[Senate Hearing 115-674, Part 1]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 115-674, Pt. 1
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR
APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2019 AND
THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
S. 2987
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2019 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION,
TO PRESCRIBE MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
__________
PART 1
U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND AND U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND
U.S. CYBER COMMAND
U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND
U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND AND U.S. AFRICA COMMAND
U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND
U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE PROGRAMS
U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
ARMY POSTURE
NAVY POSTURE
AIR FORCE POSTURE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET POSTURE
__________
FEBRUARY 15, 27; MARCH 8, 13, 15, 20, 22; APRIL 10, 12, 19, 24, 26,
2018
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
42-143 PDF WASHINGTON : 2020
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma, Chairman JACK REED, Rhode Island
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi BILL NELSON, Florida
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
TOM COTTON, Arkansas JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
JONI ERNST, Iowa RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia TIM KAINE, Virginia
TED CRUZ, Texas ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
BEN SASSE, Nebraska ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
LUTHER STRANGE, Alabama GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
Christian D. Brose, Staff Director
Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
_________________________________________________________________
February 15, 2018
Page
United States Northern Command and United States Southern
Command........................................................ 1
Robinson, General Lori J., USAF, Commander, United States
Northern
Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command........... 3
Tidd, Admiral Kurt W., USN, Commander, United States Southern
Command........................................................ 26
Questions for the Record......................................... 91
February 27, 2018
United States Cyber Command...................................... 103
Rogers, Admiral Michael S., USN, Commander, United States Cyber
Command;
Director, National Security Agency; and Chief, Central
Security Services 106
Questions for the Record......................................... 155
March 8, 2018
United States European Command................................... 161
Scaparrotti, General Curtis M., USA, Commander, United States 164
European Command, and NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe.
Questions for the Record......................................... 206
APPENDIX A....................................................... 223
March 13, 2018
United States Central Command and United States Africa Command... 297
Votel, General Joseph L. USA, Commander, United States Central 301
Command.
Waldhauser, General Thomas D., USMC, Commander, United States 321
Africa Command.
Questions for the Record......................................... 367
March 15, 2018
United States Pacific Command.................................... 375
Harris, Admiral Harry B., Jr., USN, Commander, United States 379
PacificCommand.
Questions for the Record......................................... 443
March 20, 2018
United States Strategic Command.................................. 455
Hyten, General John E., USAF, Commander, United States Strategic 457
Command.
Questions for the Record......................................... 500
(iii)
March 22, 2018
Page
Challenges in the Department of Energy's Atomic Energy Defense 505
Programs.
Perry, Honorable J. Richard, Secretary of Energy................. 507
Questions for the Record......................................... 546
APPENDIX A....................................................... 550
APPENDIX B....................................................... 555
April 10, 2018
United States Transportation Command............................. 567
McDew, General Darren W., USAF, Commander, United States 569
Transportation Command.
Questions for the Record......................................... 601
April 12, 2018
Army Posture..................................................... 609
Esper, Honorable Mark T., Secretary of the Army.................. 610
Milley, General Mark A., USA, Chief of Staff of the Army......... 613
Questions for the Record......................................... 658
April 19, 2018
Navy Posture..................................................... 671
Spencer, Honorable Richard V. Secretary of the Navy.............. 673
Richardson, Admiral John M., USN, Chief of Naval Operations...... 679
Neller, General Robert B., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps.. 683
Questions for the Record......................................... 736
April 24, 2018
Air Force Posture................................................ 765
Wilson, Honorable Heather A., Secretary of the Air Force......... 767
Goldfein, General David L., Chief of Staff, United States Air 774
Force.
Questions for the Record......................................... 815
April 26, 2018
Department of Defense Budget Posture............................. 837
Mattis, The Honorable James N., Secretary of Defense; Accompanied 840
by Honorable David L. Norquist, Under Secretary of Defense,
Comptroller.
Dunford, General Joseph F., Jr., USMC, Chairman of the Joint 856
Chiefs of Staff.
Questions for the Record......................................... 906
APPENDIX A....................................................... 927
(iv)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2019 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 2018
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND AND UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m. in Room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe
presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker,
Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue,
Sasse, Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, Shaheen, Blumenthal, Donnelly,
Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, and Peters.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Senator Inhofe. We will call the meeting to order.
We are going to receive testimony from two of my favorite
people. General Lori Robinson--I have to say that I taught her
everything she knows from when she was the wing commander at
Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma. Kurt Tidd, Commander for the
U.S. Southern Command [SOUTHCOM].
I think there is a lot of overlap--we have talked. All
three of us have talked about this--between the north and the
south command. I think that is one reason that Senator McCain
would want to have these meetings together.
The new National Defense Strategy, the NDS, identifies
protecting the Homeland, sustaining American advantages in the
western hemisphere as key priorities even as the DOD
[Department of Defense] focuses on the rising challenge of
great power competitors. As we have seen from increasing
economic and military efforts by China and by Russia to gain a
foothold in the Americas, the boundaries between great power
competition and unconventional threats are increasingly
blurred. I think that is one reason when General Dunford made
the observation that we are losing our qualitative and
quantitative edge on China and Russia.
General Robinson, you are tasked with addressing the
missile and nuclear threats that we face, and while I am
encouraged by recent efforts to bolster our Homeland missile
defense system, more needs to be done to address the ballistic
and cruise missile threats. I think particularly recently we
have observed others gaining talents that we were not convinced
that they already had.
Admiral Tidd, in SOUTHCOM, you are on the front lines
combating illicit networks, smuggling drugs, people, weapons,
and money and destabilize every country along the way. You also
face involvement in external actors that present unique
challenges in the theater and lack sufficient resources.
I think that we have a lot in common, and for that reason,
we are having these together. We look forward to your
testimony. I appreciate the time that each one of you spent in
our office talking about the challenges you guys have.
Senator Reed?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let
me join you in welcome our witnesses: General Robinson and
Admiral Tidd. Thank you for your extraordinary service to the
nation. Please convey our thanks to the men and women in your
commands who, as we all know, do the job every day for us.
Thank you.
General Robinson, your mission is to protect the Homeland
to deter and defeat attacks on the United States and support
civil authorities in mitigating the effects of attacks and
natural disasters. We saw this demonstrated in DOD's support to
the States and territories affected by hurricanes, wildfires,
and floods in this past year, and we thank you for that.
You are also dual-hatted as the Commander of the North
American Aerospace Defense Command, NORAD, which brings unique
responsibilities and partnering opportunities with Canada to
deter and defend against threats to our nation.
You are also responsible for the operation of our Homeland
ballistic missile defense system. We look forward to hearing
about your priorities for further improvements to the ground-
based missile defense system. This is particularly important in
light of the growing threat from North Korea.
Lastly, your relationship with the military leadership in
Mexico, along with your collaboration with Admiral Tidd and
other federal agencies, is crucial to promoting security along
our southern border. A number of problems at the border
originate in the SOUTHCOM area of operations and efforts to
address those problems require a whole-of-government approach.
Admiral Tidd, you are on the front lines of a significant
threat facing our nation, the opioid crisis. In 2016, we saw
64,000 deaths from drug overdoses, an increase from 52,000 in
2015. What has made the crisis worse is that more and more
Americans addicted to opioids are turning to other dangerous
drugs that are flowing into our borders from Central and South
America and Asia. The flow of heroin and cocaine and other
drugs like fentanyl into the country is exacerbating this
crisis. Cocaine production in Colombia is up, as we spoke in
our office, and is destabilizing the countries of the Northern
Triangle as it works our way to our border and destroys lives
here.
I was very encouraged to hear that SOUTHCOM held an opioid
conference last week which brought all the government
stakeholders together to work on this problem. Because it is
important to recognize, while our military has an important
role to play in the fight against narcotics in this country, we
will only win against this threat with adequate resources for
domestic agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration, the
Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Department of Health
and Human Services. Admiral Tidd, I look forward to hearing
from you about the outcome of the conference and about
SOUTHCOM's effort to counter the flow of narcotics into the
United States.
In addition, China and Russia have been increasingly active
in Central and South America, committing millions of dollars of
investment and partnering with Latin American militaries.
Admiral Tidd, as you noted in your written statement, China has
pledged $500 billion in trade with Latin American countries and
$250 billion in Chinese direct investment over the next 10
years. Increased economic cooperation and the continued
provision of financing and loans that appear to have no strings
attached provide ample opportunity for China to expand its
influence over key regional partners and promote unfair
business practices and labor practices. I am concerned because
of the cuts to our State Department and USAID [United States
Agency for International Development], we are not doing
everything we can to position ourselves as a partner of choice
for our neighbors in the region. Admiral Tidd, I would like to
hear from you on how China and Russia are investing in Central
and South America and how they pose a national security threat
to the United States.
Finally, we are all observing the humanitarian crisis in
Venezuela. We would like your perspectives on how much longer
the regime can survive and how the crisis will affect
neighboring countries. I am especially concerned about
Colombia, which is already struggling to implement its
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process and is
ill-equipped to deal with a long-term refugee problem in the
border region.
General Robinson, Admiral Tidd, again thank you for your
service.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
We will go ahead and hear opening statements by both of our
witnesses and try to confine them to 5 minutes, if you can.
Your entire statement will be made a part of the record. Let us
start with you, General Robinson.
General Robinson, I just found out that your husband was
best friends and a fellow F-16 pilot with my best friend,
Charles Sublett, in Oklahoma, and I was not aware of this. I do
not know how that went unnoticed.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL LORI J. ROBINSON, USAF, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES NORTHERN COMMAND AND NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE
COMMAND
General Robinson. Well, sir, you know, when you bring him
to the witness table, he has to tell the truth, noting but the
truth.
Senator Inhofe. I will share that was Charles.
General Robinson. Yes, sir, please do. Please do.
First of all, I would really like to say--we know that he
is a figure here--to Senator McCain and his family and that I
know all of our thoughts and prayers are with him. I just
wanted to extend that. I think that is incredibly important.
Senator Inhofe, Senator Reed, all the distinguished members
of the committee, I am honored to join you today. David and I
are honored to join you today to testify alongside my friend,
my shipmate, more importantly, my wingman, Kurt Tidd. He and I
do things arm in arm.
The year 2017 was a challenging year. NORTHCOM and NORAD
addressed proactive actions by our adversaries while
simultaneously providing defense support to civil authorities
during an historic series of natural disasters that required
significant military capabilities and military manpower.
However, I will say that those challenges were definitely
handled by a team of absolute professionals. I cannot tell you,
sir, how much I am proud to represent all of them here today.
In my 21 months as the Commander of NORAD and U.S. Northern
Command, I have been so impressed by the dedication and
vigilance shown by the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines,
coast guardsmen, civilians, Americans, and Canadians who stand
ready to defend our nations and our fellow citizens.
Looking forward, I see no reason to believe that the
threats to our Homeland will decrease. Our adversaries continue
to extend their operational reach and are developing new
capabilities to range targets in North America and in Canada.
Our preparation for these threats relies on a dependable
budget. We appreciate all that this committee has done to help
reach the 2-year budget agreement. In 2018, National Defense
Strategy recognizes a return to great power competition and
lays out a long-term strategy for addressing provocative
behavior by China and Russia.
In NORAD and U.S. Northern Command, we understand the
urgency of keeping pace with these evolving threats. We also
recognize that North Korea represents the most immediate threat
to our Homeland and therefore remains NORTHCOM's highest
priority. In the past year, Kim Jong-un has demonstrated
several successful ICBM [Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles]
tests. We continue to watch their developments closely and are
prepared to defend the United States. I want to assure this
committee today that I am confident that I can defend the
United States.
While I am confident that we can defeat this threat today,
it is critical that we continue to improve the ballistic
missile defense enterprise with emphasis on the development of
improved sensor networks, combined with interceptor capability
and capacity and reliability. We continue to work with the
Missile Defense Agency, the intelligence community, and other
combatant commands to ensure our collaborative effort in
outpacing the threat.
Russia continues to modernize its long-range bombers and
its submarines and has developed new cruise missiles with the
capability to hold targets at risk at ranges that we have not
seen before. To defend against advanced cruise missiles, it is
important that we continue to make prudent and savvy
investments in advanced sensors and defensive weapon systems.
The strategic advancements in Russian submarine fleets to
demonstrate their capability to threaten our Homeland for the
years to come. The threats are the most serious. However, we
remain vigilant against the adapting threat of terrorism, as
well as unpredictable natural disasters.
As we review the 2017 hurricane response and prepare for
the 2018 season, we are working with our mission partners to
include the active, guard, reserve forces to incorporate the
lessons learned to ensure that we provide our best support to
lead federal agencies.
With respect to Canada, we are building interoperability
across domains with a tri-command framework that is comprised
of NORTHCOM, NORAD, and the Canadian Joint Operations Command.
This arrangement allows further planning integration while
preserving our ability to conduct unilateral missions.
With respect to Mexico, our military-to-military
relationship with the Mexican secretariats of national defense,
SEDENA and SEMAR, is unbelievably strong. We focus on
illuminating the pathways used to transit illicit goods with my
partner here, Admiral Tidd, with our interagency partners,
SOUTHCOM and SOCOM [Special Operations Command]. Theater
security cooperation is an essential part of strengthening
continental defense and builds relationships essential for
future cooperation.
By the way, this year we have the 60th anniversary of
NORAD. Throughout its long history, this binational command has
seen several evolutions in the air domain, and we are proud of
that. The men and women of United States Northern Command and
NORAD stand united in a common purpose ready to face the
threats of the United States and Canada today, and we are
evolving to face the threats of tomorrow.
I need all of you to know that we have the watch, but I
also need you to know while, Senators, today you are going to
ask about me and about our capabilities and the things that we
need--I want you to know that we could not do it without our
families. If it was not for our families and our steadfast
things that keep us grounded, we would not be able to be where
we are today. I want to say thank you to my husband, who is
here today representing all the families of United States NORAD
and Northern Command, because without them, we would not have
the standard.
So, Senator, back to you.
[The prepared statement of General Robinson follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, General Robinson.
Admiral Tidd?
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL KURT W. TIDD, USN, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND
Admiral Tidd. Senator Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and
members of this committee, thank you for this opportunity to
address you today. I join my colleague and partner, General
Robinson, in extending our very best, warmest wishes to Senator
McCain and to his family, and he is in our thoughts and prayers
today.
Also in our thoughts and prayers are the victims and family
members of yesterday's tragedy in Parkland, Florida. As you
probably know, some of our Southern Command teammates have
children who were present during the incident but were,
fortunately, unharmed. We greatly appreciate the first
responders, the faculty members, and other students whose
actions no doubt saved lives.
Now, as I said, I am here with my good friend and my
teammate, General Lori Robinson. We are products of the
intentions of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation that led to an
emphasis on jointness. This is not the first time that we have
appeared together. This is not the first time that we have
worked together. In fact, our partnership goes back over a
decade. I would just like to say that it is absolutely very
much appropriate and fitting that we have the opportunity to
talk to you today about the western hemisphere security
challenges.
I look forward to discussing how our two commands work
together and to ensure that there is an absolutely seamless
defense of our Homeland.
Over the past year, SOUTHCOM has focused on building a
regional security network of principled, inclusive
partnerships. Partners throughout Latin America and the
Caribbean are working with each other and with us on a range of
shared challenges.
These challenges manifest themselves in our hemisphere in
several concerning ways. Criminal and extremist networks
continue to threaten regional stability and our national
security. We know of specific cases of individuals who were
involved in plots to attack our Homeland or our partners.
Fortunately, they were stopped but this remains a significant,
persistent concern.
Competitors like China and Russia seek to exploit the
perception that we are disengaging from the Americas, and as
they succeed in their efforts comes an increased ability for
them to interfere with our security relationships and to hold
our interests at risk. These challenges are less overt and
sometimes more insidious than in other theaters. They are
manageable with modest investment, sufficient attention, and
early engagement. For SOUTHCOM, that involves tools that
strengthen relationships and build capacity.
Now, we are not talking about brigade combat teams or
aircraft carriers in our theater. We are talking about small
teams of general purpose and special operations forces to
maintain critical training engagements. We are talking about
medium endurance ships with embarked helicopters and
particularly those that are interoperable with our partners and
with enough awareness to buy down risk against problems early
and stop threats at their source before they become more
costly.
We appreciate the attention of Congress to this region and
thank this committee for its support to the mission and the men
and women of SOUTHCOM and to our families.
I look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Tidd follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Inhofe. Okay, Admiral, thank you very much. I
appreciate it.
You just said in your opening statement, General Robinson,
that I can defend the United States today. I know that is true.
You and I have talked about this. But at what level of risk?
You know, when General Milley said--this is a quote. Before
this committee, he said the most important of many challenges
we face is consistent, sustained, predictable funding over
time. Now, we corrected that a little bit with our 2018 budget.
So it is kind of predictable between now until the year 2020,
but then it becomes unpredictable again.
I would like to have both of you just very briefly tell us
at what level of risk are we able to do what we have to do
today that you can tie directly to the unpredictability of the
budget.
General Robinson. So, sir, I will start and then I will
turn it over to the Admiral.
To me, predictability is everything. As a consumer of
readiness, as the one that has to use the things that the
service chiefs have to organize, train, and equip for, for me
what is important is to understand what I have got out there
for capabilities. So I am telling you today I can defend the
United States of America when it comes to ballistic missile
defense, given what we have done from a funding perspective but
as importantly what we did with the ATR and adding capability,
capacity in Alaska and what we continue to do with
discriminating radars. So all of those things I am comfortable
for. But we have to allow the services to be able to plan
because they are the ones that provide us that readiness.
Senator Inhofe. Admiral?
Admiral Tidd. Sir, as you and I have discussed, anything
that challenges the services' ability to provide the forces
that we request to be able to effectively secure the southern
approaches to the United States is a challenge. Budget
unpredictability has probably been the single greatest impact
on their ability to provide those forces.
The challenge that we have, when it comes to awareness of
what is going on in the environment--we have already discussed
our ISR [Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance] requirement.
We receive about 8 percent of what we have asked for. I am very
appreciative of the fact that about half of that has been
provided as a direct result of creative contract ISR
capabilities that the Congress has so generously funded. But
that still is an enormous challenge.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, not just for you but for all commands.
We hear that all the time, and that is one that we really need
to be direct.
Senator Reed brought up China. I actually read your
statement. Now, you did not cover it in your abbreviated
message this morning, but you made a statement in there that
caught my eye. You said that China in particular is increasing
aggressive and courting IMET [International and Military
Education and Training] students from the region to attend
their military school. I have never heard that before. Now, I
know in Africa, the IMET program is singularly one of the
really truly great programs we have. Once we get them in with
us, they are there for life, and we see evidence of this all
the time. I was not aware that China is actually trying to move
into that.
Could you kind of share that?
Admiral Tidd. Senator, I have long felt that the IMET
program is probably our single greatest long-term investment,
value for the dollar that we put into it. I would just
highlight that it is an investment that sometimes may take 2
decades or more to pay off, but when it pays off, it pays off
with relationships with strategic partners that are absolutely
critical. It creates the personal contacts that many of the
military leaders from across the region that I work with on a
day-to-day basis have participated in the IMET program, have
studied at our war colleges, gone to our service schools.
China watches that very closely. They have recognized the
value of that strategic investment. They basically have taken a
leaf out of our book and they are very lavishly funding to
bring senior military officers from a variety of key countries
around our region to China for very lavishly expensed, all-
expense-paid trips for them, for their families to be able to
live a very high lifestyle in the countries.
There is still a recognition from our partners that the
greatest value comes from studying in the United States. We
believe our country sells itself, and when people come here,
they get to know who we are, who our country really is, the
values that we truly represent. We think that is a very, very
important----
Senator Inhofe. Yes. We have always said once we get them
over here, we have got them forever. That has been my
experience particularly in Africa because they are there. It is
very disturbing to me to hear that statement or observation
that you made that they are actually going after the same
individuals that we have already had. This is disturbing. It
has given us something new to address, and I appreciate that
very much.
Senator Reed?
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me concur. IMET is absolutely critical. In a way I have
personal connections. Two of my classmates from West Point
later went on to become chief of service in the Philippines and
in Thailand. They have been staunch defenders of their
countries but also our relationship. I think the President of
Costa Rica was a West Point graduate, at least one of them.
That program is funded by the State Department. Correct?
Admiral Tidd. Yes, Senator, that is correct.
Senator Reed. It is another example of, particularly in
both of your commands, where whole-of-government--without
funding State, there is no IMET. When we see some of these
proposed cuts to State, it will play out in fewer opportunities
for students to go to American war colleges, American military
academies, et cetera. Is that accurate?
Admiral Tidd. Senator, I would agree completely.
Senator Reed. In fact, again both of you represent in
critical ways the need for not just the Department of Defense
but Department of State, Homeland Security--Coast Guard cutters
are part of your intercept plan for narcotics. In fact, what
percentage of the destination of cargos that you knew were en
route can you intercept?
Admiral Tidd. Senator, the challenge that we face right now
is about 25 percent of vessels that we know that are
transporting illicit materials--we can intercept about 25
percent.
Senator Reed. So a quarter. If we could invest more in the
Coast Guard, presumably we could intercept more than 25 percent
of the ships.
Admiral Tidd. Senator, I believe security in our theater is
a team sport. It requires the efforts of many departments and
agencies.
Senator Reed. Again, I think both you and General Robinson
illustrate so dramatically how we have to get adequate funding
for every significant national security component whether they
are in the Defense Department or outside the Defense
Department.
General Robinson, when you say you can defend the nation
against missile attack, you are referring to a limited missile
attack by a country such as North Korea. Correct?
General Robinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. You are not making a generalized statement.
General Robinson. No, sir.
Senator Reed. Thank you. I just want to make that clear for
the record.
General Robinson. I will defer all that to General Hyten.
Senator Reed. In that issue you raised in your testimony,
there is the constant tension between capacity and capability.
General Robinson. Yes.
Senator Reed. We are investing lots of dollars in increased
capacity. That is going to take a while, 5, 6, 7, or 8 years to
get some of these new fields up. But at the immediate moment,
we have real issues of capability whether we can effectively
take down through sensors, through shot doctrine, through the
kill vehicle anything coming at us. Particularly,
unfortunately, the offense in this game seems to have an
advantage if they can deploy decoys or multiple-stage rockets.
Can you comment now about this issue of where we should be
focusing and how we should do it?
General Robinson. Yes. Sir, I have to tell you I am
completely comfortable with where we are. The fact that in the
above threshold reprogramming that we added capacity and then
the redesigned kill vehicles--and I think it is 2022 when we
will have those. At the same time, we are looking at
discriminating radar. So in 2019, we are going to add the long-
range discriminating radars to Alaska. We are going to add
radars to Hawaii, and we are going to do a study on what we
need as we look at Cobra Dane coming down. Thank you to the
committee for funding Cobra Dane until we figure all this out.
I am very comfortable where we are.
I think as we look at the discrimination of radars, we look
at the capacity of the fields in Alaska, I think we are in a
really good place because when we sit back and look at what Kim
Jong-un has done, he is looking at capability. You and I talked
about this. He has not built up capacity yet. Right now, our
capacity is very good where we are and as we continue to move
forward.
Senator Reed. Are you satisfied with the schedule, the
frequency, and the rigor of the testing of the system, the
actual testing?
General Robinson. I am very comfortable. You know, one of
the things that I say about Kim Jong-un all the time is that he
is not afraid to fail in public. You learn as much from failure
as you do from success. I am very comfortable where we are with
our testing and where we are going in the future. I rely very
much on General Reaves and where MDA [Missile Defense Agency]
is going, and he and I talk all the time.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
General Robinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. Again, thank you both for your service.
General Robinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Wicker?
Senator Wicker. Admiral Tidd, thank you. Thank you both for
your testimony and your service.
Admiral, our strategy now is great power competition first
and foremost. Senator Inhofe asked you to drill down on China.
So let me ask you to turn to Russia, which you discuss
extensively in your written testimony. You mentioned Cuba,
Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Is that principally where they are
playing? What are they trying to do there and where else do we
need to be concerned?
Admiral Tidd. Senator, those are the countries in which
previously the Soviet Union had a longstanding relationship and
Russia has continued that relationship. However, they continue
to engage in a direct competition for influence with some of
our key partners around the region.
Our challenge is to be able to disprove the false narrative
that Russia peddles in the region, that the United States is
withdrawing, that we are not a reliable partner. Many of the
actions that we engage in are directly intended to show our
partners, who are very much interested in working with us, that
we in fact share common interests. We certainly share common
democratic values and principles, which neither Russia nor
China share.
Senator Wicker. You are not a diplomat. You are a military
person. But if the President's new openness to the Trans-
Pacific Partnership advances, would that be helpful to us in
making the point that we can be a reliable partner?
Admiral Tidd. Senator, I do not profess to be either a
diplomat or an economist, but I would just observe that the
things that we do to show our partners directly--and we have
Pacific-facing nations within the SOUTHCOM region--anything
that we can do to show that we are reliable partners is
valuable.
Senator Wicker. To what extent are we comfortable with the
militaries of these countries subscribing to the position that
we advocate and that we are the great standard of the military
being answerable to the civilian leadership? To what extent are
the members of their legislative bodies significant players in
this regard?
Admiral Tidd. Senator, I think each of the countries
differs slightly. My relationships are with the military
leaders of the countries. My observations and my conversations
genuinely reflect that they recognize and are grounded in the
same democratic principles that really are characteristic, that
were the founding characteristics of the Americas community. I
think as we have seen, as a number of elections that have
occurred throughout the region that led to changes in
government positions, the militaries in each instance have
played a very reasoned, responsible role, and they recognize
that the ability to freely and fairly express democratic
preferences as enshrined in the background of this theater have
been respected. The one country I think that I would highlight,
though, that has been singularly contrary to that has been
Venezuela where recent elections have been neither free nor
fair.
Senator Wicker. Very good.
Let me ask you quickly to shift to the ships, the role of
the Coast Guard there. Clearly for you, it is going to continue
being almost totally Coast Guard. If you could take a moment to
say how you plan to integrate unmanned systems into your
platform.
Admiral Tidd. Senator, I have said before on a number of
occasions in the USSOUTHCOM region, my maritime force has white
hulls and orange stripes. Frankly, if it were not for the
United States Coast Guard and the significant effort by the
Commandant, we would not have a maritime presence. That is not
because my parent service, the United States Navy, does not
recognize the very significant importance of the region. It is
just a matter of strategic priorities and availability of
forces, and we run out of forces before we run out of mission.
The Coast Guard cutters that have been participating are
irreplaceable. The national security cutters, terrific when we
get them. But the real workhorse, the cop on the beat vessels,
are those medium endurance cutters, many of which are past 30
years in age. Some were built in the 1960s, and so the
recapitalization of those medium endurance cutters with the
offshore patrol cutters I view as extremely important to
USSOUTHCOM's ability to provide an adequate maritime presence
in our region.
Senator Wicker. Unmanned?
Admiral Tidd. Unmanned vessels? Unmanned aerial vehicles.
There are some challenges procedurally to incorporate them in
the missions that we are engaged in, but we are actively
exploring efforts to be able to do that.
Senator Wicker. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Peters?
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
To our two witnesses, thank you for your service to our
country. Thank you for being here today.
General Robinson, I am certainly pleased to hear that you
have great confidence in our missile defense capabilities. I
would also like to have you expand a little bit on how we can
continue to strengthen those capabilities. We currently have,
obviously, the site in California, as well as in Alaska. There
is talk about having an east coast site that would provide
additional capabilities, particularly given the potential
threat from Iran at some point in the future. If you could talk
a little bit about what the advantages would be to add a
ground-based interceptor capacity at another location in
addition to the two we have.
General Robinson. Sir, thanks for that.
I tell everybody that I watch North Korea with an eyeball
and a half to North Korea and then a half an eyeball to Iran.
As I continue to watch them work on their space launch
vehicles, I know that they can maybe quickly transfer that to
an intercontinental ballistic missile defense capability. Right
now, they are very regional, and they are staying within the
JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action].
As I work very closely with Missile Defense Agency
understanding what we can do from Alaska and California, I
ensure that I have the battlespace that I need to defend from
the east coast. I pay attention to that each and every day, and
as the Missile Defense Agency is working their way through what
does it look like for an east coast site, I ensure that my
words and the battlespace that I need are there to defend the
United States.
Senator Peters. Thank you, General.
General Robinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Peters. Admiral Tidd, you mentioned in some of your
earlier testimony the situation in Venezuela and one that you
are concerned about. Could you elaborate a little bit as to how
concerned you are with what we are seeing in Venezuela?
Admiral Tidd. Senator, I think the fact that it is a matter
of very significant concern to the nations that neighbor
Venezuela is probably the most important piece to point out. As
we have seen, the impact on Venezuelans who are fleeing the
absolutely abominable economic conditions in the country puts a
severe burden on the school systems, medical systems, the
social support infrastructures particularly of Colombia where
over 500,000 Venezuelans have now entered Colombia. It is
putting an increasingly growing strain on Brazil where we have
seen tens of thousands that have come across. It also places a
significant burden on Guyana, on countries like Curacao and
Aruba, as well as Trinidad and Tobago. It is having a very
significant impact on those countries, and those countries
recognize that they are going to have to be able to deal with
this humanitarian crisis.
Senator Peters. It is certainly very destabilizing to many
of our allies and friends in that area.
I would like you to comment, if you would, on the
involvement of Cuba in Venezuela. Things that I have read--
there are commentators who believe that there are hundreds to
perhaps thousands of Cuban troops in Venezuela. Some have said
this is a play right out of the old Castro playbook. What is
your assessment of Cuban influence in Venezuela, and how is
that contributing to the instability that we are seeing?
Admiral Tidd. Senator, I think we have read some of the
same documents, both open source and other. When I talk with,
again, my counterparts in the region, they have been quick to
share that we see significant presence of Cuban advisors to the
security forces that continue to prop up the Maduro regime. I
just think it is a matter of concern.
Senator Peters. Well, thank you. I appreciate your
testimony.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Rounds?
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Robinson and Admiral Tidd, first of all, let me
just say thank you very much for your service to our country.
Admiral Tidd, I would like to go back a little bit to what
Senator Wicker was discussing with you. Basically in recent
years, China, Russia, and Iran have all increased their
activities in the western hemisphere from economic investments
to military sales and engagement. Which of these competitors
concerns you the most in your areas of responsibility? What are
doing to maintain and expand our position as a partner of
choice to Latin American and Caribbean nations? I understand
the desire--and as you said earlier, you recognize that you
will do what is necessary. I am wondering if you can give us
some specific areas that you either intend to move forward with
or that you would need additional assistance with.
Admiral Tidd. Well, Senator, without parsing, I think as
the new National Defense Strategy has clearly articulated,
Russia and China are significant concerns. They are global
concerns and so they are of concern because they are very
present and aggressive in the USSOUTHCOM theater.
Iran also is present. Particularly worrisome is their proxy
Hezbollah, which is an area that we have been watching for
many, many years and is an item of concern.
When it comes specifically to Russia and China, the very
best thing that we can do is to be the best possible partners
that we can with countries who are absolutely interested,
committed, want to work with us. Sometimes there are just
things that make it difficult for us to be the best partner
that we can. Sometimes it is adequate forces for us to be able
to engage with them and so to be able to conduct meaningful
exercises with them, but also sometimes our ability to be able
to work with them and facilitate the kinds of information
sharing that is critical to having an effective common defense
for the challenges that we face.
Senator Rounds. Let me work my way through it a little bit
because I am really curious about such things as foreign
military sales or foreign military financing for those military
sales, international military education and training, the
impact and so forth. Can you talk a little bit about those
specific ones with regard to our ability to not only provide
them with resources but also the training as well? Where are we
at right now with those same partners? Is that working or is it
not working? Do we have the resources allocated there that we
need?
Admiral Tidd. Well, Senator, I do not know a theater
commander who says he has got as many resources as he or she
would like to have, but I would say that particularly with
regard to the programs that you mentioned, FMS [Foreign
Military Sales] and the IMET program, it is a small pie to
begin with. The SOUTHCOM allocation of that pie is smaller
still based on global priorities. Our challenge is to make that
small slice of the pie go as far as it possibly can.
Now, sometimes programs that we offer--it is expensive for
our partners to be able to come and live in the United States
and bring their families with them and spend the time here. So
that is where we really try to maximize both the number who are
able to come and I guess the quality and the quantity, if you
will, and finding that balance point can be a real challenge.
I think as far as particularly the IMET program, if there
was one program that I would say is a long-term strategic
investment--and like financial investments, sometimes they take
a while to pay off, but when they pay off, they are absolutely
priceless.
Senator Rounds. Okay, thank you.
General Robinson, our 114th fighter wing in Sioux Falls has
been flying alert missions out of the March Air Base in
California since 2012. We have four jets constantly deployed
there and crews on a 24-hour flying alert basis that really are
part of that critical defense team for our nation. NORAD
recently requested 72 upgraded ASR [Airport Surveillance Radar]
radars through a joint urgent operational needs request, and
they have been funded to include for the aircraft of the 114th.
The problem is that there are over 300 Air National Guard F-
16's, and we are only going to modify 72 of them with this
radar.
Our worry is that we will put real heavy wear and tear on
those specific modified aircraft, and that we will only modify
a handful of the aircraft, thus really wearing out that
particular group.
The cost to upgrade these jets is approximately $2.1
million per jet, and compared to the additional capability
gained, it is probably a pretty good buy.
Can you talk a little bit about your perspectives on
whether or not we should upgrade the remaining F-16's in the
Air National Guard alert squadron so that we are not focusing
just on those 72 with that capability?
General Robinson. Yes, sir. I am working very closely with
the Air Force on this. First of all, I am grateful to be able
to modify those jets because that just happened recently. So
that I think is a really good deal. But I continue to work with
the Air Force on what does it look like as we not just modify
airplanes but what does the transition to F-35's look like. I
will look closely and ensure that not only do we not rely
heavily on just those, but what does the long-term transition
plan look like.
Senator Rounds. Very good. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for your service and for your testimony
today.
General Robinson, I especially appreciate your comments
about the support that everyone in the military receives and at
NORAD from your families. I know that sentiment is shared by
everyone on this committee. Thank you both.
Admiral Tidd, I want to go back to Senator Reed's question
I think about the 25 percent. Did you characterize that as 25
percent of the missions that you could do, you are able to do,
and because of the lack of resources, not able to do more than
that?
Admiral Tidd. Senator, I think the way that we describe it
and to clarify is we have pretty good situational awareness on
an awful lot of the trafficking that is occurring, and that is
based on a very close partnership with a variety of countries
in the region, most notably with Colombia. Of the known tracks
that we are aware of--and we think we have got a pretty good
handle--we are only able to intercept about 25 percent, about
one-quarter.
Senator Shaheen. Well, I am sure you are both aware of the
challenges that we face with the opioid and heroin and drug
epidemic in this country. It has hit New Hampshire particularly
hard. Can you estimate, if you had the resources, that you
could use to do all of the missions that you would like for all
of the interdiction efforts that you are aware of, what
difference would that make in terms of the amount of drugs you
are able to interdict?
Admiral Tidd. Senator, you raise an excellent question. The
challenge that we have particularly with regard to opioids--
that is the reason we hosted the conference last week was
because we recognize that what we knew and the procedures that
we had in place did not seem to be having the kind of impact.
It is because the supply chain of that particular illicit
substance does not travel in the same way that the supply chain
for, if you roll the clock back, marijuana originally and then
cocaine where we have well-understood and identified source
zones, transit zones, arrival zones and we are able to lay
across those various pathways a variety of primarily law
enforcement but also intelligence community and military
resources to have an impact on them. The opioid problem is a
fundamentally different problem. We understand it is different.
I would say the value of last week's conference was
bringing together many, many, many of the agencies that touch
that problem at least on the interdiction side and recognize we
have got to do business differently. I am not prepared to tell
you that we have an answer to it yet, but we recognize the
scope of the problem, the seriousness of the problem, and the
work that remains to be done and our commitment to work
together to put in place a more effective mechanism than what
we are doing today.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
General Robinson, are you seeing similar on the northern
border with Canada--are you seeing similar traces of drug
runners coming across?
General Robinson. No, ma'am, not like what Admiral Tidd
would talk about.
The one thing I would like to also add and give Admiral
Tidd a lot of credit for is last month we had a meeting with he
and I and Admiral Duran from Colombia and Admiral Soberon from
Mexico to talk about as we watch things go from the land-based
transit to the ocean-based transit, those two folks talking to
each other about how do we decide how we are going to combat
this together. So under his leadership, we had Colombia present
a plan. We had Mexico present a plan. We had the U.S. present a
plan. Now the three of us are going to sit down and go what is
the best way we can do this from an open ocean perspective to
try to get after that. This is not a single dimension
conversation. This is a multi-dimension conversation, and it is
a multi-combatant command conversation, which to me is what is
really important is the fact that he and I stand side by side
doing this.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. I think it is very
important, as you all know. I hope that we can provide
additional resources to make sure that you are successful.
I want to pick up on another issue that Senator Reed raised
with respect to funding for the State Department. You both
talked about the importance of working across DOD and State in
terms of what you are trying to accomplish. We have seen a
proposed budget that would cut the Department of State by 30
percent. Can you quantify what that would mean in terms of your
operations and your efforts to work with State if they saw that
kind of a cut?
General Robinson. I do not know if I can give you a number
that would mean anything, but here is what I do know. Every
single day we talk about anything, Secretary Mattis diplomacy
leads. The fact of the matter that he says diplomacy leads,
then I know my role and responsibility is to support diplomacy.
I cannot say is that 10, 20, 25 percent, but I can tell you
that I know that I follow diplomacy.
Admiral Tidd. I would just add again--I cannot put a
number--but so many of the programs that are critical to
building effective partners across the region--actually they
come out of the State budget. We implement them, but we could
not do it if they are underfunded.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you both. I think that is a
very strong statement in terms of funding as we think about
increasing funding for the military and Department of Defense.
I know we are all on board for that, but we should also be on
board for funding for the State Department and our diplomatic
efforts.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Fischer?
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for being here today.
General Robinson, your opening statement discusses the
increasing capabilities of Russian cruise missiles to hold
targets in the Homeland at risk, and specifically you state,
``These systems present an increasing threat to North America
due to their long range, low radar cross section, and the
limited indications and warnings likely to be seen prior to a
combat launch.'' Can you elaborate and characterize this threat
in further detail, and how much does it concern you?
General Robinson. So, ma'am, here is what I would say. I
tell everybody we should often look at the map from the North
Pole down. I know Senator Sullivan does every single day. We
should look at the fact that Russia looks different if you look
at it that way.
Then every single day I would tell you I get an operations
and intelligence briefing that talks to me about where bombers
are, where submarines are, and what they are doing and what
their activity is. I pay attention to that every single day.
When I sit back and I look at that, I look at their
capability, what they are capable of. I look at their capacity
as they continue to train both their bomber pilots and their
submarine pilots. But I look at intent. In the air domain, as
the Commander of NORAD, I know from an intent perspective their
intentions--I do not see that. But that does not mean from a
strategic, long-term perspective, as we talked about in the
National Defense Strategy what Russia is out there doing.
But I have to tell you. I have to tell you. So one of the
things that we are doing is a northern approaches' surveillance
analysis of alternatives with Canada to understand what is
coming across the northern approaches, both Canada and Alaska,
because I look across the entire part as the Commander of
NORAD. What I have said to everybody is I want to be able to
detect, ID, track, and engage if necessary at ranges to defend
our Homeland. Those are the things I think about when I think
about Russia.
Senator Fischer. Your final comments there about being able
to detect early and then engage, if necessary--do you think we
have enough of that capability right now? I know that in fiscal
year 2017, the Air Force began upgrading the radars on the 72
National Guard F-16 fighters. Is that going to be sufficient
because is that not really our last line of defense at that
point?
General Robinson. Yes. So, ma'am, what I would say is that
is part of our Homeland defense phase one. In phase two, it
allows us to use our fighters and tactics, techniques, and
procedures to move out further than we were able to before. So
we appreciate the committee's support on that. But this is now
the longer-range part, if I look at the northern approaches,
specifically to be able to do that.
Senator Fischer. I happen to believe that our missile
defense system provides really an immense capability, and the
expansion of that system is going to help us to continue to
defend the Homeland as this threat increases.
Yet, over the weekend, General, we saw ``The New York
Times'' editorial board publish a column titled ``The Dangerous
Illusion of Missile Defense.'' In it they described our
Homeland defense system as riddled with flaws and repeated what
I consider an old, tired claim that tests were not conducted
under realistic conditions.
To be clear, do you have confidence in the ability of the
GMD system to defend the United States from a North Korean
ballistic missile attack today?
General Robinson. Ma'am, I am 100 percent confident in my
ability to defend the United States of America.
Senator Fischer. Do you believe the actions taken by
Congress and this administration to expand the system's
capacity and improve discrimination will enhance NORTHCOM's
ability to defend the Homeland from ballistic missile attack in
the future?
General Robinson. So, ma'am, I would tell you I appreciate
the above-threshold reprogramming for the capacity that we
gave, and I think that is helpful as we look at adding on to
that the redesigned kill vehicle, in addition to continued
work, which we need to do, with the discriminating radars.
Between all of those three things, I think we continue to
outpace everybody, and it gives me more and more confidence,
continued confidence of our ability to defend the United
States.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, General, for presenting
valuable information and very clear answers. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Donnelly?
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank both the witnesses. Thank you for meeting
this week as well.
I want to talk to you about what we talked about in my
office, which is the opioid crisis. Last week, the Centers for
Disease Control reported overdose deaths in Indiana increased
by 28 percent from July 2015 to July 2016. Over 1,700 Hoosiers
died from opioid overdoses. Only six States had larger
percentage increases. But this is a national epidemic. It is
getting worse, not better. Your commands are on the very front
lines of this battle.
How would you prioritize the opioid crisis in your command
priorities right now? General Robinson and then Admiral Tidd.
General Robinson. Sir, I take this opioid crisis as a
personal issue. When you sit back and you talked about it and
it is about families and it is about people, it is incredibly
important.
I sit down every month and I talk to the Secretary of DHS
[Department of Homeland Security]. I work very closely with my
subordinate commanders who work very closely with Mexico on all
of this.
This crisis is not something that I set aside. It is
something that I take very personally. What is important to me
is that I understand the support role that I can give to DHS
and the support role and information that I can give Mexico
which then translates to the things that I can give to Admiral
Tidd because the UCP [Unified Command Plan] line on the map
does not exist for Admiral Tidd and I, and so it is a very
personal thing.
Senator Donnelly. Admiral Tidd?
Admiral Tidd. Senator, I share General Robinson--this is a
crisis that has come to touch us all personally. The challenge
that we face is that how do you handle it. How do you deal with
it?
What became clear at our conference last week was the
United States Department of Defense cannot solve this problem
on its own. The Department of Homeland Security cannot solve
this problem on its own. Health and Human Services cannot solve
it on its own. It will only be through all of us working
together in a collaborative manner. That is why our approach at
USSOUTHCOM is to apply a threat network-based approach. That is
our number one priority is threat networks.
Senator Donnelly. I apologize because I have limited time.
These drugs are coming across from Mexico not through
unguarded areas or anything but through checkpoints in the back
of trucks. We are in a position of seeing the very checkpoints
we have in our country allowing trucks in, many of these trucks
loaded with drugs.
There are two questions. Number one is detection systems.
In regards to fentanyl, tracker dogs die because of the effects
of fentanyl on their mucus systems and other things. Where are
we in finding new detection systems so we can determine whether
these are in the trucks? Are we in a position where we simply
need to say, look, your refrigerator is not coming in today. It
is coming in in a month and a half because we are checking
every box in every truck because it is more important that a
young person in Logansport, Indiana be able to stay alive as
opposed to having your refrigerator come in on time. First is
detection systems, and second, should we just simply change the
way we do business at the border and check every single box
that comes in?
General Robinson. So, sir, I will tell you in the support
role that we do for DHS, we have the opportunity to provide
them some biometric detection capability. We have the
opportunity to provide marine sensor platoons at the border--
capability.
As you know and as you and I talked about yesterday, it is
very much in a support role and the things that we can do from
a technology capability. Last year in front of this committee,
as you and I chatted about yesterday, Senator McCain asked us
to talk about what are some of the technologies. We will come
talk to you about some of the things that we are doing to
provide and to support DHS.
Senator Donnelly. Admiral?
Admiral Tidd. Sir, all I can say is there is no single
silver bullet that is going to solve this problem. This is
going to take the very best efforts across the entire national
security team to be able to work together effectively.
Senator Donnelly. Is there a discussion about changing the
way we handle crossings at the border because that is where it
is coming through? Not that you know of.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Perdue?
Senator Perdue. Thank you both for being here. I have got a
question about the NDS [National Defense Strategy]. Three quick
questions before I get to the two on the NDS.
Admiral, to finish up on what Senator Shaheen was talking
about--and before I do that, I would be remiss as a Member of
the Senate not to apologize to both of you combatant commanders
on behalf of the United States Senate. Today we are officially
sitting in a continuing resolution again. You have my personal
commitment and resolve that before I leave the United States
Senate, we are going to do everything we can to get away from
this budget process that puts us in this detrimental, high-risk
situation. We are doing more to harm the security of our
country than any of these people we are talking about today
outside.
Sorry. Admiral, real quick. General Kelly talked about this
too, but you have talked about--there is an asset that you
could use in your AOR [Area of Responsibility] to actually
interdict more. We do not know what percentage we can get to. I
understand that. But you could close that gap without spending
a lot of money. Is that true?
Admiral Tidd. I think there are some platforms out there
that would be enormously helpful to us. Yes, sir.
Senator Perdue. What would one of those look like?
Admiral Tidd. I think a littoral combat ship would fit
perfectly into the mission space that we are----
Senator Perdue. Rotary wing capability as well?
Admiral Tidd. Absolutely. It is a package. It is a vessel
that is capable of operating in the eastern Pacific with rotary
wing, with interceptor boats as a package, coupled with
maritime patrol aircraft.
Senator Perdue. In Latin America, Russia today is supplying
40 percent of the arms sales. China is the second largest
trading partner in Latin America. Iran is in there through
Hezbollah.
The question I have is the NDS is pivoting toward near-peer
competitors. Heretofore, our mission in the last 15 to 17 years
was mainly about terrorism. You were underfunded in SOUTHCOM
because we were pushing resources out to the battle. Today the
battle looks like it is getting closer and closer to home. Are
you being resourced in order to support the NDS, and is the NDS
focusing enough on greater power threats, peer power threats in
our own hemisphere?
Admiral Tidd. Not yet. The NDS recognizes these challenging
nations, and I think that we must move beyond applying
resources to the home zip code of where those specific
countries are and apply the resources to be able to deal with
them wherever they are found across the globe.
Senator Perdue. General, thank you for being here again and
thank you for being on the wall.
The Arctic. China just last month issued a statement.
Russia has been actively building resources in the Arctic. We
see sorties or whatever in the Arctic region increasing at an
exponential rate. Admiral, maybe I am going to ask you. I am
sure you can too. I do not know how many icebreakers we
technically have. We do not have very many. I think China or
Russia has a multiple.
Can you talk about the threats in the Arctic? Are they
increasing? What is Russia's and China's strategy? You told us
last year about your strategic estimate. Can you give us an
update on that strategic estimate in the Arctic?
General Robinson. Absolutely, sir. I did a strategic
estimate. Out of that strategic estimate, I have directed by
two-star planner to provide a mission analysis. As I have said
to people, we have had our toes in the sand. It is time to put
our feet in the snow, and it is time to understand more and
more what is going on up there.
So out of that mission analysis, we are going to do a
couple of exercises. We did a Vigilant Shield last fall. We are
going to do an Arctic Edge. We will be able to understand
certain tasks out of that. But at the same time, we know that
we need to look at the infrastructure, the communications, and
the domain awareness to understand what is happening.
Senator Perdue. Both of you very quickly. I have limited
time.
Our strength against these near-peer competitors is our
network of allies. I know Secretary of State Tillerson has
talked about that actively. Secretary Mattis has talked about
that actively. In your AORs, what are we doing with our allies
to help leverage our military expenses and capabilities?
Admiral, do you want to address that quickly?
Admiral Tidd. We are working together to help train them.
We are building their capabilities in the areas that they are
most interested in, and we are showing by our actions that we
trust them.
General Robinson. If I can tell you, earlier this year
Secretary Mattis held a North America defense ministerial with
Canada, the United States, and Mexico to talk about how do the
three of us work together to show that we have the longest
borders in the world and that we are a shining beacon of trust
and cooperation.
Senator Perdue. Thank you both.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Warren?
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to our witnesses for being here today.
General Robinson, I know you have said that you are
confident in our Homeland defense. I was glad to see that the
most recent test of our Homeland missile defense system in May
of 2017 was successful. It brings our record to 9 out of 18,
which is 50 percent. I know that testing is important. Whether
tests succeed or fail, we gather a great deal of information
and it helps us.
As the missile threat from North Korea increases and we
invest additional interceptors to meet the threat, it seems to
me that it is more important than ever that we accurately
assess the reliability of this system. Physical tests are
expensive and they cost hundreds of millions of dollars each.
Predictive modeling is one cost effective way to increase
our data. But in his 2017 annual report, General Behler, the
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, criticized--and I
am going to quote him--the lack of independent accreditation of
modeling and simulation for performance assessment of our
ballistic missile defense system. He recommended that Missile
Defense Agency prioritize investments in modeling and
simulation.
General Robinson, as NORTHCOM Commander, you are the
primary customer for our Homeland missile defense system. Do
you agree with General Behler's recommendation? Would increased
modeling and simulation improve your confidence in ground-based
missile defense system?
General Robinson. Ma'am, it is good to see you again.
Senator Warren. Good to see you.
General Robinson. Thank you for that.
I would tell you two things. Modeling and simulation is as
good as what you put in is what you get out. Right? I think it
is very important that we do modeling and simulation, but I
also think that the importance that Missile Defense Agency does
with its live testing helps answer into all of that. When you
take both the live part and you can input that into the
modeling and simulation, that helps you with overall
understanding.
I want to say to you again I am confident today in our
ability to defend the United States. I think it is important,
not just the live testing but the modeling and simulation, and
put all of that together to make us understand where we are
going.
Senator Warren. Thank you, General.
You know, we have spent over $40 billion on the Homeland
missile defense system. I do not think it is asking too much to
expect it to work 100 percent of the time, and if that is not
possible, to rethink our overall approach.
DOT&E [Director of Test and Evaluation] has been making the
same recommendation that we invest in modeling since 2010. That
is 8 years ago. I think it is time to take that recommendation
seriously, not a substitute but as a both/and.
If I can, let me ask you one other question, and that is,
General Robinson, your responsibilities include coordinating
defense support to civil authorities in the event of a natural
disaster. In 2017, Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria----
General Robinson. Nate and Ophelia.
Senator Warren. That is right. Strained our federal
response nearly to the breaking point.
I recently visited Puerto Rico, along with the
Massachusetts congressional delegation, and we were able to see
the damage firsthand. One sector that was particularly hard hit
was health care. We previously talked about your decision to
send the hospital ship Comfort for about seven weeks. I visited
a hospital and a community health center that were still
struggling without clean water, without reliable power months
after the storm and more than a month after the Comfort had
departed. Now, even though they have not recovered from last
year's storms, they are all starting to prepare for the next
round of hurricane season.
I am about out of time, but General Robinson, can you very
briefly list, say, your top three lessons learned from Maria
and whether there is more that DOD can do to support the health
care sector specifically?
General Robinson. So, ma'am, I would tell you we just
finished--very quickly--an internal NORTHCOM lessons learned
conference. We are going to go out to OSD [Office of the
Secretary of Defense]. The conversation that we had is, is
there a difference between Texas, Florida, and Puerto Rico? So
you have got state, state, and island. So what can we learn out
of that, and can we think about that differently? So I would
tell you that would probably be the first thing that I would
say back to you.
Once we finish through inside the Department, I would be
happy to have me and my staff come talk to you about the things
that we learned and interagency, quite frankly, because as you
know better than I do, we are very much in a support role to
FEMA [Federal Emergency Management Agency] and the Governor. We
would be happy to come talk to you.
Senator Warren. Good. I appreciate that, and I appreciate
that you responded to my letter with a lot of detailed
information about the Comfort and its use in Puerto Rico.
Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I would like to submit
the letter from the General for the record.
Senator Inhofe. Without objection.
[The information follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Warren. All right.
Just to say, Puerto Rico has still not recovered.
General Robinson. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Warren. Health care has been a particularly hard
hit area. DOD can move resources often much faster than anyone
else, and I think we need to think much harder about the role
that DOD plays in future hurricanes because we know they are
coming.
General Robinson. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Warren. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Cotton?
Senator Cotton. Thank you, General Robinson, Admiral Tidd,
for your appearance and continued service.
Admiral Tidd, the President announced at the State of the
Union Address that we would once again be moving detainees,
where appropriate, to Guantanamo Bay. That falls under your
authority. Can you tell us a little bit more about that plan
and what you have in store for the facilities there?
Admiral Tidd. As has been the case, our responsibility is
to ensure the safe, secure, legal detention of law of war
detainees. I am highly confident that we have been doing that
and we will continue to do that. You know, we have 41 detainees
who are there right now. We are prepared to receive more should
they be directed to us. As of today, we have not been given a
warning order that new detainees might be heading in our
direction, but our responsibility will be to integrate them
effectively into that mission.
Senator Cotton. What about the facilities there and your
personnel rotation plans?
Admiral Tidd. Thanks to the generosity, obviously, of
Congress and spearheaded by this committee, we appreciate the
support for barracks that are capable of withstanding the
environmental conditions of the Caribbean region especially
during storm season. We look forward, once the money is in
hand, to be able to start construction on those barracks. I can
anticipate, although I do not have a plan for you today--there
were a variety of buildings that were temporary in nature when
they were put up that have deteriorated beyond their useful
life. We will be taking a hard look and prioritizing those
buildings that will need to be replaced with facilities capable
of withstanding the environmental conditions in Guantanamo Bay.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
Let us turn our attention to the south. You have already
spoken with a couple Senators about the situation in Venezuela,
which is rapidly deteriorating under the brutal Maduro
dictatorship. Can you talk to me about the implication it has
for Colombian security and especially the impact it could have
in the Colombian elections coming up?
Admiral Tidd. Yes, Senator, thanks.
Because of the significant number of Venezuelans, over
500,000 and continuing to rise, Venezuelans who have come
across the border into Colombia overwhelming their social
support infrastructure, Colombia has, I think, a grave concern.
They are also beginning to see--and this is based on
conversations with my Colombian partners. They are very
concerned that there are a large number of Venezuelans who are
being pushed across the border, that are being encouraged to
vote in elections. They have dual citizenship as Colombia and
Venezuela. There is some concern that that may skew the
elections that will be very critical taking place this spring
and summer in Colombia.
It is a matter of a security concern to Colombia, but those
security concerns I think are largely shared by Brazil. Numbers
are not as great yet, but it is beginning to overwhelm the
states that are directly across the border from Venezuela, and
we are seeing it affecting other countries across the region.
The humanitarian disaster is in progress, and our partners are
very concerned about it.
Senator Cotton. Thank you, Admiral Tidd.
General Robinson, I want to ask you about a story that was
in the news recently, the use by service members of smart
exercise devices, for instance, Fitbits or smart watches,
particularly overseas. But you, obviously, underneath your
authorities have a lot of sensitive sites here in the United
States. Could you tell us what steps, if any, NORTHCOM has
started to take to address this security risk?
General Robinson. Sir, Senator, thanks for that.
I would tell you as I watch and I work through the service
chiefs and to see what they are doing, while I worry about
force protection in all of the installations, I work it through
the service chiefs. So I am paying attention to the steps that
they are taking to make sure I understand to ensure that I can
implement anything that they need me to do.
Senator Cotton. You feel comfortable at this point with
what the services are pursuing?
General Robinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Cotton. Okay.
Thank you both for your testimony and for your service.
Senator Inhofe. Senator King?
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Tidd, since we have been talking here this morning,
four people in this country have died of overdoses just in the
last hour. As many people have died in the last month as were
killed on September 11th, including one a day in my State of
Maine.
I cannot believe we are having the same conversation today
that I remember having with General Kelly 2 or 3 years ago and
getting this figure of 8 percent of ISR resources and 25
percent of known drug shipments interdicted, 75 percent get
through.
I think you have identified the problem. If we give you a
mission, you will deal with it. The problem is nobody has this
mission. I hope you will go back and talk to this interagency
group and talk to the White House. It is inexcusable to be
sitting here 3 or 4 years later and still only being able to
interdict 25 percent of the drug shipments that we know about,
and we would know about more if we had adequate ISR. This is
simply a question of allocation of resources. This is the most
serious public health problem this country faces. Four people
have died in the last hour, and you are giving me the same
figures that General Kelly gave 3 or 4 years ago.
Can you commit to me that you will move this to the highest
level of priority and kick some behinds and take some names in
this interagency cooperation? Please do not come back here
again next year with the same testimony.
Admiral Tidd. Senator, I can commit to you that not only
will I but I have continued to communicate the challenge that
we face. I will observe the services--the biggest challenge
they have to being able to provide additional resources, which
they recognize very clearly are required, are challenged by the
inability to have budget predictability to be able to produce
more forces to make them available. This is a team sport. This
is a team effort. We have to work together as constructively
and collaboratively as possible.
My commitment to you is that I will do everything within my
power to do my part.
Senator King. Hopefully we have just passed a 2-year budget
authorization. Hopefully again we will have the final numbers
within the next two or three weeks, and then we will be able to
move forward. But please make this the highest priority. I am
not attacking you. I am attacking the failure of our structure
to adequately get at a problem when we have it right in front
of us. It would be one thing if we did not know, but when we
have it right in front of us.
General Robinson, let us move north. First question. We all
know that there is a Russian buildup along the northern border
along the Arctic Ocean. What is their purpose? What can you
discern? What is their strategic reason for doing this? Is it
defensive, offensive? Are they looking to get closer to be able
to attack us, or are they simply protecting their shore?
General Robinson. Sir, I would say I think what you just
said at the last is great, protecting their shore. You know, as
you and I chatted about the other day, the opportunity for them
to move their infrastructure around to their different bases is
incredibly important, just like I do. You know, I move
capability from Anchorage to Eielson, from Eielson to Inuvik,
from Inuvik to Tuele. We move things around. But it is to make
sure that they can put things in the places they want to at the
time and place of their choosing.
Senator King. I think you made an important point earlier
that there are two elements of national strategy. One is
capability. The other is intent.
General Robinson. Yes, sir.
Senator King. The problem is right now they may have a
benign intent or a lack of malicious intent. I would put it
that way. But they are building up the capability which
requires that we have to be alert. Are there assets you need in
the north that you do not have, for example, an icebreaker?
General Robinson. Sir, I will defer to my colleagues in the
Coast Guard for the icebreakers. But what I will tell you is
that I very much get ISR [intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance] capability in Global Hawk and other things that
I share with EUCOM [United States European Command] and PACOM
[United States Pacific Command] to understand what is happening
in the region. But I will tell you I am very good at advocating
for needing other capabilities such as, as an example, if you
want, icebreakers. I talk with my Coast Guard brothers often
about this because I think about it in the summer when Crystal
Serenity goes through.
Senator King. We are going to see more of that.
General Robinson. Yes, sir.
Senator King. A final short question. If you had to choose,
if you could only have one priority in order to improve our
missile defense system, what would it be?
General Robinson. I want to thank the Congress for the
capacity that we just got, but we have got to keep our eye on
discriminating radars.
Senator King. That is what I thought you would answer, and
I think that has got to be a very high priority.
General Robinson. Yes, sir.
Senator King. Thank you. Thank you both.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Ernst?
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
General Robinson, Admiral Tidd, thank you very much.
Sergeant Major, nice to have you here as well. Thank you very
much for joining us.
General Robinson, yesterday we had the opportunity to talk
about the counter-weapons of mass destruction activities that
we have going on here in the Homeland. SOCOM now has the
responsibility for countering weapons of mass destruction, but
it is something, once it approaches the Homeland, we need to
figure out how to respond to that. You have a great role in
that, as well as number of other combatant commands,
departments, and agencies.
One thing I want to point out is we tend to focus a lot
about North Korea and the threat that their nuclear program
might have on the United States. We have to remember there are
other things involved with weapons of mass destruction:
chemical, biological, and radiological agents as well. We know
that North Korea does have the potential to develop some of
those other threatening means to the United States.
Can you talk a little bit about how NORTHCOM works with all
of these other COCOMs [combatant command], various federal
agencies, how are we protecting the Homeland not just from the
nuclear threat but some of the other threats as well?
General Robinson. Yes, ma'am. Thanks.
First of all, I think one of the things that I really enjoy
is my opportunity and privilege to work with DHS, FEMA, and all
the other intelligence agencies here in the Homeland. I have
Joint Task Force Civil Support in Virginia, an amazing guard
unit, that works very focused on the chemical and biological
reaction. But I have other task forces in the guard that help
respond. One of them is yours.
For me, that whole relationship with the governors and with
the TAGs [The Adjutant General] to bring the forces to bear
when we need them to be there, independent of the niche
capability that JTF [Joint Task Force] Civil Support provides
to me from Virginia, but in addition to forces that other guard
units provide are amazing. It is understanding what is going to
happen here. You heard me talk about earlier about our exercise
Ardent Sentry, and you heard me talk about understanding what
the nuclear capability can do. So it is understanding now the
forces that we would need to support and defend governors and
States.
Senator Ernst. Thank you.
We mentioned yesterday too those civil support teams and
others that work behind the scene. They truly are those quiet
professionals.
General Robinson. Yes, ma'am. They are the quiet
professionals. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Ernst. Thank you very much for that.
Admiral Tidd, thank you also for sitting down with me and
going through a number of really concerning issues. You have
heard a lot of impassioned speeches from our Senators today. I
think we are all very concerned about the illicit trade that
goes on and terrorism throughout the region. We know that there
is the trade of drugs, tobacco, weapons illicit and sometimes,
in cases, human trafficking. Sometimes they are generating
revenue for terrorist organizations like Hezbollah.
Can you explain how you are trying to tighten down on that
nexus? Can you specifically address our wonderful partners
throughout the region, some of the countries that have helped
step up and combat some of these problems?
Admiral Tidd. Senator, thanks for your question.
I think the way that we have reoriented the way that we do
business in our main effort, being countering threat networks,
is specifically intended to maximize the tools that we within
the Department of Defense bring to bear into this interagency
and international partnership to be able to counter these
threat networks regardless of what commodity that they are
moving.
Partners like Colombia have been absolutely irreplaceable,
their willingness to work with us, to share information with
us, to be partners not just within Colombia but also working
side by side with Central American neighbors to help them build
their capacity to be able to deal with, track down, apply
pressure on, and disrupt these threat networks.
I would highlight the terrific work that has been going on
that General Robinson and all of her work with the armed forces
of Mexico, SEDENA and SEMAR. Mexico is now exerting I think a
significant interest in helping to improve security in Central
America. We work together in partnership, NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM
together, to facilitate that particular type of activity.
Many other partners throughout the region. We have got
capable partners. I would highlight a few, and just working
around the continent, Brazil. Argentina has now come on strong
and played a critical role. Chile has for many years been one
of the premier security partners in the region. Peru is now a
very significant partner. Again, I come to Colombia as probably
our single most significant strategic partner in the region.
Senator Ernst. Thank you very much. I think it is important
that we realize we do have solid partners in the region. It is
not all on our shoulders. We cannot do it without them.
Admiral Tidd. Far from it.
Senator Ernst. I appreciate your service. Thank you very
much for being here today.
Admiral Tidd. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Inhofe. Senator McCaskill?
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for serving and thank you for being here
today.
I am not going to plow ground that has already been gone
over as it relates to opioids. I just want to echo that the
threat of black market fentanyl to the safety and security of
Americans probably tops just about anything else we are facing
right now. I do think it is an all hands on deck moment for
every part of our national security apparatus.
I wanted to specifically ask about CBRN [chemical,
biological, radiological and nuclear], and for people that
might be watching this that are not yet used--or maybe never
want to get used to all the acronyms, obviously that is
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear schools that we
have in the military.
As we look at North Korea and what they are doing, clearly
there is an issue about readiness as it relates to the training
that we need to have in terms of dirty bombs and biological
weapons and obviously the potential that there could possibly
be a nuclear threat to our country.
What I wanted to ask, General Robinson, do you not think it
might be wise if we started using our military schools, on a
space available basis, our CBRN training programs, to start to
begin to put some civilian first responders into that training
that could really be a force multiplier? Because if we are
actually in an armed conflict with North Korea, we are really
going to be stretched because there are still going to be
trouble spots throughout the world. It just seems to me if we
have got space available and we have got the infrastructure,
that it would be a really good idea that we would begin opening
those doors more widely to police departments and fire
departments and other first responders in our country to get
this really important response training to that kind of attack
from our enemy.
General Robinson. Ma'am, when I first took over command at
NORTHCOM and NORAD, I think it was about a week I was there and
we had this exercise that was called Ardent Sentry. It was
about I-5 corridor, earthquake, you know, all those things
happening. When I walked into the room, there were 200 people,
300 people in this room. I looked at one of my predecessors,
General Jacoby, and I go who are all these people. What I
discovered in this exercise was the fact that it was local,
state, and TAGs and folks from emergency managers from all the
States that would be involved in that.
Last year, we had the same exercise, and it had to do with
a 10-kiloton nuclear event in New York City. So the same thing.
We had local, state, emergency responders, and all of that.
When Secretary Kelly took over, he said, Lori, I want to
talk about let us think about how we are going to do this
should something happen with North Korea, and then just
recently Secretary Nielsen.
Ma'am, we are all doing this together saying what does it
look like, how do we go forward with this to understand that.
Senator McCaskill. Well, I would like to consider, with the
chairman's, hopefully, support and bipartisan support,
something in the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] that
would open up training slots in our military CBRN schools to
first responders just on a space-available basis.
General Robinson. Ma'am, I would be happy to work with the
committee.
Senator McCaskill. That would be I think terrific. I know
we have a great one at Fort Leonard Wood. But there are times
that the infrastructure that is there is not being fully
utilized. It just seems to me this would be a hand in glove fit
for the threats that we face.
General Robinson. You know, come talk to me. I will have my
staff talk to yours, and I would be happy to work with the
committee.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you very much, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thanks to the witnesses.
General Robinson, sometimes at these hearings I ask
questions to get information, sometimes to make a point, and
sometimes to educate the public about something that I think I
already know but I think the public should know. My question is
going to be in that category, trying to educate the public
about something important.
Within the last month, about a month or so ago, we had two
news reports on successive days that caused some real alarm
among citizens in Hawaii. There was an emergency alert sent out
suggesting that there was an incoming missile attack. It took
38 minutes for that improper emergency alert to be, I guess,
retrieved. Then a couple of days later, the Japanese news
agency NHK put out a warning about an incoming missile attack
from North Korea that I think was corrected within a few
minutes. But in each event, these things caused a whole lot of
public concern.
I was in a classified hearing recently where I had a chance
to ask--and I think this is actually non-classified material,
and I hope you can get there. I was able to ask the question of
our military leadership, when these false warnings went out,
did our military immediately realize--how quickly did the
military realize that these were not attacks? I think that is
the kind of thing that gives comfort to people that there might
be a false warning but our military understands it pretty
quickly, which reduces the risk then of an accidental
provocation, accidental military action.
From your perspective as NORTHCOM Commander with NORAD
under your jurisdiction, can you talk a little bit about those
two incidents and how quickly we were able to confirm that
these in fact were not missile attacks?
General Robinson. Sir, in this unclassified hearing, I can
tell you very comfortably and confidently we were quickly to
confirm that nothing had happened.
Senator Kaine. That is, I think, an important thing for the
public to know.
General Robinson. But I do want to just say at the first
indications of a missile launch, NORAD and NORTHCOM command
centers will initiate a conference call to process the event
and make an attack assessment. FEMA ops center and their
alternate ops center is a part of that call. I would like to
add that into the record.
Senator Kaine. Right. There are a lot of folks who are
reaching the same conclusion.
General Robinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Kaine. That is comforting, I think, for people to
know.
Let me ask you, Admiral Tidd. You talked a little bit in
response to Senator Perdue's question about the training that
we do with SOUTHCOM partners. It is the case that nations in
your area are purchasing more from Russia. There is activity by
Russia, by Iran, by China. But talk a little bit more about the
training side because I have had a chance to see some of the
training in action, and I am very, very impressed with the kind
of training we do, the degree to which these nations want us to
be their partner, the relationships you build. Somebody you are
training might be the defense minister in 10 years or the
president in 20 years. But talk about some of the nations and
the training exercises currently underway between the U.S. and
nations in your command.
Admiral Tidd. Senator, there is no doubt in my mind that
the countries that we work with unanimously prefer working with
the United States because we work together as equal partners,
because we work together defending the same interests, the same
values, the same piece of the hemisphere together. So we try to
find ways to make it as easy as we possibly can.
We could not do that without the enormous support of, for
instance, our state partner program, National Guard units that
are active in virtually every country throughout our region.
They provide that long-term contact, personal relationships
many times with these countries that is valuable and that helps
build their capability and capacity.
I mentioned previously the enormous importance of our very,
very small but capable special operations forces that come down
and work with partner nations. They are highly respected both
for their professional ability but also for their ability to
work together and to understand how to meet the needs of
particular countries. I have told General Tony Thomas he is
oftentimes my most important force provider, and special
operations forces over and over again are my major maneuver
force. Small, small numbers but critically important throughout
this region.
Also other reserve forces, the regionally aligned force
that the Army provides, could not do a lot of the training that
we do in Central America.
Last but absolutely not least, our special purpose marine
air-ground task force that 6 months out of the year during the
hurricane season, come down, work with partner nations, build
their capacity, build their resilience to deal with disaster
response, and then when the need arises, if a disaster occurs--
and for the last 2-years, they have been directly employed in
disaster response operations throughout our theater.
Senator Kaine. I have had the opportunity to witness some
of these. In Honduras, deployment of mobile medical clinics to
remote areas which have a humanitarian purpose but also help
train our own folks to do deployment of medical clinics in
combat, if we need to. I have watched training in Colombia
where I have watched not only training on military tactics but
respect for the rule of law and proper respect for human rights
during the time when the war was going on against the FARC. I
have seen the value of these trainings. I also know sometimes
it is these kind of training exercises that get really squeezed
in budget pressures. That is one of my hopes with the budget
that we have recently announced that you will have the
opportunity to continue to build those relationships, which I
think put us in a much stronger position.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Blumenthal?
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
General Robinson, I have been to Puerto Rico twice, and I
have been impressed by the complete inadequacy of the federal
response to fellow Americans there. As we speak, I think a
third of the island's population lacks electricity. The economy
is struggling. In fact, it is on the brink of bankruptcy if not
there. The Army Corps of Engineers and FEMA have worked hard.
People on the ground are devoting themselves valiantly, but my
sense is that there is a lack of resources from the Federal
Government.
I recognize that NORTHCOM is in a support mission there. I
wonder--and I know Senator Warren has asked about it, and you
have said you are conducting a review--whether you have any
preliminary insights or observations for this committee about
what could or should have been done differently.
General Robinson. Sir, one of the things I talk about all
the time is every hurricane has its own characteristics. One of
the characteristics of this hurricane season was there were
five hurricanes. People forget about Nate, and we forget that
Ophelia was out there. But the fact of the matter is Puerto
Rico is an island, and that is different than Texas and that is
different than Florida. That is different than other things
that we have seen.
One of the things that we are going to go back and look
at--and we did an internal review inside of my command, we are
going to do inside of the Department--so how do we think about
that differently. Do we have force structures set up
appropriately? Do we the have things that we need? Because at
the end of the day, sir, as you know, we support the governor
and we support FEMA, and we provide niche unique capabilities
that at that place, as an example, that the guard might not
have, and ensure that we have it positioned at the right place
at the right time to be there when it is necessary.
Senator Blumenthal. Do you think that FEMA and other
federal agencies made full use of the resources that you could
offer?
General Robinson. Sir, I would say it this way. Secretary
Mattis told me I could have whatever I needed whenever I needed
it. Whenever it was asked for, I had a----
Senator Blumenthal. But my question is did they make
sufficient use of----
General Robinson. Sir, we have not had the ability to have
an interagency top-down conversation about that. I think that
is a different conversation. I think what is important is the
fact that Secretary Mattis said I could have what I needed when
I needed it.
Senator Blumenthal. He said to this committee that he would
make available whatever was necessary when it was needed.
General Robinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. I have no doubt about the availability
and your readiness and your willingness. I am asking about
resources that were unused because they were unasked for.
General Robinson. Since we have not had a lessons learned
across the interagency, I would not want to answer that
conversation.
Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Tidd, my understanding is that
Hezbollah is very active in a number of South American
countries, particularly in money laundering, drug trading. Is
that your observation as well?
Admiral Tidd. Yes, Senator, it is.
Senator Blumenthal. What actions are being taken against
Hezbollah?
Admiral Tidd. Senator, we have been watching Hezbollah for
a number of decades now because, as you well recognize, they
have been in this hemisphere for a while engaged largely in
criminal activities supporting their terrorist activities
abroad. They are the A team that has been mentioned from time
to time. We are watching what they are doing, working with our
partners and with the intelligence community within our country
teams and increasingly with partner nations to be aware of what
they are doing and to not be surprised.
Senator Blumenthal. Should there be more action as opposed
to watching? Have we reached the point where the United States
needs to be more actively engaged in light of its interests in
the Middle East?
Admiral Tidd. Senator, these actions are taking place in
sovereign nations that have their laws that they are applying.
We are making sure they have got the best information available
to them to apply their laws.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. This may fall into the category of Senator
Kaine's educating the public, but I would only say that we have
had a lot of varying experiences with Puerto Rico. I can
remember one that was not pleasant, and that was when I
personally lost the battle of Vieques. They had the only area
where we had the joint training capability, and searching
worldwide, we were not able to replace that. We did not get the
cooperation that we should have gotten, and it had some adverse
effects.
Following up a little bit on Senator Cotton's comments
about Gitmo, Admiral, what I would like to do--I was very
critical of President Obama when he was trying to close Gitmo.
One of his alternatives--what are you going to do with all
these guys you pick up--was to put them into incarceration
within the United States. One such place happened that was
suggested by that administration was Fort Sill in Oklahoma.
Obviously, you cannot put--these are not prisoners. These are
not criminals. These are enemy combatants. You cannot put them
in and intermingle them with the prison population. Their job
is to teach other people to be terrorists. I am really
concerned, as we follow through with this.
I was happy when the President, in his State of the Union
message, talked about expanding, keeping open that great
resource that we have there. I am very anxious for that to
happen.
So what I would like to have you do, Admiral, is kind of
monitor that, let us know why we are not using it more already
because I know that there have been some placements that took
place. If you could do that for me, I would appreciate that
very much and follow through with that.
Admiral Tidd. I will, Senator.
[The information referred to follows:]
Admiral Tidd. As of today, we have 41 detainees at the detention
facility at Guantanamo Bay. We have not yet received any additional
detainees, but we are prepared to receive them if the decision is made
to send them. Questions of where to place law of war detainees,
however, are ultimately policy decisions.
Senator Inhofe. I had one last comment to make. Why do you
not go ahead, Senator Reed?
Senator Reed. No, sir.
Senator Inhofe. This would go to the gentleman sitting
behind General Robinson. We share a best friend whose name is
Sublett. Sublett actually had a lot of missions in Vietnam, I
think about 300 of them. When he got out--they changed the
570th--and you are aware of this--from the F-16 mission to a
refueling mission. When that happened, he took retirement from
the reserves. I was his speaker at the retirement. He wanted to
keep flying. I am still a flight instructor. So what I had to
do, I say to you, David, was I took the awesome responsibility.
You know, anyone can fly fast. I had to teach Charles Sublett
how to fly slow. I had to say something you were not aware of,
and that is it.
Any further comments?
Senator Reed. I cannot top that, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. All right.
Anything more?
[No response.]
Senator Inhofe. Well, we are adjourned and we appreciate
very much your willingness and your straightforward answers to
the questions. You both did a great job. Thanks so much.
[Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m., the committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
great rivalry with russia and china
1. Senator Sullivan. General Robinson, the new National Defense
Strategy declares the DOD's highest priorities are the strategic
competition with Russia and China. I am particularly concerned about
this competition playing out in the critically strategic Arctic region.
The Russian are flying off our coastlines, including near Alaska. The
Chinese are operating naval vessels in the Bering Sea.
What specific capabilities have you advocated for in the Arctic
region to help us counter this growing threat? Are any of them
currently fielded?
General Robinson. Through the USNORTHCOM Arctic Capabilities
Advocacy Working Group, we have identified four key enablers to ensure
security, safety, and defense cooperation in the Arctic region:
communication, domain awareness, infrastructure, and presence. We
coordinate closely with the other combatant commands the military
Services, defense agencies, and the Canadian Department of National
Defense to advocate for Arctic capabilities in light of evolving
defense requirements.
To improve communication and domain awareness, we successfully
advocated for funding of the Enhanced Polar System and the Mobile User
Objective System to enable high latitude voice and data transmission.
USNORTHCOM is also participating in OSD's Wideband Communications
Services Analysis of Alternatives which began in fiscal year 2017 and
will participate in OSD's Narrowband Analysis of Alternatives, which
will be funded by the U.S. Navy in fiscal year 2019, to explore options
for enhanced Arctic communications capabilities.
NORAD and USNORTHCOM advocacy led to fiscal year 2017 funding of
the Northern Approaches Surveillance Analysis of Alternatives to
identify options to improve persistent, wide-area air surveillance of
the northern approaches to the continent. As part of an ongoing effort,
USNORTHCOM received Coalition Warfare Program funds to advance fielding
of the Next Generation Over-the-Horizon Radar, and we continue to
advocate for increased national and theater intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance capacity and capability.
Regarding infrastructure and presence, we were successful in
advocating for exercise-related funding to build a barracks in Alaska
to support joint exercises and training. We have also requested that
the U.S. Army provide funding for the Joint, All-weather, All-Terrain
Vehicles program. While not a Department of Defense program, we
strongly advocated for the U.S. Coast Guard's ice-breaking mission,
requirements, and ongoing assessment of ice-breaker requirements and
the development of those platforms, as well as the Coast Guard's
recently announced plans to build new icebreakers.
2. Senator Sullivan. General Robinson, in your testimony you talk
about ``scalable infrastructure in the Arctic.'' What exactly does that
look like?
General Robinson. Scalable infrastructure refers to capability we
can temporarily deploy to a specific location to accomplish a specific
mission, such as deploying the Arctic Sustainment Package to support a
search and rescue incident.
3. Senator Sullivan. General Robinson, we clearly are falling
behind in the Arctic--to both the Russians and seemingly the Chinese
now--what more can this committee do to help us catch up?
General Robinson. While we presently assess that the likelihood of
military conflict in the Arctic remains low, safeguarding North America
is inherently linked to the Commands' ability to operate in the Arctic
environment across each of our assigned missions. There is always the
potential that changes in Russian intent and increased Chinese activity
in the Arctic that could result in miscalculation and instability in
the region. Presently, we have sufficient military capability to
accomplish my assigned missions. I will continue to keep the Committee
informed of emerging threats and challenges in the region, as well as
associated requirements to address those threats.
arctic port
4. Senator Sullivan. General Robinson, as the USNORTHCOM Commander,
you are assigned the role as ``Advocate for Arctic Capabilities.'' Have
you advocated for a Strategic Arctic Port, something supported by this
committee?
General Robinson. Based on current assessments, we have not
advocated for a Strategic Arctic Port to date. However, we continually
monitor activity and the strategic environment in the Arctic region to
ensure we retain the capability and capacity to address any potential
threat and protect our national interests. Should conditions evolve in
a manner that merits reconsideration of the need for a new strategic
Arctic port, I will make that requirement known to the Department of
Defense and to the Congressional defense committees.
russia--flight activity
5. Senator Sullivan. General Robinson, in light of Russia's
attempts to intrude on our nation's coastlines, how do you explain the
decline in Russian air activity since the record levels observed during
the 2014 Ukraine crisis?
General Robinson. Russia relies primarily on its Long Range
Aviation TU-95 BEAR H heavy bombers to conduct flights near North
America. Russia suffered a series of BEAR H accidents in 2015, which
led the Russian Aerospace Command to ground the fleet for an extended
period. Moscow also started its refitting and modernization of the
entire heavy bomber fleet at about the same time, not only to address
the immediate safety of flight issues but also to increase the BEAR H
fleet's capabilities for 21st Century operations. While this refit and
modernization program is ongoing, Russia appears to be limiting most of
its heavy bomber activity to shorter-range flights.
6. Senator Sullivan. General Robinson, would you expect Russian air
activity to increase again in the future?
General Robinson. Russia placed extra emphasis on modernizing and
professionalizing its military after invading Crimea in 2014. This
included Long Range Aviation forces. Russia will have the capability to
increase its Long Range Aviation fleet's operational tempo once
modernized bombers become operational and pilots gain proficiency on
the modernized aircraft. I expect Moscow will increase their air
activity when such action aligns with their strategic intent.
7. Senator Sullivan. General Robinson, in your opinion, are there
any strategic elements that may enhance NORAD's air capabilities to
include our Canadian allies given the amount of 5th Generation Combat-
Coded Fighters currently in Alaska?
General Robinson. NORAD has several strategic strengths and
capabilities that enhance our ability to defend North America. Our most
significant strategic strength is the six-decade bi-national
partnership with Canada that synchronizes capabilities between United
States and Canadian forces and continues projecting strength against
Russia or any threat to North America.
Alaska-based 5th generation fighters serve as NORAD's front-line
conventional deterrent against Russia. These aircraft also provide
unique operational capabilities against emerging threats, and they
ensure the United States and Canada can defend against potential
threats against North America.
8. Senator Sullivan. General Robinson, following up from question
6, what more could Canada do?
General Robinson. Canada has been a stalwart partner for the past
60 years and continues to stand shoulder to shoulder with the United
States against threats to North America. As Russia moves to modernize
some of its weapons systems, some of their capabilities are beginning
to become more difficult to mitigate with some of NORAD's older
equipment.
Canada is actively participating in efforts to improve the North
Warning System and is also moving to recapitalize and modernize its
fighter fleet. These improvements will enhance the Royal Canadian Air
Force's capability to detect, track, and engage low-observable targets
such as advanced cruise missiles being fielded by Russia.
big strategic--north korea vs. china/russia
9. Senator Sullivan. General Robinson, given the focus on ``great
power rivalry'' in the NDS--and the need to defend the Homeland against
these increasingly complex and diverse threats in vastly different
domains--how we balance the likely need to either enhance our
deterrence posture on the Peninsula against more conventional threats/
post-Cold War threats with the need to rapidly innovate new systems,
technology, and TTPs to deal with TWO great power rivals?
General Robinson. Emerging ``great power'' rivals to the United
States are capable of attacks against North America in multiple
domains, from multiple approaches, and at increasingly greater ranges.
Beyond our current deterrence posture on the Peninsula to counter
intercontinental ballistic missiles, USNORTHCOM is working to identify
and recommend materiel and non-materiel solutions to outpace threats.
This comprehensive effort analyzes each current and emerging threat
through the lens of the following domains: air, maritime, cyberspace,
aerospace, space, and land. Each domain is analyzed across the
categories of policy, plans, command and control, organization, and
materiel to determine capability gaps and develop recommended
solutions.
10. Senator Sullivan. General Robinson, how do we go ``all in on
Korea without getting sucked into Korea?'' as Gen. McDew said?
General Robinson. USNORTHCOM conducts our Homeland defense mission
on a daily basis informed by and adjusted to the threats posed to the
Homeland. By ensuring a dependable ballistic missile defense
capability, we provide our senior leaders with decision space for
diplomatic and military options. We also continue to work closely with
the Joint Staff and USPACOM to ensure that adequate forces are retained
in Alaska and the Continental United States to defend the Homeland.
north korea--strategy, objectives, and good for china?
11. Senator Sullivan. General Robinson, what should be the United
States overall strategy to mitigate the threat to our Homeland posed by
North Korea?
General Robinson. I believe the current whole-of-government effort
to maintain pressure on North Korea is the best approach. The United
States Department of State is in the lead and continues to work with
the international community through diplomatic channels, while from a
military standpoint, I believe we can continue to mitigate the threat
to the Homeland by maintaining a robust defense-in-depth in close
coordination with our allies. We work closely with USPACOM and other
mission partners to maintain constant situational awareness and
mitigate risks to the Homeland.
12. Senator Sullivan. General Robinson, beyond security for the
regime, what are North Korea's strategic objectives in attaining long-
range nuclear weapons?
General Robinson. I share the United States intelligence
community's view that North Korea's strategic objective in attaining
long-range nuclear weapons is to gain coercive influence over South
Korea, Japan, and the United States, thus benefitting North Korean
sovereignty and interests on the Korean Peninsula. I believe Kim Jong-
un seeks a strategic capability that will ensure North Korea's
territorial integrity and regional interests are recognized and
acknowledged by the international community.
13. Senator Sullivan. General Robinson, is a long-range nuclear
capability on the Korean Peninsula at all in China's strategic
interest?
General Robinson. China's declared policy of a de-nuclearized
Korean Peninsula matches ours, and I do not believe a North Korea in
possession of long-range nuclear capability is in China's overarching
strategic interest.
14. Senator Sullivan. General Robinson, is there any strategy for
North Korea that you can think of that does NOT involve a more robust
missile defense for both the United States and our allies?
General Robinson. As the Commander responsible for active defense
of the United States, my focus is on missile defense. I am confident we
can defend the United States against the current North Korea missile
threat, but we must complete necessary improvements with a sense of
urgency to remain in a position of relative advantage. I defer to my
partner Combatant Commanders for their regional views on left-of-launch
offensive capabilities, however, I appreciate the ongoing efforts
throughout the Department to improve both our offensive and defensive
capabilities to defeat adversary missiles.
ballistic missile defense
15. Senator Sullivan. General Robinson, given recent increases in
Ballistic Missile Defense in the NDAA and the upcoming release of the
Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) and/or Missile Defeat Review
(MDR), what do you see as the next short term steps to solidify the
United States against Ballistic Missile Threats from Rogue Nation
States in the near term? What capabilities do we need?
General Robinson. We are working with the Missile Defense Agency to
address near-term improvements to our sensors and interceptors. For
sensors, there are plans to field the Long Range Discrimination Radar,
Homeland Defense Radar-Pacific, and Homeland Defense Radar-Hawaii. The
Missile Defense Agency continues work on the Redesigned Kill Vehicle
and concept development for the Multi-Object Kill Vehicle; they are
also procuring twenty additional interceptors tipped with Redesigned
Kill Vehicles. In addition, we are looking at possible additional
defensive layers beyond just the Ground-Based Interceptors.
16. Senator Sullivan. General Robinson, following up from question
14, what do you think we need in the next 5-10 years, and beyond?
General Robinson. In the near term, we need to improve our sensors
and interceptors. In the long term, we are working with the Department
to identify and prioritize space-based sensor capabilities and
additional defensive ``layers'' against intercontinental ballistic
missiles beyond Ground-Based Interceptors. I continue to support
Department-level efforts to integrate left- and right-of-launch
operations.
17. Senator Sullivan. General Robinson, as we ask our allies to do
more on missile defense, how should we seek to prioritize our
collaboration--what systems should our allies focus on first?
General Robinson. In the Pacific Region, there is opportunity to
improve the sensor architecture to the mutual benefit of the United
States and our allies and partners. For instance, there is currently a
study initiated by the Missile Defense Agency for a Homeland Defense
Radar--Pacific that could provide significant contributions to both the
region and United States defense.
18. Senator Sullivan. General Robinson, following up from question
16, what more could Canada be doing?
General Robinson. Canada has currently chosen not to participate in
the ballistic missile defense mission. As the Commander of NORAD and
USNORTHCOM, I respect that this is the Government of Canada's decision
to make and defer to their sovereignty for any future changes to their
current policy.
space-based sensors
19. Senator Sullivan. General Robinson, assuming you have non-
sequestered AND threat-based budget, what specific investments in
capacity and capability would you want as a warfighter to improve our
Homeland missile defense and to modernize it for threats on the not-
too-distant horizon? Please be specific.
General Robinson. We are working with the Missile Defense Agency to
address near-term improvements to our sensors and interceptors. The
realization of the Long Range Discrimination Radar, Homeland Defense
Radar-Pacific, and Homeland Defense Radar-Hawaii are important steps to
improve persistent discrimination capability. The testing and fielding
of the Redesigned Kill Vehicle and development of the Multi-Object Kill
Vehicle interceptors will improve reliability and lethality, with the
Multi-Object Kill Vehicle being a longer-term initiative. In addition,
the procurement of 20 more interceptors at the Alaska site, tipped with
Redesigned Kill Vehicles, is in work to provide both additional
capability and capacity. I believe we are on the right track with these
planned improvements, but we will need to ensure we proceed on a pace
that outpaces North Korean advancements.
20. Senator Sullivan. General Robinson, what is your view on a
space-based sensor infrastructure that would allow us to track--from
birth to death--incoming missiles that might threaten the United States
Homeland, that I called for in my bill S.1196?
General Robinson. I support the development of space-based sensing
capabilities in the long term. Space-based sensors can provide a more
comprehensive capability and are less sensitive to axis of attack.
However, I prioritize employing the more mature technology of
terrestrial radars in the near term with a sense of urgency due to the
rapid advancements and evolutions we are seeing from North Korea.
21. Senator Sullivan. General Robinson, what effect would a space-
based sensor layer have on regional missile defenses, such as THAAD,
Aegis, and Patriot?
General Robinson. I defer to the Missile Defense Agency and my
partner
geographic combatant commanders due to the regional nature of these
system capabilities.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
hurricane relief efforts
22. Senator Nelson. General Robinson, this past year, the United
States Northern Command worked to overcome several challenges during
their response to hurricane ravaged Puerto Rico, which included opening
ports and restoring power. What lessons learned did NORTHCOM take away
from their role in disaster response in 2017 as it relates to Florida,
Puerto Rico, and Texas?
General Robinson. The 2017 hurricane season presented a number of
challenges due to the number and severity of the storms, the wide
geographic area that was affected, and the scale of damage that
resulted with significant impacts to millions of American citizens. The
key lessons learned during the USNORTHCOM response in support of
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as the lead federal agency
included the critical importance of pre-established relationships;
combined training; and integrated planning with federal, state, and
local partners.
The response to Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria further
demonstrated the absolute importance of effective communication between
all elements and agencies involved with the response. By deploying a
Defense Coordinating Official and Element to coordinate directly with
FEMA and state/territorial officials on the ground in advance of each
storm's landfall, USNORTHCOM was able to anticipate pending mission
assignments from FEMA officials. The need for agility and creativity
was also reinforced throughout the responses as USNORTHCOM and the
military Services employed appropriate authorities to pre-position
assets at forward staging areas to provide a more rapid response
immediately on receipt of mission assignments from FEMA.
illicit opioid trafficking
23. Senator Nelson. Admiral Tidd and General Robinson, you are
acutely aware of the opioid crisis and how it is intimately connected
to our southern U.S. approaches. How are you collaborating with key
interagency partners to develop an effective campaign to stop the flow
of illicit opioids from reaching our coastline?
Admiral Tidd. The opioid crisis is fueled by a complex network of
issues that cannot be solved by any one entity alone. In order to bring
together all the disparate organizations within the United States
Government that play a role in confronting this crisis, USSOUTHCOM
hosted an Opioid Summit this February at our headquarters. Attendees
spanned the interagency with over 125 representatives from 28 distinct
organizations taking part. This first in what will be a continuing
effort, gave the interagency (including USSOUTHCOM) the opportunity to
develop shared understanding of the problem and to strengthen the
relationships that will be needed to truly affect the criminal
organizations that are involved in illicit opioid trafficking. Our
Joint Interagency Task Force--South (JIATF-S) works across the
interagency to gain awareness of illicit movements of opioids through
the transit zone en route to the U.S., and to take action to stop those
movements if they have assets available to do so. JIATF-S also works
closely with JIATF-West to ensure seamless information sharing if any
illicit movements enter our Joint Operating Area from Asia. Within
USSOUTHCOM, we have shifted our fundamental approach to center on
supporting, strengthening, and enabling the ``friendly network'' of
U.S. Government, regional, allied, and civil society partners to work
together to degrade opioid and other threat networks, disrupt their
operations, and affect the underlying conditions and enablers that they
rely on for success.
General Robinson. Along the United States southern border, we
continue to support our federal law enforcement partners with military-
unique capabilities that aid in the detection, monitoring, and eventual
law enforcement interdiction of illegal narcotics. We also continue to
leverage our military-to-military relationships with Mexico and The
Bahamas, along with collaborating and sharing information with United
States Southern Command, as part of a broad interagency effort to stem
the flow of dangerous drugs into the United States.
24. Senator Nelson. Admiral Tidd and General Robinson, how are you
working together and enhancing military cooperation with allies to
counter transnational criminal networks from smuggling fentanyl from
China and Mexico?
Admiral Tidd. The significance of the threat has coalesced a wide
range of partners who are interested in sharing their capabilities and
information to collaboratively illuminate and dismantle these nefarious
networks that can move anything and have global reach. Consistent with
our approach to all transregional threats, we are working with our
partners at PACOM and NORTHCOM to help illuminate these networks and
enable the endgame for both U.S. and partner nation law enforcement. In
application and to the limit of our current resources, we seek to
identify the specifics of the threat through intelligence collection
and analysis, we share that information as widely as possible, and we
help build the capacity of our willing partners to accomplish the
needed disruption.
General Robinson. Along the United States southern border, we
continue to support our federal law enforcement partners with military-
unique capabilities that aid in the detection, monitoring, and eventual
law enforcement interdiction of illegal narcotics. We also continue to
leverage our military-to-military relationships with Mexico and The
Bahamas, along with collaborating and sharing information with United
States Southern Command, as part of a broad interagency effort to stem
the flow of dangerous drugs into the United States.
venezuela
25. Senator Nelson. Admiral Tidd, what is your assessment of the
situation in Venezuela? In particular, how best can the United States
target the criminal dictator Maduro, and help restore Venezuela's
democracy?
Admiral Tidd. Venezuela is facing an unprecedented socioeconomic
crisis. Venezuela has the world's highest inflation rate (near 2,400
percent in 2017), with IMF experts forecasting it will be above 13,000
percent in 2018. Oil output was down 29 percent in 2017. The population
is experiencing serious shortages of food, medicine, and basic goods.
These financial shortfalls and dwindling oil revenues coupled with
extreme debt are creating a political and economic crisis with
humanitarian consequences driving migration out of the country. As many
as 5 percent of the population have already deserted the country, and
estimates are that another 5 percent could leave in 2018. Key partners
like Colombia and Brazil are increasingly concerned about this
migration, with numbers exceeding 550,000 Venezuelans entering
Colombia. We continue to closely monitor this deteriorating situation
and engage our partners regularly as to how they are being impacted by
the humanitarian crisis generated by the Maduro Administration.
Clearly, a crisis of this magnitude requires an international
diplomatic solution, which the Department of State is leading. For
questions on restoring democracy in Venezuela, I would refer you to the
Department of State.
military housing in south florida
26. Senator Nelson. Admiral Tidd, currently, the Housing Services
Office, who assist eligible personnel and families in finding adequate
affordable housing while assigned to active duty in South Florida, is
operating with limited inventory and resources. What can Congress do to
find affordable community oriented housing for our service members and
their families?
Admiral Tidd. There are significant challenges to finding adequate
affordable housing for our service members in the Miami area. We are a
small population in a large, high-cost metropolitan area and have
little market influence. The area that drives housing allowance rates
is a large two-county area, while much of the housing available within
a reasonable commute of our headquarters in Doral is high-cost. This
forces our service members to the outer edges of, or beyond a 20-mile /
60-minute commute. Our housing office is working hard, in collaboration
with the U.S. Coast Guard and within department policy, to shape
housing allowance rates to make our service members more competitive in
areas closer to our installation. We have also had some successes with
state legislation to counter some challenging local market practices
like long community association approval processes for renters and 3
months' rent up front (first and last month, and a security deposit).
For a longer term solution to this problem, SOUTHCOM is actively
working with the Army at all levels on a proposal to acquire land and
construct a limited amount of military housing closer to our
installation in Doral that would do much to economically address the
problem, particularly for our most junior members. The military housing
would enhance quality of life and security for our young service
members and their families, and reduce the operational risk we
presently incur by having our military work force spread across a large
metropolitan area.
We appreciate your concern for our forces and will keep Congress
informed as we develop this housing project.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
expeditionary fast transport ships
27. Senator Shaheen. Admiral Tidd, in a recent memo the Secretary
of the Navy (SECNAV) identified the need for additional ships in the
U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) region to stem the flow of drugs and
defeat human trafficking. As part of the U.S. Navy's assessment, they
reportedly determined that Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and Expeditionary
Fast Transport (EPF) ships provided the best support to meet
USSOUTHCOM's requirements. Does USSOUTHCOM plan to meet the intent of
the SECNAV memo?
Admiral Tidd. USSOUTHCOM fully endorses the observation made within
the SECNAV memo, as we do not have at our disposal the ships necessary
to counter the threat. We at SOUTHCOM, like all other Combatant
Commanders, submit our force requirements, to include the number and
type of ships we need to execute our assigned missions, to the Joint
Staff. We are then dependent on the Navy, as DOD's maritime force
provider, to allocate to us the ships that would satisfy our
requirements. We welcome any support that Congress can offer to the
Navy which would enable them to meet the intent of SECNAV memo. In
order to mitigate the current shortfall in surface assets, we included
a request to fund a contract Multi-Mission Support Vessel (MMSV) as
part of our Unfunded Priority List submission to Congress this year.
28. Senator Shaheen. Admiral Tidd, how many vessels would
USSOUTHCOM need in order to meet the intent of the memo?
Admiral Tidd. An allocation of an additional four vessels, as
mentioned in the memo, will meet the intent of the memo which is to
restore presence of Navy ships in the JIATFS operations area. Since
fiscal year 2015, the presence of Navy medium and long range ships
supporting JIATFS has been, at best, sporadic. Currently, there are no
Navy medium and long range ships allocated to USSOUTHCOM to support
JIATF-S operations.
29. Senator Shaheen. Admiral Tidd, if EPFs are chosen as the vessel
to meet the intent of the memo, how many EPFs would be needed?
Admiral Tidd. In the absence of sufficient Littoral Combat Ship
(LCS) availability, and until modifications to the EPF class make them
a more capable platform from which to conduct JIATF-S operations (i.e.
improved small boat launch and recovery, hull strengthening, improved
communications suite, increases in platform reliability etc),
USSOUTHCOM would prefer a mix of LCS and EPF ships, instead of EPF only
to meet the intent of the memo.
30. Senator Shaheen. Admiral Tidd, if EPFs are chosen as the vessel
to meet the intent of the memo, when would they deploy to the
USSOUTHCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR)?
Admiral Tidd. As the DOD maritime force provider, that would be the
Navy's
decision.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
puerto rico
31. Senator Blumenthal. General Robinson, in the CR passed earlier
this month, DOD received over $1.8 billion for hurricane damage to
cover operation and maintenance costs, military construction efforts,
Army Corps of Engineers projects, and more. Do you believe this is
sufficient? How is this funding being used to rebuild response capacity
and capability?
General Robinson. While USNORTHCOM was responsible for
synchronizing DOD efforts in support of Department of Homeland
Security-generated requirements during the response phase of this
hurricane season, the military Services retain the authority and
responsibility for managing their operations and maintenance, military
construction efforts, and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers projects. As
such, I defer to the military Services regarding the sufficiency or
ultimate use of the funds appropriated during the CR.
gender advisor
32. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Tidd, can you expand on the
importance of women, peace, and security issues as it pertains to the
military? How has having a senior-level gender advisor that reports
directly to you improved your command's ability to be a more effective
fighting force?
Admiral Tidd. From illicit trafficking to armed violence to
insecurity, women often unduly bear the burden of many of the
challenges our military and security forces are trying to address. In
conflict, the civilian population--generally women and children--
becomes subject to atrocities such as Gender Based Violence and Human
Trafficking. By integrating a gender perspective into our institutions
and into our policies before conflict breaks out, we give ourselves the
opportunity to hear from a broader range of voices that together, will
help us find solutions that could prevent or mitigate the worst of the
violence. When women in conflict countries are engaged by the
militaries, we get better intelligence and raise the operational
effectiveness of our troops. We know that when we involve women in our
societies, systems, and processes, our countries are stronger and have
more lasting peace with a lower risk of armed conflict.
We do not aim to lecture our partners on the importance of gender
integration in the military, rather we always look to model this
behavior. It sends a strong message to our partner militaries when they
see the SOUTHCOM Gender Advisor, a female Master Chief Petty Officer
(who coincidentally is from Connecticut), arrive in their countries as
part of a senior NCO subject matter expert exchange. As she introduces
herself, our counterparts learn that in her 24 years of service she has
been part of Special Forces cultural support teams in Afghanistan and
Iraq. Showing that the United States has women successfully serving in
these operational roles is key to emphasizing the imperative of gender
integration in our partner nation militaries.
USSOUTHCOM also hosts an annual Women in Military and Security
Forces Conference that brings together senior defense officials from
across the region to discuss their own lessons learned about gender
integration in the military. This puts a partner nation face on these
discussions and with a goal of shifting the region's attitude toward
women in the military and opening all military positions to women.
33. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Tidd, have you engaged your fellow
combatant commanders on how they focus on women, peace, and security
issues?
Admiral Tidd. I have very publically been promoting our four
Military Imperatives--respect for human rights, the
institutionalization of jointness, development of professional non-
commissioned officer (NCO) corps, and integration of effective gender
perspectives--as fundamental core military competencies required for
professionalization of regional militaries. These competencies
strengthen the operational effectiveness, cohesion, and capabilities of
our hemisphere's forces. In discussing this at various forums and with
various audiences to include Congress and NATO, I have shared our
efforts on gender integration and women, peace, and security with
fellow combatant commanders and other senior leaders across the
national security arena.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
drug interdiction
34. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Tidd and General Robinson, I was
pleased to hear that you and your team set an interdiction record by
stopping 283 metric tons of cocaine from entering the United States.
I'm concerned, however, that a significant amount of cocaine [800
metric tons] still goes unchecked due to a lack of maritime
interdiction assets. Would you say that the vast majority of cocaine
entering our country comes by sea?
Admiral Tidd. Yes, Senator. In fiscal year 2017, 98 percent of
cocaine moved toward the U.S. by sea and two percent by air. Of that 98
percent that started its journey by sea, the vast majority made
landfall in Central America and Mexico where it was broken into smaller
loads and continued toward the United States by land.
In fiscal year 2017, JIATF-South knew exactly where 1,167 events
were at some point in their movement and were unable to take action
against them due to a lack of assets. Those illicit events contained
815 metric tons of cocaine, which would potentially result in:
4,890-8,965 U.S. Cocaine-Related Drug Overdose Deaths
450,000-835,000 U.S. Cocaine-Related Emergency Room
Visits ($978 million-$1.8 billion)
5.0 million-9.3 million New U.S. Cocaine Users
62,755 U.S. Drug-Related Offenders
$1.9 billion Additional U.S. Cost of Inmate Care in
Federal Prisons
30,970 Violent Murders in Mexico and Central America
$8.2 billion-$16.3 billion Illicit Profits (fueling
corruption and instability)
2,575 detainees (would provide additional information on
the illicit networks moving these drugs)
General Robinson. The Drug Enforcement Administration's 2017
National Drug Threat Assessment indicates the majority of cocaine
enters the United States country by sea.
35. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Tidd and General Robinson, other
drugs including illicit fentanyl, one of the main overdose deaths in
the United States, are smuggled via legal ports of entry, not walked
across gaps on our border. Are there other assets that you believe
would be more helpful in allowing you to protect our nation from
illicit trafficking of drugs? What kind of assets?
Admiral Tidd. To stop drugs from entering the country, we require
force packages that include Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) and surface
assets. For every force package we have, we can stop approximately 31
metric tons or 36 illicit events annually. MPA are the top priority
within the force package as they provides more geoprecision location
information which greatly increases detection and subsequent
interdictions of illicit conveyances. Without MPA to vector partner
nations to illicit targets, those very willing partners will typically
not launch an interdiction asset because they are very rarely
successful finding an illicit target unassisted--that would be an
inefficient use of their extremely limited operational funding and
capability. Additional interdictions are made possible by a vertically
integrated force package which includes medium to high endurance ships
with a helo embarked (authorized to use force) and over-the-horizon
RHIBs. The synergistic effect of this package greatly exceeds the
capability of any individual single asset. MPA enable both U.S. and
partner nation interdiction and apprehension asset successes.
JIATFS Annual Requirements:
Air = 90,000 flight hours per year; in fiscal year 2017
sourced at 20 percent of requirement (18,200 flight hours)
o DOD provides 88 percent of these hours
o The majority is provided by Department of Homeland Security
(DHS; CBP and USCG) and Allied and Partner Nations
Ships = 12,500 ship days per year; in fiscal year 2017
sourced at 31 percent of requirement (3,840 ship days)
o DOD provides 89 percent
o Majority provided by DHS (USCG) and Allied Nations
General Robinson. We support our partners with military-unique
capabilities that are balanced against the Department's global
requirements and within the resources provided by our authorities and
appropriations. Our support of the risk-based Southern Border and
Approaches Campaign Plan from the Department of Homeland Security has
proven to be quite beneficial by focusing these resources where
intelligence, surveillance, and technology indicate the greatest area
of threat and, hence, the greatest potential benefit.
36. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Tidd and General Robinson, given the
limited budget and resources at your disposal, would prioritizing the
construction of a wall on our southern border meaningfully reduce the
flow of drugs entering the country versus the allocation of those same
resources towards other interdiction efforts?
Admiral Tidd. USSOUTHCOM cannot speak to the interdiction efforts
at the Southern Border, as that is not within our theater of
operations. What I can tell you is that when we do have the requested
maritime force packages available to us we are extremely efficient at
stopping large loads of drugs on the high seas before they hit land and
get broken down into smaller batches that are much harder to interdict.
General Robinson. USNORTHCOM conducts Counternarcotic and Counter
Transnational Organized Crime efforts in support of law enforcement
agency and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) partners. While
technologies that enhance surveillance and interdiction capability
could be beneficial, I defer to DHS as the lead federal agency for
specific requirements.
information operations
37. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Tidd, during your posture statement,
you discussed Russian efforts to influence the information environment
in Latin America, including Russia operating two Spanish language TV
networks. Russia continues to see results from their overseas
disinformation campaigns designed to undermine United States interests
in locations where our armed forces are stationed or operating. What
are you doing in SOUTHCOM to counter these efforts by the Russians and
other adversaries who are trying to degrade American influence in the
region?
Admiral Tidd. We are educating and informing our partners on the
potentially detrimental and destabilizing effects of Russian activity,
especially Moscow's increased use of active measures and disinformation
in South and Central America, namely through Russia Today and Sputnik
Mundo. We are also working to promote the positive benefits of U.S.
partnership and highlight our continued commitment to the region. As I
told this Committee in 2017, we lose relationships not as a result of
any Chinese or Russian actions; we lose them, in large part, by not
demonstrating the depth of our commitment to the region. Success or
failure in this region depends on us, what we stand for, and what we
do, much more than it depends on anyone else.
38. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Tidd, do you believe you have the
necessary authorities and resources to counter the Russian narrative?
Admiral Tidd. One of the best ways to counter the Russian narrative
is to demonstrate, by deed, that the United States is a strong partner
in this hemisphere. To do that, we must maintain persistent presence
and be actively engaged as a visible, ubiquitous security partner. For
the most part, the countries in this region want to work with the U.S.,
however, limited resources sometimes restrict our ability to do so.
It is important to take a transregional/global approach to this
problem set; while expanded support to the Global Engagement Center to
counter Russian propaganda is extremely helpful, we should not focus
our efforts exclusively in Europe. I believe a broader, more integrated
approach is needed to address this destabilizing Russian narrative
globally, wherever it may be taking place. That means in Latin America
and the Caribbean, as well as in Europe.
counter uav at domestic military installations
39. Senator Heinrich. General Robinson, you said that the potential
threat from airborne platforms with small radar signatures will become
commonplace in the coming years and that they have the potential to
hold our vital institutions and infrastructure at risk. This committee
gave you authority in section 1692 of the last NDAA to engage unmanned
aircraft systems that threaten our military installations or other
strategic assets. Do you believe you now have the authority to better
address this threat? What about resources?
I encourage you and the Department to look at innovative solutions
like Directed Energy to address this problem.
General Robinson. The Fiscal Year 2018 National Defense
Authorization Act provided expanded authorities to better address the
threat of airborne platforms with small radar signatures. These
authorities allow installation commanders to engage potential threat
platforms as they approach and overfly sensitive military bases.
The counter-unmanned aerial systems mission is largely executed by
the Services and appropriate interagency partners, although NORAD and
USNORTHCOM have equities in both force protection (a USNORTHCOM
mission) and air domain defense (a NORAD mission), which makes
detecting small radar signature airborne platforms one of my top
priorities.
Timely detection of an unmanned aerial system is the first step in
engagement sequence and critical to providing sufficient warning time
for successful engagement. Advanced sensors are necessary to detect
low-radar cross section threats such as advanced cruise missiles and
small unmanned aerial systems. As small unmanned aerial system
technology becomes more advanced, I will continue to support Department
efforts to develop defensive systems to better protect our
installations and personnel to operate these systems.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2019 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 2018
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
UNITED STATES CYBER COMMAND
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in Room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe
presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker,
Fischer, Ernst, Tillis, Perdue, Sasse, Reed, Nelson, McCaskill,
Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King,
Heinrich, Warren, and Peters.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Senator Inhofe. The committee meets today to hear Admiral
Mike Rogers--you know, you have more titles than anybody else
down here, you really do--as the Commander of the----
Admiral Rogers. I have that going for me, sir.
Senator Inhofe.--Commander of the U.S. Cyber Command,
Director of the National Security Agency, and Chief of the
Central Security Service. Given your upcoming retirement, it
might be this is the last time you'll be dropping in. Is--do
you think that will happen? We'll miss you.
Well, the--as the recent National Defense Strategy
identified renewed great power and competition with Russia and
China--and that kind of stands--goes along with what General
Dunford said when he said that we are losing our qualitative
and quantitative edge as we move into this 2032--or, this 2023
National Defense Strategy. As we approach the eighth
anniversary of Cyber Command, we should recognize the
remarkable progress you've made in taking what was a very niche
warfighting concept and establishing around it a full-fledged
warfighting command. Later this year, we anticipate that you
will achieve full operational capability of--for the 6,200-
person Cyber Mission Force.
Despite the many successes, there are still significant
challenges. The committee remains concerned about a hollow
cyber force due to the lack of priority across the Services to
deliver the required tools and capabilities and personnel.
Efforts have improved, but the fact remains that we have not--
are not where we need to be, and that we lack the bench
strength necessary.
The other area--and then I'll have some questions about
this during our question time--is the fact that we're at--I
think, at somewhat of a disadvantage with responsibilities that
are spread, as I mentioned to you a few minutes ago, across DOD
[Department of Defense], DHS [Department of Homeland Security],
and the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], with little
semblance of coordination. We can't just wait for a major
cyberattack and then try to get this thing right. If we look at
some of the other countries, that they have got this more
centralized and coordinated. So, we need to address that to see
if maybe we've got some improvements that we can make
structurally.
Senator Reed?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Rogers, welcome. Since we are holding the
confirmation hearing for your successor later this week, this
is likely your last appearance before the committee. Let me
thank you for decades of service to the country, to the NSA
[National Security Administration] and Cyber Command. You've
done an extraordinary job. Thank you, sir.
One of the great threats facing our democracy is influence
operations, a type of information warfare which are mostly
conducted through cyberspace, the domain and theater of
operations of Cyber Command. Russia engaged in a sophisticated
influence campaign during the 2016 election cycle. China has
been engaged in information operations against their own
citizens in order to control their access to information and
their behavior, and is becoming more active abroad. They have
also engaged in massive theft of intellectual property
conducted against United States companies for their own
economic gain. North Korea's attack on Sony America was an
attempt to silence an entertainment company from exercising its
right to free speech and thereby send a message across the
world. These efforts by our adversaries highlight some of our
vulnerabilities in this area, which I hope you will address
today.
While our adversaries are freely conducting information
operations, Cyber Command is still predominantly designed to
conduct technical operations to either defend or attack
computer systems, to sustain or impede the function of
computers and networks. It is not built to deal with the
content of the information flowing through cyberspace with the
cognitive dimension of information warfare. Cyber Command has
made important strides in the last year in the cognitive
dimension in the struggle against ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria], but still has a long way to go, and must also focus
on the strategic level of engagement, not merely an operational
tactical support to engage forces.
Other organizations and officials in the Defense Department
are responsible for what the Department calls ``psychological
and deception operations.'' But, those officials and
departments, in turn, have no expertise or capabilities in the
technical aspects of cyberspace operations. This is a serious
handicap when we are confronted with adversaries, like Russia,
that conduct information warfare that combines the technical
and cognitive dimensions to manipulate perceptions through
cyberspace. Because we have separated these things
organizationally and in terms of policy and strategy, we are
greatly disadvantaged when it comes to countering an
adversary's integrated operations and when it comes to
conducting our own information operations through cyberspace.
The Fiscal Year 2018 NDAA [National Defense Authorization
Act] included a provision, cosponsored by Senator McCain and
myself, which directs the Secretary of Defense to designate a
senior official to lead the integration of all Defense
Department components and capabilities that contribute to
information warfare, and to develop specific strategies, plans,
and capabilities to operate effectively in this arena to
counter and deter adversaries. I'm eager to learn how Cyber
Command is responding to this legislation.
As stressed in the newly released National Defense
Strategy, Russia and other adversaries have mastered the art of
conducting a systematic aggression against the United States
and its interests and allies by staying just below the level
that would be considered armed aggression or an act of war. As
the DNI [Department of National Intelligence] testified
recently to the Senate Intelligence Committee, adversaries are
using cyber operations to achieve strategic objectives, and
will continue to do so unless they face clear repercussions.
Adversaries are achieving strategic effects incrementally by
applying constant pressure through cyberspace against the
sources of our national power.
In addition to tools such as sanctions, diplomacy,
indictments, and public shaming, we must meet not only Russia,
but all adversaries, where the struggle is taking place in the
information sphere. As part of this, we need to engage in blunt
information operations against us at their source by disrupting
them in cyberspace as they unfold.
The National Mission Teams of the Cyber Mission Force were
created to conduct exactly these missions. According to Defense
Department's official cyberstrategy, the National Mission Teams
were created to defend the country by disrupting ongoing
cyberattacks of ``significant consequence.'' Some of these
influence operations in cyberspace are directed against the
foundations of American democracy: the free expression of
Americans' political views, the voting booth, and through our
political parties and campaign organizations. Surely, such acts
meet the threshold of ``significant consequences,'' justifying
the use of the National Mission Teams under the Defense
Department's cyberstrategy.
The members of the Cyber Subcommittee, led by Senators
Round and Senator Nelson, have made this point numerous times.
I want to thank them for their leadership on the issue. Admiral
Rogers, I'm also interested in your views on this issue.
Finally, I understand that presidential leadership is
critical on these issues. I raised this matter with the
Director of National Intelligence and each of the intelligence
agency directors, including you, Admiral Rogers, at a recent
public hearing of the Intelligence Committee. The very
disappointing answer that I received is that the President has
not corrected any action on countering these threats. In
addition, countering these threats requires not only the
Defense Department to integrate all the components of
information warfare, it is essential to integrate capabilities
and authorities of all the national security and law
enforcement organizations across the government as a whole.
This, too, requires leadership that, so far, has been lacking.
Admiral Rogers, thank you again for your service and the
service of your family, and I look forward to your testimony.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
I, regretfully, say that Senator Rounds, who does chair the
Subcommittee, will not be here today, or actually this week,
with the loss of his father.
Senator Reed. Oh. Sorry.
Senator Inhofe. So, we all regret that.
Admiral Rogers?
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL MICHAEL S. ROGERS, USN, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES CYBER COMMAND; DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY; AND
CHIEF, CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICES
Admiral Rogers. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished
members of the committee, thank you for your enduring support
and the opportunity to talk with you today about the hard-
working men and women of United States Cyber Command.
But, first, I'd like to take a moment to extend our
thoughts and prayers to Chairman McCain and his family, and to
voice our support for him as he undertakes this tough health
fight. Senator McCain, keep fighting. Look forward to you
getting back, sir.
On behalf of the men and women of the United States Cyber
Command, I'm here to discuss the Command's posture and describe
how we prepare for and execute operations in the cyberspace
domain to support the Nation's defense against increasingly
sophisticated and capable adversaries.
The cyberspace domain that existed when we first
established Cyber Command, nearly--over 8 years ago, has
evolved dramatically. Today, we face threats that have
increased in sophistication, magnitude, intensity, volume, and
velocity, threatening our vital national security interests and
economic well-being. China and Russia, whom we see as peer or
near-peer competitors in cyberspace, remain our greatest
concern. But, rogue regimes, like Iran and North Korea have
growing capabilities and are using aggressive methods to
conduct malicious cyberspace activities.
Further, several states have mounted sustained campaigns
against our cleared defense contractors to scout and steal key
enabling technologies, capabilities, and systems. Our
adversaries have grown more emboldened, conducting increasingly
aggressive activities to extend their influence without fear of
significant consequence. We must change our approaches and
responses here if we are to change this dynamic.
While the domain has evolved, Cyber Command's three
missions areas endure. Our first priority is the defense of the
Department of Defense Information Network, or the DODIN.
Second, we enable other joint force commanders by delivering
effects in and through cyberspace. Finally, we defend the
Nation against cyberthreats through support to DHS and others
when directed to do so by the President or the Secretary of
Defense. In concert with the National Defense Strategy, we are
charting a path to achieve and sustain cyberspace superiority,
to deliver strategic and operational advantage and increased
options for combatant commanders and policymakers. Without
cyberspace superiority in today's battlefield, risk to mission
increases across all domains and endangers our security.
Since my last update almost a year ago, Cyber Command has
achieved a number of significant milestones. First, Joint Force
Headquarters DODIN, our subordinate headquarters responsible
for securing, operating, and defending the Department's complex
IT [Information Technology] infrastructure, has achieved full
operational capability. Second, Joint Task Force Ares, the
organization we created to lead the fight in cyber against
ISIS, has successfully integrated cyberspace operations into
that broader military campaign, and achieved some excellent
results. We will continue to pursue ISIS in support of the
Nation's objectives. Third, we've significantly enhanced our
training and cyber operation platforms to prepare the
battlespace against our key adversaries.
This year will bring several additional accomplishments.
Cyber Command will be elevated to a unified combatant commander
when I step down, later this spring. As a combatant command, we
will have the unique responsibilities of being a joint force
provider and a joint force trainer responsible for providing
mission-ready cyberspace operations forces to other combatant
commanders and ensuring that joint cyberforces are trained to a
high standard and remain interoperable.
In addition, in April, we'll start moving into a state-of-
the-art integrated cyber center and joint operations facility
at Fort Meade. This will be our first fully integrated
operations center that enhances the whole-of-government
coordination and improves planning and operations against a
range of growing cyberthreats.
Within this dynamic domain, it's imperative to continually
evolve the training and tools of our operators. We've recently
delivered the first of several foundational toolkits designed
to enable the Cyber Mission Force to work against adversary
networks while reducing the risk of exposure, as well as
equipping JTF [Joint Task Force] Ares in its fight against ISIS
with capabilities designed to disrupt adversary use of the
Internet.
Innovation and rapid tech development demand competition
and the ability to leverage all partners, including small
businesses. We intend, in the coming year, to create an
unclassified collaboration venue where businesses and academia
can help us tackle tough problems without needing to jump over
clearance hurdles, for example, which, for many, are very
difficult barriers. Of course, all these tools require a
talented and sophisticated workforce to operate and employ
them. The Cyber Excepted Service will help us recruit, manage,
and retain cyber expertise in a highly competitive talent
market.
Our success also remains entwined with continued
integration of the Reserve and National Guard. In our
headquarters alone, we currently employ more than 300 full-time
and part-time reservists, and, in addition, more than 150
Reserve and National Guard members are mobilized to lead and
execute cyberspace operations. For most--perhaps most
significantly, we are nearing completion of the buildout of our
Cyber Mission Force, with all teams on a glide path to reach
full operational capability before the end of this fiscal year.
As the teams reach FOC [full operational capability], our focus
is shifting beyond the build to ensuring that those teams are
ready to perform their mission and to execute sustained and
optimized mission outcomes for the Nation year after year for a
sustained effort over time.
I fully realize that cybersecurity is a national security
issue that requires a whole-of-government approach that brings
together not only government, departments, agencies, but also
the private sector and our international partners. Over the
last year, we've also increased our interaction with critical
infrastructure elements within the private sector and the
broader set of U.S. Government partners supporting them.
As you know, I serve as both Commander of the United States
Cyber Command and Director of the National Security Agency.
This dual-hat appointment underpins the close relationship
between these two organizations. The Fiscal Year 2017 National
Defense Authorization Act included a provision that describes
the conditions for splitting or ending the dual-hat
arrangement, and the Department is working its way through this
question; and ultimately the Secretary, in conjunction with the
DNI, will provide a final recommendation to the President. All
of us at Cyber Command are proud of the roles we play in our
Nation's cyber efforts and are motivated to accomplish our
assigned missions overseen by the Congress, particularly this
committee.
Finally, after serving over 4 years as the Commander of
Cyber Command, and after nearly 37 years of service as a naval
officer, I'm set to retire later this spring, and I will do all
I can during the intervening period to ensure the mission
continues, that our men and women remain ever motivated, and
that we have a smooth transition. I'm grateful for the
committee's continued support and confidence of myself and the
Cyber Command team, and I look forward to answering your
questions today.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Rogers follows:]
Prepared Statement by Admiral Michael S. Rogers
Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished members of
the Committee, thank you very much for inviting me before you today to
represent the men and women of U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM). I am
honored to lead this fine group of Americans, and to speak in public
about their accomplishments--which we owe in no small part to the
support of the Congress and of this committee in particular. I expect
this will be my last time that I speak to you about their efforts and
their progress as the Commander of USCYBERCOM, which is on the verge of
becoming a full, unified combatant command, and so I am eager to begin
and to answer any questions or address any concerns that you might
have. I look forward to a dialogue with you about what we are seeing in
cyberspace and what that means for our command, for the Department of
Defense, and for our nation.
United States Cyber Command's mission is to direct, synchronize,
and coordinate cyberspace planning and operations to defend and advance
national interests in collaboration with domestic and international
partners. We have three mission objectives: to ensure DOD mission
assurance by directing the operation and defense of the Department of
Defense's information networks (what we call the DODIN); to deter or
defeat strategic threats to U.S. interests and infrastructure; and to
achieve Joint Force commander objectives in and through cyberspace. The
Command is based at Fort Meade, Maryland, and in this fiscal year is
executing more than $600 million dollars in programs and projects. Our
full-time staff amounts to 1,060 military members and civilians, plus
contractors. At the end of December, we had 5,070 servicemembers and
civilians in our Cyber Mission Force (CMF), building to a total of
6,187 people, meaning the CMF was staffed at 82 percent.
Our team is organized into components that together represent all
the Armed Services. Officers and enlisted personnel come from each one
of the Armed Services, and are organized, trained, and equipped by our
Service cyber components in Army Cyber Command, Marine Forces
Cyberspace Command, Fleet Cyber Command/Tenth Fleet, and Air Forces
Cyber/24th Air Force (as well as U.S. Coast Guard Cyber). USCYBERCOM
proper comprises a headquarters organization and runs operations
through its components: the Cyber National Mission Force (CNMF), Joint
Force Headquarters-DODIN, plus four other Joint Force headquarters
elements, each of which is paired with one of the four Services' cyber
components named above. Both Active Duty and Reserve Component
personnel serve in our forces, and they are joined by Coast Guardsmen
as well.
USCYBERCOM performs its missions in accordance with national and
Department-wide strategic guidance. In elevating USCYBERCOM to unified
combatant command status, the President and the Secretary of Defense
made several stipulations about its mission and duties, and I shall say
more about those in a moment. I hope to impart to you today my sense of
the unique value that our Command, acting within these parameters, adds
to the defense of America and its interests. But first I want to give
you a sense of the operating environment before us and the gravity of
several current and looming cyber threats.
the cyberspace environment
We face a growing variety of threats from adversaries acting with
precision and boldness, and often with stealth. U.S. Cyber Command
engages with adversaries in cyberspace every day. Accordingly, we have
developed substantial knowledge of how malicious cyber actors work
against the United States, our allies and partners, and many other
targets as well. That knowledge in turn provides insights into the
motivations, capabilities, and intentions of those who sponsor such
activities, whether they be states, criminal enterprises, or violent
extremists. Cyberspace is a global and dynamic operating environment,
with unique challenges.
A significant story in cyberspace over the past year relates to the
progress made against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and
USCYBERCOM contributions to the eviction of ISIS fighters from their
geographic strongholds. Today, ISIS's so-called ``Caliphate'' is
crumbling. It has lost 98 percent of the territory it once controlled
in Iraq and Syria, and approximately 3.2 million Syrians and 4.5
million Iraqis now have a pathway to begin to rebuild their cities and
their lives. Denying sanctuary to ISIS in Iraq and Syria is a victory
for civilization, and an important step in stabilizing the nations of
that region and building peace in the Middle East. Cyberspace
operations played an important role in this campaign, with USCYBERCOM
supporting the successful offensive by U.S. Central Command
(USCENTCOM), U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and our
Coalition partners. We learned a great deal in performing those
missions, and continue to execute some today. Mounting cyber operations
against ISIS helped us re-learn and reinforce important lessons learned
over the last decade of cyber operations against violent extremists. I
should emphasize that this campaign was a Coalition fight, with key
international partners conducting and supporting both kinetic and
cyberspace operations against ISIS.
The near defeat of ISIS in its geographic strongholds is bringing
to a close one chapter in an enduring campaign against violent
extremists, but is not the end of the story. While ISIS has lost much
of its geographic base in Iraq and Syria, we believe its leaders and
die-hard adherents planned for this development. To be clear, the
reduction of kinetic combat operations does not mean we have achieved
the enduring defeat of ISIS. Without continued attention and support,
we risk the return of violent extremist groups like ISIS in liberated
areas in Iraq and Syria and their spread in new locations. As the
Coalition has made progress in Iraq and Syria, many ISIS fighters,
including thousands and potentially tens of thousands of foreign
fighters, have fled the battlefield in Iraq and Syria. These members
have dispersed to locations around the globe including Africa, Europe,
Asia, and other nations in the Middle East, in many cases to reinforce
other ISIS branches and affiliates. Carrying their poisonous ideology
and experiences with them, they are assimilating into local
populations, developing new local and online networks, and overwhelming
law enforcement's ability to monitor all of these potential threats our
partners' Homelands, and potentially our own.
Over the last few years, ISIS fighters and sympathizers have
complicated the picture in Afghanistan, frustrating the central
government's efforts to bring order and development to that war-torn
land. We have watched and opposed their emergence on the battlefield
and in cyberspace, and noted their conflicts with the government in
Kabul and other insurgent groups. The Afghan area of hostilities
represents another important operating area for cyberspace operations.
USCYBERCOM is in the fight there as well, employing cyberspace
operations to protect Coalition forces, target terrorist leaders, and
disrupt the operations of hostile forces. We are providing similar
support to our forces battling other violent extremist groups in Africa
and Asia.
We believe we may also face a further evolution of the cyberspace
threat from violent extremist elements. Since its inception, ISIS
leaders and their technical experts have maintained a robust online
presence, and we assess that they will seek to increase their efforts
in and through cyberspace. They and other groups, such as al Qaeda and
its affiliates, still use the Internet to market their versions of
terrorism, garner financial and material support, and inspire
followers. ISIS, like al Qaeda before it, has worked hard to target
susceptible individuals and inspire them to commit attacks in the West.
That is why USCYBERCOM works with law enforcement, intelligence, and
liaison partners to find and destroy the key nodes in ISIS online
infrastructure and media operations (along with the analogous
infrastructures of other violent extremists).
Our greatest concern, of course, remains that of actions by state-
sponsored malicious cyber actors and the states behind them. We find
that many states now seek to integrate cyberspace operations with the
plans and capabilities of their traditional military capabilities.
Indeed, several have mounted sustained campaigns to scout and access
our key enabling technologies, capabilities, platforms and systems as
they are developed and produced by cleared defense contractors. As the
Secretary's new National Defense Strategy emphasizes, the states of
greatest concern are Russia and China, with their advanced
technological bases, powerful conventional forces, and nuclear
arsenals. We watch them not just because they are big and well-armed,
but because they practice coercive diplomacy against their neighbors,
and their strategic intentions remain unclear. These two nations also
count as peer or near-peer competitors in cyberspace.
China has shown a worrying tendency to challenge the existing
rules-based order, from which it has been a major beneficiary. It is
pursuing its economic and diplomatic interests with greater
assertiveness, rejecting, ignoring, or trying to rewrite norms that it
perceives do not trend in its favor. China's behavior in cyberspace
exemplifies this trend. For example, Presidents Obama and Xi committed
in 2015 that our two countries would not conduct or knowingly support
cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property for commercial gain.
Subsequent evidence, however, suggests that hackers based in China
sustained cyber espionage that exploited the business secrets and
intellectual property of American businesses, universities, and defense
industries. The Justice Department just last fall unsealed indictments
against three Chinese nationals, alleging they exfiltrated more than
400GB of data from several companies in the United States. In addition,
the Chinese Government could exploit the production of information and
technology products to harvest corporate, government, and even personal
data from foreign countries.
Russia represents a different sort of problem in cyberspace. Moscow
says it wants to defend the existing rules-based order, yet in fact
undermines it. The Intelligence Community concluded last year that
Russian actors, with the knowledge of senior decision-makers, employed
influence operations to interfere with the United States presidential
election in 2016. In recent months, Congress has heard testimony from
leading social-media companies explaining that their business records
had logged an even wider pattern of Russian cyber meddling before the
election--one that matched malicious cyber activities seen by several
other nations. The Kremlin has used hackers to steal personal
communications that Russian operatives then parceled out in targeted
leaks, and created fake social media personas and news items on all
sides of controversial issues in the hope of stirring discord in the
West. The idea is to make Western electorates distrust all news outlets
and ultimately one another. This threatens the foundations of
democracy, making it difficult to discern Moscow's intentions and to
craft common measures for countering Russia's aggressive actions in its
near-abroad and its repression at home.
Russian-sponsored malicious cyber activities of concern to the
United States and its allies extend well beyond the behavior cited
above. Russian intelligence agencies run their own cyber theft
campaigns--witness last November's plea bargain of a foreign hacker who
admitted to working on behalf of one of Moscow's intelligence services,
wherein he hacked the webmail accounts of individuals of interest to
Russia and sold their passwords to his Russian handlers.
We are monitoring the cyber conflict sparked by the ongoing
Russian-manufactured conflict in Ukraine. Secretary Mattis in Kyiv
noted that Russia is not adhering to the letter or the spirit of its
treaty commitments, most egregiously by attempting to change
international borders by force. This behavior in geographic space
matches Russian cyberspace behavior; Russia's cyber actions seem
designed to complement and support its aggressive actions on the
ground. While we cannot discuss the details in open session, I would
draw your attention to the spate of very serious cyber attacks against
Ukrainian citizens and infrastructure over the last 16 months. For
instance, the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration
Center (NCCIC) of the Department of Homeland Security issued an alert
in July to public utilities concerning a new malware that targeted
electrical grids in Ukraine the previous winter. The most costly cyber-
attack in history, NotPetya, was launched by the Russian military last
June. NotPetya encrypted and essentially ruined hard drives on
thousands of Ukrainian computers. This cyber attack quickly spread well
beyond Ukraine, causing billions of dollars in damages to businesses
across Europe and as far away as the United States.
Most states lack the suite of diplomatic, military, and economic
tools employed by Russia and China, but rogue regimes nonetheless cause
concern because of their aggressive unpredictability in cyberspace.
Iran and North Korea have growing capabilities in cyberspace, and
although they have fewer technical tools, they employ aggressive
methods to carry out malicious cyberspace activities. The Iranians
recruit hackers for cyberespionage, surveillance of their population,
cyber attacks on their neighbors and perceived opponents, and even
attempts to penetrate our military systems. North Korea has limited
Internet connectivity and likely views the Internet as a vector to
employ in striking opponents and deterring potential threats. Pyongyang
also uses cyber tools to evade economic sanctions and harvest hard
currency for Kim Jong-Un's impoverished regime. The United States and
our British allies have publicly attributed to North Korea last
summer's WannaCry ransomware attacks; 51.92 in bitcoin, worth
approximately $140,000 at that time, was transferred out of the bitcoin
wallet used by WannaCry--one of many ways of using cyber techniques to
generate revenue. Most concerning, we do not see these actors having
the technical competence or imperative to avoid uncontrolled damage if
they conduct cyber attacks against private-sector targets, especially
critical infrastructure.
Various non-state actors in cyberspace cause us concern as well.
The main operational problem is distinguishing their efforts and
activities from the state-sponsored campaigns. Cyber criminals and
terrorists increase the ``noise level'' for systems administrators and
network defenders everywhere.
In this context, I should mention that improved attribution is in
our strategic interest, but not strictly necessary to guard against
many cyber threats. A particular malware is still dangerous whether it
was developed and/or employed by organized criminals, ideological
hactivists, or a state entity. The last year has witnessed an alarming
spate of incidents involving increasingly sophisticated cyber tools.
NotPetya and WannaCry, for example, both modified powerful tools posted
on-line by an anonymous group calling itself Shadow Brokers. What makes
this trend even more worrisome is the uncontrolled use of these
destructive cyber tools, the wielders of which clearly did not care
whether they disrupted or damaged systems far beyond their main
targets. We have reason to believe that particular states are behind
some of these cyber attacks, and the fact that they have cavalierly
unleashed tools that damaged the computers of their own citizens,
speaks volumes about their disregard for responsible state behavior in
cyberspace. DOD systems escaped particular harm in these incidents, but
that is because we made robust and early investments in active, layered
defenses. Not everyone has such resources, and so innocent victims had
their hard drives encrypted, their data stolen, and their businesses
damaged. We do not have to gain positive attribution to each particular
actor before we can act to protect ourselves and our allies and
partners; in fact, all users must take basic steps to secure their data
and systems. We need decisive responses at scale to threats and
intrusions. That is where USCYBERCOM finds its mission.
three milestones
Several developments will make 2018 a pivotal year for USCYBERCOM.
The first is USCYBERCOM's elevation to unified combatant command
status. This will take place upon the confirmation and appointment of
my successor, whom the President recently nominated. The elevation of
USCYBERCOM demonstrates to international partners and adversaries our
stake in cyberspace, and shows that DOD is prioritizing efforts to
build cyber defense and resilience. Elevation reflects the importance
of growing threats in cyberspace, and demonstrates that the United
States is maintaining a leadership role. My successor will naturally
want to make adjustments at USCYBERCOM to reflect his vision, but in
many ways elevation will not drive sudden changes in primary aspects of
the Command. The commander of USCYBERCOM will remain dual-hatted as the
Director of the National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security
Service (NSA/CSS) in the near term. We at USCYBERCOM are already
operating in the cyber mission space and have key partners among U.S.
Government agencies and allies. These will remain constants for the
foreseeable future.
In the long term, elevation entails significant adjustments in
USCYBERCOM. You can grasp the implications by consulting the new
Unified Command Plan (UCP) that the President approved in November
2017. The UCP made USCYBERCOM responsible for the planning and
execution of global cyberspace operations. The responsibilities
assigned to USCYBERCOM include: directing the operations, security, and
defense of the DODIN; directing cyber defenses of the critical
infrastructure that assures the Department can accomplish its missions;
warning and defending against significant cyber attacks on the United
States and its interests; coordinating across the Department and the
U.S. Government before mounting operations that include our own cyber
attack actions; detailing military liaison officers to U.S. Government
and international agencies to represent the Command on cyber matters;
advocating for cyberspace capabilities in the Department's programming
and budgeting processes; integrating theater security cooperation of
cyberspace operations in support of Joint Force commanders; and
executing cyberspace operations in support of military and civilian
authorities defending the Homeland, as directed.
The Unified Command Plan also gave USCYBERCOM new duties in keeping
with Congress's intent to make it something of a hybrid Command along
the general lines of U.S. Special Operations Command. Under its new
Joint Force Provider responsibilities, as specified in the UCP,
USCYBERCOM provides ``mission-ready Cyber Mission Forces'' to support
Combatant Command mission requirements and identifies for the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff relevant ``global joint sourcing
solutions'' (and supervises their implementation). In addition, under
its new Joint Force Trainer role, USCYBERCOM ensures that joint cyber
forces are trained and interoperable; sets standards for all joint
cyber forces; conducts and supports Combatant Command-level exercises;
and recommends strategy, doctrine, and procedures for joint cyberspace
operations. With our new, Service-like functions, we will be preparing
and submitting program recommendations and budget proposals for cyber
operations forces; validating and prioritizing requirements, to include
capabilities in any domain that enable employment of cyberspace
capabilities; diversifying operational infrastructure; formulating and
submitting requirements for intelligence support; coordinating with
Military Departments on promotion, assignment, and recruitment of
cyberspace operations forces; and exercising limited acquisition
authority consistent with section 923 of the Fiscal Year 2017 National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and Section 807 of the Fiscal Year
2016 NDAA.
One would be correct in inferring from that list of
responsibilities that USCYBERCOM must make significant changes over the
next couple years while executing its expanding mission. Many of our
leaders, teams, and action officers will thus be working double duty,
directing and supporting ongoing cyberspace operations while overseeing
the changes required by elevation as directed in the UCP. I need hardly
add that the stability and hence predictability of our resource flow is
especially important during this time.
The second important development to report is the progress of the
Cyber Mission Force, specifically our projected completion of the force
generation of the 133 CMF teams, with all of them attaining full
operational capability by September. In fact, we might meet this target
even earlier, likely in June of this year. This long-anticipated
milestone is due to the years of hard work by the Services and the
agencies, with the support of Congress. We at USCYBERCOM are completing
the readiness management programs that will sustain the readiness of
the CMF teams. After all, commissioning a warship--while an important
event--does not make that ship mission-ready. On a ship, as on a Cyber
Mission Force team, much work remains to be done to make the crew
members proficient at their duties and the whole team ready and able to
perform whatever missions might be directed.
Finally, in a matter of weeks USCYBERCOM will open its new
Integrated Cyber Center and Joint Operations Center (ICC/JOC) at Fort
Meade. Construction is nearly complete, and we will begin moving forces
into the building in April. The facility is USCYBERCOM's first
dedicated building, providing the advanced command and control
capabilities and global integration capabilities that we require to
perform our missions. I am grateful for the Congressional support that
brought us so far in this long process, and of course I invite Members
of the Committee to visit Fort Meade for a tour of our new facility.
On a related note, later this year USCYBERCOM will formally request
your support for a new headquarters facility. My headquarters operates
today from dozens of office suites in ten NSA-owned or -leased
buildings dispersed across 50 square miles of the Baltimore-Washington
Highway corridor. No other Combatant Commander confronts such an
obstacle, which makes efficient and effective staff function
challenging. In an operating environment where seconds matter, we
require a headquarters that facilitates staff and partner integration,
information flow, and rapid decision making. I believe the right
location for our headquarters is on Fort Meade in a purpose-built
facility, and I will request your support for this requirement.
u.s. cyber command's missions and performance
Our first and primary mission objective remains defending the
information systems of the Department of Defense. Adversaries realized
decades ago that the power of the U.S. military in no small part
derives from its integrated and synchronized functioning, which in turn
relies on networks, bandwidth, processing, and analytics. Operations,
sustainment, intelligence, and command and control rely on sensitive
networks linked across the public Internet infrastructure. Attacking
our information systems looks to some adversaries like a way to stop
the U.S. military. We know this because we read their doctrinal
writings, we watch their probes of our systems, and we see how they
monitor our personnel. If their efforts to penetrate the DODIN were to
succeed and open avenues for attacks on our DOD networks and systems,
then my fellow Joint Force commanders would find it difficult to
execute their respective missions.
Securing and defending the DODIN is a crucial, 24-hour-a-day task.
The old adage remains true: an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of
cure. Secure information systems free us from the expense and time of
remedying preventable intrusions, breaches, and disruptions. The
WannaCry and NotPetya malwares mentioned above, for instance, exploited
a vulnerability in Windows that Microsoft Corporation had patched weeks
earlier. Many enterprises and users had installed those patches as a
matter of course, keeping current with their security updates--as we
had on the DODIN. We and they thus remained largely unharmed by these
two outbreaks. No sooner did 2018 begin, than new challenges presented
themselves in the form of widespread vulnerabilities--dubbed Meltdown
and Spectre--that are inherent in nearly all computer processors.
Coordinating such preventive measures in a timely fashion and across a
huge enterprise like the DODIN is no easy feat, yet we have learned to
do so in a regular, timely, and accountable manner. That is not to say
that we do everything right in operating the DODIN; it is rather to
reiterate the importance of a central command authority to assess
operational risks, direct responses, and hold administrators
accountable for executing prescribed remedies.
We see evidence every day that adversaries continue to probe the
DODIN. Most such probes represent attempted espionage rather than cyber
attacks, but cumulatively they force us to devote considerable
resources and attention to defense--which perhaps is the intention
behind them. Over the past year, our Cyber Protection Teams have been
kept fully engaged with testing our systems and supporting the
defensive efforts of our mission partners (more on this below). We
appreciate the intent of Congress to assist us in this field as voiced
in section 1640 of the Fiscal Year 2018 NDAA. That measure requires the
Department of Defense to outline a Strategic Cybersecurity Program to
work with USCYBERCOM in reviewing the cybersecurity of critical defense
capabilities like nuclear command and control, sensitive information
systems, and long-range strike assets.
Keeping DOD's information networks, weapons systems, and affiliated
networks functioning and secure requires teamwork by many partners,
particularly the Services, NSA, the Defense Information Systems Agency
(DISA), the DOD Chief Information Officer (CIO), and the various
cybersecurity service providers (CSSPs). In our experience,
successfully defending our systems requires the application of time-
tested operational principles for the Joint Force, as well as a tight
connection with the activities to secure all DOD networked devices. In
this regard, I am naturally concerned with any legislative or policy
proposals that would take the management of operational risks out of
the military chain of command and vest it in civilian staff or advisory
components of DOD. I would point you specifically to language passed in
the Fiscal Year 2018 NDAA (section 909) that provisionally authorizes
the DOD CIO to set standards for and certify capabilities on DOD
networks. This provision could be interpreted to make an official
outside the military chain of command responsible for determining which
capabilities a Joint Force commander can employ to perform his
missions, and interpose another layer of review and delay in a
development and acquisition process that greatly needs speed and
agility.
To explain my reasoning here, the DODIN is equivalent to a joint
security area in the terrain of cyberspace--essentially a set of bases
and communications assets that enable and facilitate operations and
mission accomplishment by the entire Joint Force. I am responsible for
the security, operation, and defense of this joint security area, and
my ability to accomplish that mission is affected daily by the ever-
shifting dynamics on the physical, logical, and personal levels that
together constitute its terrain. I must both protect this terrain
against potential threats and defend it against specific threat actors.
The design, fielding, and operation of DOD information technology
directly affects how I can move and maneuver to defend the DODIN, and
thus the degree of risk that I must assume (and indirectly the degree
of risk imposed on the entire Joint Force). As the commander, I should
be the decision-maker for accepting and managing operational risks on
the DODIN. It would also help for me to have a significant degree of
influence in the development, adaptation, policy, and standards of DOD
information technology, networks, and cyberspace capabilities.
Our second major mission objective is to defend the United States
against cyber threats to U.S. interests and infrastructure. We are
concerned that many such cyber attacks now occur below the threshold of
the use of force and outside of the context of armed conflict, but
cumulatively accrue strategic gains to our adversaries. The United
States must continuously and persistently engage and contest cyber
attacks, in order to reset adversary expectations about our behavior
and commitment. The Secretary's new National Defense Strategy speaks to
this point in discussing the Global Operating Model for the Joint
Force, in which cyber is a foundational capability that remains in
contact with adversaries ``to help us compete more effectively below
the level of armed conflict.'' Through consistent action, and in
coordination with interagency partners, we can influence the calculus
of hostile actors, deter malicious cyber activities, and clarify the
distinction between acceptable and unacceptable behavior in cyberspace.
Cyber capabilities can also disrupt and potentially deter non-cyber
threats as well.
The importance of cyberspace for our nation's security and
prosperity demands unified responses across departments and agencies
regardless of sector or geography. Cyber capabilities should be
integrated with plans and operations across all domains to influence
and shape adversary behavior, in preparation for and during joint
operations in a conflict, as well as outside of situations of armed
conflict.
Equally integral to defending the nation against cyber attacks is
collective defense and collaboration with our allies and partners, both
domestically and abroad. USCYBERCOM facilitates whole-of-government
planning. We are helping DOD increase collective situational awareness
through our collaboration with partners like the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), the FBI, the Department of State, and other departments
and agencies. Working with our interagency partners, we have also
matured our collaboration with key critical infrastructure sectors.
Such collaboration allows us to better understand events and trends in
cyberspace. USCYBERCOM has established interagency coordination
processes to foster intelligence sharing between the headquarters
directorates and other United States Government entities.
As a functional combatant command, USCYBERCOM has the authority to
engage directly with foreign partner equivalents as well. USCYBERCOM
has deployed liaison officers to key foreign partners, and is crafting
agreements to broaden collaboration and interoperability. Strengthening
our foreign partnerships has paid dividends in recent years by
increasing our capabilities and capacity. Command elevation will allow
USCYBERCOM to mature such partnerships, building relationships and
trust that will help us and our partners in shaping the cyberspace
domain. We note here our support for the provision (Sec. 1239A) in the
NDAA for fiscal year 2018 that would boost cybersecurity cooperation
with NATO and European partners to thwart malign influence by Russia.
USCYBERCOM performs the third of its major missions by enabling
Joint Force commanders to deliver the effects they require in and
through cyberspace. We see an ever-increasing demand from the combatant
commanders for support; cyber effects ensure the Joint Force can
project power, enhance its lethality, and defend its command and
control. Our Joint Task Force Ares has given important supporting fires
to USCENTCOM and USSOCOM in the campaign to defeat ISIS on the ground
in Iraq and Syria. We learned many lessons from that fight,
particularly regarding intelligence in the battlespace and the broad
applicability of traditional targeting processes in the cyber domain.
Perhaps the most important takeaway from our experience was how to
build the right processes to integrate cyberspace operations as one
piece of a complex and coordinated multi-domain military campaign. I
have directed our components to apply these and related lessons as we
transition our temporary, joint task force model for fighting ISIS in
cyberspace to an analogous and enduring construct that addresses the
threat of violent extremism worldwide.
In supporting Joint Force commanders, USCYBERCOM is working to
synchronize the planning and operations of cyber forces as ``high-
demand/low density'' assets. Two Secretaries of Defense have now
endorsed this change in how our cyberspace assets are managed. The new
construct provides the Commander of USCYBERCOM the authority to balance
risk across the Joint Force by focusing cyber capacity where it is most
needed, both in time and space. This strategic approach to military
cyberspace assets will allow us to deter and respond to or preempt
cyber threats in all phases of conflict and to synchronize cyberspace
operations globally. We are building this concept into USCYBERCOM's
operational and contingency plans.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff furthered this goal by
updating the cyberspace operations command and control framework last
fall, directing that USCYBERCOM establish Cyber Operations--Integrated
Planning Elements (CO-IPEs) at each Combatant Command. We hope to have
all of these new units at full operational capability within the next
five years to plan, synchronize, integrate, and de-conflict cyberspace
operations with Combatant Command plans and operations. CO-IPEs will be
in direct support to combatant commanders but will remain under my
command and under the administrative control of USCYBERCOM's Service
components. USCYBERCOM is leading the planning effort to establish the
CO-IPEs. The size and configuration of the CO-IPEs will naturally vary
to best fulfill the mission requirements of their host commands; in
most cases they will have fewer than 40 people. USCYBERCOM will monitor
the Services' progress in standing up their respective CO-IPEs and
provide guidance to synchronize their efforts.
Success in our missions depends on a trained and ready force. It
sounds unoriginal to call people our most valuable resource, but for
USCYBERCOM that old saying is true. I must thank Congress for recently
increasing our agility in shaping our workforce; the new Cyber Excepted
Service will help us recruit, manage, and retain cyber expertise in a
highly competitive talent market. We are rapidly preparing to bring in
talented people. With support from the NDAA, the Services have the
ability to directly commission cyberspace operations officers, the
first of whom will be entering the force early this year. As for our
valuable civilian technical experts, we are using the ability to
directly hire uniquely skilled people to strengthen our team. I also
note that the Services will lead the cyber training mission in fiscal
year 2019 as they take over the training functions that USCYBERCOM has
performed in recent years. We have been preparing for that development
for some time, and believe the transition will be seamless.
USCYBERCOM's success in cyberspace reflects a total force effort
with fully integrated Reserve and National Guard cyber warriors who are
trained to the same joint standard as the regular force. In our
headquarters at Fort Meade, we employ more than 300 full-time and part-
time reservists, providing support for intelligence, operations,
planning, training, and cyber capability development. An additional
more than 150 Reserve and National Guard members mobilize continually
to lead and execute operations in support of CNMF and Joint Task Force
Ares. The Reserve Component is especially valuable because Reservists
often bring cyber skills from the private sector; many others come to
us with insights from extensive federal or state government experience.
In addition, the U.S. Army's Reserve and National Guard are building 21
Cyber Protection Teams (CPTs), with plans to reach full operational
capability by fiscal year 2024. These Reserve Component Soldiers are in
the fight today. For example, an all-Army National Guard team named
Task Force Echo is made up of Soldiers from seven states and has been
on-mission since last year, providing essential cyberspace support to
our operations.
By the end of this summer, three National Guard and Reserve teams
will achieve full operational capability. While that number in itself
appears small, the Reserve Component's strength lies within its surge
capacity. A significant portion of the Air Force Cyber's contribution
will draw on more than a thousand Reserve Component members.
Recent events illustrated a need for improved coordination between
Active Duty and Reserve Component cyber forces for domestic response.
Future training partnerships between USCYBERCOM, the Reserve Component,
state, local, and tribal governments, along with interagency partners,
enable these core missions by empowering operations that target the
threat outside the United States while allowing law enforcement and
state authorities to defend against the threat within the Homeland.
Making all this work will require sustained training and exercises.
USCYBERCOM personnel, both Active Duty and Reserve Component, hone
their skills and their teamwork through increasingly realistic exercise
scenarios and simulated network environments. This June, we will re-
focus our annual Cyber Guard exercise from certifying tactical teams to
validating our operational concepts. This year's planning takes account
of state governors' and National Guard Adjutant Generals' concerns
about protecting critical assets. It will be a true operational-level
command exercise. Both our Cyber Guard and Cyber Flag will include more
players from the other Combatant Commands, as well as whole-of-
government and industry participants to evaluate cyber capabilities in
a Defense Support to Civil Authorities scenario involving foreign
intruders in the nation's critical infrastructure. We have synchronized
our efforts with the Chief of the National Guard Bureau and his Cyber
Shield exercise as well as with our DHS partners and their Cyber
Prelude exercise. Our exercises, moreover, have each year included a
wider range of foreign partners in offensive and defensive cyber
operations.
Finally, we also need to give good people good tools. In this
regard, we are using our new acquisition authorities (conferred in the
NDAA for fiscal year 2016), and executed our first such acquisition
when we awarded a contract for IT executive research services in
September 2017. The award was valued at over $500,000 and demonstrated
that USCYBERCOM can acquire services and capabilities required to equip
the Cyber Mission Force. Moreover, USCYBERCOM also delivered the first
of several foundational tool kits enabling the CMF to work against
adversary networks while reducing risk of exposure; its organic
development team equipped JTF-Ares with capabilities to disrupt and
influence adversary use of social media. We also thank the Congress for
the provisions of the NDAA for fiscal year 2018 (section 1642), which
requires USCYBERCOM to evaluate new, faster, and more agile development
processes for cyber capabilities. We have a team focused on this task,
and they should be ready to report their findings to the Secretary
within the period stipulated in the Act.
conclusion
Thank you again for inviting me to appear before you today to
represent U.S. Cyber Command, and for all the times you have allowed me
to do so over the past four years. Serving as Commander of USCYBERCOM
has been the highlight of my military career. The Command has
accomplished a great deal in the last four years, operationalizing the
cyber mission space and making what seemed nearly impossible in 2014
look almost routine in 2018. Indeed, I have seen dramatic progress in
just the past year as the Command matures and prepares for unified
combatant command status. All this has been achieved because of the
extraordinary talents and efforts of the men and women of USCYBERCOM
and those of our mission partners. They are great people, and you
should be so proud of them.
Your support has been of enormous help to the Command's maturation,
and remains vital to the work that we perform on behalf of our nation.
As you have surely gathered from my comments, we have big tasks ahead
of us, and your continued assistance could make the difference between
mission success and less satisfactory outcomes. I am confident in the
ability and the drive of our people to accomplish the tasks before
them, just as I have never wavered in my trust in your support for
USCYBERCOM. Now I look forward to your questions.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Admiral Rogers.
Well, in my opening statement, I addressed this--the three
agencies' approach that we have responsible for defending
against the attacks. We have the FBI as the lead for law
enforcement; the Department of Homeland Security is the lead
for critical infrastructure and defending government computer
networks; and, thirdly, the Department of Defense as the lead
for defending the Homeland, defending military computer
networks, and developing and employing military cyber
capabilities. So, you've got the DOD, the DHS, and the FBI. No
one agency--no one agency--has all the authorities required to
defend and protect the Homeland. So, did we set it up wrong to
start with? What needs to be done to encourage a more whole-of-
government--you mentioned that in your opening statement--
combating the cyberthreats that are out there?
Admiral Rogers. So, I think the challenge, as I look at the
problem set--and I'm looking at it from the perspective of an
operational commander--``How do we execute and generate
outcomes,'' if you will? I think it's less an issue of people
not understanding what their respective roles are within the
structure you outlined. Instead, I think the challenge is,
``How do we integrate those capabilities into a tighter hole,
if you will, that's really optimized to execute at the day-to-
day level?'' I think that's the area where I look at the
future, and, as I--you know, during my--with my
responsibilities as Commander of Cyber Command, that's where
I'd like to see us focus our efforts. How do we get down to
integrated structures and organizations at the execution level?
Because that's where you get speed. One of the challenges with
the current structure--as I said, while I think people
understand their respective roles, it is not optimized for
speed and agility. One of the things that I see in the world
we're living in right now, we have got to get faster and we
have got to be more agile.
Senator Inhofe. Yeah. The--there's a lot of discussion
about the gaps and seams that exist between each leg of the
whole-of-government approach. Now, our adversaries will seek to
exploit those gaps and seams, and the confusion that follows an
attack as various agencies and departments grapple with the
scattering of authorities needed to respond. What are the most
dangerous gaps and seams, as you look at them?
Admiral Rogers. So, for right now, the time it takes to
deploy capability, the time that it takes to coordinate a
response across multiple organizations, when those well-meaning
and hard-working organizations are existing in separate
structures, that's not optimized for speed. To me, what I think
the biggest challenge for us is, ``How do we integrate this
more at an execution level?'' I understand there's a broader
policy issue here, and a broader legal framework. That's not my
role as an operational commander. But, where I see the need for
speed and agility is really when it gets down to----
Senator Inhofe. Is someone working on that now?
Admiral Rogers. Oh, there's an ongoing dialogue about, ``So
what's the right way ahead?'' Now, again, I'm the operational
commander, so I have a voice in that----
Senator Inhofe. Maybe we have too many people in that.
Admiral Rogers.--in that process. There's no lack of
opinions on this topic.
Senator Inhofe. Yeah. Lastly, you had said previously--and
I'm quoting now--``Offensive cyber, in some ways, is treated
almost like nuclear weapons, in the sense that their
application outside of defined area of responsibilities is
controlled at the chief executive level; it is not delegated
down.'' Has anything changed under this new administration----
Admiral Rogers. So, we're currently--again, I don't want to
speak for the policy side, but I will acknowledge we are
currently in a policy discussion on this very issue. You know,
the Secretary of Defense has been very aggressive in
articulating this concerns him. There's an ongoing discussion
at the moment that I hope is going to come to a way ahead in
the near term. Again, I will get an input into that, as the
operational commander. I'm not the primary decisionmaker, here.
I understand what my role is.
Senator Inhofe. All right, good.
Senator Reed?
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Again, thank you, Admiral Rogers, for not only your
testimony, but your service.
I have a series of questions, and I think they require
just, sort of, yes-or-no answers.
The mission of National Mission Teams under DOD
cyberstrategy is to blunt cyberattacks against the United
States of, quote, ``significant consequence.'' Is that
accurate?
Admiral Rogers. Yes.
Senator Reed. Okay. Russia's----
Admiral Rogers. Although, if I could, I'd phrase it as,
that's an accurate mission for Cyber Command. We haven't
actually defined it specifically down on the team level. But, I
understand the point you're trying to make, sir.
Senator Reed. Now, is Russia's ongoing campaign to steal
and leak confidential information from our candidates'
political parties to plant and amplify misinformation in social
media, to break into State election board networks, of
significant consequence to our national security?
Admiral Rogers. Certainly, if successful.
Senator Reed. Yes. Do you agree with DNI Coats' testimony
that they will continue to conduct cyber operations to achieve
strategic objectives unless they face clear repercussions?
Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir, that was my testimony, as well,
in that hearing.
Senator Reed. Is Russia attempting to achieve its strategic
objective by influencing United States public opinion in
elections?
Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir, I believe they are attempting to
undermine our institutions.
Senator Reed. Now, aside from our intelligence agencies
operating under a presidential finding, are there any other
organizations, other than the Cyber Command's Cyber Mission
Forces, that have the authority and capability to disrupt
Russian election hacking operations where they originate? Do
the FBI, DHS, or the States, the private sector, have such
authorities or capabilities?
Admiral Rogers. You could argue, probably, only that--
again, that there's a legal aspect to this that I'm not the
most qualified--but, probably you'd argue some combination of
DOD/DOJ [Department of Justice] have the standing authority in
that regard.
Senator Reed. But, the mission teams, particularly at the
origin of these attacks, have the authority to do so.
Admiral Rogers. If granted the authority. I don't have the
day-to-day authority to do that. If granted the authority.
Senator Reed. So, you would need, basically, to be directed
by the President, through the Secretary of Defense----
Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir, as I--in fact, I mentioned that
in my statement.
Senator Reed. Have you been directed to do so, given the
strategic threat that faces the United States and the
significant consequences you recognize already?
Admiral Rogers. No, I have not. But, if I could flesh this
out, I'll say something in an open, unclassified. I'd be glad
to go into more detail----
Senator Reed. Yes, sir.
Admiral Rogers.--in a classified.
Based on the authority that I have as the Commander, I have
directed the National Mission Force to begin some specific
work--I'd rather not publicly go into that----
Senator Reed. Right.
Admiral Rogers.--using the authorities that I retain as a
commander in this mission space.
Senator Reed. So, it's inherent in the ability of a
commander to prepare, plan----
Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed.--and structure. But, you need the--you need
direct authority of the President, through the Secretary of
Defense----
Admiral Rogers. To do some specific things.
Senator Reed. Some specific authority.
Admiral Rogers. There are some things I have the authority,
and I am acting within that authority now----
Senator Reed. But, where you--essentially, we have not
taken on the Russians yet. We're watching them intrude in our
elections, spread misinformation, become more sophisticated,
try to achieve strategic objectives, as you have recognized,
and we're just, essentially, sitting back and waiting.
Admiral Rogers. I don't know if I would characterize it as
``we're sitting back and waiting,'' but I will say it's
probably--and again, I apologize, I don't want to----
Senator Reed. Right.
Admiral Rogers.--get into the classified here--it's
probably fair to say that we have not opted to engage in some
of the same behaviors that we are seeing, if I could just keep
it----
Senator Reed. No, I--it's--one searches for, sort of,
historical analogies, but, you know, we have, in the past, seen
threats building, but, at some point, particularly when they've
manifested----
Admiral Rogers. Sir.
Senator Reed.--themselves, which they already have in 2016,
we've taken action, that we've not just continued to watch.
Admiral Rogers. Right. No, we are doing some things.
Senator Reed. Let's go back to the--in the brief time I
have remaining--the issue that is, I think, consistent
throughout your testimony and the Chairman's comments. That is,
the technological aspects, which you do pretty well, and the
cognitive issues, you know, the message versus the medium, we
are all over the place, in terms of fragmentation. Is there any
effort to pull that together? Let me, maybe, focus on a
specific point. You know, you're trying, within DOD, to sort of
get everybody lined up, then the SECDEF [Secretary of Defense]
and the administration are trying to line up all the other
parts. There's one--and I--from my experience in banking, the
Treasury Department has a--which is designed to do--be
disruptive of financial transactions, designed to--you know,
it's not just ideas, it's money that motivates the----
Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. So, in your view, are you coordinating with
them adequately? Two, do they have adequate resources on their
own to be an effective force to disrupt illegal financing and
to monitor sanctions?
Admiral Rogers. So, I'm not knowledgeable enough about the
specific level of capability and resources, but I will say we,
both Cyber Command and NSA as well, spend a lot of time working
with our Treasury counterparts about developing insights and
knowledge through cyber and other means that give them insight
that enable them to take action.
Senator Reed. Do you think they're effective?
Admiral Rogers. Oh, I think the economic broader efforts
that I've seen undertaken are positive. You've seen them
against a wealth--a host of actors out there.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Since a quorum is now present, I'd ask the
committee consider a list of 1,288 pending military
nominations. All of these nominations have been before the
committee the required length of time.
Is there a motion to favorably report this list of 1,288
pending military nominations?
Senator Reed. So move.
Senator Wicker. Second.
Senator Inhofe. Okay, second.
All in favor, say aye.
[A chorus of ayes.]
Senator Inhofe. Opposed, no.
[No response.]
Senator Inhofe. The motion carries.
[The list of nominations considered and approved by the
committee follows:]
Military Nominations Pending with the Senate Armed Services Committee
Which are Proposed for the Committee's Consideration on February 27,
2018.
1. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(Devry C. Anderson) (Reference No. 1154)
2. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of
brigadier general (Lee H. Harvis) (Reference No. 1221)
3. In the Air Force there are 25 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Paul Obi Amaliri) (Reference No. 1235)
4. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
commander (Henry J. Kennedy) (Reference No. 1246)
5. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of captain
(John A. Mills) (Reference No. 1302)
6. In the Air Force Reserve there are 24 appointments to the
grade of brigadier general (list begins with Michael L. Ahmann)
(Reference No. 1449)
7. In the Air Force Reserve there are 5 appointments to the grade
of brigadier general (list begins with Christopher R. Alderdice)
(Reference No. 1450)
8. In the Marine Corps Reserve there are 3 appointments to the
grade of brigadier general (list begins with Timothy L. Adams)
(Reference No. 1459)
9. In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (Lonnie M. McGhee, Jr.) (Reference No. 1494)
10. In the Air Force there are 17 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Carl P. Bhend) (Reference No.
1502)
11. In the Air Force there are 56 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Steven J. Acevedo) (Reference No. 1503)
12. In the Air Force there are 289 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Nataliya A. Ables) (Reference No. 1504)
13. In the Air Force there are 67 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with George Z. Aberth) (Reference No. 1505)
14. In the Air Force there are 121 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Kevin D. Alford) (Reference No.
1506)
15. In the Air Force there are 6 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Ann E. Alexander) (Reference No. 1507)
16. In the Army there are 90 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Andrew A. Arndt) (Reference No. 1508)
17. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Tyler M. Abercrombie) (Reference No. 1509)
18. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Randolph S. Carpenter) (Reference No. 1510)
19. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Angel Soto) (Reference No. 1511)
20. In the Army there are 2 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Matthew C. Dawson) (Reference No.
1512)
21. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of captain
(Eric C. Correll) (Reference No. 1513)
22. In the Air Force there are 3 appointments to the grade of
major general (list begins with John J. DeGoes) (Reference No. 1550)
23. BG Jeffrey P. Kramer, ARNG to be major general (Reference No.
1552)
24. RADM(lh) Gordon D. Peters, USN to be vice admiral and
Commander, Naval Air Systems Command (Reference No. 1553)
25. RADM Brian B. Brown, USN to be vice admiral and Commander,
Naval Information Forces (Reference No. 1554)
26. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (David J. Caswell) (Reference No. 1557)
27. In the Air Force Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade
of colonel (Bruce P. Heseltine) (Reference No. 1558)
28. In the Air Force there are 2 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel and below (list begins with Michael T. Cain)
(Reference No. 1559)
29. In the Air Force there are 3 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel and below (list begins with Kerry L. Hirzel)
(Reference No. 1560)
30. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Miguel J. Morales) (Reference No. 1561)
31. In the Air Force there are 3 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Julie A. Bowman) (Reference No. 1562)
32. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Thomas A. Summers) (Reference No. 1565)
33. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Christina M. Buchner) (Reference No. 1566)
34. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Marcia L. Lewis) (Reference No. 1567)
35. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(Jack E. Shields III) (Reference No. 1568)
36. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Jerzy M. Matyszczuk) (Reference No. 1569)
37. In the Army Reserve there are 8 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Alecia D. Biddison) (Reference No. 1570)
38. In the Army Reserve there are 10 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Joseph W. Bishop) (Reference No. 1571)
39. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Jennifer L. White) (Reference No. 1572)
40. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Patrick E. Mather) (Reference No. 1573)
41. In the Army there are 4 appointments to the grade of colonel
(list begins with Luis G. Fuchu) (Reference No. 1574)
42. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Olivia H. Ivey) (Reference No. 1576)
43. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Han
S. Kim) (Reference No. 1577)
44. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(John E. Richardson) (Reference No. 1578)
45. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Paul A. White) (Reference No. 1579)
46. In the Army Reserve there are 4 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Robert T. Carter, Jr.) (Reference No. 1580)
47. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
commander (Jamal L. Headen) (Reference No. 1584)
48. In the Navy there are 44 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant commander (list begins with Patrick P. Arrigo) (Reference
No. 1585)
49. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
commander (Jessica M. Ferraro) (Reference No. 1586)
50. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
commander (Vijay M. Ravindra) (Reference No. 1587)
51. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of captain
(Elisabeth S. Stephens) (Reference No. 1589)
52. In the Marine Corps there are 7 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Michael E. Feuquay) (Reference No.
1591)
53. Col. John J. Allen, USAF to be brigadier general (Reference
No. 1593)
54. Col. Todd M. Lazaroski, USAR to be brigadier general
(Reference No. 1595)
55. In the Air Force there are 375 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Marc M. Adair) (Reference No. 1599)
56. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Kyle R. Stiefel) (Reference No. 1602)
57. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Adam C. Miller) (Reference No. 1603)
58. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(Mathew M. Condry) (Reference No. 1604)
59. In the Army there are 45 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with David A. Amamoo) (Reference No.
1605)
60. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Jason B. Yenrick) (Reference No. 1606)
61. In the Marine Corps there are 7 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Shawn P. Chabot) (Reference No. 1607)
62. In the Marine Corps there are 5 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Enrique Luz, Jr.) (Reference No. 1608)
63. In the Marine Corps there are 4 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Jeffrey A. Bryant) (Reference No. 1609)
64. In the Marine Corps there are 2 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Andrew E. Cheatum) (Reference No. 1610)
65. In the Marine Corps there are 4 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Brian K. Evans) (Reference No. 1612)
66. In the Marine Corps there are 3 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Daniel H. Flick) (Reference No. 1613)
67. In the Marine Corps there are 2 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Ezra H. Bardo) (Reference No. 1614)
68. In the Marine Corps there are 2 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Matthew C. Pampush) (Reference No. 1615)
69. In the Marine Corps there are 2 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Odin Pineda) (Reference No. 1616)
70. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(David R. Addams) (Reference No. 1626)
71. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Pankaj A. Ksheersagar) (Reference No. 1627)
72. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Michael P. Sargent) (Reference No. 1628)
73. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Nicholas E. Hurd) (Reference No. 1630)
74. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Michael C. Agbay) (Reference No. 1631)
75. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Jay A. Iannacito) (Reference No. 1632)
76. In the Marine Corps there are 2 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Natalie E. Moore) (Reference No. 1633)
_______________________________________________________________________
TOTAL: 1,288
Senator Ernst?
Senator Ernst. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Admiral Rogers, in your opening statement, you rightly
noted the importance of National Guard and Reserve cyber
warriors. Many of those young men and women bring critical
cyber skills from the private sector. Very, very important.
However, you don't mention how or if the DOD plans to track
cyber capabilities found in the National Guard and Reserve
Force. We've had this discussion before. But, in 2016, the
Government Accountability Office report found that ``National
Guard units have developed capabilities that could be used, if
requested and approved, to support civil authorities in a cyber
incident. However, the Department of Defense does not have
visibility of all National Guard units' capabilities for this
support,'' end quote.
Last year, I introduced legislation, along with my
committee colleagues, Senators Gillibrand and Senator Fischer,
to correct this oversight. Unfortunately, it wasn't included in
the final version of the 2018 NDAA [National Defense
Authorization Act]. As of July of 2017, DOD has not complied
with the GAO's [Government Accountability Office]
recommendation.
So, sir, how do you ensure Cyber Command is fully tapping
into the expertise of our National Guard and Reserve units when
the DOD doesn't have visibility of all of the capabilities
within the National Guard? What more can we do to correct this
at Cyber Command?
Admiral Rogers. So, I try to work closely with General
Lengyel and the National Guard Bureau, the National Guard team.
I complement them. They just established and released a cyber
strategy, for example, just last month, as a matter of fact. We
were part of that dialogue about, so how do we make sure we're
doing, you know, an integrated approach within the DOD here?
This can't be an Active-only component or civilian-only
component.
As you and I have previously discussed the aspects of your
question, in some ways, you know, we're beyond, you know, my
immediate responsibilities. What I've tried to work with the
National Guard Bureau is, ``So how do we create a structure
that enables us to access the full range of capability?'' Not
just units, but, to your point, ``Hey, how do you get down to
the individual bubble?''
It's similar, in many ways--putting on my other hat,
Director of NSA--we've tried to do the same thing over time for
language. Many people in the Department have language skills
that have no connection with whatever their job is that we've
trained them to do. I'm trying to see, ``Can we do the same
thing over time with the Guard and the Reserve?''
Senator Ernst. Certainly. An additional identifier or
something----
Admiral Rogers. Right.
Senator Ernst.--that can be tracked. I think we really need
to focus on that much more so than we have done in the past,
just because of the continuing threat that we see in cyber out
there. You know, as--kind of along this same theme, though, it
is such an important part of our national defense, and we're
going to have to continue to improve our capabilities and
readiness in this area. If you could, in just the couple of
minutes that I have left, what more can we do to make sure that
we have an adequate pool of really talented individuals that
can step up into these fields? We've seen, at large, military
recruiting has been very difficult, even for our regular
branches of service. So, what can we do to make sure that we
are filling the gap with qualified individuals that meet the
requirements of today's military?
Admiral Rogers. So, first, to me, you've got to look at it
as an ecosystem and realize there's different components to
this cyber population, from civilians to Active military to
Guard and Reserve. Each one of those components has different
attributes. So, one of the things we need to do is come up with
solutions that optimize for each of these subpopulations. So,
the Congress, for example, with the Civilian Excepted Service,
the CES, effort, that's a big positive for us on the civilian
side. On the DOD side, the Services are--for Active, are
working through, ``So, you know, are there other compensation
tools, for example, that we can use?'' ``Are there other things
we need to do in terms of the commitment we make to individuals
when they first enlist or get commissioned, in terms of, `Can
we align them early on and offer them extended service in the
cyber arena?' ''
On the Guard and Reserve, it's a similar kind of thing,
though one--it goes to your point--the one thing I've--it's
been a little while since I had this conversation with General
Lengyel, but, outside the Army Guard and the Army Reserve and
the National Guard, the other Services tend to use Reserves on
a cadre status, as opposed to units. One of the things that I'm
trying to work with my Guard teammates on, ``Is there a way to
both use the unit structure that's traditional within the
Guard, but also maybe a cadre kind of thing?'' That gets to
your point about, ``How do we access individual skills?'' We
are clearly not there yet, but I'm wondering, ``Is that a part
of the future structure that we need to be looking at, that we
haven't, to date?''
Senator Ernst. Right. Thank you. My time is expired, but
certainly this is an issue we need to wrangle with and make
sure that we're coming up with an appropriate answer.
So, thank you, Admiral, very much.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Admiral, thank you for your public service,
your long service. We wish you well in retirement.
Since Senator Rounds is not here, I will speak for him, in
that we have the privilege of leading the Cyber Subcommittee. I
want you to know that we think the public sector in the
Department of Defense are woefully unprepared and split and
segmented and not coordinated to be able to handle now what is
one of the greatest threats to our national security, the
cyberattacks that constantly come. We feel that about the
private-sector community, as well.
Now, having said that, Mr. Chairman, I want to enter into
the record a letter that Senator Blumenthal, Senator Shaheen,
and I sent to the Secretary of Defense, February the 6th. One
of the things that we ask is that the National Mission Teams,
which are part of U.S. Cyber Command's Cyber Mission Force,
should be ordered to prepare to engage Russian cyber operators
and disrupt their activities as they conduct clandestine
influence operations against our forthcoming elections.
Would you enter that into the record, Mr.----
Senator Inhofe. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
Senator Nelson. Now, Admiral, let me ask you. Is there any
question in your mind that they have--they, the Russians----
Admiral Rogers. Russians.
Senator Nelson.--have conducted these kind of activities
against our past election?
Admiral Rogers. No, sir.
Senator Nelson. Okay. In an answer to Senator Reed, you had
said, ``Yes, if the Russians were successful,'' as if there was
some doubt in your mind that they had been successful. That's
not the case----
Admiral Rogers. No, sir, I apologize. The point I was
trying to make--the quote that Senator Reed used was from the
strategy, where it talked about acts of ``significant
consequence.'' I was trying to get to the ``consequence''----
Senator Nelson. Okay. So----
Admiral Rogers.--piece of the plan.
Senator Nelson. So, we have been attacked, and there are a
lot of us that feel like we are still being attacked and that
we're going to be attacked, particularly with regard to our
elections, which we consider as critical infrastructure. Let
the record note that you nodded affirmatively. So, what's the
holdup?
Admiral Rogers. Well, I'd say there's a series of--and
again, this is much broader than the DOD, much broader than
Cyber Command--Department of Homeland Security is overall
responsible for this--the election infrastructure within the
segments that private--that have been identified as critical
infrastructure. They're the sector lead. In fact, I've had this
conversation with the Secretary of Homeland Security within the
last couple of weeks about what we're doing to try to generate
insights and knowledge to try to help their effort in their
leadership role.
Senator Nelson. Let me be appropriate and respectful----
Admiral Rogers. What?
Senator Nelson.--but let me interject, please, because time
is fleeting.
Admiral Rogers. Sir.
Senator Nelson. Let's get--so, for someone who is looking
out for the common defense of this country to say, ``Well,
they've got the lead, and this is that, but I'm the Cyber
Commander, and it's going to be a combatant command''--that
doesn't cut it over here.
Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir. The challenge for us is, we have
this thing called the law and the legal framework that, right
now, shapes what DOD can and cannot do.
Senator Nelson. So----
Admiral Rogers. I'm not trying to minimize that. It----
Senator Nelson.--what do you need----
Admiral Rogers.--certainly impacts me----
Senator Nelson.--Admiral----
Admiral Rogers.--as an operational commander.
Senator Nelson.--what do you need, as the commander, to
say, ``Go after and punish these guys that are trying to tear
apart our critical infrastructure''? What do you need?
Admiral Rogers. So, I'd need a policy decision that
indicates that there is specific direction to do that. Then I
would need--again, I'd have to tee up--the normal way we work
this process, I would then be tasked to tee up some specific
options. I'd rather not go into the specifics of any of that,
and they would be reviewed by the Secretary, the chain of
command. The Secretary ultimately would make a recommendation
to the President as to what he, the Secretary's, views are
here, and then, based on that, we'd be given specific
direction, potentially, and specific authority.
Senator Nelson. So, you need a direction and specific
authority from the White House.
Admiral Rogers. Right. The President ultimately would make
this decision----
Senator Nelson. From the President.
Admiral Rogers.--you know, in accordance with a
recommendation, in my experience, from the Secretary of
Defense, and others. I would assume the Department of Homeland
Security and others would be----
Senator Nelson. So, the chain of command----
Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir.
Senator Nelson.--is what you need.
Admiral Rogers. Sir.
Senator Nelson. All right.
Let the record reflect that we have written to the
Secretary of Defense, February the 6th, and would appreciate an
answer.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you?
Senator Perdue?
Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, thank you for your----
Admiral Rogers. Sir.
Senator Perdue.--decades of service. I remember your
testimony last year. You've been nothing but consistent,
talking about speed and agility. I hope, in retirement, you'll
find a way to continue to nudge us toward that goal.
I've got a question to follow up on a couple of questions
we've already had today. Recently the Defense Science Board--
last year, actually--concluded--and there's a quote here: ``For
at least the next decade, the offensive cyber capabilities of
our most capable adversaries are likely to far exceed the
United States ability to defend key critical infrastructures.''
Sir, do you agree with that conclusion?
Admiral Rogers. I mean, we were a part of that effort with
the DSB [Defense Science Board]. There is no doubt that, for
right now, I would argue, technology favors the offense vice
the defense. I mean, just what you're--the scope of what you're
trying to defend, the scope of potential vulnerabilities or--
boy, it keeps you awake at night.
Senator Perdue. So, the ability to preclude it is minimal,
and you mentioned, last year----
Admiral Rogers. Well, ``preclude it,'' from a technical
standpoint.
Senator Perdue. Yes.
Admiral Rogers. But, then that gets into the whole broader
question about, ``Are there other activities that could be
brought to bear that would convince----''
Senator Perdue. Well, that's my next question----
Admiral Rogers.``--you know, on----''
Senator Perdue.--is deterrence.
Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir.
Senator Perdue. You talked, last year, about deterrence.
So, has our ability to deter these types of activities--you
know, a nuclear attack, we deter by having the threat of mutual
annihilation, right? So, in the cyber space, what is our
deterrence capability today, relative to where we were a year
ago? Is it adequate to defend against intrusion?
I want to add to that, specifically, with--we've had these
questions about election. In your mind, are we capable--the
United States--of defending our election, this coming year?
Admiral Rogers. Now, I'm not an expert on the electoral
system, as a whole. I haven't personally looked at it as a
target, so to speak, and asked myself----
Senator Perdue. But, that--doesn't that speak to the issue?
I mean, I know Homeland Security is charged with that.
Admiral Rogers. Right.
Senator Perdue. But, is their capability up to your
capability, in Defense? Then you get inside DOD, you've got--
each service has their own growing capabilities. So, the
question I have--and we've all talked around it here--is, ``So
who's really in charge of getting the highest and best
deterrence, detection, and preclusion capabilities regarding,
let's just say, an election, as one part of our critical
infrastructure?''
Admiral Rogers. So, in our constitutional structure, States
largely have overall responsible for the execution of an
election process. Within the Federal Government, the Department
of Homeland Security is overall responsible for providing
government resources to assist the States in the execution and
defense of that structure. Again, that is a DHS lead role. So,
I don't--in my role as Cyber Command, I'd be the first to
admit, I'm not talking to individual State officials about,
``Walk me through what your structure is, give me your
assessment of where you think you are.'' I'm trying to generate
insights and knowledge now that help inform this with a
readiness to--if directed, to potentially do more.
Senator Perdue. You interact with DHS----
Admiral Rogers. Oh, yes, sir.
Senator Perdue. Okay.
Second thing, following up on the deterrence capability.
What are the menu of options that you, in the Department of
Defense, can give the President, should he so choose to respond
to the cyberattacks, if we--if we have a deterrent, then the
question is, ``Is there a like response, similar response?''
What are the menus--what's included in the menu for the
President?
Admiral Rogers. So, the first point I would make is, number
one, merely because someone comes at us in cyber doesn't mean
we should automatically default to a, ``We have just to respond
in kind.'' I have always urged, we need to think more broadly,
look at the full range of levers and capabilities, as a Nation,
that we----
Senator Perdue. Have we ever responded in kind?
Admiral Rogers. Oh, there are certain specific steps that
have been taken over the course of the last couple of years.
Again, to have an argument about--``is it sufficient or not?
But, there have been some specific steps taken. And again----
Senator Perdue. Well----
Admiral Rogers.--I would rather not get into that----
Senator Perdue. I understand that, and I wouldn't ask that
in open----
Admiral Rogers.--publicly.
Senator Perdue.--an open hearing. But, it's pretty obvious
to me, as one Senator sitting here, that the diplomatic efforts
here are failing, that the activity is really one-sided----
Admiral Rogers. Right. We're not where we need to be, or
where we want to be. I don't think there should be any----
Senator Perdue. No, and I want to--I now want to about,
``What can we do about it?'' That is--go back to speed and
agility. We're going to be about 1.8 million cyberwarriors
short over the next 5 years. There's a----
Admiral Rogers. As a nation----
Senator Perdue.--as a country, both--in all three of
these--FBI, DHS----
Admiral Rogers. Right.
Senator Perdue.--and DOD. So, the question is--we're not
going to win that war against China, for example, in terms of
the ability to put cyberwarriors in the field. The question is,
``Where does--where do technology and, like, artificial
intelligence come to bear?'' Where are we climbing that hill,
in terms of--if this were a trigger puller, we'd stand up a
number of soldiers against their soldiers, and all that. That's
a historical--that's the----
Admiral Rogers. Right.
Senator Perdue.--the last war. The future war may be, you
know, how to--who's got the best minds focused on artificial
intelligence, robotics, et cetera, et cetera? Just on this
specific case, where are we, in terms of artificial
intelligence? How is that going to help us face the shortfall
in cyberwarriors over the next 5 years?
Admiral Rogers. So, we're clearly looking at what are the
technical applications and capabilities out there that enable
us to optimize the human capital piece of this, that are also--
I'm also interested in the fact, guys, as--to your point--we
are not going to Industrial Age our way out of this----
Senator Perdue. Right.
Admiral Rogers.--with, well, it's just hire 10,000 more
people.
Senator Perdue. Right.
Admiral Rogers. That's not going to get us----
Senator Perdue. Right.
Admiral Rogers.--where we need to be. That's not a
sustainable strategy. Therefore, among the things we're looking
at--and we're not the only ones--so how can you apply
technology to help overcome the human capital piece?
The other point I would make is, again, don't just focus on
cyber versus cyber. How do we bring this broader range of
capabilities in place to convince actors out there--nation-
states, criminals, nonstate actors--``You don't want to engage
in this behavior, either because you're not going to succeed or
because, quite frankly, even if you do succeed, the price you
will pay will far exceed any benefit you might gain''?
Senator Perdue. Yeah.
Admiral Rogers. That's where we've got to get to.
Senator Perdue. Yeah. Agree. Thank you, Admiral.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Rogers, thank you for your service. We will miss
you when you retire.
I want to follow up on both Senators Reed and Nelson's
questions about the 2016 election and the action of the
administration. I just want to be clear. As I understand, you
said that President Trump has never ordered CYBERCOM to take
any action to defend or thwart Russian attempts to meddle in
the elections this fall. Is that correct?
Admiral Rogers. So, I said I've never given--I've never
been given any specific direction to take additional steps
outside my authority. I have taken the steps within my
authority, you know, trying to be a good proactive commander.
