implementation.
b. If not, please provide describe the status of PTC on the City of
New Orleans route and the impact upon Amtrak's revenue service on that
route.
Answer. This segment is not owned by Amtrak. The host railroad,
Canadian National, should be able to provide an update on progress for
implementation. While we are in regularly communication with Canadian
National, they would be able to provide the most accurate and up-to-
date information on this route.
c. Please provide information describing the status of PTC on
Amtrak's Crescent route and the impact upon Amtrak's revenue service on
that route.
Answer. This segment is not owned by Amtrak, but Amtrak has
completed interoperability testing on this route between Washington, DC
and New Orleans. The Amtrak project schedule calls for beginning
operations with PTC in the fall of 2018 after final software upgrades
are ready.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Bill Nelson to
Richard Anderson
Positive Train Control. Mr. Anderson, Florida relies on Amtrak
service to provide access to long-distance rail service for many
cities.
Question 1. What is the status of positive train control on routes
you travel in Florida? When will it be implemented?
Answer. There has been significant progress since the hearing on
locations where Amtrak had concerns about a host's implementation
schedule or ability to qualify for extensions or exemptions. Since the
hearing, many of these concerns have been addressed and we have
received significant information from hosts to confirm compliance or
exemptions have been filed in accordance to the law. In Florida, we are
working with both the South Florida Regional Transportation Authority
and SunRail as they progress forward in their work to achieved
Alternate Schedules for implementation from the FRA. Assuming that such
schedules are granted, Amtrak is undertaking hazard analysis and risk
mitigation plans for operations over the territory until PTC becomes
operational.
Grade Crossing Safety. Panel, my state continues to top the list
for grade crossing collisions and fatalities. In recent months, we have
seen a renewed problem with grade crossing safety following the start
of higher speed rail service.
Question 2. What steps should we be taking to better address grade
crossing safety?
Answer. We continue to look for opportunities to address grade
crossing safety and we have long supported outreach programs. The most
prominent program is ``Operation Lifesaver,'' a nonprofit public safety
education and awareness organization dedicated to reducing collisions,
fatalities and injuries at highway-rail crossings and trespassing on or
near railroad tracks. However, more needs to be done and we still
believe the safest grade crossing is the one that does not exist.
Several of the host railroads have programs in place that financially
incentivize communities to remove public grade crossings and we
strongly believe that more funding and focus on upgrading those grade
crossings that necessary with enhanced traffic control and safety
features is justified. Similarly, where new public grade crossings are
introduced it is imperative that active warning devices are installed.
Washington State Crash. Mr. Anderson, the Amtrak derailment in
Washington State is eerily similar to the 2015 derailment in
Philadelphia. In the last transportation bill, Congress mandated that
railroads evaluate curves where the speed drops in hopes of preventing
a similar crash.
Question 3. Did Amtrak evaluate the curve near DuPont, Washington
prior to starting service? What actions did you take to address it?
Answer. In light of the open and ongoing NTSB investigation we are
unable to provide this information at this time. It is important to
note that the NTSB has publicly released that had an automatic-braking
system been operational, it would have applied the brakes to slow and
stop the train.
Question 4. Could a derailment like the one in Washington State
happen in Florida or elsewhere? What steps are you taking to prevent
that from happening?
Answer. The possibility of a train derailment is present across the
Nation's railroad network from a variety of possible risk areas.
However, many of the recent accidents involving Amtrak trains have
involved over-speed situations that Positive Train Control could have
prevented. Thus, we believe PTC or the application of technology and
operating practices that achieves PTC-equivalency must be standard for
all Amtrak routes and that this technology will make the entire U.S.
rail network safer for passengers, railroad employees, and communities.
While some question the need for PTC on low-density territory, our
recent experience has shown that over-speed relative to signal
indications and permanent or temporary speed restrictions is a
significant risk and this risk exists regardless of traffic levels on a
given route. As the leader in the installation of PTC for decades,
having already deployed systems across nearly all of tracks we control,
we have strong corporate experience with both the benefits of having
PTC installed and the risks associated with its absence.
For the tracks we use but do not own or control, we are cooperating
with our freight and commuter host railroads as they advance their
obligations to complete PTC installations, which are required either
because of the presence of passenger trains or certain hazardous
material. Additionally, the various freight and commuter railroads that
operate over Amtrak's infrastructure must equip their rolling stock
with PTC for use on our infrastructure and we are working cooperatively
with them to advance these tasks.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Richard Anderson
Speed Limit Action Plans. Mr. Anderson, the FAST Act requires
passenger railroads to come up with speed limit action plans for any
place there is a speed reduction of 20 miles-per-hour or greater. Speed
limit action plans are meant to help prevent incidents like the Amtrak
Cascade Train 501 derailment in DuPont, WA by creating numerous
warnings for the engineer that they need to reduce their speed.
Question 1. Had Amtrak created a speed action plan for the curve in
DuPont, WA, where the derailment occurred?