Because my view is----
Senator Shaheen. But, no one from the administration has
asked you to take any additional steps. Is that correct?
Admiral Rogers. I haven't been granted any, you know,
additional authorities, capacity, capability. No, that's
certainly true.
Senator Shaheen. I understand that to be a confirmation of
what I just said. Is that correct?
Admiral Rogers. I thought that's what--I apologize.
Senator Shaheen. Okay.
Admiral Rogers. All right.
Senator Shaheen. It's come to my attention that the
Department of Defense contracts with IT [Information
Technology] companies that share sensitive source code data
with Russia and other hostile governments while they do
business overseas, and that this practice risks exposing
sensitive underlying codes within our national security
platforms to hostile governments. As I understand, there aren't
any safeguards, like disclosures, to protect against these
risks. Can you confirm whether that's the case and what the
role of CYBERCOM is in ensuring the safety and integrity of
DOD's platforms?
Admiral Rogers. Right. So, first, I have no--Cyber Command
has no direct role with non-DODIN--with civilian users here, if
you will. Now, having said that, I'm aware of this issue, and
we have worked with others in the Department to try to address,
``Okay, so what are some of our key vendors and providers
doing, here?'' There have been several incidents where I've
actually bore--dug into execution-level, ``Walk me through
exactly what you've done with your code. Walk me through
exactly who had access to it. I want to compare this version
that you tell me you shared with them versus what we currently
are using within the DOD.'' I've done that in a couple of
instances.
But, your point goes to--and several of you have raised it
already--going to a broader dialogue about, what should the
nature of the relationship be between the Department and its
key infrastructure in this digital world that we're living in?
It just forces us to step back and look at things very
differently, to me. We never used to think about things, 10
years ago, about, ``Who are you sharing source code with? You
know, who are you doing your testing with?'' In the world we're
living in now, those are the kinds of discussions that we've
got to have. ``Who are your supply-chain providers?''
Senator Shaheen. So, who has the responsibility to decide
that? If it's not CYBERCOM, is it the Secretary of Defense?
Admiral Rogers. So, the Defense Security Service has
overall responsibility within the DOD for the interaction with
our cleared defense contractors from a cybersecurity
perspective. I will partner with DSS [Defense Security
Service]. The FBI is also involved here. One of the discussions
that currently I'm raising within the Department is--experience
teaches us, I think, we need to step back and ask ourselves,
``Do we have this model optimized?'' I won't go into the
specifics, but there's a specific scenario we're working our
way through right now that I'm trying to use as an example of:
This is why we need to make some fundamental change. I'm glad
to talk about that in a closed----
Senator Shaheen. So, should CYBERCOM have that
responsibility, or should someone else have it?
Admiral Rogers. I don't know. Part--quite frankly, one of
my challenges, you just look at the things we've talked about
in the last 40 minutes, where you have said to me, ``Hey, why
doesn't Cyber Command to do this? Why doesn't Cyber''--and I'm
going--the challenge for us is about prioritization, aligning
mission with resources, and trying to figure out what's our
role with a broader set of partners? One of the points I try to
make within the DOD is, ``Be leery about viewing Cyber Command
as the end-all/be-all for everything.'' If we try to do
everything, we're going to suboptimize ourselves, so we need to
focus on one of the priority areas.
Senator Shaheen. That makes sense to me, but the concern I
have is who's in charge? Unless there's somebody who's
responsible for coordinating activities for dealing with what
Homeland Security is doing and what Cyber Command is doing and
what DOD is doing and what the White House is doing, nobody's
going to be in charge. And----
Admiral Rogers. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Shaheen. It seems to me that that's a challenge
that we have right now. As you look at what our both defensive
and offensive strategy is around cyber for the United States,
do you believe that we have those--that strategy in place?
Could you articulate that, either now or in a closed----
Admiral Rogers. I mean, I believe----
Senator Shaheen.--in a way that we can understand?
Admiral Rogers.--I believe we have a structure in place,
with well-defined responsibilities, but, as we said previously,
my argument would be, I think experience is showing us that we
need to be mindful--while we understand that structure, is it
generating the outcomes that we want? My answer would be,
``We're not where we need to be.'' So, that would argue, doing
more of the same is not necessarily going to generate different
outcomes. Even as I acknowledge I have a narrowly defined role,
but I try to, along with others, act as a, ``Look, we need to
focus on this area.''
Senator Shaheen. Well, I would certainly agree. I don't
think a structure and a strategy are the same thing. While we
may have a structure in place, it doesn't seem to have produced
a strategy that's easily understandable.
Admiral Rogers. Ma'am.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That's a statement. I'm not asking
for a response.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, Admiral. It's nice to see you.
Admiral Rogers. Ma'am.
Senator Fischer. Admiral, the NDS [National Defense
Strategy] highlights Cyber's importance, I think, quite a bit.
How does that National Defense Strategy's prioritization of
long-term strategic competitions with Russia and China impact
CYBERCOM's mission?
Admiral Rogers. So, I like the fact that the strategy
expressly calls out cyber as a domain. The strategy also
expressly calls out the fact that we've got peer competitors
and near-peer competitors in here that we have--within the
cyber arena, that we have to be capable of dealing with. I also
like the fact that the strategy specifically calls out
competition--trying to remember the phrase--it's ``competition
below conflict''--at a level below conflict, you know, the so-
called gray area--which I think is very powerful. That gray
area goes to many--much of the discussion we've had so far this
morning. This activity that is occurring, short of armed
conflict, if you will, that is generating strategic advantage
for others and not in our best interests. I like the fact that
the strategy acknowledges we are living in a world where this
is now becoming the norm, and we have got to figure out how
we're going to deal with this.
Senator Fischer. As we look at that continuing focus with
our peer competitors--with Russia and China--I think that means
we're going to have to do more with less, and we may see less
of a focus on other areas, where, in the past, CYBERCOM's been
very focused, whether it's with the global terrorists or with
Iran and their proxies. So, with those tradeoffs, I think that
brings a lot of risk. How do you propose that CYBERCOM and the
Department are able to handle that type of risk?
Admiral Rogers. So, within the last year, I and others made
an argument, and the Secretary bought off on it, where I said,
``Look, we need to increasingly treat Cyber Command as a high-
demand, low-density resource, where we have to acknowledge
there's not enough capacity to do everything we want.'' So, we
need a prioritization of a risk-based model about how we're
going to allocate our capabilities. We've got to continually
reassess this, just like we do with ballistic missile defense,
with ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance], with
SOF [Special Operation Forces] forces. We shouldn't be viewed
any differently.
So, we put a new process in place. I just made an argument,
and was granted authority, to reallocate some of our capability
against some of the challenges you've already talked to me
about within the last 40 minutes or so. That didn't exist--a
year ago, that process didn't exist. It wasn't envisioned. The
thought was the cyber forces that we had created would be
permanently aligned. I argue that's not just going to--there's
just not enough. It's not going to get us where we need to be.
Senator Fischer. Do you see that increased focus on a high-
end fight--is that primarily going to impact the training, or
is it going to impact operations?
Admiral Rogers. It's probably a combination of both. I
don't necessarily view it as a binary----
Senator Fischer. Either/or.
Admiral Rogers.--one or the other. The positive side--you
know, as I said, I've been in command almost 4 years. In those
4 years, I haven't run into a situation where we didn't have
some level of capacity and expertise--or some level of
capability or expertise. The challenge is capacity. It's,
``Okay, I can deal with this in a reasonable level of places,
but if I get into something larger, that becomes a challenge.''
Now, no one should think for one minute--I am proud of the
capability Cyber Command has, and I am confident in our
readiness to execute our mission, even as I acknowledge that
there's challenges.
Senator Fischer. Okay. When you--when you're talking about
capacity, you're building a 6,200-strong Cyber----
Admiral Rogers. Right.
Senator Fischer.--Mission Force.
Admiral Rogers. Sir.
Senator Fischer. How adequate do you believe that force is
going to be compared to the threat that we're seeing today?
Admiral Rogers. So, that was based on an assessment--boy,
it's almost 10 years ago now, when we did the groundwork about,
what do we think the structure----
Senator Fischer. But, that hasn't really changed.
Admiral Rogers. No. So, what we said was, ``Let's build the
force out.'' So, as I said, we'll complete the buildout by the
end of the fiscal year. The argument I'm trying to make now is,
``So based on the 8 years of actual runtime, that suggests to
me that the way that we've structured some of the teams, I
would like to change.'' I told the Services, ``I will leave
this alone until you complete the mission generation.'' But,
what that--once that's done, I'd like to retool this a little
bit, because I think we can take advantage of the lessons of
the last 8 years. I think it also argues, we're probably going
to need some level of additional capacity over time. That's
something I'll be talking to my successor about. I think that's
going to be a key thing for him during his time as--in command.
Senator Fischer. It seems like we--we hear this over and
over again, a lot of the same challenges. I realize the NDS is
out now, and it's presenting us with a strategy. But, it's
frustrating sometimes, on our side, that--I don't know if we're
seeing much progress.
A last question for you. I was a little confused by an
earlier statement, so I wanted to clarify that. You have
testified, in the past, that you do not support creating a
special corps or service focused on cyber.
Admiral Rogers. Yes, ma'am, that's true.
Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you very much.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Senator Blumenthal?
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, thank you for your service. We will miss you, as
others have said.
Have you read the Special Counsel's indictment against 13
Russians and several Russian entities?
Admiral Rogers. I haven't read the actual indictment. I've
seen the media reporting on it. I haven't seen the actual
indictment.
Senator Blumenthal. Well, I recommend that you do so, sir,
with all due respect. For us, as Americans, it is an incredibly
chilling, absolutely terrifying account of an attack on our
democracy. You refer to it as a series of actions that,
``threaten the foundations of our democracy.'' I think that's a
very polite way of putting this act of warfare. In fact, the
Russians themselves refer to it as informational----
Admiral Rogers. Informational.
Senator Blumenthal.--warfare. That's from them, not from
us. So, I feel a sense of urgency about this ongoing warfare
against our democracy that I feel, so far, is not reflected in
the response from our Department of Defense. That's one of the
reasons why Senators Nelson and Shaheen and I wrote to the
Secretary of Defense last week and asked for engagement of
Russian cyber operators and disruption of their activities. I
understand from you that your feeling is, you have not been
given authority to take additional action. That's correct.
Admiral Rogers. Sir.
Senator Blumenthal. Have you asked for that authority?
Admiral Rogers. No, I have not. I've tried to act within
the authority that has been granted to me to be aggressive.
Senator Blumenthal. Why have you not asked for additional
authority?
Admiral Rogers. Because I guess my sense right now is, I'm
not sure that the capabilities that I have would be the optimal
or only response to this. I think we need to----
Senator Blumenthal. It may not be the only response----
Admiral Rogers. If I could--I apologize.
Senator Blumenthal.--but wouldn't you agree that it is a
necessary response?
Admiral Rogers. It could be a part of a response. I would
certainly acknowledge that. I just think we need to step back
and look at this very broadly. Because one of the arguments,
not just the--this current piece, but others--is, ``Be mindful
of falling in the trap that, just because someone comes at us
in cyber, that we have to default to immediately going back and
doing the exact same thing.'' I've--and just have--I've always
believed we need to step back and think a little bit more
broadly about it, and just don't default. It's because of that,
you know, that I have not done that, to date.
Senator Blumenthal. Well, for how long, with all due
respect, are we going to step back and look broadly at this
ongoing attack? I mean, literally last week, in the wake of the
Parkland shooting, the bots, the fake accounts, again and
again, disrupting, sowing discord, continuing to attack our
democracy in ways that most Americans should find absolutely
intolerable, may I suggest that seeking that additional
authority perhaps is appropriate at this point?
Admiral Rogers. Sir. Again, much of what you're asking me--
I'm an operational commander, not a policymaker. That's the
challenge for me as a military commander.
Senator Blumenthal. Wouldn't you agree with me that the
President himself is aware of these attacks and should give you
that additional authority?
Admiral Rogers. I think the President is certainly aware.
Sir, I am not going to tell the President what he should or
should not do. I'll use my chain of command to make my
recommendations to the Secretary as to, ``Hey, sir, hey, within
the DOD mission set and within the responsibilities that you
have allocated to the Cyber Command, here's what I think we can
and should do.''
Senator Blumenthal. Well, without belaboring this point,
would you agree with me that the Russians have been in no way
deterred from----
Admiral Rogers. Oh, yes, sir, I think that's true.
Senator Blumenthal. They're doing it with impunity. They
could care less what we think. They're continuing to attack us.
Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. So, thus far, the response of the
United States of America to this ongoing attack has been
completely inadequate to----
Admiral Rogers. It hasn't changed the calculus, is my
sense. It has not----
Senator Blumenthal. It has not changed the calculus----
Admiral Rogers.--changed the calculus or the behavior on
the part of the Russians.
Senator Blumenthal. It hasn't changed their behavior.
Admiral Rogers. Right, that's my sense.
Senator Blumenthal. They have paid no price for meddling in
2016 election or----
Admiral Rogers. They haven't paid a price at least that's
sufficient to get them to change their behavior.
Senator Blumenthal. Well, they haven't paid any price, so
far as I can see, have they?
Admiral Rogers. You could argue some of the sanctions that
were--that have been imposed--you could also argue some of the
indictments--again, I don't think it's fair to say nothing has
been done, although, again, you're getting way outside my lane
as an operational commander, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. But, it has been completely inadequate
so far.
Admiral Rogers. It certainly hasn't generated a change in
behavior that I think we all know we need.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Hirono.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Rogers, I do join my colleagues in thanking you for
your service, not only in Cyber Command, but also your 37 years
of service in the military.
You have been asked a number of questions about the Russian
interference with our elections and questions about who's in
charge. You testified that Department of Homeland Security is
the sector lead on combating Russia's--countering Russia's
efforts to tamper with our elections. Now, it seems, to me
anyway, that perhaps Cyber Command has the best resources and
best equipped to actually do something in this area. You are
the operational person. But, you don't have specific authority
from the President or the--or anyone else, for that matter, to
go forward. Now, you did also indicate that you are--I believe
you used the word ``constant contact'' with Department----
Admiral Rogers. I said ``regular.'' I said----
Senator Hirono. Regular.
Admiral Rogers.--I interacted with them----
Senator Hirono. Regular----
Admiral Rogers.--regularly.
Senator Hirono.--contact with Department of Homeland
Security. The sense that we have--I have--is that the--that I
wonder what the Department of Homeland Security, which is
charged with countering the Russian interference with our
elections--what they are doing. So, since you are in regular
contact with Homeland Security, what have you advised DHS to do
in this area to counter Russia's interference with our
election----
Admiral Rogers. What have I advised DHS to do in the
execution of DHS's mission? That's not really----
Senator Hirono. Yes. Have you given them any advice?
Admiral Rogers. That's not really my role, ma'am.
Senator Hirono. No, but you are in constant contact. What
are you in constant----
Admiral Rogers. So, we talk about----
Senator Hirono.--regular contact about?
Admiral Rogers.--``Tell me what you're doing. Tell me how
you're organized. What are the capabilities that Cyber Command,
for example, could support you with?'' Those are the kinds of
discussions. I also make sure the information flow, ``Are you
getting the benefit of the insights that we're generating''----
Senator Hirono. So----
Admiral Rogers.--``based on actions that we have taken?''
Senator Hirono. So----
Admiral Rogers. Those are the kinds of----
Senator Hirono.--with regard to those kinds of
conversations, then is Homeland Security doing what they need
to be doing to counter Russian interference, continuing
interference with our elections?
Admiral Rogers. You need to talk to them, ma'am. I don't
have full knowledge of everything the Department of Homeland
Security is doing here. Therefore, it would be----
Senator Hirono. Yes, I understand that.
Admiral Rogers.--it would be an ill-formed opinion----
Senator Hirono. I get that.
Admiral Rogers.--on my part to assess their performance.
Senator Hirono. So, I'm trying to get at--with all the
resources and the awareness that you have, what kind of
specific advice you have given to Homeland Security, because we
do not get the impression that they are doing what's adequate
to--definitely to counter anything that the Russians are doing,
certainly not to the point where they will stop doing it.
Admiral Rogers. Right.
Senator Hirono. So, I hope that, at some point, in some
other committee or in this committee, we'll be able to ask
those kinds of questions of the Homeland Security Secretary,
because what they're doing to--with our elections does have an
impact on national security. As you say, they are seeking to
undermine our institutions.
I would also like to join Senator Ernst in her focus on the
Department of Defense fully utilizing the cyber capabilities of
our Reserves and National Guard. That's just a statement, and I
think you concur with that.
As you leave your command, I am wondering, what would be
your suggestion that your successor, you know, focus on as he
or she--it'll probably be a he--take over Cyber Command? What
are the things that you would want the new person to focus on?
Admiral Rogers. So, ``You're in''--this is what I would say
to the individual, assuming the nominee is confirmed, ``You're
inheriting a structure that reflects choices we made 8 to 10
years ago. We need to step back and ask ourselves, `Is the
structure optimized for today and tomorrow?' How do we take the
lessons of the last 8 years, where we've done a whole lot of
activity on the defense, in the offense, working with the
private sector? There are insights there that I think we can
harness to look at, `How do we evolve the structure?' '' I'd
also argue, we need to step back--and you have raised this with
me already this morning--how do we better work the DOD role and
the defense industrial base and the cleared defense
contractors? We've got to get a different dynamic here. We've
got to look at that differently. Then, more broadly, Cyber
Command--and again, it goes to some of the points you've
raised--Cyber Command, in its role, partnering with others, how
do we do this in a much more integrated way? That'll be
something that I hope maybe I can continue to provide opinions
on in my next life.
Senator Hirono. Yes, how to get an integrated structure for
speed and agility. So, you have different departments: DHS,
FBI, Treasury. Who should take the lead in creating this
integrated structure?
Admiral Rogers. Well, that's, you know, clearly the role of
the administration within the executive branch. That's their
task. I know they're working their way--again, DOD, we're going
to support this. There's an ongoing review right now on this
same question. So, we'll see what comes out of that.
Senator Hirono. Is there something that Congress can do to
enable one entity, one of these agencies, to take the lead in
integrating our structure?
Admiral Rogers. I'd--you know, I'd prefer to give the
executive branch a chance to say, ``So, tell me what you think
the plan is.'' Now, I--I'm not trying to minimize the role of
the Congress. Please, Senator, that's not what I'm trying to
say.
Senator Hirono. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Heinrich.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Rogers, this committee has long expressed concern
about the lack of an effective doctrine to help deter
cyberattacks before they happen. The Fiscal Year 2018 NDAA
specifically directed the development of a national cyber
doctrine. Why don't we have one yet? We've been talking about
this for years.
Admiral Rogers. Right. So, I don't want to speak for
others. I flat out can't tell you why. The point I'm trying to
make, as the Commander, is, ``Hey, we need this,'' that there
would be value, not just for Cyber Command, not just for the
Department of Defense, but for the Nation as a whole. As I've
said, there is an ongoing effort right now. I hope this is
going to generate some of the points that you make. I think
it's frustrating to all of us. It's not because of willful
ignorance or neglect or negligence, but we clearly haven't put
ourselves where we need to be.
Senator Heinrich. Is it even possible to achieve cyber
deterrence when we don't have some sort of public-facing
articulated cyber doctrine that gives our enemies pause?
Admiral Rogers. Well, I think deterrence has multiple
components, from capabilities to a sense of, you know, what we
can and can't do, and what we will and won't do. So, I would
also argue, Let's not think of what----
Senator Heinrich. So we have some inherent deterrent----
Admiral Rogers. Right.
Senator Heinrich.--value in our capabilities.
Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir.
Senator Heinrich. If we had an articulated doctrine----
Admiral Rogers. That would also help----
Senator Heinrich.--that drew some--you know, that pointed
out that there would be consequences, would that increase our
deterrent ability?
Admiral Rogers. I think that would increase it, but I
also--the--I apologize--the other point I wanted to try to make
was: But don't think a strategy, in and of itself, is the
panacea. I think----
Senator Heinrich. Sure.
Admiral Rogers.--it's an important----
Senator Heinrich. Yeah.
Admiral Rogers.--component of where we----
Senator Heinrich. Absolutely.
Admiral Rogers.--where we need----
Senator Heinrich. We need tools.
Admiral Rogers.--to be, but it's the tools and the
underpinning, as well. Once you get that framework, then it's,
``So what do you do to actually get to actionable outcomes?''
Senator Heinrich. So, right now, as my colleagues pointed
out, the Russian state continues to use bots, they continue
to----
Admiral Rogers. Right.
Senator Heinrich.--use trolls and other, basically,
information warfare tools to sow division in this country----
Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir.
Senator Heinrich.--to sow doubt. Has our response been
adequate to create any sort of visible deterrence to those
activities?
Admiral Rogers. It clearly has not changed their calculus.
It's not changing their behavior.
Senator Heinrich. I think that draws just sort of a fine
point on--we need to be doing everything we can right now to
increase that deterrent value, because it's not being
effective.
Let's take a hypothetical for a moment. Tomorrow, there's a
nation-state cyberattack against our power and energy sector.
It results in power outages, it results in oil and gas
pipelines shutting down. Take a moment and assume that the
other decisionmakers, folks at DHS as well as the
administration, are in agreement that this is a hostile nation-
state attack, and who it's coming from. The White House wants
to respond in the cyberdomain immediately. Without talking
about what that looks like, are you ready?
Admiral Rogers. It--there are so many variables in what
you--so, who's the actor? What kind of capability was used?
What specifically are we looking to defeat or overcome? It's
one of those--I apologize----
Senator Heinrich. Are you confident in your tools and your
team to be able to respond immediately?
Admiral Rogers. It--the tools are optimized for specific
actors and specific--and again, I apologize, I don't want to
get into the specifics of----
Senator Heinrich. I don't want to give you specific actors,
but you know----
Admiral Rogers. Right. But, the capabilities are optimized
for specific actors and specific configurations, in many ways.
So, there are so many variables--the other thing in all this
is, you know, time. It's one of the reasons why I think we've
got to get a much more integrated day-to-day approach to this.
Because one of my challenges is: Look, my experience as a
military commander teaches me, doing discovery learning while
I'm moving to contact--I'm being told, ``Hey, I want you to
forestall the following adversary.'' If the first time I've
dealt with this potential adversary is in the scenario you've
outlined, then I'm doing a lot of discovery learning as I'm
going to contact. That's----
Senator Heinrich. Let's make----
Admiral Rogers.--not optimal.
Senator Heinrich.--the assumption that it's somebody we've
been planning for for a----
Admiral Rogers. Right.
Senator Heinrich.--long time.
Admiral Rogers. Then that's a little different scenario.
Again, it depends on the----
Senator Heinrich. You mentioned----
Admiral Rogers.--specifics, but----
Senator Heinrich.--a few in your----
Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir.
Senator Heinrich.--initial testimony.
Admiral Rogers. That there are capabilities for us.
Senator Heinrich. Okay.
You have talked for years about, sort of, your top three
cyber concerns: critical infrastructure, data manipulation, and
attacks from nonstate actors. Just quickly, compare how you
think we're doing on those three, versus how you viewed them,
from a risk point of view, when you first took this job. How
has it changed?
Admiral Rogers. So, first, critical infrastructure. There's
greater recognition of the problem set, which is good. I'm not
spending a lot of time, now, saying, ``Hey, this is something
we need to be focused on.'' But, I would still argue it's
uneven. Some segments, very advanced, doing some great work.
Other segments, not so much.
The second area was--I apologize--was data manipulation. My
argument would be--``Boy, are you watching that unfold now in
the world around us?'' It goes to the influence piece. I would
argue that has gotten worse, because now you've got a major
actor, and they're not the only ones, in the form of the
Russians, who--now it's a conscious part of their strategy, and
they're doing it on a regular basis. So, there I would argue
we've gotten worse.
The third was----
Senator Heinrich. Nonstate actors.
Admiral Rogers.--nonstate actors. That one, that surprised
me a little bit, in the sense that, while I've--and I'm not
talking criminal, because I would argue criminal activity is
still the greatest single segment of activity, from a threat
basis, within the cyberspace arena. That has not taken off
quite as much as I thought it would, to be honest.
Senator Heinrich. I'm over my time. I apologize, Mr. Chair.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Admiral Rogers, thank you so much for your service and your
multiple appearances here.
I was interested that, in the aftermath of the
announcements by Director Mueller of indictments of 13 Russian
individuals, two Fridays ago, that the President tweeted out--
and I'm just going to use his words; I normally wouldn't use
these words, but--and I'm going to quote him. He said Russia
is, ``laughing their asses off.'' He also said that ``Russia
has succeeded beyond their wildest dreams.''
I think this is going to be chapter in our life where we're
going to just have to acknowledge we've been humiliated as a
country. Our democracy has been humiliated. We've had our
pocket picked. We've lost what may be, you know, the first real
cyber war that our Nation has been in. You can characterize it
a lot of different ways, but I think it's going to be
characterized as a chapter of failure. The U.S. Government
failed to protect the U.S. democracy.
I want to ask you, based on your lengthy experience in this
position, but really your lengthy experience in service to the
country, where is the source of that failure? Was the failure a
failure of imagination? Was it a failure of will? Was it a
failure of policy? Was it a failure of structure? Was it a
failure of personnel? Was it a failure of leadership? Was it a
failure of investment? Was it more than one of those things? We
can learn from failure, and we should, so that we----
Admiral Rogers. Right.
Senator Kaine.--can improve. But, I think the history of
this, especially the 2016 election, which has now led to 19
indictments or guilty pleas by individuals, and another three
indictments or pleas by entities. It's going to be viewed as a
chapter where the U.S. Government failed the U.S. democracy. I
want your best professional judgment, in what may be your last
appearance before the committee in this particular role, as
where the source of that failure is, so that we can fix it.
Admiral Rogers. So, I don't think there's one single source
of failure, but I'll share some thoughts with you.
So, first, one of the things that's always struck me is,
we--if you go back several years, we tended to define
``critical infrastructure'' from a very Industrial Age
approach. Hey, does it produce a product or service, an
outcome? So, for example, using that methodology, we didn't say
to ourselves, our electoral process is a critical
infrastructure product. Because we're thinking, there's no
product or service, so to speak, that it tangibly generates. I
mean, there's votes and outcomes. So, the first thing I was
struck by is, we need to rethink what does critical
infrastructure really mean to us in this Digital Age that we're
living in?
Secondly, I think--you know, I--again, I've been in the job
for a while. I've been in that part of multiple
administrations. I think the thought initially was, ``We'll go
to them, we'll tell them we have awareness of what we're doing,
and this will convince them--and we'll take some initial steps,
and we'll convince them that they should stop.''
Senator Kaine. Underestimating an adversary.
Admiral Rogers. Right. That clearly has not happened. I
don't think we anticipated how--what level of sustained
aggressive behavior we were going to see over time, that this
wasn't viewed as a one-off, ``Hey, it was just about one
particular election, one particular outcome,'' that clearly
we're looking at a nation now who views this as a strategic
imperative over time for them, that there's value to be
achieved in continuing to do this. I don't think we necessarily
initially looked at it that way.
Then, the final thing that comes to my mind is--and it's
symptomatic of cyber as a whole--what do you do when we're
dealing with a challenge that crosses so many different lines?
So, as I said, in our structure, elections are a State process.
Cyber capability--DOD, DOJ, DHS--that's the executive--that's
not State, that's a Federal and it's an executive branch. You
look at capability in the private sector, how do we--one of my
takeaways is, cyber is going to force us to think outside the
traditional lines that we use in assigning--in defining
problems and aligning resources.
Senator Kaine. Let me ask you one more question. I was a
mayor and a Governor. Why should mayors--local officials or
State officials today believe that the United States Government
will protect the United States democracy in future elections?
Because, as I talk to Governors and local officials, they have
very grave doubt whether the Federal Government will act in any
way to protect the electoral system from attacks such as those
that Russia conducted in 2016. Tell them why they should have
confidence that the United States Government will----
Admiral Rogers. Well, first, I don't interact with them,
but, as a citizen, my attitude would be, ``Look, I hope one of
your takeaways is, here, while the system is imperfect and
clearly has not achieved the outcomes we want, it is not
because there aren't motivated, hard-working individuals trying
to do things.'' That, hopefully, as you've said, you know, we
want to be a learning, adaptive nation, here, where we learn
and change over time. That's what I'm hoping we're going to see
in the coming months and years ahead of us. Because this is not
a, ``All we've got to worry about is--we'll deal with this in 6
months or a year.'' That's not the way this is going to work, I
don't think.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Senator Inhofe. Senator McCaskill.
Senator McCaskill. I'm going to try to--I know this ground
has gone--been gone over, but--first of all, thank you.
Admiral Rogers. Yes, ma'am.
Senator McCaskill. You've been terrific. I'm a big fan of
the work you've done.
But, I'm going to try to channel a woman who came up to me
at the grocery store not too long ago. She asked me a simple
question: ``Is Russia at war against our democracy?'' What
would you have said to her in the grocery store?
Admiral Rogers. I--well, a war is, by definition, as a
specific legal document aspect to it. I'm not a lawyer. What I
would probably say to her is, ``There shouldn't be any doubt we
are in a competition with these guys, and they are trying to
use every tool they have to gain advantage. Some of that
advantage they want to gain is by undermining our very
institutions.''
Senator McCaskill. That's a lot of words. I said, ``Yes.''
[Laughter.]
Admiral Rogers. So----
Senator McCaskill. I said, ``Yes.''
Admiral Rogers. I like to talk to people. I apologize.
Senator McCaskill. I mean, I've just got to tell you, they
came after our democracy.
Admiral Rogers. Yes, ma'am.
Senator McCaskill. I can't imagine anything more essential
to the United States of America than our democracy. So, the
next question she asked me, ``Are we strong enough and smart
enough that we can keep them from doing this again?''
Admiral Rogers. Yes.
Senator McCaskill. Okay. So, then the next question she
asked me--I said the same thing--the next question she asked
me, ``Are we doing that right now?''
Admiral Rogers. We're taking steps, but we're probably not
doing enough.
Senator McCaskill. Okay. So, she wants to know, and I want
to know, why the hell not?
Admiral Rogers. Ma'am, I'm not----
Senator McCaskill. What's it going to take?
Admiral Rogers. I'm an operational commander, ma'am. You're
asking me a question that's so much bigger than me. I don't--
I'm not trying to duck this. I'm trying to say, Here's what my
role is. You're----
Senator McCaskill. It's a problem----
Admiral Rogers.--asking me something that's----
Senator McCaskill.--it's a problem, Admiral.
Admiral Rogers. Oh, I don't deny that----
Senator McCaskill. It's a problem.
Admiral Rogers.--for one minute.
Senator McCaskill. You know, the notion that this country
came after the essence of what we are--the character and value
of our country is all about the democracy--the notion they came
after us, brazenly, and that nobody can sit in that chair and
say, ``We got this''--you guys can do this. You give America's
military a mission, and nobody is better.
Admiral Rogers. Right.
Senator McCaskill. The notion that you have not been given
this mission to stop this from happening this year is
outrageous. It is outrageous. There's no question that they
know we're not coming after them. Frankly, your response to
Senator Reed's question about Cyber Command disrupting their
interference, you said, ``We have chosen not to engage in the
same behavior as Russia.'' But, defending is not the same
behavior as Russia. Preventing and deterring is not the same
behavior. They came after us. We're not asking you, ``Are you
going after them?'' We're asking you, ``Have you the authority,
have you the command to stop them from doing this again to
the--us in 2018?''
Admiral Rogers. I cannot operate out of the DOD information
network, ma'am, on a daily basis. I do not have the authority
to do that. I don't have the legal authority to defend a
State's voting infrastructure----
Senator McCaskill. Well, I'll tell you, Admiral Rogers, if
there--if you don't have the authority to defend our voting
structures, then we've--we've got the ability to fix that.
Correct? I believe, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, we have
the ability to fix the law to give you the authority to protect
our voting systems. Because I guarantee you, the Secretary of
State of Missouri doesn't have an ability to go after Russia.
Admiral Rogers. Right. Yes, ma'am
Senator McCaskill. I mean, they could harden, but they
can't go after them. The only entity that can go after Russia
is the United States military. That's the only one. The fact--I
mean, effectively--I mean, maybe Department of Homeland
Security can help around the edges, but their primary mission
is not to go after a foreign nation. It is, in fact, to protect
the Homeland.
Admiral Rogers. But, again, I would argue, think--
respectfully, think beyond just cyber and responding in kind.
There's a whole--economic, politi---there's a whole breadth of
tools that we could potentially apply here to try to shape the
Russians' behavior and their choices. I would just urge us,
``Don't default to, We've got to go after them in cyber.'' I'm
not arguing that cyber isn't a potential part of a broader
strategy. I'm not trying to say that----
Senator McCaskill. I just never thought I'd----
Admiral Rogers.--for one minute.
Senator McCaskill.--see the day--honestly, I never thought
I'd see the day that Russia would go after the heart of our
country.
Admiral Rogers. Ma'am.
Senator McCaskill. Ever. That we would be sitting here
parsing words about whether or not we've got this. I want
somebody with your experience and your courage and your
tenacity--I want somebody to sit in that chair and say to the
United States of America, ``We've got this.''
Admiral Rogers. Ma'am.
Senator McCaskill. Until we have that moment, Russia is
winning. That is disgusting.
Admiral Rogers. Yes, ma'am.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Guess what question I'm going to ask?
[Laughter.]
Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir. Would this be a Russian--
associated with Russia?
Senator King. It would be. A deterrence-related question.
Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir.
Senator King. On December 23rd of 2016, the Congress passed
the National Defense Authorization Act. In it was a section
that required the Secretary of Defense to file a report, on
just the questions we've been talking about, within 180 days,
which was June of 2017, about the definition of a
``cyberattack,'' what would be the response. It talks about
operational authorities--what operational authority is
delegated to the United States Cyber Command for military cyber
operations, how the Law of War applies, the whole--a whole
list. The purpose of the amendment, which was in the law, which
is in the law, was to establish a clearly articulated doctrine
of response in this kind of situation. I'm asking you, as an
operator, have you been asked--have you been tasked with
drafting any part of the response to this requirement, which--
--
Admiral Rogers. I've been----
Senator King.--by the way, is now in----
Admiral Rogers. I've been part of the----
Senator King.--month eight?
Admiral Rogers.--part of the dialogue about responding,
particularly on the operational piece of this, in terms of
overall responsibility. This is--the Office of the Secretary of
Defense has the responsibility for----
Senator King. But, I'm asking, is anybody----
Admiral Rogers.--replying----
Senator King.--working on this? We're 8 months in--we're 8
months late now.
Admiral Rogers. I apologize. I don't know the specifics of
the timeline for----
Senator King. But, were you given a deadline, saying, ``We
need this by June of''----
Admiral Rogers. I was----
Senator King.--``2017?''
Admiral Rogers.--part of this. I don't remember--I honestly
don't remember if we were given a--can I take this one as a--an
action to----
Senator King. Yeah, but here's----
Admiral Rogers.--get back----
Senator King.--here's what's frustrating, is--Here we are,
still talking about this issue, when the Congress made a
specific instruction to the Secretary of Defense, and the
President, by the way, was then required to respond to the
Congress within 180 days from that report that should have been
coming in June of 2017, hasn't come. So, you know, we're way
late, and we----
Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir.
Senator King.--keep talking about this. You and I have been
in probably a dozen or 15 hearings on this, and we don't seem
to be any further ahead than we are--were before. The problem,
as you've testified today, and I think quite accurate and
repeatedly, until we have some clearly articulated doctrine of
response to these kind of attacks, they're going to continue.
If all we do is try to patch our software----
Admiral Rogers. Right.
Senator King.--they're going to continue. You know that,
and I know that. What's it going to take? Is it going to take
the destruction of the electric grid or the financial system in
order for us to finally get to the point of taking this
seriously?
Admiral Rogers. Like I said, sir, there is an ongoing--
I'm--and I'm participating in this. I just--apologize--I just
don't know the specific timelines here. I'm----
Senator King. Yeah. I'm not--I understand you're an
operational guy, but you have to understand our--you're the
nearest thing that we have----
Admiral Rogers. I've got it. I know my----
Senator King. You're lucky enough to be here today. But,
this is serious business. And----
Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir.
Senator King. And--well, let me turn to some--a little more
specific question that I think underlines what we're talking
about here. What would happen today if you, on your way back to
your office, got a call and said the U.S. financial system has
been taken down, all the computers on Wall Street are off, the
markets are in chaos? I don't mean from a policy point of view.
I'm----
Admiral Rogers. No, no.
Senator King.--talking about----
Admiral Rogers. In terms of----
Senator King.--what would be the execution? Who's in
charge? What would the results be?
Admiral Rogers. So, DHS would have overall responsibility
for the provision of Federal support in response to this. My
role would be: help to make sure I understand, number one, who
was the actor. So, can we identify who did this? Because if I'm
going to respond, I have to know who I'm responding to or what
I'm responding to. So, one of my first questions, as Cyber
Command, would be, ``Let's make sure we understand what's the
characterization of activity, who's the actor, what did they
do----''
Senator King. Who would take the lead? Who's in charge?
Admiral Rogers. ``--how did--'' DHS would have overall
responsibility.
Senator King. DHS would be in charge?
Admiral Rogers. Sir.
Senator King. Do--have you--do you--have you war-gamed
this?
Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir. In fact, I made it a broad
reference it--the finance sector, for example, the scenario you
posture here, I've--we've actually undertaken some very good
tabletops, specifically, as I reached out to DHS and the
financial sector. ``Look, we have got to get down execution-
level work here, team.'' So----
Senator King. Well, that's--and you----
Admiral Rogers.--we have done----
Senator King.--repeated talk about integration. What
worries me is that--whether anyone is in charge. I guess a
followup is: Do we have a serious red-team, war-game process to
be sure we're not surprised about how to react when one of
these things happens?
Admiral Rogers. I don't know if I'd use the phrase, ``We
have a serious red team.'' Do I--is this part of our mission
responsibility? Yes. Is this something we train and exercise
against? Yes. Is this something we continually assess, looking
for indicators of this type of activity before it occurs? Yes.
Senator King. Well, I want to thank you. This may be our
last----
Admiral Rogers. Sir.
Senator King.--time to talk about this. Thank you for your
service and your straightforward response, always. Just leave
you--and you know, I hope, as you leave this job, you will
leave a memo behind that says, ``We are not adequately
prepared. We need a doctrine. We need it to be publicly
available. We need our adversaries to know that, if they strike
us in this realm, they're going to be struck back.'' It may not
be cyber. I mean, as you say----
Admiral Rogers. Right. Sir.
Senator King.--it may be a whole range of things. But,
right now, we are not--we have not done that. I deeply hope
that this is something you can take on as a kind of exit
interview.
Admiral Rogers. Sir.
Senator King. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Tillis.
Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Rogers, thank you for being back before the
committee.
Could you just give me a brief description, in your tenure
in the current role, where you think things have got--tell me
the positive things that have occurred and the things that you
wish you had made more progress on in your time in the Command.
Admiral Rogers. So, the positive thing, among the things
that jump out at me, it's cyber's integration with other
operational commands, particularly CENTCOM, SOCOM, some things
we're doing out in the Pacific with Pacific Command. That has
been a real strength. It's something I really--I knew it was a
good day when you have those commanders publicly talking about
what Cyber Command is doing. It's not Cyber Command talking
about, ``Look at all the great cyber things we're doing.
Shouldn't you like what we're doing?'' That's been a real
process.
Some of the command-and-control structures--JTF Ares that
we put in place. How do you build a structure designed to
integrate capability so we can generate effects against ISIS--
was a slow start, because we were starting from ground zero,
but it has really taken off. That has worked out very, very
well.
The campaign planning in the structure, from a planning
perspective, that we've put in place, particularly that's been
a focus for us over the last calendar year, that--oh, that's
just some great work. That really sets the foundation for the
future and gets cyber into a much more traditional, ``Hey,
look, we're no different in our mission set than CENTCOM is in
what they're--in terms of the mechanisms and the framework
they're using to plan, or what European Command is doing.''
That's a real positive.
If I ask myself, ``What are the areas where I would?'' The
force generation. I mean, we're going to beat the timeline for
FOC. That took a lot of work by a lot of people. The areas
where I--were not as far along as I wish we were, tool and
capability development and who's going to do what. We've still
got to work this out between, What's the role of the Services
and what's the role of the Command? You have give us--the
Congress has given us some acquisition authority. We've started
down that road. I think that's a real positive. But, we've got
to ask ourselves, So what's the future here?
Senator Tillis. Do we have the timelines on acquisition
right with the nature of the developing technology? In other
words, are we compressing the time to new capabilities to a
point that you feel comfortable?
Admiral Rogers. So, we're--we're never where we want to be.
But, I like the fact that there's been recognition, we need to
do this outside the traditional acquisition framework, which
was really built to generate these capital-intensive
capabilities that take a decade to develop. That's not our
model. That is not what we need. So, I like the recognition of
this. It's an area the Secretary's asked me to take a look at
over time, so this will be something I'm going to comment on
before I leave. I've got some thoughts I want to share on this
before I leave.
Senator Tillis. How well have you done on personnel
recruiting and retention?
Admiral Rogers. So, if you look at a uniform----
Senator Tillis. As chair of the Personnel Subcommittee,
I'm----
Admiral Rogers. Right.
Senator Tillis.--particularly interested in other things
that we should be doing as we look at the NDAA specifically
around personnel issues.
Admiral Rogers. So, if you look on the uniform side, I'd
say we're probably exceeding our expectations. It doesn't mean
that it's perfect. The biggest challenge for me in the 4 years
has been less the military uniformed component, and the
civilian piece is proving to be harder. Retention,
recruitment--part of it also now is the process. When it comes
to the military, we've got a lot of people coming to us, many
of whom have skills that I can apply in cyber. In the cyber
world, it's much more about going out and trying to find people
with the right skills. It's a little different dynamic, and so,
the civilian piece has probably proven to be harder.
Senator Tillis. Well, that's something that we're always
interested in, in things that we can do to make that easier.
It's very----
Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir.
Senator Tillis. I can't imagine how you compete with the
likes of the firm that I worked with on recruiting and
retaining----
Admiral Rogers. Right.
Senator Tillis.--some of the top talent. I could go and
fill the new capability in 3 months that you could take 3 years
to do. I think that we have to continue to look at that. These
highly talented people----
Admiral Rogers. Right.
Senator Tillis.--want an environment where they're moving
at the pace of the threat, and that's the last thing.
Since the time you started this role, how would you
describe the number and the nature of threats that you're
dealing with today versus when you began?
Admiral Rogers. State actors have gotten more aggressive,
not less aggressive. The breadth of capability in many states
that are of concern to us is growing. You can look at the level
of--I mean, we publicly talk about Russia, China, Iran, North
Korea--you look at the level of investment they are making, it
is significant.
Senator Tillis. How well--last question--how good have you
gotten at knowing what we don't know? I've talked about this
before----
Admiral Rogers. Right.
Senator Tillis.--in prior committee hearings, the latent
capability. There are a lot of people who express frustration
because, when we see malign behavior on the part of, maybe, a
state actor or some other organization, the idea is to go out
with some sort of a proportionate response in the cyber world.
The thing that concerns me with that is, we really don't know
what we don't know about latent capabilities that could
ultimately brought--be brought back to us. Are we at a point
where we have any better or more holistic idea of what the
latent threats are out there----
Admiral Rogers. I mean, we're----
Senator Tillis.--in private sector or with----
Admiral Rogers. Right.
Senator Tillis.--whole-of-government?
Admiral Rogers. I mean, we're better. But, on the other
hand, just as a broad----
Senator Tillis. They're better, too.
Admiral Rogers. Right. Just as a broad operational
principle, one of the team--one of the things I constantly tell
our team is, ``You must assume we have imperfect knowledge, and
we must be capable of acting on imperfect knowledge.'' So,
don't come to me, telling me, ``Hey, we think we totally
understand.'' I--just my experience--teaches me, it doesn't
always work that way.
Senator Tillis. Well, thank you. Again, encourage you to
get any feedback to the committee staff----
Admiral Rogers. Sir.
Senator Tillis.--in my office on anything that we can do,
at least on the recruiting-and-retention piece for any
resources going into the NDAA.
Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir.
Senator Tillis. Thank you for your service.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Tillis.
Let me just make one comment here before going on to
Senator Peters.
I was thinking, all during this, less than complimentary
comments have been made. I just returned, last night, from 12,
13 days in PACOM. Everyone from Admiral Harris, Shaunessy, all
the rest of them, I've talked to, all the way around to and
including on the DMZ [Demilitarized Zone], between South and
North Korea. So, all the principals there. I have to say to
you--and this is at PACOM--they are very complimentary of the
work that you've done and the progress that you've made.
Senator Peters?
Senator Peters, Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Rogers, wonderful to have you----
Admiral Rogers. Senator.
Senator Peters,--here again. I'll join in saying thank you
for your service. We're going to miss you. It's been great
having you before this committee, and I've appreciated your
attention to this issue, and personally talking to me about a
variety of----
Admiral Rogers. Sir.
Senator Peters,--issues, as well.
I'd like to talk a little bit more about the future of
warfare and the future of technology. There's been some
questions related to machine learning and artificial
intelligence, which is going to change everything, not just in
the military space, but in the commercial side. I am on the
Commerce Committee, and we recently had a hearing on artificial
intelligence and how that's going to change business and
commercial activities, in general. I asked one of the leading
executives at one of the leading technology companies in the
country, ``What did he fear most about artificial
intelligence?'' We had a hearing primarily of all the positive
aspects of it, but I asked him, ``What did he fear?'' I was
actually surprised by his answer. He said his fear was the
manipulation of elections and the manipulation of public
opinion that can undermine democracy, which I thought was a
very interesting response from a leading tech company.
I wanted to ask you a bit about that in the Department of
Defense, and, more broadly, our posture when it comes to
investing in these technologies, and how are we working to
increase innovation and work with those commercial companies to
integrate it into defense systems? I guess I'll ask you that
question, as well. What do you fear--if we don't get this
right, what is our fear of an adversary acquiring machine
learning and AI [Artificial Intelligence] systems in advance of
our own capabilities?
Admiral Rogers. From a military's perspective, my concern
is, you potentially lose speed and knowledge. That's a terrible
combination as a warrior. Like, speed and knowledge are
advantages for us, historically. One of my concerns is, if
we're not careful, AI potentially gives opponents speed and
knowledge better than ours, if we're not careful. I'm not
arguing that's going to happen, but I acknowledge we've got to
look at it.
What was--I apologize, Senator--what was the----
Senator Peters, That's all right. That's--and I guess I
want to pick that up, because this technology is moving through
the commercial side even----
Admiral Rogers. Right.
Senator Peters,--faster than through the military side. So,
it--in the past, oftentimes military research would be a
leading factor. That's not necessarily the case here at all.
I'm worried, in particular, about our adversaries that are able
to come in and actually buy those technologies, particularly
from startup companies.
Admiral Rogers. Right.
Senator Peters, I'm working right now in trying to fill
some of the gaps on the CFIUS process, which is the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States.
Admiral Rogers. Sir.
Senator Peters, You basically have foreign entities that
buy companies, perfectly legal, get that information, and they
use it not just for commercial applications, but also figure
out ways to----
Admiral Rogers. Right.
Senator Peters,--weaponize that type of technology, as
well.
So, my question to you is, ``How can we better integrate
the missions of CYBERCOM and the NSA as to it relates to this
CFIUS review process?'' Are you concerned about it? What should
we be doing to make sure that we are protecting this
intellectual capital that has significant national defense
potential?
Admiral Rogers. I'm not concerned about the review process,
in terms of NSA role and Cyber Command. Again, it's one of the
advantages of--we are so physically colocated to each other.
My bigger concern goes to what you've already said. CFIUS,
to me, is a reflection of an environment of the past, not today
in the future. It is very clear to me that some nation-states
have spent a lot of time studying this CFIUS process, and have
developed strategies to overcome it, ``Hey, I don't have to
worry about buying a corporation outright, it's--so tell me
what your overseas subsidiaries are, and tell me what your
providers are, tell me who else has access to this intellectual
property, so to speak. I'll acquire that.'' Things like that,
I'm going--CFIUS is not set up to--it wasn't what we built it
to do. So, I applaud your efforts to--we need a different
construct. Not--we don't want to get rid of CFIUS, but I need--
I think we need to think about it more broadly, about the
national security challenges of foreign investment in areas
with national security implications for us.
Senator Peters, Is there a role for CYBERCOM to be more
actively involved in some of that process, providing
information? I mean, you'll be aware of what's happening,
things that you're concerned about, but how----
Admiral Rogers. Right.
Senator Peters,--how do you see a potential role there, if
any?
Admiral Rogers. I think it's much more an intelligence--so,
my role in--on the NSA side, because we're tasked with
generating knowledge and insight, is much greater. Cyber
Command helps feed--feed that effort, because one of the things
we do is, we generate knowledge and insight on the Cyber
Command side, based on what we're doing. We're putting out
reporting, so that goes into the broader effort. But, it's not
a primary mission for Cyber Command. It's much more a primary
mission on the NSA side.
Senator Peters, Great. Thank you for your testimony.
Appreciate it.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Warren.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, thank you for your----
Admiral Rogers. Ma'am.
Senator Warren.--37 years of service. I----
Admiral Rogers. When you say that, I just feel----
[Laughter.]
Senator Warren. No, no, you should feel proud. Feel strong.
You know, you probably picked up on a theme today, that
this committee feels a sense of urgency about the Russian
threat to our elections. This is not a personal criticism of
you.
Admiral Rogers. No, I understand.
Senator Warren. We're frustrated that this administration
has not lived up to its responsibility to do something about
the Russian cyber action.
Now, you told Senator Blumenthal and Senator McCaskill that
not every cyberattack requires a cyber response. So, I'd just
like to follow up on that just a little bit here.
The Pentagon's Cyber Security Strategy says--and I'm going
to quote it to you--``In response to certain attacks and
intrusions, the United States may undertake diplomatic actions,
take law enforcement actions, and consider economic
sanctions.'' So, I want to focus for just a minute on that last
piece, sanctions.
Congress overwhelmingly passed a law last year that, in
part, required sanctions on individuals and companies that
knowingly engage in malicious cyberactivities on behalf of the
Russian Government. Those sanctions include freezing access and
restricting travel. The Trump administration has not imposed
these required sanctions.
Admiral Rogers, I know that this is not your primary
responsibility----
Admiral Rogers. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Warren.--to impose the sanctions, but I want to ask
a different question. What message does it send to Vladimir
Putin that the United States has not fully implemented
sanctions to counter known Russian cyberattacks?
Admiral Rogers. You know, more broadly, the--not just the
sanctions, but more broadly--my concern is, I believe that
President Putin has clearly come to the conclusion, ``There's
little price to play here''----
Senator Warren. Bingo.
Admiral Rogers.--``and that, therefore, I can continue this
activity.''
Senator Warren. Yes.
Admiral Rogers. Everything, both as a director of NSA and
what I see on the Cyber Command side, leads me to believe that,
if we don't change the dynamic here, this is going to continue,
and 2016 won't be viewed as something isolated. This is
something--will be sustained over time. So, I think the
challenge for all of us is, So what are the tools available to
us? As the strategy says--diplomatic, economic, some cyber
things--there are tools available to us. Again, I think, in
fairness, you can't say nothing's been done. But, my point
would be, it hasn't been enough.
Senator Warren. It hasn't been enough.
Admiral Rogers. Clearly what we've done hasn't been enough.
And----
Senator Warren. That's right.
Admiral Rogers.--you know, I'm mindful of my role as an
operational commander, but----
Senator Warren. Yeah. No, I appreciate that. It hasn't been
enough. It doesn't do us any good to have tools in the toolbox
if we don't pick them up and use them. You know, Russia will
keep trying to interfere in our elections. If the Trump
administration doesn't fully implement sanctions, then we're
not using every tool we can to effectively deter Russia from
undermining democracy in the future.
Let me ask you one other question, if I can, Admiral. It's
clear that the United States needs to step up its cyber game. I
want to follow up on a question from Senator Tillis. We've
previously discussed the question of how to build a skilled
cyber force. You said that improving DOD's network defenses and
building a cybersecurity culture depends on our ability to
attract the most talented people out there. This committee is
now considering reforms to the Defense Officer Personnel
Management Act, or----
Admiral Rogers. Right.
Senator Warren.--DOPMA, another one of our great acronyms--
love to talk about DOPMA--which governs how we recruit and
retain our military officers. So, with that in mind, Admiral,
if you could make just one change to DOPMA to help attract the
right technical talent for the cyber jobs of tomorrow, what
would that be?
Admiral Rogers. I'd want to make--within a military----
Senator Warren. Yes
Admiral Rogers.--construct--and, to be honest, we use the
phrase DOPMA, because ``DOPE-MA''----
Senator Warren. Okay.
Admiral Rogers.--sounds terrible.
Senator Warren. I always think----
Admiral Rogers. In a military standpoint, it would probably
be--and the Services are working their way through this, but I
think we want to make sure that we have got a mechanism for a
professional cyberforce across a career, that this can't be
viewed as something we do--``Hey, we give you training, you do
it for a few years, you go do something else, you know, then we
bring you back, then you're gone again.'' That's not going to
get us where we need to be. The Services are all--because they
do man, train, and equip--you know, they provide capability
that I, as a joint--and that includes people and other things--
but that I, as the joint commander, then harness to achieve
specific mission outcomes as a joint commander. That would
probably be the biggest thing.
Senator Warren. Okay. It's actually very helpful to know. I
know that the 2017 defense bill gave the Pentagon a lot of
flexibility in how to recruit, but I remain concerned that our
recruiting system is so focused on recruiting for the military
of today that we're not effectively targeting the best talent
and best-suited talent to execute the missions we will face
tomorrow. How we think about that, I think, is really
important.
Admiral Rogers. Ma'am.
Senator Warren. So, thank you again. Thank you for your
service, and thank you for your help.
Admiral Rogers. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
It's the Chair's intention to go ahead and close the
meeting after a few remarks from the Ranking Member. Is there
objection to that?
[No response.]
Senator Inhofe. All right.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I have just very specific points I want to clarify.
First, there are ongoing Russian direct or inspired
cyberoperations against our electoral system, as we speak?
Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. Yes.
Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir. I'm speaking more as NSA than as
Commander----
Senator Reed. Right.
Admiral Rogers.--of Cyber Command, but yes, sir.
Senator Reed. Two, with the authority or the direction of
the President of the United States, National Mission Teams can
disrupt these attacks at the point of origin. Is that correct?
Admiral Rogers. We could be tasked to do that. Again, it
depends on the specifics. I don't----
Senator Reed. But, it's legal?
Admiral Rogers.--want to overpromise----
Senator Reed. It's legal, and it can be done.
Admiral Rogers. Sir.
Senator Reed. Have you been asked to make a recommendation
to--with respect to deploying these teams?
Admiral Rogers. No, but I've certainly provided my--
nobody's necessarily directly asked me--I certainly have
provided my opinion in ongoing discussions----
Senator Reed. What is your----
Admiral Rogers.--about this.
Senator Reed.--opinion?
Admiral Rogers. Again, my comment has been: Be mindful of
just defaulting to the cyber piece, here. I'd like us to think
about this a little bit more broadly, and I'd like us to think
about how does this potential cyber piece that Cyber Command
could play--how does it fit into something broader?
Senator Reed. So, let's just conclude. You have not been
formally asked for a recommendation.
Admiral Rogers. No, sir.
Senator Reed. You have expressed your opinion to the
Secretary of Defense and to the White House about the possible
uses of this, but not in any formal way.
Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir. I haven't put anything in
writing, for example.
Senator Reed. I guess, final point. This goes--do you feel,
as a professional officer, you have an obligation to make a
formal recommendation to this? Have----
Admiral Rogers. I feel that the system provides me the
opportunity to provide my recommendation, to provide my
insights, to provide my opinions, that people listen to what I
have to--I acknowledge there's other opinions out there. I
acknowledge there's other perspectives. But, I feel very
comfortable in the fact that there's a--been a dialogue on this
topic, and that dialogue continues.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
Thank you, Admiral.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Thank you, Admiral, for your straightforward answers and
for the--your patience on this, perhaps your last event here.
We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator David Perdue
efficiencies in cyber training and networks
1. Senator Perdue. Admiral Rogers, in 2013, the Secretary of
Defense directed the standup of the Cyber Mission Forces and provided
funds for CYBERCOM and the service cyber components to establish teams
and fund the training of personnel and units. Between 2013 and 2016,
under your (CYBERCOM's) supervision the Office of the Secretary of
Defense and the Joint Staff were supposed to come to an agreement on a
joint, federated training program funded by the services for the
training of the Cyber Mission Force (CMF). This federated training
program was supposed to be an equitable division of labor that avoided
duplication and built on the expertise of each service. Last year, I
sponsored language in the NDAA that noted this committee's concern that
the Services were not able to come to an agreement for this joint
training program in time for last year's budget submission, and flagged
this issue as a priority for the DOD to address. Can you update me on
the status of that agreement on a joint training program for the Cyber
Mission Force?
Admiral Rogers. The Senate Report to S. 1376, ``urges the
Department of Defense to create a federated and joint training model
and discourage having each service build separate training capabilities
for its cyber contingent.'' The Cyber Force Model Implementation Tiger
Team (CFMITT), led by the Joint Staff, produced a Training Transition
Report signed January 19, 2017. The CFMITT worked with USCYBERCOM to
ensure that services will leverage respective centers of excellence and
avoid duplication efforts. The transition plan made the recommendation
to migrate to a hybrid model of centralized governance and
decentralized execution of courseware. This model best leverages
service strengths (and core roles) in training cyber forces using
established training capability and capacity while ensuring a common
training standard that meets USCYBERCOM's operational needs for the
Cyber Mission Force.
This transition is currently underway. The service cyber components
have provided their transition plans to USCYBERCOM, and initial funding
has been provided to each service to begin the transition. Training
funding will be fully allocated to each service beginning in fiscal
year 2019.
2. Senator Perdue. Admiral Rogers, can you elaborate on CYBERCOM's
new Joint Force Trainer role that has been specified in the Unified
Command Plan (released last November)?
Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]
3. Senator Perdue. Admiral Rogers, do you believe this Joint Force
Trainer role fulfills the 2013 requirement?
Admiral Rogers. Yes. As the approved CMF Training Transition Plan
sets the conditions for the CMF, the JFT role will complement that plan
with joint standards for the remainder of the JCOF. With USCYBERCOM's
new JFT responsibilities and authorities, the command will establish
training and certification standards for the cyberspace workforce,
including personnel that secure, operate or defend and protect DOD,
CCMD and U.S. cyberspace resources.
4. Senator Perdue. Admiral Rogers, do each of the services maintain
the same standards for cyber warriors?
Admiral Rogers. There is one joint standard for training.
USCYBERCOM promulgates those training standards as the Joint Force
Trainer (JFT). Upon graduation from their service feeder schools, cyber
personnel enter the Cyber Mission Force (CMF) Training Pipeline. This
pipeline outlines USCYBERCOM's joint training requirements for
individuals based upon their specific work role in the CMF. After
individuals complete their training pipeline, CMF teams conduct
collective training as a unit to demonstrate specific task proficiency;
these tasks are outlined in the USCYBERCOM Training and Readiness
Manual. Joint training standards are applied to all services to ensure
that each team member in an assigned role is trained to the same level
and standard.
5. Senator Perdue. Admiral Rogers, we're in a fiscal environment
where we simply can't afford waste and a security environment where we
can't afford our services being out of sync on this critical issue.
What synergies can be achieved by joint training? Will we avoid
duplication and waste doing so?
Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Kirstin Gillibrand
national guard and elections
6. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Rogers, last year, I included in the
defense authorization a provision that would allow for the integration
of election-system cyber vulnerabilities in the annual ``Cyber Guard''
exercise. I also required a report back on the exercise and the
capabilities the National Guard could provide on elections security.
For example, in the last election cycle, at least three states used
Guard units to assess their elections systems' vulnerabilities. After
all, the National Guard is already part of the national mission and is
being trained to that standard, yet also serves the states and can
serve under the control of state governors. Do you think that we have
sufficiently explored the role of the National Guard in protecting our
elections systems to address this gap between where the capabilities
lie and who owns the systems?
Admiral Rogers. One of the top priorities for USCYBERCOM is greater
integration of the Reserve Component into our operations. One facet of
this integration is understanding and enabling National Guard support
to civil authorities during a domestic cyber event of significant
consequence. The role for the National Guard in ensuring election
systems integrity is an important topic worth examining. In August
2018, USCYBERCOM will conduct a seminar-style exercise bringing
together stakeholders to explore election systems. Invitees will
represent the whole of nation; including various state, local and
tribal governments, OOO, OHS and other interagency partners, as well as
various state National Guard participants. USCYBERCOM's concept is to
examine voting system vulnerabilities, authorities, countermeasures,
threat information sharing, National Guard support and other relevant
topics.
7. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Rogers, could the National Guard
help address some of the existing gaps in our whole-of-nation approach
and serve as a conduit on cyber between state, local and Federal
Government as well as the private sector because of its unique
authorities?
Admiral Rogers. Yes, our whole-of-nation approach requires the use
of the National Guard and the unique authorities under which its
members operate. Future partnerships between USCYBERCOM, the Reserve
Component, state local and tribal governments, along with interagency
partners, enable these core missions by empowering operations that
target the threat outside the United States while allowing law
enforcement and state authorities to defend against the threat within
the Homeland. Towards that end, USCYBERCOM, OHS and USNORTHCOM
synchronize their efforts daily. Furthermore, USCYBERCOM's Cyber Guard
exercise has been refocused to be an operational-level exercise. During
the Cyber Guard exercise, USCYBERCOM's operations centers will
coordinate closely with the National Guard Coordination Center, the DHS
National Cyberspace & Communications Integration Center (NCCIC), and
USNORTHCOM to refine our whole-of-nation unity of effort to defend the
nation's Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources.
misattribution
8. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Rogers, this weekend, the press
reported that Russia hacked the Olympics in South Korea and tried to
make it look like North Korea had done it. The indictment that the
Justice Department issued on February 16 alleged that the Internet
Research Agency used VPNs to make it look like it was doing business in
the United States. What do these two situations demonstrate to us about
how our adversaries can mask their efforts and limit or misdirect
attribution?
Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]
9. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Rogers, tensions with North Korea
are already quite high and mistaken attribution--maybe not in the case
of the Olympics, but were this an attack on United States
infrastructure--could have significant consequences. For example, some
of us have concerns that the new Nuclear Posture Review implies that
the United States might use nuclear weapons to respond to a cyber
attack on critical infrastructure. How do we ensure that a situation
won't escalate over a misattribution and that we are not manipulated by
actors whose goal is to make us to misattribute, possibly with dire
consequences?
Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]
cyber workforce development
10. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Rogers, growing the cyber workforce
has been the subject of intense interest on this committee, including
determining the proper mix of active duty, reserve component (including
National Guard), and civilian personnel and how to develop career
tracks to recruit and retain cyber warriors. Last year, you and I spoke
about whether the Cyber Mission Force were sufficient to meet all of
our country's requirements and since then our needs have only grown. As
you prepare to leave this position, can you please assess the state of
development of the cyber workforce and specifically the Cyber Mission
Force, including the question of whether we have enough people in the
Cyber Mission Force?
Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]
11. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Rogers, what have you seen thus far
in terms of recruitment and retention challenges?
Admiral Rogers. Several ongoing initiatives are occurring within
DOD, the Military services, USCYBERCOM and OPM to maintain, retain and
recruit a talented cyber workforce, and some challenges are hindering
our efforts. Competition and lack of professionalization (not to be
confused with professionalism) are the biggest obstacles to
identifying, recruiting and retaining qualified cyber operations
personnel.
Regarding initiatives, each military service maintains its own
initiatives in regards to maintaining cyber talent. USCYBERCOM
continues its own efforts to develop and manage a cyber-operations
force that meets the missions through the Cyber Workforce Development
Framework which is modeled after the five-phase Human Capital Life
Cycle Model. OPM, in accordance with the July 2016 Federal
Cybersecurity Workforce Strategy, provides guidance to use existing
compensation flexibilities to recruit and retain cyber professionals.
Our biggest challenge is competition. Highly qualified cyber
professionals continue to be in high demand but low in quantity.
Finding potential candidates has been less of a problem compared to our
ability to attract them to federal service. Many candidates simply
don't have the patience to wait on the federal hiring process, nor do
they have the desire to accept lower wages set by federal compensation
rules. The Department's new authorities for the Cyber Excepted Service
(CES), provided in the Fiscal Year 2016 NOAA and addressed in personnel
policies signed in December 2017, are great start to provide
recruitment/retention incentives to the civilian cyber workforce. The
CES takes elements from the Intelligence Community's Defense Civilian
Intelligence Personnel System and is built to champion faster, flexible
hiring. Future Target Local Market Supplement pay tables in Cyber
Excepted Service will help improve ``lower wages'' in high demand cyber
specialties and in hard-to fill localities, organizations, and grades.
Those employees who do join typically do so for altruistic reasons; in
order to serve their country and pursue a mission which is unique and
important. While these attributes do our civil servants credit, it does
not erase the fact they can find patriotic and fulfilling jobs in the
private sector-which offer higher wages and competitive benefits.
Another challenge is the professionalization of a ``cyber warrior''
can be molded from a host of different career fields. From on-net
operators, to linguists and operational planners; cyber professionals'
career paths are intermingled with other professional specialties.
Unlike the intel or the special operations force communities, cyber
does not have a well-worn path to career advancement . As such, many in
our community feel isolated and have difficulty in seeing advancement
within what could be a lifelong profession.
12. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Rogers, this committee is
considering reforms to the military's personnel management practices.
As we do that, do you think we should separate how we think about the
cyber workforce from our approach toward conventional military
functions?
Admiral Rogers. This domain is unique because it impacts our
success in other domains, but to treat it too differently would be
misguided, as it would diminish the ability to execute operations and
create operational outcomes.
13. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Rogers, do you think that we have
developed a cyber strategy against which we can build our forces?
Admiral Rogers. Questions about a cyber strategy are better
addressed to DOD. As an operational command, USCYBERCOM's focus over
the past five years has been building the Cyber Mission Force. All 133
teams achieved Full Operational Capability.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
attributing cyberattacks
14. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Rogers, in June 2017, Russia's
military launched the NotPetya ransomware cyberattacks against Ukraine,
but it was not until this month that the United States attributed the
attack. Yet this delay in attribution is nothing new, as the United
States only attributed the May 2017 WannaCry cyberattack to North Korea
in December 2017. Attribution is an important step, but must come far
sooner and be followed by swift action. Why are the sources of these
attacks not identified to the public sooner? What are you doing to
connect the dots at a more rapid pace?
Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]
15. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Rogers, in your testimony you note
that ``improved attribution is in our strategic interest, but not
strictly necessary to guard against many cyber threats.'' You go on to
say, ``We do not have to gain positive attribution to each particular
actor before we can act to protect ourselves and our allies and
partners; in fact, all users must take basic steps to secure their data
and systems. We need decisive responses at scale to threats and
intrusions. That is where USCYBERCOM finds its mission.'' What have you
done between the NotPetya and WannaCry attacks to decisively respond?
Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]
16. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Rogers, while attribution is
important, it is not sufficient. Do you agree that North Korea, Russia,
and other malicious actors must pay a steeper price for their
cyberattacks? Do you agree that our actions so far have not made them
realize that they have more to lose than gain with their behavior?
Admiral Rogers. Deterrence is partially a function of perception.
It works by convincing a potential adversary that it will suffer
unacceptable costs if it conducts an attack on the United States, and
by decreasing the likelihood that a potential adversary's attack will
succeed. The United States must be able to declare or display effective
response capabilities to deter an adversary from initiating an attack;
develop effective defensive capabilities to deny a potential attack
from succeeding; and strengthen the overall resilience of U.S. systems
to withstand a potential attack if it penetrates the United States'
defenses. In addition, the United States requires strong intelligence,
forensics and indications and warning capabilities to reduce anonymity
in cyberspace and increase confidence in attribution.
Paying a ``steeper price'' for cyber attacks is one strategy for
impacting the risk versus reward calculus but it must be considered as
one component of a full range of options.
countering russian disinformation campaigns
17. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Rogers, USCYBERCOM's National
Mission Teams' mission is to defend the nation from cyberattacks of
significant consequence. How can we best use these teams to counter
Russia's disinformation campaigns for our elections?
Admiral Rogers. Defending the nation from cyber attacks of
significant consequence is a broad mission set encompassing support to
civil authorities and Homeland defense. The National Mission Teams of
the Cyber National Mission Force (CNMF) can best be employed as part of
a larger whole-of-government response--in understanding
vulnerabilities, identifying malicious cyber actors, actions, and
activities and sharing information on adversary activities, mitigations
and defensive measures.
18. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Rogers, I agree with your statement
in your testimony that Russia's actions ``threaten the foundations of
democracy.'' Would you also agree that Russia has not been deterred by
our actions thus far? Would you concur with members of the
Administration--such as CIA Director Pompeo and Secretary Tillerson--
that Russia will continue to seek to meddle in our elections?
Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]
cyber strategy
19. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Rogers, because the current
Administration has yet to articulate a cyber strategy, this Committee
required the President to develop a national policy on cyber in the
Fiscal Year 2018 NDAA, including how to deter, disrupt, deny, and
respond to cyberattacks to improve our resiliency and offensive
capabilities. What is USCYBERCOM's role in the development of the
President's cyber policy? Please provide a status update on the
development of this policy.
Admiral Rogers. Questions about a cyber strategy are better
addressed to DOD. As an operational commander, USCYBERCOM identifies
options and recommends courses of action to the SECDEF and President
through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Working through the
Joint Staff and the OSD, USCYBERCOM supports the development of
national-level strategy and policy.
20. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Rogers, how do you define a
cyberattack? What constitutes an act of war in the cyber realm?
Admiral Rogers. Whether a particular cyber activity rises to the
legal definition of an armed attack or a use of force under
international law, or otherwise constitutes an unlawful intervention,
is highly fact-specific and is determined on a case by-case basis by
our national policy makers. Similarly, the decision to declare an event
an ``act of war'' resides in the hands of elected leaders in accordance
with the law.
21. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Rogers, last month, DOD released
its National Defense Strategy. I am concerned that it does not
emphasize cyber enough. It notes DOD will ``invest in cyber defense,
resilience, and the continued integration of cyber capabilities into
the full spectrum of military operations.'' We must send a strong
signal to our adversaries that we are serious about addressing this
threat. How does the National Defense Strategy inform and strengthen
USCYBERCOM's work?
Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]
north korea cyber revenue
22. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Rogers, what is USCYBERCOM doing to
blind North Korea's cyber capabilities to prevent the regime from
continuing to launch offensive cyber operations that provide illicit
revenue for their nuclear weapons program?
Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]
23. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Rogers, last week, the
Administration announced its largest tranche of sanction designations
against North Korea, yet this did not focus on their cyber activity. Do
you agree that we must do more to make North Korea pay a steeper price
for its cyberattacks?
Admiral Rogers. This is a decision for our Nation's leaders.
fancy bear targets defense industry
24. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Rogers, it was recently reported
that Russian hacking group ``Fancy Bear'' targeted 87 United States
defense contractors who work on weapon systems critical to our national
security. While it is still uncertain what may have been stolen--what
is clear is that Fancy Bear continues to target the U.S. with impunity.
What should the U.S. be doing to address this intrusion? How do we
address the loss of sensitive national security data?
Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]
25. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Rogers, it is reported that as many
as 40 percent of the targeted contractors clicked on Fancy Bear's
phishing links. How can employers improve their cybersecurity training
to ensure their employees do not fall prey to these tactics?
Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]
26. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Rogers, how is USCYBERCOM working
with the defense industrial base to prevent and protect against this
exfiltration of industry data on our most advanced weapon systems?
Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine
sharkseer
27. Senator Kaine. Admiral Rogers, I'm sure you are aware of the
NSA's SharkSeer cybersecurity program, which orchestrates 23 commercial
technologies--most, if not all, of which have a large presence in the
Commonwealth of Virginia--to provide automated cyber defense for the
DOD information network. It is my understanding that since becoming
fully operational, SharkSeer has increased DOD detection rates by 886
percent and has discovered over 2 billion unique cyber events. I also
understand that SharkSeer's automated means for detecting, analyzing
and responding to nation-state cyber events has replaced the need for
nearly 90 personnel to generate mitigations; now, only a few personnel
are needed to approve automated work flows and interactive mitigations
are executed in minutes rather than days--this means that DOD's
security architecture is not only more secure, it's also more cost
effective. Can you please share your general views on both the efficacy
and the cost-effectiveness of the SharkSeer program?
Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]
sharkseer transfer
28. Senator Kaine. Admiral Rogers, I understand that DOD is
planning on transferring the SharkSeer program from the NSA to the
Defense Information Systems Agency, though there appears to be a lack
of clarity regarding that determination. How do you and the Defense
Department intend to continue to support the great strides the
SharkSeer program has made?
Admiral Rogers. DISA and NSA plan to submit a Fiscal Year 2020
Issue Paper to fund the transfer of the Sharkseer (SS) program to DISA.
The Fiscal Year 2020 Issue Paper will address: continued sustainment of
the current SS system; conducting a technical refresh of the current
baseline, while seeking a reduction in sustainment costs; and the
evolution of the SS system. DISA will sustain and operate the system,
while NSA will conduct the research to evolve SS to combat more
threats.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2019 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 8, 2018
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in Room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M.
Inhofe, presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker,
Fischer, Cotton, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue, Sasse, Scott,
Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal,
Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, and Peters.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Senator Inhofe. Our meeting will come to order.
The committee meets to receive testimony on the posture of
United States European Command, EUCOM. We welcome our witness,
General Scaparrotti.
Chairman McCain asked that I submit a statement for the
record on his behalf, and read the following excerpt, ``The
United States faces a new strategic reality in Europe. The
first step in addressing it is to recognize the scope, scale,
and seriousness of the challenges Russia presents to our
national security and to the international order. Then we need
to--a coherent strategy and policy to deter and, if necessary,
defeat aggression against the United States and our allies. We
must be prepared to face the world as it is, not as we wish it
to be.''
[The information referred to follows:]
Prepared Statement by Chairman John McCain
The United States faces a new strategic reality in Europe. The
first step in addressing it is to recognize the scope, scale, and
seriousness of the challenges Russia presents to our national security
and to the international order. Then we need a coherent strategy and
policy to deter and, if necessary, defeat aggression against the United
States and our allies. We must be prepared to face the world as it is,
not as we wish it to be.
The administration's new National Defense Strategy recognizes this
new strategic reality and provides a framework for prioritizing the
most complex and dynamic global threat environment since the end of
World War II. It identifies long-term interstate competition with
countries like Russia as the primary challenge we face and offers a
roadmap for adjusting to this new era of great power competition.
As we decide how to move forward in this new reality, it is
important to remember how we got here. Russia's recent investment in
military modernization is designed to erode the United States military
advantage. Its buildup of troops along its western border is designed
to intimidate our allies. Its interference in democracies near and far
is designed to undermine our confidence in our own institutions.
Ultimately, each of these efforts is part of Mr. Putin's plan to
shift the international order toward authoritarianism and lay the
groundwork for future aggression. We cannot let this stand. If we
continue to allow Russian provocation--from its invasion of Ukraine to
its development anti-access/area denial capabilities in Kaliningrad to
its violation of the INF Treaty to its interference in elections--to go
unanswered, we are teaching Mr. Putin a very dangerous lesson.
We have finally begun to impose costs on this provocation and work
to deter future aggression. Efforts such as congressional support for
the European Deterrence Initiative and the administration's decision to
provide defensive lethal assistance to Ukraine are significant steps
toward developing the right approach to dealing with Russian revanchism
and assuring our European allies and partners. I hope this hearing will
include a conversation about what kinds of new policies, resources, and
authorities would help EUCOM further the recent progress we have made.
Underlying each of these issues is another important reality: no
United States policy or strategy in Europe can succeed without a strong
NATO alliance. As we adjust to the renewed era of great partner
competition and begin to implement the new National Defense Strategy,
we must do so in close coordination with our European allies and
partners. We should never forget that America is safer and more secure
because we work with and through our allies, who are willing to step up
and share the burden of collective security.
Senator Inhofe. Your testimony today is extremely relevant
as the United States is engaged in a renewed great-power
competition with Russia. The National Defense Strategy
prioritizes Russia and China. It's been stated, by several of
the top people, that we're losing some of our edge that we've
had in the past. We clearly see the growing threat that
Russia--especially in Europe. Vladimir Putin recently discussed
Russia's new nuclear capabilities, including a new ICBM
[intercontinental ballistic missile], intercontinental
hypersonic missile, nuclear-powered cruise missiles, and
undersea drone. This is in addition to Russia's aggressive
behavior in Ukraine and the cyber domain.
Then there's China and their militaristic expansion in the
Pacific. While this is not part of your AOR [Area of
Responsibility], it's one where we--several of us--Senators
Ernst and several of us who have just recently visited, we are
watching what's going on there. If something should happen in
the East China Sea that would draw our assets over, that would
have a direct effect on you, General.
This week, we received testimony from the Director of
National Intelligence in which he stated, ``The risk of
interstate conflict, including among the world's great powers,
is higher than at any time since the end of the cold war.''
General Scaparrotti, we ask you to help this committee begin to
think through the requirements necessary to implement the new
strategy and what resources and authorities you might need that
you don't currently have. Thank you very much for attending.
Senator Reed.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General Scaparrotti, thank you for joining us this morning,
and let me also thank you for your service to the Nation over
many years. Please extend our gratitude to the military men and
women and their families under your command for their
commitment and service to the Nation. Thank you.
The new National Defense Strategy marks a shift in United
States defense priorities from terrorism to the reemergence of
long-term strategic competition with near-peer rivals,
particularly Russia and China. This morning's hearing is an
opportunity to hear from General Scaparrotti on EUCOM's
military plans and operational requirements for implementing
the new defense strategy within the European theater.
There can be no doubt that Russia poses a serious threat to
United States national security, and that our allies and
partners are also threatened. We have repeatedly heard from our
intelligence leaders, including Director of National
Intelligence Coats on Tuesday, that Russia is aggressively
confronting the United States and its allies, seeking to
destabilize the international order, which President Putin
considers contrary to Russia's claim to great-power status.
Russia is also seeking to reassert a sphere of influence over
its neighbors, and has actively sought to prevent their further
integration with Europe.
To advance its strategic interests, Russia is using the
full spectrum of capabilities at its disposal, from nuclear and
conventional modernization to asymmetric operations below the
threshold of direct military conflict. Just last week,
President Putin gave to nuclear and conventional saber-rattling
in his annual address to the Russian nation.
The Kremlin's hybrid aggression against the West includes
deception, information warfare, cyberattacks, political
influence, and malign financial influence. Russia is using the
war in Ukraine as a test lab for new hybrid warfare tactics,
including, as the White House recently confirmed, the Russian
military's ``NotPetya'' ransomware cyberattack against Ukraine.
The intelligence community is already warning that Russia has
launched an assault on the United States midterm elections this
year with even more sophisticated tools than in the 2016
presidential election. General Scaparrotti, we'll be interested
in hearing what tasking, if any, you've received from the White
House to disrupt or prevent Russian operations aimed at
interfering with our democratic institution as well as those of
our allies.
Over the last few years, Congress has authorized critical
resources to reassure our allies and ensure a credible military
deterrent against Russian aggression. The fiscal year 2019
defense budget request includes $6.5 billion for the European
Deterrence Initiative, or EDI, to continue to enhance our
deterrence and defense posture throughout Europe. The committee
is interested in hearing your priorities for EDI for the coming
fiscal year.
I commend EUCOM for taking steps to start rebuilding the
Command's expertise on Russia to better understand the Russian
threat perception and the Kremlin's decisionmaking process. I
remain concerned about our naval posture in Europe to counter
the Russian threat, and EUCOM's cyber challenge.
The U.S. EDI funding has also been an effective tool for
leveraging increased defense spending by our NATO [North
Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies, and I hope that will
continue at the next NATO summit planned for July in Brussels.
As Supreme Allied Commander Europe, you play a critical
role in ensuring that the alliance is prepared to respond in
the event of a crisis. In February, NATO defense ministers
approved changes to the alliance command structure, including
the establishment of a new joint force command for the
Atlantic. An area of concern is the ability of the NATO force
structure to respond quickly to any early stages of a crisis
before NATO reaches an article 5 declaration. I would be
interested in your views on whether additional authorities
should be delegated to SACEUR to initiate the movement of force
as the crisis begins to unfold and before NATO members reach a
political decision.
Strategic competition with Russia is but one of the many
challenges with the EUCOM theater. Relations with Turkey have
been tense due to the instability and violence in Syria and
Turkey's decision to buy the Russian S-400 air defense system,
which potentially jeopardizes the full range of United States-
Turkey defense cooperation. The flow of people seeking refuge
across the Mediterranean to southern Europe has strained these
nations' security resources and has helped fuel the rise of
nationalistic anti-immigrant political parties in some
countries. Longstanding simmering resentments in the Balkans
risk increased instability in the region.
I look forward to this morning's testimony, and again,
thank you, General Scaparrotti, for being here today, and for
your service.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
General, we have--there's another hearing that's taking
place at the same time--we have nine members on--of this
committee that are also on Environment and Public Works, so
you'll see some movement back and forth. Forgive us for that.
You are recognized for your opening statement, anything you
want. Your entire statement will be part of the record. Try to
confine it to around 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL CURTIS M. SCAPARROTTI, USA, COMMANDER,
UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND, AND NATO SUPREME ALLIED
COMMANDER EUROPE
General Scaparrotti. Thank you, Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished members
of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify
before you today as the Commander, United States European
Command.
It's an honor to represent more than 60,000 men and women
who are forward-deployed, supporting United States' mission in
Europe. Our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, our
coastguardsmen and civilian workforce continue to demonstrate
selfless service and dedication in an increasingly complex and
competitive security environment. Our adaptation to this
environment has made significant progress, thanks to the
resourcing provided by Congress, particularly under the
European Deterrence Initiative. EUCOM deeply appreciates
Congress's support for EDI, which has supported the largest
reinforcement of Euro-Atlantic defense in a generation.
In this reinforcement, the U.S. has been joined by NATO
alliance, which remains a keystone to our national security, as
it has been for almost seven decades. I'm proud to report that
the alliance is strong, it is unified, and it's committed to
being fit for purpose. Our European allies in Canada have
turned a corner on defense spending, with increases in each of
the past 3 years. During this time, they've added $46 billion
to defense spending, including $5 billion increase from 2016 to
2017. In 2018, eight countries will meet NATO's 2 percent
spending target, with at least 15 nations on pace to reach or
exceed 2 percent mark by 2024. Backed by these collective
commitments, NATO is adapting to ensure its vigilance in peace,
responsiveness in crisis, and that it possesses the strategic
depth for high-end, large-scale, multidomain conflict.
Together with NATO, the United States has made significant
progress, but we have much work to do as we execute our
National Defense Strategy dealing in increasingly lethal,
agile, and resilient joint force in long-term strategic
competition with Russia, and ready to counter violent extremist
organizations.
Russia is carrying out a campaign of destabilization to
change the international order, fracture NATO, and undermine
United States leadership around the world. To this end, Russia
is advancing asymmetric capabilities in accordance with its
concept of warfare, which envisions the employment of the full
spectrum of military and nonmilitary power. Throughout Europe,
along its periphery, in the Middle East, and beyond, Russia has
demonstrated a willingness and capability to exert influence,
spread disinformation, and undermine confidence in NATO. At
sea, on land, in the air--frankly, every domain--Russia's
increasingly modernized military is operating at levels not
seen since the cold war. In response to the challenge posed by
Russia's pursuit of power, the United States has increased its
posture in Europe by deploying rotational forces, to include an
armored brigade combat team, a combat aviation brigade as well.
Additionally, we've implemented the Framework Battalion Task
Force for NATO's enhanced forward presence in Poland. We have
pre-positioned equipment for an additional armored brigade
combat team. We have doubled the maritime deployments to the
Black Sea. We have exercised theater antisubmarine warfare
operations. We have executed bomber assurance and deterrence
missions and, for the first time, we've deployed fifth-
generation fighters to Europe. The United States has taken
these actions in coordination with NATO, which, since the 2016
Warsaw Summit, has made significant gains in meeting its
security commitments and in implementing decisions to enhance
our collective defense. NATO has implemented its enhanced
forward presence with four multinational battle groups, backed
by 29 nations. It's also established a tailored forward
presence in the Black Sea region. Collectively, this enhanced
deterrence posture is necessary to prevent further Russian
aggression, preserve stability, and reassure allies and
partners.
The second major threat we face throughout the European
area of operation is violent extremist groups. Since 2014,
Europe has endured 18 major terrorist attacks. While the Defeat
ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] Coalition, which
includes NATO, recovers seized territory in Iraq and Syria,
ISIS remains active, and seeks to expand its operations across
Europe. EUCOM provides forces for military operations against
ISIS, such as Operation Inherent Resolve [OIR], and has
increased information intelligence-sharing among its United
States agencies, international partners, and the private
sector. With the EU, NATO, EUCOM--with the EU and NATO, EUCOM
supports a trinodal community of action to identify and counter
terrorist threats. Also, EUCOM has increased coordination with
EUROPOL [European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation]
and INTERPOL [International Police] to thwart terrorist
activities.
Our European allies deploy forces worldwide to support
United States-led counterterrorism operations, including OIR
and Operation Freedom Central, and to conduct national
counterterrorism missions. The allies are committed to this
fight, and their support is essential to ongoing
counterterrorism efforts.
In addition to deterring Russia and defeating violent
extremist organizations, EUCOM is working to strengthen
strategic partnerships, bolster regional security, and
reinforce a free and open international order conducive to our
security and prosperity. Thanks to the resources provided by
Congress, particularly through the European Defense Initiative,
EUCOM has made significant headway in establishing a defense
posture that is credible, capable, and relevant to our
strategic objectives.
As our National Defense Strategy states, ``A strong and
free Europe bound by shared principles of democracy, national
sovereignty, and commitment to article 5 of NATO's treaty is
vital to our security.'' The servicemembers and civilians at
EUCOM stand ready to protect the Homeland, strengthen the
alliance, and defend a Europe that's whole, free, and at peace.
Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I look forward to the
committee's questions.
[The prepared statement of General Scaparrotti follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Curtis M. Scaparrotti
introduction
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of this committee, thank you
for the opportunity to testify before you as the Commander of the
United States European Command (USEUCOM). It is an honor to represent
the more than 60,000 men and women who are forward-deployed supporting
our USEUCOM mission. Our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coast
guardsmen, and civilian workforce continue to demonstrate selfless
service and dedication in an increasingly contested and complex
security environment, both in Europe and around the globe. We greatly
appreciate the continued support of this committee.
The Trans-Atlantic alliance is a keystone of our national security.
USEUCOM, fully aligned with the National Defense Strategy (NDS),
supports each of the President's four National Security Strategy (NSS)
objectives by strengthening and safeguarding this alliance. Europe
provides essential strategic access in support of United States global
operations to protect the Homeland and the ability to pursue potential
threats to their source. As our most significant trading partner,
Europe is vital to promoting American prosperity. The North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) enables us to preserve peace through
strength as alliance unity fundamentally deters the aggression of
potential adversaries. With shared history and values, Europe is also a
critical partner in advancing American influence throughout the world.
There are real threats, however, to United States interests in
Europe and to Israel (which also falls within the USEUCOM area of
responsibility). These threats are trans-regional, multi-domain, and
multi-functional. Additionally, the speed, complexity, and breadth of
new threats and challenges are increasing.
USEUCOM continues to adjust to this dynamic strategic environment,
aggressively adapting our thinking and approaches to meet our assigned
missions. In doing so, the Command's focus has shifted from engagement
and assurance to deterrence and defense. USEUCOM has adapted its plans,
posture, activities, and strategic communications to shape the
operational environment and prepare forces to respond to crisis at
speed. In all these efforts, we are guided by Secretary Mattis's
direction to sharpen our military edge, expand the competitive space
with Russia, and provide a combat-credible military force to deter war
and protect the security of our Nation.
Our adaptation to the new European security environment has made
significant progress thanks to the resourcing provided by Congress,
particularly under the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI). USEUCOM
deeply appreciates Congress' support for EDI, which remains crucial to
preserving peace and stability in Europe. We have accomplished much,
but we have much work to do to support an increasingly lethal, agile,
and resilient Joint Force in long-term, strategic competition with
Russia and in combat with violent extremist organizations.
useucom strategic environment
Russia
Russia continues to destabilize regional security and disregard
international norms, which have preserved the peace in Europe since
1945. Russia seeks to change the international order, fracture NATO,
and undermine United States leadership in order to protect its regime,
re-assert dominance over its neighbors, and achieve greater influence
around the globe. To achieve these ends, the Kremlin is prepared to
employ the full spectrum of Russia's power, to include forcefully using
its increasingly capable military. Russia has demonstrated its
willingness and capability to intervene in countries along its
periphery and to project power--especially in the Middle East.
Additionally, Russia aggressively uses social media and other means of
mass communication to push disinformation, test the resolve of the
United States, and erode our credibility with European partners.
The Russian military is improving and modernizing its capabilities,
enhancing its ability to be a more agile force capable of executing
operations across the entire spectrum of modern warfare. Moscow's
strategic armament program has led to increased defense spending with
an estimated investment of $285 billion in modernization from 2011
through 2020. Russia continues to modernize its nuclear forces and to
develop and deploy long-range, precision-guided conventional weapons
systems. In the Baltic and Black Sea regions, and in the Eastern
Mediterranean, Russia is expanding its anti-access area-denial (A2/AD)
capabilities threatening freedom of movement to our land forces, our
ships, and our aircraft. In the maritime domain, Russia is making rapid
progress with its new Severodvinsk nuclear attack submarine, more
capable Kilo submarines, and Kalibr cruise missiles. Russia continues
to hold snap exercises and to limit transparency of planned exercises.
Additionally, Russia continues to intercept our routine reconnaissance
flight operations over the Baltic and Black Seas, flying dangerously
close to our aircraft and occasionally causing unsafe conditions for
our pilots operating in international airspace.
Along with military modernization, Russia is advancing its indirect
and asymmetric capabilities in accordance with its concept of warfare,
which envisions the coordinated use of military and non-military
elements of national power to shape the strategic environment.
Throughout Europe, Russia exercises malign influence to disrupt and
attempt to fracture NATO, undermine trans-Atlantic cohesion, and erode
democratic foundations. Russia interferes in the electoral process
across numerous states, including supporting a plan to violently
disrupt elections in Montenegro, the newest member of NATO. Russia
works to influence the geopolitical environment through the use of key
acquisitions, proxies, and other agents of influence. Using indirect
action, particularly against countries along its periphery, Russia
seeks to use information operations and cyberspace operations to
manipulate and influence the information domain and to shape a
narrative of its choosing.
Russia's strategy of malign influence also includes prolonging
unresolved conflicts across Europe and Eurasia. In Ukraine, Russia
continues to train and equip proxy forces in the east and refuses to
implement its commitments to the Minsk Agreements. As part of Russia's
effort to destabilize Ukraine, the Russian military launched the
destructive and costly NotPetya cyber-attack in June 2017. Russia
maintains its presence in Moldova, preventing a resolution of the
conflict in Transnistria. Russia stations roughly 5,000 troops in
Armenia and sells weapons to both Armenia and Azerbaijan despite
ongoing tensions over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In Georgia, Russia
maintains 7,000 troops in South Ossetia and Abkhazia and has recognized
both regions as independent states with military, economic, and social
linkages to the Russian Federation, despite the fact that Georgia,
supported by the international community, has opposed this recognition.
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russia uses relationships with the
leadership of Republika Srpska to undermine the state institutions
established by the Dayton Accords.
The threat from Russia is not limited to the European theater but
extends all along its periphery and beyond. Russia is exerting its
influence in the Middle East, where its intervention in the Syrian
civil war bolstered the Assad regime, enabling the expansion of Iranian
influence across the Levant. Russia is also increasing aid to Middle-
East states, deepening collaboration with Iran, and extending its
influence in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Libya, and Cyprus. These efforts are
changing regional dynamics, adversely affecting Israel's security,
stability in Lebanon, and other United States interests in the region.
In the Arctic, Russia is revitalizing its northern fleet and
building or renovating military bases along their Arctic coast line in
anticipation of increased military and commercial activity. Russia also
intends to assert sovereignty over the Northern Sea route in violation
of the provisions of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS). Although the chances of military conflict in the Arctic
are low in the near-term, Russia is increasing its qualitative
advantage in Arctic operations, and its military bases will serve to
reinforce Russia's position with the threat of force.
Our highest strategic priority as a Combatant Command is to deter
Russia from engaging in further aggression and exercising malign
influence over our allies and partners. In accordance with the NDS, and
thanks to Congressional support, we are working to create a combat-
credible posture in Europe that will underpin our deterrence. We are
updating our operational plans to provide military response options to
defend our European allies against Russian aggression. Finally, we are
increasing our efforts to counter Russia's malign influence in Europe
and compete below the level of armed conflict. This includes supporting
the Russian Information Group (RIG), an interagency effort to counter
Russia's propaganda and misinformation campaigns.
To effectively expand our competitive space with Russia we must
have a whole-of-government approach that employs all elements of our
national power. Visible political, economic, and military commitments
are critical in deterring Moscow while reassuring allies. Continued
Congressional support is essential to our Nation's ability to
successfully compete with Russia over the long-term, shore up the
international order, and preserve European security.
Violent Extremist Organizations and Terrorism
Violent extremists remain a significant threat to our allies and
partners throughout the Euro-Atlantic. Decentralized transregional
terrorist organizations thrive in the security vacuums of failed
states. Additionally, violent extremists continue to pose a threat to
United States personnel, our allies, and our infrastructure in Europe
and around the globe.
As coalition actions recover ISIS-seized territory in Iraq and
Syria, ISIS remains active and seeks to expand its operations across
Europe. ISIS operatives and sympathizers are targeting European
citizens for radicalization and recruitment. In cyberspace, ISIS
reaches across geographic boundaries to entice new followers, direct
acts of terrorism, and spread their extremist ideology.
USEUCOM works directly with our European partners and our Combatant
Command counterparts to identify and counter threats to the United
States and United States interests. USEUCOM provides forces for
military operations against ISIS, such as Operation Inherent Resolve
(OIR), in the Middle East. In addition, we continue to increase
information and intelligence-sharing among United States agencies,
international partners, and the private commercial sector. We also
continue to pursue radicals in the digital domain where they are able
to hide and recruit others. These efforts help close the seams
exploited by terrorist networks and link global counterterrorism
efforts to reduce the Homeland's vulnerability to terrorism emanating
from Europe and to reduce the terrorist threat to our allies.
Coordination among NATO, partner nations, and international
organizations such as EUROPOL and INTERPOL is central to defeating
VEOs. For example, information sharing and coordination with the
International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) has assisted
investigations in more than 80 countries to date. Our EU, NATO, and
USEUCOM-shared Tri-nodal Community of Action targets existing VEO
networks and facilitates expanded intelligence and law enforcement
information-sharing.
European allies provide essential strategic access for United
States, allied, and coalition counter-terrorism operations in the
AFRICOM and CENTCOM Areas of Responsibility (AOR). The United States
depends on countries in the USEUCOM AOR to grant overflight and use of
host-nation facilities in countries where we do not have permanent
basing. U.S. facilities in the USEUCOM AOR are not sovereign U.S.
territory, and therefore basing and access permissions to conduct
operations from these facilities are subject to limitations in
bilateral agreements with host-nations. In addition to providing
critical strategic access, European allies deploy forces worldwide to
support United States-led counter-terrorism operations, including OIR
and Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS), as well as to conduct national
counter-terrorism missions. Allies are committed to this fight, and
their support is essential to our ongoing counter-terrorism efforts.
Deterring Russia and defeating violent extremist organizations
constitute USEUCOM's two main priorities. Supporting these main
efforts, within the NATO alliance and throughout the AOR, we are
working to strengthen strategic relationships, bolster regional
security, and reinforce a free and open international order.
NATO
NATO allies are adapting to new strategic realities, recognizing
their need to remain fit for purpose. They are making significant gains
in meeting their security commitments and implementing decisions made
at the 2014 Wales and 2016 Warsaw Summits. Latvia, Lithuania, and
Romania have joined the United States, Greece, Poland, Estonia, and the
United Kingdom in meeting NATO's 2 percent defense spending target, and
by 2024, 15 allies are expected to reach or exceed the 2 percent
guideline. Additionally, in 2018, 22 NATO members will meet the 20
percent target for defense expenditures devoted to investment in major
equipment and related research and development. We have now seen three
consecutive years of growth among European allies and Canada, adding
approximately $46 billion (USD) to defense.
Another aspect of burden sharing is contributions to operations,
missions, and other activities. Germany, Canada, and the United Kingdom
serve as Framework Nations for NATO enhanced Forward Presence (eFP)
battle groups in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia respectively. The
United Kingdom, Romania, and Croatia contribute forces to the United
States-led eFP battle group in Poland, and Italy is the Framework
Nation for the 2018 NATO Very High Readiness Joint Task Force brigade.
Allies are committing personnel to fill gaps in the Resolute Support
Mission and Kosovo Forces (KFOR). Nations are also adding capabilities
and skills in cyber, joint effects, and asymmetric action to remain
relevant to the changing character of warfare in the new strategic
environment. Allies are also working together to ensure the credibility
and readiness of our nuclear deterrent, which requires continued
commitment and investment.
Given the realities of this strategic environment, the alliance has
undertaken a NATO Command Structure Adaptation (NCS-A) effort. The new
NCS design will account for the complexity stemming from the
interrelation of crises and threats, the emergence of new warfare
domains, the speed and breadth of combat action, and the requirements
for the timely fusion of information and decision-making from the
tactical to strategic levels. Proposed changes include increased
manpower at command headquarters for situational awareness, planning,
and targeting capabilities, a third Joint Force Command focused on the
Atlantic maritime space, and a Joint Support and Enabling Command to
facilitate multi-directional force maneuver and support in conflict.
Combined, the proposed organizations, enablers, and processes will
improve the capability and capacity of the Alliance for vigilance in
peace, responsiveness in crisis, and strategic depth in a large-scale,
multi-domain conflict.
USEUCOM is supporting NATO's augmentations in deterrence and
defense forces. Since April 2017, USEUCOM's 2nd Cavalry Regiment (2CR),
based in Vilseck, Germany, and has fulfilled the United States
commitment as the Framework Nation for the NATO eFP battle group in
Poland. 2CR will hand off the eFP mission in September 2018 to the
278th Armored Cavalry Regiment of the Tennessee Army National Guard. In
the fall of 2017, USEUCOM's 493 Fighter Squadron deployed to Lithuania
to conduct the NATO Baltic Air Policing mission. In addition to
operational deployments, we are contributing to NATO defense and
operational planning in such areas as NATO operational fires,
integrated air and missile defense (IAMD), and hand-over/take-over
between U.S. and NATO headquarters. Finally, USEUCOM support to the
NATO exercise program includes leading the planning for United States
participation in the Trident Juncture 18 exercise in Norway scheduled
for late October 2018. Approximately 30,000 U.S., allied, and partner
nation personnel are expected to participate in Trident Juncture 18.
With the close support of other Geographic and Functional Combatant
Commanders, the Joint Staff, the Services, and the Missile Defense
Agency, USEUCOM and its Service components are augmenting NATO's
Ballistic Missile Defense. The implementation of European Phased
Adaptive Approach (EPAA) Phase 3 will increase NATO's strategic depth.
Recent multi-national deployments in support of Operation Active Fence
in Turkey, and NATO's ongoing development of complementary BMD
capabilities demonstrate clear progress on a combined IAMD
architecture.
To enhance freedom of movement in the European theater, USEUCOM has
formulated a military mobility strategy that will enable United States
and Allied forces to respond to crises at speed. We have leveraged
Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) and Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB)
rotations to refine our understanding of the requirements and timelines
for Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (JRSOI)
of forces deploying into the theater. Through bilateral and
multilateral key leader engagements, we have encouraged our European
allies to address policies and procedures that impede freedom of
movement.
USEUCOM complements its support to NATO with bilateral partnership
and capacity building efforts with allies and partners. In fiscal year
2017, USEUCOM conducted over 2,500 military-to-military engagements,
including over 700 State Partnership Program events in 22 countries,
and under section 1251 authority, USEUCOM trained nine allies in 22
exercises. These activities directly support ongoing United States and
NATO operations, increase interoperability, promote partner nation
integration in the Euro-Atlantic community, and foster relationships
that enhance United States strategic access. Our partnership focus
helps allies and partners in Eastern and Southern Europe meet emerging
security challenges. For example, along with British and German
counterparts, USEUCOM implements the Transatlantic Capability
Enhancement and Training (TACET) initiative, which synchronizes the
contributions of more than a dozen NATO allies in the Baltic states and
Poland across the joint, land, air and maritime domains. Additionally,
with approximately $35 million of fiscal year 2017 section 333 support
and $18 million in fiscal year 2015 State Department Foreign Military
Financing (FMF) support, USEUCOM is launching the Georgia Defense
Readiness Program this spring. The program will augment Georgia's
military readiness and ability to support both national and NATO
missions. Through these and other activities, USEUCOM helps to ensure
that NATO hones its operational edge that allies meet defense
obligations, and that partners are equipped to defend their sovereign
territory.
Ukraine
USEUCOM continues its strong support of Ukraine's efforts to build
its defense capacity to defend itself from Russian aggression.
Following the occupation and illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and
its invasion of eastern Ukraine, Russia has done little to nothing to
implement the commitments it made in the Minsk agreements. Russia
remains satisfied with the status quo in the hope that its multifaceted
effort to destabilize Ukraine will eventually succeed so that Russia
can reassert its sphere of influence. Russia continues to foment the
conflict in eastern Donbas, where it arms, trains, leads, and fights
alongside Russian-led forces. In Crimea, Russia has increased its post-
annexation military posture, forming a new Army Corps with
reconnaissance and coastal defense forces and increasing capabilities.
Despite Russia's destabilizing actions, Ukraine is making progress
toward its goal to achieve NATO interoperability, but much remains to
be done. USEUCOM, working with DOD and the interagency, supports
Ukraine's development of capable, accountable, and transparent
institutions. The Ukrainian Government recognizes its need to develop a
capable, sustainable, professional defense force interoperable with
Euro-Atlantic military structures. Ukraine's defense reforms will
improve its ability to deter and defend against Russian aggression. The
Multinational Joint Commission (MJC) for Defense Reform and Security
Cooperation in Ukraine is the primary vehicle for United States and
allied security assistance. The MJC meets semiannually with
representatives from Ukraine, the United Kingdom, Canada, Lithuania,
Poland, and the United States to identify Ukrainian requirements and
prioritize training, equipment, and advisory initiatives.
USEUCOM support to Ukraine falls into three broad areas. First, we
lead the Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine (JMTG-U) program to
train Ukrainian forces. Under United States Army Europe and Special
Operations Command Europe, the JMTG-U provides individual and
collective training to conventional battalions and special operations
units within Ukraine's Armed Forces. JMTG-U also supervises train-the-
trainer efforts, which will allow Ukraine to assume full training
responsibility by 2020. Second, USEUCOM provides recommendations on the
utilization of security assistance funds to support Ukraine's self-
defense capacity. Since 2014, the United States has provided over $850
million in security assistance to Ukraine through Department of State
and Defense authorities. These funds have provided counter-battery
radar support, medical assistance, communications, command and control,
HMMWVs, night vision devices, and training and advising assistance. The
President recently decided to provide enhanced defensive capabilities
to Ukraine, as part of the United States effort to help Ukraine build
its long-term defense capacity, to defend its sovereignty and
territorial integrity, and to deter further aggression. Third, USEUCOM
supports broader Presidential and Ministerial-level reform activity
directed at Ukraine's defense institutions.
Balkans
In the Balkans, our command directly supports United States efforts
to promote regional stability. USEUCOM is assisting the Kosovo Security
Forces (KSF) with implementing its Security Sector Review
transformation recommendations. Security cooperation activities include
developing English language capability, leadership training, equipment
to support the KSF core competencies in search and rescue, explosive
ordinance disposal and demining, hazardous material response, and fire-
fighting.
USEUCOM also continues to support the United States contribution of
approximately 600 personnel to Kosovo Forces (KFOR). In accordance with
the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, KFOR's mission is
to contribute to the maintenance of a safe and secure environment and
freedom of movement throughout Kosovo for citizens of all ethnicities,
as well as for NATO and EU personnel. KFOR helps ensure conditions
remain conducive for continued EU-facilitated dialogue to normalize
relations between Pristina and Belgrade, while Serbia sees KFOR as a
way to ensure the security of ethnic Serbs in Kosovo. As a nonpartisan,
professional presence, KFOR is essential to the security and stability
of Kosovo and the greater region.
In Bosnia-Herzegovina, our security cooperation activities focus on
assisting the Bosnian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces meet NATO
standards and interoperability goals, while supporting their
aspirations to join the Alliance. Troops from Bosnia-Herzegovina
already support NATO operations, such as the Resolute Support Mission
in Afghanistan.
EUCOM works closely with interagency partners such as the
Departments of Justice, Treasury, Energy, and State to facilitate and
enhance support for democratic institutions and processes in the
Balkans and to counter malign influence. Balkan nations view the United
States as a major supporter of their efforts to develop institutions
and processes that promote the rule of law and strengthen governmental
systems.
Russia is exerting its influence in the Balkans to prevent
individual nations from progressing on a Euro-Atlantic path. We must
assist our NATO Allies in the region as they seek to increase their
resiliency in the face of Russian malign influence. We must also
support our non-NATO partners as they pursue a brighter future as part
of the Euro-Atlantic family of nations.
Turkey
Turkey is a strategically for the United States and NATO, a proven
enabler for combat operations, and a pivotal player in our long-term
competition for a favorable balance of power. USEUCOM actively
participates in several ongoing efforts to explore strategic issues and
find bi-lateral solutions mutually supporting United States and Turkish
interests. Through increased intelligence sharing, continued counter-
terrorism coordination, and regular military-to-military dialogue,
USEUCOM is committed to strengthening the trust between the United
States and Turkey.
Situated within Europe's strategic southeastern security zone,
Turkey is a key stakeholder of regional security, stability, and
access. Turkey provides the United States with proven logistical
support, as demonstrated in Operations Iraqi Freedom, Enduring Freedom,
and now Inherent Resolve. Turkey also supports Operation Atlantic
Resolve and NATO activities in the Black and Mediterranean Seas, while
securing one of the region's most important sea lines of communication
through the Turkish Straits.
A major customer of our defense technology, Turkey has 334 open
foreign military sales (FMS) cases, valued at over $9.9 billion. These
sales are important components of the broad United States-NATO effort
to ensure interoperability of equipment and combined training in
Western tactics, techniques, and procedures.
Turkey's geographic location also puts it at the crossroads of the
theater's two primary security challenges--Russian subversion and the
terrorist threat from ISIS. With instability along its southern border
and more than 3 million Syrian refugees within its borders, Turkey has
been affected by the Syrian war more than any other NATO country.
Meanwhile, Russia benefits from political disputes between Turkey and
NATO allies that it can exploit to undermine trust and unity. In
alignment with the National Defense Strategy's direction to fortify the
Trans-Atlantic alliance, USEUCOM will safeguard and strengthen the
United States-Turkey relationship.
Israel
The United States' commitment to the security of Israel is
unwavering. Our ongoing support and commitment to Israel is focused on
enhanced mil-to-mil cooperation to ensure our Israeli partners maintain
a qualitative military edge. Israel continues to be the largest
recipient of United States foreign aid, and in September 2016, the
United States and Israel signed a new Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
that provides $3.8 billion a year in military assistance over the
fiscal year 2019 to fiscal year 2028 period. As the executor of the
United States-Israel military-to-military relationship, USEUCOM
maintains a robust series of senior leader engagements, constant
coordination, and multiple joint exercises. This bond has assumed
greater significance as the regional security environment has become
increasingly volatile and complex.
the way ahead
USEUCOM is determined to address the diverse challenges in the
European theater by capitalizing on our strengths, building new
capabilities, and leveraging relationships with European allies and
partners. We are working to optimize the force posture of land, air,
maritime, and cyberspace units. We are enhancing the resiliency and
redundancy of our infrastructure network to enable reliable and
flexible response options. We are improving cyberspace security and
operations through joint defense activities with allies and partners.
However, we cannot accomplish our assigned missions without the
continued support of Congress. The resources requested in DOD's fiscal
year 2018 and fiscal year 2019 Budget Requests are needed to implement
the National Defense Strategy, especially to deter, defend, and expand
our competitive space with Russia.
Deterring adversaries is contingent on U.S. Forces retaining a
decisive edge in combat capabilities, agility and flexibility, on our
ability to respond rapidly in a crisis, and on U.S. presence as a
constant reminder of the costs of aggression and miscalculation. United
States force posture in Europe has been augmented by increased
rotational presence, enhanced pre-positioning of equipment, and
military infrastructure improvements. Posturing a combat-credible force
in Europe as called for in the NDS is essential to deterring future
aggressors, preserving stability, and reassuring allies and partners. A
combat-credible force includes a combination of assigned and rotational
combat forces, flexible basing options, and pre-positioned equipment in
the theater.
European Deterrence Initiative (EDI)
USEUCOM's preparedness and agility to respond amidst the
uncertainty posed by the current strategic environment is contingent
upon adequate and predictable resourcing. The European Deterrence
Initiative provides resources that are essential to deterring Russian
aggression while assuring European allies of the United States
commitment to NATO's article 5. These resources, in addition to the
base budget funding that supports USEUCOM, enable our headquarters and
Service components to: 1) increase presence through the use of
rotational forces; 2) increase the depth and breadth of exercises and
training with NATO allies and theater partners; 3) preposition supplies
and equipment to facilitate rapid reinforcement of U.S. and allied
forces; 4) improve infrastructure at key locations to improve our
ability to support steady state and contingency operations; and 5)
build the capacity of allies and partners to contribute to their own
deterrence and defense.
EDI-funded land forces capabilities are resourcing USEUCOM's
requirement for an ABCT presence along with a Division Mission Command
Element and combat support and service support enablers. Coupled with
CAB rotations, integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) enhancements,
ISR initiatives, and eFP support, this increased in-theater presence
across Eastern Europe has fundamentally improved our readiness and
posture.
In the air domain, we leverage EDI to deploy theater security
packages of bombers as well as 4th and 5th generation fighter aircraft
to execute deterrence missions and train with ally and partner nation
air forces. We are building prepositioned kits for the Air Force's
European Contingency Air Operation Sets (ECAOS) and making improvements
to existing Allied airfield infrastructure, which will afford us the
ability to rapidly respond with air power in the event of a
contingency.
In the maritime domain, we are expanding our theater antisubmarine
warfare capabilities both by improving our sensor capabilities as well
as increasing our capability to surge P-8 antisubmarine assets to
critical areas. Additionally, EDI dollars help fund USEUCOM's mission
partner environment, which successfully linked into NATO's federated
mission network during exercise Steadfast Cobalt last year. This was a
significant step in improving interoperability with NATO.
Finally, EDI supports mil-to-mil engagements and exercises that
improve interoperability and build partner capacity. Joint exercise
Saber Guardian 17, a United States Army Europe led event in Hungary,
Romania, and Bulgaria focused on building readiness and improving
interoperability under a unified command and control framework. In
total, nearly 25,000 United States, Ally, and partner nation personnel
from 21 European countries demonstrated the ability to execute the full
range of military missions in the Black Sea Region.
To retain our competitive edge and build on the progress made over
the last few years since the implementation of the European Reassurance
Initiative and EDI, we continue to work within Departmental processes
to meet our posture requirements across warfare domains, with
consistent targets and a long-term view.
Land Forces
We continue to enhance our assigned and rotational land forces to
meet the requirement for an armored division accompanied by critical
enablers, such as a fully sourced combat aviation brigade, long-range
fires, engineers, and sustainment brigades. This armored capability
will be comprised of forward stationed and persistent rotational units
as well as prepositioned stocks and infrastructure that enable us to
rapidly aggregate these capabilities.
Air Forces
USEUCOM requires additional combat and aviation support air assets,
to include prepositioned assets, airfield infrastructure improvements,
and dispersed basing. The fiscal year 2018 and fiscal year 2019 budget
requests have begun the process of funding investments that enable the
rapid reception of fourth and fifth generation fighters, close air
support, bombers, and air mobility aircraft in a contingency. We have
detailed these requirements in our ECAOS concept, funded through the
Administration's EDI request.
Maritime Forces
Additional maritime capabilities are being requested to increase
our lethality in the maritime domain and to counter Russian maritime
capabilities. Similar to the land and air domains, this necessitates
infrastructure improvements to sea ports of debarkation (SPOD) as well
as prepositioning critical naval capabilities such as munitions. The
fiscal year 2019 request also provides additional capability for
antisubmarine warfare (ASW) sensors and platforms such as the P-8s.
Additionally, USEUCOM is working with the Department to increase the
rotational presence of guided missile destroyers, a Carrier Strike
Group, and attack submarines, all of which provide lethal combat power
to deter our adversaries and counter growing threats in the undersea
domain.
Amphibious Forces
USEUCOM has requested enhancements to Marine Corps Prepositioned
Program-Norway to allow the rapid deployment of naval expeditionary
forces. USEUCOM has also asked the Department to assess the role that
an increased Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit (ARG/MEU)
presence could play in the AOR, recognizing that deployments in the
Mediterranean allow for response to threats in three Geographic
Combatant Commands.
Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD)
It is essential that our assigned and rotational multi-domain
forces are protected by a robust, layered IAMD capability. The fiscal
year 2019 budget calls for the development of an IAMD architecture that
begins to address USEUCOM's requirements for capabilities such as those
provide by Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Patriot
batteries. These capabilities will ensure we can effectively maneuver
forces throughout the AOR. Our approach to IAMD must be inclusive with
our NATO allies and key partners as we face a growing ballistic missile
threat from regional adversaries.
C4ISR
C4ISR is a fundamental capability set for the Global Operating
Model articulated by the NDS. To this end, the fiscal year 2019 budget
helps to reverse the long-term reductions in ISR platforms, in manning,
and in processing, exploitation and dissemination (PED) capabilities.
This includes growing our cadre of intelligence linguists and analysts,
adding permanently stationed ISR platforms to the theater, and
expanding our satellite footprint.
USEUCOM's command, control, communications, computers and
intelligence (C4I) networks must also become more resilient and
survivable. More work is needed to ensure the sustainment of operations
and to maintain freedom of maneuver in cyberspace. We are working with
the Services to develop infrastructure that will significantly increase
C4I capability and resilience.
Freedom of Movement
The ability to rapidly surge combat ready forces into and across
the theater is critical to deterring future Russian aggression.
Improving freedom of movement and force maneuver both prior to and
during conflict requires enhancing our logistics infrastructure.
Additional organic logistical assets are being deployed to reduce
reliance on commercial providers, mitigate distribution gaps, and
accelerate steady state operations. We are also increasing our close
coordination among United States agencies, NATO, the EU, and individual
European nations.
If fully funded, and once the necessary access agreements are in
place, the fiscal year 2018 and fiscal year 2019 EDI program requests
will increase freedom of maneuver for the Joint Force by establishing
critical logistical hubs capable of supporting maritime operations in
the North Atlantic and increasing pre-positioned forward stocks of
equipment and munitions. USEUCOM will maximize cost sharing
initiatives, such as the NATO Security Investment Program, and increase
coordination with European nations and commercial entities to further
enhance mobility.
Complex Exercises
A key pillar of our overall deterrence approach is a campaign of
high end, multi-domain exercises. We will continue to coordinate our
Joint Exercise Program with NATO allies and partner nations to enhance
our high-end combat capabilities, promote interoperability, and sustain
strategic access.
Cyber
USEUCOM is expanding its cyber capabilities and integrating cyber
operations into full-spectrum military activities. USEUCOM is focused
on refining cyberspace information sharing tactics, techniques and
procedures. To ensure wartime interoperability, USEUCOM is engaged with
NATO Allies' and partners' logistics and cyberspace experts to develop
a shared framework for cybersecurity.
conclusion
In closing, I want to again thank Congress for its continued
support for USEUCOM--especially for the European Deterrence
Initiative--and for helping us to articulate to the Nation the very
real challenges that the United States and NATO face in the European
theater. Russia is engaged in strategic competition with the United
States, pursuing a strategy that undermines the international order and
erodes U.S. leadership and influence. Violent extremists, also intent
on destroying a Western, rules-based system, remain a significant
threat. Faced with these challenges, we must reestablish our military
competitive advantage and ensure our forces are prepared to address the
challenges of this complex, dynamic, and competitive strategic
environment. The Service members and civilians of USEUCOM stand ready
to do so. We are fully committed to being the agile, lethal, and
resilient force needed to protect and defend the Homeland while
supporting a Europe that is whole, free, and at peace.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, General Scaparrotti. Excellent
statement.
I think we all look at Russia now--and with the new
strategy that we have, we include both China and Russia as the
threats. Of course, in your AOR, it's primarily Russia, and
it's--we've seen the advancements. There was a RAND report that
came out yesterday. There are three things in the RAND report
that I want to refer to. One was: In 2016, Russia spent 5.3
percent of its GDP [Gross Domestic Product] on the military.
It's important, as we look at some of what we are expecting
from our NATO partners, to recognize this. Second thing that
was in that report, Russia has the ability to defeat a NATO
ally and present NATO with a strategic and operational
challenge; specifically, that Russian forces could reach the
capitals of Estonia and Latvia in 60 hours. Third, they say
Russia has approximately 32,000 troops in the Baltics region,
compared to 78,000 for Russia; and the NATO is outnumbered
757--that's Russia--to 129 in NATO, in tanks in the AOR. In
addition to the RAND report that came out, The Army Times
article this morning--says the Army plans on repositioning two
fully modernized armored brigade sets of equipment in Belgium
and Netherlands and, as you said in your opening statement, in
addition to one, I guess, rotational armored brigade combat
team.
So, to set this hearing off, let me ask you a series of
five--these should be yes-or-no questions. However, there's no
such thing as a yes-or-no question in Washington.
First, the National Security Advisor, General McMaster,
stated that United States ground forces are ``outranged,
outgunned, and overmatched by Russian ground forces.'' Do you
agree with that?
General Scaparrotti. Chairman, if you look at it in a
concentrated way, on the border of eastern Europe and only on
the ground force, I would agree with that statement. We----
Senator Inhofe. All right.
General Scaparrotti. We fight multidomain, however.
Senator Inhofe. I understand that.
The report--the RAND report paints a pretty bleak picture
and warns that NATO could be overwhelmed by superior Russian
firepower in a war in eastern Europe. Do you agree with that
statement?
General Scaparrotti. Chairman, would you state that again,
please? I'm----
Senator Inhofe. Yes. The statement that was in the report
says that NATO could be overwhelmed by superior Russian
firepower in a war in eastern Europe.
General Scaparrotti. Chairman, I don't agree with that.
When you look at NATO, writ large, it has the strength of 29
nations. The effort that's being made in NATO, and the one
that's being made here in the United States, is to increase our
capability to deter and, if necessary, defend.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. That's good statement. I'd--I'm not
asking you to agree with this, but I am concerned, when we have
so many reports coming out, that--it's important for the
American people to understand the threats that we do face, not
just here, but in China also.
Then, the other--third thing it said. Do we have adequate
United States forces postured throughout Europe to meet the
challenge? I think you've already answered that.
It says--and then, Russia has developed a ground-launch
cruise missile, in violation of the INF [Intermediate Range
Nuclear Forces] Treaty. Do you agree with that? Yeah, I'm sure
you do.
Lastly, the--like we saw in--2 weeks ago in China, and what
they're doing in the South China Sea--and, as I said in my
opening statement, this is not something that is in your AOR,
but, as we have to meet those challenges--and this was a much
greater challenge than I thought it was before I was over
there, 2 weeks ago--this still would draw off resources from
you and--from your AOR, so it's one you have to be very
sensitive to. So, I would say, how does EUCOM partner with--on
the cybersecurity side--with Cyber Command [CYBERCOM] to
prevent and mitigate threats? That's in cyberthreats now. You
want to talk a little bit about that?
General Scaparrotti. Yes, Chairman.
First of all, in terms of the cyber world, it's
interesting, because we each have cyber centers, we each have
teams committed, through CYBERCOM, to us, but cyber doesn't
have boundaries, like we do between I and General Waldhauser on
the ground. So, I think it's pretty fluid, and CYBERCOM is the
one that helps us, you know, shift resources that might need to
be shifted. Certainly, we share very closely with them any
intelligence that we have, et cetera, that affects their AOR.
So, I think there's a close relationship.
Senator Inhofe. Yeah. Well, this is--and this is the new
threat. This is something that the general public is not very
familiar with.
One last thing I'd want is--you to get on the record--you
know, we have this requirement in NATO for--a 2 percent
requirement. As it is right now, in 2018, the Secretary General
estimates eight of 29 NATO allies will meet this, and then
it'll get up to 15 allies by the end of 2024. Now, right--
recently, there have been a lot of these countries complaining
about this. Are you concerned that some of the European
officials criticize the 2 percent requirement as arbitrary and
unrealistic?
General Scaparrotti. Chairman, I'm concerned. They----
Senator Inhofe. Yeah.
General Scaparrotti.--need to invest in defense. We've
discussed the complexity of this environment, and particularly
in Europe. Of course, we strongly encourage them to meet that 2
percent, but also the 20 percent requirement in modernization
focused at specific capabilities that are relevant to the
environment we're in.
Senator Inhofe. Yeah, that was one of the first things,
when President Trump took office, that he examined, was the
burden-sharing of NATO. I agree with that, too.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General Scaparrotti.
As we all note, Russia has significant conventional power,
and so does NATO, but it--they seem to be focusing their
attention--asymmetric warfare, knowing that a conventional
fight with NATO would probably not be something they could win.
Is that your estimate?
General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir. I think part of their
strategy is, first of all, that, as you look at their doctrine,
they intend to use activities below the level of conflict to
undermine their opponent. If that would go well, they would
undermine their opponent without firing a shot. I would like to
make the statement that I think that, while they have
advantages, even conventionally, due to interior lines,
proximity, and size of force, which was noted by the Chairman,
in the longer run, NATO has great advantages that they actually
recognize and fear.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Getting into the asymmetric warfare, one of the most
disturbing aspects recently is the integration of information
warfare in cyber operations. As you pointed out, cyber has no
real limit. So, again, we've seen quite extensive activity in
Ukraine. But, have you noticed that this--you know, similar
organizations in Russia are concentrating, not just on Ukraine,
but also the United States? Are you beginning to pick up
indications of efforts that are directed against us, you know,
directly?
General Scaparrotti. Chairman, I'll say that I have, that
I've seen activity related to, you know, infrastructure,
reconnaissance, et cetera, within the United States. I'll leave
it at that.
Senator Reed. Fine. Are we, to your knowledge, the
intelligence community and the geographic commanders, kind of
map out the Russian, sort of, cyber infrastructure, the--how
it's delegated to commercial ``enterprises'', how it's
sometimes retained by the intelligence community in Russia, et
cetera? Have we got a good picture of that? Because if we
don't, then, you know, it's hard to respond.
General Scaparrotti. My personal opinion is yes, we're
trying to map that out. We're getting better understanding of
it. I would not characterize it as a good picture at this
point, not satisfactory to me. Thank you.
Senator Reed. Are you getting, not only the resources, but
the clear direction to fill in the missing pieces on your--from
your perspective as well as worldwide?
General Scaparrotti. Yes. I have had my Cyber Operations
Center reinforced substantially. We've made good progress. Over
the next 2 years, thanks to both the funding here in Congress
as well as from CYBERCOM, that will continue to give me the
skills that I need in my cyber center. I also, upon request,
have the authorities that I've asked for with respect to Russia
over the past year to 18 months.
Senator Reed. Every time we get on this topic, very
quickly, the ``whole-of-government response'' comes up. So, how
would you assess our whole-of-government response? You have
CYBERCOM within the chain of command, et cetera, but the
intelligence community, the Treasury Department, Homeland
Security--do you feel there's a unified effort among all these
different agencies, and the State Department, to effectively
confront this threat?
General Scaparrotti. I don't believe there's an effective
unification across the interagency, with the energy and the
focus that we could attain.
Senator Reed. That's something that would--is something we
should do immediately, because--the nature of the threat.
General Scaparrotti. Yes, Senator, it is.
Senator Reed. Just changing slightly, we are--and you are--
constantly trying to assess the strengths, the weaknesses of
the Russian forces, going forward. Not just the Russian forces.
Any sort of top-line sort of estimate of, you know, long-term,
their ability to be competitive with us?
General Scaparrotti. Senator, in this setting, I would say
that, given their modernization and the pace that it's on and
what we are aware of they're doing, we have to maintain our
modernization that we've set out so that we can remain dominant
in the areas that we are dominant today. If we were not to do
that, I think their pace would put us certainly challenged in
almost every domain, in a military perspective, by, say, 2025.
Senator Reed. Just a final question is that--part of this
is significant investments, not just in platforms, but in basic
research, which, during the cold war, they were--and we were--
deeply engaged at a national effort. Are they engaged in this
kind of basic research--quantum computing, AI [Artificial
Intelligence], et cetera--to a significant extent?
General Scaparrotti. Yes, they are.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. General, you did read and study that RAND
report, classified and unclassified, did you not?
General Scaparrotti. Yes, I did.
Senator Wicker. Okay. In that regard, Chairman McCain just
asked Senator Inhofe to read a statement, in which he said
there's a new strategic reality in Europe. General Dunford is
quoted as saying the United States is losing some of our past
edge. You have the report from RAND, which none of us enjoyed
listening to or studying, where it said we--there are plausible
scenarios where the United States can lose a war with Russia.
What--in that regard, what have--did we learn from the Russian
Zapad exercises--wargame exercises in eastern Europe in late
2017 regarding their intentions and capabilities? How well
prepared are we, based on what we've learned there? Then I want
to ask you to respond generally about where you think the RAND
report is missing the mark and where you think they're
accurate.
General Scaparrotti. Senator, with regard to Zapad, for the
most part what Zapad did is reinforce what we believed was
their direction, in terms of their doctrine, their training,
their modernization. They focused on command and control,
strategic to tactical. We saw that throughout the exercise.
They focused on both conventional and nuclear, which we
expected. They focused on both offensive/defensive operations,
and they incorporated what I would call a whole-of-society
approach. They mobilized their people, et cetera, in some
aspects of this. For us, it was a reinforcement of the doctrine
that we've seen developing over the last, I'd say, 10 years.
From that--I mean, we learn from watching, and it helps us
posture our force and train our force, and also, you know, the
development of our plans, obviously. We take that very
seriously, watch it very closely. We had a focused effort to do
so. We'll employ it, and we'll be better as a result of that
focused effort in their exercise.
Senator Wicker. So, you were informed, but we weren't
shocked by anything we saw----
General Scaparrotti. I was not. I was not shocked by
anything that I saw.
With respect to the RAND report, we have worked with RAND
on this. In fact, it was 2014 or 2015 when the base report was
done. From the basis of the report, I don't have any argument
with the basis of the report and the threat that we have,
particularly in the eastern borders, with what it's focused on.
That report was also a basis from which we've developed our war
planning in EUCOM. Since 2014, we've come a good ways, both in
planning and with the posture of our forces there. That
report's been helpful in that regard. I would----
Senator Wicker. Did you plan, assuming that sequestration
was going to be lifted, as it has now been?
General Scaparrotti. We planned with--for what we need,
Senator, yes. Having said that, I would--the budget that we
have before us today, with a 2-year look, as well, that
Congress has agreed to, funds all of those areas that I need in
EUCOM to get my posture and my capabilities where it needs to
be throughout the FYDP [Future Years Defense Program]. So, it's
an important one.
The last point I'll make on this is, is that we have
repostured forces since the RAND study was done. We've
rewritten plans since that. We would fight this differently
than RAND fought it--fought that--you know, that experiment or
that exercise that they did. But, there's elements of that that
are still, you know, true today. Hence, my comment that I don't
have all the forces I need in Europe today, and we've got to
continue to invest and establish the posture that's required.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Based on what we're going to do the
23rd of this month regarding this fiscal year and the next
fiscal year, how are you going to get the forces you need?
General Scaparrotti. The European Deterrence Initiative is
a very foundational funding of the forces that I need. It is
actually supporting the rotational forces that I noted in my
opening statement. My intent is, is to use that as well to
begin to station or rotate additional forces, particularly
enablers that I need. As you look across the FYDP, I can build
the posture that I believe I need, given the funding that I
foresee within the FYDP.
Senator Wicker. Just quickly, that's what number of troops
today versus what you hope to get to?
General Scaparrotti. Well, I can't--it's difficult to give
you the number of troops. I can take this for the record, and I
can provide you, by service, the posture that I believe that we
should be in.
[The information referred to follows:]
[Deleted.]
Senator Wicker. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Scaparrotti, thank you for being here and for your
testimony.
As we look at the potential for future Russian aggression
in Europe, how important is it for them to feel some heat for
what they're doing and to have that whole-of-government
approach to respond to their activities? So, for example, how
important would it be for us to go ahead and implement the
sanctions on their CAATSA [Countering America's Adversaries
Through Sanctions Act] so they understand that, if they
continue their cyber intrusions, that there's going to be a
price to pay?
General Scaparrotti. Senator, I think fundamental to
deterrence is either, you know, denial or an imposition of
costs. So, an effective deterrent has to have one of those
elements, or both, and it should have a communication aspect to
it, as well, that demonstrates both our capability and our
will.
Senator Shaheen. Do you--as you talk about that whole-of-
government approach that you don't see happening right now, do
you think that would accomplish a piece of the deterrence?
General Scaparrotti. Well, I think--yes. You mentioned
CAATSA. I think, across the board--I don't necessarily ascribe
that we should always do what they do. We shouldn't mirror
them. But even----
Senator Shaheen. Sure.
General Scaparrotti.--that underscores the importance of a
whole-of-government approach, that we ought to use our other
elements of power, as well, together to demonstrate deterrence
and also to establish limits on what's acceptable.
Senator Shaheen. As you look at the potential for mischief
in the future in other parts of Europe, where do you see the--
where are you most concerned about future Russian interference?
General Scaparrotti. They're involved in just about every
aspect of Europe, in one way or the other. The area that I'm
concerned about today is the Balkans, actually. It's an area
that, through the international community's work, and the
United States in particular, we've been able to keep stability
there, we've been able to work on democratic governments, and
to reinforce that. But, Russia's at work in the Balkans, and I
think that we've kind of taken our eye off the area. It's an
area where, in terms of diplomacy, we have to put some focus,
in my opinion, and we have to continue our security reform and
our capability-building that we and the international
community's engaged in, in the Balkans. That's an area that we
could have problems with again here in the future.
Senator Shaheen. How--you mentioned our diplomatic
efforts--how important is it that we have those robust
diplomatic and economic efforts there in the Balkans?
General Scaparrotti. I think it's essential. They view that
diplomatic effort and presence, frankly--the people see that
as--that's one way that they determine whether the West is
serious about their desire to be a part of the West. That
involvement, I think, is fundamental.
Senator Shaheen. One of the things that some of our
European allies in NATO have suggested is that, rather than
looking at sort of an arbitrary 2 percent of GDP contribution
to NATO, that we ought to be looking at capabilities instead.
In view of some of the recent reports about the readiness of
some of our NATO allies, how good an argument do you think that
is as we think about what may be a better way to determine
whether our allies are making the contribution that we really
want to see to NATO?
General Scaparrotti. Senator, I agree there's other ways.
In other words, it's commonly called the ``three C's in NATO.''
Cash is one, at 2 percent. Contribution is one of those, and
capabilities. But, I would tell you, I think it's all three.
It's not one or the other, or more of one and less of the other
two. Two percent's a reasonable percent of GDP, given the
threat that we're under today, in my opinion. But, you have to
look at, also, their contributions and their capabilities.
There are some of the countries that aren't at 2 percent today,
but their contributions to NATO missions and also other
international missions is quite robust. That should be taken
into account.
Then last is the capabilities they provide. Are they using
the money in their defense to develop capabilities that are
interoperable and in sync with our NATO planning? That's
important, too, in order to have a strong NATO defense and
deterrence structure.
Senator Shaheen. How worried should we be about some of
those reports that have suggested that some of our NATO
allies--some of the bigger NATO allies are not prepared as they
should be?
General Scaparrotti. I think we should continue to press
them to meet the standards. NATO has very well laid out
standards and expectations of the forces that nations provide.
We should continue to press them to be a part of this defense.
The alliance is strong as long as every member is strong and
does their part.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Several references have been made to the report--the RAND
report that just came out. I ask unanimous consent to be made a
part of the record.
Without objection, so ordered.
[The information referred to follows:]
Please refer to Appendix A.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Cotton.
Senator Cotton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General Scaparrotti, for joining us once again.
I'd like to continue the conversation about the Balkans
that you started with Senator Shaheen. Many people tend to
focus on the Baltics, since they are NATO countries
exclusively, but I think that NATO status probably makes them a
bit more stable, in terms of the threat Russia poses, than the
Balkans, in which there are numerous countries that don't
belong to NATO. Could you be more specific and say a little bit
more about which countries in the Balkans are matters of
concern for you, in terms of Russian meddling and interference?
General Scaparrotti. Well, I think Serbia, in particular,
there's a connection----
Senator Cotton. Serbia proper or----
General Scaparrotti. Serbia----
Senator Cotton.--Republic of----
General Scaparrotti. Well, I would tell you that it's
Serbia, as a nation, but then the Serb population, as well,
within the Balkans. There is obviously a historical connection
there, an affiliation, and--but there is also a--because of
that, a better opportunity for Russian influence. They take
advantage of that, in terms of disinformation, influence upon
those populations, a spoiling effect, in some cases, perhaps
with Serbia with respect to Kosovo or within the tripartite
government of Bosnia Herzegovina. That's my concern. I've seen
an increase in that, I believe, in the year and a half that
I've been in this job.
Senator Cotton. Last year, the Senate ratified the
Montenegro Accession Treaty to have Montenegro join NATO.
Obviously, that was an important part of our strategy to close
the Adriatic coast. They were the last piece of that. How has
Montenegro's integration into NATO gone since they had their
accession?
General Scaparrotti. It's going very well. I've visited the
country, spent time with their Chief of Defense. A small nation
as a part of NATO at this point, but active in providing troops
for our missions, focused on their military capabilities, and
beginning to grow those and make them better. I think they're
going to be a valued member, here, as they move on. They are a
valued member, but I think they'll continue to increase in
strength.
Having said all of that, they're not out of the woods with
respect to Russian interference in their government, influence
and attempted influence in their government, which you know was
very severe just short of their application to NATO.
Senator Cotton. I was in the Balkans last August, and I
heard some of these points, as well. One other thing we heard,
and some of the things we witnessed, there was not just Russian
influence in the Balkans, but also Turkish influence, sometimes
not for the good. Could you say a little bit about what Turkey
is up to in the Balkans?
General Scaparrotti. Turkey primarily enters most of these
countries in Balkans with a humanitarian approach and to assist
in that regard. There are some that have said this influence
isn't helpful, as you've said, in the ways that they operate.
But, I haven't personally seen that, myself. I'd--if I could,
I'd take this for the record, and I'll give you a little more
concrete and accurate----
Senator Cotton. Sure.
General Scaparrotti.--response.
Senator Cotton. Sure thing.
[The information referred to follows:]
Turkey maintains bilateral relationships with several Balkan
countries and has especially strong defense relationships with Albania,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo. Turkish engagement is often based on
historical and religious ties, which date to the Ottoman period. In the
wake of the July 2016 coup attempt in Turkey, we have observed
increased Turkish pressure on Balkan countries to close schools and
charities tied to the Gulen Movement. However, in general, Turkey's
engagement objectives in the region align with EUCOM goals. Like other
mature NATO Allies, Turkey mentors Balkan militaries through exercises,
professional military education opportunities, and provides grant
assistance to purchase military equipment from Turkish industry
sources. Additionally, Turkey has supported NATO activities in the
Balkans since the 1990s, including SFOR and KFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina
and Kosovo. Turkey currently has approximately 290 troops serving in
KFOR and two to three staff officers at NATO Headquarters Sarajevo,
along with approximately 250 troops at the European Union Mission in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. To the extent that these activities build the
capacity of Balkan nations, we believe they help strengthen the NATO
Alliance.
Senator Cotton. While we're on the topic of Turkey, there
have been reports that Turkey may be on the verge of acquiring
the Russian S-400 air defense system. That quite possibly could
trigger sanctions under CAATSA, a law that Congress passed last
year. Could you give your thoughts on what Turkey is thinking
in buying a Russian system, especially now that CAATSA is on
the books here and might target those kind of sanctions against
a NATO partner?
General Scaparrotti. The--you know, they've stated publicly
that they intend to purchase and they've made a deal with
Russia to employ the S-400 as an--as their air defense system.
I've had this discussion with their Chief of Defense multiple
times, and we continue to discuss it.
If they were to employ this system, they obviously are
interoperable with the NATO systems and the U.S. ones, and they
couldn't be connected to the system. They're aware of that
ramification. We've made--not only myself, but other members of
our government, have made them clearly aware of the other
ramifications of moving forward with a purchase of the S-400.
So, they're aware of that.
The last thing I'll say is, is that we're in a close
discussion with Turkey with respect to air defense measures and
the systems they could employ. I don't think that's a finished
deal yet. I mean, I think that they are talking to us, as well
as others, to purchase a system that's interoperable in NATO. I
think we have some time. My intent's to continue to work that
aspect, to convince them that the better system is, in fact,
one of the NATO interoperable systems.
Senator Cotton. Good. Thank you, General.
My time has expired.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Hirono.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General Scaparrotti. Good to see you again.
You were talking about the modernization--Russia's military
modernization. Our big power competitors are Russia and China.
Do you have, in terms of the scope and scale of Russian
modernization, as compared to China's modernization, is China's
modernization efforts many times more than Russia's
modernization efforts?
General Scaparrotti. Senator, if I could, I would say this,
and I'd like to take that for the record, as well, so I could
think about this a bit in comparison.
[The information referred to follows:]
Russia and China pose an enduring threat to United States and
Allied interests. There are similarities in each country's military
modernization programs and in our understanding of their approaches to
conflict. Both are developing precision kinetic and non-kinetic
capabilities capable of achieving strategic effects in all domains--
ground, air, sea, space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic. They are both
developing asymmetric capabilities and strategies most likely to
exploit perceived vulnerabilities in U.S. and U.S.-led military
coalition capabilities, and which could be used to challenge United
States force projection. Russian military modernization will support
its posture to readily apply military force in response to crises--
directly or indirectly--across the extent of Eurasia as well as advance
its interests over the long term in Europe, the Arctic, the Middle
East, Central Asia, and parts of East Asia. Both countries will
continue to develop capabilities to sufficiently pursue their interests
at the expense of our own for the foreseeable future.
Russia and China are developing formidable space and cyberspace
capabilities which will extend their reach and allow them to challenge
United States dominated space-enabled warfare capability. Russia and
China continue to develop nuclear or conventional cruise missiles
capable of striking CONUS and United States assets across the globe.
Both Russia and China are reestablishing and refining their
capabilities to conduct long duration blue water operations in an
expanding sphere of naval influence, and potential threats to United
States and allied interests in multiple theaters.
Russia's operational experience in Syria has provided opportunities
to conduct testing of precision strike, indirect fires, air defense and
special operations. Russia has demonstrated the ability to conduct
limited expeditionary operations for the first time in decades. Russia
gained similar operational experience--direct and indirect--during
their illegal annexation of Crimea and its on-going involvement in
Ukraine. These scenarios have helped them develop tactics, techniques
and procedures, gain valuable military training, and in turn drive
defense acquisition program priorities.
China continues to develop precision strike capabilities which
enable them to militarily compete and potentially win in its theater of
influence. China's continued development of military outposts,
including artificial islands, furthers their goals of projecting
sovereignty in the South China Sea. These outposts not only allow China
to contest United States access in the event of a conflict, but allow
China to forcefully claim natural resource rights in these areas,
including fishing rights and hydrocarbon exploration.
While China maintains a stronger economic standing, the continued
integration of Chinese and Russian strategic interests emboldens their
developing bilateral relationship. This potentially compounds the
threat to U.S. and allied interests. Russia and China are developing
multiple trade, development, and security agreements. Further military
integration and training could probably be propelled by shared, but
unequal, economic stimulus. Plans to develop central Asian markets will
also invigorate both economies in the long term. Progressive
collaboration will decrease vulnerability of either nation to western
trade sanctions, eroding the ability of the west to check and limit
hostile actions through political means. China's projected military
investment for 2018 is approximately $175 billion dollars, compared to
$65 billion for Russia. Hydrocarbon revenues account for nearly half of
Russia's budget, and its economic growth in recent years has been
strained by depressed oil prices, trade restrictions, and sanctions.
Conversely, China's diverse, export-based economy returned an average
of nearly 10 percent growth rates for almost four decades. Lastly,
there are limits to the extent to which the two rivals will become
``partners'' neither of which desiring it to be the ``junior'' partner.
General Scaparrotti. But, generally, having been in the
Pacific, the ways in which they're modernizing, particularly
with respect to their capabilities, their weapon systems, the
domains that they're focused on--maritime, et cetera--there's a
lot of similarity in terms of where they're focused. And so,
you know, Admiral [Harry] Harris and I, when you look at what
we're focused on for either research and development or
modernization or pacing in our forces, they very closely align.
From that perspective, I think there's a--there are common
areas there. But, again, I can be more specific, with a little
bit of time to make a very specific comparison across domains.
Senator Hirono. Well, that is not to say, of course, that
that kind of comparison should lead us to take our eyes off
either country.
One of your main priorities is to deter Russia. You noted
that they use activities below the line of what they--of what
might cause us to respond in some clear way. One of the ways
that--one of the activities that they use is to interfere with
our elections, using social media, cyber, et cetera. You would
consider that one of the ways that they are using to undermine
our country, in that we need a whole-of-government approach to
counter what Russia is doing with our elections.
General Scaparrotti. Yes, Senator, I do. You see it in
Europe, as well. They've been involved in----
Senator Hirono. Yes.
General Scaparrotti.--in elections in Europe, and the
influence of political parties in Europe, as well.
Senator Hirono. That was going to be my next question. Have
we learned any lessons from Russian interference with European
elections that would enable us to counter what they are
continuing to do in our country?
General Scaparrotti. I think we've learned from each other.
I would put it that way. We helped French and--France and
Germany as they approached their elections, based on what
occurred here. As they've gone through it, we've exchanged that
information. As a result, we've got a better idea of the
Russians' approach, the capabilities that they use, and how
they use it. That's all improving our ability to, you know,
defend the sanctity and the sovereignty of our election
systems.
Senator Hirono. All well and good, but previous testimony
from the--Director Coats and others, I think, is pretty clear
that we do not have a whole-of-government strategy at this
point to counter Russian interference with our elections. Are
you part of the efforts on our country's part to come up with a
whole-of-government strategy? Have they come to you? The
executive branch.
General Scaparrotti. I would--with respect to our
elections, that's not really within my portfolio as the EUCOM
Commander. That is at CYBERCOM, OSD [Office of the Secretary of
Defense], Joint Staff level. If there's a specific area that I
would be involved in, they would bring me into that. We have
connections, we have discussions on cyber operations,
information operations, et cetera, frequently. But, it wouldn't
be one that I am directly involved in.
Senator Hirono. No, there doesn't seem to be any one agency
that is taking the lead on this, and that is a cause of concern
for many of us.
Let me turn to another subject. Many times, that it will
require a whole-of-government approach for us to maintain our
position, let's say, in the world. Concerns with the
administration's cuts to the State Department and Treasury,
along with the effects that these cuts would have on foreign
diplomacy, which you have already noted as really important,
can you talk a little bit about the effects of these cuts to
State Department and Treasury personnel on your mission?
General Scaparrotti. Yes. I can't speak to the cuts,
themselves, and how that impacts inside of State. That's best
to go to them. But, I will say this, that everything we do in
EUCOM, we look at it as an interagency activity, generally with
State in the lead, as diplomacy leads from our--is the way that
we work here in a democracy. Everything I do, we look at from a
whole-of-government approach. We look at it, usually, with one
of the other agencies in the lead in most of what we do in
Europe. In each country, my--you know, my first goal is to
ensure--or our objective, I should say--is that we support the
Ambassador and the Ambassador's country team and their efforts
within that country. So, a reduction----
Senator Hirono. Yeah.
General Scaparrotti.--of their abilities would not be
positive.
Senator Hirono. Thank you. Including a 26 percent cut to
the State Department and the departure of many senior
personnel.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Ernst.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
General Scaparrotti, thank you so much for your service and
your willingness to come in front of us and give us important
updates today.
As the U.S. is turning its focus to great powers and near-
peer threats, it is important for us to consider ways that we
can best leverage our resources. One way that the United States
has begun doing this is by putting into place the Army's new
Security Force Assistance Battalions, or the SFAB, that's
located at Fort Benning. We are currently leveraging the SFAB
in the Middle East, in Afghanistan. Perhaps this unit, with its
unique capabilities in the train-advise-and-assist areas, could
be used to take stress off of our special operators, especially
in EUCOM. Could EUCOM benefit from those capabilities? If so,
where could you see us using the SFABs in EUCOM?
General Scaparrotti. Well, first of all, it's not
necessarily in EUCOM, but I'll respond, given that I'm also the
SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander Europe], and United States is
a part of Resolute Support, you know, the mission within
Afghanistan, which is where they're deploying the SFABs. I was
just in Afghanistan last weekend. This is going to be a great
boost to the mission there, because they're trained
specifically for train, advise, and assist. They're organized
for that. They're prepared for the mission in the place that
they're going to. That's what we need in Afghanistan. We need
to focus on train, advise, and assist to continue to build the
capability of their force. I'm fully supportive of this, and I
think it is an efficient use of resources and also helps us to
maintain the readiness of our Army units as an--as a fighting
force, in terms of those other brigades, as opposed to pulling
one apart to do the SFAB job.
Within Europe, there's a time and place. There's two ways.
We do capability development throughout Europe with our allies
and our partners. There may be an application there as we get
into a focused training effort, like we do in Ukraine, for
instance, or in a projecting-stability type of effort, where we
assist in some countries in Northern Africa, perhaps, in order
to build their capability and prevent destabilization.
Those are just a couple of quick ideas. But, I think having
that force, there's certainly plenty of opportunity when it
comes to strengthening our partners and using a force like
that.
Senator Ernst. Right. Well, I agree, and I'm excited to see
how their deployment goes in Afghanistan, and how we can
utilize their--the adeptness of that type of unit in other
cultural situations, as well. As we look to Europe and what we
see going on in Ukraine, it might be another opportunity for
our SFABs to excel. I appreciate your feedback there.
Now, we know that Russia--that's the topic, it seems, this
morning--but, the malign activity across the EUCOM AOR is, of
course, extremely concerning. I think you've seen that
demonstrated from all of us here, sitting with you today.
Whether it's the illegal presence in Crimea, whether it is
their information operations, their gray zone activities, we've
talked about a lot of that today--violations of the INF
Treaty--we need to bolster our posture in their destabilizing
actions. We need to push against that. So, the DOD's budget
request for fiscal year 2019 is $2 billion--or a near-2-
billion-dollar increase for the European Deterrence Initiative.
If it weren't for that funding provided by the EDI, do you
think that EUCOM could fully perform its mission to deter and,
if necessary, defeat aggression in Europe? What if we no longer
had those dollars?
General Scaparrotti. Senator, I could not do my mission
without the EDI and the increase. That--as I have said, it not
only continues what I have today, what we've built, but,
through the FYDP, this is what's going to establish the full
posture that we need, in conjunction with our allies.
Senator Ernst. If you had one dollar more, where would you
spend it?
General Scaparrotti. Well, that's--I would probably go--if
you look at where we need to continue development, I would most
likely start at C4ISR [Command, Control, Communications,
Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance],
because our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance is
so important to me, particularly when you don't have the
posture you want. You've got to be able to get ahead of and be
able to predict what your posture needs to be. That's probably
the area that I'd put my next dollar into, if it were up to me.
Senator Ernst. That is exceptional, because I think we hear
from many of our other commanders, as well, that ISR
[Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance] is in high, high
demand. Thank you very much, General.
Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Senator Peters.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, thank you for being here again today, and thank
you for your service, as always.
General, how would you define the term ``political
warfare''?
General Scaparrotti. Political warfare. Well, I think it
would be the attack or efforts to spoil policy or politics
within a government. That could, you know, cover a range of its
governmental activities, its individual agencies, its policy,
and its values.
Senator Peters. That's certainly been an element of
strategy for--since the beginning of warfare, just different
types of technologies. However, in today's digital domain,
that--the ability to use political warfare is leveraged
dramatically. I think most observers see that that's going to
be a major part of conflict, going forward. It's a part of
conflict that we're seeing right now with Russians.
I had the opportunity, when I was in Latvia and Lithuania
recently, to be there for Saber Strike, an exercise that went
on with a number of countries. I had the chance to visit
STRATCOM [United States Strategic Command]. That was dealing
with communications that were coming from the Russians that
were really about--were really--in my mind, were kind of the
classic definition of political warfare, to sow confusion, to
create distrust. In fact, some of the communications that I saw
were put out by Russians on social media, that the Americans
had dropped a bomb on a farmhouse or a store, some sort of
civilian building, and that the Americans simply can't be
trusted, because, when they're in your country, bad things
happen. I'm sure there are other examples. Could you give us a
sense of the types of things that the Russians are doing on a
regular basis that interfere with NATO's ability to have the
trust and confidence of the citizens of those countries?
General Scaparrotti. Yeah, thank you.
I would just tell you that the kinds of things you
described that you saw there is not uncommon throughout
particularly the east, but even into the depth of Europe.
Typically, when you look at their disinformation, their social
media, it is generally targeted at the undermining of Western
values, the confidence in that government, confidence in their
governmental leaders, almost always subtly just hedging away at
that. Because of today's capabilities and information, where
they can use a multiple--multiple platforms and generate great
volume, it can really undermine a nation. Because all they have
to do is just sow some confusion, primarily, sow enough
confusion that there's distrust in the government. It's not an
uncommon thing to see.
Senator Peters. Yeah. In fact, it's going on constantly, is
it not?
General Scaparrotti. It is. It's subtle, but it's--it is
constant. It is at greater volume in the countries in the east
than it is, perhaps, in the south/southwest of Europe.
Senator Peters. When I use the term ``political warfare,''
this--they are engaged in political warfare with the West,
generally, as a result of these activities, in trying to sow
this distrust, which undermines any of the--the fundamental
basis of democracy is, the people have trust in their
government and their ability to effect the changes in that
government. If you sow distrust, it undermines it. I--what--we
have to combat this. Obviously, this is something--we have to
understand the Russians are not our friends, they're engaged in
these activities, not just in the United States, but all across
Europe and other parts of the world. What would be the role
for--in your mind, as--in your capacity, for U.S. versus our
allies, and the role of government operations versus what the
private sector should be expected to do in civil society,
generally? How do we grapple with this?
General Scaparrotti. Well, I think one way is, is that--we,
in the military, reinforce all of these civilian agencies and
capabilities, to include national media, et cetera. We have to
continue to focus on the values and--you know, the values that
democracies profess--democratic institutions, international
rule of law. That's a very high-level, general statement. But,
we've kind of left that. Western democracies have kind of
assumed that our people understood what was important about a
democracy and the way that we live. We've got to reinforce
that. It needs to be done across all the different levers that
we can do it. That takes focus, and it takes volume. It takes
information volume to do that.
Senator Peters. Do you believe that we should actively
engage some of the major tech platforms to be part of the
solution, and to be more active in this space than they are
now?
General Scaparrotti. Yes, I do. On our side, in conjunction
with NATO and the other nations, we're actually employing our
capabilities to get our messages out, at volume.
Senator Peters. Great. Thank you, General.
General Scaparrotti. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Tillis.
Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
General Scaparrotti, it's good to see you again. Thank you
for the time that you spent in my office, and also being at the
official launch of the NATO--the Senate NATO Observer Group. I
appreciate all the work you're doing, and Ambassador
Hutchinson. We look forward, with Senator Shaheen, in getting
more engaged as we continue the rollout.
I want to probably talk about something you would have
anticipated today, and it has to do with trade. We know that--
the discussions around the tariffs, we know that China is a bad
actor, and that there legitimate, I think, national defense
concerns there. But, the way that the tariffs get implemented,
it could sweep in even some of our NATO allies if we don't get
it right. I know this is a fairly new discussion, but I was
wondering if, in your role, you have heard any of the
discussions among some of our allies about concerns with how
that gets rolled out.
General Scaparrotti. Senator, actually, I haven't, at this
point, because I was back in the States here for meetings and
then hearings. As this has been a topic in the news and
discussion, I've actually been in the States.
Senator Tillis. Well, would the--it would be very
interesting. Maybe we can get a readout once you get back over
there, because, since these tariffs are moving forward on the
basis of national defense concerns, it would seem to me that
that will probably weigh into the discussion.
The other reason--I'd be very interested in the feedback. I
won't press you more on the question. But, I know that we're
making great progress on our NATO partners' contributions as a
percentage of GDP. A part of what's going to help sustain that
upward trend is going to be good economic performance in those
nations. If they start seeing a dip in their economy, then my
guess is, this is one area where they may look at and move
their continuing contribution to the right as they move up to
the 2 percent target. I think it's very important for us to get
feedback, and have that feedback get back to the administration
so that, when they tailor it, they do it in a way that's not
disruptive to the chemistry and the relationship that we have
with our partners. I'd appreciate getting that feedback.
The other question I have, How would you grade the mood of
our NATO allies and their sense that the U.S. is absolutely
committed to moving forward and building on the partnership?
Strong?
General Scaparrotti. Yes, I'd say it's strong. What they
see is investments like EDI, 5 to 6 billion dollars, and then
the presence of our troops. That's a strong statement.
Senator Tillis. Could you talk a little bit about the--I
think some people believe that--this is for the benefit of the
public--when you're trying to get to that 2 percent margin,
it's not like it's going into some NATO account, being spent on
the new building and all the other things there. Can you talk
about the inherent capabilities and the readiness, the benefits
to the nations themselves, by virtue of upping that--their
investment as a NATO partner?
General Scaparrotti. Well, roger. First of all, we live in
an environment today that's changed dramatically in the last
even 5 years, but certainly 10, in terms of the threats that we
have in the environment--European--the Euro-Atlantic
environment. So, they need a force that's relevant to that. The
force that they had 5 years ago, that we had 5 years ago, is
not fully relevant. Take the cyber domain, for instance, as
just one example. The increase in precision weaponry, in the
types of weaponry, is another. So, to secure their population,
their own sovereignty, which is a requirement of article 3 and
4, and also to have the benefit of article 5, they have to
invest in this, and they have to have a force that's relevant.
It's to--it's for their own population's security and good, but
it's also for us, as an alliance, the good of the NATO
alliance.
NATO alliance secures 50 percent of the GDP of the--you
know, of our nations and theirs in the Euro-Atlantic alone.
When you talk about prosperity, the increasing--their
increasing economy, which it is improving right now, I think
that security in NATO's foundational security is a part of
that.
Senator Tillis. Well, thank you. Just in closing, when you
get back and you get an opportunity--it may be that nobody's
talking about the looming concern over the--what the President
described may be a trade war. I'd be very interested in seeing
if that is having any sort of an effect on the relationships
that you're most concerned with.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Senator Warren.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General, for meeting with me last week, and
thank you for your service.
Now, Russia continues to actively work to meddle in
countries along its border and undermine unity within the NATO
alliance. They do it through cyberattacks, they spread
disinformation, they spread false stories through social media,
they foment institutional corruption and use a lot of other
manipulative measures. One of the countries in your area of
responsibility is Sweden, which is not a member of NATO, but
which did conduct major military exercises with the NATO troops
last year. Sweden has a general election coming up in
September, and I understand that they are taking preemptive
steps to deter Russian interference.
General, without divulging classified information, can you
talk just a little bit about how you're working with Sweden and
other countries in your area of responsibility to deter this
kind of Russian information warfare, and what you've learned
that we might apply here in the United States?
General Scaparrotti. First of all, I'd say that Sweden is
one of those countries that I think's more advanced in this, in
terms of just my--that's a personal opinion, looking at the
nations throughout Europe, in terms of their willingness to
take it on. One of their techniques is, they're very open about
an attack, they publicize it, they push back against it.
They're, I think, very forward-leaning with respect to their
population and the education and how to question information
that they get, broadly, and ensure they know the source, et
cetera.
With respect to Sweden, they're a very close partner, a
great partner within Europe, both as a partner to NATO, but
also with the United States. We work with them and several of
the other Nordic countries together in a routine conference in
order to look at ways that we can strengthen our defense and
also conduct training that's helpful to all of us.
Senator Warren. Good. I think that's really helpful.
Whether it's Sweden or the United States or a whole lot of
other countries, Russia is hellbent on undermining democracy.
Putin and his online trolls are not going away, and we face a
choice. We can sit on our hands and let the Russians interfere
in our elections, or we can be proactive and work with our
allies to deter Russia and Russia's information warfare.
Now, there's one other topic I want to ask you about, and
that is, last year I asked you about your support from the
State Department, and you told me that you believe our military
and diplomatic agencies need to work together to confront
threats to our security and threats to our allies. I
understand, from your comments to Senator Hirono, that it's
safe to assume you haven't changed your position on that. Is
that fair?
General Scaparrotti. That's correct.
Senator Warren. Good. I thought so. I want to explore one
aspect of how this works, in practice. In order to have robust
diplomacy, we need to have the personnel to carry it out. Out
of the countries in your area of responsibility as the head of
European Command, the United States currently does not have a
confirmed Ambassador or even an official nominee for six of
them: Belarus, Belgium, Iceland, Ireland, Sweden, and Turkey.
General, as an operational commander, do these diplomatic
vacancies concern you as you carry out your mission? If so,
why?
General Scaparrotti. Yes, Senator, it does concern me.
There's other organizations that have an Ambassador that don't
have them, as well, yet, beyond the number you've given. The
country teams, for instance, in the Embassies, have great
staffs, and we work very closely with them. But, the Ambassador
is a key individual appointed by the government, recognized by
their government as the Ambassador. We need to fill those in
each one of these countries, particularly in a country, for
instance, where--Turkey, today, where we don't have an
Ambassador now and we are in very sensitive discussions in
order to continue to reinforce and strengthen, you know, our
relationship with a key NATO ally.
Senator Warren. Yeah.
General Scaparrotti. The Ambassador's position is key.
Senator Warren. Thank you. Thank you very much, General. We
need to have both a strong military and a fully staffed State
Department to best defend America and its allies. We can't do
that with empty ambassadorial posts and vacant positions
throughout the State Department and around the world. The Trump
administration's failure to fill major diplomatic posts has
damaged our diplomatic readiness, and that makes our military's
job harder.
Thank you. Thank you, General.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Sasse.
Senator Sasse. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, thank you for being here. Thanks for your
generosity with your time the last few weeks as you've been
in--back in the U.S. A bunch of us have a lot of respect for
you and appreciate the tutorials you've given us.
I think you said, earlier--you said it in your written
statement, and I think you also said earlier, in response to a
question, that Russia is now employing a broad menu of tactics
and tools to manipulate and destabilize lots of nations, and to
manipulate and distort public information in a lot of the
nations in your areas of responsibility. I think, at one point,
you also said that a lot of their tactics are just short of
war. Could you unpack what the line is in information warfare
between just short of war and being at actual cyber war?
General Scaparrotti. I think that's the key question. It's
something we've got to explore. It's particularly important in
cyber, as well. There are discussions being had here in NATO,
et cetera, to determine what the definition of that is. But, it
would have to do with, you know, an attack that damages the
vital interests of the United States, I think, is the first
place I would start to--you know, to define that, and
particularly true within cyber, as well. That's probably, at
this point, what I would say. I would start at the vital
interests and go from there. But, a better definition of that
within our government, within NATO, then helps us when we are
in a situation where we see a crisis or an attack that's
approaching that, and we can have greater agility, greater
flexibility in determining how to respond.
Senator Sasse. Public trust is at an all-time low. We've
had decent polling in this country since the 1930s. Public
trust is at an alltime low in most of our institutions right
now. When you look at every major culture-war dispute that
happens amongst us--I think about when the President decided to
pick the scab at the Kaepernick and NFL [National Football
League] kneeling-before-the-flag issue, in the--it's public
information now; I think it's been in the press enough times
that, in the 2 or 3 days after the President decided to
reignite that fight, two of the fastest trending hashtags on
Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat were#takeakneenfl and
#standfortheanthem. I think those of us who have spent a lot of
time on this issue are well aware--I know--I think the
percentage is probably still classified, but the huge share of
that culture warring in the United States was actually of
Russian origin. Both sides of our culture wars. ``Take a
knee,'' ``stand for the anthem,'' Putin loves it. When
Americans hate Americans, and when we fight with each other,
Russia wins. I know that you've seen lots and lots of similar
things happening in European nations. I don't know how that is
really different, in terms of the ultimate public negative
consequences, than if this were done to a specific U.S.
corporation, who then saw its market cap and its economic value
collapse. We're nuts if we don't understand that the next round
of this is going to include lots of specific economic warfare.
When we see attacks on public trust, we're not sure that
it's warfare. If it were an economic action and you saw a
specific United States company devalued because of fake
information that was out there from the Russians, would that be
war?
General Scaparrotti. I don't know. I don't--and I'd--you
know, this is a policy question, actually, when you get to it,
but I think what you're driving at is what I said earlier, and
that is, is that we live in a different world today. The change
in what is considered, you know, part of our environment,
particularly having to do with information, the speed of it,
the connectivity of it, the ability to, what I call, you know,
develop volume, the impact of cyber activity, are all things
that we're wrestling with. But, we need to wrestle with it,
because we've got to get a better definition of our activity
within those, and what's acceptable.
In the international community, when it comes to conflict,
what we've done since the end of the second World War was help
to establish institutions that established an international
rule of order that nations are expected to follow. I think, in
these new dynamics here, the new strategic environment we're
in, we've not done that yet, and we have to begin to move
forward, in some means, to determine how we discipline
particularly the cyber and the information domains, et cetera,
to a certain extent.
Senator Sasse. One of the things that's unfortunate about
the ways that we're deliberating about where we are in the
evolution of warfare and the emergence of cyberwarfare is that
it's people in the uniform who are doing the hardest work and
then come and stand before committees like this, and you end
up--you and your colleagues end up taking a lot of the beating
for what is really a failure of political leadership in both
the legislative and executive branches, and both parties.
Right? After the Chinese attack on OPM [Office of Personnel
Management], 3 years ago, the last administration had no real
response. In the current moment, with Russian attacks, the
current administration has no real response. The legislature is
not nearly serious as--serious enough about this issue.
Regularly, we take people who are in your position who are
trying to help develop a menu of options for us to understand
the problem, we're not active in response, and you're the one
who ends up having to take some of the brunt of the heat.
I would love to follow up with you. You and I have
discussed this in private and in the SCIF [Sensitive
Compartmented Information Facility] in the past. I'd like to
follow up with you, in a formal letter, and ask a question
about this policymaking issue in the definition of ``war'' and
in the cyber rules of engagement, because we'd like to help
push forward, at the more senior levels of the Pentagon, and
then ultimately at the handoff of the White House, where those
discussions are. Because I've been here for only 3 years. I'm
one of five people in this body who's never been a politician
before. I've been here for 3 years, and I've asked these
questions every 2-3 months for 36 months straight. Frankly, it
doesn't seem like we're any closer now than we were 36 months
ago to having answers to these questions. That's ultimately,
chiefly the responsibility of the Congress, the article 1
branch. But, we need the help of people like you to tee up
those questions. I'll follow up in letter, too.
General Scaparrotti. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Sasse. Thank you, General.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
General Scaparrotti, thank you for your service and your
testimony today.
You've been asked a couple of questions about the RAND
study, the unclassified version of which was entered into the
record. I want to ask you a question about that, too. We've
been briefed about it, and one of the things I noticed that was
interesting about that study is, it analyzed the state, sort
of, power competitors we have, in terms of their capacities,
but it didn't really look at, ``Well, what if a couple of them
combine capacities.'' That really was not covered in this part
that I read. We always talk about our combined capacity, with
NATO, for example, but if you look at the RAND report, you
would assume that we would face, potentially, a set of discrete
competitors, but there's little thought, in the sections I've
read, about what their relationships are with one another.
We're not the only country that has allies, even military
alliances.
The area that I would probably have the most concern would
be a Russia-China relationship that would seek to exert more
influence to our detriment, although you've seen Russia and
Turkey start to have some cooperation in areas that are--that
maybe is a little bit unusual, given the history between those
two countries.
I'm wondering if you could, first, maybe address this issue
from your standpoint. Are you seeing anything in the Russia-
China relationship that would signify that they are growing
closer together, in terms of mil-to-mil activity or other
activities, where the combined effect of their capacity should
pose us concern?
General Scaparrotti. I would still--start by saying, I
think that there's not a--I think they still have issues that
wouldn't make them natural partners. But, what we have seen, I
think, in the last--I'll just go for this past year, for
instance--we've seen Russian and Chinese naval operations
training together in the European theater on a couple of
occasions now.
Senator Kaine. In the European theater.
General Scaparrotti. In the European theater. Maritime
operations. We know that there has been some work together, at
least we think, in the port in Djibouti, a little bit of
assistance for each other there. So, we've seen other areas,
mil-to-mil, where they've come together for specific training
purposes, et cetera. There's a little more collaboration there
than we've seen in the past. Of course, that is somewhat
worrisome.
Senator Kaine. How about Russia and Turkey?
General Scaparrotti. Yes. But, there again, I think they've
always had an economic relationship. It was disturbed with a
shootdown of the Russian aircraft. I think part of what the
government has tried to do is reestablish the economic
relationship. There has been, obviously, with respect to Syria
and their operations there----
Senator Kaine. Right.
General Scaparrotti.--at a minimum, deconfliction, if not
support between Russia and Turkey.
Senator Kaine. How about Russia and Iran? Obviously, we
know they are both backers of the Assad regime in Syria, but
are you seeing Russia and Iran engaging in mil-to-mil
activities, training, other things that would make you worry
about their combined capacities?
General Scaparrotti. There are activities where they work
together. I think it's one of convenience. But, obviously, any
of these nations that might be able to come together,
particularly with respect to areas that we're operating in,
would be of concern, mil-to-mil.
Senator Kaine. Let me switch quickly to one last Turkey
question. The Turkey issue is very vexing. A NATO ally, we use
the base at Incirlik for important tasks in the fight against
ISIS. Turkey has been very discouraged at the United States
alliance with the Kurds in northern Syria in the ISIS battle.
That is a very serious point of contention now between the
Turkish Government and the United States. Just give us a little
bit of a future look at the United States-Kurd relationship in
northern Syria. The Kurds have been great fighting partners for
the United States in defeating ISIS in northern Syria, but the
United States has also been a great partner to the Kurds in
enabling them to take back land that is theirs, from ISIS.
Having--are we at a state now, in northern Syria, where we are
now sort of reducing the work we do together with Syrian Kurds
because of the diminished threat of ISIS in a way that should
cool the temperature of this challenge between Turkey and the
United States?
General Scaparrotti. In this process, I work closely with
Turkey. That's within EUCOM. The Kurds and those----
Senator Kaine. Right.
General Scaparrotti.--operations in Syria----
Senator Kaine. CENTCOM [United States Central Command].
Senator Kaine.--are with CENTCOM. So, we--I and Joe Votel,
as you can imagine, talk frequently on this, as well of--our
staffs, working together.
My approach to this is, is that we work not only at--look
at the immediate interests of both nations, but we look at the
longer-term interests. Where do we want to be in a year, 2
years, and 5 years? With that perspective, with a close NATO
ally like Turkey, we know that we want to maintain and
strengthen our relationship. That's the long-term objective. I
think if we look at that long-term objective, it can begin to
inform what we're doing today with respect to NATO as an ally
and the Kurds, who are our partner, in defeating ISIS. Although
it's a very difficult and complex situation, I'm hopeful that
we can walk this path and attain both interests.
Senator Kaine. Mr. Chair, thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Senator Sullivan.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I want to thank my friend from Georgia, here, for letting
me cut in line on the questioning.
General, good to see you again, and thanks for all you're
doing. I think there's--safe to say, there's a lot of us who
are glad you're in your--the position you're in. It's--I know
it's a difficult challenge. Thanks for your service.
A lot of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle here have
been talking about the importance of allies. I know you get it.
I think we all get it, whether it's China or Russia, having our
allies on board and expanding that network is really important.
You have our full support on that.
I do want to respond to Senator Warren's comment. The
second time in the last 2 days we've heard colleagues--and I
have the utmost respect for my colleagues on the other side,
particularly on this committee--about how the President needs
to get his people out to get people in positions--Ambassadors,
Assistant Secretaries. I agree. I think we could have, maybe, a
little deal here among Democrats and Republicans. We'll
encourage the White House to get more nominees out, but my
colleagues on the other side can't complain about it, like
Senator Warren was just doing, and then go to the unprecedented
lengths that they have been doing to block and delay and make
sure President Trump doesn't get his nominees confirmed. So,
can't have it both ways, Senator Warren and others. So, we'll
work with the President. When they come to the floor, let's
move them, not unprecedented blocking, which has been
happening, which doesn't help the country, doesn't help our
national security, and it's a little hypocritical to be
complaining, when, when they get to the floor, they never get
moved. But, that's not your problem, that's our problem.
I'd actually like to talk about the Arctic. I know it's an
area that you've been focused on. We appreciate that. There's a
number of us, beyond just me, being from Alaska, who are
concerned about it. How many bases in Russia--are the Russians
building or refurbishing in the Arctic? Do you have a sense of
that? Which would include their new Arctic military command.
Can you talk a little bit about that?
General Scaparrotti. Yes. They're--essentially, the
majority of this is refurbishing old bases, probably seven to
nine; in particular, those that are at the beginning and the
end of what is the Northern Sea Route across there. Those are
the key places. We're watching that closely, in terms of
militarization of the Arctic.
Senator Sullivan. What do you think their intentions are?
Let me ask, are they installing any systems, including the
fielding of major icebreakers, that would give them de facto
control of the Northern Sea Route? Is that what they're trying
to do, do you think? What are their----
Senator Sullivan. It--well, their----
Senator Sullivan.--intentions up there? They're clearly
militarizing that part of the world. What do you think they're
trying to achieve?
General Scaparrotti. Their stated intent is to provide
safeguards, security for the economic well-being of the Arctic.
It's a very--you know, their statement is along those lines.
But, if you look at what they're putting into place, they would
have the capability, I think, in some time, you know, perhaps 2
or 3 years, to control the Northern Sea Route, if they chose to
do so.
Senator Sullivan. Do you think that's in the interests of
the United States, that a country like Russia would have a de
facto control over a new and potentially incredibly important
line of communication through the world?
General Scaparrotti. No, I don't.
Senator Sullivan. So, in our Arctic policy that this
committee recommended--or, actually, requested that the
Secretary of Defense promulgate 2 years ago, we talked about
the ability to control that sea route, to run FONOPs [Freedom
of Navigation Operations] there. Are we falling behind, in
terms of the capabilities that we have, vis-a-vis the Russians,
to do that?
General Scaparrotti. We're not keeping pace.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, General.
I wanted to ask another issue with regard to shortfalls
that you may or may not have in the EUCOM AOR to counter and
deter increasing Russian aggression. What's your thought of our
shortfalls with regard to missile defense? How do we need to
address that?
General Scaparrotti. We have capable missile defense
systems. When you look at missile defense, though, I think the
things that we need to focus on are--first of all, we need to
focus again on short-range and medium-range missile technology.
We've--we have been operating in environments where we
weren't--it wasn't a contested environment, et cetera. That's
not the case any longer. So, we need to look at those systems.
We need to look at the interoperability with our allies,
because we can't do this in Europe without doing it correctly
together. Then, we need to look at other parts of this, passive
parts of our integrated air missile defense, as well. I--that's
how I would answer that. I think it's a holistic system that
we've got to put together, and it's the systems within the
midrange that I am--and probably short-range--that I am most
concerned about today.
Senator Sullivan. Okay. Thank you very much, General.
Senator Inhofe. Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, welcome to the committee.
First, I want to associate myself with the comments of
Senator Sasse. I--we've talked about this a great deal. We
really need to develop a cyber doctrine and a strategy in order
to have a credible deterrent. I think that's one of the things
that's lacking--prior administration, current administration.
Let's just get it done. I hope you will take that message back.
Because if all we do is try to defend--ultimately, as you know,
the whole idea of your forces and the whole idea of our nuclear
force is deterrence. We don't want to have to use them. We
don't have a deterrent force, in terms of cyber. I think it's
something that we certainly need to develop.
Do you agree, General?
General Scaparrotti. Yes.
Senator King. Thank you.
It seems to me that what's going on--and we've had a series
of questions about what the Russians are doing in Europe. I
think it'll be interesting to learn whether they were involved
in the recent Italian elections over the weekend. What we're
seeing before our eyes is a kind of deunification of Europe.
We've had Brexit, we've had a populist election in Italy. We've
had a very difficult election in Germany. They--we know they
attempted to interfere in the election in France. We're trying
to--they're trying to split the countries. It strikes me that
what they are doing is a kind of geopolitical jujitsu. My
memory of judo and jujitsu was, you used your opponent's
strength against them. Our strength is our freedom and our
First Amendment and our free press and our open society. That's
exactly what they are using in order to turn it back on us and
to divide us, not only within countries, but also within the
alliance. I presume you see this Russian activity all the time,
from your position in EUCOM.
General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir, I do. I agree with your
thoughts. I mean, a democratic government, the values that we
profess, the freedom of the press, those kinds of things, those
are the things that are vulnerabilities with respect to
Russia's attack.
Senator King. That's exactly what they're exploiting.
General Scaparrotti. That's what they're exploiting. That's
what they're leveraging. So, I said, earlier in my comments,
that it's important today that we not take for granted the
importance of these values, our active--individuals' active
participation as a member of a democracy to protect all of
those things. There's a certain sense that I have, both here
and in Europe, that we've kind of begun to take that for
granted. Now it's being attacked. We have to think about it
that way, and begin to come together to protect the values and
our way of life----
Senator King. I know.
General Scaparrotti.--because that's essentially what----
Senator King. And it----
General Scaparrotti.--they've gone after.
Senator King.--leads us back to the issue of some kind of
strategy and doctrine that we can develop, not unlike NATO at
the end of World War II, not unlike the strategy of deterrence
that underlay our nuclear policy for 70 years, which has
worked.
Let me change the subject for a moment. Javelins to
Ukraine. Any concern about that leading to an escalation on the
other side, particularly given the fact that Russia is so much
more proximate to the battlefield? Give me your thoughts about
that.
General Scaparrotti. I wouldn't say I had zero concern, but
I--it's not a lot of concern, particularly because, if you look
at the Russian proxies and the force structures, the kinds of
equipment provided by Russia, the presence of Russian
leadership and the proximity of Russian units on the border to
eastern Ukraine, I can't see--I mean, they would obviously take
advantage of this in information warfare to say that it's of
concern to them. But, it should not be.
Senator King. Do you--in the few seconds that I have left,
your thoughts about the status of that conflict. It seems to
be, at least from the point of view of our attention, in a kind
of limbo, in a kind of standoff. Is that the situation?
General Scaparrotti. Well, you know, sometimes there will
be those that add this to, kind of, the frozen conflicts that
we see in Europe, particularly in the east. But, I would say
it's not that. It's a hot war, yet. They take casualties on
both sides, but particularly in Ukraine, you know, every week,
to this date. We have seen the violence level go down, of late.
But, I would tell you what you don't see is, within that lower
violence level, it's less heavy artillery and more things like
snipers, et cetera. So, the casualties haven't gone down. In
fact, they've gone up a bit.
Senator King. But, it's still a hot war.
General Scaparrotti. It's still a hot war. My personal
opinion is, is that, although Russia states that it's Ukraine's
problem that we're not moving forward with the Minsk agreement,
et cetera, I think it's actually Russia who doesn't want it to
move forward. They could certainly do more than they're doing
today with respect of helping us move in the right direction,
protection of the mission monitors, for instance, in the
Donbass, which they don't help with at all, et cetera.
Senator King. Final question, on a different subject. It
could be a yes-or-no answer. You note, in your testimony on
page 4, Russia is revitalizing its northern fleet, as you just
discussed with Senator Sullivan, in anticipation of increased
military, commercial activity. They intend to assert
sovereignty over the Northern Sea Route, in violation of the
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. Would it be advantageous
to our country for us to ratify the U.N. Convention of the Law
of the Sea so that we could be a participant in those
proceedings?
General Scaparrotti. Yes.
Senator King. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Perdue.
Senator Perdue. General, thank you for being here, and for
your decades of service.
It--I want to talk about Russia just a minute, but
particularly about Georgia and their intent there and our
strategy there. It seems to me, when you look at their
facilities in Murmansk, Kaliningrad, Sevastopol now, in the
Crimea region, what they've done in Georgia, and now what
they've done in Latakia and Tartus in Syria, I'm concerned
about these frozen conflicts. I'd like to get your update on
the Georgian frozen conflict. I guess we still call that a
frozen conflict. What is--what's our posture there, and what's
the long-term strategy regarding, specifically, Georgia, but
also--you talked about the current situation in Ukraine. I'd
love for you to also update us on your current thinking--the
United States current posture with regard to Ukraine and
Georgia, relative to what looks to be a solidification of
Russia's positioning in a crescent around eastern Europe.
General Scaparrotti. First, Senator, with respect to
Georgia, one, I would state that, as a partner--Georgia, as a
partner, is a strong one. They provide forces in Afghanistan
and others. Not a large country, but a good fighting force and
a good partner. What we see there today, when you look into the
two areas that Russians have presence, those breakaway portions
of Georgia--Ossetia, et cetera--they are now working to bring
them into, I think, you know, almost the Russian Federation, in
the sense that you--what you begin to see is the use of Russian
administration within those----
Senator Perdue. Putin calls them independent states now,
those two----
General Scaparrotti. He does, but it's not recognized
internationally as----
Senator Perdue. Right.
General Scaparrotti.--independent states, neither one of
them. They call it that. I don't think there's more than maybe
three nations, or four, in the world that accept his
definition. But, my point is, what he's doing is, he's drawing
them into their administration. In some of these countries--and
I can't recall if Georgia is one of them--but, in some of those
countries, for those areas that they have presence, they have
declared those soldiers' either ability to become a part of the
Russian Federation military forces or they have agreements that
they would become a part of that if there were a conflict. So,
you--my point is, you can just see them drawing them into their
orbit.
Now, you asked about others. I think, if you go to Moldova
or other areas where we have frozen conflicts, this is to their
advantage, because they use that in order to help secure what
they see as part of their strategic depth on the periphery. It
points to their----
Senator Perdue. Well, I apologize for interrupting, but----
General Scaparrotti.--area of influence.
Senator Perdue. What is our strategy in those frozen
conflicts? I'd like a brief answer, and then--because I want to
ask a quick question on Israel as I--as you finish up.
General Scaparrotti. The--well, our strategy is--is,
diplomatically, to stay very involved in a--different areas,
whether it's OSCE [Organization for Secuirty Cooperation in
Europe], Minsk, which is what it is for a couple of those,
diplomatically, in order to resolve the conflicts and, at the
same time, respect the sovereignty of the nations and the
determination of the people involved, like in Nagorno-Karabakh
[conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan], for instance, their
desire to determine their own government. We generally follow
that track, but a better question for the diplomats who are
working that.
In our regard, we have a relationship with each of these
countries, where we help them with security reform and also
capacity-building, because, in each case, they're looking to
the West, and they would prefer to come to the West. Russia's
continuation of this frozen conflict is one way that they
freeze that ability of a nation to then look to the West for
either NATO or EU.
Senator Perdue. Thank you.
In the remaining time I've got, just a quick question about
Iran and their increased activity in Syria. It seems that
they've built a permanent base now outside Damascus that has a
warehouse that's capable of storing missiles that could hit
Israel. We know that they talk openly about a land bridge to--
from Tehran to Beirut. The changing situation in Syria
certainly raises questions, particularly with the latest
aggression with the drone incident in Israel. How does that
situation in Syria--Israel is part of your area of
responsibility, if I understand correct, correct?
General Scaparrotti. That's correct, it is.
Senator Perdue. What is the current situation? How do you
assess that? What is your command's posture relative to the
security of our ally, Israel?
General Scaparrotti. My mission in EUCOM with respect to
Israel is to support the defense of Israel. In fact, we have a
large contingent there today doing an--defense and rehearsing,
basically, you know, those operations that we planned in
defense of Israel, should it be needed. I'm going there tonight
in fact. We continue to work closely with them in a defensive
means, but also to stay very close to them with intelligence.
As you know, they see Iran as an existential threat. They're
concerned about the posture of Iranian forces or Iranian-
supported forces in Syria, and perhaps that they might be
intending to remain in Syria as this is resolved. They're
concerned about the missile technology they believe maybe
transferred from Iran to any of this--extremist organizations
or the Lebanese Hezbollah to their north. We're watching this
very closely with them. I agree that a land bridge, you know,
between Iran--through into Syria would not be a good outcome.
Senator Perdue. Thank you, sir.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you so much, General.
I want to continue the conversation you're having with my
colleague. This week, more than 2500 United States personnel
are taking part in EUCOM's Juniper Cobra missile defense
exercise with the Israeli Defense Forces. According to Israeli
media, this year's exercise will simulate a large-scale
ballistic missile attack against Israel. Will the Arrow, Iron
Dome, and David Sling missile defense system be involved in
this exercise? Am I correct that this is the first such
exercise since David Sling system went operational in April of
last year?
General Scaparrotti. The--this will involve their systems
as well as ours, and, in particular, the interoperability of
those systems and the interoperability and the connection of
our command-and-control systems. In terms of their system,
specifically, if it's a new system--this is the first exercise
that we've done, but I couldn't comment. I can come back for
the record after I look at it. I'm going there this evening to
spend a few days as we conduct this exercise.
[The information referred to follows:]
Juniper Cobra 18 was the first large scale ballistic missile
exercise with Israel involving the David's Sling weapons system. As you
noted, David's Sling declared initial operational capability in April
of 2017. Prior to Juniper Cobra 18, we did conduct procedural training
with the Israelis using the system and updated our operational tactics
and procedures accordingly.
All three Israeli missile defense systems, Arrow, David's Sling,
and Iron Dome participated in Juniper Cobra 18. From an operational
standpoint, Arrow performed well in the simulation scenarios, as did
David's Sling. Arrow and David's Sling operators conducted daily after
action reviews of tactical performance to identify areas for
improvement in communications and procedures. The IDF reviewed
performance of the Iron Dome separately from the combined reviews
conducted by United States and Israeli forces. However, these reviews
focused on procedures and operator performance, not necessarily on how
well the weapons system performed against its design specifications.
As to how the respective systems performed against their technical
design specifications, I would refer you to the Missile Defense Agency
which provided simulation support during the exercises and conducted a
technical demonstration of new Arrow software during the field training
portion of Juniper Cobra 18.
Senator Gillibrand. Do you think this exercise can
effectively counter some of the threats to Israel?
General Scaparrotti. Yes, I think it does. It's a matter of
deterrence. It's--it is making sure that those who may think
about doing them harm knows that we have a credible and a
expert defense that we can establish rather rapidly.
Senator Gillibrand. Have you discussed with Israel our
commitment to maintaining their qualitative military edge?
General Scaparrotti. Yes. I support that. We work very
closely. I would--it's--in terms of our daily activity, it's
one of the closest nations with EUCOM.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
Switching gears. Media reported that, on February 7-8,
hundreds of Russian military contractors were killed when
United States Forces and Kurdish allies repelled an attack
against a base in eastern Syria. Based on what you have seen in
Europe, how does Russia tend to use military contractors? What
is your assessment of the goal of this attack? From your
viewpoint in EUCOM, what do you believe Russia is trying to
accomplish in Syria?
General Scaparrotti. I won't comment specifically on Syria
that you noted. That's in CENTCOM's AOR. I would just say,
generally, that Russia is known, through their oligarchs or
some businesses, to establish and use private military forces,
which is what I'd call them--private military forces.
Senator Gillibrand. I was very interested in your exchange
earlier about a Russian cyberattack. I understand, from many of
your colleagues, that this is something that the President has
not asked you to do. What recommendations would you make to the
President to protect our country from a cyberattack that could
harm American's vital infrastructure?
General Scaparrotti. First of all, I--you know, the
President wouldn't--it wouldn't be normal that he'd provide
direction directly to me at EUCOM at my level with respect to
this topic. It would be CYBERCOM's area. CYBERCOM's Commander
would be the best to give him best military advice. So, to that
expect, I'd probably go to Admiral Rogers. Mine would be, if
asked for best military advice, is that we continue to develop
the capabilities we have. I think we have excellent
capabilities. We need to consider what a deterrent effect we
want or need to have. But, I would leave it very generally at
that and go to the specifics to the person that he turns to
normally, being the Secretary and, within COCOMs [Combatant
Commands], the CYBERCOM Commander.
Senator Gillibrand. The NATO Secretary General has said
that alliance members agreed that a serious cyberattack
threatening critical military and civilian infrastructure could
trigger article 5 of the NATO Treaty in the same way that a
conventional military assault would. Is that--is this a
possibility that your forces are training for, in cooperation
with our allies? What can you tell us about any collaboration
on this front?
General Scaparrotti. Yes. We train. We're a member of NATO.
Within NATO, for example, you know, we are defining the domain,
with U.S. as a part of that, and we've actually conducted
exercises, one this past year that involved ambiguous cyber
activity or attacks, that involved attacks on infrastructure,
et cetera, in order to get right at your point. That is to get
better clarity on attacks on infrastructure, when is that of--
you know, an attack on a vital national interest? Then, how do
we respond to that? There is, both the United States and within
NATO at large, work on this very question.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Scott.
Senator Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, General. Good to see you again.
My concern--we've had a lot of conversation over the last
several weeks about the state of Turkey and the region, and
especially as a NATO partner of ours. Much of my concern has
been focused on the fact that what used to be a very secular
Turkey is moved in the direction of becoming a more religious
Turkey, and the cultural shift seems to have had a significant
impact on the behavior of Turkey. Can you walk me through your
assessment?
General Scaparrotti. Well, I think that, in Turkey overall,
there is a shift of some note, specifically within the
government, perhaps to be a government that's more Islamist,
based on its religion, than in the past. Perhaps you might say
it's less secular. But, I think it--the outcome of this remains
to be seen. Most of this has happened just as a result of an
attempted coup. President Erdogan has taken steps to, in his
mind, secure his country and secure his form of government. I
think we have to watch this and look a little deeper.
Having said all of that, I have routine conversations with
my counterpart in Turkey and their security officials. We have
a close mil-to-mil relationship. They're a valued member as an
ally and as a NATO ally. We're going to continue to develop
that relationship and strengthen it. I think that, too, can
have an influence on the government as a whole and--because
they intend--I am sure, they intend to remain a member of NATO
that is based on the Washington Treaty and the values that all
of us profess.
Senator Scott. Thank you, General.
Russia's violated the Open Skies Treaty, refused to
implement the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, and
the Vienna document suspended the PMDA [Pharmaceutical and
Medical Device Agency] while placing outrageous and
unreasonable conditions on resuming and undermined the Chemical
Weapons Convention through its support to Syria and its
chemical weapons program. What conclusions do you draw from
this record about the reliability of Vladimir Putin and the
Russian Government as negotiating partners? I would just point
out that the PMDA, from my research, suggests that the 34
metric tons that we had agreed to dispose of would lead each
side to having about 17,000 metric tons, which could create
multiple--thousands and thousands of weapons out of that
weapons-grade plutonium.
General Scaparrotti. Well, the short answer is, I think,
with the Russians, just based on what you walked through--and
it's obvious to us, in terms of their treaties--is that we--I
believe in the treaty system. I believe in nonproliferation and
to continue our weapons control treaties that we have in place.
But, we have to verify what they say they're doing. That's what
it's based on. It's not a trust. It's verification.
Then, secondly, while they've stepped away from the CFE
[Conventional Armed Forces in Europe] and others, and a
violation of INF, I think we take steps, as this administration
is doing, as the Secretary of Defense has laid out, that is
using the different levers of power in order to bring them back
into compliance with the INF Treaty, in particular. I think
that's the right way to go.
I think we had spent some time where we weren't confronting
them with either their violations of that treaty or some
others, and we need to take a strong stand.
Senator Scott. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
I have advocated, for some time, strong measures to deter
and counter the blatant Russian aggression in Ukraine--and
around the globe, the assault on democracies through cyber and
disinformation. But, Ukraine is a blatant ongoing instance of
physical force that violates standards of common decency and
norms of international law. The obligation of the United States
to provide lethal military assistance, I think is clear. I have
advocated, for some time, and we've included it in the National
Defense Authorization Act, the Department of State has cleared
the sale of Javelin antitank missiles to Ukraine, which is a
long overdue move to increase Ukraine's defense capabilities.
Although lethal, these arms are, essentially, defensive in
nature. Would you agree with me that more of these type of
weapons are necessary to deter and counter Russian aggression
against Ukraine?
General Scaparrotti. I think, for what we're providing of
those types of weapons right now, I would personally--my best
military advice--say let's put this into play. We've got
training, et cetera, that we need to do. Then take a look at
the situation from that point. There are more--there are--there
is more, and there is equipment that they can use effectively
that we in EUCOM will continue to advise Congress and provide
our best advice for what will help them most.
Senator Blumenthal. Let me ask a very simple question,
which may be overly simplistic, but--Are we winning in Ukraine?
Aren't the Russians effectively winning in accomplishing their
objective?
General Scaparrotti. Yeah, that's--I mean, it's--depends on
your definition of ``win.'' I would say that we're not
progressing, because our interest there is to resolve this
conflict.
Senator Blumenthal. If we're not progressing, we, meaning
we and Ukraine, are losing.
General Scaparrotti. I don't know that I would say we're
losing. I would say, again, we're not progressing. We're more
or less at a stalemate in where we're at. If you look at
Ukraine--the reason I would say we're not losing is, Ukraine's
forces, for instance, are steadily getting stronger and much
more confident. The nation itself is----
Senator Inhofe. Excuse me, General, let me interrupt for
just a moment. Forgive me for this, but----
Senator Scott, presiding.
Go ahead.
General Scaparrotti. The government itself, in terms of the
reforms that they want and we expect as well, is moving
forward, not at the pace we want, but it is moving forward. I
said--so, even within that conflict still residing, I think
we're making progress in important ways, and we should continue
to press in that direction.
Senator Blumenthal. We're making progress, do you think, in
countering the endemic corruption that has existed? Is that
what you meant by ``reforms''?
General Scaparrotti. That's part of it, yes. They just
voted for their anticorruption law, the first vote of three
they think they have to take. That law is not everything we
wanted in it, but it's a step in the right direction, as well.
Senator Blumenthal. Because 2 years ago, at this hearing
exactly--this kind of hearing--I asked your predecessor,
General Breedlove, about the issue of corruption. He
acknowledged that there was a lot to be done, it was a very
unfortunate problem. I wonder whether there's more that can be
done by your command to counter it.
General Scaparrotti. It is still a problem, as I just
noted, in the law. Between us and our interagency, particularly
State, we continue to press. We've got--you know, we have
personnel both in the mission there with the Embassy, but also
a multinational joint committee that meets regularly, works
with State and with the other nations that are involved, as
well, in progressing both capability-building and the reform of
their security institution. We need to continue to press in
that regard. I think that there is more that can be done, in
terms of other assets that we can bring to bear.
Senator Blumenthal. I just want to note, finally, the--
because I'm almost out of time--the fiscal year 2019 budget
request includes increases for the European Deterrence
Initiative and the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative.
There is 200 million for the Ukraine Security Initiative, 50
million above the President's request from the previous year.
In addition, the President's asked for 6.5 billion for EDI, 1.7
billion more than last year. I assume--I hope that you would
agree these investments in our defensive capability are
important in Ukraine, because they demonstrate resolve against
Russian aggression there, but also in Europe generally and
around the world.
General Scaparrotti. I agree. They're foundational in
Ukraine to the activity we have there and the progress that
both we and their nation, and particularly their forces, are
making.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
Thank you, General. Thank you for your service.
General Scaparrotti. You're welcome.
Senator Scott [presiding]. Thank you, Senator.
Just a couple more questions for you, General.
Angus, do you have any questions?
Senator King. I just want to compliment the Chairman on his
meteoric rise.
[Laughter.]
Senator Scott. As fast as you go up, you typically go back
down, by the way, so you may see me in the corner. Yes, yes,
yes. Realize that.
General, in my office, you and I had a robust conversation
about the resources that you might need to make sure that we
have the quickest response--rapid response is what I called it,
not what you called it--in your command and your
responsibilities. Can you perhaps remind me of the issues or
the items that you would want to see included in the fiscal
year 2019 budget so as to make sure that you have all the
resources necessary to meet what we expect you to accomplish?
Second, the problem of the anti-access aerial denial, or the
A2AD, is a big one. But, if you can overcome it, it may help us
avoid the escalate-to-dominate scenario. Which items in the
budget request specifically help you become--deal with the A2AD
problem?
General Scaparrotti. Yeah, thank you. I'll give you a
general answer----
Senator Scott. Yes.
General Scaparrotti.--Senator, here. If you want more
detail, I'd be happy to do this in a classified means, as well.
First of all, in terms of resources, generally if you look
at our budget proposal and the way it's being used, I'd start
by saying that, of those requirements that I have had, that
this budget and the FYDP gets after virtually every one of
those areas in some means. I'm very appreciative to Congress
for that. If I were to categorize them, I would start, as I
said before, with command-control computers, information,
surveillance, and reconnaissance, C4ISR, areas that have to do
with integrated air and missile defense. There are, across each
of the services, specific areas that I could give you in a
classified vein, and then, lastly, munitions.
As you look at A2AD, or the anti-access area denial,
problem set with respect to Russia, the combination of the
services' requirements that I have laid out, as well as
precision munitions, helps me with that second threat that you
noticed--that you noted, of A2AD. The combination of those,
together, I can underline those systems.
Senator Scott. Thank you, General.
Thank you, General, for your time. Hope you have a great
day.
[Whereupon, at 11:26 a.m., the committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator David Perdue
turkey's purchase of russian s-400 air defense system
1. Senator Perdue. [Deleted].
General Scaparrotti. The Turkish decision to purchase the S-400,
while regrettable, is not without precedent in NATO. Greece, for
example, acquired the S-300 system during the 1990's and NATO
successfully worked to limit any ill effects from the purchase. As
mentioned, Turkey is working in accordance with NATO approved
guidelines and the S-400 will not be allowed to connect to NATO command
and control architecture. In addition, EUCOM and its components will
follow already established guidance concerning foreign disclosure of
assets and procedures as we would with any other foreign government.
As for the data that Turkey will use to make the system
operational, a list of critical assets and prioritization of their
defense would occur no matter which system Turkey chose to buy. As a
NATO ally, Turkey would make these decisions in concert with their NATO
partners. We are cognizant of the threat and will act proactively
counter it.
2. Senator Perdue. General Scaparrotti, do you believe that NATO
assets will have to be moved from Turkey to other, safer locations?
General Scaparrotti. NATO is working with Turkey to ensure critical
assets are protected from Russian influence during the S-400
initialization and instruction; this includes limiting Russian access
by conducting the training outside of Turkey and evaluating the
operational security for NATO assets located within the country.
Specifically related to the S-400 and the U.S. weapons for NATO's
nuclear deterrence mission, there are no specific requirements for
moving the weapons given the current situation. Under the arrangement
described, Russian intelligence agencies would have the the possibility
of collecting information on nuclear aviation operations including
weapons movements and exercise requirements. There are additional
factors related to engagements with Turkey in addition to S-400 that
would necessitate a reevaluation of United States weapons for NATO's
nuclear deterrence mission. EUCOM is actively working with the Office
of the Secreatry of Defense, State Department, and the United States
Embassy team in Ankara to address concerns regarding the S-400 purchase
and United States nuclear weapons with the Government of Turkey (GOT)
and Turkish Ministry of Defense.
3. Senator Perdue. General Scaparrotti, is it possible for NATO to
provide oversight during both the development and operational phases of
the S-400 system to ensure that Russia does not collect valuable
intelligence on our assets?
General Scaparrotti. It is possible; however, this quickly becomes
a sovereignty issue. Turkey stated the S-400 system will be stand alone
and not link to any other NATO system. For NATO to provide oversight,
Turkey would have to invite NATO to participate. Any caveats levied by
Turkey would further limit and restrict this cooperation. In the event
Turkey would like to link the S-400 to NATO systems, Turkey would have
to adhere to the NATO guidelines regarding the development and
operational use of the S-400 system.
eastern europe energy security
4. Senator Perdue. General Scaparrotti, for many decades, the
Eastern Europe has remained tethered to Russia by energy dependence,
particularly through Russia's gas supply monopoly Gazprom. In 2017,
Lithuania, among other European nations, received its first shipments
of liquefied natural gas from the United States to help reduce
dependence on. The pending Nord Stream II project, however, would build
a pipeline between Russia and Germany and would double Russia's
capacity to pipe gas across the Baltic Sea, possibly increasing
Europe's overall energy dependence on Russia. From the military and
defense perspective, what does energy dependence on Russia mean for the
security environment of our NATO and European partners?
General Scaparrotti. I remain concerned by the reliance of Europe
on Russian gas supplies for critical portions of their national energy
needs. Last year, the Russian gas supplier Gazprom reportedly provided
about a third of the natural gas consumed in Europe. Gas is used not
just for heating and cooking, but also to generate electricity. While
European natural gas consumption has fluctuated recently, the region's
shift away from nuclear power and coal coupled with the decline in
Europe's own gas production will lead to a renewed and increased
demand. Despite increased imports of United States liquefied natural
gas, these developments are likely to create additional opportunities
for Russian leverage. Russia can use this dependence as a weapon in
time of war, or as a diplomatic lever during a crisis threatening
hostilities. In a crisis, interruption of Russian gas supplies would
result in urgent demands on European governments to make good the
deficiencies in energy supplies. Failure to do so would likely lead to
civil unrest and political instability and could impact alliance unity.
Perhaps a more immediate concern, it's not just our allies who are
exposed to Russian hostage-taking in the energy arena. United States
forces in Europe depend on the same energy providers as their host
nations. An interruption of Russian gas supplies in European countries
that host United States forces would definitely impact our readiness,
operations--and the families who accompany our servicemembers.
This vulnerability suggests that Europe's search for energy
diversification will improve our security. Europe is looking to develop
additional sources of carbon fuels as well as ``green'' sources such as
wind, solar, hydro, and geothermal energy. Norway remains the second
largest source of natural gas in Europe, and we can anticipate an
increase in United States gas deliveries with the construction of LNG
terminals in the Baltics, Poland, and elsewhere in the region. The more
Europe diversifies their energy supply, the more they secure themselves
from Russian coercion.
5. Senator Perdue. General Scaparrotti, what role does EUCOM play
in stabilizing energy security in Europe?
General Scaparrotti. Significant reliance on a single supplier for
strategic commodities such as energy represents a vulnerability to
allies and partners in the region in a number of areas. First, Russia
has demonstrated a willingness to use energy supply disruption as a
tool of leverage to affect partner and ally decision-making or as a
punitive response to decisions made that are not aligned with Russian
interests. Second, significant Russian presence, market share, and
ownership in the energy sectors of partners and allies is often
followed by illicit activities, bribery, and corruption that can alter
government decision-making, for personal financial gain of those in
positions of power, that will align with Russian interests and not
necessarily those of their citizens. Third, European reliance on Russia
could become a problem in a contingency environment if Russia were to
cut off energy supplies (e.g. liquid fuels for military use). This
would negatively impact NATO force readiness and mission capabilities.
Without timely access to needed fuel supplies, we could experience a
degradation in our ability to meet out our Article V responsibilities.
Lastly, if NATO allies and partners experience significant energy
supply disruptions due to a cutoff in Russian supplies, this would have
a significant impact on civil society and a government's ability to
provide basic services to its populations. The inability to provide
basic services to a country's population has negative impacts on
military readiness and overall national defense and security,
particularly in an emergency situation. I am working to ensure energy
supply diversification and enhanced energy security remain a priority
for our partners and Allies.
6. Senator Perdue. General Scaparrotti, what can EUCOM, along with
the U.S. interagency, do to continue to assure our allies in the region
and build security partnerships in relation to the energy sector?
General Scaparrotti. EUCOM and our interagency partners will
continue to train and exercise with our counterparts to improve their
ability to protect critical infrastructure--both physically and in the
cyber domain. Confronting adversaries and new approaches to hybrid
warfare is a critical challenge that we all face, and it requires a
whole-of-government approach to ensure we are using all of the tools
available to our national governments. A specific example of how EUCOM
is working together to enhance energy security and resilience in Europe
is the EUCOM-funded, Department of Energy executed program with
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to enhance electrical grid reliability
and cyber security. This program increases their awareness of
vulnerabilities and identifies opportunities to mitigate risks to the
electric grid.
nato defense spending and burden sharing
7. Senator Perdue. General Scaparrotti, how can we ensure that
defense spending across NATO and in EUCOM is as cost effective and
beneficial to the entire alliance as possible?
General Scaparrotti. The NATO Defense Planning Process (NDPP)
identifies capabilities that are required to meet the Alliance's level
of ambition and then apportions capability target packages to Allies
every four years to fulfill these requirements. These capability target
packages are distributed according to the principles of ``fair burden
and reasonable challenge'', meaning that each Ally is expected to
deliver a set of capabilities that is commensurate with its size and
composition of force and manage their national budgets to fulfill the
quantitative and qualitative aspects of these targets on time. Internal
to the Alliance, Allies report their progress on capability target
package fulfillment through a rigorous, biennial Defense Planning
Capability Survey (DPCS). The DPCS becomes the basis of bilateral
consultations between the NATO International Staff and senior defense
policy officials in capitols and then multi-lateral examinations at the
Headquarters in Brussels. Both of these events are measures of
accountability, and Allies hold each other accountable to ensure that
resources are being adequately appropriated and used for the right
purposes.
As Commander USEUCOM, I'm focusing the work of our bilateral
cooperation on allies' NATO capability targets so that our Foreign
Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and other
theater security cooperation efforts are aimed at specific outcomes
needed to ensure the entire NATO force is ready for success.
8. Senator Perdue. General Scaparrotti, what other metrics are
important to bear in mind when looking at the efficacy of NATO defense
spending? Is the 2 percent goal arbitrary and unrealistic, as some
European officials have claimed?
General Scaparrotti. Two percent as a goal first entered the burden
sharing discussion at the Riga Summit in 2006 when the then-U.S.
Ambassador to NATO, Victoria Nuland, called 2 percent the ``unofficial
floor'' on defense spending for Allies. Since then, and especially in
the context of the security environment that emerged in 2014 with
Russia's invasion of Crimea, it has been a metric for gauging the
general political will to prioritize defense investment within the
overall context of national domestic agendas. It is certainly an
imperfect benchmark that does not capture outputs (e.g. capability
development and contributions to Alliance security), but its inclusion
in the Defense Investment Pledge agreed to at the Wales Summit in 2014
was meant to be a meaningful step toward addressing the Alliance's
structural problem of underfunding in a manner that would be achievable
by every Ally and underscore Alliance solidarity. Despite any flaws of
this metric, all Allies agreed to aim for 2 percent by 2024.
NATO Allies have agreed upon a set of indicators for providing a
comprehensive picture of how and where Allies use their resources,
which are all portrayed in an annual Metrics Report (see attached
PO(2018)0135, ``Input/Output Metrics for 2018 Onwards,'' 29 Mar 2018,
pgs 1-2 to 1-4). In addition to defense spending, these metrics portray
burden sharing from the aspect of NATO Capability Target delivery and
contributions to operations, missions, and activities both within and
outside of the NATO Framework. Some Allies contend that outputs matter
more than inputs when it comes to assessing whether a Nation is pulling
its fair share within NATO. In this regard, NATO leadership and the
United States have agreed that all three aspects of burden sharing (the
``3Cs": cash, capabilities, and contributions) are all relevant and
important, but that the ability to achieve and sustain what is needed
in capability development and contributions is underpinned by
sufficient defense investment. 2 percent is not an exact representation
of what may be needed for a given Ally to achieve its requirements for
national defense and what is asked from NATO. 2 percent is a political
commitment and reflects a general target that Allies have agreed to
aspire to. As far as being achievable, the Wales Summit Communique
notes that the Pledge on Defense Investment is meant to be achievable
by every Ally, but political realities have certainly affected the
credibility of certain plans for achieving 2 percent within a decade.
Currently, 15 Allies are expected to reach 2 percent by 2024 and 22
Allies are expected to achieve the benchmark of allocating 20 percent
of defense expenditure toward equipment modernization. We expect Allies
to continue to strive toward meeting the Wales Pledge in full as a
matter of meeting the challenges of the security environment and as a
mark of Alliance solidarity.
9. Senator Perdue. General Scaparrotti, while the 2 percent goal is
important, it is also critical that our allies invest in real
warfighting capability available to the alliance at the speed of
strategic and operational relevance. How can the U.S. be more specific
about what we believe the 2 percent should be directed towards?
General Scaparrotti. EUCOM's country objectives for each Ally are
based on a prioritization of those countries' respective NATO
capability targets. In addition, we believe that the 2 percent should
be directed toward improving the overall readiness, interoperability,
and usability of forces for high-end conflict. This will require, among
other things, investment in training and exercises with Allies and
partners, and significant resources toward improving the maintenance,
spare parts inventories, and ammunition available for major equipment.
After years of high operational tempo in crisis response operations,
Allies need to commit substantial funds toward achieving a credible
posture of deterrence and defense against a peer competitor.
10. Senator Perdue. General Scaparrotti, how else, besides
spending, can we measure the growth of NATO partnerships?
General Scaparrotti. Above all, we measure the growth of
partnerships with Allies by measuring what those Allies are
contributing to the security of NATO, specifically through
contributions to operations, missions, and activities (e..g. Resolute
Support Mission or training and capacity building in Iraq), financial
contributions to NATO-managed trust funds, access and overflight
agreements, or intelligence sharing. We see our Allied partnerships
grow through improved interoperability and habitual participation in
common exercises and training events, as well as through willingness to
engage in NATO defense capacity and defense institution building
efforts and opportunities.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Ted Cruz
ukraine
11. Senator Cruz. General Scaparrotti, the recent decision to
provide United States lethal military assistance to Ukraine is a
welcome policy shift. Ukraine's state-owned arms manufacturer
UkrOboronProm (UOP) and its subsidiaries represent the bulk of the
country's defense industrial base and coordinate Ukraine's defense
export-import policies. Beyond providing lethal military assistance to
Ukraine, should the United States also help develop the Ukrainian
defense industrial base? If so, what is the most effective means of
doing so?
General Scaparrotti. Ukraine has tremendous intellectual and
industrial resources. As a sovereign nation, Ukraine needs a defense
industry that is responsible to its national requirements and able to
provide defense products and services at a price Ukraine can afford.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense has the lead and the expertise
in interacting with Ukraine's state-owned defense industry.
ukraine
12. Senator Cruz. General Scaparrotti, Ukraine's indigenous
capacity has the potential of producing the means for Ukraine to defend
itself and conduct military operations against Russian aggression. The
United States must help develop Ukraine's indigenous capacity to
produce the means to defend itself and conduct military operations
against Russian aggression. How can we incentivize United States
defense firms to cooperate and partner with UOP in a way that
contributes to the development of Ukraine's defense industrial base?
General Scaparrotti. EUCOM supports interagency efforts to drive
Ukrainian reform processes, which build transparent, accountable
systems within the Ministry of Defense. As a part of our defense
institution building efforts, we regularly provide advice on developing
responsive and transparent defense planning, procurement, and
sustainment systems. We fully agree that Ukraine must take advantage of
its intellectual and industrial capacity in the defense sphere. The
Office of the Secretary of Defense has lead for defense industrial
matters and is better preprared to address UOP.
13. Senator Cruz. General Scaparrotti, UkrOboronProm (UOP) is
requesting U.S. support to have itself audited by a reputable and
independent third party. The audit may help improve UOP's efficiency
and laying the groundwork for reforms in the Ukrainian defense sector.
In your view, can this audit achieve these objectives? What role should
the United States play in the audit?
General Scaparrotti. We absolutely agree that reform of Ukrainian
defense industry and UkrOboronProm is essential to the long-term
efficiency and transparency of the Ukrainian defense sector. EUCOM
fully supports the Office of the Secretary of Defense's leading role in
this field, and we are prepared to include discussion of a UOP audit in
coordination with the Ukraine Defense Reform Advisory Board.
lebanon
14. Senator Cruz. General Scaparrotti, over the last few months,
there has been more and more comments from Lebanon's military leaders
in which they have publically made threats against Israel. As the Times
of Israel reported:
Lebanese Defense Minister Yaacoub Sarraf said Sunday that his
country was prepared to defend itself if Israel launched strikes on its
territory. The comments came after Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
said Israel had shot down an Iranian drone in its airspace, and would
``act if necessary'' against Iran and its proxies, including the
Lebanese terror group Hezbollah. Sarraf told participants at the Munich
Security Conference that he had lived with ``an Israeli drone above my
head for the past 15 years'' but that his country has ``no belligerent
intent'' against anyone. But, Sarraf said, ``we will defend ourselves''
and ``we are for peace, yet we will not stand for any threat and we
will not accept any aggression.''
Another threat against Israel was made by the Lebanese Army
Commander as well. As the Times of Israel reported:
``The Lebanese army commander has vowed to ``confront any Israeli
aggression, whatever that costs'' amid increasing tensions over a
border barrier Israel is building and a dispute over offshore gas. ``I
affirm again our categorical rejection of the Israeli enemy infringing
on Lebanon's sovereignty and its sacred right to exploit all its
economic resources,'' Reuters quoted Lebanese army quoted General
Joseph Aoun as saying. ``The army will not spare any method available
to confront any Israeli aggression, whatever that costs,'' he said.
United States acting Assistant Secretary of State David Satterfield has
been in the region in recent days trying to mediate between Israel and
Lebanon. The dispute is centered around a border wall the IDF is
constructing along the boundary between the two countries, contested
rights to offshore natural gas exploration, and Israeli warnings that
Iran--through its proxy in Lebanon, Hezbollah--is turning the country
into a forward base to manufacture rockets and attack the Jewish
state.''
These two examples are just from Lebanese military leaders and
exclude many ongoing threats against Israel from Lebanon's political
establishment. Given these comments, should we reconsider the
continuation United States military assistance to the Lebanese Armed
Forces (LAF)? If a conflict were to breakout, what is your assessment
on the risk that United States military equipment being provided to the
LAF could be used against Israel?
General Scaparrotti. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) values its
strong and enduring partnership with the United States Defense
Department, and would be very unlikely to directly or indirectly
sanction the transfer of United States-provided arms and advanced
weapons systems to aid Lebanese Hizballah (LH) in a conflict with
Israel. The LAF continues to see the United States as the preferred
supplier of arms and advanced weapon systems, trainer and partner over
the long-term; moreover, the LAF likely recognizes that supporting LH
in the event of conflict with Israel would be met with a strong and
swift reaction from United States policymakers that could endanger the
future of this bilateral security relationship for years to come.
However, given the LAF and LH continue to vie for primacy over which is
considered the defenders of Lebanon, the LAF may feel compelled to
respond to defend Lebanon in a crisis with Israel, particularly if the
populace is put at risk. Ultimately, how the conflict unfolds will be
the determining factor in the LAF response, though under virtually all
scenarios, we envision little potential for direct LAF cooperation with
LH conventional forces. Nonetheless, we are concerned about LH's
efforts to infiltrate and influence Lebanon's intelligence and internal
security institutions and have made clear that any cooperation with LH
will risk our continued cooperation and assistance.
15. Senator Cruz. General Scaparrotti, Hezbollah is further
establishing and strengthening its presence and control in Lebanon. It
now has close to 150,000 rockets and missiles aimed at Israel, whose
fighters now are beginning to return to Lebanon with combat experience
from the Syrian civil war and/or are remaining in vSyria to help Iran
establish a land bridge to the Mediterranean and a permanent military
presence on Israel's borders. In addition, Qais al-Khazali, the
commander of Iraq's Iranian-backed Asaib Ahl al-Haq militia, visited
the border between Lebanon and Israel in December 2017. What specific
steps and actions are the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) taking to combat,
and counter Iran and its terrorist proxies including Hezbollah from
expanding its control and strengthening its military presence in
Lebanon and the Lebanese-Syria border?
General Scaparrotti. Lebanon's response to the turmoil in Syria has
been a policy of regional dissociation. Beirut regularly criticizes
Hizballah's Syria deployments as undermining the Lebanese state, but
has demonstrated limited recourse outside of the mostly public rhetoric
and private recommendations. Much of this is attributable to
Hizballah's increasing influence within Lebanese politics and the
``blocking third'' it has held in Lebanese Cabinet since the early
2000s. This has allowed Hizballah to effectively veto any potential
legislation that could impact its strategic interests (e.g. keeping its
weapons as a recognized domestic militia).
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
air and missile defense (amd)
16. Senator Shaheen. General Scaparrotti, I am aware that General
Brooks, Commander, United States Forces Korea (USFK) has submitted
requirements to improve the vertical and horizontal integration of air
and missile defense systems on the Korean Peninsula. Have you submitted
an urgent needs statement similar to USFK's Joint Emergent Operational
Needs Statement to the department to address any capability gaps you
may face?
General Scaparrotti. I have not submitted an Operational Needs
Statement similar to USFK's requirement to improve the vertical and
horizontal integration of air and missile defense systems. I have,
however, submitted two Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statements that
the Joint Staff is currently assessing for resources, but they seek
capabilities in areas other than air and missile defense.
17. Senator Shaheen. General Scaparrotti, I understand that United
States European Command (EUCOM) has explored upgrading its European
Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), otherwise known as Aegis Ashore sites
in Romania and Poland. Would the EUCOM benefit from leveraging the
capabilities of the Navy's DDG-51 Flight III program (possible
inclusion--that includes the navy's new Integrated Air and Missile
Defense Radar, SPY-6)? If so, what is the plan/path moving forward to
provide EUCOM these increased capabilities?
General Scaparrotti. The AN/SPY-6 radar, installed on the Navy's
Flight III DDGs, represents dramatic sensor improvements to the Aegis
weapons system in the areas of detection range, search volumes,
discrimination capability, raid capacity and complexity, and resiliency
in high-clutter and jamming environments. EUCOM would welcome these
improvements to the Aegis Ashore sites and our Forward Deployed Naval
Forces (FDNF) Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) ships stationed in
Rota, Spain. EUCOM registered the need for this increased sensor
capability in our ``USEUCOM Operational Requirements Statement for the
BMD of Europe,'' on January 5, 2017, and perennially in our Integrated
Priority List (IPL) submissions. The Services are working to provide
increased sensor capability to EUCOM.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill
european deterrence initiative (edi)
18. Senator McCaskill. General Scaparrotti, last year Mr. David
Ochmanek of the RAND Corporation testified before this committee that
there was a need to have three present Armored Brigade Combat Teams
(ABCT) in Europe, with sufficient supporting artillery, to effectively
deter potential Russian aggression.
Do you agree with the assessment that there is a need for increase
in military personnel in Europe, if so, how many and what types of
units would you place in Europe, and is DOD making efforts to increase
the number of units?
General Scaparrotti. USEUCOM is currently assessing the
implications of the new National Defense Strategy (NDS) and its impact
on our force posture in Europe. As we continue to understand the
requirements to develop a credible blunt layer as described in the NDS,
we are assessing the right mix of capabilities required and whether
those capabilities need to be persistent (either assigned to USEUCOM or
heel-to-toe rotational), episodic, or provided by our NATO Allies.
Pending our complete assessment, it is likely USEUCOM will identify
additional units required persistently to generate a blunt layer, and I
am on record that I believe I need a minimum of a Division's worth of
armored forces in theater.
19. Senator McCaskill. General Scaparrotti, we are now rotating
units in and out of Europe and looking to potentially increase the
number of units in Europe. Has the DOD done the analysis of the cost
benefit of using rotating forces versus permanently stationing units in
Europe? If not, why not? If so, what did the analysis conclude?
General Scaparrotti. The Department is currently studying the costs
and benefits of forward stationing versus rotating forces in Europe,
especially considering the Dynamic Force Employment and Global
Operating Model concepts introduced in the 2018 National Defense
Strategy. That analysis is ongoing and no conclusions or decisions have
been made.
20. Senator McCaskill. General Scaparrotti, you stated in your
testimony that you need another ABCT. Currently the Army in its
modernization efforts to stay ahead of near peer competitors like
Russia. One of the modernization efforts has been testing and fielding
of Active Protection Systems (APS). Is the current rotational ABCT
equipped with APS and should EUCOM receive another ABCT will it being
given priority to be fielded with APS? If so, how will that impact
getting the unit trained, equipped, and into Europe? What efforts are
being taken to modernize the 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment with APS?
General Scaparrotti. USEUCOM believes that increasing the lethality
of the units and prepositioned equipment in theater is critical to our
ability to compete and win against a near peer competitor. In our
fiscal year 2018 EDI submission, approximately $170 million of the
funding that has been authorized for Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS)
will go toward outfitting one Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) of M1
Abrams and one Battalion of Stryker vehicles with Active Protection
Systems.
The Army has identified a shortfall in resourcing the outfitting of
the Stryker vehicles meaning that only 70 percent of the vehicles will
receive the upgrade. USEUCOM worked with Army to develop a fiscal year
2019 European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) proposal to outfit the
remaining 30 percent of the Stryker Battalion as well as one Battalion
of Bradley Fighting Vehicles with Active Protection Systems, however
the majority of those funds were not requested in fiscal year 2019 due
to concerns with the program. The Department has requested $50 million
within the APS budget line that represents the minimum level contingent
on future developmental testing results.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
ukraine: russian electronic warfare
21. Senator Blumenthal. General Scaparrotti, it is clear that
Russia believes they can use Ukraine to test and refine their cyber
warfare capabilities with impunity. I am encouraged by news that DARPA
is partnering with Ukraine to develop capabilities to counter Russia. I
understand that EUCOM is facilitating these efforts. What can you
disclose about these efforts?
General Scaparrotti. UCOM is not part of, and has not received
information on, the DARPA-Ukraine counter-Russia partnership.
22. Senator Blumenthal. General Scaparrotti, what lessons have you
learned from this partnership that can be applied to countering
disinformation campaigns in the United States?
General Scaparrotti. EUCOM is not part of, and has not received
information on, the DARPA-Ukraine counter-Russia partnership.
23. Senator Blumenthal. General Scaparrotti, do you agree that
Russia must pay a steeper price for its cyberattacks, both against
Ukraine and the United States? Do you agree that our actions so far
have not made them realize that they have more to lose than gain with
their behavior?
General Scaparrotti. All state and non-state actors must be held
accountable for their activities, including Russian state-sponsored
cyber actors. To deter Russian activities and limit their freedom of
action within the cyber domain, we must adjust the benefit to
consequence model. Deterrence of Russian activities requires a whole-
of-government approach in concert with our Allies and partners, and
this deterrence may require additional consequences for malicious
activities.
As ADM Rogers highlighted in his testimony on February 27, 2018,
Russian-backed cyber actors are active in both the United States and
Ukraine; our reactions to date have not deterred their activities.
24. Senator Blumenthal. General Scaparrotti, in your testimony you
note EUCOM is strengthening efforts to counter Russian activity through
support for the interagency Russian Information Group that counters
Russian propaganda and misinformation campaigns. Can you please expand
on this group's work and your involvement?
General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]
ukraine: military assistance
25. Senator Blumenthal. General Scaparrotti, the Department of
State has cleared the sale of Javelin anti-tank missiles to Ukraine--a
long overdue move to increase Ukraine's defense capabilities. How do
you see this provision of defensive weapons to Ukraine impacting the
conflict? Do you agree more should be provided? What resources and
steps are needed--beyond lethal aid--to strengthen Ukraine's long-term
stability?
General Scaparrotti. EUCOM appreciates the support of the Congress
in providing financial resources to augment Ukraine's self-defense
capabilities. We believe that the provision of enhanced defensive
assistance is an important signal of United States support to Ukraine
and addresses a capability gap identified by the Multinational Joint
Commission for Security Cooperation and Defense Reform in Ukraine.
Ukraine's military forces are bravely defending their own nation
against Russian aggression. At the same time Ukraine has outlined an
ambitious reform agenda for its Ministry of Defense and General Staff
to meet NATO standards. EUCOM, with other nations participating in the
Multinational Joint Commission (MJC), delivers training, advisory
efforts, and equipment to Ukraine with resources provided by the
Congress. We work closely with Ambassador Yovanovitch, the Embassy
team, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the State Department
to ensure optitimal impacts for those resources. Our efforts focus on
assisting Ukraine in developing responsive training and training
management systems to provide ready forces for national defense. In
addition, we continue to focus resources on assisting in the
development of agile and capable command and control systems,
situational awareness, long-term planning and resourcing systems, and
improving Ukraine's logistical and medical capabilities. EUCOM
represents only a part of a tremendous interagency effort to support
Ukrainian reform activities, and the State Department and Office of the
Secretary of Defense have important perspectives on strengthening
Ukraine's long-term capability.
26. Senator Blumenthal. General Scaparrotti, endemic corruption in
Ukraine continues to undercut legitimacy, and stretches to the
military. Just last month, the New York Times reported that while
Ukraine's defense industrial base has grown exponentially since 2014,
the increase in military spending has opened up new avenues for self-
dealing and insider deals that hinder anti-corruption efforts. Two
years ago at this hearing, I asked your predecessor Gen Breedlove about
the issue of corruption and he acknowledged it was a problem. How
concerned are you regarding EUCOM's ability to help stabilize and build
capacity in Ukraine when corruption remains rampant? In what ways can
EUCOM work to address it?
General Scaparrotti. European Command continues to collaborate with
other nations via the Multinational Joint Commission on Security
Cooperation and Defense Reform to identify areas of cooperation with
the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and General Staff.
Corruption remains a challenge in Ukraine. As a part of our work
and our cooperation with the U.S. Embassy, we work with the Ministry of
Defense's Reforms Committee to assist the Ministry of Defense in
building transparent and accountable systems across the Ministry and
General Staff.
As an example, along with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency,
we provide expert advice to Ukraine through the Ministry of Defense
Advisor program, to include areas like human resources and budget
management. We also have a strong defense institution building program
that works closely with Ukrainian counterparts to develop stronger and
more transparent long-term planning programs. These efforts have
assisted the Ukrainians in better understanding the relationship beween
strategy, requirements, and resources and have set the groundwork for
improved responsiveness and accountability.
We agree that Ukraine must continue to move forward on key reforms
as the Congress has outlined in the National Defense Authorization Act.
Passage of a Law on National Defense that outlines roles and missions
and accountability to the Parliament is an important step. We believe
that Ukraine continues to needlessly classify budgetary and program
information in a manner that hampers reform. However, we also recognize
that in a short time Ukraine has made important steps forward at a
critical time for this nation, and we will continue to support reform
efforts going forward.
27. Senator Blumenthal. General Scaparrotti, the fiscal year 2019
budget request includes increases for the European Deterrence
Initiative (EDI) and the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative. There
is $200 million for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, a $50
million increase above the President's request from the previous year.
In addition, the President has asked for $6.5 billion for EDI--$1.7
billion more than just last year. Can you describe how these increases
will be used to counter and deter Russia? Will this address its cyber
operations?
General Scaparrotti. EUCOM greatly appreciates the continued strong
Congressional support for the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI). EDI
has provided critical supplemental funding to establish a credible
United States posture to deter Russian aggression and assure our NATO
Allies and partners in Europe. Our fiscal year 2019 submission
continues to build on many of the larger initiatives that are in the
fiscal year 2018 authorization, including: Army Prepositioned Stocks
(APS); European Contingency Air Operations Set Deployable Air Base
Systems (ECAOS DABS); ECAOS infrastructure upgrades at existing United
States and partner airfields; heel-to-toe Armored Brigade Combat Team
(ABCT) rotations; and, Special Operations Forces (SOF) equipment
prepositioning.
Although fiscal year 2019 EDI does include funding for Command,
Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (C4ISR) that contribute to backbone requirements in the
cyber domain, as well as funds that contribute to countering Russian
malign influence in multiple information domains, fiscal year 2019 EDI
does not request funding specifically for offensive or defensive cyber
capabilities. The additional $1.7 billion in fiscal year 2019 EDI will
allow EUCOM to expand our deterrence capabilities in: theater
antisubmarine warfare via undersea sensor systems and additional P-8
contigency locations; Navy prepositioning for contingency logistics
hubs and munitions storage; additional lethality and speed in APS via
Multiple Launch Rocket System upgrades, configured-for-combat sets, and
European road compliance upgrades; munitions starter stocks in JASSM-ER
and Patriot MSE; and, Defense Logistics Agency Distribution Center for
enhanced contingency distribution capability.
The initial fiscal year 2018 budget requested $150 million for the
Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative; however, the Department of
Defense (DOD) revised the request to the current $200 million for
fiscal year 2018, which now matches the fiscal year 2019 request. DOD
requested the additional funds because the $150 million was not
sufficient to address the train, equip, and advise efforts to build
Ukranian capacity to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity
against Russian aggression. In 2017, the Multinational Joint Commission
assessed and prioritized the following key capability gaps for Ukraine:
NATO-standard training and institutional reforms in support of force
generation for territorial defense and other missions; secure
communications at the tactical and operational level; secure national-
level command and control systems; military medical capabilities for
the rapid evacuation and treatment of casualties and rehabilitation
following injury; situational awareness systems (e.g., counter-
artillery radars) to ensure secure borders and to protect troops from
indirect fire and unmanned aerial systems; optics and night vision
capabilities to conduct all weather and 24-hour defensive operations;
and advanced defensive anti-armor capabilities. Without the additional
funding to meet these capability gaps, I believe there will be a
negative impact on our ability to assist in developing a sustainable
and effective Ukrainian capacity to generate and deploy appropriately
manned, trained, and equipped forces.
russian submarines
28. Senator Blumenthal. General Scaparrotti, the increased presence
of Russian submarines in the Greenland, Iceland, and UK (GIUK) gap
requires the full attention of the United States and our allies. In
December, the Washington Post published an article about increased
Russian submarine activity near these cables and the British military
has raised alarms over this as well. How are you working to address the
vulnerability the GIUK gap presents? How can the United States prevent
Russian submarines from exploiting it? Is the United States and its
allies doing enough to ensure Russia does not gain a strategic
advantage in this region?
General Scaparrotti. The increased presence of Russian submarines
in the Greenland, Iceland, and UK (GIUK) Gap has the full attention of
the United States and our allies. The United States has been working
with and through its allies to counter the increased Russian submarine
presence in the GIUK gap and to ensure that Russia does not gain
strategic advantage in this region.
The United States and NATO responded to the increased Russian
submarine activity by bolstering forces at sea and anti-submarine
warfare (ASW) efforts. The U.S. is looking to improve sensors, sonar,
weapons control, quieting technologies, undersea drones, and
communications systems to help our submarines maintain their edge. The
United States Navy has been upgrading hangars in Iceland to accommodate
new P-8A Poseidon aircraft and the United States and Iceland have
agreed to increase rotational operations in the GIUK gap this year. An
example of recent activity to counter the Russian submarine threat was
the deployment of multiple aircraft, to include eight United States
aircraft, as well as planes from Germany, France, Norway and Canada, to
RAF Lossiemouth in Scotland between January and November 2017. These
aircraft conducted ASW operations aimed at detection and deterrence of
Russian submarines operating in the GIUK gap.
In addition, NATO allies are helping the UK monitor Russian
submarine activity following a huge increase in Russian underwater
maneuvers. NATO will expand its British naval command post in
Northwood, North London by 100-200 staff this year due to the increased
activity. In concert with this, countries affected by this malign
activity have perused their own responses to counter this threat. For
example, the UK has robust maritime surveillance in place and has
purchased a new fleet of P-8 Poseidon aircraft that will patrol the
GIUK Gap starting in 2020.
29. Senator Blumenthal. General Scaparrotti, what do you assess
Russia's intentions to be with their activity near undersea cables? How
concerned should the United States be? Have you discussed this issue
with our allies?
General Scaparrotti. Academic research appears to indicate that the
Russian military believes victory in future warfare depends on
disrupting adversary information systems while protecting their own.
Russian information warfare writings claim that 95 percent of United
States military communications now use the same lines and
infrastructure as civilian communications. Russian military thinkers
and planners assert that United States military and economic prowess
relies on assured information superiority, which, in turn, requires
high-speed transoceanic data transfer and automatic control systems.
According to Russian writing, targeting communication transmission
systems offers the most effective way of causing the collapse of
critical adversary war-fighting and governmental command and control
systems, financial transactions, financial institutions, and the
economy. Industry data shows that Russia does not significantly rely on
international seabed cables.
Russia puts a premium on capabilities that it believes can rapidly
undermine United States confidence and war-fighting capability or cause
major distractions, such as economic crises during a serious
confrontation, thereby helping decrease United States incentives for
pursuing conflict. Most Russian military planners and theorists see
assured information superiority as essential for successful American
military action and assert that Moscow must be able to eliminate or
seriously degrade this advantage.
The speed and capabilities of undersea cables vary widely depending
on region. Undersea cables are primarily owned and operated by foreign
cable owners, telecommunication services providers, and the maritime
service sector. The Atlantic Ocean bears a high volume of modern
undersea cables that provide communications services between the North
American and European continents. The latency--the time it takes for
data to traverse the network--limits the industry's ability to restore
communications by rerouting data over alternative cables and causes
disruptions to critical services dependent of timely transfer of data,
in the event of a major transatlantic outage.
In the event of such an outage, the United States would need to
transfer data over Pacific and Indian Ocean cables, and then to Europe.
The data would take approximately 10 times longer to reach its
destination, resulting in widespread service disruptions.
We have and will continue to discuss this issue with Allies.
israel
30. Senator Blumenthal. General Scaparrotti, the United States must
continue to strengthen its relationship with Israel through ongoing
security cooperation. Just this week, the annual joint United States-
Israel military drill ``Juniper Cobra'' began in Israel--involving more
than 2,500 American troops and 2,000 Israelis. Can you provide an
update on how this year's Juniper Cobra drill is progressing in its
early days? What do you hope to achieve or learn this time around?
General Scaparrotti. Juniper Cobra 2018 (JC18) began on March 4,
2018 and concluded on March 15, 2018. United States forces integrated
with Israeli forces to train for the combined defense of Israel against
a ballistic missile attack. United States forces were able to integrate
Aegis, Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Air Defense missile defense
systems into Israeli defensive systems. Additionally, the United States
conducted a crisis resupply exercise, a mass casualty medical exercise,
and a combined United States-Israeli Patriot missile live fire
exercise. JC18 was an overwhelming success and enabled our forces to
practice integration into the Israeli air defense architecture, refine
our combined standard operating procedures, exercise our reception,
staging, onward movement and integration processes and train for the
logistical support of deployed forces. While simultaneously exercising
the defense of Israel, JC18 allowed United States forces to conduct a
computer simulated exercise focused on the evacuation of non-combatant
civilians from Lebanon. Collectively, JC18 allowed both United States
and Israeli forces to exercise and refine defensive tactics,
techniques, and procedures and identify gaps and seams in our
capabilities. JC18 was USEUCOM's premiere military exercise for fiscal
year 2018 and demonstrated the United States' commitment to the defense
of Israel and to the overall stability of the region.
31. Senator Blumenthal. General Scaparrotti, how else is EUCOM
working to strengthen cooperation with Israel in an increasingly
conflicted region?
General Scaparrotti. UCOM frequently engages, with all levels of
leadership, to strengthen our already solid relationship and
partnership with Israel, one of our longest standing partners in the
Levant region. We maintain cooperation and dialogue at the highest
levels of the command. Additionally, we conduct a series of exercises
with Israel, the scope of which I intend to expand to incorporate
CENTCOM and SOCOM.
My deputy commander, Lieutenant General Timothy Ray, has met
recently with his Israeli, CENTCOM, and SOCOM counterparts to discuss
expanded planning opportunities. These discussions focus on countering
Iranian malign influence in Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen. The government
of Israel has clearly signaled that continued Iranian expeditionary
operations in these countries is an unacceptable risk that demands
action. EUCOM and CENTCOM planners are working with the Israel Defense
Forces (IDF), within United States policy and authorities, to develop
options that will maximize the unique access, placement, and capability
of each partner to act on this threat.
As I work with CENTCOM and SOCOM to expand our relationship with
Israel, and since EUCOM is responsible for managing the military-to-
military relationship with Israel, I have asked my team to re-examine
the Strategic Cooperation Initiative Program (SCIP) to ensure that our
myriad complimentary efforts progress toward well-developed and
combined goals. In so doing, we will synchronize regional efforts among
three combatant commands and Israel.
Our future planning with Israel is principally based on guidance
from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a directive from the
Secretary of Defense. EUCOM has also begun planning for our next
iteration of Juniper series exercises, which will rehearse assistance
to the Defense of Israel. I will seek to incorporate CENTCOM and SOCOM
into future Juniper series exercises. The operational environment to
Israel's east has changed greatly in the last two years. As such, a
successful United States contribution to the defense of Israel requires
a hard look at the role of CENTCOM and SOCOM in the future of Israel's
defense. As these expanded defensive planning efforts progress, we will
include the Government of Israel to the greatest extent possible
without inadvertently emboldening unilateral Israeli action.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Donnelly
eucom cooperation with israel
32. Senator Donnelly. General Scaparrotti, last year you testified
in great detail about the importance of the EUCOM mission to assist in
the defense of Israel. There has been important cooperation between
United States and Israeli forces this year, including through the
Juniper Cobra missile defense exercise. What cooperative activities are
you planning with Israel for the coming year?
General Scaparrotti. I would like to clarify that Exercise Juniper
Cobra 18 rehearsed more than just the United States support to the
ballistic missile defense of Israel. We took a multifaceted approach to
exercise the entirety of our plan to assist in the defense of Israel.
This included logistical support through our crisis resupply program
and rehearsed the release of War Reserve Stocks for Allies--Israel.
Additionally, my team incorporated combined training between Israel
Defense Forces (IDF) and the United States Marine Corps' 26th Marine
Expeditionary Unit.
Our next major training exercise with Israel will be in February/
March of 2019 named Juniper Falcon 19. It will exercise scenarios
similar to those in Juniper Cobra 18 and will incorporate lessons
learned from this year's exercise while focusing on the nascent stages
of potential regional conflict. Planning for this exercise will take
place throughout 2018 via a sequence of combined conferences. We also
maintain a series of events dedicated to missile defense and testing
led by United States Air Forces Europe (USAFE) and United States Army
Europe (USAREUR). These events are designed to improve our partnered
capacity and capability in missile defense. Each service component
conducts rhythmic exercises with Israeli counterparts. USAFE
participates in the Israel Air Force-hosted Exercise Blue Flag, which
tests the interoperability of regional air forces' tactics, techniques,
and procedures. United States Naval Forces Europe (NAVEUR) conducts
annual Search and Rescue, Explosive Ordinance Disposal, and dive-
salvage exercises on a rotational basis. USAREUR will exercise airborne
assault operations with the IDF's parachute regiment during Exercise
Sabre Strike in June 2018.
We continue combined dialogue with the IDF through the Strategic
Cooperation Initiative Program (SCIP), which includes elements of U.S.
Central Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, and the Joint Staff
to the greatest extent possible. Through the SCIP, we plan our combined
events and discuss complimentary planning efforts. There are at least
12 such engagements already planned in the third quarter of fiscal year
2018.
Lastly, I should note that we maintain dialogue at the highest
levels with our IDF partners. I regularly meet with my IDF counterpart,
Lieutenant General Gadi Eizenkot, members of his staff, and General
Joseph Votel, Commander, USCENTCOM, to discuss progress and stability
in the Levant region. In fact, I last met with Lieutenant General
Eizenkot and his staff on 11 March. My Deputy Commander, Lieutenant
General Timothy Ray, conducts similar events with his USCENTCOM and IDF
colleagues. His next meeting with our IDF partners is scheduled at the
end of May 2018.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Maize Hirono
nato reorganization--two new commands
33. Senator Hirono. General Scaparrotti, NATO has undertaken a
reorganization to proactively combat Russian aggression. Part of this
reorganization includes two new operational commands focused on moving
allied forces back and forth across the Atlantic Ocean, and moving with
greater speed around Europe. The two new commands are reported to be a
joint forces and a logistics support command.
What is the status of the reorganization and what are the strategic
implications and benefits of the new commands?
General Scaparrotti. On 14 February 2018, at the meeting of NATO
Defense Ministers in Brussels, Secretary Mattis announced the United
States will lead the establishment of a new Joint Force Command for the
Atlantic (JFC-Norfolk). Detailed implementation planning is underway
and work on the new JFC concept has been initiated with the office of
Chief of Naval Operations in the lead. Close coordination is being
conducted with NATO's Strategic Commands (Allied Command Operations and
Allied Command Transformation) and USEUCOM in order to define mission,
roles, responsibilities, and authorities. This JFC will provide NATO
with the capacity to plan and conduct operations in the North Atlantic
ensuring sea lines of communication between North America and Europe
are protected. This reinforces Alliance deterrence and ensures a ready
defense when needed.
NATO Defense Ministers also approved the establishment of a new
support Command for logistics, reinforcement and military mobility.
Germany will lead its establishment. Germany has also initiated its
work on a concept for the mission working closely with the NATO
Strategic Commands. This new Joint Support and Enabling Command will
provide NATO with the capacity to secure the timely movement of troops
and supplies to where operationally required to preserve deterrence and
defend if necessary.
34. Senator Hirono. How will the two new commands impact readiness
and training?
General Scaparrotti. Both commands, the Joint Force Command for the
Atlantic and the Support Command for logistics, reinforcement and
military mobility will contribute to NATO readiness and speed the
ability of the Alliance to respond. They will improve NATO's ability to
command and control forces, enhance capability for planning, establish
their proficiency and certification through exercising, and maintain
relationships with the other relevant NATO Command and Force
structures. In this way, they both will improve Alliance readiness and
training and ensure a credible deterrence and defense posture is
maintained.
cyber security--nato cyber center planned
35. Senator Hirono. General Scaparrotti, we are aware that Russia
has conducted cyber operations in various countries including the
Ukraine and Montenegro, by attacking military communications, secure
databases, election infrastructure, as well as power grids. Another
reported priority of NATO is the establishment of a new cyber center,
one that is intended to bolster defenses against Russian intrusions to
power grids and misinformation campaigns.
What are some of the lessons learned in terms of what has worked to
effectively combat Russian cyber operations in Europe?
General Scaparrotti. The most important lesson learned by both
USEUCOM and NATO is that the United States, Allies and partners must
demonstrate both the ability and the political will to combat Russian
activities in cyberspace. Our ability to deny Russian cyber actors
access to critical systems relies on information sharing and
implementation of cybersecurity best practices to minimize exposure and
risk to critical systems. Information sharing is a cornerstone of
effective cyber security and relies on close and open relationships
between Allies and Partners. Once identified, indicators of compromise
must be disseminated to deny Russian cyber actors the ability to use
the same techniques multiple times. This information shapes cyber
security best practices, including the maintenance, protection, and
defense of both government and private networks. Well maintained
networks provide a significant obstacle to Russian cyber actors,
raising costs and resources associated with successfully attacking
Allied or Partner networks.
36. Senator Hirono. General Scaparrotti, what is the current status
of the cyber center?
General Scaparrotti. NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg announced
the NATO Cyberspace Operations Center in November, 2017; its role in
the Alliance's operations is evolving and maturing. The Cyber Center is
not aligned against any specific threat or area, but will rather serve
as a focal point for NATO's common defense concept for the cyber
domain. The most pressing work involves normalizing attribution of
where information comes from and information sharing agreements.
Although all nations endorse the concept of information sharing, most
are reluctant to put their specific sources, means and methods at risk.
Discussions are ongoing to address these concerns, and the Cyber Center
expects to achieve initial operating capability by autumn of 2019.
37. Senator Hirono. General Scaparrotti, what is your greatest
Russia cyber concern that you hope the cyber center will work to
counter (infrastructure/grid, elections, or social media servers)?
General Scaparrotti. NATO Allies and Partners have watched Russia
aggressively exploit diverse portions of European civilian and
government infrastructure to achieve both military and civilian goals.
These activities cross national borders and require timely and open
information sharing. The NATO Cyberspace Operations Center is intended
to facilitate the sharing of cyberspace information, including
indications and warnings, of future and on-going cyber actions between
Allies and Partners. Sharing information will facilitate both denying
Russian access to critical civilian and military systems and aid in
restoral following an attack or successful intrusion. Through
information sharing, the NATO Cyber Center will serve as a focal point
for a collective cyber defense effort among Allies and Partners.
energy resilience--dependency on russian natural gas
38. Senator Hirono. General Scaparrotti, the Congressional Research
Service reported that Russia is Europe's main energy supplier, and that
40 percent of the European Union's natural gas is supplied by Russia. A
large portion of that natural gas flows through the Ukraine, as
tensions remain. Complicating matters, Russian companies and their
subsidiaries have significant ownership stakes in European energy
infrastructure, including pipelines, distribution, and storage
facilities.
Most recently, Russia's state-owned gas company Gazprom announced
it will cut ties with Kiev-based Naftogaz. This was spurred by a
Stockholm arbitration court's award to Naftogaz that resulted from a
four-year legal battle. The decision by Russia's Gazprom to cut
supplies could lead to gas shortages in European Union countries and in
Ukraine.
General Scaparrotti, what are your thoughts on this announcement?
What impact would the reduction in supplies of natural gas have on
Europe, NATO, and EUCOM?
General Scaparrotti. This seems to be Russia's standard operating
procedure. They do not get their way, so they threaten to, or actually
cut energy supplies to the other party in a dispute. This is not the
action of a reliable partner and supplier. A reduction in supplies of
natural gas to Europe could have a broad impact, depending on the size,
location, time of year, and duration of the supply disruption. Eastern
European countries that are heavily reliant on Russian supplies would
be hit the hardest. Loss of gas supplies could impact power generation
and grid stability, industrial activities, and/or home and building
heating, depending on the country in question. This could have an
adverse effect on force readiness and operational capacity as NATO
defense forces rely on host nation-supplied electricity and other
platforms that may be supported with natural gas. Our partners may also
be forced to make decisions that run contrary to the U.S. interests;
the pressing need to sustain energy supplies could outweigh alliance
commitments.
39. Senator Hirono. General Scaparrotti, should we be more
aggressive with sanctions to counter measures such as this one? What
would you recommend?
General Scaparrotti. I will defer to Congress and the broader
interagency process as to how to proceed with specific sanctions
measures to counter Russian malign influence. What I can say is that
Russia continues its efforts to undermine American international
leadership and fracture the alliance. Its brazen actions must be met
with a strong and coordinated Alliance response, including a strong
whole-of-government focus from the United States. As I mentioned in my
testimony, countering Russian actions is not a DOD only activity but
needs to be a coordinated whole-of-government approach that utilizes
all of the tools of our elements of power--diplomatic, information,
military, and economic.
north korean and russian nuclear capabilities
40. Senator Hirono. General Scaparrotti, despite reports that North
Korea is willing to sit down and negotiate denuclearization, we know
that the Pyongyang is committed to developing a long-range, nuclear-
armed missile that is capable of posing a direct threat to the United
States, and that it continues to conduct a large number of ballistic
missile tests.
We also cannot forget about Russia. The Kremlin now claims a new
class of hypersonic glide vehicle under development that will allow
Russia strategic missiles to penetrate our missile defense systems.
What are your thoughts on North Korea's perceived willingness to
negotiate their nuclear capabilities?
General Scaparrotti. We concur with PACOM's statement of suspicion
regarding North Korea's intent and the truthfulness of Pyongyang's
words. North Korea has a long and undistinguished track record of
broken promises dating back to the 1994 Agreed Framework. However, if
we take Kim Jong-un at his word and assume he actually is willing to
negotiate, this might signal an important shift in his perspective.
Any change in Kim Jong-un's willingness to negotiate is likely
being driven by a combination of key factors: sanctions and economic
pressure, diplomatic isolation, military pressure, and Pyongyang's
perceived strengthened negotiating position.
Although difficult to quantify, sanctions are impacting North
Korea. Amid rising prices and limited availability, Kim Jong-un has
been forced to issue edicts to the populace to mitigate impacts.
Sanctions circumvention is also becoming more difficult, and North
Korea is also grappling with the forced return of a sizeable percentage
of its overseas workers, an important piece of North Korea's GDP.
North Korea has no friends, and even its few ``business
associates'' have largely turned their back. North Korean relations
have deteriorated across the board over the past year. Despite this,
Kim Jong-un may think recent missile and nuclear tests put him in a
fundamentally better negotiating position.
Although Kim Jong-un is likely overconfident in the Korean People's
Army, he probably understands that fighting the United States would not
end well for him, and North Korea is sensitive to the United States
military presence on the peninsula. In exchange for steps towards
denuclearization, Kim may seek concessions from the United States such
as removal of forces from the Korean peninsula or promises to never use
nuclear weapons against North Korea. This would be consistent with 2016
regime statements and with Kim's likely desire to ensure regime
survival and safety for North Korea.
41. Senator Hirono. General Scaparrotti, can you shed some light on
the current capabilities of Russia? How concerned should we be of
Putin's recent claims?
General Scaparrotti. Russia is developing an intercontinental-range
hypersonic glide vehicle intended to defeat ballistic missile defenses.
In reference to the President Putin's claim that you raised, Putin
stated Russia's newest strategic weapon system, ``Avangard,'' differs
from exisiting systems because its payload can perform intercontinental
flights in dense atmospheric layers at a hypersonic speed exceeding
Mach 20. He said the system performs wide-range horizontal and vertical
maneuvers to defeat missile defense systems. Russian military and
civilian leadership continue to claim that Russia is producing a
variety of systems to defeat United States missile defenses.
russia and china force modernization efforts
42. Senator Hirono. General Scaparrotti, in your testimony, you
mention that the Russian military is improving and modernizing its
capabilities, enhancing its ability to be a more agile force capable of
executing operations across the entire spectrum of modern warfare. And
that Moscow's strategic armament program has led to increased defense
spending with an estimated investment of $285 billion in modernization
from 2011 through 2020.
Can you compare and contrast the modernization of Russia with that
of China?
General Scaparrotti. Russia and China pose an enduring threat to
United States and Allied interests. There are similarities in each
country's military modernization programs and in our understanding of
their approaches to conflict. Both are developing precision kinetic and
non-kinetic capabilities capable of achieving strategic effects in all
domains--ground, air, sea, space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic. They
are both developing asymmetric capabilities and strategies most likely
to exploit perceived vulnerabilities in United States and United
States-led military coalition capabilities, and which could be used to
challenge United States force projection. Russian military
modernization will support its posture to readily apply military force
in response to crises--directly or indirectly--across the extent of
Eurasia as well as advance its interests over the long term in Europe,
the Arctic, the Middle East, Central Asia, and parts of East Asia. Both
countries will continue to develop capabilities to sufficiently defend
and pursue their interests at the expense of our own for the
foreseeable future.
Russia and China are developing formidable space and cyberspace
capabilities which will extend their reach and allow them to challenge
United States dominated space-enabled warfare capability. Russia and
China continue to develop nuclear or conventional cruise missiles
capable of striking CONUS and United States assets across the globe.
Both Russia and China are reestablishing and refining their
capabilities to conduct long duration blue water operations in an
expanding sphere of naval influence, and potential threats to United
States and allied interests in multiple theaters.
Russia's operational experience in Syria has refined its ability to
conduct testing its precision strike, indirect fires, air defense and
special operations. Russia demonstrated an ability to conduct limited
expeditionary operations for the first time in decades. Russia gained
similar operational experience--direct and indirect--in illegal
annexation of Crimea and its on-going involvement in Ukraine. Both
situations will develop tactics, techniques and procedures, military
training, and drive defense acquisition program priorities.
China does not have the same ability to operationally field its
equipment in an active military conflict, but dominating its theater of
influence. China continues to develop a comparable global strike
capability. and has the ability to threaten United States allies and
interests in the Indo-Pacific region. China's continued development of
military outposts with the goal of projected sovereignty in the South
China Sea has strengthened China's military power projection along the
coasts of its neighbors. China developed 72 new acres above and below
ground in 2017 alone. In addition, the considerable amount of natural
resources of these areas continues to disadvantage China's neighboring
countries under the guise of historic cultural dominion.
While China maintains a stronger economic standing, the continued
integration of Chinese and Russian strategic interests emboldens their
developing bilateral relationship. This compounds the threat to United
States and allied interests. Russia and China are developing multiple
trade, development, and security agreements. Further military
integration and training will probably be propelled by shared economic
stimulus. Plans to develop central Asian markets will also envigorate
both economies in the long term. Progressive collaboration will
decrease vulnerability of either nation to western trade sanctions,
eroding the ability of the west to check and limit hostile actions
through civil means. China's projected military investment for 2018 is
approximately $175 billion dollars, compared to $65 billion for Russia.
Hydrocarbon revenues account for nearly half of Russia's budget, and
its economic growth in recent years has been strained by depressed oil
prices, trade restrictions, and sanctions. Conversely, China's diverse,
export-based economy returned ``an average of nearly 10 percent growth
rates for almost four decades.''
Over the long term, both countries, individually and combined, will
pose challenges to U.S. military power projection in all warfighting
and geographic domains.
43. Senator Hirono. General Scaparrotti, are you concerned with the
pace of Russia's and China's force modernization efforts? What should
be the United States response to their efforts?
General Scaparrotti. We are concerned that Russia and China pose an
enduring threat to United States and Allied interests. There are
similarities in each country's military modernization programs and in
our understanding of their approaches to conflict. Both are developing
precision kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities capable of achieving
strategic effects in all domains--ground, air, sea, space, cyberspace,
and electromagnetic. They are both developing asymmetric capabilities
and strategies most likely to exploit perceived vulnerabilities in
United States and United States-led military coalition capabilities,
and which could be used to challenge United States force projection.
Russian military modernization will support its posture to readily
apply military force in response to crises--directly or indirectly--
across the extent of Eurasia as well as advance its interests over the
long term in Europe, the Arctic, the Middle East, Central Asia, and
parts of East Asia. Both countries will continue to develop
capabilities to sufficiently defend and pursue their interests at the
expense of our own for the foreseeable future.
Russia and China are developing formidable space and cyberspace
capabilities which will extend their reach and allow them to challenge
United States dominated space-enabled warfare capability. Russia and
China continue to develop nuclear or conventional cruise missiles
capable of striking CONUS and United States assets across the globe.
Both Russia and China are reestablishing and refining their
capabilities to conduct long duration blue water operations in an
expanding sphere of naval influence, and potential threats to United
States and allied interests in multiple theaters.
Russia's operational experience in Syria has refined its ability to
conduct testing its precision strike, indirect fires, air defense and
special operations. Russia demonstrated an ability to conduct limited
expeditionary operations for the first time in decades. Russia gained
similar operational experience--direct and indirect--in illegal
annexation of Crimea and its on-going involvement in Ukraine. Both
situations will develop tactics, techniques and procedures, military
training, and drive defense acquisition program priorities.
China does not have the same ability to operationally field its
equipment in an active military conflict, but dominating its theater of
influence. China continues to develop a comparable global strike
capability. and has the ability to threaten United States allies and
interests in the Indo-Pacific region. China's continued development of
military outposts with the goal of projected sovereignty in the South
China Sea has strengthened China's military power projection along the
coasts of its neighbors. China developed 72 new acres above and below
ground in 2017 alone. In addition, the considerable amount of natural
resources of these areas continues to disadvantage China's neighboring
countries under the guise of historic cultural dominion.
While China maintains a stronger economic standing, the continued
integration of Chinese and Russian strategic interests emboldens their
developing bilateral relationship. This compounds the threat to United
States and allied interests. Russia and China are developing multiple
trade, development, and security agreements. Further military
integration and training will probably be propelled by shared economic
stimulus. Plans to develop central Asian markets will also invigorate
both economies in the long term. Progressive collaboration will
decrease vulnerability of either nation to western trade sanctions,
eroding the ability of the west to check and limit hostile actions
through civil means. China's projected military investment for 2018 is
approximately $175 billion, compared to $65 billion for Russia.
Hydrocarbon revenues account for nearly half of Russia's budget, and
its economic growth in recent years has been strained by depressed oil
prices, trade restrictions, and sanctions. Conversely, China's diverse,
export-based economy returned ``an average of nearly 10 percent growth
rates for almost four decades.''
Over the long term, both countries, individually and combined, will
pose challenges to U.S. military power projection in all warfighting
and geographic domains. The United States needs to be prepared to
respond to and counter the modernization efforts of both Russia and
China, but we should also pursue innovative strategies to maintain our
advantage.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Gary Peters
nato strategic communications
44. Senator Peters. General Scaparrotti, the Fiscal Year 2018
National Defense Authorization Act included Senate report language that
``urges the Secretary of Defense to assign appropriate personnel to the
NATO Strategic Communications Center of Excellence.'' Have any United
States personnel been assigned to the Center?
General Scaparrotti. USEUCOM submitted the required documentation
to the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy in February 2018,
to include a legal and fiscal review of the Center. Once OSD approves
these documents and State Department agrees, I can assign an officer to
the Center. In order to comply with 10 USC 344 pertaining to NATO
Centers of Excellence, this process typically takes 18-24 months.
45. Senator Peters. General Scaparrotti, please provide an overview
of NATO and EUCOM strategic communications operations, including the
number of personnel assigned to strategic communications positions and
how EUCOM and NATO organizations interact.
General Scaparrotti. The United States currently has 24 military
officers assigned to NATO in Information Operations (IO), Strategic
Communications, or Strategic Analysis/Plans positions. The NATO Center
of Excellence for Strategic Communications (StratCom COE) is dedicated
to improving strategic communication capabilities within NATO and with
its Allied Nations. In February, 2018, USEUCOM identified a military
billet and submitted a request to the Joint Staff seeking permission to
join the NATO StratCom COE.
USEUCOM has no organizations or positions that are specifically
designated for Strategic Communications. We do have one position for a
Strategic Communicator Process Manager. That position is currently
vacant but the hiring process is underway. We have one military and
three civilian information operations planners and our Public Affairs
directorate has five military and nine civilian employees.
USEUCOM Public Affairs routinely coordinates and communicates with
NATO Public Affairs on public affairs guidance and strategic messaging
and our NATO Branch communicates with NATO staff members daily. We
participate in the NATO Assessments Working Group run by NATO's Public
Diplomacy Division to obtain an understanding of the various messaging
approaches and outputs of Allies.
APPENDIX A
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2019 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 13, 2018
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND AND UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:29 a.m. in Room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe,
presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker,
Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue,
Graham, Scott, Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, Shaheen, Gillibrand,
Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, and Peters.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Senator Inhofe. Our meeting will come to order.
The committee today meets to receive testimonies on the
posture of the United States Central and African Commands.
We welcome our witnesses, General Votel and General
Waldhauser, and thank each one of you for your great service.
In advance of this hearing, Chairman McCain asked that I
submit a statement for the record on his behalf. I will quote
that statement.
[The information referred to follows:]
The new National Defense Strategy provides a helpful
framework for prioritizing the multitude of national security
threats we face. As we turn our attention to the central
challenge of great power competition, the National Defense
Strategy challenges us to think about our efforts in the Middle
East in new and different ways. With all of the recent success
in the fight against ISIS, we must work to consolidate our
gains and move forward with a coherent regional strategy to
ensure security and stability.
The current administration has succeeded in turning the
tide in the fight against ISIS. The so-called caliphate that
once threatened to engulf the Middle East has been reduced to a
fraction of its former territory. But our hard-fought tactical
victories cannot alone secure American interests in the region,
and a single-minded focus on defeating ISIS falls far short of
the strategic clarity needed to do so. We need a coherent
strategy to account for all of the complexities of this
difficult region and demonstrate American leadership.
With a civil war raging in Syria and Assad continuing to
massacre his own people, two successive United States
administrations have failed to do anything meaningful to end
the slaughter. This administration is more than one month late
in delivering a strategy for Syria, which Congress required in
the Fiscal Year 2018 National Defense Authorization Act. With
the Assad regime poised to retake the last pockets of
resistance in Syria, we cannot delay any longer in developing a
strategy to change course.
In the absence of American leadership, others have not
hesitated to fill the void. Both Russian and Iranian influence
are only expanding in the Middle East--much to the detriment of
our interests, our values, and our partners. It is not that the
United States is not active in the region, it is that our
activities are unmoored from strategy.
From Iraq to Afghanistan and Yemen to Niger, CENTCOM and
AFRICOM face serious questions about the United States role in
ensuring stability and supporting partner forces. Without
broader strategic coherence, we cannot hope to achieve our
interests and secure peace and prosperity across these vital
regions.
I hope this hearing can shed light on what policies,
authorities, or resources our commanders on the ground need to
accomplish that mission--particularly in light of a National
Defense Strategy that identifies great power competition, not
terrorism, as the primary concern in U.S. national security. In
that context, we must be diligent in asking how CENTCOM and
AFRICOM can pursue their counterterrorism missions with greater
efficiency without compromising efficacy.
``As we turn our attention to the central challenge of
great power competition, the National Defense Strategy [NDS]
challenged us to think about our efforts in the Middle East in
new and different ways. With all of the recent success in the
fight against ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria], we must
work to consolidate our gains and move forward with a coherent
regional strategy to ensure security and stability.''
This committee looks forward to working with this year's
National Defense Authorization Act [NDAA] to provide the
policies and authorities needed to adjust to this new approach
both in the Middle East and in Africa, where the threat of
violent extremism is in increasing dramatically.
For CENTCOM [United States Central Command], over the past
year, we have seen remarkable progress in the fight against
ISIS. Military victories in Mosul and Raqqah and beyond have
helped dismantle the caliphate ISIS once claimed in the Middle
East.
At the same time, significant challenges remain in the
region. The Syrian civil war rages on. Iran continues to grow
its influence and fund its proxies. According to the region, we
face serious questions about the Kurds, many of whom have
fought by our side valiantly.
For AFRICOM [United States Africa Command], I will make one
statement that I think is significant for us to keep in mind
for the purpose of this hearing.
General Waldhauser, it is my understanding the
investigation into the October 2017 ambush in Niger by ISIS-
affiliated fighters that killed four United States soldiers is
completed. I understand it is now pending review by the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dunford, and the
Secretary of Defense, Jim Mattis. After his approval, AFRICOM
will immediately offer a brief to the families of the four
soldiers if they desire prior to any in-depth briefing to
Congress. Obviously, we want the families to have an
opportunity know what happened to their loved ones.
Accordingly, I understand that you are not able to comment
on the investigation's results during this posture hearing. At
the conclusion of the briefs to the families, I know you will
be providing us with a thorough briefing of the investigation's
findings and recommendations.
Now, we want to talk about Africa and AFRICOM. Our troops
have an important mission there to train and assist regional
partners so that they will be capable of handling security
threats before they become global crises. Our engagements in
Africa are critical not only to regional stability but to our
own national security, but it lacks dedicated troops,
resources, sufficient basing, and strategic access.
Senator Reed?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank our witnesses for appearing today, for also
your service and the service of the men and women you command.
Thank you very much and thank them, please.
You are leading your commands in very challenging times. We
are in the 16th year of military engagement in Afghanistan, for
example. Early last year, General Nicholson, Commander of
United States Forces Afghanistan, testified we were facing a
stalemate. Since that time, the [Trump] administration has
announced a new South Asian strategy, articulated a negotiated
settlement as the desired end state, moved additional forces
into the theater to support the military elements of the
strategy, and curtailed security assistance to Pakistan.
Despite these shifts, 2017 continued to be plagued by
widespread violence and instability in Afghanistan as the
Taliban expanded their territorial control and conducted a
number of large-scale attacks against military and civilian
targets.
In addition, ISIS-Khorasan remains resilient despite
significant pressure.
While the administration has clearly laid out a military
strategy, battlefield victories are hollow without political
and economic progress, both of which seem stalled in
Afghanistan.
However, the Trump administration has yet to articulate the
political governance or economic aspects of the strategy, much
less the associated staffing and resources that will be
required to implement it.
General Votel, I am interested in your assessment of the
situation in Afghanistan. I am sure all of my colleagues are
also.
In Iraq and Syria, the destruction of the so-called
physical caliphate previously enjoyed by ISIS is a significant
victory, and I commend the administration and your leadership
and your colleagues too for this United States-led
international coalition. Our Iraq and Syria partners on the
ground have done so much. However, ISIS is not defeated and
will remain a threat for the foreseeable future.
Additionally, the underlying issues that gave rise to ISIS
in the first place remain unaddressed. We need strong United
States diplomatic leadership to help bring about the necessary
political accommodations that will give Sunni communities a
stake in their future and to bring the international community
together to assist communities recovering from ISIS.
As some experts have stated, the seeds of the next
insurgency are sown in the rubble of Mosul and Raqqah. In Iraq
alone, the cost of reconstruction is expected to be at least
$88 billion, and the international community has pledged less
than one-third of that amount.
I am deeply concerned that the administration's
marginalization of our diplomatic corps undermines our ability
to stabilize the areas once held by ISIS, as well as the
broader region. It is notable that across the CENTCOM and
AFRICOM areas of responsibility, a number of ambassadorial
posts remain vacant, most notably in Jordan and Somalia, where
I recently visited, but also in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Libya, and
Egypt. This is not a question of congressional inaction. No
nominations have been forthcoming, and I am sure our
colleagues, all of them, would rapidly move to consider
nominees for these very important positions.
Military power alone will not be enough to address the
national security challenges we face in these complicated
regions in any enduring way. We must have the people in place
to help ensure our long-term strategic objectives are met.
On Iran, the President risks creating a foreign policy
crisis by threatening to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action, or JCPOA. By all accounts, the JCPOA is working
as intended, and Iran is verifiably meeting its commitments
under the agreement. Let there be no doubt. Iran continues to
be a state sponsor of terror and abuser of human rights. Iran
continues to destabilize the region through its development of
ballistic missiles and support for proxies in Iraq, Syria,
Lebanon, Yemen, and elsewhere. The JCPOA was not intended to
address all of Iran's bad behavior, just the nuclear aspect. If
Iran behaves this way without a nuclear weapon, imagine how
much worse it would be with a nuclear-armed force.
Withdrawing from the JCPOA would be a devastating blow not
only for the Middle East, but also for our efforts
diplomatically with North Korea and for any future diplomatic
efforts to constrain aggressive behavior by our adversaries.
General Votel, I am interested in hearing if you, like
Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, believe that remaining in
the deal is in the best interest of the nation.
In Africa, the importance of relationships is paramount as
we seek to engage by, with, and through our partners in the
furtherance of our shared security goals. I recently traveled
to East Africa where I saw firsthand the ongoing efforts to
disrupt violent extremists and build capacity with critical
partners in places like Djibouti and Somalia. I also saw the
challenges from competitors, such as China and Russia, who are
actively seeking investments and involvement across the
continent.
Despite some battlefield success against groups like Al
Shabaab, Boko Haram, and ISIS affiliates, many governments in
the region have struggled to translate security gains into
durable outcomes.
As we turn our attention to the great power competition
articulated by the National Defense Strategy, we must be
mindful not to focus exclusively on these issues at the expense
of other threats such as terrorist organizations, rogue
regimes, and other non-state actors and criminal organizations,
issues that are unfortunately present in both of your commands.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your service.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
We will now have opening statements by our two guests, and
your entire statement will be made a part of the record.
General Votel?
STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOSEPH L. VOTEL, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
General Votel. Senator Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed,
distinguished members of the committee, good morning and thank
you for the opportunity to appear today to discuss the current
posture and state of readiness of the United States Central
Command.
I am pleased to be here today with my fellow combatant
commander and fellow Minnesotan, General Tom Waldhauser of the
United States Africa Command.
I come before you today on behalf of over 80,000 members of
the command, U.S. military, civilians, and coalition members
from 71 nations. In the most complex area of the globe, they
serve and sacrifice on a daily basis, in many cases for the
benefit of not only American strategic interests but also the
world's. Our people are the very best at what they do, and they
and especially their families deserve our admiration and
gratitude. It is my sincere honor to lead and be a member of
such a fine team and dedicated professionals.
Since I last appeared before the committee last year, we
have made considerable military progress across the region.
However, as we consolidate our gains in places like Iraq,
Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, we remain clear-eyed about the
challenges that the region continues to present. In the past
year, we have achieved incredible success against ISIS in both
Iraq and Syria. The Iraqi Security Forces and the Syrian
Democratic Forces are operating at their most effective levels
and have liberated over 98 percent of the territory previously
held by ISIS. The destruction of the ISIS physical caliphate is
within our grasp and thousands of displaced persons are
returning home and beginning the long task of rebuilding. Now
we must consolidate gains by investing in the security forces,
relationships, and capabilities that will hold the territory
and keep ISIS from returning.
Based upon that progress, CENTCOM is conducting an
operational alignment and rebalancing effort to achieve three
goals.
The first goal is to complete major combat operations in
Iraq and Syria to bring the Defeat ISIS campaign to a
responsible close. Military success in the campaign presents us
an opportunity to reposition forces from Iraq and Syria to
Afghanistan in a manner that keeps the pressure on ISIS but
also sets us up to break the stalemate in Afghanistan. We
retain sufficient capability to continue our efforts against
ISIS despite the increasingly complex situation across Syria
and especially in the northwest province of Afrin. Our partners
on the ground in Syria have gotten us a long way in Syria
toward our objectives, and we must stick with them through the
completion of this fight.
In Iraq, the Iraqi Security Forces are rapidly
consolidating gains and preparing to support elections later
this spring.
The second goal is to prioritize the implementation of the
South Asia strategy in Afghanistan, reaffirming our enduring
commitment to Afghanistan by reinforcing the two complementary
military missions: the NATO-led [North Atlantic Treaty
Organization] train, advise, and assist mission, and the United
States counterterrorism mission. With our support, the Afghan
National Defense and Security Forces are well postured to begin
operations to seize the initiative, to expand population
control and secure credible elections.
Part and parcel of this effort is our regionalized approach
to engage all countries with a stake in Afghanistan's
stability, especially Pakistan where we seek a more productive
and trustful relationship that benefits our mutual objectives
in the region.
The third goal is to ensure that we have aligned our
military efforts with our broader interagency and international
activities to neutralize, counterbalance, and shape the
destabilizing impact of Iran. Make no mistake. Iran's malign
activities across the region pose the long-term threat to
stability in this part of the world.
The recently published National Defense Strategy rightly
identifies the resurgence of great power competition as our
principal national security challenge, and we see the effects
of that competition throughout the region. Russia's support of
the Assad regime has not only propped him up but has also added
complexity to the Defeat ISIS campaign. Moscow plays both
arsonist and fire fighter, fueling tensions among the Syrian
regime, Iran, Turkey, the Syrian Democratic Forces, the United
States, and other coalition partners, then serving as a
supposed arbiter to resolve disputes. Today, Russia's
manipulative behavior has placed our campaign progress at risk
with activities that are not focused on the defeat of ISIS, but
rather preserving their influence and control over the outcome
of the situation.
China is pursuing long-term, steady economic growth in the
region through its One Belt, One Road policy, but it is also
improving military posture and force projection by connecting
ports such as Gwadar in Pakistan with its first overseas
military base in Djibouti, adjacent to the critical Bab al
Mandeb Strait.
Both China and Russia not only seek to fill in perceived
gaps in United States influence with increasing defense
cooperation and sales of their equipment to regional partners,
but they are also cultivating multi-dimensional ties to Iran.
Against this backdrop of increasing great power interaction
are the enduring issues of the region: social, economic, and
political challenges, high unemployment, falling oil prices, a
youth bulge, large numbers of refugees, and longstanding border
conflicts. We in CENTCOM stand ready with all of our partners
to defend U.S. interests against these and other threats. Our
strategic approach of preparing the environment, pursuing
opportunities, and prevailing wherever we can is working. We
are postured for purpose, proactive in pursuing opportunities,
and resolved to win.
I would like to close by sharing three dynamics that we
assess are essential to prevailing in this region.
First, in the conduct of our campaigns in Iraq, Syria,
Afghanistan, Yemen, Lebanon, and Egypt, we have adopted a by,
with, and through approach that places a heavy reliance on
indigenous partner forces. While this approach does present its
own challenges and can be more time consuming, it importantly
provides local solutions to local problems. This approach is
not without risk, as we are seeing unfold in northern Syria
today, but it is proving very effective and will pay
significant dividends going forward.
Second, successful pursuit of U.S. objectives in this
region comes only from an integrated approach aligned with
interorganizational partners. Defense of the nation is a team
sport. This applies not just within the command but with our
fellow combatant commands, the central region's 18 country
teams, other departments, agencies, and organizations of the
U.S. Government and, most importantly, our coalition partners
who have provided unwavering support for nearly two decades of
persistent conflict. As the National Defense Strategy captures
clearly, strengthening existing relationships and building new
ones will be key to our future success.
Finally, we could not do what we do on a daily basis
without the support of Congress and, by extension, the American
people. We sincerely appreciate this committee's continued
strong support for our operations, authorities, and resources
and especially for your support to the services, SOCOM [United
States Special Operations Command], and the other defense
agencies that we rely upon for our military wherewithal. Your
support will remain important as we contend with what
potentially are generational struggles to defend our Homeland
from the threats outlined in our National Defense Strategy.
Thank you again, and I look forward to answering your
questions.
[The prepared statement of General Votel follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Joseph L. Votel
introduction
Last month I walked down the main street of Raqqah, the former
capital of the brutal Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Amidst
the mountains of rubble, reminiscent of European cities in World War
II, vegetable sellers and falafel carts have set up shop, Raqqawi
citizens are coordinating reconstruction efforts, and children are
preparing to return to school--evidence of the indomitable spirit of
the Syrian population.
Our Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and partners, in particular the
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), have
made extraordinary progress for over 3 years, liberating Mosul and
Raqqah--the former capitals of ISIS's self-proclaimed ``caliphate.''
Now, more than 98 percent of the territory in Iraq and Syria formerly
held by ISIS is no longer under their control. In Afghanistan, our
Operation Enduring Freedom Coalition of 39 countries is supporting an
increasingly capable Afghan National Defense and Security Forces
(ANDSF) as they destroy Taliban and ISIS safe havens, remove terrorists
from the battlefield, and establish the conditions for greater Afghan
governmental control. United States Navy vessels and the Combined
Maritime Force (CMF) patrol the Gulf and Red Sea, ensuring the free
flow of commerce through these strategic waterways. Every day, our
military and civilian personnel, forward deployed across the region,
conduct training exercises and strengthen our partners' abilities to
defend themselves from external threats and challenge violent extremism
within their borders. These activities, paired with robust diplomatic
efforts from our country teams also help balance against Iran's
destabilizing influence in the region.
Our success over the last year is largely due to the unyielding
support of our allies, tremendous cooperation with our interagency
partners, provision of additional authorities, and the continued faith
of the American people in our military. However, despite the great
strides we have made, there is much work left to do. The challenges in
the region are many: terrorism, violent conflicts, massive refugee
populations, economic stagnation, social upheaval, great power
competition, nuclear and ballistic missile threats, humanitarian
crises, and radical violent ideologies to name a few. As our country
begins to shift focus to threats in other parts of the world, the
CENTCOM region remains vital to United States' security and economic
interests. We will continue to ensure our nation's resources are
responsibly employed to protect the American people from terror,
promote American centers of trade and prosperity, and preserve peace
through strength to deter future conflicts.
centcom's challenging environment
The CENTCOM area of responsibility stretches from northeast Africa,
across the Middle East, to Central and South Asia. The twenty countries
within this vast region confront profound social, economic, and
political upheaval while simultaneously facing grave security
challenges in the form of widespread conflict, expansionist regional
powers, violent extremist organizations (VEOs), and destabilizing
behavior from outside actors. The enduring tension between the nuclear
powers of India and Pakistan remains unreconciled while fractured
states like Yemen and Syria are wrestling with enormous humanitarian
concerns. The generational Israeli-Palestinian conflict simmers
incessantly below the surface and complicates partnerships and
coordination. Iran, Russia, and China are increasingly competing to be
the partner of choice--militarily, politically, and economically--with
United States allies. Turmoil in the Central Region seldom remains
contained, and regional problems quickly become global as they bleed
across Combatant Command seams into Africa, Europe, Asia, and threaten
the United States.
Humanitarian Crises. Years of conflict in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan,
and Yemen have caused large-scale humanitarian crises, created havens
for extremism, blurred national borders, and provided Iran and Russia
opportunities to expand their influence in the region. Millions of
refugees stress Middle Eastern and European countries. The government
of Iraq, in partnership with the UN, has facilitated the return of
millions of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), but sustainable
returns are contingent on successful security and stability efforts. In
Syria, the return of displaced persons has started but the vast
majority cannot safely return to their homes until fighting has ended,
IDPs feel free from Syrian regime reprisals, and Explosive Remnants of
War (ERW) are cleared from their roads and homes. Yemen is plagued by
cholera and malnutrition, with nearly 80 percent of the population
requiring urgent humanitarian assistance.
Economic Uncertainty. Economic prospects across the region remain
hampered by poor economic policies and corruption, which are compounded
by inadequate education and health services. This has led to stagnant
economies marked by inflation, low wages, and high unemployment. Many
economies in the CENTCOM region depend on oil and gas revenues, but low
oil prices have challenged governments' abilities to balance fiscal
considerations with social contracts. Large state-owned sectors and
bloated civil service departments are a drag on economic growth and
limit opportunities for a burgeoning youth population.
Corruption inhibits reform and stabilization efforts and undermines
the population's confidence in its government. Unfortunately,
corruption in the Central Region is at historically high levels;
according to Transparency International Corruption Index, 90 percent of
countries in the Middle East score a failing grade, and CENTCOM
includes some of the most corrupt countries in the world--Syria, Yemen,
and Iraq. President Ghani is challenging persistent corruption in
Afghanistan by putting reforms in motion to fight corruption in the
military and government. Iraqi Prime Minister Abadi is working with the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to implement an
ambitious reform program, but the challenges are daunting. Some of the
countries in the region are working to address these economic
challenges; Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 program, Egypt's ambitious
macroeconomic reforms, and Jordan's concerted efforts to boost GDP
growth rates and reduce unemployment are a few examples.
Violent Extremism. The violent extremist ideologies of ISIS, al
Qaeda (AQ) and other VEOs remain a threat to the United States and our
allies and partners, not just in the CENTCOM region but worldwide.
Although ISIS has steadily lost control over physical territory and no
longer controls any major population centers in Iraq or Syria, Sunni
populations remain vulnerable to identity-based recruitment into VEOs.
Violent extremists have utilized online forums to spread violent
interpretations of Islam to audiences across the globe. The
impressionable youth in this tumultuous region, seeking community and
justice, are highly susceptible to extremists' teachings; consequently,
a new generation of radicalized followers could become online citizens
of a ``virtual caliphate,'' dedicated to the struggle against the West.
Both ISIS and AQ are resilient and have proven capable of
projecting propaganda and inspiring attacks throughout the region and
outside of the Middle East. In Egypt, ISIS has expanded its reach into
the mainland and carried out mass-casualty attacks. ISIS-Khorasan
(ISIS-K) continues to orchestrate high-profile attacks in Afghanistan.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) continues to plan attacks on
the Homeland from the ungoverned spaces in Yemen.
Proxy Warfare. The Central Region has a long history of proxy
warfare, violent militias, and irregular forces operating in the ``gray
zone''--military competition short of war. Iran has extended its
tentacles across the region through numerous proxies, including
Lebanese Hizballah operating in multiple countries, hardline Iranian-
backed Shiite Militia Groups (SMGs) in Iraq and Syria, and Iranian
support has enabled the Houthis. The result is prolonging the civil war
in Yemen, threatening Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and risking expansion
of Yemen's civil war into a regional conflict. Iran uses its proxies to
secure supply lines for malign activities and influence neighboring
governments. Militants operating out of remote areas in Pakistan
threaten Afghanistan and India.
Nuclear/Ballistic Missile Proliferation. Regional conflicts and
power imbalances drive nations to seek and acquire nuclear weapons and
extend ballistic missile capabilities to secure their influence. As an
example, Iran continues to develop advanced ballistic missile
capabilities and also transfer them to the Houthis and to its Hizballah
proxies. This will enable them to strike United States partners and
allies, and the possibility Tehran will reinvigorate its nuclear
program in the out-years of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA) remains a potential risk. Nuclear proliferation, combined with
proxy warfare, increases opportunities for miscalculation and generates
a serious threat to the region and the United States.
Regional Competitors. Iran remains the major threat to United
States interests and partnerships in the Central Region. The
competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia for influence in the region
exacerbates multiple security dilemmas throughout the Middle East--from
Iran's support of Houthis in Yemen, to Riyadh's attempt to diminish
Hizballah's authority in Lebanon. Iran is also working through proxies
and friendly political allies in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon to establish
an arc of influence, or ``Shiite Crescent'' across the Middle East. As
we navigate the many challenges and relationships in our region, we
partially view them through the lens of countering Iran and diminishing
malign influence.
We must also compete with Russia and China as they vie for access
and influence in the Central Region. Russia's presence in Syria
established Moscow as a long-term player in the region, and the Kremlin
is using the conflict in Syria to test and exercise new weapons and
tactics, often with little regard for collateral damage or civilian
casualties. An increase in Russian surface-to-air missile systems in
the region threatens our access and ability to dominate the airspace.
On the diplomatic front, Moscow is playing the role of arsonist and
firefighter--fueling the conflict in Syria between the Syrian Regime,
YPG, and Turkey, then claiming to serve as an arbiter to resolve the
dispute. Moscow continues to advocate for alternate diplomatic
initiatives to Western-led political negotiations in Syria and Afghan-
led peace processes in Afghanistan, attempting to thwart the UN's role
and limit the advance of American influence. Russia's insistence on a
separate Syrian political peace process at Astana and Sochi detracts
from the internationally-sanctioned UN talks in Geneva. In Afghanistan,
Moscow has exaggerated the presence of the ISIS-K threat, and while the
Coalition and the Afghans are the only forces actively fighting ISIS
there, Russia has used familiar propaganda techniques to brand ISIS's
presence as a United States/NATO failure.
Russia is also trying to cultivate multi-dimensional ties to Iran.
Though historic rivals, Moscow and Tehran share interests across the
region, including an overarching desire to sideline, if not expel, the
United States from the region. Russia and Iran are both trying to
bolster a brutal regime in Syria, limit United States military
influence in Iraq and Afghanistan, and fracture the longstanding United
States-Turkey strategic partnership.
Russia also maintains significant influence in Central Asia, where
the countries of the former-Soviet Union rely on Russia to varying
degrees for their economic and security needs. This is problematic as
Russia's efforts could limit United States engagement options and
provide Moscow additional levers of influence, particularly as NATO
forces deployed in Afghanistan are dependent on Central Asian partners
for logistical support. Since 2014, Russia has increased Eurasian
integration efforts to reassert Moscow's dominant influence along the
periphery or buffer zone.
Likewise, an increasingly assertive China is testing Russia's
dominance in the economic and security arenas of Central Asia but also
posing challenges to United States influence. China seeks to capitalize
on regional concerns over what it perceives as waning United States
influence and support. Toward this end, Beijing is building and
strengthening trade, infrastructure, defense, and political
relationships across the Middle East, Central and South Asia.
China is pursuing long-term, steady economic growth that bolsters
its international influence and access to energy resources. Its Belt
and Road Initiative (BRI), which includes the China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor (CPEC), could serve as a stabilizing, profit-generating
project in the region, but it could also improve China's military
posture. This collection of infrastructure projects already provides
China with access to Gwadar Port in Pakistan, which is operated through
a Chinese-Pakistani agreement and has the potential to increase China's
strategic presence in the Indian Ocean. China also recently established
its first overseas military base adjacent to the Bab al Mandeb (BAM) in
Djibouti. While Beijing claims both locations support peacekeeping and
humanitarian operations, the new military base and port allow China to
project forces more permanently within the region and influence
strategically valuable trade waterways.
China also seeks to increase its economic and diplomatic
cooperation with Iran. The lifting of UN sanctions under the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) opened the path for Iran to resume
membership application to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a
Eurasian political, economic, and security organization. This, along
with the existing BRI cooperation between the two nations, increases
China's ties to Iran.
China considers its relationship with the GCC states critical for
its current economic needs. The Gulf States provide approximately one-
third of China's oil, and Qatar is its single largest supplier of
natural gas. Like Russia, China has sought to arbitrate some conflicts
in the region, offering to mediate between Saudi Arabia and Iran. While
China will continue to develop its relationships with nations in the
Middle East, Beijing will likely maintain its stance of avoiding a
major role in ongoing conflicts.
North Korea plays a relatively minor role in the Central Region,
but its potential export of ballistic missile and nuclear technology
remains an area of concern. For decades, North Korea widely
proliferated ballistic missile expertise and materials to a number of
actors including Iran and Syria. North Korea also exports cheap labor
to various Middle Eastern countries; remittances from these laborers
are a significant source of revenue for North Korea, despite the State
Department's efforts to persuade our partners to expel these workers.
prepare--pursue--prevail
CENTCOM's mission is to direct and enable military operations and
activities with allies and partners to increase regional security and
stability in support of enduring U.S. interests. We aim to accomplish
this mission through our strategic approach of ``Prepare, Pursue,
Prevail.'' This approach aligns with the recently published National
Defense Strategy (NDS), which directs us to ``Compete, deter, and win
in conflict and reinforce all levers of national power from sustainable
positions of military advantage.'' It also aligns with the POTUS-
approved strategies for Iraq and Iran. These strategies look to
consolidate gains achieved through defeating ISIS, while neutralizing
and countering Iran's destabilizing influence, and ensuring a stable
Iraq does not align with Iran and remains a productive strategic United
States partner.
Preparing in advance of crises creates decision space for leaders
and allows for the responsible and effective employment of resources
and forces. Effective preparation enables CENTCOM to compete with the
other major actors in the region through strengthening alliances and
partnerships. Pursuing opportunities ensures we seize and maintain the
initiative as we meet each of the challenges in our complex region. We
also retain the flexibility to effectively deter threats, preferably
short of military force. We constantly seek to Prevail in conflict,
winning the current fight and preparing for the next challenge.
centcom priorities
While the CENTCOM team manages a broad range of difficult
challenges on a daily basis, a significant portion of our efforts and
resources are necessarily focused in three areas: supporting the
Administration's South Asia Strategy--to include Operation Freedom's
Sentinel (OFS) and Resolute Support Mission (RSM) in Afghanistan;
countering VEOs in the Central Region, to include Operation Inherent
Resolve (OIR) in Iraq/Syria; and countering Iranian destabilizing
activities across the region.
Supporting the Administration's South Asia Strategy. Since my last
posture hearing, CENTCOM has begun a transition--an operational
alignment and rebalancing to better address challenges, mitigate risk,
and optimize resources in an ever-changing battlespace. With ISIS's
territorial control crumbling in Iraq and Syria, we have shifted our
main effort to implementing the military component of the South Asia
Strategy in Afghanistan through OFS and NATO's non-combat RSM, while
still retaining sufficient resources to enable local security forces to
prevent the reemergence of ISIS in Iraq and Syria.
The NDS directs us to deter adversaries from aggression against our
vital interests and to discourage destabilizing behavior. Working ``by,
with, and through'' the ANDSF, we have maintained constant pressure on
the Taliban with the intent of removing their influence on the
population and forcing them to reconcile with the Government of the
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA). Our conditions-based approach
to the conflict gives hope to our Afghan partners and demoralizes the
enemy. This strategy reaffirms the United States Government's enduring
commitment to Afghanistan while supporting two complementary missions--
counter-terrorism operations and security force assistance of RSM.
Preventing AQ and ISIS-K from directing or supporting external attacks
against the United States and our allies is a vital national interest,
and the RSM preserves peace through a strong network of alliances both
regionally and globally.
The GIROA is making dedicated and transparent efforts to combat
corruption at every level and ensure an effective Afghan fighting
force. Implementation of the current GIROA 4-Year Roadmap is improving
overall ANDSF capabilities. Our method of working ``by, with, and
through'' the ANDSF ensures we are training Afghan forces to take the
lead in combat, enabling them with key assets like intelligence and
logistics, and working through the GIROA to find Afghan solutions to
Afghan problems.
ANDSF capability to respond to crises has greatly improved over the
last few years, and they are able to prevent security setbacks from
becoming cascading events; however, the ANDSF does not have the ability
to prevent the insurgency from maintaining a rural presence and
occasionally threatening a population center or critical ground lines
of communication (GLOC). The increase in U.S. and RSM partner military
personnel enables the provision of enhanced train, advise, and assist
capability to the ANDSF. This will advance the ANDSF's ability to plan
and execute simultaneous offensive military operations, keeping
constant pressure on the enemy.
In addition to our plan for closer, more persistent advising, we
are developing critical capabilities within the ANDSF to provide them
clear advantages over the Taliban. The Afghan Air Force (AAF) continues
to develop offensive capability, and our security cooperation funds are
training maintainers as the AAF transitions from dated Russian
platforms to modern United States aircraft. We are also working to
double the size of the Afghan Army's Special Operations force--
currently the most effective combat element against the Taliban.
Simultaneously, we are targeting many of the Taliban's revenue and
support networks; illicit narcotics production and trafficking largely
finances insurgent operations. The Taliban remains a resilient
adversary capable of inflicting heavy ANDSF casualties, but we,
shoulder to shoulder with our ANDSF partners, will continue to apply
military and economic pressure to force the Taliban to the negotiating
table.
Kabul's uncertain political situation remains the greatest risk to
stability as the ANDSF increases security nationwide and the GIROA
prepares for planned 2018 elections. GIROA continues to suffer from a
professional governmental capacity deficit, competing interests, and
corruption. We are pursuing opportunities to develop bilateral
relationships with Central and South Asian states to promote regional
stability and to encourage them, and our NATO allies, to contribute
financial and advisory support to the GIROA. As an example, we strongly
support improved Indian-Afghanistan ties as a means to advance Kabul's
economic interests and increase Afghanistan's financial independence.
As Afghanistan's neighbor and a critical supply route for RSM
operations, Pakistan presents both challenges and opportunities as we
implement the new South Asia Strategy. Pakistan's cooperation is
imperative for the success of our South Asia strategy. As the President
made clear in the unveiling of the strategy last August, the United
States expects Pakistan to take decisive action against the Taliban and
Haqqani Network leaders that operate from its territory. Taliban and
Haqqani leadership and fighters continue to find sanctuary in Pakistan.
Other Pakistan based groups like Lashkar-e-Tayyiba threaten Pakistan's
neighbor, India, and carry out attacks that jeopardize regional
stability and United States strategic interests.
Pakistan has made many sacrifices in the war against terrorism,
including important contributions in significantly degrading AQ and
combatting ISIS-K. Anti-Pakistan militant groups like Tehrik-e-Taliban
Pakistan (TTP) are able to conduct devastating terrorist attacks within
Pakistan, killing scores of civilians and military. The Pakistani
military is conducting counter-terrorism operations against select
terrorist groups that target the Pakistani state. Pakistan has also
undertaken several high profile and effective counter-insurgency
operations in North Waziristan and other parts of the Federally
Administered Tribal Area (FATA) against TTP. Security along the border
with Afghanistan will remain a priority in 2018 as Pakistan seeks to
expand border control mechanisms and efforts to improve paramilitary
security capabilities. Recently we have started to see an increase in
communication, information sharing, and actions on the ground in
response to our specific requests--these are positive indicators.
However, ongoing national counter-terrorism efforts against anti-
Pakistan militants throughout the country have not yet translated into
the definitive actions we require Pakistan to take against Afghan
Taliban or Haqqani leaders. This problem is compounded by increasing
cross-border terrorist attacks and fires between Pakistan and
Afghanistan, which hinders both countries' abilities to coordinate on
border security.
We have preserved our valuable military-to-military relationship
with Pakistan and attempted to increase transparency and communication
with influential military leaders, while pressing our serious concerns
about Pakistan's provision of sanctuary and support to militant and
terrorist groups that target United States personnel and interests.
Achieving long-term stability in Afghanistan and defeating the
insurgency will be difficult without Pakistan's support and assistance.
Although most security assistance for Pakistan is currently suspended,
since 2002 Pakistan has been among the largest recipients of United
States provided Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International
Military Education and Training (IMET). To date Pakistan has also been
reimbursed hundreds of millions of dollars in Coalition Support Funds
(CSF) for counter-insurgency operations that support United States
security objectives in the region. We use ground and air routes in
Pakistan to deliver materiel to Afghanistan. However we also have
options to utilize routes through the other Central Asian nations.
CENTCOM continues to promote United States interests in the rest of
the Central Asia/South Asia (CASA) sub-region, which includes the
countries of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. While our Central Asia
partners continue to seek United States engagement, Russia, China, and
Iran continue to discourage cooperation and engagement between Central
Asian countries and the United States. Despite this pressure, several
CASA governments continue to support the transit of supplies to United
States troops in Afghanistan and engage the United States on shared
interests related to access, border security, counter-terrorism,
counter-narcotics, and counter-insurgency.
Our Central Asian partners remain concerned about the long-term
stability of Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as the specter of
returning foreign terrorist fighters to their home countries. We are
postured not only to help them address transnational threats, but also
to continue to develop our military-to-military relationships in the
CASA sub-region. In support of these efforts, our two major forums that
promote military cooperation, the CASA Directors of Military
Intelligence Conference and CASA Chiefs of Defense Conference, are
developing beyond ceremonial affairs into venues that encourage free-
flowing military-to-military communication and seek practical solutions
to security challenges. These efforts, in addition to our operations in
Afghanistan, will ensure that CENTCOM continues to support the
Administration's South Asia Strategy in the CASA sub-region with a
long-term, regional approach.
The United States-Kazakhstan relationship is our most advanced
military relationship in Central Asia. We are making notable progress
as the Kazakhstani Ministry of Defense focuses on institutional reform
of its Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) corps, human resources
administration, and its professional military education system.
Reliance on Russian-produced equipment presents challenges to
developing a more robust defense sales relationship. Despite these
challenges, Kazakhstan looks to the United States to balance, not
replace, Russian and Chinese influence through a multi-vector foreign
policy, which allows more security cooperation possibilities.
The Kyrgyz Republic has increasingly aligned its interests with
Russia and China. The United States-Kyrgyz security relationship has
declined since the closure of the Manas Transit Center and the
termination of the bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement in 2014.
Despite the Kyrgyz armed forces' desire to improve military-to-military
cooperation with CENTCOM, Kyrgyz senior civilian leaders have shown
little interest in improving military relations.
Tajikistan remains a key United States partner in Central Asia due
to its 800-mile border with Afghanistan. While United States-Tajik
relations are positive, Russia is increasingly impinging on United
States influence and spreading inaccurate information about Afghanistan
and the region. Tajikistan is Central Asia's poorest country, and its
armed forces are habitually under-funded and ill-equipped, which
complicates our efforts to help the Tajiks build and sustain long-term
security capacity. Moreover, the Russian forces at the 201st Military
base located outside of Dushanbe loom large on the political and
military landscape. The Tajik Government also depends heavily on
foreign assistance and on the remittances of its migrant laborers
working in Russia, giving Moscow considerable leverage over the
country. Despite all of these challenges, CENTCOM continues cooperation
with Tajikistan focused on border security, counter-terrorism, and
counter-drug trafficking. Tajikistan is a major transit point for
Afghan opiates; our efforts to help strengthen Afghan-Tajik border
security are important to reducing the drug trade that funds the
Taliban and destabilizes the region.
Turkmenistan is an important nation due to its strategic geographic
location between Europe and Afghanistan. Turkmenistan, as other Central
Asian states, is concerned about instability in Afghanistan and thus
supports international counter-VEO, counter-terrorism, and border
security efforts. Currently, we are building our partnership with
Turkmenistan through medical exchanges.
Uzbekistan remains a key United States partner in Central Asia due
to its strategic geographic location at the heart of Eurasia and
proximity to Afghanistan. Over the past year, Uzbekistan experienced a
relatively smooth succession of power from the late President Karimov
to President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, who has instituted a number of reforms
as Uzbekistan's second president since independence in 1991. Our
bilateral relations serve to counter Russian and Chinese influence in
the region. Russia exercises a degree of political and economic
influence, yet the Uzbeks continue to pursue a strategic relationship
with the United States Uzbekistan has been a relatively closed society,
but we are now seeing positive changes within Uzbekistan that are
leading to improved military-to-military relations, to include
increased military professionalization and training. CENTCOM is also
working to improve its military's logistics and sustainment systems to
better support previously transferred U.S. defense equipment. We also
continue efforts to bolster Uzbekistan's Special Operations Forces.
Countering Violent Extremist Organizations. Another critical
objective from the NDS is to prevent terrorists from directing or
supporting external operations against the U.S. Homeland, allies, and
partners. In the past year, Operation Inherent Resolve has achieved
remarkable success against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. The ISF and SDF are
operating at their most effective levels since the operation began.
Millions of IDPs have returned home and are starting to rebuild. The
destruction of ISIS' so called physical ``caliphate'' is imminent, but
now we must consolidate gains by investing in the population that will
hold this territory and keep ISIS from returning. The United States
Strategy for Iraq contains four primary objectives: stabilize Iraq,
limit Iran's influence and its use of Iraq to shape the Middle East,
achieve a stable Iraq economy, and sustain an enduring relationship
with the ISF. We must now look to how we effectively resource these
objectives along with the President's objectives in Syria.
The Coalition's campaign to defeat ISIS has had considerable
success. Coalition airstrikes have killed hundreds of ISIS leadership
figures and facilitators in Iraq and Syria, which has disrupted ISIS'
command and control network; degraded its use of unmanned aerial
systems (UAS); reduced its ability to conduct research and development,
procurement, and administration; and denied sources of funding for
terrorist activities. These losses have undermined ISIS' ability to
conduct attacks throughout the region and the world. With the loss of
terrain and the liberation of the population, ISIS can no longer
generate funding through extortion and taxation. Additionally,
airstrikes and ground operations have crippled and seized hydrocarbon
generating facilities and facilitation routes that moved and supplied
ISIS fighters and supported illicit oil sales. We have also degraded
ISIS media operations; the most recent version of their monthly online
terror magazine ``Rumiyah'' was last published in September 2017.
In Iraq, the ISF fought a vicious, urban battle to liberate Mosul,
with ISIS providing stiff resistance using tunnels, vehicle-borne
improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), and unmanned aerial systems. The
liberation of Mosul provided the ISF with the momentum that led to the
quick liberation of Tal Afar and Hawijah. Our partnership with the ISF
is an excellent example of the successful application of the ``by,
with, and through'' approach. Using a minimal number of U.S. and
Coalition advisors, we enabled the ISF with robust communications,
logistics, intelligence, and precision fires. Iraqi forces led from the
front in each operation, and their success elevated their legitimacy
with the population.
There remain enduring political and cultural challenges in Iraq.
Reconstruction, discontent with corruption and any delay of rebuilding
efforts as well as the Kurdistan stand-off could fuel future
instability. ISIS' reversion to an underground insurgency will remove
the greatest unifying factor among Iraq's competing factions and may
reignite unresolved grievances. In the post-ISIS period, the GoI will
be challenged to rebuild Sunni areas while balancing competing security
demands, enacting government reforms, and managing tensions among
Iraq's political factions. The KRG remains a strategic partner and
their negotiations with Baghdad for a peaceful settlement are critical
to ensure the disputed territories are not further complicated by
intra-Iraq divisions.
In Syria, the fight against ISIS has been complicated by the
multiple countries involved in the conflict, many of whom have widely
divergent interests. Syrian President Bashar al Assad remains in power,
and, due to military support from Russia, Iran, and Lebanese Hizballah
(LH), is attempting to bring all of Syria under regime control. In
2017, the regime made significant territorial gains in central and
eastern Syria, culminating in reducing opposition enclaves in western
Syria and seizing urban centers from ISIS along the western bank of the
Euphrates River from ISIS. Nevertheless, the Assad regime has
insufficient forces to adequately secure recaptured territory and often
faces insurgent counterattacks behind its lines. The regime is highly
dependent on billions of dollars in external Iranian and Russian
economic and military support, the cost of which press both Moscow and
Tehran to seek an end to the conflict.
The intervention of the Coalition and regional powers in the Syrian
conflict has blocked Assad's ability to recapture major portions of
northern Syria, and entrenched opposition fighters and VEOs across
Syria continue to challenge regime control. Diplomatic efforts to
establish de-escalation zones were most successful in a deal negotiated
between Russia, the United States, and Jordan in southwest Syria.
Russian and Iranian-led Astana talks have been far less successful, and
Russian bombardment of the Astana agreed de-escalation zone in East
Ghouta calls into question Moscow's sincerity in guaranteeing the
security of these areas. There has been some success, often under UN
auspices, to negotiate on humanitarian issues, but Syrian regime
recalcitrance to allow aid deliveries is probably driven by Assad's
choice to use starvation as a weapon of war. Assad's reluctance to
negotiate directly with the Syrian opposition, and Moscow's reluctance
to force him to do so, indicates significant challenges lie ahead in
forging a political resolution to the conflict.
For the Coalition, the SDF's liberation of ISIS' capital Raqqah in
October 2017 was a significant turning point in the conflict. The SDF,
which is composed of local Sunni Arabs and Kurds, has been a valuable
partner in the fight against ISIS, and they sacrificed greatly to
liberate large portions of their country. Simultaneous operations by
the SDF in Syria and the ISF and PMF in Iraq effectively isolated ISIS
remnants in the Middle Euphrates River Valley (MERV) and along the
Syrian side of the Iraq-Syria border where both forces are currently
conducting operations to kill or capture all remaining ISIS fighters.
Pro-Regime Forces (PRF) and Russia also continue to operate in the
MERV as they isolate ISIS fighters south of the Euphrates River, though
Assad's decision to prematurely withdraw his forces has likely given
valuable breathing room to ISIS on the western side of the river. With
PRF operating in close proximity to Coalition-backed forces in the
MERV, de-confliction measures are vital, and we have worked closely
with Russia to prevent accidental strikes and to ensure the safety of
the various forces on an increasingly complex battlefield. The
Coalition does not seek to fight the Syrian regime, Russian or pro-
regime forces partnered with them. While the deconfliction efforts have
been largely effective, the Coalition recently demonstrated its
commitment to defend United States and partner forces operating in
Syria by striking PRF that conducted an unprovoked attack on SDF and
Coalition forces. We will continue to do so, as necessary.
Though our partnership with the SDF is critical to defeating ISIS
in Syria, it has created challenges with our NATO ally Turkey, who
views the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) elements within the
SDF as analogous to the PKK terrorist group. United States Special
Operations forces have been working with vetted elements of the SDF for
several years to defeat ISIS. Our assistance to the SDF has been
focused on this goal, and we have included safeguards and transparency
measures to ensure it does not physically threaten Turkey. In January,
Turkey began air strikes and ground incursions into the predominantly
Kurdish enclave of Afrin, where CENTCOM has no presence or direct
relationships in northwest Syria, in an attempt to, according to the
Government of Turkey, ``remove the terrorist threat from its border.''
Though we have no relationship with YPG fighters in Afrin, who
previously cooperated with Russia and the regime, these operations
directly impact our ability to affect a lasting defeat against ISIS
through the SDF. Many fighters in the SDF have familial ties to the
Kurds in Afrin, and they are now forced to choose between completing
operations against ISIS fighters in the MERV and assisting their fellow
Kurds in northern Syria. Our alliance with Turkey is paramount, and we
will continue to assist the Turkish military in countering the PKK and
other VEOs that threaten their border, but we must continue to urge
restraint as their actions have clearly increased risk to our campaign
to defeat ISIS.
Amidst the visible damage caused by the Syrian civil war, the
country has also witnessed a far less-publicized change: democratic
organizations in the form of local civil councils have assembled in
places previously controlled by ISIS. These councils are providing the
necessary basic functions of governance and starting to rebuild their
war-torn communities. These ad-hoc democratic organizations come in
various forms and engage in a range of activities from providing the
most basic services to rallying the population against the re-emergence
of VEOs. For example, in the cities of Manbij and Raqqah, local
councils ran civic campaigns against ISIS in concert with more moderate
rebel groups, providing a two-pronged strategy that ultimately
prevented ISIS from regaining a foothold in these areas. In other parts
of Syria, councils have developed a more sophisticated capacity and are
building roads, repairing sewage lines, and holding local elections. As
Secretary of State Tillerson has said, ``Interim local political
arrangements that give voice to all groups and ethnicities supportive
of Syria's broader political transition must emerge with international
support.'' Any interim arrangements must be truly representative and
must not threaten any of Syria's neighboring states. Similarly, the
voices of Syrians from these regions must be heard in Geneva and in the
broader discussion about Syria's future.'' The key to the success of
these groups is their ability to maintain legitimacy among the
populace.
Although these local councils have made great strides, they can
only provide aid and assistance to the population at the pace at which
they receive it. As we enable local solutions to local problems,
supporting these local councils with our full range of Department of
Defense, interagency, and Coalition capabilities will help them
maintain popular support and set conditions for enduring, stable
governance.
A significant challenge we face as we complete the defeat of ISIS
is the repatriation of hundreds of foreign fighters to their home
countries. The SDF and ISF are both holding several hundred fighters
from a number of different countries in prisons or temporary detention
facilities, with no clear process for prosecution or repatriation. The
longer these fighters remain in detention together, the greater danger
they pose as they form new connections, share lessons learned, and
prepare to re-establish networks upon their release or escape. This
urgent problem requires a concerted international effort involving law
enforcement, intelligence sharing, and diplomatic agreements.
Yemen is another area where VEOs pose a threat to the Homeland. The
civil war continues unabated and the humanitarian crisis worsened in
the last year. Saudi Arabia and the UAE continue to lead a coalition
supporting Yemeni President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, and despite
attempts to reestablish itself in Aden, some elements of the Republic
of Yemen Government (ROYG) remain in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Houthi
forces control Yemen's capital, Sana'a, and are undeterred in their
efforts to retain key territory and attack the Saudi coalition. The
civil war has severely affected Yemen's population, with nearly 80
percent of the population requiring urgent humanitarian assistance.
Similarly, its economy has been devastated by insecurity, extremely
high unemployment (35 percent) and near cessation of its petroleum
industry. Neither the Houthis nor the exiled Hadi Government has the
ability to govern effectively. In December 2017, the relationship
between previously aligned Houthis and former President Ali Abdullah
Salih disintegrated and culminated with Salih's assassination by his
former allies. It is unclear if the Saudi-backed Hadi faction can
capitalize on these events, and Salih's forces have splintered, adding
continued chaos.
Terrorist groups like AQAP and ISIS-Yemen continue to maintain a
presence in Yemen and are focused on attacks against ROYG, the Saudi
coalition, and Houthi targets. Since mid-2014, ISIS-Yemen has leveraged
the chaotic security situation to expand its capabilities and conduct
intermittent attacks against Saudi coalition and Yemeni security
targets in Aden. AQAP still aspires to threaten Western interests with
high-profile attacks, although United States and Saudi coalition
strikes have removed successive levels of leadership and logistics
support, critically damaging their network. Our Emirati partners have
also played a key role in countering the threat from AQAP and ISIS-
Yemen in southern Yemen.
The conflict in Yemen has opened opportunities for Iran, which
continues to provide support to the Houthis with the aim of building a
proxy to pressure the Saudi-led coalition and expand its sphere of
influence. This support enabled the Houthis to launch missiles at Saudi
Arabian and Emirati cities and target ships in the Bab al Mandab and
Red Sea on multiple occasions in the last year, threatening Americans
and our partners and raising the risk of broader regional conflict.
CENTCOM is partnering with the Saudi-led coalition to help maintain
a favorable regional balance. Our goal is to ensure that nations in
close proximity to Yemen are able to secure their borders and safeguard
their populations while negotiations lead to a cessation of hostilities
between Houthis and the ROYG. Saudi Arabia has announced that it is
working to facilitate the movement of humanitarian assistance, food,
and fuel by opening ground and air avenues from Saudi Arabia into
Yemen, utilizing additional ports, and partnering with NGOs to provide
humanitarian and medical assistance.
The Levant, which includes the countries of, Syria, Israel, Jordan,
and Lebanon--and Iraq and Egypt remain an active area for CENTCOM
theater security cooperation and partnership due to instability
stemming from the Syrian Civil War, the rise of ISIS, and malign
Iranian influence. Though the scourge of ISIS is receding, Levantine
countries remain under threat of attack, as seen in Egypt where ISIS-
Sinai continues to carry out barbaric attacks against civilians and
Egyptian security forces, including the November murder of over 300
citizens in prayer at a mosque in northern Sinai. United States
assistance to our partners in the Levant has enabled improved border
security in Lebanon and Jordan. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)
demonstrated this kinetically in August--expertly routing ISIS fighters
on their eastern border during Operation Dawn of the Hills.
In Jordan, the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) remain a dedicated
partner, providing access, basing, and overflight essential to
furthering U.S. interests in the region--we must ensure we do not take
them for granted. Though the GOJ and the JAF have successfully handled
security concerns and domestic stability challenges, regional turmoil
and persistently low economic growth rates have led to rising
unemployment and high national debt. Additionally, Jordan currently
hosts approximately 660,000 UN-registered Syrian refugees and 63,000
Iraqi refugees, straining government resources, services, and
infrastructure. Despite this strain, the GOJ recently facilitated
critical humanitarian support to the Rukban IDP camp on the Syrian side
of the border. Continued commitment to funding Title 10 programs, in
addition to FMF and economic and humanitarian assistance, enables
Jordan to mitigate its humanitarian and economic difficulties, while
remaining a capable partner in coalition efforts. The JAF is also
contributing to stabilization efforts in OIR, including reopening the
Turaybil / Karama border crossing with Iraq in August 2017, a key step
in normalizing relations and restoring trade between the two countries.
Lebanon is critical to our national security interests and
exemplifies our challenges in the Middle East. Wedged between a key
friend in the region, Israel, and a corridor of Iranian influence from
Tehran through Iraq and Syria, Lebanon has managed to remain relatively
stable in a region embroiled in conflict. However, Lebanon faces a
stagnant economy, a Syrian refugee crisis, and the growing influence of
Hizballah, which holds a de-facto veto on Lebanese policy decisions due
to their strategic political alliances, omnipresent threat of violence,
strength as a social service provider, and financial support from Iran.
Furthermore, the possibility of an Israel-Hizballah conflict is a
constant threat to the stability of Lebanon and security of Israel.
Our effort to strengthen the Lebanese security forces, especially
the LAF, as the country's only legitimate security provider is a
critical aspect of our policy to promote Lebanese sovereignty and
security. With successful operations like Dawn of the Hills, the
Lebanese people are realizing more and more that the LAF, their
country's most trusted and respected institution, is increasingly
capable of protecting them from external threats. The United States is
the LAF's top security assistance partner, and our consistent, long-
term commitment and training efforts, in addition to the more than $1.7
billion in security assistance provided since 2006, have successfully
modernized and strengthened the LAF as a fighting force. U.S. Special
Operations military and civilian personnel have forged a strong
relationship with the LAF and enhanced their capabilities, making them
a capable partner in our regional counter-terrorism campaign. During
the most recent military operations against ISIS, United States
military personnel assisted the LAF in planning and conducting combined
arms maneuver, aerial reconnaissance, and integrated fires. Since our
security assistance began, Lebanon has maintained an exemplary track-
record for adhering to regular and enhanced end-use monitoring
protocols. We are confident the LAF has not transferred equipment to
Hizballah. Nonetheless, we are concerned about Hizballah's efforts to
infiltrate Lebanon's security institutions and have made clear that any
cooperation with Hizballah will risk our continued cooperation and
assistance.
On the western edge of the CENTCOM area of responsibility, Egypt
remains an anchor of United States interests in the region given its
strategic location, demographic heft, religious and cultural influence,
and its enduring peace treaty with Israel. Egypt is an essential
partner in countering the flow of foreign fighters, materiel, and
financial support to extremists transiting from Libya through Egypt
into the Central Region. Egypt supports our overflight requests,
ensures Suez Canal transit, and shares our commitment to defeat ISIS.
The cornerstone of this relationship is our security assistance
partnership. In one example of our intensifying joint efforts, in
January 2018, we celebrated the successful signing of the bilateral
Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement
(CIS MOA), crowning over thirty years of effort to enhance security and
counterterrorism cooperation.
ISIS-Sinai continues to conduct daily attacks against the Egyptian
Armed Forces (EAF) and security services, causing hundreds of
casualties, while other extremist organizations have carried out
attacks on the mainland. The United States commitment to continuing to
support Egypt in this fight against terrorism, in bringing security for
the Egyptian people, is steadfast. Until now, the EAF has contained
most of the violence in the northeastern Sinai Peninsula; however,
without a comprehensive whole-of-government strategy to defeat ISIS-
Sinai, the threat will persist and grow. The United States is committed
to working with Egypt to develop a comprehensive counter-insurgency
strategy that addresses the underlying political, economic, and social
conditions that give rise to extremist elements, while defeating the
threats that plague Egypt and the region.
Through our partnership efforts, we have observed improvement in
the security of Egyptian maritime and land borders. The EAF has shown
some success stemming the flow of fighters and illicit material into
Israel and the Central Region. We will look to strengthen our security
cooperation partnership through continued engagement and with
development of their counterterrorism/counter-insurgency strategy and
capabilities, including the prioritization of FMF toward appropriate
defense articles and training. In fiscal year 2016 and fiscal year
2017, Congress appropriated up to $1.3 billion in FMF and $1.8 million
in IMET. As a sign of our continued support of Egypt's efforts, the
President requested Congress continue to provide $1.3 billion in
military assistance for Egypt in fiscal year 2018, despite the
increasingly constrained budget environment. Moreover, the United
States and Egypt have elevated the strategic nature of the assistance
relationship through mechanisms such as our Military Cooperation
Committee and Defense Resourcing Conferences. Through these means we
help Egypt plan for its security needs on a long-term basis.
Countering Iranian Expansionism. Countering the Iranian regime's
malign influence in the region is a key component of our efforts to
defend allies from military aggression, bolster our partners against
coercion, and share responsibilities for the common defense. Our
relationships with the GCC countries play a key role in this effort.
Iran is generating instability across the region, and the Iranian
Threat Network (ITN) continues to increase in strength, enhancing its
capacity to threaten United States and partner nation interests.
Concurrently, the Iranian regime continues to maintain longstanding
criticisms that the United States is a source of instability in the
Middle East and cannot be trusted. While the International Atomic
Energy Agency reports that it continues to monitor and verify Tehran's
implementation of its JCPOA nuclear-related commitments, Iran continues
to express frustration with the degree and pace of sanctions relief
under the JCPOA and has publicly criticized United States statements
regarding continued participation in the JCPOA. Iran seeks expanded
economic, and in some cases diplomatic, engagement with the
International Community to achieve what it views as the full benefits
of sanctions relief afforded under the deal. The United States is
upholding its JPCOA commitments and has made clear that Iran's economic
troubles stem not from issues related to JCPOA implementation, but from
internal economic mismanagement, a weak banking sector, and widespread
corruption, among other factors.
Over the past year, Iran has focused its regional efforts primarily
on operations in Syria and Iraq to expand its influence in the region
and secure supply routes to Hizballah to threaten Israel. Iran has
provided increasingly sophisticated maritime and missile attack
capabilities to the Houthis in Yemen. Additionally, Iran continues
smaller-scale support to other groups such as Bahraini Shiite
militants, Gaza militants, and the Afghan Taliban. It remains wary of
U.S. and coalition intentions throughout the region, and continues to
engage Western nations in the ``gray zone,'' rather than through direct
conflict.
Iran will continue to pursue policies that threaten United States
strategic interests and goals throughout the Middle East while seeking
to expand diplomatic and economic relations with a wide range of
nations. Leaders in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps--Quds Force
(IRGC-QF) have taken advantage of surrogates, businesses, and logistics
entities to execute direct action, intelligence, influence building,
terrorism, and cyber operations against the U.S. and our partner
nations. By supporting proxies in the fight against ISIS in Iraq and
Syria and against the Saudi coalition in Yemen, Tehran seeks to gain
lasting influence and indebted allies in each country. The conflict in
Syria has also proven the ITN's expeditionary capacity; fighters from
Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Lebanon wage war there solely at
Iran's behest. After the current conflicts abate, the ITN will
undoubtedly turn its attention to other adversaries; future flashpoints
could occur wherever there is a United States or allied presence.
Iran continues to acquire and develop increasingly lethal weapons
to raise the cost of direct military conflict. The expansion of Iran's
military capabilities over the last decade enables Tehran to threaten
international trade and regional stability throughout the Gulf and
beyond. Production of advanced military equipment and threats to the
free flow of commerce through the Strait of Hormuz are intended to
challenge the U.S. enduring presence in the region. Iran's military is
composed of approximately 700,000 personnel divided into two separate
militaries: the Islamic Republic of Iran Armed Forces (Artesh) and the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which both continue to
improve. Iran's ground forces are improving their ability to quickly
mobilize and deploy in response to internal and external threats. Iran
has also advertised the development of quick reaction forces,
consisting of armor, artillery, and heliborne assets that can deploy
within 4 hours.
Iran postures its forces and supports proxies to threaten--or be
able to threaten--strategic locations like the Bab al Mandeb, Strait of
Hormuz, and oil platforms. With little warning, Iran could quickly
close the Strait of Hormuz using stockpiles of naval mines and disrupt
key maritime chokepoints throughout the region. Iranian surface to air
missiles (SAMs) along its littoral pose a significant threat to United
States Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) assets
operating in international airspace. During 2017, Iran's capabilities
improved with the deployment of advanced S-300 long-range SAM systems
provided by Russia.
Additionally, Tehran continues to increase its strategic power
projection capability with its expanding ballistic missile force. Iran
has the largest missile force in the Middle East, which can range 1,200
miles and reach key targets in the region. Iran is continuing to
increase the range, precision, and lethality of these missile systems.
Tehran relies on these systems to deter adversaries and provide a
reliable retaliatory capability against neighbors and United States
Forces.
Iran intends to expand its regional influence, counter Saudi
Arabia, threaten Israel, and maintain a capability to threaten
strategically important maritime transit routes in the Bab al Mandeb,
Strait of Hormuz, and the Gulf. On a positive note, over the past year,
we have seen an overall reduction in unprofessional Iranian actions
toward United States and coalition vessels; such interactions decreased
by 36 percent from 2016 to 2017.
To counter Iranian expansionism and destabilizing activities,
CENTCOM will deter conventional Iranian aggression, bolster our network
of allies and partners, and compete for influence throughout the
region. Our forces maintain a high level of readiness at bases across
the region and consistently patrol the waterways--this persistent
presence deters Iranian conventional military attacks against our
allies and protects international sea lanes. By improving our Arab
partners' capacity to defend themselves and encouraging them to work
together as a coalition, we also create a bulwark against Iranian
aggression and proxy warfare.
Our efforts to compete to be the partner of choice for our Gulf and
Levant partners further weakens Iranian threat networks and limits
Tehran's malign political, economic, and military influence. This is
especially crucial in Iraq, where Baghdad must work with Iran as a
neighboring state, but limit Tehran's manipulation and infiltration of
political parties and government institutions. We must continue to be a
reliable partner to the ISF to build their capacity to provide internal
security and protect their borders. Ongoing stabilization efforts that
strengthen Iraqi social and economic institutions will also impede
Iran's ability to negatively influence our Iraqi partner.
On the Arabian Peninsula, GCC states are among the United States'
best partners in the region and a counter-balance to Iran. The
virtually unhindered access, basing, and overflight approvals from our
Gulf partners, as well as their contributions of troops and airlift
have been critical to the success of Defeat-ISIS operations over the
past year. The GCC also represents the most promising baseline effort
for promoting collective defense initiatives, including joint counter-
terrorism and ballistic missile defense. As they look to the United
States for military equipment, training, and assistance, it is
essential we seek opportunities to include GCC partners in our combined
efforts to defeat regional threats posed by extremism and Iran's
burgeoning influence. However, the most significant complicating factor
in the unified deterrence to Iranian malign activity is the still-
unresolved rift between Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt with
Qatar. While efforts to reduce the impact on military-to-military
relationships among the Gulf States have been largely successful, the
rift continues to present challenges in the political sphere.
Within the GCC, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) is undergoing
potentially far-reaching changes in social, economic, and security
spheres under the banner of Vision 2030 and the National Transformation
Plan, which includes wide ranging fiscal and cultural liberalization.
This could alter the dynamics of the Saudi economy. King Salman's
appointment of his son Mohammed bin Salman as the Crown Prince, the
purported anti-corruption campaign, and recent Saudi efforts to
influence Lebanon have exacerbated an environment of uncertainty in the
kingdom's future.
Saudi Arabia remains embroiled in the conflict in Yemen, which
appears to be at an impasse in terms of a political or diplomatic
solution with the Houthis. To assist with the military aspects of the
conflict, we have increased the number of advisors to the Saudi
military over the past year to help improve command and control and
formalize targeting processes. These additional training and advisory
efforts will help mitigate incidents of avoidable civilian casualties
in Yemen.
The United Arab Emirates' strategic location, vast natural
resources, willingness to engage terrorist organizations, and ambition
to be at the forefront of military innovation makes them a valuable
partner. The UAE was among the first countries to join the Defeat-ISIS
Coalition. Although its military role tapered off when its resources
shifted to Yemen in March 2015, Abu Dhabi remains active in pursuing
many of the Coalition's lines of effort, including counter-ISIS
messaging, stabilization, countering ISIS financing, and stemming the
flow of foreign fighters.
Bahrain hosts CENTCOM's naval component and CMF and has publicly
supported the Defeat-ISIS effort, including allowing United States
forces to conduct counter-ISIS strikes from its territory. In Yemen,
Bahrain's air, land, and sea forces participated in Saudi-led coalition
operations against AQAP and the Houthis; these deployments have
improved the overall readiness of the Bahrain Defense Force. We
continue to make strides in our collaborative efforts to enhance the
Bahraini Coast Guard's capacity and expand Bahrain's role in countering
piracy and violent extremism in the region's maritime domain.
Internally, Bahrain is dealing with a domestic economy negatively
impacted by low oil prices, political discord, and a persistent, low-
level threat from Iranian-backed militant groups. We continue to
provide appropriate assistance to help it address security threats.
Prior restrictions on FMS to Bahrain created tension in the bilateral
relationship; recent movement on key FMS cases, however, has provided
renewed strength in military and political ties with Bahrain. We
continue to reassure our Bahraini counterparts that we remain committed
to our partnership, while also encouraging them to respect freedom of
expression and pursue dialogue with the nonviolent political
opposition.
The Government of Kuwait continues to provide a critical
environment within the Central Region for access, basing, and
overflight in support of U.S. and coalition operations and hosts the
forward headquarters of CENTCOM's army component, U.S. Army Central
Command. Kuwait is also CENTCOM's primary logistics gateway for
movement into and out of the region.
Over the last 20 years Qatar has provided the United States with
invaluable regional access through basing and freedom of movement for
United States Forces at Camp As-Sayliyah and Al Udeid Air Base--home to
the Combined Air Operations Center, U.S. Air Forces Central Command,
U.S. Special Operations Command Central Forward, and the CENTCOM
Forward Headquarters. Qatar hosts approximately 10,000 United States
servicemembers, and aircraft launched from Al Udeid Air Base support
operations throughout the region.
While the rift has had little direct impact on U.S. operations, it
has imposed significant restrictions on Qatar's freedom of movement in
the region through the closure of land borders and air space.
Additionally, it has impacted Qatar's participation in Gulf state-
hosted multilateral exercises and eroded coalition building efforts. It
has also proven to be a distraction from Saudi-led operations in Yemen.
In a concerning development, the rift has pushed Qatar to become more
reliant on Iran and less connected to the GCC.
Despite its small size, Qatar has contributed to coalition
operations throughout the region, including against ISIS, and seeks to
expand its participation in other regional coalitions. Qatar is
currently the second largest FMS customer in the world with $25 billion
dollars in new cases and is on track to surpass $40 billion dollars in
the next 5 years with additional FMS purchases. Qatar's efforts to
expand its military both in size and capacity have resulted in
increased bilateral military engagements between CENTCOM and the Qatari
Armed Forces. This gives the United States an invaluable opportunity to
make a positive impact on the military development of a key partner in
a turbulent region.
The Sultanate of Oman's relationship with the United States remains
strong, and Oman continues to play a constructive role in regional
diplomatic issues, including serving as an interlocutor for the United
States in dealing with Yemen, Iran, and the GCC. However, unless the
government successfully makes policy changes to constrain government
spending and attract foreign investment, Muscat will likely face an
economic crisis in the next few years. Oman's strategic location
provides CENTCOM with key logistical, operational, and contingency
capabilities; it provides important access in the form of over 5,000
aircraft overflights, 600 aircraft landings, and 80 port calls
annually. The Omani military also participates in numerous bilateral
exercises and training events on a yearly basis.
required programs, capabilities, and resources
In order to ensure we can effectively execute the NDS and protect
our national interests, we must be properly postured, alongside our
interagency partners, with the necessary policies, capabilities, and
resources to address the challenges and capitalize on the opportunities
mentioned above. To this end, CENTCOM requires specific means in the
form of programs, capabilities, and resources. We sincerely appreciate
Congress' continued support for fiscal authorities and appropriations
required to support on-going theater operations, as well as the
increased responsiveness of the USG in tackling the challenges inherent
to the Central Region's complex environment.
Building Partner Capacity (BPC). The Counter-ISIS Train and Equip
Fund (CTEF), Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), Combatant Commanders
Initiatives Fund (CCIF), Coalition Support Fund (CSF), and Commander's
Emergency Response Program (CERP) have been key enablers to the
battlefield successes the Coalition achieved in disrupting and
dismantling ISIS and the Taliban. Your approval and increase in ASFF
funding to support Afghan Aviation modernization allowed the ANDSF to
begin closing their gaps in aerial fires and lift capability and
reduced their reliance on United States and Coalition forces, while
also making them more lethal against the Taliban and ISIS-K.
In Syria, CTEF-procured equipment and supplies provided to the
Vetted Syrian Opposition (VSO) like the SDF have been instrumental to
their success against ISIS. We will continue to use Overseas
Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) and other humanitarian
and civic assistance funding to improve conditions and access for other
U.S. federal and international aid organizations' follow-on missions.
These authorities must respond in a timely manner to environmental and
operational challenges. We continue to prioritize our needs based on
our most critical requirements, coalition and interagency capabilities,
and the conditions on the ground.
In Iraq, the success of the ISF in dismantling the physical
caliphate and the fragmentation of the ISIS hybrid-conventional force
over the past year is a validation of our Coalition's BPC effort. As we
reduced major combat operations, the authorities granted to the Office
of Security Cooperation--Iraq (OSC-I) were expanded to cover critical
sustainment efforts. These authorities allow OSC-I to work with all ISF
that are posturing to battle a potential insurgency and secure their
border with Syria. OSC-I is currently executing programs to enhance
professionalization of the ISF along with prudent implementation and
oversight of FMF. In fiscal year 2018, OSC-I will leverage $42 million
in authorities to transform the ISF into a sustainable, affordable, and
effective force through security sector reform and security cooperation
efforts.
CENTCOM efforts to implement and focus BPC initiatives yielded
increased capabilities to support security cooperation and partner
nation goals. The section 333 authority also authorizes funds to be
available for two fiscal years and program sustainment for up to 5
years, allowing for execution of long-lead time programs without cross-
fiscal year constraints and improved program maintenance, training, and
sustainment support.
The CENTCOM Exercise and Training Program continues to be one of
the most cost effective and efficient tools to conduct security
cooperation engagement with partner nations throughout the region.
Every exercise, including the planning process, provides an opportunity
to demonstrate U.S. resolve in the region, strengthen partnerships,
promote cooperation among our partners, conduct key leader engagements,
and sustain and improve both joint and combined readiness. The program
continued to grow in complexity and relevance with extended
participation throughout the CENTCOM region during fiscal year 2017 and
into fiscal year 2018.
CENTCOM executed 53 bilateral and multilateral exercises during
fiscal year 2017 with 42 partner nations, spanning seven Combatant and
Functional Commands. This enhanced U.S. Joint Force capability supports
theater-wide contingency operations and sustains U.S. presence and
access in the region. Other program impacts include improving partner
nation interoperability through military-to-military engagement,
integrating staff planning, executing Joint and Combined operations,
developing coalition warfare, and refining complementary partner
warfare capabilities given conflicts that are increasingly trans-
regional, multi-domain, and multi-functional in nature.
However, continued force reductions in the area of responsibility,
as well as the increased operational use of forces remaining in
theater, threaten the viability of the CENTCOM Joint Exercise Program.
Exercises like Eager Lion--the largest CENTCOM exercise--are routinely
affected by reductions in participating forces or threatened with
cancellation due to competing requirements for operational forces.
Mitigation is limited with current exercise program funding levels that
provide restricted air/surface options for movement of out-of-theater
(CONUS) based forces to participate in exercises.
Forces and Equipment: The Key to Interoperability. With the greater
focus on operations ``by, with, and through'' our partners to
accomplish common objectives, interoperability is increasingly
important, and our BPC and FMS programs remain instrumental to this
process. The ``total package'' approach with which we pursue equipment
support and long-term sustainment ensures that maintenance support and
training are a part of the FMS plan from the outset.
However, due to political considerations, cost, or delivery speed,
some of our partners are seeking alternate sources of military
equipment from near-peer competitors like Russia and China. When our
partners go elsewhere, it reduces our interoperability and challenges
our ability to incorporate their contributions into theater efforts.
CENTCOM must also remain prepared for major unforeseen
contingencies and crises; prepositioned war reserve materiel is a
critical equipment enabler as we posture to address emerging and
unforeseen threats. The tyranny of distance between our service depots
and the Central Region requires ready, prepositioned capability sets
that can rapidly integrate with deploying forces for contingency
response. These capability sets provide the necessary shock absorber
and help us preserve decision space for the national leadership at the
front-end of emerging contingencies. Congressional support for the
services' regeneration and reset of prepositioned war reserve materiel
remains essential to our operational depth and resiliency.
Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD). We are also working to
counter the adaptive threats from enemy networks and adversary states
in the form of emerging missile and unmanned aircraft technologies.
CENTCOM continues to employ IAMD and Counter Unmanned Aerial System
(CUAS) resources to provide the best possible defense design to the
theater.
Threat missile systems continue to improve in accuracy, giving them
the ability to selectively target CENTCOM's critical assets. Current
IAMD resources remain vital to helping CENTCOM maintain acceptable
levels of risk without creating additional demand on the force.
Providing IAMD protection to deployed U.S. forces and our critical
infrastructure is crucial to mission success and provides a visible
deterrence to regional aggression. Moreover, it signals U.S. commitment
to partners and provides flexibility to respond to contingencies.
Partner nations continue to field missile defense systems that are
technologically interoperable with U.S.-based defense systems. Several
partner nations have also expressed interest in working together with
the U.S. to address the growing CUAS problem set. We must work with our
partners to integrate the systems into one comprehensive network that
enables better interaction, flexibility, and increased levels of
protection against all potential adversarial air and missile threats.
Several of the GCC countries have expressed a desire to integrate
their missile and CUAS defense systems with U.S. IAMD systems. The U.S.
Patriot force in the GCC is an important warfighting capability and a
visible symbol of U.S. partnership, resolve, and deterrence and is
linked to bi-lateral defense agreements. Integration of these systems
would increase duration and level of protection provided by the defense
design against the spectrum of threats in theater.
Critical Munitions. We appreciate continued Congressional support
for the procurement and development of precision and specific purpose
munitions, which are essential to defeat the threats to our national
interests. Multiple factors increase demand on worldwide precision
munitions stock levels, to include readiness to address threats from
China and Russia, enduring combat operations, investment in our ``by,
with, through'' approach, our directive to minimize collateral damage,
and the drawdown in munitions funding prior to OIR. Projected
expenditures coupled with partner requests for precision munitions show
a system under stress down to the industrial level. Saudi Arabia, in
particular, continues to request precision munitions to assist in
reducing the threat from Iranian-supported Houthi forces in Yemen in
the most precise manner possible.
We have implemented controls for existing and projected
requirements to ensure we can meet our current commitments while
staying ready to meet future operational needs. We also continue to
work across the Department on process improvements to provide a more
precise demand signal to the Services and the industrial base and
enable multi-year investment in this critical commodity area.
Congressional support for base budget, production, and forward
positioning of critical preferred precision and specific purpose
munitions is vital to the future success of military operations.
Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) Assets.
Competition with China and Russia are increasing demands across the
theater for ISR assets. In addition to continued ISR requirements to
enable our partners in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan, counter-Iran
operations in Yemen, the Bab al Mandeb, and the Gulf place substantial
ISR demands on already severely limited resources. We also anticipate
additional requirements to assist Egypt in their counter-ISIS
operations in the Sinai
The Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (PED) enterprise is
also stressed by continuous operations; shortfalls of PED for collected
intelligence will continue in the foreseeable future, necessitating an
increased focus on automation and development of new PED tools,
including tools to exploit publically available information. Funding
for organizations such as the National Media Exploitation Center is
also critical to our ability to handle the volume of captured enemy
material.
In order to partially mitigate these ISR shortfalls, CENTCOM is
working closely with the Services, Joint Staff, Combat Support
Agencies, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the interagency to
acquire contract ISR solutions, incorporate non-traditional ISR (such
as that collected from strike assets), and improve efficiency and asset
de-confliction.
Our Coalition partners are also assisting with ISR collection and
PED, but this support is limited by national policies regarding
deployed force levels and manner of employment as well as resource
shortages. Further, partners are generally challenged to address many
of CENTCOM's requirements, such as those where multi-discipline, low-
observable, or strike-capable assets are required. All of these factors
combine to substantially increase operational risk in those areas that
will not receive adequate ISR coverage due to decreased capacity.
Information Operations/Strategic Communications. The operational
information environment continues to evolve at a rapid pace; our
adversaries are not limited by geographic boundaries as they increase
global radicalization and recruitment online. Russia and Iran are also
waging strategic communications campaigns to cloud perceptions of
United States success in Syria and Iraq and to call into question our
commitment to key partners in the region. Offensive Information
Operations (OIO) capabilities developed and refined over the last 2
years provide CENTCOM and the Department of Defense with the best
``high impact/low cost'' investment to deter aggression, counter
destabilizing behavior, and decrease the potential for direct action
operations requirements. CENTCOM combines actions and information by
employing assets ranging from print, radio, television, and the
internet to conduct robust, synchronized information operations in
order to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp our adversary's decision
making. These efforts also directly support both the Iran and Iraq
strategies that specifically call for integrated strategic
communications campaigns.
The ISIS problem set has enabled the Department of Defense to
closely collaborate with other United States Government agencies,
Coalition partners, and regional allies to coordinate and synchronize
messaging strategies. We are building on our combined experiences to
create a broad, long-term, whole-of-government approach that amplifies
our efforts toward conflict prevention. We also routinely work with
Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia to improve interoperability,
share lessons learned, and ultimately develop a collaborative strategy
to counter violent extremism--our regional partners will play the
largest role in shaping their own futures.
As we work to address the propaganda that terrorist organizations
use to recruit new followers, we must also address the serious threat
that state-sponsored disinformation poses to U.S. national security.
Amidst these trends in the information environment, it is more critical
than ever that the U.S. Government has a comprehensive, whole-of-
government approach to strategic communication that supports and
harmonizes with our military efforts. In this vein, the Department of
Defense works closely with the Department of State's Global Engagement
Center (GEC), and we appreciate that Congress has expanded its mandate
to synchronize and coordinate the federal government's efforts to
recognize, understand, expose, and counter these harmful propaganda and
disinformation efforts. Recognizing that information operations will
continue to be a force multiplier, we must ensure organizations like
the GEC can compete and win in the information environment.
Cyber Operations/Cybersecurity. All of the traditional threats
within the Central Region are exacerbated by several challenges in the
cyberspace domain. The global nature of cyberspace means it has no
legal boundaries, challenging our legal system and ability to deter
threats or respond to contingencies. We have an adaptive enemy who has
proven creative in the information environment.
Based on the speed of technological evolution, attackers in the
cyberspace domain have an advantage over defenders. Worse, friendly
capabilities can be co-opted by adversaries at a scale and ease greater
than in other domains. Consequently, small groups can exercise state-
like powers, while a state actor can have tremendous impact. Defenders
must expend a disproportionate amount of resources to protect multiple
avenues of attack on many different networks and resources.
Integrated Operations with Interagency Partners. Whole-of-
government solutions are critical to resolving the complex problems in
the Central Region, and we strive to balance our own authorities and
resources with our interagency partners' unique capabilities,
expertise, and authorities. Our embassy country teams across the region
are doing an incredible and critical job providing nuanced information,
recommendations, and support for military operations, and senior
embassy leadership is integral to facilitating our access to senior
foreign leadership. We strive to ensure that our military activities in
the AOR reinforce our embassy colleagues' diplomatic engagements in
order to mutually advance national security priorities. The Department
of State and United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
have been invaluable partners from the inception of combat operations
in Iraq and Syria to efforts focused on consolidating hard fought
gains. As Secretary Tillerson mentioned in his recent remarks at
Stanford, ``The United States has had diplomats on the ground in
affected areas working with the UN, our partners in the Global
Coalition to Defeat ISIS, and various NGOs. We will continue to devote
personnel and resources to stabilization efforts.'' In partnership with
USAID, CENTCOM has been heavily involved in the conduct of foreign
humanitarian assistance and foreign disaster relief operations across
the region. Steady-state foreign humanitarian assistance activities are
a key security cooperation tool that enhance our BPC efforts and
improve Department of Defense visibility, access, and influence while
addressing critical humanitarian needs. We request your support of the
Administration's annual OHDACA funding request to allow us to continue
these important engagement activities.
Counterdrug-funded train and equip programs have become
increasingly important in the CENTCOM AOR. We work with our interagency
partners in the region to reduce drug trafficking. This is most evident
in the Central Asian states, where a large part of CENTCOM's security
cooperation activities provide counter-narcotics support. We routinely
send additional manpower to embassies in the region to assist them in
executing counter-drug programs that include infrastructure
improvements, communications equipment, and training in the latest
technology such as scanners and ground sensors. Together this builds an
effective capability to stem the flow of illicit trafficking in
narcotics, weapons, and persons. For example, the Regional Narcotics
Interagency Fusion Cell (RNIFC) in Bahrain continues to facilitate the
maritime interdiction of heroin and weapons emanating from the Makran
Coast of Pakistan, by providing intelligence support to Allied naval
partners.
We are also working closely with the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) and Department of Justice (DOJ) to provide
counter-threat finance, counter-facilitation, and counter-procurement
support to United States Forces-Afghanistan's reinvigorated counter-
threat finance cell. Continued linguist support and law enforcement
training for Afghan DEA mentored units is critical to receiving time-
sensitive information from the DEA-sponsored judicial wire intercept
program. We will also participate in the Department of Treasury-led
Terrorist Financing Targeting Cell in Saudi Arabia. This initiative is
part of a larger Saudi-led GCC effort to counter violent extremism in
the Arabian Peninsula and throughout the Central Region.
In the past year, we have also seen the effective expansion of our
Department of Defense Rewards program, which allows for our IA partners
to incentivize sources that deliver information, at great risk, that
result in increased force protection or counter-terrorism kinetic
strikes.
A key component of our working relationship with the IA is the
exchange of personnel; representatives from eight U.S. Government
departments and agencies reside within the CENTCOM Headquarters, a
majority co-located in our Operations Directorate's Interagency Action
Group (IAG). We sincerely appreciate the provision of high-quality
personnel to support CENTCOM operations. Reciprocally, we have embedded
personnel within the headquarters of several USG partners. These embeds
provide support to the gaining organizations and facilitate
collaboration on mutually supportive IA objectives. Embeds also allow
us to maintain visibility and coordinate activities across our
``seams'' with EUCOM, PACOM, and AFRICOM.
Coalition Partners. A unique characteristic of CENTCOM remains the
presence of 49 nations at our headquarters in Tampa. Over the last 15
years, the composition, task, and purpose of the national
representation has changed based on security trends, ongoing
operations, and our partner engagement strategy. Each nation is
represented by a Senior National Representative, and most nations have
additional officers that regularly synchronize with their counterparts
in the Command staff, creating an integrated, coalition-centric
approach to our operations.
Many nations consider counter-VEO operations a focal point for
their efforts. We capitalize on this extraordinary access to our
partners to facilitate information sharing, interoperability,
operational support, and force generation. Our co-location with SOCOM
in Tampa also enables us to capitalize on economies of scale and
synergies between our respective commands and coalition partners.
In spite of the longevity of the Coalition, the current environment
of fiscal austerity may inhibit our ability to sustain it at an optimal
level of performance. Additionally, the lack of national-level
intelligence sharing agreements often hinders the timely and
comprehensive communication of information. Our classified networks are
largely unavailable to our partner nations and inhibit our ability to
integrate operations, often requiring costly and labor-intensive
solutions to overcome.
However, utilizing a coalition-centric approach necessitates a
paradigm shift and a deliberate acceptance of risk in order to foster
an environment of reciprocal information sharing. We have an
opportunity to sustain momentum in the global campaign against ISIS and
other VEOs while continuing to refine the whole-of-coalition approach.
Opposition to violent extremism provides unique alignment of national
interests and can increase trust, understanding, and cooperation on
other critical issues. If we can sustain an enduring coalition, we will
be able to deal with persistent conflict in the region and be postured
for response when necessary. Our lessons learned can inform
departmental and national strategies for attaining increased levels of
integration with our partners.
conclusion
Given the many forces driving change and uncertainty in the region,
U.S. commitment to the CENTCOM area of responsibility is more important
now than ever. Recent experience has shown that a precipitous
withdrawal of support, before conditions for stabilization have been
set, can lead to catastrophic results. We have also learned that a
modest commitment of resources, applied steadily and consistently over
time, and in a predictable fashion, can assist our partners in managing
change, adjusting to new threats, and building their own capacity to
act. This has the additional benefit of lessening our own requirements
in future contingencies and building our reputation as a reliable
partner. Working ``by, with, and through'' our allies and partners
allows us to multiply the effect of relatively modest commitments to
ensure this crucial and truly ``central'' region never again requires a
mass deployment of United States Forces. We will retain the necessary
American military presence in the region to protect the Homeland from
terrorist attack, preserve a favorable regional balance of power, and
achieve our strategic objectives and interests found in our national
strategies.
CENTCOM remains the only geographic Combatant Command executing
Active combat operations. In the last year, we have made great strides
toward defeating ISIS. This year we will shift our focus to the South
Asia Strategy in order to push OFS toward a successful conclusion,
while consolidating the gains we have made against ISIS, supporting our
political and security objectives in the Gulf and Levant, and
countering Iran. We must continue to degrade and destroy VEOs that
threaten the safety of our citizens and partners by pursuing ISIS
across the Central Region. We will continue to counter expansionist
regional powers and inappropriate nuclear ambitions by developing
strong allies and building peace through strength.
We remain mindful that ours is a team effort and that success in
the complex Central Region requires that we work together. This applies
not just within the command but with our fellow Combatant Commands, our
Component Commands, our established combined/joint task forces, the
Central Region's 18 country teams, and the agencies and organizations
of the United States Government which have continued unwavering support
over the almost 2 decades of persistent conflict. Our deliberate and
close relationships with the U.S. Department of State, USAID, the U.S.
Department of Treasury, the Defense Logistics Agency, the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National
Security Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and the Joint Improvised Explosive Devise Defeat
Organization have paid enormous dividends in the pursuit of shared
national goals and objectives. We look forward to continuing to work
with them and others on behalf of our nation. Further, we continue to
benefit from our allies in the region, who support the CENTCOM
headquarters with more than 200 foreign military officers from 49
nations--all of whom are a part of the success of CENTCOM, and we are
grateful for their partnership.
In all of this, the outstanding men and women who comprise the
United States Central Command are our finest and most precious
resource. The world class CENTCOM team--which includes more than 90,000
soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coastguardsmen, and civilians
stationed throughout the CENTCOM area of responsibility--is highly-
skilled, motivated, and stands ready to do whatever is necessary to
accomplish the mission. They continue to make great sacrifices and
contributions to ensure the command meets our strategic objectives and
protects our nation's interests. We must ensure they have everything
they need to do their jobs as effectively and efficiently as possible.
This includes ensuring a safe environment for all our personnel,
regardless of their race, gender, creed, or religion.
We are also keenly aware and grateful for the sacrifices made by
our families. They are vital members of our team, and we could not
complete our mission without them. They, too, make important
contributions and tremendous sacrifices each and every day in support
of us and on behalf of the Command and a grateful nation.
CENTCOM: Prepare, Pursue, Prevail!
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, General Votel.
General Waldhauser?
STATEMENT OF GENERAL THOMAS D. WALDHAUSER, USMC, COMMANDER,
UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND
General Waldhauser. Senator Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to update you on the efforts of the United States
Africa Command.
I am also honored to be here today with General Votel and
discuss many of the concerns we share between CENTCOM and
AFRICOM, including countering violent extremist organizations.
I would like to begin this morning by remembering the
soldiers and sailor we lost on the continent during operations
this past year. I also want to share my respects for the loss
of our African partner forces who, during their efforts in the
fight against extremism, gave the ultimate sacrifice this past
year as well. We honor their commitment, service, and
dedication to duty, and I offer my sincere condolences to the
families of our fallen United States comrades and those of our
African partners.
Senator Inhofe, I have completed my review of the Niger
investigation and forwarded the report to the Secretary of
Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Once
the Secretary completes his review and after the families have
been briefed, I intend to provide a comprehensive and detailed
account of the investigation to you as soon as practicable.
This morning, I would like to talk to you about AFRICOM's
strategy for the continent and update you on our priority
regional efforts.
The United States interests in Africa are reflected in our
mission statement. AFRICOM with partners strengthens security
forces, counters transnational threats, and conducts crisis
response in order to advance United States national interests
and promote regional security, stability, and prosperity in
Africa. Our mission statement deliberately highlights the
importance of ``with partners.''
Following up on this point, very few, if any, of the
challenges on the African continent can be resolved through the
use of exclusive military force. Accordingly, AFRICOM's first
strategic tenet underscores our military activities and is
designed to support and enable United States diplomatic and
development efforts. We can create time and space for
governments to establish effective and accountable governance
while fostering conditions for economies to develop.
Our second theme describes our strategic approach of by,
with, and through. This framework emphasizes our main effort to
build the capacity of African partner defense forces to
credibly provide for their own security. While African nations
have enormous potential, they are often challenged by
instability and exploitation stemming from the disruption
caused by violent extremist organizations, or VEOs. These VEO
groups take advantage of vast ungoverned spaces and recruit
from populations lacking economic opportunities.
We approach these security threats through our third
strategic principle of keeping pressure on the networks of
VEOs, such as Al Shabaab, ISIS, al Qaeda, and Boko Haram, in
order to mitigate their destabilizing influence. At the same
time, we remain postured and ready to respond to contingencies
and to protect U.S. personnel and facilities on the continent.
These strategic themes and AFRICOM's approach are aligned
with the national level guidance. In accordance with the
recently released National Defense Strategy and in the context
of changes in the operating environment, we are updating our
strategy and theater campaign plan to reflect the guidance
provided by the Secretary of Defense.
Turning now to our regional efforts, I would like to
describe for you some of the challenges we face each day on the
continent.
In East Africa, AFRICOM's contributions are part of an
international commitment to help Somalia implement their
recently designed national security architecture. Al Shabaab
remains a threat to Somalia and the region, as demonstrated by
their October 2017 bombing in Mogadishu that killed over 500
people. The challenges facing the federal government of Somalia
are enormous. Nevertheless, they continue to slowly make
progress with a long way to go before they are prepared to
secure their own territory with international partners and
organizations, including the African Union and the European
Union, AFRICOM's kinetic and capacity building efforts to
assist the federal government of Somalia with the
implementation of their comprehensive approach to security
sector reform.
In North Africa, Libya remains politically and militarily
divided with leaders and factions vying for power ahead of
potential elections later this year. In close cooperation with
the United States embassy's Libyan External Office, located in
Tunis, and as part of the international effort, AFRICOM
supports diplomatic objectives for political reconciliation. We
will continue to work with the UN-established [United Nations]
government of national accord and maintain pressure on the
ISIS, Libya, and al Qaeda networks in that country.
The Sahel refers to the Sahara to Savannah Transition Belt
spanning the broadest part of Africa from the Atlantic Ocean to
the Red Sea. AFRICOM supports multinational efforts in the
western Sahel and in the nearby Lake Chad basin region of West
Africa. We provide training, advice, and assistance to the G5
Shahel countries and the multinational joint task force in
order to help them contain violent extremism and secure their
borders.
In conclusion, the continued progress on the continent with
our partners reflects dedicated efforts by the men and women of
AFRICOM. I am proud to lead these professionals who have built
strong and trusting relationships with the United States
interagency and with our international community in order to
foster the security, stability, and prosperity on the African
continent.
On behalf of the servicemembers, civilian employees, and
families of the United States Africa Command, thank you for the
opportunity to be with you this morning, and I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Waldhauser follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Thomas D. Waldhauser
introduction
Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to update you on the efforts
of United States Africa Command to protect and promote United States
vital interests in Africa. At the outset, I want to remember the
soldiers in Niger and Navy SEAL in Somalia we lost during operations in
the past year. These brave men epitomize the United States Africa
Command standard to which we all strive in the service of our country.
I offer my sincere condolences to the families for their losses. I have
reviewed the contents and signed the results of the Niger
investigation, which are currently with the Chairman and the Secretary
of Defense. Upon completion of the briefings to the families, our
intent is to provide a full and comprehensive briefing to this
committee as soon as practical. I also want to recognize all the
families who stand with us and support the United States Africa Command
mission across the continent. On any given day, up to 7,200 United
States uniformed personnel, Department of Defense civilians, and
contractors are in Africa representing all services, career fields, and
specialties, protecting our national security and working tirelessly to
tackle the many challenges on the African continent. Since I last spoke
with this committee, the United States Africa Command team has made
significant progress with our United States-Africa strategy and with
building the defense capacity of our African partners. I am truly
honored to lead this team and its efforts in a very dynamic strategic
environment.
In 2008, United States Africa Command was established as the first
fully integrated interagency combatant command; its purpose was to
foster United States long-term, security engagement in Africa. As we
commemorate our 10 year anniversary, United States Africa Command
continues to enhance the security and stability of Africa and its
people. While our area of responsibility covers 53 countries with
complex and varied issues, our mission is clear: United States Africa
Command, with partners, strengthens security forces, counters
transnational threats, and conducts crisis response in order to advance
United States national interests and promote regional security,
stability, and prosperity.
African nations--their people, their increasing appetite for
democratic principles, their growing economic impact and potential in
global markets--remain an enduring interest for the United States.
United States Africa Command supports our African partners in building
the capability and the capacity to develop local solutions to
radicalization, destabilization, and persistent conflict. By making
targeted investments and maintaining strong partnerships, we can set
the basic security conditions needed for good governance and
development to take root. Africa, our allies, the United StatesUnited
States, and the world stand to benefit from a secure, stable, and
prosperous Africa.
To achieve this end state, the United States must remain engaged in
Africa. In the long term, United States interests in Africa are best
served by stable nations with effective, accountable governments, well-
trained and disciplined militaries, and growing economies. None of
Africa's challenges can be resolved through the use of military force
as the primary agent of change. Therefore, our first strategic theme is
that United States Africa Command activities directly support United
States diplomatic and development efforts in Africa. Working with our
interagency partners--primarily the Department of State and United
States Agency for International Development (USAID)--is a core tenet of
our strategic approach in Africa. In addition, United States Africa
Command works alongside the African Union, the European Union, regional
African economic and security communities, and the United Nations.
Together, to provide alternatives to those who might otherwise be
attracted to extreme ideologies, we work to develop government
accountability, increase education opportunities, and develop strong
economies. Further, to professionalize security forces, United States
Africa Command provides human rights training to make forces more
accountable to the people and lessen the abuses and drivers of
radicalization among the civilian populations. Only by partnering with
interested stakeholders can long-term U.S. strategic goals be achieved.
United States Africa Command's second strategic theme is our focus
on the By, With, and Through framework. This is a strategic approach
that emphasizes U.S. military capabilities employed in a supporting
role, not as principal participants in armed conflict. Security
operations are executed almost exclusively by the partnered security
forces. United States Africa Command works with partnered security
forces based on their operational needs. The vital objectives of the
United States and the partnered nation are achieved through a
cooperative relationship in which United States Africa Command plays a
supporting role. African leaders tell us how important it is to develop
``African solutions to African problems.'' The framework of By, With,
and Through recognizes the importance of partner ownership, which in
turn, fosters enduring relationships.
strategic environment
African agriculture, financial services, manufacturing, and
construction are promising sectors attracting international trade and
investment. The United States, therefore, is not the only prospective
partner in Africa. We seek constructive, results-oriented relationships
with other foreign interests who wish to develop Africa's
infrastructure and tackle humanitarian and security issues. We must,
however, be aware of interests that run counter to our own, as a larger
number of external actors take a great interest in Africa. Though some
of their actions contribute to Africa's infrastructure and defense,
some of these actors are impeding the continent's long-term stability,
economic growth and financial independence. Moreover, external actors
may diminish United States influence by undermining our development and
diplomatic efforts in Africa, and we share this message with our
African partners during all levels of engagement. Nonetheless, as the
strategic environment becomes more crowded and competitive, our
engagement with external actors, like China and Russia, will continue
with an open and clear discussion of intersecting interests and
differences.
Extremes in poverty, limited infrastructure, predatory governance,
inadequate health care, and in many cases, violent ideology, exist
throughout Africa juxtaposed with enormous economic potential and
strategic opportunity. This volatile environment creates instability
and uncertainty and allows violent extremist organizations (VEOs) to
grow and recruit from disenfranchised populations. Keeping military
pressure on this VEO network is our third strategic theme. This cycle
of disenfranchisement and recruitment feeds extremist movements that
aspire to spread their violent ideology. For instance, a youth
population with significant unemployment and who are being harassed by
predatory and rights-abusing governments and security forces create the
perfect hotbed in which to garner ideological support and recruit
fighters who will target our partners, allies, and U.S. interests. VEOs
also utilize existing illicit networks to move drugs, weapons and
persons across the continent. They foment fear and distrust which
undermine governments, and when combined with the despair caused by
lack of hope for the future, provide for VEO expansion. These VEOs are
a significant threat to our partners, allies, and U.S. interests on the
continent.
Conflict, instability, and lack of economic opportunity in multiple
regions across the continent lead to large numbers of internally
displaced persons (IDPs), refugees, and migrants. According to the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Africa has approximately
18.5 million people categorized as refugees, asylum seekers, IDPs, and
stateless persons as of January 2017. The continent hosts 30 percent of
the world's displaced people, more than any other continent. In 2016,
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
estimated there are more than 1.6 million new asylum requests
worldwide, and of these, almost 1.2 million were registered in European
countries. In Africa, many countries do not have the infrastructure
necessary to absorb large influxes of refugees and displaced persons.
These large numbers may destabilize already tenuous social, economic,
and political institutions and further stress poor populations.
In Africa, weak and ineffective governance is the leading cause of
state fragility. According to the 2017 Fund for Peace ``Fragile State
Index,'' 15 of the 25 most fragile countries in the world are in
Africa. While governance is not the primary mission of United States
Africa Command, we recognize building legitimate defense institutions
is critical for African Governments that prioritize the security of
their citizens over that of the state. Therefore, we work in concert
with the Department of State, and other partners, to develop human
rights-respecting security forces and inspire them to pursue military
professionalism in their own institutions. For example, this past
November, we hosted an African Senior Enlisted Leader conference to
discuss the importance and value of enlisted leadership in the military
ranks with noncommissioned officers (NCOs) from nineteen of our African
partners. Empowering these NCOs is crucial to strengthening partner
militaries, as enlisted force leaders are closest to the soldiers in
the field and can relate to them in ways difficult for officers to
match. For example, enlisted force leaders work to get soldiers paid on
time, remove and reduce corruption, and continue to act as positive
role models within their community.
United States Africa Command conducts Military Information Support
Operations (MISO) to advise and assist partners in countries such as
Kenya, Niger, and Nigeria to enable their counter-VEO messaging and
enhance their security operations. MISO empowers the government's
ability to increase its outreach to the population and counter
adversarial messaging.
command approach
Theater Strategy
Transnational VEOs are not only the most direct threat to United
States interests in Africa, but also a threat to stability across the
continent. Just as the threat on the ground evolves, so too does our
Strategy. United States Africa Command utilizes the National Security,
Defense, and Military Strategies, Guidance for the Employment of the
Force, and other U.S. policy documents to guide our current Strategy.
The 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) states that the United States
seeks to partner with African states that exercise sovereignty over
their whole territory, are integrated into the world economy, able to
provide for their citizens' needs, and capable of managing threats to
peace and security. To that end, United States Africa Command will
continue to search out willing and capable partners, strengthen
existing partnerships, and form new relationships that promote these
goals. The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) reinforces United
States Africa Command's approach of ``working by, with, and through''
local partners to degrade VEOs, interdict transnational extremist and
criminal activity, and increase the institutional capacity of partners
to do so with limited foreign assistance. Increasing partner capacity
cannot be limited to training and equipping front-line forces. In
concert with interagency and international partners, we must also
contribute to building the institutions that fortify recruiting,
training, sustaining, and fielding of these forces. Such institutions
create the stable security environment to allow democracy and
development to blossom, which diminish the factors that allow violent
extremism and criminality to grow. Put simply, a sustainable solution
to instability in Africa involves supporting national institutions and
regional organizations willing and able to address their own security
challenges.
In order to create the time and space necessary for this long-term
effort, we maintain pressure on transnational VEOs. Our primary effort
in this aspect is to execute programs with more capable partners.
Working directly with these partners, we target VEOs who pose an
imminent threat to partner, allied, and U.S. interests.
United States Africa Command focuses on cost-effective solutions
that leverage interagency and international support as we continue our
decisive effort of building the capacity of and strengthening
relationships with African partners, primarily executed through
security cooperation activities. To support these efforts, our fiscal
year 2019 Budget Request includes appropriate resources--notably,
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets.
Theater Posture
To set the African theater, United States Africa Command's posture
plan is designed to secure strategic access to key locations on a
continent characterized by vast distances and limited infrastructure
while adhering to Department of Defense guidance to maintain a
tailorable, flexible, small, and expeditionary presence. Our posture
network allows forward staging of forces to provide operational
flexibility and timely response to crises involving United States
personnel or interests without creating the optic that United States
Africa Command is ``militarizing'' Africa.
In Djibouti, Camp Lemonnier is an enduring U.S. military
installation that serves as a vital hub for Security Force Assistance,
operations, and logistics for five combatant commands: United States
Africa Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command, U.S.
Special Operations Command, and U.S. Transportation Command. Camp
Lemonnier provides, operates, and sustains superior service in support
of combat readiness and security of ships, aircraft, detachments, and
personnel for regional and combatant command requirements; and enables
operations in the Horn of Africa while fostering positive United
States-African relations.
Over the course of the last 2 years, United States Africa Command
has endeavored to improve our distribution network. In January 2018, we
initiated processes and procedures to establish the West Africa
Logistics Network. This network will position right-sized aircraft on
the continent to facilitate distribution from a primary logistics hub
to support locations throughout West and Central Africa. That will
vastly improve support to approximately 1,800 personnel supporting 11
named operations across a 13-nation region, roughly the size of the
Continental United States.
Combatant Command Campaign Plan
To contribute to ``a secure, stable, and prosperous Africa,'' we
focus on building partner capacity, protecting United States personnel
and facilities, and maintaining U.S. access. This approach complements
the efforts of our allies, such as France and the United Kingdom.
United States Africa Command currently operates along five Lines of
Effort (LOEs), which focus resources and operations throughout the
continent: 1) Develop Security and Stability in East Africa; 2) Degrade
VEOs in Sahel and Maghreb Regions / Contain Instability in Libya; 3)
Contain and Degrade Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa; 4) Interdict
Illicit Activity in Gulf of Guinea and Central Africa; and 5) Build
Peace Keeping / Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR)
capacity of African Partners.
Each LOE links multiple tasks and objectives to achieve a desired
end state. While each geographical region presents different
challenges, the overall message that ``a secure, stable, and prosperous
Africa is an enduring American interest'' remains our focus. The LOEs
help translate our strategy into an operational approach while allowing
flexibility to address each region's specific needs. This flexibility
is key as we review and adjust our campaign plan. Over the next few
months, we will work with partners, allies, and the interagency to
review and then release an updated Combatant Command Campaign Plan in
2018, covering fiscal years 2019-23.
Our strategy features a whole-of-government approach utilizing the
specific skill sets of the Department of State, USAID, Federal Bureau
of Investigation, Department of Homeland Security, Department of
Justice, and other interagency partners to synchronize and complement
our approach. Many partners embed a liaison cell within United States
Africa Command to support our strategy, a method we endorse and expand
as needed. Additionally, United States Africa Command understands
legislation generally consistent with a proposal outlined in the
President's 2019 Budget and the National Security Strategy has been
introduced to create a new development finance institution. We look
forward to working with this new agency as well.
East Africa
For East Africa, the desired end state is one in which VEOs are not
able to destabilize Somalia or its neighbors or threaten the United
States Homeland, United States persons, or our international partners
and allies. Accordingly, the desired end state includes transitioning
security responsibility from the African Union Mission in Somalia
(AMISOM) to the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and Somalia's
Federal Member States (FMS) so the central and regional governments
ultimately secure their own territory, neutralize al-Shabaab, and
interdict illicit flows of arms, drugs, money, natural resources, and
persons.
In Somalia, the 2017 election of President Mohamed Abdullahi
Mohamed, known as President ``Farmajo,'' proved to be a strategically
significant change in the region. Historically, Somalia has been
plagued with drought, extreme food insecurity, and decades of
political, economic, and military unrest. President Farmajo inherited
clan-based conflicts, al-Shabaab's ongoing violent extremism, and the
emergence of ISIS-Somalia.
However, in the short time since taking office, President Farmajo
has re-aligned the Somali National Army security sectors to coincide
with the borders of the Somali Federal Member States. He also utilized
2017 as a year of planning while gathering local, regional, and
international support. At both the May 2017 London Conference and the
December 2017 Mogadishu Conference, President Farmajo reiterated his
administration's commitment to implementing Somali national security
architecture in 2018 and refocused the AMISOM transition into a
conditions-based turnover rather than a time- or date-based transition.
International partners, including the United States, are committed to
Somali progress leading to well-trained Somali security forces.
President Farmajo fully supports U.S.-led train and equip missions,
as well as U.S. kinetic efforts in support of the FGS. President
Farmajo recognizes that Somalia's security cannot be manufactured by
international partners but must come from Somali citizens in towns and
villages across the country. President Farmajo supports a federal form
of government, with power and security responsibilities shared among
federal member states and local forces; he also supports military
accountability to the civilian population. President Farmajo has
demonstrated a willingness to integrate federal, regional, and local
interests into his administration and encourages defections from al-
Shabaab. Also assisting in Somalia is a coalition of international
partners, such as the European Union, the African Union, the United
Nations, the United Kingdom, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates.
Even with President Farmajo's forward-looking Somalia strategy, al-
Shabaab remains a threat to the region, as demonstrated by the
devastating October 2017 vehicle-borne IED attacks in Mogadishu that
killed over 500 people. While some high-profile defections have
occurred, only a small number of fighters have actually defected. In
addition, Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS)-Somalia remains
isolated in northern Somalia with small, limited capabilities. By the
end of 2017, sustained conflict and prolonged food insecurity drove
more than two million people to flee their homes in Somalia. Though
there are some improvements in 2018, unfortunately, forecasted drought
conditions will likely lead to continued poor harvests and reduced food
security in Somalia, sustaining and contributing to population
displacement. As a component of our whole-of-government efforts, and
building on longstanding and large humanitarian investments, in 2017,
USAID signed an important development assistance agreement with
Somalia, supporting that country's efforts to achieve stability through
good governance, economic recovery, education and health. USAID has
invested $400 million in development assistance in Somalia since 2011.
Delivered over a 5-year period, the funds will support democracy,
stabilization and governance, education, and economic growth activities
to achieve economic recovery and resilience for Somalia.
With the full support of the Federal Government of Somalia, United
States Africa Command maintains pressure on the al-Shabaab and ISIS-
Somalia networks and seeks to accelerate the delivery of training and
equipment to the Somali Federal Member States. Our joint Department of
Defense-Department of State Security Force Assistance efforts in
Somalia have built the 1st Danab Advanced Infantry Battalion, a combat-
tested unit at the leading edge in southern Somalia. Furthermore, with
the Department of State and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency's
(DTRA) Joint Improvised Threat Defeat Organization (JIDO), we are
working to improve the security posture in Mogadishu and mitigate the
destabilizing effects of vehicle-borne IED attacks in the city.
Our relationship with Djibouti is strong, though we are carefully
monitoring Chinese encroachment and emergent military presence. In
November, Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti hosted a commemorative event
celebrating the Africa First Initiative and its contract awardees,
which President Ismail Omar Guelleh attended as the honorary guest.
This long-term initiative to acquire local goods and services for
United States military members helps boost African businesses. Camp
Lemonnier remains the only enduring United States Military installation
in Africa, and as such, a key component of the command's regional
readiness. Furthermore, last August, the Chinese opened their first
overseas naval base in Djibouti. United States Africa Command views
security and access to Djibouti as a top priority. Consequently, we
continue to monitor this development to ensure U.S. interests are not
deterred.
In South Sudan, the political climate continues to be volatile.
United States Africa Command maintains constant communication with
United States Embassy Juba and stands ready to assist them should the
situation on the ground necessitate our support. This response
capability means the United States can maintain diplomatic and
humanitarian presence inside of South Sudan as United States Embassy
Juba works to seek an end to one of Africa's largest humanitarian
disasters.
Ethiopia remains a longstanding partner and contributes over 4,000
uniformed personnel to AMISOM, further advancing regional peace and
security efforts in East Africa.
Other countries in East Africa continue to develop reconnaissance
and surveillance capabilities to build their capacity for
counterterrorism operations. Kenya and Uganda have deployed tactical
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in their fight against al-Shabaab in
southern Somalia. The Kenyans use theirs to identify ambushes ahead of
their patrols, and the Ugandans use theirs as artillery spotters
against al-Shabaab concentrations. Both countries have seen the value
of such capabilities, and Kenya is now investing their own money in
additional platforms. Furthermore, as Kenya received guided strike
capabilities, we are developing air-ground integration mentorship
programs to optimize the impact of these tools. Both Kenya and Uganda
receive helicopters, UAVs, and medium altitude reconnaissance
platforms.
North Africa
Turning to North Africa, our four primary objectives in Libya are:
degrade terrorist groups who threaten United States interests and
threaten to destabilize Libya and the region; avert civil war; support
the political reconciliation process towards a unified central
government; and assist to curb the flow of illegal migrants into Europe
via Libya. Efforts by European allies and international organizations
are underway to interdict the illicit flow of arms and drugs flowing
into and through of North Africa due to porous borders and under-
governed spaces.
In Libya, United States Africa Command continues to support the
United States Libya External Office's diplomatic efforts to promote the
UN-facilitated Libyan political reconciliation process. Our
counterterrorism strategy has allowed time for the political
reconciliation process to continue.
Following its late 2016 expulsion from in Surt, ISIS-Libya remains
dispersed and disorganized and likely capable of little more than
localized attacks. Meanwhile, al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM) in Libya maintains a low profile yet still aims to use
illicit means to move fighters and weapons and focuses on building
influence within Libya's various extremist groups. The disrupted state
of VEOs, however, has not translated into a stable Libya. Libya remains
politically and militarily divided, with loyalties shifting based on
tribal interests and personalities involved in the struggle for power.
Given this turmoil, the risk of a full-scale civil war remains real. We
will continue to apply pressure on the ISIS-Libya network, work with
the Government of National Accord, and support the international
community to consolidate a comprehensive approach to bringing stability
and a political settlement to Libya.
In Tunisia, we work to develop Tunisian counterterrorism and border
security capabilities. Through programs that build partner capacity,
like the JIDO counter-IED awareness program, we have trained and
equipped Tunisia's Special Operations Forces. Recently, elements of the
United States-trained Tunisian Special Forces airborne battalion
successfully engaged a group of terrorists in the Kasserine Mountains,
killing a senior ISIS attack planner. On border security, Tunisia is
making use of United States-provided mobile ground surveillance radar
systems and ISR aircraft to better monitor its border with Libya.
Furthermore, the United States-funded border security project managed
by DTRA is on track to provide fixed radar and camera coverage of the
Tunisia-Libya border in November 2018. DTRA has begun a second radar to
extend coverage to the southern portion of the Libya-Tunisia border.
This second phase is funded by the German Government and managed by
DTRA.
On 31 January 2017, Morocco was admitted to the African Union (AU),
more than 3 decades after it withdrew from the precursor Organization
of African Unity. This means all African nations are now members of the
AU. As the country with the largest Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
program within our Area of Responsibility, Morocco has repeatedly
demonstrated the ability to operate and maintain advanced United States
equipment and seeks to increase interoperability with U.S. and NATO
Forces. Morocco's role as a net exporter of security makes it a key
partner in the region.
Algeria is another highly capable partner in North Africa, who
continues to implement an effective counterterrorism program against
local extremist groups. Further, United States Africa Command and the
Algerian People's National Armed Forces hold regular dialogues to
advance cooperation on shared security interests.
Sahel Region
The Sahel region of Africa is a critical battleground in the fight
against violent extremism and jihadist terrorism. The African-led,
French-assisted, United States-supported G5 Sahel organization (Burkina
Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger) has established a joint force
to combat violent extremism within the region. United States Africa
Command is contributing two operational planners to the G5 Sahel Joint
Force.
In Mali and adjacent countries, AQIM and its affiliates remain a
threat to United States interests and the security of our African
partners. Mali's government, rebel groups, and pro-government militias
are struggling to implement the 2015 Algiers peace agreement. We remain
committed to assisting the French-led operations to degrade VEOs and to
build the defense capacity in Mali and its neighbors.
Niger is at the crossroads of regional instability: Boko Haram,
ISIS-West Africa, ISIS-Greater Sahara, Jamaat Nursat al-Islam wal-
Muslimin (JNIM), and affiliated extremist groups in the region;
spillover from the Mali conflict in the west; instability emanating
from Libya to the north; and a large flow of would-be migrants to
Europe who converge on Agadez en route to Libya. Moreover, Niger faces
internal governance and development issues with rapid population
growth, environmental degradation, lack of economic opportunity, and
stressed infrastructure. While the Department of Defense has increased
Title 10 support to Nigerien forces, the United States military does
not have a direct combat mission in Niger. Instead, United States
Africa Command has provided training and equipment to the Nigerien
Armed Forces and through the Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership
since 2005, and advises and assists certain Nigerien combat units.