Answer. In light of the open and ongoing NTSB investigation we are
unable to provide information related to the 501 derailment. However,
Amtrak did comply with the FAST Act requirements for speed limit action
plans.
Question 2. Can you explain what measures were in place to warn the
engineer that he needed to reduce the speed of the train?
Answer. The information publicly released by the NTSB confirmed
that a 30 mph speed-limit sign was posted on the engineer's side of the
train to remind engineers about the upcoming curve. It was posted two
miles before the curve.
Question 3. Can you identify what you are doing to learn from this
derailment to update all your speed limit action plans?
Answer. We have and will continue to review our speed limit action
plans. The need for full implementation of Positive Train Control is
critical. PTC will prevent over-speed derailments. PTC must be standard
for all Amtrak routes and this technology will make the entire U.S.
rail network safer for passengers, railroad employees, and communities.
Amtrak is a leader in the installation of PTC, having already deployed
systems across nearly all of tracks we control.
For the tracks we use but do not own or control, we are cooperating
with our freight and commuter host railroads as they advance their
obligations to complete PTC installations, which are required either
because of the presence of passenger trains or certain hazardous
material. Additionally, the various freight and commuter railroads that
operate over Amtrak's infrastructure must equip their rolling stock
with PTC for use on our infrastructure and we are working cooperatively
with them to advance these tasks.
In addition, Amtrak established system wide qualifications
standards for our train and engine personnel and is in the process of
expanding our use of simulation for training and route qualification.
Highway-Rail Grade Crossing Safety. I would like to address the
topic of safety issue, highway-rail grade crossings. The City of
Lakewood sits on the new Point Defiance Bypass Rail line where the
DuPont derailment occurred.
The city has 7 grade crossings within its city limits. They are
understandably concerned about safety at these crossings given that
over 30 percent of rail related fatalities occur at grade crossings.
Question 4. Mr. Anderson, can you tell me how Amtrak is working to
make highway-rail grade crossings safer?
Answer. We continue to look for opportunities to address grade
crossing safety and we have long supported outreach programs. The most
prominent program is ``Operation Lifesaver,'' a nonprofit public safety
education and awareness organization dedicated to reducing collisions,
fatalities and injuries at highway-rail crossings and trespassing on or
near railroad tracks. However, more needs to be done and we still
believe the safest grade crossing is the one that does not exist.
Several of the host railroads have programs in place that financially
incentivize communities to remove public grade crossings and we
strongly believe that more funding and focus on upgrading those grade
crossings that necessary with enhanced traffic control and safety
features is justified. Similarly, where new public grade crossings are
introduced it is imperative that active warning devices are installed.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Richard Blumenthal to
Richard Anderson
Implementation of Positive Train Control. Mr. Anderson, under one
scenario, Metro-North completely implements PTC by December 31, 2018.
That's the only acceptable option in my book.
Under a second scenario, Metro-North does just enough to get a
series of extensions of the deadline to implement from the FRA--known
technically as the ``alternative schedule.''
I want to consider the impact of a third, nightmare scenario:
Metro-North fails to qualify for any extension at all. In that
scenario, several things would happen. Metro-North should be properly
penalized. But Metro-North would not be the only railroad affected by
its failure to comply with the law. Amtrak would be, too. If Metro-
North's track isn't PTC-compliant, I understand Amtrak will need to act
accordingly. That means Amtrak service could completely cease on track
in Connecticut from the New York border to New Haven. That could sever
one of the country's key transportation arteries, leading to even more
congestion on the highways and in the air up and down the Eastern
Seaboard.
In your testimony you envision this problem. You state, ``For any
such route segments'' without PTC implemented or having failed to
qualify for an ``alternative schedule,'' ``Amtrak will suspend
operations until such time as the carrier becomes compliant with the
law.''
Question 1. Does this statement apply to Metro-North?
Answer. At present, we believe that Metro-North will qualify for an
extension but we recommend you seek confirmation of this status with
them directly. As you know, Amtrak will conduct risk assessments for
all routes which do not have operable PTC by December 31, 2018. The
risk assessment outcome will result in developing operational and/or
technological recommended enhancements on a route-by-route basis that
we can deploy until PTC is operational. However, if Metro-North were to
fail to qualify for an extension at all, Amtrak would not be able to
operate over their infrastructure.
Question 2. What would happen to the riders who depend on Amtrak
service between New York and Boston if Metro-North fails to implement
PTC by December 31, 2018, or qualify for any extension?
Answer. Amtrak does not have a plan at this time since we have been
informed by Metro-North that they expect to meet the deadline or file
for an extension. However, this segment is not owned by Amtrak. The
host railroad, Metro-North, should be able to provide an update on
progress for implementation.
Question 3. Are you confident that in 2019 you will be able to
continue service on tracks you currently use between New York and
Boston?
Answer. Yes.
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