Additionally, at the request of the Government of Niger and the
Nigerien Armed Forces, United States Africa Command is establishing an
expeditionary, contingency support location in Agadez. This will be a
Nigerien base from which we will fly ISR assets to better identify and
monitor threats in the region. Furthermore, Niger will host Exercise
Flintlock 2018, a multi-national event among African, allied, and
United States forces to develop capacity and collaboration between
security forces to protect civilian populations. The fight against
terrorism is a long-term effort, and Niger has shown itself to be a
dedicated partner.
In Burkina Faso, United States forces are supporting intra-theater
mobility operations. Additional security assistance initiatives in
Burkina Faso include training and equipping army companies dedicated to
counterterrorism operations and logistics. On 2 March 2018, our
partners sustained devastating attacks on the Burkinabe Army
Headquarters and on the French Embassy, and we remain in steadfast
support to their efforts.
In Chad, United States forces conduct Security Force Assistance
focused on logistics, sustainment, and maintenance with the Chadian
Special Anti-terrorism Group (SATG). Key programs include counter-Boko
Haram equipment (e.g. armored trucks, fuel, and radios), ISR aircraft,
and command and control enhancements. In addition, U.S. forces are
building intelligence and counter-IED capabilities to augment Chad's
counterterrorism efforts. We trained and equipped the National Army
with sixty light armored vehicles and provided fuel allotments to
support border surveillance as well as counter extremists operations in
the Lake Chad Region. In 2017, the Chadian National Army used some of
these vehicles to assist in operations to contain ISIS-West Africa in
Nigeria, decreasing attacks into Niger and Chad.
West Africa
Unrest within West Africa is driven by local grievances, corruption
and weak governance, human rights violations, and imported religious
ideology. United States Africa Command's principal strategic objective
in West Africa and the Lake Chad Region is to contain and degrade Boko
Haram and ISIS-West Africa. United States Africa Command works with the
four Lake Chad Region countries (Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria) to
build their capacity to ensure Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa do not
threaten partner, allied, or U.S interests.
The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), composed of forces from
Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, coordinates operations and
facilitates intelligence sharing. Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa
continue to hold territory and conduct suicide IED attacks, and to
varying degrees terrorize local communities, displacing people from
their homes. The persistent violence limits the ability of
international humanitarian aid organizations to deliver needed
assistance. Basic health care, clean drinking water, adequate
sanitation, and food supplies are in short supply to the millions of
refugees and displaced persons in the area. United States Africa
Command supports Department of State and USAID (the United States
Government leads) who work closely with the UN and non-governmental
organizations to provide humanitarian development assistance, and
stability to the region.
Nigeria's capabilities and capacity continue to grow, with
intelligence sharing agreements and additional cooperation with United
States forces. Nigeria has made arrangements to purchase 12 A-29 Super
Tucano light attack airplanes with delivery of the first 8 expected in
2020. Furthermore, President Buhari has encouraged trust in United
States-Nigerian interaction. However, challenges remain, as MNJTF
partners sometimes fall short of respecting international norms of
human rights when dealing with local populations. We are closely
monitoring reports of the armed forces of Lake Chad Region countries
using heavy-handed counter-insurgency techniques and which have led to
additional displacement of civilian populations and reports of forcible
return of Nigerian refugees from neighboring countries in violation of
international humanitarian principles and refugee-related conventions.
We continually remind them techniques such as these not only increase
regional fragility by undermining public trust and confidence in the
state, but also produce the grievances that fuel support for the enemy.
Partner nation fiscal challenges and competing security concerns add
additional pressure in the region. Nigeria faces unrest in its southern
Delta region, home to its oil fields and oil revenues, piracy in the
Gulf of Guinea, and threats by Biafran separatists. As Boko Haram and
ISIS-West Africa become localized to northeastern Nigeria, the
remaining MNJTF partners have become reluctant to commit resources to
what they view as ``a Nigeria problem.''
United States Africa Command supports the efforts of the Lake Chad
Region partners to counter Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa by providing
advisors, intelligence, training, and equipment instead of engaging in
direct military operations. In July 2017, United States Africa Command
started training and equipping MNJTF-designated units to counter IEDs.
Over a hundred MNJTF soldiers are now less vulnerable to IEDs employed
by violent extremists. We intend to expand counter-IED training and
equipping programs to other affected regions.
Gulf of Guinea and Central Africa
In the Gulf of Guinea, maritime security remains a strategic
priority due to its role in global oil markets, trade routes, and the
presence of approximately 75,000 American citizens residing in the
area. Piracy and other illicit maritime activities threaten development
efforts, weaken state security, and rob states of resources required
for greater economic growth and more effective governance. Incidents of
piracy and armed robbery at sea trended lower in 2017, but continued to
threaten maritime trade and offshore hydrocarbon installations.
In addition to the VEO threat throughout Africa, criminal and
smuggling networks remain a persistent danger within the Gulf of Guinea
and Central Africa. United States Africa Command supports our African
partners who work with international and interagency partners to
interdict and to disrupt illicit trafficking and smuggling networks
that finance trans-national criminal organizations.
United States Africa Command remains engaged with coastal nations
and international partners to increase African maritime capacity and
willingness to interdict illicit activity in the Gulf of Guinea. We
execute the African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership (AMLEP) and
support the Yaounde Code of Conduct, a strong regional framework for
information sharing and operational coordination. In 2017, under the
AMLEP, U.S. Coast Guard and Cabo Verde security personnel embarked a
Senegal Navy ship for joint patrol operations in Senegal and Cabo Verde
waters. This represented the first combined African partner maritime
law enforcement patrol hosted from another African partner nation's
vessel.
In Central Africa, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) used to
terrorize isolated populations. Our surge efforts with the African
Union Regional Task Force effectively diminished the LRA to a threat
that can now be better addressed by local and state actors, in which
the Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs and the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations are
investing. Now, regional efforts are focused on expanding security in
this region by investing in civilian law enforcement agencies to
provide more security and address illicit trafficking of minerals,
natural resources, narcotics and weapons which fuel violence.
Africa-Wide Capacity Building Efforts
United States Africa Command continues to build the capacity of
African partners to respond to crises including infectious disease
outbreaks. Most of our engagement with Southern Africa is in this
regard. Despite its relative stability, Southern Africa faces economic,
social, and environmental challenges that include poverty, crime,
social inequality, corruption, and lack of water. United States Africa
Command will continue to work closely with our Department of State and
USAID partners, providing support and complementing their efforts when
requested.
One of United States Africa Command's most valuable implementing
partners is the National Guard's State Partnership Program (SPP). These
state partnerships' enduring relationships build and improve
peacekeeping capacity, disaster management competency, and overall
partner readiness. For example, the SPP currently supports the Botswana
Defense Force as they build various defense institutions such as an
Office of the Inspector General and a Staff Judge Advocate program.
Through United States Africa Command's Security Force Assistance, the
SPP and other organizations are setting the stage for force development
in Botswana. Currently, the SPP pairs 13 African nations with 11 United
States states. Several more African countries have requested
partnerships, and their requests are currently under consideration. We
continue to see great value in the SPP program.
Other programs that build partner capacity include the Global Peace
Operations Initiative (GPOI), the African Peacekeeping Rapid Response
Partnership (APRRP), and the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS)
Initiative. GPOI, managed by the Department of State, works to
strengthen the capacity and capabilities of international partners to
execute UN and regional peacekeeping operations. Most GPOI partners are
in Africa (23), as the program builds sustainable peacekeeping capacity
within each country to aid in their participation in UN and regional
peacekeeping missions. APRRP focuses on six African partners (Ethiopia,
Ghana, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, and Uganda) to allow for deeper
investment in rapid response capability. APRRP allows for development
of aviation, medical, engineering, and logistical capabilities;
command, control, communications, and information systems; and the
formation of police units to handle local law enforcement requirements.
GPOI and APRRP professionalize partner militaries and security forces
through training and equipping and institution building.
United States Africa Command remains committed to aligning capacity
building efforts with WPS objectives. WPS integrates a gender
perspective in our military activities through two main efforts: 1)
staff training and awareness, and 2) integration in the Combatant
Command Campaign Plan. For training and awareness, we host ``Gender in
Military Operations'' seminars and provide informative briefings to
both United States Africa Command and partner leadership during
conferences. WPS concepts are integrated into military-to-military
engagements; training on human rights, rule of law, and prevention of
gender-based violence; and exercises.
United States Africa Command's whole-of-government approach
includes building partners' capacity for responding to disease
outbreaks. United States Africa Command Surgeon's Office leads the
Africa Malaria Task Force (AMTF) programs through leadership
engagements, assessments, and training for 18 African militaries to
implement the United States Government's President's Malaria Initiative
(PMI) and to support countries' malaria prevention programs. The
command's components lead the Africa Partner Outbreak Response Alliance
(APORA) that promotes effective military-civilian partnerships in
health and security communities to manage emerging epidemics. Based on
the initiative's successes, we are establishing professional
development and training programs for emergency managers and responders
in West Africa at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training
Center in Accra, Ghana.
Implementing Our Approach
United States Africa Command relies on partnerships not only with
African nations but also with international, multinational,
interagency, and specialized United States units to achieve U.S.
strategic objectives. Fifteen of our international partners are
embedded within the command staff in the Multi-National Coordination
Center (MNCC). United States Africa Command leads and participates in
multilateral planning groups for East Africa, North Africa, and the
Sahel region, in addition to our component command-hosted senior leader
staff talks with their respective component equivalents. In addition,
the United States Army's Regionally Aligned Force (RAF) executes a
significant share of the Security Force Assistance activities in
Africa. Sustained access to the RAF is critical to mission success.
United States Africa Command coordinates and integrates its
activities with the Department of State and USAID through the annual
Africa Strategic Dialogue in the fall and the Africa Strategic
Integration Conference in the winter. Working with the Department of
State and other departments and agencies, the Security Governance
Initiative (SGI) builds the capacity of civil and defense institutions
in six countries, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Tunisia.
Additionally, the section 333 authority provided in the Fiscal Year
2017 National Defense Authorization Act assists United States Africa
Command in building security force capacity and has been essential in
enabling African partners in their fight against home grown extremism.
Relationships with United States European Command and United States
Central Command are essential to our mission success. We rely on allies
such as France, Germany, Italy, and Spain to project United States
Forces out of Europe to support efforts in North Africa, the Sahel, and
other location on the continent, and United States European Command
helps orchestrate these efforts. We coordinate closely with United
States Central Command for shared response forces, as well as shared
equities in Egypt, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Gulf of Aden. In
2017, for example, our Exercise Cutlass Express, sought to improve
United States military interoperability with the armed forces of
eastern African nations and European allies. The exercise was linked
with U.S. Central Command's international maritime exercise to build
capabilities in the region. Finally, our partnership with United States
Special Operations Command (SOCOM)--through Special Operations Command-
Africa (SOCAFRICA)--is a vital link in containing and degrading
extremism on the continent.
To support the Department of State-led mission to protect U.S.
personnel and facilities, United States Africa Command manages rapid-
response forces that are flexible and specialized: the Special Purpose
Marine Air Ground Task Force-Crisis Response at Moron Air Base, Spain;
the Crisis Response Force in Baumholder, Germany; and the East Africa
Response Force in Djibouti. Also, when required, amphibious Marine
Expeditionary Units offer another layer of reaction forces to protect
U.S. personnel and facilities. Finally, United States Africa Command
maintains Defense Cooperation Agreements with several African nations--
which allow for the forward staging locations enable faster recovery or
evacuation of personnel.
United States Africa Command is a supporting effort in the
worldwide fight against violent extremism. With regard to resources, we
have, historically, been viewed as an ``economy of force'' area of
operations, particularly in comparison to other combatant commands.
However, consistent with the National Defense Strategy, we continue to
explore efficient and cost-effective ways to make the best use of the
assets we are provided. This is best represented by United States
Africa Command's limited ISR allocation. With personnel recovery and
casualty evacuation, contracted search and rescue assets are an
expensive but necessary substitute to our limited capacity. Moreover,
most African partners neither have the organic assets nor the funding
to assist with personnel recovery or casualty evacuation missions.
While United States Africa Command will continue to meet its mission
with the assets provided, we will also continue to find ways to help
protect personnel and enhance mission success.
conclusion
In summary, ten years ago, at the inception of United States Africa
Command, many were skeptical of a United States combatant command for
Africa. However, over the past decade, United States Africa Command
professionals have built strong and trusting relationships with many
African nations, key partners, and organizations. Today, we continue
with our partners to contain and degrade transnational threats, protect
United States personnel and facilities, prevent and mitigate conflict,
and build African partner defense capability in order to promote
regional security, long-term stability, and prosperity. In line with
the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy, United
States Africa Command will continue to bolster existing bilateral and
multilateral partnerships and develop new relationships to deter or
constrain threats to United States interests. We will focus on working
by, with, and through local partners to build the capability required
to counter violent extremism, human trafficking, transnational criminal
activity, and illegal arms trade. As a command, we will apply small,
wise investments toward ``African solutions to African problems,''
promoting United States interests and protecting the U.S. Homeland. I
am honored to lead our servicemembers, civilian employees, and families
of United States Africa Command. They inspire all of us every day as
``we go further together.''
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, General Waldhauser.
Just less than a month ago, Senators Ernst, Rounds, and
Sullivan and I spent quite a bit of time in the South China Sea
seeing, witnessing firsthand what China is doing there. They
talk about reclaiming land. I suggest it is not reclaiming land
because there is no land to reclaim. It is creating land. While
they have been doing this for some time, it has kind of gone
unnoticed. They are up now to over 3,000 acres that they have
created, all staffed with nothing but military staff in there.
So obviously, it concerns a lot of people, and a lot of people
in the region. In fact, a lot of our allies in the region look
at China as someone more significant than we are because they
do not see that type of thing from us.
Now, I know this is not your AOR [Area of Responsibility],
General Waldhauser. But recently--and you stated in your
opening statement there are requests for a presence in
Djibouti. This is very much of a concern. Djibouti is where we
have had our marines for quite some time. It is an area that
has control over the entrance in the Red Sea and ultimately the
Suez Canal. So I am very much concerned about this, and you are
too. You said at the House Armed Services last week, ``If the
Chinese took over that port, then the consequences could be
significant.'' Well, if China is successful in taking over the
port of Djibouti, could they use their control to threaten
United States access and our broader freedom to have navigation
interests in that region like the Red Sea and Suez Canal?
General Waldhauser. Senator Inhofe, thank you very much for
the question.
Although I am not an expert on port operations, I can tell
you a few things about Djibouti that may lend some context to
the question.
Within the confines of the Djibouti port, there are five
activities, two of which are run by the Chinese, obviously,
their Chinese naval port for the facility there, and then they
have control over what is called a multi-purpose port, which
essentially offloads containers. There are three other pieces
to the port, one of which is a fuel pier, which an Emirati
company owns. Then there is this container pier, which is what
has been discussed about the Djiboutian takeover in the past
couple of weeks. Then there is what is called an old port where
our ships also berth in order to pick up supplies and the like.
The Djiboutians annulled a contract that they had with the
Dubai Ports World here last week, and they essentially took
control of that port. In discussions with our key leadership in
the area and with the Secretary of State, who was there this
past week, the Djiboutians indicated that they will run that
port for the next 6 months and then determine where they will
go in terms of sale or in terms of whether they will keep
control of that port.
The container port, as I described--basically all of the
containers that come through there in Djibouti, whether it is
spare parts, whether it is provisions, anything that comes in
Djibouti comes through that port. That port is used quite a
bit.
We also use the fuel port quite a bit. Between October of
2016 and October of 2017, there were 115 ships that came in
there to refuel. The fuel also goes to the base in Djibouti to
refuel airplanes and the like.
Senator Inhofe. That is a significant area there. I am
running out of time here, but that is what I wanted to get into
the record.
One area--in fact, it was Admiral Harris who called this to
our attention. In some of the areas where we have done this
IMET [International Military Education and Training] program,
which I have always been very fond of and I think both of you
have, they are seeing that China is going after our IMET
program in that area. Are you seeing any of this in Africa, on
the continent of Africa? Because we had worked extensively on
the IMET program down there.
General Waldhauser. So it is unclear. It is difficult to
get data in terms of China and the IMET program in Africa. On
average, the National Defense University in China graduates
about 100 or so foreign students a year, some of whom are
obviously from Africa. They usually come from about 70 or so
countries.
By the way, we in the United States--we have about 850
officers from China who go--sorry--from Africa who go through
various programs, National Defense University seminars and the
like, at a cost of about $22 million.
Senator Inhofe. That is good.
Let me do this. For the record, because there is not time
to do it now, General Waldhauser, I want you to kind of outline
the resources because when we built AFRICOM, it was done
without resources, and we know who we depend on in cases when
we need those resources. So I would like to get in writing some
detail on that.
[The information referred to follows:]
Per SASC and Senator Inhofe's office, ``no requirement for
USAFRICOM to answer.''
Senator Inhofe. General Votel, I know that you have some
concerns about China and the efforts that you are seeing in
China to project their influence in your AOR. Any comments you
want to make about your AOR?
General Votel. Senator Inhofe, the thing that I would just
highlight is that the activities in Djibouti are not only
important to AFRICOM, they are extraordinarily important to
CENTCOM. This is certainly one of the key areas where we have
strong cooperation and collaboration across our geographic
combatant command areas here. So I certainly share General
Waldhauser's concerns about what is playing out in Djibouti.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. In your written statement, you also
gave some details on that, and you do make a comment, while
Beijing claims that both locations support peacekeeping and
humanitarian operations--and you go on. I do not know how many
people believe that. But it is a great concern to this
committee.
Senator Reed?
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General Votel, as I indicated in my opening remarks,
consistent with the Secretary of Defense, Secretary Mattis, and
General Dunford, do you believe that it is in our national
security interests to stay within the confines of the JCPOA?
General Votel. I think from my perspective, the JCPOA
addresses one of the principal threats that we deal with from
Iran. If the JCPOA goes away, then we will have to have another
way to deal with the nuclear weapons program. So, yes, I share
their position.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
With respect to Syria, it is a very complicated situation,
and that is an understatement. One issue involves the Kurds.
They fought with us very reliably in the Syrian Defense Forces.
Now they are moving to assist fellow Kurds against the Turks in
Afrin.
It appears that we do not have a policy as to our position
vis-a-vis the Kurds within Syria, the Syrian Kurds, and also a
longer-term policy as to what do we do. Are we going to have a
de facto partition of the country with the SDF, Syrian Defense
Forces, guarding that portion? Can you give us some clarity on
the policy? I just do not think we have one, to be blunt.
General Votel. Senator, we have not operated in the
province of Afrin. In our interactions with the Syrian
Democratic Forces, they understand that this is an area in
which we do not operate and have no intention of operating at
this particular point. The concern certainly that we have is
that the activities up in Afrin are a distraction to our Defeat
ISIS activities right now. There has been an impact of that. We
are addressing that. I think we have got very innovative people
and partners on the ground that are working to ensure we keep
the focus on ISIS. But I am concerned about the long-term
aspects of this.
Senator Reed. There is a possibility that the Kurds would
gradually leave our efforts in order to protect their fellow
Kurdish forces in Afrin. That is a possibility. Is it not?
General Votel. We have seen that already, Senator.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
General Waldhauser, thank you for your hospitality when I
was passing through AFRICOM.
One of the impressions that I received there is that we are
keeping some of these forces on their heels by special
operations particularly in working with AMISOM [African Union
Mission to Somalia] and with local forces, but that the real
long-term struggle is building capacity in every way, shape, or
form. As I pointed out in my opening statement, the sheer lack
of State Department presence, ambassadors in Somalia,
ambassadors in Libya, ambassadors in Egypt--is that impairing
your ability to get the job done?
General Waldhauser. Thank you, Senator Reed, and thank you
and your team for taking the time to come through our AOR. It
was very helpful and we appreciate your support and concern.
With regard to Somalia, we do two things there primarily.
One is the kinetic piece, which we have authorities to strike
Al Shabaab targets, and we have done that quite robustly here
in the last few months.
Additionally, we have a niche in building partnership
capacity. But I also would say that the international community
plays a big part in that as well. UAE [United Arab Emirates],
Turkey, the UK, and so forth also build this capacity. The key
there is that as we talk about AMISOM transition in around the
2020 to 2021 time frame, the Somalian National Security Forces
needs to be at a place where they can conduct their own
security operations.
With regard to the country team and the ambassador, our
country team there--we are very, very tight with them. They, as
you know, work out of Nairobi, but now they have a facility at
Mogadishu, which they just have moved into here in the last
week or so. We work very closely with them. The charge does a
great job working with President Farmajo because the bottom
line is the federal government of Somalia needs a lot of help,
a lot of mentoring, and a lot of coaching as President Farmajo
moves forward.
Senator Reed. I concur, and we do have a good and very
courageous team of diplomats on the ground in Mogadishu, but in
order to have the impact we need in a very short period of
time, we are going to have to up the game dramatically and I do
not see that happening on the civilian side. Even your
resources are limited as we shift to other priorities and as
the National Defense Strategy moves near-peer competition with
Russia and China to the forefront leaving both of you with
maybe not an economy of force operations but certainly there
are different priorities.
But thank you all for your service, and please again convey
our thanks to the men and women you lead.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Ernst?
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here today.
General Votel, I will start with you. My best to Michele as
well. Please send my greetings.
General, when I was in Afghanistan a few months ago, I
visited military and diplomatic leaders in Kabul, Kandahar, and
Baghram. It seems as though the Taliban is now transitioning
from an ideologically inspired group into a narco-terror group,
which is using ideology as a veil. As such, the Department of
Defense is focused on destroying processing facilities and
their yields as opposed to just simply destroying the poppy
fields. The State Department is very focused on enforcement in
conjunction with the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] and
the DEA [Drug Enforcement Administration].
Is this strategy different from those strategies that we
have used in the past? If so, how are they different?
General Votel. Senator, thank you.
They are different. We are using the authorities that have
been passed to us recently to ensure that we can go after, as
you suggested, these funding streams that are fueling the
Taliban right now, and they are proving effective. This is a
lesson learned from Iraq and Syria where when we got serious
about going after the funding streams that supported ISIS, we
started to see an immediate impact. That is exactly the
attention here.
I do agree with you. They are well resourced by this
narcotrafficking that takes place. So our efforts are not only
targeting their production and storage locations but also
working with regional partners to help limit the flow of that
product out of the region, again trying to impede their ability
to benefit from that.
Senator Ernst. So you think it is fair that we call them a
narco-terror group?
General Votel. I think they are absolutely that way, and
they take on many of the characteristics of a mob, mafia type
of group.
This is not a popular insurgency. I think that is an
important thing for people to understand. Over 90 percent of
the people in Afghanistan do not want the Taliban to be in
charge of their country. It is not a popular insurgency.
Senator Ernst. As we fight and try to eradicate their
funding streams then, do you believe that we are adequately
funded to achieve success?
General Votel. I do. I think we have got the necessary
resources right now to pursue the strategy that has been laid
out for us.
Senator Ernst. Then if we are successful in destroying
their narcotics industry and their funding sources, what
development do we need to see then in Afghanistan to make sure
that their people are self-sufficient?
General Votel. I think the big idea here is to force the
Taliban to reconciliation. The way we do that is by focusing on
military pressure, by focusing on political pressure working
with the regional partners such as Pakistan, and it is through
social pressure. This, of course, is ensuring that the
Government of Afghanistan continues to make the necessary
reforms that President Ghani has already committed to and that
he is moving out on as we speak. This includes not only
addressing endemic problems with corruption, but also ensuring
that fair elections are conducted in the country and that they
are addressing some of the leadership challenges they have.
They are doing these things right now, and I think this will
help build confidence in the Government of Afghanistan for the
people.
Senator Ernst. I do appreciate that.
I am going to focus in a little bit more on the Afghan
special operations units. We have had a lot of United States
effort in Afghanistan building the Afghan air force and
increasing the size of their Afghan special operations units.
How will the creation of the Afghan air force and doubling the
size of their special ops units change the conditions on the
ground as we see them today?
General Votel. Well, I think a key part of our operational
approach here is to build on what is working in Afghanistan.
Certainly their Afghan Special Operations Forces and the Air
Force have been very, very good programs. Essentially what we
are focused on doing by doubling the Afghan Special Operations
Forces, by building out the air force is to really provide the
Government of Afghanistan with a very good offensive capability
that can really focus on gaining control of the population, the
areas that we need to for the government to exert their writ.
We look at the Special Operations Forces and the Air Force
really as their kind of principal offensive capability. Then
the Army plays the role as the hold force. Then we are working
to get the police to become more competent in their policing
functions that are important in the urban and populated areas.
Senator Ernst. I appreciate that. Thank you very much.
When I was in Afghanistan, I was able to visit with some of
those pilots, and they are truly excited about being able to
support their own country.
Thank you, gentlemen, very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Ernst.
Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for your service and for being here today.
General Waldhauser, I and a number of other women Senators
had the opportunity last week to meet with two young women who
had been kidnapped by Boko Haram. They had horrific stories to
tell us about seeing family members murdered before their eyes,
about being forced into marriage, about being gang raped on an
ongoing basis.
I asked them what they would like Americans to know about
what is happening in Nigeria. They were both Nigerian. What one
of them said to me is that people in the United States should
understand that this is not just the Chibok girls, several
hundred who, as most of us remember, were kidnapped several
years ago. But this is happening to thousands of girls on a
daily basis in Nigeria.
The translator who was with them, who was with the
organization that brought them to the United States, said that
this is a strategy by Boko Haram to impregnate women, to grow a
whole next generation with that extremist ideology.
I know that in your statement, you talk about Nigeria's
capabilities and capacities growing. But in fact, they have not
really been able to address this mass kidnapping of girls in
Nigeria. Is that your understanding? What are we doing to try
and support efforts to address what Boko Haram is doing?
General Waldhauser. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Good to see
you again.
Obviously, Boko Haram is one of the most deplorable
organizations on the planet. Since 2009, they have killed,
depending on what you read or what statistics you look at, well
over 20,000 people, and they have displaced millions. They are
notorious for the things that you talked about.
With regard to the Chibok girls, you know, almost 4 years
ago this month, in April 4 years, 276 were taken away. 163 have
been returned, about 60 percent. In a closed session, I can
discuss with you what we think or where we think the other 113
girls are.
On February 19th, this happened again in Dapchi. Dapchi is
a location that is about 150 miles north of where Chibok is.
Although no group has claimed responsibility, based on the
location and based on several open sources, we believe it to be
ISIS-West Africa. ISIS-West Africa was at one time part of Boko
Haram, but they split for a whole host of reasons.
One of the things I will tell you is that we have been
asked to provide assistance to the Government of Nigeria to try
to help find these girls, and we can talk more about that in a
closed session. But we are providing assistance in terms of
intelligence support, planning, and the like that they have
asked us for. They are trying to find a negotiated solution
here. That is their desire. But as you say, the security
situation especially in Borno State and Yobe State where this
took place is very, very precarious.
Senator Shaheen. When we passed the NDAA in 2017, we
created a new authority under section 385 that allows the
Secretary of Defense to transfer up to $75 million to USAID
[United States Agency for International Development] and to the
Department of State to implement foreign assistance programs.
Are these programs that would be helpful as we are looking at
the challenges facing women and girls in places like Nigeria
where they need to be reintegrated into their societies? There
are challenges with doing that. Can either of you tell me if
the Secretary of Defense has requested any of those dollars?
General Waldhauser. So, thank you.
The 385 program, as you said, is a new one this year. So we
have had to work our way through several of the wickets to see
how we could apply it and so on.
We currently have two proposals that we have put through
OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense].
One of them has to do with defections inside Niger where we
would like to work with the State Department to follow through
on our activities. They would complement our activities. So
that one is one we put forward.
A second one we put forward is in Nigeria but it is in the
Gulf of Guinea basin where we are trying to get some of the
people there to court on a legal perspective, and the State
Department can help us there as they run illegal drugs,
weapons, and the like.
We have got two nominations in, and we are hopeful that
this is something that can complement our overall kinetic
effort as part of the development or diplomacy piece of our
activities.
Senator Shaheen. Well, I think if this committee can be
helpful with that, I hope you will let us know.
General Votel, I have only a few seconds left. But I wonder
if you could tell us what happened in Syria when our forces
engaged with Russia pro-regime forces. It appeared that those
were Russian contractors. Is this a new mechanism that Russia
is using to engage contractors to serve as mercenaries on the
ground for them?
General Votel. Senator, thank you.
I cannot speculate on what Russia's intentions might be.
But in this particular situation, this was in my view a very
clear situation of U.S. coalition forces with our partners on
the ground defending themselves. We were attacked in this
particular case. My view is that our forces responded properly
in this case. They immediately identified what was happening.
They immediately got on the net with the Russians and were
talking with them before, during, after the event and very
effectively brought together the right capabilities, whether it
was ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance] or
fire support, to address this. I think our people responded
extraordinarily well.
Senator Shaheen. I am not criticizing.
General Votel. I do not know if this is some kind of change
in their piece and how they are approaching this. I would just
tell you that we remain extraordinarily vigilant to these types
of threats and we retain the sufficient capabilities to protect
ourselves and our partners on the ground against these types of
activities.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Graham?
Senator Graham. Thank you, sir.
General Votel, is there any credible opposition to Assad
left in Syria?
General Votel. Senator, as you know, our mission is the
defeat of ISIS.
Senator Graham. That is not my question. My question is, is
there any credible opposition left to Assad in Syria?
General Votel. The only opposition that I am aware of is
those that are out in the vicinity of Damascus in the Ghouta
area and then up in the Idlib area that still controls some
terrain. So they do pose some kind of threat to the regime.
Senator Graham. Who is winning in Syria--the civil war?
General Votel. Well, again, from a civil war standpoint, it
would appear that the regime is ascendant here.
Senator Graham. Do you see any likelihood that the forces
you just named can topple Assad in the next year?
General Votel. That is not my assessment, Senator.
Senator Graham. Is Iran helping Assad?
General Votel. Iran has been a key enabler of the regime
for a while.
Senator Graham. Is Russia helping Assad?
General Votel. They also are a key enabler of the regime.
Senator Graham. Is it too strong a statement to say that
with Russia and Iran's help, Assad has won the civil war in
Syria?
General Votel. I do not think that is too strong of a
statement. I think they have provided him the wherewithal to be
ascendant at this point.
Senator Graham. Is it still our policy that Assad must go?
General Votel. I do not know that that is our particular
policy at this particular point. Our focus remains on the
defeat of ISIS.
Senator Graham. Well, if you do not know, I doubt if
anybody knows because it is your job to take care of this part
of the world.
What does it mean if Iran and Russia and Assad have won in
Syria? What does it mean to us and to the region?
General Votel. It means that we will contend with this
influence of Iran in this particular area and with the
influence of Russia.
Senator Graham. What does it mean to Israel?
General Votel. Well, certainly from an Iranian standpoint,
it means that Iran could be in a position where they could
support Lebanese Hezbollah better and then pose a great threat
to Israel.
Senator Graham. They are actually doing it. Are they not?
They are actually doing that as we speak--the Iranians.
General Votel. We have certainly seen some activities that
would certainly support that.
Senator Graham. What does it mean for Jordan?
General Votel. It means that, again, there are unstable
regimes to their north that pose threats to them as well.
Senator Graham. Thank you for your clarity and your
honesty. It is not your mission in Syria to deal with the
Iranian-Assad-Russia problem. That is not in your things to do.
Right?
General Votel. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Graham. Do you think it should be?
General Votel. At this point, I think if that was the
decision that was made by the U.S.-led coalition leadership
here, then we would pursue that.
Senator Graham. Detainees. We have rolled up about 400 and
something detainees in Syria. The Syrian Democratic Forces have
about 400 and some people in their charge. Is that correct?
General Votel. Senator, I think you are referring to about
400 or so foreign terrorist fighters that they have within
their detention.
Senator Graham. These are the people that did not die for
the cause but were captured as we liberated Raqqah and other
areas. Is that right?
General Votel. As they attempted to escape the areas in
which we are operating in right now.
Senator Graham. Do you think we have a credible plan to
detain these people?
General Votel. We actually do have a plan to detain them on
the ground, and we are working with our partners in the
government here to work to get them back to their countries so
they can be prosecuted in accordance----
Senator Graham. If they do not go back to their countries,
do you think we have a credible plan to detain them inside of
Syria long term?
General Votel. We are working on improving the capacity of
the Syrian Democratic Forces to do that right now.
Senator Graham. Africa, General Waldhauser. The Sahel is
made up of how many countries?
General Waldhauser. Well, five, five or so, yes.
Senator Graham. Of those five countries, how many would you
characterize as failed states?
General Waldhauser. I do not think there is a failed state
there yet, but there are certainly fragile states in that area.
Senator Graham. If trends continue, will they become failed
states?
General Waldhauser. It is possible.
Senator Graham. Do we have a strategy to prevent that?
General Waldhauser. Our strategy is to support the G5
Sahel. We do that bilaterally with these countries in order for
them to----
Senator Graham. Is it working?
General Waldhauser. It is in the infancy stages. I mean,
this G5 program has just begun. You have 5,000 individuals
covering a very large territory.
Senator Graham. So 5,000 people are covering five
countries.
General Waldhauser. That is correct, the border areas.
Senator Graham. I am not a military guy, but that does not
sound enough.
Does it matter if the Sahel becomes a region of failed
states to us, and if so, why?
General Waldhauser. It does matter because the groups that
are in that area, ISIS, JNIM [Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal
Muslimin], and the like--some of these have aspirations to
conduct things regionally, as well as into Europe and into our
Homeland. It is very important that we contain or that we
degrade and we work with our partners because if we had a
failed state and if these groups took over that failed state,
then you have a situation where it is just vast wastelands
where people can plan attacks against the United States.
Senator Graham. One last question. Is Libya a failed state,
fragile state, state on the mend?
General Waldhauser. It is very difficult to characterize
Libya, but I would have to say a fragile state. I mean, Salome,
who is the UN representative, has got a plan to try to work
through a restructuring of the political committees, a
constitution, and potentially a vote later this year. But the
bottom line is unless the security is there, unless a fair
election can take place, and unless those individuals who are
part of the process will agree to the outcome of the election,
then it would not serve any purpose at this point.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Warren?
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General Votel and General Waldhauser, for your
work.
For nearly 3 years, a Saudi Arabia-led coalition has been
bombing Yemen to counter Iranian-backed Houthi militias. The
United States military has been providing intelligence, mid-air
refueling, ammunitions to the Saudis.
As I understand it, refueling operations are governed by
something called a bilateral acquisition and cross-servicing
agreement. The United States has one with both Saudi Arabia and
the UAE. I have read over these documents, and there are a few
things they do not seem to cover that I want to ask you about.
So, General Votel, does CENTCOM track the purpose of the
missions that it is refueling, in other words, where a U.S.
refueled aircraft is going, what targets it strikes, and the
results of the mission?
General Votel. Senator, we do not.
Senator Warren. Reuters recently reported on a Saudi
coalition air strike in late February that killed five
civilians and wounded 14, including four children. According to
witnesses that were interviewed by Reuters, the coalition
conducted two additional air strikes that hit paramedics who
were trying to save civilians in the rubble.
General Votel, when you receive reports like this from
credible media organizations or outside observers, is CENTCOM
able to tell whether U.S. fuel or U.S. munitions were used as
part of that strike?
General Votel. Senator, I do not believe we are.
Senator Warren. The reason I ask about this is because the
Yemeni people are suffering, and this is a humanitarian crisis.
That is why I cosponsored the Sanders-Lee resolution that
directs President Trump to stop our involvement in Saudi
military operations in Yemen unless Congress provides specific
authorization. The bill would allow our counterterrorism
operations against al Qaeda and its affiliates to continue, but
it would ensure that the United States is not giving the Saudis
a blank check to bomb Yemen and worsen the humanitarian crisis.
I know that Iran sanctions against Yemen are destabilizing.
They are making the conflict worse, and that is unacceptable.
But we need to be clear about this. Saudi Arabia is the one
receiving American weapons and American support, and that means
we bear some responsibility here. That means we need to hold
our partners and our allies accountable for how those resources
are used.
I have one other question I would like to turn to, if I
can. That is, earlier this year, Secretary of State Tillerson
implied that United States troops would stay in Syria
indefinitely. In addition to our forces, Hezbollah, Russian
forces, Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and now
Turkish troops are also operating on the ground, and we have
already had several run-ins with these forces.
With my remaining time, I have just one question. General,
how is CENTCOM deconflicting between these various forces that
are operating on the ground, and what is your strategy for de-
escalation if a confrontation occurs?
General Votel. Senator, thank you for the question.
First off, the principal we are deconflicting is through
direct communications. As you aware, we do have direct
communication line with the Russian Federation forces on the
ground. I would characterize our conversations with them as
militarily professional. They take place several times a day,
and they have been going on for a couple of years. I do think
this has been a very effective way of ensuring that we can
deconflict and prevent things from happening in ground space
and in the air space.
We also have the same thing with our Turkish partners to
the north. In areas where we are in close proximity, again we
have very good communications with them. We are able to
deconflict. We are able to ensure that people have good
situational awareness, they understand what we are doing with
our partners on the ground. This direct communication really
allows us to ensure that we can minimize the opportunities for
escalation or for miscalculation on the ground. I think these
are working very, very effectively.
Senator Warren. So this is mostly about communications.
I just worry, General, because the situation in Syria is
extraordinarily dangerous. I am not sure that throwing a small
number of U.S. troops in the middle of it is a sustainable,
long-term solution. I believe we need a clear strategy here for
ending the violence and for holding Assad accountable. But I
appreciate your work in this area. Thank you very much,
General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Rounds?
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, let me begin by thanking you both for your
service to our country as well as to your families as well for
their sacrifice and your time away from home.
I would like to begin by talking a little bit about
AFRICOM. General Waldhauser, I am curious. I have had the
opportunity to accompany Senator Inhofe on several of his most
recent trips to Africa. Senator Inhofe has now made over 150
different nation stops in Africa over the last 20-plus years.
What I find interesting in each of our trips has been the
amount of interest that those countries and those leaders in
those countries have in relationships with our country.
In the case of AFRICOM and our abilities, right now, as I
understand it, if you need resources--and you do in an area of
the world in which things are not getting quieter, they are
getting more intense--you basically borrow from other
operations in and around for the resources that you need. Would
you explain for us how AFRICOM actually receives the resources
that it needs right now?
General Waldhauser. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
There are two or three ways we receive forces. One of them
is if we are assigned forces, and we do not have assigned
forces but we have allocated forces. For example, the Marine
Corps special purpose MAGTF [Marine Air-Ground Task Force],
which mission has to do with protection of U.S. citizens and
property on the continent--we are allocated that organization.
Senator Rounds. How large is that force?
General Waldhauser. That force is company-sized units, six
MV-22's and some C-139's, but it has lot of ground to cover on
the continent.
Senator Rounds. An entire continent.
General Waldhauser. An entire continent. We have used that
or we have moved that around to help on the entire continent.
We also have a force in Djibouti, an East African response
force from the Army. That is a company-sized unit, and that is
also tied to the issue of protection of U.S. citizens with
property.
We have Special Operations Command, which has a large part
of what we do in terms of the forces that come to do the train,
advise, and assist.
We also have episodic forces that come from the Army, for
example, to train units. They just trained, for example, for
about 6 weeks a battalion in Nigeria.
Although we do not have assigned forces, we are allocated
forces, and we compete for those through the Global Force
Management process, which the Joint staff runs on behalf of the
Secretary.
Senator Rounds. Is it time to take a look at actually
standing up AFRICOM, the same as the other combatant commands
are stood up?
General Waldhauser. Well, in that regard, I think we are
the same as the other combatant commands. We have a COCOM
[combatant command] staff of the same size, relatively
speaking. We are located, obviously, in Stuttgart, Germany. We
have great interagency partners with us, as well as military
force. But AFRICOM staff per se is one that is like the other
COCOMs.
I think perhaps what you may be referring to is our
components. Our components in some cases are dual-hatted. The
Air Force is dual-hatted Europe and Africa. The Navy is dual-
hatted. The Army is separated.
Senator Rounds. Do you find that working in the current
capacity?
General Waldhauser. It is working. There is no doubt about
it, and we move assets around between the COCOMs. For less than
30 days, we do not need the Secretary's approval to do so. We
work with EUCOM [United States European Command] and we work
with General Votel and his team all the time. If we have
kinetic operations, for example, in Somalia that require a
little bit more, we will schedule those and we will organize
those around a period where we can gain assets from CENTCOM,
for example.
The continent of Africa is extremely large, and it is
virtually impossible to cover the whole thing all the time with
other priorities around the globe for the United States. But we
have to be smart, innovative, and we have to have good
relationships with our fellow combatant commanders in order to
make it work.
Senator Rounds. Are we placing the appropriate emphasis on
Africa? Look, right now, we know there are hotspots. Long-term,
this is a developing part of the world, which seems to me other
super powers, other nations are paying a great deal of
attention to, China in particular. Are we doing the same?
General Waldhauser. Well, I think back to your original
point, first of all, all the countries on the continent for the
most part really want to be associated with the United States.
They want our assistance. They want our leadership. But they do
not really expect a lot. I mean, little things can go a long
way. I think in the countries that you and Senator Inhofe have
visited, perhaps you have seen that in spades. But we have to
remain engaged there for a whole host of reasons, which I think
you understand. I think a little goes a long way on the
continent because at the end of the day, we are trying to
develop capacity for their security forces to take care of
their security problems.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. My time has expired. I thank you
both, once again, for your service to our country.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. General Waldhauser, I do want to have a
personal discussion with you in the next few days because I do
not agree with you in the way this is set up. I was here when
we established AFRICOM, and there was a debate about dedicated
assets at that time. I would like to go over it to get
clarification around that issue.
Senator Peters?
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both, gentlemen, for being here today and for
your service.
General Waldhauser, I would like to talk a little bit about
Nigeria and add to some of the questions that my colleague
asked you about.
I had the opportunity to travel to Nigeria as part of my
work on this committee last year, and I was very concerned
about ISIS-West Africa, which you mentioned is basically a
splinter group from Boko Haram. At that time, it looked as if
the situation was deteriorating. My question to you is, what is
the status? Where are we in relation to ISIS-West Africa? Is
the situation getting better?
General Waldhauser. ISIS-West Africa--of those two groups,
if you divide them in half, Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa,
ISIS-West Africa is the group that is of more concern to us.
They have ties to ISIS core. They have some funding from ISIS
core. They have indicated in the past their desire to go
outside the region to conduct activities, attacks, if you will,
on U.S. interests in the area. They certainly are more of a
concern to us at this particular time.
Senator Peters. Are we applying adequate resources to deal
with the issue?
General Waldhauser. The strategy for ISIS-West Africa is
with the Lake Chad basin region where we apply our assistance
to the countries around there, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and
Nigeria. We have made progress with Nigeria in the last year or
so with regard to our ability to share intelligence with them,
to assist them in planning, and also to assist in training.
Senator Peters. You mentioned in your written testimony
that the multinational task force in that area in the basin
does not seem to be as interested in dealing with the
situation. They believe it is a Nigeria-centric problem. I
gather you do not agree.
What can we do to convince them otherwise? Based on your
testimony here today, it sounds as if they do want to operate
across a broader region.
General Waldhauser. Well, they do want to operate--the
countries that support the multinational joint task force. But
in most cases, these countries have significant other
challenges, whether it be Nigeria itself in the coastal area or
in the central area, whether it is a country like Chad, for
example, who has concerns about their border with Libya. Niger
has all kinds of issues throughout their country, and so the
ability to have large military forces that can do all of these
things is difficult for these countries. Sometimes it appears--
let us just say over a period of months, the trend line has
been in a negative way, if you will, on how Boko Haram has been
acting, these countries may decide to move their assets other
places because their interests and their security concerns--
Boko Haram, for example, may not be on the top of the list
based on some internal issues that are going on within those
countries.
Senator Peters. You mentioned Chad which is in a very
dangerous part of the world in the region that we are focused
on. It has always been my understanding in some briefings that
I have had related to some of the operations in the Sahel, that
Chad has been a pretty capable and productive partner for U.S.
operations. Is that accurate?
General Waldhauser. That is accurate. But their main
concern I think at the moment would be the issue of foreign
fighters coming from Libya into their northern area.
Senator Peters. Having a relationship with them is
important because that could also have an impact to the United
States. I know that yesterday Secretary Tillerson--I guess
former Secretary Tillerson--indicated that the United States is
considering removing Chad from the travel ban.
Now, I have been concerned about some of the rhetoric we
have seen from the President in relation to Muslims and African
nations, including using some very disparaging language in
reference to African nations. I think that can damage certainly
our standing and working in that part of the world.
I would like your thoughts as to any impact on the
relations we have had with Chad as a result of them being
included in the travel ban and how important our partnership
with countries like Chad and others in dealing with what could
be very serious issues arising out of the African continent.
General Waldhauser. Senator, we continue to work with all
the countries, Chad included, and show them our commitment and
demonstrate our desire to help them build capacity. One example
I would give to Chad. It is a small example and it is very
simple, but it demonstrates I think AFRICOM's commitment.
A few months ago, there was a huge storm in Chad and
various aircraft hangars--and they have a very, very small air
force. But a few aircraft hangars were destroyed, and they
simply have no way to repair them. We were able to gather some
funds and quickly send a team down there and erect several
shelters that would replace these hangars that had been
destroyed in the storm. That is a small way to demonstrate our
commitment and AFRICOM's commitment to that country to let them
know that we certainly are behind them and have a desire for
their capacity to be built.
Senator Peters. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Scott?
Senator Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning to you. Thank you for being here this morning.
General Waldhauser, the National Defense Strategy describes
the greatest threat to U.S. prosperity and security as a
reemergence of long-term strategic competition by revisionist
powers. These revisionists include Russia and China, two
countries we see more and more activity in the continent of
Africa. China just opened a new naval base in Djibouti, mere
miles from our only enduring military presence in Africa while
Russia has been courting leadership from both sides of the
conflict in Libya and announcing major new investments in
Zimbabwe. These Russian and Chinese efforts are self-interested
as these countries are doing very little to counter the myriad
of terrorist threats across the region. Groups such as Boko
Haram, ISIS-West Africa, and Al Shabaab continue to operate
freely.
What is your assessment of the Russian and Chinese
activities in Africa? First question. The second, as we shift
our National Defense Strategy to the two revisionists, how are
we working to make sure that the terrorist activities in Africa
do not find their way to our country?
General Waldhauser. Thank you, Senator.
The first part, I will talk about Russia rather briefly.
First of all, Russia's interest in the continent has to do
with intelligence exchanges with various countries with arms
sales and also with energy partnerships. You mentioned
Zimbabwe. There is a platinum mine there that they have had
some activities in. They have got a $4 billion investment
there. They are also interested in arms sales because there has
not really been any arms sales from the West since about the
mid-2000s there. So they are trying to open those type of
markets any way they can to show that the U.S. perhaps is not a
good partner or someone that is not willing to work with them.
My personal concern with the Russians is what they are
trying to do in the northern part of the country from Egypt to
Libya, Tunisia, Algeria. It is that part of northern Africa on
the Mediterranean, which is on the southern part of NATO. They
have got interests there. As you said, in Libya they are
playing--on one hand, they talk about supporting the UN
agreement, but on the other hand, the support that they provide
for Haftar and the HOR [Tabrule-based House of Representatives]
forces is something that needs to be addressed.
With regard to China, they obviously have a lot of
investments. They are interested in the One Belt, One Road.
That gives them the ability to diversify economically imports
and exports. I think that has been very well documented. So
they obviously have a big part in there too.
But there areas where we can work with China. I mean, we
have a unique situation where their base in Djibouti is just a
mile or so from ours. If there are interests that have to do
with humanitarian, peacekeeping, safekeeping with regard to air
flight and range usage by their ground forces there, we have to
find a way to communicate that with them. On one hand, we are
certainly aware of the great power competition, but we have a
unique situation where they are a neighbor of us in Djibouti.
With regard to the future and what the National Defense
Strategy says, really if you look at what Africa is described
in there, we are told to conduct a by, with, and through
strategy. We are told to develop relationships, work with our
partner forces to continue the C-VEO [violent extremist
organization] struggle there. Even though a lot of it is China,
Russia, Iran, and North Korea, the part on Africa basically
tells us to continue what we have been doing to include
building partnership capacity to defeat the terrorist
organizations.
Senator Scott. So, General, do you see the Chinese in
proximity to our basis as an opportunity for partnership, as
well as the Chinese being a competitor?
General Waldhauser. It is, and that is the unique part. It
is the only place on the planet where China has an overseas
base. It is right next to ours. Not only do you have China and
the United States in Djibouti, there is Japan. The French and
the Italians are all located there as well. The Chinese have
started to work closely with the French in terms of some of the
exercises they do there. This is small-level operations. But
again, the unique situation is what we do with China obviously
has to be informed by our overall global strategy, but the
unique situation that we have with those individuals being next
door and participating in peacekeeping operations and anti-
piracy operations, we have got to find a way to work with them
as well.
Senator Scott. Thank you.
General Votel, I have a few seconds left, 30 seconds. As
opposed to naming the conflicts and the extraordinary
complexity in your region, I will just ask a question.
As you consider the strategic environment in the Middle
East and competing interests among even our nominal allies such
as Turkey, would you provide your assessment of Russia,
Turkish, and Iranian goals in the Middle East and if you see
their goals as mutually supporting the overall conflict?
General Votel. Well, first off, Senator, Turkey is a NATO
ally. Our relationship is deeply valued. They have been a key
partner in the fight against ISIS here for a long period of
time, and we do recognize they have legitimate concerns with
security along their border from terrorism. Of course, this has
led to a little bit of a tension between us at this particular
point that we are working through largely diplomatically but
also militarily at this particular point.
I guess what I would highlight is what I mentioned in my
opening remarks and that is Russia does play a role here.
Again, it is cute to say arsonists and firemen is kind of what
they try to do. They are trying to instigate tension among
partners in the region and then trying to play a role in trying
to be an arbiter in that. This is what happens, and this is
what plays out on a regular basis. We really do have to take a
look at our long-term relationships and make sure that we are
focused in on that and staying as strong as we can on those. I
am concerned about this role that Russia plays in northern
Syria and how it impacts all of our relationships and
especially the relationship between us and Turkey.
Senator Scott. Thank you, General. I will submit a couple
questions for the record as it relates to Turkey.
General Votel. Thank you.
Senator Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Senator King?
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Votel, I want to follow up on a couple of the
questions that Senator Warren asked about Yemen. What would be
the implications and the impact if the United States stopped
providing the aerial refueling, the intelligence, and the
advice to the Saudi forces?
General Votel. Senator, I think right now the provision of
those things that you just covered right now gives us
placement, it gives us access, and it gives us influence with
Saudi Arabia. What I would highlight to you is that we have
been working with them sharing our own experiences.
Senator King. But you testified earlier that when we refuel
a Saudi plane, we do not have any control over the mission,
where it goes, what it does next. If the argument is that this
allows us to maintain control, are we maintaining some level of
control?
General Votel. The influence that we derive with them is by
working with them to demonstrate how we do our targeting
process----
Senator King. Do they listen?
General Votel. They absolutely do.
Senator King. Have they ever changed a mission based upon
our input?
General Votel. They absolutely do. In the work that we have
been doing with them related to the ballistic missile threat,
we have seen some very good progress in this area. Recently
Saudi Arabia has followed many of the things that we have done
in terms of how we stand up architectures to investigate
civilian casualties. These are problems that we have on
occasion even as good as we are.
Senator King. So the principal argument against this move
to limit or cut off that aid is if we do, the Saudi conduct
might be worse.
General Votel. Senator, from my perspective it is better
for us to stay engaged with them and continue to influence
this. They want this type of support, and they want to improve
their capability.
Senator King. You said for us. How about for the people of
Yemen?
General Votel. I think it is absolutely essential that we
stay engaged in this for them. I think this does give us the
best opportunity to address these concerns.
Senator King. Thank you.
Turning to Iran, I understand Iran--all the testimony is
Iran is abiding by the JCPOA in terms of inspections and what
they are doing. What would be the implications for the region
if the United States abruptly terminated the agreement, and
what would Iran do?
General Votel. Senator, I cannot speculate on what Iran
would do. You know, the implications for the region--I think
there would be some concern I think about how we intended to
address that particular threat, if it was not being addressed
through the JCPOA. Of course, our approach here is one of
assuring our partners, maintaining deterrent capabilities in
the region, and then of course, where we can----
Senator King. But if the agreement were terminated, would
the Iranians not then be free to pursue a nuclear weapon within
a matter of months?
General Votel. Theoretically they would be able to do that.
Senator King. That certainly would not contribute to--if
the Iranians had a nuclear weapon, we would have two rogue
states with nuclear weapons on our hands instead of one, the
other one being North Korea.
General Votel. Right. This could certainly be the case.
Again, we are speculating that that would be the direction.
Senator King. Do you think it would be in the national
security interest of the country to maintain the Iran agreement
at least for the near term?
General Votel. I share the Secretary of Defense's and
Chairman's comments on this, that right now I think it is in
our interest.
Senator King. There may be a different point of view in 4
or 5 years when it is near the end of its term. Is that
correct?
General Votel. That could be true.
Senator King. Thank you.
Turning to Pakistan, by the way, you have one of the most
complicated jobs in the world I think. You can go from one area
to the other--I have not even mentioned Syria. Is Pakistan
still supporting terrorist activity in Afghanistan, and has the
recent get tough with Pakistan policy influenced their
behavior?
General Votel. It has. The pressure that has been put on
Pakistan I think through our South Asia strategy and some of
our public communication I think has helped gain their
attention. As I have mentioned previously, we have seen some
positive indicators as a result of this. I cannot tell you that
we have seen decisive changes in the areas in which we are
working, but I remain very well engaged with my partner to
ensure that we are moving forward on this.
Senator King. But there appears to be a surge of attacks in
Afghanistan. You do not associate those with Pakistan?
General Votel. Well, again, having sanctuary in Pakistan or
having support from other actors in the region certainly is an
aspect of the Taliban's success here. So I think we have to
look at all of these to ensure we attribute the causes of these
attacks to where that is. We also have ISIS that does have a
different approach as well.
Senator King. Final question. Should we be even tougher
with Pakistan? Should we ratchet up the pressure because they
still are providing sanctuary? It is still unclear whose side
they are on in that region.
General Votel. Senator, I think right now the strategy that
we have is an appropriate one, and I think we have the
mechanism to continue to keep them focused on our objectives,
our mutual objectives here. So I do think we are pursuing this
in the right way, and I think some of the positive indicators
that we have begun to see, although it has not to led to
decisive changes yet, are things that we have to pay attention
to as we move forward.
Senator King. Thank you. Thank you, gentlemen.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Senator Sullivan?
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, good to see you. Thanks for your service.
General Waldhauser, I just want to ask a very basic
question. I know there is an answer to it that I am sure I am
missing. But why is AFRICOM not located in Africa?
General Waldhauser. Well, as you know, this is the tenth
year of the Africa Command as it stood up. There have been
several attempts to perhaps move it to the continent.
Senator Sullivan. What is the roadblock? Is it because they
do not want us there, or is it the Congress not helping you? It
always seems to me a little disjointed that it is in Germany.
General Waldhauser. Well, I think the roadblocks are, first
of all, there is a financial aspect of this, the cost to do
that. But then the second and third order effects, if you move
to a country in Africa, then what does that mean to surrounding
countries or other partners? They may view that as something
that is perhaps skeptical.
I think just to restate it, 10 years ago when the command
was stood up--and Senator Inhofe is well aware of this--there
was a lot of skepticism on the continent as to what the intent
was for a military command for that particular area. It
surfaces every once in a while, but to my knowledge, there has
been no effort at the moment to move.
Senator Inhofe. If you will let me use 10 seconds of your
time, I would say that the reason is perceived colonialism. I
was on your side back when we set this up 10 years ago, and I
lost that battle.
Senator Sullivan. Well, maybe we should relook at that. It
just seems to me--anyway, it is probably a longer conversation.
General Votel, I want to congratulate you and the men and
women under your command on the campaign with regard to ISIS.
You know, it is really remarkable what you have achieved over
the last year. I do not think the press has done an adequate
job of highlighting that, but it is quite commendable. So
please pass that on to your men and women who are serving with
you.
But the next question is--so we are going to have troops
remaining in Syria. There seems to be a bit of a disconnect
regarding what that mission is. Obviously, we do not want ISIS
to return. So that has got to be a key component. But in your
testimony, there is a lot of focus on Iran. Obviously, they are
in Syria or their proxies. I guess former Secretary Tillerson
now gave a speech not too long ago at the Hoover Institution at
Stanford and was very focused on Iran and how our mission there
in Syria should be about countering the Iranian threat.
I get a little bit nervous when we have troops on the
ground in a very kind of complicated, hostile region where it
is not 100 percent clear what the mission of our troops are. I
do not think anyone wants us to get back to the situation like
we had with the marines in Lebanon 3 or 4 decades ago where
their mission was ``presence,'' and obviously that did not turn
out very well for our troops there. What is the mission of our
troops in Syria, and are they focused on countering the Iranian
threat, which is probably the biggest threat that we have
there. Is it not?
General Votel. Senator, thank you.
Our mission in Syria is strictly focused on defeating ISIS.
Senator Sullivan. Okay. But what is the biggest threat in
Syria right now?
General Votel. Well, the biggest threat in Syria right now
is all the other instability that is taking place that is
preventing the country from moving forward----
Senator Sullivan. Is Iran not behind it?
General Votel. Certainly Iran is an aspect of this, but so
is Russia and so is the regime itself. Our mission, of course,
has been focused on ISIS. We still have ISIS that we are
addressing. So that is where our particular focus is.
I would tell you that while we do not have a specific task
to do something against Iran in this particular area, our
strong relationships with the Syrian Democratic Forces,
certainly our strong relationships with the Iraqi Security
Forces do put us in a position where we, through our strong
relationships, can have influence, can encourage them to
conduct operations and do things that are in the interest of
their countries, as opposed to other parties in the area.
Senator Sullivan. Can I just ask a final question? My time
is running out.
We know how that during the 2004, 2005, 2006 time frame,
that the Iranians were supplying Iraqi Shiite militias some of
the most sophisticated, deadly IEDs [improvised explosive
devices] on the battlefield that ended up killing and maiming
thousands of American troops. So in my view the blood of
American soldiers and marines and sailors, airmen--the Iranians
had that on their hands. Right? That is a fact. They, of
course, denied it back then, but it is a fact that we all know
now.
I just want to make sure in terms of our rules of
engagement, if there is any, any, any threat posed by any
Iranian or Iranian-backed proxies, do our troops have the full
authority to respond to defend themselves and kill these
threats, again given that they have a history of killing our
troops? Do they have that rule of engagement authority?
General Votel. They do, and we have actually demonstrated
that most recently in the middle of the Euphrates Valley. But
as you will recall last year down around the Top area, we did
have pro-regime forces supported by Iranian Shiite groups that
attempted to encroach on us and we did use the full
capabilities within our arsenal to protect ourselves. So I
think our people clearly understand this, and they have all the
authorities they need to protect themselves.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Blumenthal?
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for your service in particular in very
difficult areas of the world and parts of the world that are
very important to the United States.
General Votel, talking about America's mission in Syria
that was just the subject of Senator Sullivan's questioning, is
one of our missions or one of our responsibilities in Syria not
to prevent war crimes?
General Votel. Certainly within the forces that we work,
certainly.
Senator Blumenthal. War crimes are occurring in Syria with
the support and apparent encouragement of Russia. Correct?
General Votel. I think if you look at some of the
activities that take place over in the Damascus area and the
Ghouta area, I think we certainly would think that was the
case.
Senator Blumenthal. In fact, last week UN investigators
linked Russia, specifically the Russian air force, to possible
war crimes, citing the November attack near Aleppo when a
Russian fighter killed at least 84 people and injured more than
150. In the last 3 weeks, as you have observed, more than a
thousand people were killed in Eastern Ghouta with Russian
military support. My question is what can and are we doing to
deter Russia from engaging----
General Votel. Well, Senator, as you know, we do not
operate in that particular part of Syria militarily. But
certainly through our diplomatic channels, through our
ambassador in the UN, Russia has, frankly, been one of the
authors of this recent ceasefire. Their inability to enforce
it, to enforce standards on this really means one of two
things: one, they lack the ability to do that, or they are
choosing not to do that. I think one of the things that we do
have to do is hold them accountable for the actions that they
are taking here and for the humanitarian disasters that they
are perpetuating through their support to the regime and
through their own activities.
Senator Blumenthal. What would you recommend to hold them
accountable?
General Votel. Well, I think certainly the best way of
doing this is through political and diplomatic channels, and
certainly if there are other things that are considered, we
will do what we are told. I do not recommend that at this
particular point, but I think holding them accountable to the
things that they have agreed to, particularly through the
offices of the United Nations or others here, I think is a very
important way of approaching this.
Senator Blumenthal. So far, they have not been responding
to whatever political or diplomatic steps that have been taken.
Correct?
General Votel. It does not appear that they are, Senator.
Senator Blumenthal. In order to have some effect, the
intensity of whatever we are doing diplomatically and
politically has to be heightened, or there need to be some kind
of military responses to protect people in that area from the
war crimes that are being perpetrated. Would you agree?
General Votel. It certainly needs to be addressed.
Senator Blumenthal. In terms of diplomacy--I think others
may have raised this before me--is the lack of ambassadors in
the area, the lack of sufficient diplomatic capacity in this
State Department not an obstacle to really effectively using
diplomacy?
General Votel. Senator, I cannot comment on the broader
aspects of the Department of State. That is more appropriate
for them.
But what I can comment on is in the 18 country teams that
we work with of the 20 countries that are in the region--we do
not have a country team for Iran or for Syria--we have
extraordinarily good relationships. Twelve of these countries
do have ambassadors. Six do have charge d'affaires. The
relationships we have with them I think are very good. We get
good advice. We have good coordination with them in our day-to-
day activities. I think our relationships, certainly from a
military standpoint, remain very, very strong with our
diplomatic partners across the region.
Senator Blumenthal. So 6 out of the 18 ambassadorships are
vacant?
General Votel. Six out of 18 that have country teams are
being led by charges at this point.
Senator Blumenthal. Does that not reflect an absence of
leadership in the Department of State?
General Votel. I think that is probably a more appropriate
question for them than for me, Senator.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, General. Thanks for your
very helpful and forthright answers. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Senator Cotton?
Senator Cotton. Thank you, gentlemen.
I want to add my voice to Senator Blumenthal and his
concerns about what is happening in Syria. I was in the grocery
store at home on Friday, and an old, rough and tough retired
marine came up to me. He was wearing a USMC [United States
Marine Corps] hat. That is how I knew it, but I would probably
be able to figure out even if he was not wearing the hat. He
introduced himself and said he just wanted to ask me a
question. You know, often in settings like that, the question
might be about the VA [Veterans Affairs] and what they are
doing for our vets. But the question was what are we going to
do about Syria. How can anybody stand by and watch what is
happening to those little children throughout Syria?
I thought it was a very touching moment but also indicative
of how much normal Americans pay attention, not just the
humanitarian crisis there but to the strategic disaster Syria
has been for 7 years.
But for now, I want to turn my attention south to another
civil war, in which Iran is meddling. General Votel, in Yemen,
when this war started 3 years ago, much of the fighting was
confined to the mountainous terrain of Yemen, and now long-
range missiles are being fired at King Khalid International
Airport outside of Riyadh. It seems like a dangerous escalation
in the fighting there. Does it not?
General Votel. I would absolutely agree, Senator.
Senator Cotton. Where are Houthi rebels getting long-range
missiles that can range the airport in Riyadh?
General Votel. Senator, they are getting them from Iran.
Senator Cotton. Well, that is not very neighborly of Iran
with its neighbor, Saudi Arabia.
How are they getting those missiles into Yemen?
General Votel. Senator, I think Iran has a very
sophisticated network of doing this. They can certainly move
them by components. They can move them by air. They can move
them by maritime means. They can move them by land routes to
get their stuff in there and then reassemble it and provide it
to the Houthis.
Senator Cotton. Can those missiles range the United Arab
Emirates?
General Votel. I think, Senator, some of this might be a
discussion that is best handled in a classified setting. But as
you pointed here, we have seen threats that have gone as far as
the international airport outside of Riyadh.
Senator Cotton. If you were a Saudi leader or an Emirati
leader, you probably would not be very happy about those
missiles being able to range your citizens. Would you?
General Votel. I agree. It is a dangerous threat to them.
It is a dangerous threat to us. We have 100,000 United States
citizens that live and work in Saudi Arabia.
Senator Cotton. We also have more than a few naval and
merchant ships going through the Bab al Mandeb. Do we not?
General Votel. We absolutely do.
Senator Cotton. Could you tell us a little bit more about
the nature of the intelligence and military support we are
providing to the coalition fighting in Yemen?
General Votel. Certainly. We are not parties to the civil
war, as you know, Senator. Our principal focus in Yemen has
been on the counterterrorism front against al Qaeda and now
against ISIS there. But we are authorized to help the Saudis
defend their border, and so we have done that. We are doing
that through intelligence sharing, through logistics support
and through military advice that we provided them. We are
principally focused on the ballistic missile threat and the
maritime threat that plays out in the Bab al Mandeb and in the
Red Sea to the west of Yemen.
Senator Cotton. Is it fair to characterize that as a
primarily defensive operation in nature?
General Votel. It is principally defensive. It is designed
to, again, protect Saudi Arabia.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
General Waldhauser, there has been some open source
reporting about China's construction of the African Union
headquarters in 2012. That open source reporting states that
China installed microphones in the walls and under desks, and
it has also copied data from servers each night. AU [African
Union] has since installed new servers and swept its
headquarters to remove these listening devices.
This kind of public disclosure of blatant Chinese
espionage, you would think, would cause many nations, but
especially those victimized at the AU headquarters, to think
twice about accepting such Chinese generosity, if you will.
Have you seen any kind of growing reluctance by the AU or
by African nations to cooperate with China or accept that kind
of aid given this espionage against the AU headquarters?
General Waldhauser. I really have not seen any reluctance
on part of African countries individually to refuse any type of
aid. I mean, I think that the Chinese assistance with
infrastructure building and the like is something that is
welcomed there, but then the agreements that they make, the
arrangements that they make need to be scrutinized.
I would say, however, to that point, with our base in
Djibouti and the Chinese base right next door, what you
described is a big concern to us. I mean, we have got to make
sure that our operational security is such that we can operate
freely there because it is not just AFRICOM that uses Djibouti.
Special Operations Command, European Command, CENTCOM all use
that area, and we need the ability to operate freely there.
Senator Cotton. I agree.
Thank you, gentlemen, both for your service and for your
appearance today.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you to our witnesses for your testimony.
General Votel, I want to start. We had a good session with
General Scaparrotti about EUCOM last week, and he mentioned
that you and he spend a lot of time together especially talking
about Syria and Turkey. There have been some questions about
Syria. I want to really focus on the Kurds in northern Syria.
The Kurds have been superb fighting partners of the United
States. Or maybe I would put it in reverse. We have been superb
fighting partners of theirs in trying to drive ISIS back. They
have helped us and we have helped them significantly. But the
United States-Kurdish relationship in northern Syria has been a
real tough spot with our NATO ally, Turkey. Now that we,
through the great work of your team and our coalition partners,
have made some real battlefield success against ISIS in
northern Syria, what do you see as sort of next steps forward
in the relationship of the United States to the Kurds that can
hopefully allay some of Turkey's concerns and maintain their
ability as a NATO ally to provide us the support we need?
General Votel. Thank you, Senator.
As you know, there are ongoing diplomatic discussions with
Turkey led by the Department of State. I will not comment on
those. They certainly have our support with that to work
through that.
Our intention with Turkey--and we do, again, recognize
their concerns here and have certainly kept that in the
forefront of our mind--has been to try to be as transparent and
clear with them on the things that we are doing with our
partners on the ground, the Syrian Democratic Forces, which is
about half and half Arab and Kurd. So they have proven to be,
as you pointed out, very effective against ISIS. As we move
especially in the liberated areas and the areas where we are
now consolidating our gains, we are trying to move more into
the stability phase here so we can root out the remainder of
ISIS and we can allow people to come back into their villages
and back into their homes. I think we have, again, got to
continue to work closely with Turkey and with the coalition and
certainly with our State Department partners here to work
through this. It is, as you pointed out, an extraordinarily
complex situation. The demographics of the area are all over
the place frankly in this. This is going to take a lot of very
close work on the ground.
But I think the important piece to get in place right now
is to make sure that we have good communication back and forth,
we have a mechanism to reduce tensions and certainly to pass
information and prevent these situations from escalating into
conflict. That will make it extraordinarily difficult to
resolve if we are instigating conflict among ourselves.
Senator Kaine. Let me follow up focusing on Syria for a
minute. If you will forgive me, I am going to read a statement
out of the Marine Corps' doctrinal strategy publication to an
Army general:
``What matters ultimately in war is strategic success,
attainment of our political aims, and the protection of our
national interests. History shows that national leaders, both
political and military, who fail to understand this
relationship sow the seeds for ultimate failure even when their
armed forces achieve initial battlefield success. Battlefield
brilliance seldom rescues a bad strategy.''
I am very, very puzzled about the strategy right now in
Syria. We have asked the administration to come up even in a
classified session and talk to us about strategy because the
battlefield success of the United States plus partners against
ISIS has been very notable, very, very notable. But we read
just in open source newspaper articles we need to stay in Syria
to not let ISIS come back. We need to stay in Syria to check
Iran. We did a missile strike against Syrian forces after
Syrian forces pushed against Syrian opposition. We came in a
couple of days later with a missile strike against them.
We are seeing activity, but we are not really yet, in
Congress, kind of read into a strategy. I do not know that this
is really the place for a discussion of that. It might be
better to do it in a closed session. But some of us have been
asking the administration to read us into the full strategy. Is
it just about keeping ISIS from reoccurring? Is it to check
Iran's presence in Syria? Is it to actively push against the
Syrian military, as we did with the missile strikes last April
and then the recent missile strike that occurred last month? We
are real puzzled about it. Anything you want to say about that
in open?
General Votel. Senator, our mission, as you know, has been
strictly focused on ISIS. The coalition has been focused on
addressing this common threat that virtually everybody agrees
has to be dealt with. That is what we have been doing with
this. By pursuing the consolidation operations, by stabilizing
the areas in which we are operating, what we are hoping to do
is create a platform, a platform upon which the international
community can move forward under a Geneva process and begin to
also address the broader underlying issues that are very
apparent across Syria and that really cannot be resolved
through fighting but have to be resolved through talking and
through diplomatic means under the United Nations.
Our focus on addressing this common threat that everybody--
everybody--agree is bad is really I think one of the
preliminary steps that has to take place. Certainly I think
continuing to keep them from rising, continuing to allow these
areas to become stabilized, get people back in their home,
reduce the refugee problem, I think contributes to, hopefully,
creating an environment that the international community can
step forward into with the leadership of the United States and
others here to actually pursue a diplomatic solution to these
problems through the United Nations.
Senator Kaine. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Perdue?
Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you both for your decades of service.
I would like to echo earlier comments, General Votel, for a
message sent to your troops for the outstanding success we have
had over the last year. It goes without notice here many days,
but I want you to know on record those of us who pay attention,
we are very, very grateful for that.
I have a question, General Waldhauser, before I get into
the other question. Recently four United States servicemen were
killed in Niger, and one of those, Staff Sergeant Dustin
Wright, was a constituent of mine. So your investigation is
obviously very important to us. When do you expect that
investigation to be completed, sir?
General Waldhauser. Senator, thank you very much.
As you well know, the investigating officer did an
exhaustive assessment, visited all these countries, 150
witnesses and the like. He gave the investigation to me at the
end of January. I reviewed it for about 3 weeks, and I turned
it over to Chairman Dunford for him to pass it to Secretary
Mattis. Secretary Mattis I believe now has it and will review
it. As soon as he is done with his review, the families will be
briefed. That has been our commitment all along, and we want to
continue to that.
Then as soon as practical as the families have been
briefed, we will come her to the committee and we will brief
you, myself, the two-star who investigated it, and a civilian
representative from OSD, and we will answer all of your
questions at that time.
Senator Perdue. Thank you, sir, and thank you for that
investigation.
I would like for both of you to address the NDS briefly in
your AORs. The most recent NDS obviously prioritized great
power competition with China and Russia is a primary effort of
DOD and directs a more resource sustainable approach to
counterterrorism. General Votel, what does that mean in your
AOR?
Parallel to that, we are in a competition for influence
there. With China's One Belt One Road issue and all the money
they are putting behind it and Pakistan and other areas in your
AOR, what does the NDS change mean to your mission and AOR? Are
you resourced to accomplish it?
General Votel. Thanks, Senator.
I think as we look at great power competition--for example,
we look at a resurgent power like Russia--Russia is, as we
know, not just a European problem. It is a global problem. I
mean, they have influence globally. So they are certainly
acting out in the area of responsibility that I have.
I think the first thing that the National Defense Strategy
and the National Military Strategy that is being modified will
recognize that aspect, that we have to be prepared to address
these threats, not just in the areas in which they reside, but
the areas in which they have influence.
Under General Dunford's leadership, we have developed
between all of the combatant commanders I think very good plans
and processes for how we will do that.
I think more specifically what it means for us in the
region here, particularly as we look to potentially shift to
other areas of the globe in accordance with the National
Defense Strategy's priorities--what it means for us is we will
put a premium on the by, with, and through approach and having
strong relationships with the people we have always had
relationships with but also fostering new relationships.
Senator Perdue. Excuse me, General, but this does not send
a message to the Taliban that we are not open for business in
Afghanistan. Does it?
General Votel. Absolutely not. Absolutely not. We remain
very dedicated on this.
So we are focused on sustaining these relationships, on
working with our partners, on becoming more interdependent with
them, on becoming more mutually supporting with them among
ourselves. That is what it means for me.
I am looking forward here in a couple weeks to meeting with
a number of the chiefs of defense across the region to talk
specifically about what the National Defense Strategy means and
how we are going to approach it in the CENTCOM region.
Senator Perdue. General Waldhauser, I know you have talked
in the committee hearing already about China's effort in
Africa, but I would like for you to address the NDS shift and
what that means in your AOR specifically.
General Waldhauser. Senator, I think one of the things that
the NDS shift has done is it has put a spotlight on China's
activities on the continent, which have been ongoing for quite
some time. But now with this strategy and with this notoriety,
I think it gives an opportunity for us to actually have a
discussion and bring to awareness what actually the Chinese are
doing and how that impacts us.
But interestingly, on our future there, we are specifically
told in the NDS to continue the by, with, and through approach.
We are specifically told to work with partners and build
capacity and continue the fight against counterterrorism
forces.
So, in essence, the strategy frames the overall global
posture. It frames for us prioritization, but it also tells us
to essentially continue to build capacity on the continent so
the Africans can take care of problems themselves and continue
to degrade and disrupt the VEO fight so that those problems
either stay localized and do not get out of the region or
certainly to Europe or to our continent.
Senator Perdue. Thank you, sir. Thank you both.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Senator Hirono?
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
For both of you, I believe that some of my colleagues have
already asked you about basically what I see as a hollowing out
of the State Department at a time when we need to maintain that
capacity. I just wanted to ask you, would you acknowledge that
a proposed 25 percent cut in the State Department and a 12.5
percent cut to USAID funding from the fiscal year 2017 would
not be helpful to your mission, either one of your missions?
General Votel. Senator, as I mentioned in my opening
comments, we look at this as a team sport. We are very
dependent upon our intergovernmental partners. Continuing the
support for their activities is, I think, essential to the
things that we do.
Senator Hirono. Well, I would think that a 25 percent cut
to the State Department would make it a lot harder for you to
work with your partners. I think that that goes without saying,
and I realize you have to be very tactful in your responses.
Let me get to some other questions.
General Votel, the President's South Asia strategy was
announced nearly 7 months ago, and General Nicholson stated in
November that new permissions granted within the strategy for
Afghanistan means that the campaign is on the--quote--path to
win. Yet, the Department of Defense Inspector General estimates
that the Afghan Government is in control of only 18 percent of
the districts in the country, and we are now in the 17th year
of conflict in Afghanistan. The Director of National
Intelligence stated that conditions this year are likely to
deteriorate.
In your view, what exactly does winning mean in Afghanistan
at this point? Can the addition of troops, even the much
heralded security force assistance brigade, really make enough
of a difference to reach the level of winning?
General Votel. Senator, I think we are on the right
approach. I am aware of what you are citing there, but I would
also highlight that the Government of Afghanistan also controls
64 percent of the population, has control and is able to
protect 64 percent of the population.
Our strategy is really this year, using the additional
authorities, the additional resources that we have moved within
CENTCOM and those that are coming from the Department, to
ensure that we are in a position to break the stalemate, to
seize the initiative, to expand that population control, and to
ensure that we have in this year provided the right security
environment to support the upcoming parliamentary elections. I
do think we are on the right track with this.
Senator Hirono. That remains to be seen because a number of
years ago when I went to Afghanistan, we were training the
Afghan troops to be able to support their own military efforts
and defense. At that time, we were told that we were on the
right track, and here we are 17 years later. So it remains to
be seen.
I want to get to what is going on in Yemen. The United
Nations has called Yemen the worst humanitarian crisis in the
world, and the United States continues to support the Saudi-led
coalition. But the situation on the ground continues to be a
stalemate. Your testimony mentions both the challenge of this
crisis and the threat of Iran's proxy war in Yemen growing into
a regional crisis.
Do you see a realistic path to hostilities in Yemen
concluding? How long do you expect the hostilities to go on?
Are there ways to deal with the humanitarian crisis immediately
before a full cessation of hostilities?
General Votel. Well, Senator, to answer your question
directly, I think there are our diplomats and there are other
international parties under the UN that are trying to pursue
the diplomatic solution to this and get to some kind of a peace
process. That has been difficult to do at this particular
point.
I guess what I would highlight first off is that what is
happening in Yemen--there certainly is a humanitarian disaster
taking place, but there is also a security disaster taking
place, and there is a political disaster taking place. The
people that are responsible for this are the Houthis, and they
are the central nexus to all of this, enabled by Iran. They are
refusing to cooperate in the political process. They are
impeding humanitarian efforts that are being undertaken by
Saudi Arabia and others here, and they are perpetuating the
military situation with their support from Iran, which
threatens to widen the conflict. So I think it is important to
recognize that at the heart of these problems, humanitarian,
security, and political, are the Houthis, enabled by Iran.
I would also say----
Senator Hirono. I agree with you. I acknowledge that. What
is the opportunity for any kind of U.S. leadership? Because we
are enabling the Saudis to continue their battle there.
General Votel. Well, we are not parties to this conflict.
Senator Hirono. But we are enabling the Saudis.
General Votel. But what we can do is we can help them, we
can advise them, we can share our lessons learned on how to
more effectively apply their capabilities, how more effectively
to apply their partnerships that they have in conjunction with
this.
I would also add, Senator, during my last visit to Saudi
Arabia, one of the things I had an opportunity to do was to
talk with them about how they are helping with the humanitarian
aid or the humanitarian disaster situation. What I would share
with you is what I learned is that they have a much more
aggressive program in this area than even I had realized. They
are not only going into the Port of Hodeidah, they are
exploring other ports. They are bringing aid into airports in
the central part of the country, and they are using their own
ground routes across the border to do this. In many ways, they
are pushing a lot of effort in this. It is not perfect. The
situation is extraordinarily challenging here, but they
recognize this and I do believe they are trying to take efforts
to support this wherever they can with their coalition
partners.
Senator Hirono. I still do not know what the U.S. role
there should be and is because we are very much a part of what
the Saudis are doing.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Senator Gillibrand?
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Votel, I am deeply troubled by an incident that
happened in Afghanistan on June 9th, 2014, in which five
American troops and an Afghan soldier were killed by our own
aircraft. This friendly fire incident was explored in a ``60
Minutes'' segment last November that highlighted deeply
concerning elements about the event, including the assignment
of a JTAC [Joint Terminal Attack Controller] who had been
demoted and kicked out of an Air Force special operations unit
for poor performance and then assigned to these Green Berets,
and the lack of understanding by the B-1 crew and the unit on
the ground about what the crew could see. Are you familiar with
this incident, and if so, what can you tell me about how
something like this can actually happen?
General Votel. Senator, I am familiar with the incident,
although I will tell you I do not recall all the specific
details of it right here today.
What I can tell you is that in all of these instances--and
I know this from my own experience--that we do exhaustive
reviews, exhaustive investigations to determine the cause of
what happens. If people are to be held accountable, they are
held accountable. Then we make efforts to try to apply the
lessons learned out of this to limit this.
The unfortunate aspect of this business is that our people
are operating oftentimes in confusing situations, making
decisions in very dynamic environments, and unfortunately,
things like this do occur. Our goal has been to minimize that
by ensuring that we have the right people, they have the right
training, and we have the right capabilities.
Senator Gillibrand. Do you think that B-1's are appropriate
airframes for close air support?
General Votel. I think the B-1's have been very effective
in that role as they played it in Afghanistan and other places.
Senator Gillibrand. Do they have the technology available
to be able to see the strobe lights that are placed on the
helmets of our troops?
General Votel. I believe they do.
Senator Gillibrand. Were any changes made as a result of
this incident?
General Votel. Senator, again, I would take that question
for the record, and we will go back and look and I will provide
you a more thorough response to all the actions that we did
take as a result of this.
Senator Gillibrand. Specifically infrared strobes. I have
asked the Pentagon for the investigation of this incident and
have not yet received it. Can I please have your commitment
that you will help me get this information?
General Votel. You have my commitment, Senator.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
In early February, Israel intercepted an Iranian drone in
its airspace resulting in an Israeli response striking what it
described as the command center from which Iran had launched
the drone. An Israeli F-16 fighter jet involved in the
offensive was downed by a Syrian antiaircraft fighter which
prompted the Israeli military to respond against eight Syrian
targets, including three aerial defense batteries and four
Iranian positions that it described as part of Iran's military
entrenchment in Syria.
What is your assessment of Iran's actions in Syria? Is it
entrenching itself in the country?
General Votel. Well, Senator, I am extraordinarily
concerned about Iran's role. I think they are trying to
perpetuate their influence and certainly they are trying to
create an access so that they can continue to support Lebanese
Hezbollah and use that relationship to threaten Israel. So I am
extraordinarily concerned about that.
Senator Gillibrand. Do you feel that this incident
reflected a change in the Iranian rules of engagement in Syria?
General Votel. I cannot speak for what the Iranian rules of
engagement are. Certainly it was brazen and foolhardy for them
to do this given the capabilities that Israel has.
Senator Gillibrand. General Waldhauser, I took a CODEL
[Congressional Delegation] with a number of Senators to Africa
a few years ago to assess where we were with regard to the
growth of terrorism because, as you know, the precursors to 9/
11 came out of Africa, whether it was the bombing of the
embassy in Kenya or other terrorist attacks.
I am very concerned about what is happening in Africa. Not
only your previous answers today but even the front page of The
New York Times yesterday a story that more than 650,000
children under the age of five are severely malnourished in
northern Kenya, Somalia, and Ethiopia and that famine
throughout Africa is causing 12 million people to rely on food
aid. You combine that with the effects of global climate change
specifically on the ability of many countries within Africa to
grow their own food and provide for food. It is creating crime.
It is creating more terrorism. You add to that what is
happening with the Boko Haram efforts to steal children, to
have trafficking of females, and to destroy whole communities.
I am really concerned about the direction of terrorism and its
growth throughout Africa.
Can you give me guidance on how these changes are impacting
our mission and our posture in the area of your operations?
General Waldhauser. Senator, some of the numbers that you
stated are certainly overwhelming. When it comes to the African
continent, unfortunately those numbers are sometimes the order
of the day. Last year, for example, inside Somalia, there were
over 6 million people who were food insecure. This year it is
going to be around 5 million. That is just in that region.
I would say from the climate perspective, we have seen the
Sahel, the grasslands of the Sahel, recede and become desert
almost a mile per year in the last decade or so. This has a
significant impact on the herders who have to fight, if you
will, for grassland, waterholes, and the like. So these
environmental challenges put pressure on these different
organizations. Some are VEO. Some are criminal. But it puts
pressure on these organizations just for their own livelihood.
Consequently in areas like northern Mali, ISIS-West Africa
in the northern part of Niger, these are areas that are very
concerning to us, and this is why we are trying to work so
closely with those countries there so that they can maintain
security, that they can at a minimum keep these challenges
inside those particular boundaries. But there are some
significant challenges, and the numbers sometimes in Africa can
overwhelm you.
Senator Gillibrand. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
We do not have any more members, and hopefully we will not
have any more members.
But let me--just for clarification, first of all, I did not
want to be discourteous in that one interruption that I had
during the course. But I think it is important because this is
something that can be changed.
I think what Senator Rounds is getting to is that we are
all aware that prior to 10 years ago, the continent of Africa
was divided into three different commands, PACOM [United States
Pacific Command], EUCOM, and CENTCOM. It completely surrounds
Africa.
Now, when we decided to have AFRICOM, still under its
construction, we had both allocated and assigned troops in
PACOM, allocated and assigned troops in EUCOM, allocated and
assigned troops in CENTCOM, but only allocated troops in
AFRICOM. Now, that is the difference.
I would still think that should be open to discussion
because we have seen a lot of things. LRA [Lord's Resistance
Army], for example. When we had problems, we had to bring in
troops from other places.
It is my intention and I am sure it is Senator Rounds'
intention to put that in the focus to see if we have the right
blend there or if, in fact, we should have assigned troops in
AFRICOM.
Now, do you have any comment to make on that?
General Waldhauser. Senator, I think to a large degree we
are saying the same thing. I mean, the technicality of assigned
and allocated to those who do not do this on a daily basis may
not seem like a big deal, but allocated is something that you
might be able to count on all the time but you may not.
Assigned forces, obviously, you can count on.
Senator Inhofe. Exactly. I am sure that is what he was
getting to. I think we are in total agreement on that.
Any other thoughts?
Senator Reed. No, thank you.
Senator Inhofe. We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:31 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Joni Ernst
illicit trafficking
1. Senator Ernst. General Votel, we know that illicit trafficking
has been used to some extent to finance terrorist groups. Would you
agree that as we get better at choking off traditional financing
mechanisms used by terrorists, illicit trafficking is becoming a
greater concern?
General Votel. [Deleted.]
2. Senator Ernst. General Votel, what specific commodities are
being illicitly traded to finance terrorist groups within the CENTCOM
AOR?
General Votel. [Deleted.]
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
coast guard centcom patrol boat support
3. Senator Sullivan. General Votel, the Coast Guard has six patrol
boats working in direct support to CENTCOM. Are they valuable for the
missions you have in the Persian Gulf?
General Votel. [Deleted.]
4. Senator Sullivan. General Votel, these patrol boats are well
past their service life and need to be decommissioned soon. Have you
requested new Coast Guard assets to replace these patrol boats?
General Votel. [Deleted.]
5. Senator Sullivan. General Votel, the Coast Guard has replaced
their legacy patrol boats with new Fast Response Cutters (FRCs). Would
they be a good fit for the missions in CENTCOM?
General Votel. [Deleted.]
6. Senator Sullivan. General Votel, the Navy also has small surface
combatants (Patrol Coastal, PCs) that perform similar missions
alongside the Coast Guard patrol boats. The PCs are also scheduled for
a phased decommissioning which begins in 2022. However, the Navy does
not plan to replace these with similar assets, instead, they plan to
replace this capability with some (fewer number of) Littoral Combat
Ships (LCS). However, LCS may not necessarily provide the right
capability for the CENTCOM AOR. Does the Navy plan to provide you new
ships to maintain this capability? Is LCS the right platform for the
missions you have?
General Votel. [Deleted.]
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator David Perdue
syria--chemical weapons
7. Senator Perdue. General Votel, Syrian President Bashar al Assad
has committed many atrocities since the beginning of the Syrian Civil
War, but one of the most disturbing is his use of chemical weapons
against civilians. As we've seen with the recent CW attack in Idlib
province, despite the Russian-backed plan to rid Syria of chemical
weapons in 2013, Bashar Assad still has them and still uses them, and
has not declared all the elements of its chemical warfare program to
the OPCW. Recently, a United Nations Panel of Experts report was
released that connects North Korea to the Syrian Government's use of
chemical weapons against its own people. Disturbingly, the report
uncovers that these heinous actions were exacerbated by North Korean
technicians with specialized knowledge of chemical and ballistic-
missile technology, who have repeatedly visited Syria over the last 2
years in Barzeh, Adra and Hama. Do you believe that without DPRK
military assistance, President Assad would have been less able to
inflict chemical weapons atrocities on his own people?
General Votel. [Deleted.]
8. Senator Perdue. General Votel, are there ways the U.S. and
partner forces can halt this deadly cooperation?
General Votel. [Deleted.]
9. Senator Perdue. General Votel, given that the Assad regime has
``made significant territorial gains in central and eastern Syria,'' do
you believe there will be an increase in chemical weapons usage?
General Votel. [Deleted.]
10. Senator Perdue. General Votel, do you believe that the lack of
American intervention against the Assad regime in Syria has empowered
and emboldened Assad to continue on his path of detention, torture, and
extermination of his own people?
General Votel. [Deleted.]
jstars isr capability
11. Senator Perdue. General Votel and General Waldhauser, in the
past, I have written to both of you to inquire about the importance of
the JSTARS platform to operations in your AORs. As you know, JSTARS is
an Air Force platform that provides critical intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), ground targeting, and
battlefield command and control capabilities to all branches of our
military in multiple regions of the world. General Waldhauser, your
command replied to us that ``JSTARS' moving target indicator data, when
fused with the data collected by cross-cued platforms, enhanced
geolocation accuracy of ISIS activity in Libya, allowed new target
discovery, and helped confirm ISIS presence in areas where previously
we had low confidence, single-source reports.'' General Votel, you
wrote that ``we employ JSTARS capabilities in our combat areas 12
months a year. Any delay in providing this critical capability is
detrimental to our mission.'' As you know, the Air Force has zeroed-out
its FY19 recapitalization of the JSTARS fleet, when just last year this
platform was the number 4 acquisition priority of the Air Force. While
I agree that we eventually need to move to the new ``system of
systems'' in the future, I'm very concerned we'll see critical gaps in
ISR (especially with GMTI) for you and for troops on the ground. The
Air Force is planning to take the JSTARS platform offline without
acquiring more ISR assets. Have they explained to you how they plan to
bridge the capability gap in GMTI-ISR that will arise in the upcoming
3-12 year period? (If possible, I would appreciate a classified and
unclassified response)
General Votel. [Deleted.]
General Waldhauser. [Deleted.]
12. Senator Perdue. General Votel and General Waldhauser, what does
this potential gap mean for you and your combatant commands' ISR
requirements?
General Votel, [Deleted.]
General Waldhauser. [Deleted.]
13. Senator Perdue. General Votel and General Waldhauser, how well
are your ISR requirements being met currently?
General Votel. [Deleted.]
General Waldhauser. [Deleted.]
14. Senator Perdue. General Votel and General Waldhauser, in your
experience, what mission-critical capabilities can be met with JSTARS
that can't be met with another ISR platform?
General Votel. [Deleted.]
General Waldhauser. [Deleted.]
15. Senator Perdue. General Votel and General Waldhauser, could you
provide me an example of a specific mission that you have commanded
whose success depended on the JSTARS?
General Votel. [Deleted.]
General Waldhauser. [Deleted.]
16. Senator Perdue. General Votel and General Waldhauser, how
important to you, as a combatant commander, is the role of JSTARS
airborne battle management and command and control, in addition to
being an ISR provider?
General Votel. [Deleted.]
General Waldhauser. [Deleted.]
reassurance of gulf partners and allies
17. Senator Perdue. General Votel, former Secretary Gates gave a
mixed assessment of the nuclear deal with Iran, but critiqued the
overall policy approach because of the lack of a strong signal that the
United States remains committed to Iran's geopolitical containment. He
said, quote, ``We cut deals with the Soviets [on nuclear weapons] but
at the same time pursued very aggressive policies'' to counter Soviet
meddling around the world. ``I don't know why we didn't do the same
things with Iran.'' The result, Gates said, is that allies like the
Saudis and Israelis now fear the United States is deliberately
acquiescing in Iran's emergence as the new hegemon in the region. Do
you think our Gulf Cooperation Council partners have increased doubt
about the commitment of the United States to their stability and
security since the nuclear agreement with Iran? How about our other
allies in the region like Israel, Jordan, and Egypt?
General Votel. [Deleted.]
18. Senator Perdue. General Votel, have you sensed a change in Gulf
relations since the transition to a new administration? What kinds of
steps could reassure them after an extended period of uncertainty?
General Votel. [Deleted.]
19. Senator Perdue. General Votel, how does the ongoing GCC rift
impact your military operations in the region? How does the rift open
the door for adversaries, like Iran?
General Votel. [Deleted.]
20. Senator Perdue. General Votel, how has Qatar stepped up as a
partner since 9/11, and more recently, since the embargo?
General Votel. [Deleted.]
north korea and africa
21. Senator Perdue. General Waldhauser, as was reported last week,
President Trump is planning to engage with North Korean leader Kim
Jong-un over denuclearization of North Korea very soon. Unlike past
failed negotiation attempts with North Korea, it is imperative that we
keep our campaign of maximum pressure, including sanctions, on North
Korea, and don't fail to take our eye off of the ball. Various
countries in the African continent are among those who have been
dealing with the Kim regime for decades. According to reports, trade
between North Korea and African countries was at $216.5 million a year
on average between 2007 and 2015. Construction agreements with various
countries make up a significant portion of this amount, mostly through
a North Korean state-owned enterprise called Mansudae. A UN Panel
report that came out in September accused countries like Tanzania and
Mozambique of contracting Pyongyang to provide support for their air
missile systems. North Korean entities have built arms factories in
some countries while providing military training to others, both in
clear violation of the sanctions regime. It is vital that the United
States steps up pressure on African states to cut longstanding military
and diplomatic ties with North Korea as part of its push to squeeze the
funding of North Korea's missile and nuclear programs. What actions has
AFRICOM taken to monitor and combat North Korean sanctions-evasion
activity on the continent?
General Waldhauser. AFRICOM monitors North Korean activities in
cooperation with the United States missions on the continent and is
currently in the process of operationalizing our tasks associated with
the Global Campaign Plan--North Korea to do even more to counter North
Korea's activities in Africa. We are committed to supporting the
Department of State and the maximum pressure policy using all tools
available. This includes ensuring all our African partners are aware of
the activities prohibited by UN Security Council Resolutions, as well
as the degree to which North Korea will abuse its diplomatic, military,
and trade relations to evade sanctions, often undermining the
reputation of governments hosting its embassies and trade missions, and
exposing these unwitting host governments to international penalties.
22. Senator Perdue. General Waldhauser, how can the United States
ensure and incentivize African compliance with United States and
International sanctions on North Korea?
General Waldhauser. [Deleted.]
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tim Scott
russian behavior in the middle east
23. Senator Scott. General Votel, with heavy assistance from United
States and coalition partners, Iraq seems to for the most part have
defeated ISIS and retaken most of the territory lost to that terrorist
organization starting in 2014. But the situation in the region is only
growing more complex. Russian involvement in Syria is growing, as
Vladimir Putin works to ensure the survival of Bashar Assad and his
murderous regime. Syria is Russia's only remaining ally in the Arab
world and it is clear to me that Putin and Russia are investing a great
deal in Syria and the Assad regime's survival. Iran continues to exert
its malign influence throughout the region, from supporting the
Houthi's in Yemen, to continued backing for Hezbollah in southern
Lebanon. Competing interests in the Middle East are myriad, and I think
it would be too easy for the United States to find itself stretched,
distracted, and ultimately focused on the wrong issue. In the midst of
this complexity, I am most concerned about Russia's role in the region.
Ties between Russia and Turkey, a member of NATO, appear to be growing
and solidifying. Russian mercenaries are fighting alongside Syrian
troops, while Russian aircraft support them from above.
General Votel, given the complicated environment, how do you
prioritize your efforts in the region?
General Votel. [Deleted.]
24. Senator Scott. General Votel, the Washington Post reported on
February 22nd that the Russian Foreign Ministry acknowledged ``several
dozen'' Russians were killed when they attacked a position held by the
United States and its allies. How far will Russia go to defend the
Assad regime and ensure its survival?
General Votel. [Deleted.]
25. Senator Scott. General Votel, should we be concerned about
Russia implementing its ``escalate to dominate'' strategy in Syria and
threatening the use of low-yield nuclear weapons to ensure the survial
of the Assad regime?
General Votel. [Deleted.]
26. Senator Scott. General Votel, if Russia does pursue its
``escalate to dominate'' strategy in the Middle East, how do you think
Israel will respond?
General Votel. [Deleted.]
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
women, peace, and security (wps) initiative
27. Senator Shaheen. General Waldhauser and General Votel, how
receptive have our partners in your Area of Responsibility been to
efforts to implement the Women, Peace, and Security initiative and how
has the WPS assisted you in accomplishing your Building Partner
Capacity (BPC) missions?
General Waldhauser. We seek opportunities to integrate WPS
initiatives within our building partner capacity missions by:
Supporting defense institutions that facilitate the capacity building
of women as well as men in African partner defense forces; Ensuring our
capacity building programs include requirements for the protection of
civilians, specifically women and girls; Assisting the development of
training and accountability mechanisms within African partner defense
forces that facilitate professionalism and prevent sexual and gender
based violence, to include sexual exploitation and abuse. The WPS
initiative strives to inculcate in our partners that women and men have
the necessary talent and capability to improve their armed forces.
However, due to competing priorities and varying interpretation of the
global WPS mandate, challenges remain on consistently implementing WPS
across the continent. Despite these challenges, the majority of our
partners are willing to send representatives to USAFRICOM-sponsored WPS
events. Below is a summary of some of the most recent WPS-sponsored or
inclusive events: USAFRICOM Intelligence Directorate facilitated a two-
part all-female intelligence officer training course attended by
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and
Tunisia. USAFRICOM Office of Legal Counsel hosts an annual colloquium
attended by military justice personnel from 25 African countries which
has twice focused on preventing and responding to sexual exploitation
and abuse as the main topic. USAFRICOM leverages its Global Peace
Operations Initiative (GPOI) funding to sponsor a biannual Gender in
Peace Support Operations attended by African troop contributing
countries to the UN. In 2017, Special Operations Command Africa began
including a WPS Seminar as part of its annual Flintlock exercise to
highlight the importance of women's leadership and understanding gender
dynamics to countering violent extremist organizations. The 2018 WPS
Seminar was attended by Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Ghana, Mali,
Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal. In 2014 and 2015, United States Army
Africa hosted a Regional Gender Mainstreaming Seminar attended by
Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and
Zambia to discuss best practices for integrating women into the force.
Increasingly, some partners are requesting the integration of WPS into
their bilateral BPC activities with USAFRICOM. For example, in January
2018, United States Air Forces Africa began a four-phased engagement to
support Mali's force generation and personnel readiness processes for
the Malian Air Force, a key element of which is the development of a
sexual harassment and assault policy. Additionally, Zambia leveraged
GPOI funding to develop a Female Engagement Team Training in February
2018 to prepare approximately 100 female soldiers to deploy to the
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the
Central African Republic. Through our cooperative relationships with
our interagency, European, and multilateral partner organizations, such
as the UN and African Union, we continue to encourage and support the
integration of WPS initiatives through our collective BPC activities.
General Votel. [Deleted.]
aid to pakistan
28. Senator Shaheen. General Votel, in your advance statement for
the record, you indicated that ``achieving long-term stability in
Afghanistan and defeating the insurgency will be difficult without
Pakistan's support and assistance.'' The administration recently
suspended security assistance aid to Pakistan due to concerns about
Pakistan's provision of sanctuary and support to militant and terrorist
group that target United States personnel and interests, yet Pakistan
and the United States are partners in targeting other terrorist groups.
What has been the impact of the suspension of security assistance aid
to Pakistan and are you concerned about its long-term impact on our
military-to-military relationship with Pakistan?
General Votel. [Deleted.]
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie Hirono
influence of china
29. Senator Hirono. General Votel, you mentioned in your written
testimony increased Chinese investment and attempts to gain influence
in the Central region of the world. China appears to have a long-term
plan that it is executing now. What are the short- and long-term risks
to the Central region from increased Chinese investment and influence
campaigns?
General Votel. [Deleted.]
isr deficit
30. Senator Hirono. General Votel and General Waldhauser, one of
the common themes we hear from the regional combatant commanders is the
constantly increasing demand for Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance (ISR) assets. Both General Scaparotti and Admiral Tidd
testified this year that large percentages of these requirements go un-
met. What percentage of your general ISR requirement is regularly met?
General Votel. [Deleted.]
General Waldhauser. USAFRICOM's ISR requirements are fulfilled at
830 percent of its Joint Staff validated, but mostly unsourced,
requirements. GFM-sourced solutions provide 820-25 percent; USAFRICOM
attempts to overcome this deficit using the HAC-D / USD(I) ISR Transfer
fund to obtain and maintain an additional 85-10 percent.
31. Senator Hirono. General Votel and General Waldhauser, what is
the ISR capacity of allies and partners in your region?
General Votel. [Deleted.]
General Waldhauser. [Deleted.]
32. Senator Hirono. General Votel and General Waldhauser, are you
able to effectively leverage the ISR capacity of allies and partners to
meet your requirements?
General Votel. [Deleted.]
General Waldhauser. [Deleted.]
scope of missions in africa
33. Senator Hirono. General Waldhauser, your written testimony
states that there are about 7,200 personnel in Africa on any given day.
How does that number of personnel compare to 2015 or 2016?
General Waldhauser. The average number of personnel on any given
day in Africa in 2015 was 5,540. This is an increase from 2015 to 2018
of 1,660 personnel. The average number of personnel on any given day in
Africa in 2016 was 6,143. This is an increase from 2016 to 2018 of
1,057 personnel. For reference, the average number of personnel on any
given day in Africa in 2017 was 6,595. This is an increase from 2017 to
2018 of 605 personnel. Over the past four years, the increase in
personnel is primarily due to our efforts and engagements in Niger,
Somalia, and Tunisia. Personnel in Niger increased from approximately
300 to 900 from 2015 to 2017. This increase in personnel is principally
tied to airfield construction and activities in Agadez which began in
March of 2016. Thus, the components which saw the largest increase were
United States Army Africa (USARAF) and United States Air Forces Africa
(AFAF). The seemingly large increase in personnel in Somalia from
approximately 50 to 600 from 2015 to 2017 is attributed to two main
reasons. First, between 2015 and 2017, all major force operations in
Somalia transitioned from Joint Task Force (JTF) 94-7 to Special
Operations Command-Africa (SOCAF). Based on the manner in which Task
Force 94-7 deployed into theater not all of the Task Force 94-7
personnel were accounted for and thus not likely included in the
initial number of 50 personnel in 2015. Moreover, prior to 2015, Task
Force personnel numbers were not included in USAFRICOM personnel
totals. Additionally, a new United States Code Sec. 333 Program stood
up to train Somali National Army DANAB Advanced Infantry Battalions in
Baledogle. This new training program required additional U.S.
personnel. Second, as part of the Task Force 94-7 and SOCAF transition,
Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) was tasked to
assume Base Operating Support--Integrator from Task Force at Forward
Operating Base Baledogle and Galcayo. As part of HOA's assessment, the
CJTF-HOA Commander determined the contracted security force Task Force
utilized to secure the Baledogle base posed too much risk to SOCAF
forces and subsequently replaced the contracted security force with a
sizeable and traditional DoD Security Force. In sum, with the transfer
of responsibility from Task Force and their accompanying contracted
security personnel, the components which saw the largest increase were
Special Operations Command-Africa in Mogadishu, and the Combined Joint
Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in Baledogle and Galyco. Personnel
in Tunisia increased from approximately 30 to 120 from 2015 to 2017.
This primarily was a result of new basing of ISR aircraft and
associated operations and security personnel in Tunisia. These ISR
assets support operations in Libya and Tunisia as well as countering
regional violent extremist organizations. Consequently, the component
which saw the largest increase was AFAF.
34. Senator Hirono. General Waldhauser, over the next year, do you
expect the personnel commitment to AFRICOM to grow?
General Waldhauser. Currently, USAFRICOM does not anticipate any
growth in personnel over the next year. The new National Security and
Defense Strategies reprioritizes near-peer competition against global
state actors and Joint Force Readiness above Counter Violent Extremist
Organization (C-VEO) contingency operations. USAFRICOM supports these
strategies with a focus on building partner capability. By investing in
training and investing in the operational needs of our partnered
security, U.S. personnel and unit commitments on the continent may
likely decrease. While there may be instances in time when we might see
a short term increase of deployed forces to support U.S.-directed
operations, we expect a reduction of forces and personnel over the next
several years.
35. Senator Hirono. General Waldhauser, of the 7,200 personnel, how
many are directly involved in countering Violent Extremist
Organizations, ISIS-West Africa and Boko Haram?
General Waldhauser. In USAFRICOM's ``By, With, and Through''
framework, where the vast majority of operations in Africa are
conducted ``by'' our partners on the ground, USAFRICOM provides
approximately 2,500 servicemembers who directly Advise, Assist, and
Accompany partner force units and enable these operations by ensuring
the operation is resourced deliberately with supporting ISR, fire
support, CASEVAC, and QRF enablers.
36. Senator Hirono. General Waldhauser, is the force currently in
Africa sufficient to contain the threat as it stands today?
General Waldhauser. The current allocation of United States
military force on the continent is sufficient to enable our African
partners to contain most VEO threats and degrade their ability to
conduct external operations. We employ a ``By, With, and Through''
strategic framework where the vast majority of security operations in
Africa are conducted ``by'' our partners on the ground. They execute
these operations ``with'' our assistance and enablement, and
``through'' established mutually supporting partnership agreements. In
the context of this framework, we have sufficient forces to accomplish
the mission. The U.S. does not have enough deployed forces to contain
the various VEO networks across the continent. Countering the numerous
VEOs requires cooperative engagement with our partners. These partners
are not limited to our African teammates, but include critical allies
such as France and our continued support to their ongoing operations in
Mali and the greater Sahel.
djibouti port terminal seizure
37. Senator Hirono. General Waldhauser, related to Djibouti's
recent seizure of a port terminal, there are reports indicating that
President Guellah could turn it over to the Chinese as a gift or in
lieu of repaying debt as the Chinese have provided over $1.4 billion in
financing to improve the local infrastructure. You've stated that the
``consequences could be significant'' for the United States and
specifically your Command. This move also comes in the wake of China
establishing a base in Djibouti--located a few miles from our only
permanent base in Africa, Camp Lemonnier, which hosts 4,000 military
and intelligence personnel and serves as a key outpost for
counterterrorism operations targeting AQIP, al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, the
Lord's Resistance Army and ISIS. Like the port facility recently
seized, the U.S. operates Camp Lemonnier under a 20 year lease. What's
to stop President Guelleh from breaking that agreement if the Chinese
want to call in another debt?
General Waldhauser. While we do not believe China could
successfully pressure the government of Djibouti to break the lease
agreement, we are carefully monitoring Chinese activities and its
emergent military presence in Djibouti and elsewhere in Africa. The
United States has a very strong partnership with Djibouti that has been
mutually beneficial to both the United States and the government and
people of Djibouti. In 2014, the United States signed a new
international agreement that serves as a 20-year lease for Camp
Lemonnier at the cost of $63 million per year (accounting for 8 percent
of the Djibouti's Government revenue), with an option to extend the
lease through 2044. Since 2002, DoD has invested almost $1 billion in
developing Camp Lemonnier. Camp Lemonnier has awarded over $40 million
in contracts since 2015. The Djibouti First legislation, which was
expanded to Africa First legislation in 2017, has given us an
important, and popular, tool to demonstrate directly to the people of
Djibouti the benefits of partnering with the United States. The
government of Djibouti, including President Guellah, has made clear
they value their relationship with the United States, even as they
expand their relationship with China.
38. Senator Hirono. General Waldhauser, can you expand on the
``consequences'' for the United States and our allies should Djibouti
continue to act based on Chinese interests?
General Waldhauser. Djibouti is located on the Bab el Mandeb
Straits which is a geo-strategic chokepoint at the southern entrance to
the Red Sea. Almost all of the maritime trade between Europe and Asia
transits this point. Djibouti has no natural resources and is selling
its one unique resource of strategic location. Djibouti is heavily
indebted to China with estimates as high as 75 percent of Djibouti
total GDP tied up in Chinese debt. This factor makes Djibouti highly
vulnerable to Chinese influence. The Djiboutian port is the largest
employer and biggest source of revenue in Djibouti. There is concern
the Chinese could eventually control the Djiboutian Port and the
Strait. This factor, coupled with their already established military
forces at the Chinese Naval base in Djibouti, places the Chinese in a
controlling position at one of the most critical strategic locations in
the world for both commerce and power projection. The loss access to
the Djiboutian Port would hinder Camp Lemonnier, tenant commands, and
Naval Ship operations dependent on in-port replenishments. Camp
Lemonnier relies on the port of Djibouti for replenishments of
sustenance, construction material, fuel, military equipment end items,
and medical supplies. To fill the supply chain gap created by the loss
to the port, reliance would shift immediately to strategic airlift
assets. The nearest available port capable of handing the throughput,
in a permissive environment, is the Port of Mombasa. Utilizing this
port poses a time distance challenge by adding an additional 2450
kilometers of transit from source to warfighter. The transfer of
maritime shipments is important to United States operations in Djibouti
and East Africa. The United States base in Djibouti is the only
permanent United States military base in Africa and is critical to
United States counter-terrorism efforts. Conflicts in nearby Yemen and
Somalia have also turned Djibouti into a critical staging ground for
military operations in these countries. Chinese control of the port
could also open the door for future Chinese-Russian cooperation.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2019 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 15, 2018
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
UNITED STATES PACIFIC COMMAND
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in Room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M.
Inhofe, presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker,
Fischer, Cotton, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue, Sasse, Reed,
Nelson, McCaskill, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, and
Peters.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Senator Inhofe. Our meeting will come to order this morning
to hear testimony from one of my favorite people, Admiral
Harris. I was so excited to be there at the time that everyone
was paying tribute to you in your upcoming retirement. I
stumbled into that big party of people who were rejoicing the
great contributions you have made. We appreciate so much having
you here. I only regret that it'll probably be your last time
here. The committee would like to congratulate you along with
me.
Chairman McCain has asked me to submit a statement for the
record. I'm going to go ahead and quote him at this time, ``The
National Defense Strategy offers a new framework for thinking
about the global challenges we face and that places China
squarely at the top of our priority list. As we turn our focus
to great-power competition and near-peer threats, we must face
up to the true nature of the reality of Chinese power and
ambition.''
[The prepared statement of Chairman McCain follows:]
Prepared Statement by Chairman John McCain
The evolving security situation in the Indo-Pacific presents a
dynamic environment for safeguarding America's deep and enduring
interests in the region. The National Defense Strategy offers a new
framework for thinking about the global challenges we face and places
China squarely at the top of our priority list. As we turn our focus to
great power competition and near-peer threats, we must face up to the
true nature and reality of Chinese power and ambition.
For decades, many Americans hoped that China's ``peaceful rise''
would lead Beijing to assume a role as a ``responsible stakeholder'' in
the rules-based international order. But China's Communist Party
leaders have made a different choice. China's hostility to the rules-
based order--which has been increasingly brazen under Xi Jinping--
threatens to undermine peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific.
However, this is not merely a regional issue. As a Pacific power, this
reality threatens America's interests as well. I am convinced the only
successful path to preserving the rules-based order in the Indo-
Pacific--and the peace and prosperity it has generated--is to renew
America's leadership in the region in full.
In the military domain, China's rapid modernization has been aimed
at developing capabilities that directly challenge the American way of
war. They have succeeded in eroding our conventional military overmatch
and countering our ability to project power. While America's military
remains the most powerful on earth, urgent action is required to keep
to keep it that way. America no longer has the luxury of taking its
military advantage for granted.
We must think differently about capabilities and concepts, forward
basing and force posture, and logistics and mobilization. We must
prepare for future threats with an eye to how the rapid diffusion of
advanced technologies has changed the landscape of warfare. We must
recognize our adversaries are competing across the entire spectrum of
conflict, which requires us to be more adaptive and innovative in order
to expand the competitive space.
While the long-term challenge of strategic competition with China
looms, the most immediate threat in the Indo-Pacific is the situation
on the Korean Peninsula. Last year in the National Defense
Authorization Act, Congress required the President to submit a report
setting forth the United States strategy for North Korea. The
administration missed that deadline this week.
A North Korean missile with a nuclear payload capable of striking
the United States Homeland is no longer a distant hypothetical--it is
an imminent danger. The threats to our allies and partners and U.S.
military bases in the region are even more severe. While I welcome any
efforts to resolve the situation diplomatically, I remain skeptical of
any assurances that North Korea is ready to denuclearize after decades
of pursuing its current program at grave cost.
At the core of every issue in this important region is the reality
that securing our interests relies on working closely with the
countries who share them. I am encouraged that the new National Defense
Strategy commits to strengthening United States alliances and
partnerships in the Indo-Pacific. In addition to our long-time allies
in Japan and South Korea, Secretary Mattis has focused his efforts on
developing and deepening partnerships with India, Indonesia, and
Vietnam--where we recently witnessed an historic port call by a United
States aircraft carrier that demonstrates just how far we have come. I
welcome these efforts because ultimately, no policy for deterring
aggression, maintaining stability, and achieving prosperity in the
region will be successful without our allies and partners.
As much as I am encouraged by efforts to provide more funding to
meet our military requirements and to improve defense cooperation
across the region, I fear these efforts will be in vain unless the
United States takes action, especially in the economic sphere, to
demonstrate that we are not a declining or disinterested power--and
that we remain committed to playing our historic role as a Pacific
power. That is why I urge the Trump administration to show the courage
required to change course by reentering negotiations to complete the
Trans-Pacific Partnership. We also need to cease threats to withdraw
from existing trade agreements, such as the Korea-United States Free
Trade Agreement. We need to ensure that America's allies and partners
in the Indo-Pacific are not targeted by steep steel and aluminum
tariffs.
Finally, on the occasion of today's hearing, let me express my
deepest thanks to Admiral Harris, who has served our nation honorably
for decades, and has been a faithful steward of the post my father once
held. Admiral, we thank you for your friendship and leadership. We wish
you well in retirement and as you continue to serve our nation as
Ambassador to Australia.
Senator Inhofe. For evidence--unquote--for evidence that
Secretary Mattis identified priorities in the NDS [National
Defense Strategy] correctly, we need to look no further than
what's happening with China. Of course, everyone's familiar
with Russia and with the threats that are out there with the--
North Korea, but they haven't thought, really, about China in
the framework that we have now seen it from our trip out there.
I was recently out with members of the committee, and we had a
chance to see it firsthand. I'm hopeful that our recent
agreement to increase United States defense spending will help
us to recover from our current readiness and modernization
crisis and prepare for future threats in Asia and beyond.
I recently returned from that trip, and, with several
members of this committee, we visited the Philippines, Taiwan,
South Korea, and Japan. We observed firsthand the threat that--
Chinese expansionism in the region, and we need for American
leadership to assure, if necessary, to defend, our allies.
Admiral Harris, the committee looks forward to your very
candid assessment of the threat that's out there. We appreciate
your being here with us.
Senator Reed.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Harris, thank you for being here to testify on
behalf of yourself and for General Brooks. It's unfortunate
General Brooks wasn't able to join us, but we appreciate the
operational needs on the Korean Peninsula. I also believe it's
the committee's expectation that General Brooks will testify
before us as soon as it is feasible for him to return to
Washington.
In Asia, we are faced with two very different problem sets
that will both require long-term, integrated, whole-of-
government strategies. I am concerned that the administration
has not developed the comprehensive strategies for the threat
posed by North Korea or our long-term competition with China.
Both problem sets are interdependent. For example, I firmly
believe that if we preemptively attack North Korea, we will
forfeit any ability to prevail in our long-term competition
with China. If we mishandle that competition, we will be poorly
positioned to put the type of pressure on North Korea that is
necessary to deter and contain the threat that the regime poses
to the United States and our allies in the region.
With regard to North Korea, the recent announcement that
President Trump will be meeting with Kim Jong-un has led to
cautious optimism about a path to a resolution in this crisis.
Success in the proposed talks will require consistent strategic
messaging, close coordination with our partners in China, and
increased diplomatic capacity and empowerment for the experts
at the State Department and other agencies. I am concerned that
some of the critical players necessary for effective
negotiation are not in place, since we are still lacking an
Ambassador for South Korea, the Secretary of State is in
transition, and the top diplomat who had the most experience
with the North Koreans recently resigned. Additionally, there
should be significant pre-negotiations with the Republic of
Korea, Japan, and China to make sure that we are presenting a
comprehensive position that has buy-in from all of the relevant
stakeholders. I am concerned that there's a very short window
of time for all of this work to take place.
We should all be realistic about the prospects for
negotiations. Given North Korea's all-consuming drive for
strategic nuclear capabilities and its history of failing to
adhere to negotiated agreements, we can all agree that the
likelihood of either near-term or long-term success for the
talks is relatively low. Even in the event that North Korea
agrees to verifiable denuclearization on terms that we can
accept, there is a strong likelihood that a long-term
deterrence-and-containment strategy will likely need to be in
place for decades to come.
Finally, it is critical that, if negotiations are not
successful, the administration does not pivot to preparing for
a preemptive war with North Korea. I believe there is growing
agreement that war is not an acceptable alternative to
sustaining pressure on North Korea, preventing proliferation
and deterring aggression. The talks should be seen as an
opportunity to curtail the regime's nuclear missile programs
while still maintaining the maximum pressure campaign.
Admiral Harris, I'm looking to hearing your views on this
latest development and the implications for U.S. national
security and the security of our allies in the Pacific region.
China is the largest economic, military, and global
competitor that we face. It is critical that this
administration develop a comprehensive strategy that focuses on
all these areas of competition. First and foremost, the United
States needs a better global messaging campaign to counter
Chinese influence in the region. For years, China has been
circulating a narrative that the West is in decline and that
the economic future lies with China. Our consistent response
must be that we are committed to the Asia-Pacific region, that
we will stand with our allies and partners to counter Chinese
aggression, and that we will continue to promote a shared
vision of strong economies, vibrant civil societies, and open
democracies. In the end, it is that vision and the human rights
that we champion that will ensure American success in the
region.
China has not demonstrated a willingness to be a
responsible global leader. The U.S. should ensure that
international order is followed. Our contention with China is
not over who owns the South China Sea, but over who has access
to it. To that end, we must enable and assist our partners and
allies in the region, especially Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam,
and Singapore, in defending their own sovereignty, the maritime
rights, and provide them with economic alternatives to China.
China is using state wealth and productive capacity to
target key companies in entire industrial sectors in the United
States to gain economic dominance. Even wise tax, regulatory,
and trade policies would not be sufficient to overcome this
mercantilist strategy. We must invest more in research and
development, workforce development and training, and correct
lagging private investment in American manufacturing. We must
also improve our own defense against the theft of our
intellectual property and technology. Only recently have we
come to fully understand some of our own vulnerabilities.
Admiral Harris, I'm looking forward to hearing your
testimony and how you view our long-term competition with China
as Commander of the Pacific Command. I'm interested in hearing
about all these issues and much more.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Admiral Harris, you are recognized for your
opening statement, and then we'll have questions from the
Chair.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL HARRY B. HARRIS, JR., USN, COMMANDER,
UNITED STATES PACIFIC COMMAND
Admiral Harris. Thank you, Senator Inhofe and Ranking
Member Reed and distinguished members. It's an honor for me to
appear again before this committee for what is likely my last
posture statement--posture hearing to you all.
I do regret, as the Senator said, that I'm not here with my
usual testimony battle buddy, United States Forces Korea
Commander, General Vince Brooks, but I think you'll all agree
that he's where he's needed most right now, on the Korean
Peninsula.
General Brooks and I extend our thoughts and prayers to
Chairman McCain and his family as he continues his tough health
fight.
There are many things to talk about since my last testimony
before you 11 months ago, but I want to start by thanking the
Congress for your action last month. I'm grateful for your
bipartisan efforts to raise the budget caps for fiscal year
2018 and fiscal year 2019, and I'm optimistic that Congress
will resource the fiscal year 2018 NDAA [National Defense
Authorization Act] in the coming weeks. I and many others have
regularly highlighted the negative impacts that sequestration
and the Budget Control Act have leveled against the military,
so I would ask Congress to make these bipartisan measures
permanent and end sequestration for good.
One of the principal problems that we face in the region is
overcoming the perception that the United States is a declining
or disinterested power. A fully resourced defense budget
leading into long term stability--budget stability will send a
strong signal to our allies and partners, and all potential
adversaries, that the United States is fully committed to
preserving a free and open order in the Indo-Pacific.
As your PACOM [United States Pacific Command] Commander, I
have the tremendous honor of leading approximately 375,000
soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen, coast guardsmen, and DOD
[Department of Defense] civilians standing watch for the
largest and most diverse geographic command. These men and
women, as well as their families, fill me with pride in their
hard work and devotion to duty. I am humbled to serve alongside
them.
The United States has an enduring national interest in the
Indo-Pacific, and, as I stated last year, I believe America's
security and economic prosperity are indelibly linked to this
critical region, which remains at a precarious crossroad, where
tangible opportunity meets significant challenge. Here we face
a security environment more complex and volatile than any we
have experienced in recent memory.
Senator Reed, I join you in being encouraged by recent
developments on the Korean Peninsula and the possibility of a
summit between President Trump and Kim Jong-un. But, North
Korea remains our most urgent security threat in the region.
PACOM will continue to fully support the President's maximum
pressure campaign and be ready to respond with our allies and
partners to the full range of contingency scenarios.
This past year has seen rapid and comprehensive improvement
in North Korea's ballistic and missile--ballistic missile and
nuclear capabilities, despite broad international condemnation
and the imposition of additional United Nations Security
Council resolutions. This includes the detonation of its
largest nuclear device, first-ever launches of two different
intercontinental ballistic missiles, and six launches of an
intermediate-range ballistic missile, all of which Pyongyang
emphatically states will target the United States, including
Guam.
While some might dispute both the reliability and quantity
of the North's strategic weapons, it is indisputable that KJU
[Kim Jong-un] is rapidly closing the gap between rhetoric and
capability. The Republic of Korea and Japan have been living
under the shadow of North Korea's threats for years. Now that
shadow looms over the American Homeland.
Meanwhile, China is leveraging military modernization,
influence operations, and predatory economics to coerce
neighboring countries to reorder the Indo-Pacific to their
advantage. While some view China's actions in the East and
South China Seas as opportunistic, I do not. I view them as
coordinated, methodical, and strategic, using their military
and economic power to erode their free and open international
order. China's aggression in the South China Sea moves along
unabated, despite the Permanent Court of Arbitration's tribunal
ruling that invalidated China's Nine-Dash Line claim and
unprecedented land reclamation in 2016. China is attempting to
assert de facto sovereignty over disputed maritime features by
further militarizing its manmade bases, to this very day.
China's impressive military buildup could soon challenge
the United States across almost every domain. Key advancements
include fielding significant improvements in missile systems,
developing fifth-generation fighter capabilities, and growing
the size and capability of the Chinese navy, to include their
first overseas base in the Port of Djibouti. They're also
heavily investing in the next wave of military technologies,
including hypersonic missiles, advanced space and cyber
capabilities, and artificial intelligence. If the U.S. does not
keep pace, PACOM will struggle to compete with the People's
Liberation Army on future battlefields.
Thailand's ongoing military buildup, advancement, and
modernization are core elements of their strategy to supplant
the United States as the security partner of choice for
countries in the Indo-Pacific. China also holds global
ambitions. But, don't take my word for it, just listen to what
China says, itself. At the 19th Party Congress, President Xi
stated that he wanted China to develop a world-class military
and become the global leader, in terms of composite national
strength and international influence. Ladies and gentlemen,
China's intent is crystal clear, and we ignore it at our peril.
These types of aspirational goals could be appropriate for
a nation of China's stature, but, judging by China's regional
behavior, I'm concerned China will now work to undermine the
rules-based international order, not just in the Indo-Pacific,
but on a global scale, as China expands its presence in Central
Asia, the Arctic, Africa, South America, and Europe. This
increasingly competitive environment necessitates continued
dialogue between the United States and China and our militaries
to improve understanding and reduce risk.
For PACOM, my goal remains to convince China that its best
future comes from peaceful cooperation and meaningful
participation in the current free and open international order
and honoring its international commitments. After all, the
Chinese economic miracle could not have happened without the
rules-based order the region has long supported. But, I've also
been loud and clear that we won't allow the shared domains to
be closed down unilaterally. So, we'll cooperate where we can,
but remain ready to confront where we must.
Now on to Russia. Russian operations and engagements
throughout the Indo-Pacific continue to rise, both to advance
their own strategic interests and to undermine ours. Russia
intends to impose additional costs on the United States
whenever and wherever possible by playing the role of spoiler,
especially with respect to North Korea. Russia also sees
economic opportunities to not only build markets for energy
exports, but also to build, or in some cases rebuild, arms
sales relationships in the region.
Of particular note are Russian efforts to build presence
and influence in the high north. Russia has more bases north of
the Arctic Circle than all other countries combined, and is
building more with distinctly military capabilities.
In the PACOM region, one event dominated the
counterterrorism fight in 2017, the siege by ISIS [Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria] of the Philippine city of Marawi and
the city's recapture by Philippine security forces. This was
symbolic of the largest struggle against violent extremism that
we saw in Iraq and Syria and Africa, and now see in South and
Southeast Asia. Marawi underscores two important themes with
regard to defeating ISIS in the Indo-Pacific. First, localized
threats can quickly transform into international causes. An
early and effective response is vital to control the fight and
own the narrative.
Second, counterterrorism operations are extremely
challenging, and most regional forces are poorly equipped for
such fights. Our engagement strategy and capacity-building
efforts have remained, and will continue to remain, focused on
enabling regional counterterrorism forces to win whatever
fights they face. Through multinational collaboration, we can
eliminate ISIS before it spreads further in the area.
Every day, our allies and partners join us in addressing
these global challenges to defend freedom, deter war, and
maintain the rules which underwrite a free and open Indo-
Pacific. These mutually beneficial alliances and partnerships
provide a durable asymmetric strategic advantage that no
competitor or rival can match.
In the Indo-Pacific, our alliance with Australia continues
to anchor peace and stability in the region with increased
collaboration in counterterrorism, space, cyber, integrated air
and missile defense, and regional capacity-building. Our
alliance with South Korea is ironclad, and our alliance with
Japan has never been stronger. The attack on Marawi City served
as a reminder of the value of our alliance to Philippine
security and stability, and we reinvigorated our alliance with
Thailand through continued engagement with military leadership
to promote regional security and healthy civil/military
relations. We've also advanced our partnerships with India,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, and many
others who are dedicated to the principles of longstanding
customary international law.
While United States interests in the Indo-Pacific are real
and enduring, the growing challenges to our interests are
equally real and cannot be overstated. In order to deter
conflict initiated by revisionist powers, rogue states, and
transnational threats, we must continue to develop, acquire,
and field advanced capabilities. Our evolving force posture
must decrease our vulnerabilities, increase our resilience, and
reassure our allies and partners. America's resolve is strong,
and it's imperative that we continue to show our commitment to
the region in the years to come.
I ask this committee to continue its support for these
future capabilities that maintain our edge and prevent would-be
challengers from gaining the upper hand. Based on your
bipartisan efforts last month, I'm excited about the path
ahead. Thank you for your enduring support to the PACOM team
and our families who live and work in the Indo-Pacific, a
region critical to America's future. I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Harris follows:]
Prepared Statement by Admiral Harry B. Harris Jr.
Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished members of
the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today. This is my third opportunity to present my posture assessment
since taking command of U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) in May 2015.
During my time at USPACOM, I have had the tremendous honor of leading
the soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen, coast guardsmen, and Department
of Defense civilians standing watch for the largest and most diverse
geographic command. These men and women, as well as their families,
fill me with pride with their hard work and devotion to duty. I'm
humbled to serve alongside them.
Since its inception in 1947, USPACOM and the joint military forces
assigned to it have served as a shield protecting the U.S., its
territories, its people, and its interests throughout the Indo-Pacific
region. To accomplish this, USPACOM works hand-in-hand with the other
U.S. Government agencies in this region to defend our Homeland and our
citizens. This is USPACOM's enduring responsibility and my #1 command
priority. To enhance our efforts, USPACOM works with our allies and
partners to improve stability in the region by promoting security
cooperation, deterring aggression, responding to contingencies, and,
when necessary, fighting to win. The path to security is based on our
commitments to mutual interest and partnership, continuous military
presence, and global readiness.
The United States has a lasting national interest in the Indo-
Pacific. As I stated last year, I believe America's security and
economic prosperity are indelibly linked to this critical region, which
remains at a precarious crossroad where tangible opportunity meets
significant challenge. Of the five principal challenges that drive
United States defense planning and budgeting--China, Russia, Democratic
People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), Iran, and violent extremist
organizations--four are found within the Indo-Pacific. To protect the
Homeland, the American people, and the American way of life, we must
target threats at their source and confront them before they ever reach
our borders or cause harm to our people. America cannot ignore these
challenges and should not allow any nation or treacherous non-state
actor to erode the rules-based security order that has yielded
tremendous benefits for our nation and this region for the last seven
decades.
Following the upheaval of World War II, the rules-based
international order--or what the 2018 National Defense Strategy
described as a free and open international order--flourished to keep
the Indo-Pacific largely peaceful, creating the stability necessary for
economic prosperity in the U.S. and countries throughout the region.
Ironically, the country that has benefitted the most from regional
stability is China. The collective respect for, and adherence to,
international law and standards have produced the longest era of peace
and prosperity in modern times. This was not happenstance. This was
made possible by seven decades of robust and persistent United States
military presence and credible combat power. America's security
treaties with Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), the
Philippines, and Thailand have buttressed this security order, which is
consequently strengthened even further by growing partnerships with
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Singapore, Sri
Lanka, and Vietnam. USPACOM recognizes the global significance of the
Indo-Pacific region and that strong and independent states are the best
hope for a peaceful world. Challenges are best met together; therefore,
America will remain an engaged and trusted ally and partner committed
to preserving the security, stability, and freedom necessary for
enduring prosperity.
A free and open order encompasses a number of critical principles:
the rule of law; adherence to international law and other international
standards; peaceful resolution of disputes; freedom of navigation for
all civilian and military vessels and aircraft; and open access to the
sea, air, space, and cyberspace domains. The outcomes of these
principles are enhanced security and open, legitimate trade.
Sustainable security requires effective and enduring institutions, both
civilian and military, that are guided by these principles. Defense,
diplomatic, and development efforts are intertwined and continue to
reinforce each other to promote stability to build and sustain stable
democratic states.
The Indian and Pacific Oceans are the economic lifeblood that links
the Indian Subcontinent, Australia, Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, and
Oceania with the United States Oceans that were once physical and
psychological barriers keeping nations apart are now maritime
superhighways that bring them together. Over half the global GDP comes
from the region (including the United States) and roughly one-third of
global shipping passes through the South China Sea. A quarter of United
States exports go to the region, and exports to China and India have
more than doubled over the past decade. This diverse region drives
global growth and is home to the world's largest economies (United
States, China, and Japan) and six of the world's fastest growing
economies (Cambodia, India, Laos, Burma, Nepal, and the Philippines).
Unimpeded lawful commerce, fair market economies, and free trade
promote American prosperity and security, leading to a strong economy
that protects the American people, supports our way of life, and
sustains American power.
The Indo-Pacific has the world's most populous democracy (India)
and the world's largest Muslim-majority state (Indonesia), both of
which we see as key United States partners in the region. The area is
home to more than half the world's population. Eleven of the 15 largest
militaries in the world are in or adjacent to the region, as are a
majority of the countries that possess nuclear weapons. These regional
characteristics merely reinforce the need for a strong and persistent
United States presence in the region to preserve peace through
strength. To be blunt, the stability of the Indo-Pacific matters to
America. The region needs a strong America, just as America needs a
vibrant, thriving Indo-Pacific that remains both politically and
economically free.
It is not just history that necessitates our continued presence in
the Indo-Pacific region; it is the future as well. The U.S. must
maintain credible combat power across the region in order to defend
against revisionist powers that seek to subvert democracy and undermine
a free and open international order. It is to our long-term benefit to
remain the region's security partner of choice by working closely with
our allies and partners who share our commitment to uphold peace,
economic prosperity, and security. We must not cede ground in this
endeavor.
What follows is USPACOM's strategic approach to the region, as
directed by the National Defense Strategy, including my assessment of
the regional security challenges, the key strategic opportunities, and
the capabilities necessary to preserve a free and open Indo-Pacific. I
will emphasize critical needs in order to seek your support for
budgetary and legislative action to improve our position and military
readiness in the theater. I will detail the value of U.S. strategic
force posture and forward presence, and describe how these
preconditions improve the readiness of our joint force to fight
tonight, while simultaneously enhancing our ability to reassure allies
and partners. Finally, I will discuss how USPACOM can advance U.S.
foreign policy by strengthening our existing alliances and cultivating
important partnerships, thereby yielding strategic benefits that
improve USPACOM's readiness to protect and defend U.S. interests.
overview
Regional security and stability are threatened by a range of rogue
and revisionist state and non-state actors who are challenging U.S.
influence and the free and open international order that has helped
underwrite peace and prosperity for America and throughout the region
for over 70 years. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has
rapidly advanced and improved its ballistic missile capability and its
nuclear weapons program. Sanctions, international condemnation, and
even increased pressure from China, to date, have not yet compelled the
DPRK to end their unlawful nuclear and ballistic missile programs.
While tensions in the East China Sea between China and Japan have
stabilized, China's provocative and destabilizing actions in the South
China Sea continue unabated. China's historically unprecedented
economic development has enabled an impressive military buildup that
could soon challenge the United States across almost all domains. Key
Chinese advancements include: significant improvements in missile
systems; 5th generation fighter aircraft capabilities; and increased
size and capability of the Chinese navy. A major initiative for that
growing navy is China's first-ever overseas base in Djibouti. I am also
deeply concerned about China's heavy investments into the next wave of
military technologies, including hypersonic missiles, advanced space
and cyber capabilities, and artificial intelligence--if the U.S. does
not keep pace, USPACOM will struggle to compete with the People's
Liberation Army (PLA) on future battlefields. China's ongoing military
modernization is a core element of China's stated strategy to supplant
the United States as the security partner of choice for countries in
the Indo-Pacific. Russia's interest and influence in the region
continues to increase through national outreach and military
modernization--in both its conventional forces and nuclear strike
capabilities. The threat of ISIS in the Indo-Pacific changed
drastically from inspiration and support to direct action as ISIS-
Philippines seized control of the city of Marawi in May. The Armed
Forces of the Philippines recaptured the city after a long fight and
scattered what was left of ISIS-Philippines, but the incident
highlights the dangerous and difficult problem transnational terrorism
presents to the region. Drug trafficking, human smuggling, piracy,
weapons proliferation, natural disasters--as well as illegal,
unreported, and unregulated fishing--further challenge regional peace
and prosperity.
The U.S. military remains the most powerful in the world, but our
relative advantage and ability to counter these threats have declined.
For USPACOM to continue to underpin U.S. diplomatic efforts and deter
future conflict against peer competitors, rogue states, and
transnational threats, the joint force must maintain a clear ability to
fight and win when called upon to do so.
strategic approach
The 2018 National Defense Strategy aims to Compete, Deter, and Win
alongside our allies and partners. In support of these aims, USPACOM
maintains a strategic approach to the region that encompasses four core
elements:
1) Maintain credible combat power and work with the Services and
Departments to build the right force of the future;
2) Maintain a network of like-minded allies and partners to
cultivate principled security networks which reinforce the free and
open international order;
3) Continue to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law
allows and encourage others to do the same. Be ready to counter the
coercive influence of regional competitors;
4) Counter transnational threat and challenges, including
terrorism and illegal/illicit trafficking, and be ready to respond to
natural disasters.
USPACOM recognizes the global significance of the Indo-Pacific and
understands that challenges are best through a unified approach. Thus,
USPACOM actions are guided by two unifying concepts: 1) communicate
effectively and truthfully; and 2) synchronize efforts outside of
USPACOM across the DOD, the interagency environment, and
internationally with like-minded allies and partners. Together, fully
aligned with our interagency, joint, and combined partners, USPACOM
will remain prepared to meet the following key challenges.
key challenges
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK): Last year I
testified that the DPRK was our most immediate threat, and since then
the level of that threat has increased significantly. The past year has
seen rapid and comprehensive improvement in the DPRK's ballistic
missile and nuclear capabilities, despite broad international
condemnation and the imposition of additional United Nations Security
Council sanctions. This includes the first-ever launches of two
different intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (ICBM) during three
separate ICBM tests and six launches of an intermediate-range ballistic
missile (IRBM). Pyongyang emphatically states its ICBMs are only
designed to target the United States and its IRBMs are only designed to
strike Guam. Two missile tests overflew sovereign Japanese territory,
needlessly endangering Japanese citizens. Several commercial aircraft
on standard flight routes also reported being close enough to see
missiles in the air during tests, underscoring the DPRK's reckless
research and development programs.
The DPRK still holds the distinction of being the only nation to
have tested nuclear weapons in the 21st Century, and the DPRK detonated
its sixth and largest nuclear device at its underground facility at
Punggye-ri in September 2017. Senior DPRK officials then threatened to
conduct an air burst of a nuclear warhead mated to one of its long-
range ballistic missiles. Although this has not happened, Pyongyang
could potentially do so to further demonstrate capability or to prove
that its design and technical functions work. The international
community has cautioned against doing so, and is certain to condemn
such an act if it occurs, but Kim Jong-un has demonstrated over and
over again his disdain for international norms, responsibilities, and
prudent conduct.
The combination of successful, or mostly successful, ballistic
missile tests and the most recent nuclear test have advanced the DPRK's
capabilities significantly. Following the 29 November 2017 Hwasong-15
ICBM test, Kim Jong-un declared with pride that they now have ``finally
realized the great historic cause of completing the state nuclear
force.'' While some in the U.S. might dispute both the reliability and
quantity of the North's strategic weapons, it is indisputable that Kim
is rapidly closing the gap between rhetoric and capability. Our two
close allies in Northeast Asia--the Republic of Korea and Japan--have
been living under the shadow of the DPRK's threats; now the shadow
looms over the American Homeland. USPACOM and the entire DOD fully
support the President's maximum pressure campaign, led by the State
Department. Nobody seeks or desires conflict with the DPRK, but the
United States and its allies must prepare for the full range of
military contingencies.
Beyond the unanimous adoption of United Nations Security Council
Resolutions (UNSCR) 2321, 2356, 2371, 2375, and 2397 in 2017, countries
around the world are diplomatically and financially isolating the DPRK.
In response to the efforts of Secretary Tillerson and other senior
administration officials, the international community has drastically
reduced trade with the DPRK, frozen assets, expelled overseas DPRK
workers, and more. China's actions are critical as China is the DPRK's
largest trading partner (approximately 92 percent of all trade). To
Beijing's credit, China has taken significant steps to enforce the
various UNSCRs, but Beijing can and should do more. I am also concerned
about Russia's limited contributions to the pressure campaign. While
Moscow voted in favor of the recent Security Council resolutions,
Russia has the capability to undermine the efforts of other countries,
thereby playing the role of a spoiler as the DPRK approaches a full
ICBM capability. Overall, the pressure campaign does appear to be
affecting Pyongyang's calculus, but Kim Jong-un continues to channel
his reduced resources to weapons programs and high profile ``morale''
projects that benefit only the elites, leaving the DPRK's citizens to
suffer.
The DPRK's grossly oversized conventional forces provide the regime
additional coercive options. Pyongyang's active military force of
almost 1.2 million is the fourth largest in the world, though the
DPRK's population (approximately 24.5 million) ranks as only the 52nd
largest worldwide. By contrast, the 53rd most populous country,
Australia, fields an active force of under 60,000. The DPRK People's
Army boasts a substantial inventory of long-range rockets, artillery,
and close-range ballistic missiles aimed across the Demilitarized Zone
at the Republic of Korea and United States forces stationed there. Many
of these systems are capable of delivering chemical and biological
weapons. The DPRK's well-trained, highly disciplined special operations
forces are another asymmetric option for Kim Jong-un. Additionally, the
DPRK is arming its navy with longer-range anti-ship missiles and is
continuing to work on a submarine-launched ballistic missile
capability.
I said last year that it was critical that the United States
maintain a strong sense of resolve in order to bring Kim Jong-un to his
senses, not his knees. That is even more true today.
China: The People's Liberation Army's (PLA) rapid evolution into a
modern, high-tech fighting force continues to be both impressive and
concerning. PLA capabilities are progressing faster than any other
nation in the world, benefitting from robust resourcing and
prioritization. During the 19th Party Congress in October 2017, Chinese
Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping promised military
development would remain a national priority, pledging to complete
modernization by 2035 and to achieve ``world class'' status by 2049. On
the current trajectory, USPACOM assesses the PLA will likely attain
these goals well ahead of the projected completion dates.
In the past year, PLA forces have become more expeditionary and
more integrated. The reorganization that created geographically-focused
Theater Commands is now 2 years old and the PLA is exhibiting a rapid
maturation of processes and structures. As tensions on the Korean
Peninsula increased, Chinese and regional press began highlighting
exercises and preparations underway in the Northern Theater--the
command responsible for Korean contingencies. Similarly, there was a
variety of activities in the Western Command this past summer and fall
during the standoff between Chinese and Indian forces at Doka La. While
we assess the PLA will still face a number of challenges moving
forward, the PLA has clearly embraced the need for increased joint
interoperability.
Perhaps nowhere is the PLA making more dramatic progress than in
ballistic missiles. While the PLA is rapidly expanding the number,
type, and sophistication of all of its missiles, China has made the
most progress in intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM)
technology, with IRBMs now constituting approximately 95 percent of the
PLA's overall missile force. Chinese media routinely trumpets missile
developments, carefully noting their missiles do not target any
specific country. However, a simple comparison of missile ranges with
geography suggests where Chinese missiles would most likely be
targeted--SRBMs against Taiwan and United States carrier strike groups
operating at sea, IRBMs against United States bases in Japan and Guam,
and ICBMs against the continental United States. China's pursuit of
advanced hypersonic missile technologies portends even greater
challenges over the next few years.
The PLA Navy (PLAN) is in the midst of a massive shipbuilding
program. If this program continues, China will surpass Russia as the
world's second largest Navy by 2020, when measured in terms of
submarines and frigate-class ships or larger. The first Type 055
(Renhai) guided missile cruiser was launched in June 2017--the lead
unit in a class of advanced multi-warfare ships that we expect will
enter operational service next year. At least four more of these ships
are under construction. Six Type 052 (Luyang III) Guided Missile
Destroyers are operational, with another seven being built or fitted
out. Amphibious capabilities are also growing. Four of an expected six
Type 071 (Yuzhou) Amphibious Transport Docks have joined the fleet in
the past decade, and the first Type 075 Landing Helicopter Dock is
under construction. In October 2017 China launched the lead ship in the
Type 901 Fast Combat Support Ship class, the first logistics ship
specifically designed to support China's aircraft carrier(s); the
second PLAN carrier is in the water at Dalian and progressing toward
sea trials. New submarines under construction include five more Type
039A (Yuan) and four more Type 093 (Shang) Nuclear Attack Submarines.
All of these ships boast improved communications suites and defensive
systems, as well as more lethal and longer-range weapons.
The advances shown in the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and Naval Air Force
(PLANAF) are less focused on new aircraft--though there are several
noteworthy developments. Air and air-defense progress has been most
evident in the increasing sophistication of operational training. When
Chinese bombers began flying simulated strike profiles in the
Philippine Sea, Sea of Japan, and South China Sea a few years ago, the
exercises were very basic events. Now we see fighter escorts and
supporting packages of other specialized aircraft, including aerial
refuelers. Major training events are increasingly incorporating
professional opposing forces, evaluators, and instrumentation to better
challenge and assess capabilities. The J20 multi-role fighter program
is progressing from development and prototypes into operational use.
The J31 program appears to be advancing less quickly, but the two
programs suggest a near-term capability for China to field 5th
generation fighters within the next few years. At least two new heavy-
lift transports (Y-20) are the leading edge of a fleet that will help
the PLA overcome a long-standing inability to move troops and equipment
anywhere in China or across the world. New and/or upgraded bombers,
electronic warfare, command and control, and anti-submarine aircraft
all expand PLA abilities to conduct a wide range of operations.
PLA ground forces are still in the midst of a force-wide
reorganization as the PLA Army (PLAA) moves from divisions to combined
arms brigades as its basic combat formation. These more flexible,
integrated formations will give the PLAA the ability to respond more
precisely to a wider variety of contingencies. Forces are training in
unfamiliar locations, under challenging environmental conditions, and
with increased realism in an attempt to gain proficiency across a range
of circumstances. The expansion of the PLAN-Marines continues as well,
as the force has grown from two brigades to possibly eight, with two
brigades each allocated to most of the Theater Commands. A contingent
of PLAN-Marines continues to garrison the PLA's first overseas base in
Djibouti, having arrived late last summer.
Following its establishment at the close of 2015, the PLA Strategic
Support Force (PLASSF) has quickly matured to better manage and employ
the PLA's impressive array of cyber, space, and other specialized
capabilities. The PLASSF consolidates and employs specialized
capabilities that could degrade or deny other countries the use of
space, the electromagnetic spectrum, communications systems, and data
networks. This joint organization reflects the PLA's emphasis on
winning ``system versus system'' conflicts.
To operationalize these new and expanded capabilities, Chinese
forces--especially the PLAN--are operating in more locations, more
often, leading to greater degrees of proficiency. The PLAN's counter-
piracy deployment to the Gulf of Aden is now in its ninth year, and has
provided invaluable experience to many of the PLAN's surface ships and
crews. Chinese submarines have deployed to the Indian Ocean seven times
in the past 4 years, and Chinese ships have conducted dozens of port
visits across Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. This does not
mean the PLAN has become a global navy, but its presence and influence
are expanding. Much of this activity is linked to China's ambitious
Belt and Road Initiative, which is meant to increase China's global
influence through a China-centered trading network. The majority of
this activity was expected, and is consistent with the actions of a
rising power, but some activities and China's lack of openness about
its plans are reasons for concern. When the base in Djibouti opened
last year, the base was touted as a logistics outpost; yet within the
base's first few months of operation, PLAN-Marines held several live
fire drills involving armored combat vehicles and artillery. This
suggests the base also functions as a forward deployed location for
expeditionary capabilities, rather than as simply a logistics hub.
Recent efforts to introduce clarifying legislation--in the form of
the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA, aka
``CFIUS 2.0'')--seek to improve the national security focus of the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) and will
help focus the lens on activities conducted by the Chinese. The
economic stimulus of Chinese investment in the United States and across
the Indo-Pacific region, including real estate transactions in the
vicinity of military installations, threatens to undermine our national
security objectives and those of our allies and partners. I am fully
supportive of these efforts, and believe we must view Chinese
investment holistically to best understand Beijing's overall intent.
Territorial Disputes and Maritime Claims: Overlapping and
competing territorial and maritime claims remain a source of friction
in the region. I am most concerned about China's ongoing actions in the
South China Sea. In 2017, China took significant steps to further
militarize its bases on disputed features.
South China Sea: The United States takes no position on competing
sovereignty claims to naturally formed islands in the South China Sea,
but we do strongly call on all countries to ensure their claims and
activities are consistent with international law. Specific to maritime
claims and activities, countries should adhere to the law of the sea as
reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
The most significant territorial disputes in the South China Sea
include: 1) the Paracel Islands, between China, Taiwan, and Vietnam; 2)
Scarborough Reef, between China, Taiwan, and the Philippines; and 3)
the Spratly Islands, where China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia,
and the Philippines each claim sovereignty over some or all of the land
features. It is the last one that has drawn much of the attention in
recent years. On September 25, 2015, Chinese Communist Party General
Secretary Xi Jinping stated in a Rose Garden ceremony that China did
not intend to militarize its outposts on the Spratly Islands. The plain
fact is that China has built a number of clear military facilities and
capabilities on all of their seven outposts, and China continues to
build more.
It is important to note that there are no military aircraft, air
defense missile launchers, or anti-ship missile systems currently
deployed to any of China's Spratly Island outposts. The only weapons
present now are short-range defensive systems appropriate for close
defense of the outposts. However, China has built a massive
infrastructure specifically--and solely--to support advanced military
capabilities that can deploy to the bases on short notice. The United
States should assume Beijing plans to use these facilities for their
clearly intended purposes at some point in the future. The Chinese also
built the same sets of structures on each of its three largest outposts
in the Spratly Islands (at Fiery Cross Reef, Mischief Reef, and Subi
Reef), including:
10,000 foot runways capable of launching and recovering
all military aircraft
Fighter aircraft hangars
Large aircraft hangars, capable of supporting larger
aircraft such as bombers, AWACS, and transports
Protected air defense launcher sheds
Protected anti-ship missile launcher sheds
Water and fuel storage tanks farms
Ammunition storage facilities
Barracks, communications systems, deep water pier
facilities, military radars
These bases appear to be forward military outposts, built for the
military, garrisoned by military forces, and designed to project
Chinese military power and capability across the breadth of China's
disputed South China Sea claims. China's explanation that Beijing was
``forced'' to deploy these capabilities in ``response'' to an
``increased'' United States presence--especially Freedom of Navigation
Operations (FONOPS)--is disingenuous. The United States Navy has been
navigating and operating in the South China Sea, and has been
peacefully exercising freedom of navigation operations all over the
world, for decades. On the other hand, China only recently began island
reclamation earlier this decade. The overall design and execution of
the projects strongly suggests a master plan was in place from the
start. In July 2016, an Arbitral Tribunal under the Law of the Sea
Convention issued its ruling in favor of the Philippines' South China
Sea claims. Even though the Arbitral Tribunal is binding on both China
and the Philippines, China has yet to abide by the ruling. The
Philippines, preoccupied with the counter-terrorism fight on Mindanao
and desirous of stable relations with China, has not pressed the issue
since China is ``allowing'' Filipino fishermen some access to
Scarborough.
Across the South China Sea, China's air force, navy, coast guard,
and maritime militia all maintain a robust presence. Routine patrols
and exercises ensure Chinese forces are in and around all the features,
not just the ones they occupy. China routinely challenges the presence
of non-Chinese forces, including other claimant nations and especially
the United States, often overstating its authority and insisting
foreign forces either stay away or obtain Chinese permission to
operate.
Since 1979, the U.S. Freedom of Navigation program has peacefully
challenged excessive maritime claims by coastal states all around the
world, including those of our friends and allies. This program consists
of diplomatic communications and operational assertions, which are not
provocative and are not a threat to any country. These operations are
conducted globally to maintain open seas and skies, which underpins
economic prosperity for the U.S. and all countries.
East China Sea: Tensions between Japan and China over the Senkaku
Islands have largely stabilized since last year, but there is no long-
term resolution in sight. With substantive military and coast guard
assets in the area from both countries, the situation could easily lead
to miscommunication, miscalculation, and escalation. China persistently
challenges Japan's administration over the islands by sailing Coast
Guard ships near the Senkaku Islands and protesting Japanese
reconnaissance flights. Chinese exercises prominently feature military
actions focused on the Senkaku Islands, including exercises training
for a possible future physical occupation of the islands and
establishment of a maritime blockade to isolate the disputed areas.
Clearly describing Beijing's intent to the United States and Japan,
Chinese media prominently features stories that highlight those
specific capabilities and actions. America's policy is clear and has
not wavered: the Senkaku Islands are under the administration of Japan
and, as such, are covered by article 5 of the United States-Japan
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. The United States opposes
any unilateral action that seeks to undermine Japan's administration of
these islands.
Russia: Russian operations and engagement throughout the Indo-
Pacific continue to rise, both to advance their own strategic interests
and to undermine United States interests. Russia intends to impose
additional costs on the United States whenever and wherever possible by
playing the role of a spoiler, especially with respect to the DPRK.
Additionally, Moscow seeks to alleviate some of the effects of
sanctions imposed following their aggression in Ukraine by
diplomatically wooing select states in Asia. Russia also sees economic
opportunities to not only build markets for energy exports, but also to
build--or in some cases rebuild--arms sales relationships in the
region.
Russia's strategic nuclear forces are modernizing and routinely
practice nuclear strikes against the United States Homeland. The
Russian Pacific Fleet's two Borey (Dolgorukiy-class) nuclear ballistic
missile submarines (SSBN) have been integrated into operations since
their arrival in 2015 and 2016, augmenting older Delta III SSBNs and
substantially bolstering Russia's modern nuclear strike capabilities.
Tu-95 Bear bombers fly off the coasts of Canada, Alaska, and
occasionally the northwest part of the continental United States in
profiles designed to train their crews and assess United States and
Canadian responses. Additionally Russia uses its long-range aviation
forces for strategic messaging on other issues, for example, flying
around Japan or off the Korean Peninsula. Most recently, a pair of Tu-
95s deployed to eastern Indonesia, passing by Guam during their
transits each way. Land-based nuclear missile forces similarly exercise
and test-fire missiles oriented toward North America.
Russian naval modernization is making their Pacific Fleet more
capable and more lethal. The fleet is expected to receive as many as 10
new ships in 2018, including several combatants. The first
Steregushchy-class guided missile corvette was commissioned in January
2017 with two more expected to arrive this year. This ship class is
equipped with the advanced Kalibre missile system, a multi-functional
weapons array that can fire a variety of long-range anti-ship and land
attack missiles. The first of six modernized Project 636.3 (Kilo)
nuclear attack submarines is scheduled to arrive in late 2018 (though
it could slip into 2019), with all six in the fleet by 2021. The
Russian Pacific Fleet's five Project 949A (Oscar II) nuclear-powered
guided missile submarines are being upgraded to incorporate the Kalibre
system as well. This will make these submarines, whose wartime missions
include attacking aircraft carriers and other priority land and sea
targets, much more lethal.
Ground and air modernization efforts continue as well, including
state-of-the-art Bastion coastal defense cruise missiles, S-400
strategic air defense missiles, and new/upgraded helicopters and
fighters. In 2017, Russian troops and warships held several combined
training events with China and hosted India for their first tri-service
bilateral exercise.
Of particular note are Russian efforts to build presence and
influence in the high north. Russia has more bases north of the Arctic
Circle than all other countries combined, and is building more with
distinctly military capabilities.
ISIS/Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs): One event dominated
the counter-terrorism fight in the USPACOM AOR in 2017: the siege by
ISIS in the Philippines (ISIS-P) and recapture by government forces of
the Philippine city of Marawi. The crisis began in May 2017, following
a failed operation by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to
capture the leader of an ISIS-pledged group. A range of extremist
actors, motivated by ideology, financial reward, clan ties, adventure,
or other reasons descended upon Marawi, where they found a historically
marginalized, predominantly Muslim population. ISIS-P became a focus
for global ISIS media publications and statements, many of which
encouraged additional supporters to flock to Marawi. A few tried, not
many made it. USPACOM--with Special Operations Command, Pacific
(SOCPAC) in the lead--provided counter-terrorism support and assistance
to the AFP, enabling the Philippine Security Forces to disrupt ISIS-P
activities in the southern Philippines. After a protracted fight, the
AFP recaptured the city and killed or drove out what was left of ISIS-
P. According to the AFP, 962 ISIS-P, 165 AFP, and 47 civilians were
killed during the siege and recapture.
Marawi underscores several important themes with regard to
defeating ISIS in the Indo-Pacific. First, localized threats can
quickly transform into international causes. Prior to Marawi, few, if
any, ISIS leaders or media coordinators had ever heard of the location
or key actors involved. Within weeks, Marawi was the cover story on
ISIS' flagship media product. An early and effective response is vital
to control the fight and own the narrative. Second, despite such media
attention and calls for support, few extremists from within the region
responded, and even fewer came from outside the AOR. This underscores
our assessments that most issues in the Indo-Pacific are ``local'' and
the desire and ability to join someone else's fight are limited. Third,
counter-terrorism operations are extremely challenging, and most
regional forces are poorly equipped for such fights. Our engagement
strategy and capacity-building efforts have remained--and will continue
to remain--focused on enabling regional counter-terrorism (CT) forces
to win whatever fights they face.
USPACOM remains concerned about the potential for ISIS ideology to
inspire terrorism in the Indo-Pacific, but cautiously notes that the
number of successful attacks dropped significantly during the past
year. The decline could be the result of an increased CT focus by
governments across the region, as well as more effective efforts by
host nation intelligence and security services--Indonesia, Malaysia and
Bangladesh are among the places where authorities have successfully
disrupted plots. The decline might also be due to the diminished
stature of ISIS and its ideology following losses in Iraq and Syria.
However, the region is still fertile for radicals and extremists
looking to affiliate with the ISIS brand.
Multinational partnerships represent the best method of countering
VEOs across the region. USPACOM is engaging Malaysia, Indonesia, the
Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand to degrade and defeat ISIS and
other VEO threats. Many Indo-Pacific countries such as Australia, New
Zealand, and Singapore have joined the coalition dedicated to ISIS'
complete destruction. Through multinational collaboration, like-minded
nations can eliminate ISIS before it spreads further in the USPACOM
area of responsibility.
Countering violent extremism in the Indo-Pacific requires close
collaboration with U.S. Government interagency partners, such as the
Department of State, the Department of Treasury, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), USAID, and the other agencies from the U.S.
intelligence community. Through an interagency network reinforced by
liaison officers embedded in USPACOM headquarters and Special
Operations Command (SOCOM), we are able to leverage tools from across
our Government to fight terrorism and counter violent extremism.
Transnational Crime:
From finished opioids to industrial chemicals that support
production of other illegal drugs, the Indo-Pacific is a key player the
global supply chain for the illegal drug market. Transnational criminal
organizations, operating across borders and across the globe, are
responsible for the vast majority of the illicit activities that spill
drugs and related violence into American communities. Characteristics
of these threat organizations continue to evolve. They use technology
as an enabler to further disperse and decentralize their organizations,
thereby making effective targeting of these threats more challenging.
The opportunistic nature of drug trafficking organizations enables them
to stay ahead of law enforcement.
At the same time countries in the Indo-Pacific are wrestling with
growing internal drug consumption challenges. In the Philippines, the
scourge of drug use has had multiple destabilizing effects, at the
family-level, community-level, and the national level, as President
Duterte's efforts to address the problems have created relationship
challenges with the United States and others. Amphetamine Type
Stimulant (ATS) use continues to grow throughout East and Southeast
Asia, while heroin demand remains steady. Consistently high prices for
cocaine in Australia and New Zealand support a small but extremely
lucrative trade for Western Hemisphere drug traffickers.
Across the Pacific Island Nations, expanding ATS usage, concurrent
with expanding crime and corruption, aptly demonstrates the symbiotic
relationship between drugs and these corrosive effects. United States
territories such as Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas
Islands (CNMI) face these same challenges.
Many of the drug trafficking challenges on America's southwest
border start with the precursor chemicals that are sold through licit
commerce, predominantly from China, and to a lesser extent, India.
Criminal entities with ties to Mexican and South American drug cartels
use these licit chemicals to produce methamphetamine, cocaine, and
heroin.
Another drug, fentanyl-laced heroin, has been responsible for a
spike in United States overdose deaths. Fentanyl, and its numerous
analogs, originate almost exclusively from China. To combat these
threats, the United States Government works closely with the government
of the People's Republic of China in a Joint Liaison Group (JLG) on Law
Enforcement Cooperation led by the Department of Justice.
Cyber: The importance of cyberspace is growing rapidly as the
world becomes increasingly interconnected and networked. National power
and security depend on the ability to operate securely in and through
cyberspace. The two most capable cyber actors worldwide are Russia and
China. Both of these countries have incorporated cyber into their joint
warfighting doctrine and routinely exercise these capabilities
alongside more traditional elements as a force multiplier. In fact,
China values cyber so highly it created the Strategic Support Force to
integrate and synchronize cyber operations. Meanwhile, a provocative
DPRK continues to employ cyber operations against its adversaries. Last
May, the DPRK deployed the WannaCry ransomware attack, affecting over
300,000 computers in 150 countries. As regional interaction becomes
increasingly dependent on cyber activity, these threats to cyberspace
will become more concerning.
Proliferation: The Indo-Pacific has the busiest air and maritime
ports in the world. Technological advances have outpaced many
countries' ability to effectively manage export controls to counter the
proliferation of component technology. Trade includes dual-use
technology, such as commercial items controlled by the nuclear,
ballistic missile, and chemical/biological weapons control regimes,
including manufactured or re-exported materials from other countries
with limited export control enforcement. USPACOM's Countering Weapons
of Mass Destruction (C-WMD) community supports Special Operations
Command (SOCOM) global counter-proliferation strategy by addressing
regional concerns through key leader engagements, combined and joint
exercises, and international security exchanges focused on counter-
proliferation activities. Since 2014, an enduring Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI) Asia-Pacific Exercise Rotation (APER) is held
annually between PSI Operational Experts Group (OEG) states in the
USPACOM AOR. The United States, New Zealand, Singapore, Australia,
Japan, and Republic of Korea rotate hosting the PSI exercises. This
year, Japan is hosting the PSI APER followed by the Republic of Korea
next year.
Natural Disasters: The Indo-Pacific region continues to remain the
most disaster-prone region in the world. About 75 percent of the
Earth's volcanoes and 90 percent of earthquakes occur in the ``Ring of
Fire'' surrounding the Pacific Basin. According to a 2015 UN report,
disasters over the last ten years took the lives of a half a million
people in the region, with over 1.5 billon people affected, and damages
greater than 500 billion dollars.
While disaster response is not a primary focus for USPACOM, a key
element of USPACOM's Theater Campaign Plan (TCP) is building capacity
with allies and partners to improve their resiliency and capability to
conduct humanitarian assistance/disaster response (HA/DR). HA/DR
cooperation is also an effective means to deepen and strengthen
relationships. USPACOM's Center for Excellence in Disaster Management
(CFE-DM) serves as a regional authority on best practices for HA/DR and
helps prepare regional governments for HA/DR events. Our service
components are prepositioning HA/DR stocks to facilitate timely
response and to build access in the region. When possible, U.S.
military forces assist with their unique capabilities in the areas of
air and sealift, infrastructure restoration, and emergency medical
support. As just two examples, in 2016, USS Sampson (DDG 102) and
Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft assisted New Zealand in its
response to an earthquake on its South Island; and in 2017, USS Lake
Erie (CG 70) supported Sri Lanka during flooding from a tropical
cyclone and the rainy season.
Workforce Challenges for Military Realignments in the Pacific: I
appreciate Congress' efforts in the fiscal year 2018 NDAA to provide
much-needed relief for DOD on the problem of construction worker
shortages in Guam and Commonwealth of Northern Marianas Islands (CNMI).
By extending the authority to grant H2B visas from 2018 to 2023 for
military construction (MILCON) projects, Congress will help alleviate
labor shortages in these areas that would otherwise drive cost
increases and delays in key MILCON projects that support the
realignment of U.S. forces in the region. However, the same labor
shortages that threaten MILCON also threaten much needed civilian
construction for these communities. Unless directly supporting a MILCON
project, civilian construction efforts will not receive the same relief
from H2B Visas. In addition to slowing the economic growth of Guam and
CNMI, the insufficient number of workers is causing friction between
the military and civilian communities. The local communities perceive
that the U.S. has favored military construction at the expense of
civilian construction.
Budget Uncertainty: Fiscal uncertainty breeds a significant risk
to USPACOM's strategic priorities. The Budget Control Act and yearly
continuing resolutions (CR) interrupt USPACOM's ability to work with
the Services, Unified Commands, and Sub-Unified Commands to effectively
plan for the long-term mission. According to the Government
Accountability Office's (GAO) September 2017 report, ``Budget
Uncertainty and Disruptions Affect Timing of Agency Spending,'' we have
had approximately 101 CR extensions between 1999 and 2017. This year
added five more CR extensions. Under these conditions of perpetual
uncertainty, we cannot efficiently and effectively plan and prepare our
forces to meet today's challenges. This is no truer than in the Indo-
Pacific.
Five years ago, sequestration cut almost every defense program
equally. As a result, readiness and operational capability have
suffered. While the recent tragedies in the Western Pacific involving
surface combatants assigned to USPACOM were the direct result of gross
negligence by the ships' crews, multiple reports cited additional
contributing factors. Both the Secretary of the Navy's Strategic
Readiness Review and U.S. Fleet Forces Command's Comprehensive Review
identified the ``imbalance'' in surface combatant capacity and
operational requirements. In fact, the Comprehensive Review noted that,
``Under the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011 and extended Continuing
Resolutions, the ability to supply forces to the full demand is--and
will remain--limited.'' Additionally, the Strategic Readiness Review
stated that, ``the lean fiscal environment, worsened by the BCA,
coupled with a high operational demand for forces and reduced fleet
levels, challenged the Navy even more, placing a heavy strain on the
service. Coincidentally, as the BCA further constrained the fleet, it
became clear that China was emerging as a peer Navy competitor.''
The lean fiscal environment, coupled with a high operational demand
for forces and reduced fleet levels, challenged the Navy even more and
placed a heavy strain on the service. As the 2011 BCA further
constrained the fleet, it became clear that China was emerging as a
peer Navy competitor. China's adoption of advanced technology, its
increasingly dispersed operations, and its doctrinal writings make
clear that it aspires to a more robust regional capacity and global
reach. Our peer competitors like China and Russia are quickly closing
the technological gap. I need weapons systems of increased lethality
that go faster and further, are networked, are more survivable, and
affordable. If USPACOM has to fight tonight, I don't want it to be a
fair fight. If it's a knife fight, I want to bring a gun. If it's a gun
fight, I want to bring in the artillery, and the artillery of all of
our allies. I have said during my last two appearances before this
Committee, that sequestration could reduce us to wielding a butter
knife in this fight. This is unacceptable. We must not let that happen.
In order to deter potential adversaries in the Indo-Pacific, we must
build a more lethal force by investing in critical capabilities and
harnessing innovation. We must develop a lethal, agile, and resilient
force posture that decreases our vulnerabilities. The force posture
must also reassure our allies and partners and encourage them to be
full and cooperative partners in their own defense and the defense of
the free and open international order.
Overall, I am grateful to Congress for the recent agreement on the
DOD-budget caps for the next two years. The positive actions you took
last week will help the DOD and USPACOM address many of the issues
above, and I'm optimistic that the DOD is approaching an era of fiscal
certainty. Over the long-term, fiscal certainty will allow us to build
and train a force that is best postured to overcome the external
challenges that we face in the Indo-Pacific.
critical capabilities
The most technological, high-end military challenges America faces
in the region continue to grow. While forward presence, alliances, and
partnerships address these challenges, USPACOM requires our most
technologically advanced warfighting capabilities to fully meet them.
The critical capabilities in this section demand our attention and
treasure. We must preserve our asymmetric advantages in undersea and
anti-submarine warfare, and we must strengthen our abilities to counter
strategies designed to limit our freedom of action.
China has developed and fielded capability and capacity to
challenge our regional maritime dominance. I need increased lethality,
specifically ships and aircraft equipped with faster and more
survivable weapons systems. Longer range offensive weapons on every
platform are an imperative. We must also network this force and take
advantage of man-machine teaming to improve our responsiveness.
Pacing the threats we face in the region is not an option in my
playbook. We must work hard and invest the money to outpace the
competition by developing and deploying the latest technology to
USPACOM. Examples include: Navy Integrated Fires and the AEGIS Flight
III destroyer and its new Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR);
rotational deployment of Air Force and Marine Corps 5th generation
fighters; and new systems capable of defending our vulnerable bases
from the full spectrum of current and emerging threats (e.g.,
hypersonic missiles and armed unmanned aerial systems). These tools are
essential in today's complex operating environment.
Munitions, Fuels, and Logistics Networks: Critical munitions
shortfalls continue to be my top warfighting concern. Shortages in our
munition inventories pose a significant threat to our combat readiness
and exacerbate the effects of the peer competitors who continue to
modernize their weapon systems and expand their inventories. It is
critical that we retain our capability to operate in contested
environments, which requires dedicated investment in the industrial
base and the development of new concepts and technologies.
Additionally, we must continue to expand Intermediate Nuclear Force
Treaty-compliant theater strike capabilities to effectively counter
adversary Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) capabilities and force
preservation tactics.
My priorities include multi-domain kinetic/lethal strike
capabilities, including hypersonic, long-range strike, air-to-air
missile, long-range precision fires, maritime strike, and integrated
air and missile defense. Additional requirements include the command
and control (C2) and integration of long-range, high-speed, lethal,
survivable, and precision munitions capabilities in ships, submarines,
patrol craft, land-based formations, bombers, and fighters. With
respect to ship-to-ship and air-to-ship munitions that allow us to
defeat an aggressor from greater range, we are pursuing capabilities
similar to Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) and Joint Air-to-
Surface Standoff Missile--Extended Range (JASSM-ER). In the air-to-air
realm, I continue to seek advancements in munitions that will provide
us an advantage in a denied environment, such as the AIM-120D and AIM-
9X air superiority missiles. We must continue to modernize and improve
our torpedo and naval mine capabilities to maintain our undersea
advantage. I appreciate Congress' efforts to address LRASM, JASSM, air-
to-air missiles, and undersea warfare capabilities in the fiscal year
2018 NDAA. Continued improvements in the capability and capacity of
ballistic/cruise missile defense interceptors will further enhance
Homeland defense capabilities and protect key regional nodes from
aggressive action. In support of the Korean Peninsula, the new policy
on cluster munitions, signed 30 November 2017, helps to alleviate the
capability gap created by the previous policy. However, I support
efforts to acquire a replacement for cluster munitions--we need an area
effects munition now.
As new inventory becomes available, storage capacity will become
critical. As an example, we are beginning to see the storage capacity
limitations play out as Services reposition munitions on the Korean
Peninsula. Admittedly, this is a nice problem to have. Beyond the
capacity challenges posed, our current, legacy storage locations are
inadequate to store specific types of modernized munitions and meet the
requirements of fiscal year 2021 Department of Defense Explosive Safety
Standards. We are currently operating on waivers in many areas and
assuming risk to meet mission requirements.
Fuel is the lifeblood of operations, and without resilient resupply
capability, our operational effectiveness is severely degraded. Crucial
to our ability to operate in increasingly contested and austere
locations is the velocity of fuels support from source of supply to the
point of use. Strategic positioning is a key pillar of our logistics
posture. Ensuring we have the right fuel, in the right amount, at the
right location, at the right time, is vital to USPACOM's ability to
project power throughout the Indo-Pacific under combat conditions.
USPACOM is closely integrated with the Defense Logistics Agency and the
Services, and I am encouraged by the progress being made. In fiscal
year 2018, investments are planned to increase fuels supply/operations
infrastructure, storage, and resiliency in Guam, Japan, and Australia.
I remain committed to building the capacity of our prepositioned war
reserve stocks of fuel, including resiliency of the facilities,
infrastructure, and distribution capabilities on which these stocks
depend.
USPACOM's ability to project power is underpinned by strong airlift
capabilities. Unfortunately, budget instability and ongoing continuing
resolutions have driven inflexibility into these critical areas while
the global strategic environment requires increased flexibility. In
today's global competition for airlift, increased demand and limited
resources hinder the joint force's ability to promptly achieve
operational objectives. In war, this shortfall will result in greater
loss of life, increased risk to USPACOM forces, and increased risk to
our nation's credibility with partners and allies.
Strategic sealift assets play a significant role in PACOM's
success. Whether during a contingency or during peacetime, the ability
to deliver forces and sustain them with timely equipment, critical
logistics, and service support is essential. Our adversaries continue
to strengthen their capabilities, while many of our assets and
platforms are approaching the end of their service life, resulting in
shortfalls which reduce our ability to maintain sea supremacy. In order
to adequately support current operations and prepare for future
warfighter requirements, it is crucial that we increase investment in
strategic sealift assets.
As the Indo-Pacific region becomes more connected to other regions
and more influential, we must be prepared to anticipate the need for
key enablers that will ensure our influence in the region remains
strong. Preparedness is underwritten by logistics and sustainment
capability, capacity, resiliency, and agility. Our logistics capability
is one of the U.S. military's key asymmetric advantages around the
world. Unfortunately, due to budgetary pressures and decades of global
engagement, our logistics systems and infrastructure are struggling to
support the full range of military operations in the Indo-Pacific
region. No one aspect of our logistics system is broken; but when
examined as a ``system of systems,'' executed by logisticians,
engineers, and medical experts, the overall logistics enterprise has
become more vulnerable, or brittle, because the system has fewer
redundancies. More specifically, risk against each key functional area
in our logistics system has risen over the last decade. The slow
erosion of our logistics system has been manifested in manpower cuts to
key areas like maintenance manning or the consolidation of our
engineers in the Pacific. Each service has made difficult choices -
balancing modernization with recapitalization and sustainment. Smaller
munitions inventories mean the overall logistics enterprise must make
up for that limitation by better, faster distribution processes to get
the right munition to the right place at the right time to support
operations. Additionally, the Services have consolidated and
centralized important wartime materiel to better set the globe or have
consolidated and reduced logistics staffs. Those changes have
exacerbated the challenges associated with PACOM's ``tyranny of
distance.'' The time consumed by logistically supporting operations
from greater distances reduces my decision space in a very dynamic and
fast paced crisis or contingency.
Taken collectively, the complex problem of getting the right stuff
to the right place at the right time in a contested environment is a
vexing problem made worse by the slow erosion of capability, capacity,
and agility. That reality requires that we make faster, more accurate
logistics decisions to support operations. The Indo-Asia-Pacific
Stability Initiative (IAPSI) is the single most important initiative
that can reverse a dangerous trend toward an inevitably brittle Joint
Logistics Enterprise in the Pacific, and I'm thankful for Congress'
efforts to fund IAPSI. Our logistics systems, infrastructure, key
supplies, and processes are in need of replenishment with new
equipment, better infrastructure, additional trained professionals, and
innovative logistics concepts to better prepare USPACOM for peer-level
competition and large scale crises.
Air Superiority: For the last several decades the U.S. has enjoyed
unmatched air superiority. The preponderance of aircraft ensuring this
permissive air-domain has been 4th generation fighters and air-battle-
management platforms, which have benefitted from a technology gap over
any potential rival. Our potential adversaries, however, are rapidly
closing this gap as both Russia and China have fielded their own
versions of 5th generation fighters which threaten our ability to gain
air superiority at a time and place of our choosing. In order to deter
and defeat potential adversaries in the Indo-Pacific region, we must
have the capability to quickly gain and maintain air superiority long
enough to complete critical missions. The U.S. is now beginning to
field 5th generation platforms in the Pacific; however, our legacy 4th
generation platforms will be in our inventory for years to come, and we
must be prepared to address future threats. While we continue to invest
in 5th generation platforms, we must also find innovative ways to make
our 4th generation aircraft and air-battle-management platforms more
capable.
Undersea Warfare: USPACOM must maintain its asymmetric advantage
in undersea warfare capability including our attack submarines, their
munitions, and other anti-submarine warfare systems like the P-8
Poseidon and ship-borne systems. Roughly 230 of the world's 400 foreign
submarines are in the Indo-Pacific, of which approximately 160 belong
to China, DPRK, and Russia. Potential adversary submarine activity has
tripled from 2008 levels, requiring an increase of U.S. activity to
maintain undersea superiority. This growth of regional submarine
fleets, and increasing demand from other Combatant Commands for SSNs,
will challenge the Joint Force to address our SSN requirements in the
decade ahead. The SSN imbalance will only be aggravated as the global
U.S. Navy SSN inventory drops and submarines are retired faster than
replacements are constructed. China is improving the lethality and
survivability of its attack submarines, building quieter, high-end
diesel and nuclear powered submarines, and has placed in service four
nuclear-powered Jin-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). An
armed Jin-class SSBN will give China an important strategic capability
that must be countered. Russia is modernizing its existing fleet of
Oscar-class multi-purpose attack nuclear submarines (SSGNs) and
producing their next generation Severodvinsk Yasen-class SSGNs. Russia
has also homeported their newest Dolgorukiy-class SSBN in the Pacific,
significantly enhancing its strategic capability. Current counter
undersea capabilities include the Integrated Undersea Surveillance
System (IUSS), including the Surface Towed Array Sensor Systems
(SURTASS). While these platforms have operated since the early 1980s,
these systems, along with the new autonomous Unmanned Underwater
Vehicle technologies, play a key role in theater operations and must be
resourced appropriately to ensure they remain relevant and capable.
Maintaining pace with submarine activity growth is necessary and I
support the Secretary of the Navy's 2016 ``Force Structure Assessment''
which calls for a 355-ship navy, including 66 attack submarines.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR): The
challenge of gathering credible, deep, and penetrating intelligence
cannot be overstated. The Indo-Pacific presents a dynamic security
environment requiring persistent and intrusive ISR to provide
indications, warning, and situational awareness across a vast
geographic area. Our treaty allies rely on U.S. ISR capabilities to
support mutual defense treaties. ISR is required to prevent strategic
surprise, buy decision space for national leadership, accurately assess
the security environment, and defeat adversaries, if necessary. The
rapid modernization of our peer competitors requires additional
advancements in how our intelligence is collected and processed,
including the associated risks. Our ISR capabilities must be suited to
our unique operating environment.
Space and Cyberspace: USPACOM relies heavily on space-based assets
for satellite communications (SATCOM), Intelligence, Surveillance,
Reconnaissance (ISR), Missile Warning, and Positioning, Navigation, and
Timing (PNT) capabilities to support missions across the range of
military operations. USPACOM's region spans over half the globe and
space-based assets are high-demand, low-density resources. As the
electromagnetic spectrum grows increasingly congested and contested,
our adversaries continue to develop means to deny our space-enabled
capabilities. China continues to pursue a broad and robust array of
counter-space capabilities, which include direct-ascent anti-satellite
missiles, co-orbital anti-satellite systems, cyber-attack and
exploitation capabilities, directed energy weapons, and ground-based
satellite and PNT jammers. DPRK continues to develop and employ SATCOM
and PNT jammers, while also continuing their development and testing of
nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles despite UNSCR 1718 prohibiting
such activities.
USPACOM faces constant threats in the cyber domain from both state
and non-state actors, such as China, DPRK, Russia, and criminal actors.
The United States must ensure it has a robust and capable cyber force,
as well as the equipment necessary to maintain command and control of
our forces. USPACOM requires an agile and defensible mission command
network infrastructure to enable interoperability with our allies and
mission partners to fully leverage our combined capacity. In addition,
offensive cyber capabilities provide additional tools to use as part of
tailored options that bolster multi-domain effects, but these
capabilities must grow faster. As we work across the interagency
environment to develop whole-of-government solutions, we require a
workforce that strikes the right balance between cyber forces assigned
in the theater, working directly for USPACOM and its subordinates, and
forces assigned to USCYBERCOM and other U.S. Government agencies at the
national level.
Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD): USPACOM faces unique
Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) challenges despite efforts to
forward station
additional IAMD sensors and weapons capabilities in the Indo-Pacific to
protect
our forces and allies. Hawaii, Guam, and our Pacific territories are
part of our Homeland and must be defended. Hawaii is currently
protected from DPRK intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) by the
Ground-Based-Midcourse Defense System. This system includes Ground-
Based Interceptors in Alaska and California; ground-, sea-, and space-
based sensors; and redundant command, control and communications
systems. For the defense of Hawaii, the Homeland Defense Radar--Hawaii
(HDRH) siting process is near complete. The Missile Defense Agency
(MDA) plans to compete and award a Pacific Radar contract in fiscal
year 2018 and deliver an initial capability by fiscal year 2023. The
new radar will provide an enhanced ballistic missile sensing and
discrimination capability in the Pacific, and will increase the
capability of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System to defend the
state of Hawaii. This radar is being built to stay ahead of potential
future threats. DPRK's 3 September 2017 nuclear test, its KN-22
``Hwasong-15'' ICBM test launch on 28 November 2017, and DPRK's
continuing research and development of submarine launch ballistic
missile technology, demonstrates the DPRK's desire for greater
technical performance and capability. Also, China and Russia continue
to develop and operationally field advanced counter-intervention
technologies which include fielding and testing of highly maneuverable
re-entry vehicle/warhead (i.e., hypersonic weapons) capabilities that
challenge U.S. strategic, operational, and tactical freedom of movement
and maneuver. China and Russia also present other notable challenges in
the form of cruise missiles and small-unmanned aircraft systems (s-UAS)
which fly different trajectories, making them hard to detect, acquire,
track, and intercept due to unpredictable low-flight profiles and high-
potential use of countermeasures. I support MDA's intent to formally
study the efficacy of putting an interceptor capability in Hawaii.
USPACOM's IAMD priority is to establish a persistent, credible, and
sustainable ballistic missile defense presence by forward deploying the
latest advancements in missile defense technologies to the Indo-
Pacific. Through their forward and persistent presence, these active
missile defense capabilities help mitigate the risk to missile threats
that USPACOM faces in the AOR. USPACOM continues to work with the
Department of Defense (DOD), our academic institutions and industry to
improve or deploy systems capable of countering the missile threat
challenges in the Indo-Pacific.
USPACOM maintains an active Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
(THAAD) battery on Guam to protect our fellow citizens and strategic
military capabilities from the threat of DPRK intermediate-range
ballistic missiles (KN-17 and MUSUDAN). USPACOM also employs additional
radars across the theater to support Homeland defense and testing of
the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). Additionally, USPACOM is
supporting MDA's siting-study to identify a home for the new Homeland
Defense Radar in Hawaii.
USPACOM and USFK, with the support from the MDA and the DOD,
deployed a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery to the
Korean peninsula in 2017 that is fully operational. The U.S. Navy is
moving forward with the port shift of the USS Milius from San Diego to
Yokosuka, Japan this spring. This port shift provides the U.S. Seventh
Fleet with improved capability to support the United States-Japan
alliance. USPACOM will continue working with Japan, the ROK, and
Australia to improve our level of staff coordination and information
sharing with the goal of creating a fully-integrated Ballistic Missile
Defense (BMD) architecture that addresses the increasing cruise missile
threat.
USPACOM continues to support MDA and the Services to develop and
test emerging missile and counter-small UAS defense capabilities
through modeling and simulation, as well as live-fire testing conducted
at the Pacific Missile Range Facility, the Ronald Reagan Test Center at
Kwajalein Island, Point Mugu, and other testing ranges located on the
continental United States and Alaska. These tests encompass a number of
developmental flight tests including: Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block
IB Threat Upgrades; Distributed Ground Tests to assess the performance
of the Ballistic Missile Defense System; two Standard Missile-6 (SM-6)
missiles against a complex medium-range ballistic missile target; and
SM-3 Block IIA allowing longer flight times and engagements of more
complex threats higher in the exo-atmosphere. USPACOM will continue to
support future flight tests to help improve the Ballistic Missile
Defense System performance against more complex threats. Going forward,
USPACOM supports all efforts that improve the capability and capacity
of ballistic missile, cruise missile, and UAS defense technologies to
further enhance Homeland defense capabilities and protect key regional
locations from aggressive action. The development of a credible and
effective defense against advanced and future missile and UAS threats
remains vital to our operational plans and critical to the continued
defense of the U.S.
Innovation: USPACOM increasingly relies on innovation to address
USPACOM's capability gaps and maintain our military advantage. This
includes testing and integrating new technologies, developing new
capabilities, and exploring new concepts of operation and employment.
This multi-pronged approach to innovation is paying dividends, and my
innovators are getting these capabilities into the hands of the
warfighters quickly in order to enhance our ability to fight tonight.
Advances in man/machine teaming, artificial intelligence, machine-
learning, hypersonic technology, autonomy, and command and control will
enable the Joint Force to maintain a velocity of precision operations
our adversaries simply cannot match. USPACOM's ability to conduct
operationally realistic exercises where we can rigorously test our
innovative ideas makes me confident we will continue to identify, test,
evaluate, and integrate the best technology our industry offers.
Capitalizing on the vast open spaces of the Pacific, USPACOM runs
the most complex field exercises in the world. For example, the Joint
Pacific Alaska Range Complex (JPARC) is a premier location to focus on
joint air and electronic warfare exercises, while the Pacific Missile
Range Facility and ranges near Guam provide excellent opportunities to
test naval and missile innovations. USPACOM forces conducted over 50
more warfighting experiments in 2017 than any year before. I believe we
can take this construct to the next level by combining innovation
across multiple areas: operational planning, cutting-edge technologies,
modeling and simulation, and execution of multi-Combatant Command
exercises.
Our innovation successes would not be possible without strong
partnerships. USPACOM benefits from our continued relationships with
organizations across the DOD, including the Defense Advanced Research
Project Agency, the Defense Innovation Unit-Experimental, Service
laboratories and innovation offices, national laboratories, university-
affiliated research centers, and industry. USPACOM has also
significantly increased its interaction with U.S. Special Operations
Command, and we continue to work closely with the OSD Strategic
Capabilities Office (SCO) to develop and field game-changing
technologies for the Indo-Pacific.
Fires . . . Achieving Multi-Domain Battle (MDB): Multi-domain
battle is the ultimate joint concept that allows commanders to achieve
cross-domain effects while mitigating significant advancements in our
adversaries' ability to out-range and out-gun some of our most advanced
platforms and systems.
We have made significant progress in the past 12 months. This year,
the Army and the Marine Corps ``signed out'' Version 1.0 of this
warfighting concept in a document titled U.S. Army and Marine Corps
Concept, Multi-Domain Battle: The Evolution of Combined Arms for the
21st Century. This concept describes how U.S. and partner forces
organize and employ capabilities to project and apply power across
domains, environments, and functions over time and physical space to
contest adversaries in relative ``peace'' and, when required, defeat
them in ``war.'' The concept of MDB seeks a common and interoperable
capability development effort to provide Joint Force Commanders
complementary and resilient forces to prosecute campaigns and further
the evolution of combined arms for the 21st Century.
In execution, MDB broadens the options for Joint Force Commanders
and poses a corresponding dilemma for our adversaries. Version 1.0 of
this concept formally transitions emergent concepts and ideas to
experimentation. The complementary capabilities described in this
concept provide an initial set of ideas to test with regard to
employment and capability requirements, while supplementary
capabilities required for combined arms and maneuver serve as a
starting point for common capability development efforts between the
Army, Marine Corps and their joint partners. Our joint forces will
revise this concept to Version 2.0, refining ideas and corresponding
solution set by incorporating the results of experimentation, as well
as other Service and Joint perspectives.
I recently asked the USPACOM component commands to test MDB
operational concepts as part of our Joint Exercise Program, to include
demonstrations in one of our major capstone events--the Rim of the
Pacific exercise (RIMPAC '18). Implementing a ``crawl-walk-run''
methodology, we will move from discrete events across domains to the
fusion of joint capabilities across domains in a sensor to shooter
agnostic environment that is both contested and integrated across the
combined force. In keeping with the MDB concept vision--we will
progress from experimentation to validation of concepts, culminating in
a validation and demonstration of the Army's new Multi-Domain Task
Force during the RIMPAC '20 exercise.
We will capitalize on the existing MDB capabilities resident in
much of our force, but in order to maintain our competitive edge, we
must continue our rapid pursuit of new technologies and approaches. One
of the biggest capability gaps in terms of joint effects is the lack of
complete connectivity and integration between the Services' operational
and tactical ISR, target acquisition, and fire control systems--such as
the Navy's Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC), the Army's Advanced
Tactical Field Artillery Target Data Systems, Army's THAAD and Patriot
Systems, and the USMC's C2 systems. Together with the Services, USPACOM
is working to solve these problems with the Joint Staff and OSD.
strategic force posture in the indo-pacific
The Joint Force is forward-stationed throughout the Indo-Pacific
region to deter conflict or to defeat adversaries should deterrence
fail. The tyranny of distance, mobilization timelines for reserve
component enablers, and strategic lift constraints hinder the ability
to generate force flow early in a crisis. While USPACOM remains focused
on fielding credible combat power, gaining access to new locations,
upgrading existing operating locations, and encouraging whole-of-
government approaches to deter and confront regional adversaries are
all critical to preserving our positional advantage in the region. As
challenges in the Indo-Pacific region continue to evolve, the
importance of infrastructure recapitalization and the fielding of
advanced capabilities have increased.
Global Force Management (GFM): Credible combat power offers the
greatest potential for meeting the Indo-Pacific region's complex
security issues and enables our ability to prevail in combat. The DOD
continues to strongly support USPACOM GFM priorities through the
assignment of critical platforms and capabilities in Alaska and on the
West Coast. USPACOM continues to prioritize forward stationing and
deployment of 5th generation aircraft in the Indo-Pacific, to include
the first Marine Corps F-35B Joint Strike Fighters to Japan in January
2017 and the first Air Force F-35A squadron to the Republic of Korea in
November 2017. In addition, United States commitment to the Indo-
Pacific is further evidenced by the deployment of our newest and most
advanced aviation platforms such as the P-8 Poseidon, RQ-4 Global Hawk,
MV-22 Osprey, EA-18G Growler, E-2D Hawkeye, and C-130J Super Hercules.
The long-range capabilities of U.S. bombers are well suited for the
Indo-Pacific region due to the vast distances and unique challenges.
This mission enables Joint Force readiness and commitment to extended
deterrence, offer assurances to our allies and partners, and strengthen
regional security and stability in the Indo-Pacific region.
In addition to the Pacific Pathways deployments and posture
commitments, the Army is assessing existing U.S. inventories to
prioritize requirements for focused readiness, critical munitions,
sustainment stocks, mobility shortfalls, chemical defense, and facility
operations within the region.
The culmination of joint and combined force operations with our
Service components and our partner nations in the Indo-Pacific region
in 2017 was the three-carrier strike force exercise in the Western
Pacific. USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76), USS Nimitz (CVN 68), and USS
Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) strike groups conducted coordinated
operations in international waters to demonstrate the Navy's unique
capability to operate multiple carrier strike groups as a coordinated
strike force effort.
Force Posture Initiatives: USPACOM's ability to execute national
tasking and meet national objectives is reflected in military
construction investments that support increased resiliency for the
Joint Force via projects in Japan, Guam, the Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), and Australia. The vast distances
associated with the Indo-Pacific, coupled with the short timelines to
respond to crises, require investment in infrastructure to properly
preposition capabilities and capacity throughout the region. Military
construction supports critical capabilities to include Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles for increased intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
(Republic of Korea), Cyber Mission Force teams (Hawaii), Special
Operations Forces (Japan), increased critical munitions storage
capacity in Washington State, and quality of life investments for the
Joint Force and their families in Guam, Republic of Korea, Japan, and
the Republic of the Marshall Islands.
Host country support at 23 established operating locations in the
Indo-Pacific region remains robust overall. The U.S. military receives
approximately $37 billion in new construction at a cost of less than $7
billion to the United States taxpayer in the Indo-Pacific region. The
Government of Japan committed resources in 2013 that continue to assist
in the strategic realignment of United States Marine forces from
Okinawa to Guam and other locations as a part of the Defense Posture
Realignment Initiative (DPRI). Additionally, the Government of Japan is
supporting the airfield expansion work underway at the Marine Corps Air
Station Iwakuni, Japan and the Futenma Replacement Facility. The
Republic of Korea continues to support the work on the Land Partnership
Plan and Yongsan Relocation Plan, which are estimated to be finished
within the next 4 years. Outside of the above initiatives, Japan and
the Republic of Korea continue to provide other funding and support,
which play a critical role in sustaining United States presence in the
region.
USPACOM continues to execute five major force posture initiatives:
(1) United States-Japan Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) / USMC
Distributed Laydown; (2) United States Forces Korea Realignment; (3)
Resiliency; (4) Agile Logistics; and (5) Agile Communications.
Defense Posture Realignment Initiative (DPRI)/USMC Distributed
Laydown: DPRI is a vital part of the larger U.S. military Integrated
Global Basing and Presence Strategy. A major goal of DPRI is to create
an environment that is geographically distributed, operationally
resilient, and politically sustainable to better support the enduring
presence of United States Forces in Japan. USPACOM maintains
significant focus and effort on these initiatives. DPRI is one of the
largest construction efforts since the end of the Cold War. Much work
by both the United States and Japan remain, but progress is being made
towards realigning some United States Marines from Okinawa to Guam and
build-up of facilities at other locations such as Marine Corps Air
Station (MCAS) Iwakuni, Japan. Military construction investments in the
fiscal year 2018 NDAA include projects for DPRI in Guam and Iwakuni.
Another critical cooperative effort, the Futenma Replacement Facility
(FRF) at Camp Schwab/Henoko will enable the United States to fulfill
its security obligations to Japan while also enabling the return of
MCAS Futenma to Okinawa. In the past year, top leaders from the United
States and Japan have reaffirmed the commitment of both countries to
construct the FRF. This solution maintains our presence at MCAS Futenma
until the FRF is completed.
USFK Realignment: The consolidation of United States Forces in the
Republic of Korea via the Land Partnership Plan (LPP) and Yongsan
Relocation Plan (YRP) continues to progress as planned. Posture
priorities remain the relocation of thousands of United States
personnel to bases south of Seoul and setting conditions to support
United Nations Command and the ROK-United States Combined Forces
Command. The United States is committed to maintain the current level
of United States military personnel assigned to the Republic of Korea
through the next five years, at which point the Joint Force will become
strategically flexible and exercise freedom of action throughout the
AOR.
Resiliency: The Joint Force remains ready to fight tonight across
all domains in the Indo-Pacific. USPACOM ensures sustained power
projection capabilities exist forward in theater, and generates
resiliency through the dispersal of our capabilities and the decisive
aggregation of effects. USPACOM resiliency efforts include investment
in more robust infrastructure in ally and partner countries and the
hardening of critical facilities. USPACOM also works to disperse
critical enablers, including communication nodes, fuel repositories,
medical readiness centers, and logistic support equipment.
Agile Logistics: Combat operations in a contested environment
require U.S. forces to disperse across multiple locations, both inside
and outside the enemy's operational reach. We can no longer rely on the
past strategy of consolidating in large, central locations that
position combat capabilities close to the fight to maximize efficiency
and time on target. To survive, our warfighters must move quickly in
and out of enemy fire, placing a greater burden on the units that
support them. Logistics plans can no longer construct central basing
stockpiles of critical sustainment materiel without fear of attack.
USPACOM must disaggregate those stockpiles, anticipate demand, and
adapt to the speed of operational maneuver. Supported by other
Combatant Commands and strategic partners, USPACOM is working to
develop an agile, resilient logistics network, to included
sophisticated logistics decision support tools.
Agile Communications: USPACOM must work with mission partners in
order to further national objectives throughout the Indo-Pacific
region. Five of seven U.S. Mutual Defense Treaties exist in the USPACOM
area of responsibility (AOR), which translates to five alliances of
national militaries that must operate together as a unified force on a
daily basis and through all phases of planned operations. Similarly,
USPACOM does not have formal agreements for exchanging information with
many of the nation states or organizations within the USPACOM AOR,
giving rise to the need for dynamic information technology capabilities
to support the full spectrum of military operations. Agility with
coalition information sharing environments that allow for the rapid
addition or removal of mission partners must be available on short
notice to adequately respond to natural disasters and contingencies in
order to synchronize efforts, achieve synergistic results and to ensure
forces do not interact with each other in a negative manner. As a
result, we are not fully postured with the latest technology to
interoperate with multiple partner combinations over all the phases of
military operations. Furthermore, we will not have the communication
capacity and sharable encryption capability to support the most modern
warfighting platforms and associated weapon systems as they are built
and deployed.
Indo-Asia-Pacific Stability (IAPSI) Initiative: I'm grateful for
the inclusion of IAPSI in the Fiscal Year 2018 NDAA. IAPSI supports a
number of the force posture initiatives addressed in this section,
including enhanced resiliency and increased logistical agility.
Overall, IAPSI helps USPACOM fully leverage the capabilities of our
allies and partners, while also signaling our persistent commitment to
the region.
Readiness: USPACOM is a ``fight tonight'' theater with short
response timelines across vast spaces. Threats as discussed earlier
require U.S. military forces in the region maintain a high level of
readiness to respond rapidly to crisis. USPACOM's readiness is
evaluated against its ability to execute operational and contingency
plans, which place a premium on forward-stationed, ready forces that
can exercise, train, and operate with our partner nations' militaries
and follow-on forces to respond to operational contingencies. Forward-
stationed forces west of the International Date Line increase decision
space and decrease response times, bolster the confidence of allies and
partners, and reduce the chance of miscalculation by potential
adversaries.
The ability of the U.S. to surge and globally maneuver ready forces
is an asymmetric advantage that must be maintained. Over the past two
decades of war, the U.S. has prioritized the readiness of deploying
forces at the expense of follow-on-forces and critical investments
necessary to outpace emerging threats. As a result of high operational
demands, delayed maintenance caused by sequestration and ongoing
Continuing Resolutions (CR), and training pipeline shortfalls, a
shortage of ready surge forces limit USPACOM's responsiveness to
emergent contingencies and greatly increases risk. These challenges
grow each year as our forces continue to deploy at unprecedented rates.
We are overstressing the force as the Services are unable to establish
conditions to reset their force elements with the current fiscal
instability.
Past budget uncertainty degraded USPACOM's ability to plan and
program, leading to sub-optimal utilization of resources. Fiscal
uncertainty forces the Department to accept risk in long-term
engagement opportunities with detrimental strategic consequences to
U.S. relations and prestige. Services must be able to develop and
execute long-term programs for modernization while meeting current
readiness needs. Constrained budgets over the last few years forced
choices within the Services that have limited procurement and fielding
of 5th generation fighter aircraft (F-35) in sufficient quantities and
modernization of 4th generation aircraft (F-15, F-16, F/A-18) essential
to prevent capability gaps and to maintain pace with potential
adversary advancements. Much of the supporting infrastructure in the
Pacific and on the West Coast of the continental United States was
established during World War II and during the early years of the Cold
War. The infrastructure requires investment to extend its service life
but the Services struggle to maintain infrastructure sustainment,
restoration, and modernization accounts at appropriate levels.
Similarly, the shadow of budget uncertainty has exacerbated the
industrial base's inability to meet and respond to increasing
requirements to replace expenditures and field new systems and
technologies. If funding uncertainties continue, the U.S. will
experience reduced warfighting capabilities and increased challenges in
pacing maturing adversary threats.
allies and partners
U.S. national power depends on more than a robust economy and
military strength: we need allies and partners. Our network of
alliances and partnerships, established over the past 70-plus years,
has contributed to the free and open order that we enjoy today. These
countries do not follow U.S. lead on all issues, but allies and
partners provide a foundation for like-minded nations to draw upon when
dealing with major issues or crises. Australia, Japan, Republic of
Korea, Philippines, and Thailand have all been long-standing allies,
but Congress' designation of India as a ``Major Defense Partner'' in
2016 provides USPACOM the opportunity to forge a new relationship with
the world's largest democracy. A robust network of allies and partners
creates an environment of cooperation to work together on shared
challenges.
USPACOM is directly connected to regional leaders. I am in frequent
communication with my regional counterparts and appreciate the ability
to reach out at any time to share perspectives. USPACOM maintains a
close link with allies and partners through staff exchange and liaison
officers, in addition to a series of formal bilateral mechanisms. In
Australia, key engagements stem from the Australia-New Zealand-United
States security treaty and are guided by USPACOM's principal bilateral
event with Australia, the Military Representatives Meeting, which leads
up to the Australia-United States 2+2 Ministerial Meeting with SecDef/
SecState and their Australian counterparts. Similarly, the annual Joint
Senior Leader Seminar guides USPACOM's military-to-military
relationship with Japan. The Military Committee and Security
Consultative Meetings are the preeminent bilateral mechanisms that
guide the United States alliance with the Republic of Korea (ROK). Each
year USPACOM and the Armed Forces of the Philippines co-host the Mutual
Defense Board and Security Engagement Board to deal with 21st Century
challenges. USPACOM conducts annual Senior Staff Talks with Thailand to
address security concerns and reinforce United States commitment to
democratic principles. USPACOM also conducts annual formal bilateral
activities with non-alliance partners throughout the region, including
Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam.
Our multilateral cooperation is further enhanced by numerous Flag
and General Officer (FOGO) exchange officers that work for the U.S. at
USPACOM. These foreign officers from our ``Five Eye'' (FVEY) partners
(Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and United Kingdom) serve under my
Command as fully integrated members of the USPACOM team. Our operations
and intelligence watch centers are FVEY environments and FOGOs are
embedded within USPACOM and our service components
Bilateral and Multinational ``Partnerships with a Purpose'': The
future lies in multilateral security mechanisms. USPACOM is broadening
key bilateral relationships into multilateral ``partnerships with a
purpose'' that will more effectively address shared security concerns.
For example, the United States-Japan-Republic of Korea multilateral
coordination in response to the DPRK's provocative behavior, while
challenging, is improving. The ROK and Japan each recognize that
provocative actions by the DPRK will not be isolated to the peninsula
and greater coordination and cooperation are required. Historical
tensions between the nations remain, but cooperation and collaboration
are slowly improving. The November 2016 signing of the Japan-Republic
of Korea General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) is
a major accomplishment in improving bilateral relations between Seoul
and Tokyo; the GSOMIA lays an essential foundation for expanding
cooperation and enables the U.S. to work more closely with both allies.
Recognizing the benefits of this bilateral agreement, in November 2017,
the Republic of Korea and Japan renewed GSOMIA for another year. I look
forward to increasing the frequency and complexity of multilateral
information sharing while simultaneously enhancing multilateral
security cooperation.
To encourage multilateral cooperation, USPACOM hosts the Chiefs of
Defense Conference (CHODs) annually. The CHODs conference location
normally rotates between Hawaii and a regional partner. In 2017, 30
countries attended the CHODs conference in Victoria, Canada. USPACOM
also participates in Australia-Japan-United States multilateral defense
dialogues, including the Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF).
The multilateral relationship between the United States, Japan, and
India is growing stronger as well. All three countries share democratic
values, interests in protecting sea-lanes of commerce, and respect for
international law. On the security front, all three countries
participate in India's increasingly complex annual Malabar military
exercise as well as the multinational Rim of the Pacific exercise.
In Southeast Asia, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines formed a
multilateral relationship aimed at countering violent extremists
through coordinated maritime and air patrols. Additional Southeast Asia
nations, such as Brunei and Singapore, and other Indo-Pacific regional
nations, such as the United States, Japan, and Australia are all
supporting the multilateral initiative through various support
missions.
Allies
Australia: The United States-Australia alliance anchors peace and
stability in the region. Australia plays a leading role in regional
security, capacity-building efforts and addressing disaster response.
Australia is a key contributor to global security and a significant
contributor to counter-ISIS efforts in Iraq and Syria and the Resolute
Support mission in Afghanistan. With the implementation of force
posture initiatives, the Marine Rotational Force-Darwin successfully
completed its sixth deployment while maintaining a presence of 1,250
U.S. Marines. The seventh deployment begins in April 2018 and will
consist of approximately 1,500 U.S. Marines with future growth informed
by capability requirements and budget resource availability. The 2018
deployment will include ten MV-22 Osprey aircraft, providing a more
robust capability. The deployment of USAF F-22s to Australia for
integration with Royal Australian Air Force E/A-18G, F/A-18F, and/or E-
7A as part of the Enhanced Air Cooperation force posture initiative
will build upon the initial activities that occurred in 2017 by
increasing the complexity of mutual tactics, techniques, and
procedures. The United States and Australia are increasing
collaboration in counter-terrorism, space, cyber, integrated air
missile defense, and regional capacity building. Australia is procuring
high-tech United States platforms that will further increase
interoperability. These include the F-35A Lightning II, P-8 Poseidon,
C-17 Globemaster III, EA-18G Growler, Global Hawk UAVs, and MH-60R
helicopters. To enhance interoperability, the Australian Government
provides a General Officer to USPACOM and a General Officer to United
States Army Pacific on a full-time basis. Australia has also set a goal
of reaching 2 percent of its GDP on defense spending over the next
decade.
France: As a NATO ally, France has significant equities in the
Indo-Pacific, and I welcome France's growing involvement in the region.
The French territories in Polynesia and New Caledonia make France the
sixth largest nation on the planet by area, which translates into an
Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ) of over 166,000 square miles. The French
navy maintains a professional military force in both territories,
focused primarily on maritime security. But, France aims to become more
involved across the Indo-Pacific writ large. Not only is France
providing submarines to Australia and India, France is currently
operating a combatant frigate (FF VENDEMIARE) in the East and South
China Seas with United States Pacific Fleet. France also maintains a
contingent of forces on New Caledonia and remains active in support or
regional Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief operations. During
my recent visit to New Caledonia, the French military Commander
indicated a strong desire to increase their training interaction with
USPACOM forces, and we are developing opportunities for increased
interaction. Overall, I am very excited about France's increased
willingness to stand by the United States as we confront revisionist
state and non-state actors across the region.
Japan: The United States-Japan alliance remains the cornerstone
for peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. Operational
cooperation and collaboration between USPACOM and the Japan Joint Staff
continue to increase. Japan's Peace and Security Legislation
authorizing limited collective self-defense operations and the revised
2015 Guidelines for United States-Japan Defense Cooperation have
significantly increased Japan's ability to contribute to regional
stability more broadly. Japan continues to support USPACOM activities
to maintain freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, and remains
concerned about Chinese activities in the East China Sea. We are
strengthening our alliance with Japan, including through reviewing our
roles, missions and capabilities, to ensure seamless alliance responses
across a full spectrum of situations amid an increasingly challenging
regional security environment. Japan is procuring high-tech United
States platforms that will increase interoperability such as the F-35B,
E-2D Hawkeye, Global Hawk UAS, and MV-22 Osprey; it has also announced
its intentions to procure AEGIS Ashore.
Republic of Korea (ROK): The United States-ROK alliance is
ironclad, and our commitment to the Republic of Korea is unwavering. We
continue to work with our close friend and ally, as it moves toward
obtaining the capabilities required under the Conditions-Based
Operational Control (OPCON) Transition Plan (COT-P). In response to the
evolving threat posed by the DPRK, the United States in coordination
with the Republic of Korea, deployed a THAAD system to improve alliance
missile defense posture. The Republic of Korea is also procuring high-
tech United States platforms that will further increase
interoperability to include the F-35B, P-8 Poseidon, AH-64 Apache, and
Global Hawk UAS.
The resumption of inter-Korean dialogue in January and the North's
decision to participate in this month's PyeongChang Olympic Games are
encouraging developments, but any future talks with the DPRK must be
focused on achieving a complete, verifiable, and irreversible
denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Accordingly, the alliance
will maintain a high military readiness posture and will continue to
provide support for the diplomatic pressure campaign through credible
combat deterrence.
The Philippines: The United States-Philippine alliance has
demonstrated resilience through President Rodrigo Duterte's pursuit of
an independent foreign policy. The tenor of our bilateral relationship
has improved over the past year, due in part to the relationship-reset
in President Duterte's personal interactions with President Trump.
Through frank and frequent dialogue with Philippine leadership, we
continue to maintain a robust defense relationship comprised of 261
activities for calendar year 2018, slowly expanding parameters of
military-to-military cooperation. In particular, we have obtained
Philippine commitment to resuming live fire exercises and close air
support training. The attack on Marawi City in Mindanao by ISIS-P posed
a significant challenge to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
and served as a reminder of the value of our alliance to Philippine
security and stability. United States support, primarily in the form of
providing Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR),
tactical advice, and the use of our Mutual Logistics Support Agreement
(MLSA) to assist in the timely delivery of weapons and ammunition,
proved crucial in the AFP's defeat of ISIS-P in Marawi. Our quick
response to addressing AFP needs helped to bolster the bilateral
relationship. Our military cooperation supports a broader whole-of-
government approach to countering terrorism and building resiliency and
capacity in Mindanao, as well as continuing to work together to
modernize the AFP. While the government of the Philippines refocused
attention on internal security to address short-term security and
political challenges in Mindanao, we must not lose sight of the long-
term objectives of building a territorial defense capability and
creating a modern and self-sufficient AFP. Strategic patience has
helped recalibrate the alliance relationship. I am convinced that the
relationship pendulum will continue to swing in a positive direction
and will continue to stabilize the region as it has for over 60 years.
Thailand: Our deep and longstanding military-to-military ties with
Thailand go back to our 1950 Agreement Respecting Military Assistance
between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of Thailand. Despite recent challenges, we remain close
allies and important security partners. Our alliance is back on track
at senior levels, capping off a year of re-engagement that included
multiple 4-star visits, Secretary Mattis' visit to Bangkok for the
Royal Cremation, and POTUS' hosting the Prime Minister at the White
House. These discussions aimed to ``Reinvigorate the Alliance,'' and we
have communicated that strengthening the alliance is a shared
responsibility. Overall mil-to-mil engagements are also on a positive
trajectory. Thailand facilitates world-class training opportunities for
United States personnel across all services, and co-hosts Exercise
Cobra Gold with us, Asia's largest multinational military exercise.
Thailand provides logistical nodes essential to our forces operating
throughout the Indo-Pacific region. Funding for International Military
Education and Training (IMET) and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) are
currently restricted, but a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Direct
Commercial Sales (DCS) relationship continues. Thailand has publicly
committed to hold national elections in November 2018, and our
continued engagement with military leadership remains the best way for
the United States to promote regional security and healthy civil-
military relations in Thailand.
United Kingdom: I'm excited about the trend of UK involvement in
the Indo-Pacific. As a key NATO ally, the UK continues to support
United States logistics and ISR operations across multiple Combatant
Commands from the Indian Ocean territory of Diego Garcia. The UK is
also looking to become more involved in maritime security in the Indo-
Pacific. The HMS Sutherland, a Type 23 Frigate, is currently conducting
combined maritime operations with U.S. Pacific Fleet in Southeast Asia,
and I expect this type of interaction will increase in the years to
come.
partners
India: The United States-India strategic partnership continues to
advance at a historic pace and has the potential to be the most
consequential bilateral relationship of the 21st Century. The United
States and India maintain a broad-based strategic partnership that is
underpinned by shared democratic values, interests, and strong people-
to-people ties, and I expect 2018 to be a significant and eventful year
in United States-India relations. The United States and India are
natural partners on a range of political, economic, and security
issues. With a mutual desire for global stability and support for the
rules-based international order, the United States and India have an
increasing convergence of interests, including maritime security and
domain awareness, counter-piracy, counterterrorism, humanitarian
assistance, and coordinated responses to natural disasters and
transnational threats. India will be among the United States' most
significant partners in the years to come due to its growing influence
and expanding military. As a new generation of political leaders
emerge, India has shown that it is more open to strengthening security
ties with the United States and adjusting its historic policy of non-
alignment to address common strategic interests. The United States
seeks an enduring, regular, routine, and institutionalized strategic
partnership with India. USPACOM identifies a security relationship with
India as a major command line-of-effort. Over the past year, United
States and Indian militaries participated together in three major
exercises, executed more than 50 other military exchanges, and
operationalized the 2016 Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement
(LEMOA). Defense sales are at an all-time high with India operating
United States-sourced airframes, such as P-8s, C-130Js, C-17s, AH-64s,
and CH-47s, and M777 howitzers. USPACOM will sustain the momentum of
the strategic relationship generated by the POTUS-Prime Minister-level
and the emerging 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue through strengthening our
military-to-military relationship and working toward additional
enabling agreements to enhance interoperability. At the moment, India
is considering a number of United States systems for purchase, all of
which USPACOM fully supports: the F-16 for India's large single-engine,
multi-role fighter acquisition program; the F/A-18E for India's multi-
engine, carried-based fighter purchase; a reorder of 12-15 P-8Is; a
potential purchase of SeaGuardian UAS; MH-60R multi-role sea-based
helicopter; and F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.
Indonesia: Indonesia plays an essential role as the maritime
fulcrum of Southeast Asia. We maintain a robust defense relationship
comprising over 200 annual activities as part of our Strategic
Partnership. USPACOM continues to partner with Indonesia, particularly
in maritime security. Indonesia desires to play a larger role in
international economic and security issues. Their goal to provide 4,000
deployable peacekeeping troops by 2019 is another important area where
we can engage. Indonesia continues to build and exercise in strategic
maritime border areas to bolster its defense capabilities, and has
concerns with Chinese activities in the vicinity of the Natuna Islands.
The money spent on professional military education and technical
training in Indonesia has borne fruit in terms of Foreign Military
Sales of excess defense article F-16s and new AH-64 Apaches. The
Government of Indonesia is also considering the F-16 for the
recapitalization of the Indonesian Air Force's aging fleet of fighter
aircraft, most of which are of Russian origin.
Malaysia: Our close security ties with Malaysia are based on our
Comprehensive Partnership. Malaysia's regional leadership role,
technologically advanced industry, sizeable economy, and capable
military make it an important partner in securing peace and prosperity
in Southeast Asia. Over the past year, Malaysia has implemented air and
maritime patrols in the Sulu and Celebes Seas in accordance with a
multilateral arrangement with the Philippines and Indonesia due to
increased security concerns in East Malaysia. We have worked closely
with Malaysia as co-chairs of ASEAN's Humanitarian Assistance and
Disaster Relief (HADR) working group. Malaysia also has an on-going
dispute with China with respect to the Luconia Shoals, which China also
claims. Malaysia has demonstrated the capacity and resolve to
contribute to regional security, and we continue to support Malaysia's
emerging security requirements. Malaysia recently selected MD-530
attack helicopter, and the United States is also providing Malaysia
with secure communications equipment to increase interoperability in
maritime security and counter-terrorism missions.
Mongolia: Mongolia endures as a small, yet strong, partner in
Northeast Asia and continues to demonstrate staunch support for United
States regional and global policy objectives--especially those linked
to the Global Peace Operations Initiative and security operations in
Afghanistan. The government engages with the U.S. and other countries
as part of their ``Third Neighbor'' policy. Mongolia also markets
itself as a model for emerging democratic countries such as Burma,
Nepal, and Timor Leste. My deputy visited Mongolia last summer and
spoke at the Exercise KHAAN QUEST 2017 closing ceremony, reaffirming
that USPACOM's goals are to assist the Mongolian Armed Forces through
their defense reform priorities. These priorities include: development
of professional military education for officers and non-commissioned
officers; developing a professional NCO corps; and developing an Air
Force and ready reserve force. The Mongolians punch above their weight
and we should continue to support them where we can.
New Zealand: The United States-New Zealand partnership remains on
solid footing and continues to evolve. New Zealand is increasing its
leading role in regional security and capacity-building efforts while
addressing disaster response in the South Pacific and Antarctica. New
Zealand is a key contributor to global security and a significant
contributor to counter-ISIS efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The United
States is thankful for the New Zealand Defense Force's gracious offer
of the Royal New Zealand Navy ship Te' Kaha to replace the USS
Fitzgerald after she was involved in an unfortunate mishap in summer
2017 during the USS Nimitz Carrier Strike Group deployment. We commend
New Zealand's commitment to planned defense capability improvements
identified in their 2016 Defense White Paper. These improvements
acknowledge the threats posed by the rise of China's strategic
influence in the Indo-Pacific, an escalation of military spending
across Southeast Asia, and increasing challenges to the rules-based
international system. Military-to-Military relations and defense
engagements with New Zealand remain strong. New Zealand is procuring
the P-8 Poseidon--continuing the strong legacy of interoperability
among Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft with the United
States.
Singapore: Singapore remains a steadfast partner in Southeast Asia
with a strong commitment to promoting a free and open Indo-Pacific. We
owe Singapore our sincere gratitude for its assistance in the aftermath
of the USS John McCain accident and timely aviation support to
Hurricane Harvey relief efforts this past year. Singapore leaders
believe the United States plays an indispensable role in bolstering the
region's economic and security frameworks. Though not a formal treaty
ally, Singapore provides us invaluable access to the strategically
located entrance of the Malacca Straits and South China Sea. Singapore
also hosts Littoral Combat Ships, rotational Maritime Patrol Aircraft,
and Seventh Fleet's Logistics Force headquarters, while maintaining
training detachments in the United States for Singapore Air Force F-
15SGs, F-16C/Ds, CH-47 Chinooks, AH-64 Apache helicopters, and the
Singapore Army's High Mobility Artillery Rocket System. We conduct
dozens of high level and increasingly complex military exercises with
Singapore each year to increase our interoperability. Furthermore,
Singapore officers regularly attend United States professional military
education at all levels, developing relationships that span careers.
The combination of a shared outlook on regional security and
prosperity, strong support for U.S. presence, and a deep and broad
defense relationship enables the U.S. to promote our interests abroad
and focus on shared regional challenges. Overall, we remain their
defense partner of choice despite intense Chinese pandering of economic
influence. USPACOM was excited to support Singapore's request for an F-
22 and an F-35B static display at the 2018 Singapore Air Show in
February--a great opportunity as the Government of Singapore considers
a purchase of F-35B in the future.
Sri Lanka: The trajectory of United States-Sri Lanka relations
continues to ascend, with Sri Lanka emerging as a significant strategic
partner in the Indian Ocean region. Despite recent political turmoil,
President Sirisena, elected in January 2015, remains committed to
reforms and addressing Sri Lanka's human rights issues. Over the last
year he continued Sri Lanka's path toward reconciliation and democracy
following its multi-decade civil war. I believe it is in America's
interest to continue to increase military collaboration and cooperation
with Sri Lankan forces. Accordingly, USPACOM expanded bilateral defense
ties, military leadership discussions, rule of law training, increased
naval engagement, and focused security cooperation efforts on defense
institution building in areas such as demobilizing, peacekeeping, and
military professionalism. In October 2017, the USS Nimitz became the
first United States aircraft carrier to visit Sri Lanka in over thirty
years. This visit, along with granting Sri Lanka an excess United
States Coast Guard cutter, underscores the deepening relationship
between the United States and Sri Lanka.
Vietnam: Vietnam is currently our boldest regional partner in
standing up to China's provocative behavior in the South China Sea. A
series of high-level bilateral visits in 2017 helped deepen our
partnership, including visits to the United States by Prime Minister
Phuc in May and Defense Minister Lich in August, as well as President
Trump's travel to Vietnam in November and Secretary Mattis' visit in
January. In March 2018, the USS Carl Vinson will make an historic port
visit to Da Nang, Vietnam--an indication of the significant progress in
the bilateral security relationship. Last year, we transferred a 378
foot former United States Coast Guard High Endurance Cutter to the
Vietnam Coast Guard. Over the next few years, we expect to continue to
assist the Vietnamese to build their capacity for maritime domain
awareness. In addition, we signed the Cooperative Humanitarian and
Medical Storage Initiative (CHAMSI) Memorandum of Understanding in May
2017. When implemented, CHAMSI will allow USPACOM to store humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief equipment in Vietnam increasing our
mutual ability to train for, and respond to, natural disasters in
Vietnam.
Other Key Actors
Oceania: Maintaining strategic relationships in Oceania is
becoming ever more important to U.S. national security. The provisions
included in the Compacts of Free Association with the Federated States
of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic
of Palau are important mechanisms that guide the relationships,
including U.S. obligations for their defense. In return, these
agreements provide assured access to the three Compact Nations in a
contingency situation. They also give the U.S. authority to grant or
deny access to another nation's military forces, which allows the U.S.
to maintain a clear strategic line of communication across the Pacific.
I am grateful to Congress for fully authorizing the 2010 Palau Compact
Review Agreement in the fiscal year 2018 NDAA and would ask that
Congress appropriate all required funds. The implementation of this
legislation will have a significant impact on our defense relationship
with Palau, and will provide a measurable advantage in our strategic
posture in the Western Pacific. Continued United States commitment to
defend the Compact Nations and to partner with other Pacific island
countries enhances American influence and sends a strong message of
reassurance throughout the region.
ASEAN: ASEAN turned 50 last year and the U.S. commemorated its
40th year of United States-ASEAN dialogue relations. The United States
and ASEAN share the common principles of a rules-based order, respect
for international law, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. The ten
ASEAN member states, under the chairmanship of the Philippines last
year and Singapore this year, continue to seek ways to improve
multilateral security engagements and advance stability in the Indo-
Pacific. During this past year, the United States strengthened its
commitment to ASEAN with engagements at the Secretary of Defense and
Presidential levels where we reached agreement on whole-of-government
approaches to shared challenges in areas of maritime security and
maritime domain awareness. USPACOM is committed to strengthening
regional institutions such as ASEAN, ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting-
Plus, the East Asia Summit, and the ASEAN Regional Forum. Over the
course of the last year, USPACOM participated in ASEAN exercises, key
leader engagements, and practical multilateral cooperation related to
the spectrum of shared transnational challenges. The United States is
postured to support Singapore's Chairmanship priorities for 2018 in the
areas of Counterterrorism (CT), Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and
Nuclear (CBRN), and Confidence Building Measures. Malaysia and the
United States co-chair the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM)-Plus
Experts' Working Group on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
over the next 2 years. A key objective will be to support ASEAN's
effort to operationalize the ASEAN Military Ready Group to
multilaterally respond to natural disasters. USPACOM's approach is to
promote multilateral partnerships of sub-regional ASEAN nations to
strengthen a rules-based international order. This includes USPACOM
support to the Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines multilateral Cooperation
Arrangements and the Cambodia-Malaysia-Thailand-Vietnam Gulf of
Thailand Initiative. USPACOM looks forward to supporting the ASEAN
Defense Ministers' Meeting-Plus that Singapore will host in October.
Burma (Myanmar): Our engagement with Burma's military is extremely
limited and is expected to remain so considering the ongoing crisis and
human rights violations by the military in the Rakhine State. The
primary goal of our engagement is to encourage a professional military
that operates under democratic standards of civilian control,
transparency, and accountability, while also complying with
international law, including international human rights law and
international humanitarian law, as applicable. We underscore these
points in all of our limited engagements. In addition to the
humanitarian rights violations, I am also concerned about Chinese
involvement in the country. Beijing is attempting to move into Burma
while other countries are taking a step back, and Chinese support comes
with no string attached.
China: While the United States has an economic relationship with
China, in my opinion, our two nations are in clear competition for
influence and control of the Indo-Pacific. As the President commented
in his recent State of the Union Address, China is now our ``rival,''
and I wholeheartedly agree with this assessment. For the last few
years, I have advocated for dealing with China realistically--as it is,
and not as we would wish it would be. In other words, our relationship
with China should be based on candor and clear-eyed pragmatism instead
of yearning and misty-eyed optimism. Some view China's actions in the
East and South China Seas as opportunistic. I do not. I view Chinese
actions as coordinated, methodical, and strategic. Beijing is using its
military and economic power to coerce its neighbors and erode the free
and open international order. As I have previously stated, I believe
the Chinese are building up combat power and positional advantage in an
attempt to assert de facto sovereignty over disputed maritime features
and spaces in the South China Sea, where they have fundamentally
altered the physical and political landscape by creating and
militarizing man-made bases. While the United States has no claims in
the South China Sea--and it is our policy not to take positions on
sovereignty over the disputed land features--the United States
resolutely opposes the use of coercion, intimidation, threats, or force
to advance claims. These differences should be resolved peacefully and
consistent with international law.
This increasingly competitive environment necessitates continued
mil-to-mil dialogue between the United States and China to improve
understanding and reduce risk. USPACOM remains committed to a
constructive, results-oriented relationship with China, so while we
rightfully call out China for its aggressive behavior in some areas, we
should also seek its support for shared security goals, such as the
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. We will continue to cooperate
with China where we have shared interests, such as military medicine
and disaster response. USPACOM conducted numerous bilateral and
multilateral engagements with China last year, and co-led the United
States-China Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) plenary
and working group focused on operational safety. Encounters between our
forces at sea and in the air are generally safe, but the MMCA provides
a forum for continuous dialogue to identify and address safety issues
when they arise.
For USPACOM, my goal remains to convince China that its best future
comes from peaceful cooperation and meaningful participation in the
current free and open international order. China has the potential to
emerge as a net security provider for the region, but to do so, Beijing
must honor its international commitments. After all, the Chinese
economic miracle could not have happened without the stability that
emerged from the rules-based order--an order that Beijing now seeks to
undermine. But I've also been loud and clear that we will not allow the
shared domains to be closed down unilaterally, so we'll cooperate where
we can but remain ready to confront where we must.
Taiwan: Taiwan's open economy and its prosperous, free, and
democratic society reflect the shared values between Taiwan and the
United States. In accordance with our One China Policy, based on the
three United States-China Joint Communiques, the United States does not
maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Yet, we maintain a
substantive and robust relationship with the people of Taiwan based on
the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. In line with this policy, USPACOM
will continue supporting Taiwan's efforts to develop a credible,
resilient, and cost-effective deterrent and self-defense capability.
Continued, regular arms sales and training for Taiwan's military are an
important part of that policy and help ensure the preservation of
democratic institutions. As the military spending and capability of the
PRC grow every year, the ability of Taiwan to defend itself decreases.
We must continue to help Taiwan defend itself and demonstrate United
States resolve that any attempt by China to force reunification on the
people of Taiwan is unacceptable. USPACOM has supported extensive
security cooperation activities with Taiwan in air and missile defense,
maritime security, logistic support and joint operations and training.
Recent sales of anti-ballistic missiles, anti-aircraft weapons,
logistics helicopters, surveillance radar, Perry-class Frigates, and
amphibious assault vehicle (AAV-7), and electronic warfare systems
continue to improve their self-defense capabilities.
Activities, Direct Reporting Units, and Mission Partners
Interagency: USPACOM collaborates with a broad group of
interagency partners that bring diplomatic, economic, reconstruction
and stabilization, intelligence, law enforcement, health, national
security, and scientific expertise to the discussion. This allows us to
address key national security issues through a whole-of-government
approach, synchronizing all instruments of power. Our interagency
partners help USPACOM maintain relationships with key allies and
partners in this region. Our interagency collaboration has yielded
success in supporting the DPRK pressure campaign; supporting
humanitarian efforts in the aftermath of natural and man-made
disasters; countering transnational threats, including transnational
crime; preparing for potential pandemics; and, in supporting
traditional military-military engagements and in non-traditional
security cooperation. Our emerging and complex problems will
increasingly require whole-of-government solutions, and USPACOM stands
ready to support interagency-led efforts where we are needed.
Global Engagement Center (GEC): The GEC is a key USPACOM partner
in facilitating interagency collaboration and coordination of efforts
to counter foreign propaganda and disinformation in the Indo-Pacific.
While we work to address the propaganda that terrorist organizations
use to recruit new followers, we must also address the serious threat
that foreign state-sponsored disinformation poses to U.S. national
security. To address these threats in the information environment, it
is more critical than ever that the U.S. Government has a
comprehensive, whole-of-government approach to informational power. In
support of this effort, USPACOM has embedded a GEC officer within the
Command and is actively prioritizing information related capabilities
in its planning, operations, and activities.
Security Cooperation and Capacity Building: USPACOM's Security
Cooperation approach focuses on building partner readiness, reducing
partner capability gaps, and building partner capacity. To effect
change in these endeavors USPACOM is working to fully employ the
consolidated Security Cooperation authorities in the fiscal year 2017
NDAA. The Section 333 Global Train and Equip authority, introduced in
the 2017 NDAA, consolidates older train and equip authorities such as
2282 and 1004, leading to significant benefits, such as a global
approach to planning and greater visibility across lines of effort. We
see great promise in advancing partners' readiness and capabilities.
USPACOM continues to follow a Theater Security Cooperation planning
process that identifies partners' priorities, to which the various
authorities can be applied in concert. Additionally, the State
Department is involved in the joint planning and development of section
333 programs, and the Secretary of State must concur on any section 333
program prior to Congressional notification. USPACOM greatly
appreciates the State Department's foreign policy review of our global
train and equip programs.
USPACOM is also focused on improving partner-nation maritime domain
awareness, which directly contributes to increased maritime security
across the region. The fiscal year 2016 NDAA section 1263 ``Southeast
Asia Maritime Security Initiative (MSI)'' is effectively enhancing
maritime domain awareness and improving the maritime capacities and
capabilities of partners and allies in Southeast Asia. Additionally,
the Philippines, Australia, and the United States continue to discuss
regional maritime security best practices through partnership
workshops. These workshops facilitate whole-of-government discussions
on maritime challenges that support creation of a regional maritime
domain awareness network to share information between Southeast Asian
partners. We need to go beyond maritime domain awareness and use an
initiative like IAPSI to improve our partners' and allies' multi-domain
awareness and increase their domain denial capability so that they can
better protect their territory and enforce their maritime rights.
USPACOM is also grateful for the State Department's long-standing
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education
and Training (IMET) programs. FMF enables USPACOM to meet regional
challenges to include border security issues, disaster response,
counterterrorism and maritime security, and IMET offers long-term
relationship building and sustainment.
State Partnership Program (SPP): SPP states and territories have
demonstrated an impressive ability to integrate and understand their
partner nations, while integrating into USPACOM's long-term strategy
for the region. Not only do the National Guard states travel to their
partner nations, partner nation military and civilian personnel often
travel to the states for visits and engagements. This consistent and
constant contact helps PACOM assess and refine our strategy and helps
the U.S. maintain influence in the region.
Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI): Countries of the Indo-
Pacific provide 31 percent of the world's uniformed peacekeepers to UN
peacekeeping operations worldwide, and of these peacekeepers, 20
percent come from the 12 GPOI partners in the Indo-Pacific. These 12
countries support 13 of the 15 UN peacekeeping missions, as well as
three political missions. GPOI builds the capability and capacity of
our partners to deploy ready forces and is centered on providing high-
quality, action-oriented, challenging scenario-based training so that
peacekeepers are better prepared to implement UN Security Council
Resolutions of protecting vulnerable civilians, halting conflict-
related sexual violence, working to put a stop to the use of children
soldiers, addressing misconduct, and trying to bring long-term peace
and security to conflict torn regions. In 2018, USPACOM and Bangladesh
will cohost a multinational peacekeeping exercise called SHANTI DOOT,
which focuses on preparing personnel for deployment to UN peacekeeping
missions. We expect participation in this exercise from 32 nations who
recognize the value of working with other peacekeeping nations in a
very demanding training environment. Many of our partners are meeting
program goals, with six of twelve partners achieving a self-sustained
indigenous training capability while the others continue to make
progress toward this milestone. We continue to emphasize a ``train-the-
trainer'' approach enabling standardization and interoperability to
work within United Nations guidelines. USPACOM will continue improving
partner military peacekeeping skills and operational readiness, as well
as provide limited training facility refurbishment. This program not
only supports our efforts to improve UN peacekeeping, it is also
helping to strengthen interoperability with U.S. Forces and builds the
trust required to improve interoperability in other relevant areas.
Joint Exercise Program: USPACOM's Joint Exercise Program is vital
for improving the operational and warfighting readiness of assigned
Pacific Theater and partner nation forces, ensuring joint force
readiness for crises and contingency operations while providing a
visible and tangible deterrent to aggression. This important program is
essential for advancing Combatant Commander Campaign Plan objectives
including strengthening regional alliances and partnerships and
deepening interoperability through combined training. Combatant
Commander Exercise Engagement Training Transformation (CE2T2) program
funding enables our Joint Exercise Program, helping to enhance the
readiness of our assigned forward deployed forces.
Joint Interagency Task Force-West (JIATF-W): The drug trade in the
Indo-Pacific threatens regional stability as drug trafficking
organizations continue to utilize new supply chains and develop
troubling partnerships across the globe. As USPACOM's Executive Agent
for counter-narcotics activities in the AOR, JIATF-W combats drug
trafficking in the region by disrupting flows of drugs and precursor
chemicals that transit the region, and by hardening the theater against
the expansion of transnational criminal organizations. JIATF-W
continues to build partner capacity to counter illicit trafficking of
narcotics in the coastal areas of Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia,
Malaysia, and Sri Lanka; and the border regions of Bangladesh and
Thailand. In order to develop cooperative solutions and procedures to
address the transnational criminal threats in the region, bilateral and
multilateral cooperative engagements are also a focus in building the
capacity of our partner nations.
The global nature of illicit trafficking means that problems that
exist in this area of the world may have their start on the other side
of the globe, or vice versa. For example, some of the problems we are
dealing with on the Southwest border of the United States with drug
trafficking start with the precursor chemicals that are being sold
through licit commerce, predominantly from China; and to a lesser
extent, India. Criminal entities with ties to Mexican and South
American drug cartels use these licit chemicals to produce
methamphetamines, cocaine, and heroin. Another drug, fentanyl-laced
heroin, has been responsible for a spike in U.S. overdose deaths.
Fentanyl and its numerous analogs originate almost exclusively from
China. To combat these threats, the United States Government works
closely with the government of the People's Republic of China in a
Joint Liaison Group (JLG) on Law Enforcement Cooperation led by the
Department of Justice. JIATF-W collaborates with U.S. Government
interagency partners to support the JLG. To date, China has agreed to
list over 100 precursor chemicals on their controlled substance list.
JIATF-W works with U.S. Government partners to facilitate information
sharing and interagency efforts to disrupt the opioid scourge that is
so quickly claiming over 100 U.S. lives every day.
In fiscal year 2017, JIATF-W identified and tracked chemical flows
resulting in the disruption of roughly 116,000 kilograms of
methamphetamine precursor chemicals. JIATF-W also continues to work
closely with United States and partner-nation agencies throughout the
South Pacific, to include the French Armed Forces in Polynesia, as well
as both Australian and New Zealand law enforcement, military, and
intelligence services. With these partners, JIATF-W assists in the
disruption of the lucrative drug trade in the region. In 2017, JIATF-
W's efforts contributed to the interdiction of 16.6 metric tons of
methamphetamine precursor chemicals, nine small vessels carrying
cocaine or methamphetamine, the seizure of approximately 6.5 metric
tons of cocaine, and 1.5 metric tons of methamphetamines, resulting in
the removal of over 1.5 billion dollars in revenue from the trafficking
organizations.
Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian
Assistance (CFE-DM): CFE-DM increases the capacity of U.S. and partner
nation military forces to respond effectively to disasters and
humanitarian emergencies, as well as enhances regional civil-military
coordination through its education and training programs, regional
civil-military engagements, and applied research and information
sharing programs. The Center trains approximately 8,000 military and
civilian personnel annually, including through bilateral and
multilateral exercises focused on humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief. CFE-DM also trains deployable U.S. forces and foreign
audiences. Regional partnerships with key civilian international
humanitarian community and military responders enhance cooperation on
regional disaster response and preparedness, increase civil-military
collaboration, and encourage a robust collection of best practices for
future relief efforts.
The Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (DKI
APCSS): While DKI APCSS is no longer a Direct Reporting Unit to
USPACOM, I have formally designated it as a ``Mission Partner'' to
underscore its importance to the USPACOM mission set. DKI APCSS builds
and sustains key regional partnerships, improves partner nation
capacity, and enhances cooperation on regional security challenges. The
Center's courses, workshops, dialogues, and alumni engagements directly
support OSD-Policy and USPACOM priorities and are integrated into
USPACOM's Theater Campaign Order. Focus areas include: rule-of-law
based governance emphasizing civilian oversight of militaries, defense
institution building, maritime security, and enhancing regional
security architecture; collaborative approaches to maritime security,
domain awareness, and counterterrorism; and improved capability and
cooperation in HADR. DKI APCSS has major competitive advantages in its
location, credibility, convening power, and alumni network. APCSS has
now graduated 12,000 students--many now serve in key leadership
positions in nations throughout the Indo-Pacific. Those advantages, and
the Center's focus on substantive and sustainable outcomes, have
broadly improved security sector governance. Specifically, this
organization is leading the DOD in the implementation of UNSCR 1325
(Women, Peace, and Security) and the U.S. National Action Plan to
achieve greater inclusion of women in the security sector.
Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC): USPACOM continually
benefits from the expertise and responsiveness the U.S. Transportation
Command's (USTRANSCOM) JECC provides to Combatant Commanders world-
wide. JECC recently demonstrated the ability to respond effectively to
time sensitive, real-world operational requirements of USPACOM and
United States Forces Korea (USFK), specifically with surge support of
dynamic targeting and contingency planning efforts related to DPRK
provocations. JECC's deployable support teams remain critical to
USPACOM's ability to establish joint force headquarters rapidly,
fulfill Global Response Force (GRF) responsibilities, and bridge joint
operational requirements by providing mission-tailored, ready joint
capability packages. JECC supports real-world contingencies,
operational plans, and exercises, to include USPACOM's high-end Pacific
Sentry series.
Logistics Support Agreements (LSAs): USPACOM continues to view
LSAs as critical Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) enablers, with 16
logistics agreements in the region. We continue to actively work with
eligible but as yet uncommitted partners to conclude as many of these
agreements as possible, and I personally stress their importance in my
engagements with partner country leadership. The logistics agreement
with Japan was especially useful during the Kumamoto earthquake
disaster in 2016, and the logistics agreement with the Philippines was
absolutely crucial in our support to the Marawi counter-terrorism
operations last year. I often share these success stories with our
partners and ensure they understand that the ability of U.S. forces to
provide support during a crisis or disaster is limited without an LSA
in place.
Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar (PASOLS): PASOLS is
an annual forum that brings together senior logisticians from 30
countries in the Indo-Pacific. The goal is to strengthen regional
cooperation, improve interoperability, and develop partner capacity to
cooperatively address regional challenges. The Republic of Korea hosted
PASOLS 46 in September 2017. PASOLS is our most important annual
logistics engagement event.
conclusion
United States interests in the Indo-Pacific are real and enduring,
while the growing challenges to our interests are daunting and cannot
be overstated. In order to deter potential adversaries in the Indo-
Pacific, America must continue to invest in critical capabilities,
build a force posture that decreases our vulnerabilities and increases
our resiliency, and reassure our allies and partners. Simultaneously,
we must also encourage our allies and partners to be full and
cooperative partners in their own defense and the defense of the free
and open international order. America's resolve is strong, and it is
imperative we continue to show our resolve and commitment to the region
in the years to come. I ask this committee to continue support for
future capabilities that maintain our edge and prevent would-be
challengers from gaining the upper hand.
Thank you for your enduring support to the USPACOM team and our
families who live and work in the Indo-Pacific--a region critical to
America's future.
[The prepared statement of General Vincent Brooks follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Vincent K. Brooks
introduction
Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished members of
the Senate Armed Services Committee, thank you for your continued
support to our efforts. I sincerely regret that I am unable, due to the
ongoing mission requirements here in Korea, to appear before you in
person. I am grateful to Admiral Harry Harris, my ``battle buddy'' of
many years for shouldering the testimony load by himself.
For nearly 2 years, I have had the distinct honor to command the
men and women of the United Nations Command (UNC), the Republic of
Korea (ROK) and United States Combined Forces Command (CFC), and the
United States Forces Korea (USFK). These extraordinary soldiers,
sailors, airmen, marines and civilians--Korean and American, and
representatives of the original 17 UNC Sending States from the Korean
War--remain forward-deployed, devoted to deterrence, and postured to
defend the Republic of Korea and its citizens every day. I could not be
prouder of their efforts.
We could not accomplish our mission in the Republic of Korea
without the steadfast Congressional support we receive each year. We
are dedicated to maintaining strong relationships with our counterparts
on Capitol Hill and are grateful for the opportunity to host
Congressional delegations to visit our facilities, discuss our
challenges, and meet with senior officials to engage on various issues
to strengthen our posture and defend our allies. Your unwavering
dedication to the Command enables us to foster the cohesion in
Northeast Asia necessary for the Alliance to act as the guarantor of
peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula. Thank you for your
commitment to the maximum pressure campaign, and the implementation of
United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR), all of which
are vital to the international efforts to apply the diplomatic and
economic pressure to further isolate the Kim regime while finding the
way toward complete, irreversible, verifiable denuclearization.
These diplomatic and economic efforts rest on the foundation of a
credible, ready military capability. Our effort to maintain a high
state of military readiness is coupled with developing and
strengthening relationships within the United States-ROK Alliance,
regionally with our allies and partners, and globally with UNC Sending
States to ensure that we have a structure of relationships tailor-made
to adaptively respond to the myriad of potential security challenges in
the region. I am confident that our combined and unified team is
prepared to address the complex and dynamic challenges we may
potentially face. The ROK-United States Alliance--although increasingly
tested by North Korea's military advancements--remains ironclad. A
spirit of goodwill between the United States and the Republic of Korea
as enduring allies undergirds our day-to-day interactions. Here in
Korea, we (ROK and United States) go together.
activities across the three commands
The three commands--UNC, CFC, and USFK--made improvements in
numerous areas in the past year, which significantly increased our
readiness to fulfill the unique missions of each command. UNC is the
home for international commitments to the Korean Peninsula. CFC is the
heart of the United States-ROK Alliance. USFK is living proof of
America's enduring commitment to the defense of South Korea. Together
the three Commands provide the collective capabilities necessary to
enhance the security of the ROK and its citizens.
Throughout the past year, UNC harnessed efforts to increase its
vitality and relevance as the home for international commitments to the
Korean Peninsula. While steadfastly maintaining the Armistice, we
actively sought to expand our engagements with the 17 United Nations
Command Sending States and our like-minded international partners. We
continued to identify and enhance intelligence sharing,
interoperability and unified training and planning opportunities. UNC
Sending States provided liaison officers to augment the 2017 UNC
Military Armistice Commission (MAC) Secretariat mission including
advise and assist visits, inspections and investigations, observations,
Armistice education, and DMZ access control. Over the last 2 years,
other non-U.S. UNC Sending States have shared their perspectives and
robustly supported exercises on the Peninsula by contributing a total
of 755 service members.
Efforts are advancing for the possible development of Visiting
Forces Agreements (VFA) for UNC Sending States. We are also striving to
establish greater end-to-end awareness with UNCRear Headquarters in
Japan. Corollary efforts are being made to discuss the critical role of
bases in and agreements with Japan. During 2017, UNC-Rear hosted a
significant increase in multilateral engagements, including port calls,
aircraft visits, and visits from UNC Sending States and other
international partners. These notable activities serve to reinforce
UNC's organic, multinational framework for international peace and
security on the Peninsula.
CFC is the heart of the United States-ROK Alliance (which, for the
ROK, is the cornerstone of their foreign policy) and its primary
warfighting command. Over the past year, CFC strived for an increase in
naval, aerial, and special operations exercises, which highlighted the
strength and readiness of the combined force. These bilateral efforts
demonstrated that we stand ready to defend against all adversaries and
support diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts of our two
governments. CFC increased its interactions with multilateral partners
through its robust exercise program. The Command also refined its
Operations Plans (OPLAN); made significant advances in ballistic
missile defense (BMD); closed early warning gaps; and advanced theater
command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I)
capabilities. CFC continues to make progress in countering-weapons of
mass destruction (CWMD), cyber, and joint information environment
efforts.
As living proof of America's commitment to the defense of the ROK,
United States Forces Korea also made advances in readiness and
capabilities. Based upon the Alliance decision this past year, the
Command successfully deployed the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
(THAAD) BMD system to South Korea. This advanced system is the most
effective BMD platform in the world and an important capability that--
when paired with existing systems like Patriot--reinforces the BMD
architecture defending millions of ROK citizens, much of South Korea's
critical infrastructure, as well as United States Forces and assets in
the ROK. Action by the U.S. Congress improved our ability to logically
integrate Patriot and THAAD systems so the ``right'' interceptor, not
just the ``best'' interceptor defeats any incoming threats. Our ability
to intercept inbound North Korean ballistic missiles threatening the
areas defended by THAAD and Patriot have been remarkably enhanced.
USFK also increased several critical munition stockpiles essential
for the defense of the ROK. This major effort was accomplished with the
tireless assistance of the military Departments, in close partnership.
The Command continued to receive and integrate rotational brigades,
which participated in numerous combined exercises with their ROK
counterparts. Last year, the Command also relocated the United States
Eighth Army from Yongsan Garrison, within the capital city of Seoul, to
Camp Humphreys, approximately 50 miles to the south and well outside
the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area (GSMA). This is a milestone in
USFK's efforts to return Yongsan Garrison to the ROK Government and a
move that reflects the enduring nature of our commitment.
The Command also continued to emphasize a robust and challenging
exercise program that serves as a cornerstone of our readiness. We
participated in bilateral exercises ULCHI Freedom Guardian (summer) and
Key Resolve (spring), the two largest command post exercises supported
by the Department of Defense (DOD). U.S. Eighth Army executed two Non-
combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) exercises, named Focused Passage
and Courageous Channel, in the spring and in the summer, respectively,
which improved NEO readiness and better integrated our plans and
actions with United States Embassy Seoul, United States Embassy Tokyo,
United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) and United States
Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). United States Special Operations
Command Korea (SOCKOR) executed nine joint combined exercise training
events that focused on working with their ROK Special Operations
counterparts. USTRANSCOM, U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), and U.S.
Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) remain key partners who have enhanced
their readiness to support contingency operations in Korea over the
last year, and I remain grateful for their devoted support.
In November, the USS Ronald Reagan, USS Nimitz, and USS Theodore
Roosevelt carrier strike groups conducted a tri-carrier strike force
exercise in U.S. Seventh Fleet's area of operation, the first of its
kind in ten years. In a truly combined and joint fashion, CFC conducted
two maritime counter-special operations forces (MCSOF) exercises where
combined Army, Air Force, and Navy aviation assets operated under the
tactical control of ROK Aegis ships and United States Navy strike
groups to rehearse preventing infiltration along South Korea's maritime
flanks. The U.S. Seventh Air Force-hosted Vigilant Ace exercise brought
state-of-the-art capabilities to the Peninsula by incorporating F-22s
and F-35s into our combined air operations for the first time. In a
show of close cooperation between United States and ROK military
forces, we conducted numerous multilateral shows of force utilizing B-1
bombers and our newest 5th Generation aircraft, as well as combined
live fire exercises utilizing the United States Army Tactical Missile
System (ATACMS) and the ROK Hyunmoo-II Missile.
We also cooperated with our ROK ally through other formal and
informal frameworks. In October 2017, the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff
hosted the annual Military Committee Meeting (MCM) and Security
Consultative Meeting (SCM) between the United States Secretary of
Defense and the ROK Minister of Defense. The Foreign Affairs and
Defense agencies of both countries also approved a framework for the
Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG), which now
works to strengthen the Alliance's deterrence posture against North
Korean nuclear and missile threats. The second EDSCG meeting convened
this past January, with increased emphasis on Alliance coordination of
defense activities and strategic communications. Informal processes
were also continuously at play through the conduct of our bilateral
command post exercises and the recurrent engagements between members of
our Command and various ROK officials.
strategic environment
North Korea. North Korea remains a significant threat to security
and stability in Northeast Asia and beyond. The past year was marked by
continued North Korean provocations, threats, and actions that have
raised tensions on the Korean Peninsula and across the globe. The Kim
Jong-un regime continues to hold security and stability in the Indo-
Pacific at risk with its conventional arms and further development of
WMD and other asymmetric capabilities capable of posing a direct threat
to the United States Homeland. Their strategy is aimed at fracturing
consensus among the key regional actors by carefully orchestrating the
timing and methods of their provocative actions and messaging.
In 2017 alone, North Korea launched three ballistic ICBMs and
conducted its sixth nuclear test along with 16 other missile launch
events (two of which overflew Japan). North Korea's missiles threaten
not only South Korea, but an increasing number of our allies. Pyongyang
overtly threatens the safety of citizens in Australia, Japan, the
United Kingdom, the United States, specifically calling out Guam, and
South Korea. In addition, the Kim regime deployed a chemical agent in
Malaysia to assassinate Kim Jong-un's half-brother Kim Jong Nam in the
sovereign territory of another nation. While the sum of these unlawful
activities and developments may have extended the reach of North
Korea's threats, the international community has confronted the Kim
Jong-un regime in months past with unprecedented diplomatic and
economic pressure.
Though the expanding range of North Korea's ballistic missiles is
concerning, a serious, credible threat to 25 million ROK citizens and
approximately 150,000 United States citizens living in the GSMA is also
posed from its long range artillery. Nearly 250,000 United States
citizens live in South Korea, with approximately 150,000 Americans in
the GSMA. North Korea has deployed at least three artillery systems
capable of ranging targets in the GSMA with virtually no warning.
Conservative predictions of a likely attack scenario anticipate an
initial artillery barrage focused on military targets, which would
result in significant casualties, while a larger attack targeting
civilians would yield several thousand casualties with the potential to
affect millions of South Korean citizens, not to mention hundreds of
thousands of United States citizens and nationals of other countries
within the first 24 hours. North Korea also possesses the world's
largest special operations force, the fourth largest standing army, and
a long-standing chemical weapons program with the capability to produce
nerve, blister, blood and choking agents. Moreover, North Korea could
employ chemical weapons agents by modifying a variety of conventional
munitions, including artillery and ballistic missiles. Considering its
known research efforts, physical infrastructure, and weapons industry,
the North also has a potential capability for biological warfare.
Kim Jong-un's regime continues to expand its offensive cyber
capabilities. In May 2017, ransomware attributed to North Korea
attacked computer systems worldwide. This came on the heels of cyber
operations that allowed the country to steal more than $80 million from
international financial systems in 2016. According to reports, North
Korea has more than 6,000 hackers, whose improving capabilities provide
the regime a financial pipeline to support its weapons programs and a
means to collect sensitive information from other parties and disrupt
infrastructure in other countries.
While North Korea continued its pattern of destabilizing
activities, cooperation and consensus among concerned partners and the
greater international community increased. Just this last year, the
United Nations Security Council championed efforts to further isolate
the North, unanimously adopting Resolutions (UNSCRs) 2345, 2356, 2371,
2375, and 2397 to denounce its unlawful nuclear and ballistic missile
tests, condemn its persistent defiance of the will of the international
community and violations of international law, and further sanction the
Kim regime. The full and strict implementation of UN sanctions will
bring about greater pressure on North Korea.
The year came to an end with a 73-day hiatus from North Korean
provocations, interrupted by the 29 November (Korea date--and 28
November in Washington) ballistic missile launch that achieved the
highest apogee and longest flight time yet. In the time since that
event to the submission of this report, we have experienced another
hiatus from provocations. This is worthy of note, given the rapid pace
of testing that characterized 2017.
The steady application of focused international pressure may be
having an effect, given the recent signs of rapprochement between North
and South Korea. Both sides cooperated at the Pyeongchang Winter
Olympics hosted by South Korea and have pursued cultural exchanges in
conjunction with athletic engagements. In addition, they agreed to
conduct military engagement around the re-established border hotline
and explore other senior official meetings in order to improve
relationships between the countries and ease tensions on the Korea
Peninsula. We continue to observe and closely coordinate with our ROK
partners during these recent developments. The ROK Government believes
that dialogue must be added to pressure in order to move toward
denuclearization. My frequent encounters with the senior leadership of
the ROK Government make this clear. South Korea will respond to North
Korea's sending an Envoy and a representative to the ROK during the
Pyeongchang Olympics, while conveying a unified Alliance demand for
complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization of North Korea.
Republic of Korea. Strong Alliance military cooperation persisted
through South Korea's political transition in 2017, as the ROK
continued to demonstrate commitment to increase its primary military
role of conventional deterrence by developing and procuring modern,
interoperable capabilities. The ROK Government continues to increase
spending on defense (currently 2.7 percent of GDP), and ROK President
Moon Jae-in committed to further raise ROK defense spending by 0.1
percent of GDP each year through 2022. As a comparison, ROK defense
spending as a proportion of GDP is higher than all NATO members save
the United States. The ROK Government also contributes significant
funds to the United States military presence in South Korea. In 2017,
the Special Measures Agreement (SMA) provided approximately $830
million in support of USFK activities that would have otherwise been
paid by the United States Treasury, and the ROK Government approved a
one percent increase to the SMA for 2018. South Korea is also funding
92 percent of the total costs for the expansion, construction and
relocation effort into United States Army Garrison Humphreys in the
city of Pyeongtaek. In addition to strong fiscal support from the ROK
Government, the South Korean public is strongly in favor of the
Alliance, demonstrated by a high United States favorability rating that
today ranges between 75 and 85 percent.
Seoul is also investing heavily in defense modernization. The
United States and South Korea currently manage over 650 foreign
military sales cases, valued at over $26 billion. Our Korean ally has
committed to acquire a number of military capabilities critical to our
Alliance, particularly in the areas of intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR), missile defense, air superiority, precision
guided munitions, and maritime security. Some examples of recent
acquisitions include Global Hawk unmanned surveillance aircraft,
Patriot PAC-3 upgrades, Guidance Enhanced Missiles (GEM-T), Harpoon
missiles, Aegis KDX-III destroyers, AH-64E Apache attack helicopters,
upgrades of KF-16s, and F-35A Joint Strike Fighters. These capabilities
and commitments are designed to greatly enhance the warfighting
readiness of the ROK-United States Alliance and bring about many of the
conditions required for successful transition of wartime operational
control (OPCON) to South Korea. Additionally, South Korea recently
began BMD modernization. Once completed, ROK Patriot BMD forces will
have greater effectiveness against theater ballistic missiles. In
concert with these advances in ROK defense modernization, we are
striving for ever-greater transparency within the Alliance regarding
these maturing capabilities to ensure there is a common understanding
of all of the tools that will be available to the CFC in wartime. It is
notable that South Korea not only invests in advanced United States
technologies in a large way, but they also develop their own advanced
capabilities as a sophisticated, technologically advanced ally.
Beyond the Korean Peninsula, South Korea contributes to
international security through peacekeeping operations, stabilization
and reconstruction efforts, regional security cooperation initiatives,
and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Seoul has also taken
important steps to increase its cooperation with Japan by bolstering
multilateral cooperation, particularly in the areas of information-
sharing and BMD. There is sufficient military willingness to cooperate
more with Japan both trilaterally and multilaterally; however, the deep
social and political issues that mark the history of the relationship
between the two countries will determine the pace of progress toward
this collective end.
China. China remains a pivotal player with unique global reach and
is one of the region's most influential actors. While it once held a
reputation for being as close to North Korea as ``lips and teeth,''
Beijing has expressed frustration with the North's repeated
provocations, and supported multilateral sanctions against the regime.
However, China also retaliated economically against Seoul in protest of
its deployment of the THAAD BMD system on the Peninsula. One of the
most impacted sectors was ROK tourism, with losses estimated to exceed
$6.5 billion. During President Xi and President Moon's summit in
Beijing in December, the deployment of THAAD to the Peninsula and
China's pressure on the South continued to linger as an issue between
the two nations. China and South Korea pledged to improve bilateral
relations and bolster cooperation. I find that this has been partially
acted upon, and there are still limits to the degree of cooperation and
relief between South Korea and China.
The United States is looking closely at how China approaches its
relations with North Korea, especially regarding implementation of
recent UNSCRs. There are open source reports of recent Chinese efforts
to uphold sanctions which indicate China's trade with the North has
fallen since strengthened international sanctions came into effect in
September 2017 and January 2018. Such a drop in trade may be
attributable to decreases in North Korean exports of coal, iron ore,
lead ore, and seafood to China. It is evident that the relationship
between China and North Korea is a strained one, perhaps at an historic
low point. China's continued enforcement of sanctions will be vital to
achieving the ``biting'' effect required to cause the North Korean
regime to reconsider its strategic weapons development.
Russia. Russia remains opposed to North Korea's persistent
provocations and has implemented some sanctions against Pyongyang.
However, as it observes international cooperation, it also adopts the
opportunist role in the Indo-Pacific that it takes elsewhere in the
world. Recent signaling indicates that Moscow may attempt to continue
to grow its role on the Korean Peninsula. In July 2017, Russia joined
China in endorsing a ``freeze-for-freeze'' initiative that calls for
North Korea to refrain from missile and nuclear testing and the United
States and South Korea to halt large-scale bilateral military
exercises. In December 2017, Russia also expressed a willingness to
mediate talks between the United States and North Korea. We find
Russia's actions to be based on self-interest and must always remain
alert to their inclination to ``spoil'' progress being made around
them.
Japan. In light of North Korean provocations, Japanese Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe has sought to bolster his country's defensive
posture and allow Japan to play a larger role in the United States-
Japan alliance. Along these lines, Tokyo is pursuing its largest-ever
defense budget for FY 2018, with funds earmarked for introducing the
United States military's Aegis Ashore land-based missile interceptor
system to protect against North Korean missiles. Tokyo also sought to
advance substantive cooperation with Seoul in areas where they have
complementary interests. Japan's recent attendance at the Vancouver
Foreign Ministers Meeting on Security and Stability on the Korean
Peninsula and Prime Minister Abe's appearance at the Winter Olympics in
South Korea are positive signals between South Korea and Japan. Japan
and South Korea remain in a complex relationship, which I assess may
improve in 2018 if internal domestic politics provide more room for
cooperation and constructive engagement. UNC, which maintains a
headquarters and seven bases in Japan, and USFK remain in unprecedented
closeness to the Japan Self Defense Forces, and to United States Forces
Japan, through engagements in South Korea and in Japan. The trajectory
is measured, yet positive.
looking to the future
Innovation. USFK endeavors to become a hub for burgeoning
technologies, innovative thinking, and the application of fresh
strategic capabilities. With the addition of ROK and UNC partner
capabilities, we seek innovative approaches to solve our challenges in
this highly dynamic environment. I have directed the creation of a
small team--the Emerging Capabilities and Innovative Effects Division--
to connect and apply the innovation that is emerging from across the
DOD to the Alliance's opportunities and challenges on the Korean
Peninsula.
Initial efforts are centered on the integrated defense of the GSMA.
The ability to destroy North Korean artillery and ballistic missiles at
their firing positions, coupled with the ability to intercept and
protect the South Korean capital from these threats, are options we
seek to continually develop and employ with our ROK partners. We also
look to develop a robust chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear,
and explosive integrated early warning system with our ROK counterparts
in order to provide immediate detection and public warning while
informing decision making at the highest levels of the two governments.
When examining many of the military challenges we face, there are
opportunities for path-changing innovation. Through this work, USFK
established unique partnerships with defense, government, industry, and
academic organizations in the United States, South Korea and UNC
Sending States. Recent Command engagements with Defense Digital Service
(DDS), Defense Innovation Unit--Experimental (DIUx), Defense Threat
Reduction Agency (DTRA), U.S. Army Research, Development, and
Engineering Command (RDECOM), Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA), and Massachusetts Institute of Technology-Lincoln Laboratory
have enabled the Command to begin to sharpen its focus and spur
innovation with our partners.
Increased multilateral cooperation. Nations in the Indo-Pacific
and beyond are increasingly concerned about the North Korean threat,
and many have demonstrated their willingness to work with South Korea,
Japan, the United States, and like-minded partners to more rigorously
implement UNSCRs that impose sanctions on the Kim regime. Our efforts
extend to integrating UNC Sending States and FVEY partners into
combined exercises and planning efforts in the Korean theater of
operations. We are grateful to the Department of State for their
successful sponsorship of the January 2018 Vancouver Foreign Ministers
Meeting on Security and Stability on the Korean Peninsula, an idea that
emerged from monthly meetings with the Ambassadors of the 17 United
Nations Sending States of the Korean War. We will stand ready to enable
any additional opportunities that may arise from this important
international gathering.
By reinforcing our multilateral efforts, we will work toward a
coherent, collective response to our common security challenges and
find ways to enhance interoperability and improve our collective
defense capabilities. It is paramount that we continue to improve
ballistic missile defenses, facilitate the sharing of information, and
conduct exercises to maintain a common operational framework. We will
bolster maritime interdiction operations, humanitarian assistance and
disaster response exercises, and anti-submarine warfare capabilities.
Improved readiness. USFK's efforts to improve readiness on the
Peninsula are a two-pronged approach aimed at ensuring we conduct
robust combined and joint exercise cycles and continue whole scale
integration efforts throughout each subordinate component command. We
will execute the two major theater-level command post exercises and one
theater-level field training exercise each year. These exercises are
essential to strengthen the Alliance, deter North Korean aggression,
ensure the UNC's ability to maintain the Armistice, improve force
readiness and interoperability, and integrate UNC Sending State
(multinational) forces and capabilities into theater defense
operations. Maintaining and further developing these exercises in the
future also provides the ability to execute certification requirements
for the transfer of wartime OPCON, while concurrently assessing our
combined warfighting readiness.
The Combined Forces Command is also making great progress toward
becoming more united at the component level. Cooperation between the
Commander, Naval Forces Korea (CNFK) and the Commander of the ROK Fleet
(CRF) hit an inflection point in February 2017 with the collocation of
their headquarters (HQ) on the ROK Fleet base in Busan. This has
dramatically increased cooperation, interoperability, and warfighting
synchronization and effectiveness. Current initiatives are underway at
U.S. Seventh Air Force to streamline the integration of combined
component-level HQ staffs to operate together on a routine basis.
SOCKOR is becoming more combined with their ROK counterparts through a
recent increase in engagements, establishment of a co-located staff
element within the ROK Special Operations Forces Headquarters, and a
planned feasibility assessment for the collocation of the SOCKOR HQ
with ROK Special Warfare Command.
Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP). Our commitment to the timely
completion of the Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP) and Land Partnership
Plan (LPP) remains one of my top priorities. USFK unit relocation and
the closing and relocating of camps continue to progress favorably.
Through the consolidation of U.S. Forces and positioning troops closer
to air and sea installations south of Seoul, the relocation program
enhances United States-ROK Alliance readiness, and improves USFK's
capacity to respond to future defense initiatives. 2017 saw the
relocation of the U.S. Eighth Army Headquarters to U.S. Army Garrison--
Humphreys. Relocation of most remaining units to that garrison--USFK,
UNC, United States Marine Forces Korea and the 2nd Infantry Division
Headquarters--is slated for completion in 2018. We continue to
cooperate closely with the ROK Government to enable seamless progress
of the remaining USFK base relocations, and to consult closely on camp
return issues through the Joint Environmental Assessment Procedure
(JEAP).
Conditions-based OPCON Transition Plan (COTP). The Alliance has
made significant progress in setting the conditions for the future
combined command. The command will continue to operate under the
bilateral guidance of the Presidents of the United States and South
Korea or their delegates. After this transition, a United States
general officer will change roles to serve as the deputy commander of
the future combined command and remain as commander of the UNC and
USFK. U.S. Forces will continue to operate under U.S. national
authorities. The Alliance is prepared to accelerate OPCON transition as
South Korea continues to develop and acquire the critical capabilities
required for the Alliance's wartime success. The OPCON transition
process must proceed in a way that strengthens deterrence against North
Korea and enhances our combined capabilities.
The ROK Minister of Defense and U.S. Secretary of Defense pledged
in October 2017 to make joint efforts to implement the commitment by
President Trump and President Moon in June 2017 to enable the
expeditious conditions-based transfer of wartime OPCON. The Minister of
Defense emphasized South Korea's commitment to complete the
preparations necessary to exercise OPCON in accordance with the signed
COTP. The draft organization of the future combined command was
discussed, and the Ministers decided to continue to refine the concept
through combined exercises and certifications. They also committed to
develop Alliance guiding principles for the further enhancement of
combined defense posture post-OPCON transition. The two sides decided
to reexamine the implementation plan for OPCON transition, such as the
Alliance capability acquisition plan; Terms of Reference--Relationship
(TOR-R) and Operation Plan; and combined exercises and certification
plan. They also agreed to jointly review and update COTP by the 2018
SCM.
critical capabilities
Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). CFC and USFK
will seek multi-discipline, persistent ISR capability and associated
exploitation support to extend the warning time available to the
Commander. Deep-look ISR and moving target indicators provide the
ability to continuously track indications and warnings (I&W) targets
over longer durations. As North Korea grows its threat to the Homelands
of the United States and our allies, it is essential to have the
fullest possible picture of activities in all domains above the
Military Demarcation Line. While there are restrictions, both generally
under international law and under the Armistice regime, on using ISR
assets outside of ROK territory or in international airspace and
waters, an increase in assets available and a broadening of the
spectrum of collection would be helpful to improve our I&W, and to
better sense opportunities in our competition short of war.
Command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence
(C4I). It is important that we strive for C4I interoperability with
our Korean ally, in areas including tactical communications and blue-
force situational awareness and seek system survivability and
robustness to enable modernized information sharing. Policies,
agreements, and technologies must lean toward enabling bi-national and
multi-national information sharing. We rely on military and commercial
satellite capacity for mission command to provide assured
communications and situational awareness down to the individual
soldier. Advanced C4I capabilities that are compatible with the
available frequency spectrum in Korea, able to penetrate underground
facilities and capable of transmitting high bandwidth imagery and data
via satellite are essential to our mission set.
Ballistic missile defense (BMD). We have made significant strides
in BMD capability this year with the commitment to thicken the layers
of missile defense through THAAD and Patriot system modernization.
Increasing interoperability with ROK systems is a key part of improving
Alliance missile defense, including program upgrades to the ROK Patriot
system and procurement of PAC-3 interceptors. As North Korea continues
to improve its missile forces, the ROK-United States Alliance must also
continue to expand its BMD capabilities.
Countering-WMD (CWMD). North Korea continually demonstrates its
commitment to develop its chemical, biological and nuclear weapons
programs, so it is imperative that we work diligently to close any gaps
in our CWMD capabilities that would put ROK-United States forces,
civilian safety and our objectives at risk. We must ensure we have
sufficient integrated early warning, protection, decontamination
capabilities, and medical countermeasures and that our systems provide
a shared picture of the combined operational environment.
Critical munitions. Thanks in large part to our U.S. military
service partners, we made significant progress during the past year to
increase our stocks of select munitions that are critical to early
phases of conflict. However, there is still work to be done. Together
with our ROK counterparts, we continue to identify ways to close these
capability gaps through various procurement channels. The long-term
U.S. solution is for the services to develop munitions requirements,
fund, and procure munitions identified through the Joint Capabilities
Integration Development System (JCIDS) and Munitions Requirements
Process (MRP) to supply munitions that are not available from other
sources.
closing
Through the difficult challenges of the past year, UNC, CFC, and
USFK have steadfastly defended United States security interests on the
Korean Peninsula, and sought to maintain stability in Northeast Asia.
The United States military presence on the Korean Peninsula and the
strength of the United States-ROK Alliance are critical to deterring
future aggression, and posturing for potential conflict. As Commander,
I can report that over the past year the Command improved readiness;
pursued innovative solutions to our challenges; and filled capability
shortfalls that lessen North Korea's ability to hold the United States
and South Korea at risk. By making thoughtful resource decisions,
developing Alliance initiatives, and reinforcing relationships with our
allies and partners, we will continue to shape our environment to
advance security and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Thanks to the
Committee for your support, and for the opportunity to communicate my
assessment of our current posture. I am honored to have the privilege
of leading American soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines; our
Government civilians; and their counterparts from the Republic of
Korea. Our Alliance remains strong through daily trustbuilding
interactions that are enabled by your support. We will remain ready to
``fight tonight'' while also ensuring we take every possible route to
prevent war and accomplish U.S. and ROK strategic objectives.
``Katchi Kap-shi-da!'' We Go Together!
Senator Inhofe. Well, thank you very much. It was an
excellent opening statement.
You know, since we started the NDS as being the two-three
approach, the two, of course, is China and Russia, and the
changes, I've commented in my opening statement that, when
Senator Ernst and Senator Sullivan and Senator Rounds and I
were over there, and with you and then on through that area, it
was very disturbing. During the trip, we came to the conclusion
that our allies are worried about the pace of China, which is
more evident, more visible than anything that we're doing.
A key topic of discussion was China's built-up
militarization in the South China Sea. In fact, over 3,200
acres have now been--they call it ``reclamation.'' I don't call
it ``reclamation,'' because there's nothing to reclaim. It's
creation of new land. They don't have the legal authority to do
the things they're doing, but they're doing them anyway. That's
gotten everyone's attention. These reclaimed lands are up to
over 3,000 acres now, and they have a shocking amount of
military equipment there, and it's very disturbing. It's
increased its military activities in the Sea to bolster its
territorial claims there, despite U.S. and international
efforts to maintain freedom of navigation. That's a serious
problem.
If you look at the location of these islands, it's right in
the navigation province, creating problems, potentially, for
us. It's also increased the pace of the military activities.
The Trump administration's National Defense Strategy, as I
mentioned, places an emphasis on improving our ability to
expand the competitive space against China.
Now, the thing that disturbs us--and I think I speak for
all five of us who were over there just two weeks ago--is the--
our allies are actually having a hard time choosing between
China and us because of the visibility of what they're doing.
I'm talking about allies that I mentioned in my opening
statement. We talked to the Philippines, Taiwan, South Korea,
Japan, and they all seem to be divided between the leadership--
their Secretaries that--or Ministers of Defense and their
Foreign Ministers are each taking a different side. So, it
was--that was an awakening to us to see that happen.
So, starting with China. I'll just ask you the question.
You've covered it pretty well. You talked about, ``China's
intent is clear.'' Well, let me ask you. Do you consider
China's buildup in that area as a direct threat to the United
States and its allies?
Admiral Harris. Senator, I do believe that China's actions
and what they've done in the South China Sea does threaten our
position there. I think they're reaching a point of position on
advantage in the South China Sea. If it comes to a conflict,
we'll have to deal with that.
Senator Inhofe. Yeah.
Admiral Harris. I do believe that China gains when we don't
call them out publicly. It's important that we maintain that
public criticism of China.
Now, I've talked, in the past, that we should compliment
China and thank them for the things that they are doing in the
international space that's good for the order, things like
counter-piracy operations, their work to help the effort to
remove chemical weapons from Syria, and on and on. These are
positive things. Most recently, their work in the U.N.
sanctions regime against North Korea. We should thank them for
that, and appreciate that.
Senator Inhofe. Yeah. I understand that.
Admiral Harris. But, at the same time, we should hold them
accountable for the things they're doing that are provocative
and aggressive to their neighbors and to us. We do have to
counter their perception, as I mentioned in my comments, that
the U.S. is either a declining power, which I don't believe, or
a disinterested power, which I also don't believe. But, that is
the perception, and we must work to counter that, in my
opinion.
Senator Inhofe. Well, I know that's the perception, because
we were there, and we heard that articulated, and there is no
doubt what their feelings are.
Just before I run out of time, I want to mention North
Korea, and, of course, Russia is the threat. But, North Korea
is something that is a changing scene. We had a hearing, last
week in this chamber, of our intel. We had the DIA [Defense
Intelligence Agency] and the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency]
here, and we talked about this in some depth. I just disagreed
with them. I've never disagreed with Dan Coats in my life until
that--until last week. But, when he--asked the question, ``Do
you really think that this recent communication from Un to our
President was one that we cannot depend on having any
results?'' They both said, ``No, we've gone through this drill
before.'' To me, it's different this time. We had a very
direct, harsh response from our President to Kim Jong-un when
he made the statement about having the button, ``I'll press
it,'' and all of that. It was immediately after that response
that North Korea communicated with South Korea and said, ``We
want to join in now with the Winter Olympics,'' and then, of
course, they came out with this statement. I can't help but
think----
Look, his dad, Un's dad, never had the bargaining chip that
he has now. The fact that, November the 28th, that they sent
something over that can reach the United States, that's
something that he can use. People argue, ``Well, it didn't have
a payload, it wouldn't have performed that well with a
payload.'' That doesn't give me any comfort at all. They say it
doesn't have the reentry capability. But, you know, the fact
that they can do that, puts him in a position, I think, to be a
negotiator. Is there anything further concerning the threat
from Un that you want to share before I turn this over?
Admiral Harris. Sir, I'll just say that I do believe that
the strength of the pressure campaign plan was part--a big part
of bringing North Korea to the table, to the offer of a summit.
Senator Inhofe. I----
Admiral Harris. Without the strength of the pressure
campaign plan and its effectiveness so far, I don't think we
would be where we are.
Senator Inhofe. I appreciate that very much.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Admiral Harris, not only for your testimony, but
for your service, particularly, as you've indicated, this might
be your final meeting. You've served the Navy and the Nation
very well. Thank you, sir.
Admiral Harris. Final meeting with this committee, sir.
Senator Reed. With this committee, of course. There are
other committees, but let them----
Admiral Harris. Downrange. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. Yes, sir.
North Korea. Part of our approach must be multilateral with
all of our allies, including South Korea and Japan. Any
insights on Japanese participation? The South Koreans, of
course, initiated these talks, and seem to be engaged--
President Moon. But, President Abe has his own problems in
Japan, but, also, they--are they onboard? Are they going to be
100 percent with us on this?
Admiral Harris. I believe they will be, sir. I think that
Japan is clearly an interested party in what happens on the
Korean Peninsula and this summit that's coming up. But, I
believe that Japan will be supportive of the outcome. They
share our concerns about the trustworthiness of North Korea.
So, you know, we--in the past, in talking about other countries
and stuff, you know, we tend to use the term ``trust but
verify.'' In this case, I think it's ``distrust and verify.''
But, I believe that we are--that Japan will be with us as we go
forward, here.
Senator Reed. And, you know, perhaps being overly
optimistic, but if there is a--some type of an agreement, that
would require years and years of intense verification and
constant surveillance. So, we would be making a huge but, I
think, appropriate investment in terms of following up the--any
type of agreement with the kind of oversight and
nonproliferation activities that would be essential.
Admiral Harris. I agree with you, Senator. I do believe
that our position will remain a complete, verifiable
denuclearization, irreversible denuclearization of the
Peninsula, as we go into this. I think we can't be overly
optimistic on outcomes. We'll just have to see where it goes,
if and when we have the summit.
Senator Reed. Just two other questions. I presume, and I'll
ask you to comment, that this would, at its best, be a stepwise
process, that the likelihood of a total, complete agreement in
one or two meetings would--is doubtful, that progress would be
slow, that it would be a--concessions followed further
concessions, et cetera. Is that your view, too?
Admiral Harris. You know, I don't know, Senator. We've
never been in a position where the President, our President,
has met with a leader of North Korea, ever, and so, I don't
have a way to predict the future. I just think that we have to
go into this, eyes wide open.
Senator Reed. And just so, with respect to North Korea,
finally, a great deal of the pressure has been generated
economically by the Chinese participation. It's actually--
they're getting better and better, in terms of curtailing trade
with North Korea. Do you sense any kind of pullback now, based
on other issues, like trade policies or anything else that----
Admiral Harris. With regard to China?
Senator Reed. China.
Admiral Harris. No, right now, Senator. As I mentioned
earlier, I think that we should compliment China for the work
that they're doing to enforce the sanctions that the United
Nations have--has put in place. I'm encouraged by China's
activities in this space with regard to North Korea. They have
a vested interest in the outcome, and I've said before that I
think China remains the key to a peaceful outcome on the Korean
Peninsula. But, China is not the key to all outcomes.
Senator Reed. Now, with respect to China and our presence
in the Pacific, the National Defense Strategy calls for a much
more forward presence, denser positioning of platforms and
personnel. That requires, obviously, the cooperation of the
countries of the Asia area. Their trade relationships with
China are increasing rather than decreasing. Would that make
them hesitant to invite us in or support our efforts?
Admiral Harris. It could, because they have to value--they
have to weigh a continued relationship and alliance--in some
cases, an alliance; certainly partnership, in all cases--with
the United States against economic advantages of their
relationships with China. But, I do believe that the United
States remains the security partner of choice. The work that
you all have done to fund the budget for the next 2 years, I
think that sends a strong signal of America's resilience and
continuing interest in the Pacific, in the Indo-Pacific region.
And I--and that goes a long way. The National Defense Strategy
acknowledges that we're in strategic competition with China. I
think that alone serves notice to not only China, but to our
friends, allies, and partners in the region.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Admiral.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, Admiral.
Last year, when you testified before the committee, you and
I discussed PACOM's need for ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance
and Reconnaissance]. I'm proud to represent Offutt Air Force
Base and the 55th Wing, which provides support for that mission
out of Kadina Airbase in Japan. Do you have enough ISR assets,
including the RC-135s, to be able to meet the demands in your
area of responsibility?
Admiral Harris. I do not, Senator.
Senator Fischer. Can you describe how you use the RC-135 in
PACOM?
Admiral Harris. Yeah, we're--yes, ma'am. We use the RC-35s,
the Rivet Joint, for all--not all, but for a large portion of
our signals intelligence requirements throughout the western
Pacific, whether it's in the northwestern Pacific focused on
North Korea, or whether it's in the South China Sea area
focused on China. But, RC-135--the Air Force's RC-135 and the
Navy's EP-3 are critical to signals intelligence collection
against our potential adversaries and adversaries in the
region.
Senator Fischer. When you said you don't have enough, is
that because demand's increasing?
Admiral Harris. I don't have enough because there isn't
enough to go around. When you look at a fixed amount of ISR
assets, and all of the combatant commanders have requirements,
then that--those requirements have to be apportioned by some
entity. That entity is the Joint Staff, through the global
force management process. You know, I think all of the
combatant commanders would tell you that none of us have all
that we want.
Senator Fischer. Do you see demand increasing in the----
Admiral Harris. I do see demand increasing, clearly.
Senator Fischer. North Korea's pursuit and aggressive
schedule of nuclear testing, in my understanding, is that the
WC-135s operating in PACOM provide valuable intelligence on
those activities. Is that correct?
Admiral Harris. That is correct.
Senator Fischer. Can you explain how that information helps
inform your decisionmaking with regard to forces in the area
of----
Admiral Harris. Well, the----
Senator Fischer.--your responsibility?
Admiral Harris.--the WC-135 is a service retain asset that
I have to ask for. When I ask for it, I always get it, which is
a good thing. WC-135 helps me understand the nature of North
Korea's nuclear testing.
Senator Fischer. You mention, in your testimony, the fact
that we risk losing the dominance of the air domain that we've
enjoyed for decades in the Pacific. Both China and Russia are
investing heavily in the A2AD [Anti-Access/Area Denial] and new
fifth-generation fighters, and are rapidly closing the gap. Do
you believe that we still have that air superiority in the
region?
Admiral Harris. I do believe we have that air superiority.
I think it's unquestioned now, but I can see a path where it
might not be, unless we continue to resource it.
Senator Fischer. Under what scenarios do you believe that
we risk losing that superiority and, really, the freedom of
access that we have?
Admiral Harris. If we don't overturn the Budget Control
Act, if sequestration is the law of the land, remains the law
of the land, and we're--and we fail to resource our
requirements in air superiority, then Chinese development will
continue apace, and there will be a timeline, a time of which
those lines cross, and we'll lose our air superiority. Today, I
believe we have it. I think the Congress's actions, as
evidenced by the bipartisan agreement last month, I think that
sends a strong signal and will help us maintain that advantage,
at least through fiscal year 2019.
Senator Fischer. When you talk about the advances that the
Chinese are having, are you speaking of the technologies----
Admiral Harris. I'm----
Senator Fischer.--that they're----
Senator Fischer.--speaking both the technologies, in terms
of Chinese development of fifth-generation fighters, and the
weight of their numbers, alone. You know, I've often said, in
that quantity has a quality all its own. And so, while the U.S.
equipment and personnel, in terms of quality, far exceeds that
of any of our competitors or potential competitors, quantity
has a quality all its own.
Senator Fischer. Can you speak to any certain technologies
that you believe might seriously threaten us?
Admiral Harris. I believe China's development and research
into hypersonic glide weapons is one of those technologies that
they're working on that could threaten us significantly.
Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
Senator Peters.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Admiral, for being here once again.
Admiral Harris, I'd like to ask you about Australia.
Australia, as you're well aware, has been a very consistent
United States ally for decades, but a recent article in Foreign
Affairs discusses how China interferes in Australia, working
covertly to manipulate the Australian political system by
access and influence, and stealing research and intellectual
property to aid China's military. Australia is also very
closely linked, economically, to China, with about a third of
their exports going to China, as well. But, despite these very
strong economic ties, Australia has taken steps to resist
China's influence, with public warnings that have been
amplified by the press, including investigations into links
between major political donors in Australia and the Chinese
Communist Government.
Admiral Harris, could you elaborate a little bit on what
you are seeing in Australia and their work? Are there perhaps
lessons that we should learn as a country, based on Australia's
experience with China?
Admiral Harris. Senator, surely.
I was in Australia last week. I visited with the Chief of
Defense there, Air Chief Marshal Binskin. I believe that
Australia is one of our strongest allies. They have been with
us for literally 100 years. This year is the 100th anniversary
of the first time American troops fought under a foreign
leader, and that was General John Monash in 1918, in World War
I. So, I have no doubt, there is no question about the
solidness and strength of the American-Australian alliance.
Specific to your questions about Chinese influence, it is
real in Australia. There is a book out that complements the
article that you spoke about, called ``Silent Invasion,'' and
it talks about malign Chinese influence in Australia. I think
Australia understands that. They get it. They're going after
it.
Senator Peters. Well, we should, and follow how they are
doing. It's successful, you believe? Are those----
Admiral Harris. I believe there are----
Senator Peters.--are there some lessons there for us?
Admiral Harris.--I believe there are lessons to be learned
in the Australian case that are applicable to our situation.
Senator Peters. Right. Thank you, Admiral.
Admiral, in your written testimony, you talk about the
Communist Party General Secretary promising military
development that would remain a national priority in China, and
that he pledges to modernize by 2035 and achieve, ``world-class
status by 2049.'' You go on to say that you believe that they
will achieve it well before those kinds of deadlines. So, talk
a little bit about that progress. Perhaps, are there any
benchmarks that we should look at to measure that progress,
ones that should raise particular alarms to us?
Admiral Harris. Yeah. So, I believe the development of
hypersonic weapons is a benchmark. I think the development of
China's fifth-generation fighters, fighter aircraft is another
benchmark. They are beginning to field fifth-generation
fighters now, the J-20, and they're developing the J-31. So, I
think these are things that we should watch carefully. As we
watch them, observe them militarize their bases in the South
China Sea, they're doing the vertical improvements on them now,
and they're turning these islands that they've built into
military bases, clearly. So, I think we have to keep our eyes
on that.
I think the new move, politically, inside China is already
a benchmark. Now, by that, I mean their decision to remove the
term limits that has been in place in China since Deng Xiaoping
became the leader there, and to have a president for life. I
view that with concern. I mean, there is a possibility that, in
2049, the centennial of the Modern People's Republic of China,
Xi Jinping could be the president then. I think that's--we
should view that with concern. The kind of country, the kind of
nation that China could be, we're getting a sense of that now,
with this move to remove term limits for its leader.
Senator Peters. So, given these challenges--and we've
talked about many of them, and there will be many more
challenges we'll talk about during this hearing--you also
mentioned, in your opening comments, that we need to figure out
a way to help China become a peaceful, cooperative partner with
the United States. What sort of things can we do to, hopefully,
get to that point?
Admiral Harris. Well, I do believe that we should continue
to encourage China to be a peaceful, responsible partner. We
shouldn't do that through rose-colored glasses. Our experience
in the past has been that, if we--or our hope in the past,
rather, has been that if we bring China into organizations like
the World Trade Organization, and include China in our military
exercises and the like, that somehow China will become like us.
``Us'' being not the United States only, but our democratic
friends, allies, and partners. I think the expectation is, the
reality is, that that's simply not true. China has taken
advantage of our openness with China to continue on the path
that they've always been on. We're seeing that play out now, in
2018. Certainly over the next 20 years or so, it'll be of
concern to us. But, that shouldn't obviate the need to try. We
should do so with eyes wide open.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Admiral.
Admiral Harris. You bet.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Peters.
Senator Cotton.
Senator Cotton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Admiral Harris, for your testimony and, once
again, for your service.
I want to speak about critical munitions; specifically,
ammunition. For all the fancy weapons we have in our military,
if you don't have enough rounds, then you don't have much. The
U.S. Navy has identified a number of shortfalls and unfunded
priorities, going forward, in this area, including LRASM [Long
Range Anti-Ship Missile], Harpoon Block II, AIM 96, and Mark
48. What would a shortfall of these munitions mean for you in
the PACOM area of operations?
Admiral Harris. Ultimately, Senator--depending on the size
of the shortfall, ultimately, it could mean we lose in war. I
mean, you've got to have the munitions to beat the enemy.
Senator Cotton. Yeah. Safe to say, then, that, given the
budget deal we reached last month and the additional funding
for our military, that if this committee and this Congress can
find more money for those munitions, that's something you would
support?
Admiral Harris. The budget deal was very much appreciated,
Senator. Thank you very much for that.
Senator Cotton. But, you would support additional funding
for those critical munitions?
Admiral Harris. I would.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
One kind of munition this country lacks, only country in
the world that lacks it now, is a ground-launched intermediate-
range cruise missile, because of the INF Treaty. Russia is not
supposed to have those. We now know that Russia does, because
they've been cheating on that treaty. Last year, we discussed
this topic, and you stated, ``The aspects of the INF
[Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty] Treaty that limit
our ability to counter Chinese and other countries' land-based
missiles, I think is problematic.'' Over the last year, China
has continued to produce the DF-21, the DF-26 missiles. So, I
think it's safe to assume that those challenges have continued
to increase.
If this country were no longer a part of the INF Treaty and
we could produce ground-launched intermediate-range cruise
missiles, could you explain what that would do to the military
balance of power in the PACOM----
Admiral Harris. Yes, sir.
Senator Cotton.--area of operations?
Admiral Harris. I think that we are at a disadvantage with
regard to China today, in the sense that China has ground-based
ballistic missiles that threaten our basing in the western
Pacific and our ships. They have ground-based ballistic anti-
ship missiles. We have nothing, we have no ground-based
capability that can threaten China, because of, among other
things, our rigid adherence, and rightfully so, to the treaty
that we signed on to, the INF Treaty.
That said, there are good aspects of INF, and that is the
nuclear piece of it, which we also adhere to. I think that's
important. So, I'm not calling for us to pull out of the INF. I
am asking and, suggesting rather, that we consider ways to work
within the INF regime to overcome these shortfalls that are
presented to us by China. Because INF, as you know, only
affects us and Russia and the successive republics from the
Soviet Union. It does not include China. China's not a
signatory to it. We can't reasonably expect, nor should we
expect, that China adhere to a treaty that they're not a
signatory to. But, it puts us at a disadvantage in the western
Pacific. So, we could do anything from one extreme, to pull
out, to the other extreme, to do nothing. I think we should
look at ways to maximize our operational flexibility with
regards to the advantage that China has over us, in terms of
ground-based ballistic missiles.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
One final question about the impact of the recent sanctions
legislation this Congress passed, designed primarily with
Russia in mind, and specifically countries that continue to use
Russian military hardware and systems. I supported that
legislation. I still do. But, I do have some concerns about
potential unintended consequences among countries that, for
various historical reasons, still have Russian hardware, and it
would be hard to avoid Russian hardware. Is that a area of
concern in PACOM?
Admiral Harris. It is, Senator. We're speaking here about
the CAATSA [Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions
Act] legislation. Secretary Mattis has sent a letter--it's
classified in its entirety--to you all, asking for some relief
from CAATSA. I can't get into the specifics of the letter,
because of its classification, but I--my own opinion is that
countries like India, where we are--we've made a key partner--I
believe that India is a great strategic opportunity for the
United States. Seventy percent of their military hardware is
Russian in origin. You can't expect India to go cold turkey on
that. I think they're--we ought to look at ways to have a
glidepath so that we can continue to trade in arms with India.
So, CAATSA affects that, and I hope that we can, you know,
achieve some relief for the rigidity that's in that
legislation.
Senator Cotton. Thank you. Your point--and I assume
Secretary Mattis's point in his classified letter--is that you
have a country like India that's a close ally, and growing ever
closer, but, for historical reasons going back decades, they
just rely on a lot of Russian equipment, and it would really
impair them, and therefore our relationship with them, to try
to ask them to go cold turkey immediately.
Admiral Harris. You are correct.
Senator Cotton. Okay.
Well, thank you very much for your testimony. I know you
said this is the last time you'll appear in front of the Armed
Services Committee. But, I know you'll have a hearing coming up
soon in the Foreign Relations Committee, so you'll get to
continue to tell the noble lie that it's a pleasure to be in
front of Congress again today. But, most importantly, I know
that I and probably most members of this committee will look
forward to supporting your nomination to be our Ambassador in
Australia. I'm very grateful you're willing to continue to
serve in a new capacity.
Thank you, Admiral Harris.
Admiral Harris. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Several things you have mentioned today, you've talked
about China's activities in the South China Sea, and you also
talked about Russian activities in the Arctic. In your view,
would it be in the United States national security interests
for us to be signatories of the U.N. Convention on the Law of
the Sea?
Admiral Harris. My opinion, Senator, has not changed over
the past decade or so. I'm an advocate of the United Nations
Convention on Law of the Sea.
Senator King. In fact, we're relegating ourselves to the
sidelines as these disputes about continental shelf and
relationships are being adjudicated.
Admiral Harris. I believe that UNCLOS [United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea] gives Russia the potential
to, ``Own almost half of the Arctic Circle.'' We will not have
that opportunity because of--we're not a signatory to UNCLOS.
Senator King. We won't be in the discussion.
Admiral Harris. That is correct.
Senator King. Thank you.
There's a great deal of discussion about a potential summit
meeting between our President and Kim Jong-un. What, in your
view, would Kim Jong-un want to get out of these discussions?
In other words, number one, is it realistic that he would put
his nuclearization on the table? Number two, if he did so, what
would he want in return?
Admiral Harris. Senator, I don't know what Kim Jong-un
actually wants out of the summit, but I do believe that, in a
general sense, Kim Jong-un seeks reunification of the Korean
Peninsula under his leadership, he seeks respect and status
that nuclear weapons gives him, and he seeks security, which he
believes the nuclear weapons give him.
Senator King. What you said at the beginning was very
important, reunification of the Korean Peninsula. What would be
the impact on his calculus if we removed our troops from, and
various security arrangements, from South Korea?
Admiral Harris. I believe he would do a victory dance.
Senator King. In Seoul, probably.
Admiral Harris. I think he'd be a happy man if we abrogated
our alliance with South Korea and with Japan.
Senator King. Let's talk about China for a minute. I've
thought for a long time that China's primary intention was
commercial and regional hegemony, but their military buildup,
it seems to me, indicates greater ambitions. What's your view
of China's ultimate goal, here? Then I'll ask a second question
about President Xi's ascension.
Admiral Harris. Yes, sir. I agree with you that I believe
that China seeks regional hegemony. That means pushing the
United States out of the Indo-Pacific region.
Senator King. Do you think they have greater ambitions?
They've now built a military base in Djibouti or----
Admiral Harris. I do. I think that--you know, as I said in
my opening statement, just take them at their word, and they
seek to be a global military and a global force. That, of
itself, is not a bad thing. A country with great economic power
ought to be able to buy and build the military that they
choose. But, it's how they go about it that's of concern. I
think their actions speak for themselves, their provocative
nature and their aggressive nature and how they deal with their
neighbors. We see that play out in India--I mean, I'm sorry, we
see that play in the Indo-Pacific on a daily basis.
Senator King. As we see them develop this capability, my
concern is, right now they may not have the will to be an
aggressive territorial nation, but if they develop the
capability, the will could change overnight.
Admiral Harris. I believe they do have the will. They don't
have the capability.
Senator King. But, they're building the capability.
Admiral Harris. They're clearly building to that
capability.
Senator King. I read recently that one commentator said
they thought the greatest geopolitical development of recent
years was President Xi's ascension to unlimited length, in
terms of his authority. How do you see that--long term, do you
see that as an advantage or a disadvantage?
Admiral Harris. I don't know, to be honest with you,
Senator. There hasn't--you know, we haven't seen it play out.
We just know the fact of it. I'm concerned about it. I mean, I
think countries, at least historically, that choose presidents
for life, it doesn't end well for their own people. I don't
know how it will play out. It's something that we must watch
closely to see how it goes.
Senator King. Finally, you mentioned, in your earlier
comments, Russia's role in North Korea. I think you used the
term ``spoiler.'' What do you see Russia, are they just going
to--my father used to use the term ``officious intermeddler''--
are they going to just try to mess things up?
Admiral Harris. I do believe they're trying to mess things
up. I think they'll meddle. I believe that if the sanctions
that are put in place over North Korea are too hard on North
Korea, including the sanctions that China are following--I
believe that Russia will seek to relieve the pressure of the
sanctions regime in the pressure campaign plan.
Senator King. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator King.
Senator Perdue.
Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Admiral, you called us out about President Xi Jinping's
move. In '82 Deng Xiaoping put term limits in after the
excesses of Chairman Mao's cultural revolution. We saw 30 years
of economic development. Today, we have a leader for life in
China. I see that development, along with the Belt and Road
strategy that you so eloquently have called out over the last
year, as two major initiatives that I think give us a hint at
their long-term strategy. It looks like, if you look at the
global map, a new world order could be in mind, here, between
Europe, Asia, and Africa. In Africa, alone, they've got over 20
ports that they've invested in and developed. Today, they have
$200 billion in loans in Asia, the Pacific, Africa, and Europe.
They've promised over $1.2 trillion of future loans. That's ten
times the size of the Marshall Plan that rebuilt Asia and
Europe earlier, or in the middle part of last century.
Sir, my concern is that we already see their intent. The
Marshall Plan was not loans, primarily. It was philanthropy.
This investment, the 1.2 trillion that's coming, is mostly in
the form of loans. In Africa, as an example, they're loaning
money into these ports, in the ports' development. Sri Lanka,
we already have an example where some of those loans went bad,
and they, China foreclosed, and now China, for 99 years, has a
port in Sri Lanka, in addition to Djibouti and in addition to
what they're doing in the Belt and Roads strategy.
Can you tie together that for us, the danger it has to the
world order we enjoy today, where representative democracies in
the free world dominate the cultural/political situation? Do
you see it this way? Are you calling that out for us to think
about this in a longer-term perspective regarding to what we
see evidence of right now, in terms of the China strategy with
the Belt and Road, and also with President Xi Jinping's change
to a lifetime leader?
Admiral Harris. Senator, I do see it that way. As I said
earlier, I do believe that, for those of us, myself included,
who wonder the kind of country that China will be in 2049, I
think we're seeing that now. We're seeing that play out with
this move toward a leader for life. We're seeing it play out in
OBOR, One Belt, One Road, or the Belt-Road Initiative, which is
not only about development, which, of itself, is a good, but
it's not about development as much as it is about malign
influence throughout the region, making China the security
partner of choice and pushing the United States and our
friends, allies, and partners out of the region. So, I think it
has a strategic impact beyond simple development.
China announced, a few weeks ago, the Polar Silk Road.
That's a clear indication that China views the Arctic as a
sphere of influence for them. They are some--there are some
Chinese scholars that would actually suggest that the resources
in the Arctic, a portion of those resources, should be China's
because they have a fifth of the world's population.
So, I think we should look at that carefully, consider what
that means in the long term. China is putting their money where
their mouth is. They have four icebreakers, and building to a
fifth. I think that's significant. You know, why would a
country have that kind of capability if it has no border on the
Arctic or Antarctic? Because they're interested in the
resources that are there, because they've called that out and
named it the Polar Silk Road.
Senator Perdue. Thank you, sir.
Following up on that, the committee took the lead recently
in establishing the Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative
in the fiscal year 2016 NDAA to support maritime domain
awareness capabilities of our partners and allies confronting
sovereignty challenges in the South China Sea. You've called
out the dangers in South China Sea. You talk about thousands of
acres of reclaimed property there, used primarily for military
use. This program, the Southeast Asia Maritime Security
Initiative, is now ramping up, with $98 million requested in
the fiscal year 2019 budget. Would you please give us your
assessment of the strategic importance of the Maritime Security
Initiative? In your view, what signal would it send if this
initiative did not receive full funding?
Admiral Harris. Senator, I'm a big believer in the Maritime
Security Initiative. It's $425 million across five years. It's
not a lot of money. But, we have put the $190 million or so
over the past 3 years, including this year, to good use. We've
put it to use to improve maritime domain awareness. The
Maritime Security Initiative affects our Southeast Asian
partners, principally Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and
Thailand, and Vietnam. We're using this funding to improve
their maritime domain awareness, so they can understand what's
happening in their water space. We're using it to improve
things like the Zulu Sea Initiative, which goes after sea
crime, kidnap for ransom, and piracy in the Zulu Sea, in the
Gulf of Thailand area. These are important things that signal
our interest and our willingness to help our friends and allies
and partners that are affected by the Maritime Security
Initiative.
To cut that funding or to pull us out of it would send the
wrong signal at the wrong time, in my opinion.
Senator Perdue. Thank you, Admiral.
I just want to echo the voices of my colleagues in thanking
you for your decades of service, and for your willingness to
continue that service in Australia. It's a very critical post,
as you well know and as we heard earlier in question. I just
thank God for your career and your help for the United States
of America.
Thank you, sir.
Admiral Harris. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Perdue. We all agree
with that.
Senator Hirono.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Harris, this being your last testimony before this
committee, I certainly join my colleagues in thanking you for
your distinguished service throughout your career, and
especially your last two tours in Hawaii as Commander of
Pacific Fleet and your current assignment as Pacific
Commander--PACOM Commander. And we, in Hawaii, will miss you
and your wife, Bruni, who I also had the privilege of getting
to know, for your leadership and your participation in our--
support of the community in Hawaii. Of course, we wish you well
as you move into your next chapter of life. You and Bruni will
always be a part of our Hawaii ohana.
There's no question that we're now in a period of great-
power competition with China and Russia. I think China's goal
is to become a global military and economic power. As you say,
it's how they go about it that's concerning. They do not play
fair. I'm glad that you are very clear in your support for the
United States signing on to UNCLOS. There might have been a
time when our country not being a signatory to UNCLOS maybe
didn't matter that much, but now, with global warming and
climate change, places like the Arctic Circle become very
attractive to countries such as Russia. As you note, there is a
potential that Russia will control almost one-half of the
Arctic Circle. So, I would say that it is time for Congress to
visit the issue of signing on to UNCLOS, and we should sign on.
In past hearings, you and I have discussed the importance
of the whole-of-government approach to what we do and concerns
with the administration's cuts to the State Department and
Treasury, along with the effects that these cuts would have on
foreign diplomacy, your mission, and the ability to combat our
adversaries in the Pacific region. In your testimony, you
specify that countering violent extremism in the Indo-Pacific
requires close collaboration with United States Government
interagency partners, such as the Department of State,
Treasury, the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], USAID
[United States Agency for International Development], and other
intel agencies. Can you discuss briefly the importance of this
whole-of-government approach to accomplish PACOM's mission?
What are the effects of cuts to the State Department and
Treasury personnel on your mission? How do these cuts impact
your ability to counter threats in the Indo-Pacific region?
Admiral Harris. Thank you, Senator.
I do believe that the challenges that we face are not
solely military challenges, even though I'm a military officer
in charge of a geographic combatant command. I believe that a
strong State Department complemented by a strong Defense
Department, and diplomats complemented by military personnel,
is the key to a strong American position. In terms of funding,
a weak State Department means you have to have a stronger
Defense Department. I think it would be so much better to have
both funded to the level they should be funded.
Senator Hirono. So, at 26 percent cut to the State
Department will be concerning to you, in terms of your ability
to carry out your mission.
Admiral Harris. As I understand the State Department, it
would be. But, I suppose that, you know, I mean, the devil's in
the details. It depends on how it's cut, what's cut, and so on.
Generally speaking, I think we need a fully funded State
Department complemented by a fully funded Defense Department to
project American power correctly, in my opinion.
Senator Hirono. As we see what's going on with North Korea,
it is not helpful at all. I believe you have said that we
should have an Ambassador to South Korea appointed.
Admiral Harris. I don't believe I said that, per se.
Senator Hirono. Or others have said.
Admiral Harris. I'm----
Senator Hirono. Do you join that?
Admiral Harris. I'm pleased with Constable--with the
Charge, rather, Mark Knapper. I think he's doing a great job.
He works very closely with General Vince Brooks. I think our
Korean allies know who to turn to for questions they have,
whether they're diplomatic questions or military questions.
Senator Hirono. And yet, we don't have an Ambassador to
South Korea, and also, the Envoy to South Korea from the State
Department also left. So, these are not helpful conditions.
As you know, the United States, Japan, India, and Australia
have a quadrilateral regional cooperation supporting a free and
open Indo-China region. Can you discuss briefly the importance
and impact of the quadrilateral regional cooperation to the
U.S., its allies, and on your PACOM mission?
Admiral Harris. I believe that the Quad is important. I
think these are Japan, United States, Australia, and India form
a natural grouping, if you will, a natural grouping of
democracies to face the challenges that are out there in the
region. So, I'm pleased with the Quad. I don't think the Quad,
that it has to be four. I mean, I think the Big Ten has 12
teams, and the Big 12 has 14 teams. So, I don't think we're
obligated to the number four. But the nature of it, the sense
of it is that these are democracies that are linked, in terms
of values and in military relationships, and we should advocate
for this.
Senator Hirono. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Senator Sullivan.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I do want to just mention, because I know Senator Hirono's
mentioned it, Senator Warren, you know, I think this comes up
in the Armed Services hearings a lot lately, is, this concern
about not getting enough nominees out to the State Department,
for the Department of Defense, from the White House, from the
administration. I think they could do a better job. But, I do
think that my colleagues on the other side of the aisle then
don't talk about the next issue, which is how there's
unprecedented, historically unprecedented blocking of nominees.
So, my colleagues, they can't have it both ways. We'll
encourage the administration, get more people out, a South
Korean Ambassador, Assistant Secretaries of State and Defense--
but, my colleagues on the other side of the aisle can't then
just say, ``Now we're going to take 30 hours for every nominee
that comes before the Senate.'' It's not--you can't have it
both ways. Let's work on getting nominees, and then you guys
can help us stop the historic obstruction of these nominees. I
think that would be a good compromise, and I'm certainly ready
to do that.
I know that's not your issue, Admiral, although it might be
your issue when you're nominated to be Ambassador to Australia.
I certainly hope my colleagues don't block you for seven
months. I think the German Ambassador has been blocked for
months now, and few people on the other side want to talk about
that.
Admiral, I want to show you a slide. I think you have a
copy, and it's right there on that chart--but, it's the
evolution of how China has been talking about the South China
Sea militarization. As you see there, in September in the Rose
Garden with President Obama, Xi Jinping essentially said,
``We're not going to militarize.'' So, that's standing next to
the President of the United States. Then, slowly but surely,
they've come out and--with the most recent Global Times-Voice
of China, essentially saying, ``Hey, you know, we're going to
be a big, strong military power. Yeah, maybe we will.'' So, how
do you interpret that evolution? I don't think it's very useful
to have the leader of a country standing next to the leader of
our country, saying they're not going to do something, when--do
you think, in 2015, the master plan was to do it, even though
they said they weren't?
Admiral Harris. I do believe that, in 2015, China had a
plan to militarize the South China Sea. I don't think there's--
this is a pretty good graphic. I--it's--there's nothing to--
there's no interpretation needed, here. Clearly, China is
militarizing the South China Sea.
Senator Sullivan. In terms of their--I have very much
appreciated your policy statement, which is, ``We're going to
cooperate, where we can, but confront.'' I think sometimes
China has come out and said, ``Well, we were forced to do this
because you're running Freedom of Navigation operations in that
region.'' How long have we been running FONOPs in the South
China Sea as a United States Navy?
Admiral Harris. Senator, as a policy item, Freedom of
Navigation Operations, we've been doing those for decades. The
United States Navy and the United States Air Force have
conducted operations in and above the South China Sea for even
longer periods of time. We have been a presence--we, the United
States--we have been a presence in the western Pacific for over
70 years.
Senator Sullivan. Your point about how, in some ways, that
was key to the rise of China, because keeping sea lanes open
has helped the international order, and no country's benefited
more from that----
Admiral Harris. Right.
Senator Sullivan.--than China. I think it's a really
important one.
Next you mentioned the Polar Silk Road. I'd just like to
note that we're trying--right now, Russia has 40 icebreakers,
and they're building 13 more. China has four, and you say
they're building a fifth. We have two, and one is broken, and
yet, we're an Arctic nation. We're an Arctic nation because of
my State, and they're not. So, what do you, again, think their
intentions are there?
Admiral Harris. I believe their intentions are clear.
They're interested--China is interested in the resources in the
Arctic Circle. Russia is interested in the security aspects of
the Arctic Circle. Russia is using UNCLOS to its advantage. I
think that we are at a disadvantage because we don't have the
icebreakers and stuff that the other countries have. But, I do
want to acknowledge and thank the Congress for putting
icebreaker in the 2019 budget.
Senator Sullivan. Well, that's progress, but we need to
make a lot more progress.
Let me ask one final question, Admiral. So, I think we
should acknowledge that China has actually been helpful with
the administration's approach to North Korea. I think that
they've done more than they ever have previously. I think we've
made more progress on this maximum pressure campaign than
previously done, including good work at the U.N. Security
Council. Do you see China being helpful in the future on this?
What do you think their strategic calculation is with regard to
North Korea?--when, so far, they have moved pretty far. I think
it's important that we acknowledge that. What do you
anticipate, particularly as we get to this moment where, if the
President's going to meet with Kim Jong-un, obviously there's
going to be a lot of diplomatic focus, and focus with regard to
our allies in countries like China on the importance of this
issue?
Admiral Harris. Yeah, I--Senator, I believe, in 2018, that
China is probably--I mean, I don't know for a fact, but I
believe that China is probably as worried about the path that
North Korea is on, vis-a-vis its nuclear weapons, as we are. I
think, in the past, China viewed North Korea as a way to
pressure the United States. It could--and all that that
entails. But, today I think what happened in 2017, in 2016, was
a wake-up call for Beijing to--and it made them realize what a
danger North Korea poses, not just to the United States or
South Korea or Japan, but a danger it poses to China and the
danger it poses to stability in the Indo-Pacific. So, now
they're helpful. I appreciate that help. As you say, we should
compliment and acknowledge them for the work that they're
doing.
Senator Sullivan. Right. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
Senator Warren.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Admiral. Thank you for your many years of
service. Thank you for being here today.
I'd like to spend my limited time this morning on our
National Defense Strategy. The Trump administration recently
released its National Defense Strategy report, and the
unclassified version says that, ``Long-term strategic
competitions with China and Russia are the principal priorities
for the Department of Defense. The strategy stresses the need
to modernize existing equipment, invest in advanced
capabilities, and enhance the readiness of the joint force for
a high-end fight.''
Admiral, I know you've been focused on managing the
challenge posed by China, but your area of responsibility also
includes China's neighbor, North Korea. Many analysts estimate
that a conflict on the Korean Peninsula could bog us down for
years, degrading our equipment and potentially resulting in
thousands of casualties both to our allies and to our own
troops. So, let me ask, Admiral, What would be the impact of a
long-term conflict on the Korean Peninsula on our ability to
prepare for a high-end conflict like the kind described in the
[National] Defense Strategy?
Admiral Harris. Thank you, Senator.
I do believe that a conflict on the Korean Peninsula will
result in thousands of casualties. I believe that China could
be opportunistic, in terms of what they do in their area if
we're bogged down in Korea. But, I don't believe that we should
allow our concern or fear for what could happen with China
detract us from our treaty obligations with South Korea and to
defending our own Homeland, which is the threat posed by North
Korea.
Senator Warren. I appreciate that, Admiral. I'm asking
about the difficulties that are posed, here. So, let me just as
a different question related to this. Would we be able to
maintain our technological investments to counter China if we
were engaged in a sustained ground war in North Korea?
Admiral Harris. I think we would be able----
Senator Warren. All right.
Admiral Harris.--to do that.
Senator Warren. You know, I was glad to see other
President's renewed interest in diplomacy last week. I'm not
sure if he recognizes the enormous complexity of these
negotiations and the fact that a breakthrough may not occur
overnight, but I think we should all be hoping for success,
because a ground war on the Korean Peninsula would be
devastating to our long-term strategic interests in the Indo-
Pacific region and around the world.
Admiral Harris, while I have you--and I still have 2
minutes left--I want to ask one other question. I know that you
support CFIUS [Committee on Foreign Investment in the United
States], which reviews acquisitions by foreign companies for
threats to our national security. You support reform to capture
a wider range of transactions and technologies, particularly as
they relate to China. You have made the point that China is
blurring the lines between military and civilian activity and
exploiting America's open system to gain access to sensitive
technologies.
I agree with you that we need to protect our most advanced
technologies. But, there are two sides to this coin. Our
adversaries will be interested in stealing from us only as long
as we continue to produce the most innovative science and
technology in the world. Being at the top of that heap is not a
guarantee, it's not a birthright, and, in fact, right now China
is also investing heavily in R&D [Research and Development],
including in areas like physics, robotics, high-performance
computing, nanoscience.
So, Admiral, do you think that government investment in
research and development helps maintain our military advantage?
Would we improve our chances of maintaining technological
superiority over China by increasing our R&D investments in
advanced technologies?
Admiral Harris. I do. Senator, I'll also add that
government investment can't be the only source of innovation in
the United States, and it hasn't been in the past, nor should
it be in the future. I'm a big supporter of what we
colloquially call CFIUS 2.0. I wrote a letter to Senator Cornyn
about FIRRMA [Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act
of 2017], the new law on this. I believe we have to be
sensitive to our open society and what that does for our
adversaries, the advantages that it gives our adversaries.
In terms of China, that's manifested in both technology and
technological change and in a Chinese acquisition of large
tracts of land that are adjacent to our training and electronic
ranges.
Senator Warren. Yeah. Well, I do see this as--both sides. I
think we're in agreement on this, that, on the one hand, we've
got to be very sensitive about what they're trying to steal
from us; but, on the other, we've got to continue and even, I
believe, ratchet up our investments so that we maintain our
technological superiority.
Admiral Harris. Absolutely. No argument from me on that.
Senator Warren. Good. I'm glad to hear it. Thank you,
Admiral.
Admiral Harris. Yeah.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Warren.
Senator Tillis.
Senator Tillis. Good morning, Admiral Harris. It's good to
see you again. Thank you for your service.
I was thinking about you. You know, I'm from North
Carolina, so, when I was filling out my bracket, I had to pick
the Tarheels to go all the way. But, then I got another bracket
so I could pick the Volunteers. So----
Admiral Harris. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Tillis.--I want you to know the--Tennessee's got a
special place in my heart. I know it does for you.
Just two questions. One, there were some press reports
about the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Treaty [INF] that you
have expressed some concern over, or at least there were some
reports. Could you expand on that for the purposes----
Admiral Harris. Yes, sir.
Senator Tillis.--of this committee?
Admiral Harris. The INF Treaty is an important piece of
diplomacy. It was formed and signed in 1987 by Presidents
Reagan and Gorbachev of the Soviet Union. It was the right
treaty for that time, when we were in a bipolar world.
Today, we're not in a bipolar world, we're in a multipolar
world. I think the restrictions that the INF Treaty places on
us ought to be looked at, particularly when you consider that
countries like China and Iran are not signatories to the
treaty, and there is no obligation for them to follow any part
of the treaty. We follow it to the letter, because we're
America, and we do what we are--we sign on to do. As has been
mentioned earlier, Russia has violated the Treaty routinely for
the last number of years. So, I think there are aspects of the
treaty that we ought to look at.
The nuclear restrictions in the treaty, I think are
important and commendatory, and we should keep those in place.
But, the treaty also restricts our ability to deploy ground-
based ballistic missiles that counter ballistic missiles that
threaten us, our ships and our bases, from countries like
China.
Senator Tillis. Thank you. You're going to be moving, and I
hope you will be swiftly confirmed as Ambassador to Australia.
I'll be supporting your nomination. I hope my colleagues on the
other side of the aisle will let us get that done quickly. But,
I believe, when we met with you in PACOM a couple of years ago,
we talked a little bit about trade and how alliances with how
the economic alliances are pretty important. We know where TPP
[Trans Pacific Partnership] ended up. But, what's your opinion
on the--on that side of the equation? When you go to Australia,
for example, who would have been one of the TPP partners, what
do you think we need to do down there, at an economic level or
strategic level, to make our military relationship stronger?
Admiral Harris. Senator, I was interested in the TPP, when
it was first postulated, because of the security linkages that
I saw TPP affording us and our friends, allies, and partners
that were also part of TPP, when it was the TPP 12. I talked to
some folks yesterday. You know, there are very few things that
are--that engender bipartisan support today. One of those was
pulling out of TPP. Both parties were opposed to it, and both
candidates were opposed to it.
That said, the other 11 countries that were involved in
TPP, they went ahead and formed, on their own, TPP 11. I think
that, if we can get a fair and equitable and--a trade pact with
them, that we might want to consider getting into it.
But, I'm not a trade expert or an economics expert, for
that matter. You know, my theory in life has been to buy high,
sell low. It hasn't worked well for me. So, here I am today.
I look at the security parts of it, though, and there were
clearly advantages, because it links us, in the security space,
with these countries. There are aspects of the original TPP
that included cybersecurity, intellectual property security,
and that kind of stuff, which I thought was important, and it
merited some--it merited a deeper look.
So, I don't know where we're going to be with regard to TPP
11, whether we'll join it or not, it's an important grouping,
and we'll have to look at it and see if there's a way that we
can achieve what the President seeks, in terms of fair and
equitable trade.
Senator Tillis. Well, thank you very much. I appreciate
your many years of service to the Nation. I look forward to
your continued service in the position as Ambassador.
Thank you.
Admiral Harris. Thank you, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Tillis.
Senator Donnelly.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, thank you very much.
As you may know, last year's NDAA included a provision I
authored requiring the White House to submit a report on North
Korea strategy within 90 days. The report was supposed to
include, among other components, a detailed roadmap that
identifies United States objectives and a desired end state, a
clear timeline, and an assessment of unilateral and
multilateral policy options with respect to the situation in
the Korean Peninsula. The administration is late on that report
at the present time.
In light of the recent developments that we've seen on a
possible meeting between the President and Kim, I'm even more
convinced than ever that the administration needs to have a
clear vision and a comprehensive strategy, and they need to
present it to Congress.
So, I'm asking you, What do you think are our interim
objectives for these talks with North Korea?
Admiral Harris. Sir, I believe that we'll go into these
talks, hopefully, eyes wide open, and that, you know, we
continue to seek what we've said all along, a complete and
verifiable and irreversible Korean--denuclearized Korean
Peninsula. I think that's what we're going into those talks
with, and hopefully we'll come out in--with a framework that
satisfies the President.
Senator Donnelly. Do you consider it a success if there's
no discussion of denuclearization on the Korean--on the North
Korean side, but simply just, ``We'll stay where we are right
now''?
Admiral Harris. I don't know where we're going to end up
with the talks. I don't think that the talks will be such that
we accept as a positive that we end up where we are. But, I'll
go back to what Churchill once said, you know, ``It's better to
talk, talk, talk than shoot, shoot, shoot.''
Senator Donnelly. Right.
Admiral Harris. So, the fact that we're talking at all has
a positive framework around it.
Senator Donnelly. What do you think happens if, after these
talks, there's no agreement made? Does that change how things
continue moving forward after that point?
Admiral Harris. I couldn't tell you, looking into the
future. But, I think that the fact that we talked, that has a
value. If the talks produce nothing, you know, we're talking
about talks in April or May, I guess--soon, anyway, so we
haven't lost anything by talking. So, the opportunity to engage
is--has value of itself, regardless of the outcome.
Senator Donnelly. I'm just curious, what do you think Kim
is hoping to get out of this? Obviously, I'm not holding you to
an exact replication after the talks are over, but you know,
you're in a position of great influence and have done
extraordinary service for our country. What do you think Kim is
looking for out of this?
Admiral Harris. Well, if you're asking me to read his mind,
I mean, that's a dark place. I'm----
Senator Donnelly. I'm not asking you to read his mind.
Admiral Harris. But----
Senator Donnelly. I'm asking, your years of experience, to
give me an idea.
Admiral Harris. I believe that he seeks security and he
seeks respect and he seeks a reunification of the Korean
Peninsula under his leadership. Those are his ultimate gain--
ultimate objectives, in my opinion. The talks, if they produce
results, or if they produce further talks to hopefully produce
some good results, that'll be where the details lie.
Senator Donnelly. What do you see as the biggest challenges
with North Korea now? What can we do to help you solve those?
Admiral Harris. I think the biggest challenge with North
Korea is their nuclear program, their--both their missile
development program and their weapons, themselves. I think that
one of the areas that I need help in that I don't have is
persistent ISR--intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance--so I can keep eyes on, an unblinking eye on
North Korea, which we do not have today.
Senator Donnelly. Well, let me just change, for one
second--I've just got a little bit of time left--on
Conventional Prompt Strike. It's my understanding that PACOM,
alongside STRATCOM [United States Strategic Command] and EUCOM
[United States European Command], has identified the
development and fielding of a Conventional Prompt Strike system
as a high priority. Is that correct? If so, could you elaborate
on----
Admiral Harris. It is correct, Senator, but I would like to
respond to that question in a classified manner for the record.
Senator Donnelly. Okay.
Admiral Harris. I'll take that question, as well.
Senator Donnelly. That would be great.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Donnelly.
Senator Sasse.
Senator Sasse. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, thanks for being here.
Could you say publicly on the record some of what you've
said to a number of us in private the last 2 or 3 days about
how big China's Belt and Road Initiative is?
Admiral Harris. Senator, what I said the last couple of
days was, it's probably the biggest development program in the
world. It's five times the amount of money that the United
States,--corrected for 2018 dollars, what the United States put
into the Marshall Plan. It's a significant investment by China.
The difference, as was mentioned earlier, was, the Marshall
Plan was philanthropic in nature and was designed to lift up
the countries in Europe following World War II. One Belt, One
Road is designed to lift up China.
Senator Sasse. Yeah. I think, just to underscore that, the
Marshall Plan, which was foundational to the 75 years of
military alliance across the Atlantic and of economic
prosperity that benefited the United States and all of our
allies, this current Chinese initiative is more than five times
larger in net present value. Is the Belt and Road Initiative
partially intended to marginalize the United States influence
in the Pacific?
Admiral Harris. I agree.
Senator Sasse. What do our allies think right now--our
military allies, think about China's Belt and Road plans?
Admiral Harris. Well, our allies, as well as our friends
and partners, they have to balance their own national
interests, and they have to balance China with the United
States. You know, we're not asking them--or any country, for
that matter, to choose between China and the United States.
What we hope is that they'll see One Belt, One Road potentially
for what it is. I think that, you know, our allies are smart
enough to do that, and they'll make the decisions that benefit
them, and us, in terms of our alliances.
Senator Sasse. I'd certainly agree with you that we view a
world where people should have commerce and peace with lots and
lots of their neighbors, even in a multipolar world where the
United States and China, over the coming decades, are going to
be outsized, relative to everyone else. And yet, nations are
partly going to be forced to choose between a rules-based
international order and a Chinese system that is more
interested in lifting up China with more vassal state
supplicant near neighbors.
I know that you're not allowed, given your current calling
and position, to answer a question as direct as, Was it wise or
foolish for the U.S. to pull out of TPP? But, you can speculate
with us. Is China happy that the United States pulled out of
TPP?
Admiral Harris. I believe that China took advantage of the
fact that we're not in TPP to try to drive a wedge between us
and our TPP partners. China had a plan, the RCEP, the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Program, as a counter to TPP. Most of
the countries--not all, but most of the countries that were in
the original TPP formulation are in RCEP. So, that should tell
you, right there, that China sought to drive a wedge between us
and our TPP partners.
Senator Sasse. Toggling between your current calling and
where you're likely headed next, I'm, here with everybody else
on this committee, sure that you're going to be easily
confirmed as Ambassador, and we're grateful for your continued
service--when you look at your current calling and your next
calling, the TPP without the U.S., can you speculate a little
bit about what the potential ways that we might get back in
might be?
Admiral Harris. I can't, Senator, other than to say that,
if we can reach a fair and equitable trade agreement with the
TPP 11 countries, then that's probably the key to us getting
back in. But, as I said before, I'm focused on the security
aspects of any relationship like TPP, rather than economic
aspects, of which I'm not an expert.
Senator Sasse. Thank you very much, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Sasse.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Senator Sasse, I asked Admiral Harris, upon
him taking over as Pacific Commander, what was one--this is now
3 years ago. Congratulations to you. This is a perfect position
for you to go into as Ambassador. I asked, What's one of the
most important things for our national security in the Pacific
region? Three years ago, the Admiral said passing the Trans-
Pacific trade agreement. Okay. So, 3 years have passed, and all
of this has happened. As brought out by your questioning, that
puts us at a significant economic disadvantage.
So, Admiral, you're going to be a diplomat in a short
period of time. Now, of course, as a Commander and as a
warrior, you've also been a diplomat, to wear those four stars.
But, you're going be a real Ambassador. What do we do now to
make up for the lost last year and a half?
Admiral Harris. I'm not sure what we've lost in the last
year and a half, Senator, I'm sorry.
Senator Nelson. Well, how do we gain back the economic
advantage in the Pacific?
Admiral Harris. Well, I think we have to stay with it. You
know, we have to keep at it. I mean, there--it's not just the
economic issues that are resident in the Pacific that are
important to America. It's the security relationships and the
whole framework that's informed by security, on one part, the
economy, on the other part, and cultural ties that bind us to
the countries in the Indo-Pacific region.
Senator Nelson. Okay, understood. Are you in a position to
offer an opinion with regard to trying to resurrect something
of a Pacific trade agreement?
Admiral Harris. I am not in that position, Senator.
Senator Nelson. Will you be, as Ambassador?
Admiral Harris. I might be, depending, I've never been an
Ambassador, so I'm not sure what challenges will cross my desk
then if I am--if I'm given that opportunity, if you all give me
that opportunity, but I'll take it on and do what I have to do,
you know, if I'm fortunate enough to be confirmed.
Senator Nelson. You will be confirmed.
Admiral Harris. Thanks.
Senator Nelson. As Ambassador to one of our important--very
important allies in the region of the Pacific, I think it's
going to be exceptionally important for you to weigh in on
this, because I--this Senator, and by the implication of the
Senator previously questioning, by his implication, his opinion
that we're losing ground economically, that they're getting in
ahead of us.
Tell me, in your prepared testimony, you highlighted the
threat of China's growing arsenal of intermediate- and short-
range ballistic missiles and on their threat to our forces.
That certainly is a greater threat. How do we best defend
against this threat, and particularly protect our people in the
region and ensure their ability to operate?
Admiral Harris. Senator, I think it's key that we maintain
our credible combat power. I think it's important that we fully
resource the Department's needs. I'm grateful to the Congress
for doing that in this two-year budget deal. I'm hopeful that
we'll get an appropriation to match the deal. But, that's the
most important thing, that we demonstrate to our friends,
allies, partners, and adversaries that the United States is
neither a disinterested or a declining power globally and in
the region.
Senator Nelson. Do we need additional THAAD [Terminal
Altitude Area Defense] missiles in the region?
Admiral Harris. Today, I'm satisfied with the ballistic
missile defense architecture that's resident in the region:
THAAD, in Korea; THAAD, in Guam; Patriots, throughout the area;
and Japan's intent to buy Aegis Ashore; and our Aegis ships,
and our ally--and Japan's Aegis ships. That architecture works
today.
I'm concerned about the North Korean missile development
and where it'll be in the future. I'm grateful that we funded--
that you all have funded the defense of Hawaii radar, the
Homeland defense radar for Hawaii. That's an important thing.
I've asked the Missile Defense Agency, the MDA, to study
whether we should have ground-based interceptors in Hawaii, or
not. I'm not smart enough on that to know, but I think we ought
to study it in advance of where we think North Korea's missile
development will go. Today, the architecture is sufficient, but
it might not be, in the mid-2020s.
Senator Nelson. In the mid-2020s, what we know about
national missile defense, do you have the information, on the
top of your head? What is our ability to hit an ICBM
[Intercontinental Ballistic Missile] out of North Korea today
with our national missile defense--with those radars in Alaska?
Admiral Harris. Sir, without getting into the classified
area, where--which I'm skirting pretty carefully right now with
that question.
Senator Nelson. Understood.
Admiral Harris.--I'm confident in our systems today, and I
don't own those systems for us. You know, that's Northern
Command, and I'm confident in Lori Robinson's ability to do
that today.
I'd like to respond to that more fully, more fulsomely,
with a classified question for the record.
Senator Nelson. That would be good, especially for 2020 and
beyond.
[The information referred to follows:]
[Deleted.]
Senator Nelson. I thank you, Admiral.
Admiral Harris. Yes, sir.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Senator Nelson. Congratulations, again, to you. He's a
Pensacola boy. Florida makes good again.
Admiral Harris. Thank you, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Good.
Senator King--Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Admiral Harris, I'll add my congratulations to you for
wonderful service in this area. Look forward to working
together with you in new ways.
I want to ask you a couple of things. Might have been
covered, but they matter to me, and I'll--and they're
important.
So, we've seen, in the press, discussion of, obviously, not
just the concerns that we legitimately have about North Korea,
but there's been a phrase that's been used publicly about,
well, whether we could engage in sort of a ``bloody nose,''
some kind of a preemptive strike against North Korea. That
makes it sound, you know, pretty de minimis. But, my assumption
would be, in calculating the validity of any such step, you
would need to calculate what a likely response would be by
North Korea. You couldn't go in with the expectation that it
would just be sort of a one-off thing and with a guarantee of
no response. I think the response you'd have to contemplate
would be twofold. One would be, What would North Korea's
response would be? But also, If the United States took some
sort of unilateral or preemptive action, might it draw others
into a conflict--China, for example--with the historical
precedent of the Korean War as an example? I'm assuming that,
as the DOD contemplates its own options, those sort of
downstream consequences are things that you definitely think
about. Am I correct in my assumption?
Admiral Harris. Yes, sir. We have no ``bloody nose''
strategy. I don't know what that is. The press have run with
it. I'm charged with developing, for the National Command
Authority, a range of options through the spectrum of violence.
I'm ready to execute whatever the President and the National
Command Authority directs me to do. But, a ``bloody nose''
strategy is not contemplated.
Senator Kaine. Again, I'm not going to ask you about what
you advised the President. I'm going to ask you about your
military judgment. It would not be a smart thing to think we
could take some affirmative action against North Korea and then
assume that there would be no action in response, either
against us or maybe against South Korea. We couldn't also
assume that it wouldn't draw other adversaries, potentially,
into the conflict, correct?
Admiral Harris. Right. I believe, Senator, that if we do
anything along the kinetic region in the spectrum of conflict,
that we have to be ready to do the whole thing.
Senator Kaine. Yeah.
Admiral Harris. We are ready to do the whole thing, if
ordered by the President.
Senator Kaine. Thank you.
You and I talked, and I know you've talked a bit about
this, but I'm really intrigued with the notion of the Quad that
has been discussed in some public hearings at Munich Security
Conference, the notion of deepening the relationships between
the United States, Japan, Australia, and India around security
cooperation. Senator King and I visited India in October of
2014, and visited the shipbuilding industry in India. Under the
Indian President [Narendra] Modi's Government, it does seem
like there's new opportunities for us to be partners. The
Indian navy sent a delegation to the United States a year or so
later to look at our shipbuilding capacity. So, talk a little
bit about the Quad, and maybe, in particular, since we've had
longstanding security cooperation with Australia and Japan, how
the addition to India to some of our security cooperation
enhances American interests in the area.
Admiral Harris. Senator, I've said, for the last 2\1/2\,
almost 3 years, that I think India is the biggest strategic
opportunity for the United States. We share democratic values,
we share the same concerns, and we operate more frequently in
the Indo-Pacific region together. I think the Quad is an
important construct of like-minded nations that can go after
the challenges that are in the Indo-Pacific region. So, that's
Japan, United States, Australia, India. But, as I said earlier,
you know, it's not--the Quad is an idea. It's not rigid, I
don't believe.
Senator Kaine. It's not exclusive.
Admiral Harris. Right. I mean, as I said, I think the Big
10 has 12 teams, and the Big 12 has 14 teams, or something like
that.
Senator Kaine. That's a very astute observation that you
made.
Admiral Harris. So, I mean, we're going into March Madness
now. So, I think the Quad is an idea. It's an important idea
that I think the countries are starting to get their arms
around, including the United States. But, India presents a
great opportunity for us. I think we present a great
opportunity for India.
Senator Kaine. You also have said, and I agree with you,
that Vietnam presents an opportunity. It's an opportunity with
some challenges, obviously, and yet the [USS] Carl Vinson just
was in Vietnam. I think it's the first carrier visit to
Vietnam. That's a pretty big thing, in terms of showing the
relationship of our nations. If you could, just maybe address
opportunities there, as well.
Admiral Harris. Yeah, Vietnam is an important country to
the United States and to the region. What Vietnam says matters,
regionally and globally. They stand up to China. They're
concerned about Chinese expansion and aggressiveness in the
South China Sea. To your point about Carl Vinson, the USS Carl
Vinson was the first carrier to visit Vietnam since World--
since the Vietnam War, was a very successful visit. I was
ecstatic about the visit, itself, the welcome by the Government
of Vietnam, and the outcomes of the visit.
Senator Kaine. If I could, Mr. Chair--I'm over time, but
just to comment, sort of, for the committee as much as for
Admiral Harris--I don't think anything shows the possibility of
American magnanimity in the world more than a picture of the
USS John McCain docked in Da Nang Harbor or the Carl Vinson in
Vietnam, the fact that, with a former adversary, where the scar
tissues are still very alive in the American public and Vietnam
War veterans, this is an adversary that deeply wants a
partnership with the United States, just as Japan and Germany
deeply wanted partnership with the United States after World
War II. That shows that people recognize the United States, for
all its imperfections and warts, is still a country with high
values and it's still a country that they want to be in
partnership with. I think that's a positive sign.
Admiral Harris, thank you for your testimony.
Admiral Harris. We are the security partner of choice for
many countries, including Vietnam.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Admiral.
Senator Inhofe. Agreed. Having just returned from viewing
the repairs that were taking place on that, I agree with you.
Thank you so much, Admiral Harris.
Before someone else shows up, we're going to adjourn this
meeting. And appreciate very much your patience and your
service.
[Whereupon, at 11:13 a.m., the committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator David Perdue
north korea sanctions--additional levers
1. Senator Perdue. Admiral Harris, in your hearing before the House
Armed Services Committee last month, you said, quote, ``I think what we
should be doing is what we are doing, and that is to maintain and
increase the pressure campaign run by the State Department, to convince
Kim Jong-un that his nuclear ambitions are flawed.'' In the past year,
President Trump has authorized the Treasury to block entities that
trade with North Korea from the United States financial system, and
imposed sanctions on North Korean military and regime officials, North
Korean financial facilitators who prop up the regime with foreign
currency earned through forced labor operations, and on Chinese
entities that export metals and other goods to North Korea.
Additionally, there were numerous United Nations Security Council
resolutions passed that restrict North Korean coal, iron, oil,
agricultural, and labor exports. However, due to this international
pressure campaign, North Korea has upped its sanctions evasion
strategy. In Africa, countries like Tanzania and Mozambique are
reportedly contracting with Pyongyang to provide support for their air
missile systems. Last August, it was uncovered that the Egyptians were
buying military munitions from North Korea. China and Russia are
estimated to have tens of thousands of North Korean workers, earning
over $500 million to Kim Jong-un's regime. Recently, a UN report was
released that that unveiled that North Korean technicians helped
Assad's forces develop chemical weapons and ballistic-missile
technology, and were aided by the Chinese and Russians. Finally, both
China and Russia have been found guilty of trading oil and coal with
North Korea. It is encouraging to read in your testimony that the
international sanctions regime is ``changing Kim Jong-un's calculus.''
However, as you said, quote, ``Kim Jong-un continues to channel his
reduced resources to weapons programs,'' and North Korea continues to
skirt sanctions. Admiral, I also sit on the Banking Committee, which
authorizes new Treasury sanctions. What additional levers in terms of
sanctions have we yet to pull that can put additional pressure on North
Korea? Is this a matter of authorities or enforcement?
Admiral Harris. While I defer to the Treasury Department regarding
additional authorities, PACOM works actively with interagency partners
and regional allies to aggressively enforce UN Security Council
resolutions. To date, the success of this effort supports enforcing the
strongest sanctions regime against the DPRK. Over the past year and a
half, the United States has significantly increased the actions taken
against individuals and entities linked to North Korea's illicit
activities, many of which have connections to UN sanctions violations.
2. Senator Perdue. Admiral Harris, you said in your written
testimony, ``To Beijing's credit, China has taken significant steps to
enforce the various UNSCRs, but Beijing can and should do more.'' How
can we pressure China to become more proactive in enforcing sanctions?
Admiral Harris. The United States holds regular meetings with
Chinese counterparts to share information on DPRK sanctions evasion
that could lead to enforcement actions by the Chinese. In my view,
these meetings should continue, but the United States should also
consider calling China out publicly when it does not take action on the
information provided. Additionally, the United States should consider
increasing the application of sanctions against Chinese entities for
illicit activities with the DPRK.
3. Senator Perdue. Admiral Harris, are there additional secondary
sanctions on Chinese entities that you believe would be effective?
Admiral Harris. While I defer to the Treasury Department on the
specifics of secondary sanctions, I believe the U.S. should consider
secondary sanctions as part of the application of all instruments of
U.S. national power in support of the Maximum Pressure Campaign.
4. Senator Perdue. Admiral Harris, President Trump said in January
that ``Russia is not helping us at all with North Korea. What China is
helping us with, Russia is denting. In other words, Russia is making up
for some of what China is doing.'' Can you speak to Russia's role in
aiding North Korea in sanctions evasion?
Admiral Harris. Direct evidence of Russian Government involvement
in sanctions evasion is lacking, but recent activities suggest there
may have been some degree of complicity in actions intended to shore up
the North Korean regime. For example, numerous reports late last year
noted the illicit transfer of oil from Russia to North Korea.
While Russia generally supports limited UN sanctions, Moscow has
consistently tried to water-down those sanctions and/or protect
Russia's individual interests. During the most recent UN debate, Russia
pushed to allow North Korean workers to remain in country for up to two
years, an action that assures continued access to cheap North Korean
labor despite awareness that a large percentage of the earnings flow
back to Pyongyang. Russia also protects Kim Jong-un from justified
criticism over his role in raising tensions. Over the past year,
Russia's Foreign Ministry has repeatedly decried United States military
deployments and exercises on or near the Peninsula as provocative and
intended to provoke a North Korean response.
Russia only has limited military relations with North Korea, with
no combined training and very limited assistance. I do think, however,
that Moscow may see an opportunity to try to re-establish some of the
arms sales programs it previously had with Pyongyang.
5. Senator Perdue. Admiral Harris, how can we combat North Korean
sanctions evasion activity more effectively?
Admiral Harris. The United States works with partners in the region
to ensure the full implementation and strict enforcement of North
Korea-related UN Security Council Resolutions. To increase
effectiveness, the United States welcomes the support of allies and
partners to maintain pressure on the DPRK, and particularly to enforce
the maritime-based provisions to prevent illegal exports and disrupt
illicit ship-to-ship transfers of petroleum.
6. Senator Perdue. Admiral Harris, do you support the proposal made
by a number of experts, including Admiral James Stavridis, for a
maritime task forces to enforce UN sanctions and counter North Korean
proliferation activities?
Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]
7. Senator Perdue. Admiral Harris, who are the likely countries
that would join the United States in a maritime task force?
Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]
8. Senator Perdue. Admiral Harris, is PACOM examining options for
expanded international cooperation in the maritime domain to increase
pressure on North Korea?
Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]
jstars isr capability
9. Senator Perdue. Admiral Harris, as you know, the Air Force has
zeroed-out its FY19 recapitalization of the JSTARS fleet, when just
last year this platform was the number 4 acquisition priority of the
Air Force. While I agree that we eventually need to move to the new
``system of systems'' in the future, I'm very concerned we'll see
critical gaps in ISR (especially with GMTI--Ground Moving Target
Indicator) for you and for troops on the ground. The Air Force is
planning to take the JSTARS platform offline without acquiring more ISR
assets. Have they explained to you how they plan to bridge the
capability gap in GMTI-ISR that will arise in the upcoming 3-12 year
period? (If possible, I would appreciate a classified and unclassified
response)
Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]
10. Senator Perdue. Admiral Harris, what does this potential gap
mean for you and your combatant commands' ISR requirements?
Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]
11. Senator Perdue. Admiral Harris, how well are your ISR
requirements being met currently?
Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]
12. Senator Perdue. Admiral Harris, in your experience, what
mission-critical capabilities can be met with JSTARS that can't be met
with another ISR platform?
Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]
13. Senator Perdue. Admiral Harris, could you provide me an example
of a specific mission that you have commanded whose success depended on
the JSTARS?
Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]
14. Senator Perdue. Admiral Harris, how important to you, as a
combatant commander, is the role of JSTARS airborne battle management
and command and control, in addition to being an ISR provider?
Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]
china-russia military cooperation
15. Senator Perdue. Admiral Harris, Russia and China are displaying
the highest level of military cooperation in 3 decades, posing an
escalated threat to the United States and its allies. Russia and China
show no signs of stopping this level of military coordination for years
to come. How does this cooperation stand to threaten United States and
allied security objectives in the Asia Pacific?
Admiral Harris. While it is true that Russia and China have
increased military interaction, the relationship remains highly
superficial and there is little evidence of true military integration
or interoperability. As such, the threats to U.S. and allied security
objectives still predominantly come from each country individually. I
do not anticipate the relationship evolving to a point anytime in the
near future that would produce integrated or interoperable military
forces.
16. Senator Perdue. Admiral Harris, what are you seeing in the
theater? Does Sino-Russian military cooperation threaten current
operations?
Admiral Harris. No. Russia and China pose substantial military
threats on their own, but the current level of cooperation between them
does not increase the threat or threaten current operations.
Bilateral military exercises remain limited with the annual naval
exercise JOINT SEA as the most noteworthy. Russia and China have held
this combined naval exercise annually since 2012, alternating hosting
duties each year. JOINT SEA has modestly increased in size and
complexity, but still lacks any significant degree of interoperability.
I characterize the military cooperation as `synchronized' as opposed to
`integrated.'
Even so, both Moscow and Beijing incorporate aggressive strategic
communications into their relationship, claiming levels of partnership
and cooperation that are not supported by exercise design or execution.
Finally, the exercise series does provide both navies access to
areas in which they would otherwise not routinely operate. For example,
the first phase of the 2017 JOINT SEA took place in the Baltic Sea,
which allowed China to demonstrate its growing global capabilities; the
2016 iteration was held in the South China Sea, a non-traditional
operating area for the Russian Navy.
17. Senator Perdue. Admiral Harris, are you responding to this
defense coordination between Russia and China? If so, how?
Admiral Harris. Russia and China have improved their level of
military interaction; however, the relationship remains highly
superficial and there is little evidence of true military integration
or interoperability. I believe the current level of military activity
and engagement in the Indo-Pacific deters aggression from these two
competitors and assures our allies and partners of U.S. commitment to
their defense and regional stability.
18. Senator Perdue. Admiral Harris, what are more options for
response?
Admiral Harris. I view current military cooperation between China
and Russia largely as a partnership of convenience at a superficial
level to try to counter United States objectives in the region. While
the United States has an interest in ensuring China--Russia military
cooperation does not evolve toward integration and interoperability.
China and Russia are not natural allies.
china-subs and naval advantage
19. Senator Perdue. Admiral Harris, Chinese submarines have
deployed to the Indian Ocean seven times in the past 4 years, and
Chinese ships have conducted dozens of port visits across Europe,
Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. This does not mean the PLAN has
become a global navy, but its presence and influence are expanding. The
PLA Navy (PLAN) is in the midst of a massive shipbuilding program. If
this program continues, China will surpass Russia as the world's second
largest Navy by 2020, when measured in terms of submarines and frigate-
class ships or larger. Last year, Admiral Harris, you told this
committee that approximately 230 of 400 foreign submarines worldwide
are located in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. Of these, 160 belong to China,
Russia, and North Korea. And yet, you told us that as a combatant
commander, you only gets 50 percent of the submarines you need, based
on our 52-submarine force (attack sub force). However, the United
States maintains a critical advantage in undersea warfare. What
investments is China making to erode this advantage? What is your
assessment of how successful these efforts have been?
Admiral Harris. Historically, anti-submarine warfare has lagged
behind anti-surface and anti-air warfare as a priority for the PLAN.
Although anti-submarine warfare remains a relative capability gap,
recent new-construction classes are equipped with a variety of new
sonar systems, including towed arrays and variable-depth sonars, as
well as hangars to support embarked helicopters. These helicopters are
fitted with search radars, dipping sonar, sonobuoys, torpedoes, and
depth charges. The anti-submarine warfare variant of the Y-9 fixed wing
aircraft is equipped with a magnetic anomaly detector boom and a large
surface search radar. Recent exercises suggest the PLAN has
strengthened its training cycle and has made some progress in deep
water anti-submarine warfare. The PLAN conducts complex multi-
discipline warfare training throughout the year, and the scope of naval
training has broadened to include more robust anti-submarine warfare.
20. Senator Perdue. Admiral Harris, is China on course to surpass
the United States Navy in the same terms? If so, when?
Admiral Harris. I believe that China will not surpass the United
States Navy in the next several years. However, I expect to see a
consistent erosion of United States advantage in this domain as China
fields new and better capabilities, integrates them into a coherent
system of systems, and trains to more effectively operate them. This
assessment should generate a sense of urgency to maintain and improve
U.S. undersea capabilities--a critical advantage that our nation must
retain.
That said, United States and Chinese naval capabilities do not
easily support direct comparison. For example, China's submarine force
is very different from that of the United States Navy, but has
characteristics well suited for its more limited mission set. Most of
China's submarine force is conventionally powered, with anti-ship
cruise missiles, but without towed arrays. These submarines are
optimized for regional missions that concentrate on anti-surface
warfare near major sea lines of communication. China's small nuclear
attack submarine force is more capable of operating further from the
Chinese mainland; conducting intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance; and anti-surface warfare missions. Finally, China's
submarines lack optimization for two missions at the core of the United
States submarine force: anti-submarine warfare and land attack.
burma (myanmar)--rohingya genocide
21. Senator Perdue. Admiral Harris, since clashes in Rakhine broke
out between the Rohingya and the Burmese military in last August, more
than 688,000 Rohingya Muslims have fled Burma's Rakhine State to escape
the military's campaign of ethnic cleansing. Many of these refugees
fled to Bangladesh. The atrocities committed by Burmese security
forces, including mass killings, sexual violence, and widespread arson,
amount to crimes against humanity. Secretary Mattis said, ``This is a
tragedy that's worse than anything that CNN or BBC has been able to
portray about what has happened to these people.'' What are your views
on the terrible atrocities that are ongoing in Burma?
Admiral Harris. USPACOM views the atrocities in Burma as tragedy
and a major setback and ongoing challenge in democracy for the Aung
Sang Suu Kyi (ASSK) administration. Lack of civilian control of the
military will continue to plague ASSK's efforts to stabilize and
control military actions throughout Burma. This atrocity will have a
long lasting effect impacting the ability to conduct military to
military engagements.
22. Senator Perdue. Admiral Harris, has PACOM played any role in
facilitating aid to dispersed Rohingya refugees?
Admiral Harris. USPACOM monitored the situation from the onset and
stayed in constant communication with the United States Embassies in
both Burma and Bangladesh. USPACOM remains ready to support at the
request of the Department of State and direction from the Department of
Defense. To date, no request has been made, and United Nations and Non-
Governmental Organizations are facilitating the dispersal of aid.
USPACOM did conduct bilateral engagements with Senior Government
Officials in Bangladesh and Thailand encouraging support for the
refugees.
23. Senator Perdue. Admiral Harris, how has this refugee crisis
affected stability in that region?
Admiral Harris. The Rohingya crisis has strained Burma's political
relations with regional countries and increased tensions between
Bangladesh and Burma. In the long-term, the large influx of Rohingya
could create instability in southeastern Bangladesh due to tensions
between the refugees and local population over competition in the
informal labor market, rising food prices, and environmental
degradation. The lack of sustainable employment opportunities for the
Rohingya and protracted delays in the repatriation process could also
exacerbate these tensions.
The approaching summer monsoon season in South Asia will place
significant additional stress on the displaced Rohingya. Severe weather
is likely to increase disease, worsen living conditions, and complicate
already insufficient sanitation systems. International pressure on the
Governments of Bangladesh and Burma will almost certainly increase. In
short, an already difficult situation will become even more difficult.
chinese investment in us-cfius reform
24. Senator Perdue. Admiral Harris, gaps in the CFIUS process have
allowed China to weaponize investment to achieve the back-door transfer
of dual-use United States technology and related know-how, aiding
China's military modernization and jeopardizing the ability of the
United States to maintain its overall military advantage. CFIUS was not
designed to stop investment-driven technology transfers, and many such
transactions are occurring today, carefully designed to sidestep CFIUS'
limited jurisdiction. Nor does CFIUS currently cover real estate
transactions near military bases (or other sensitive national security
facilities), which could pose a risk to national security. I also sit
on the Banking Committee, which oversees this matter, so what is your
view on CFIUS and do you believe we need reforms?
Admiral Harris. Existing and emerging technologies are vital to
maintaining our technological edge and military superiority. The CFIUS
process is absolutely essential to protecting our defense technologies,
military capabilities, and critical infrastructure. I likewise fully
support the pending Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act
(FIRRMA) legislation. I'm pleased to see that the interests and
concerns of the security community are increasingly represented in the
CFIUS process, and that FIRRMA strengthens the process. I particularly
appreciate the intent of FIRRMA to broaden the scope to include review
of real estate transactions in close proximity to military facilities.
I believe continuing to increase DOD's voice in the CFIUS process will
help realize the intent of CFIUS and FIRRMA.
25. Senator Perdue. Admiral Harris, what threats currently exist
with Chinese investment in the United States?
Admiral Harris. The United States has an open economy that is the
largest in the world and the top destination for foreign investment. It
attracts investment from all over the world, including China. It's only
natural that China, as the world's second-largest economy, wants to
increase investment in the United States. However, Beijing does not
give our firms reciprocal access to its markets, which stifles fair and
productive competition.
Additionally, Beijing exploits United States open markets to
promote its own strategic interests at the expense of ours and those of
our allies and partners. The Chinese Communist Party has an
unparalleled willingness and ability to leverage its economy for its
own ends. It uses both private and state-owned Chinese companies and
investors to advance the objectives of its overarching strategy to
``rejuvenate the Chinese nation.'' When a Chinese entity seeks to
invest in a strategic sector in the United States, it is often unclear
at the outset if it is simply an ordinary business transaction, or if
it is being undertaken in service of the regime. Often, the drivers are
mixed. In many cases, Chinese investments enable regime goals at odds
with United States interests in several key areas. First, China seeks
to build a ``world-class military'' and uses extensive theft,
absorption, and purchase of United States technology and expertise to
advance its military modernization. Second, Beijing seeks to reshape
international laws, regulations and technology standards to better
align with China's political model and the authoritarian tools that
accompany it.
26. Senator Perdue. Admiral Harris, has China, in your view, been
weaponizing investment?
Admiral Harris. I believe China has weaponized investment. As I
noted previously, the Chinese Communist Party has an unparalleled
willingness and ability to leverage economics--including Chinese
overseas investments--to serve regime objectives. China seeks to build
a ``world-class military'' capable of deterring the United States and
its allies, winning should conflict occur, and diminishing U.S.
presence in the Indo-Pacific. In pursuit of this aim, Beijing
institutes practices, such as ``military-civilian integration,'' that
transfer advanced technologies and exquisite expertise acquired via
licit and illicit access to United States private sector and research
institutions to make the Chinese military more capable and lethal.
China also frequently attaches political strings to its overseas trade
and investments--turning on and off its economic spigots, or
threatening to do so, to persuade recipient countries to comply with
Beijing's demands.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Senator Ben Sasse
artificial intelligence and intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (isr)
27. Senator Sasse. Admiral Harris, in your prepared statement, you
said you are concerned about China's investment in artificial
intelligence (AI). You wrote that the Indo-Pacific requires,
``persistent and intrusive ISR to provide indications, warning, and
situational awareness across a vast geographic area'' and that our
``ISR capabilities must be suited to our unique operating
environment.'' Presumably, China has reached the same conclusions about
the value of ISR in the region. Have you seen any indications that
China is leveraging its AI investments to close the ISR capability gap?
Admiral Harris. China is clearly researching and considering how AI
can be used to improve development and use of ISR capabilities
(satellites, unmanned aerial systems, reconnaissance aircraft, etc.).
China released its New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development
Plan in July 2017 which articulated its ambition to lead the world in
AI by 2030. Some of the concepts could be used to enable better,
``smarter'' ISR operations include intelligent and autonomous unmanned
systems (such as swarm intelligence), AI-enabled data fusion,
information processing, intelligence analysis, and intelligent support
to decision making. China has pursued closer civil-military focus for
AI, institutionalizing the relationship between cutting edge research
efforts and military requirements.
28. Senator Sasse. Admiral Harris, how are we using AI to maintain
or grow our ISR advantage in the Indo-Pacific?
Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]
cyber partnerships with allies
29. Senator Sasse. Admiral Harris, in your prepared statement you
noted, ``the two most capable cyber actors worldwide are Russia and
China. Both of these countries have incorporated cyber into their joint
warfighting doctrine and routinely exercise these capabilities
alongside more traditional elements as a force multiplier. In fact,
China values cyber so highly it created the Strategic Support Force to
integrate and synchronize cyber operations.'' The 2018 National Defense
Strategy aims to Compete, Deter, and Win alongside allies and partners.
In the context of the cyber domain, how is PACOM aligning itself with
allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific?
Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]
30. Senator Sasse. Admiral Harris, do any of our treaty allies and
partners in the Indo-Pacific have offensive cyber capabilities? If so,
are they using them?
Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Kristin Gillibrand
korean peninsula
31. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Harris, at the end of February,
media reported on an unreleased UN report claiming that North Korea has
been shipping acid-resistant tiles, valves, and other chemical weapons-
making supplies to the Syrian Government, as well as providing
technicians that have been spotted working at chemical weapons and
missile facilities inside Syria. According to reports, these shipments
have gone on for a number of years, and ties between North Korea and
Syria go back decades. In our CENTCOM hearing earlier this week,
General Votel noted in his statement that ``For decades, North Korea
widely proliferated ballistic missile expertise and materials to a
number of actors, including Iran and Syria.'' What can we do to better
prevent North Korea from providing this illicit aid to the Syrian
Government, and how can we prevent Syrian funds from enriching the Kim
regime?
Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]
32. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Harris, does the fact that this
illicit trade continues reflect a failure to detect North Korea
shipments, or an inability to interdict them?
Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]
33. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Harris, what role, if any, has
China played with regard to stopping this trade?
Admiral Harris. With regard to impeding the movement of personnel
associated with missile or WMD programs, China acts when provided with
evidence associating individuals with proscribed activities or when
individuals have been `designated' by a sanctioning entity. However,
China's enforcement of its domestic export control laws and
international nonproliferation commitments is inconsistent. North
Korean proliferation entities often use China's large role in global
commercial markets to mask their illicit activity among legitimate
trade transactions. The combination of weak Chinese enforcement and
North Korean deception techniques presents a persistent challenge to
United States and allied counter proliferation efforts.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
diplomacy
34. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Harris, would you agree that we
must strengthen our diplomatic arm of our efforts to address North
Korea's nuclear ambitions? How have key diplomatic vacancies impacted
your efforts?
Admiral Harris. PACOM continues to support the Maximum Pressure
Campaign, which has exerted an unprecedented level of pressure on North
Korea to denuclearize. While the top United States diplomatic post on
the Korean Peninsula has remained vacant for some time, this is being
rectified. I believe that United States Government priorities and
security interests are well represented and carried out in the Korean
Peninsula. The State Department's Charge d'Affaires at the embassy in
Seoul is a long-time Foreign Service Officer who has a strong
relationship with the Republic of Korea. Furthermore, Secretary
Pompeo's May 15 lifting of the State Department's hiring freeze will
give the domestic bureaus and missions overseas the ability to fill
essential positions vacated after December 31, 2017, to further advance
U.S. foreign policy goals.
35. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Harris, the New York Times reported
recently that satellite imagery indicates North Korea may be making new
nuclear bomb fuel. What can you tell us about the activity at the
reactor site?
Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]
north korea strategy
36. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Harris, the FY18 NDAA required the
President to produce a North Korea strategy within 90 days of the
legislation becoming law. We have hit the deadline, yet no strategy has
been produced. Are you aware of this strategy required by the most
recent NDAA? Have you been consulted? Do you know when we will see the
strategy?
Admiral Harris. Yes, I am aware of the requirement in the FY 2018
NDAA. PACOM has provided input and support via the Joint Staff and the
Secretary's staff. I defer to the White House and the office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) on the timing of the release.
submarines
37. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Harris, both Russia and China are
modernizing their submarine fleets. As you testified before this
committee both last and this year, ``potential adversary submarine
activity has tripled from 2008 levels, requiring an increase of U.S.
activity to maintain undersea superiority.'' Can you provide an update
on our capabilities, as well as our adversaries' progress? How advanced
are their anti-submarine warfare capabilities?
Admiral Harris.
United States: No country can match our ability to operate under
the sea, but that is a perishable advantage that China and Russia are
working to close. Therefore, we must continue to resource the undersea
warfare capabilities that reside in the Navy today. We must also
continue investments in our submarine and anti-submarine warfare
forces, such as the Virginia-class SSN's and Mk-48 torpedoes. If we
don't, China and Russia will close that gap.
Russia: Although the Russian Federation Navy is mainly made up of
Soviet-era surface ships and submarines, an extensive modernization
program is underway, focusing first on the submarine force. The Russian
Pacific Fleet has received two Dolgorukkiy SSBNs, will eventually
receive Severodvinsk SSGNs, and a new fifth-generation general purpose
nuclear-powered submarine is under development. The IL-38 MAY Maritime
Patrol Aircraft has undergone numerous updates over the decades. The
latest operational development concerns the IL-38N (Novella) variant
that received an upgraded anti-submarine warfare system installation.
China: The Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is rapidly
retiring legacy combatants in favor of larger, multi-mission ships
equipped with advanced anti-submarine weapons and sensors. The PLAN
remains engaged in a robust surface combatant construction program; the
latest ships are anti-submarine warfare variants with towed-array
sonars. The PLA is making gradual progress in the undersea domain but
continues to lack a robust deep-water anti-submarine warfare
capability.
38. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Harris, you note your support for
the Navy's 2016 Force Structure Assessment that included an increased
attack submarine requirement--from 48 to 66. Last month, the Navy
released its FY19 Shipbuilding Plan, which considers building not only
two attack submarines per year for the next 30 years, but possibly
three per year in some years (FY21, 22, 25 at the earliest) to reach
the 66 requirement sooner than the late 2040s. Would you support this?
How would such an acceleration help PACOM?
Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]
39. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Harris, what more can we do in
terms of our submarine fleet to ensure that we remain able to mitigate
any maritime threat in the Pacific?
Admiral Harris. SSNs remain one of my top three readiness concerns
along with critical munitions and fifth generation fighters. The SSN
inventory stands at 52 but in the 2020s it will drop to the mid-40s.
Additional investments made today will help fill tomorrow's
requirements. So, I fully support the procurement of the 3rd Virginia
Class SSN and additional Mk-48 torpedoes. The U.S. should also consider
life extension programs for a number of later model Los Angeles Class
SSNs. No country can match our ability to operate under the sea, but if
we don't continue to resource undersea warfare capabilities, China and
Russia will close that gap.
pacific collisions
40. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Harris, we were all very saddened
and concerned by the multiple maritime mishaps in 2017 in the Pacific
that led to the death of 17 sailors, including two from Connecticut.
What was your involvement with the Navy's review of the fatal
collisions? Did you provide input for the reviews that were conducted?
Admiral Harris. I had no involvement with the Navy's review of the
fatal collisions.
41. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Harris, following these tragedies,
what steps have you taken to improve operations?
Admiral Harris. As the PACOM Commander I supported the Navy's
efforts to improve readiness for all Pacific Fleet naval forces.
42. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Harris, how has the loss of two
U.S. destroyers equipped with the Aegis ballistic missile defense
system impacted PACOM's ability to carry out its mission?
Admiral Harris. The Navy mitigated the loss of the two Aegis
Ballistic Missile destroyers through a homeport shift of one destroyer
(USS Milius) from San Diego to Japan, and a change in the rotational
deployment of USS O'Kane from CENTCOM to PACOM. To cover CENTCOM, the
Navy deployed an additional Aegis ship from the east coast. PACOM
experienced minimal impact to meeting its assigned missions.
43. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Harris, as I understand that no
replacement ships have been sent to the Pacific, how has this impacted
the operational tempo of those ships and sailors required to fill the
gaps?
Admiral Harris. The Navy mitigated the loss of the two Aegis
Ballistic Missile destroyers through a homeport shift of one destroyer
from San Diego to Japan, and a change in the rotational deployment of
another destroyer from CENTCOM to PACOM. These actions allowed the
operational tempo for PACOM's forward deployed ships to remain constant
while focused on improving readiness and supporting operational
requirements.
north korea cyber revenue
44. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Harris, North Korea's cyberattacks
are estimated to provide the regime with as much as $1 billion per
year--a staggering figure equivalent to one-third of the country's
exports. What are you doing to blind North Korea's cyber capabilities
to prevent the regime from continuing to launch offensive cyber
operations that provide illicit revenue for their nuclear weapons
program?
Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]
45. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Harris, last month, the
Administration announced its largest tranche of sanction designations
against North Korea, yet this did not focus on their cyber activity. Do
you agree that we must do more to make North Korea pay a steeper price?
Admiral Harris. Yes. The Administration has focused on North
Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile activities with the State
Department-led Maximum Pressure Campaign synchronizing all instruments
of United States national power--including diplomatic overtures,
economic sanctions, and continued military readiness--combined with the
efforts of the international community. PACOM fully supports the
Maximum Pressure Campaign with military activities and capabilities.
While these whole of United States Government and international efforts
have contributed to Kim Jong-un's recent willingness to negotiate
denuclearization, North Korea's cyber activity has changed very little.
46. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Harris, in December, DHS officially
attributed the WannaCry attack that impacted over 300,000 victims in
150 countries to the North Korean Government. While attribution is
important, it is not sufficient. Do you agree that North Korea must pay
a steeper price for its cyberattacks? Do you agree that our actions so
far have not made North Korea realize that they have more to lose than
gain with their behavior?
Admiral Harris. Yes to both questions. Deterring malicious cyber
activity is a difficult challenge, especially with North Korea, a
country that does not accept or honor international rules and laws.
United States Government actions to date have not deterred North Korea
from conducting these types of malicious cyber activities. I believe
that cyberattacks against the U.S. should result in consequences for
the actor. The United States should employ a whole-of nation approach,
in conjunction with allies and partners, to change North Korea's
decision calculus about the cost of continuing its malicious cyber
activity.
47. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Harris, North Korean hackers often
operate from abroad, notably in China as they rely on its internet
structure. What should be done to pressure China and others to crack
down on North Korean hackers and prevent North Korea from accessing
their networks?
Admiral Harris. The United States should consider publishing timely
reports of North Korean malicious cyber activity originating from
abroad to convince China and others to crack down on these hackers and
deny access to their networks. This will likely require establishing
new and responsive processes to develop interagency consensus and
crafting appropriate exceptions to national disclosure policies. If the
U.S. can empower the international community with timely and relevant
knowledge of such internet use, all countries stand to benefit from
broader leadership to influence and potentially eliminate this
malicious activity.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Donnelly
conventional prompt strike
48. Senator Donnelly. Admiral Harris, it is my understanding that
PACOM--alongside STRATCOM and EUCOM--has identified the development and
fielding of a Conventional Prompt Strike system as a high priority. Is
that correct and, if so, can you elaborate on that need?
Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]
49. Senator Donnelly. Admiral Harris, in your view, what are the
tradeoffs between a land-based versus a sea-based capability?
Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie Hirono
joint interagency task force-west (jiatf-west)
50. Senator Hirono. Admiral Harris, Congress has made changes over
recent years on how the U.S. military works with its allies. This
includes efforts to streamline security cooperation, and how the
military contributes to the fight against illicit drug trafficking.
Within your area of responsibility (AOR) are countries which produce
and export products which go into the production of illicit drugs as
well as final products themselves. This includes products contributing
to our opioid epidemic. I am interested in determining if changes to
security cooperation rules have impacted the operations and
effectiveness of the Joint Interagency Task Force West to work with our
allies in combatting the flow of illicit precursor and final products.
Can you provide a brief status on how JIATF-West is doing to combat
illegal drug operations, such as those related to Chinese produced
Fentanyl which get sent to our country?
Admiral Harris. JIATF West works in concert with foreign law
enforcement and the U.S. interagency to identify and disrupt drug
threats. Main focus areas include conducting partner capacity building
programs, sharing intelligence, and assisting in the coordination of
foreign partner interdiction efforts. JIATF West's counter fentanyl
activities directly support ongoing U.S. law enforcement cases
conducted by Homeland Security Investigations and the Drug Enforcement
Administration. This work has primarily served to identify Chinese
manufacturing and shipping networks, contributing to investigations of
specific producers, vendors and distributors within China.
51. Senator Hirono. Admiral Harris, how have congressional security
cooperation changes impacted JIATF-West in doing its job, specifically
focusing on second or third order negative effects? This includes
things that have helped or hindered operational effectiveness and
timeliness. Would you recommend and modifications to existing laws and
regulations which would improve the abilities of JIATF-W in conducting
its missions?
Admiral Harris. Changes to security cooperation promulgated through
the fiscal year 2017 and fiscal year 2018 National Defense
Authorization Acts have reduced JIATF West's ability to engage and
train partner nation law enforcement. Specifically, the new authorities
have made it problematic to conduct long-term budgetary planning.
Previously, the DOD Counternarcotics (CN) community could rely upon the
predictability of dedicated funds in the DOD CN appropriation for train
and equip activities which enabled long-term planning. The new security
cooperation authorities require the DOD CN community to compete
annually for Defense Security Cooperation Agency funds to conduct these
activities, with uncertainty in the resultant funding outcomes. This
uncertainty limits JIATF-West's ability to build enduring partnerships
and effectively increase partner capacity/capability over the long
term.
I recommend amending 10 USC Sec. 333 to allow funding of CN train
and equip activities using DOD Drug Interdiction and Counter-drug
Activities, Defense.
energy resilience-fuel and electric supply vulnerabilities
52. Senator Hirono. Admiral Harris, there are concerns of the
threats posed by our adversaries in the Indo-Pacific region to disrupt
our ability to deliver fuel or electricity in support of PACOM's
mission. In the region, DOD relies on vulnerable fuel and electric
supplies to conduct its military operations, where power outages on
military installations or fuel supply disruptions could hinder DOD's
ability to conduct critical military operations. In your testimony, you
state that we must ensure we have the right fuel, in the right amount,
at the right location, at the right time, for PACOM to project power
throughout the Indo-Pacific under combat conditions.
Can you discuss the capabilities of China and Russia to disrupt our
electric or fuel supplies in the Indo-Pacific region? Are we prepared
to respond, and how?
Admiral Harris. U.S. adversaries have the capability to disrupt the
flow of fuel and potentially electric supplies. Additionally, the U.S.
operates fuel systems that may be vulnerable to disruption through a
loss of power. However, these systems have redundant capabilities, such
as back-up power sources and manual operating systems, which mitigate
the impact of a power loss.
PACOM has sufficient fuel capacity in theater to support forces for
contingency operations. However, the strategic placement of fuel stocks
and the availability of commercial shipping to deliver it present
concerns in a contested and denied environment. Annually, PACOM
evaluates OPLAN requirements with the Defense Logistics Agency to
ensure strategic fuel reserves and the global fuel market can meet the
demand of contingency forces.
53. Senator Hirono. Admiral Harris, based on expected growth in
military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region, do you believe we are
appropriately planning for the growing energy demands in the region?
What can be done better to ensure energy demands are met and will even
be met during a contingency?
Admiral Harris. PACOM plans for the growing energy demands in the
region, but has some significant challenges. I view bulk fuel as the
most critical commodity to sustain operations. In planning for
contingencies, PACOM assumes the loss of access to fixed forward fuel
reserves, which makes PACOM forces dependent on bulk fuel deliveries
originating outside of the second island chain. This places a greater
reliance on commercial tankers and the capability to distribute fuel
from the tankers to other at-sea platforms or to locations on land. To
ensure the ability to meet future energy demands to sustain operations,
the U.S. should grow the number of combat refueling ships and expand
the capability to move bulk fuel from commercial tankers to combat
ships and ashore.
china/russia: military modernization
54. Senator Hirono. Admiral Harris, in your testimony, you state
that China's provocative and destabilizing actions in the South China
Sea continue unabated. That, China's historically unprecedented
economic development has enabled an impressive military buildup that
could soon challenge the United States across almost all domains. You
specifically express concern that the PLA Navy (PLAN) is in the midst
of a massive shipbuilding program. And that if this program continues,
China will surpass Russia as the world's second largest Navy by 2020,
when measured in terms of submarines and frigate-class ships or larger.
Admiral Harris, can you quantify the naval threat and capabilities
of China and, for that matter, Russia in the Indo-Pacific region?
Admiral Harris. With more than 300 ships, the PLA Navy is the
largest in Asia. The PLAN has undergone a rapid shipbuilding and
modernization program over the past decade, which has replaced older
ships and submarines with more modern and capable platforms, many of
which employ anti-air and anti-ship missiles that are among the best in
the world. With over 20 advanced destroyers, over 90 frigates or
corvettes, and nearly 60 attack submarines, the PLA Navy can maintain
persistent presence throughout the adjacent seas and project
substantial maritime power throughout the region. China currently
operates one developmental aircraft carrier. The second carrier has
begun early-phase sea trials and could reach initial operational
capability as early as late 2019.
Over the past decade, the PLAN has steadily expanded its operating
areas, number of days spent at sea, and scale and complexity of
training. Not only is the PLAN getting bigger, it is also getting
better.
Though Russia's navy is large, the Russian Pacific Fleet
(RUSPACFLT) in the Indo-Pacific region is relatively small compared to
its neighbors' navies. For example, Russia has only, at most, seven
major combatants available for operations in the Pacific. These ships
include one cruiser, one guided missile destroyer, four anti-submarine
destroyers and one new frigate. Russia also has two of the new
Dolgorukiy SSBNs and is slated to receive two more.
Modernization is ongoing and will significantly improve the
RUSPACFLT capabilities. Russia is slated to receive eight new frigates
by 2025, and six new KILO-class diesel submarines. These vessels will
be equipped with the Kalibr cruise missile weapons system--the same
type Russia used to launch cruise missiles into Syria and which pose a
significant threat to land targets, ships and submarines.
55. Senator Hirono. Admiral Harris, in your opinion, what
recommendations would you offer to counter the naval threat China and
Russia pose in the region? Are future authorizations needed to counter
this threat?
Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]
anti-submarine warfare (asw) capabilities
56. Senator Hirono. Admiral Harris, your written testimony
describes significant advances in the capabilities and quantities of
China's submarine force as well as the modernization of Russian
submarines. In the past, the Navy based several squadrons of P-3s at
Barber Point and later at Kaneohe Bay. Once the successor aircraft, the
P-8, began operations, decisions were made with a significant emphasis
on efficiencies to move a vast majority of P-3s to Florida and
Washington State. There is a plan to keep two P-8s in Hawaii, along
with rotational crews. Further, the current and future submarine
threats from China and Russia will also be primarily located within the
Indo-Pacific.
Should the Navy and PACOM take a fresh look at the basing of P-8s,
given our primary threats will be in the Indo-Pacific, and to allow the
P-8 fleet to be timely, responsive, and agile to satisfy PACOM's
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and ASW
requirements?
Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2019 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 20, 2018
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:24 a.m. in Room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe
presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker,
Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Cruz, Sasse, Scott,
Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal,
Donnelly, Kaine, King, Heinrich, Warren, and Peters.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Senator Inhofe. Our meeting will come to order.
The committee today is meeting to hear testimony on the
posture of the U.S. Strategic Command, and we welcome our
witness, General Hyten, Commander of STRATCOM.
The Trump Administration's National Defense Strategy
prioritizes the reemergence of long-term strategic competition.
Nowhere is this reality more evident than in Russia and China
intensifying their efforts in the nuclear, cyber, and space
domains, which are a focus of a Strategic Command mission.
The Nuclear Posture Review released last month orients our
nuclear enterprise to address these strategic competitors. The
NPR [Nuclear Posture Review] offers continuity in the U.S.
nuclear modernization efforts and wisely advocates developing
additional capabilities to achieve our fundamental goal of
nuclear deterrence.
Our potential adversaries are not standing still. In his
recent state of the nation address, Putin unveiled new nuclear
weapons, including heavy, mobile ICBMs [Intercontinental
Ballistic Missiles] and hypersonic glide vehicles. Meanwhile,
Russia's continued violations of both the INF [Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces] and Open Skies treaties threaten to
undermine strategic stability.
Then there is China. China is rapidly expanding its missile
forces, including development of new ICBM capabilities and
advanced ballistic missile submarines. It recently developed a
new nuclear capable strategic bomb, achieving a nuclear triad
for China.
Beyond our strategic competitors threats from North Korea
and Iran persist. In particular, recent North Korean missile
tests suggests that they are capable of striking the Homeland
with an ICBM. I would say I am more optimistic now about North
Korea than I was just a short while ago. I think our response
to North Korea's threat was one that actually produced some
good results. So I think that right now I really believe that
the meeting is going to take place with Kim Jong-un and our
President.
Russia and China are also increasingly active in space,
intent on challenging our domain superiority to achieve an
asymmetric advantage. Both countries invested significant
resources in anti-satellite ISR [intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance], direct energy, jamming, and cyber
capabilities. We have got to do more to meet these challenges.
Thank you for being here, General Hyten.
Senator Reed?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General Hyten, thank you for your service to the country
and for testifying on the posture of the United States
Strategic Command as we prepare for the fiscal year 2019
National Defense Authorization Act.
I would like to hear from you about a number of topics
based on your office call with me last week. Thank you again
for making time.
First and foremost is the Administration's Nuclear Posture
Review. It adopts many of the same premises as the 2010 posture
review that we will not use nuclear weapons against nations in
good standing under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, but we
always reserve the right in cases of extreme circumstances to
use nuclear weapons. It affirms the importance of
nonproliferation but places an emphasis on the changed threat
conditions that exist today versus 2010. It reaffirms the
importance of the 2010 review and modernizing the triad of
delivery platforms and weapons and their nuclear command,
control, and communication, or NC3 systems. But it also
proposes two supplemental systems: a low-yield submarine-
launched ballistic missile and a sea-based cruise missile which
was dropped in the 2010 posture review because it was not being
deployed and maintained. I am referring to the sea-based cruise
missile.
While I agree with much of the NPR, I have concerns about
the low-yield submarine-launched warhead. It is my
understanding that this system is in response to Russia's
military doctrine of using a small-yield nuclear weapon as a
means to escalate to deescalate or escalate to win a
conventional conflict. The Russian doctrine of escalate to
deescalate could easily spin out of control if our response to
their low-yield weapon is to use a similar one which could
escalate into exchange of larger weapons. We have to devote
considerable effort to war-gaming this problem and ensure that
existing systems, both conventional and nuclear, cannot meet
this doctrinal challenge of escalate to deescalate.
In any case, such a proposal certainly opens up a debate of
deeply held opinions. While this debate may be important to
have--I think it is important to have, indeed--I worry that it
may disrupt the bipartisan consensus that presently ensures the
modernization of the triad and NC3 system. This process will
take decades and I believe it should be our highest priority
and sole focus.
Beyond the nuclear mission, General, you also have an
increasingly important space mission. I realize much of this is
classified, but it is imperative that you communicate in an
appropriate format what this budget request proposes and how it
addresses the threats we face.
You are also responsible for synchronizing global missile
defense plans and operations. I would like to hear your
thoughts on the state of our Homeland and regional systems, how
we need to improve reliability and address advancing threats.
Your command is also responsible for spectrum operations
and electronic warfare. I would like to know what your command
has been advocating to make this integrated effort across the
Department of Defense.
Strategic Command, as its name implies, is about deterrence
with near-peer competitors. Today, deterrence is a seamless
continuum between land, sea, air, electronic spectrum, and
space. You have many issues on your plate, and I look forward
to your testimony.
Thank you very much, sir.
Senator Inhofe. General Hyten, you are recognized for an
opening statement. Your entire statement will be made a part of
the record.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOHN E. HYTEN, USAF, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND
General Hyten. Thank you, Senator Inhofe, Ranking Member
Reed, members of the committee. I am honored to be here today
in a continuing privilege for me to represent the 184,000
Americans, the 184,000 men and women performing the missions of
U.S. Strategic Command every day.
I want to start by thanking you for your enduring support
to our nation's defense.
As we sit here today, it is important to note that the
appropriations bill funding our military is still awaiting full
approval by the Congress. Passage of this bill is essential in
ensuring our Department maintains the ability to field the most
lethal, capable, and resilient military in the world. I remain
optimistic that Congress will pass this bill as the existing
continuing resolution expires this Friday. Reliance on
continuing resolutions in lieu of stable budgets delays
mission-critical modernization, degrades troop morale, and
impedes readiness recovery. But I am grateful for this
committee's continued support. But timely budgets are essential
in order to ensure our all volunteer force remains fully
trained and equipped to address the nation's existing and
emerging future threats.
The first and most important message I want to deliver
today is that the forces under my command are fully ready to
deter our adversaries and respond decisively should deterrence
ever fail. We are ready for all threats. No one should doubt
this. We just have to make sure that the future STRATCOM
commanders that come after me will always be able to make this
statement.
STRATCOM is a global warfighting command. We set the
conditions across the globe as the ultimate guarantor of our
national and allied security. Our forces and capabilities
underpin and enable all other joint force operations. STRATCOM
forces are dispersed across the globe, under the sea, on the
land, under the land, in the air, across cyber and into space.
The men and women of this command are responsible for strategic
deterrence, nuclear operations, space operations, joint
electromagnetic spectrum operations, global strike missile
defense analysis, and targeting, and still cyberspace
operations until Cyber Command is elevated.
Today, our country is challenged by multiple adversaries
with an expanding range and capabilities available to them. To
maintain military superiority in this multipolar, all-domain
world, we must out-think, out-maneuver, our-partner, and out-
innovate our adversaries. Deterrence in the 21st Century
requires the integration of all our capabilities across all
domains, enabling us to respond to adversary aggression anytime
anywhere.
The bedrock of our nation's deterrence continues to be our
safe, secure, ready, and reliable nuclear triad. The surest way
to prevent war is to be prepared for it, and while the current
triad continues to provide the backbone of our national
security, we will eventually consume the last remaining margin
from our investments made during the Cold War. And our
modernization programs are critical and include the B-21
bomber, the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine, the
ground-based strategic deterrent, the long-range standoff
cruise missile, nuclear command and control, and life-extended
nuclear warheads, which will provide, without a doubt, the
nuclear deterrent capability that our nation needs now and well
into the future.
The recently completed 2018 Nuclear Posture Review
reinforces and clearly defines longstanding national objectives
regarding nuclear weapons. From a warfighter perspective, there
is important consistency between the 2018 NPR and its
predecessor. The biggest difference, as with the recent
National Defense Strategy, is the return to threat-based
planning and response to great power competition. We started
the NPR with assessment of the threat--it was all about the
threat--and based our approach on what our adversaries are
doing today and the increasing challenges of the future. We
have to remember the strategic environment is dynamic. It
changes constantly. And our approach to deterrence must be
equally dynamic to address these evolving threats.
STRATCOM truly is a global warfighting command, and the
strength of its command is its people. The soldiers, sailors,
airmen, marines, civilians of this enterprise have the most
important mission in our entire Department and our entire
nation. Their hard work and dedication ensures our nation's
strategic capabilities remain safe, secure, reliable, and
ready. Sustained congressional support will ensure we remain
ready, agile, and effective in deterring strategic attack
assuring our allies and partners well today and into the
future.
So I thank you for the opportunity to be here, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Hyten follows:]
Prepared Statement by John E. Hyten
introduction
USSTRATCOM is a global warfighting command, setting the conditions
across the globe as the ultimate guarantor of national and allied
security. Our forces and capabilities underpin and enable all other
Joint Force operations.
USSTRATCOM is globally dispersed from the depths of the ocean, on
land, in the air, across cyber, and into space, with a matching breadth
of mission areas. The men and women of this command are responsible for
Strategic Deterrence, Nuclear Operations, Space Operations, Joint
Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations, Global Strike, Missile Defense,
Analysis and Targeting, and Cyberspace Operations (until USCYBERCOM is
elevated). Nearly 184,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and
civilians support the USSTRATCOM mission, providing an umbrella of
security for the United States and its allies every day. These critical
capabilities are an integral part of our combat operations and enable
warfighters across all domains to preserve the peace and when called
upon, dominate in conflict and win.
This past year, USSTRATCOM began restructuring in alignment with
our warfighting mission. We now have an air component and will soon
have a maritime component. Due to the command's unique
responsibilities, we are also leading doctrine with our new Joint Force
Space Component Commander.
Our new Command and Control Facility is moving toward completion
and will support the long-term viability and credibility of our
strategic deterrent force. From this new facility, we will conduct
strategic planning, warfighting operations, aid the President's nuclear
response decision-making process, provide global situational awareness
to the National Command Authorities and combatant commands, and, when
necessary, deliver a decisive response in all domains.
The focus of this command remains to deter strategic attack on the
United States and its allies. USSTRATCOM stands ready to respond to
threats anywhere, anytime across the globe. We acknowledge that we
cannot do this alone and must continually work towards enhancing our
alliances and partnerships, in all areas.
The command's priorities remain:
Above all else, we will provide Strategic Deterrence;
If deterrence fails, we are prepared to deliver a
Decisive Response;
We will do this with a resilient, equipped, and trained
Combat-Ready Force.
global security environment
The strategic landscape of today is increasingly uncertain,
complex, and volatile. Long-term, inter-state strategic competition
between nation states is reemerging, rogue regimes are taking actions
that threaten regional and global stability, and violent extremist
organizations are bent on destroying peace across the globe.
Nevertheless, we remain committed to strategic stability with China and
Russia.
China continues to challenge in the Indo-Pacific region, and our
allies and partners look to the United States to provide balance.
China's excessive maritime claims and aggressive conduct in both the
South China Sea and East China Sea undermine international law and
global maritime standards. Moreover, China's continued long-term
military modernization of both conventional and strategic forces has
implications in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond. They are
aggressively modernizing their mobile nuclear forces and re-engineering
their long-range ballistic missiles to carry multiple nuclear warheads.
China is swiftly developing and testing a hypersonic-glide vehicle
capability, a technology used to defeat ballistic missile defenses.
China's pursuit of conventional global strike capabilities, offensive
counterspace capabilities, and exploitation of computer networks also
raises questions about its global aspirations. These developments--
coupled with a lack of transparency on nuclear issues such as force
disposition and size--impact regional and strategic stability.
Russia continues to pose challenges that require consistent and
deliberate focus. Russia's support to forces in eastern Ukraine (which
it continues to fight alongside with), occupation and purported
annexation of Crimea, operations in the Middle East, and efforts to
present itself as the mediator for concerns in Middle East and Asia-
Pacific regions reinforce its goal of being seen as a military and
diplomatic global power. Russia continues to tout advances in cyber and
counterspace capabilities along with improvements in its strategic
nuclear and general purpose forces. In June 2017, as part of an effort
to destabilize Ukraine, the Russian military launched the most
destructive and costly cyber-attack in history. The effects of this
attack spread globally and included devastating damage to U.S.
businesses. On March 1, President Putin announced Russia's development
of six new strategic nuclear weapons systems including an
intercontinental-range nuclear-powered cruise missile, an
intercontinental-range underwater drone, and a maneuverable hypersonic
glide vehicle. President Putin's statements are not surprising and only
reinforce Russia's commitment to develop weapons designed to intimidate
and coerce the United States and its allies. Finally, Russia's
violation of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with
the development of the SSC-8 ground launched cruise missile remains a
significant issue as delivery of the treaty-violating system continues.
North Korea remains a dangerous and unpredictable actor in the
Pacific region, continuing to develop the capability to threaten the
United States and allies with Pyongyang's evolving ballistic missile
and nuclear weapons program. Kim Jong-un continues to defy
international norms and resolutions through provocative actions
including their sixth nuclear test, three tests claimed to be of
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM), and the WannaCry cyber-
attack. North Korea is progressing in development of Submarine Launched
Ballistic Missiles (SLBM) and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles.
These developments highlight its commitment to diversify its missile
forces and nuclear delivery options, while strengthening missile force
survivability. North Korea continues efforts to expand its stockpile of
weapons-grade fissile material and demonstrated its capability and
willingness to conduct destructive cyber-attacks against the United
States and its allies.
Iran continues to develop ballistic, space, and cyberspace
capabilities--and we remain focused on preventing the development of
the new threats in the region. While the International Atomic Energy
Agency continues to verify Iran is meeting its nuclear-related Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action obligations, we must remain vigilant to
any Iranian intentions that indicate it will abrogate its commitments
and pursue nuclear weapons.
Ungoverned or ineffectively governed regions remain incubators for
those who seek to attack the world's peaceful societies. Transregional
Terrorist Organizations (TTOs) recruit and operate freely across
political, social, and cyberspace boundaries. The effect of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) in the hands of TTOs could be catastrophic,
which highlights the importance of our national nonproliferation and
counter-WMD efforts.
the problem
Today, our deterrent force is safe, secure, ready, and reliable,
but the pace of change in the strategic environment is rapid and
demands adapting how we operate in order to stay ahead of evolving
threats. Failure to meet the pace of change will result in decreasing
U.S. global influence, eroding cohesion among allies and partners, and
reduced access to markets contributing to a decline in our prosperity
and standard of living. The actions we take today assure continued
American primacy in the future.
Our budget, requirement, acquisition, and testing processes are too
slow. We need integrated processes that are faster and tolerate a
greater acceptance of risk. The velocity of change required to resolve
our operational challenges is far higher than we have attained to date.
Our culture must embrace competition, seek higher performance levels,
and generate urgency in achieving innovative outcomes. We must remember
that our military superiority is not a birthright, but rather actively
sustained by each generation.
strategic deterrence
We must look at deterrence through a new lens. We are no longer
defined by the bi-polar world of two superpowers that simplified our
approach to deterrence. The U.S. is challenged by multiple adversaries
with an expanding range of capabilities available to them. With each
potential adversary comes a different set of perceptions and internal
dynamics. Deterrence is more complex and a `one size fits all' approach
no longer applies. Operations countering one adversary have potential
second and third order consequences when interpreted by other potential
adversaries or our allies. This multipolar and all-domain environment
requires collaboration among combatant commands, other DOD elements,
allies, and partners ensuring individual efforts do not adversely
affect the globally integrated approaches to each problem set. To
maintain military superiority in this multipolar world, we must out-
think, out-maneuver, out-partner, and out-innovate our adversaries.
The bedrock of our deterrence is our safe, secure, ready, and
reliable nuclear Triad. The surest way to prevent war is to be prepared
for it. While the current Triad continues to provide the backbone to
our national security, we will eventually consume the last remaining
margin from our investments made during the Cold War. Our modernization
programs including the B-21 bomber; Columbia-class Ballistic Missile
Submarine (SSBN); the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD); Long
Range Standoff (LRSO) cruise missile; Nuclear Command, Control, and
Communications (NC3); and life-extended nuclear warheads will provide--
without a doubt--the nuclear deterrent capabilities our nation needs,
now and well into the future.
Today, deterrence is more than just our nuclear capabilities.
Deterrence requires integrated planning for all capabilities, across
all domains. This enables the synchronized operation and decisive
response to adversary aggression anytime, anywhere. We must make this
concept operational for all domain warfighting throughout the DOD. We
must normalize space and cyberspace as warfighting domains. There is no
war in space, just as there is no war in cyberspace. There is only war,
and war can extend into any domain. To fight wars in these domains we
must develop the appropriate rules of engagement that allow for rapid
response and delegate authority to the appropriate level to operate
more quickly.
the nuclear posture review (npr)
The 2018 NPR guides nuclear modernization efforts and establishes
U.S. deterrence policy, strategy, and posture over the coming years.
This document responds to the threats of today, the burgeoning
challenges of tomorrow, and underscores nuclear deterrence as a
foundational element of U.S. national strength. The NPR clearly ties to
USSTRATCOM's priorities.
The guidance in the NPR is based on the strategic environment of
today. As Secretary Mattis states in the document's preface, ``We must
look reality in the eye and see the world as it is, not as we wish it
to be.'' Our previous efforts to deemphasize the role of nuclear
weapons and reduce the size and variety of capabilities within our
nuclear force did not have the reciprocal effect on other nuclear-armed
states. China and Russia continue to place increased importance on
nuclear weapons in their strategy and doctrine as well as expand the
number and diversity of their nuclear weapons and weapon systems. We
remain committed to strengthening nonproliferation and nuclear
security, and we stand ready to reengage on future arms control
agreements. However, a commitment to arms control and other reductions
cannot be unilateral in the face of ever-increasing threats. This would
harm the readiness of our nuclear deterrent, destabilize relations with
potential adversaries, and reduce the confidence our allies place in
our extended deterrence guarantees.
While our nuclear posture is successful in deterring our
adversaries today, we require a mix of yields and improved platforms to
credibly deter the threats of the near future. The NPR directs near-
term fielding of a low-yield SLBM capability, and in the longer term,
pursuit of a modern nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM).
These capabilities are necessary to enhance the flexibility and
responsiveness of our nuclear forces to ensure potential adversaries
understand they cannot achieve their objectives through force and there
is no benefit in the use of nuclear weapons--in any scenario. Russia's
increased ``non-strategic nuclear weapons'' and evolving doctrine of
first-use in a limited conflict, give evidence of their perceived
advantage at lower levels of conflict. North Korea's burgeoning nuclear
capabilities demonstrate the belief that nuclear weapons provide
escalation options against the United States and our allies in the
Pacific. We must counter these dangerous perceptions with supplemental
capabilities to our previously planned modernization programs. These
enhanced deterrence capabilities ensure adversaries clearly understand
U.S. resolve and do not miscalculate the consequences of nuclear use,
raising the nuclear threshold and reducing the likelihood of nuclear
weapon employment.
The NPR clearly states the role of nuclear weapons in hedging
against an uncertain future. While hedging is not new, this explicit
statement communicates importance of nuclear weapons in ensuring we are
ready and confident to address future threats. As we have witnessed
over the past decade, the security environment can change quickly.
Technology is constantly evolving, and countries are seeking to use
these technologies to advance their own capabilities and diminish ours.
This requires an agile, ready force that is flexible enough to meet the
ever-changing strategic environment, and men and women who are
dedicated to the mission and postured to win.
nuclear weapons and supporting infrastructure
To remain a credible nuclear state, the U.S. must have modern
facilities and a highly skilled workforce able to maintain a credible
nuclear deterrent. Across the nuclear enterprise, many of the
specialized capabilities required to complete stockpile work have
either atrophied or become obsolete. As a result, the U.S. is not
capable of producing and/or manufacturing many of the materials and
unique components in the quantities needed to sustain the stockpile
over the long term.
Re-establishing the capability to produce plutonium pits at a
production rate sufficient to support planned weapon sustainment
activities must be a national priority. Specifically, USSTRATCOM
requires no less than 80 War Reserve plutonium pits delivered to the
stockpile per year by 2030 to support future deterrent requirements.
Delays in developing a viable plutonium pit production capability will
eventually affect our ability to meet the nation's deterrence mission
requirements.
In addition to plutonium manufacturing, we require critical
infrastructure investments in uranium processing, tritium processing,
and lithium component production. Any shortcomings in these
infrastructure projects represent a real risk to maintain force
readiness and our capability to respond to either a technical issue
with our stockpile or adversary advancements in their capabilities.
Modern facilities are of little value without a highly skilled
workforce to conduct the necessary surveillance, sustainment, and
modernization activities necessary to maintain our deterrent. National
Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Administrator and each of our
national security laboratory directors have expressed concerns with
recruiting, developing, and retaining the workforce essential to
sustain our stockpile. The U.S. must have a workforce and industrial
base capable of designing, engineering, and producing materials and
components necessary to sustain the number of warheads and develop a
flexible stockpile to hedge against future risks.
Since the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) approved the Long Term
Stockpile Sustainment Strategy, we have made solid progress in life
extending our aged weapon stockpile. The Navy's W76-1 ballistic missile
warhead Life Extension Program (LEP) is over 90 percent complete and on
track to finish in 2019. The B61-12 gravity bomb program is on
schedule, on budget, and exceeding operational expectations. This
weapon supports extended deterrence commitments to NATO and allows the
U.S. to retire legacy gravity weapons that are approaching the end of
their service lives. The Air Force and NNSA are progressing with work
on the LRSO cruise missile and the associated W80-4 warhead design work
to deliver that weapon system on schedule.
Our next significant weapon LEP decision pertains to future
ballistic missile warhead modernization. We must determine the
appropriate approach for the replacement of the Air Force's W78 ICBM
warhead. The NWC's Strategic Plan is examining the feasibility of
producing a warhead with interoperable features for both Air Force and
Navy ballistic missile systems. The W78 replacement study will
determine the appropriate approach for developing and deploying this
much needed capability.
nuclear weapons security
Protection of nuclear weapons, installations, and personnel is the
utmost priority. We continue to work closely with the Navy and Air
Force to assess nuclear security requirements and adjust our force
posture, training, and equipment to maintain the high standards this
mission demands. While we continue to upgrade our security
capabilities, there are areas where additional investments are required
to ensure the absolute denial of unauthorized access to nuclear
weapons.
We need to replace the Vietnam-era UH-1N helicopters that provide
security across our vast ICBM complex. I strongly support any effort
that delivers a replacement helicopter with the necessary speed,
armament, and carrying capacity to meet our security requirements as
soon as possible.
Additionally, we need to address the escalating costs of an aging
security infrastructure. Our nuclear security program relies heavily on
manpower that requires appropriate investments to ensure our existing
nuclear security programs are capable of protecting this Nation's most
vital assets against a wide-range of technological and human threats.
The continued proliferation of sophisticated small Unmanned
Aircraft Systems (sUAS) is concerning. The availability, ease of use,
and capabilities of these sUAS vehicles represents a growing threat to
our deterrence operations. We rapidly implemented counter-sUAS systems
into our security architecture, and continue to refine our tactics,
techniques, and procedures to address the developing threat. Pacing
this sUAS threat will require vigilance and dedicated investment as
these capabilities continue to evolve.
nuclear command, control, and communications (nc3)
Our nation's nuclear deterrent continues to be as effective as the
command, control, and communications capabilities that enable it to
function; therefore, we require an assured, reliable, and resilient NC3
system across the full spectrum of conflict. Maintaining a credible
nuclear deterrent requires sustainment, modernization, and
recapitalization of key systems and capabilities throughout the NC3
architecture that ensures effective command and control of the Nation's
nuclear forces throughout today's complex multi-domain, multi-threat
security environment. These capabilities must provide assured
communications capabilities to the President and nuclear forces
throughout all phases of hostilities and under all conditions.
USSTRATCOM requires a robust NC3 capability operating throughout
the space, aerial, and terrestrial domains to both effectively execute
strategic deterrence operations and provide support for the President
as an essential component of the National Leadership Command
Capability. As an example of this, USSTRATCOM is working with the White
House, national laboratories, and the private sector to develop
decision support capabilities, setting the conditions for timely and
informed senior leader decision-making under any circumstance.
In the space domain, we are transitioning from the aging Military
Strategic and Tactical Relay (MILSTAR) satellite communications system
to the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite
communications systems. The AEHF satellite constellation system,
coupled with requisite ground node and airborne platform Family of
Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight terminals (FAB-T) extends enhanced
capabilities to enable collaboration between the President and senior
advisors under any circumstances and improves connectivity with the
nuclear forces.
Within the aerial domain, we are continuing to replace aging
communications systems on the E-6B Airborne Command Post (ABNCP) and
Take Charge and Move Out (TACAMO) aircraft as well as the E-4B National
Airborne Operations Center (NAOC) to provide assured and worldwide
connectivity to the nuclear forces. In conjunction with communications
update efforts, the Air Force is pursuing a course of action to
recapitalize the E-4B platform, which is approaching its end of service
life. The Air Force continues efforts to field a very low frequency
(VLF) capability for the B-2 bomber fleet and will leverage that
capability to modernize the B-52s legacy VLF systems. These
advancements, combined with our extremely high frequency
communications, provide bombers with beyond line-of-sight connectivity
throughout the spectrum of conflict.
intercontinental ballistic missiles
The U.S. relies on ICBMs as a critical component of a credible and
effective nuclear deterrent force. ICBMs promote strategic stability as
no adversary can defeat our highly responsive and widely dispersed ICBM
force with a limited, surprise attack. Additionally, our ICBM force
provides the bulk of our day-to-day nuclear alert force with precision
and professionalism. Serving over 60 years, our Minuteman force will
retire in the mid-2030s, well beyond any deployed strategic missile in
the world. We must execute a comprehensive ICBM modernization program
to keep the force effective in this rapidly evolving strategic
environment.
In August 2017, the Air Force achieved a significant milestone when
it awarded the GBSD Technology Maturation and Risk Reduction contract.
The future GBSD weapon system will employ modern, proven technology to
meet the varied threats of today and incorporate modular architectures
able to adjust quickly to advancing adversary technologies. GBSD will
employ enhanced security features to counter evolving threats while
reducing resource demands. Likewise, GBSD's maintenance processes
employ advanced diagnostic tools allowing us to predict and resolve
technical issues before affecting operations.
Finally, replacing 1960 and 1970s technology with state-of-the-art
systems will increase effectiveness and provide better platform
performance with greater resilience against improving adversary
defenses. GBSD will deliver a modern missile system, supported by a
fully updated infrastructure, all delivered at lower cost.
bombers and air delivered nuclear weapons
Bombers represent the most visible and flexible leg of the U.S.
nuclear Triad. Their presence unambiguously demonstrate U.S. commitment
and resolve to deter potential adversaries and assure our allies and
global security partners. The bomber's operational flexibility provides
the President a number of options in response to a crisis. The
combination of stealth and long range denies adversaries the ability to
use geography to protect high value assets.
The B-52 will remain in our arsenal for several more decades and is
receiving a communications upgrade to ensure command and control
connectivity. Additionally, the B-52 requires a radar system upgrade to
enhance weapons delivery, improve targeting capability, and improve
weather detection and avoidance. Replacing the B-52's engines provides
increased combat range, reduced air refueling demand, longer on-station
time, and a significantly reduced maintenance footprint.
As our nation's only penetrating long-range strike aircraft, we are
enhancing the B-2's survivability to retain the platform's stealth
attributes against modern air defenses. Beyond the B-2, the B-21 will
ensure we maintain an effective penetrating bomber capable of striking
any target around the world even as potential adversaries deploy
increasingly sophisticated air defenses.
While legacy gravity bombs and the Air Launched Cruise Missile
(ALCM) meet current military requirements, declining sustainability and
survivability challenges require a focus on replacement systems. The
B61-12 gravity bomb and LRSO cruise missile programs must deliver on
schedule to avoid any strategic or extended deterrence capability gaps.
Legacy bombers and their associated weapons are beyond or quickly
approaching their intended service life, requiring focused attention
and resources to maintain combat readiness. To ensure our air delivered
deterrent remains effective, ongoing sustainment and planned
modernization activities must remain on schedule.
sea-based strategic deterrent
Every day, a sizable portion of our Ohio-class SSBN fleet is
silently patrolling at sea, un-locatable to our adversaries, and ready
to respond when called upon. These submarines, and their highly capable
Trident II (D5) SLBM, constitute the most survivable leg of our
strategic deterrent force. As such, they send a very clear message to
any adversary that they cannot hope to gain any benefit from a
strategic attack against the U.S. or its allies.
The robust design of the Ohio-class SSBN, along with a
comprehensive maintenance program, allowed its operational life to
extend from 30 to 42 years. However, with no engineering margin to
extend them further, the Ohio-class SSBNs will retire starting in 2027.
To avoid a capability gap in our strategic deterrent, the Columbia-
class SSBN must deliver on time for its first strategic deterrent
patrol in 2031. Building the Columbia-class SSBN requires highly
technical and unique skillsets spanning multiple manufacturing and
trade disciplines. As production draws near, we must support our
industrial partners' expansion of both infrastructure and training
programs to minimize the risk of potential delays.
To avoid two concurrent strategic weapon programs, the Navy
extended the life of the D5 SLBM, enabling it to serve as the initial
ballistic missile for the Columbia-class SSBN. The D5 SLBM was fielded
over 25 years ago, and we must begin a follow-on SLBM program for the
Columbia-class SSBN to remain effective to its projected end of life in
the 2080s. USSTRATCOM and the Navy will work together in developing the
strategic requirements for this follow-on SLBM that continues the
unparalleled success of the D5 SLBM.
space
Space is a warfighting domain just like the air, ground, maritime,
and cyberspace domains. The DOD, with the National Reconnaissance
Office (NRO), is implementing the Space Warfighting Construct. This
construct supports the National Space Policy and focuses on the forces,
operations, and systems needed to prevail in a conflict that extends
into space. As an enterprise, we must normalize how we think of space,
operate in it, and describe it to each other. It is unique for many
reasons, but the concepts that govern other military operations such as
intelligence, maneuver, fires, protection, logistics, and command and
control apply just the same.
In April 2017, we re-named the Joint Interagency Combined Space
Operations Center (JICSpOC) to the National Space Defense Center
(NSDC). The NSDC is a partnership organization strongly supported by
both the DOD and Intelligence Community (IC) that develops and improves
our ability to rapidly detect, warn, characterize, attribute and defend
against threats to our nation's vital space systems. The NSDC directly
supports space defense unity of effort and expands information sharing
in space defense operations among the DOD, NRO, and other interagency
partners. Recently, the NSDC transitioned to 24/7 operations, marking a
significant step for the growing interagency team focused on protecting
and defending the nation's critical space assets.
In 2016, Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) and NRO developed the
joint Space Enterprise Vision (SEV) to advance their shared interest in
designing, acquiring, and operating more agile and resilient space
capabilities in response to emerging threats. A key goal of the SEV is
to leverage synergies in AFSPC/NRO acquisition activities, where
feasible, as the two organizations pursue architectures and operational
approaches in support of their respective missions.
Multi-national space operations initiatives are paramount in the
safety and security of the space domain. As we continue our combined
space operations initiative with Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and
the United Kingdom, we are expanding the initiative with the addition
of France and Germany. I have directed the Joint Force Space Component
Commander to transition our Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) to a
Combined Space Operations Center (CSpOC) by the end of 2018. The CSpOC
model envisions a centralized hub for operational planning and tasking
with distributed execution through contributing partners.
Exercises and wargames continue to refine how we coordinate today
and determine how we will work together in the future. This year, Japan
is participating in the Schriever Wargame, joining France, Germany, and
our Five Eye partners. GLOBAL SENTINEL, our operational experiment for
space situational awareness, increased its international participation
in 2017 and now includes Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, France,
Spain, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Republic of Korea.
Future satellite communications (SATCOM) systems are key to our
continued strategic posture in space. We must design and fund
replacement systems and remain on schedule for smooth transition of
operations to these new systems. We must expand international SATCOM
partnerships, strengthen our industrial base response to acquisition
challenges, and integrate commercial pathfinder opportunities to
leverage space operations.
We must continue to build a robust SATCOM network that includes our
allies and partners and leverages commercial SATCOM industries to
integrate, synchronize, and share global SATCOM resources. Through
multilateral SATCOM agreements Canada, Denmark, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, and New Zealand provided funding for Wideband Global
SATCOM-9 (WGS-9) that launched in March 2017. These international
partners receive a proportional share of the bandwidth provided by the
WGS constellation based on their financial contribution.
The department continues to close the gap in synchronizing
terminals and ground infrastructure to match available satellite
capability, a time-critical and essential element in operating freely
in all other domains. Our protected wideband communications are
essential for allowing the warfighter to communicate in contested
environments. Our narrowband legacy constellation is approaching the
end of its life cycle in a matter of years, and any additional loss of
satellites will reduce our narrowband SATCOM capabilities. The
narrowband follow-on Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) using Wideband
Code Division Multiple Access (WCDMA) has experienced delays due to
program development, waveform challenges, and Service terminal fielding
schedules. The fielding of new AEHF Extended Data Rate (XDR)
capabilities is improving over time, but delayed XDR terminal programs
are hampering the transitions from MILSTAR to AEHF.
USSTRATCOM, in conjunction with AFSPC, Fleet Cyber Command, and
U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command / Army Forces Strategic
Command (SMDC/ARSTRAT), is standing up the SATCOM Integrated Operations
Environment (SIOE). The SIOE is designed to leverage key wideband,
narrowband, protected band, and commercial SATCOM enterprise
capabilities and expertise to improve the Joint Force Space Component
Commander's ability to mitigate and fight through SATCOM degradation
and continue to support the warfighter in a potentially contested
domain. Interim SIOE operations will be located at headquarters SMDC/
ARSTRAT and is scheduled for completion in March 2018. SIOE is
currently operating in a limited fashion, and we are working on
providing additional joint manning positions to bring it to initial
operational capability.
In accordance with the direction of the 2018 National Defense
Authorization Act, USSTRATCOM will deliver a space warfighting concept
of operations (CONOPs) no later than June 11, 2018. This CONOPs will
guide the Service's space capabilities development and acquisition
programs.
joint electromagnetic spectrum operations
Achieving superiority throughout the electromagnetic spectrum is an
essential prerequisite for achieving superiority across all other
military domains. USSTRATCOM developed an electromagnetic spectrum
operational employment guide for standardized and synchronized
electromagnetic battle management, and we are working with the other
combatant commands on the implementation of this guide in joint
electromagnetic spectrum operations planning. In coordination with the
Joint Staff, we are initiating development of a Joint Electromagnetic
Spectrum Operations doctrine publication, working to re-align
electronic warfare universal joint tasks, advocating for advancing
joint training in realistic congested and contested electromagnetic
spectrum environments, and identifying electromagnetic battle
management requirements.
This comes at a time when our ability to maneuver freely within the
electromagnetic spectrum is at risk. Many countries have adapted their
militaries for spectrum warfare, developing specific electronic/
spectrum warfare units and electronic attack capabilities to counter
our spectrum dependent systems. The electromagnetic spectrum is not a
utility to be managed, it is a maneuver space, the same as other
warfighting domains. If we fail to change the way we resource, train,
and operate within the spectrum, we risk allowing an adversary to
control key terrain in the future.
missile defense
Missile proliferation and lethality continues to increase as more
countries acquire greater numbers of missiles and are increasing their
technical sophistication specifically to defeat U.S. missile defense
systems. In the past year, we continue to see missile tests from North
Korea and Iran as well as other nations that are introducing
increasingly sophisticated missiles--all of which cause us and our
allies deep concern. Their efforts to advance missile technologies
threaten global stability and seek to degrade our ability to project
power. In response, we must continue our efforts to advance missile
defense forces and capabilities to assure allies of our commitment for
a common defense and to deter further aggressions from these regional
and transregional actors.
In addition to the NPR, the Department is conducting a 2018 Missile
Defense Review (MDR). The MDR is broader in scope than the 2010
Ballistic Missile Defense Review, addressing more than the ballistic
missile threat, specifically hypersonic vehicles and cruise missiles.
We cannot be successful in this endeavor by investing solely in
active missile defense capabilities--we must strengthen and integrate
all pillars of missile defense including the capability to defeat
adversary missiles before they launch. We are exploring efficiencies
gained by fusing non-kinetic, cyber, electromagnetic, and kinetic
capabilities to deny, defend, and defeat adversary threats.
Furthermore, we are requesting additional efforts invested in the
Department's ability to find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess
(F2T2EA) threats and the adoption of corresponding policy and
organizational constructs. We continue to gain synergy through
integrated missile defense planning, force management, and operations
support ensuring global coordination of regional missile defense
execution--thereby, matching the best interceptor with the best sensor.
We must strengthen our collaboration with our allies and explore
further integration of our collective capabilities toward an effective
mutual defense. We are investing in collaboration with our allies
across multiple venues, including the USSTRATCOM-hosted NIMBLE TITAN
wargame. We conduct this biennial wargame with key allies and in
partnership with the Department of State and other combatant commands.
We continually explore and experiment with potential collaboration and
integration approaches with our allies to inform development of options
for operations, policies, and investments.
As an essential element of the U.S. commitment to strengthen
strategic and regional deterrence against states of concern, we
continue to deploy missile defense capabilities and strengthen our
missile defense postures. We operationally deployed the Aegis Ashore
Missile Defense Complex in Romania completing the European Phased
Adaptive Approach Phase II to defend against threats from the Middle
East, particularly Iran. We deployed additional Ground Based
Interceptors (GBIs) to meet the objective of 44 GBIs by the end of
2017. We are continuing investments toward our warfighting missile
defense priorities, which are essential. Priority missile defense
upgrades and capability advancements include:
Sensor and discrimination capabilities. Continued
development of the Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) in Alaska. A
new Homeland discrimination radar to support the defense of Hawaii. A
new Medium Range Discrimination Radar to provide additional precision
and tracking. Upgraded and expanded land, sea, and space based
detection and tracking sensors.
Kill vehicles. Increase the reliability and lethality of
our interceptors including the development of the Redesigned Kill
Vehicles (RKV) for the GBI, completion of testing and deployment of the
SM-3 Block IIA capability, and enhancements to the GBI, most notably
the Multi-Object Kill Vehicle (MOKV).
GBIs. Increase the GBI inventory to 64 and complete
Missile Field-4 at Fort Greely, Alaska to provide silos for 20
additional fielded interceptors as early as December 2023.
Capability and capacity. Increase the robustness of
regional missile defense capability and capacity including deployment
of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense and the Terminal High-Altitude
Area Defense (THAAD) capabilities and implementation of recommendations
from the Department's Joint Regional Integrated Air and Missile Defense
Capability Mix (JRICM) study.
Finally, we depend on flight-testing, which is critical in
assessing and validating the performance of the operational system in
actual flight environments. The high cost of flight-testing often
limits the number of flight test opportunities. The Missile Defense
Agency strives to maximize opportunities for learning through flight
test success or failure. The body of data collected in flight-testing
is robust, and we discover unexpected findings with each test. Flight
test failures are unplanned, but when failures happen--learning occurs.
The root cause of failure is determined, corrective actions are
implemented, and the overall capability of the system improves.
conventional prompt strike (cps) / hypersonic strike
Adversary anti-access / area denial strategies are challenging
traditional U.S. approaches to power projection. Advancements in
adversary integrated air defense systems and offensive missiles inhibit
our ability to maneuver within the battlespace. Additionally, our
strategic competitors are investing significant resources in hypersonic
weapon research and development with the goal of deploying hypersonic
strike weapons in the next few years. The Department is pursuing
hypersonic capabilities along several lines of effort, but we need to
prioritize and accelerate development if we are to field our own
capability in the near term.
New long-range, survivable, lethal, and time-sensitive strike
capabilities, such as a hypersonic CPS weapon, will allow the U.S. to
achieve its military objectives in these environments. This new weapon
class prevents adversaries from exploiting time and distance and
provides additional response options below the nuclear threshold. The
Navy's successful CPS flight test last October demonstrated the
technical maturity required to field an effective hypersonic strike
solution within the near future. As our competitors continue to move
fast in this area, we must retake the initiative and commit the
necessary resources to develop and field hypersonic conventional
weapons.
conclusion
USSTRATCOM truly is a global warfighting command, and the strength
of this command is its people. The soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines,
and civilians in this enterprise have the most important mission in the
entire Department. We expect them to perform to the highest standard,
yet mission success often looks as if nothing happened. The hard work
and dedication of the nearly 184,000 men and women supporting the
USSTRATCOM mission ensures our nation's strategic capabilities remain
safe, secure, reliable, and ready. Sustained Congressional support will
ensure we remain ready, agile, and effective in deterring strategic
attack, assuring our allies and partners today and into the future.
Peace is our profession . . .
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
When a quorum is present, we are going to shift over and do
some confirmations, a brief interruption.
As you heard the opening statements from both Senator Reed
and myself, there is little difference of opinion in terms of
low-yield capabilities. Both China and Russia have a robust
nuclear arsenal and a triad of delivery systems, as you said in
your opening statement. I think that China and Russia are
identified a little differently than the rest of the threats. I
think General Dunford said it the best way. He said we are
losing our qualitative and quantitative edge.
The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review calls for the development
of a low-yield nuclear weapon in the range of approximately 10
kilotons to counter Russia's tactical nuclear weapons, weapons
that are not controlled by New START [Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty].
Now, when you talk about 10 kilotons, sometimes we have to
remember what is a kiloton. I think Hiroshima was 15 kilotons.
The Minuteman 3 is around 300-350 kilotons. So you are talking
about a capability that is not there right now.
The New START limits both the United States and Russia to
1,550 deployed strategic nuclear weapons. It has been stated
policy that since the early 2000s, that Putin could use a
nuclear weapon in a conventional fight to, using his words,
escalate to deescalate the conflict by using a tactical nuclear
weapon to halt hostilities. Now, I know that some worry that
this might lead to increased nuclear proliferation.
But I would kind of like to hear from you what your
thoughts are. This is a part of the posture review right now.
Do you think we ought to have a low-yield capability?
General Hyten. So I strongly agree with the need for a low-
yield nuclear weapon. That capability is a deterrence weapon to
respond to the threat that Russia, in particular, is
portraying. President Putin announced as far back as April of
2000 that the Russian doctrine will be to use a low-yield
nuclear weapon on the battlefield in case of a conventional
overmatch with an adversary.
Senator Inhofe. Let us say if we do not have one, the only
thing we could do, if we were to use a response, would be a
larger one in terms of kilotons.
General Hyten. So two limits in that are what Henry
Kissinger recently said: that if you do not have the right
response, you could put the United States in a position where
the two choices for the President would be surrender or
suicide, suicide if you escalate too high and the escalation
comes back at you, surrender if you do not have the ability to
respond.
We do have low-yield nuclear weapons in our arsenal. They
are with our aviation capabilities right now, but those
aviation capabilities may not be the right response in terms of
timeliness and survivability to get to where the threat is.
Therefore, to respond to the threat, we need a small number of
low-yield nuclear weapons that we can deploy on our submarine-
launched ballistic missiles, still in the New START limits.
Senator Inhofe. I remember the conversation we had, when
Kissinger was here, on that.
We talk a lot about the hypersonic threats that are out
there. Let us start off by--give me a definition of a
hypersonic threat.
General Hyten. A hypersonic threat is a system that starts
out ballistic, and so you will see it like a ballistic missile,
but then it depresses the trajectory and then flies more like a
cruise missile or an airplane. So it goes up into the low
reaches of space and then turns immediately back down and then
levels out and flies at a very high level of speed. That is
hypersonic. That is a hypersonic weapon.
Senator Inhofe. Do both or either Russia or China have the
hypersonic threat capability?
General Hyten. Both Russia and China are developing
hypersonic capabilities. We have watched them test those
capabilities. So both Russia and China are aggressively
pursuing hypersonic capabilities.
Senator Inhofe. If that happens, what kind of defense do we
have against a hypersonic threat?
General Hyten. Our defense is our deterrent capability. We
do not have any defense that could deny the employment of such
a weapon against us. So our response would be our deterrent
force, which would be the triad and the nuclear capabilities
that we have to respond to such a threat.
Senator Inhofe. Back to the triad, the capability that we
would have with ours--when I talk to people back home who are
not really into these issues, but they have heard of the B-52
and how old it is today and to use that for the length of time
that we anticipate we would have to use that before we are able
to replace that. What do you think in terms of the age of the
three elements of our triad and their capability relative to
those of China and Russia?
General Hyten. So as you look across our force, you can
start with the B-52. It is such an amazing airplane. The
designers of the airplane were geniuses way before their time.
But it is basically a truck to carry weapons. It is not a
penetrating bomber. It will never be a penetrating bomber. A
penetrating bomber would be the B-21. We only have a small
number of B-2s. We need a larger number of penetrating bombers.
That will be the B-21. We will need a new weapon to go on the
B-52. We will need the long-range standoff weapon.
I am concerned about our ICBM force about the 2030 time
frame and beyond. We replaced the propulsion, the guidance, the
electronics on that system 15 years ago or so, and by 2030, all
of those capabilities will have aged out. We did a detailed
analysis that said the smartest thing we can do is just buy new
this time instead of trying to replace all the components. We
will have to do that.
The Ohio-class submarine. At a certain point, it will not
go down under the water anymore. We need a new submarine to
replace that, and we need new command and control and we need
new weapons as well.
All those things come to fruition in the 2030s.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. Thank you, General Hyten.
Senator Reed?
Senator Reed. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again, General, I think this is a very serious debate about
the new proposed systems, particularly the low-yield submarine-
launched ballistic missile.
As you indicated in your testimony, we have systems that
are even lower yield than the one we are proposing today. They
are generally airborne, I believe, launched by an aircraft.
One of the things--and we talked about this--is there will
be--my sense--a reaction and reaction. This will be a dynamic
process. If there is a conventional attack, I do not think we
will sit back and wait 'til they threaten to use a nuclear
device. We will start positioning our resources immediately.
Some of those resources will be low-yield nuclear weapons as a
deterrent to their use of weapons.
In that context, why can we not use something like the
long-range standoff weapon as a deterrent to the use of small
nuke by the Russians?
General Hyten. The answer is basically the reason we have a
triad. We have a triad to respond to the different elements of
the threat that Russia brings to bear. Russia is going to have,
in the unclassified world, at least 11 different delivery
platforms for a low-yield nuclear weapon that they can use in
different places and different times. Right now, we have one
and that is an airplane. The airplane can be positioned in the
right place in order to respond to that kind of threat, but an
airplane is also difficult. It has to fight through a denied
environment. It has to work in different areas.
As we worked through the various gaming of the responses
that the Russians may have to those capabilities, we felt
strongly that we needed another delivery option. So a small
number of low-yield nuclear weapons on the submarine-launched
ballistic missile, still under the 1,550 deployed strategic
nuclear weapons under the New START. In other words, we will
take a big weapon out of a submarine and put a small weapon
back in, still the same kind of structure. We believe that will
give future adversaries significant pause before they act.
Senator Reed. Again, I think the whole issue--and you put
your finger on it--is deterrence. The flip side of that is that
even if we have these new systems, if they make, I think, the
extraordinary error of using a nuclear device, we respond.
There is at least the option on the other side--as you point
out, they have multiple launching devices and multiple nuclear
warheads--is to maybe try a second one, in which case we try a
second one. Again, we get into this nuclear escalation
scenario, which I think we are concerned about.
This is an issue I would like to say--I think it is a point
we have to really think very, very clearly about and share with
you your thoughts and the gaming that you have done and
analysis you have done to see--again, for the public to vet
this. So I look forward to doing that with you.
One of the other proposals is the sea-based nuclear cruise
missile. As you know, in 2010, the prior NPR canceled the
submarine-based cruise missile because the Navy literally had
it in storage, and NNSA [National Nuclear Security
Administrator] was not modernizing its warheads. So it seemed
to be sort of obsolete in effect.
We have got some criticism from our colleagues, our allies,
the South Koreans and the Japanese, because they see this as a
very effective extended deterrent.
Can you just state the military requirement now for
bringing back this system?
General Hyten. Yes, sir.
The threat is from both Russia and China that drives the
need for the sea-launched cruise missile. We have not made a
decision yet about how to base that, whether it is on a surface
ship or a submarine. We will look at that. Part of the 2019
budget request is to start down that process and decide what
the best basing for that would be.
I can tell you the details in a classified session of why
we believe the threat demands it, but I can tell you the threat
is clear and I believe we need that to respond to the threat
that is there.
Senator Reed. Thank you, sir.
Just a final question is that we mutually rely upon NNSA to
create the nuclear pits and all the other basic components of
our nuclear missile response. Your predecessor, General Keller,
indicated that he had some doubts about the ability of NNSA to
do this given the ongoing debate about whether production would
be in Los Alamos or elsewhere or what kind of production, the
big box or the small box. Do you share those concerns?
General Hyten. Well, I still have concerns. Those concerns
have not gone away.
However, you should know that the Administrator of NNSA,
Lisa Gordon-Hagerty--the first day that she took the oath, the
first call she made was to me to commit that NNSA and the
Department of Energy was fully on to deliver the capabilities
that we need. As the STRATCOM Commander, my requirement for a
future capability is that we need to build to 80 plutonium pits
by 2030 in order to build out the nuclear weapons profile. I
think that has been well studied, understood. We can talk about
that further later if you desire.
But I still am concerned because the infrastructure is
challenged, but the current leadership in DOE [Department of
Energy] has made a commitment to me that they will go after
that. I guess the concern that I have left over is we do not
have a lot of margin there, and anytime we do not have a
margin, I am concerned.
Senator Reed. Thank you, sir.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. I ask the committee to consider a list of
2,901 pending military nominations. All of these nominations
have been before the committee the required length of time.
Is there a motion to favorably report this list of 2,901
pending military nominations to the Senate?
Senator Reed. So moved.
Senator Inhofe. Is there a second?
Senator Fischer. Second.
Senator Inhofe. All in favor, say aye.
[Chorus of ayes.]
Senator Inhofe. All opposed, no.
[No response.]
Senator Inhofe. The motion carries.
[The list of nominations considered and approved by the
committee follows:]
Military Nominations Pending with the Senate Armed Services Committee
Which are Proposed for the Committee's Consideration on March 20, 2018.
1. BG Timothy J. Hilty, ARNG to be major general (Reference No.
1118)
2. In the Marine Corps Reserve there are 7 appointment to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Eric G. Burns) (Reference No. 1432)
3. VADM Matthew J. Kohler, USN to be vice admiral and Deputy
Chief of Naval Operations for Information Warfare, N2/N6, Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations/Director of Naval Intelligence (Reference No.
1455)
4. In the Marine Corps there are 2 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Thesolina D. Hubert) (Reference
No. 1491)
5. In the Air Force there are 24 appointments to the grade of
major general (list begins with Vincent K. Becklund) (Reference No.
1551)
6. In the Marine Corps there are 6 appointments to the grade of
major general (list begins with James W. Bierman) (Reference No. 1556)
7. In the Army there are 533 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Rachel L. Adair) (Reference No. 1563)
8. In the Army there are 35 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Rose Abido) (Reference No. 1564)
9. In the Army there are 2 appointments to the grade of colonel
(list begins with John P. Kilbride) (Reference No. 1575)
10. In the Army there are 530 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Gregory J. Abide) (Reference No. 1581)
11. In the Army there are 993 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Steven Abadia) (Reference No. 1582)
12. In the Marine Corps there are 337 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Benjamin S. Adams) (Reference No.
1592)
13. In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of
major (Aaron J. King) (Reference No. 1611)
14. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Steven M. Hemmann) (Reference No. 1629)
15. LTG Timothy M. Ray, USAF to be general and Commander, Air
Force Global Strike Command (Reference No. 1665)
16. MG David D. Thompson, USAF to be lieutenant general and Vice
Commander, Air Force Space Command (Reference No. 1666)
17. VADM Christopher W. Grady, USN to be admiral and Commander, US
Fleet Forces Command (Reference No. 1667)
18. RADM Timothy J. White, USN to be vice admiral and Commander,
Fleet Cyber Command/Commander, TENTH Fleet (Reference No. 1670)
19. Capt. David A. Welch, USN to be rear admiral (lower half)
(Reference No. 1671)
20. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Arthur W. Primas, Jr.) (Reference No. 1684)
21. In the Air Force Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade
of colonel (Gregory J. Payne) (Reference No. 1685)
22. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (Michael J. Patterson) (Reference No. 1686)
23. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (Brad R. Matherne) (Reference No. 1687)
24. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Jonathan A. Morris) (Reference No. 1688)
25. In the Army there are 35 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Hayley R. Ashbaugh) (Reference No. 1691)
26. In the Army there are 62 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Jeffrey A. Anderson) (Reference No. 1692)
27. In the Army there are 169 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Ahmad B. Alexander) (Reference No. 1693)
28. In the Army there are 137 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Ashley K. Aiton) (Reference No. 1694)
29. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Wilson R. Ramos) (Reference No. 1695)
30. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Curtis D. Bowe) (Reference No. 1696)
31. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Carl E. Foster III) (Reference No. 1697)
32. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Michael A. Fowles) (Reference No. 1698)
33. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Andrew K. Sinden) (Reference No. 1699)
34. In the Army there are 2 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with D013264) (Reference No. 1700)
35. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Christopher F. Ruder) (Reference No. 1701)
36. RADM Scott A. Stearney, USN to be vice admiral and Commander,
US Naval Forces, Central Command/Commander, FIFTH Fleet and Commander,
Combined Maritime Forces (Reference No. 1720)
37. In the Army Reserve there are 2 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with John J. Morris) (Reference No. 1736)
38. In the Army there are 2 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Christopher M. Bell) (Reference No. 1737)
39. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(Mikal L. Stoner) (Reference No. 1738)
40. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of commander
(Jeffrey G. Bentson) (Reference No. 1740)
_______________________________________________________________________
TOTAL: 2,901
Senator Fischer?
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General, for your service to this country, and I
thank you for representing the men and women under your
leadership.
The NPR states, ``If Russia returns to compliance with its
arms control obligation, reduces its non-strategic nuclear
arsenal, and corrects its other destabilizing behaviors, the
United States may reconsider the pursuit of an SLCM [submarine-
launched cruise missile].''
However, in the debate, this statement has lost some of its
nuance, and some now describe the SLCM as purely a chip to
bargain for Russia's return to compliance with the INF Treaty.
Can you clarify this? If Russia returned to compliance with
the INF Treaty and otherwise maintained its current course with
respect to non-strategic nuclear weapons, would it be your best
military advice to cancel the deployment of the SLCM?
General Hyten. Senator, I agree with my boss, Secretary
Mattis. I do not like the term ``bargaining chip.''
The capabilities that we proposed in the Nuclear Posture
Review are in response to the threat. Everything that we talked
about, including the low-yield nuclear weapon and the sea-
launched cruise missile, are in response to a threat.
If that threat changes, then my military advice will
change. But if that threat does not change, my military advice
will stay that we need those capabilities in order to respond
to the threat. I am not a diplomat. I am not a politician.
Diplomats need to work those issues with our adversaries. I
hope that they do, but my job as a military officer is to look
at the threat, understand the threat, and propose capabilities
to this body to deliver to the military so we can respond to
any threat that exists. It is all about the threat.
Senator Fischer. While we are on the topic of Russia's
violations of the INF Treaty, your opening statement reads,
``Russia's violation of the treaty with the development of the
SSC-8 ground-launched cruise missile remains a significant
issue as delivery of the treaty-violating system continues.''
When you say delivery of the treaty-violating system
continues, do you mean that Russia is continuing to produce and
deploy the illegal system in greater numbers?
General Hyten. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Fischer. Since the NPR's release, some, the Russian
Government in particular, deny that Russia genuinely has an
escalate to deescalate strategy. I think you were questioned by
a member of the Russian embassy staff on this point during a
speech that you gave last month.
Do you agree with the NPR's assessment that the escalate to
deescalate strategy reflects that Russian doctrine?
General Hyten. I guess I will say that I watch very closely
what President Putin says, and I watch very closely what the
Russian military does in response. President Putin in April of
2000--April of 2000--almost 18 years ago, President Putin said
that the doctrine of Russia will be to use nuclear weapons on
the battlefield in a conventional scenario. That has been the
continuing doctrine of Russia for almost 18 years. This is
nothing new.
We need the ability to effectively respond to that. We need
the ability to deter that. We do not want that to ever happen.
There is no such thing as a tactical nuclear weapon in my
opinion. There is no such thing as a conventional nuclear
weapon. All nuclear weapons are strategic, but you need
different kinds to respond to different threats.
Senator Fischer. Would you agree that when we are looking
at this continuous threat of a Russian doctrine to escalate to
deescalate that is based on the talk of their senior leaders?
It is based on the fact that they are building weapons that are
designed for this purpose and that they do conduct training
exercises.
General Hyten. There is no doubt that they do all of those
things. When I have my intel--I do not speak Russian, but when
I have my intels translate the Russian for me, it is not
escalate to deescalate. It is escalate to win. It is escalate
to win on the battlefield. We have to deter that kind of
response. That cannot be allowed.
Senator Fischer. General, critics have made a variety of
arguments against the deployment of that low-yield ballistic
missile warhead on a submarine. In sum, they believe the system
is impractical because any use of the weapon would enable the
submarine to be detected, destroyed, and they believe would
initiate a full-scale nuclear war.
Can you speak to those arguments, sir?
General Hyten. Those arguments are not true, ma'am. I can
tell you in a classified forum how a submarine would survive
after launching. I can tell you how the Russians would see it.
I can tell you how they would respond to that. I can also tell
you that from a U.S. perspective, when we see a launch of a
missile, we can characterize that threat. We understand where
it is, where it is going. Unless it is a massive attack from
Russia, any other scenario, there is actually a lot of time to
respond, a lot of time to characterize, and it will be the same
way on the Russian side. So each of those arguments is false.
It is better to discuss the answers in a classified session.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir, for addressing these
immense threats that we face.
General Hyten. Thank you, ma'am.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
Senator Nelson?
Senator Nelson. Good morning, General.
I am not too keen on ripping space out of the Air Force and
creating a space corps. Do you want to state your position for
the record?
General Hyten. So I think I have stated my position many
times. I think that some day we will have a space corps or a
space force in this country. But I do not think the time is
right for that right now. But I loved the fact that the
President talked about space as a warfighting domain. I loved
the fact that he embraces the fact that we need to have a
future that looks at this warfighting domain.
I am a big supporter of the bill that was passed by
Congress last year in the National Defense Authorization Act
that talks about looking at a space force and looking at when
that would be the right time and what elements would be in
place. I think the best example is the budget. The budget that
was submitted this year is an 18 percent increase in space.
Looking at warfighting, we are going to get after those pieces.
Both the President and the Vice President and Members of this
Congress, everybody is aligned with the threat. That is exactly
where it should be, Senator. Thank you.
Senator Nelson. So you gave a speech back in December that
the days of viewing space as a benign environment are clearly
behind us, and we need to maintain our lethal edge in space.
You have said continually since then that in order to maintain
the edge, we have to move faster. Do you think this is
happening?
General Hyten. I see good signs. The good signs I see is
the leadership in the Department right now: Secretary Mattis,
Secretary Shanahan, Lord, Mike Griffin in R&E [Research and
Engineering]. I see leadership in the Air Force and AQ
[Aquisitions] that all believe in going fast. I think the
budget lays the groundwork for going fast, but Senator, we have
not done it yet. We have not done any of that yet. We have not
proven to anybody that we can go fast again. We used to be able
to do that. We need to be able to do it again. We can do it
again. But we have to get out of our own way. But I am excited
about the leadership in the Department that has been put in
place to help lead that change.
Senator Nelson. General, I dare to touch the politically
sensitive topic of the JCPOA [Joint Coalition Plan of Action].
If the President were to unilaterally withdraw, what kind of
impact is that going to have on our global security
environment?
General Hyten. So my job, Senator, is to look at that
treaty, look at what it does to our overall strategic
deterrent, work with the intelligence community, as well as the
broader interagency to evaluate whether Iran is in compliance
with JCPOA. As I sit here today, Iran is in compliance with
JCPOA.
But JCPOA is about nuclear, and from a command that is
nuclear, that is an important piece to me because it allows me
to understand the nuclear environment better. But it does not
say anything about Iran as a global sponsor of terrorism or if
Iran is building huge numbers of ballistic missiles that
threaten their neighbors and potentially us some day. All of
those will be the decision that a policymaker has to make, but
my job is to look at the nuclear capabilities and make that
recommendation, which I have done.
Senator Nelson. If we were to pull out of the JCPOA, does
that send a message to North Korea?
General Hyten. Any action the United States makes sends a
message to everybody on the planet. So it will send a message
to North Korea. It will send a message to Russia, China, our
allies, Iran, Saudi Arabia. Everybody is impacted. That is one
of the differences in deterrence in the 21st Century is that it
is no longer a single country problem and a single issue
problem. It impacts everybody. So every decision has to be
considered in concert with the entire global environment.
Senator Nelson. General, you already discussed in detail
the threat of the hypersonics. Your answer was that we need
this submarine-based low-yield nuclear capability. Is that the
deterrent to hypersonics not only from Russia but also China?
General Hyten. So that is where we stand today. But I
believe we need to pursue improved sensor capabilities to be
able to track, characterize, and attribute the threats wherever
they come from. Right now, we have a challenge with that with
our current space architecture and the limited number of radars
that we have around the world.
In order to see those threats, I believe we need a new
space sensor architecture. The Missile Defense Agency and the
Air Force are looking into that right now. There are $42
million in the fiscal year 2019 budget in the Air Force line to
look at that, alongside of MDA [Missile Defense Agency] as a
prototype. I am going to advocate, as I have advocated for the
last 30 years that we need to move into space and be able to
build sensors to conduct both the characterization of these new
threats that are appearing, as well as discriminate better and
earlier the mid-course element of the threat that exists today.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, I will just
say I am sure that General Hyten lays awake at night after he
has prepared all of this infrastructure up in space to protect
us, and then he sees the threat of cyber attacks on that
infrastructure, that that must keep you awake at night,
General.
General Hyten. All the threats keep me awake at night, sir.
I wish they did not.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Cotton?
Senator Cotton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General, for testifying once again in front of
our committee.
I want to return to something you said a few moments ago.
You mentioned that Vladimir Putin first started talking about
the use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield 18 years ago. Is
that right?
General Hyten. Yes, sir. I think it is worth going through
that entire history because it goes across multiple
administrations. It really talks about where Russia has been
for the last 18 years. In April of 2000, he announced that the
new doctrine of use of low-yield nuclear weapons on the
battlefield was part of the Russian doctrine. He also announced
a 50 percent increase that year in the budget for nuclear
capabilities. 6 years later, he announced that Russia was going
to modernize their entire nuclear arsenal and build new weapons
and they were going to be 70 percent done by 2020. Dmitry
Rogozin in 2015 came out and said we are not going to 70
percent done. We are going to get 100 percent done by 2020.
This has been a continuing pattern of behavior that creates a
threat to the United States that we have to respond to. That is
the work that we have been doing, and that is what the Nuclear
Posture Review does. I think it is a very measured response to
the threat that has been presented to us, much more measured
than the speech Vladimir Putin gave on the 1st of March.
Senator Cotton. So it is often perceived that Vladimir
Putin and his senior general staff's rhetoric on this is a
response to U.S. actions, especially post-2014 in their Crimea
invasion. But what you are saying is he first started raising
this in less than a year after he had taken over leadership in
Russia.
General Hyten. Almost immediately upon his first election
in 2000, he made this.
Senator Cotton. I think that is very telling. Now,
sometimes talk is cheap with politicians, but when that talk is
backed up by a substantial commitment of national resources,
you can usually accredit it. Would you say that Russia has
engaged in a substantial commitment of their national resources
to modernize their nuclear force over these last 18 years?
General Hyten. An enormous of their national treasure.
Senator Cotton. That threat is primarily driving the 2018
Nuclear Posture Review for our country.
General Hyten. The Nuclear Posture Review is very
consistent with previous, but it addresses the threat
specifically.
Senator Cotton. Let me ask you this broad question before
you get into any details. So we have been doing nuclear posture
reviews for a while. We have been a nuclear power for 73 years.
Is there a single operating concept or capability in the 2018
Nuclear Posture Review that is truly innovative or not
reflective of 73 years of tradition in this country?
General Hyten. It is all consistent with what we have been
looking at from nuclear capabilities really since the beginning
of the nuclear age in August of 1945.
Senator Cotton. So let us now be specific on a few points.
First, it has been this country's position for 73 years
that we would not foreswear the first use of nuclear weapons.
Is that correct?
General Hyten. That is correct.
Senator Cotton. It remains so today.
General Hyten. It remains so today.
Senator Cotton. Second, we have talked some about the low-
yield submarine-launched warhead. While that specific
capability may not have existed to this point on a submarine,
as you have testified before, we have had lots of other low-
yield weapons and we continue to have low-yield air-launched or
bomb warheads. Correct?
General Hyten. We used to have low-yield submarine-launched
weapons too. As I think Senator Inhofe talked about, we did not
maintain those going into the previous Nuclear Posture Review.
Senator Cotton. Is that low-yield submarine-launched, or is
that sea-launched cruise missiles?
General Hyten. It was low-yield submarine-launched at that
time.
Senator Cotton. But we have also had sea-launched cruise
missiles before.
General Hyten. We have had sea-launched cruise missiles
before. None of those capabilities are new. They are
reintroducing previous capabilities that we felt were needed to
deter our adversaries and we believe we need to deter those
adversaries again.
Senator Cotton. Again, driven primarily by the threat that
Russia has posed by both the rhetoric and the reality of their
nuclear modernization, as you have testified today, not just in
the last year, not just in the last 9 years, but going back 18
years across three prior administrations, the Clinton
Administration, the Bush Administration, and the Obama
Administration.
General Hyten. That is true, but it is also important to
add China and North Korea into that equation because they drive
the threat as well.
Senator Cotton. I think that is an important point. Almost
all strategic discussions, certainly strategic arms control
negotiations revolve around the bilateral threat between the
United States and Russia. China is rapidly modernizing its
nuclear forces. Much of that happens in a very clandestine
fashion. So it is hard to say just how dire that threat has
become. Certainly when you add Russia and China together, we do
face the potential threat of nuclear overmatch in the future.
I have to say we do not have a good history of estimating
nuclear weapons programs. We usually, in the last 73 years,
have gotten it wrong when you look at countries like the Soviet
Union, like China, like India, like Pakistan, and erred on the
side of caution saying that it would take them longer to
develop those threats.
So I think it is very important what you are doing at
Strategic Command, what the entire administration has done with
this new Nuclear Posture Review to counteract those threats
that we face and to keep this country safe from ever having to
face a nuclear war. The best way to do that is to have nuclear
overmatch against all of our adversaries.
Thank you.
General Hyten. Thank you, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Hyten, thank you for being here and for your
constant vigilance.
I want to go back just quickly to a question that Senator
Nelson posed about Iran's nuclear capabilities, recognizing
that you are looking at it only from the nuclear perspective,
and I share your concern about their other destabilizing
activities. But in your assessment, are we not better off with
an Iran that does not have nuclear weapons than we would be
with an Iran that does have nuclear weapons?
General Hyten. I would prefer nobody had nuclear weapons.
That would make my job a whole lot easier.
Senator Shaheen. I certainly agree with that. But on the
issue of Iran----
General Hyten. Would I prefer Iran without nuclear weapons?
Absolutely. I would prefer Korea without nuclear weapons.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
General Hyten. I do not think nuclear weapons will ever go
away. But I believe in nonproliferation, and the more nuclear
weapons proliferate, the more difficult the world is.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much.
I want to go back to something you said at a hearing in
2017 when you were before this committee because I asked you
about cyber efforts and specifically whether you think we have
a strategy that incorporates both a defensive and offensive
strategy with respect to cyber attacks. I wonder if you can
discuss whether we have made any progress since that hearing in
2017 on these issues.
General Hyten. So, ma'am, we have made progress.
Senator Shaheen. Can you talk a little bit about what that
is?
General Hyten. We have made progress in moving forward and
taking the fight to the adversary that is in the Middle East
right now. But in my opinion, we have not gone nearly far
enough. I think we have to go much further in treating
cyberspace as an operational domain. Similar to the discussion
we were having earlier about space as a warfighting domain,
cyberspace needs to be looked at as a warfighting domain. If
somebody threatens us in cyberspace, we need to have the
authorities to respond.
I always find it odd that we will give young soldiers,
sailors, airmen, and marines lethal authority to operate far
from home in harm's way to apply lethal force against an
adversary using a set of rules of engagement, but we will
hesitate to give a four-star admiral the authority to conduct
cyberspace operations because we are concerned he will not
follow the rules of engagement. We need to have specific rules
of engagement in cyber that match the other domains that we
operate in, but then we need to delegate that authority all the
way down so we can deal with threats that exist that challenge
the United States.
Senator Shaheen. Well, I agree with that. So what do we
need to do in Congress to make that happen? Do we need to give
you expressed legislative authority? Do we need to delineate
who has got those authorities?
General Hyten. I always hesitate to advise Congress on what
you should do. That is your responsibility.
But I will tell you when I look at, what would be helpful
to me is statements like we have had the last 2 years in space
where space is a warfighting domain, and we need to develop
responses to the warfighting domain. What that has done is it
allowed us to push the envelope inside the Department. We are
not there yet. We are going to be coming back in space with a
number of different things about declassification of certain
capabilities, additional authorities, those kind of things. But
stating it is a warfighting domain similar to land, sea, and
air was a huge step forward for us to move forward. I think we
need similar things in cyberspace.
Senator Shaheen. Well, does, to some degree, the Nuclear
Posture Review not do that because it suggests that a response
to a massive cyber attack might be the use of nuclear force? I
mean, I do not agree with that, but it does sort of lay that
out, that that is a potential response.
General Hyten. I think it is clear that you could have
catastrophic attacks on the United States through space or
cyber and that we need to have the ability to respond to that
and a means of our choosing in a domain of our choosing. People
always ask me in space and cyber, how do you deter in cyber?
How do you deter in space? How do you fight and win a war in
space or cyber? You do not. War, conflict, deterrence is
against an adversary, not against a place. You have to take the
place out of it and focus on the adversary. What is the
adversary doing? How do I deter that adversary? That is the
piece that we have to go down, focusing back on an adversary.
That is what you see in the Nuclear Posture Review,
focusing on adversary threats. How do we respond to that? Then
hopefully that allows room for our diplomats to sit down with
our adversaries and say is this the world you really want to
live in.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. I am out of time. Can I
just ask one more question, Mr. Chairman?
You talked about the progress, so to speak, that Russia has
made in nuclear weapons and their military might. This is a
country with an economy that I think is about the size of Italy
that has been under sanctions for a number of years since they
invaded Ukraine. They have done all of this military buildup
despite those things. So what are they doing right to allow
them to do this, and what lessons can we take from that?
General Hyten. Well, ``right'' is in the eye of the
beholder.
Senator Shaheen. Right. You are right. I do not really mean
to say ``right.'' But what have they done to be successful in
this arena?
General Hyten. So they have decided that that is the most
important investment they have to make as a nation, and they
have put the vast majority of the resources they have left into
that. Oh, by the way, North Korea has done the same thing. That
is a prioritization in Russia and North Korea.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Rounds?
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, first of all, thank you for your service to our
country and thanks for the opportunity to visit with you today
on some of these key issues.
I would like to follow up a little bit with where Senator
Shaheen was going. I want to talk about our policy versus the
policies of our near-peer competitors.
Let us just start out with the treaties that we have in
place right now. With regard to INF, are we in compliance with
the INF today?
General Hyten. We are in compliance with the INF today.
Senator Rounds. Would you say that Russia is in compliance
with the INF today?
General Hyten. They are not.
Senator Rounds. Would you say that we have not only Russia
to be concerned with with regard to similar weapons but also a
near-peer competitor in China as well?
General Hyten. I agree that all weapons have be looked at
on the global perspective.
Senator Rounds. Do you see any limitations on China with
regard to the INF?
General Hyten. They do not have any limitations in the INF,
and they have built significant numbers of intermediate-range
ballistic missiles that if they were in the INF, they would be
contrary to that treaty.
Senator Rounds. So with regard to our near-peer
competitors, we have a deal with Russia. We do not have a deal
with China. We are bound by the deal with Russia. We are
honoring it; they are not. China, on the other hand, has no
obligations to comply with it, and so they are free to move
forward with their weapons development and deployment in place.
Is it fair to say that that puts us at a competitive
disadvantage, similar to having one hand tied behind our back?
General Hyten. I think Admiral Harris testified to a
similar thing the other day. It makes his job much more
difficult.
But there is no one-size-fits-all when it comes to
deterrence. There is no one-size-fits-all. You have to look at
all the adversaries separately and then you look at the impacts
of any decision with those adversaries. I believe that we are
better off if Russia would come into compliance with the INF
and we would be in compliance with the INF in the overall
scheme of the world. However, we have to make a decision in the
near term. If they do not come into compliance with the INF,
how long will we continue to, as you said, tie our hands?
Senator Rounds. I think that is being recognized in your
posture position at this time.
Let me go on from there because what we have talked about
now--we discussed the triad, the air, land, and the sea. I
think you made a very clear statement about both cyber and also
about space.
With regard to cyber, do you believe that our near-peer
competitors in cyber--that they have the same identification of
what the norms are with regard to how we operate in cyberspace
as we do?
General Hyten. No, sir, they do not.
Senator Rounds. In other words, if I could shortcut it a
little bit, they do not see any problem with attacking us in
cyberspace today while we probably do not take as active a role
in attacking their infrastructures they do in attacking our
infrastructures today?
General Hyten. I think that the restrictions on Russia and
China in particular are much less than the restrictions we put
on ourselves.
Senator Rounds. That is a policy decision on our part. Is
it not?
General Hyten. That is a policy decision on our part.
Senator Rounds. What about with regard to space? Clearly
any one of our weapon systems right now is dependent upon our
ability to see and to hear and to monitor what other people are
doing. Do they have the same norms with regard to operations in
space as we do?
General Hyten. There are no such things as norms of
behavior in space.
Senator Rounds. So are they more aggressive with regard to
the deployment of militarily designed or systems that are
designed with military purposes as we are?
General Hyten. So I do not want to talk about that in an
unclassified session. I would be glad in a classified forum to
go into details of what they are doing, but all I can tell you
is that they are being very aggressive in establishing what
they perceive as norms that we see that I cannot talk about in
here at the current time.
Senator Rounds. Would it be fair to say that the eyes and
ears that we have in space are at risk today from our near-peer
competitors?
General Hyten. Today they are not at risk, but I am
concerned in the near term they would be at risk. Today we have
such an enormous capacity that the capabilities that our
adversaries are building cannot challenge it just because of
the sheer capacity that we have. But in the not too distant
future, they are going to build the capabilities that will
allow them to challenge that across the board, and we have to
make sure we stay ahead of that threat.
Senator Rounds. Let me go to one other line of questioning
for just a minute. The Air Force has recently announced their
plans to retire the B-2 by the early 2030s, sustain the B-52
through 2050, and move forward with procurement of 100 B-21's.
Were you involved--was STRATCOM involved in making the
determination of the overall bomber requirements?
General Hyten. I was involved in the discussions.
Senator Rounds. Do you believe that 75 B-52s and 100 B-21s
will be sufficient to conduct a nuclear deterrence mission
while supporting conventional bomber missions as well?
General Hyten. I believe that is the minimum capability
required.
Senator Rounds. Has the Department begun planning for
basing the B-1s--I am sorry--the B-21s.
General Hyten. The B-21s? I know that the basing process is
underway. I think that is an Air Force issue. That is something
that they will come to me, STRATCOM, when they come to the
Congress as well. But that is an Air Force issue that they have
to work. But I know that process is underway because, well, I
am an Air Force officer. So I do stay in touch with my service.
Senator Rounds. I understand. Thank you, sir.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
Senator Heinrich?
Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman.
Welcome, General Hyten.
I want to say that I appreciate that you have long
expressed your frustration about our inability as both
government and military to move more quickly in terms of
acquisition, as well as in terms of decision-making. I
certainly agree that we need to be more agile and responsive
across the board. I think that applies to space systems. It
applies to helicopters. It applies to our nuclear programs.
Does it concern you that the NNSA conducted an analysis of
alternatives on pit production that chose to ignore the Nuclear
Weapons Council's previously endorsed plan to meet our nation's
nuclear stockpile requirements and that it also took 3 years
for that analysis to move forward?
General Hyten. It does not concern me they conducted an
analysis of alternatives. I think that is a smart thing to do.
But it does concern me it took 3 years. I do not think any AOA
[analysis of alternatives] should take 3 years. We take 3 years
in the Department of Defense a lot too. I do not know why that
is, Senator. I do not know why we spend so much time. It used
to be we could build something in 3 years, but now we like to
study things for 3 years.
But like I said earlier, Lisa Gordon-Hagerty, the new
Administrator of NNSA--she called me day one and said we are
going to get you the answer. I do not have the answer yet on
where we are going to go. As a member of the Nuclear Weapons
Council and as the STRATCOM Commander, my job is to state the
requirement. The requirement is 80 pits. And, oh, by the way,
the first element of that is 30 pits at Los Alamos. That is
regardless of whatever the AOA comes out. We have got to get to
30 pits at Los Al first.
Senator Heinrich. Do you think it would have been
appropriate and smart for them to at least have considered the
pathway that was chosen a few years ago as a response to the
fact that NNSA was not moving fast enough at the time?
General Hyten. So I think they are doing that in part of
their engineering analysis now. I have not seen the results of
that yet. I will see that shortly. I think Lisa Gordon-Hagerty
has committed to this body to come back in the near future.
Senator Heinrich. I have had some productive conversations
with her.
Can you talk a little bit about what any additional slip
would mean in terms of our life extension programs?
General Hyten. I am very concerned about any because
basically all the new weapons that we just talked about,
Columbia, sea-launched ballistic missiles, which is Trident,
the GBSD [Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent], the new ICBM, the
LRSO [Long-Range Stand-Off Missile]--all of those require
weapons. Plutonium pits that are 100 years old are not a good
thing for this country. We do not know how to characterize
that. We do not know the material interaction of all those
pieces. We have to make sure that we have a modern--if we are
going to be a nuclear nation, we have to have plutonium pit
production.
So I am concerned that we have now pushed that just like
everything else so everything will deliver just in time.
Anytime we have something that delivers just in time, I get
very nervous.
Senator Heinrich. Well, I share your concern.
The NDAA, Mr. Chair, that was just signed into law actually
requires the Nuclear Weapons Council to certify no later than
May 11th of this year that NNSA's recommendation actually meets
requirements. So we have certainly got to get this thing back
on track and get it on track quickly.
I want to shift gears for just a minute to some of the
developments around what was formerly called Operationally
Responsive Space. It is now the Space Rapid Capabilities
Office. It certainly received significant priority in resources
in this year's budget request.
Can you talk a little bit about the importance of
responsive space in general and describe how the newly
designated Space Rapid Capabilities Office will contribute to
our nation's resilience in that domain?
General Hyten. So the key, when you look at the budget,
especially when you look at all the elements, including the
classified side, is the beginning finally of building a
resilient warfighting architecture for space. That is the path
we are starting down to right now. The Space Rapid Capabilities
Office will be a key piece of that because there will be
certain elements that will be small, resilient that we need to
go fast with. They will be the perfect place to do that. We
have to give them the authority and responsibility, the
funding, and let them go do that. But like I talked about with
Senator Nelson before, that is the good news.
The challenge we have now is we have not done it. We have
not done anything. It is just sitting right there. I think,
Senator, you have been involved in that discussion with me for
at least the better part of a decade. We have never quite got
there. Everything is lined up now. It is right there. Everybody
understands the need. The administration, the Congress, and the
Department understand the need. We have put a budget in place
that starts down that starts down that path. Now we have to do
it.
Senator Heinrich. I could not agree more. I think for the
first time we actually have that alignment. So let us take
advantage of it.
General Hyten. Yes, sir.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you, sir.
General Hyten. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Heinrich.
Senator Ernst?
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
General Hyten, very good to see you. Thank you for your
leadership of Strategic Command, and for the men and women that
serve with you in STRATCOM, we thank them for their service as
well.
You have acknowledged over and over again today that space
is becoming an increasingly contested and militarized domain.
While we continue to hold that technological advantage in
space, our adversaries are rapidly catching up to us. They are
modernizing and developing their own space capabilities.
So I do appreciate your efforts to streamline the Air
Force's space acquisition process, which has significantly
hampered our ability to rapidly develop and deploy our critical
capabilities. I do believe more needs to be done to ensure the
U.S. can overmatch our near-peer competitors and adversaries in
space.
So the only way to solve a problem is to understand exactly
what we are up against. You have discussed what you can today
in an open setting. But would you agree that the threats that
we see in space are greater and more complex than they were in
the year 2011?
General Hyten. Significantly greater. I think tomorrow you
will see in the closed hearing how all of that comes together
because in the closed hearing, you will see the budget played
out into the future against the threats that are now coming
out. You will understand the integration of all those pieces
together. So weather permitting, I sure hope we get together
tomorrow so you can see that.
Senator Ernst. Absolutely. Given that the last national
security space strategy was developed in 2011, do you believe
it would be worthwhile for the DOD [Department of Defense] to
develop a modernized strategy to face today's threats?
General Hyten. So if that is a yes or no question, which it
sounded like, I will say yes. But I will tell you that the Air
Force, the Services, the National Reconnaissance Office, and my
command have worked together to build what I think is an
integrated strategy. The challenge with it is it is so
classified we can share it with only a very few people. We will
be able to share it with you tomorrow.
I think the work we have to do is actually figure out what
really needs to be classified in the future, how do we do that
because we need to be able to plan with the other combatant
commands, plan timing and tempo of our operations. All those
pieces have to come together, and unless we have things that we
can talk about in forums like this, it is a very difficult
problem to do. So I think we have a very good strategy now. The
problem is not that many people know it. So we are going to
have to work that issue.
Senator Ernst. I do appreciate that. You can see the level
of concern that is coming from those of us on the Armed
Services Committee here in the Senate. We do hear it from our
public as well. While they might not have access to the same
level of information, they do have a concern about it. So we
look forward to getting that information.
On to the Nuclear Posture Review. The 2018 NPR stresses the
importance of nuclear command, control, and communications, so
our NC3 modernization, promising upgrades, new technology, and
better governance and planning across the commands. What are
the greatest challenges to sustaining and modernizing the
Department's NC3 capabilities?
General Hyten. So the biggest challenge is the integration
of all those new weapons platforms I was describing before. Our
nuclear command and control today is secure and reliable, but
it operates on the old weapon systems, the old platforms, the
old structure. We talked about in 2030, the new submarine, the
new bomber, the new ICBM, new capabilities are going to come on
line and they are going to have to fit into a new nuclear
command and control architecture. We have not directly defined
that for the Congress or for our nation yet, and we are going
to have to do that. If you think about 2030, it sounds like a
long time away, but it is only 12 years. This year, we have to
make some critical decisions on governments. The Chairman and
the Secretary are involved in that right now. We have to get
after defining what that issue is.
Senator Ernst. So you would characterize this as that we do
not have sufficient and capable acquisition prepared.
General Hyten. So I would say that the nuclear command and
control today is fine. We can talk about that in a classified
forum, but it is good. But we have to have an acquisition plan
that delivers the nuclear command and control in 2030 that will
match all the weapon systems. We have not matched that yet. The
Air Force has done a good job in establishing the right
structure. The Navy has done a good job establishing the right
structure. But there is another element, which is the national
piece, that is not as well defined yet, and how all those
pieces are going to come together is probably the biggest
question. So we understand the problem. We have clearly
understood what the problem is. Now we have to explain to
ourselves and then to you the approach to get there in the
future.
Senator Ernst. I appreciate that. My time is expired but,
General, I do want to thank you again for your leadership in
this area and appreciate the fact that you are very forward
thinking. We really do need that at such a critical time. So
thank you to you and for the men and women that serve with you.
Thank you.
General Hyten. Thank you, ma'am.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Ernst.
Senator Warren?
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General Hyten, for being here.
General, we just passed a significant deadline for the New
START, which requires both the United States and Russia to
limit the number of deployed nuclear warheads and platforms.
According to the terms of the agreement, both Russia and the
United States were required to certify by February 5th of this
year that we have met those caps.
General, are you confident, based on the verification
mechanisms we have in place, that the Russians have lived up to
their end of the agreement so far?
General Hyten. Again, a yes or no question. The answer is
yes. There are some caveats. There are still disagreements on
both the Russian and American side about certain elements of
their bomber force, our bomber force. But we certified on the
5th. They certified. We believe, given the current mechanisms,
that we are in compliance.
Senator Warren. All right, good. Thank you, General.
Last year, you told Senator Kaine that you continue to
support the New START limits, and I understand that New START
applies only to strategic weapons not to the entire nuclear
arsenal. I share your concerns about Russian verification in
the INF Treaty that there are some areas where we have
concerns. The Nuclear Posture Review calls for two new low-
yield warheads to be developed in our own nuclear arsenal.
General, you said that you do not support increasing the
number of strategic weapons. As part of developing these two
new low-yield options, do you support increasing the overall
size of the nuclear arsenal?
General Hyten. No, ma'am. So here is what we will do. We
will take each of the sea-launched ballistic missiles, the
Ohio-class submarines that we have. We will pull a missile out.
We will take the large warhead off. We will put a small warhead
on, put it back on the submarine, and put it out to alert. So
the total numbers of weapons that we have will be greater,
which is kind of an interesting piece is that we will have the
same number of weapons, lower total yield, and somehow that is
creating a destabilizing structure which is an interesting
dynamic.
Senator Warren. Thank you, General. I appreciate the detail
on this.
If I can, just one more question on this. New START expires
in February of 2021, but the agreement includes an option for a
5-year extension. What conditions would you want to see in
place for us to extend New START?
General Hyten. So that is a question for the State
Department. Again, I am not a diplomat. I am not in the White
House.
My desire and what I present to the State Department and to
my leadership in the White House is that if we can create
conditions for stability across nuclear weapons across the
board, that makes my job easier. My job is to defend the Nation
against nuclear threats, space threats, all the threats that we
have. Knowing what our adversaries have and being able to
verify that is hugely important. I would like to be able to do
that across the entire spectrum of capabilities. But the most
critical is the strategic limits that are in the New START.
Senator Warren. Good. Well, I appreciate that, General. I
have no illusions about Vladimir Putin. I think he is a thug
and a bully. I think we will continue to disagree with him more
than we agree, including on nuclear issues. But Russia and the
United States still control strategic nuclear arsenals capable
of blowing up the world many times over. So if it is possible
to continue to make progress and, as you say, more stability in
this one area, then I think we need to continue to have that
conversation.
With my remaining time, I would like to ask one other
question and pick up on Senator Ernst's point and ask you about
plans to modernize the nuclear command, control, and
communications system, the NC3. Last month, Senator Reed and I
visited Hanscomb Air Force Base in Massachusetts to meet with
the program executive office for NC3. We have got some really
talented people up there doing critical work. But I am worried
because everyone I have talked to agrees that the Air Force
Materiel Command, which is responsible for acquisition side of
NC3 recapitalization, is understaffed for this mission.
So can I just ask, General? Will you commit to working with
me and with this committee and with General Pawlikowski to
advocate that NC3 is appropriately staffed so that it can move
forward as it needs to?
General Hyten. I will commit to do that, Senator.
If I could, just one addition to that is that we actually
have really good people assigned to that job right now. The
problem really is that you can create the slots and put people
in those slots, but this is such a complicated problem, that it
takes years to build the expertise that you have. So just
because you get a smart person and put him in the chair, it
does not mean you have solved the problem. We actually have to
get training for them and build that expertise up because we
took our eye off that expertise, and now we have to rebuild it.
Senator Warren. Well, I understand that. Your point about
we took our eye off this is absolutely spot on. The systems
that comprise NC3 are aging, and they are far too critical to
be left to chance. We need to make sure that this system is
secure and that it is resilient, and we need the best
acquisitions approach to it to make sure that we can get this
done on time. I hope we can continue to work together on that.
General Hyten. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Warren. Thank you, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Warren.
Senator Tillis?
Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, thank you for being here and for your decades of
service and dedication.
One question I would like to start with--it was maybe an
NDAA or two ago that we had a discussion about retiring some of
the outdated weapons in our arsenal. How are we doing with
that, and is there anything more that we need to do for some of
the outdated weapon systems, some that are just either outmoded
or potentially dangerous?
General Hyten. So the stockpile--you are talking about the
nuclear weapons here. The nuclear stockpile is secure. But as
you said, a few years ago, we started looking at some of the
old weapons, and slowly and surely started removing those from
the stockpile. In order to get to what we have actually done,
we have to go to a classified forum.
But I think that is a smart thing to do because we need to
make sure that the stockpile is there for two reasons: to
support the fielded forces that we have but to also support a
potential violation of the New START or a breakout of that
treaty so that we have the ability to go forth. I mean the
Minuteman missiles today, for example, only have one warhead on
top of each of the missiles that we have deployed but we have
the ability to put three on top. We need to have those extra
weapons in case there is a problem with our adversaries in
Russia or China that we need those capabilities. So we have to
make sure we maintain the stockpile at the right level, but we
should not maintain anything greater than that. So we have been
making good progress on that.
Senator Tillis. The 2-year spending bill. How is that
affecting--what kind of time horizon do we really need for you?
You have got some long-term execution horizons for your work.
The 2-year spending bill helps, but can you tell me
specifically in an open setting how that has been helpful to
your command?
General Hyten. We do not have the bill yet. That is the
biggest concern I have. But assuming that we do, what we will
do for the first time is we will have stability for 18 months,
and stability is the most important thing. You know, all the
things we----
Senator Tillis. Eighteen months seems like a long time
around here, but it is amazing that you consider that positive.
But we all know that is not enough time for your line of
business.
General Hyten. The most important thing is a budget is a
budget on the first of every year. That is the most important
thing. Whether that budget comes through a 2-year budget or an
18-month, but having a budget on the first of the year. When I
look back at the history and the folks that used to go fast,
the Shrevers, the Rickovers, the biggest thing--they always
started with a budget on the first of the year, and because of
that, they had the ability to make decisions and flex
accordingly. When you do not, not only do you not go fast but
you actually waste huge amounts of money. Both of those things
bug me.
Senator Tillis. So is it not fair to say--I know you do not
want to give Congress advice, but if we come up short on these
spending decisions, then some of the dates that you have talked
about and some of the capabilities that will come on line will
also shift to the right?
General Hyten. Since I have almost no margin in some of
those programs, that scares the ever-living heck out of me.
Senator Tillis. On the INF with Russia, the ideal world
would be that Russia is actually complying. But if they do not,
at what point--is there a sufficient level of compliance where,
even though they are cheating in certain areas, it is worth
having, or at what point do we have to say we have got to take
the handcuffs off?
General Hyten. Well, you have seen in the budget for fiscal
year 2019, we have proposed starting research and development
on the ground-launched cruise missile. Research and development
is not in violation of the treaty, but testing and deployment
of that capability would be. But nonetheless, we have said it
does not look like they are going to come back in compliance,
and we are going to start down that path.
President Putin yesterday said he did not want an arms
race. Of course, on the 1st of March, he showed nuking Florida.
So I am not sure exactly what the message is there, but I can
tell you that if we have to build intermediate-range missiles
to respond to the threat, I have no doubt that this country
knows how to do it. We have done it before. We can do it again.
We proposed starting the research and development in 2019 to
start down that path.
Senator Tillis. Do you agree that if we do not take that
threat seriously, that some have testified before the committee
they put us in a position of--I think the phrase was used--we
could be in a position of either surrender or suicide?
General Hyten. That is the Kissinger quote, and I agree
with that. I think we need a low-yield nuclear weapon, very
small numbers. I can tell you how many we need in a classified
session. It is not many. But I think we need that to deter our
adversaries to make sure we do not get into that point where
the only decision for the President is suicide or surrender.
Senator Tillis. Well, thank you, General. I for one will be
doing everything I can to make sure that we provide you funding
so that you can do your job the way I know you can do it. Thank
you.
General Hyten. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Tillis.
Senator Peters?
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General Hyten, for being here today and for your
testimony. As always, thank you for your service as well.
We have heard from several members here today questions
related to the low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missile,
as well as the nuclear-capable sea-launched cruise missile. So
my question relates to the discrimination issue that some
people have raised, that with these particular capabilities, an
adversary may not be able to identify that a low-yield SLBM
[Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile] is actually a low-yield
weapon that has been fired and it could possibly trigger
escalation thinking something more is coming at them.
In fiscal year 2007, the Navy considered a conventional
Trident modification where Trident submarines would carry
conventional warheads, as well as nuclear warheads. At the
time, Congress rejected funding for that modification. Ted
Stevens, a former Senator here, said, ``A country that picks up
or identifies a launch might legitimately worry whether the
weapon carries a nuclear or conventional payload.'' This could
be a provocative action if taken, which was part of his
comments in rejecting that idea.
So my question to you is, with a low-yield warhead, is the
discrimination problem not still there? Is it more dangerous?
What should we do about that?
General Hyten. So there are a million ways to go down that.
It is a very complicated answer. I will try to be brief.
The first thing is that from detection to creation of the
explosion is less than 30 minutes. It is a very short period of
time. If somebody does detect that launch, they will see a
single missile or maybe two missiles coming. They will realize
it is not an existential threat to their country and therefore
they do not have to respond with an existential threat. That is
what I would recommend if I saw that coming against the United
States.
But I think the first thing you have to realize is that,
first of all, it is a deterrence weapon. The first use of that
weapon is to make sure that nobody use that kind of weapon
against us.
The second piece is that if we do have to respond, we want
to respond in kind and not further escalate the conflict out of
control. And so an adversary, Russia in this case, will see a
weapon coming perhaps--I can talk about that in a classified
forum as well. They will see it coming, but they do not have to
respond right now and they will not have time to respond
because they will not want to commit suicide.
So all of those pieces, when you look at all the pieces
coming together, actually if you are talking about a rational
actor, will not be an issue in terms of it: so deterrence first
and then a response weapon in kind to keep the conflict from
escalating worse. It actually makes it harder for an adversary
to use the weapon in the first place, and, if it does use it,
it allows you to respond appropriately.
Senator Peters. The key is a rational actor.
General Hyten. The key is a rational actor. A rational
actor is the basis of all deterrence policy.
Senator Peters. Right.
There have also been a number of questions related to NC3
systems that you have answered. My question is about the
priorities. Where does modernizing NC3 fit in with the
modernization efforts of our broader nuclear enterprise? It
seems to me that it is essential that we have secure and
reliable command and control in place prior to new weapons, but
how would you balance those priorities?
General Hyten. So the way I have talked about it, it used
to be the big four. The big four were bomber, ICBM, cruise
missile, submarine. It is now the big six, bomber, ICBM, cruise
missile, submarine, plus NC3, plus nuclear weapons. Those six
elements have to come together for our nuclear infrastructure
and for our nuclear deterrent to continue to be viable in the
future. All six of those have to come together in the 2030 time
frame for the future. They all come together today. We are
fully ready today, but to make sure it comes together in the
future, we have to be working all six.
Senator Peters. Simultaneously.
General Hyten. Simultaneously.
Senator Peters. Earlier you testified that the sea-launched
cruise missile is not a bargaining chip. But last month,
Secretary Mattis testified at the House Armed Services
Committee that the submarine-launched cruise missile will,
``give our negotiators something with which to negotiate.''
Could you clarify that for us, please?
General Hyten. Absolutely. I think the Secretary said it
exactly right. I do not like calling anything a bargaining
chip. That capability is against the threat. However, that
capability also gives our negotiators something to talk about.
If you do not have something to talk about, it is very hard to
sit down and negotiate. But it is not a bargaining chip because
it is to counter the threat. I think the only thing he did not
like and I do not like is using the term, ``bargaining chip.''
But it does give our negotiators things to work with, which is
a good thing.
Senator Peters. Thank you, General.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Senator Scott?
Senator Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, General. Thank you for your service to the
country as well.
General Hyten. Thank you, sir.
Senator Scott. Russia's strategy to escalate to dominate is
something this committee has heard about over the last 3 weeks
several time. Senator Fischer mentioned it this morning.
General Scaparrotti talked about it in my office when we met a
few weeks ago as well. To me, it is chilling to think that
Vladimir Putin sees the preemptive opportunity as a real one
and a way to cement the gains that he is making as he tries to
grab more territory and frankly intimidate as many of his
neighbors. Eastern Ukraine comes to mind as does the
possibility of Russia seeking to build a land bridge through
Lithuania to its enclave Kaliningrad.
I am confident the administration will use all available
resources, whether it is diplomatic, military, and economic
means, to counter such a strategy if we find ourselves or our
allies in need of assistance.
What we have learned, though, is that Russia truly respects
strength. I am interested in what kind of strength we should
have to put Russians' ambitions in check, and that being the
recently completed Nuclear Posture Review proposes returning
two capabilities you have already talked about with Senator
Peters, both the sea-launched ballistic missile, as well as the
cruise missile.
My question for you is do you have all that you need in
order for us to develop a complete low-yield nuclear program
for missiles?
General Hyten. So, first of all, as the Commander of United
States Strategic Command, I have everything I need today to
deter Russia from doing anything against the United States of
America. We are fully ready against any threat that exists
today, without a doubt.
Senator Scott. Very good.
General Hyten. What my concern is will that be the case for
the commander after commander after commander after me as we go
down looking in the future. In that case, we have a lot of work
to do in order to make sure that those capabilities come on
line. We believe that in order to deter Russia from using
nuclear weapons on the battlefield, we should deploy a low-
yield nuclear weapon on our ballistic missile submarines. We
believe, to respond to a number of threats both in Russia and
China, that we should have a sea-launched cruise missile
capability in order to respond to that. We know how to do all
of that stuff. It is not new. It is work that we have done
before both in the Department of Defense and the Department of
Energy. We know exactly how to do it. We just have to go do
that work.
But the most important thing--and I think Senator Reed said
it earlier. The most important thing is the continuing
modernization of the triad because that is the foundation of
our nation's defense, and that is the strength that will
continue to deter Russia into the out-years.
Senator Scott. As we look at the potential of those who
succeed you or come after you, is congressional authorization
as it relates to low-yield nuclear weapons essential or not
necessary?
General Hyten. That is really a question for lawyers not
for a combatant commander because it is so important to me I
talk to lawyers. They have told me that congressional
authorization is required. Therefore, the Nuclear Weapons
Council and I have talked to the Office of Management and
Budget. The Department of Energy is working with them. I think
they will have an approach to come look for authorization to
begin that right away so we can start down that path. It is
already in our 2019 budget submission. It was not in the 2019
Department of Energy budget submission. That is the Department
of Energy piece that will require authorization, and I think
that will come in a fairly timely way.
Senator Scott. Senator Tillis mentioned it earlier and you
commented on it very clearly that the continuing resolutions
that have presented real hurdles for our military are
measurable in real dollars. I met with the Secretary of the
Navy, and he said that over the last several CRs [Continuing
Resolutions], it has cost the Navy in quantifiable dollars
about $9 billion. That to me seems astounding that as tight as
things have been--and frankly, we are hopeful for the $165
billion that we are looking for to being deployed to help our
men and women in uniform. The fact of the matter is that short-
term budgeting has got to be an obstacle that is preventable,
number one, and number two, a major source of angst for folks
in your position.
General Hyten. So I worry about it for a number of reasons.
I cannot even describe the impact on morale to the workforce
because when it happens, the message that is sent--I know it is
not intentional because I talk to each and every Member of
Congress, and they all respect the military. But the message
that is sent is they do not care, is that the Congress does not
care, the Nation does not care when they do not get a budget.
When the civilians employees have to sign a piece of paper that
says, yep, I will go home, I will do no work, it is so
deflating to the workforce that it is hard to describe what the
impact of that is.
Then the inefficiencies that we put into the overall
conduct of the B-21 program, any new program that comes up that
has a funding increase required that we cannot do, we
incorporate all kinds of inefficiencies into that process.
Then I still do not have a problem today conducting my
mission, but I really worry about the long-term impact for
continuing to do that. I know that if we do not get routine
budgets, that the schedules now that deliver just in time will
not deliver in time because we will not have an efficient
program delivering them.
So I worry about that in a lot of ways. I know each of the
members here do, but as a body, it is so essential that the
Congress come together and pass a defense appropriations bill.
Senator Scott. Thank you. Certainty and predictability are
absolutely essential for the success of our military.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Scott.
Senator Donnelly?
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General, for being here.
In your written testimony, General, you highlight the need
to prioritize and accelerate development of hypersonic
capabilities, and I could not agree more with you. Is the
United States leading the way in development of hypersonic
glide vehicles or are we behind the curve relative to Russia
and China?
General Hyten. We are ahead in some areas, behind in other
areas. So as a whole, I would say it is a competition, and it
is a competition I believe that we should have a goal of
winning that competition, not tying, not losing, but winning
the competition. So that means the areas we are behind in--and
I can talk about those in a classified setting--the areas they
are ahead in we should accelerate further. We need to make sure
that that becomes a priority for our nation to understand what
that is, and then we have to figure out how to respond to it.
The first way to respond to it is to be able to see the threat,
which right now is challenging. So we have to build
capabilities to see what the threat is as well.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
In terms of that competition, as you look at Russia and
China, is it that as we look forward, are we moving further
ahead or are they closing in on us in terms of capabilities?
General Hyten. They are closing in. I think we are still
ahead. We are ahead significantly on the conventional side. I
think we have stability with Russia on the nuclear side. We
have an advantage with China on the nuclear side. But they are
gaining ground quickly, especially when you look at space and
cyber.
Senator Donnelly. The Navy successfully demonstrated a
conventional prompt strike missile last year that could become
a sea-based capability in the future. What are the next steps
for the development of a sea-based CPS [Conventional Prompt
Strike] capability?
General Hyten. The next step--you have seen it in the
budget. The Navy has been given the program now. The Navy has
to decide who is going to lead the program. So there is a joint
task force underway involving the Navy, the Joint Staff, my
command to look at the future of that program and to define it
in 2019 so that we can execute the budget that we have put
together. That work will be underway this summer and we will
report out. Admiral Richardson, the CNO [Chief Naval Officer],
is the lead on that. I talked to him about it the other day. He
is committed to make sure that that comes across right because
STRATCOM and other combatant commands have a valid need for
that capability.
Senator Donnelly. General, we have a new bomber, a new air-
launched cruise missile, the life extension of our current
ICBMs, a new ICBM, a new SSBN [submersible ship ballistic
missile nuclear-powered], warhead life extensions in our
nuclear command and control systems. The Nuclear Posture Review
adds to this potentially another warhead modification, a new
submarine-launched cruise missile, any necessary modifications
to the subs carrying the SLCM, and any warhead modifications
necessary to arm it.
Can you give us a list from first to last of how you rank
these because our concern is we do not have a budget that can
accomplish even the portion that we all see as absolutely
essential? We know there are things we need to do, and I was
wondering if you have a list of how you put these in place.
General Hyten. I do not have a list, Senator.
Senator Donnelly. Is it that they are all critical?
General Hyten. They are all critical. The most critical is
the modernization of the triad, the big six that I talked about
with Senator Peters a while ago. That is the most important
piece of it. But everything in the Nuclear Posture Review that
we talk about, everything that is in the budget is in response
to a threat. So I cannot sit in front of the Senate, I cannot
sit in front of Congress, I cannot sit in front of the
President and say, yes, sir, because of that threat, we do not
need this capability because the threat exists.
The only way I can change my recommendations to you is if
we can change the threat, and I hope some day that threat
changes. I hope it changes in Russia, China, North Korea, Iran.
I hope those threats change, but if they do not change, I will
sit in front of you next year and advocate for those
capabilities because they are all in response to an existing
threat to this nation.
Senator Donnelly. In light of how critical all of those are
and the budget challenges that we have as well, now more than
ever we need to be sharing information, services, and parts
across the Services to control cost and risk in this
undertaking. Can I secure your commitment to find commonality
between the Services and industry to try to reduce that cost
and risk, that we are not reinventing the wheel in effect?
General Hyten. So I am a combatant commander. So I need the
capability. However, I am also a taxpayer. So I look for any
way we can come up with commonality. I think there are ways to
do that. But I will also point out that we have to be careful
not create single point failures in the nuclear enterprise. So
if we have everything common on the ICBM side and the SLBM
side, that is actually not a good thing because now if one
thing fails, we have lost two legs of the triad. So we have to
be careful as we walk through that.
But I am working with Strategic Systems Program and Admiral
Benedict and Admiral Richardson to try to figure out with the
Air Force where elements of commonality should be. We have an
effort going on inside the Nuclear Weapons Council to define
the strategy for modernization in the future so we understand
what those pieces are.
Senator Donnelly. General, thank you for your service.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Donnelly.
Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you, General Hyten. I appreciate your being here
today and your great service.
I was looking in your written testimony because I saw a
phrase that interested me, and now I cannot find it.
General Hyten. I am sure it was brilliant.
[Laughter.]
Senator Kaine. It was brilliant. It said there is no cyber
war, there is no space war, there is just war.
General Hyten. That is correct. It is one of the few things
I get frustrated about is when I get a question how are you
going to fight and win a war in space. How are you going to
fight and win a war in cyberspace? It occurred to me a couple
of years ago that there is no such thing. There is just war. In
war, there may be an element of it that extends into space.
There maybe an element that extends--but war is against an
adversary. If you have to deal with the adversary and if we get
attacked in space, for example, is the United States' response
going to be a response in kind in space? In many cases, that
might be the exact wrong response. We may want to respond in
another domain.
Senator Kaine. But we ought to respond.
General Hyten. But we ought to respond, but it should be
focused on the adversary and what the adversary holds dear. If
we hold space dear, maybe we will respond in some way that
holds something the adversary holds dear. There is just war.
There is just conflict.
Senator Kaine. General, on page 3, you go over in your
testimony the global security environment, and you have this
phrase in your paragraph about Russia. In June 2017, as part of
an effort to destabilize Ukraine, the Russian military launched
the most destructive and costly ever cyber attack in history.
The effects of this attack spread globally and included
devastating damage to U.S. businesses.
Is that war?
General Hyten. I believe it is. I believe that war extends
into cyberspace. I believe that our adversaries have figured
out that that is part of the structure. War is against a nation
state, and you attack the thing the nation state holds dear.
Certainly I would hope that everybody in America holds our
economic structure dear and holds our ability to live
comfortably dear, holds our power grids dear, all those kind of
things that could be attacked through cyberspace.
Senator Kaine. Should we hold our election systems as dear
as we hold our economic capacity?
General Hyten. I believe that any attack against our nation
should be considered an attack that we have to respond to.
Senator Kaine. Including the Russian attack of 2016 against
the election.
General Hyten. I actually have talked to Admiral Rogers. I
understand I believe it was. But I do not know exactly the
relationship inside Russia about how that happened. All those
kind of pieces are still to be worked.
Senator Kaine. If it was attributed to the Russian
Government rather than just rogue elements, is it an act of
war? We are not talking about cyber war, space war is an act of
war.
General Hyten. So it is the job of the United States
Congress to declare war.
Senator Kaine. What if somebody takes action against us? We
have not declared war on Russia. We had not in 2016. But when
they took that action against the Ukraine, which you said was
an act of war--I just asked you about that--because it effected
the attack of a sovereign nation, on a sovereign nation, how
about--I agree we had not declared war on Russia, but was
Russia's effort to undermine the American electoral system, if
it can be shown that it was with governmental imprimatur rather
than rogue elements, would that be an act of war?
General Hyten. So it would be an act of war by definition,
but would we declare war? I would think not. I would think,
however, that the United States would want to respond in some
way to an attack on our nation.
Senator Kaine. So it would be an act of war by the Russians
against us. Obviously, the Administration, Congress has the
ability to decide what to do. I think that is important.
We had a hearing with Cyber Command, a very strong hearing
with Admiral Rogers, a couple weeks back, and we were grappling
with this. One of the worries that I think we have with a broad
portfolio not only in Armed Services but we serve on other
committees--we are dealing with the American election system;
we are dealing with power grid; we are dealing with all kinds
of things--is how do we protect the country. Admiral Rogers
said, well, the protection of the election system really is
more about how states run elections. Senator McCaskill said,
you cannot expect the Secretary of State of Missouri to go head
to head against the nation state of Russia if they want to
attack the American election.
So we are depending upon our defense, DHS [Department of
Homeland Security], and others to protect us, but we also have
to be clear because if we are unclear what it is, then we will
likely be unclear what our response should be.
General Hyten. I think that is the challenge we have in
cyberspace today. So I have given you my best military advice,
my personal opinion. But as a nation, we have not made that
decision yet.
Senator Kaine. Well, I would just say you call it out
pretty clearly about what an attack on Ukraine is. I looked in
that paragraph to see any reference to Russian attacks directly
against the United States, and I did not see any. The one I saw
was an attack against the Ukraine in June 2017 that affected
American businesses. When I asked you about it, you said you
thought that kind of attack of nation against nation vis-a-vis
Ukraine was an act of war. I agree. We have to decide how
seriously we will treat it.
On our side there has been some ambiguity about it, and I
will say on the side of the last administration and this
administration, there is real ambiguity. I do not know of a
mayor or a governor who believes that the Federal Government is
really going to have their back to protect their electoral
system in 2018. They have not seen the signal sent that we are
going to have their back. I think it something we should send.
Mr. Chair, I am over my time. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
Senator Cruz?
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, welcome. Thank you for your service. Good to see
you again.
In your written testimony, you stated ``we cannot be
successful in this endeavor by investing solely in active
missile defense capabilities. We must strengthen and integrate
all pillars of missile defense, including the capability to
defeat adversary missiles before they launch.''
Building on this point, as you know, currently America's
missile defense systems are limited to ones that intercept
missiles during the mid-course when the missile is coasting in
outer space and in the terminal phase, once it has entered back
into the atmosphere. But the Missile Defense Agency has noted,
``Intercepting a missile in its boost phase is the ideal
solution for a ballistic missile defense since destroying a
missile during this phase of its flight precludes the
deployments of any countermeasures and also prevents the
missile warhead from attaining the velocity necessary to reach
its intended target.''
As you know, the greatest challenge in targeting during
boost phase is that a missile is only in boost phase for a very
few short minutes at the beginning of the flight. This requires
sensors that are able to quickly detect a missile launch and
relay targeting information. A study conducted by the Hudson
Institute and a senior review group consisted of two former
Missile Defense Agency directors, two former NORTHCOM
commanders, the former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
among others, stated that, ``An SBI [Space-based Interceptor]
capability would dramatically augment U.S. terrestrially and
sea-based defensive capabilities, reduce the demand on current
systems, and provide the United States with the optimal vantage
point for destroying enemy missiles regardless of their launch
or target location, whether on land, at sea, in the air, or in
space.''
Given the metastasizing nuclear threat from North Korea,
given Iran's relentless pursuit of nuclear weapons, the growing
development of anti-access/area denial capabilities in the
Persian Gulf and the South China Sea, and great power
competition in space, the case for urgently pursuing a space-
based intercept capability has never been stronger.
Recent investments from China and Russia in missile
technology like hypersonic glide vehicles that circumvent our
current missile defense architecture further underscore the
potential value of a space-based layer for the boost phase.
General, understanding that the MDR [Missile Defense
Review] is forthcoming, can you share some of your views on the
path forward for developing the architecture necessary to make
boost-phase defense a reality here?
General Hyten. So as the Commander of STRATCOM, I have been
on the record as supporting the requirement for boost-phase
intercept for the entire time I have been in command, and I
have supported that for many years now. I would love to drop a
missile back on somebody's head that launched it. It is really
that simple. I think there are multiple ways to do that.
I think the most important piece of the puzzle that you
described is the sensor architecture that you need in order to
target it. I am a huge supporter of building space-based sensor
elements to be able to target against all of those
capabilities, as well as hypersonic capabilities, other
capabilities in the boost phase to get after a number of those
issues.
The actual technical solution I am agnostic for. In my
past, I have worked space-based interceptor solutions and
spaced-based sensor solutions. I am convinced that space-based
sensors are absolutely required. I am not convinced at this
time that the space-based interceptor is required, but the
requirement is there. I will advocate for that requirement. I
think there are technologies that we can talk about in a
classified session that can meet that. I think space is an
element of that overall architecture, but the most important
thing is the requirement for boost phase and left-of-launch. I
think the Missile Defense Review will talk about that in more
detail.
Senator Cruz. What specifically is required? What is needed
to get this accomplished, to make boost-phase intercept a
reality?
General Hyten. So I think that the Department has to decide
to integrate the number of different programs that are out
there. I think the leadership in the Department right now is
the perfect leadership to do that. I know Dr. Mike Griffin. I
know that he has looked at that technology in the past. He has
only been in office now a few weeks, but that has been
important to him for a long time. I think Secretary Lord,
Secretary Shanahan, I think the Secretary of Defense support
the boost-phase construct.
So I think what we are going to have to do this year is we
are going to have to align all of the elements that are out
there and make sure we realize it is not just the interceptor--
it is coming up with the entire approach to dealing with boost-
phase intercept--and get after that. Like I said the Missile
Defense Review will get to it in much more detail.
Senator Cruz. So what can or should this committee do?
General Hyten. I think the key is look at the Missile
Defense Review. The Missile Defense Review will describe the
approach of the Nation and the Department on how to do that.
Then we will have a discussion about, okay, what is good, what
is bad, where do you disagree, and we will have that discussion
as we go through the year. But we really need the Missile
Defense Review to start that discussion.
Senator Cruz. Very good. Thank you, General.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Cruz.
Senator Blumenthal?
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Talking about the boost phase intercept, you think this
technology is doable and feasible and should be pursued.
General Hyten. Senator, I think the technology is actually
pretty straightforward. I think the policy discussions are much
more complicated because in order to attack a missile in the
boost phase, you have to commit to dropping something on
adversary territory. Now, if we are in the middle of a war or
the middle of a conflict, that is really not a complicated
decision. But if we are not and we want to make that decision,
that is a very complicated policy discussion. We have not had a
lot of discussion about the policy impacts of making a decision
like that. But from a technical perspective, I think the
technology is there.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, General.
I have a question about helicopters. This issue is one that
you and I have discussed.
General Hyten. Yes, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. In fact a year ago, as you may recall,
I asked you about your frustrations with the Huey replacement
program, and you said, ``Of all the things in my portfolio, I
cannot even describe how upset I get about the helicopter
replacement program. It is a helicopter, for gosh sakes. We
ought to be able to go out and buy a helicopter and put it in
the hands of the people that need it, and we should be able to
do that quickly. We have been building combat helicopters for a
long time in this country. I do not understand why the heck it
is so hard to buy the helicopter.''
Do you still have the same frustrations with the Air
Force's continued delays in fielding a replacement helicopter?
General Hyten. I had a feeling somebody was going to quote
me on that today, and I had a feeling it was going to be you.
So I have been working to try to get a helicopter in the
hands of the folks in the missile fields for over a decade.
That is where my frustration comes from. That frustration will
not go away until the helicopter is in the hands of the people.
But the good news is the leadership, Dr. Roper, Dr.
Griffin, Ms. Lord, Secretary Shanahan--they have taken it very
seriously. We are in the middle of a source selection now. I
hope contractor war is not imminent. There is a protest going
on inside the source selection which limits how much I can talk
about it. But the leadership of the Air Force, the leadership
of the Department has taken it very seriously, and we are in
the middle of a source selection now which is a good thing.
Senator Blumenthal. Can you give us a date when you think
it will be done?
General Hyten. I cannot give you a date because of the
protest right now. That is the piece that is still frustrating
me. I would like to sit in front of you and give you a date
saying here is where it is going to be.
The good news is that my air component commander, General
Robin Rand, has put a number of adjustments into the Huey force
in terms of fuel, in terms of armament, in terms of arms to
allow them to do the job until that helicopter comes into
being. So the operational risk that I was concerned about
significantly last year has really been eliminated in the near
term. But I do not have a date where I can tell you, Senator,
and I wish I did.
Senator Blumenthal. But that is still a concern that this
aircraft, even with that short-term measure, still is incapable
of meeting requirements to protect our ICBM fleet. Correct?
General Hyten. Well, especially the movement of nuclear
weapons. That is the key. I can tell you in a classified
session what we have done in terms of arming, in terms of
fueling to allow us to adequately protect the weapons. I am
comfortable with that protection system that is in there right
now. But the Huey is still ancient and it has got to be
replaced. It has got to be replaced, and the sooner we can
replace it, the better.
So I will continue to be demanding of my Air Force to
deliver that capability. I can tell you the Chief, the
Secretary, and the acquisition leadership have all committed to
getting there as fast as we can. I hope that contract award is
soon.
Senator Blumenthal. I am concerned about the triad and
American naval superiority. I attended the commissioning of the
USS Colorado over the past weekend, a proud moment as all these
commissionings and christenings are. Our undersea superiority
is more important than ever for all the reasons that you have
outlined so well in your testimony.
I am concerned about the ramping up, which I think has to
come in the construction of both the Ohio-class replacement,
the Columbia, and the Virginia-class, which requires the
defense industrial base to be strong, worker training, and
worker skills.
Would you agree that the worker training grants that are
provided by the Federal Government play an important role in
our national strategic superiority, that industrial base has to
be trained, and the Federal Government has a role in funding
it?
General Hyten. The shipyards are a critical national asset
to America. It is one of our strengths. That workforce is
essential to us being able to build Columbia, to be able to
build Virginia. I think it is the responsibility of all of us,
including the Federal Government, to make sure that that
workforce, which is a strategic asset, is supported across the
board.
Senator Blumenthal. When people talk about spending on our
military security and our military budget, really our national
security depends on that defense industrial base, as you just
said.
General Hyten. Every worker that is at a shipyard that is
working on the Columbia is part of our national security
infrastructure.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
Thank you very much, General Hyten, for your patience and
your straightforward answers. We appreciate you very much.
With that, we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:16 a.m., the committee adjourned.]
Questions Submitted by Senator David Perdue
columbia-class ssbns
1. Senator Perdue. General Hyten, initially, the Navy planned to
build up to 12 new, Columbia-class, nuclear-armed SSBNs, to be in
service by the early 2040s and serve well into the 2080s. However, the
Nuclear Posture Review revised previous commitments to a fleet of 12
Columbia-class SSBNs to a fleet of ``at least'' 12 Columbia-class
SSBNs. Do you believe we need more than 12 Columbia-class SSBNs?
General Hyten. A force of 12 Columbia-class SSBNs provides the
necessary survivability, performance, and flexibility to meet projected
strategic deterrence requirements. However, as stated in the Nuclear
Posture Review, the future international security environment remains
uncertain and assumptions regarding deterrence requirements may change.
USSTRATCOM will continue to work closely with the Department and
Service leadership to analyze the security environment and determine
the capabilities needed across the Triad to counter emerging threats.
2. Senator Perdue. General Hyten, if so, how many SSBNS would
suffice our nuclear triad needs?
General Hyten. Our Triad force requirements are determined by our
strategic deterrence objectives and by the threat potential adversaries
project. The Navy program of record for the Columbia-class SSBN is
sufficient to meet projected deterrence requirements. As the strategic
security environment continues to evolve, we will assess if any program
changes are required.
3. Senator Perdue. General Hyten, is the Navy prepared to procure
more Columbia-class SSBNs as necessary?
General Hyten. I respectfully refer you to the Navy for program
acquisition questions.
4. Senator Perdue. General Hyten, how will this impact the overall
shipbuilding budget?
General Hyten. I respectfully refer you to the Navy for any
questions about impacts to their shipbuilding budget.
advanced battle management & surveillance (abms) vulnerabilities
5. Senator Perdue. General Hyten, JSTARS is an airborne battle
management, command and control, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance platform that is currently housed aboard E-8C aircraft.
As you know, the Air Force has zeroed-out its FY19 recapitalization of
the JSTARS fleet, when just last year this platform was the number 4
acquisition priority of the Air Force. While I agree that we eventually
need to move to the new ``system of systems'' in the future, I'm very
concerned about the survivability and reliability of their proposed
Advanced Battle Management & Surveillance (ABMS) to replace the
airborne battle management of JSTARS, given Chinese and Russian
progress in the space domain. The ABMS connect satellites, drones,
ground sensors and manned surveillance aircraft seamlessly in real time
across a fast-changing, dispersed combat area of operations. However,
Russia has tested the PL-19 Nudol, its direct ascent anti-satellite
missile, at least twice, in November 2015 and May 2016. China has
conducted at least two anti-satellite tests, one in 2007 and another in
2013. Both are developing and to some extent have deployed technologies
in directed energy, jamming, and cyber to counter satellite
communications as well. Given our adversaries' emphasis on anti-space
strategies, is their reason to be concerned about the Air Force's
proposed ABMS's survivability? (If possible, I would appreciate a
classified and unclassified response)
General Hyten. Air Combat Command (ACC) is conducting an Advanced
Battle Management Systems (ABMS) Analysis of Alternatives (AOA)
assessing viability of multiple architectures (space & non-space).
Until the AOA is complete, it would be premature for me to comment.
6. Senator Perdue. General Hyten, are you working with the Air
Force to address these potential survivability issues of the proposed
ABMS? (If possible, I would appreciate a classified and unclassified
response)
General Hyten. Yes, USSTRATCOM is supporting ACC's AOA.
7. Senator Perdue. General Hyten, where among these anti-satellite
technologies are our adversaries most advanced?
General Hyten. [Deleted.]
8. Senator Perdue. General Hyten, are you concerned about US
progress in space vis a vis our adversaries?
General Hyten. Yes. Our adversaries have studied the way we conduct
operations, have monitored U.S. statements highlighting the tremendous
advantages provided to our military forces enabled by our space
capabilities, understand our dependency on space, and are developing/
demonstrating a wide variety of counter-space technologies with the
clear intent to contest our operations from and through space.
The PB acknowledges the threat and makes initial investments to
improve resiliency and incorporate self-defense measures into our
future satellite architectures.
Additionally, DOD leadership has recognized the legacy requirement
and acquisition models and processes do not support today's need to
increase speed and innovation in response to the growing threats.
USSTRATCOM has also taken steps to operationalize space as a
warfighting domain:
The National Space Defense Center provides command and
control for space warfighting operations and creates unity of effort
among the DOD, IC, and interagency.
The Joint Force Space Component Command, under Gen
Raymond, builds a coherent, streamlined warfighting construct
consistent with doctrine, enabling more effective command and control
of forces and direct lines of authority.
The DOD is preparing to submit to Congress a Space
Warfighting Concept of Operations as directed in the Fiscal Year 2018
NDAA.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie Hirono
missile defense
9. Senator Hirono. General Hyten, even though talks with North
Korea regarding its nuclear weapon and missile programs are scheduled,
North Korea has made significant progress in its programs since the
last time you testified before this committee, and they remain a threat
to both the mainland United States and Hawaii. Are you confident that
our Missile Defense System, as it stands today, can protect the United
States and its territories from North Korean ballistic missiles?
General Hyten. Yes. I agree with the USNORTHCOM Commander and am
confident the Ballistic Missile Defense System can protect the US and
its territories from current NK ballistic missile launches.
10. Senator Hirono. General Hyten, what about in the future?
General Hyten. The threat is evolving and the ability to sustain
our advantage demands a strong commitment to sustained future
investments.
11. Senator Hirono. General Hyten, what capabilities will we need
to add to maintain our ability to defend against ballistic missiles?
General Hyten. Our ability to defeat advanced ballistic missiles,
associated countermeasures, cruise missiles and hypersonic glide
vehicles requires continued Congressional support of PB investments in
sensors (space & ground), improved kill vehicles, and both boost phase
defense and left of launch capabilities.
homeland defense radar-hawaii
12. Senator Hirono. General Hyten, there is a request in the fiscal
year 2019 budget from the Missile Defense Agency for $62.2 Million in
Research and Development funds for the Homeland Defense Radar-Hawaii
(HDR-H). Can you explain in detail why that radar and its location in
Hawaii is important for the future of missile defense, especially in
Hawaii?
General Hyten. The Hawaii radar location provides 24/7 persistent,
enhanced tracking and discrimination capabilities against increasingly
complex threats. These advanced capabilities significantly improve
midcourse and Aegis ballistic missile defense interceptor capabilities
against long range ballistic missile threats targeted at Hawaii.
Additionally, HDR-H will serve a multi-mission role as a Space
Situational Awareness sensor.
maui space surveillance site
13. Senator Hirono. General Hyten, your written testimony goes into
some detail regarding Space as both a warfighting domain and a critical
enabler of other military capability. The Maui Space Surveillance Site
(MSSS) run by the Air Force Research Laboratory provides both research
and operational capabilities to create Space Situational Awareness that
don't exist anywhere else in the world. The Memorandum of Understanding
between the Air Force Space Command, National Reconnaissance Office,
and Air Force Materiel Command that funds operations at MSSS is set to
expire at the end of fiscal year 2018. I am concerned that the
inability to renegotiate an MOU may result in the loss of a unique
space surveillance capability. With more and more objects in space to
track, how important is it to ensure that a facility such as the MSSS
Site maintains its research and operational capabilities as space
becomes an increasingly crowded and contested domain?
General Hyten. The MSSS is an integral part of the Space
Surveillance Network (SSN) designed to detect, identify, catalogue and
track on-orbit man-made objects to facilitate safety of flight
operations and/or provide warning of hostile actions in space.
MSSS hosts a unique mix of operational and research assets
provisioned with visible and infrared sensors, adaptive optics, and
telescopes to collect imaging and signature date on objects ranging
from near-earth to deep space.
The geographic location and unique SSN capabilities provided by
MSSS require continued sustainment and modernization.
I'm confident Air Force Space Command, National Reconnaissance
Office, and Air Force Material Command understand the site's value and
will conclude a fair and equitable MOU.
national guard space control squadron
14. Senator Hirono. General Hyten, I am aware that the Air Force is
considering creating a new Space Control Squadron that may be allocated
to the National Guard, and that the Hawaii Air National Guard is a
finalist to host this squadron. Both Pacific Air Forces and PACOM
support this squadron being established in Hawaii due to its location
and access to national security space facilities. While I understand
this is outside the scope of your current command, your long career in
space matters, including command of Space Command, makes you a
recognized expert on our military's space operations. Can you describe
the advantages of having this capability within the PACOM AOR as well
as bringing in the Air National Guard?
General Hyten. Prepositioning space control assets within the PACOM
AOR enables greater operational integration and training. This leads to
a more effective ability to execute STRATCOM and PACOM's contingency
plans against potential adversaries in the Pacific theater.
USSTRATCOM has not participated in the Space Control Squadron
mission assignment analysis. Therefore, I must defer to the Air Force
as to the advantages or disadvantages of Guard employment.
nuclear command, control, and communication (nc3) modernization
15. Senator Hirono. General Hyten, your written testimony describes
a safe, secure, ready and reliable nuclear Triad as the bedrock of our
deterrence. The Nuclear Command, Control and Communication
infrastructure ties the National Command Authority to the operating
nuclear forces, yet much of the NC3 architecture is decades old and
dependent on Cold-War era platforms. Modernization of NC3 systems is
critical to the reliability and safety of our nuclear deterrent yet
technology is vastly since the last generation of NC3 systems was
designed. How are you accounting for security and surety within the
modernized NC3 system?
General Hyten. [Deleted.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2019 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 22, 2018
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
CHALLENGES IN THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE PROGRAMS
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m. in
Room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator James M.
Inhofe, presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker,
Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Cruz, Graham,
Sasse, Scott, Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, Shaheen, Gillibrand,
Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, Heinrich, Warren,
and Peters.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Senator Inhofe. Our hearing will come to order.
They are the force sitting right behind you, Rick. So you
wave at them.
The committee meets today to hear testimony from the
Department of Energy's atomic energy programs.
We welcome our witness, Energy Secretary Rick Perry, a good
friend of all of ours.
The DOE [Department of Energy] houses a number of defense
programs, such as the National Nuclear Security Administration
and the Office of Environmental Management that are under the
jurisdiction of the Armed Services Committee.
Even so, a hearing like this is rare. Our committee has not
called a Secretary of Energy to testify for over 10 years. You
ought to feel good about that.
Secretary Perry. I am trying, sir.
[Laughter.]
Senator Inhofe. The DOE's defense programs, including the
cleanup of nuclear waste, have gone without sufficient
oversight.
Chairman McCain has asked that we read into the record a
statement that he would like to make concerning this hearing
today, so I am quoting. The Department of Energy's defense
atomic energy programs are critically important to our national
security. Unfortunately, in recent years, the DOE has run up a
long list of cost overruns, schedule delays, and violations of
safety and security. Put simply, too often they have failed to
meet mission requirements with billions of dollars in the DOE
funding authorized by the NDAA [National Defense Authorization
Act] each year. The Senate Armed Services Committee has the
opportunity to conduct the kind of oversight that will help the
Department correct course.
The fiscal year 2019 budget request for the NNSA [National
Nuclear Security Administration] and the Environmental
Management totals over $20 billion. That comprises about 70
percent of the Department of Energy's proposed budget for
fiscal year 2019. It is up to us to ensure vigorous oversight
of these taxpayer dollars.
Secretary Perry, it is a pleasure having you here.
Senator Reed?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, Mr. Secretary. Thank you very much.
The last Secretary of Energy to testify before the
committee was Secretary Chu in 2010. The Augustine-Mies
Commission which evaluated the effectiveness of the NNSA
recommended in 2015 that the Secretary of Energy appear before
the Senate Armed Services Committee on an annual basis. This
appearance I hope fulfills that recommendation and becomes a
recurring part of the committee's posture hearings given that
the atomic energy defense funding in the Department of Energy
totals approximately $19 billion, which is more than two-thirds
of the Energy Department's fiscal year 2019 budget.
Secretary Perry, there are a number of issues I am hoping
you will address today.
First and foremost is the ability of the Department and the
NNSA to build 80 pits a year by 2030, as mandated by the 2014
National Defense Authorization Act. This requirement was
ratified by the Department of Defense based on a series of
modules to be built at Los Alamos after spending about $600
million to design a prior building there, whose costs became
out of control and was canceled. The modular approach was also
approved by the DOD [Department of Defense] and the NNSA and
was authorized in the 2013 National Defense Authorization Act.
I understand that you may again be reconsidering or considering
a large building design rather than the modules. Since a single
building approach failed in 2013, I am interested in your
thinking on this issue.
Second, the Department is modernizing six weapon systems,
and at the same time is modernizing an infrastructure that in
some cases dates back to the Manhattan Project, which includes
the NNSA uranium and the plutonium infrastructures. For fiscal
year 2019, $3 billion, or about 20 percent of NNSA's overall
budget, is dedicated to this effort. Maintaining momentum on
modernization will be a daunting challenge, and I am interested
in your views on sustaining this effort.
Third, I would like to know about the Department's plan to
clean up the Hanford nuclear site. In 2014, after spending
close to $8.3 billion at the Hanford site to treat
approximately 55 million gallons of radioactive waste in 177
underground tanks, the Department paused its efforts to treat
and turn into glass the waste in those tanks. In addition, the
Department now only intends to turn the low-activity waste into
glass while leaving the high-level waste treatment, which is
about 10 percent of the site, to a later date. I would like to
know the status of the low-activity waste effort, when will you
return to treating the high-level waste, and what is the
estimated total cost.
Finally, I would like to know how the Department is
addressing the flow of loose nuclear material particularly from
Russia. In just one example, a British newspaper has reported
on four thwarted attempts in Moldova to stop the sale of
nuclear material on the black market. In some cases, the sale
is linked to Russia and buyers were linked to extremists in the
Levant region. Proliferation of nuclear materials is one of the
greatest threats facing our Nation, and I hope is the top focus
of the Department of Energy.
Again, I look forward to your testimony today and hope this
becomes an annual event for this committee. Thank you, Mr.
Secretary.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Secretary Perry, thank you again for being here, and we
would like to have you give us your opening statement. Your
entire statement will be made a part of the record. You are
recognized.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE J. RICHARD PERRY, SECRETARY OF
ENERGY
Secretary Perry. Chairman Inhofe, thank you, to each of the
members. Some of you I have worked with through the years. It
is always good to see a governor or two in the crowd. Mike and
Governor Shaheen, thank you for your kindness. It is my honor,
Ranking Member Reed, others to be in your presence, and at your
request, I will be here as often as you need me, sir. So I hope
I can answer your questions, discuss this very important issue
with you today, and in a succinct way, as we talk about the
President's 2019 Budget request for the Department of Energy.
But before I get started, I just want to share with you I
had a wonderful conversation yesterday, a phone call, with
Chairman McCain. He was lively, focused. Anyway, he sent his
regards and said that you would ably chair the committee,
Senator Inhofe. Anyway, it was good to talk to him. Certainly I
know I think all of you keep him in your prayers and wish the
best to him and his family.
Mr. Chairman, this budget request capitalizes on the
Department of Energy's scientific capabilities to advance our
nuclear security, support our nuclear Navy, and reduce the
threat of nuclear terrorism. It also confirms our commitment to
clean up the environmental legacy of America's past efforts to
maintain nuclear security. I appreciate this committee's
steadfast support for these missions as they pertain to our
efforts, past and present, to keep America safe and strong.
I firmly believe that we have a moral obligation to protect
the American people from adversaries who are wishing to do us
harm. For the past 70 years, our government has advanced this
goal by maintaining our nuclear deterrent.
The Department of Energy's role in our national security is
one I undertake with utmost seriousness. In the last year, I
visited our national security facilities at Los Alamos, Pantex,
Y-12, Kansas City. Next week, I am going to have the pleasure
to go out west to Sandia and Lawrence Livermore. For these
visits, I have identified key challenges facing our Department
and its national security mission.
First, through DOE's National Nuclear Security
Administration, NNSA, we need to ensure that our nuclear
strategy responds to the threats of today while anticipating
those of tomorrow.
Second, through our Office of Environmental Management, we
need to increase the pace of cleaning up the legacy resulting
from decades of nuclear weapons production. We aim to address
both challenges through our partnership with our national
laboratories. Those crown jewels are, I think, irreplaceable.
They are clearly great incubators of innovation.
The 2019 $30.6 billion budget request for the Department
meets both of those needs that I have just pointed out.
When it comes to our nuclear posture, we have long embraced
a two-pronged strategy of deterrence and nonproliferation. We
have sought to deter aggressors by maintaining a powerful
nuclear arsenal and infrastructure, and we have sought through
nonproliferation to prevent those foes from gaining such
weapons for themselves or providing them to others.
But since the end of the Cold War, we have not kept pace
with rising threats to our nation and its allies. These include
threats from borderless enemies and the potential sale of
nuclear materials to bad actors. They also include new
challenges from Russia and China who are upgrading their
nuclear capabilities and, of course, the challenge posed by
North Korea.
Mr. Chairman, let me pause for a moment and just say thank
you to you specifically, the committee as a whole. This
committee understands that we have to keep pace with
modernization. You understand that we have deferred maintenance
for too long, that it is going to take a multiyear approach to
get us back to a position of strength. Thankfully with your
help, our administration is starting to turn the corner on this
arena. Coupled with the National Security Strategy, the
President's recently released Nuclear Posture Review, it
reaffirms our nuclear triad as the bedrock of the Nation's
deterrent. This strategy necessitates that our capabilities be
more robust, more resilient, and more flexible than ever
before.
The President's Budget provides the resources to do exactly
that. This budget will help us modernize our nuclear forces by
extending the life of existing warheads, replacing them with
systems that use today's technologies. It will ensure the safe
and reliable operation of our nuclear-powered submarines and
aircraft carriers and meet the Navy's requirement for
modernized nuclear propulsion. It will help us replace our
aging nuclear security infrastructure, much of which dates back
to the Eisenhower administration, and it will keep nuclear
weapons out of the wrong hands by aiding in nonproliferation
efforts.
While the President's Fiscal Year 2019 Budget request
provides much needed resources for our nuclear security
enterprise, we must be mindful that those resources are not
unlimited, and we have a responsibility to the American
taxpayers.
I recently visited the Savannah River site, and it is a
national asset, populated with some amazingly capable,
patriotic men and women. Savannah River is a critical partner
in our national security and our environmental management
missions, and it has a very bright future ahead of it.
We have a solemn moral duty to address the environmental
legacy left at the sites, which produced the materials that
helped us end a world war and to secure the peace. We also have
a moral duty to the taxpayers to use scarce resources wisely,
effectively.
I will report to you that our Environmental Management has
made undeniable progress in advancing its mission. It has
completed cleanup activities in 91 sites in 30 States. However,
there is still a lot of work to be done, and Mr. Chairman, we
are committed to doing it. We will commission and start up the
salt waste processing facility at Savannah River. In addition
to our work at Savannah River, we will continue our progress at
Hanford. We will ramp up activities to increase shipments of
transuranic waste to Senator Heinrich's district out at WIPP
[Waste Isolation Processing Plant]--for his State. Excuse me.
We will complete design and initiate construction of the Oak
Ridge mercury treatment facility, and we will continue to press
forward with tackling these aging and excess facilities in some
cases at various sites.
I want to thank you again for your hospitality and for your
continued support of our mission and for having me here this
morning. I will attempt to answer your questions, as you have
them, sir.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Perry follows:]
Prepared Statement by Secretary Rick Perry
Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and Members of the Committee,
it is an honor to appear before you on behalf of the Administration and
the Department of Energy (``the Department'' or ``DOE''). I appreciate
the Committee's strong support for DOE's enduring national security and
environmental management missions and the opportunity to testify in
support of the President's Budget request for fiscal year (FY) 2019.
Since my confirmation a little over a year ago, two of my highest
priorities have been to refocus the Department on restoring the nuclear
security enterprise and enhancing national security through the
military application of nuclear science, while also addressing the
issue of legacy management and nuclear waste.
While DOE is making solid progress, there still is much to be
accomplished. We live in an evolving international security environment
that is more complex and demanding than any since the end of the Cold
War, which necessitates a strong national commitment to maintain modern
and effective nuclear forces and infrastructure. To remain effective,
it is critical that we modernize and recapitalize our nuclear forces.
The U.S. nuclear deterrent has been the cornerstone of the United
States' strategy to keep the American people safe and secure for more
than 70 years, as well as a significant contributor to global
stability. U.S. nuclear capabilities make critical contributions to one
of our nation's highest priorities, the deterrence of nuclear and non-
nuclear aggression.
The Department's enduring national security and environmental
management missions are accomplished through the hard work and
dedication of the highly-skilled men and women of the National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA) and Office of Environmental Management
(EM). NNSA is responsible for: maintaining the safety, security,
reliability, and effectiveness of the nuclear weapons stockpile;
reducing the threat of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism
around the world; and providing nuclear propulsion for the U.S. Navy's
fleet of aircraft carriers and submarines. The mission of EM is the
safe cleanup of the environmental legacy of five decades of nuclear
weapons development and government-sponsored nuclear energy research.
NNSA achieves its critical mission, in part, through a robust,
healthy partnership with DOE's National Laboratories. There is close
collaboration between the national laboratories and NNSA on several
fronts including supercomputers, cybersecurity, and basic science,
which help advance nuclear deterrence, naval reactors, and
nonproliferation missions.
In addition, the Department works jointly with the Department of
Defense (DOD) through the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC), which serves
as the focal point for interagency activities to maintain the U.S.
nuclear weapons stockpile. DOE's partnership with DOD ensures that our
deterrent is modern, robust, flexible, resilient, ready, and
appropriately tailored to deter 21st Century threats and reassure our
allies and partners. In this partnership, DOE provides the weapons and
DOD provides the delivery systems. DOE/NNSA oversees the research,
development, test, assessment, and production programs that respond to
DOD's military requirements.
accomplishments in the past year:
Thanks to strong support from the Administration and Congress, over
the past year, DOE has seen a move toward increased investment in its
nuclear security mission. From flight qualification tests of the B61-12
in the Nevada desert, to the removal of highly enriched uranium (HEU)
in Ghana and Kazakhstan, to the commissioning of a new class of
nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, DOE has lent its world-class
expertise to the military application of nuclear science to help keep
the United States safe and secure. Here are a few examples:
Last year, NNSA continued to maintain the safety,
security, and effectiveness of nuclear weapons through the Stockpile
Stewardship Program (SSP), enabling the Secretary of Defense and me to
certify to the President once again the reliability of the nuclear
weapons stockpile.
In November 2017, NNSA published the Fiscal Year 2018
Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP), a detailed report on
the programs, scientific tools, capabilities, and infrastructure
necessary to ensure the success of NNSA's nuclear weapons mission well
into the future.
Throughout the year, NNSA actively participated in the
recently released Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The NPR was directed by
the President and led by the Department of Defense to ensure that
America's nuclear deterrent is modern, robust, flexible, resilient,
ready, and appropriately tailored to deter 21st Century threats and
reassure our allies and partners.
The Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) project continues
to make timely progress with the recent completion of the Site
Infrastructure and Services subproject, two months ahead of schedule
and $18 million under budget. Of the five remaining subprojects, two
are underway and the final three will begin later this year. The
Department is committed to delivering UPF by 2025 for no more than $6.5
billion, assuming stable funding through the duration of the project.
Working with the State of Missouri, NNSA transferred
excess federal property at the Bannister Federal Complex in Kansas City
to private developers. The transfer will save taxpayers hundreds of
millions of dollars and will lead to further community development.
NNSA partnered with the Institute of Nuclear Physics
(INP) in Kazakhstan to remove its remaining HEU. NNSA has helped remove
or down-blend 200 kilograms of Russian-origin HEU from the INP, enough
for eight nuclear weapons.
EM realized a significant accomplishment with resumption
of waste shipments and emplacement at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
(WIPP) in New Mexico. WIPP received approximately 130 shipments from
April 2017 through December 2017.
building a strategic capability
DOE is building on the previous year's achievements with new
activities tailored to 21st Century threats. With the recent release of
the 2018 NPR and the President's National Security Strategy, we are
laying the foundation for strategic capabilities that will enable us to
fulfill our national security and environmental management missions.
The 2018 NPR reaffirmed the findings of previous reviews that the
nuclear triad--comprised of silo-based intercontinental ballistic
missiles, bomber aircraft, and nuclear submarines--is the most
strategically sound means of ensuring nuclear deterrence. To remain
effective, however, we must recapitalize our Cold War legacy nuclear
deterrence forces, continuing a modernization program initiated during
the previous Administration.
The NPR considers the path ahead for the U.S. nuclear strategy and
posture over the longer term, and states that we will pursue
initiatives to ensure the necessary capability, capacity, and
responsiveness of the nuclear weapons infrastructure and the needed
skills of the nuclear enterprise workforce. We will continue to work
with DOD to determine the resources, time, and funding required to
address policies laid out in the NPR, including the potential low yield
ballistic missile warhead, sea launched cruise missile, and B83-1
gravity bomb. NNSA will work with Congress to ensure that the program
of work is properly authorized and funded.
modernizing our nuclear forces:
The Department is modernizing our nuclear enterprise to ensure that
we have the scientific, engineering, and manufacturing capabilities
necessary to maintain an effective and safe nuclear triad and respond
to future national security threats.
Unique, state-of-the-art capabilities for research, development,
testing, evaluation, and production enable this critical effort. In
coordination with DOD, we have fully integrated the scope, budgets, and
schedules of the life extension programs (LEPs), infrastructure
modernization, and nuclear delivery systems.
We are making significant progress in the full set of LEPs while
remaining aligned with the DOD through the NWC.
W76-1 LEP: The $113.9 million requested for the W76-1 LEP
directly supports the sea-based leg of the nuclear triad by extending
the service life of the original W76-0 warhead. With continued funding,
the W76-1 LEP will remain on schedule and on budget to complete
production in fiscal year 2019. The W76-1 will have an extended life of
approximately 30 years.
B61-12 LEP: NNSA continues to make progress on the B61-12
LEP that will consolidate four variants of the B61 gravity bomb. This
LEP which is in the Production and Engineering Phase, will meet
military requirements for reliability, service-life, field maintenance,
safety, and use control while also addressing multiple components
nearing end of life in this oldest nuclear weapon in the stockpile.
NNSA will remain on schedule to deliver the First Production Unit (FPU)
of the B61-12 in fiscal year 2020.
W88 Alteration 370 Program: Currently in the Production
Engineering Phase, the W88 Alt 370 is on schedule, with FPU planned in
December 2019. The budget request for this program, which also supports
the sea-based leg of the nuclear triad, is $304.2 million in fiscal
year 2019.
W80-4 LEP: The current air-launched cruise missile
delivers a W80 warhead first deployed in 1982. Both the missile and the
warhead are well past their planned end of life. To maintain this vital
deterrent capability, NNSA, in close coordination with DOD, has
requested $654.8 million in fiscal year 2019, an increase of $255.7
million, or 64.1 percent over the fiscal year 2018 request to extend
the W80 warhead, through the W80-4 LEP, for use in the Air Force's Long
Range Stand-Off (LRSO) cruise missile.
W78 Replacement Program: The W78 replacement program will
replace one of the oldest warheads in the stockpile, and provide
improved warhead security, safety, and use control. To replace the W78
warhead, NNSA has requested $53.0 million to support the scheduled
restart of the feasibility study and design options work suspended in
2014.
Recapitalizing Our Cold War Era Infrastructure:
DOE/NNSA's diverse national security missions depend on its
extensive, complex, and in many cases antiquated infrastructure. More
than half of NNSA's facilities are over 40 years old, roughly 30
percent date back to the Manhattan Project era, and nearly two-thirds
are rated as less than adequate to meet mission needs. NNSA is long
overdue to build a modern, safe, streamlined complex that will meet
mission requirements, keep the deterrent safe, secure, and effective,
and enhance employee and public safety. We cannot accept this risk in
an uncertain and evolving global security atmosphere.
As reaffirmed in the NPR, an effective, responsive, and resilient
nuclear weapons infrastructure is essential to the U.S. capacity to
adapt flexibly to shifting requirements. Such an infrastructure will
offer tangible evidence to both allies and potential adversaries of
U.S. nuclear weapons capabilities and can help deter, assure, hedge
against adverse developments, and discourage adversary interest in arms
competition. These investments will include:
An enduring capability and capacity to produce plutonium
pits at a rate of no fewer than 80 pits per year by 2030. A delay would
result in the need for a higher rate of pit production at higher cost.
Reconstituting the U.S. capability to produce lithium
compounds that are sufficient to meet military requirements.
Fully funding the UPF and ensuring availability of
sufficient low-enriched uranium and the necessary reactor capacity to
produce an adequate supply of tritium.
The full capability to develop and manufacture secure,
trusted strategic radiation-hardened microelectronic systems beyond
2025 to support nuclear weapon modernization.
Pursuing the Stockpile Responsiveness Program established
by Congress will expand opportunities for young scientists and
engineers to advance warhead design, development, and production
skills.
In 2015, NNSA developed new methods to prioritize investments to
improve infrastructure. With support from Congress, it successfully
halted the growth of deferred maintenance in fiscal year 2016 and 2017
for the first time in nearly a decade. NNSA is implementing innovative
management tools that are data-driven and risk-informed, and are
creating a science-based infrastructure stewardship approach to change
the way NNSA manages infrastructure.
EM's fiscal year 2019 budget request includes $150 million to
continue decontamination and decommissioning of selected high-risk
facilities not currently in the EM portfolio at the Y-12 National
Security Complex and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
Decontamination and decommissioning of these facilities support the
national security missions at these sites. DOE's disposition effort
will stabilize degraded relatively high risk facilities, characterize
their hazards and conditions, remove hazardous materials, place them in
the lowest risk condition possible, and eliminate the risk posed by
these facilities demolishing them and disposing of the resulting waste.
With a vision to modernize, streamline, and sustain the infrastructure,
Department's goal is to maximize the benefits of the resources
provided. However, additional improvements are needed to ensure our
infrastructure provides the responsiveness and reliability necessary to
support evolving mission requirements.
preventing global nuclear threats:
Effective nuclear non-proliferation and arms control measures can
support U.S., allied, and partner security by controlling the spread of
nuclear materials and technology; placing limits on the production,
stockpiling, and deployment of nuclear weapons; reducing misperception
and miscalculation; and avoiding destabilizing nuclear arms
competition.
NNSA's Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) works with
international partners to remove or eliminate vulnerable nuclear
material; improve global nuclear security through multilateral and
bilateral technical exchanges and training workshops; help prevent the
illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological materials; secure
domestic and international civilian buildings containing high-priority
radiological material; provide technical reviews of U.S. export license
applications; conduct export control training sessions for U.S.
enforcement agencies and international partners; strengthen the
International Atomic Energy Agency's ability to detect and deter
nuclear proliferation; advance U.S. capabilities to monitor arms
control treaties and detect foreign nuclear programs; and maintain
organizational readiness to respond to and mitigate radiological or
nuclear incidents worldwide.
With the release of the NPR, DNN will continue its efforts to 1)
minimize the number of nuclear weapons states; 2) deny terrorist
organizations access to nuclear weapons and materials; 3) strictly
control weapons-useable material, related technology, and expertise;
and 4) support the State Department to make sure arms control
agreements enhance security, and are verifiable and enforceable.
countering global nuclear threats:
NNSA's counterterrorism and counterproliferation program is part of
broader U.S. Government efforts to assess the threat of nuclear
terrorism and develop technical countermeasures. The scientific
knowledge generated by this program underpins the technical expertise
for disabling potential nuclear threat devices, including improvised
nuclear devices; supports and informs U.S. nuclear security policy; and
guides nuclear counterterrorism and counterproliferation efforts,
including interagency nuclear forensics and contingency planning.
Nuclear counterterrorism and counterproliferation provides a
flexible, efficient, and effective response capability for any nuclear/
radiological incident in the United States or abroad by applying the
unique technical expertise across NNSA's nuclear security enterprise.
Appropriately trained personnel and specialized technical equipment are
ready to deploy in order to provide an integrated response for
radiological search, render safe, and consequence management for
nuclear/radiological emergencies, national exercises, and security
operations for large National Security Special Events.
The Office of Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation (CTCP)
maintains an operational nuclear forensics capability for pre-
detonation device disassembly and examination, provides operational
support for post-detonation assessment, and coordinates the analysis of
special nuclear materials. Readiness is maintained to deploy device
disposition and device assessment teams, conduct laboratory operations
in support of analysis of bulk actinide forensics, and deploy subject
matter expertise and operational capabilities in support of ground
sample collections that contribute to conclusions in support of
attribution.
With the release of the NPR, the United States will continue to
hold fully accountable any state, terrorist group, or other non-state
actor that supports or enables terrorist efforts to obtain or employ
nuclear devices. CTCP will strive, under a multilayered approach, to
counter terrorist efforts to acquire, transfer, or employ nuclear
weapons, material, technology, and expertise.
moving forward with new scientific advancements:
Science underpins everything we do, including our core
responsibility to certify the safety, security, and effectiveness of
the nuclear stockpile in the absence of nuclear explosive testing.
DOE's world-class research, development, testing, and engineering are
the key to this success. Through the science-based Stockpile
Stewardship Management Program, we are fielding a suite of innovative
experimental platforms, diagnostic equipment, supercomputers, and
modern codes that build on past nuclear explosive test data to simulate
the dynamics of nuclear weapons.
With the Department as a world leader in computational capability,
and four of the ten fastest supercomputers in the world located in
NNSA's laboratories, it is clear that high performing computers (HPCs)
are a critical component of the national security, energy, and science
missions of the Department of Energy. Over the past six decades, U.S.
computing capabilities have been maintained through continuous research
and development and the deployment of new computing systems, with
rapidly increasing performance on applications of major significance to
government, industry, and academia. Maximizing the benefits of high
performance computing in the coming decades will require an effective
national response to increasing demands for computing power, emerging
HPC technological challenges and opportunities, and growing economic
dependency on and competition with other nations.
In 2016, DOE initiated research and development activities designed
to deliver an exascale (high speed) computing capability by the mid-
2020s. The Department's Office of Science and NNSA are jointly
responsible for executing a program that focuses on advanced simulation
through a capable exascale computing program, with an emphasis on
sustained performance on science and national security mission
applications and increased convergence between exascale and large-data
analytic computing.
To maintain the safety, security, and effectiveness of the Nation's
nuclear deterrent, DOE/NNSA requires a trusted supply of strategic
radiation-hardened advanced microelectronics (broadly defined),
including R&D capabilities. The supply chain for nuclear weapon
microelectronics must meet formal standards of trust to protect against
the potential for sabotage, malicious introduction of an unwanted
function, or subversion of a function without detection. The
Microsystems Science & Technology Center at Sandia National
Laboratories produces custom, strategic, radiation-hardened
microelectronics for nuclear weapons. NNSA is examining options to
extend the life of the Silicon Fabrication facility at Sandia beyond
2025 to help meet microelectronics requirements.
To ensure a diversified supply chain and provide risk reduction,
NNSA intends to fund a demonstration project to produce R&D
microsystems at the DOD-owned fabrication facility at Massachusetts
Institute of Technology's Lincoln Laboratory (MIT/LL) to validate the
production of radiation-hardened electronics at 90 nm. This investment
would provide contingency and R&D options to NNSA, and would be
conducted in collaboration with Sandia National Laboratories.
Additive Manufacturing (AM) uses the three-dimensional printing of
polymers and metals to shorten production schedules and design cycles
for a variety of applications. To date, the use of additive
manufacturing has provided multi-million-dollar cost benefits and
significant schedule risk reduction in utilizing AM for tools,
fixtures, and molds in NNSA's ongoing major modernization efforts, as
well as the testing and evaluation programs. NNSA is continuing to
develop and mature this technology to expand its applications to the
NNSA mission where appropriate. Ultimately, NNSA's goal for AM is to
exploit its capability for rapid response to emerging threats while
significantly shrinking the footprint and time required for
manufacturing. While working to achieve this long-term objective, NNSA
is actively using additive manufacturing to supplement our existing
manufacturing capabilities in order to increase our research,
development and manufacturing flexibility for the benefit of our
nation's nuclear deterrent.
Cybersecurity is a high priority of the current Administration and
the Department. The NNSA Stockpile Stewardship Management Plan calls
for a strong cybersecurity program that implements a flexible,
comprehensive information technology and cybersecurity system to ensure
the protection of NNSA's classified and sensitive information assets
related to the nuclear weapons stockpile. Adequate funding is crucial
to managing cybersecurity risks across the nuclear security enterprise.
NNSA will need to explore how technologies such as quantum computing
and additive manufacturing influence the cyber threat landscape and
manage risk accordingly. Conversely, NNSA will also need to explore how
these technologies can be leveraged to combat cyber threats.
responsible stewardship of the environment
The government's nuclear weapons and nuclear energy research
programs made significant contributions to our nation's defense. The
Office of Environmental Management (EM) is tasked with the disposition
of radioactive wastes; the management of spent nuclear fuel and special
nuclear material; the cleanup of contaminated soil and water; and the
decontamination and decommissioning of thousands of excess facilities.
Since 1989, the federal government's investment in EM has resulted in a
reduced risk that these materials and excess facilities may pose to the
American people and the environment.
EM has completed cleanup activities at 91 sites across 30 states--
with cleanup work remaining at 16 sites across 11 states. The remaining
work is complex and challenging, and accomplishing the Department's
cleanup goals will mean applying innovative strategies to one-of-a-kind
challenges while ensuring the work is safely completed.
In 2017, EM made significant progress including the following:
At WIPP, waste emplacement resumed and, to date, the
repository has received more than 12,000 shipments of transuranic (TRU)
waste for safe disposal.
At Hanford, the Department safely and successfully
completed remediation of the 618-10 burial ground, as well as continued
to make progress on the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant.
At Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), workers safely
and successfully completed treatment of a set of nitrate salt drums to
prepare for disposal of these drums at WIPP.
Idaho workers completed a near-15-year effort to retrieve
65,000 m3 of TRU waste.
At Oak Ridge, the Department broke ground on the Mercury
Treatment Facility, which will enable EM to carry out additional
cleanup activities at the Y-12 National Security Complex.
At the Savannah River Site, the Department completed the
construction of the 33 million-gallon Saltstone Disposal Unit 6.
Over the past year, EM has continued to look for innovative ways to
perform its cleanup mission in a safe and efficient manner while
serving as a good steward of taxpayer resources.
The EM mission not only addresses cleanup of the environment, but
also helps the Department continue its important national security and
scientific and energy research missions. The new alignment of the
Offices of Science and EM reporting to the Under Secretary for Science
will add momentum to environmental cleanup. By further leveraging the
expertise of the DOE National Laboratories, and exploring various
Science and EM project management and contract approaches, the
Department hopes to manage costs better and solve environmental
management challenges, while ensuring the highest level of safety for
Federal and contractor employees, the public, and protection of the
environment.
Workforce Safety
DOE and EM are committed to ensuring the safety of our workforce,
the public and protection of the environment. Safety is the top
priority for the Office of Environmental Management. I am proud to say
that EM has a lower rate of worker accident-related statistics than the
Department of Energy as a whole and industries that perform similar
work. We are also strongly committed to a workplace where all workers--
federal and contractor--are free to speak out, voice concerns or lodge
complaints without fear of retaliation.
Project Management
The processes the Department has established for capital asset
projects continue to mature and have brought significant improvements
to the rigor and consistency in how EM oversees management of capital
projects.
In 2017, the Project Management Institute (PMI) also recognized
EM's track record of success. At Hanford, PMI recognized the AY-102
tank recovery effort as its international project of the year after the
site completed work ahead of schedule and $8.7 million under budget.
PMI also recognized the Savannah River Site's successful eighth
underground liquid tank waste closure.
Regulatory-Cleanup Commitments
Generally, EM has worked successfully with state and Federal
regulators in negotiating, updating and improving compliance
agreements. The Department is actively working to meet its commitments.
To the extent that milestones are delayed, DOE will follow the
provisions in its cleanup agreements for making notifications and
working with federal and state regulators regarding schedule
adjustments if necessary.
requirement and retention of highly qualified people
The Departments greatest asset will always be its workforce. DOE's
challenging national security missions require it to recruit, train,
and retain highly skilled and dedicated federal employees and
Management and Operating (M&O) workforce. DOE and Congress must
continue to provide these highly-talented men and women with the tools
necessary to support their work as they carry out complex and
challenging responsibilities.
The government-wide security clearance backlog is particularly
acute at NNSA, where over 3,500 current employees are awaiting
completion of their initial investigations and are unable to perform
the duties for which they were hired. This number includes over 30
individuals designated as mission critical. NNSA has undertaken several
measures to mitigate the impact of these delays and is working with the
National Background Investigation Bureau to expedite mission-critical
background investigations. However, more needs to be done. This backlog
is making it difficult to recruit the technical talent we need in our
highly classified programs essential to DOE/NNSA missions.
A skilled federal workforce is required for appropriate program and
project oversight as NNSA enters the next phase of nuclear
modernization efforts, including LEPs and major infrastructure project
management. However, as of February 2018, NNSA on-board staffing levels
were 10 percent lower than fiscal year 2010 Full Time Equivalent (FTE)
levels, while funding increased 50 percent in the same period for
Weapons Activities and Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, primarily for
the nuclear modernization program. To help manage growing program
requirements, NNSA's fiscal year 2019 request includes funding for
additional federal FTEs.
Succession planning is an important part of NNSA workforce
planning, since 44 percent of the current NNSA workforce will be
eligible to retire by fiscal year 2023. Thus, NNSA uses career
developmental initiatives such as the NNSA Graduate Fellowship Program,
and the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) Pathways and
Presidential Management Fellows programs to recruit, hire, and retain
the federal workforce needed for the NNSA national security mission.
Working with OPM experts, NNSA is developing a Human Capital Management
Plan that will institutionalize a consistent staffing analysis and
career development methodology to support NNSA's mission and address
projected retirements.
fiscal year 2019 budget request
The President's Budget for Fiscal Year 2019 requests $30.6 billion
for the Department of Energy to advance U.S. national security and
economic growth through transformative science and technology
innovation that promotes affordable and reliable energy through market
solutions and meets our nuclear security and environmental cleanup
challenges. The fiscal year 2019 budget request provides: $15.1 billion
to modernize and restore the nuclear security enterprise, a $2.2
billion increase over fiscal year 2017 enacted levels, which makes
necessary investments consistent with the NPR and National Security
Strategy; and, $6.6 billion to continue our commitment to cleaning up
the Cold War nuclear legacy.
This budget request demonstrates the Administration's strong
support for NNSA and EM. Decades of underfunding has left the nuclear
security enterprise's infrastructure in a brittle state that requires
significant and sustained investments over the next decade to correct.
There is no margin for further delay in modernizing NNSA's scientific,
technical, and engineering capabilities, and recapitalizing our
infrastructure needed to produce strategic materials and components for
U.S. nuclear weapons.
The fiscal year 2019 budget request for NNSA's Infrastructure and
Operations is $3.0 billion, an increase of $199.6 million, or 7.1
percent above the fiscal year 2018 request. The request provides
funding to sustain, operate, and modernize the NNSA enterprise. The
fiscal year 2018 National Defense Authorization Act provided NNSA and
its M&O partners with added flexibility to address the challenges of
modernizing the enterprise by increasing the minor construction
threshold to $20 million. This reform supports efforts to address
deferred maintenance through recapitalization projects that improve the
condition and extend the design life of structures, capabilities, and
systems to meet NNSA's nuclear weapons and nonproliferation program
needs.
The fiscal year 2019 budget request for EM provides the resources
to make progress on cleanup activities across the complex. At the
Savannah River Site, the request will enable DOE to increase
significantly the production of canisters of vitrified high-level waste
at the Defense Waste Processing Facility, as well as support planned
operation rates for the Salt Waste Processing Facility, and continued
construction progress for necessary Saltstone Disposal Units. As a
result, Savannah River will be able to build substantially on its
record of successfully emptying and closing underground waste tanks.
The WIPP investment the request supports will have wide-ranging
benefits across the EM program, with the planned infrastructure
improvements at WIPP intended to enable increased TRU waste shipments
from other EM sites.
We will continue to make steady progress on those portions of the
Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant necessary to initiate
tank waste treatment through the Direct Feed Low Activity Waste (DFLAW)
approach; and complete design and launch site preparations for the Oak
Ridge Mercury Treatment Facility, which will help address mercury
contamination and aid in the eventual decontamination and
decommissioning of deteriorating facilities at the Y-12 National
Security Complex. We also will complete buried waste exhumation at the
Idaho National Laboratory and continue with preparations to transfer
cesium and strontium capsules at Hanford from wet storage to a dry
storage configuration. We will also implement an interim measure to
address chromium groundwater contamination at LANL.
project management execution--safe quality construction on budget:
NNSA is driving continued improvement in contract and project
management practices. This includes policies and procedures that employ
rigorous analyses of alternatives (AOAs); provide clear lines of
authority and accountability for federal and contractor program and
project management; and improve cost and schedule performance.
Since 2011, NNSA has delivered its $1.4 billion project portfolio 8
percent under original budget.
NNSA fosters competition beyond the M&O contractors through ``best
value acquisition solutions.'' NNSA's diversified approach allows
qualified contractors, other than the traditional M&Os, to compete in
fixed price, non-nuclear contracts. Contractors have included the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and others to
meet mission requirements when a better value to government was
demonstrated. The competition creates motivation among the parties to
strive for exceptional performance, operate within budget, and execute
on time.
Additional oversight of M&O contractors involves aligning contract
structures and incentives with taxpayer interests to encourage further
contractor performance. For example, the contract for the TRU Waste
Facility at LANL was structured so the contractor could earn more fees
if it delivered under budget. Conversely, the contractor could lose all
fees and pay for the overrun if the project delivered over budget. This
contract model proved successful, and the TRU Waste Facility was the
first nuclear facility NNSA delivered under budget. We are using this
model at other locations.
A final point on effectively managing and overseeing M&O contractor
operations is that NNSA developed a systematic process to conduct
independent third-party project peer reviews to ensure that all
projects are tracking on budget and schedule. As part of this process,
NNSA issued a 90 percent design policy requiring nuclear projects to
achieve final design completion prior to starting construction. NNSA
also has issued a Project Management Business Operating Procedure
clarifying roles, responsibility, authorities, and accountability for
the Programs, Field, and Functional offices across NNSA to ensure
stakeholders are aligned to deliver safe quality construction on budget
and schedule. Several of these policies and processes were later
exported to the Department and codified in DOE Order 413, Program and
Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets.
conclusion
DOE's diverse missions are critical to the national security of
these United States: maintaining the safety, security, reliability, and
effectiveness of the nuclear weapons stockpile; reducing the threat of
nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism around the world; and
providing naval nuclear propulsion to the U.S. Navy's fleet of aircraft
carriers and submarines. By investing in our nuclear security
enterprise and continuing our efforts to modernize our scientific,
technical, and engineering capabilities and infrastructure, the
Department will continue to meet its national security missions while
supporting other national and international stakeholders that also use
our national assets. We are mindful of our obligation to improve our
business practices continually, be responsible stewards of the
environment, and use in a responsible manner the resources that
Congress and the American people have entrusted to us. The investments
in our nuclear security and environmental management missions pay
abundant dividends across the DOE mission, and for the American people.
Senator Inhofe. That is great, and I appreciate that very
much.
We are going to have 5-minute rounds, and I am going to
adhere to it myself.
I think you said it in your last few statements that we
have catching up to do, and people do not realize that. You
know, the Department of Defense recently completed its Nuclear
Posture Review, and the administration's defense strategy and
nuclear posture--they both highlight the acute threat that
China and Russia are to us as peer competitors. Now, we are not
used to that in America, but they are. We just got back from
the South China Sea and we saw what they are doing with
reclaiming land down there, and they are in the driver's seat
in many parts. People question is it China or the United States
who we should be partners with.
Secretary Mattis put it the best way. He said we looked
reality in the eye as the world sees us as it is not as we wish
it were. That fits in with the National Defense Strategy
because nuclear weapons are an unavoidable part of our return
to great power competition, whether we like that or not.
So we are talking about China and Russia in this part of
our review.
I would just first ask you just to get this out of the way.
Do you support the recommendations of the Nuclear Posture
Review? Just yes or no?
Secretary Perry. Yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. That is good and I agree.
Now, I want you to elaborate on that only if there is time
because I have two other questions I need to get out of the way
first.
Both China and Russia have a robust nuclear arsenal and a
triad. Now, we are talking about missiles and the bombers and
submarines. In 2018, the Nuclear Posture Review recommends the
development and procurement of a low-yield warhead for
submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Now, this has become
controversial, and I know there is honest difference of opinion
at this table on this. Sometimes we talk about, well, we do
have it now. We only have it with bombs. That would assume then
a B-52 could get through, which I am not ready to assume. So
the recommendation is to have this capability with the idea
that if we ever got into something with Russia and they have a
low-yield and we do not, it might put us in a position of
having to respond with something that we would not want to
start that could lead to mutual assured destruction.
I would just ask you, Secretary Perry, how does the NNSA
plan to provide this capability?
Secretary Perry. Senator, I will try to be very brief in
this answer. This program will be a modification of the W-76
warhead using the existing components that we have. I respect
the arguments on both sides of this, but I will say from my
perspective is that I think it is necessary for us to go
forward with this program to achieve our tailored deterrence
objective. I do not think this raises the threshold for use of
nuclear weapons. I think it will deter others, which is exactly
from my perspective the role that we should have. We are
working with DOD on the specific requirements, and obviously we
will work with OMB [Office of Management and Budget] and this
committee going forward for the necessary authorization to
begin the engineering and production side of that.
Senator Inhofe. I think also people need to understand when
they talk about low-yield, we are talking about up to 10
kilotons. Hiroshima was 15 kilotons. So we are talking about a
lot of power and a lot of destructive power.
Back when they were putting together the deal, when John
Kerry was, with the Iran deal, I was opposed to that all the
way through. But the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was
established to ensure that Iran's nuclear program would be
exclusively peaceful. I think a lot of people are walking
around now believing that they want to have their enrichment
program. They do not want to use that as weapons but for
energy, for peaceful reasons. Now, let us assume that they are
right on that, which I do not think they are. The most
significant flaw in this agreement is they have the sunset
provisions where they ease after a period of years, and another
flaw is that does not apply to ballistic missiles or terrorism
activities.
In the short time that we have here, Secretary Perry, how
can the United States mitigate proliferation potential in Iran
after these provisions expire, if they go beyond the expiration
date?
Secretary Perry. Senator, I support the President's desire
to put America in a stronger position relative to this
agreement. My role, the Department of Energy's role is in a
technical position. We are really not in the policy side of it.
We will respect what you, this committee, Congress, and the
President working together does relative to that.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much.
Senator Reed?
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Secretary Perry.
The issue of proliferation is one that is critical, and one
aspect of this that you have already been asked about on your
visit to the House is you have been in discussions with Saudi
Arabia about the transfer of nuclear technology for power
production. But there are indications that there may be a
waiver of the traditional standards we insist upon, which is no
nuclear enrichment, the so-called gold standard. In fact, we
have arranged with the UAE, the United Arab Emirates, in which
they have to adhere strictly to the gold standard.
I think you already know that if such a deal was proposed
where the Saudis would not be liable to and required to adhere
to this standard, I would oppose it and I think many others
would too. I just wanted to make that clear on the record,
Secretary Perry.
Secretary Perry. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed, I think it is really important to look at
each of these agreements not in a vacuum but certainly with the
specificity of what we are looking at here. I like to remind
people that our choice is at this particular point in time, it
appears to me either Russia or China is going to be a partner
in building civil nuclear capability in the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia or the United States. I am very confident that the prior
two have no requirements of nonproliferation. So I think it is
really incumbent upon us to sit down to work as closely with
the Kingdom to not only bring them into our fold from the
standpoint of being able to build that for them, our
technology, our jobs being created, et cetera, but also from
having those additional protocols and the International Atomic
Energy Agency with their ability to go in and make sure that
they are in fact not involved in any activities that would be
untoward.
I think it is important for us to negotiate in a powerful
way, but recognizing that the alternative of who they are going
to be doing business with is of great concern to me.
Senator Reed. No. I appreciate that point. I think the
proliferation dangers are so great that we should be able to
wield all of the influence we have, which goes way beyond just
this one transaction, to insist upon the same standards we
applied to the Emirates, and there should be no difference.
Let me turn quickly to the issue of pit production. General
Hyten was here testifying, and he was very, very clear that we
need 80 pits by 2030. In 2013, after spending $600 million on a
design at Los Alamos, both Congress, NNSA, DOD, and this
committee agreed in 2014 that we have to go ahead and proceed
with the modular facilities there. Frankly, we are in a rush to
get those 80 pits done by 2030.
But now there is talk of sort of stopping and recalculating
and looking at another approach. I just do not think we have
the time to do that. So your comments.
Secretary Perry. Yes, sir. Senator Heinrich and I have
discussed this at length many times. I have been to Los Alamos
and visited P-4 and the other facilities out there. It is
populated with some extraordinary men and women. They have done
fabulous work, pits 0 through 30. Los Alamos is going to be the
center for plutonium excellence for as long into the future as
there is a future. We are committed to that.
Zero through 30 will be done there. I think it does make
some sense to have--we have been given the directive with this
analysis of alternatives to take a look at with GAO [Government
Accountability Office] best practices. You know, there were two
options that were identified, Savannah River and Los Alamos.
That engineering study has not been done yet, but when it does,
we will report to you on a very timely basis. I think we know
to get the job done, I think 2026 is when the calendar is for
the 30 pits per year to be done. Then that 31 through 80--it is
important for us to be able to send a clear message that we can
get it done, we can get it done on a timely basis and get it
done in a way that the taxpayers' respect is thoughtful about
their concerns.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I might
follow up with some questions about Hanford and otherwise. But
thank you very much.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Fischer?
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, Secretary Perry.
The Nuclear Posture Review states the longstanding goal of
building a responsive nuclear infrastructure but notes that
despite being highlighted in all previous NPRs [Nuclear Posture
Reviews], the United States has failed to make sufficient
progress to achieve this objective.
Are you committed to making the necessary investments to
ensure that we meet the Department of Defense's requirements
and the objectives described in the Nuclear Posture Review?
Secretary Perry. With Congress' blessing and funding,
absolutely.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
Can you speak to how you will implement the NPR's
recommendations and what steps you can take to ensure the goals
of this Nuclear Posture Review result in real action when it
comes to modernizing the nuclear complex?
Secretary Perry. Well, I want to remind the committee that
I just had the privilege of naming a new director or
administrator, I should say, of the NNSA, Lisa Gordon-Hagerty,
a brilliant, capable, and I might add, the first female that
ever headed up that administration, that agency. She is very
capable.
When you look at the work that has to be done--and I think
we all recognize this is going to be multi-years. This
Congress', this administration's, focus on the increase in
funding I think was very important, whether it is the
modernization of those warheads or whether it is the
facilities. Again, I have not been to all of the facilities we
have. I am en route to get to all of them.
But when I go to Oak Ridge and I am in facilities that were
built in some cases before I was born--and that was a spell
ago--then it becomes abundantly clear to me that both on the
modernization side having the workforce, having the resources
to dismantle in my home State of Texas with Pantex, being able
to process those whether it is over in Senator Heinrich's
district or whether it is at some of the other facilities, that
is going to require a long commitment for as long as I am the
Secretary of Energy and for years down the road. I hope that
what we are doing today with this budget sends the message that
modernization is a priority, dealing with these facilities is a
priority, and putting America in a position to be stronger and
do it in a way that our taxpayers recognize is very efficient.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
I was pleased to see in your opening statement that you
committed to achieving the required production capacity of
those 80 plutonium pits by 2030 and affirms that there is no
margin for further delay in modernizing NNSA's capabilities and
infrastructure.
Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, who I have strong confidence in,
made similar points during a recent hearing that I chaired in
the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, and I welcome that sense of
urgency that you are both bringing to this important issue.
Since the Department of Energy's budget was finalized
before the Nuclear Posture Review, do you anticipate seeking
funding increases for the National Nuclear Security
Administration, the NNSA, beyond the out-year projections
included in this budget request in order to implement the NPR's
objectives?
Secretary Perry. I do not. I think that the budget that
is--actually the omnibus that was finished last night, the 2019
budget is the appropriate amount of dollars. My commitment to
you is that those dollars will be spent as efficiently, as
effectively. As a former governor of a State and a manager of
some pretty big line items, I hope I give some comfort to not
only the governors that are represented around this table but
to all of the members here that the management of the
Department and into those
enterprises that are outside of Washington, D.C. will be
run as efficiently, as effectively as they have ever been in
their history.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for being here.
I think it is very important for this committee to have more
insight into what you are doing at the Department of Energy to
address our defense requirements.
There was a story in The New York Times on March 15th that
was based on information provided by the Department of Homeland
Security that talked about the Russian Government's series of
cyber attacks targeting United States and European nuclear
power plants, as well as water and electric systems. Separately
on that day, there was also a story about a cyber attack on a
Saudi petrochemical plant by the Iranian Government, or the
suggestion was that it was the Iranian Government.
I wonder if you could talk about what you are doing within
the Department of Energy to try and address cyber attacks and
the threat of cyber attacks on our nuclear infrastructure.
Secretary Perry. Senator, thank you. A year ago in front of
some of my committees, I made the statement that cybersecurity
was one of the priorities of the Department. That has not
changed. If anything else, it is even highlighted more by those
activities that you mentioned here.
As we looked at the administration, NNSA has some cyber
work that they do and over at the enterprise level in the
Forrestal building. We saw a lot of bifurcation, a lot of
fragmentation, if you will. What I asked the administration to
do was to come back with a plan where that we could really
consolidate, we could focus, we could have as tight a process
as possible to really focus on this issue of cybersecurity. As
you well know, DOE is the sector-specific agency in the
electrical side of things. So the grid, the reliability, the
resiliency of that grid, attacks from cyber--all of that is
statutorily in our house.
With all of that said, we laid out to you, to the Members
of Congress, this concept called CESER, the acronym. It is
Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response. We
bifurcated the Office of Electricity. Those two have assistant
secretaries now that are equal.
The reason I think this was wise from my perspective--it is
certainly worth having a conversation about--to create a clear,
important, and a chain of command on this issue of
cybersecurity.
Senator Shaheen. I am sorry to interrupt. My time is
running.
Secretary Perry. I am sorry.
Senator Shaheen. I agree with you on the chain of command
issue. I think that is very important.
What I am concerned about is whether we have a chain of
command throughout the whole-of-government. Who do you report
to or who is it throughout government who is taking charge of
this issue? Do you know?
Secretary Perry. When you say this issue, sector-specific
it is DOE and it is me through my Under Secretary of
Electricity who will be in charge of this.
I think what you are talking about, Senator, is do we have
global relationship. And we do. We work very closely with the
Department of Homeland Security. She also sits on the National
Security Council.
Senator Shaheen. In terms of national security threats from
cyber, it is the Department of Homeland Security who you
understand to be in overall----
Secretary Perry. But not in the electrical sector. There is
a clear bifurcation, if you will, statutorily. DHS [Department
of Homeland Security] has a role. They are very comfortable
with that. They are working on it. We coordinate. We talk to
them. We got a great relationship with DHS. But sector-specific
when it comes to the electrical grid, when it comes to
protecting that grid, when it comes to having a cyber effort in
place for that, that is in the Department of Energy.
Senator Shaheen. Can you brief members of this committee
about specifically what you are doing to address the potential
for cyber attacks?
Secretary Perry. In a smaller room.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Sullivan?
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, good to see you again.
I appreciate your focus in your testimony here on the
nuclear modernization issue. It is an important issue. I think
it still remains--I hope it still remains--a bipartisan issue.
You and I had the opportunity to present at a forum at the
Reagan Defense Forum a couple years ago, and that is when
President Obama was still in office and I was touting their
nuclear modernization program as important, something that we
should all get behind. It seems to me the Trump
administration's modernization program is very similar to the
Obama one. I certainly hope we can have a bipartisan support
for that. It is an important issue that should transcend
politics.
But I wanted to actually talk about another element of
energy that you have been talking about. I actually read your
interview in The Examiner this past week, a good picture there.
So congratulations on that. But it is the issue of energy as a
new instrument of American power, and whether it is renewables
or natural gas or oil, we are on track, because of States like
yours and States like mine, to become once again the world's
energy super power, a position we had occupied for decades
until a couple of decades ago.
Just given your experience, I think it is important to kind
of get on the table as a former governor of Texas--I am a
former Department of National Resources commissioner in
Alaska--we clearly have the highest standards in the world--our
country--in terms of producing and exploring energy than any
other place, say, like Russia or Iran or Kazakhstan or Saudi
Arabia, other places that produce energy. Do we not, Mr.
Secretary?
Secretary Perry. Yes, sir.
Senator Sullivan. So can you talk to us a little bit more
about how you see energy as an instrument of American national
security and economic security and jobs? A lot of my
colleagues--I consider myself part of it--are looking at ways
to push back against Russia. The New York Times recently
reported that, ``Russia is increasingly wielding oil as a
geopolitical tool, spreading its influence around the world and
challenging the interests of the United States.''
Yet, Senator McCain and I had a meeting about a year and a
half ago with a very senior Russian dissident, someone that is
trying to undermine the Putin regime, which I think a lot of us
want to do, push back on that regime. At the end of that
meeting, he said the number one thing we can do--number one
thing we can do--to help push back against Putin is produce
more American energy.
So can you talk about that? It is this incredible
opportunity we have. I think it should be bipartisan. You are
clearly an expert on it with a lot of experience. I would love
to hear your views on what we can do more and then what we
should, as the Congress, do more to take advantage of this
great American energy renaissance, American energy dominance,
as you and Secretary Zinke and the President talk about it, but
how it helps our national security, helps our allies. I would
love to hear whatever you think we should be doing on this
issue. You have been a leader on it and we appreciate it.
Secretary Perry. Yes, sir. I will try to go fast. For a
southern boy, I will talk as fast as I can.
Senator Sullivan. Well, I have about a minute and a half
left. So go for it.
Secretary Perry. We all remember 15 years ago there was a
person traveling around the country giving a pretty good speech
called peak oil. We found it all, and even if we were going to
produce anymore, it was going to be incredibly expensive.
Senator Sullivan. We were going to be importing LNG
[Liquified Natural Gas].
Secretary Perry. Yes, sir. George Mitchell, with the help
of national labs I might add--George Mitchell was an old
geologist from down in Texas, a Texas A&M graduate I might add,
who along with our national labs on hydrologic fracturing and
directional drilling changed the world literally. Today, the
geopolitical geography, if you will, has truly changed and it
has changed because America decided that it was going to
produce and we had the technology to do it and the innovation
to do it.
It is not just on the fossil fuel side. I mean, my home
State of Texas produces more wind than any other state in the
Nation. We did that in a decade period of time because we want
to have a portfolio that was clearly diversified. I think when
we talk about a bipartisan way to do this, I mean, whether it
is wind, whether it is hydro, whether it is solar, whether it
is LNG--I mean, we are sending LNG shipments to 27 countries
now. I mean, the idea that American LNG was going to be
anything--well, there was not an American LNG. We were going to
import.
So it is the most fascinating time to be----
Senator Sullivan. How does that help our national security
here on the----
Secretary Perry. Certainly from the standpoint of--that
dissident gave you good advice. Anytime that we can deliver
LNG, for instance, whether it is sending it into Poland to that
LNG facility up there, it sends the message to the rest of the
European Union, you do not have to be held hostage by Russian
gas.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
Senator Gillibrand?
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you so much, Mr. Secretary, for joining us.
One of the primary responsibilities of the Department of
Energy is to promote international nuclear safety and
nonproliferation. However, President Trump recently waved
sanctions on Iran under the JCPOA [Joint Coalition Plan of
Action] but threatened not to do the same again unless Congress
put forth legislation to rewrite the agreement to meet his list
of demands.
Is the Department preparing to address any damage to
international nuclear safety and worldwide nonproliferation
efforts that would be caused by the United States reneging on a
nonproliferation agreement that it helped to negotiate?
Secretary Perry. Senator, I am going to support the
President's position when it comes to JCPOA. I agree with him
that, if we can get a better deal, we certainly ought to have
that conversation.
My role in that and the Department of Energy's role in that
is from a technical standpoint to give him the technical
expertise as he goes forward on that. We are not in the policy
business.
Senator Gillibrand. Yes, but as you know, the technical
expertise is really important----
Secretary Perry. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Gillibrand.--because when we negotiated the JCPOA,
the Department of Energy was very heavily involved, and your
predecessor was in the room for all negotiations. So I hope
that you can focus on that technical support but recognize that
if we do walk away from this agreement, I think it will
undermine nuclear nonproliferation.
Do you have a plan to address any responses to us walking
away from the agreement?
Secretary Perry. Here is how I will address that. Our
responsibility in the nonproliferation side of the equation is
clear. We will use every means that we have, whether it is our
ability to have detectors used, well, anywhere in the world for
that matter, our scientists, the training of scientists in
other countries. Our commitment to nonproliferation I think is
as strong as it has ever been in this country. I intend to make
it even stronger. So you have that commitment, Senator.
Senator Gillibrand. I have a related question. Earlier this
week, the Commander of Strategic Command testified that the
effect of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of
transregional terrorist organizations could be catastrophic.
Yet, at the same time, the 2018 NPR states that the current
environment makes further progress towards nuclear arms
reductions in the near term extremely challenging.
What is the Department of Energy doing to mitigate the
possibility of nuclear materials ending up in the hands of
terrorists?
Secretary Perry. Senator, that may be a conversation that
we need to have in a smaller room.
Senator Gillibrand. Okay.
Secretary Perry. But know that we are committed to that.
Senator Gillibrand. Can I then ask for that briefing in
closed session? If you prefer by letter, that is fine.
Secretary Perry. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
One more issue. The safe and efficient cleanup of sites
that are contaminated with legacy nuclear material is
critically important to the communities that surround them. I
appreciate your commitment to prioritizing your Department's
responsibilities to clean up those sites.
However, I am concerned that the DOE's fiscal year 2019
budget request would decrease funding by 8.5 percent for the
West Valley Demonstration Project. West Valley is a project
authorized by Congress for decommission of a facility in
western New York that was used to process high-level waste
prior to 1980. It has been nearly 40 years since the facility
closed down and the site remains highly toxic. A decrease in
funding for this project will result in further delays while
the site continues to pose a threat to health and safety of
western New Yorkers.
I know that in our omnibus we are going to restore some of
that funding, but will you commit to prioritizing the West
Valley Demonstration Project within DOE's Office of
Environmental Management to ensure that the cleanup does not
fall behind schedule?
Secretary Perry. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Heinrich?
Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman.
Welcome, Secretary Perry.
For the record, I want to associate myself with the
comments of the ranking member with regard to maybe looking at
doing this annually. I think the Secretary of Energy's
importance to DOD cannot be overstated.
Secretary, I would like to start with DOE's capacity to
produce plutonium pits. When General Hyten testified here on
Tuesday, he reinforced DOD's requirement of up to 80 pits per
year by 2030 with the initial 30 per year by 2026 taking place
with the existing facilities at Los Alamos. As I see it,
General Hyten is really DOE's customer here.
Secretary Perry. Yes, sir.
Senator Heinrich. Are you fully committed to meeting
STRATCOM's requirement for pit production of 30 by 2026 and 50
by 2030?
Secretary Perry. Yes, sir.
Senator, if I could, I'll just add one thing. I think it
was Senator Fischer that asked about the budgeting side of it
and if we were going to have the resources in the omnibus in
the 2019, and I said yes. But the caveat here that I think is
important is that we are going to work with DOD and the OMB on
any issues that may come out about that, any equivalency. So I
just wanted to, for the record, make sure that she recognizes,
you all recognize that the budget, as written, appears to be
sufficient. If DOD has additional requirements, then we will
address those.
Senator Heinrich. We will certainly work on the budget side
of things.
I asked that in part, Secretary, because spending 3 years
on what I have viewed as a flawed analysis of alternatives
[AOA] does not exactly inspire confidence with regard to the
timeline. As you know, I had serious doubts about NNSA's
analysis of alternatives to meet the 80 pits per year. In
December, I sent you a letter expressing specific concerns with
the AOA and that the modular approach at Los Alamos had not
even been considered at that time.
The AOA has now taken a full 3 years. We were assured that
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty intends to meet the May 11th
deadline to make a decision on NNSA's recommended strategy for
pit production. General Hyten testified Tuesday that he would
be concerned if there is any further delay in that timeline. So
as these delays stack up, it means there is simply no room for
error at this point.
Can you assure me that the modular approach at Los Alamos
will be fully considered in this process?
Secretary Perry. I join General Hyten in telling you that
that timeline is correct, and I will be greatly concerned if it
is not met. Yes to your question.
Senator Heinrich. Will you and the Deputy Secretary also
commit to do a careful review of that recommendation by the May
11th deadline?
Secretary Perry. Yes, sir.
Senator Heinrich. Finally, can you assure me that the best
available cost estimates are used and that the recommended
option will meet STRATCOM's required capacity by 2030?
Secretary Perry. Yes, sir.
Senator Heinrich. I am going to shift gears a little bit
right now, Secretary, and talk a little bit about trusted
electronics. The Nuclear Posture Review confirmed the need to
maintain a robust capability for both research and also a
production capability of trusted radiation-hardened
microelectronics.
The MESA facility at Sandia National Labs was built in the
1980s. It must be upgraded to meet future national security
requirements after 2025. A plan is now being developed to
upgrade MESA to meet NNSA's requirements through 2040.
Do you agree that NNSA should maintain the unique
capability at Mesa for both the R&D [Research and Development]
side but also the production capability of strategic radiation-
hardened microelectronics?
Secretary Perry. Yes, sir. I hope before the next 7 days
are up to have visited that site.
Senator Heinrich. Yes, I look forward to that. Thank you
very much for making that a priority.
I was also really pleased to see an increase to $403
million in the request for WIPP to help restore full operations
at that facility. I know you are familiar with that facility
and I thank you for that. I had been concerned about the
growing backlog in maintenance and repair at that facility, and
so it is good to see an additional $47 million to look at those
systems and structures, including a significant fire
suppression system and an existing salt hoist there that are
going to be very important to maintaining that in a safe way.
Secretary Perry. Yes, sir.
Senator Heinrich. I want to thank you for your focus and
your commitment to funding WIPP in a way that ensures proper
maintenance but also safe operation because we cannot afford to
have a deviation from the safe operation of that facility.
Secretary Perry. Indeed.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you.
Secretary Perry. Yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Heinrich.
Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Good to be with you.
Secretary Perry. Thank you.
Senator Kaine. I am really glad we are having this hearing,
to the chair and ranking. One thing this hearing does is it
kind of points out the somewhat arbitrary distinction that we
often make between defense and non-defense spending as we are
talking about budget caps.
This is an agency, the DOE, with a $30 billion budget and
$25 billion of it is defense programs. Those programs are
authorized in the NDAA but then appropriated through not the
SAC-D [Senate Appropriations Committee-Defense] but through the
domestic committee. Having this hearing is really important
because it shows the way we talk about budget caps and things
can be a little bit arbitrary. These expenditures are critical
to the Nation's defense.
Mr. Secretary, I know that you know that in Virginia we
care a lot about this. The Lynchburg area of Virginia--it is
kind of odd how it developed, but is the center of production
of nuclear reactors for the carriers and subs that are a
critical part of the work we do. They are developed there in
Lynchburg by amazing craftsmen and women and then on trains
down to the shipyard where they are installed into carriers and
subs. The deal we budget is absolutely critical to the Nation's
defense.
I thank you for the work that you are doing to make sure,
and I am happy with the omnibus that I hope that the Senate
will vote in the next day or so because I think it portends
well for the consistency of those investments.
I actually want to go, though, to a different space, which
is you have a pretty amazing track record as a governor in a
number of areas. Your tenure was pretty historic. But Texas and
renewables. Texas produces more renewable energy than any
State. Texas is in the top few in terms of the percentage of
its energy that has been produced by renewables. If I got this
right, I think Texas did a renewable portfolio standard in 1999
and then a new one in 2005, and yet whatever standard was set
by the governor and legislature, Texas innovators and industry
beat the standard. My sense, from everything I have studied, is
that sort of a combination of policy and then private sector
innovation has been not only an environmental good but also an
economic good for Texas. Would you agree with that?
Secretary Perry. I could not have written it any better,
sir. That was an awesome display of what we were able to do in
the State, and I totally agree with you.
Senator Kaine. How did Texas beat its standard? So you set
CAFE [Corporate Average Fuel Economy]--I mean, not CAFE
standards--renewable portfolio standards. Often we hear a
debate about, oh, that is going to pit the environment against
the economy. Yet Texas beat the standards again and again. How
did that happen?
Secretary Perry. I will try to be brief.
One of the ways we did it was by giving incentives to
companies. For instance, we had a program called the Texas
Emissions Reduction Program. We gave incentives on the
franchise tax for fleet operators to remove old, inefficient
burning engines and replace them. We subsidized--the State
did--the building of a CREZ [Competitive Renewable Energy
Zones] line from out where the wind blows to where the people
are. There were incentives to get the private sector to do
particular things.
The result of that and one of the things, Senator, that I
am really proud of--Texas is a pretty good sized place, the
12th largest economy in the world. We created a lot of jobs
while this was going on. The rural economic development from
the wind energy was fascinating to watch happen. But we lowered
emissions: NOx [Nitrous Oxide] by over 60 percent, SOx [Sulfer
Oxide] by over 50 percent. The total carbon dioxide footprint
in the State of Texas during that period of time was almost 20
percent in a State that grew by 7,000 people. That is a lot of
pickup trucks on the road.
Senator Kaine. Right. So a growing population, growing
economic activity----
Secretary Perry. Lowering emissions. It was driven by two
of those. The third one that really drove it was changing out,
shifting out those old, inefficient power plants, replacing
them with natural gas plants.
Senator Kaine. Well, I think Texas just offers such a bit
of evidence for the country. We have had at least one vote
during my time in the Senate on a national renewable portfolio
standard. I think Texas and the States that have done it have
demonstrated that if we are bold enough to lead, we will
actually be surprised and go farther than the standards that we
set.
I remember a visit with Shimon Peres once where he said the
same thing to me about the Middle East that was stated to you
about Russia, Senator. He said, look, the best thing you could
do for the Middle East is reduce your reliance upon oil, reduce
your reliance upon foreign energy.
I think Texas gives us a path forward, and I wanted to
praise you for your work there. I hope we would embrace that
kind of a policy as a Nation.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
Senator Blumenthal?
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for being here, Mr. Secretary.
As I know you are aware, DHS and the FBI [Federal Bureau of
Investigation] highlighted a series of cyber attacks targeting
United States Government entities and critical infrastructure
sectors, occurring since at least March 2016, notably on the
nuclear energy and water sectors. The New York Times reported
last week that by 2013 researchers had linked Russian hackers
to hundreds of attacks on United States and European energy
grids. In my view, those attacks are an act of war. Would you
agree?
Secretary Perry. I would tend to agree with you, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
By December of 2015, in fact a noticeable change of
strategy occurred. The Russians had gone from intelligence
gathering to actually possibly seeking to shut down these
operations, a more serious act of war.
We know that Russia is willing to go much, much further. We
know that fact from what they have done in the Ukraine in 2015
and 2016 when Russian Government hackers, in fact, executed
cyber attacks against Ukraine's critical infrastructure that in
fact vastly disrupted electrical grids and disabled control
systems that impacted hundreds of thousands of people.
Can you assure us that the United States of America has
taken dramatic action to deter such Russian attacks?
Secretary Perry. I can.
Senator Blumenthal. You can.
Secretary Perry. I can.
Senator Blumenthal. What kinds of actions have the United
States taken?
Secretary Perry. That conversation probably needs to occur
in a smaller room, Senator.
Senator Blumenthal. Well, I am asking what kinds of
attacks. Are these verbal messages? Are they covert actions?
Are they cyber messages of some kind?
Secretary Perry. Senator, we are making, I think, every
effort to protect the electrical grid from those types of
attacks. Again, I am a bit--I am not a bit uncomfortable. I am
quite comfortable telling you that we need to have this
conversation in a room where we can talk classified.
Senator Blumenthal. Is one of those actions to congratulate
Vladimir Putin on his election? That kind of congratulations
seems to, in effect, remove the deterrent effect of any action
that we have taken.
Secretary Perry. Senator, I think there are a lot of ways
that we will be sending messages. My bet is that people call
people from time to time that they are in great competition
with and maybe tell them thank you on one sense, nice
competitive work, but on the other side, rapping their kneecaps
pretty hard to get their attention. In some other areas, you
are making some big, big mistakes.
Senator Blumenthal. Do you agree that Russia has to pay a
price?
Secretary Perry. I agree that the United States and the
rest of the world need to send some very powerful messages to
Russia relative to some of their activities.
Senator Blumenthal. Do you agree that the only message the
Vladimir Putin understands is one that makes him pay a price?
Secretary Perry. That is exactly why the United States
having an energy policy where that we can deliver energy to
Eastern Europe, for instance, where we are a partner with
people around the globe where they know that we will supply
them energy and there are no strings attached is one of the
most powerful messages that we can send to Russia.
Senator Blumenthal. Do you agree that there has to be more
cooperation between your Department and the utilities that are
privately run and owned?
Secretary Perry. Yes, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. What steps are you taking to do that?
Secretary Perry. We are working closely with that sector.
With some specific companies, we are working even more closely
with. There are some of these pieces of information that get
into very sensitive areas. One of the conversations that we
need to have, Senator Blumenthal, is being able to speed up the
process of which we can get individuals classified so that if
we need to bring them in and talk to them in a classified
setting, we can do that. I know this is a little off subject
here, but the point is I think it is really important for you
and the committee to know that the process to get individuals
classified so that they can do work is very slow and onerous. I
think we need to have this conversation about how to speed that
up and to be able to get these people into a classified
designation.
Senator Blumenthal. My time has expired.
But, Mr. Secretary, it is not off topic. It is a very
relevant issue in this space and in protecting our election
system, as was raised yesterday in the Department of Homeland
Security or, I should say, the Intelligence Committee hearings
involving the Department of Homeland Security.
But I would just emphasize to you that the Russians almost
certainly know everything that you would tell me in a closed
setting. They already know it. The ones who do not know it are
the American people. They are the ones who deserve to know it.
I would respectfully suggest that you and other leaders who are
responsible in this area owe it to the American people to come
in an open forum like this one and explain what we are doing to
fight back against the Russians who are attacking our country
every day not only our Department of Defense but also our
critical grid.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Peters?
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Secretary Perry, for your testimony here today.
Secretary Perry, as you know, your Department plays a key
role in national security particularly in advancing nuclear
nonproliferation and promoting nuclear safety generally across
the globe. This includes working with the international
community and the International Atomic Energy Agency.
One area that the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency]
is involved in deals with the production and the reprocessing
of plutonium. I would argue that the United States should take
a leading role in pursuing strict enforcement of the IAEA
agreement that requires participating countries to manage their
production and their reprocessing of plutonium to maintain a
balance between the supply created, as well as the demand for
their peaceful purposes, the rightful peaceful purposes that
they are conducting within their countries.
Currently, however, there are countries that are members of
this agreement that are not in compliance with the best
practices of balance between plutonium production supply and
peaceful use demand. I would also argue the United States
should encourage strict compliance with the principle of supply
and demand balance of plutonium and then work to the next
standard which we should employ which is to have a supply/
demand balance for highly enriched uranium as well. This I
think has the advantage of strengthening our global position in
terms of nonproliferation norms before the JCPOA expires in the
years ahead.
If the United States takes swift action and can show the
global leadership to raise and not lower international nuclear
standards so that the JCPOA provisions, when they expire, will
find a very different diplomatic environment where the world
community understands that we need to have this balance and we
are taking strict action now, I think it will help us move to a
place where Iran does not begin the commercial and large-scale
reprocessing of--or, I should say, enrichment of uranium, which
would be a global threat to us.
Secretary, my question is I would like you to share your
views on this issue and whether or not it makes sense to try to
push for a balance of supply and demand as is required in
plutonium agreements and to move to highly enriched uranium as
well.
Secretary Perry. Yes, sir. I can answer that very briefly
and directly. Yes, I believe that that should be our goal.
Senator Peters. So what sort of diplomatic efforts will you
be engaged in to promote that?
Secretary Perry. My role is more on the technical side,
Senator, than being a diplomat. That is the State Department.
The State Department leads these types of efforts. So we have
not a secondary role but I would say a supporting role on the
technical side. I try to stay in my lane when it comes to--if
the President asks me to be a diplomat in a particular way, I
will certainly take my instructions.
But let me go back and have a conversation with the folks
in our office about the specificity of what you talked about,
the balancing of that, and get back to you if I may.
Senator Peters. Well, I would appreciate that, Mr.
Secretary, because I think this is critically important.
Certainly as a member of the cabinet with these
responsibilities, your voice will be important. If it is
something that you believe we need to pursue, I would certainly
like to work with you to give a nudge to the administration to
move in that area, particularly given the fact the JCPOA--every
day we wait we get closer to its expiration, and we could see
the production of enriched uranium.
I think that is also related to a question that was asked
by Senator Reed as well, that in dealing with Saudi Arabia,
that we really need to push to make sure that they also agree
to the gold standard that the UAE agreed to. I think it would
set a horrible precedent to allow Saudi Arabia to begin
enriching uranium and perhaps to higher levels at the same time
we may be getting close to the JCPOA expiring. I would
certainly hope that you would push aggressively to make sure
that Saudi Arabia is held to the same standard that we should
hold every single country to really across the planet.
Secretary Perry. Yes, sir. Count on it. As we are asked to
engage in whatever way, we will. But I always remind people
that the alternative is not good. If Russia, China, or who are
going to be chosen to do the civil nuclear projects in the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, there will be no oversight.
Senator Peters. That is why we need to push to make sure we
have this balance of supply and demand. Certainly both China
and Russia need to be a part of that as well. This is going to
take a very large diplomatic effort, which I believe the United
States should lead. This is common sense, and if we can
implement that with other nuclear powers, we will make a safer
world.
Secretary Perry. Indeed.
Senator Peters. Thank you.
Secretary Perry. Yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Peters.
Senator Cotton?
Senator Cotton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome back, Mr. Secretary. Always good to see you.
Senator Peters and I had a little vacation over the
weekend. We went up--just a little, short flight up to the
Arctic icecap where we got on a fast attack submarine and
sailed underneath the ice and then surfaced about 24 hours
later. It was a lot of fun. I would recommend to all of you
that you do it. The quarters in the submarines are a little
tight, though, I have to say.
But we had a chance to tour the nuclear reactor on the
submarine. Naval Reactors is considered probably the gold
standard within our nuclear enterprise, one of the best run
organizations, maybe one of the best run organizations in the
entire government. Now that you have been on board for a little
over a year, you have had a chance to get to know your
organization and observe Naval Reactors. I just wanted to know
what your thoughts are about what has made Naval Reactors such
an outstanding organization for now 40-plus years, maybe what
lessons could we learn from that and apply to some of the other
more troubled parts of our nuclear enterprise or, for that
part, across the government entirely.
Secretary Perry. I will suggest to you it has had good
leadership. Frank Caldwell is an incredibly capable leader. You
look back to the man who started it, the extraordinary Admiral
Zumwalt. So you have some really fine leadership. They have a
tight focus. They basically stay in their lane. They have not
gotten outside of that. They have a mission, and Naval Reactors
has well run an operation, as I have had the opportunity to--
and that is not to say that there are not some other places at
the DOE and other areas of government that are not as capable.
But I think your observation is very succinct that they indeed
are well run.
Senator Cotton. I agree. It is really important for an
organization to have leadership. There is no substitute for it.
That is why we depend as a Congress on you and your people and
the American people depend on all of you. As Secretary Gates
used to say, when he was the Secretary of Defense, to his
people, we can solve problems here with a scalpel or we can
wait until Congress solves them with a meat cleaver. You have
got some of the most important challenges that our government
faces, not always pleasant business to think about these kind
of things, but the American people are depending on you and the
Department of Energy to make sure that our nuclear deterrent is
safe, reliable, effective, credible.
I want to turn to one specific point now in your testimony,
in which you state that you are building the capability and
capacity to produce 80 pits per year by 2030. Is the main risk
of missing that mark lack of adequate and certain funding for
your organization?
Secretary Perry. I think if the adequate funding was not in
place, you would be correct. At this particular point in time
in this budget cycle, it is adequate. In the out-years, I
cannot respond to that because I do not know what those numbers
are going to be. But for us to continue to build those pits to
have those 30 pits per year ready by 2026, obviously the
funding has to stay in line.
Senator Cotton. If the threats from Russia and China and
Iran and North Korea, potentially other now or future nuclear
states were to grow and our leaders determine that we need to
produce more than that number of pits per year, with additional
funding, do we have the technical ability to achieve that?
Secretary Perry. Yes.
Senator Cotton. Good.
While we are talking about funding requirements as well,
the Nuclear Posture Review, in addition to your testimony,
observes that more than half of NNSA's infrastructure is over
40 years old. More than a quarter of it dates back to the
Manhattan Project in the 1940s.
Your budget request had an increase of about $200 million
for infrastructure and operations, much of that going to
deferred maintenance for NNSA infrastructure. Secretary Perry,
is the budget that we passed last month, the spending bill we
may be on the verge of passing going to give you the money you
need to make real progress on this infrastructure backlog?
Secretary Perry. Yes.
Senator Cotton. Good.
Thank you very much for what you do, and thanks for all the
men and women at the Department of Energy.
Secretary Perry. Thank you, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
Senator King?
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, Governor, welcome.
Secretary Perry. Thank you, sir.
Senator King. For 70-plus years, there has been no use of
nuclear weapons since 1945 in the world, and that has
principally been because of the strategy of deterrence, that
there are nuclear-armed countries, but the deterrence strategy
of, if you use them, you will suffer horrendous consequences
has worked.
My concern is that the whole strategy of deterrence breaks
down if you are talking about terrorists having nuclear weapons
or a nuclear device. They have indicated they do not care about
dying. They do not represent a nation state, and we really do
not have a strategy to deal with that except nonproliferation.
What bothers me is that in your budget under NNSA, there is
a significant increase for weapons activity. There is a
significant increase for naval reactors. There is a decrease
for nonproliferation. It is not a big decrease, but it is a
decrease. It seems to me this is one of the most serious issues
that we face in terms of the danger of nuclear weapons or even
one nuclear device falling into the hands of either a small
rogue state or more dangerously a terrorist organization.
Why in the world in this situation are we seeing a decrease
in the activities of the Department in nonproliferation instead
of an increase?
Secretary Perry. Senator, I do not think you are seeing a
decrease in the activities. You may be seeing a decrease in the
funding line item, but the focus of the Department--and if my
information is correct, we actually have an increase of the
entire nonproliferation budget. I think it is approaching 4
percent.
Senator King. Well, perhaps I am misinformed. I have got a
Department of Energy budget request fact sheet, February 12th.
It says 1.98 for defense nuclear nonproliferation, $17 million
below fiscal year 2017 enacted. So maybe we need to get
together offline and straighten out those numbers.
So you are committing to me a serious and unrelenting
commitment to nonproliferation.
Secretary Perry. Regardless of what that budget may be,
sir.
Senator King. Thank you.
NNSA has had some difficulty over the past years managing
the life extension program, which is a very important part of
the Nuclear Posture Review of recapitalizing. There have been
cost overruns, schedule delays, reductions in numbers of
weapons refurbishment. What are you doing to get a hold of that
program and tighten the management so that we can meet the
deadlines and also the cost limitations?
Secretary Perry. I am sorry. Repeat that again, Senator.
Senator King. On the life extension programs for nuclear
weapons, there have been cost overruns, delays. The question is
can we rely on the Department to focus management skills on
this problem because this is going to be a part of the Nuclear
Posture Review's recapitalization.
Secretary Perry. Excuse me for making you repeat that,
Senator.
What I found a year ago when I came into the agency, there
are a number of programs that had some pretty big cost
overruns. There were some pretty big programs, whether it was
in the environmental management side of things or whether it
was in the programmatic side of life extension programs.
We have a new NNSA Administrator. She and I have had very
pointed conversations about the management of the modernization
of the arsenal, the life extension programs. I will suggest to
you and I hope that you will see a commitment to managing those
programs where that the result is not only up to your
satisfaction, but the expenditures are within the realm of
thoughtful, efficient use of our taxpayer dollars.
Senator King. Thank you.
In just a few seconds, just a comment. You mentioned it
earlier. The issue of clearances is a huge problem throughout
the government. We had a hearing in the Intelligence Committee
a couple of weeks ago just on this subject. It turns out there
is a backlog of 791,000 people awaiting secret or top secret
clearances, which is impeding our ability across the
government, but I know it is in your Department. We discovered
in that hearing that OMB seems to be the center of where this
is focused, and I hope that you will work with OMB and add your
voice to those of other departments that we have just got to
solve this problem. Not only is it slowing down the activities,
but we are losing good people. I know people who have been in
the queue for a year and a half or 2 years, and finally they
said I am going to go off and get a job in the private sector.
I cannot wait for this anymore. I think that is a real loss.
That is an opportunity lost to our country.
Secretary Perry. I will not sit here in front of you and
defend OMB, sir.
Senator King. I want you to raise this with them and be
insistent as only you can be.
Secretary Perry. Yes, sir.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator King.
Senator Cruz?
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Perry. Senator.
Senator Cruz. Welcome. Let me say first of all congrats on
the Aggies beating North Carolina. I know you were celebrating
loudly, and we all were. That was a good victory and I hope
more to come.
Secretary Perry. On to Michigan.
Senator Cruz. It should have been Houston. That would have
made an even better game. But alas, it was not to be.
Mr. Secretary, often when people talk about the work of the
Department of Energy, they think about physicists in
laboratories and models being developed on supercomputers. But
an important part of it is that we also have to be able to
build and produce the things our scientists design, and for
that we need production capacity like at the Pantex plant
outside of Amarillo, Texas. We used to have huge production
capacity in this country, but we have closed much of that down
at the end of the Cold War. Now we have a few places left and a
lot of the buildings in those places are too old and too small
to do what we need to have them do.
The Nuclear Posture Review the Department of Defense
recently released mentions, ``developing a National Nuclear
Security Administration road map that sizes production capacity
to modernization and hedging requirements.'' Could you
elaborate a little bit on what that means and what kind of
production capacity we need that we do not have right now?
Secretary Perry. Senator, I think the issue that you
rightly focused in on--it is as much as, in a global sense,
looking back over the last 25 years after the end of the Cold
War, if you will, the peace dividend that we all appreciated.
Then the world has changed since then. The requirement, whether
it was in facilities, whether it was in modernization of our
weapons, whether it was in keeping a supply chain in place, is
a slight diversion here. It is the same challenge that we have
got on our civil nuclear side, is that those got pushed back on
the back burner.
We are faced now with, on the civil nuclear side, a real
challenge, whether it is keeping our companies engaged in this
in a worldwide way, developing the engineers and the technology
and the expertise to go forward with. The same is true in the
sense of our weapons program. You have visited Pantex before.
You have visited Senator Graham's facilities out at Savannah
River. Oak Ridge has some facilities that are older than I am.
For a building that is old.
But my point is that this Nuclear Posture Review and this
committee needs to be, as I said in my opening remarks, thanked
for recognizing that we have got to have the resources to be
able to get this country back on track from the standpoint of
building the life extension programs, the modernization of the
fleet. If we do not, then we put America in a place of jeopardy
that I do not think anyone on this committee wants to see us
in.
Senator Cruz. Is the Department looking at expanding
facilities in existing plants like Pantex?
Secretary Perry. I do not know whether we are looking at
expanding facilities. One of the things that is very close to
being is a new headquarters building at Pantex that is going to
get them out of some early 1950s buildings that are scattered
around and all over that complex into one facility where I can
assure you that your constituents that are getting up in
Randall County every day and going to work are really going to
like going to work there because it is a first class facility,
but it is long overdue. So the facility side of this is a real
challenge, and we should not be asking some of the people who
are involved in some of the most important work in this country
keeping us safe and deterring those that would do us harm from
having to go to work in buildings that, quite frankly, are an
embarrassment in some cases.
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Cruz.
Senator Warren?
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Secretary Perry, for being here today.
Secretary Mattis told this committee that, ``the central
challenge to United States prosperity and security is the
reemergence of long-term strategic competition with countries
like Russia and China.'' More specifically, he said that China,
quote, continues its economic and military ascendance asserting
power through an all-of-nation long-term strategy. He called on
the U.S. to pursue a similar whole-of-government response.
Let me just ask. I will start with just a yes or no
question here, Secretary Perry. Do you agree with Secretary
Mattis on this?
Secretary Perry. Yes, ma'am. I might expand on that.
Senator Warren. But basic agreement. Good. Because I want
to ask you how this plays out in your area of responsibility.
According to the International Energy Agency, renewables
accounted for almost two-thirds of new net power capacity
around the world in 2016. Last year, according to Bloomberg,
China accounted for 40 percent of all global clean energy
investments. China has vowed to spend at least $360 billion on
renewable energy by 2020. But here at home, President Trump's
latest budget would cut the Energy Department's research office
on renewable energy and efficiency by 65 percent.
Very briefly, can you explain to me, Secretary Perry, how
cuts to funding for research into energy efficiency and
renewable energy improve America's future energy security?
Secretary Perry. Senator, I will talk about two different
arenas here. One is that we are different from China, and we
are different from China in the sense that our private sector
is where a substantial amount of R&D is done. We have a role in
early stage development, which we have, I think, done a very
good job of. Once those technologies become more mature and we
can commercialize them, then the private sector will take over.
Senator Warren. But why do we cut that by 65 percent, Mr.
Secretary? That is what that is.
Secretary Perry. But the point there is that these are
technologies that are starting to mature.
Senator Warren. I am sorry, Mr. Secretary, but that is the
whole point is that we keep doing the early stage research so
the next technology is supported and the next one and the next
one. What I do not understand is how you can cut research into
energy by 65 percent and how that is going to help us be a
global competitor.
You know, the Trump administration is rolling back rules
designed to limit dependence on dirty fossil fuels, and our
competitors at the same time, competitors like China, are
making huge investments in solar power and other renewable
energy sources. This is a $1 trillion market, and we are
cutting ourselves out of it. Instead of leading the energy
revolution, the Trump administration's policies are causing the
United States to be left behind.
Secretary Perry. Senator, as I look at our budget, the
Office of Technology Transfer had a 23 percent increase in our
budget. So I do not think we are arguing apples and oranges
here.
Senator Warren. Are you telling me the Trump administration
budget did not propose a 65 percent cut?
Secretary Perry. No. What I am telling you is that just
because a line item does not have the same amount of money in
it that it did in 2017 does not mean that the focus is not
there.
Senator Warren. Look, I got to say if you do not spend the
money, you cannot support the research.
I want to ask you about the nuclear deal between the United
States, the five partner nations, and Iran and the restrictions
this has placed on Iran's nuclear program under limits and
inspections so it cannot develop nuclear weapons. I just want
to start with a couple of baseline technical questions.
As a result of the nuclear deal, has Iran eliminated 97
percent of its low-enriched uranium stockpile?
Secretary Perry. I think that is correct.
Senator Warren. Yes. Has Iran removed the core of the Arak
heavy water reactor and filled it with concrete so that it will
not produce significant amounts of weapons-grade plutonium?
Secretary Perry. That is correct.
Senator Warren. Do international weapons inspectors have
more access to and more monitoring of Iran's nuclear sites,
their uranium mines, and their mills and centrifuge production
facilities?
Secretary Perry. I would say you are correct. There may be
some other places that those inspectors would like to take a
look at.
Senator Warren. Right. I know that under the additional
protocol, they are allowed to do that. But do you basically
agree that that is what they have got now?
Secretary Perry. With my caveat to that.
Senator Warren. I know there are other technical aspects to
the agreement, but one last question. I know I am out of time
here. I am going to ask the indulgence of the chair. We will
try to be short.
In his most recent threat assessment, the Director of
National Intelligence said the Iran nuclear agreement has,
``extended the amount of time Iran would need to produce enough
fissile material for a nuclear weapon from a few months to
about 1 year'' and, ``has enhanced the transparency of Iran's
nuclear activities.''
Secretary Perry, do you agree with the intelligence
community's assessment on that?
Secretary Perry. I cannot tell that I do or I do not.
Senator Warren. Okay. I am a little surprised by that. They
are the intelligence community that has brought us this
information.
I will just say I understand that Iran supports terrorism,
abuses human rights, develops nuclear missiles, in short, is a
bad actor. But an Iran without nuclear weapons is at least a
lot easier to deal with than an Iran with nuclear weapons. I
think that is something we have to keep in mind as we talk
about our agreement to keep Iran from having those nuclear
weapons.
Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Warren.
Senator Graham?
Senator Graham. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, I think you are doing a great job for the
President, and I really appreciate your service to our country.
Secretary Perry. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Graham. Just to pick up on the Iran deal, I was not
going to talk about it, but I will now. Did the Iranians deny
inspectors access to military sites in Iran?
Secretary Perry. It is my understanding that they did.
Senator Graham. Under the agreement, in 15 years from now,
can the Iranians enrich and reprocess without limitation?
Secretary Perry. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. Do you think that is a good deal?
Secretary Perry. No, sir.
Senator Graham. Thanks for coming to SRS [Savannah River
Site]. It was a great visit. I know we have some differences on
MOX, but you identified some things that we could work on at
the site that are very exciting to us and the community.
The President tweeted out a couple of days ago he wants to
talk with Putin about stopping an arms race. Do you think that
is a good idea?
Secretary Perry. I think stopping an arms race would be a
good idea.
Senator Graham. I do too. Actually I think it is okay to
talk to the Russians about where we are going with nuclear
weapons.
This nuclear-powered cruise missile that they displayed on
a video in Russia--what did you take that to mean? What are
they trying to tell us?
Secretary Perry. They are back in the game and we better
pay attention to them.
Senator Graham. I could not say it any better.
Your effort is to get us back in the game by rebuilding our
triad system that has been depleted over time.
Secretary Perry. Correct.
Senator Graham. That is to modernize our nuclear force. I
hope to God we never use it, but make sure it is a deterrent.
That is correct.
Secretary Perry. That is correct.
Senator Graham. The money you think is well spent?
Secretary Perry. I do.
Senator Graham. I do too.
Secretary Perry. I hope it is even more efficiently spent
under the current administration.
Senator Graham. I think we have to do two things at once:
talk to the Russians about where we are headed but rebuild a
nuclear deterrent force that is in decline. That is on your
watch and I have a lot of confidence that you will get that
done.
As to the MOX issue, 34 metric tons of weapons-grade
plutonium was agreed to be disposed of by both sides in early
2000. You are aware of that agreement?
Secretary Perry. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. The Russians had 34 metric tons of weapons-
grade plutonium in excess of their defense needs. We had the
same amount. If you took 34 metric tons of weapons-grade
plutonium, do you realize you can make over 10,000 warheads out
of that material?
Secretary Perry. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. So the goal is to take that off the table,
turn it into a plowshare, no longer a sword.
In 2010, are you aware of the fact that we signed an
agreement with Russia where the MOX system would be our
disposal method and they would burn their plutonium in a fast
reactor?
Secretary Perry. Yes, sir, I am.
Senator Graham. The Obama administration decided to
abandoned construction of the MOX program. Do you consider that
a withdrawal of that agreement?
Secretary Perry. No, sir. I consider the Russians are who
walked away from the agreement.
Senator Graham. What did they do to walk away?
Secretary Perry. They unilaterally suspended the PMDA
[Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement]. Prior to that
suspension, the Department had informed Russia both formally
and informally that we would pursue the D&D [Dilute and
Dispose] process.
Senator Graham. Dilute and disposal.
Secretary Perry. Dilute and disposal, yes, sir.
Senator Graham. So your belief is the Russians walked away
not us.
Secretary Perry. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. Why did we go from MOX to dilute and
dispose? Is that the new policy of the administration?
Secretary Perry. Yes, sir. I will try to give you the short
version of this. You and I have talked about it at length, but
for the purposes of the committee, we think that the cost
versus the cost of D&D, the timetable to being able to address
the plutonium issue in the MOX versus----
Senator Graham. You realize that I have a different view of
all of this.
Secretary Perry. Yes, sir, I do.
Senator Graham. So let us look at the dilute and dispose
option. It would go to New Mexico to the WIPP system--is that
right--after it is diluted?
Secretary Perry. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. Have you talked to the New Mexico
delegation?
Secretary Perry. I have talked to the delegation. I have
talked to the Governor.
Senator Graham. What did they say?
Secretary Perry. They are in the process of having a
conversation, a negotiation with their environmental
commission.
Senator Graham. Have they agreed to accept the material?
Secretary Perry. We will know the answer to that in May.
Senator Graham. Do you not think we should know the answer
to that before we stop the other program?
Secretary Perry. I am comfortable that we are already
sending plutonium----
Senator Graham. Let me ask you another question.
Secretary Perry.--to the WIPP as we speak, 5 metric tons.
Senator Graham. What regulations would be required to be
changed to do dilute and dispose? Have you inventoried what
regulations would be required to be changed?
Secretary Perry. Can I get back to you on that?
Senator Graham. Sure.
[The information follows:]
Secretary Perry. The Department of Energy (DOE) has reviewed
existing regulations and determined that no regulations would be
required to change for dilute and dispose. DOE is working with the
State of New Mexico to address Waste Isolation Pilot Plant capacity
issues, regardless of any decisions on the 34 metric tons of surplus
plutonium. The current tracking method, which uses outer container
volume, counts a significant amount of air between the inner and outer
containers as waste. A proposed permit modification, which does not
require changes to current law, identifying a more accurate tracking of
actual waste volumes was submitted to the New Mexico Environment
Department on January 31, 2018. The public comment period on this Class
3 modification ended September 20, 2018. We'll continue to work with
the State on the process moving forward.
Senator Graham. What legislation would be required to be
changed?
Secretary Perry. Same response.
Senator Graham. Okay.
Have the Russians agreed to dilute and dispose?
Secretary Perry. No. The Russians basically said that their
waiver would require----
Senator Graham. They object to it.
Secretary Perry. Yes, in some pretty harsh ways basically
saying that we got to--anyway.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
I think what we have done is ended the biggest
nonproliferation program in the history of the world for no
good reason, and I am going to try to fix that.
Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Graham.
Senator Nelson?
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, it is good to see you.
Secretary Perry. Thank you.
Senator Nelson. You are looking very well.
I want to pick up on this discussion about nuclear
proliferation. Do you think that Iran--do you have any reason
to believe that Iran by denying access to some of these
military facilities is cheating on the JCPOA?
Secretary Perry. Senator, if history is a teacher, then the
Iranians do not have a real good track record of living up to
agreements or telling the truth.
Senator Nelson. What do you recommend that we do?
Secretary Perry. I think anytime that you can renegotiate
an agreement that puts you in a better position, you should do
it, whether it is the North American Free Trade Agreement or
whether it is the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. I think
this President properly and for the right reasons is
renegotiating some agreements that from his perspective is not
in America's best interest.
Senator Nelson. The agreement basically keeps Iran from
having a nuclear weapon for a specified number of years. Is
there anything that you know of that would indicate that that
is not going to be fulfilled?
Secretary Perry. I think the President's focus here is on
being able to push that timeline even further down the road. I
think everyone around your dais agrees that that is a good
idea. The idea that we could push Iran back from the standpoint
of when they can start processing is a good thing.
Senator Nelson. Beyond the 15 years.
Secretary Perry. Yes, sir.
Senator Nelson. Let me ask you about our concern that Saudi
Arabia might be wanting to get into the nuclear bomb business.
So they are wanting to have a whole bunch of nuclear reactors
for electricity production. We worked with the IAEA to produce
these protocols called additional protocols to monitor for
diversions from technology used for electricity to get it over.
Do you think Saudi Arabia should adhere to those protocols?
Secretary Perry. Yes, sir.
Senator Nelson. So do I.
Mr. Secretary, back to an earlier discussion that you had
with Senator Blumenthal. It is troubling--and I am saying this
from my standpoint. I have the privilege of, along with Senator
Rounds, leading the Cyber Subcommittee of the full committee
here. We are quite concerned with what Russia is able to do to
us, in addition to a whole bunch of other countries and
parties, in cyber attacks.
If an electric company--and I am making this point--in the
private sector, an electric company, a banking company, a water
company, whatever in the private sector--if they were attacked
with, say, a bomb, a sabotage, a missile from Russia, that
would be a direct attack on our country. Would it not be the
same thing if they use cyber to attack and shut down, say, an
electrical grid?
Secretary Perry. Senator Nelson, I think you are absolutely
correct. I think the world has changed greatly over the course
of the last decade when it comes to using a digital way to
attack a country and that we have to have this conversation. We
have to be not only on the cybersecurity side of this but also
on the rules of engagement standpoint, that when there is
massive amounts of damage done--for instance, if a hospital
were to be shut down and their ability to deliver lifesaving
procedures because of an attack on their information technology
system, that is every bit as much a direct effect on people's
lives as if someone would explode a bomb in an emergency room.
Senator Nelson. Well, I think I can speak for Senator
Rounds. So you know this is in a bipartisan spirit. We are
concerned that the DOD, which is our only capability now as the
commander--we are concerned--and he is also, the head of NSA
[National Security Agency]. We are concerned if he has the
authorities in order to, number one, prevent or, number two,
counterattack in the case of such a thing. I want to bring this
to you since you are definitely a part of the national security
apparatus to please give counsel to this because it is upon us,
and it is going to happen one way or another. We have already
seen how an attack undermines our very democratic institutions.
Secretary Perry. Yes, sir.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Scott?
Senator Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, Secretary.
Secretary Perry. Senator.
Senator Scott. Good to see you again.
Secretary Perry. Good to be in your presence, sir.
Senator Scott. Thank you, sir.
Thank you for visiting the MOX facility and the entire
Savannah River site.
Can we just revisit why the Russians withdrew from the PMDA
because from my perspective nonproliferation equals the PMDA in
many, many ways? It has been widely reported that the Russians
withdrew from the PMDA because of our lack of progress on the
MOX facility. Would you agree or disagree?
Secretary Perry. Yes, sir. They are the ones that walked
away.
Senator Scott. But would you agree that part of the reason
why they walked away, at least the focus that I have read--part
of their rationale for walking away--is that we were not
upholding our part of disposing of and eliminating the weapons-
grade component of the material?
Secretary Perry. Senator Scott, without having any more
information, I might agree with that simplistic approach. But
here is what I think from my perspective, and I am not going to
base this on anything other than some facts.
The Russians suspended it because I think they were looking
for a reason to suspend it. That is my read on this. I think
when they put the requirements for the resumption out on the
table, then that even solidified it more for me. When they talk
about they require the reduction of military infrastructure and
manpower in certain NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]
countries before they will come back to the table, when they
say they want a repeal of the Magnitsky Act and the Ukraine
Freedom Support Act, so I start seeing a real political
pushback from the Russians. You and I--we have done a few
negotiations before. I think they were looking for a reason to
walk away from this so that they could make some political
points.
Senator Scott. Let me suggest that what you are talking
about is a part of the aftermath. The fact of the matter, that
which opened the door for them to walk away was us not honoring
the obligation and our responsibility to develop the technology
that eliminates the weapons-grade component. So the reality of
it is that we opened the door. Actually we did not open the
door. We took the door off the hinges and said please feel free
to walk away with your part of the 34 metric tons of weapons-
grade plutonium that at least creates 10,000 warheads, perhaps
15,000 warheads. So the reality of it is we opened a door and
we still focus on the importance of nonproliferation. We opened
the door with a bad actor from my perspective.
A question for you. What if New Mexico says no? What if the
capacity levels that seem to be in question already becomes an
answered question that there is no capacity? What if the
incidents that have occurred at the New Mexico site become more
problematic or we find more reasons and rationale why it will
not work?
What if the Russians actually say that the D&D does not
eliminate the weapons-grade component and we find ourselves
back at the table and back in South Carolina at a site that
according to some--I am sure that you guys would disagree--is
between 60 and 65 percent complete? We have invested billions
of dollars. What if the United States Congress is unwilling to
change the laws and the administration cannot find ways to
change regulations in order for us to move forward on some
alternative other than the current alternative that is about 65
percent finished and is the only means we have in the United
States to eliminate the weapons-grade component?
Secretary Perry. Senator, I do not get to work on ``what
ifs.'' I have to work on concrete evidence. This committee has
put forward a directive from my perspective that MOX is shut
down, and MOX is shut down because it is horrendously over
budget. The timetable for it that we are looking at now is 2048
before the first plutonium could be processed versus dilute and
dispose, which is substantially less so. In the NDAA, we were
clearly given instructions that I think this committee may have
passed twice and sent out that says here are the four
parameters of which you need to meet. We will have the answers
to those in the very near future. But what I am looking at is
my own GAO-supported numbers and this committee's instruction
that we look at this alternative. And so I know we have had
disagreement about whose numbers are right.
Senator Scott. Yes.
Secretary Perry. But this committee has sent a really
powerful message to me that this is what we want you to do.
Senator Graham and you and I both talked about at length
some legacy programs that can go into Savannah River, and there
are. We want to work with you all, with the governor, with the
people out there to find those opportunities.
Senator Scott. We welcome that.
I know I am over time, but Mr. Chairman, I will close with
this to our Secretary, whom I have a great respect for and
admiration.
Secretary Perry. Thank you.
Senator Scott. We disagree fundamentally on this issue. I
will say, however, that looking for concrete evidence--let me
lay out the concrete evidence from my perspective. What is
concrete is that we simply do not know the cost of transferring
to WIPP. That is concrete. Number two, what is concrete is we
do not understand the timeline. Concrete is we do not
understand the process for getting the regulatory environment
or Congress to approve. Concrete, we do not have any
confirmation that the New Mexico delegation will move forward.
What we do have concrete is billions of dollars of concrete
in the ground in South Carolina. What we do have concrete is
that the only known way for us to dispose and eliminate the
weapons-grade component is the MOX facility, and we have very,
very strong disagreements on the price, the time of completion.
I think the chairman is telling me to stop. Thank you, sir.
Secretary Perry. Senator Scott, thank you. The only thing
that I would say in response very quickly is the dilute and
dispose technology has been proven, and the reason it has been
proven is that we have put 5 metric tons of plutonium into the
ground at WIPP.
Senator Scott. Mr. Chairman, thank you so much for allowing
us to go forward.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much, Mr. Scott.
Senator Donnelly?
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I appreciate your highlighting the
importance of a trusted supply of strategic radiation-hardened
advanced microelectronics, including R&D capabilities, in your
testimony. NNSA is our nation's source for these critical
supplies for our nuclear weapons. But the challenges related to
the production of trusted microelectronics and circuit boards
exist with all of our weapon systems, not just nuclear. The
declining U.S. industrial base and the proliferation of threats
in our supply chain is creating new and dangerous ways for
adversaries to attack our systems.
How are you coordinating with DOD to ensure we are
investing properly and not duplicating efforts or leaving gaps
in critical areas?
Secretary Perry. Senator, I know you have probably had the
opportunity to meet the new Administrator at NNSA, a very
capable, bright, and hard charger. I have every confidence in
the world not only does her history of where she came from,
national security, but also her--I mean, I would not have asked
her to come and serve in that role if I was not very confident
that she is going to be able to stand in there and deliver to
you exactly what you want.
Senator Donnelly. I just want to emphasize to you that this
is not only an important issue to me but to national security.
Secretary Perry. Absolutely.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
As ranking member of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, I
am a strong supporter of modernizing all three legs of the
nuclear triad. I am pleased to see we agree on that. The work
of the NNSA is integral to our nuclear modernization. We held a
hearing just last week in our Strategic Forces Subcommittee
with Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, with Admiral Caldwell, Mr.
Owendoff, and Mr. Trimble from the GAO. I want to get your
thoughts on some of the issues raised there.
We have a new bomber, a new air-launched cruise missile,
the life extension of current ICBMs, a new ICBM, a new SSBN
[Submersible Ship Ballist Missile Nuclear Powered]. Now the
Nuclear Posture Review adds to this potentially another warhead
modification, a new sea-launched cruise missile, any necessary
modifications to the vessels carrying that cruise missile, and
any warhead modifications necessary to arm it.
Do you have a budget proposal for that warhead, and how
much will it cost for fiscal year 2019 and over the 5-year
defense plan?
Secretary Perry. This is not a new capability. This a
weapon that we have had in the fleet before that we are
bringing back up. Let me, with your permission, get back to you
on the exact budgetary requirements for that.
[The information follows:]
Secretary Perry. There is no funding in the fiscal year 2019
request or associated Future Years Nuclear Security Program for the
Sea-Launched Cruise Missile initiative. As the Department of Defense
continues the work of translating the policy of the Nuclear Posture
Review, through the Nuclear Weapons Council, into requirements for the
nuclear security enterprise, the Department of Energy's National
Nuclear Security Administration will support as needed. The process
building the fiscal year 2020 request will consider any new
requirements, as they are identified.
Senator Donnelly. Okay.
The last thing I want to ask. I think it is important to
ensure we are investing in our national labs. I think they are
extraordinarily critical and investing in their workforce while
also providing oversight of management and operation
contractors. It will take a joint effort to build and sustain
our nuclear security enterprise into the future.
Can you tell me how you think about this challenge and the
importance of the labs? I heard you mention early on today that
you said they are a jewel. They really are.
Secretary Perry. They really are, yes, sir. If it is the
one thing that I have been the most impressed with with my time
as the Secretary, it has been to be able to go visit with these
labs, have the lab directors in fairly regular, and share with
the rest of the country through a lot of different means,
including social media, just how good these labs are. It is one
of the reasons that this lab-directed research and development
program is so important. It is one of the reasons that we think
that the ability for our national labs to have some autonomy,
if you will, when it comes to being able to let the labs direct
some of this funding to where it needs to go. So I am sure
there are some really big cheerleaders for the national labs,
but I am going to put myself right up there with the best of
us.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you for your hard work.
Secretary Perry. Thank you, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Donnelly.
I am going to go ahead and adjourn the meeting here because
we are out of time.
[Whereupon, at 11:59 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Ben Sasse
cybersecurity and the energy grid
1. Senator Sasse. The Department of Energy is the lead agency for
combating cyber threats to the electric grid and our energy
infrastructure. Since at least March 2016, Russian hackers have tried
to infiltrate sectors of American infrastructure, including energy,
nuclear, commercial facilities, water, aviation and manufacturing,
according to a Department of Homeland Security report published this
month. In 2015 and 2016, Russian cyber attacks brought down parts of
Ukraine's electrical grid. Clearly Russia has both the capability and
will to harm an opponent's energy grid. This makes them a cyber threat.
What is the Department of Energy doing to protect itself and the energy
grid from cyber attacks?
Secretary Perry. Cybersecurity of the energy sector is a top
priority for the Department of Energy (DOE), which established the
Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response
(CESER) in May 2018 to focus on early-stage activities that improve
cybersecurity and resilience to harden and evolve critical grid
infrastructure. CESER programs will work in an integrated manner in
partnership with industry and other stakeholders, as well as other DOE
offices, to enhance the resilience (the ability to withstand and
quickly recover from disruptions and maintain critical function) and
security (the ability to protect system assets and critical functions
from unauthorized and undesirable actors) of the U.S. energy
infrastructure.
DOE, the Sector-Specific Agency (SSA) for the energy sector, is
working closely with the critical infrastructure security lead, the
Department of Homeland Security, as well as stakeholders across
industry, law enforcement, the intelligence community, and state
governments, to ensure resilience is factored into ongoing grid
modernization efforts. DOE works with its energy sector partners,
through forums such as the Electricity Subsector Coordinating Council
(ESCC) and Oil and Natural Gas Subsector Coordinating Council (ONG
SCC), to prioritize efforts to strengthen cybersecurity preparedness in
the energy sector, improve capabilities to coordinate cyber incident
response and recovery and accelerate innovative research and
development of resilient energy delivery systems.
DOE advances industry-wide cybersecurity risk management and
practice by disseminating information through classified threat
briefings and security workshops and providing access to tools and
technical resources that are used to improve decision making and inform
investments by our sector partners. One of these resources, DOE's
Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (C2M2), helps organizations
evaluate their current cybersecurity capabilities and prioritize and
improve future activities to improve them, and has been used by over
1,200 energy sector organizations.
DOE has also worked with Idaho National Laboratory and the
Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center (E-ISAC) to host
the Energy Sector Security Workshop series, which provides energy-
sector owners and operators with a hands-on, simulated demonstration of
a cyberattack. The lessons learned from these workshops help to better
inform future security and resiliency investments by furthering
attendees' understanding of the range of methods and tools, as well as
common targets, associated with a cyberattack. These engagements are
further complemented by DOE's partnerships with the E-ISAC, Oil and
Natural Gas Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ONG-ISAC), and
Downstream Natural Gas Information Sharing and Analysis Center (DNG-
ISAC). DOE works with the energy sector ISACs to regularly share threat
information and trends with a broad range of industry stakeholders to
help them better protect their current networks and inform future
security decisions.
In addition to cybersecurity preparedness and information sharing
initiatives, maintaining a robust pipeline of cutting-edge technologies
is essential to helping the energy sector continue adapting to the
changing cyber landscape. As the technology landscape in the energy
sector continues to advance, including the growing use of digital
communications and control systems to improve reliability, so do the
capabilities of the threat. DOE has been working with the energy sector
for more than a decade to get ahead of this continual evolution through
investments in advanced R&D to develop resilient systems that can
survive a cyber event without loss of critical functions. More than 40
tools and technologies resulting from the Office of Electricity
Delivery and Energy Reliability's cybersecurity research, development
and demonstration (RD&D) projects have transitioned to the energy
sector and are in use today. Nearly 1,000 utilities in all 50 states
have purchased technologies developed under our Cybersecurity for
Energy Delivery Systems research program.
DOE's current RD&D portfolio of more than 60 projects builds on new
concepts from past R&D to develop groundbreaking cybersecurity
solutions. Several of these projects are led by DOE national
laboratories, including the Argonne, Brookhaven, Idaho, Lawrence
Berkeley, Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, National Renewable Energy,
Oak Ridge, Pacific Northwest, and Sandia National Laboratories.
Researchers are developing tools and technologies that can be
transitioned to the energy sector to prevent, detect, and mitigate
cyber-attacks intended to disrupt the computers and networks that
manage, monitor, protect, and control energy delivery, the power grid,
and oil and natural gas.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
nuclear power assistance to saudi arabia
2. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Perry, the government of Saudi Arabia
has indicated it plans to build nuclear power plants in Saudi Arabia.
As the Trump administration considers whether the United States
Government should provide assistance to Saudi Arabia in its pursuit of
nuclear energy, how would the Department of Energy (DOE) balance
fulfilling the nuclear nonproliferation mission of the National Nuclear
Safety Administration (NNSA) on one hand, against preventing Russia and
China from offering Saudi Arabia a ``no strings attached'' type of
alternative?
Secretary Perry. The United States has discussed for several years
potential terms for a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement (123
Agreement) with Saudi Arabia, which last year announced its intention
to build at least two large nuclear power plants. DOE provides
technical support to the State Department, which is charged with
negotiating nuclear cooperation commitments from partner countries that
meet statutory requirements relating to nuclear nonproliferation,
safety and security, while at the same time creating a relationship and
foundation to facilitate effective overseas competition by the U.S.
nuclear industry.
joint comprehensive plan of action (jcpoa)
3. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Perry, the NNSA's 2016 ``Year in
Review'' noted the technical expertise within the NNSA along with other
DOE national laboratories played a pivotal role in support of the
negotiations for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to
ensure the scientific underpinnings of the deal were solid. Further, it
noted the NNSA continued to play a leading role in JCPOA implementation
by verifying the complex technical parameters of the agreement were
met. This week, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman stated that if
Iran builds nuclear weapons, then Saudi Arabia will, as well. What
would be the likely impact of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East
Region--and around the world--if the United States effectively
withdraws from the JCPOA?
Secretary Perry. DOE/NNSA will continue to leverage our unique
technical capabilities in support of the Administration's goal to
prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. In particular, as part
of our support for the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA)
broader safeguards mission, DOE/NNSA will continue to provide technical
support, training, and expertise to the IAEA to strengthen the IAEA's
ability to monitor and verify nuclear activities worldwide. Further,
DOE/NNSA will work with international partners and the IAEA to prevent
the spread of materials, equipment, technology, and expertise that
could be used in weapons of mass destruction.
4. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Perry, if President Trump refuses to
issue any additional waivers to continue the suspension of sanctions on
Iran--and thereby effectively withdraws the United States from the
JCPOA--how would the role of the NNSA regarding the Iranian nuclear
program change, especially for its Office of Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation (DNN)?
Secretary Perry. NNSA/DNN will continue to provide technical
support, training, and expertise to the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) to strengthen the IAEA's ability to monitor and verify
nuclear activities worldwide.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
north korea
5. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Perry, as noted in your testimony,
the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation will continue efforts
to, ``support the State Department to make sure arms control agreements
enhance security, and are verifiable and enforceable.'' Has the
President requested assistance from the Department of Energy to prepare
for negotiations with North Korea?
Secretary Perry. The Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA) is an active participant in the
interagency process run by the National Security Council, providing
guidance on nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, and the nuclear fuel
cycle.
6. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Perry, what role do you see the
Department of Energy having in preparing the President to meet with Kim
Jong-un?
Secretary Perry. DOE/NNSA was an active participant in the
interagency process supporting preparations in advance of the June 12,
2018 North Korea Summit in Singapore. DOE/NNSA is uniquely capable of
and responsible for the development, production, verification, and
disposition of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials, including all
activities to verifiably dismantle a nuclear fuel cycle.
7. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Perry, is the National Nuclear
Security Administration providing research and advice on nuclear
materials and weapons to better inform the President prior to these
negotiations?
Secretary Perry. DOE/NNSA is an active participant in the
interagency process run by the National Security Council, providing
guidance on nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, and the nuclear fuel
cycle.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Donnelly
nuclear modernization
8. Senator Donnelly. Secretary Perry, do you have a budget proposal
for the sea-launched cruise missile warhead and an estimate of how much
will it cost for fiscal year 2019 and over the five year defense plan?
Secretary Perry. There is no funding in the fiscal year 2019
request or associated Future Years Nuclear Security Program for the
Sea-Launched Cruise Missile initiative. As the Department of Defense
continues the work of translating the policy of the Nuclear Posture
Review, through the Nuclear Weapons Council, into requirements for the
nuclear security enterprise, DOE's National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) will support as needed. The process building the
fiscal year 2020 request will reflect any new requirements, as they are
identified.
9. Senator Donnelly. Secretary Perry, when will the NNSA Stockpile
Stewardship and Management Plan be updated to include any additional
requirements derived from the Nuclear Posture Review, including
facilitization and production?
Secretary Perry. The Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and
Management Plan will reflect the policy outcomes of the Nuclear Posture
Review. Policy outcomes and initiatives will be translated into
requirements by the Nuclear Weapons Council.
trusted microelectronics
10. Senator Donnelly. Secretary Perry, your testimony highlights
the importance of a trusted supply of strategic radiation-hardened
advanced microelectronics, including R&D capabilities. NNSA is our
nation's source for these critical supplies for our nuclear weapons.
But the challenges related to the production of trusted
microelectronics and circuit boards exist with all of our weapon
systems, not just nuclear. The declining US industrial base and the
proliferation of threats in our supply chain is creating new and
dangerous ways for adversaries to attack our systems. How are you
coordinating with the DOD to ensure we are investing properly--and not
duplicating efforts or leaving gaps in critical areas?
Secretary Perry. The foundry at Sandia National Laboratories
produces radiation-hardened microelectronics for U.S. nuclear warheads.
DOE/NNSA is working to extend this capability beyond 2025. NNSA's
foundry follows security and supply chain requirements established by
DOE for assuring the integrity of the people and processes used in
producing critical integrated circuits and microsystems. This foundry
is also accredited as a trusted supplier by the Defense
Microelectronics Activity, which manages DOD's Trusted Foundry Program.
In addition, DOE/NNSA continues to collaborate with DOD as they develop
a comprehensive national strategy for government access to
microelectronics.
nnsa nuclear labs
11. Senator Donnelly. Secretary Perry, I believe that the
government needs to be an effective steward of the taxpayer dollar. In
this regard, I'd like to ask about a December 2017 DOE Inspector
General Audit report that analyzed the management and operation (M&O)
at the Y-12 National Security Complex and the Pantex Plant. This report
was critical of a focus on cost savings as well as of the lack of cost
savings achieved by the current contract structure. What are your views
on how to balance between mission delivery and cost savings in the NNSA
enterprise, particularly in the production plants?
Secretary Perry. NNSA's priority at the Y-12 National Security
Complex and the Pantex Plant is mission delivery in a safe and secure
manner. Cost savings are only approved once NNSA determines there is no
adverse effect on our safe and secure mission accomplishments. The DOE
Office of Inspector General Audit analyzed cost savings achieved under
the NNSA Production Office Management and Operating contract with CNS
as a result of the contract merger in 2014. Since assuming the contract
to manage and operate the Y-12 and Pantex production sites, CNS
generated savings to NNSA under this first-of-a-kind contract through
the merger, consolidation, and transformation of the sites. The intent
of the merged contract is to free up savings for site reinvestment and
site improvement, and that is being realized. A distinctive feature of
this unique contract is that a portion of the savings generated through
improved efficiency are being reinvested by NNSA to support the short-
and long-term mission needs of both Y-12 and Pantex. Through
reinvestment of cost savings, NNSA is appropriately balancing mission
delivery with cost savings resulting from the merger.
APPENDIX A
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
APPENDIX B
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Energy Secretary Rick Perry is focused on an ``all-of-the-
above'' energy strategy as he moves into his second year as
head of the Energy Department. He tells the Washington Examiner
in an exclusive interview that the Trump administration is not
only focused on fossil fuels, but also wants to support a
global market for U.S.-made solar and renewable energy
technologies.
Perry is also working with the White House on rolling out
an energy strategy for Appalachia this year, which will look to
build out the petrochemical capacity of coal country, which is
now at the center of the shale natural gas boom.
He is also pushing ahead on the national security front by
ramping up a new cybersecurity office at the Energy Department
to be the lead agency in helping the energy industry respond to
cyber attacks. He is also heading up a robust agenda to
modernize the nation's nuclear weapons arsenal, which is a
central part of the president's fiscal 2019 budget and Nuclear
Posture Review. The Energy Department houses the National
Nuclear Security Administration, which oversees the nation's
nuclear weapons enterprise. Nearly half of the Energy
Department's budget in fiscal 2019 goes to NNSA.
Washington Examiner: I just wanted to first touch on coal,
and understand where you are. You were trying to get a proposal
through the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and I was
just wondering if there is a new iteration of that in the
works, and if you're looking to do something after that? I know
they're doing something as well, but just wanted to see what
you were doing for the power plant side, what you're doing for
coal?
Rick Perry: Let me back up . . . We're an all-of-the-above
department. We're not here just to promote the fossil fuels.
We're here to promote a wind, and solar, and hydro, and maybe
some forms of energy that we haven't even dreamed up yet. But
for the foreseeable future, fossil fuels are going to play a
really important role, not just in America, but in the world.
By, I think, 2040, over 70 percent of the electricity that's
created in the United States is going to come from fossil
fuels. So, our goal is to produce it, develop it, make it
available cleaner. That's the key for us. So, we're promoting
American technology around the world; we're promoting American
fossil fuels around the world.
As the governor of Texas, I oversaw a rather interesting
period of time as we transitioned out of older, inefficient
power plants to a massive amount of natural gas plants. We put
programs to move old, dirty-burning diesel engines out of the
fleets of big fleet operators to cleaner burning engines. We
had the largest wind energy development in the nation. Texas
developed more wind energy now than five countries. So, I've
got a history of being an all-of-the-above guy promoting it. It
makes a lot of sense from an economic standpoint for us to be
selling our coal, exporting it. Obviously, LNG [liquid natural
gas]. Crude, now. So, America is in the energy business. My
role in that is not only to be a really good salesperson as we
travel around the country, we interact with world leaders, my
counterparts, but also to promote this technology that we have,
CCUS, for instance.
Washington Examiner: The clean coal technology.
Perry: Clean coal technology. Yes, sir. The carbon capture,
utilization, sequestration. It's really an exciting time to be
the secretary of energy, partly because of American ingenuity,
American technology, and we're just coming out of a period of
time from, let's say, the mid-70s when America was all about
regulation. You know, we're going to regulate our way forward,
no matter how draconian it may be or how dark the future may
look. We don't believe in that. We believe that it's innovation
rather than regulation. Because if you will give Americans
stability, predictability in the regulatory world, they will
risk their capital. They will go spend dollars. A lot of those
dollars will go into research and development, our national
labs and things that we do there. I just think it's a
fascinating time to be the secretary of energy, and an all-of-
the-above strategy is the wise way to go.
Washington Examiner: We're now becoming a net exporter of
natural gas. What's your outlook there?
Perry: We are the No. 1 oil- and gas-producing country in
the world. We will soon be the net gas exporter. So, it's a
fine line producing versus exporting. But the point is, 15
years ago, if someone had said you and I were going to be
having this conversation, ``Boy, you boys are not in touch with
reality.''
Washington Examiner: You're talking about innovation over
regulation, or laying the foundation for the private sector to
come in, the private sector has come in, they're investing
more. They're asking you to approve facilities for export.
Where do you see that role for the government in helping move
faster toward an energy export economy?
Perry: So, I've got a history. I was the governor of the
12th largest economy in the world, and during that period of
time, one of the things that I heard often was the regulatory
climate is what affects us more so than anything, have a
predictable, stable regulatory climate. The way we did that in
my home state was we said, ``OK, here are the rules. You've got
the rules written down. When somebody comes to get a permit,
here are the rules; you make these rules. Those get made by
legislators or by agencies. I mean there's a process that you
go through to get those. But once those are out there,
government's role should be simply: ``Here are the rules. You
meet these rules, here's your permit.'' That's not what we saw
in the last eight years at the federal government, in
particular. We saw a government with their thumb on the scale.
They had a definite bias against coal. They had a bias against
nuclear, and if you were in the renewable business, hallelujah.
We don't think that's fair. We like for people to have a
lot of options out there from a national security standpoint
and from the security of our citizens standpoint, so we believe
that if you will have a stable, fair, and if you don't like the
rules, work through the process to change them, but don't stop
a permit going forward because you've got a political bias
against a particular type of fuel. The Trump Administration all
across the board, whether it's EPA, Department of Interior,
whether it's Commerce, whether it's over here at DOE, the
message is clear. You have a regulatory climate that is fair,
predictable, and if a rule is blocking something going forward,
if it's in the way, if it costs more than it benefits--out the
door.
Washington Examiner: Now, I know for LNG, you have
principal authority to approve permits in line with FERC.
Perry: FERC has a role. They're an independent agency. I
don't mind giving them advice. They don't mind giving me
advice.
Washington Examiner: Is there any specific way you're
looking to speed up permits? Is there a certain number you want
to see approved in the next year?
Perry: The market will decide what's the right number. My
job is to basically say, here are the rules. You meet the
rules, here's your permit. My job is not to say, ``Well guys,
we're looking at this, and we think the market is a little
oversaturated.'' That's not our job. That is for the private
sector to decide how they're going to risk their capital, and
when they think that the market is ripe for them to be building
an LNG facility, they'll show up here and make the application.
At that particular point in time, our job is to look and make
sure that they follow all the rules and then deliver a permit.
Washington Examiner: There are new market opportunities in
Appalachia. There's a lot of natural gas in Pennsylvania, in
Ohio, a lot of liquids in Ohio.
Perry: Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania, West Virginia.
Washington Examiner: They're talking about opening
refineries for things like ethane, which is a precursor to a
whole bunch of other things. The administration seems to be
supportive of that. How do you see that coming to bear in the
next year or so?
Perry: The administration is highly supportive of that. The
president really likes the concept of duplicating the
petrochemical footprint that's in the Gulf Coast region in
Appalachia. Here's why it's wise. As the governor of Texas in
August and September, I always was very wary about hurricane
season, a major hurricane, a category five, storm up the
Houston ship channel. Devastating not just to the city of
Houston and the millions of people that live there, but that
petrochemical footprint. It could literally knock out the
economic and national security basis of this country. So,
wouldn't it make sense to have a duplicate of that, if you
will, in another region of the country? I think Appalachia
makes a lot of sense, partly because of the economics that come
along with that, the transition in a region of the country that
could really use the help economically, sitting on top of a
massive amount of natural gas in the Marcellus and then below
that the Utica, and the close proximity to the East Coast, to
those ports there that they could be sending that value-added
product out of.
So, I think it's a brilliant concept that the president
really likes. I think that the members of Congress, as they are
educated on it and take a look at it, there'll be support in
Congress for that. At the end of the day, the private sector
will build it out. The private sector will be the ones who
decide. Our job will be, don't get in the way. We have our role
to protect the environment, protect the people with our rules,
``You meet the rules, here's your permit.''
Washington Examiner: That proposal is attracting a lot of
investment to the tri-state area--West Virginia, Ohio,
Pennsylvania--looking for places to set up, seeing the huge
resource there. How's that affecting DOE as far as the
workload? Are you looking to set up an Appalachian division?
Perry: I think we're yet to announce anything from the
standpoint of here's how DOE is going to be structured around
this project, but we'll be very involved at the appropriate
time. I think it's a little early to be laying it out with
great specificity. But the other side of that is that we're not
too far away from being able to do it.
Washington Examiner: You mentioned the hurricanes and the
threat they pose and that being a reason for expanding refinery
capacity. The other threat is cyber, and you have structurally
proposed some changes at DOE to embrace that. Also, today's
news about Russian sanctions and some of what was revealed at
the White House that the Russians were trying to undermine the
electric grid. What is DOE's role in combating that?
Perry: So, from a bit of a high-level look down, the
Department of Energy is the sector-specific agency dealing with
the protection, the resiliency of the electric grid that
includes any natural disasters that would occur. It also covers
any cyber attacks that would occur. So, the decision was made
to clearly define that, to stand up an office that sent that
message clearly, not to just the public, but also to our
friends on the Hill, that this is where sector-specific,
relative to the electrical grid, the real work is going to be
to protect it. So, CESER [Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and
Emergency Response], it's cyber, and the back end of that is
emergency recovery. So, this has a number of areas, cyber is in
there, the security of the grid, you have emergency response
and recovery, all in one shop. One of the things the president
wants to do is to, he talked about on the permitting process in
his infrastructure plan, a one-stop shop, if you will. We're a
long way away from that because of the massive amount of
government agencies that if you're building some type of
infrastructure, you got to go to all these different agencies.
Sometimes, it's pitting agency against agency. The president
wants to cut through all of that as much as he can.
On cyber for the electrical side, that's one of the things
that we're doing, clearly defining that this is where you come
if you're in the electrical generation business and you've got
big panels, the Department of Energy is going to be here to
help you deal with any cyber attacks. If you're in the
transmission business, this is the place you would come to
partner. We've got national labs that work on this, we've got a
real focus on cybersecurity, dealing with the resiliency and
the protection of the electrical grid.
Washington Examiner: There had been some concerns in the
past by the electricity sector that they would have to go to
DHS, Department of Homeland Security, but they'd rather go to
FERC or DOE. So, is that what you're addressing?
Perry: DHS certainly has a very important, I would suggest
even a lead, role in global cybersecurity, the issues that are
dealing with the Department of Homeland Security [are] efforts
that you would see in the attack of a hospital computer system.
DHS would be the lead on that. With that said, we work very
closely together. There's no space between DHS and DOE. We've
probably from time to time borrowed some of their things; from
time to time, they use our national labs to see if they can
break a particular piece of equipment, or get into all the
things they do.
Washington Examiner: Is the president asking the Department
of Energy to do anything in light of the Russian revelations?
Are you collecting information? What is your role as they
impose sanctions? Are you being asked to do anything by the
White House in light of these attacks?
Perry: We know what our duties are. Some of them we can
share with you, and some of them we can't. We've pretty much
shared with you our public side of what we do. You know,
there's a reason that the Department of Energy and the
secretary is on the National Security Council. There's a lot of
work out there that we classify, and we're right up to the edge
of that now.
Washington Examiner: That brings me to National Nuclear
Security Administration, and the arsenal. The budget proposal
for NNSA is pretty robust. There are some reforms that the
national academies and others have proposed. Where do you see
the reorganization of the nuclear weapons arm of DOE in the
next few years?
Perry: Again, I want to take you back to a little higher
level and observe. For 25, 30 years, the members of Congress
did not see the importance of modernizing our weapons program.
They patched it up from time to time, but there was no effort
to modernizing. I moved into a house in Austin one time that
hadn't had any upgrades done to it for about 40 years. I mean
it literally still had fuses that you screwed into the
electrical system, OK? This was in the early 90s, but still
that's maybe a poor analogy, but these systems are old. They
deteriorate. Both the DOD and the DOE recognized that we have a
responsibility, and we were getting to a point where these
weapons systems were at the end of their ability to just sit on
the shelf and replacing a few parts here and there wasn't
enough. So, I think the administration wisely and Congress,
saluting properly, they added dollars that have gone to
modernize that fleet, and it's going to be a lot of work. NNSA
is going to be tested if they are up to it.
But the better news in all of that is that the message that
it sends around the world is that United States technology,
United States readiness is going to be as good as it's ever
been. That is an appropriate response and an important duty at
the DOE.
Washington Examiner: What was the meeting you had with the
president on Monday at the White House? What was that about?
Perry: Man, in an hour we covered the watershed. We talked
about a lot of different things. As a rule that I don't break,
I don't talk about my conversations with the president. One
thing I will tell you is that we talked about some veterans'
issues because we have a program over here called ACTIV, A-C-T-
I-V, which we use our massive computing capability to deal with
traumatic brain injury, post-traumatic stress, and mental sides
of the veteran world. But it's more than just the veteran; it
reaches into the world of first responders into professional
athletes anywhere in the country. It could be a young lady who
played soccer who's had a concussion. The data that we're going
to be making available is literally going to change the world
if you've had a traumatic brain injury or been affected by
post-traumatic stress.
Washington Examiner: Why did the president want to hear
about that? Is he planning something?
Perry: I don't know whether he wanted to hear it or not. I
wanted him to hear it. That was my job, is to share that with
him so that he understood the importance of what we were doing
over here. And you know, the president's curious. He asked a
lot of questions. He wants to know what's going on, ``What have
you been doing? How's this sector, that sector doing?'' I mean,
he covers the watershed. So, we talked about a lot of different
things. What he didn't talk about was me changing jobs. I know
there's a lot of interest in that over the last 48 to 72 hours.
The president knows I like where I am. He knows that we have a
done a really good job of getting this agency focused,
particularly in those areas that he's interested in, selling
American, running an agency effectively. It was a good
conversation, and I'm glad I got to sit down with him and share
with him. So, he knows what's going on at DOE. He knows what
our priorities are, he knows about what we're doing with cyber,
he knows what we're doing on the promotion of American energy
resources globally. He knows what we're doing on a regulatory
front.
This veteran's program, some might look at and say that's a
little outside of your lane. Actually, it's not because of the
national labs and what the national labs had been doing on
brain science for a long time and this massive amount of
computing capability now. So, we're right up to the point of
both machine learning, verging on artificial intelligence, if
you will, with computers of that capacity. Five of the 10
fastest computers in the world belong to the Department of
Energy.
I've just got a passion about these veterans, particularly
veterans who have had both TBI and post-traumatic stress
events, and we know that both in professional sports and and
public school sports. The public that we will be servicing with
this program is relatively small. Obviously, we are doing some
programs with the VA as well. There's one called the Million
Veterans Program, which draws the blood, runs the DNA, and then
be able to go back to the vet and say, here are the things you
have a propensity [for], here's what you need to be looking out
for as you go on with your life.
Washington Examiner: Have you been at the Department of
Energy a year yet?
Perry: March 2 was my one-year anniversary. That's also
Texas independence day. So, it's easy for us to remember
anyway.
Washington Examiner: How do you see the next year shaping
up?
Perry: I look back over the last year and say what was the
most successful thing? It was putting a really good
professional team together, and we still have a few openings
out there. But we brought in a highly capable professional team
of men and women who are serving well.
So, the next year, what I full well expect is we'll get the
2018 budget done, knock on wood, and we'll have some surety and
our funding going forward. We'll have the 2019 process in
place. The Senate and the House will both look at what we've
done and say, ``good job,'' continue with the tweaks that they
want. Certainly given us direction on what we need to be
working on together. But cyber and the standing up with the
CESER office, continuing to promote American energy, that is
probably as target-rich an environment as there is. We've got
trips into India, into Europe, into some other regions ...
South America, of which the potential for American innovation,
American technology, American products, whether it's fossil
fuels or whether it's our solar and wind energy technology. I
think the potential here in the next year is quite good.
Domestically. This Appalachian plan, we hope to be able to
not only flesh it out, but to announce it. This is one of those
on the infrastructure side. I mean, the president's vision
about infrastructure is really big, as it should be. I've had
the privilege of visiting almost every state in the nation, not
in the last year, but over my public service years, and what I
saw was a crumbling infrastructure. Roads that need work,
bridges that need work, and then, when you think about rail,
wires, and pipelines, those are owned by the private sector.
So, there's a lot of infrastructure out there that we need to
see built back up and, in some cases, expanded.
For instance, pipelines in the Northeast, that's a real
restriction for citizens living in, say, New York. They don't
have access to all of this abundance of energy and they're
having to pay substantially higher rates, or in the case of
these really cold snaps that came along, they were burning fuel
oil up there. I mean, it sure would have been a lot better for
the air if they were burning natural gas.
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Mark Zuckerberg heads into Capitol Hill firestorm.
Arthur Brooks: `I'm going to stay at it'.
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Long-simmering battle over e-cigarettes erupts as FDA clamps
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Perry travels to India for high-level energy talks.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2019 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 10, 2018
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m. in Room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M.
Inhofe, presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker,
Fischer, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Cruz, Scott, Reed,
Nelson, McCaskill, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly,
Hirono, King, Warren, and Peters.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Senator Inhofe. The meeting will come to order.
The committee today meets to receive testimony from General
Darren McDew on the current state of the U.S. Transportation
Command [TRANSCOM].
In the contested environment described within the new
National Defense Strategy [NDS], TRANSCOM's capacity to
mobilize and deploy forces across the globe becomes ever more
crucial to our ability to project power.
The National Defense Strategy provides clear focus on the
great power competition with China and Russia. We have been
talking a lot about that recently.
Further, the National Defense Strategy emphasizes the
importance of resilient and agile logistics.
The assumptions that U.S. forces will have uncontested
access to airspace and sea lanes is becoming less and less
likely.
General McDew, you appear before this committee at a time
when these responsibilities are of vital importance to the
nation's security. Our adversaries are not standing still. They
are moving fast, and we are very distressed at some of the
things that we see on a firsthand basis. TRANSCOM's job is to
ensure that our operational plans contain valid assumptions for
how our soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen will get to the
fight and how they will be sustained in a contested forward
environment.
Efforts are currently underway to conduct an overarching
mobility study that would articulate how TRANSCOM would operate
in a contested environment as well as execute its joint
distribution and deployment responsibilities. Our current
approach relies on moving materiel to large air and sea ports
which serve as efficient hubs but are also well known to our
adversaries and would be very hard to defend against a
precision weapon attack.
The Department must begin to focus on improving resilience.
Anything less would significantly increase the risk of our
missions.
So we thank you for appearing today and look forward to
your frank discussion on TRANSCOM's potential problems and
successes.
Senator Reed?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let
me join you in welcoming General McDew to the committee this
morning and to testify on the plans and programs of the United
States Transportation Command, or TRANSCOM, as we continue to
review our fiscal year 2019 authorization. We are grateful to
you for your service and the service of the men and women of
TRANSCOM. Please thank them for us and their families who also
serve with great distinction.
The men and women of TRANSCOM perform duties that sustain
the whole Department of Defense [DOD] effort in protecting our
nation's security. With the competitive edge and its ability to
deploy and sustain America's armed forces, TRANSCOM provides
DOD with unique capabilities that we have come to expect and
perhaps too frequently take for granted. TRANSCOM forces are
busy supporting all of the combatant commanders every day, and
without these TRANSCOM forces, the United States would be at a
significant disadvantage almost everywhere in the world.
TRANSCOM faces a number of daunting tasks, including a
unique set of cyber threats because you must work extensively
with private sector entities in the transportation and shipping
industries to support DOD deployment operations.
Three years ago, the committee issued a report on certain
aspects of TRANSCOM's cybersecurity situation. General McDew, I
would like to get an update from you on the progress in the
cybersecurity efforts that you have made since last year.
The Ready Reserve Force, the RRF, a group of cargo ships
held in readiness by the Maritime Administration, is aging and
will need to be modernized over the next decade. Last year, the
committee authorized the Department to start a program to
recapitalize the Ready Reserve Force by authorizing DOD to
purchase up to two foreign-built vessels while the Navy moves
forward on a plan to design a family of auxiliary vessels for a
number of uses, including recapitalizing the Ready Reserve
Force.
This authorization to purchase two vessels was intended to
cover recapitalization requirements for the first several years
of the future defense program. However, this year, the
administration is asking to increase that authorization to
include purchasing up to 24 foreign-built vessels. General
McDew, I am interested in your perspective on this request,
whether such a large increase is needed, and if there are any
alternative options.
In addition to the Ready Reserve Force, the Defense
Department also needs to ensure that the Civil Reserve Air
Fleet, or the CRAF, the CRAF program which provides as much as
40 percent of wartime airlift needs, remains viable after
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and will be able, as needed,
to surge capacity in the future. General, I am interested in
your views on the state of the fleet and if anything needs to
be done to ensure their readiness.
Our global transportation capability, owned and managed by
TRANSCOM, has been one of our asymmetric advantages for many
years now. However, we cannot assume that potential adversaries
will allow us free rein in this area in the future. General
McDew, I understand that you have been conducting an analysis
to assess requirements for an environment where our mobility
forces would be challenged. I also understand that the
Department will share those results later this year. Perhaps
you could give us an update on when we are likely to see the
results of your analysis.
Thank you again for your decades of service, and I look
forward to your testimony.
Thank you, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
General McDew, we would like to hear your opening
statement. Your written statement will be made a part of the
record. Thank you for being here. You are recognized.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL DARREN W. McDEW, USAF, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
General McDew. Thank you, Senator Inhofe, Ranking Member
Reed, and distinguished members of the committee. It is an
honor to be with you this morning, and thank you for your
leadership and unwavering support you give the men and women
who serve our great and mighty nation.
I also want to thank you for the opportunity to represent
the United States Transportation Command and the work of our
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines and coast guardsmen,
civil servants and contractors and their families. The men and
women who make up this command underwrite the joint forces'
lethality with unparalleled capability, and I am exceptionally
proud of what they do. As a matter of fact, we are probably the
only command that has a watch party for this event. So they are
all watching back home in the cornfields of Illinois right now.
USTRANSCOM's total force team works every day to provide
our nation with a broad range of strategic capabilities and
options, but they do not do it alone. I wish every American
citizen could understand how much we rely on the nation's truck
drivers, conductors, commercial pilots, mariners, stevedores,
and much, much more to meet national defense requirements.
USTRANSCOM is a global warfighting command with functional
expertise and we move and sustain the joint force, but we are
also responsible for operating the expansive joint deployment
and distribution enterprise. I can say with full confidence
that today USTRANSCOM stands ready to deliver on behalf of
national objectives anywhere at any time.
However, I do remain concerned about the future. As we
refocus our efforts on great power competition, we are faced
with potential challenges to our democratic values, our
security. In this environment, we must always be ready. As we
increase lethality across the joint force, the resources
necessary to transport and sustain America's military must keep
pace. Our ability to project a decisive force is foundational
to the National Defense Strategy. The size and lethality of the
force is of little consequence if we cannot get it where it
needs to go when it needs to get there.
To that end, the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act
[NDAA] directed a mobility capabilities and requirements study.
This study will determine if in fact the current inventory of
mobility assets is sufficient to support national security
requirements. The study will consider the impact of multi-
domain contested environments as well as the implications for
attrition. The outcomes of this study will provide valuable
insight to ensure we continue to meet today's needs while
simultaneously evolving for tomorrow.
But USTRANSCOM cannot get there alone. We must have the
weight of the entire nation behind us to ensure that when our
diplomats go to the negotiating table, they do so from a
position of strength. One of the greatest threats to that
strength is malicious activities in the cyber domain. Our
adversaries no longer have to stop us with bombs and bullets.
All they have to do is slow us down with 1's and 0's. That,
ladies and gentlemen, is the challenge of our time. We must
grow in this domain as a nation so that we can protect
ourselves and protect each other.
We also face challenges in the physical domain. The current
ratio of active duty and reserve component forces means we must
rely on the reserves and the National Guard to fulfill wartime
requirements. For 3 decades, our reserve component has been
used to sustain day-to-day operational requirements, a function
for which they were not properly resourced or structured.
Meeting the challenges of the future may require adjustments to
mobilization authorities or force mix to assure access to vital
capacity.
While USTRANSCOM operates the most robust patient movement
system in the world, we lack sufficient capacity to surge for a
large-scale conflict. The combination of a number of factors
decreases the likelihood that we will see the same high
survival rates we have seen in the more recent conflicts. We
continue to work with the services, the Joint Staff, and the
national health enterprise to address these challenges.
Finally, if we are to maintain our nation's power
projection capabilities, we must first acknowledge our waning
sealift capacity. The U.S. flag fleet has steadily declined
since World War II from 1,288 ships in 1951 to 81 U.S.-flagged
ships operating in international trade today. The degradation
of the fleet also means fewer qualified merchant mariners, the
simple backbone of our maritime industry. With the decline in
our maritime capacity, it is becoming increasingly difficult to
characterize America as a maritime nation.
In response to an aging organic sealift fleet, the fiscal
year 2018 Defense Authorization Act authorized the purchase of
two used vessels. We thank you for supporting this first step.
Thank you again for inviting me to speak to you today.
Please say hello to all the folks in the cornfields of Illinois
who are watching you today. And we thank you very much for
allowing me to speak on behalf of USTRANSCOM and I believe
America's heroes and those of the civilians, contractors, and
servicemembers who project and sustain power around the globe
every single day. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General McDew follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Darren W. McDew
america as a superpower
The United States of America is the world's only superpower. The
Nation maintains this status because of our global influence and
ability to project power around the world at a moment's notice. United
States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) is a critical element in
this national capability. The men and women who make up this command
provide an unparalleled expeditionary capability and underwrite the
Nation's ability to rapidly respond to emerging crises. A global,
warfighting combatant command (CCMD) with functional responsibilities,
USTRANSCOM's role in projecting and sustaining power is the cornerstone
of the Joint Force's efforts to meet national policy objectives.
Established in 1987, United States Transportation Command's marked
its 30th Anniversary in 2017. Operationalized during Operations Desert
Shield and Desert Storm, the command now delivers global mobility
solutions every day in both peace and war through its component
commands: Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC),
Military Sealift Command (MSC), Air Mobility Command (AMC) and what I
call our fourth component, the commercial industry. Together, with our
subordinate commands, Joint Transportation Reserve Unit (JTRU) and the
Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC), our Total Force team of
Active Duty, Guard, Reserve, civilians and contractors, remains
postured to preserve the Nation's comparative advantage and provide the
President a broad range of options today, and tomorrow.
In the past year, USTRANSCOM bolstered American influence around
the globe. We exercised our deployment capabilities, sustained combat
operations, and managed the expansive Joint Deployment and Distribution
Enterprise (JDDE). USTRANSCOM's team of Joint Warriors also enabled the
movement of America's sick and wounded to medical treatment facilities
worldwide, relocated thousands of families, and responded to every
Geographic Combatant Command's requirements without fail. We performed
33 Brigade Combat Team (BCT)-sized movements, shortening deployment
timelines and demonstrating our ability to deliver a decisive force at
the time and location of our choosing. When hurricanes ravaged Texas,
Florida, Puerto Rico, and the United States Virgin Islands, our joint
enabling and strategic mobility assets deployed to provide critical
capabilities including planning support, aeromedical evacuation, and
life-saving supplies. Our efforts demonstrated the Nation's resolve and
strengthened partnerships worldwide.
mission
The President of the United States designated USTRANSCOM's five
primary roles and responsibilities through the 2017 Unified Command
Plan (UCP). The UCP established USTRANSCOM as the Joint Deployment and
Distribution Coordinator (JDDC), merging and expanding our previous
roles as Distribution Process Owner and Global Distribution
Synchronizer. This evolution of our responsibilities provides extended
authorities to coordinate operations and planning across all domains
spanning the JDDE. As DOD's Single Manager for Transportation,
USTRANSCOM provides common user and commercial air, land, and sea
transportation, as well as terminal management and air refueling in
support of deployment, employment, sustainment, and re-deployment. We
are responsible for providing joint sourcing solutions for all mobility
forces and capabilities, in close coordination with the other CCMDs in
our role as the Mobility Joint Force Provider. Enabling America's
unprecedented patient movement capability, we arrange timely and safe
movement for the Nation's ill and injured in support of the CCMDs,
other U.S. Government agencies, and key international allies and
partners as the DOD Single Manager for Patient Movement.
Our fifth and final UCP responsibility is the provision of Joint
Enabling Capabilities, performed by the JECC. The JECC provides alert
postured communications, planning, and public affairs capabilities to
accelerate the formation of Joint Force headquarters. Delivering high-
impact experts with knowledge in joint warfighting functions, the JECC
supports SECDEF-directed deployments as well as immediate Global
Response Force (GRF) missions. This Total Force team offers a unique
capability not replicated by any other organization within DOD.
the contemporary security environment
USTRANSCOM has been successful for 30 years, but the Nation is at
an inflection point, and we must evolve to remain viable in the future.
Volatile geopolitics, shifting demographics, and emerging technologies
are changing the character of war. These considerations are changing
societies and the way we fight--they are also changing why and where
wars are fought, and who is fighting them. Today, every domain is
contested, with conflict unconstrained by Geographic Combatant Command
boundaries or principles of sovereignty. Lower barriers of entry are
expanding our adversaries' access to disruptive technology, placing our
technological superiority at risk. Mobility forces may be required to
transport and sustain US and allied forces while under persistent
multi-domain attack, including deception and data manipulation in
cyberspace. We face the most complex and volatile security environment
in recent history. Our past successes will not ensure success tomorrow.
The Joint Force has taken domain dominance for granted for 70
years, but we can no longer assume logistics will arrive in theater
unchallenged by our adversaries. In an effort to better understand
contemporary threats and operate effectively in the current context,
USTRANSCOM hosted a series of Contested Environment Wargames and
Summits. Lessons learned from these events drove changes in how we plan
for attrition, cyber, mobilization, authorities, access, and command
and control. We now consider the attrition of organic sealift and
airlift fleets in our planning and requirements analysis, as well as
the need for global mission command of disparate mobility forces. A
growing realization that the Homeland is no longer a sanctuary led us
to plan for denied access to our own strategic nodes, as well as those
abroad. Our analysis revealed that an adversary can derive immense
strategic benefit from cyber operations alone. The reality of our time
is that adversaries no longer have to stop us with bombs or bullets;
all they have to do is slow us down with ones and zeroes. Yet our
preparation for these challenges cannot exist solely on paper. We must
make some tough fiscal decisions today, prioritizing readiness and
modernization to assure our strategic advantage tomorrow.
our global perspective
In a contemporary environment filled with uncertainty and rising
geopolitical tensions, the logistics enterprise must always be ready.
Key to this preparedness is USTRANSCOM's effort to set the globe for
logistics on behalf of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, continuously shaping the Nation's ability to
respond to simultaneous threats within a trans-regional, multi-domain,
and multi-functional security environment. With our global perspective
and responsibilities, this command is uniquely postured to balance
resources worldwide and understand the risks associated with surging
and swinging mobility assets between theaters.
Setting the globe for logistics involves balancing resources
historically employed in a theater-centric paradigm and regularly using
the worldwide network of modes, nodes, and routes to ensure the network
remains active and resilient. Balancing and using the globe builds
resilience within the JDDE, maximizes scarce strategic transportation
assets, and strengthens relationships with our fourth component,
allies, and strategic partners. Balance requires having the proper
authorities to position and reposition mobility assets, thus enhancing
agility, mitigating risk across the JDDE, and increasing the
President's decision space. Effectively using the globe means
unshackling ourselves from our habituated uses of the JDDE. The
previous practice of only using finite strategic nodes for deployment
and sustainment operations limits the Joint Force's flexibility to
compete over the long term and deter conflict in multiple regions,
while preparing to win in any war. We must implement new and innovative
ways of using the globe by fostering strong partnerships and agreements
with commercial industry, allies, and other partners to build network
resiliency, expand our competitive space, and proliferate our power
projection capabilities. When USTRANSCOM sets the globe, it creates
options . . . and options create opportunities.
challenges and opportunities
The Secretary of Defense has deemed his number one priority,
``Restoring Readiness as We Build a More Lethal Force.'' As we restore
readiness and increase lethality, the resources necessary to transport
and sustain the Joint Force must keep pace. Current operations and on-
going sustainment requirements engage a significant portion of the
total force, limiting capacity to surge or meet increased deployment
and distribution demands. The DOD has historically viewed the Reserve
Component as a strategic reserve. However, capacity shortfalls in the
Active Component required the DOD to leverage Guard and Reserve assets
to maintain steady-state activities for nearly three decades. Several
conditions exacerbate this concern; fiscal uncertainty, aging fleets,
workforce shortages, and an increasingly contested maritime domain.
Despite the many challenges of our time, global integration, emerging
technologies, and the collective experience of our mobility forces
present opportunities to strengthen our distribution networks and
improve the effectiveness of our logistics operations while decreasing
risk to force. Whether to pursue opportunities or overcome challenges,
we must continue to invest in key areas to secure victory on tomorrow's
battlefields. These areas fall into the following four broad
categories, which mirror USTRANSCOM's priorities: Readiness, Cyber,
Evolving for Tomorrow, and Workforce Development.
Readiness: State of the Command
USTRANSCOM stands ready to deliver in support of national
objectives today. However, as we look to the future, contested domains
and fiscal uncertainty present a threat to the viability of the JDDE.
If we fail to address a number of these challenges in the coming years,
the strength on which the Nation has historically relied will no longer
be there when needed. Specifically, we must address issues of capacity,
availability, and proficiency within USTRANSCOM's air, land, and sea
components; shore up commercial industry's capacity and security gaps;
and provide the necessary resources to rebuild readiness and modernize
the mobility force.
Fiscal Uncertainty
The Budget Control Act (BCA) and recent Continuing Resolutions
prevent the force from adequately addressing our most pressing
readiness concerns. These legislative measures force the Services to
prioritize immediate operational needs over prudent long-term planning
and investment, eroding readiness over the long term. Specifically, the
BCA prevents the Services from adequately manning, training, and
equipping their forces for contemporary challenges, ultimately
threatening USTRANSCOM's ability to deploy forces when necessary. After
more than 16 years of conflict, rebuilding readiness and modernizing
the force is a national imperative.
However, timely and predictable funding is essential if we are to
make progress toward meeting tomorrow's demands; the uncertainty that
comes with government shutdowns and continuing resolutions only delays
these efforts.
Sealift
When the United States goes to war, USTRANSCOM moves 90 percent of
its cargo requirements with the strategic sealift fleet, which consists
of government-owned ships augmented by the commercial U.S.-flagged
fleet. The ability to deploy a decisive force is foundational to the
National Defense Strategy, as the size and lethality of the force is of
little consequence if we are unable to project power in the pursuit of
national objectives. Therefore, the readiness of the entire strategic
sealift portfolio, both organic and commercial, remains the top
priority for USTRANSCOM.
USTRANSCOM's Navy component, Military Sealift Command (MSC),
controls the organic strategic sealift ships that deliver logistics and
humanitarian relief, move military equipment, supply combat forces, and
forward position combat cargo around the world. MSC also assumes
operational command of the Maritime Administration's (MARAD) Ready
Reserve Force (RRF) ships during periods of activation. However, our
organic sealift capabilities will degrade rapidly over the coming years
if we fail to pursue a responsible recapitalization strategy. Although
the Navy added service-life extension funding for 22 vessels in POM19,
30 of 65 Roll-on/Roll-off (RO/RO) vessels and all 11 special capability
vessels could age out over the next 15 years. As further directed by
the Fiscal Year 2018 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA),
USTRANSCOM is working with the Navy on a comprehensive recapitalization
plan which includes acquiring used vessels, extending the service life
of able vessels, and building new ships--all three of which are
required to stabilize the fleet.
The 2018 NDAA authorizes the Secretary of Defense to purchase two
used vessels. This provision was intended to serve as a bridging
strategy within the recapitalization program but is insufficient to
bridge the impending capacity gap. Based on the estimated build rate
and size of newly constructed vessels, 24 additional ``buy-used''
authorizations are needed by 2030. Available capacity for used vessel
acquisition presents a prime opportunity to pursue this strategy.
As a result of changes in market conditions within the maritime
industry, USTRANSCOM will be the only remaining owner of steam ships in
the United States by 2020. We possess a sufficient number of certified
steam engineers to operate this legacy vessel today. However, the pool
of certified steam engineers will rapidly drop in number and
proficiency as steam-powered commercial vessels leave service. Due to
this diminishing capability, recapitalization of steamships with newer
technology, such as diesel ships, is a high USTRANSCOM priority.
Opportunities to regularly exercise the organic Strategic Sealift
Fleet ensures MSC maintains the highest state of readiness. Activating
ships for exercises and sea trials is the primary mechanism for
assessing RRF and MSC Surge Fleet readiness. These operations allow MSC
and MARAD to better assess changes in material degradations, vessel and
Mariner availability, and corresponding risk to mission accomplishment.
However, in a fleet of 61 vessels, current resourcing only allows for
10 training activations per year. We regularly pursue additional
opportunities to integrate our organic fleet into DOD-supported
exercises and support unit-level missions, including participating in
exercises with other CCMDs . We will continue to pursue means to
increase activations and extend sea trials, where possible, to get
these ships underway with more frequency and improve the overall
readiness of the fleet.
An aging organic sealift fleet coupled with a reduction in U.S.-
flagged vessels threatens our ability to meet national security
requirements. The U.S.-flagged fleet has been in steady decline since
World War II as a result of decreasing demand and the rising cost of
the U.S.-flagged fleet compared to international fleets. In 1951, 1,288
U.S.-flagged ships were registered in the United States. In 1990, the
fleet was down to 408 ships, and in 2013 just 106. Today, 82 U.S.-
flagged ships operate in international trade, representing a 25 percent
reduction in just the last 5 years. This reduction in actively trading
U.S.-flagged vessels correlates to a decline in the numbers of
qualified Merchant Mariners, the workforce required to deliver U.S.
Forces to war. If the fleet continues to lose ships, a lengthy, mass
deployment on the scale of Desert Shield/Desert Storm could eventually
require U.S. Forces to rely on foreign-flagged ships for sustainment.
The U.S.-flagged commercial fleet is vital to the Joint Force's
ability to accomplish its mission. USTRANSCOM's relationships with
U.S.-flagged sealift partners are formalized through the Voluntary
Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) and the Maritime Security Program
(MSP). Since their establishment in 1996, participation in these
programs by privately-owned U.S.-flagged commercial shipping has proven
a cost-effective means to assure access to sealift capability,
capacity, and worldwide networks. The Merchant Marine Act of 1920, or
the Jones Act, and the Cargo Preference Act are intended to ensure a
baseline of ongoing business to support our inter-coastal shipping
capacity and maintain a market for U.S. industrial shipyard
infrastructure to build, repair, and overhaul U.S. vessels. However,
the dwindling size of the domestic U.S. inter-coastal shipping fleet
demands that we reassess our approach to ensure that the U.S. retains
critical national security surge sealift capabilities. We also may need
to rethink policies of the past in order to face an increasingly
competitive future.
The MSP provides an intermodal and logistics capability outside of
the DOD portfolio that would be cost prohibitive to replicate. MSP
assures access to 60 militarily useful vessels, the mariners who crew
those ships, and commercial carriers' global networks and
infrastructure. Without this program, DOD's asymmetric advantage in
logistics would be put at significant risk as many of the vessels
currently in the program would reflag under foreign flags and no longer
participate in VISA. In this scenario, DOD would be forced to augment
organic capacity with foreign-flagged vessels to deploy and sustain the
Joint Force. During Operation Desert Shield, 13 of 192 (7 percent)
foreign-flagged vessels declined to enter the area of operations, while
U.S.-flagged vessels provided steadfast support. Although the security
environment today is more complex than it was 27 years ago, MSP remains
a critical enabler in our ability to execute the National Defense
Strategy (NDS), and it must continue to evolve. We are reviewing MSP
this year to ensure the program's next evolution is best suited to
support national defense.
Along with declining capacity, we are also concerned about the pool
of current and qualified licensed Merchant Mariners who crew America's
ships. If the international U.S.-flagged fleet continues to decline,
the Merchant Mariner labor pool will also decline, putting at risk our
ability to surge forces overseas and sustain a protracted conflict with
U.S. Mariners. Although the qualified Mariner labor pool industry-wide
is adequate to support a surge requirement today, a protracted need for
Mariners would stress the labor pool beyond acceptable risk. The DOT,
with DOD support, must seek innovative ways to recruit and retain
sufficient Mariners to sustain sealift operations across the full
spectrum of conflict. A healthy and viable U.S.-Flagged Fleet remains
the foundation for a suitable Merchant Mariner pool.
Airlift/Air Refueling
USTRANSCOM's air mobility forces provide the Joint Force with a
distinct advantage, projecting and sustaining immediate power in
response to crises and contingencies around the world, any time the
Nation calls. USTRANSCOM's Air Component, Air Mobility Command (AMC),
provides airlift, air refueling, aeromedical evacuation, and air
mobility support functions in support of all CCMDs by leveraging a team
of Total Force Airmen and commercial partners. Although the air
mobility enterprise stands ready to deliver an immediate force tonight,
we must address several readiness concerns in our airlift and air
refueling capabilities, as well as our patient movement system, to
ensure we are able to meet our defense objectives in the future.
America's air refueling fleet is the most stressed of our air
mobility forces. The combination of an aging fleet, increasing demand,
and global tanker distribution puts a significant strain on this scarce
national resource. At an average age of 61 years old, the KC-135
remains the workhorse, comprising 87 percent of the tanker force.
Investments are necessary to allow the aircraft to continue to operate
in a changing environment and stem the decline in aircraft
availability. Nonetheless, as the fleet ages, sustainment costs and
dwindling availability rates will eventually become untenable. The KC-
10, which served as a key part of the tanker force for decades, is
programmed for retirement in Fiscal Year 2019-2024. The current tanker
requirement, set at 479, was based on the 2013 Mobility Requirements
and Capabilities Study (MRCS). The 2018 NDAA-directed Mobility
Requirements and Capabilities Study (MCRS-18) will reflect requirements
articulated in the new National Defense Strategy and address the
current and future levels of risk to the air refueling mission, which
may drive the Department toward increasing air refueling capacity for
CCMDs. However, we already know the convergence of an aging air
refueling fleet with protracted KC-46 production puts the Joint Force's
ability to effectively execute war plans at risk. Day-to-day, high
levels of air refueling fleet utilization are approaching a point that
challenges the Total Force to sustain current levels of support. Thus,
the tanker fleet's end strength will require careful synchronization
between KC-10 and KC-135 retirements and KC-46 production and delivery
to sustain current force projection capabilities.
The uneven geographic allocation of the tanker fleet requires an
agile command and control construct to balance this high-demand asset
across GCCs. The practice of stockpiling resources in specific regions
with no single organization possessing the capacity and authority to
dynamically reallocate assets creates deficiencies in some theaters and
surpluses in others. Global sourcing solutions, on the other hand,
generate capacity out of multiple regions to support emerging crises in
prioritized theaters.
To that end, the SECDEF directed USTRANSCOM, through the 2017
Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP), to manage in-theater
air refueling assets that exceed the minimum required by Geographic
Combatant Command (GCC) war plans. However, legislation enacted in 2011
reserves a disproportionate number of theater-assigned tankers for
USPACOM and USEUCOM, limiting USTRANSCOM's ability to balance scarce
resources against total requirements. Optimal allocation of assets
requires a trans-regional perspective and the flexibility to manage
mobility forces at an enterprise level. Given its global visibility,
command and control resources, and geographic impartiality, USTRANSCOM
is uniquely suited to manage the entirety of the tanker fleet. Relief
from legislation that restricts changes to operational control of
tanker forces in USPACOM and USEUCOM would allow USTRANSCOM to optimize
the air refueling fleet and mitigate risk across the Joint Force.
The Operational Support Airlift (OSA)--Executive Airlift (EA)
enterprise provides vital transportation for senior DOD and Federal
officials, including the President, Vice President,
Secretary of Defense and Presidential Cabinet. The EA fleet remains
a necessary asset, providing our senior military and government leaders
with in-flight command, control, and communication capabilities as well
as dedicated, secure transportation. Given its high-visibility and
national level impacts, USTRANSCOM and the Joint Staff are reviewing
options for long-term management and oversight of the EA enterprise.
The Air Force has made key investments in upgrading, modifying, and
recapitalizing its airlift fleet, and we must stay the course. The last
of 52 C-5M aircraft is scheduled for delivery in 2018 through the
Reliability Enhancement and Re-Engineering Program (RERP). Similarly,
advances in the C-17 fleet are enhancing its viability through the
development of high altitude airdrop capabilities and improved secure
communications for portions of the fleet. The Air Force also modernized
the tactical airlift fleet through acquisition of new C-130J aircraft
and various upgrades to the Air Force Reserve Command and Air National
Guard C-130H fleets. The health of the airlift fleet remains strong and
continues to improve through these timely upgrade and modification
efforts.
However, the growing pilot shortage challenges our ability to
sustain current force projection levels. Roughly 30 percent of the Air
Force's pilot shortages come from air mobility platforms. By fiscal
year 2019, we project mobility manning shortfalls will reach or exceed
about 650 pilots. A nearly insatiable demand for commercial pilots,
coupled with a high OPTEMPO, is leading to a larger-than-expected
number of pilots leaving the service. Last year, the Air Force took
actions to mitigate the loss of experienced pilots and increase
production of new pilots. We expect to see initial results from these
efforts by fiscal year 2020.
Today, the mix of Active to Reserve Component resources in
USTRANSCOM means the command relies on the Reserves and National Guard
to fulfill war-time requirements. For example, more than 50 percent of
AMC's airlift and air refueling assets are in the Reserve Component.
The current force balance creates component command dependence on
National Guard and Reserve units to volunteer for activation.
Furthermore, for the past three decades, the Reserve Component has been
used as a reliable and trustworthy asset to sustain day-to-day
operational requirements, a function for which, historically, they were
not resourced or structured. Funding increases in fiscal year 2018 and
fiscal year 2019 will alleviate some of the strain on the force but the
disproportionate force mix may still have broader implications across
the department. The Department's vigilance is required to ensure the
means support the ends against which the Services have aligned our
Reserve Component.
Our Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) partners are critical to the
success of our enterprise, and today, the CRAF program is healthy and
fully subscribed to meet national security objectives. CRAF is a
voluntary program by which U.S. air carriers are awarded government
airlift business to assure access to commercial capacity during
contingencies and emergencies. This resolute relationship has
historically afforded our partners the opportunity to lift about 93
percent of all DOD passengers and 40 percent of DOD air cargo in direct
support of our warfighters. As our 25 CRAF carriers remain in a steady
state of readiness to support DOD cargo and passenger requirements, we
are committed to maintaining a viable CRAF program to continue to meet
national defense requirements.
Surface
When the Nation goes to war, American forces begin deployment
operations using U.S. transportation infrastructure. USTRANSCOM relies
on the DOT, along with other Federal and State agencies to ensure our
roads, rails, and ports are capable of supporting the warfighter's
deployment and distribution requirements. Our Army component command,
SDDC, represents the interests of the DOD to access and safely use both
private and public transportation infrastructure and services. Today,
these networks are capable of effectively deploying the Joint Force.
However, it is imperative that we remember that our transportation
infrastructure is not merely a medium for commercial and civilian use,
it is a national strategic asset, critical to moving military members,
equipment, and supplies in times of crisis.
Highways and railways are strategic links that serve as routes for
the DOD to deploy military forces from fort to port and to project
warfighting materiel from factories to foxholes. Currently, public road
networks are capable of meeting DOD ground transportation needs while
providing adequate access to commercial trucking capacity to meet
current and anticipated surface transportation requirements. America's
rail networks rapidly move large quantities of heavy equipment from
military installations to ports of embarkation, a capability that is
critical to national security. SDDC collaborates closely with the DOT
and the railroads to assess the suitability of our rail networks (most
of which are privately owned) to continue to support military needs.
Although rail networks remain adequate, we face age-mandated
retirements of some of our uniquely capable, DOD-owned railcars. We are
developing a plan, in close cooperation with the Department of the
Army, to replace this critical deployment enabler.
The health of America's strategic sea ports are also of vital
national interest. There are 23 designated Strategic Seaports along our
coasts--17 commercial and 6 military--which serve as major springboards
from which the Nation delivers diplomatic and military solutions around
the world. The infrastructure of each of these ports, to include their
cyber-enabled infrastructure, must be viable and resilient to allow the
flow of equipment and cargo during times of conflict or distress.
Military Ocean Terminal Concord (MOTCO) on the West Coast and
Military Ocean Terminal Sunny Point (MOTSU) on the East Coast are
critical to DOD's ammunition distribution mission, and remain a top
readiness priority. MOTCO, in particular, was identified as requiring
increased investment due to aging infrastructure and lack of
acceptable, ready alternatives to support ammo movement to the Pacific.
The U.S. Army is in the process of a $300 million modernization program
at MOTCO, to include construction of a new pier. We must continue to
maintain and modernize both of these strategic seaports, as well as
build capacity at other ports to enhance resilience, as their unique
mission set underwrites the Joint Force's lethality.
Patient Movement
Today, USTRANSCOM operates the most robust patient movement system
in the world, safely and efficiently moving America's ill and injured.
Last summer, we completed our Aeromedical Evacuation Requirements
Analysis to evaluate the number of aeromedical evacuation crews,
Critical Care Air Transport teams, and patient movement equipment items
required to move patients on time in a single scenario. Although we
conduct patient movement without falter in the current operating
environment, we found shortfalls in our ability to surge for large-
scale conflict with mass casualties. We are currently working with the
Air Force to determine the appropriate way ahead to mitigate these
shortfalls.
Limitations on patient movement in a non-permissive context
highlighted the need to develop interoperable, multi-modal solutions
for joint casualty transportation. Current plans create a near
dependence on airlift which may not be feasible to meet requirements
depending on the scenario. Furthermore, as military medical facilities
consolidate or close, the military infrastructure to support patient
movement is increasingly strained. Insufficient access to en route
medical care (transfer, staging, and treatment) at critical
distribution nodes will further challenge our ability to safely move
expected numbers and types of casualties in future conflicts.
Additionally, a decrease in CONUS-based health care capacity in the
National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) partnership will further
complicate our ability to move patients to the care they need.
The combination of insufficient patient movement personnel,
equipment, infrastructure, and capacity significantly decreases the
likelihood that our Joint Warriors with survivable injuries and
illnesses will have the same high survival rates we have seen in recent
conflicts. In partnership with the Joint Staff, we initiated a
capabilities based assessment which will be completed this year. We are
also working with the Services, the Joint Staff, and the National
Health Enterprise to address these challenges.
Cyber
Threats in the cyber domain pose the greatest threat to our
decisive logistics advantage. The return of great-power competition is
characterized by activities in the so-called ``gray zone.'' In this new
normal, both state and non-state actors conduct persistent probes and
malicious cyber activities, seeking to erode the U.S. military
advantage and alter existing international order. The logistics
enterprise is more susceptible to these malicious activities than other
military organizations based on our unique relationship with commercial
partners. Although logistical and operational planning generally takes
place on classified networks, ninety percent of military logistics and
global movement operations executed on unclassified commercial
networks. This challenge is exacerbated by the inadequacy of
implementing existing cybersecurity standards and the fact that DOD's
extensive cyber protections do not extend to industry, critical
vulnerabilities in our cyber security posture. Defending DOD
information on those commercial networks goes beyond the authority of a
single combatant commander. Mission assurance, particularly in degraded
and contested environments, requires a collaborative effort between the
Department of Homeland Security, other national agencies, commercial
industry, and the Nation's leading experts. We will not solve this
problem alone.
In 2017, USTRANSCOM made strides toward hardening our overall
cybersecurity posture in collaboration with commercial industry. We
strengthened our partnerships through the National Defense
Transportation Association (NDTA) with the inclusion of cybersecurity
training programs for the entire enterprise. Moreover, several industry
CEOs participated in our Cyber Roundtables, creating future options to
improve national defense, incorporate commercial equities in the
initial stages of contingency planning, and share information across
domains. Learning from these venues, we began modifying existing
Transportation Service Provider contracts to mandate compliance with
the National Institute of Standards and Technology's (NIST) Special
Publication 800-171, which governs the protection of covered defense
information, including unclassified controlled technical information.
Prior to this update, transportation contractors were not required to
upgrade security systems or comply with threat reporting measures. We
are beginning to implement contractual language, which requires our
industry partners to adhere to NIST standards commensurate with Defense
Federal Acquisition Regulation System (DFARS) rules. This measure will
protect information systems handling of comprehensive DOD transactional
information. We are also embedding a contractual requirement for
participants to perform self-assessments against NIST standards and
submit a plan of action to USTRANSCOM to address deviations from the
standard and non-compliance. USTRANSCOM may conduct an on-site visit or
request a third-party assessment to review progress toward meeting
action plans.
The completion of an initial Mission Assurance Assessment of the
Joint Deployment Distribution Enterprise (JDDE) also offered insight on
where we need to improve our cyber defenses. With the knowledge gained
from this study, we are completing a more comprehensive, OSD-directed
assessment of selected strategic seaports. We incorporated cyber events
in multiple major exercises and learned it is impractical to defend
everywhere, all the time. Instead, resiliency is key, not only in our
cyber-enabled systems, but also in the operations that depend on those
cyber-enabled systems. As demonstrated by Maersk's June 2017 NotPetya
incident, one cyber incident has the potential to impact the entire
enterprise.
To address these challenges, we must iteratively improve risk-
reduction measures to include identifying and hardening security risks
for National Key Cyber Terrain, developing and implementing
cybersecurity standards, sharing information across agencies,
conducting routine vulnerability assessments, mitigating insider
threats, and developing contingency plans for significant cyber
incidents. We need to link DOD and DHS cyber authorities across
critical defense networks and develop procedures to share information
with our fourth component as we all operate among the same threats.
Finally, cybersecurity standards must advance beyond the minimum
requirements and facilitate a collective framework to defend against
competitors and adversaries. Our challenge is everyone's challenge.
Evolving for Tomorrow
USTRANSCOM delivers on behalf of the Nation and has done so
successfully for 30 years. However, we must avoid complacency. We face
a challenging future marked by growing uncertainty, risk, and complex
demands. We have to be ready for any possible set of circumstances.
With that reality in mind, the Command is focused on evolving to
respond to the Nation's needs today, while simultaneously preparing for
the future. In doing so, we continue to pursue opportunities in cyber
and technology to modernize our systems and processes and ensure the
enterprise remains ready and resilient across the spectrum of
operations.
Transportation Management System (TMS)
The Joint Force's transportation requirements demand transparency,
affordability, and asset visibility to preserve options in the current
operating environment. Over the last three decades, USTRANSCOM
developed technical solutions with the best available technology
platforms at that time. As a result, the command now has a diverse set
of programs that link movement requirements with available
transportation assets across the enterprise. In 2015, USTRANSCOM
identified 12 performance gaps in the current network structure that
prevent the command from conducting integrated multi-modal operations.
Most major manufacturers and distribution companies (e.g., Walmart and
Amazon), use a Transportation Management System, a single platform for
end-to-end shipment planning and execution, to increase return on
investment. While the dollar may not be the bottom line for the DOD, a
TMS promises to improve support to the warfighter and boost
auditability.
In August 2017, the command initiated a proof-of-principle to
determine the feasibility of implementing a TMS. This four-month proof
of principle validated our assumptions on the capabilities and benefits
of a TMS and confirmed its broad reaching value to the JDDE. TMS
streamlines transportation and financial management processes, enhances
enterprise-wide asset visibility and flexibility, and increases
readiness. With plans for an enterprise-wide TMS, USTRANSCOM is forging
ahead with implementation, beginning with a full-scale prototype. We
are strengthening strategic partnerships with Defense Logistics Agency
(DLA) and Pacific Command (PACOM), and inviting the Services, CCMDs,
and other partners to a joint planning event early this year. These
engagements will build universal acceptance and allow the enterprise to
leverage the operational power of a TMS.
Cloud Computing
This year, USTRANSCOM is in the process of rapidly transitioning
all our digital applications to cloud-based technology. Leveraging
best-of-breed commercial technology allows us to control costs,
enhances Mission Assurance, and improves our agility and network
resiliency. Furthermore, the cloud allows our program managers,
developers, and software engineers to keep pace with industry, and
track, review, and plan costs associated with IT projects, in real
time. Economies of scale, standardization, and automation in cloud
computing also promise to substantially reduce the cost of IT
infrastructure. We anticipate completing this effort in the summer of
2018, to include secret level applications.
Pathfinding for the Department as its ``Cloud Center of
Excellence,'' the command is executing its migration, with about 25
percent of programs and applications already in the cloud. We are
increasing security, access, and reliability while freeing resources
and manpower to tackle our toughest cyber challenges. Most importantly,
we are providing a production contract model and repeatable process for
the entire Department to leverage. Establishing secure IT
infrastructure for commercial industry must be a priority. USTRANSCOM
is setting conditions for success for the rest of the DOD--we'll
proudly continue to serve as the pathfinder for defense cloud-
computing. Moving to the cloud not only improves security, it is also a
key requirement in harnessing the power of data.
Building the ``Data Lake''
Developments in the field of big data analytics suggest that
transformative solutions to many of the most complex problems within
the logistics enterprise are just over the horizon. Access to large
data-sets and the interrelationship between them, along with tools to
translate data into knowledge, will enable the enterprise to rapidly
convert knowledge into action. We must have the proper tools to
actually derive meaningful insight from data and subsequently, convert
knowledge into action. Currently, the transportation enterprise uses
data to inform daily transactional functions but fails to fully
leverage big data and advanced analytics to inform logistics
forecasting and rapid decision making. Last year, we partnered with
Defense Innovation Unit Experimental, Defense Digital Services, and the
Strategic Capabilities Office to build a roadmap for constructing the
enterprise's ``data lake'' and take advantage of the power of living
data for logistics.
Leveraging Emerging Technologies
Transitioning our systems to the cloud and building the data lake
are the foundational steps to realizing the potential in future
technologies like machine learning, artificial intelligence, and
autonomy. When distribution requirements surge and operator shortages
strain the distribution system, demands will eventually overcome
capabilities. To mitigate these challenges and meet dispersed
distribution requirements, industry is innovating a future of low
technology and high volume, in contrast to our current high technology
and low volume model of more advanced and expensive defense assets.
This future is based on machine learning and artificial intelligence
platforms that eclipse the human advantage. We are embedded with the
OSD Artificial Intelligence Working Group to realize this technology
and ensure we are maintaining pace with industry and rival nations.
Focusing on these technologies will also allow the enterprise to pursue
a future in autonomous systems--trucks that drive themselves, ships
that can navigate oceans without human inputs, and wide-body aircraft
that can land on their own.
Workforce Development
Meeting the challenges of our time and realizing the full potential
in the opportunities ahead, demands an innovative, agile, and diverse
workforce. These challenges are only increasing in complexity, and
recruiting, developing, and retaining talent is more important than
ever. At USTRANSCOM, we strive to cultivate a force that is agile
enough to operate across GCC boundaries and adaptable enough to thrive
in a complex and dynamic operating environment. To achieve this end, we
undertook several initiatives within the past year to enhance our
developmental opportunities and ensure we retain high-performing
individuals. In an effort to broaden our workforce and expand
partnerships, we instituted a civilian exchange with the Defense
Logistics Agency (DLA) and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
(NGA) through our civilian experiential development program. Through
initiatives like this one, we intend to diversify thought and reinforce
an already strong, collaborative relationship with our strategic
partners. We are also developing robust strategic workforce planning
initiatives that will help the Command identify and access the right
talent needed to continue to meet national security mission
imperatives. Among these workforce initiatives are adding data
scientists, data analysts, data managers, and cyber professionals to
the workforce, all critical to mission assurance in the future.
our commitment to meeting tomorrow's challenges
For 30 years, the Nation has turned to USTRANSCOM's strategic power
projection capabilities to respond to global threats and disaster. We
do not know what tomorrow will hold, but the next year promises to be
as busy and challenging as the last. The actions we take today to
improve readiness, modernize the force, and assure our future
capabilities have to be sufficient to ensure we remain the preeminent
military power. USTRANSCOM will not get there alone. Together, We
Deliver.
Senator Inhofe. Well, thank you very much. You will be
happy to know that all of your corn guys are right down here to
my right.
[Laughter.]
Senator Inhofe. I have two things I want to----
Senator Donnelly. There is corn in Indiana too.
Senator Inhofe. That is right.
Senator Wicker. There is corn in Mississippi too.
Senator Shaheen. There is some corn in New Hampshire.
[Laughter.]
General McDew. We are okay with all of you.
Senator Inhofe. It is great to eat but not good in your gas
tank.
[Laughter.]
Senator Inhofe. You really started something. Did you not,
General?
You have said some things that I look at and I try to do
the math and figure out how this is going to work as we get our
aging fleet going. You made the statement, America's air
fueling fleet is the most stressed of our air mobility forces.
Now, the KC-135 is 61 years old. They have quit making the
C-5 and the C-17, and we are looking at the KC-46. That is
great and it is going to be well maintained at Tinker, and I am
very happy that that is going to come. However, they have
ordered 179 of them.
I would like to have you kind of explain how this is going
to work. You are going to see a phasing out. At the same time,
it is going to take 10 years apparently to get to the 179, and
then we have our KC-135, which will be at that time over 70
years old.
So I really have two questions on this. Do you think that
the KC-46 will be delivered this year as projected and the
impact on the current operations in maintaining the existing
air fueling because of production delays of the KC-46? Do you
believe the current inventory of C-17's and C-5's are
sufficient to provide the necessary gap that we are looking at?
How is the math going to work on that down the road?
General McDew. Well, Senator, that is a very insightful set
of questions, and I will try to give as concise a set of
answers as I can.
Believing whether or not the KC-46 will be delivered on
time, I talked to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force
yesterday. He has some concerns about the ability to deliver
the airplane as projected but is committed to having the
airplane that is delivered be operationally capable when it is.
I believe Boeing and the Air Force are both trying to get to
that point.
Your discussion about whether or not our fleet is of
sufficient size--thank you for having us do another mobility
capabilities requirements study because that will answer that
question. All the studies we have had to this point have not
included things like a contested environment, cyber, and some
other things that we have discovered over the last few years
that we really need to put a focus on the mobility forces
because no one before has believed that we are going to lose
anything.
Senator Inhofe. I appreciate that, and we will look forward
to getting that report.
Now, I do want to have time to get an answer to this one.
It was just a month ago that Senators Ernst, Rounds, Sullivan,
and myself were in the Pacific area. We were talking to our
international partners in South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and the
Philippines. It kind of solidified my understanding of the
expansionist activities of China and what they are doing.
People do not realize they are actually creating these islands.
There is not any legal justification in my mind for this, but
it is being done. They are actually set up as if they were
preparing for World War III, everything from runways, cannons.
It is 100 percent military. They have got seven locations down
there, and the seven outposts add up to over 3,000 acres. So it
is a big deal over there and it has got a lot of attention.
Then when you stop and realize where the seven outposts are in
the Spratly Islands, they are located in international waters
between Vietnam and the Philippines.
So I would like to get from you how concerned you are in
terms of what this does to our seaways and our capability that
you are going to have to be using.
General McDew. Senator, freedom of navigation and access to
global ports is one of the most significant things I deal with
on a regular basis, not just for me but for our partners and
allies around the world, anybody that loves freedom and
understands how important it is to the global economy.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, but in that particular area, though,
it would seem to me that could be very obstructive in our
ability to fulfill the missions that we have on those sea
lanes. Apparently you do agree with that.
General McDew. Absolutely.
Senator Inhofe. Okay, good.
Senator Reed?
Senator Reed. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General McDew, you indicate in your comments and my
comments also that cyber is probably the number one challenge
if you look at your responsibilities. Can you elaborate a bit
about what you are doing? But also I am under the
understanding--and correct me if I am inaccurate--that many of
your contractors do not have adequate cyber protection--
civilian contractors. In fact, there is even some notion that
they are not required to report immediately when they detect
breaches. Can you give us kind of an evaluation of not only
what you are doing but the problems you have in your contractor
force?
General McDew. Yes, Senator. So cyber is the number one
threat to U.S. Transportation Command, but I believe it is the
number one threat to the nation. The nation's problem is there
is not a clear national cyber standard.
All of our contracts with our contractors include a cyber
standard, a hygiene standard for our contractors. It doubles
down on the requirement federally to report intrusions. But a
greater problem is in our headquarters, cyber is the
commander's business, but not everywhere across our country is
cyber a CEO's [Chief Executive Officer] business.
Senator Reed. How are you doing in terms of compliance? You
have teams that will go out and review a major contractor for
either ships or planes, et cetera, and then require them to
make corrections. Can you do that?
General McDew. We have the authority to go out and do
inspections, but that is a relatively new one that we have not
exercised yet. Across our civil reserve air fleet contractors,
they get a regular inspection as part of their safety
inspection, and we are trying to get that to be a regular part
too with cyber.
Senator Reed. Do you have the resources to do those types
of intensive inspections?
General McDew. Not at the pace we probably would like to.
But we also require that they have someone check on their
security as well. The problem is I am not sure everybody
understands how problematic it is.
Senator Reed. Right. I think what you have said before is
that unless it is a command priority--and in your shop, it is,
but over in civilian shipping lines and aircraft, it is not so
much a leader responsibility. It is there but it is not being
fully enforced. Is that accurate?
General McDew. In some. Some are probably leading the
nation in their ability to look at this problem set. But in our
cyber roundtables, which is one of the things we are doing to
raise our level of awareness, some of the CEO's chief security
officers cannot even get to the see the board, they cannot even
to see the CEO. So that is a problem.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
We are trying to deal with that on the Banking Committee
with requiring someone on the board to be a cyber expert. We
are running into some trouble, but the SEC [Securities &
Exchange Commission] should do that immediately without waiting
for us.
Shifting gears, we gave you authority to buy two foreign
ships as, we thought, a bridge to a longer-term plan. Now you
are coming and asking for 24.
The first question that strikes me is can our American
shipyards not produce these ships if they are given the design?
Why do we have to go off and acquire so many foreign ships?
General McDew. Our American shipyards build some of the
finest ships in the world. So that is not really a problem. It
really comes down to how much money we want to spend and when
we want to recapitalize this program.
So, first, thank you for the authority to buy two used
ships. You know that I focus on the fact that they are used.
Many of these ships were built in foreign yards. However, they
are sailing for us today under the U.S. flag, and they have
been converted to U.S.-flagged and they are U.S.-crewed ships.
What we would like to be able to do is to get rid of the steam
plants that I own. In 2020, I become the largest owner of steam
plants in all of the maritime industry across the world. I do
not want that title, Senator.
Senator Reed. But we will look carefully at that request.
Obviously, last year we were sensitive to your requirements for
an immediate, quick fix and we did.
Another aspect here, which is I think very important, is
that in your prepared statement, you point out that the medical
evacuation system has some shortcomings that we have to respond
to in terms of the ability to move injured personnel quickly to
a suitable facility. Can you just quickly--I only have a few
seconds--make a comment on that?
General McDew. The biggest part is that we have
transitioned ourselves to thinking that we are no longer going
to work in a permissive environment, that every environment
will be contested. If that is the case, then it compounds every
one of my missions that I have been given. The biggest part as
well is that our medical infrastructure in the United States is
not the same as it was in, say, 19--whatever. You want to pick
the date. It started to atrophy. And so if we are going to move
back hundreds of patients from the theater in a big war, our
ability to scale and use American hospitals is not the same as
it was, say, 20 years ago.
Senator Reed. And you have alternative plans to cope with
that situation?
General McDew. We are working with the national health
agencies to try to come up with those alternative plans, but
they are not as easy as you could imagine. If you start to
think that we are going to lose more people in a potential big
end fight and have to transport more people back, we do not
have the military hospitals we once had and we do not have the
civilian hospitals we once had.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Wicker?
Senator Wicker. Senator McDew, thank you for your service.
General McDew.
[Laughter.]
General McDew. I could not do your job.
Senator Wicker. Well, we could not do yours.
But let me ask you to follow up on this question that
Senator Reed asked. Of these 22 ships, you are asking for 22
more--24 used ships. Where were they manufactured? I guess you
have not identified them.
General McDew. All those ships have not been identified
yet.
Senator Wicker. But typically they would have been
manufactured other than in the United States.
General McDew. Most of them.
Senator Wicker. Would all of these be currently U.S.-
flagged ships?
General McDew. The ones we would target would be U.S.-
flagged ships that are sailing for us--many of them--in the
maritime security program that a company might shuttle after 20
years of life. That cuts my fleet's age in half overnight. They
are pennies on the dollar right now on the open market.
Senator Wicker. What is their life expectancy after you
would purchase them? These two that you are already in the
process of acquiring and the other 24.
General McDew. We would probably end up using those ships
for another 20 to 30 years. And so you are talking about a ship
you can purchase right now from $20 million to $30 million on
the open market that you would use for another 20-30 years
versus buying a new ship, which is the ultimate goal is to
build ships in the U.S. yards that would be built new but maybe
cost $850 million a ship. It would take a while to
recapitalize.
Senator Wicker. Now, do you support the Jones Act and the
Cargo Preference Act as being vital to national security?
General McDew. I do, Senator, but for a number of different
reasons. My primary focus is on national security and the
capacity that I need to take this nation to war. It is our
asymmetric advantage to deliver a decisive force in the
maritime domain. The rheostats I have to effect that balance
right now is helped by the Jones Act and Cargo Preference
because being able to get more mariners to work allows us to
have the capacity we need to go to war. If there were other
rheostats--and currently there are not--maybe we could use
those, but those are the ones I have to use.
Senator Wicker. What has happened in a year to cause you to
go from a request of two ships to 24?
General McDew. The fact that my request was larger last
year. I am happy to get the two that I got. We have a
requirement to try to recapitalize about 26 steam plants. So
two is the beginning to try to get to 26. We will not have a
brand new ship built that I understand in the Navy's recap plan
till about 2030. Between now and then, I am going to age out
some ships.
Senator Wicker. What does the 25 percent reduction in U.S.-
flagged ships do to our labor pool? What help do you need from
this committee and this Congress in that regard, sir?
General McDew. The labor pool--we are approximately a
couple thousand mariners short of the need that we have--we
think we will have in the early days of a conflict. That labor
pool is the true heroes of our national defense. Those mariners
who went to war in World War II and lost at the highest rate of
any single population are the ones I believe that will be with
us in the next big conflict. An incentive to keep those people
going to sea is the kind of help we need.
Senator Wicker. Well, okay, but part of that is having the
ships for them to serve on.
General McDew. The cargo for them to put on a ship. We have
got to be able to also decide as a nation is this country still
a maritime nation. I believe it is.
Senator Wicker. I believe it ought to be.
General McDew. However, we have a hard time right now
finding the evidence in our policies and laws that would be
able to convince us.
Senator Wicker. One other quick point just for you to
emphasize. I notice on page 15 and 16, you talk about the
nation's infrastructure, and you make the point that an
infrastructure program is great for commerce and great for
transportation domestically but it is also very much part of
your national security program.
General McDew. A strong U.S. economy, a strong U.S.
infrastructure, and a strong industrial base--and I am not
talking about the defense industrial base. Those are the people
that make our exquisite widgets. I am talking the industry base
in this country that does things for us. It is the military
that we have today that heavily relies upon those and the
infrastructure they ride on.
Senator Wicker. Specifically you have a concern going
forward about our nation's rail system being up to speed in
terms of what the military is going to need to transport on
rail going forward.
General McDew. Our rail companies do a very nice job
because they actually work on that infrastructure. So it is
probably the best shape of our infrastructure. The concerns I
have are in the cyber domain when it comes to rail. Cyber
defenses--we have got to continually look at it. I would
imagine that every one of our potential adversaries understands
our vulnerabilities in rail.
Senator Wicker. Thank you. I apologize for calling you a
Senator.
General McDew. I am actually flattered but I cannot do your
job.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Well, General McDew, thank you very much for your service
and for being here today.
I want to follow up on some of the cyber issues that have
been raised already in your testimony and by others. Have there
been any changes to how TRANSCOM writes its contracts with
private providers or commercial partners to address cyber
issues?
General McDew. Absolutely. I am quite proud of our
acquisition professionals. When we had our cyber contested war
game, the first in the history of the command after 30 years of
existence--we have since had two. When cyber came at the top of
that list of things we ought to be considering, we put cyber
standards in every one of our contracts. They are not as
stringent as we want them to be, but we are trying to work with
industry to bring them along because if we push them too fast
and too hard without the help of Congress and the national
standard, I am not sure they will stick with us.
Senator Shaheen. Are those standards that have been
developed by TRANSCOM? Are they DOD standards? Are they
reflected across the Federal Government? Do you know the answer
to that?
General McDew. The standard is a NIST [National Institute
of Standards and Technology] standard. It is a NIST-800
standard we have adopted.
Senator Shaheen. Great. Is that consistent with what the
rest of DOD is doing? Do you know?
General McDew. I cannot say that all of DOD in all of their
contracts has that standard in there.
Senator Shaheen. But it is probably something we should
strive for.
General McDew. There should be a standard across the nation
in the Federal Government of how we are dealing with cyber.
Senator Shaheen. One of the things you mentioned in your
testimony last year was that you believed we need a cyber-
related--you called it--bridging of the gap between DOD and the
rest of the Federal Government. Have you seen any progress on
that, and can you enunciate what that is?
General McDew. I have not seen as much progress as I would
have liked to have seen. However, there has been incremental
progress. U.S. Cyber Command and DHS [Department of Homeland
Security], the two entities that are responsible for each side
of the gap, are completely coordinating and involved. I sit in
the middle of that gap in a lot of areas that we do not focus
on. I go back to the defense industrial base. Everybody is
focused on the defense industrial base. Not everybody is
focused on all of industry. I deal with a lot of mom and pop
organizations, single owners, the folks that make our country
run. They do not have the help and the cyber technical
expertise to do what they need to do.
Senator Shaheen. So when there is a question about who is
complying and who is not, who is in charge of that? One of the
concerns that I have is that we do not have a singular person
or entity who is responsible for cyber throughout the Federal
Government.
General McDew. So on the civil side, .com, .gov, it would
be DHS. On the .mil side, it is U.S. Cyber Command.
Senator Shaheen. If there is a difference for some reason
around an issue, who resolves that?
General McDew. I would imagine that it would have to go to
a cabinet-level discussion because the Cyber Command commander
is a COCOM [combatant command]--well, about to become a COCOM--
just like me. So he cannot argue with the Department of
Homeland Security.
Senator Shaheen. It is my understanding that there have
been some issues with the European Deterrence Initiative and
movement of personnel and equipment around Europe. Can you
describe what those challenges have been and what we need to do
to address them?
General McDew. I believe that U.S. European Command [EUCOM]
and our NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies have
done a very nice job of illuminating some things that we have
lost track of over the last few decades. When we had 300,000
soldiers on the European continent, we had a better
understanding and relationship with the multiple countries that
would be involved, the border crossing issues, and all of those
things that you just routinely dealt with because you had a lot
of people there. Now we are facing some atrophy in that
understanding. We have been seeing changes in how the Europeans
themselves deal with transportation across the continent. So
all of that is compelled us to say that we need to put more
focus in that area, and EUCOM is doing a nice job of that.
Senator Shaheen. So the issue has not been so much the
transportation capacity. It has been around the coordination of
how we move people and equipment?
General McDew. A little bit of both. So many of the things
that used to be government-owned are contracted out in Europe,
as well as in our country. So you have got multiple contractors
now where it might have been a government-owned entity before
at some point. You have got different rail gauges in one side
of Europe to another. All of those things are a bit more
complicated because we do not have the forces in the theater
that actually just make that much smoother.
Senator Shaheen. How important have our allies been in
helping us address some of those issues?
General McDew. One of the reasons that we are as good as we
are is we have some wonderful allies in some wonderful places.
We have got to continue, as the National Security Strategy
says, by, with, and through our allies and partners, and they
have been exceptional.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Rounds?
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to
thank the chairman for bringing up the importance of corn as a
food source and also recognizing the availability of our
farmers to produce enough to not only produce food but energy
as well. It does a great thing when it comes to the petroleum
produced in your State because when added to petroleum, it
actually improves petroleum. So I appreciate the opportunity to
bring that up again today, Mr. Chairman.
General McDew, first of all, thank you for your service. I
most certainly appreciated the time that you spent with us
ensuring some of the concerns that you have expressed here
today publicly. Let me just work through a couple of items that
I think I would like to flesh out just a little bit.
We have heard from GAO [Government Accountability Office]
and others that decisions about transportation infrastructure
such as ports and equipment have struggled because of the lack
of prioritization by the services and the lack of visibility to
TRANSCOM and the larger community of transportation
professionals where they may be existing issues.
To your knowledge, is DOD working to establish some sort of
internal capability to expose capability gaps and funding needs
for transportation infrastructure?
General McDew. Senator, DOD is working on and continues to
work every year on prioritizing how we spend our money to get
the best use of every taxpayer dollar that we get. We have been
very blessed to get the amount of money we have gotten
particularly for the next couple years of a budget cycle. But
when the services go and decide that they have to--and they
balance their budget every year. But when they balance it under
constraint and the fact that it is not always delivered on
time, that means that a service chief and the service secretary
has to make a decision on what priorities get funded. When they
make those, sometimes logistics falls at the end and the bottom
of that priority list.
I fully understand having to have a kinetic effect, but I
am parochially interested in the fact that our ability to
project that power is what makes us the world's last super
power.
I think the priorities that are established are as about as
good as they can get. What I would like to get is more emphasis
on kinetic. Also it has to have projection.
Senator Rounds. I think I was fortunate to accompany the
chairman on a CODEL [Congressional Delegation] earlier this
year where we went into the Pacific region. Clearly, the
distances there are critical. As we have said, if we have to
fight a war, we want to do it away from our shores. We fight
away. We do not fight at home. That means that in order to get
there, we have got to have your operation be as successful as
possible. It has got to be efficient, and it has got to have
the means to not only get people there and get them home safely
but to resupply them while they are there as well.
I am just curious. You have talked about cyber and about
the need to continually improve the cybersecurity that we have
got right now.
There has been a little discussion today about where you
believe we are at today. Can you share how serious the cyber
threat is to your command? Can you give us some examples in
this open setting about how serious the threats are that are
out there today?
General McDew. Senator, I believe it is serious enough for
me to challenge one thing you just said, and I try not to
challenge a Senator in public testimony. But you talked about
us fighting away games versus fighting on our home field. I
believe in the cyber domain we are fighting on our home field
right now. That is how serious I think it is. I believe every
single day in both the information space and the cyber space,
we are fighting right now, and our contested environment is
actually inside the continental United States.
Senator Rounds. I think that is well taken, and I would
agree with you. But I think sometimes we have a tough time
publicly being able to discuss how serious that threat is.
Assuming that we are actually fighting it right now at home, is
this something that happens once in a while? Is this something
that happens occasionally? Is this a case of where you are
concerned about somebody checking to see whether or not they
can get into your plans? Or how deep is the threat? Just for
the public, how deep is the threat to our ability to actually
wage war and keep the kinetic war off of our home borders?
General McDew. The American public needs to understand how
advanced the cyber threat has become, so advanced that an
adversary can every day--and I believe that every single day
across this country an adversary or potential adversary is
probing us to see how we operate, where our most important data
resides, and what triggers they can use to stay short of armed
conflict. Nobody right now wants to take on the United States
military head to head. So why would they?
Senator Rounds. One last thought, Mr. Chairman, if I could.
The point I guess I would make is this just is not the peer
adversaries looking at our military operations. They are
looking at the soft underbelly, which is our non-defense but
critically important resources that we rely on to move our men
and women and our equipment from our shores to any place in the
world. It is the civilian side that they are also looking at as
well.
General McDew. Absolutely. I would like to point to the
fact that we have a National Security Strategy. Many people
believe that it is actually a national DOD strategy. It is the
nation that most of our big adversaries and small adversaries
will try to attack. I do not think they will actually try to go
after, say, a United States Pacific Command [PACOM] or a
European Command when they could easily get into the United
States of America.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
Senator King?
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, General, by the power vested in me, I want to bestow
upon you the rank of honorary Maine citizen. I know that you
started your career I believe and not only that in Aroostook
County, which is a particular honor. I want to acknowledge that
and delighted to have you here today.
I consider your command one of the most important, if not
the most important, in all of the commands that we have because
without you, none of the combatant commands can function. On
July 2nd, 1863, the 15th Alabama was charged with coming up
Little Round Top and dislodging the 20th Maine. Joshua
Chamberlain gets a great deal of the credit and should for the
leadership that day that he displayed. But a key element in
that engagement was that the Alabamans did not have water.
Their canteens were empty. They had marched 20 miles on a very
hot day, and the fact that they did not have water and were
exhausted was a factor in what happened, which turned American
history at that moment. I think it exemplifies how important
what you do is--it does not get the headlines or the credit,
but what you are doing in supplying both people and materiel is
so critical.
Here is one of the things that concerns me. A great deal of
your capability is in the private sector, and you are given the
responsibility without full authority because you cannot tell
Delta Airlines or a shipping line exactly what to do. Do you
feel that we are sufficiently wedded, that the contracts are
strong enough that the responsibilities are being met in the
private sector that will allow you to meet your obligations in
a time of conflict?
General McDew. First, Senator, I duly accept the honor of
being an honorary Maine citizen. My daughter was born in Maine
in Aroostook County in lovely downtown Limestone. She has a 007
Social Security number, which I just gave out some PII
[Personal Identifying Information] on her.
[Laughter.]
General McDew. But that double 0 means a lot to us, and we
spent 5 and a half years and six lovely winters in upper Maine.
Logistics, as you said--and the folks that are watching
this back in the cornfields of Illinois are quite proud of the
fact that we do things for other people and we take great pride
in it. It is like oxygen. When you have it, you do not think
about it; when you do not have it, it is all you can think
about.
The contracts are not as strong as I would like them to be.
I do not believe that all of our vendors across the country
fully understand the threat they are under, nor do they have
necessarily the capabilities. We are trying to strengthen our
contracts through relationships and bringing our commercial
partners along with us. I call them my fourth component. I am
just as interested in their readiness and their viability as I
am the other military components I have. So we try to bring
them along with us and educate them as well.
Senator King. I hope that you will be very tough on your
partners in these situations because my sense is from dozens of
hearings here both in this committee and others that the
private sector is not fully cognizant of the threat that they
are under, and we do not want to find that out in a time of
crisis.
The other thing that has changed in your situation is that
we have been operating essentially in an uncontested
environment for 2 or 3 decades. I understand you did a war
game, a contested environment war game, recently. Insofar as
you can share in this setting what you learned from that
because now the whole National Defense Strategy is shifting
toward peer competitors, and how does this play out in your
strategy and capabilities?
General McDew. Our big revelation, Senator, was that cyber
is in fact a bigger problem than we had thought before and that
we had to do some things to secure our networks better, which
they are pretty secure, but also provide ourselves a level of
resilience.
The biggest takeaway for me as a warfighting combatant
commander is the fact that all of our exercises to this point
had assumed no loss of any logistics capability, like the enemy
would not target it and so we did not have to think about it.
Some of the numbers that were relied on to say this is the
requirement assumed no attrition of the force. Attrition is
everything from kinetic effects to the lack of maintenance and
reliability.
Senator King. But if we are dealing with a peer competitor
who has submarines and underwater drones and aircraft, that is
a whole different calculation.
General McDew. It is and it is generational. So go back to
World War II. We had that lesson learned. We have forgotten it.
Senator King. I take it that we are now trying to play
catch-up in terms of our capabilities to operate in a contested
environment.
General McDew. We are actually trying to catch up on what
this new contested environment looks like. Before, we always
thought we were in either peace or war, and the gap between the
two is about the gap between my hands now. We now realize there
is a bigger gap in that space. What is in that space is the
difference between being at peace one day and the nation
deciding to go to war. The last time we decided to go to war as
a nation and the entire nation was behind it was 1942 in
Romania. That space in the middle is not an easy space to live
in, and we live in it every day and it is contested.
Senator King. Thank you, General. Thank you again for the
work that you are doing. I know that we are very cognizant of
how important it is. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator King.
Senator Warren?
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General McDew, for your service, for your hard
work here.
The U.S. military is one of the largest consumers of fuel,
and TRANSCOM's operations in particular are highly fuel-
dependent. According to the U.S. Information Administration,
the price of crude oil has been on the rise for more than 2
years now.
So let me ask, General, what impact does the rising price
of fuel have on TRANSCOM's budget?
General McDew. Obviously, amongst the large consumers of
fuel, we are the largest, I believe, in the Department of
Defense. So every time the price of fuel goes up, that
increases the amount of money we must spend to do our
operation.
Senator Warren. Right. I take it it is large enough that it
has a real impact on your budget. That is what I am really
asking.
General McDew. It does. I am also blessed enough to have a
budget that is a little different than everybody else's.
However, the services' budgets are the ones that are more
directly impacted.
Senator Warren. So in your prepared testimony, you discuss
the current stress on our logistics fleet, both air and sea.
DOD has been working for years on efforts to reduce fuel
consumption and incorporate alternate fuels. In my home State
of Massachusetts, for example, the Army scientists at the
Natick Laboratory have been experimenting with new, more energy
efficient shelters in base camps with a goal of reducing fuel
demand for the deployed Army by about 25 percent. Would a 25
percent reduction in fuel consumption by our deployed forces
help mitigate some of the stress on your command and the
Defense Logistics Agency?
General McDew. Yes, Senator, it would.
Senator Warren. So that would be a helpful direction. Good.
You know, we know that transporting fuel to our forward
deployed forces in combat zones is expensive and dangerous even
when we have full control of the skies and the shipping lanes.
But as Senator Inhofe said earlier, that is not guaranteed in
the future.
The new defense strategy says that DOD must be prepared to
fight a high-end adversary. That guidance applies not only to
the tip of the spear but also to your ability to supply the
logistics chain our deployed servicemembers rely on over time.
So let me ask this one, General. Would it be challenging
for TRANSCOM and the Defense Logistics Agency to refuel assets
and meet deployed energy needs in an environment where we did
not have air or sea supremacy?
General McDew. Everything gets more challenged when we do
not have domain dominance. That is air, land, sea, and cyber
and space.
Senator Warren. Thank you.
Reducing use of our fuel and exploring renewable
alternatives is not just about the environment. It improves
mission effectiveness and it saves money that we can use to
reinvest in the kinds of capabilities that you need. In a
future combat situation like the ones the defense strategy
describes, it is going to be an operational necessity. I think
we need to get ahead of this now while we can. If we wait until
our resupply lines are under threat, it is going to be too
late.
So I appreciate your good work in this area, General. Thank
you.
General McDew. Senator, if I can just add one more thing.
Senator Warren. Please.
General McDew. The fact that cyber is such a warfighting
domain now, we are under threat right now.
Senator Warren. A fair point. So all the more about the
urgency of this moment, and we have got to make these changes.
Thank you. Thank you, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Senator Warren.
Senator Hirono?
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Nice to see you again, General. Thank you for your work.
You mentioned that the cyber threat is one of your major
concerns and that the contested environment is inside the U.S.
You also said that our adversaries will not go after PACOM or
European Command but that they would get into the U.S. Can you
talk a little bit more about what you mean by they are going to
get inside the U.S. and what can we do to counter them getting
inside the U.S., as you put it?
General McDew. I probably misspoke, Senator. A potential
adversary will always fight head on with the fighting force.
However, what we have been seeing over time is that the
information warfare space and the cyber warfare space does not
have the geographic boundaries that we once thought of. So
PACOM geographic boundary or CENTCOM [Central Command]
geographic boundary is not as interesting to a cyber or an
information warfare officer. So they will go to where they can
go. So the United States of America, without a strong cyber
standard or without us debating the information warfare space,
means that it is a potential target for a potential adversary.
Senator Hirono. So can you give a concrete example of the
kind of vulnerability that we have? You mentioned that we have
a National Security Strategy, which should include a cyber
strategy, but are you saying that it is not implemented? It is
not robust enough for your comfort?
General McDew. No, it is really not.
I visited Estonia last fall. Estonia in 2007 was taken down
by a cyber threat, took to their knees, and they changed their
entire perspective as a country on what the cyber threat means
to them and their survival as a country. And so they put coding
in elementary schools because they thought the threat was
significant enough.
I am not sure if we have gotten to a point that we believe
that something that we can do as a nation would strengthen our
ability to protect ourselves from this new threat. It is a new
threat. And so the specifics would be I may be a bit paranoid,
but when I see an airline company's reservation system go down,
I do not immediately think that it is just a problem part. I
think is that an actor potentially probing. If I see a rail
switch not work, I also want to make sure that it is not a
cyber problem, and it could be just mechanical. But we have all
got to think about how do we protect ourselves ahead of the
investigation after a problem happens.
Senator Hirono. So what I get from your response is that we
certainly are not prepared as a nation to counter effectively
all of the different ways that particularly our infrastructure
can be vulnerable to cyber attacks. This is why we have a Cyber
Command [CYBERCOM], and there is a lot of emphasis in this
committee, as well as other committees, on our cyber
vulnerabilities. I can see where we need more. What I would
like to see is more of a whole-of-government kind of approach
to what we can do regarding the cyber issue, and I do not think
we have that.
In your testimony, you stated that the maritime security
program provides an intermodal logistic capability outside of
the DOD portfolio that would be too expensive to replicate. Can
you describe the challenge as to the TRANSCOM mission if you
did not have this program?
General McDew. So the maritime security program provides
about 60 U.S.-flagged ships with U.S. mariners on board to do
our needs and to potentially take this nation to war. Without
that stipend paid to those companies, I believe that many of
them might cease to exist as U.S.-flagged companies, and that
has been something we have been doing for a number of years to
assure that access to that capability and capacity.
Senator Hirono. You also indicated the number of U.S.-
flagged ships are also decreasing, have decreased over time,
and that you also have concerns about whether we have a labor
pool of U.S. personnel that can staff these ships. So this is a
double-edged problem, and what are we doing to counter these
problems?
General McDew. Similar to the CYBERCOM issue that you
brought up--so USCYBERCOM cannot defend the entire nation. It
does not have the authorities to do so. I personally cannot
change all the things that need to probably be changed. I am
not sure where the young men and women who grew up in my day
who wanted to be mariners and truckers and pilots are because
we are seeing a decline in a lot of those. I am not sure what
all of the forces that are in play to have 1,288 ships flying
the U.S. flag in 1950 dwindle down to 88 ships today. I am not
sure of all the forces. But the MSP [Maritime Security Program]
program allows 60 of them to keep their U.S. flag and to stay
with us.
Senator Hirono. Mr. Chairman, if I could just ask one
follow-up question. Is it your preference that you have access
to U.S.-flagged U.S.-crewed ships as opposed to, at some point,
having to resort to internationally owned ships?
General McDew. It is not a decision that I made. It is a
decision the country made that we will move our U.S. forces on
U.S.-flagged and U.S.-built ships--U.S.-flagged ships. If the
nation wants to change that, that is a debate the nation can
have, but I right now will comply with what I am told to do.
Senator Hirono. Well, as a strong supporter of the Jones
Act, that is kind of where we should be, I would say.
Thank you very much.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Hirono.
Senator Scott?
Senator Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, good morning. Thank you for being before the
committee.
In your last war games exercise, what vulnerabilities were
exposed that we should think about addressing, and in what
order would you address those exposures?
General McDew. It was a grand flash of the obvious after we
did it. The importance of doing it was it identified several
areas that we need to focus on internal to U.S. Transportation
Command and I would say possibly across the nation because our
problems are actually not just our problems. They are actually
national problems.
The first and foremost is cyber. Cyber is, I believe, the
challenge of our time. It is the one that will define this
period of time in our history more than just about any other
challenge, and it brings potentially the fight that we would
have on other people's shores--it brings it here.
The other for us is attrition. The fact that logistics
capabilities and mobility capabilities have not been counted on
to attrit in a fight is something that we cannot probably have
as a reality going forward.
Mobilization. Just about every option I give to the nation
today requires me to mobilize the Reserve and Guard. I do not
think we formulated them, resourced them to be the operational
force that they have become over the last 3 decades.
That is just a few of those things, Senator.
Senator Scott. Let us take a little more time on the cyber
exposure. I understand that 90 percent of your command's
mission takes place over unclassified communication networks. I
think you said in your written statement establishing secure IT
[information technology] infrastructure for our commercial
industry must be a priority.
Can you walk me through the complex exposures and
vulnerabilities that you have when 90 percent of it happens in
a commercial environment?
General McDew. Senator, what I have been learning over time
is there are many companies out there who understand how
vulnerable they are in the cyber space. Because I bridge the
gap between the authorities that are invested in U.S. Cyber
Command and the authorities inherent in the Department of
Homeland Security to protect respectively the .com and .mil
different domains--because I live in that space, we have had a
series of cyber roundtables as a result of our contested
environment war game where we are inviting academics,
commercial industry, and some hackers to help us understand the
problem better. In one of those roundtables in one of the
panels, a series of security officers in corporate America said
that they cannot get in to see the board or can they get in to
see the CEO to talk about the problem. That is not every
company, but it is at least a few that do not understand the
severity of the problem. Even if they understand it
intellectually, they may not have all the tools required to
fully understand the sophistication of today's threat.
Senator Scott. On the attrition aspect, there is a
likelihood that during transportation you lose something. Is
that pretty simple?
General McDew. I think that is pretty simply stated and
quite true.
Senator Scott. On the mobilization, can you expound upon
that for a minute?
General McDew. Absolutely. So when I was a youngster 150
years ago coming in to fly airplanes for the very first time,
the majority--and I will use one example and it can apply to
all of the logistics force. The KC-135 was heavily invested in
the active duty. Strategic Air Command existed. And so 80
percent of those airplanes were in active duty units.
Transition to today, and about 60 to 65 percent of that is now
in the Guard or Reserve. It has nothing to do about my trust
and confidence in their ability to do the mission. It has
everything to do with how available they are.
With all of that shift in the Guard and Reserve, a high-end
fight says we must mobilize. If our history says that we would
immediately decide to go to war, immediately decide to
mobilize, that is fine. If history shows that we will live in
this space between peace and war for a period of time, I am
worried that I will have access to those folks that I need when
I need them.
Senator Scott. Chances are pretty high we are going to live
in that purgatory for a lot longer than we are comfortable.
Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Scott.
Senator Sullivan?
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, good to see you, and thanks for all you are doing.
I just want to ask you a very--just off the top--your
command does so much and it is so critical to the warfighter,
to any kind of military operation. I think it is unsung in many
ways how much work you do and how we cannot function as a U.S.
military without you operating effectively, efficiently. What
is the top issue that keeps you up at night right now, General,
and the biggest challenge?
General McDew. Well, first, let me thank you for
acknowledging the great men and women who live in the
cornfields of Illinois who are watching you right now in watch
parties all across the command.
Senator Sullivan. They do a great job, and I think they are
unsung.
General McDew. Then you just pumped me up because all of my
self-esteem is derived from how good they are because I do not
actually do much anymore.
Our number one threat, Senator, is cyber and how well we
are able to protect ourselves and protect my fourth component,
which is commercial industry, in the cyber domain.
Senator Sullivan. And so you have some control over the
cyber domain as it relates to the military, but it is much less
control in the commercial realm. Is that not correct?
General McDew. I have no personal control in the cyber
domain in the military. U.S. Cyber Command does and they do an
effective job of that. I have zero control except through
contracting mechanisms with the commercial industry.
Senator Sullivan. I want to ask a question relating to the
great State of Alaska. You know, with the National Defense
Strategy out, which I strongly support the kind of shift in
focus--I think most Senators do, by the way--to kind of a great
power competition and some of our national security challenges,
whether it is Russia, North Korea, China. My State actually
happens to be close to all of those countries. And as you know,
we are the hub air combat power for the Asia-Pacific and the
Arctic with soon to have over 100 fifth generation fighters
based in Alaska, and all the C-17's and C-130's and F-16's and
a whole host of important military assets, including
expeditionary forces that can get to North Korea or the Korean
Peninsula or anywhere else in a moment's notice.
I know that you--and I have talked to the Secretary of the
Air Force and General Goldfein a lot about this--are looking
soon at the OCONUS [outside the continental United States]
decision with regard to KC-46's and the tanker refueling
deployments. I have been trying to make the case that it makes
a lot of strategic sense not just because of the assets that
are in there but every airplane that flies over the Asia-
Pacific from the Lower 48 actually flies over Alaska.
Can you give us a sense of where we are in the OCONUS KC-46
deployments and give me assurances that Alaska's strategic
location--as you know, Billy Mitchell, the father of the Air
Force, called it the most strategic place in the world--is in
strong consideration for those OCONUS deployments?
General McDew. I will acknowledge that Alaska is
strategically important. Although I wear this wonderful blue
uniform and I am an airman and have been a proud airman for 35,
nearly 36 years, I am not currently in the Air Force right now.
So I cannot talk to you about the choices the Secretary of the
Air Force and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force made about
the actual basing of those assets.
The thing I would like to highlight, though, is as the
combatant commander who has combatant command authority over
those assets in a war fight, our ability to set, balance, and
use the globe entirely is going to be important.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
One final question, General. I am sorry I missed my
colleague, Senator Scott's question but I think it relates to
that. But on the integration of Reserves and Guard and active
forces with regard to your command, how important is that, and
how important is it that we continue to make sure that our
Reserve and Guard components are fully trained, fully funded,
fully resourced to make sure that when called upon they can do
the mission that is so important to your command?
General McDew. My command would cease to exist and operate
the way it does today without the Reserve component. A good
portion of my force is in the Reserve component across all the
services, and my Army component--I am not sure of the
percentage, but the plurality is in the Reserve component. The
air component--the majority is in the Reserve component. I am
very interested in both their readiness and training and
resourcing, and it is not the way it should be based on how
often we will use them and how much we will be able to rely on
them.
Senator Sullivan. Do continuing resolutions [CRs] help or
hurt the readiness of those forces?
General McDew. CR's are probably the most disastrous thing
that we could have happen to a military force that is trying
to, one, recapitalize and maintain a level of readiness to
fight today's high-end fight.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
Senator Blumenthal?
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome and thank you for your service.
As you know, the United States has continued to reassure
our partners in Europe, our NATO allies, of America's
dedication to that region in the face of Russia's continuing
belligerent and aggressive actions. TRANSCOM continues to
support the services of our presence in Europe, including
aircraft, tanks, personnel, so that we do joint exercises and
we demonstrate a joint resolve.
I would like to know what capabilities Russia has to
interfere with our logistics pipeline in Europe. Should we be
more concerned about the physical obstruction and manipulation
that Russia can present, the potential destruction of our
pipeline, including the cyber realm but in other domains as
well?
General McDew. Senator, because our contested environment
war game allowed us to see more clearly the problem set and how
contested the world is, we see access as being one of those
areas in the physical domain. If we look around the globe and
particularly the European continent, we are going to have to be
able to use as many ports of entry, as many lines of
communication as possible if we were to find ourselves in a
potential fight in that theater. All of those are not as
assured as they once were, say, 20-30 years ago. So Russia has
levers of influence in that domain that we probably have not
considered for a number of decades.
Senator Blumenthal. As you know--and I think you made
reference to it--compared to the 300,000 troops in the Cold
War, we have about 64,000 now. They could be used in crisis.
The European Union is also seeking to build European defense
capabilities. Do you think that Europe is contributing or doing
enough?
General McDew. There are several ways to go down this path,
and I am going to choose one. One is I have great faith and
confidence that one of the reasons that America is as respected
as we are around the globe is our partnerships and allies. The
things that we can do today with partners and allies is
something that some other great powers in the world just do not
have. The fact that we have an alliance like NATO, the fact
that we have partners that are willing to be with us and
contribute what they can when they can is important. Many of
them can contribute more, and I believe the administration is
trying very hard to get them to that level of contribution. But
I will tell you there are some potential adversaries out there
that do not have any partners and allies, and I would go to war
with us anytime.
Senator Blumenthal. You would go to war with our allies.
General McDew. With our allies anytime.
Senator Blumenthal. Do you think they can and should do
more?
General McDew. I believe that every country ought to do as
much as they can. I think sometimes our asks are not as
specific as they need to be in today's environment. For
example, Estonia has some of the greatest cyber experts on the
planet. Maybe that is their contribution. Maybe they do not
have exquisite planes or exquisite ships, but they have the
cyber capability. So contribute where you can.
Senator Blumenthal. And some of their contributions are in
kind, not necessarily monetary.
General McDew. Correct.
Senator Blumenthal. So they are more difficult to measure.
They still are material.
General McDew. They are. However, there are some countries
that can provide monetary aid at a higher level than they are
and they ought to.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Nelson?
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, good morning.
I have the privilege, along with Senator Rounds, of heading
the Cyber Subcommittee. He is our chairman. Needless to say, I
think that we are very vulnerable in cyber. What authorities do
you need to help the private sector improve their cyber
defenses before we end up having a major disruption?
General McDew. Senator, I do agree with you that cyber is
one of the challenges of our time, probably the greatest
challenge of this generation. In that regard, we need a
national cyber standard. We need to decide where the low
watermark is for the country and get at least everybody to that
direction.
I believe the other help we need is to understand this
generation, as they grow up as high-end users of cyber,
understand the high-end vulnerabilities of cyber. We taught
them at one point in their lives to cough into their sleeves
and to wash their hands when they are sick, but we have not
taught them the dangers that face them in the cyber realm.
Senator Nelson. What is it going to take? Is it going to
take a major cyber attack and therefore a shutdown of American
industry for the private sector to really realize what is
happening?
General McDew. Senator, I hope not. I still believe in
America and I still believe in America's ingenuity. I still
believe that we will eventually get it right. However, our
history shows that getting our attention sometimes is difficult
and painful, and sometimes it takes an economic crisis or
sometimes it takes a financial ruin for some companies to get
kind of religion on this one.
Senator Nelson. Over in the Commerce Committee, General, we
are, hopefully, going to be able to pass an FAA [Federal
Aviation Administration] bill, and since your Transportation
Command certainly involves a lot of the use of the airspace, I
think we have pretty well put to rest the fact that there was
an effort by the airlines to want to privatize air traffic
control. I think that is pretty much over and done with. Do you
want to do any comment about that?
General McDew. No, Senator.
[Laughter.]
Senator Nelson. Well, just so the record is complete, I
will say that for several years now, up until just recently, it
was the position of the Department of Defense, as articulated
by the Secretary of Defense's Office, that since they had about
20 percent of the airspace, they did not want to privatize air
traffic control. So I will just leave it at that.
The KC-135's are really doing a workhorse job for you. Are
they not, General?
General McDew. They are. They have been for 60-plus years,
Senator.
Senator Nelson. But now the delays on the KC-46 are putting
additional pressure on the 135's. Are they not?
General McDew. There are actually a number of factors
working on those things besides age. I would love to be as
young as some of them, but I am not. The other, maintenance
capability and the fact that the parts are not as readily
available as possible--but those great young men and women,
particularly the ones who maintain them, are doing a great job.
Senator Nelson. Well, has this impacted your readiness?
General McDew. It has. And a series of continuing
resolutions do not help the fact that the Air Force has had to
make some tough decisions on what they can fund and what they
cannot fund, when they can fund those things. It has taken a
slight dip in readiness in the KC-135 fleet.
Senator Nelson. When is it going to become apparent that it
is a significant issue that is going to have to be confronted
by the Air Force?
General McDew. I believe the Air Force understands the
nature of the problem. They have also had a problem with being
able to fund all the things that they need to fund and to be
able to do it on a regular recurring basis. I am thankful for
the budgets we have. I am hoping that they continue at least to
be on a regularly scheduled period of time.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Cruz?
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, welcome. Thank you for being here.
In your testimony today, you explain that in today's
operational environment, mobility forces may be required to
transport and sustain U.S. and allied forces while under
persistent multi-domain attack, including deception and data
manipulation in cyberspace.
In your opinion, which TRANSCOM assets are most vulnerable
in this contested environment?
General McDew. This may surprise you a little bit when I
talk about TRANSCOM assets. The ones most vulnerable are the
ones I do not own, and that is commercial industry. We have a
strong cyber defense standard inside the Department of Defense,
but outside the Department of Defense, I am not sure it reaches
all of American citizens and all of American industry the way
it ought to.
Senator Cruz. If those assets are compromised, how would
that impact your ability to perform the task given to you?
General McDew. It would be disastrous because 90 percent of
our ability to take troops to war is in the commercial
industry. Fourty percent of the cargo capability is in the
commercial industry. It would be disastrous.
Senator Cruz. So from your perspective, are there aspects
in your budget that are focused on dealing with the
vulnerability on the commercial side?
General McDew. Not at all, Senator.
Senator Cruz. Let us shift. In your testimony, you also
state that volatile geopolitics, shifting demographics, and
emerging technology have all changed the character of war, the
way we fight, and they are changing where wars are fought and
who is fighting them. These new dynamics have a potential to
bring a dramatic shift from the wars in the Middle East that
have shaped much of the current force's expertise and
experience.
How have you begun to shape the training and the mindset of
TRANSCOM forces to prepare them for a war fought under these
new conditions?
General McDew. Senator, we have not been perfect to date,
but what we are purposely good at is understanding where our
problems are now. Our contested environment war game that we
had 2 years ago, followed up with one last year, has
illuminated a number of the problem areas that we will have so
that we have problem statements and solutions that we are
trying to go after in each of them. I do not control all the
areas because in my components that do the business of this
nation projecting power to go to war, a good portion of it is
outside of my control. So we are using contracting mechanisms
to bring people up to a certain standard in some of those
areas, and then we are continually having war games and
exercises where we invite not just the services but commercial
industry and academia to participate.
Senator Cruz. Now, you just mentioned the contested
environment war games. How are you measuring success during
these training events?
General McDew. Unfortunately, Senator, we are in its
infancy. Success right now is bringing everybody's knowledge
level up. Two and a half years ago, we did not have a cyber
standard in our contracts. We have one now. That is a direct
result of that level of learning and understanding. If you were
to come to my headquarters--and the invitation is out there
now. If you were to come to our headquarters, you would see a
level of discussion and dialogue and language being used that
is vastly different from any other combatant command. I am a
little bit parochial and proud, but I would say that would be
true.
Senator Cruz. I understand.
Have you all been able to take any lessons learned that
have been operationalized as a result of the war games?
General McDew. We have. Most of it has been through what we
have included in our exercises. So all of our exercises now
assume some level of cyber degradation, every last one of them.
It may be just at the tabletop level, but it is in every
exercise. We bake attrition into every one of our exercises and
everything we discuss, and then, as I said, the contracts all
have cyber standards in them.
Senator Cruz. One area that has been a persistent concern
for me has been our vulnerability in space, and we are seeing
more of our near-peer competitors targeting space assets. To
what extent in war games or exercises are you all exercising in
a space down environment with no satellite support or contact
whatsoever?
General McDew. I cannot say that we do it in every
exercise, but the cyber degradation also has a level of space
because it is the precision navigation and timing aspect. That
loss is catastrophic. So we are trying to bake more and more of
that in every time we have an exercise.
Senator Cruz. Very good. Thank you, General.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Cruz.
Senator King, did you have a follow-on question?
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I was struck by your testimony a few minutes ago that we
went from, I think you said, 1,288 U.S.-flagged ships in 1950
to 80 today. Is that the correct number? It seems to me that
really underlines the importance of the MSP program. I never
thought of it that way before, but it is kind of an insurance
policy. Should we be investing more heavily in that program in
order to be sure that 80 does not become 20?
General McDew. Right now--I love the way you stated that.
It is an insurance policy, and I think it is a very cheap
insurance policy. If we were to have those 60 ships in our own
yards, I would tell you it would cost you a lot more than $300
million, and that is all it costs us right now. It is an
effective policy.
In our next set of mobility capability study, we will look
at how much maritime capacity do we need and is it sufficient.
I will be able to come back to you with that answer.
Senator King. I hope you will because I would hate to low
ball this and end up with a lack of capacity again in a crisis
and say, gee, why did we not spend a relatively small amount
compared with trying to build that fleet ourselves in-house. So
I hope you will track that, and perhaps in your presentation
for next year's budget, that is a factor.
General McDew. That study is due in September of this year
to the Senate.
Senator King. Good. Thank you very much.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator King.
Thank you very much, General McDew. We were commenting how
excellent your answers have been during this hearing, and we
appreciate that very much.
We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 10:53 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Roger Wicker
additional service to guam
1. Senator Wicker. General McDew, the United States has a
significant and growing military presence on Guam. The United States
military's footprint includes Andersen Air Force Base, Naval Base Guam,
and about 7,000 servicemembers. Given its distance from Hawaii and the
United States mainland, it is important that Guam has access to
adequate container-fleet shipping. In 2015, a second shipping carrier
began providing service to Guam from both Asia and the West Coast of
the United States. What have been the implications of adding more
shipping capacity from TRANSCOM's perspective?
General McDew. From a USTRANSCOM perspective, having additional
options to provide global mobility solutions during a contingency is
highly desirable, regardless of the theater of operations. The vast
distances between land masses in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command's
(USINDOPACOM) area of responsibility (AOR), make a robust sealift
capability particularly critical to the support of operations in the
USINDOPACOM AOR. The addition of a second shipping carrier providing
container service to Guam from Asia and the West Coast of the United
States strengthens our commercial partnerships and enhances the
resiliency of our lines of communication to this critical logistics
hub. The additional capacity provides redundancy, flexibility, and
additional sustainment capability that increases USTRANSCOM's ability
to support USINDOPACOM humanitarian and contingency operations.
maritime security program importance to guam
2. Senator Wicker. General McDew, according to your written
testimony, the Maritime Security Program (MSP) ``provides an intermodal
and logistics capability outside of the DOD portfolio that would be
cost prohibitive to replicate.'' Guam is served by an MSP container
carrier. What is the military significant of having Guam served by
shipping carrier that participates in MSP?
General McDew. Whether it's Guam other locations in the
USINDOPACOM's AOR, or other locations around the globe, in the event of
a major contingency, the Department of Defense will rely on the
commercial capacity provided by the international carriers
participating in the MSP and the domestic (Jones Act) carriers to meet
sealift mission requirements. USTRANSCOM needs as many options as
possible to service theater locations, in terms of lines of
communications and the number of available carriers.
However, the Fiscal Year 2018 National Defense Authorization Act
(Public Law 115-91), changed title 46, chapter 531 of the U.S. Code,
prohibiting certain MSP participants to operate in mixed foreign and
domestic trade, once they renew their MSP operating agreements. As a
result, this option to service Guam will no longer be available in the
near future.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Rounds
operation control of assets in pacom/eucom
3. Senator Rounds. General McDew, when we met in my office some
months ago, you commented that statutory language prohibits TRANSCOM
from operational control of KC-135s and C-130s stationed in the Pacific
and European theaters. What is the state of play with this issue?
General McDew. USTRANSCOM will address questions surrounding
operational control of mobility assets as we execute the Chairman's
Dynamic Force Employment concept. In the interim, USTRANSCOM
implemented a strategy of Global Mobility Agile Command and Control
(GMACC). GMACC enhances command relationships between COCOMs, enabling
the rapid movement through transfers of tactical control. While not a
perfect solution, GMACC facilitates movement at the speed of war while
Dynamic Force Employment continues to take root in the DOD.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill
cyber vulnerabilities
4. Senator McCaskill. General McDew, you testified that TRANSCOM
began modifying existing Transportation Service Provider contracts to
mandate compliance with the National Institute of Standards and
Technology's (NIST) Special Publication 800-171. Has your staff looked
into the possibility of including provisions in these agreements that
enable the federal government the right of access to the Transportation
Service Provider's systems to ensure compliance, and to monitor those
systems or provide assistance in specific contingencies, such as in
case of a cyberattack?
General McDew. When a contractor discovers and reports a cyber
incident that affects covered contractor information or affects their
ability to perform operationally critical services, current DOD cyber
language included at Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
clause 252.204-7012 requires the contractor to allow DOD, upon request,
access to information or equipment to conduct a forensic analysis and/
or damage assessment. In addition to the Defense Federal Acquisition
Regulation Supplement, USTRANSCOM's contract language allows for the
conduct of an on-site review to assist the contractor in evaluating the
extent of an incident and to share information with the contractor in
an effort to minimize the impact to both parties. An on-site assessment
may also be performed if a carrier is having difficulty in achieving
compliance with NIST 800-171.
5. Senator McCaskill. General McDew, if you have, what has been
your findings?
General McDew. To date, USTRANSCOM has not conducted an on-site
assessment.
6. Senator McCaskill. General McDew, if you have not will your
staff look into this being a possibility and the impact it may have?
General McDew. This capability is available to utilize should a
cyber attack threaten USTRANSCOM's mission or impact readiness.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie Hirono
maritime security program (msp)
7. Senator Hirono. General McDew, the Maritime Security Program
(MSP) provides an intermodal and logistics capability outside of the
DOD portfolio that would otherwise be cost prohibitive to replicate.
The MSP provides for a fleet of 60 militarily-useful commercial vessels
operating in international trade. The vessels themselves are obviously
valuable and essential to mobility planning, but the carriers operating
under MSP also provide the American citizen crews that man the
government-owned reserve fleet and a global intermodal logistics
network that is available to the DOD. There are estimates value these
ships and networks in the tens of billions of dollars. What are the
challenges to the TRANSCOM mission if you didn't have the program?
General McDew. According to the National Security Directive on
Sealift (NSD-28), ``The U.S. owned commercial ocean carrier industry,
to the extent it is capable, will be relied upon to provide sealift in
peace, crisis, and war. This capability will be augmented during crisis
and war by reserve fleets with national defense features that are not
available in sufficient number or types in the active U.S. owned
commercial industry.''
Without the capabilities provided by U.S. flagged commercial
industry through the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) and
the MSP, the DOD would have insufficient capacity to meet requirements
and would be forced to expand the government-owned (organic) reserve
fleets to replicate what commercial industry provides, at significant
cost. Additionally, the organic fleets are manned and operated by
commercial merchant mariners. Without the commercial manpower provided
by the VISA and MSP programs, DOD would also be required to create the
manpower programs (including training, certification and proficiency)
necessary to operate an expanded organic fleet.
8. Senator Hirono. What is the value of the MSP carriers' global
networks to TRANSCOM and its mission?
General McDew. USTRANSCOM accesses U.S. flag commercial sealift
capacity through the VISA and the MSP. These critical programs provide
approximately twenty-five percent of required force deployment capacity
and are used to transport nearly all sustainment cargo to meet global
DOD sealift requirements.
Given the precipitous decline of the U.S. flag internationally
trading sector from more than 1,200 ships in the early 1950s, to only
82 today, the MSP's 60 ships and the associated 2,400 highly qualified
U.S. Merchant Mariners are holding the line against the further loss of
this capability and its critical support to the Nation.
energy resilience--fuel and electric supply vulnerabilities
9. Senator Hirono. General McDew, the committee is aware of
concerns related to a stressed air refueling fleet, and that attention
is needed to the air refueling mission. Further, the fuel carried by
these tankers is critical to conducting missions in the PACOM region.
Our adversaries pose serious threats in the Indo-Pacific region that
would disrupt our ability to deliver fuel or electricity in support of
TRANSCOM's mission. In the region, DOD relies on vulnerable fuel and
electric supplies to conduct its military operations, where power
outages on military installations or fuel supply disruptions could
hinder our ability to conduct critical military operations. What are
TRANSCOM's main concerns if our adversaries disrupted our fuel supplies
in the Indo-Pacific region? How would TRANSCOM prepare and respond to
such a disruption?
General McDew. USTRANSCOM's main concern, in any disruption of the
bulk petroleum supply chain in support of the USINDOPACOM AOR, is our
reduced organic capacity, specifically access to tankers to distribute
bulk petroleum. The Voluntary Tanker Agreement (VTA) program, which is
similar to the VISA, provides commercial tankers in a surge. The
Maritime Administration is working to renew the VTA program to ensure
more effective commitment of tanker capacity. The VTA is not part of
MSP, though two product tankers (OVERSEAS SANTORINI and OVERSEAS
MYKONOS) are in service under the MSP program providing assured access
to these ships for DOD. USTRANSCOM is working with Maritime
Administration to identify possible options for increasing the
availability of militarily useful U.S. flag tankers for assured access
by DOD.
Finally, the Mobility Capability Requirement Studies (MCRS) 2018
will examine the required capacity needed from our commercial partners.
The study is due to Congress by September 2018.
10. Senator Hirono. General McDew, based on expected growth in
military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region, how is TRANSCOM
planning for the growing energy demands in the region? Can you provide
recommendations for the committee to assist you?
General McDew. USINDOPACOM in collaboration with Joint Staff,
Defense Logistics Agency Energy and Bulk Petroleum community continues
to explore solutions in addressing the myriad of complex challenges for
bulk fuel storage and distribution in the USINDOPACOM AOR. No single
solution can mitigate theater-wide risks. However, DOD must think in
terms of risk mitigation options across the Joint Force, commercial
industry, Service components and DOD Agencies. Some of those options
are continued support of new capability through the following:
a. Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) process
b. USN development of modular, adaptive and scalable sea-based
petroleum discharge system program of record to augment or replace Off
Shore Petroleum Discharge System capability
c. Development of Services' tactical storage and distribution
system
One particular Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E)
project I would like to highlight is the Expeditionary End-to-End
Fueling Concept (E3FC) RDT&E Project. USTRANSCOM, in collaboration with
the U.S. Navy and U.S. Army Pacific as partners, is funding the E3FC
project. The goal of the E3FC effort is to demonstrate a service
interoperable capability that addresses ``end-to-end'' fueling
requirements from ship-to-shore to inland distribution.
The E3FC deliverables will be a prototype modular pumping system
which will reduce risk and inform development of the U.S. Army's Early
Entry Fluid Distribution System. E3FC will also provide a development
path for Navy/USMC ship-to-shore technology supporting transformational
enhancements to improve USTRANSCOM's ability at providing the Combatant
Commands with premium deployment, distribution, and sustainment.
energy resilience--strategic importance of red hill for fuel resupply
during contingencies
11. Senator Hirono. General McDew, the Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage
Facility at Joint Base Pearl Harbor is a key component of the DOD's
operations in the Pacific and Asia, as it provides secure underground
fuel storage for ships and aircraft. It is of vital strategic
importance for strategic supplies of fuel for critical mission
operations. What is the importance of this secure storage facility on
the reliability and resilience of refueling in the Pacific?
General McDew. The Red Hill Bulk Fuel storage at Joint Base Pearl
Harbor-Hickam is critical infrastructure and is a vital strategic node
in the bulk petroleum supply chain. We are concerned about its age and
maintenance upkeep. USTRANSCOM, as a voting member on the Defense
Logistics Agency Energy Installation Planning Review Board influences
the prioritization of Military Construction, Sustainment Restoration,
and Modernization projects towards global posture. We seek continued
support in funding for Red Hill's maintenance and restoration.
Additionally, there are other storage facilities in the USINDOPACOM AOR
that are critical to the bulk petroleum supply chain. We will continue
to explore adversary capabilities and operational requirements in a
contested environment to ensure storage facilities are at their optimal
location in terms of risk mitigation and resupply operation.
china: south china sea
12. Senator Hirono. General McDew, Admiral Harris recently
testified to this committee that China's provocative and destabilizing
actions in the South China Sea continue unabated. And expressed great
concern in actions to expand its influence by what appears to be the
building of forward military outposts, built for the military,
garrisoned by military forces, and designed to project Chinese military
power and capability across the breadth of China's disputed South China
Sea claims. As China continues to expand in the South China Sea, what
is the main concern associated with its expansion in the region, and
how will this expansion affect how TRANSCOM conducts its mission?
General McDew. The unrestricted flow of commercial and military
surface and air traffic through the South China Sea is critical to
national security, and the continued placement of advanced long range
weapons systems and military bases within the South China Sea provides
China the ability to effectively disrupt the air and sea lanes of
communications in one of the world's busiest maritime choke points.
China's continued development of precision long range weapons systems,
construction of surface fleet combatant vessels, and improvements in
air refueling capability is enlarging the envelope of People's
Liberation Army anti-access operations.
13. Senator Hirono. General McDew, does TRANSCOM have sufficient
assets to project power and sustain military operations if current sea-
lanes are impeded? What recommendations could you provide to ensure the
readiness and resilience of our transportation forces to counter this
threat?
General McDew. USTRANSCOM has sufficient strategic mobility force
structure to achieve the objectives of the 2012 National Defense
Strategy, which at that time assumed uncontested access to ports and
infrastructure in theater. The 2018 National Defense Strategy asserts
that every domain is contested--air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace,
and the DOD can no longer assume uncontested deployments, and must
prepare for mitigating risk in contested domains. To that end,
USTRANSCOM and OSD-CAPE, in coordination with the Joint Staff,
Services, and Combatant Commands are conducting the Mobility
Capabilities and Requirements Study--2018 (MCRS-18) which will address
the sufficiency of the mobility force structure to achieve the
objectives of the 2018 National Defense Strategy which includes
deployment in contested domains. MCRS-18 will be delivered to Congress
in September 2018 and we look forward to more dialogue with you, plus
collaboration with the Joint community in addressing these issues after
the MCRS-18 findings and recommendations are shared.
federal and state partnerships (whole-of-government approach)
14. Senator Hirono. General McDew, TRANSCOM's mission relies on a
whole-of-government approach with the Department of Transportation
(DOT), along with other Federal and State agencies to ensure roads,
rails, and ports are capable of supporting the warfighter's deployment
and distribution requirements. This is because, the transportation
infrastructure is not merely a medium for commercial and civilian use,
but that it is a national strategic asset, critical to moving military
members, equipment, and supplies in times of crisis. How does the
TRANSCOM integrate a whole-of-government approach to accomplish its
mission? And, how are Federal and State partnerships integrated into
your mission?
General McDew. The Department of Transportation provides
representatives on-site in the USTRANSCOM headquarters. These
representatives are integrated with the USTRANSCOM staff and work
routinely with the Surface Deployment and Distribution Command's
Transportation Engineering Agency. The Transportation Engineering
Agency monitors the strategic health of the national infrastructure--
highways, railroads, and ports--to support military operations. The DOT
leverages regulations, grants, and matching funds as well as the state
and municipal partnerships already in place to maintain or upgrade the
local highways, railroads, and ports. The Transportation Engineering
Agency coordinates with the DOT to ensure the nation's transportation
infrastructure adequately meets DOD needs.
Beyond our work with DOT, much of our interagency activities are
operationally oriented and coordinated in our Global Operations Center.
Most support for other agencies occurs through our supporting
relationships with USNORTHCOM where the preponderance of interagency
coordination occurs.
cyber security: national strategy
15. Senator Hirono. General McDew, threats in the cyber domain pose
a serious threat to our decisive logistics advantage. And, this
challenge is exacerbated by the inadequacy of implementing existing
cybersecurity standards and the fact that DOD's extensive cyber
protections do not extend to industry, creating vulnerabilities in our
cyber security national posture. Although logistics and operations
planning generally takes place on classified networks, ninety percent
of military logistics and global movement operations are executed on
unclassified commercial networks. Similarly, we have seen the lengths
Russia has gone to disrupt our democracy in United States elections,
and their use of social media for information operations. As our
adversaries, such as China and Russia, continue to consolidate and
integrate their cyber operations, are we losing a competitive advantage
in cyber space by not doing so as well?
General McDew. Yes, I believe we can do more to integrate cyber at
the national level, however I firmly believe that we are not
disadvantaged against any competitor. USTRANSCOM advocates for and
supports an integrated, whole-of-government approach to cyber. We are
already leading the way in partnership with DHS, USCYBERCOM, and other
federal agencies to leverage expertise collaboratively across the
government. We are also laying the groundwork to leverage information
provided to us by our Transportation Service Providers (TSPs). Our goal
is to reach real-time information sharing across the government and
with our TSPs to mitigate cyber threats and respond rapidly to emerging
threats.
16. Senator Hirono. General McDew, do you believe the U.S. should
develop a national strategy to consolidate and integrate our cyber
operations to counter these threats? What is the greatest concern to
your mission by a lack of national cyber strategy?
General McDew. Yes, I strongly believe a unified, whole-of-
government approach to securing our nation's cyberspace is greatly
needed. USTRANSCOM's greatest vulnerabilities lie in the fact that the
Command operates by leveraging networks that traverse two distinct
environments--the secure DOD Information Network (DODIN) and the
unsecure, commercial Internet. These diverse environments are governed
by organizations with differing authorities, roles and
responsibilities, with unclear, undefined boundaries between them.
USTRANSCOM has very limited visibility into the security posture of the
various networks and nodes that its data transits on the internet, so
it is not possible to guarantee security of this unclassified, mission-
relevant information that must be provided to commercial carriers that
operate exclusively on the unclassified internet, yet are responsible
for conducting 90 percent of the USTRANSCOM mission. We are not the
only federal government entity facing these issues and I support and
advocate for a national-level strategy that encompasses and integrates
all cyber efforts.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
cyber attack on commercial partners
17. Senator Heinrich. General McDew, our ability to project and
sustain force, at the time and place of our choosing, is one of the
most critical elements of our military might. As you noted, our
logistics enterprise relies heavily on commercial partners, making it
more susceptible to cyber-attacks than other military functions.
Despite this, the DOD's cyber protections do not extend to industry
partners. Do you think this poses a risk to our ability to reliably
deploy and sustain military force?
General McDew. Cyber vulnerabilities to the DOD mobility enterprise
pose a significant risk to our ability to deploy and sustain military
force. The Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise's Command and
Control / Information Systems must send information on the classified
and unclassified Department of Defense Information Networks (DODIN), as
well as unclassified commercial networks. While DOD provides formidable
cyber defense across the DODIN, commercial providers present a more
vulnerable attack surface to adversaries and other nefarious actors.
Select industry partners are better incentivized and therefore, better
prepared than others. USTRANSCOM has incorporated initial cyber
security standards in its contracts and established cyber security
information sharing arrangements requirements with its Transportation
Service Providers. USTRANSCOM is also assessing other solutions to
include options such as third-party compliance inspections, enhanced
information sharing, enhanced cyber safety standards within IT
manufacturing, and potentially ``War Powers Act'' like authorities for
DOD to provide cyber security for vendors that are consequential to
national defense. As a last resort, USTRANSCOM must ensure there is
sufficient resiliency across the strategic mobility enterprise to
enable continued operations in a denied or degraded cyber environment.
18. Senator Heinrich. General McDew, what is TRANSCOM doing to
mitigate this threat?
General McDew. I am addressing these vulnerabilities by proactively
enhancing partnerships with Transportation Service Providers (TSPs) and
leveraging relationships with whole-of-government partners such as DHS,
FBI, and others to work together to solve this problem that affects
military, government, and industry partners. Certainly enhanced
contract language and legislation can help, but strong partnerships
will be just as important to our collective success in this space in
the future. I am pursuing a partnership that assures our TSPs that we
want to help them achieve better security without penalizing them, as
their strong cybersecurity practices will ultimately improve their
bottom line while enhancing USTRANSCOM mission success--a win-win
scenario for both communities.
cyber authorities / doctrine
19. Senator Heinrich. General McDew, you wrote in your statement
that ``we need to link DOD and DHS cyber authorities across critical
defense networks and develop procedures to share information as we all
operate among the same threats.'' What authorities do you think need to
be linked between the DOD and DHS?
General McDew. I see a ``gap'' in authority to defend our mission
critical data as it traverses the commercial internet. Title 6, title
10, title 50 and title 32 authorities need to be re-examined to keep up
with the rapid evolution of the cyber frontier. Our nation needs a
holistic approach to cyber spanning ``.gov'', ``.mil'' and ``.com'' and
what federal authorities each agency can enact. As it stands today,
DOD, DHS, and DOJ could all have varying responses to the same events
in cyberspace with conflicting actions and mission sets. These
individual agency ``playbooks'' all need to be brought together at the
national level to ensure unity of effort and action.
20. Senator Heinrich. General McDew, what networks do you identify
as ``critical defense networks?'' Does this include commercial networks
being used for TRANSCOM or other military missions?
General McDew. Critical defense networks include both the DODIN
networks that are protected by DOD cybersecurity providers and the
commercial networks that USTRANSCOM relies heavily upon that are owned
by its transportation service providers. Further, these critical
defense networks also extend to our various defense contractors who
also have networks attached to the commercial internet with whom our
data is entrusted.
21. Senator Heinrich. General McDew, do you agree that a national
cyber doctrine would help clarify the authorities and responsibilities
for our various cyber defense organizations?
General McDew. I have sought and continue to advocate for a
national-level dialogue on cyber security. In the near term, Congress
can assist in this mission area by promoting this national dialogue on
the importance of cybersecurity to every facet of our national fabric--
from education to industry to defense and everything in between. It
will be through this national dialogue that we can begin to seed the
thought of baking in cybersecurity from the beginning--in our schools,
health care, technology, and key infrastructure.
aircraft survivability
22. Senator Heinrich. General McDew, the proliferation of long-
range anti-aircraft weapons is bringing US high value assets such as
our airborne ISR, command and control, and refueling tankers under
increasing threat. For example, the sale of the Russian SA-20 Gargoyle
SAM system to Iran could limit our ability to operate as freely in the
Persian Gulf area.
As you may know, the Air Force is developing high-energy laser
systems, like the Self-protect High Energy Laser Demonstrator (SHiELD)
program, to protect fighter aircraft. It stands to reason that these
systems would be even more effective on larger, slower aircraft. Given
the availability of space and power, High Value Airborne Assets (HVAA)
including Air Refueling tankers, Cargo, Bombers, and Command and
Control aircraft are excellent candidates for early self-defense laser
prototypes. Have you considered the use of high-energy lasers to
protect TRANSCOM's high value assets?
General McDew. USTRANSCOM has considered the use of high-energy
lasers to protect its Air Refueling tankers and Cargo aircraft.
However, the Air Force has not been able to fund the advanced R&D and
the follow on procurement of these systems within available Total
Obligation Authority. Targeted funding for the Air Mobility Command,
Air Force Reserve Command, and Air National Guard assets would allow
USTRANSCOM to better protect its air arm. In order to make SHiELD work,
tankers and cargo aircraft require additional systems. Air Mobility
Command aircraft lack situational awareness of the threat environment,
and integrated systems to tie that situational awareness to the
protection provided by a high-energy laser.
23. Senator Heinrich. General McDew, what aircraft self-protect
requirements have you requested through the military services? What
type of resources do you need from the military services for this
purpose?
General McDew. There is a long-standing requirement for aircraft
self-protect and awareness in the form of the Advanced Situational
Awareness & Countermeasures Capability Development Document. This
document was issued as a requirement in 2006. However, the Air Force
does not have the funding necessary to enable pursuit of the
requirement. In order for USTRANSCOM air assets to be protected, Air
Mobility Command will need funding in the form of RDT&E to develop and/
or acquire systems that provides a common operating picture of
battlespace situational awareness and own-ship self-protection.
24. Senator Heinrich. General McDew, adapting the mature SHiELD pod
HEL system for larger aircraft self-defense can be accomplished at an
expedited pace in parallel with the SHiELD prototype. Do you support
also applying the SHiELD program to your larger aircraft?
General McDew. As long as funding is programmed to integrate SHiELD
into a conformal aircraft design rather than the initial pod, then yes.
There are several concerns that need to be addressed with the SHiELD
program that in its current and forecast form will limit or inhibit
operational effectiveness.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2019 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
THURSDAY, APRIL 12, 2018
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
ARMY POSTURE
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:37 a.m. in Room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M.
Inhofe, presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Inhofe, Wicker,
Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue, Cruz,
Graham, Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, Shaheen, Gillibrand,
Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, Heinrich, Warren,
and Peters.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Senator Inhofe. Our meeting will come to order. Let me
explain what we'll be doing. We have two votes. One vote's
taking place right now. Those members who are here now have
already voted. We're going to be working right through the
second vote so that we won't have to keep you folks any longer
than necessary.
The committee meets today to receive testimony on the
posture of the United States Army and its fiscal year 2019
budget request. We welcome Dr. Mark Esper, Secretary of the
Army, and General Mark Milley, Chief of Staff of the Army.
The National Defense Strategy directs our Nation's military
to prepare for the return of great-power competition. This
means that we must be prepared to deter and, if necessary,
defeat potential near-peer adversaries, both China and Russia.
With their alarming speed of modernization of both conventional
and nuclear forces, these adversaries now present a credible
threat to America and our allies in the regions. It's time for
us to take stock and act. Senior Army leadership has said the
service is outranged and outgunned. That's a frightening
thought, and we've heard it over, over again, and it is a fact.
As currently organized and equipped, the future of the
Army's readiness and relevance requires modernization now. The
Army's modernization program unveiled last fall shows you take
this challenge seriously. The solutions for acquisition and
program management will help the Army repair identified
capability gaps within the force. Any successful modernization
strategy must focus on results. Rapid prototyping, and the
realistic experimentation will be vital to getting modern,
reliable, lethal weapons into the hands of our soldiers, and
doing so on time.
With the calculation of Crusader and Future Combat Systems,
we have fallen woefully behind in our artillery. That's
something that I'm very sensitive to, and we remember how much
money both the Crusader and the Future Combat System ended up
costing, and really, we got nothing from it, and we're not
going to let that happen again. A lot of that's going to be the
acquisition that we are working on now.
Now we have a system integral in solving these issues. We
have no doubt but the cross-function at teams currently
operating there--we're talking about Fort Sill--will help solve
the disparity with our adversaries. We look to you gentlemen to
lead the effort for real, sustained modernization. It will
require your engagement, leadership. It will require you to
make hard choices, set priorities, and accept some risk, and it
will require an open and transparent dialogue with Congress
along the way. We look forward to working with you to make our
shared modernization vision a reality as the Army reinvents
itself to become the 21st Century fighting force prepared for
it.
We're waiting now for Senator Reed to get here, and we're
going to get his opening statement and start right away, but
this is different than anytime that I recall. I've been on this
committee for 24 years, and on the House committee for 8 years
prior to that, and to see that we're going to finally have to
do something with acquisition. But, we've never been faced
with--several of us just came back from the South China Seas,
and we watched what China is doing with the islands they're
building out there. It's almost as if they're preparing for
World War III. Our allies in that part of the world--and I've
talked to you folks about this before--realize that this is a--
that they're watching China flex its muscles out there, and
they are kind of taking--deciding who to take sides with. These
are our allies. So, this is something that I'd suggest you guys
have not had the opportunity to experience prior to the time
that we're experiencing today.
Let me just see--yeah, what we're going to do, we're going
to start with your opening statements. Senator Reed is on his
way, and what we'll do is interrupt your statements so that he
can give his opening statement. Is that all right? Very good.
Let's start with you, Secretary Esper.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MARK T. ESPER, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
Dr. Esper. Well, Senator Inhofe, distinguished members of
the committee, good morning, and thank you for the opportunity
to appear before you today.
Let me say up front that the Army's readiness across its
formations is improving, and, if called upon today, I'm
confident we would prevail in any conflict. This is due, in
part, to the increased funding Congress provided last year. For
this, I would like to say thank you.
The Army's mission to defend the Nation has not changed,
but the strategic environment has. Following 17 years of
sustained combat, we now face a future characterized by the
reemergence of great-power competition and the continued
challenges posed by rogue states and nonstate actors, making
the world ever more complex and dangerous. To address these
challenges, the Army is changing. We have a comprehensive plan
to ensure our long-term dominance. In fact, since my previous
testimony before the committee on December 7th of last year, we
have released our vision for the Army. Our vision is fully
consistent with the National Defense Strategy, and one that
General Milley and I believe will ensure our success for years
to come.
We will achieve this vision through focused and enduring
priorities encompassing several major long-term lines of
effort. But, a vision alone will not make the Army successful.
We must have predictable, adequate, sustained, and timely
funding. Fiscal uncertainty has done a great deal to erode our
readiness and hamper our ability to modernize. While the Army
must be ready to deploy, fight, and win anytime, anywhere,
against any adversary, the National Defense Strategy has
identified China and Russia as the principal competitors
against which we must build sufficient capacity and
capabilities.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Just for a moment--would you like to give your opening
statement?
Senator Reed. Well, Mr. Chairman, would it be better for
the Secretary and the Chief to finish, and then I'll----
Senator Inhofe. That's a good idea.
Continue.
Dr. Esper. Yes, sir.
With regard to Russia and China, both countries are taking
a more aggressive role on the world stage, and either possess
or are building advanced capabilities that are specifically
designed to reverse the tactical overmatch we have enjoyed for
decades. In support of the National Defense Strategy, the Army
is increasing our lethality along three focus priorities:
readiness, modernization, and reform.
Readiness is the top priority, because only a ready total
Army--that's regular Army, Guard, and Reserve--can deter
conflict, defeat enemies, and enable the joint force to win
decisively. We are refocusing training for our soldiers to be
more lethal and more resilient on the high-intensity
battlefield of the future. We are also increasing home station
training, getting more repetitions for our formations at the
company level and below. We are giving training time back to
commanders by reducing certain self-imposed mandatory training
requirements not tied to increased lethality and by eliminating
excess reporting. We have maximized the number of Combat
Training Center rotations to 20 per year, four of which are
dedicated to the Reserve component. These rotations are focused
on the high-end fight, replicating near-peer competitor
capabilities, including increased enemy lethality, degraded
communications, persistent observation, and a contested
environment.
While the quality, training, and spirit of our soldiers are
what make the U.S. Army the most ready and lethal ground combat
force in history, our superiority is enabled by the best
weapons and equipment we can provide. As such, our second
priority is modernization, or future readiness. To ensure our
soldiers never enter a fair fight, the Army is now increasing
the investments in modernizing the force. Our modernization
strategy is focused on one goal: making our soldiers and units
far more lethal and effective than any adversary. The
establishment of the Army Futures Command this summer is the
best example of our commitment to the future lethality of the
force. Army Futures Command will address the key shortcomings
of the current acquisition system, providing unity of command,
effort, and purpose to the modernization process.
The Army has also identified its top six modernization
priorities for the coming years. Each of these priorities is
detailed in my written statement, and each is the purview of a
newly established cross-functional team. The purpose of these
CFTs [Cross Functional Team] is to determine the requirements
of needed capabilities to ensure all stakeholders at the table
from day one, and to focus Army resources on accelerated
experimentation, prototyping, and fielding. In order to ensure
battlefield success, our doctrine must reflect the threat
environment we face and remain apace with our efforts to
modernize our equipment.
Our third priority is reform, freeing up time, money, and
manpower to enhance readiness, accelerate modernization, and
ensure the efficient use of resources provided to us by the
American people. Our reform efforts, particularly within the
acquisition system, are long overdue. While Futures Command is
probably the boldest reform we are pursuing, other reform
initiatives owe much to the acquisition authorities delegated
to the services in prior NDAAs. Within these authorities, we
are reinvigorating the Army Requirements Oversight Council,
moving major defense acquisition programs back to the service,
and using other transactional authorities to accelerate
fielding in limited situations.
Another essential reform effort is development of a
modernized personnel system based on the principles and
practices of talent management found in the private sector, a
system much more open, flexible, and dynamic so that we can
better attract, develop, and retain the best and brightest our
Nation has to offer.
A ready and modernized Army is critical to defend the
Nation, but we must not overlook what makes us remarkable. For
this, I have outlined three enduring priorities. First, taking
care of our soldiers, civilians, and their families. Second, a
servicewide recommitment to the Army's values, especially by
leaders, to treat everyone with dignity and respect. Finally,
strengthening our alliances and partners by building stronger
ties through a number of initiatives. I look forward to
discussing these with you, as time permits.
With that, let me thank you again for this committee's
continued support of the Army, and specifically the defense
authorizations and funding increases requested in the fiscal
year 2018 and 2019 budgets. I look forward to your questions
and appreciate the opportunity to discuss these important
matters with you today.
Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Secretary Esper.
General Milley.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL MARK A. MILLEY, USA, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE
ARMY
General Milley. Thanks, Senator Inhofe. I appreciate the
opportunity. Thanks, Ranking Member Reed and all the
distinguished members of the committee, for the opportunity to
testify today.
Although he's not here today, I also want to acknowledge
and recognize Chairman McCain for his immeasurable support to
our Army and his lifetime of incredibly brave and dedicated
service to our Nation. Each of us in the Army prays, as you do,
for his speedy recovery and return to the Senate.
I want to start by thanking Congress for the 2018 bill.
That was significant. It has tremendous impact on the future
readiness and the current readiness of our Army, and impact on
morale of the force. As you know, this funding is vital, and we
will all work diligently to spend these dollars in a
responsible manner over the last two quarters of this fiscal
year.
Thank you, also, for the general increases in the defense
caps for 2018 and 2019. These increases support the new
National Defense Strategy and advance the Army's readiness and
lethality while allowing our Army to modernize for the future.
In short, what these monies have done is stopped a steep
decline, it stopped the bleeding of the Army, and we are on the
mend. I can report out to you today that 2 and a half years
after I became the Chief of Staff of the Army, we are in
significantly better shape through the generosity of the
American people and this Congress. It's essential, though, that
we maintain these increases, as returning to BCA [Budget
Control Act] caps will halt our ability to modernize, and it
will reverse any recent gain in readiness.
The demand for ready, able, and lethal Army continues.
Today, we have about 180,000 or so soldiers supporting
combatant commands around the globe, including ongoing
operations in the Middle East and supporting our posture in
order to deter operations--order adversary operations in Europe
and Asia-Pacific. The Army roughly fills about 50 percent of
annual planned demand by any of the combatant commanders. And,
of emergent demand or unplanned demand, the Army fills between
60 and 70 percent of all of those requirements. Our newly
created SFABs [Security Force Assistance Brigades], for
example, are already in high demand from all the combatant
commanders. One of them, just yesterday, asked for an SFAB to
be assigned to him. The first deployed this past couple of
months, and the second has been activated, and we are quickly
proceeding with a third, fourth, fifth, and sixth. Your support
has allowed the Army to field those units, and has allowed the
Army to become significantly more combat ready today than we
were just 24 months ago.
We have increased the number of Combat Training Center
rotations, as Secretary Esper talked about. We've improved our
equipment operational readiness rates. We've improved these
flow of spare parts. We've replenished our Army pre-positioned
stocks in both Asia and Europe. We've improved munitions around
the world. We've significantly improved our manning shortfalls
and filled holes inside of our operational and deployable
units. In short, we have a better Army today than we had just a
short while ago.
The bottom line is that the United States Army continues to
meet all the missions required of us. Thanks to your support,
we are more ready. But, we cannot be content with simply being
ready for today's global demands. Instead, we must focus on
readiness both now and in the future. The National Defense
Strategy calls for us to build a more lethal force. As noted by
Secretary Esper, we face long-term competition with China and
Russia, and regional and serious threats from Iran and North
Korea, as well as ongoing operations against terrorism.
The strategic global environment is increasingly unstable
and increasingly dangerous, and there is no time to pause. We
know these competitors, these great-power competitors, both
China and Russia, have made significant advances in the
development of advanced weapons, technology, and the
capabilities of their military forces. I'd be happy to go into
great detail in a classified briefing on that.
We must maintain our overmatch to achieve victory against
any adversary at any time. The increased lethality on a future
battlefield is going to require that. To both stay ready and to
build a force of the future, that's going to require
predictable, adequate, sustained, and timely funding. The
Army's fiscal year 2019 budget requests our priorities to grow
and maintain a highly capable force both today and to modernize
and build our future force and to take proper care of our
soldiers and family members and Army civilians while being good
stewards of the taxpayer dollar. We recognize the American
taxpayer entrusts us with a significant amount of money to meet
these demands. We will be diligent stewards of our resources,
and we will enforce accountability to make effective use of
every single dollar. Your support for the fiscal year 2019
budget will ensure our soldiers remain ready to fight tonight
as we prepare for the unforeseen conflicts of tomorrow.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I look
forward to each of your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of the Honorable Mark T.
Esper and General Milley follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by the Honorable Mark T. Esper and General
Mark A. Milley
introduction
America's Army is lethal and effective. Our lethality provides the
assured capability to defeat enemy ground forces through sustained land
campaigns in defense of our vital national interests. To maintain our
land power dominance, we will concentrate our efforts on our
priorities--Readiness, Modernization, and Reform--to ensure America's
Army is always ready, now and in the future. We also live by enduring
priorities to take care of our soldiers, civilians, and their families;
to re-commit to the Army values and warrior ethos that guide us; and to
strengthen relationships with allies and partners.
We thank Congress for its strong support, which has enabled the
Army to halt the decline in our warfighting readiness. Importantly
though, the Army needs timely, predictable, adequate, and sustained
funding to preserve these readiness gains now and in the future. The
Army's fiscal year 2019 (FY19) budget prioritizes our resources based
on the President's guidance, and our strategy is consistent with the
National Defense Strategy. This year's budget allows us to continue to
build readiness for high intensity conflict and begin building our
future force through key modernization efforts. It also enables us to
continue to take care of our people and institute reforms across the
Army to free up time, money, and manpower. Army leadership, with
congressional support, is committed to ensuring America's Army is ready
now and modernizing for the future.
strategic environment
Our Army faces a complex and demanding strategic environment. This
will require the Army to remain ready for a wide range of missions to
defend American interests. We must build readiness for high-intensity
conflict and modernize our forces to ensure overmatch against near-peer
competitors, while sustaining irregular warfare as a core competency.
Our competitors are seeking to alter global strategic realities for
their own benefit, often at the expense of U.S. interests and those of
our allies and partners. Russia and China continue to assert themselves
in an effort to gain dominance in key regions, and are developing
advanced weapons to achieve parity both strategically and in close
combat. North Korea has pursued nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles
for decades with significant advances over the last year. Iran is
attempting to expand its regional influence by developing more advanced
ballistic missiles and supporting insurgent groups against United
States allies in the region. Additionally, these state actors use a
range of actions short of armed conflict, from cyber-attacks to
irregular warfare through proxies that destabilize regions without
attribution. Finally, terrorist groups continue to threaten the U.S.
Homeland, U.S. citizens, U.S. interests abroad, and our allies and
partners.
Soldiers directly contribute to our Nation's efforts to counter
these challenges by serving combatant commanders worldwide with over
178,000 soldiers operating across a wide array of missions. The Army is
committed to maintaining peace, stability, and security in the Asia-
Pacific with nearly 80,000 soldiers assigned, deployed, and forward-
stationed throughout the region. Twenty-four thousand soldiers continue
to deter North Korean aggression, with the Army focused on building
readiness to respond to any contingency, including potential conflict.
In Europe, the Army has over 30,000 forward stationed and rotational
forces. In the Middle East, the troop increase in Afghanistan has
already begun to advance the train, advise, and assist mission at the
tactical level. In support of Homeland defense, the Army provides over
15,000 soldiers as well as a Global Response Force of 9,500 personnel,
capable of deploying anywhere in the world within 96 hours. Over the
last year, Army forces were critical in disaster relief efforts in
Puerto Rico and the United States Virgin Islands resulting from
Hurricanes Maria and Irma, the California wild fires and mud slides,
and widespread flooding in the central United States.
The Army's competitive advantage is our soldiers' ability to
rapidly deploy when and where required, gain and maintain overmatch,
and achieve decisive victory against any adversary. This produces a
combat-credible deterrent against potential adversaries who are hostile
to our Nation's interests. Sustained, predictable, adequate, and timely
funding will secure the Army's ability to continue to defend our
Nation's interests.
the army's budget request
The Army's total fiscal year 2019 budget request totals $182.1
billion which consists of $148.4 billion in the base budget and $33.7
billion for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO). This represents an
eight percent increase over our total fiscal year 2018 President's
Budget plus amendments. Our request reflects the Army's priorities:
grow and maintain a ready high-end force; build our future force
through key modernization efforts; continue to take care of our people;
and institute reforms that lead the Army to be even better stewards of
taxpayer dollars.
readiness to fight tonight
Ready forces ensure that the Army can compete against our
adversaries, deter conflict, and win decisively. Fiscal year 2017 and
fiscal year 2018 authorizations and fiscal year 2017 appropriations
provided critical support to fill manning requirements, fund important
gains to training such as increasing combat training center rotations,
increasing equipment operational readiness rates, building and
modernizing Army Prepositioned Stocks, and beginning to address
munitions shortfalls. Barring a significant increase in demand for land
forces, the Army will attain our Total Force readiness recovery goals
in 2022. To ensure that we meet this goal, we need predictable,
adequate, sustained, timely funding, enabling us to sufficiently
organize, man, train, and equip our formations.
We are growing the Army by both recruiting and retaining physically
fit, mentally tough soldiers without lowering standards. Increased end
strength has enabled the Army to fill manning shortfalls in key
formations. Soldiers within the ranks are also increasingly deployable,
with a four percent decrease in Regular Army non-deployable rates over
the past year, and an overall goal of a five percent non-deployable
rate by fiscal year 2021. Contributing to this is increased holistic
fitness, improved medical tracking, unit injury prevention and physical
therapy programs, and leveraging end strength increases to raise
operational unit manning levels. These are accompanied by new policies
intended to rebuild a culture of deployability across the force. As a
result, the number of brigade combat teams (BCTs) in the highest state
of personnel readiness has more than doubled.
Tough, realistic training is key to maintaining our competitive
advantage in the current security environment. In order to increase
soldiers' opportunity to conduct training focused on lethality, we have
reduced, and will continue to reduce, ancillary mandatory training,
requirements, and distractions at home station. We are also using
virtual simulations to increase training repetitions for small units,
creating greater proficiency at unit collective tasks. Leaders across
the Army are taking steps to ensure a predictable training management
cycle, and returning our training focus to preparation for a high-end
fight validated at combat training centers. However, these units can
only remain ready if they remain together, so we must also find
innovative ways to meet combatant command demand without breaking apart
our baseline combat formations.
An important part of the Army's effort to maintain the readiness of
the Army's BCTs for major combat operations is the security force
assistance brigade (SFAB). The SFAB will provide combatant commanders
with a skilled advisory force to team with our security partners
worldwide. Previously, we assigned BCTs to conduct advisory missions,
breaking those formations apart. The first SFAB deployed to Afghanistan
in the spring of 2018. We request congressional support to man, train,
and equip six SFABs: five in the Regular Army and one in the Army
National Guard.
In addition to improved training, our Army must have sufficient
equipment. We are modernizing our equipment, refining our supply
distribution systems, and enhancing our Prepositioned Stocks to balance
our capabilities across multiple threats and theaters. However, we
continue to have shortages of some critical preferred munitions. As a
result, Holston Army Ammunition Plant in Tennessee is expanding
production capacity, and Pine Bluff Arsenal in Arkansas and McAlester
Army Ammunition Plant in Oklahoma are beginning repair and upgrade
programs. We request congressional support as we continue to reform and
align requirements and resources within the Organic Industrial Base.
modernization: ready for the future fight
Over the past decade, the Army made necessary but difficult choices
to defer modernization in order to support combat operations. We
upgraded current weapons systems rather than acquire new or next
generation technologies. However, we can no longer afford to delay
modernization without risking overmatch on future battlefields. Thanks
to congressional support, the Army now has the means to modestly
increase investments towards modernization and lay the groundwork for
increased funding in the coming years. To improve modernization we will
focus on three things. First, we will establish the Army Futures
Command to reform our acquisition process through unity of command,
unity of effort, and increased accountability. Second, through the
efforts of eight cross functional teams, we will focus these additional
resources towards six modernization priorities to ensure future
overmatch. Third, Army leadership will strengthen our relationship with
industry, our allies, and the top intellectual and innovative talent
our Nation has to offer. Collectively, these improvements and others
will help ensure our lethality and future readiness.
The Army must adapt quicker than our adversaries to maintain our
competitive advantage. This is the rationale for the Army Futures
Command. The formal establishment of Army Futures Command in the summer
of 2018 will represent the most significant organizational change to
the Army's structure since 1973. The new command will consolidate the
Acquisition process under one organization with a mission to deliver
integrated solutions for increased lethality and capabilities to the
soldier when and where they are needed.
The fiscal year 2019 budget coupled with our reforms will enable
the Army to accelerate upgrades to critical capabilities, managing
current risk while we innovate and prototype with a goal to begin
fielding the next generation of combat vehicles, aerial platforms, and
weapons systems by 2028. These vehicles and weapons must be better than
anything our adversaries will deploy in the future. We will focus
modernization, science and technology, and research and development
efforts on six modernization priorities, managed and assessed by eight
cross functional teams:
Long Range Precision Fires--modernize a cannon for
extended range, volume, and increased missile capabilities to restore
Army dominance in range. Systems like the Extended Range Cannon
Artillery, which has been accelerated to fiscal year 2023, and the Long
Range Precision Fires Missile, accelerated to fiscal year 2021 protect
and ensure freedom of maneuver to forces in contact with the enemy in
deep, close, and rear operations. The Army has included $73.7 million
for Long Range Precision Fires in the fiscal year 2018 Enhancement
Request, with $22 million in additional requested funds in the fiscal
year 2019 President's Budget.
Next Generation of Combat Vehicles--develop prototypes
that lead to the replacement of our current fleet of infantry fighting
vehicles, and later tanks, in manned, unmanned, and optionally manned
variants. A next generation vehicle is needed to enhance soldier
protection, increase mobility, and make our forces more lethal.
Prototypes for both manned and robotic vehicles will arrive in fiscal
year 2021, with $13.1 million requested in the fiscal year 2018
Enhancement, and $84 million in the fiscal year 2019 President's
Budget.
Future Vertical Lift--incorporate manned, unmanned, and
optionally manned variant vertical lift platforms that provide superior
speed, range, endurance, altitude, and payload capabilities. These
include the Future Unmanned Aircraft System, which is undergoing
experimentation and will be prototyped in fiscal year 2024, and the
Modular Open System Approach, a software prototype that has been
accelerated from fiscal year 2028 to fiscal year 2026. $25.1 million is
included in the fiscal year 2018 Enhancement Request for Future
Vertical Lift, with additional funds included in the fiscal year 2019
President's Budget.
Network--develop expeditionary infrastructure solutions
to fight reliably on the move in any environment. The Army Network
should incorporate electronic warfare; resilient, secure, and
interoperable hardware; software and information systems; assured
position, navigation, and timing; and low signature networks. $180
million is included in the fiscal year 2018 Enhancement Request to
conduct Network related experimentation next fiscal year, including an
Infantry Brigade at the Joint Readiness Training Center this summer,
and a Stryker Brigade by early 2019.
Air and Missile Defense--ensure our future combat
formations are protected from modern and advanced air and missile
delivered fires, including drones. We are focusing on capabilities that
include Mobile Short-Range Air Defense with directed energy and
advanced energetics. We are also accelerating the fielding of existing
air defense capabilities over the coming years.
Soldier Lethality--develop the next generation of
individual and squad weapons; improve body armor, sensors, and radios;
and develop a synthetic training environment that simulates the modern
battlefield, allowing our soldiers multiple iterations before they ever
deploy. The fiscal year 2018 Enhancement Request includes $81 million
to experiment and procure Enhanced Night Vision Goggles by fiscal year
2021.
These modernization priorities illustrate how our Army will adapt
to future threats. The cross functional teams are the driving force for
the modernization priorities. Each cross functional team uses technical
experimentation and demonstrations, in conjunction with increased
engagement with industry and commercial sector partners, to inform
prototype development and reduce the requirement process.
The Army remains concerned about preserving key skills and
capabilities for our original equipment manufacturers and their key
supplier bases. Collaboration with our private sector partners early in
the process helps reduce risk. Efforts such as the Army Manufacturing
Technology Program have provided affordable and timely manufacturing
solutions that assist our industry partners to address manufacturing
risks. Collectively, congressional support for the Army Futures
Command, implementation of the future recommendations of the cross
functional teams, and a strong relationship with the commercial base
has one simple goal: make soldiers more lethal and ready for the
future.
reform
To achieve these objectives, we are assessing everything we do
across the Army, looking for ways to free up time, money, and manpower
for our top priorities. In support of DOD reform efforts, we have
placed increased emphasis on a number of business reforms and
stewardship initiatives. Specifically, we are instituting Army-wide
programs that address Acquisition Reform; Contract Management; Budget
Execution; divestiture and consolidation of legacy information
technology systems; and auditability of our resources.
The Army's Acquisition Reform Initiative shortens the development
timeline and approval process of capabilities requirements. This reform
initiative directs the consolidation of two oversight groups into one
and provides Army leadership with access to decisions earlier in the
decision cycle. The Army is creating strategic enterprise metrics
through policies and procedures intended to drive significant savings
from the reform of contracted services per year from 2020 to 2024. We
are also monitoring de-obligating funds through the Command
Accountability and Execution Review to increase Army annual buying
power. Additionally, we are improving our auditability. This year, we
plan to complete an independent audit that will further enable the Army
to improve our business practices and management of our resources.
Another key area of reform is in Army institutions. We are
undertaking efforts to optimize non-divisional two-star headquarters
and above to enable faster decision making. We are beginning by
optimizing key essential tasks at the Army Secretariat, Army Staff, and
Army Commands to address manning requirement needs at the division
level and below. Next, revised experimentation and war gaming will
accelerate new Army warfighting doctrine, providing a comprehensive
framework to underpin how we train and how we fight. Finally, a new
talent management based personnel system will optimize individuals'
effectiveness and professional development, and ensure we develop and
retain exceptional leaders and soldiers of unmatched lethality.
soldiers, civilians, and families: our greatest asset
The United States Army is composed of Regular Army, Army National
Guard, and Army Reserve soldiers, civilians, and family members serving
the Nation at home and abroad. The quality of soldiers the Army
attracts and retains is extremely high. Quality metrics for Army
recruits are at their highest point, exceeding every DOD-mandated
education and aptitude threshold for the eighth year in a row. Waivers
for recruits are down nearly eight percent over the past decade. The
Army's long term success depends on developing smart, innovative
leaders of character who bring a wide range of skills and experiences
to our ranks. We will remain a standards-based organization and
maintain the values that we have established for those who enter and
serve the Army and for those soldiers who remain for a career. We will
not lower standards to meet our end strength goals.
The Army is committed to taking care of our soldiers, civilians,
and their families by maintaining opportunities for promotions and
schooling, providing attractive career options, and continuing quality
of life programs. We ensure the well-being of our people through world-
class medical services, quality facilities to live and work, and child
care and youth services. New civilian hiring initiatives for spouses
promise to accelerate work opportunities on Army installations, while
other reforms may allow them to sustain careers by reducing the
frequency of moves. The cumulative effect of these programs is to
increase retention through increased satisfaction with Army life.
We also take care of individual soldiers and strengthen teams
through Sexual Harassment/Assault Prevention and Response initiatives,
active Suicide Prevention measures, Army Warrior Care, and transition
assistance through our Soldier for Life program. In particular, a new
task force is addressing suicide reduction in the Army National Guard
and Army Reserve. Taking care of our people ensures soldiers and
families have the support they need to focus on preparing to deploy,
fight, and win our Nation's wars.
conclusion
On behalf of the entire Army, we thank Congress for their support
that allows us to continue to improve readiness and make an increased
investment in our future Army. Our current security environment
continues to have numerous challenges, and they are growing. With
predictable, adequate, sustained, and timely funding, we will increase
capacity, train advisory forces, close critical munitions gaps, improve
modernization, and take care of our soldiers, civilians, and their
families. We are a standards-based organization accountable to Congress
and the American people. We know that the only acceptable result of our
efforts is a lethal Army, ready now, and prepared for the future.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, General Milley.
Senator Reed.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me join you in welcoming Secretary Esper and General
Milley. Thank you, gentlemen, for your service. Please thank
the men and women of the Army for their great service. I look
forward to your response to our questions as we move forward.
The President's Budget request for fiscal year 2019
includes $182 billion in the funding for the Army. Of that
amount, 148 billion is for base budget requirements and 34
billion for overseas contingency operations. As the committee
considers the Army's funding request, we must be mindful, as
you've pointed out, of the risks facing our country and our
national security challenges.
The new National Defense Strategy is focused on the
reemergence of long-term strategic competition, which makes the
threat posed by China and Russia the primary focus for the
Department. This strategic shift will require the Army to train
for full-spectrum operations and to field equipment necessary
for a high-end fight. The new strategy also assumes risk in our
counterterrorism mission, as it is no longer the primary
national security concern. As you go forward, your comments on
views on how the Army is going to balance that shift to the
high-end, near-peer fight while seeking more efficient
approaches to counterterrorism would be deeply appreciated.
Several months ago, the Army created a number of cross-
functional teams, as you pointed out, Mr. Secretary, that were
designed to break down acquisition stovepipes so new
technologies and modernization platforms could be delivered to
the force in a more effective manner. I would ask, going
forward this morning, that you would share with us what you've
learned so far from these efforts, and how these teams will
inform your modernization efforts throughout the Army.
In addition, given the new emphasis on great-power
competition, I hope you will also discuss the necessary
investments in modernization that you're emphasizing in this
budget, and not this--just this budget, but budgets that might
follow. Modernized military platforms and upgraded equipment
are necessary to prevail in great-power competitions, but
success against a near-peer adversary also requires the Army to
build and maintain readiness levels, as you've pointed out.
This hearing is an opportunity to update in more detail the
Army's current efforts to rebuild and sustain readiness.
Finally, the budget request seeks an increase of 4,000
Active Duty soldiers, as well as increased full-time support
for the Reserve component. It's imperative that, as the Army
grows, it remains focused on the quality of our soldiers rather
than the quantity. The training and readiness of our soldiers
is paramount. Enhancing the fighting ability of the force, we
must have a situation where we don't allow size to overcome
quality.
The President's Budget also requests an across-the-board
pay raise of 2.6 percent for all military personnel, which I
think has universal support here. But, the President does not
request an increase in civilian pay. In fact, there's a freeze.
That will make it very difficult to recruit the high quality
civilians that you need, and reward those that you need to stay
with the Army.
I hope, again, to get your comments on these and many other
issues. Again, thank you very much for your testimony and your
service.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Let's start off with--we talked about the condition that we
were in a year ago, in terms of our brigade combat teams, our
readiness. We are, you know, understandingly, happy with what
happened with our fiscal year 2018 and fiscal year 2019
budgets. The problem is, that is good only up to fiscal year
2020. Now, I think it's a good time to get on record--let's
assume that we, for some reason, had to go back to the BCA
spending caps, starting in 2020, and that we were not fortunate
enough to keep up the increase that we achieved in 2018 and
2019. I would like to have each of you express what our
condition--the condition of our Army would be if that were to
occur and we had to go back to those caps.
Secretary Esper.
Dr. Esper. Well, thank you for that question, Senator
Inhofe. It's clear that what it would mean if we are unable to
sustain funding is that we would revert back to where we were a
few years ago, that we would reverse the gains that we are
currently making with regard to either training readiness,
equipment readiness, munitions purchases that are critical for
warfights, and the personnel gains that are necessary to ensure
that we have sufficient end strength to meet the demands of the
combatant commanders and are prepared to execute the National
Defense Strategy. So, it would be a lost opportunity as we--
we're really building momentum right now.
I think, to address Senator Reed's question, the critical
thing is, as we continue to improve our readiness, which we've
seen good growth in, we need to make sure that we can sustain
it, then, through 2020, 2021, 2022, because, after 9-10 years
of warfighting and bad budget challenges, it will take many
years to get back to the readiness posture we need to be in.
Senator Inhofe. Yeah. Right.
General Milley.
General Milley. Yes, Senator. We've done extensive analysis
over the last couple of years, just in the event that that were
to happen. If we went to sequestration caps, bottom line is,
for the ground force, the Army, that we would end up
essentially doing individual training and collective training
up through squad level and, in some cases, platoon level. Squad
and platoon training, an Army does not make. You've got to be
able to do company, battalion, brigade, and so on. Training
only at those levels, and funded only at those levels, would
not work.
Flying hours, right now we're coming in at close to 14, 14
and a half hours with current budgets. We'll drop back to 10,
11, 12. That's not good for our aviation rotary wing. Home
station training will come to a halt. The CTCs will come to a
halt.
It will not be good if we went backwards. If the
intangibles, the effect on morale, cohesion, enlistment,
reenlistment--right now, in terms of reenlistment, we've
already exceeded our 2018 reenlistment. We're working on 2019
reenlistment, which is an indicator of morale that's going up.
All of those things would take steps backwards. So, I would
strongly encourage not to do that.
Senator Inhofe. Yeah. I think it's important to get that
out in the open now, talk about it now.
Now, another area that I'm particularly interested in, of
course, is our artillery, the fact that other--both China and
Russia have passed us up, in terms of range, in terms of rapid-
fire. Right now we're in a position, we're--are working the
system to correct that, the PIM program. In my opening
statement, I talked a little bit about what's happened in the
past with the Crusader, the Future Combat System. But, now we
have this program that I think is going to be--put us in a
position where we should be, getting back up in--ahead of our
adversaries. That's what we want to get done.
Secretary Esper, can you articulate what your number-one
priority is for modernization to meet the new National Defense
Strategy? Let's start with that.
Dr. Esper. Yes, Senator. The Army has outlined six
modernization priorities, beginning, number one, with long-
range precision fires, and the sixth being soldier lethality.
With regard to long-range precision fires, we are pursuing
technologies at the tactical, operational, and strategic level.
So, at the tactical level, as you mentioned, the PIM program is
very important. At the operational level, it's the extended-
range cannon artillery. At the strategic level would be
hypersonics, the ability to really reach deep and--in support
of the Navy and the Air Force to do that. I will tell you that,
as I've traveled the Army, in the 4 and a half months, and
spoke to a few combatant commanders, they have also conveyed to
me the importance, the criticality of long-range precision
fires to their respective warfights.
Senator Inhofe. That's good.
General Milley, I--just one real quick question as to--your
goal has always been to be up to 66 percent. We actually in--my
information was, we dropped down--in the--our BCTs, capability
went down as low as, what, 33 percent. Now we're--I understand
we've improved dramatically on that. We're going to continue to
do it. But, how close are we now to your goal, 66 percent?
General Milley. Our readiness goal for the regular Army,
the Active Duty Army, is 66 percent of all units, all types of
units--brigade combat teams, logistics units, aviation units,
et cetera--so 66 percent for the regular Army, and 33 percent
for the Reserve component, both Guard and Reserve. We are not
at those benchmarks right now, but we are working towards them,
and we predict, given consistent funding and if the world stays
the way it is right this minute, then we should achieve those
benchmarks sometime in 2021, 2022. We have made significant
progress.
Senator Inhofe. Okay.
General Milley. What you're citing as 30 percent or so is
from a year or so ago. We're at--for brigade combat teams,
which is only one slice of the total force, we're in the range
of the 50 percent mark. So, we have made significant progress
in the last 24 months.
Senator Inhofe. Yeah, that's good.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
My question--first question will follow at least the theme
that the Chairman has set, and that is that he pointed out one
area of technological overmatch by our adversaries, but there
are several, unfortunately, including command-and-control
disruption because of cyber. So, in general, how are you going
to--dealing with this issue of technological overmatch, not
just in precision fires, but in a host of other issues?
Dr. Esper. Senator, another one of the six modernization
priorities is the network. We know that we've learned, from
various studies, what we saw the Russians do in Ukraine, that
we need a network that is reliable, that is resilient, that is
mobile, that can meet our needs in such an environment. We are
fairly confident that the future adversaries will certainly
strike asymmetrically at our space systems, at our information
systems, our networks. So, we need to do everything from
looking at the next-generation technology to make sure we have
resilient systems, but, at the same time, we need to look at
training, make sure soldiers are training now to operate in a
environment in which they either have no data or coms, or
limited.
I was pleased to see, on my first trip to National Training
Center in November, that the 1st Cavalry was actually doing
that. The Op4 out there were presenting that type of scenario,
and we were training in a--an environment of limited
communications. That's the guidance we have set out for
commanders, as well, to be able to train along that spectrum.
Senator Reed. General Milley, are there other areas of
overmatch that you want to emphasize?
General Milley. The six priorities that we've laid out,
which are related to the fundamental functions of an Army to
shoot, move, communicate, protect, and sustain are long-range
precision fires, the upgraded vehicles, rotary wing aircraft,
future vertical lift, the network that the Secretary just
mentioned, ballistic and air missile defense, and then all the
soldier improvements in the soldier lethality--those are the
areas where we want to laser focus, where we think that we can
make significant advances.
There's two particular technologies that we need to put the
pedal to the metal to, both as a country, a Department of
Defense, and as an Army: artificial intelligence and robotics.
Those are significant. We're in a period of the changing
character of war. Those two technologies, perhaps more than
others, will have fundamental impact on the character of war
coming up. So, we are shifting monies in our R&D [Research &
Development] and S&T [Science & Technology] accounts into those
technologies, as well as many others.
Senator Reed. Do you think there is enough resources going
to those accounts, not just in the Army, but DOD-wide and
governmentwide?
General Milley. I think we should put more, is my
personal--or my professional opinion is, we should add monies
into those particular research, development, science,
technology accounts.
Dr. Esper. I would add--Senator, that I meet frequently
with Secretary Spencer, the SECNAV [Secretary of the Navy], and
Secretary Wilson. We've had these same discussions about those
technologies, hypersonics, and a couple of others, where we
really need to pull our efforts together and look at how we can
make sure that we're making advances and not duplicating
efforts, to get more bang for every dollar we put toward it.
Senator Reed. As I mentioned in my opening statement, as I
think we've all mentioned, is that the new defense policy has
pushed us up into the area of near-peer competition. There is a
tendency of Army's--based on my experiences, you only can do,
really, one thing, and that's what you focus on. You know,
when--1970s and 1980s, we got out of counter-guerrilla warfare
and we got into the air-land battle. We did it very, very well.
But, we had to reimmerse ourselves into counterinsurgency
warfare techniques and equipment and practices in Afghanistan
and Iraq.
Now we have not just two dimensions, but probably three
dimensions. You have conventional warfare, you have hybrid
warfare, which is right below that, with a sophisticated enemy
with technological advantages and disadvantages, and then you
have the counter-guerrilla warfare, like we're practicing in--
or counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. How are you going to keep
that balance between these three missions and avoid the danger
of we-just-do-and-we-do-it-very-well X?
General Milley, you want to start?
General Milley. Well, I think you're correct that, post
Vietnam, we sort of did away with any kind of skillsets that we
had, for the most part, within our inventory, in terms of
counter-guerrilla/counterinsurgency warfare. We don't have that
luxury. Guerrillas, insurgents, terrorists are going to be
around for a long time in various different forms. We have to
maintain the skillset. We can't throw the baby out with the
bath water. So, we have to keep that going, and we intend to
keep that going. That's part of the SFABs [Security Force
Assistance Brigades]. There's a large resident capability
within our Special Operations Forces for that. But, our
conventional forces also need to have skills in that regard.
But, at the same time, we have to recapture our skills at
combined-arms maneuver warfare against near-peer competitors in
great-power competition, because, you know, frankly, you know,
probably the word ``peace through strength'' is sometimes
overused, but it's true. In the international environment, you
have to maintain the capabilities so that your opponent, your
adversary, believes and knows that you have incredible
dominating strength and incredible lethality on the
battlefield. So, we have to be able to do both capabilities--as
a military, not just as an Army--in order to deter any
potential aggression from any other country. If we don't do
that, then you invite aggression, in my view.
So, it's incumbent upon us to do that, to invest in those
capabilities, to maintain those skills. That's a very expensive
proposition, and we recognize that. But, maintaining the peace
is a very expensive proposition. The only thing more expensive
than that's fighting a war. The only thing more than that is
losing one.
So, it's really important, I think, as we go forward in
these budgets, that we continue to sustain predictable funding
to be able to do both counterinsurgency, counterterrorist-type
operations within our force structure, and higher-end
conventional operations against a great-power competitor.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
The second vote has started. Senator Reed is, I believe,
going to go down and vote at the first of it, and I'm going to
wait toward the last.
Senator Cotton.
Senator Cotton. Thank you, gentlemen, for your appearance
again. Thank you for your service to our country.
General Milley, let me just follow up on what you just said
about sustained funding. So, we passed a budget a couple of
months ago. Last week--or last month, we passed spending bill
for this fiscal year. I don't think we should spike the
football about those things, though. Those were long overdue.
We still have to pass a defense appropriations bill for the
next fiscal year. So, is the point you're making--and,
Secretary Esper, you made it to Chairman Inhofe--is that you
needed Department of Defense appropriations bills done in a
timely and predictable fashion this summer?
Dr. Esper. Absolutely, Senator. If--timeliness is critical
to that. If not, what it does is push back our spending
authority. If we're--we are under a CR [Continuing Resolution],
as you know, we are not allowed new starts. We are not allowed
to in--spend money greater than the previous-year funding
level. We are not able to procure additional munitions. It
impacts training, because we have reduced O&M [Operations &
Maintenance] dollars. So, there are a--any number of reasons
why the timeliness is critical to ensuring we are able to
maintain the positive glide slope we're on with regard to
readiness.
Senator Cotton. That carries us out to the next fiscal
year, fiscal year 2019, that is covered by the 2-year budget we
just passed. But, we still have fiscal year 2020 and 2021 ahead
of us, about 16-18 months away, for which the Budget Control
Act and sequestration still comes into effect. Is it your
judgment that Congress needs to act now to stop that kind of
sequestration from even looming over the Army's head, come the
summer of 2019?
Dr. Esper. Yes, sir. For all the services, it's critical to
all of us achieving our readiness goals. With regard to the
Army, in particular, as I said earlier, we endured 7, 8, 9
years of falling budgets, a very high operational pace. It's
going to take many years to get out of that. If you step back,
we have this goal of achieving our readiness status by around
2022. It's that point in time where we want to--really want to
start making significant investments and start fielding--
prototyping the next generation of technologies that we've
outlined in our modernization priorities.
Senator Cotton. General Milley?
General Milley. Absolutely, Senator. I mean, you're not
going to dig out of a 10-year trough, 8-year trough, in
readiness and modernization--you're not going to do that in 2
years. It's not one-and-done sort of thing. So, it has to be
consistent, it has to be predictable over time. The
sequestration, the BCA [Budget Control Act] caps, they just
need to go away. It's an incredibly efficient--inefficient
means of funding, when we're only given part of the year to
spend. With industry, it's not predictable, so you can't do
long-term contracts. There's a wide variety of reasons why it
is not an effective or efficient means of using the taxpayer
dollars. It needs to go away.
Senator Cotton. Yeah. So, the Budget Control Act was
designed to have 8 eight years of potential sequestration cuts
if budget caps aren't met. We have now gone through three
iterations of 2-year budget cycles. I predict that, if we don't
repeal the Budget Control Act, we'll have a fourth iteration in
2020 and 2021 before that law expires. I think Congress should
just repeal it outright this summer.
General Milley, I want to return to what you said about
readiness. So, you predict that, barring some significant
increase in the demand for land forces, all Army elements will
be--will meet your readiness goals by 2021-2022?
General Milley. That's the glide path I'm currently
estimating, that's correct.
Senator Cotton. Where are brigade combat teams today?
General Milley. I don't want to give specific numbers in
open testimony. I'll be happy to do it in classified testimony.
But, it's in the range of 50 percent.
Senator Cotton. Where were they when you took this job, 3
years ago?
General Milley. Significantly less than that. When I came
in,
2-\1/2\ years ago, we had two brigades at the highest level of
readiness.
Senator Cotton. Okay. Good work.
Secretary Esper, I'd like to turn to a point about long-
range fires. It has a policy implication. So, Department of
Defense, Department of State have long recognized and
acknowledged publicly that Russia is violating the INF
[Intermediate Nuclear Forces] Treaty. If Russia continues to
violate the INF Treaty and the United States continues to
observe the INF Treaty, doesn't it stand to reason that there's
no way the United States can make up the gap in long-range
fires in Europe?
Dr. Esper. It is. We are looking at hypersonics as a
potential way, a promising way to be able to reach beyond the
treaty constraints imposed by the INF. So, that's one option.
But, clearly, as I've spoken to industry, if that constraint
did not exist now, we could certainly do it with missiles.
Senator Cotton. It would be the easier way to do it than
developing hypersonics that might be compliant----
Dr. Esper. Probably easier and quicker, although
hypersonics provide--have some benefits that--in terms of
volume of fire and other things that you can do. But, yes.
Senator Cotton. General Milley, I'd like to turn to an
operational aspect of another one of the six modernization
priorities, the network, and, specifically, fighting in a
denied environment. Both of you have discussed with me how
we're working with our soldiers to make sure that they can go
back to the old-fashioned way of fighting, with compass and map
and so forth, in the call for fire and navigation and what have
you. If that were to happen, if our soldiers had to fight in a
denied environment, surely the enemy soldiers would also be
fighting in a denied environment, as well, right? There's no
situation in which, to use the football term, it won't be
raining on both sides of the field?
General Milley. No, I think that all modern militaries are
incredibly reliant on very sophisticated command-control
communication systems, reliant on space systems, GPS, you know,
precision in navigation and timing capabilities. All modern
militaries rely on those. Those are vulnerable for all forces.
So, yes, I guarantee that any adversary that takes on the
United States will be operating in a significantly degraded
environment.
Senator Cotton. So, if our soldiers are using compasses and
hand-and-arm signals, so to speak, to put it in colloquial
terms, their soldiers will be using compasses and hand-and-arm
signals.
General Milley. I would imagine that that is very likely.
Senator Cotton. Do you have any doubt that our soldiers
fighting on those terms are going to be able to defeat their
soldiers?
General Milley. Well, as you know, that our Army, like
modern armies, we're very reliant on these things for
navigation and for precision munitions and for calling in
close-air support. It's important that we have systems that are
resilient, that are capable of operating in degraded
environments, and that our soldiers are trained to do so. I'm
confident that our soldiers' ability to operate in a degraded
environment is improving. A couple of years ago, we started
doing cyber operations against ourselves, out at the National
Training Center. It's a very effective way to increase the
training levels and the comfort of our soldiers to operate in
those environments.
So, it's not going to be a perfect world. Combat's not a
perfect environment. It's a very lethal environment. It is
something that we'll have to adapt and overcome the ability of
operating in a degraded electronic warfare environment. There's
no question about it.
Senator Cotton. Thank you General, my time is expired.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Rounds, presiding.
Senator King?
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I also have to go to vote, so I'm going to be quick with my
questions.
I think, to follow up on Senator Cotton's questions, Are we
training our troops now with compasses and maps, just as at
Annapolis, after a 20-year gap, they're now teaching how to do
celestial navigation? In other words, are we specifically
training for the failure of the GPS system?
General Milley. Yes.
Senator King. That's a very succinct and--that's the answer
I hoped I would get.
Dr. Esper. We are reinforcing, Senator, the importance of
doing that in training scenarios, in training activities, that
you have to be prepared to operate without communications,
without electronics across a range of specialties.
Senator King. Good. I think one of the most important
things that's going on now is the Army Futures Command. I guess
my question is, Should that be a four-star in order to give
that person sufficient authority to do the kind of coordination
and pulling together of authorities to make it work?
Secretary?
Dr. Esper. Yes, sir. We believe so. Not just that, but the
Army Futures Command is envisioned to be a peer institution to
the other four-star major commands. That's Army Materiel
Command, TRADOC [Training and Doctrine Command], and Forces
Command.
Senator King. I think that's important, because there's
going to be some important turf battles, I think, going on
there, and I think it's important that the authorities be
equivalent.
Secretary Esper, this isn't a hostile question, but it's a
challenging question. You talked about acquisition. The Army
doesn't have a very stellar record in the history--in recent
history, in terms of acquisition. You talked about, ``We're
going to do it better.'' Why? What--why--the people that didn't
do so well before weren't bad people, and they were doing their
best. What are--what is changing, systematically or
structurally, in order to give you the assurance that we're not
going to have some of the disasters that we had in the 1990s?
Dr. Esper. Yes, sir, it's a fair question. Needless to say,
we have taken a hard look at what experts have said in the past
who have revealed--reviewed Army programs. We have studied
reports, such as the Decker-Wagner report. We've had officers
working on this for a couple of years. We know that one of the
fundamental problems with the current big-A acquisition system
is lack of unity of command and unity of effort. In other
words, we have piece-parts of the acquisition system spread
across multiple commands and, in some cases, not under a
specific command. So, the promise of Army Futures Command, in
one aspect, is to pull them under, get--pull them all together
under a single commander, who can manage everything from what
he or she believes the future threat environment may look like,
to operational concepts, into materiel solutions, all the way
through testing and evaluation and procurement. And so, you'd
have that single chain of command. That's number one.
The other big problem has been a requirements process that
has crept along, that has extended the timelines and costs----
Senator King. Requirements creep.
Dr. Esper. Yes, sir. And so, the--what the cross-functional
teams are doing now, have been doing, and successfully, and we
will--this will be imported into Army Futures Command--is to
put all those stakeholders that I just described at the table
up front, and to agree on what is a--what are the reasonable
requirements that we know that we can achieve in a date certain
that provides us overmatch, that the technology is sufficiently
available to do, and move along that type of line. As
technology matures, we will continue to incrementally approve--
improve vehicles or systems, whatever the case may be.
Senator King. Well, one way to make sure that happens is to
build the initial platform in a modular way that--so it can be
upgraded without having to scrap the whole platform.
Dr. Esper. Yes, sir. We're doing that right now as we look
at deploying a mobile SHORAD (short-range air defenses), in
Europe in the next couple of years. We've already decided on a
chassis to do that, and we're working on the effectors. But,
one of the things, as I've talked to the CFT [Cross Functional
Training] lead on, is to make sure that you build sufficient
size, weight, and power into that vehicle so that, as the
technology matures, for example, we could put lasers on it,
because lasers provide an unlimited magazine, if you will, at
very minimal cost to do that.
Senator King. Well, I'd like to follow up with you offline,
because, just the number of hearings that we've had, there are
lots of lessons. I think it's so important to try to avoid some
of those issues that have plagued us in the past.
Dr. Esper. Yes, sir.
Senator King. I appreciate your attention.
General Milley, my understanding is that the increases that
have taken place in your funding in the last few months are
going almost entirely to capital and not to personnel. Is that
accurate?
General Milley. In terms of modernization and putting it
into, you know, remanufacturing of the helicopters or new
helicopters, new aircraft--is that what you're talking about,
Senator?
Senator King. Well, just that the increase--the increment
of increase----
General Milley. Yeah.
Senator King.--is going into capital improvements rather
than manpower and other----
General Milley. Well, we've taken the additional monies,
and we're putting it in modernization.
Senator King. That's my point.
General Milley. Yeah. Into--absolutely, modernization,
because modernization--we, the Army, took a modernization
holiday in the last 16 years. We've been fighting a war, we've
been consumed with current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
and elsewhere. Our modernization has lagged behind
significantly. So, we're trying to redress that and dig
ourselves out of that hole. That's really--in part, is the
reform of AFC, but we are shifting monies----
Senator King. But, we have to realize that----
General Milley. Yes.
Senator King.--that there are still unaddressed issues on
the personnel side.
General Milley. There are. But, we are increasing by
4,000--this budget, 2019 and 2018, is an increase of 4,000
personnel. We have a steady growth in the military personnel,
of 4,000 a year. And we--we're shooting to get north of
500,000--or 500,000 in the regular Army. We'll cap out at about
343-five in the Guard and at 199 in the Reserve. So, in terms
of military end-strength growth, there's a gradual modest
growth in order to fill the holes in the existing units, but we
think we needed to shift additional monies into modernization.
That's the need.
Senator King. I understand.
Thank you, gentlemen. I want to thank you particularly for
the progress that you've made, both of you. It's, I think,
quite remarkable, necessary, and I just hope that we can see it
maintained. I look forward--I'll have some questions for the
record, and, Mr. Secretary, talking to you about the
acquisition process. We've got to get it right this time.
Dr. Esper. Absolutely.
Senator King. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Rounds [presiding]. On behalf of the Chairman,
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
I want to echo what Senator King said. Bottom line, I think
you all make a heck of a team for the Army. Hats off to you.
You've been in a bad spot, and we're trying to dig out. I
appreciate both of your leadership.
So, let's talk a little bit about Syria, because it's sort
of the hot topic. The President said that Assad is an animal
who killed innocent children by using chlorine gas, and maybe
some other form of gas, and he is going to pay a big price. Do
you agree with that statement, Mr. Secretary, that Assad should
pay a big price?
Dr. Esper. Senator, it's something that, you know, is a--my
responsibility is for title 10, making sure the Army is
organized, trained, and equipped. It's something that is--it
obviously is playing out in real time. So, I would, at this
point, defer to SECDEF.
Senator Graham. General Milley, do you agree with that
statement?
General Milley. Absolutely yes.
Senator Graham. Okay. Thank you.
General Milley. No question he should.
Senator Graham. So, do you agree with the following. If
Assad doesn't pay a big price, we will, because we have now
challenged him.
General Milley. Well, in--you know, Assad or any others----
Senator Graham. Once you challenge somebody----
General Milley.--unanswered aggression leads to more
aggression.
Senator Graham. I couldn't agree with you more. The only
thing worse than war is losing a war. And----
General Milley. That's right.
Senator Graham.--you said that.
General Milley. That's right.
Senator Graham. So, the President, I think, rightly said
that, ``Enough is enough when it comes to Assad. You're a war
criminal, by any definition, and a big price.'' Do you think a
big price should include that he'll have less capability to gas
people in the future?
General Milley. I think his ability to use chemical
munitions on the innocent needs to be significantly degraded.
Senator Graham. Do you think he's a legitimate target,
given what he's done?
Assad?
General Milley. I'll not answer that question in public at
this point.
Senator Graham. Okay, fair enough.
I just hope a big price, when it's all said and done, that
Kim Jong-un says, ``Hey, that was a big price.'' I hope that
the Iranians believe that Assad paid a big price, the Russians
believe that he paid a big price. I hope they start paying a
price for supporting Assad. Because the President's right to
say he's going to pay a big price, given the fact that he's
killed 500,000 of his own people, disrupted the entire Mid-
East, and is a war criminal, by any measure. The question of
whether or not it's a big price is yet to be determined. I
would say this. If, after saying that, he doesn't pay a big
price, America will pay a big price.
Residual forces. Do you support leaving residual forces in
Iraq, if the Iraqis would agree, to make sure ISIS doesn't come
back, General Milley?
General Milley. I think we need to continue to sustain our
level of effort in order to achieve our national security
objectives, which have been----
Senator Graham. Would it----
General Milley.--clearly stated.
Senator Graham.--include a residual force?
General Milley. Well, I think the Iraqis--absolutely,
because I think the Iraqis----
Senator Graham. Yeah.
General Milley.--need continued support, so you--you don't
see----
Senator Graham. Sure.
General Milley.--the return of ISIS. That's important. We--
--
Senator Graham. Well----
General Milley.--learned this lesson in 2011. We don't want
to learn it again.
Senator Graham. Well, that's right. It's in our national
security interest to make sure we don't do this twice.
Syria, we have a couple thousand troops training the Syrian
Democratic Forces and doing operations against ISIL. Do you
think that's in our national security interest, to have that
presence?
General Milley. I believe it's in our national security
interest to destroy ISIS----
Senator Graham. Right. And----
General Milley.--absolutely.
Senator Graham.--make sure they----
General Milley. That's what----
Senator Graham.--don't come back.
General Milley.--we're doing.
Senator Graham. And make sure they don't come back.
General Milley. That's correct. And----
Senator Graham. Do you think it's in our national security
interest to counter the Iranian aggression throughout the Mid-
East?
General Milley. I do.
Senator Graham. Okay.
As to all these things that we're asking you to do, do you
think it's in our national security interest to maintain troops
in Afghanistan?
General Milley. I do.
Senator Graham. All right.
So, the bottom line is, Russia is on the prowl, China's
making it difficult for us in their part of the world, and only
God knows what's going to happen in North Korea. Bottom line
is, the budget we just passed, how much of help has it been to
the Army?
General Milley. In my view, it's enormous help--enormously
helpful. Again, what I mentioned earlier, it can't be one-and-
done, though. It--you can't dig yourself out of a--an 8- or 10-
year trough in readiness and modernization, which was getting
consumed with current operating--we can't do that in just two
budgets.
Senator Graham. Do you agree with that Mr. Secretary?
General Milley. This has got to be sustained over time.
Senator Graham. Do you agree with that?
Dr. Esper. Absolutely. What we're getting n 2018 and what
we'll see in 2019 is tremendous. We thank the Congress. But, it
will take many years to get to the readiness level and then get
to the next generation of technologies we need for the future
fight.
Senator Graham. Yeah, I couldn't agree with you more.
In 2011, CBO [Congressional Budget Office] projected that
military spending in 2018 would be 801 billion. It's 700
billion. In 2010, nondefense spending was 611, today it's 589.
So, these are just facts. Sequestration's cost us a lot.
So, is it fair to say that the Congress needs to understand
that we're making progress, but we're a long way--long away--
long's way away from actually fixing the problem caused by
sequestration? Is that true, General Milley?
General Milley. In my view, I think that's accurate. In
terms of the readiness and modernization of the United States
Army, I think that's true.
Dr. Esper. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
Thank you both for your service.
Senator Rounds. On behalf of the Chairman, Senator
McCaskill.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you very much.
Thank you both for your service. We are glad that you are
there.
As you both probably are aware, I've spent a lot of time on
this committee talking about contracting. I want to really
drill down on some contracting issues in my time here this
morning.
I began some oversight on the Legacy Program, beginning way
back in October of 2012. As you all know, the Legacy Program is
a very expensive American effort to build the intelligence
capacity of Afghanistan and Iraq.
We are now very engaged in an investigation into parts of
this contract. I have sent a lengthy letter, in August of last
year, to Secretary Mattis requesting a lot of information that
we--through both SIGAR and Robert Portman and I, we have all
been asking for more oversight on this. We learned that, in
August of 2017, that there was a nonpublic DCAA [Defense
Contract Audit Agency] audit of the subcontractor, New Century
Consulting. This audit, we know, includes questioned costs
amounting to over $50 million, including Bentleys, Alfa-Romeos,
assistant salaries of $420,000. It is--you know, it's so
discouraging to me, after all the work we've spent on
contracting, after all--after the War Contracting Commission
and all the reforms we've done in contracting, that we have not
yet figured out how to get at these abuses, close in time and
close to the source. I don't even think leadership finds out
about this until it's way too late. We're always engaged in the
clawback process.
So, I have been on this for awhile, and I would like a
couple of things that we're not getting right now, and I'd like
to bring them to your attention.
One of the things that we would like is a full list of
contracts and subcontracts in which New Century Consulting is
still engaged in. We would also like the NCC performance
assessments. Now, we're being told we can't get the audit
because the audit agency is worried that, if they publicly
disclose some of the audits, that that would discourage
contractors in the future because their financial information
would become public. I think we can get around that, and I
think we've got to figure out a way to get all this information
out. Because if I just don't embarrass the hell out of you
guys, I don't know how we're ever going to stop this stuff.
Ultimately, what--I'm not going to issue this investigative
report until I figure out who was seeing this stuff and not
saying anything, who on the ground.
Which brings me--Secretary, when you were here on your
confirmation, you know I talked to you about the IG [Inspector
General] report, the DOD IG report, in terms of top management
challenges. Ironically, the DOD IG, no surprise, had overseen
contracting officers' representatives was one of the biggest
challenges, and assessing and reporting on contractor
performance was one of management's biggest challenges.
Can you give me some good news, Secretary, as to whether or
not you've now digested this report and whether or not you,
along with General Milley, are actually strategizing how we
can--I mean, we've made progress on CORs, because when I went
to Iraq in the beginning, it was clear that a guy was just
getting a clipboard. I mean, all that stuff with LOGCAP
[Logistics Civil Augmentation Program] and all of the abuses
with the cost-plus, that was really sitting at the feet of a
very ineffective CORs training and assessment program. When
those--the contracting representatives that are right there on
the ground that see what's going on.
So, give me some good news about how you view this problem.
Please tell me that a Senator 20 years from now is not going to
be sitting here and going, ``How in the world are taxpayers
paying for Alfa-Romeos and Bentleys?"
Dr. Esper. Yes, ma'am. You're correct. You know, after you
raised the issue with regard to the contracting, with regard to
aviation, I think it was 2,000 separate contracts amongst
hundreds of contractors for hundreds of millions of dollars,
and, in many cases, for the same parts at different prices, I
went back and went through that report. I've discussed it with
folks internally. I will tell you, in the 4 months I've been on
the job, I have met with Contracting Command twice, as recently
as 3 weeks ago. I've had a conversation with my senior
acquisition executive. It's something that General Milley and I
recognize is a challenge. The head of Army Materiel Command is
all this week. We recognize that, as the--as that report
outlined, is, we need to have clear metrics and hold leaders
accountable for meeting those metrics with regard to
accounting--contracting, I'm sorry.
One of the reform initiatives we're pursuing right now is
to--is aimed to reduce the number of contracts, reduce that
process. We're looking at savings of possibly over a billion
dollars over a multiyear period. But, there's a lot more work
we need to do with regard to this. It's--we just don't have--we
have to be good stewards of the taxpayers' dollars, and that
means reform includes, certainly, contracting.
Senator McCaskill. Well, I look forward to having a
meeting. And you've been kind and tried to reach out to my
office, have a meeting. When we have that meeting, let's talk
about these contracting representatives----
Dr. Esper. Yes, ma'am.
Senator McCaskill.--on the ground, and what next step we
need to take to augment their ability to be the eyes and ears.
I won't regale you now, because I'm out of time, with all of
the time and energy that has been spent on this.
General, if you could help get this information that I've
asked for, I would really appreciate it. I think----
General Milley. We will get you the information.
[The information referred to follows:]
[The documents received will be retained in the committees
files.]
Senator McCaskill. Thank you so much.
General Milley. What you're describing is unacceptable,
smacks of corruption and criminal activity. It's unacceptable,
and the people are going to be held accountable.
Senator McCaskill. By the way, we keep doing business with
them. This goes all the way back to the alcohol at a party.
General Milley. I got it. We owe you answers.
Dr. Esper. I would just add briefly, I had a good meeting
with the head of GAO [Government Accountability Office] a
couple of weeks ago to talk about a number of issues, past
reports, along the same lines you raised. We made a commitment
to work together to help us look at issues and solve them. So.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you very much.
Senator Inhofe [presiding]. Senator Rounds.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Milley, I commend the Army for already reaching
full operational capability on the fielding of Cyber Force
ahead of the October 2018 requirement. Can you share the
lessons learned on that process and from the Army's
experimentation with placing offensive and defensive cyber
capabilities down to the brigade combat team level? And also,
would you share your perspective on integrating artificial
intelligence to enable both superior performance and security
of Army networks?
General Milley. I'd say, really, two or three things, here,
on the cyber piece of it. First of all, we have a lot--even
though we've achieved FOC [Full Operational Capability] we
have--on our objectives that we stated, in terms of our
organizations and our capabilities, the cyber protection teams
and the offensive teams, there's still more growth, and that's
a big growth industry. Cyber is an area, a domain of warfare
that is going to require us to continue to grow in the out
years. So, we're not really done, even though we've achieved
FOC for the stated objectives that you're referring to.
Some of the key lessons learned. I think one of the biggest
lessons learned is to empower the youth. You and I and probably
most in this room are essentially digital immigrants into a
world in which we are really semi-familiar with a lot of the
digital technologies that are out there, but these young
soldiers and sailors and airmen and marines that are coming
into the force, they're digital natives, and this is all second
nature to them. So, it's best to arm them, equip them, and
listen to them as they create the capabilities and the forces
that are going to be required in this new domain of war. That's
probably the biggest lesson. We've embedded them into the
units, the tactical and operational units, and we also have
ones at operational and strategic level, as well. But, the
tactical-unit ones are doing tremendous work. We're learning a
lot more about the vulnerabilities of our systems and how to
make them more resilient. But, I think the biggest single
lesson learned is, listen to the young, on this one. This is
one where they have far more wisdom than the rest of us.
Senator Rounds. These young people are vital to the long-
term security defense----
General Milley. No question.
Senator Rounds.--in our Nation.
General Milley. That's right.
Senator Rounds. We want them to stay in the Army. We want
them to feel like this is a good profession for them and that
there is a place for them, long term. Fair enough?
General Milley. Absolutely.
Senator Rounds. Part of that--I'm going to ask your
personal opinion now, and part of it's because I think you do
listen to these young people coming in--what's the scuttlebutt
on TRICARE?
General Milley. TRICARE is a very large capability--
insurance capability that takes care of our soldiers. I am, as
well as my family, recipients of that, and have been for years.
There are--like there are with any large system, there are
bureaucratic issues sometimes with it. I will tell you that, on
balance, TRICARE is an effective system for our soldiers. There
are areas, though, of improvement that we need, in terms of its
responsiveness to people. But, on balance, it's not a bad
system at all.
Senator Rounds. Part of the challenge is, is making sure
the claims get paid on time.
General Milley. That's right.
Senator Rounds. Are they getting paid on time?
General Milley. I'd have to look at the exact statistics,
but I have not heard--I don't have any evidence that there's
any wide disparity of being paid on time.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
You know, one of the other items that I think a lot of
these young people appreciate is the fact that they don't get
paid a whole lot of money, and they want to make that money go
as far as it possibly can. We provide, on bases, the
commissary.
General Milley. Right.
Senator Rounds. Do you think those commissaries are
valuable to the young people that are coming in?
General Milley. My professional opinion is yes, because the
commissary--you know, food is one of your big--bigger household
item expenditures--housing, food, medical, education, those
sorts of things, but food is a big one. So, a family of four--
our demographic is, the majority of our soldiers, well over 50
percent, are in the E4-E5 range, they're in the 26-27-28-year-
old range, and they are--about 60 percent are married, and, of
those that are married, on average, there's two children. So,
you--on average, you know, the bulk of the Army is about a
family of four. A family of four, on average, their monthly
food bill is several hundreds of dollars. The commissary--use
of the commissary knocks off a significant portion of that, in
lieu of having to go to some commercial entity to buy food
every month. So, the commissary is a big benefit and advantage
to the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines out there, in my
view.
Senator Rounds. Do you think that those young people coming
in, the ones that we want to keep in--do you think they feel
that the commissary system is working to their benefit today?
General Milley. I think so, yes. I think the commissary is
one of those areas where you almost universally get positive
comments, in terms of the cost, performance, the quality and
diversity of goods that are sold there. Commissary gets pretty
high marks.
Senator Rounds. Very good. Thank you.
Thank you both for your service to our country.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
Senator Warren.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, to our witnesses, for being here.
I'd like to follow up on an issue that really hits a nerve
in my home State. Secretary Esper, during your confirmation
hearing, you may remember that I asked you to look into
complaints from National Guard officers about delays in Federal
recognition of their promotions. According to the National
Guard Association, many Guard officers are waiting 200 days or
more. This can have a really negative effect on their pay, on
their benefits, on their command opportunities.
So, Mr. Secretary, what have you found, and what actions is
the Army taking to address this issue?
Dr. Esper. Yes, Senator, thank you for that question.
After we did have that during--that exchange during the
hearing, I spoke to the TAG [State Adjutant General] of the
Massachusetts Guard, and then, about 4 weeks ago, met with all
54 TAGs at the Army National Guard headquarters, and this issue
came up again. I took it back and had a meeting with my
Manpower and Reserve Affairs personnel, and you're right, the
numbers are too long, and it's unacceptable. And, frankly, I
endured--my time in the Guard, I had a similar type of action,
you know, happen to me.
So, what we're doing is, we're digging through it right
now. Part of the challenge is, there are multiple steps. The
process begins at the State TAG level, goes through NGB----
Senator Warren. Yeah.
Dr. Esper.--the G1, all the way through, and, in some
cases, the Senate, if it's a colonel, above. There are things
we need to do to improve the process. We have added additional
manpower. We're looking at greater automation. I think there
are ways we can reduce the time. There's about--anywhere from
30 to 45 days added on to determine if they have exhibited
exemplary behavior. Then there are other things out there that
may require congressional action. For example, part of the
process, as I understand it, is the scrolling, which is an
antiquated pen-and-paper process that also adds time to it. So
we're trying to attack it on a number of fronts, but we need
to--it needs to be much, much more timely.
Senator Warren. Okay. Well, I really do appreciate your
working on this. I'm going to keep pushing on this.
You know, I understand the need to thoroughly vet our
officer corps, but this has become a morale issue for the
Guard. I don't think it's right to make our junior officers pay
the price for bureaucratic delays and antiquated systems,
regardless of where those delays originate.
So, let me ask you another question on this. Would you
support providing back pay to the guardsmen whose promotion
sits idle for months while they're waiting for Federal
recognition and actually doing the next-level job?
Dr. Esper. Senator, I think that's a fair approach to it.
As I discussed with you, I would want to make sure I talk to
National Guard, make sure it's fair to them, we all understand
what the implications are. But, I think, in principle, that's
fair.
Senator Warren. Good. I'm glad to hear that. You know,
these young men and women who volunteer to serve their country
don't get paid all that much, and I think it's just plain wrong
when National Guard officers earn their promotions, serve at a
higher level of responsibility for months, and then don't get
that rank's pay while they're waiting for Federal recognition
of that. We've got to find a way to speed this up and--or else
I worry that it really is going to do a lot of damage to
morale.
Dr. Esper. I do, too, Senator. The National Guard has
become integral to our operational readiness. They're serving
around the world now in support of real-world activities. I was
with the Guard in both Poland and in Ukraine in January, doing
a fantastic job. So, we need to fix these things. And not
just--we have similar problems in Reserves and the Active side,
as well. It's just--to get the bureaucracy out of the way and
make the system much more efficient.
Senator Warren. Good. I'm really glad to hear that.
With my remaining time, what I'd like to do is follow up on
Senator King's question. The Army has announced plans to
establish a new Futures and Modernization Command. The idea is
to bring people who need new technology and the people who
acquire that technology together under one roof so they can get
the technology into the hands of our soldiers faster. But,
today a lot of the cutting-edge technology is not developed
within the Pentagon, but in the commercial sector or in
laboratories at our colleges and universities.
Secretary Esper, how important is it to capitalize on
commercial and academic developments in advanced technology?
Here's the key. As the Army establishes this new command, what
steps are you taking to make sure it is closely tied to outside
innovators?
Dr. Esper. Yes, Senator, you're right, Army Futures
Command, it's critical that we have access to talent, to
talent, not just on the material side, particularly with the
hard sciences, but also talent that can help us think about the
future strategic environment, thinking in the 2030s-2040s,
because that will inform, in many ways, the steps we take with
regard to materiel.
So, we are looking at a number of locations. I think we
started out with around 150. We've winnowed it down to around
30, and I think the next step, in a week or so, will be to get
it down to 10, 11, 12. But, each time we go through this, we
look at different filters, whether it's talent, it's then
specific areas of talent, it's the proximity to innovation,
it's proximity to academia. Then, there are other issues, of
course, that we have to look at--quality of life, cost of
living, all these things. So, we're really trying to be smart
about it. We want to make sure we can attract the top talent,
we can--we have access to an ecosystem of talent, where we put
it. That's why we're really trying to get into a--into an area
that really offers much of that.
Senator Warren. Well, I'm really glad to hear that the Army
is focused on taking advantage of existing talent and where
technological innovation is occurring. Of course, General
Milley and I both come from a State where a lot of that is
going on. I know you've lived there, Secretary Esper. Anytime
you want to come to Massachusetts and look around, you're
welcome.
Dr. Esper. Thank you, ma'am.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Senator Peters.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here. Thank you for your
service to our country, as well. We appreciate having you
before the committee.
Secretary Esper and General Milley, I'd like to ask about
the Army's plans for production of the Stryker vehicle. I
understand that the Army intends to produce Stryker A-1s, which
include both improved protection of the double-V hull and
improved mobility and the power provided by engineering change
proposal number 1. But, I'm concerned that the current budget
request for fiscal year 2019 doesn't seem to provide for
converting the Army Stryker brigade combat teams to modern
Stryker A-1s quick enough. Getting them out in the field seems
to be important, particularly with new threats emerging around
the world. Could you please give me an update on the Army's
plans for production of the Stryker vehicle?
Dr. Esper. Yes, sir. We are looking at, like you said,
improving the survivability by adding the double-V hull. We're
looking at improving lethality by adding the 30-millimeter gun
and some antitank weapons. I had the privilege of actually
seeing a Stryker when I was in Grafenwoehr, Germany, in
January, walked around a vehicle, spent some time with the
soldiers. They are very impressed with what they're doing. It
will go through operational testing now for several months, and
I think that we will make an assessment with regard to its
performance. All the feedback now is good.
I would note, in terms of procurement, we've increased
about--over 18 percent over the fiscal year 2018. So, it's
something that General Milley and I are watching closely, but,
you know, the commitment is to make sure we improve the
survivability and lethality of all these vehicles as we look
at, you know, this great-power competition that we're in now.
General Milley. As you're aware, Senator, the--you know, we
are putting money against it, but we're also--it's a balance
right now. So, for the Bradley, the Abrams, and the Stryker,
these systems were designed and came online many, many years
ago. Now, they've had various upgrades and improvements over
the years, but they are products of technologies and ideas that
come out of the 1960s and 1970s, vice today's world. So, the
next-generation combat vehicle, ground combat vehicle that
we're working on, it's in the R&D and S&T phases, and the
prototyping, et cetera. That will eventually replace the entire
family of vehicles that we have.
The Abrams, Bradley, and Strykers, realistically their
lifespan is probably 10, maybe 15 years. So, we are putting
improvements in double-V hull, lethality, and some other
things, but what we really need to do now is to make the shift,
in money and investments, to a next-generation combat vehicle,
and that's what we're doing with our modernization accounts.
Senator Peters. Well, speaking of the--or the next combat
vehicle, could you please talk a little bit about--or at least
give us an update on the prototyping effort, which is something
different that seems to make some sense?
General Milley. Yeah, the philosophy or the methodology,
we've shifted in--and we're incorporating much more
prototyping, which will crunch down the amount of time it
takes. There's a long lead time to the Army acquisition
process. It's very linear. It's step-by-step. It's left-right
or left-right or left-right or left, down the line. So, what we
want to do is accelerate that by bringing in prototypes.
In terms of the next-generation combat vehicle, one of the
things that we're accentuating in it, it must be optimized for
urban operations, which our current families of vehicles are
not. It must be optimized so that it can be both manned and
either autonomous or semi-autonomous, robotic, depending on
what the commander chooses to do at the time in the situation
in the battlefield. Those are significant radical changes to
the current system or family of vehicles.
So, there are companies, there are corporations and
industries out there, that are already producing robotic
vehicles. We are modifying them, and we are prototyping them.
We have several experimental prototypes going on right this
minute that are showing some promise. We're not there for down-
selecting or picking vendors or anything, but we are
experimenting with the various technologies. We think that, by
2028, we should be able to begin fielding a next-generation
combat vehicle that's optimized for urban operations, that's
both--either manned or unmanned for ground operations, that has
lethality, power, speed, weight, that's optimized for the next
generation of a battlefield that we perceive. We think we'll
have that fielded inside of 10 years, which, under current Army
practices, would take 15 or more.
Senator Peters. Yeah, and as mentioned in a previous
question, a great deal of this work is being done on the
civilian side. Obviously, I'm very involved in self-driving
vehicles, from Michigan----
General Milley. Yes.
Senator Peters.--and what's happening in the auto industry.
A lot of work is being done in Michigan, in TARDEC [Tank
Automotive Research Development and Engineering Center], and
other places.
General Milley. Absolutely.
Senator Peters. You mentioned the next-generation vehicle
with the autonomy features. Do you see having two different
variants, or will all of these capabilities be----
General Milley. There will be multiple variants. There will
be a tank-like variant, there will be a infantry carrier-type
variant, there will be logistics and medical variants. I mean,
it's a family of vehicles. It's not a single vehicle, but
they'll be based off of common chassis and common engines and
power packs and so on.
Senator Peters. Well, my question related to those
variants. Will they all have autonomous capabilities----
General Milley. Yes.
Senator Peters.--or will some----
General Milley. Every ground and rotary wing vehicle that
the United States Army produces from now on, the next
generation, after Bradley, after Abrams, every single one of
them has to have the base requirement. It has to be either
manned or unmanned, robotic--either fully autonomous or semi-
autonomous, built into its very basic requirement. It has to be
able to have that option so that the commander on the
battlefield of the future has the option, based on mission and
enemy and terrain and time and troops available, to pick
whether he wants this objective to be seized with manned
vehicles, or not, and it depends. It depends on the situation
sort of thing at the moment in time. But, we want that option
to be available to company commanders, battalion commanders,
brigade commanders in the future. So, the requirement for all
vehicles, in the air or on the ground, is both manned and
unmanned.
Dr. Esper. Senator, to be clear, we're looking expansively.
It's--it is beyond combat vehicles, as the Chief just alluded
to. So, for example, within this year, the 101st will be
experimenting with an unmanned squad support vehicle. I'm
talking to our senior acquisition executive about unmanned
trucks so we can transport, you know, supplies. We hope to
accelerate that, as well, so we could be experimenting in the
next couple of years with regard to, you know, unmanned
sustainment, logistics support.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Tillis.
Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here, and for your service.
General Milley, thank you. Actually, for the 3 years that
I've had the opportunity to get to know you, the only thing I
don't like about you is, you're a Patriots fan. But, I thank
you for your generous time in the office the--yesterday.
Just a quick update. You and I talked. I think it bears
repeating. Talk a little bit about what it means to become a
more lethal force, and, you know, in, hopefully, a limited
amount of time. I've got one, two other questions. But, I think
running through that's very important.
General Milley. Well, just briefly. I mean, the way I look
at it is, you evaluate an organization, both based on its
individuals, but also on its collective capability, and we look
at the training, the equipping, the manning, and the
leadership.
So, for training, we want to make sure that a lethal force
collective entity--a squad, platoon, company, et cetera--has
got many, many reps at their basic mission-essential tasks. Not
one or two reps, but hundreds of reps, if not thousands of
reps. That's what makes the Patriots a great football team, is
because they do it thousands of times before they win, except
against the Eagles. So, the--but, reps matter. Reps matter. So,
one of the things, the initiatives we're doing, is a synthetic
training environment, which will give leaders and collective
units thousands of reps, relatively cost-free, without going
out into the field. So, training's important, lots of reps.
That applies to the individual, as well.
In terms of equipping, to make sure that, not only do you
have the right amount of equipment on hand, but that equipment
works, so spare parts and the maintenance of that equipment so
it's fully operational. We want to make sure that that
organization has the most modern equipment that is available,
really, that money can buy.
In terms of your manning levels, we don't want units going
out to training at home station or at the Combat Training
Center at 75 or 80 percent fill. We want them going out into
the field to train at 90, 95, or 100 percent, or even more, to
train, because they get the full benefit of the collective
training experience.
The leadership is key. We want leaders who can operate in
intense environments, middle of the night, smoke's going on,
bombs are going off, people are screaming and bleeding right
next to you, and yet you can still make incredibly complex and
difficult decisions under intense pressure. They can be morally
correct decisions, ethically correct decisions, and tactically
correct decisions. You can do that in unbelievable pressure.
That's what it takes in a modern environment, but that's the
same type of leaders that it took in World War II, at Normandy,
or Iwo Jima and the Korean War and Vietnam, and so on.
So, that's what--increased lethality. It's the combination
of training, equipping, manning, and having excellent leaders
that are up to the task, units that are fit, they're able to
shoot, move, communicate, protect themselves, and sustain
themselves.
Senator Tillis. Do either of y'all think that
sequestration's going to be helpful to achieving that increased
lethality?
General Milley. No, it'll kill it.
Senator Tillis. I want to talk briefly about Futures
Command. I believe that the Army Futures Command that Senator
Warren made a--may have brought it up. I look forward to seeing
you all go through the process in assessing the various States
that may be the most hospitable to house that command. I know
that you're going to start proceeding through the process over
the next week or two. It's like I've said a number of times
before, I will never fight for a dollar in North Carolina that
can be better spent somewhere else. I look forward to that
selection process being a level playing field, absent political
pressure to go one place or another because of the jobs or
economic impact. When we're constantly trying to fight to get
you all more money, the last thing we can possibly do is
satisfy the political pressure of any one person or any one
delegation, when you know in your heart of hearts there's a
better or more optimal place to put it. The States that are
under consideration, the cities that are under consideration,
have the onus on presenting the best possible case. And your
onus is to make sure that whoever doesn't get it, should it be
North Carolina, Massachusetts, any other State that you may be
considering, that you've got a well-articulated reason for why
whatever choice you had, based on the numbers, based on the
empirical data, was the best place. I will heartily support
that decision, regardless of where it goes. I obviously would
like for it to be in North Carolina, but only because it's the
best and highest use of the limited dollars that you have.
General Milley. I can assure you, Senator, that Secretary
Esper has laid out a rigorous process, it's totally apolitical,
it's totally based on data and analysis, and that we are very
rigorously and deliberately going through that and evaluating
each location based solely on its own merits, with no political
interference whatsoever.
Senator Tillis. Thank you all very much for your service.
We may submit a few questions for the record.
General Milley. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Senator Heinrich.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman.
Secretary Esper, I understand you'll be visiting White
Sands Missile Range next week.
Dr. Esper. Yes, sir.
Senator Heinrich. So, I want to thank you for taking the
time to visit that facility. I think you'll be incredibly
impressed at the scale of the range, in part, which is very
unique.
I want to ask, if you're able, if you might take a few
minutes and quickly visit what used to be the old 2nd
Engineering Battalion facilities. It's about $170 million worth
of brand-new facilities at White Sands that is currently
sitting vacant. At the very least, drive through that
footprint. I think it'll give you a better understanding of the
potential for hosting a security force assistance brigade at
that site. So, if you would, I'd ask you to fit that into your
schedule.
Dr. Esper. Yes, sir.
Senator Heinrich. Super. I very much appreciate that.
As you know, the full New Mexico delegation and local
communities support the addition of that mission. I think one
of the things you'll find at White Sands is that it's an
incredibly safe community, with good-quality family housing,
and, for that matter, one of the best schools in the State. So,
it's a very attractive place for folks to serve.
General Milley, I was really glad to see the Army place a
high priority on modernization, and the short-range air and
missile defense, in particular, and was particularly impressed
to see that General McIntire and the Army's new cross-
functional team have accelerated some systems by up to 5 years.
I think that's good news to all of us here who recognize, as
you've said, that we've sort of taken a break from
modernization for far too long. Do you believe that CFTs will
be able to shorten the prototype development and fielding
timelines for your modernization objectives? How are you seeing
that come together?
General Milley. I do, I think it's coming together
tremendous. I think that the process that we've put in place,
the organization that we've put in place, and the governance or
oversight we've put in place is very effective. I have no doubt
that it's going to shorten the procurement and acquisition
timelines. The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, General Jim
McConville, and the Under Secretary of the Army, Ryan McCarthy,
are driving this, and these guys are driving it hard. They're
sitting on top of the six cross-functional teams--there's
actually eight, but two of them are embedded under two others,
so there's six total teams that are working--each of those six
modernization priorities--long-range precision fires, next-
generation future vertical left, and so on.
With respect to air missile defense and McIntire, he's
doing a great job in driving that. You're correct, we, the
Army, have been blessed by having the greatest Air Force ever
known throughout the history of mankind, in that we, the Army,
have not come under enemy fixed-wing air attack since the
beaches of Normandy. If we get into a conflict with a great
power, those days'll be gone. We will likely be under attack
from enemy fixed wing. Our Air Force would again do a
tremendous job, but we, the Army, must protect ourselves. So,
air and missile defense is a critical capability to protect our
unit formations, and it's a critical vulnerability right now.
So, we want to speed that up as fast as we can. We're doing
that. McIntire is leading the way, under the supervision of
McCarthy and McConville. So, the three ``Macs'' are bringing it
home.
Senator Heinrich. Are you comfortable with how much the
Army is budgeting towards RDT&E [Research Development Testing &
Evaluation] funding to meet those modernization and testing
goals?
General Milley. Well, from my perspective, I would always
like more to put in there, but it's a balanced portfolio----
Senator Heinrich. Sure, I get that.
General Milley.--and we think--the Secretary and I think
that we have balanced it for the FY---for this proposed budget,
2019, we think we have about the right amount. We've increased
it--I think it's 8 percent or so, in terms of our R&D and S&T
capabilities. So, we think it's balanced. It's not optimized,
but it's balanced.
Senator Heinrich. I very much appreciate that approach.
During the AUSA Global Force Symposium, General McIntire
said that the first prototype platoon of Strykers equipped with
directed energy weapon systems will be fielded by 2023, but
that he'd like to move that timeline further to the left. What
can we do? Is it just a matter of funding, or are there other
things that we can do to assist with that? Because I think
that's a very important development.
Dr. Esper. I think, Senator, I'd have to look at whether
it's the funding challenge, but there is a technology
challenge, as well. That's why we're trying to work with the
other services on that, and he's talking about fielding. We are
trying to push hard to move left as quickly as we can. It does
get to the bigger issue about sustained funding beyond 2019 to
make sure we can make those big procurement bets at that point
in time. But----
Senator Heinrich. You know, Secretary, if anything, I
finally see that we're turning a corner on recognizing just how
far the technology has moved. Now it's more a matter of getting
all of these technologies through the various processes----
Dr. Esper. Right.
Senator Heinrich.--working out how they're going to be used
in the field. It's not so much a limitation, in my view, on the
technology anymore, it's a limitation in how quickly we can----
Dr. Esper. Yes, sir.
Senator Heinrich.--work out the details of how they will
operate in the field.
Dr. Esper. Right. Our view is, don't make the perfect the
enemy of the better. So, even if we get limited power at a
limited range, we'll start there, and then we'll continue to
upgrade as the technologies mature, and build upon it.
Senator Heinrich. Look forward to working with you on that,
Secretary.
Thank you both.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Senator Cruz.
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, General, welcome. Thank you for your
service.
Secretary Esper, the capability gap separating the United
States and its competitors, Russia and China, has reached a
troubling inflection point. Over the past two decades, for a
whole lot of reasons, the United States military hasn't been
able to match the rapid pace of Russian and Chinese military
modernization. Both nations are reaching parity in some areas
once dominated by the United States, such as field artillery,
reactive armor, air defense artillery, electronic warfare, and
antitank guided munitions. Furthermore, the training and
professionalism of the Russian and Chinese militaries have seen
steady improvements, as well. That's why the recently released
National Defense Strategy explicitly directs the United States
military to prioritize the threats emanating from Russia and
China. The NDS [National Defense Strategy] will have far-
reaching implications for how the U.S. military trains, equips,
and postures its forces. Each of the services will play a
significant role in the implementation of the NDS, which
requires new and innovative ways of conducting joint
operations.
In light of the NDS, what does the Army see today as its
primary mission?
Dr. Esper. Our primary mission is to deploy, fight, and win
the Nation's wars, Senator. As the National Defense Strategy
has outlined in this era of great-power competition, our focus
is on high-intensity, near-peer threats, possibly Russia and
China--or namely Russia and China. So, that is our core focus.
Now, in addition to that, the NDS outlines the need to, of
course, protect the Homeland, the need to preserve irregular
warfare as a core competency. But, those two strategic
competitors are our primary focus.
Senator Cruz. How is the Army prioritizing threats posed by
Russia and China, both in the context of weapons procurement,
but also transitioning the mindset of our soldiers from a
global war on terror to a more expeditionary posture?
Dr. Esper. So, we have moved to focus on high-intensity
conflict in our home-station training and our national training
centers, particularly the National Training Center. When I was
there in November visiting and the 1st Calvary was going
through the training, they were actually facing scenarios that
the Ukrainians saw in eastern Ukraine against the Russians--
high-intensity use of drones, et cetera. So, training is one.
With regard to materiel, as we've outlined today, there are
six modernization priorities that we think, if fully exploited,
will ensure our overmatch in the out years. So, that's the
second part of it. Again, we must, as the Chief spoke
eloquently on earlier, continue to develop our leaders to make
sure that they are prepared for the future battlefield, and
train the soldiers, as well, so that they can fight along the
entire spectrum of conflict, which well may--which well may
mean that they don't have access to communications,
electronics, et cetera.
Senator Cruz. I'm also concerned about the modernization of
our armored brigade combat teams, such as those at Fort Hood
and Fort Bliss in Texas. Technology such as active protection
systems and reactive armor have failed to keep pace with where
Russia is currently. I understand the Army has started fielding
systems like Trophy before deploying to Europe. What is the
status incorporating APS systems like Trophy on our armored
vehicles such as the Bradley or the Stryker?
Dr. Esper. Senator, you're correct, we are looking to--we
are outfitting some armored brigades with active protection
systems. We're looking at the same with regard to Bradleys and
Strykers. But, there are other things going on, as well. We're
upgrading the Abrams tanks. With the budget we see in 2018 and
2019 will allow us to accelerate the upgrade of five ABCTs from
10 years to 5 years. And, of course, we are pursuing other ways
to improve the survivability and lethality of these systems.
Senator Cruz. Additionally, how are you working to ensure
that our armored formations incorporate technology such as APS,
FLIR, and other off-the-shelf technologies to keep pace with
the threats that exist today?
Dr. Esper. I would defer to the Chief here, as well--and
this is one of the areas where the schoolhouses are looking at
requirements for the future fight, certainly cross-functional
teams, to make sure that we are incorporating whatever
technologies are available to do that. Certainly with regard to
communications we have pivoted now to looking a lot more at
commercial off-the-shelf technology that we could ruggedize.
I've seen that already with regard to how we are outfitting the
Stryker and infantry brigade combat teams, and it's the only
way we're actually going to be able to keep up with the
changing pace of technology in the communications sphere.
Senator Cruz. General, anything to add on that?
General Milley. Yeah, in the seconds remaining, I would
just tell you that we are actively upgrading our Bradley and
Abrams formations. But, as I mentioned earlier to a previous
question, the Bradley and the Abrams came into service when I
was commissioned as a 2nd lieutenant. They have served the
Nation extraordinarily well, but they are fundamentally at the
end of their lifespan. We'll probably get, max, another 10,
maybe 15 years out of these vehicles. We have maxed out their
weight, the technological upgrades that we can do. So, hence,
the modernization program of a next-generation combat vehicle.
But, we are aggressively upgrading Abrams and Bradley and
Stryker in all of our formations throughout the Army. I'm very
confident that those weapon systems will continue to serve us
well, even against a Russia or a China in the near term.
Because, you know, armies don't go to war, nations go to war,
and armies don't win wars, nations win wars, and we go as part
of a joint force. So, it's not just the Army. It's the Army
with the Marines, the Navy, the Air Force, the CIA, and so on
and so forth. It's the synergistic effect of all that combat
power in time and space against the opponent, whether it's
China, Russia, no matter what the country, that's what brings
victory or defeat.
We do know that decision in war happens on the ground. We
know that, because that's--war is part of politics, people live
on the ground, and so on. So, it's important. The Army's
contribution to that piece is critically important, that we
have a decisive conventional capability that can conduct
campaigns over extended periods of time to do combined arms
maneuver and defeat the armies of the opponent, and then to
take control of the land mass from the enemy army. That's the
fundamental task of any army, and that's our task, as well.
We're confident in our current capabilities, we're confident in
our current systems, relative to Russia, China, or anyone else,
for that matter. But, we are keenly aware of the modernization
programs of both Russia and China right now, and we are keenly
aware that we need to shift gears rapidly into the
modernization in order to make sure that we don't have parity
or that they don't close the gap or cross the gap.
We want a military, across the board, to be unbelievably
lethal and unbelievably dominant so that no nation will ever
challenge the United States militarily. That's what we want.
Senator Inhofe. Good----
Senator Cruz. Thank you, gentlemen.
Senator Inhofe. Good statement.
Senator Hirono.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This is for both Secretary Esper and General Milley.
Senator Cruz has touched upon the National Defense Strategy and
how ready we are, but I want to focus on the Asia-Pacific area.
China, of course, is a significant rival in the Pacific. It's
important for the United States to project strength, reassure
our allies, and build partnerships in Asia-Pacific,
particularly in light of the actions of China and North Korea.
So, I have a series of questions for both of you. How are
you resourced for mil-to-mil exercises in the Asia-Pacific
region? How are you resourced to cover Army requirements in the
region? Is the Army's force laydown appropriate to meet current
threats? Does the Army envision directing additional assets to
the Asia-Pacific area of operations?
Let's start with you, Mr. Secretary.
Dr. Esper. Senator, I'll take a shot at the first question.
One of the most important programs we have out there for
improving interoperability and addressing training in the
Pacific is the Pacific Pathways Program. The U.S. Army Pacific
Commander has requested $61.8 million for that program in
fiscal year 2019, and the Army fully funded it. So, I think we
will continue to sustain that level of training and readiness
as we look ahead.
With regard to disposition of forces, there are currently
no plans to put more forces in the Pacific, that I'm aware of.
I'll defer to the Chief if there is something else. But, really
what we're focusing now is to make sure that we--the troops
prepare, both at home station and through our training centers,
for the high-end conflict, whether it occurs in Europe, Asia,
or elsewhere.
Senator Hirono. Chief?
General Milley. I would echo that, Senator, that our--we
have a very wide variety of exercises in the Pacific that
you're very familiar with. Pathways is one of those. We think
we have adequate funding in the 2017-2018 series of bills, and
we're requesting adequate funding in the 2019 series of bills.
Those are really important that the United States Army remain
continually engaged, because China, Asia-Pacific--Indo-Pacific,
really--is the priority in the National Security Strategy and
in the National Defense Strategy that Secretary Mattis has laid
out for us. We think we have adequate funding and resources to
do that. We have a considerable amount of Army forces, not only
in your State of Hawaii, but up in Alaska, on the West Coast,
in Washington, and forward in Guam, Japan, and Korea. So, we've
got a good array of forces throughout the Pacific region.
Senator Hirono. Well, there is a concern about the fact
that the service deputies testified in the Readiness
Subcommittee in February, and they all stated that nearly 70
percent of young people in the U.S. today are not qualified to
join the military. Your fiscal year 2019 request calls for an
increase in end strength of 487,500 regular Army soldiers. Will
you be able to continue increasing end strength without
lowering standards, giving the small pool of people who meet
the current standards?
General Milley. The short answer is yes. I believe--we've
done a lot of modeling and estimates on that--that we can
increase our force by 4,000 or so each year that we've been
shooting for. We've been meeting that, to date. I think we'll
meet it in the future within lowering any standards. So, the
key is standards. It's a standards-based Army. We're not going
to lower those. I think we can meet the end strength.
As far as, you know, 70--and what the vices all said, 70
percent, that's a statistic that's been out there for a
considerable length of time. That's well known and, we focus on
those that do meet the standards, and we're not going to move
the standards.
Senator Hirono. Yes.
Dr. Esper. I completely occur, and I would say, actually,
in many ways, though, you know, we all face that same problem--
we, being the services--in terms of how we attract youth. We
are putting more money into recruiting and into other ways in
which we can attract youth. The National Guard is doing the
same, and so, it's a challenge, but we will not lower standards
to bring a young man or woman into the service. In fact, if
anything, we are raising standards and we are looking at--you
know, for example, how can we extend either basic training or
one station unit training to make sure that the product we put
through is ready to go, that young man or woman, when they
arrive at their first unit.
Senator Hirono. Let me ask a question about cyber capacity,
because that is an issue of concern throughout these services.
Last month, General Nakasone testified about the success of the
Army Cyber Center of Excellence that they--you are having in
developing and training a cyber workforce, including the first
class of enlisted cyber operators who graduated from the Army
Cyber School last August. What percentage of soldiers trained
at the Army Cyber School come from the Reserve and Guard
components? Do you envision growth in these numbers in the
future? As the Army continues to successfully train cyber
operators, how will that affect the Army cyber efforts across
the service? Could the model--Army model employed at the Cyber
Center of Excellence be scaled up to train other services or
members throughout the Government?
Dr. Esper. Senator, if I can, I mean, speak broadly, and
then I'll get to one of your questions there. I--one of the
things I was most pleased to find when I came into this role,
about 4 and a half months ago, was how far the Army had
progressed and what it had achieved with regard to cyber. So,
we have a Cyber School, a Cyber Command, a cyber MOS, a cyber
branch, and are doing really well with regard to bringing
people in.
The goal was to have 62 cyber mission force teams. We
currently have 41 in the regular Army and are building 21 in
the Guard and Reserve. I was at the Guard Bureau a couple of
weeks ago, and they told me that they are up to, like, 30 teams
in the States, and building more. So, I think there is--we
continue to grow. I think the Guard, the States provide good
opportunities, because there's a lot of talent out there that
is familiar with these skills, and they are working in the
private sector. So, to bring them in as a guardsman is a great
opportunity to capitalize on skills they already have.
Senator Hirono. Do you want to add something before----
General Milley. It's--yeah. On the percentage, it's roughly
a third. We can get you the exact numbers.
[The information referred to follows:]
In fiscal year 2017, the U.S. Army Cyber School graduated
1,020 soldiers. Of those, 28 percent came from the Reserve and
National Guard. Specifically, 243 National Guardsmen (component
2), 43 Reserve (component 3) soldiers, and 734 Active duty
(component 1) soldiers graduated from Cyber School courses.
Thus far in fiscal year 2018, as of April 12, 2018, 26 percent
of the Cyber School's graduating soldiers have come from either
the National Guard or Reserves. Of those 380 soldiers who have
graduated before April 12, 2018, 90 came from the National
Guard, 7 from the Reserves, and 283 from the Active Army. Of
the 278 soldiers still attending training on April, 12, 2018,
16 percent were from the National Guard and Reserves, with 28
from the National Guard and 15 from the Reserves.
General Milley. You were asking about other RC at the--that
are getting trained.
In terms of growth, absolutely. The cyber is a domain of
warfare--you know, land, maritime, and air, the normal three
traditional ones, but now space and cyber. So, developing
capable cyber forces in the joint force, in all of the
services, is critical to our warfighting capability in the
future. So, this is an area of absolute growth. No question
about it, and we're very fortunate--and you know him well--
General Nakasone has led the way for the Army, and done a great
job there, and, of course, he's the nominee who will be taking
command of CYBERCOM, here, shortly.
Senator Hirono. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Senator Perdue.
Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you both for your service.
General, I just returned from North Korea, and I just want
to make a comment to you. I've been around high-performance
teams all my life, and I have to tell you, General Brooks and
your team over there is absolutely the best of the best. I want
to thank you for the training and the preparation of those
young men and women over there. I was really proud to be
surrounded by them. So, please pass that message along, both of
you.
General Milley. Will do, Senator.
Senator Perdue. You've got about 24,000 soldiers over
there. I think this--the National Commission on the Future of
the Army recommended that the Army consider forward deploying a
combat aviation brigade in Korea in order to bolster the
aviation readiness on the peninsula. This spring, an Army--as
you mentioned, I believe, earlier--an Army tank brigade, the
1st Brigade 3rd Division, I think, from Fort Stewart, deployed
to South Korea to deter potential aggression over there and to
make sure people around the world know we're serious. Can you
give us an update on the forward-deployment strategy with
regard to Korea, as you can--as you best can in an open
conversation like this?
General Milley. Yeah. As you know, we've got 28,500 U.S.
military personnel. Of those, 24,000 to 25,000 or so are U.S.
Army.
Senator Perdue. Sure.
General Milley. We rotate an armored brigade combat team,
as you noted, through there on a regular basis. They go over
there for a deployment. That's a heel-to-toe rotation. That's a
critical capability that's necessary in order to deter North
Korean aggression. In addition to that, we've got the
headquarters of the 2nd Division, we've got artillery
capabilities, we've got ballistic missile defense, with Patriot
and THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area Reserve], forward
deployed. We've got appropriate sustainment and intelligence
capabilities and a variety of other capabilities built within
that 24,000 soldiers.
As you know, the situation on the Korean Peninsula is
dynamic right now. We've got a very important strategic-level
summit meeting between the President and Kim Jong-un coming up,
here, shortly. Right now, the U.S. strategy is to maintain
maximum pressure, and if--and to continue our capability to
deter, and we'll see what develops in the diplomatic realm. The
main effort is clearly to resolve our issues with North Korea
through peaceful diplomatic means, but to retain the capability
and--for the options to be presented to the President if
diplomacy does not work.
So, that's what we're doing. We're maintaining our maximum
pressure. We're maintaining our readiness. We're keeping those
forces, under General Brooks, at a very, very high state of
readiness.
Senator Perdue. Yes, sir, thank you.
Mr. Secretary, you both have spoken to the five domains,
and the growing domains of space and cyber in addition to
maritime, land, and air. We've been getting these cyber
briefings, in the Subcommittee on Cyber, and I have to say it's
very sobering. In an open environment like this, though, there
are some concerns that we can discuss relative to the
integration. I know we have one approach for the Government,
but when we look at the services--and this is your
responsibility--talk to us about the integrated efforts between
the services so that we don't--so that we have best practices--
we share best practices and we also have a concerted effort
that can efficiently compete with the absolute rapid
development in both China and Russia.
Dr. Esper. Yes, sir. This is a--an area of focus, as well,
for all the concerns you outlined. There is certainly a lot of
cooperation going on between the services--and with OSD [Office
of the Secretary of Defense], I might add--to make sure that we
are protected from the tactical through the strategic level.
Certainly, for the Army, we're building a lot of capability at
the brigade level and above to deal with the tactical problems
that we might face. I can tell you, with regard to the
modernization priorities and the cross-functional teams, I've
talked to them, and they're committed to making sure that
whatever we procure for the future is cyber hardened and cyber
resilient. As you think higher and look across the DOD, we're
looking at the same thing to make sure we can protect our data.
It's recognized that this is a vulnerability. I can't go into
too much detail, but there is clear recognition that that's the
case, and we need to be able to attract the talent, as the
Chief spoke to, the talent from the private sector, to make
sure that we are on the cutting edge and are capable of
defending ourselves in this--in what is considered a--could be
an asymmetric vulnerability.
Senator Perdue. Thank you both.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
Dr. Esper and General Milley, thank you for being here, and
thank you for your service.
On April 3rd, 2018, the American Medical Association wrote
a letter to Secretary Mattis decrying the recent policy release
by the White House. Echoing concerns raised by the Americans
Psychological Association and two former surgeon generals, the
American Medical Association said, quote, ``We believe there is
no medically valid reason, including the diagnosis of gender
dysphoria, to exclude transgender individuals from military
service.'' The memo mischaracterizes and rejected the wide body
of peer-reviewed research on the effectiveness of transgender
medical care. Yet the DOD, quote, ``panel of experts,'' quote,
``came out to a drastically different conclusion from the
preeminent medical organizations in America about gender
dysphoria, the effectiveness and impact of gender transition on
medical and psychological health, and the ability of
transgender servicemembers to meet standards of accession and
retention.'' Who represented the Army on this panel?
General Milley. For the Army, it was, I believe, the Vice
Chief of Staff of the Army, General McConville.
Senator Gillibrand. Did the Army include any health
professionals on the panel? If so, who?
General Milley. I don't know the specific answer to your
question, in terms of ``on the panel,'' but there were--General
McConville consulted with lots of internal folks, medical
professionals. Absolutely, yes.
Senator Gillibrand. Can you submit to the committee who was
consulted, specifically?
General Milley. Absolutely. Yeah, sure.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Panel received support from medical and personnel
experts from across the Departments of Defense and Homeland
Security. The Medical and Personnel Executive Steering
Committee, a standing group of the Surgeons General and Service
Personnel Chiefs, provided the Panel with an analysis of
accession standards, a multi-disciplinary review of relevant
data, and information about medical treatment for gender
dysphoria. The Panel also received input from military medical
professionals and civilian medical professionals with
experience in the care and treatment of individuals with gender
dysphoria.
Senator Gillibrand. Do you know whether any health
professionals from within the Government and outside of it
testified before, or consulted with, the panel in written
testimony, or was it just verbal?
General Milley. With the DOD panel?
Senator Gillibrand. Uh-huh.
General Milley. I don't know if it was written or verbal,
but I can get you the answer.
Senator Gillibrand. Whatever you--whatever was submitted,
we'd like to see, please.
General Milley. Yeah, yeah. Sure.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
General Milley. Sure. Sure.
[The information referred to follows:]
Department of Defense medical providers from all Services
who provide health care services for transgender Service
members and civilian medical experts in the field of
transgender care consulted with the panel in a verbal
discussion. Input was provided to the Panel in many forms, both
written and verbal.
Senator Gillibrand. Are you aware of anyone else who
contributed to the panel?
General Milley. Each of the service vices, I believe, was
on it. There were several DOD folks. I think the--I'm pretty
sure the panel was led by DOD P&R, if I remember right--
Personnel and Readiness--the Under Secretary for Personnel and
Readiness. We can get you the exact names.
Senator Gillibrand. Great. Thank you----
General Milley. Sure.
Senator Gillibrand.--so much.
General Milley. Yeah.
Senator Gillibrand. And any information they submitted.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Army representatives on the Panel included the Senior
Officer Performing the duties of the Under Secretary of the
Army, Mr. Thomas Kelly, the Army Vice Chief of Staff, General
James McConville, and the Sergeant Major of the Army, Sergeant
Major Daniel Dailey.
General Milley. Sure.
Senator Gillibrand. Dr. Esper and General Milley, in light
of the existing injunctions, DOD is currently operating under
the previous transgender open service policy put in place by
the last administration, yet transgender soldiers have now seen
the Department's recommendations and are on notice that, if the
policy is implemented, they will get kicked out for seeking
care or treatment for their gender dysphoria. I'm worried that
this uncertainty will get--will have a negative impact on these
individuals, but also on their units, and that fear of these
recommendations will stop these soldiers from seeking care.
What are you doing to ensure readiness in light of the pall
that has been cast on the future of transgender soldiers?
Dr. Esper. Senator, we continue to treat every soldier,
transgender or not, with dignity and respect, ensure that
they're well trained and well equipped for whatever future
fights. With regard to accessions, our accessions folks
understand that we are operating under the Carter policy, if
you will. We've had some persons already join, transgender
persons join, and we will continue to access them and train
them and treat them well, in accordance with that policy.
Senator Gillibrand. Well, I'm concerned, because the report
that was included with the memo claimed that transgender
persons serving in our military might hurt unit cohesion. So,
that is different than treating everyone with dignity and
respect. When asked by reporters, in February, whether soldiers
have concerns about serving beside openly transgender
individuals, you said it really hasn't come up. Are you aware
of any problems with unit cohesion arising since you made that
comment? If so, can you tell us how they were handled by the
unit leadership involved?
Dr. Esper. Senator, nothing has percolated up to my level.
When I made that comment, I was--it was a question about, you
know, have I met with soldiers and talked about these issues?
What do they raise? As I said then, the soldiers tend to--you
know, young kids tend to raise the issue in front of them at
the day. It could be that they're performing all-night duty or
didn't get their paycheck, and this was just not an issue that
came up at that moment in time. Beyond that----
Senator Gillibrand. Have you since heard anything, how
transgender servicemembers are harming unit cohesion?
Dr. Esper. Again, nothing has percolated up to me.
Senator Gillibrand. General Milley, have you heard that?
General Milley. No, not at all. The--and we have a finite
number. We know who they are, and it is monitored very closely,
because, you know, I'm concerned about that, and want to make
sure that they are, in fact, treated with dignity and respect.
And no, I have received precisely zero reports of issues of
cohesion, discipline, morale, and all those sorts of things.
No.
Senator Gillibrand. Okay. That's good news.
I know that the Secretary spoke with transgender soldiers
recently. Of all the ones that you have personally spoke with
of the Active Duty transgender soldiers, were you concerned by
any of them continuing to serve?
Dr. Esper. Well, I actually met with them in the first 30
days on the job, Senator. And no, nothing came up that would
cause me concern. I was, you know, impressed by what I heard.
Senator Gillibrand. Have either of you spoken to any
transgender servicemembers since this set of recommendations
was released by the administration in March? If you have, what
did you hear?
Dr. Esper. No, ma'am.
General Milley. I have not. I did before. I have not. But,
as you know, the case, as you are well aware, is in litigation.
It's in four different courts. So, we're limited in, what we
should or could say right this minute, because it could, either
one way or the other, impact that litigation. But, let me just
say that our feeling and I'll say my feeling, my view is that
we have an Army that is standards-based. It has always been
standards-based, it will remain standards-based for medical,
physical, psychological, conduct, et cetera. Those soldiers or
those applicants of people who want to access into the Army
that meet those standards--and they're rigorous standards--if
you meet those standards, then you're on the team. If you don't
meet those standards, for whatever reason, then you won't be on
the team. It's that simple, and those standards are based upon
the rigors of ground combat, and it's important that this 1
percent who wear this uniform and the cloth of our country,
we're giving up certain civil rights so the other 99 percent
can retain their civil rights. We know that. We do it
willingly, and volunteer to do it.
So, this is not an issue--with respect to transgenders,
this is not an issue, in our--my view, it's not a civil rights
issue. This is an issue of standards and maintaining the
deployability and the combat effectiveness and lethality of the
United States Army. I think I speak for the other services--
service chiefs, as well.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
General Milley. Standards-based.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thanks, to the witnesses, for this important hearing.
Secretary Esper, I want to ask you about a passion of mine.
I've got two bills filed in the Senate now, which I am hoping
might be included, ultimately, in the mark for the NDAA. One is
a Military Spouse Employment Act, and colleagues on this
committee, including Senators Gillibrand and Perdue, are
cosponsors. The second is the Childcare for Military Families
Act. Senator Rounds on this committee is a cosponsor.
What I've tried to do in both of these bills is take a
significant amount of feedback from spouses all across the
country to address major factors leading to an unacceptably
high unemployment rate among military spouses. As I've worked
with spouses on this issue, we've identified a whole series of
challenges and causes: lack of direct employment opportunities
with other Federal agencies, lack of childcare, lack of or
underutilization of education and training resources, lack of
counseling, frequent moves. Additionally, the first bill tries
to encourage more public/private partnerships for the DOD and
more opportunities for entrepreneurship on military bases for
military spouses.
These bills, the two, address each of these issues. I don't
think there's a silver bullet that's going to drop the
unemployment rate of military spouses from three to five times
the national average to the national average, but I think these
bills offer a great start in beginning this conversation and
moving us in the right direction.
I want to ask if you've had a chance to review the
legislation. Is this an effort that the Army would be
supportive of?
Dr. Esper. Senator, I looked over the legislation. I'm
impressed by what you put in there. As I shared with you
before, I think these are some of the most important
challenges, if not the most important challenges, facing our
spouses--Army spouses. I know my wife experienced the same
challenges when I was on Active Duty.
Everywhere I go, if there's a family readiness group,
spouses, I meet with them, and this issue comes up over and
over and over again. They are intricately linked. The fact that
it takes, on average, 140 days to hire someone is hurting the
Army, it's hurting our readiness, and it's certainly hurting
spouses, and as a result, it hurts retention.
The direct link here, as I think I shared with you, is, if
you can--we have daycare centers that go unfilled with
supervisors because it takes months to hire them. The supply is
there to tap into, but the--it's cluttered up in everything
from things that we are doing within the building all the way
up to, you know, how OPM handles it.
So, I've talked to staff, I've talked to members about the
need to fix this problem, because it's--there's nothing but
good if we can.
Senator Kaine. I have a son in the military who signed up
and then did--for a first four, and then a second three, as a
single individual, and now is married. As he gets to the 7-year
point and he has to make another decision, it's fundamentally a
very different decision.
Dr. Esper. Yes, sir. Well, we like to say you recruit
soldiers and retain families.
Senator Kaine. It's very true, and so, you know, the
ability of spouses to feel like, with the sacrifice that they
bear, there is going to be an opportunity for them to put their
talents to use is a really important part of retention. I
appreciate your answer to this.
I have one other question. We had a Readiness Subcommittee
hearing--Chair Inhofe is the chair of our Readiness
Subcommittee--in February, had the service vices in, and I
asked about how the services are balancing reconstitution
efforts against the COCOM [Combatant Command] force requests.
Focusing specifically on the Army, to each of you, General
McConville answered, that day, and he said, basically, ``We
need more people and fewer missions.'' The funding that we just
did in the budget, I think, is going to be really helpful over
the next 18 months on the first part of this, the funding for
the additional people, but how about the second part, the fewer
missions? Is there an opportunity to reconstitute, since we now
have fewer troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, or are the
additional necessary missions that we're engaged in around the
world sort of immediately taking up whatever slack there was
from that drawdown in Iraq and Afghanistan?
Dr. Esper. Yes, sir. This is a supply-and-demand issue, and
I think, with the 2018 and 2019 bills, we can grow end
strength. It helps us create more supply, fully flesh out our
units, et cetera. But, there is the demand side of the
equation. It's something that we've had discussions with
internally, we've discussed it with OSD to look at, you know,
the range of demands placed on the Army. Can we do some of it
differently? Can we look at lower-value exercises or training,
and, you know, if not limit them, reduce them, make them at
least more productive to preserve readiness?
What we really have to do is get the soldier deployment
rate, the bog-to-dwell, as we call it, up to the 1-year to 2-
year standard. Right now, we're well below that. We're
somewhere just north of one. That has an impact on the force,
both in terms of readiness, and retention, it has a range of
impacts that we need to address with regard to that.
Senator Kaine. Thank you very much.
Appreciate it, Mr. Chair.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Donnelly.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you, to both of the witnesses.
I know the Army's committed to addressing military suicide.
I'm sure both of you know that suicide risk among
servicemembers often isn't tied to deployments or combat
experiences. We can't be restricting our most rigorous mental
health assessments to the deployment cycle. This committee
helped pass legislation in 2014 to ensure every servicemember--
Active, Guard, or Reserve--receives a thorough in-person mental
health assessment every year. It was named after a brave
Hoosier soldier, Jacob Sexton, who was lost to suicide in 2009.
It's my understanding that the Army is now fully implementing
the Sexton Act requirement for a robust annual mental health
assessment. Is that correct?
Dr. Esper. Correct.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
General Milley. That's correct.
Senator Donnelly. What are your top priorities, looking
forward, for combating military suicide, the best tools you
think you have in improving mental health services for our
soldiers this year and in the years ahead? What do you think
are some of the areas where, when you look at general--that you
look, and you go, you know, ``Here's one of the causes of some
of this, and the best way to try to reduce it"?
Dr. Esper. Well, Senator, thank you for raising this issue.
It's very troubling. I sign too many condolence letters
associated with, you know, the scourge of suicide, and the
rates that I see across the Army are not heading in the right
direction. I mean, we need to get them, rather than flat,
heading the right direction. The challenge is, you know,
particularly troubling in the Guard and Reserve, where you--
where units only come together every 30 days and break back up.
You're right, it's not related to--necessarily, to
deployments. The experts will tell you it's hard to pin it
down. But, we do know the most vulnerable population are these
young soldiers, 17 to 22 or so. It often is--the cause is a
relationship issue, you know, a breakup, whatever the case may
be.
As I've looked at this problem, I've asked our folks to
come back with, you know, new thinking with regard to
strategies that we can deal with this. We already put
behavioral health experts in the units. We provide a lot more
access. As I've talked with some of the committee staff, we
need to make sure the commanders and the officers in the units
have greater access to that type of information so they know
how to deal with soldiers. But, I also think it's critical that
we make sure that the chain of command is responsible and in
charge. In some cases, we've moved away from that. So, making
sure that we implement programs like Not in My Squad, that we
put NCOs, junior officers, back in charge of teaching their
soldiers resiliency. All that is important.
Senator Donnelly. General?
General Milley. Yeah, I think the key, Senator, is two
things in order for--for prevention. We have a lot of
resources, and we appreciate the support of Congress in helping
us do that. But, I think the key--and the resources have to be
focused in two particular areas. One is situational awareness
of the soldiers in a squad, in a platoon, in a company, of the
early warning indicators and signs of potential suicide, the
stressors that are on an individual soldier. The first key is,
recognize the early warning signs--the second key is, know that
you can intervene, that we are, in fact, our brother and
sister's keeper, that being silent is not okay--to intervene,
to take action, and to get that soldier help. They are reaching
out, they are crying out for help. Get them help. So,
situational awareness, and it's okay to intervene.
Senator Donnelly. Great. Thank you.
To both of you, I just wanted to mention that, in Indiana,
we have a training center, Muscatatuck. It's used for all types
of training. It's a national asset. It's a venue that can help
prepare our forces for current, future threats. I just wanted
to make both of you aware of it. Hope you both have a chance,
at some point soon, to go there.
Dr. Esper. Yes, sir. It's on my visit list. I think----
Senator Donnelly. Great.
Dr. Esper.--in the next 4 or 5 months, I plan on coming out
there.
Senator Donnelly. Terrific.
General, what does stability look like in Afghanistan? When
you look at that, and you look and go, ``This is an acceptable
state to move forward with,'' how do you see that?
General Milley. A couple of things, Senator, that we've
defined in the strategy. One is that Afghanistan--and this has
been the objective since 2001--that Afghanistan no longer is a
platform for terrorists to conduct strikes on the continental
United States, or in the United States. That's key. That's why
we're there, and that's why we're still there.
Secondly, how do you achieve that? You achieve it through a
stable Afghanistan. So, what does that look like? It means that
the armed opposition--the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, al
Qaeda, ISIS-K, and all these other groups--are reduced, in
terms of capability, that they no longer present an existential
threat to the regime in Kabul, and that the Afghan National
Security Forces, writ large--their army, their police, their
intelligence forces--can handle the violent threat against the
regime at a level that is something akin to crime or banditry,
and they are no longer capable of--the enemy is no longer
capable of actually presenting a downfall to the regime.
Senator Donnelly. The last thing I want to ask, real quick,
is just, can we do that without the real cooperation of
Pakistan?
General Milley. Well, that's the end state of Afghanistan,
is reduce the threat to something that can be handled on a
routine basis by the internal security forces. In order to do
that, you have to essentially do several things. You mentioned
Pakistan. That is key. It's important that Pakistan is part of
the solution. It's a regional solution. Part of our strategy is
a regional strategy. That involves--very much involves
Pakistan. It's very, very difficult to eliminate any insurgency
if that insurgency has safe haven in another country. Right
now, the Taliban, Haqqani, and other organizations do, in fact,
enjoy some safe haven in the border regions on the Pakistani
side of the border. Pakistan's got to be part of the solution.
Lastly is reconciliation. At the end of the day, the Afghan
Government has got--is on the path right now to establishing
some sort of political reconciliation with the various opponent
groups. We're in support of that effort.
So, it's important that we realign the forces, that we
reinforce the capabilities that we're already doing, and that
we regionalize the problem, including Pakistan, and that
there's some sort of reconciliation process. At the end of the
day, that's how that ends, and it ends successfully. I believe
that's achievable.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, General.
Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
I join my colleagues in thanking you for your service, and
thank you for being here today.
I want to focus on Ukraine. I know, Mr. Secretary, you
visited with some Ukrainian soldiers recently. You have been to
Europe and various Army posts there, and discussed this issue
with them. Operation Atlantic Resolve, as you know, is an Army-
led operation designed to reassure our NATO allies and partners
of America's dedication in the region after Russia's illegal
annexation of Crimea and its continued aggression--I might say,
overt defiant military aggression in Ukraine. Since April of
2014, the Army has conducted continuous multinational and
security cooperation training through the European Deterrence
Initiative. As someone watching from the outside, my conclusion
would be that whatever we're doing there has had no impact, no
effect whatsoever on Russian aggression, either to deter it or
defeat it. Maybe you can dissuade me.
Dr. Esper. Senator, I did visit Europe in January. I went
to Belgium, Poland, Germany, and Ukraine, with different focus
on each. My takeaway was that, at least with regard to Atlantic
Resolve when I met with the Poles, both the military and on the
Ministry of Defense side, that they were very happy with our
presence there, that they felt it provided not just a
reassurance role, but also a deterrence role. It was not just
because of United States troops, but you had NATO [North
Atlantic Treaty Organization] troops in all the Baltic states
and Poland. They were very eager to continue to improve that
relationship, to increase the number of forces. When I was in
Germany, for example, with regard to exercises, a Polish
brigade was training in Germany with American, Italian, British
units underneath it. So, a lot of great training happening.
But, my sense--and I recently met with a Lithuanian Vice
Defense Minister--again, very happy with our presence there,
and very reassured in the helpfulness of what the EDI funding
has provided.
Senator Blumenthal. I apologize. I probably was less than
fully clear in my question. Focusing on Ukraine.
Dr. Esper. Ukraine, I was very impressed by the New York
National Guard at the time was training, and the training was
going exceedingly well. What's interesting is the degree to
which Ukraine is really adapting to NATO doctrine, NATO
standards, really building a--quite a capability. What's
interesting is, they're using the facility that we're training
at in western Ukraine not just to bring in new recruits, but to
bring soldiers off the front lines in eastern Ukraine, in
Donbass, and coming back to the training site and incorporating
those lessons learned.
Senator Blumenthal. Is it having an effect on the
battlefield?
Dr. Esper. Yes, sir. I think what the Ukrainian officers
told me was, it was having an effect, in terms of their
performance. The soldiers felt reassured. But, that was my
takeaway. I don't----
General Milley. Yes, Senator, it has. The violence along
the Ukrainian in the--along the line of contact is at a 3-year
low right now. That's significant.
Senator Blumenthal. The level of violence is at a 3-year
low.
General Milley. That's correct.
Senator Blumenthal. But, have they pushed back?
General Milley. Well, there is cause and effect as to why
it's low. It's, in part, because the Ukrainian capability has
increased since we have begun an advisory effort in our support
efforts, and because they're fighting against the various
separatist groups in eastern Donbass. So, the Ukrainian
military's performance has increased, the enemy's performance
has met that and is reduced, and they recognize what they're up
against, therefore the violence has subsided. It's not done.
There's still violence. Don't get me wrong.
Senator Blumenthal. The other way of interpreting the
situation--and I say it with all due respect--is, the Russians
have gotten what they want, for now, and they and their
proxies--and I mean the Russians--are staying put, maybe
because they sense a little bit more strength from the
Ukrainians; but, in terms of their ill-gotten gains, they are
satisfied they've divided the country.
General Milley. That is a way of looking at it, that's
correct.
Senator Blumenthal. Is there a Ukrainian determination to
push back and to recover----
General Milley. From my visit there and, I think, Secretary
Esper's visit there, the Ukrainians have determined that
Ukraine is a sovereign nation and that they intend to remain a
sovereign nation. They do not accept annexation of eastern
Donbass. That's what the Ukrainians told me, and I believe
that's what they told you, and I believe that's their stated
policy position.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
I really appreciate both of----
General Milley. Yes, sir.
Senator Blumenthal.--your candor and your very informed
presentation today.
Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. I want to say thank you to our witnesses.
It's been--I appreciate your patience and your responses.
They've been excellent.
We're adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
army missile defense
1. Senator McCain. Secretary Esper and General Milley, what is the
impact of M-SHORAD's pull to the left on the Army's existing failure to
deliver IFPC in a timely manner?
Secretary Esper and General Milley. Maneuver-Short Range Air
Defense (M-SHORAD) fielding schedule is not linked to IFPC's fielding
schedule. IFPC is currently on schedule for an Initial Operating
Capability (IOC) in fiscal year 2021 with fielding of the fourth
battalion complete by fourth quarter fiscal year 2022 and is not linked
to M-SHORAD's fielding schedule.
2. Senator McCain. Secretary Esper and General Milley, please
explain how the investment in M-SHORAD will contribute to the overall
National Defense Strategy.
Secretary Esper and General Milley. The National Defense Strategy
(NDS) prioritizes readiness against great power competitors. M-SHORAD
supports this focus through the protection of maneuver forces from air
threats, manned and unmanned, during potential operations in the Blunt
and Surge layers of the NDS Global Operating Model. The M-SHORAD
program will enable a more lethal, resilient, agile, and ready Army and
allow forces to survive while maneuvering and operating without domain
superiority. Recent studies have shown that M-SHORAD increases the
ability to achieve the desired ends. Given the change in focus codified
in the new NDS, the Army must return to this much-needed capability in
order to deter and win in a contested and challenging environment.
3. Senator McCain. Secretary Esper and General Milley, what risks
is the Army taking on in order to field M-SHORAD five years faster than
originally anticipated?
Secretary Esper and General Milley. There is no risk because the
Initial Maneuver--Short Range Air Defense (IM-SHORAD) addresses a
subset of the Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) requirements. Several
vendors have demonstrated capability and IM-SHORAD will execute in an
interim capacity until M-SHORAD meets the full ICD requirements. The
initial IM-SHORAD fielding is being accomplished in fiscal year 2020
accelerating the original Initial Capability Document (ICD) anticipated
fielding of fiscal year 2025.
4. Senator McCain. Secretary Esper and General Milley, how will the
Army's Cross-Functional Teams contribute to successful deployment of M-
SHORAD?
Secretary Esper and General Milley. The Air and Missile Defense
(AMD) Cross-Functional Team (CFT) will accelerate the fielding of
maneuver short-range air defense (M-SHORAD) battalions to divisions
starting in fiscal year 2021 with a plan to cover all 10 active
divisions by fiscal year 2025. M-SHORAD will be employed as part of a
tiered and layered approach to establish cross-domain dominance of
tactical airspace. This will enable the Land Component to penetrate the
A2AD in support of multi-domain operations in a contested environment.
In addition to accelerating the material solution, the CFT will assist
in overseeing the synchronization of the Doctrine, Organization,
Training, Leader Development, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF).
5. Senator McCain. Secretary Esper and General Milley, how will M-
SHORAD contribute to the Army's mission to protect the joint force?
Secretary Esper and General Milley. Currently, there is need to
better protect the maneuver force, and developing a solution for this
problem is of the highest priority. Maneuver-Short Range Air Defense
(M-SHORAD) will employ a mix of sensors and shooters to protect Army
Divisions, focused on the Brigade Combat Team and below, by providing
defense against rotary wing, fixed wing, and Unmanned Aircraft Systems
(UAS). Commanders will integrate this Stryker-based, maneuverable
capability into combat formations to employ multiple effectors, guns
and missiles, up to eight kilometers against fixed and rotary wing
threats, and up to six kilometers against UAS. The system will utilize
an on-board sensor and links to air defense networks for additional
situational awareness and combat identification. While not directly
assigned to support other Joint Forces, the Combatant Commander (based
on a defined critical asset list) has the flexibility to prioritize key
assets across all phases of the operation in support of all components
on the battlefield.
6. Senator McCain. General Milley, will M-SHORAD have capabilities
to defend against cruise missiles?
General Milley. No. M-SHORAD will not have the capability to defend
against cruise missiles. The Army program to counter cruise missiles is
the Indirect Fire Protection Capability, Increment 2-Intercept (IFPC
Inc. 2-I) with planned Initial Operating Capability (IOC) in fiscal
year 2021. We also have cruise missile defense capability with the
Patriot system and the Integrated Air Defense System (NCR-IADS).
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
brigade combat team readiness
7. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Esper and General Milley, in your
joint testimony, you state the number of brigade combat teams in the
highest state of personnel readiness has more than doubled, which is
certainly worthy of praise. Three years ago during the end of the Obama
administration, we only had one ``ready'' BCT and three at the ``almost
ready'' level. How many BCTs are considered ``ready'' now or ``almost
ready''?
Why do you think BCT readiness has improved so dramatically? It is
related to Congressional funding? End strength?
Secretary Esper and General Milley. The Army has eight Brigade
Combat Teams fully ready. The Army's emphasis on readiness is the
primary factor for our improvement enabled by additional funding from
Congress. With focus comes the actions over time necessary to
synchronize and improve training, equipment, maintenance, and
personnel. In the last three years there are numerous examples of how
the Army's emphasis has improved readiness. These include a re-focus on
Decisive Action training against a near-peer adversary; increasing the
number of Combat Training Center rotations from 15 to 20; implementing
the Sustainable Readiness process; working with combatant commands to
ensure deployed Brigade Combat Teams continue to build readiness when
possible; improving the Army's training strategy.
Stable, consistent and adequate funding is critical to the Army's
effort and ensures the Army can plan, resource and fund readiness.
Increased end strength authorization and funding will also increase
readiness. While it will take some time to bring the additional
soldiers into the Army, a responsible increase in end strength does two
things. First, in the near term it helps fill personnel shortages in
key units. Second, it allows the Army to make existing units more
robust with critical capabilities like aviation, rocket artillery,
ballistic and air defense, cyber, electronic warfare, and unique
sustainment elements.
reducing mandatory training
8. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Esper and General Milley, I applaud
your continued efforts to reduce mandatory training so our soldiers can
actually focus on critical combat training. How much mandatory, non-
combat training has been reduced or eliminated thus far and--due to
these reductions--what benefits are you seeing in improving the
lethality of the force?
Secretary Esper and General Milley. We are building a more lethal
force by reducing requirements in brigade and below units. Our efforts
are providing commanders more time to prioritize activities and time to
enhance the readiness and lethality of our formations. We are
underwriting prudent risk assessment and risk mitigation so commanders
at each echelon are empowered to prioritize combat-related tasks over
all others. Our efforts have identified numerous mandatory tasks not
directly supporting combat readiness. To date, our proponents have
recommended adjustment to roughly 25 percent of the over 1,800 tasks
identified as affecting brigades or below. We expect more change
recommendations as we continue this effort. As tasks are approved by
the Secretary of the Army for elimination, simplification or
consolidation, we are publishing policy changes to rapidly implement
the changes across the force. The Secretary of the Army published four
policy change memorandums in April 2018. We plan to publish an Army
Directive summarizing all changes after the June 2018 Senior Leader
Readiness Forum.
9. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Esper and General Milley, what is
the percentage or hours of duty time that soldiers should ideally
devote to mandatory, non-combat training and when do you anticipate
being able to reduce down to that amount?
Secretary Esper and General Milley. The percentage of duty time
devoted to mandatory, non-combat related training is at the discretion
of the commander. Commanders must train to standard and not to time.
However, the Army is continuing to review mandatory, non-combat related
training to eliminate, consolidate, and simplify requirements in order
to reduce the administrative process and reduce the burden on soldiers.
This effort will take some time but ultimately will help build a more
capable and lethal force.
10. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Esper and General Milley, can you
talk about moving away from mandatory online training and moving back
toward empowering unit leaders to properly train their soldiers?
Secretary Esper and General Milley. Commanders have full authority
to simplify, reduce, or eliminate those tasks which are not combat
related, while making prudent risk-informed decisions. Mandatory
training no longer has a prescribed duration and will have alternative
methods of delivery which do not require the use of an automated online
or projected system. Online training may be used to supplement training
conducted by leaders, but does not suffice as a substitute for it.
Training must be led and conducted by their leaders.
jparc for advanced ground and air training
11. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, in order to properly prepare
for intense joint combat operations (such as North Korea), as well as
near-peer conflicts, would you agree that we need specific and large-
scale Joint Air and Ground combat exercises that improve our joint
readiness?
General Milley. The Army agrees that large-scale joint air and
ground combat exercises improves joint readiness. The Army will
continue to seek these types of exercises to improve its joint
interoperability. Current examples include the U.S. Army Combat
Training Centers (CTCs) and large-scale exercises such as the Joint
Warfighting Assessment (JWA) exercise program, utilizing the Decisive
Action Training Environment (DATE) to train Brigade Combat Teams
(BCTs), Division and Corps level Commanders plus staffs. Bilateral
agreements between the Army and the Air Force exist to support the
Army's CTC rotations and large scale exercises, as well as improve and
facilitate joint interoperability in the air and land domains.
12. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, following up from the
previous question, the JPARC in Alaska is the largest joint overland
training area in the U.S. with airspace the size of Florida. Would you
agree that it is an ideal location for the type of advanced integrated
training we will need to best counter high-end and near-peer threats
General Milley. The Army recognizes the unique and important
training opportunities at the Joint Pacific Range Complex (JPARC). The
Army's training areas associated with Fort Wainwright are central to
that capability. The facilities and infrastructure within the JPARC can
enable scenarios supporting advanced integrated training; primarily for
Army division and above assets including Grey Eagle, HIMARS, AH-64, and
Patriot. Readiness of joint formations to fight large-scale integrated
battle campaigns is primarily the responsibility of Combatant
Commanders and are accomplished through joint exercises. The Army
infrastructure supports integrated training at JPARC, notably the
USAF's Red Flag.
small unit support vehicle (susv) and joint all-terrain all-weather
support vehicle (jaasv) advocacy
13. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, Alaska, as well as several
State National Guard units, rely on the Small Unit Support Vehicle
(SUS-V) to maneuver in cold weather, austere environments. While the
SUS-V is no longer a program of record, it is a necessity for areas
like the Arctic. What is the Army's plan to keep these vehicles
maintained, which is becoming increasingly more difficult?
General Milley. The current Small Unit Support Vehicle (SUS-V) is
maintained with unit operation and maintenance funding. Recognizing the
increasing difficulty in maintaining the current fleet, the Army's
Training and Doctrine Command is conducting a business case analysis to
evaluate replacement options, assess the capabilities of available
commercial options, and provide recommendations on changes to SUS-V
tactics, techniques and procedures. This analysis is scheduled to be
completed by the end of fiscal year 2018.
14. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, the plan for the procurement
of the Joint All-terrain All-Weather Support Vehicle (JAASV), a much-
needed replacement to the SUS-V, is not scheduled to even compete until
the 2020-2024 POM. That means that a replacement to the SUSV could be
over a decade away. Isn't there already a commercially available
solution that Army could utilize?
General Milley. Yes, we understand that there may be commercial
vehicles that provide some of the capabilities required of the Small
Unit Support Vehicle (SUS-V) / Joint All-terrain All-Weather Support
Vehicle. The Army's Training and Doctrine Command is conducting a
business case analysis to evaluate replacement options, assess the
capabilities of available commercial options, and provide
recommendations on changes to SUS-V tactics, techniques and procedures.
The analysis will also consider alternative acquisition solutions, such
as leasing rather than conventional procurement, to significantly
reduce the amount of time required to field a SUS-V replacement. This
analysis will be completed by the end of this fiscal year and will
inform funding decisions for next year's budget request.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Ben Sasse
cyber policy and force structure
15. Senator Sasse. Secretary Esper and General Milley, recently
stated that the Army had to change its force structure to have
sufficient capacity and capability to ensure overmatch in everything,
including cyber. Please explain how the Army is doing this, including
any regulation or policy that is guiding the Army's cyber development,
and how the Army is working with USCYBERCOM on cyber issues, including
training and equipping the force.
Secretary Esper and General Milley. The Army is modernizing its
force structure to ensure capacity and capabilities overmatch through
force structure development, capability modernization, and critical
infrastructure and weapon systems hardening. Published in 2016, the
Army Cyberspace Strategy for Unified Land Operations 2025 guides Army
cyberspace capability development through five lines of effort:
building the workforce, cyberspace operations, capability development,
facilities/systems and infrastructure, and building partnerships.
Army Cyber Mission Force teams are being equipped with cutting-edge
cyber tools to protect against sophisticated cyber attacks and to
ensure military advantage in cyberspace. In support of the USCYBERCOM
led DOD Cyber Mission Force, the Army is building cyber threat realism
into the virtual scenarios within the Persistent Cyber Training
Environment to keep pace with adversaries' Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures. In addition to the Cyber Mission Force, the Army is
currently reviewing proposed force structure changes to increase
cyberspace capacity and capability for Corps and below commanders,
including the recently approved Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF) pilot.
The Army continues to improve the defensive posture of C4 networks
and reduce vulnerabilities of weapons systems, warfighting platforms
and mission critical infrastructure, through network improvements,
equipment modernization, and cyberspace operational resilience
assessments.
cyber direct commission program
16. Senator Sasse. Secretary Esper and General Milley, please
describe why the Army chose to create this program, your estimation of
its success, and how many officers have been commissioned through the
program.
Secretary Esper and General Milley. In accordance with National
Defense Authorization Act 2017 section 509, the Army designed the Cyber
Direct Commissioning Pilot Program to assess into service uniquely
skilled and experienced individuals who meet program requirements. The
program leverages existing expertise in academia and industry to close
existing gaps in key competencies within the Army's cyber mission
forces. These technical officers will support and lead rapid cyber
capability development and analytics.
The Army began the direct commission program in October of 2017,
reviewing a total of 205 applications. Two iterations of the selection
process have been completed, and the third iteration is currently
underway. The quantity and quality of applicants has increased with
each iteration. There is an expectation that this upward trend will
continue as we work to recruit more and better qualified cyber
specialists by working with Congress to increase the amount of
constructive credit (up to the grade of O6) that may be offered direct
commission applicants.
Two officers have commissioned through the program as First
Lieutenants. These officers are currently in the Direct Commissioning
Course at Fort Benning, Georgia. Upon graduation, they will attend the
Cyber Basic Officer Leaders Course at Fort Gordon, Georgia and are
expected to report to their units in late October 2018.
land-based anti-ship missile
17. Senator Sasse. Secretary Esper and General Milley, describe the
Army's current capability to sink enemy ships, what future capabilities
the Army is developing to gain or increase that capacity, and how it is
working with sister services in this effort.
Secretary Esper and General Milley. The United States Pacific
Command identified a doctrinal capability deficiency in 2017 and
submitted an Operational Need Statement requesting the Army to develop
a Land Based Anti-Ship Missile (LBASM) to address this gap. The
Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO) has lead on the effort and plans to
modify an existing Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) with a seeker
capability to engage selected maritime targets and designated the
missile the Cross-Domain ATACMS. The Army is developing doctrine and
policy that could include the use of sister service (Navy and Air
Force) sensors and target acquisition platforms to enhance an anti-ship
kill chain. Further study is needed to adapt a future LBASM capability
into any operational need within a COCOM.
sensor-shooter integration
18. Senator Sasse. Secretary Esper and General Milley, describe the
Army's efforts to integrate its Long-Range Precision Fires systems with
existing and planned sensor systems fielded by the rest of the
services. What obstacles are you encountering in this area and how are
you overcoming them?
Secretary Esper and General Milley. The Army currently has ongoing
efforts to explore expanding the capability of the sensor-to-shooter
network. These efforts involve integrating additional shooters from the
U.S. Air Force (USAF)/U.S. Navy (USN) aircraft to National Technical
Means through utilization of the LINK-16 architecture to Advanced Field
Artillery Technical Data System (AFATDS). Within the LRPF area, Army
Science and Technology has two efforts utilizing the AFATDS technology,
Multiple Simultaneous Engagement Technologies (MSET) and Land-Based
Anti-Ship Missile (LBASM). MSET starts in fiscal year 2020 (FY20), and
will demonstrate technology readiness level (TRL) 6 in fiscal year
2024. MSET utilizes a weaponized unmanned air system platform with a
data link that could potentially provide an additional sensor-to-
shooter pathway. During the Rim of the Pacific Exercise 18, the Army
will work with the U.S. Pacific (USARPAC) to demonstrate LBASM fires
that are cued from USN aircraft using LINK-16 and AFATDS. A significant
challenge facing new sensor-to-shooter pathways is authority; as the
list of available sensors and entities that can call for fire expands,
determining who has the authority to direct a fire mission and the
responsibility for clearance of fires needs to be resolved. A possible
solution to this challenge is developing a Common Operation Picture to
process inputs from sensors and shooters.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
u.s. army future command needs
19. Senator Nelson. Secretary Esper and General Milley, as we
continue to go after terrorist and support our allies and partners in
Afghanistan, Africa, and anywhere else we're needed, I'm pleased that
the National Defense Strategy has focused on our near-peer competitors.
I'm even more pleased that in order to achieve this objective, the Army
has decided to create Futures Command, which will modernize our forces
and ensure we continue to have the most technologically advanced force
in the world. As I mentioned to General Milley yesterday, Orlando would
make the perfect home and has everything that Futures Command needs in
order to succeed: world class universities, home to existing innovation
in the modeling and simulation sector, and access to civilian experts.
The Army doesn't know it yet, but ask the Air Force and the Navy and
they'll tell you Florida is where you want to be. Given the need for
our Army to keep up with rapidly changing technology and near-peer
competitors, what will the needs of Futures Command be?
Secretary Esper and General Milley. The most critical need for the
Army Futures Command is that it must inculcate a culture of change and
possess the talent to make it happen, in both the headquarters and the
entire modernization enterprise from concepts through system delivery
to the soldier. Thus, we seek to locate the headquarters (because the
headquarters must lead the change) in a location that at a minimum
meets four criteria: rich in workforce talent with the skills to
support the Army's future needs; an established eco-system of
innovative commercial entities and academic institutions, where we can
partner and learn; and has a high quality of life measurement in order
to attract and retain top talent. Further, we have been, and will
continue pursuing a data-driven broad-based approach to avoid
unintentional confirmation bias based on anecdotal evidence to make the
most informed decision possible. We must be the best possible stewards
of the resources entrusted to us, and we have taken a deliberate
approach to ensure we are positioned to best partner with a broad
spectrum of innovators in industry and academia in an eco-system that
helps the leadership generate the large scale cultural change necessary
to set conditions for the future.
20. Senator Nelson. Secretary Esper and General Milley, what
criteria are the Army using to decide where the Command will be
located?
Secretary Esper and General Milley. In order to select the first 15
candidates, four sets of criteria have been applied to the selection
process for the headquarters. First, proximity to talent in key
technical fields that support the Army's needs for the future,
emphasizing computer software and hardware, novel materials, and both
emerging and traditional engineering specialties; second, proximity to
private sector innovation to ensure our access to commercial partners
with track records in delivering innovative solutions; third, proximity
to academic R&D focused on Science, Technology, Mathematics, and
Engineering (STEM), so we can easily and pervasively access cutting
edge basic and applied research; and fourth, a quality of life
assessment (based on the AARP Livability Index), to ensure we attract
and retain top talent. We will use the inputs received from the
candidate cities, and other factors, to further enrich our analysis and
assist in down selection to a smaller number of cities that we can
reasonably visit.
cyber and electronic warfare
21. Senator Nelson. Secretary Esper and General Milley, our Army is
an extremely lethal fighting force. No one wants to go head to head
with our soldiers. Instead, our peer competitors are investing heavily
in technologies to take away our advantage in cyberspace and the
electronic spectrum. How is the Army balancing the requirement to fight
in the physical space with the growing need to fight in the digital
space?
Secretary Esper and General Milley. The Army recognizes that in
order to fight and win today's and future battles, it needs to be able
to dominate both the physical battlespace and also in cyberspace and
the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) simultaneously.
In addition to the 62 Cyber Mission Force teams, the Department of
the Army is undertaking a number of complementary efforts that
holistically integrate cyberspace and Electronic Warfare (EW)
capabilities at the Corps and below. These efforts include five
potential EW-related force initiatives designed to increase operational
capacity throughout the Army. The Army's Cyber Electromagnetic
Activities Support to Corps and Below pilot at the Army's Combat
Training Centers is increasing Brigade Combat Teams' ability to deliver
cyberspace effects and conduct electronic warfare in support of their
operations in an increasingly contested and congested cyberspace domain
and EMS environment.
Additionally, the Army continues to improve the network defensive
posture and reduce cyber vulnerabilities to weapons systems,
warfighting platforms and mission critical infrastructure at our most
critical installations thru network improvements, equipment
modernization, and cyberspace operational resilience assessments.
22. Senator Nelson. Secretary Esper and General Milley, what are
you doing outside of CYBERCOM to prepare our Brigade Combat Teams for
battle in the cyber and electronic warfare environment?
General Milley and Secretary Esper. The Department of the Army is
working to increase the pace, stress and rigor of Combat Training
Center (CTC) training operations to match a near-peer competitor,
including the intensity of OPFOR Cyber, EW, air attacks, indirect fires
and chemical warfare.
Since 2015, the Army's Cyber Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA)
Support to Corps and Below (CSCB) pilot has been integrated into nine
rotations at the Army's Combat Training Centers (CTCs), enabling
Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) to integrate CEMA, which spans both
offensive and defensive cyberspace, electronic warfare, and information
operations into a BCT's operations with emphasis on the ability to
operate in a contested or denied Cyber and Electromagnetic Operational
Environment. This pilot has helped BCTs to deliver cyberspace effects
and conduct electronic warfare in support of their operations and
better understand their unit's footprint in the cyberspace and in the
electromagnetic spectrum. It is also helping BCTs maximize the role of
their organic Electronic Warfare Section and identify the best methods
of using the new Expeditionary CEMA Team concept under the proposed
Cyberspace Warfare Support Battalion (CWSB).
joint surveillance target attack radar system (jstar) capabilities
23. Senator Nelson. Secretary Esper and General Milley, the Air
Force has announced the desire to stop recapitalization efforts for the
JSTARS aircraft in favor or newer capabilities on the horizon. We
developed this platform specifically to give the Army the edge in
defeating a highly-capable enemy ground force on the battlefield.
Modernization is what our military needs but I'm concerned the future
technology won't be ready for prime time when we need it. Have you been
briefed and are you comfortable with the Air Force plan to replace
JSTARS? If our soldiers are called upon to stop a heavy Army in the
Europe, how critical is the capability the JSTARS offers to our
soldiers on the ground?
Secretary Esper and General Milley. I have / have not been briefed
on the Air Force's plan to replace the Joint Surveillance Target Attack
Radar System (JSTARS). The Army is involved in discussion about the Air
Force's plan to replace JSTARS with a new capability and is working
closely with the Joint Staff and the Air Force to ensure that the new
capability provides the Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) data
required to support the Army. The Air Force's plan is not final. We
will coordinate with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the
Joint Staff to ensure that the JSTARS replacement satisfies Army
requirements for GMTI data. We are supportive of the Air Force's plan
to use JSTARS recapitalization funding to pursue a follow-on capability
that will be more effective and address threats as outlined in the
National Defense Strategy, but are concerned with the cost to the Army
to upgrade our ground systems to ensure interoperability with any new
system. The Army remains platform-agnostic to how we receive GMTI data.
The Army requires GMTI data regardless of the platform to provide early
threat warning and que other intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance sensors to identify threats and support long-range
targeting in support of ground maneuver commanders.
24. Senator Nelson. Secretary Esper and General Milley, if our
soldiers are called upon to stop a heavy Army in the Europe, how
critical is the capability the JSTARS offers to our soldiers on the
ground?
Secretary Esper and General Milley. Against a near-peer threat
prior to hostilities, the Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) sensor
data that the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS)
provides is critical. GMTI sensor data provides early threat warning;
indicators of slow moving aircraft, ground vehicle and personnel
movement; and cues other intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
(ISR) platforms and sensors with multi-disciplinary intelligence
capabilities. However, the Army remains platform-agnostic to how we
receive GMTI data. GMTI data provides wide area collection perspective
and enables both Joint Force and ground commanders to cue other ISR
platforms and collection capabilities to identify threats and enable
long-range targeting. The JSTARS GMTI sensor data can mitigate the
Army's critical stand-off ISR capability gap to enable long range
targeting, which is fundamental to conducting a successful campaign in
a near-peer armored (heavy) engagement.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaeen
research and development
25. Senator Shaeen. Secretary Esper, while I admire your desire to
reform the acquisition system and your efforts to power down to the
general officers in the acquisition community, the title 10
responsibility for managing the Research, Development, Technology, and
Evaluation (RDTE) funds remains with your acquisition executive, Dr.
Jette. We put these legal responsibilities with the Secretary's
Civilian staff for a reason. I am concerned that that in your zeal to
improve acquisition that you will be delegating too much decision
making power to the Future Missions Command without proper authority
and as a result will make it unnecessarily difficult, if not impossible
for Dr. Jette and his staff to carry out their title 10
responsibilities. Will you ensure us that your staff will have final
say on the allocation of RDTE funds in the budget and across the
program years?
Secretary Esper. Yes, I can ensure you that the final decision over
the allocation of Research, Development, Test and Evaluation funds in
both the budget and future year's program will remain with me and the
Army Acquisition Executive. Army Futures Command will have authority
over the development and rapid integration of future requirements into
the Army, and will provide valuable insight into what and how the Army
modernizes in the future. However, the Planning, Programming and Budget
Execution process will remain at Army Headquarters, exercised through
our existing process that appropriately balances authority between the
Secretariat and the Army Staff and enables my staff principals to
exercise their statutory responsibilities.
26. Senator Shaeen. Secretary Esper, what will you do to ensure
that the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics,
and Technology (ASA-ALT) remains in charge of planning, programming,
and budgeting RDTE funds?
Secretary Esper. The Army Acquisition Execution will retain co-
chairmanship of the Equipping Program Evaluation Group; this is the
body that I charge with the planning, programming and budgeting of
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation funds.
27. Senator Shaeen. Secretary Esper, the Army Medical Research and
Material Command (MRMC), the Army Corps of Engineers Engineer Research
and Development Center (ERDC), and others perform important cross
cutting research in supporting the Army that has a significant positive
impact on the rest of the Department of Defense and the nation. I am
concerned that your efforts to realign Science and Technology (S&T)
funds into cross functional teams that support the acquisition
community will have the unintended consequence of stopping important
research that is important to the nation and the Army that is not and
should not be tied to the acquisition of new equipment. The Army has
many problems and challenges that require research that don't require a
new piece of equipment to be solved. What are you doing to ensure that
the Army Medical Community and the Army Corps of Engineers will
continue to have sufficient funds to conduct cross cutting research and
research that solves Army problems that is not tied to acquisition?
Secretary Esper. For the Army, we are committed to the research
done by our medical and engineering communities that are aimed at
solving Army problems that are not duplicated by other institutions. As
part of our reallocation of funds to support modernization priorities,
lower priority research programs will be reduced. From the medical
research perspective, some programs will be reduced. For combat
engineering research, we resourced programs aimed at Protection from
Advanced Weapons Effects, Expedient Passive Protection of Critical
Assets, Power Projection in Anti-Access/Area Denial Environments,
Adaptive & Resilient Installations, and Advanced/Additive Manufacturing
but other programs may be cut. The Army has to focus it dollars on our
six Modernization priorities.
28. Senator Shaeen. Secretary Esper, I understand that the Army
staff is in the process of developing their recommendations for
Military Construction projects for fiscal year 2020 (FY20) to fiscal
year 2024. I am concerned that the Army's laboratory research
facilities have not had sufficient priority in the past and many of
them need to be replaced with modern technologies and efficiencies.
Will you ensure that the fiscal year 2020-24 Military Construction
(MILCON) Program Objective Memorandum (POM) considers the needs of our
laboratories and begins to recapitalize our S&T infrastructure?
Secretary Esper. Yes, The Army's Infrastructure Planning Team (IPT)
infrastructure programing process ensures this with the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology)
representation on the team. This allows the Army's S&T infrastructure
requirements to compete on an equal footing with other Army
infrastructure requirements.
29. Senator Shaeen. Secretary Esper, will you ensure that your
MILCON Integrated Planning Team (IPT) membership includes voting
members that will represent the laboratory community?
Secretary Esper. Yes, The Army's Infrastructure Planning Team (IPT)
infrastructure programing process currently includes a representative
from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition,
Logistics and Technology). This participation allows the Army's S&T
infrastructure requirements to compete on an equal footing with other
Army infrastructure requirements.
cold weather conflict
30. Senator Shaeen. Secretary Esper, the U.S. Army Cold Regions
Research and Engineering Laboratory (CRREL) is conducting valuable
research with the goal of improving the readiness of the U.S. military
by enhancing its ability to effectively operate in cold weather
environments. Do you believe that it is important for the U.S. Army to
be ready to conduct large-scale combat operations in a cold weather
environment?
Secretary Esper. Yes. The National Defense Strategy (NDS) directs
the Army to prioritize long-term strategic competition with near-peer
and peer competitors, while deterring and countering rogue regimes like
North Korea. Our competitors possess immense territory, much of which
borders or contains regions where we might face cold weather
challenges. Similarly, winter warfare on the Korean Peninsula would
involve significant challenges from cold weather. We man, organize,
train, equip, and lead the Army to deploy, fight, and win our Nation's
wars as part of the Joint Force in any environment; our focus on the
priorities given to us by the NDS necessitates an appropriate focus on
preparing for cold weather warfare.
31. Senator Shaeen. Secretary Esper, do you believe that additional
cold weather-related research, as well as realistic, large-scale
military exercises in cold weather environments, would be useful to the
U.S. military, particularly the U.S. Army?
Secretary Esper. Cold weather related research and exercises
conducted in extreme environments ensure that the U.S. Army will not
fight unprepared in these conditions.
The Army continues to evaluate future investments to meet Army
modernization priorities such as cold weather related research. The
Army currently includes cold weather-related research conducted across
the Army S&T enterprise. The Fiscal Year 2019 President's Budget
request provides an appropriate funding level for this cold-weather-
related research. Examples of recent Army S&T efforts include: modeling
and high-resolution mapping of permafrost and ground ice to assess
impacts on infrastructure, training, and deployment in arctic and sub-
arctic environments; modeling of environmental contaminant effects in
arctic and subarctic climates; arctic camouflage solutions for both
vehicles and dismounted soldiers; and demonstration of improved soldier
cold weather protection technologies.
army mtrs gen ii program
32. Senator Shaeen. Secretary Esper, it has now been six months
since the Army awarded the Man Transportable Robotics System Increment
II (MTRS Inc II) for next generation combat engineer robotics units. As
the Army continues to modernize and prepare for emerging threats on the
modern battlefield, what is the status of the MTRS Inc II program?
Secretary Esper. The MTRS Inc II program is progressing on
schedule. The Government awarded the development and production
contract to Endeavor Robotics on 29 September 2017. Since then, the
Government and Endeavor team has completed the Critical Function
Analysis (12 December 2017) and the Cybersecurity Preliminary Design
Review (28 February 2018), and is currently preparing for the system
Critical Design Review (30 May to 1 June 2018).
The MTRS Inc II competitive source selection resulted in contract
production pricing well below the robot that the MTRS Inc II is planned
to replace. This reduced pricing results in an Army cost avoidance of
approximately $127 million and allows the Army to field all systems
three years sooner than originally planned. The MTRS Inc II
capabilities are on track for meeting or exceeding the Army's
operational requirements.
33. Senator Shaeen. Secretary Esper, has the Army received initial
MTRS Inc II robotics systems for testing and/or evaluation?
Secretary Esper. No, the Army has not yet received the initial MTRS
Inc II robotics systems for testing and/or evaluation. However, under
the contract timeline, the MTRS Inc II program contractor is scheduled
to deliver initial engineering systems in August 2018 for early
Developmental Testing and Production Qualification Test (PQT) systems
in November 2018. Upon completion of PQT the MTRS Inc II program will
begin fielding production systems in fourth quarter, fiscal year 2019.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Kirsten Gillibrand
transgender service members
34. Senator Gillibrand. General Milley, can you please provide me
with the following information as we discussed during this hearing: Who
served on the DOD panel of experts on transgender service?
General Milley. The Army representatives on the Panel included the
Senior Officer Performing the duties of the Under Secretary of the
Army, Mr. Thomas Kelly, the Army Vice Chief of Staff, General James
McConville, and the Sergeant Major of the Army, Sergeant Major Daniel
Dailey.
35. Senator Gillibrand. General Milley, who were the medical
professionals consulted by the DOD panel of experts, if any?
General Milley. The Panel received support from medical and
personnel experts from across the Departments of Defense and Homeland
Security. The Medical and Personnel Executive Steering Committee, a
standing group of the Surgeons General and Service Personnel Chiefs,
provided the Panel with an analysis of accession standards, a multi-
disciplinary review of relevant data, and information about medical
treatment for gender dysphoria. The Panel also received input from
military medical professionals and civilian medical professionals with
experience in the care and treatment of individuals with gender
dysphoria.
36. Senator Gillibrand. General Milley, was consultation from
health professionals received verbally or in writing? Please provide
any such materials.
General Milley. Department of Defense medical providers from all
Services who provide health care services for transgender Service
members and civilian medical experts in the field of transgender care
consulted with the panel in a verbal discussion. Input was provided to
the Panel in many forms, both written and verbal.
37. Senator Gillibrand. General Milley, please provide the names of
individuals who testified before this panel as well as any information
that was submitted for consideration in developing this new policy.
General Milley. The Army representatives on the Panel included the
Senior Officer Performing the duties of the Under Secretary of the
Army, Mr. Thomas Kelly, the Army Vice Chief of Staff, General James
McConville, and the Sergeant Major of the Army, Sergeant Major Daniel
Dailey.
38. Senator Gillibrand. General Milley, are you aware of anyone
outside the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security who was
involved in crafting the final report?
General Milley. I know the Panel of Experts consulted with civilian
medical experts. However, I am uncertain of who these experts are by
name or whether they were involved in crafting the final report.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
improved turbine engine program (itep)
39. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Esper and General Milley, does
the Improved Turbine Engine Program (ITEP) remain the Army's number one
aviation modernization priority? What is the near and long term
development timeline for ITEP? Are you planning to fully fund ITEP in
fiscal year 2019 and beyond?
Secretary Esper and General Milley. The Improved Turbine Engine
Program (ITEP) remains a priority for our current fleets, providing our
attack and utility helicopter fleets with significant increases in
performance, fuel efficiency, and sustainability. ITEP is a bridge from
our highly capable current fleets to Future Vertical Lift (FVL)
platforms and has the potential to power certain FVL variants. We
believe ITEP will achieve milestone (MS) B by 1st quarter fiscal year
2019 (FY19), which will allow development, building and testing of the
capability. We anticipate that ITEP will achieve MS C in fiscal year
2024, which will enable low rate initial production and initial
operational test and evaluation to support initial operational
capability in fiscal year 2027. ITEP is fully funded in fiscal year
2019 and across the Future Years Defense Program.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie Hirono
acquisition reform
40. Senator Hirono. Secretary Esper and General Milley, the Army's
recent history with large acquisition programs, specifically the Future
Combat Systems and Ground Combat Vehicle programs, has not been very
successful. Your testimony outlines a very ambitious acquisition plan
to increase the Army's capabilities across the force, and as you said,
its success is critical to maintaining overmatch against near-peer
competitors. What lessons has the Army learned from the failed programs
of the recent past and what changes have been made to make current
modernization plans successful?
Secretary Esper and General Milley. The Army remains committed to
continuous improvement in our acquisition process to deliver overmatch
capabilities to our warfighters rapidly, effectively, and affordably.
We have taken a hard look at the many expert reviews of cancelled Army
programs of the recent past and as a result, are taking efforts to
address a lack of unity of command, unity of effort, efficiency, cost
effectiveness, and leader accountability in our current acquisition
system. The Army is moving toward utilizing more prototyping efforts
and experimentation in an effort to not overestimate technology
readiness levels for programs. If the Army is going to fail, we need to
be able to fail early and learn quickly in the early stages of a
program versus later when the mature product is getting ready to be
fielded. As part of that process, we must put equipment in the hands of
the soldier earlier so they are involved from the very beginning.
In order to help accomplish these initiatives, we have established
Cross Functional Teams (CFTs) to address the top priorities to contend
with the full spectrum of existing and emerging threats. These CFTs
integrate S&T, R&D, acquisition, sustainment, and warfighter
perspectives to establish a sound footing for modernization programs.
The CFTs will fall under our new Army Futures Command (AFC), bringing
together these various elements of the modernization enterprise onto
one team. Having all the stakeholders under one command will allow us
to better define requirements and better ensure we go after technology
that is achievable.
missile defense
41. Senator Hirono. Secretary Esper and General Milley, in the
fiscal year 2018 NDAA the Committee directed the Army to transition
ownership of the Terminal High Altitude Area Denial (THAAD) missile
defense system from the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). In January,
Lieutenant General Dickinson mentioned that the Army is working on an
updated Integrated Air and Missile Defense Strategy. How is the
transition of THAAD going with MDA?
Secretary Esper and General Milley. The transition of Terminal High
Altitude Area Denial (THAAD) from Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to the
Army is still under discussion and several issues related to resources
and authorities have not yet been resolved. One of my greatest concerns
is that the transfer of THAAD to the Army is accompanied by the full
amount of funding to modernize and sustain the system, as well as
preserve the required munitions. Without that, the Army will incur a
very significant resourcing bill that would compete with our six
Modernization priorities.
We have had RAND examine this transition and they found that there
are key risks of large scale transfer such as performance of the BMDS,
disruption of pending Foreign Military Sales cases, and potential
unfunded requirements for Army and MDA. The study found that there is
an inherent tradeoff between focusing MDA on the future (transfer)
versus the performance of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (do not
transfer). The Army, MDA, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense
continue to evaluate all options.
42. Senator Hirono. General Milley, was the Army's Integrated Air
and Missile Defense Strategy undertaken within the context of the
national-level Missile Defense Strategy expected to be released soon or
was it a stand-alone effort?
General Milley. Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC) is leading
the Army effort to develop the updated Air and Missile Defense (AMD)
strategy. This effort will be informed by the results of the DOD
Missile Defense Review and other strategic documents and is currently
expected to be released before the end of the calendar year. SMDC is
working closely with the Army National Guard, Joint, and Coalition
partners on the AMD way ahead.
43. Senator Hirono. Secretary Esper and General Milley, what is
your top priority for improving the capability of the Air and Missile
Defense System?
Secretary Esper and General Milley. Maneuver Short Range Air
Defense (M-SHORAD) is our top Air and Missile Defense System priority.
M-SHORAD will defeat a wide range of aerial threats including rotary
wing, fixed wing and unmanned aerial systems. M-SHORAD will increase
survivability of our maneuver formations and improve our ability to
fight and win against near peer competitors. We have accelerated
development of the initial M-SHORAD capability and will field 4
battalions by fiscal year 2022.
military construction
44. Senator Hirono. Secretary Esper and General Milley, the cost of
construction in Hawaii and other parts of the Pacific is acknowledged
to be higher than in many parts of the continental United States. It is
encouraging to see that the Army is planning for a MILCON
revitalization effort for Army facilities in Hawaii. I have visited
many Army facilities in Hawaii and highly encourage these MILCON
projects and revitalization efforts which will impact the readiness,
safety and morale of men and women serving in our Army. While the costs
are higher, will you commit to the extent possible, to ensure that the
men and women serving in Hawaii have comparable facilities such as
company operations facilities and quarters as their fellow soldiers do
in other parts of the country?
Secretary Esper and General Milley. Yes, installations provide
critical infrastructure and services that generate combat power and
keep the Army ready. The Army recognizes some infrastructure is failing
and deficient in key categories within Hawaii. As a result, the Army is
addressing these critical shortages through dedicated funding and
attention.
pacific pathways
45. Senator Hirono. Secretary Esper, the Pacific Pathways program
has been a great way to build military to military partnerships in the
Asia-Pacific. Does your budget request for fiscal year 2019 maintain
support or expand this program?
Secretary Esper. The Pacific Pathways provides our Army in the
Pacific with unique training opportunities by connecting a series of
security cooperation exercises to maximize readiness and achieve
regional engagement objectives. The fiscal year 2019 budget request
increases our Army investment in Pacific Pathways by $20 million to
$61.8 million. The increase ensures U.S. Pacific Command a robust,
versatile force, forward-deployed of the International Date Line for up
to nine months each year. These opportunities generate interoperable
combat-ready units and support regional security and stability. The
Pacific Pathways program builds our warfighting readiness, increases
our collaboration with regional partners and provides relevant land
forces support to the Pacific Area of Operations.
IN REVIEW OF THE DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 2019 AND
THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
THURSDAY, APRIL 19, 2018
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
NAVY POSTURE
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m. in Room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M.
Inhofe, presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker,
Fischer, Cotton, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue, Graham,
Scott, Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, Shaheen, Gillibrand,
Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, and Peters.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Senator Inhofe. Our meeting will come to order.
The committee meets today to receive testimony on the
posture of the U.S. Navy and its fiscal year 2019 budget
request.
We welcome our witnesses, the Honorable Richard Spencer,
Secretary of the Navy--welcome; Admiral Richardson, the Chief
of the Naval Operations (CNO); and General Neller, Commandant
of the Marines. Welcome, all three of you. We thank you for
your dedicated service.
The National Defense Strategy aims to build a more lethal
and ready force and reform the Department of Defense for
greater performance affordability. We look forward to hearing
from each of you as to how the Navy and the Marine Corps plan
to support these objectives.
I was pleased to see requested procurement increases that
align with the new strategy, including 11 more ships, dozens of
aircraft, and expanded investment in long-range precision
fires, air defense, electronic warfare, and other critical
capabilities over the next 5 years. I continue to be concerned
about the readiness, with the number of recent air and sea
mishaps and the tragic loss of life in results. And I hope you
have the chance to talk about that. You know, when we have this
accelerated mishaps that we have had, obviously it has
something to do with OPTEMPO, with maintenance, with training.
It's difficult to identify just where that is. However, I think
it's something that we need to be talking about.
I'm encouraged to see the Navy and the Marine Corps
prioritizing manning challenges during a time when our sailors
and marines have been asked to maintain a high operational
tempo. We look forward to hearing where you would use
additional end strength to fill in gaps at sea and support
priorities outlined in our National Defense Strategy.
Finally, recognizing service in the military is inherently
difficult, I'd like to ensure we're doing all the things that
we can do to relieve stress on our sailors, marines, and
families, and prioritize the readiness of the force.
Senator Reed.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I--and let me welcome Secretary Spencer and Admiral
Richardson and General Neller. Thank you, gentlemen, for your
service over many, many years, and to all the men and women of
the Department of the Navy and their families. We're grateful
for that service, and please give them our appreciation.
As the leaders of the Navy and the Marine Corps, you face
huge challenges as you strive to balance the need to support
ongoing operations and sustained readiness with the need to
modernize and keep the technological edge so critical to
military success. The Department of the Navy face serious
readiness problems caused by deferred maintenance, reduced
steaming and flying hours, and canceled training and
deployments. We are all keenly aware of the number of ship
collisions, and I want to work with the Navy to implement
changes that should help to prevent such incidents in future
operations.
These challenges have been made particularly difficult by
the spending caps imposed in the Budget Control Act.
Fortunately, we have a budget deal under the defense top line
for 2 years, but additional challenges loom on the horizon, as
the Budget Control Act will be back in force for fiscal year--
fiscal year 2020. I look forward to hearing your testimony on
progress you're making in correcting these readiness problems
while the funding levels are increased.
All areas of our naval forces are maintaining extremely
high operational tempo. Demand is overwhelming for attack
submarines, air and missile defense cruises, destroyers, and
strike fighter inventories. In addition, the Navy is now in its
sixth year of operating with fewer than the required 111
aircraft carriers. During the next decade, as a first priority,
the Navy will need to buy the new Columbia-class ballistic
missile submarines to replace the Ohio-class submarines. I am
interested in hearing how the Navy is managing current demands
on its assets, and how it plans to manage future modernization
demands, particularly how it is using the additional
authorities that are granted under the National Sea-Based
Deterrence Fund, beginning with the Columbia-class program
funding in fiscal year 2018.
The Marine Corps continues to make modernization of ground
vehicles a priority by balancing the procurement of new systems
while upgrading existing platforms to meet current operational
needs. The amphibious combat vehicle will replace the aging
inventory of assault amphibious vehicles in order to provide
marines with increased force protection and enhanced lethality.
The Marine Corps is also partnering with the Army to develop
the joint light tactical vehicle, the JLTV, to replace the
Humvee. I would welcome an update from our witnesses on the
status of these programs.
Last year, we were presented with a document that
identified a new force-structure goal, as recommended by the
Chief of Naval Operations. That was the new Force Structure
Assessment (FSA). The Navy's current high-level operations
contributed, in part, to the CNO's conclusion in this
assessment that calls for increasing the goal for the Navy
fleet from 308 ships to the level of 355 ships. The Navy
submitted a new 30-year shipbuilding plan with the fiscal year
2019 budget request. While the plan would lead to increasing
the size of the fleet, it would not meet the new 355-ship goal.
This 30-year plan would achieve the attack submarine force goal
of 66 boats in 2048. However, in the same year, we would have a
force of nine aircraft carriers, compared to a goal of 12
carriers, and 92 large service combatants versus the goal of
104. We need to understand the steps the Navy will be taking to
address these shortfalls.
In addition, a significant factor that bears on our
discussions this year is that Secretary Mattis has published a
new Defense Strategy that is intended to guide force-structure
development and modernization programs through increased
capability. It is reasonable to speculate that the implications
of this new Defense Strategy under the Department of the Navy
could yield increased demand for naval forces and complicate
the Navy's plans to achieve its force-structure goals. I am
interested in hearing how the Department is implementing these
strategy decisions, and how this might affect future force-
structure goals of the Navy and the Marine Corps.
Again, I thank the witnesses and look forward to their
testimony.
Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Let's start with you, Admiral. Your entire statement will
be made a part of the record, but--so, we'll be anxious to hear
your opening statement, and then get to your questions.
Why don't we start with you, Secretary Spencer.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RICHARD V. SPENCER, SECRETARY OF THE
NAVY
Secretary Spencer. Thank you, Senator, Ranking Member Reed,
distinguished members. It--I want to thank you for the
opportunity to come before you today and present to you the
posture of the Department of the Navy.
It's an honor--truly an honor to sit here with Admiral
Richardson and General Neller, who, over the last 9 months,
ladies and gentlemen, have truly become my business partners in
tackling the issues that are facing the Department of the Navy,
specifically as they pertain to my title 10 responsibilities.
On behalf of the Navy and Marine Corps team, thank you for
the effort put forth by Congress in reaching a bipartisan
agreement to support the President's Budget request. We
completely understand and appreciate that this stretched people
to the farthest extent of their comfort zone, and we are very
supportive of this and just want to know that we thank you all
for your efforts, collectively.
We look forward to receiving these resources as soon as
possible to enhance the readiness and lethality across the team
while expending them in a focused manner in support of the
National Defense Strategy. Today, 94,000 sailors and marines
and 101 ships are forward deployed and stationed using the
global maritime commons as a medium of maneuver, ensuring the
maritime lanes of commerce remain free and open, assuring
access to overseas regions, defending key interests in those
areas, protecting United States citizens abroad, and
leveraging--and preventing adversaries from leveraging the
world's oceans against us 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. Our
budget request enhances readiness and continues increasing
capability and capacity of the Navy-Marine Corps team. As
directed in the 2018 National Defense Strategy, our budget
submission supports a more lethal, resilient, agile force to
deliver and defeat aggression by peer competitors and other
adversaries in all domains across all spectrums.
My priorities for the Department center on three
categories: people, capabilities, and process.
The ability to accomplish our mission relies on people.
Eight-hundred-thousand sailors, marines, Active Duty and
Reserve, and their civilian teammates and families, comprise
that number. We are building a more lethal, agile, talented,
and rapidly innovating workforce as we speak.
The ability to accomplish our mission relies on having
capabilities necessary to fight tonight, challenge competitors,
deter our rivals, and to win. We're investing in modernization
of key capabilities and new technologies to attain this goal.
Lastly, the ability to accomplish our mission relies on
having efficient processes in place that will speed the value
and ability to support our warfighters in more effective and
efficient manners.
We are creating a continuous-improvement mindset in both
our culture and management systems to deliver performance with
affordability and speed. I deliver to you today a plan with
urgency. We cannot and will not allow our competitive advantage
to erode. With your guidance and help, these planned
investments will provide combat-credible maritime forces for
the future. We will ensure we are good stewards of the money
and resources you give us. We will drive efficiency across the
Department to maximize every dollar and invest smartly in order
to leverage the return on our investments.
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Spencer follows:]
Prepared Statement by the Honorable Richard V. Spencer
introduction
Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished members of the
Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to
testify regarding the Department of the Navy (DON) 2019 President's
Budget request (PB19).
First, on behalf of our sailors and marines, I would like to
express gratitude for the efforts put forth by Congress addressing the
President's Budget request. We are very aware that this process has
stretched members to their limits on many fronts. Please know that the
resources we receive will be expended in focused alignment with the
National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defense Strategy (NDS)
building our combat credible force.
Our Nation supports maritime operations worldwide. Forward-deployed
and forward-stationed naval forces use the global maritime commons as a
medium of maneuver, ensuring the maritime levels of commerce remain
free and open, assuring access to overseas regions, defending key
interests in those areas, protecting U.S. citizens abroad, and
preventing adversaries from leveraging the world's oceans against the
United States. The ability to sustain operations in international
waters far from U.S. shores constitutes a distinct advantage for the
United States--a Western Hemisphere nation separated from many of its
strategic interests by vast oceans. Maintaining this advantage in an
interconnected global community that depends on the oceans remains an
imperative for the Sea Services and the Nation.
Our President's Budget 2019 request enhances readiness and begins
increasing the capability and capacity of the Navy and Marine Corps
team. As directed within the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS), the
President's Budget 2019 budget submission will support the building of
a more lethal, resilient, and agile force to deter and defeat
aggression by peer competitors and other adversaries in all domains and
across the conflict spectrum. Ultimately, our budget submission
reflects the DON's efforts to protect the Homeland and preserve
America's strategic influence around the world. The Navy's overarching
plan--the Navy the Nation Needs (NNN)--consists of six dimensions:
Readiness, Capability, Capacity, Manning, Networks, and Agility. The
Marine Corps' plan--Modernizing for the Future Force--focuses on
investments in Modernization, Readiness, and Manpower; further
increasing its competitive advantage and lethality resulting in a Next
Generation Marine Corps. The resourcing of both services aligns with
the NDS, ready to fight and win across the range of military operations
(ROMO).
The strategic environment is rapidly changing and the Navy and
Marine Corps is engaged in a competition that they have not faced in
over twenty years. To meet the objectives of the NDS, and as part of
the Joint Force, the Navy and Marine Corps' primary force contributors
are Carrier Strike Groups (CSG) and Amphibious Ready Groups / Marine
Expeditionary Units (ARG/MEU), and ballistic missile submarines--the
most survivable leg of the nuclear triad. These units remain forward at
all times, while additional CSGs and ARG/MEUs are ready to surge in
support of Operational Plans. Our President's Budget 2019 budget
continues to make strides in achieving that requirement to once again
re-establish the standard that has ensured preeminence. This will be
imperative to winning peer-on-peer competition, as we move forward to
deliver enhanced distributed lethality.
The Department is committed to follow reform guidance and has
identified savings of over $1 billion in fiscal year 2019 and $5
billion over the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) which will be
reinvested in force structure and readiness. Savings were achieved
through reform efforts focused on improving organizational
effectiveness; eliminating, restructuring, or merging activities; and
workforce management. One specific fiscal reform effort has been the
Department's focus on improving the expenditure of funds through an
emphasis on the quality of our obligations. Leadership is committed to
ensure that a dollar appropriated to the Department is expended by the
Department to achieve the direction laid out by the NDS. Additionally,
the Department has also reviewed duplicative programs or programs that
are no longer mission essential. This has resulted in the divestiture
of legacy F/A-18 Hornets, the transition of the HH-60H reserve squadron
from legacy aircraft to newer MH-60S aircraft, and a review of Marine
Corps training munitions. Representative investments resulting from the
reform initiative include an additional DDG-51, one additional F/A-18
E/F, increased procurement of Rolling Air Frame missiles and MK48
torpedoes, and funding afloat readiness to maximum executable levels.
Moreover, the Department is focused on improving business processes
heightened through the audit of our financial statements.
As we continue to look forward to the President's Budget 2019
budget, our priorities center on people, capabilities, and processes,
and will be achieved by our focus on speed, value, results, and
partnerships. Readiness, lethality, and modernization are the
requirements driving these priorities.
people
The ability to accomplish our mission successfully relies on the
Navy and Marine Corps team--800,000 sailors and marines, active duty
and reserve, our civilian teammates and families. We rely on their
superior talent, recruiting the most promising workforce for the
future, and making strategic investments in training and retention
initiatives.
Our forward-deployed forces suffered tragic mishaps in 2017, both
on the sea and in the air. We will never forget those we lost and we
stand by our fellow sailors and marines along with their families in
solidarity.
We do not take these losses lightly; both the Comprehensive and
Strategic Readiness Reviews have examined the factors that led to the
series of incidents on the sea and provided recommendations we are now
implementing. The Strategic Readiness Review found that institutional
deficiencies were the cumulative result of well-intended decisions
developed over decades. Accepting deviations from our standards
translated into the acceptance of higher risk, which then gradually
became normalized, thereby compounding the accumulating risks. The
entire Department of Navy leadership is committed to addressing these
issues across the Force. The action plan, well underway, commands my
full support and oversight and while we operate with a sense of
urgency, we are steadfast in ensuring this is addressed correctly the
first time.
Good order and discipline are key ingredients to unit cohesion and
lethality. Sexual assault is a cancer effecting the aforementioned. The
Department of the Navy has come a long way in addressing sexual
assault, but until we get to zero, there is still work to be done. As
with any cultural change in an organization, our challenge involves
sustaining positive momentum. We continue to resource and monitor our
progress and address preventing sexual assault along with prosecution.
My commitment is enduring and fundamental, and my position of
intolerance for sexual assault anywhere is unequivocal.
While the Navy and Marine Corps are achieving overall military
recruiting objectives, the Department faces ongoing challenges from an
increasingly competitive marketplace and a decline in the propensity
for military service among young people as our accession goals are
modestly increasing. The Department continues to explore systematic
improvements to support recruitment and retention, to include programs
which maintain the health and resilience of the force, and maximize
professional, personal, and family readiness. Our success in sustaining
maritime dominance relies on our ability to attract America's best. We
will continue to recruit superior talent and invest in long-term
measures to retain it, while fostering an environment where our
sailors, marines, and civilians are provided the opportunities and
resources they need to thrive and be successful. Aligned with our Core
Values of Honor, Courage, and Commitment, we continue to strengthen our
investment in the ethical development of our sailors, marines, and
civilian employees. While competition for talent with the private
sector continues to increase, I believe we are resourced and positioned
to overcome our manning and retention challenges.
capabilities
As we build our lethal capabilities to fight tonight and challenge
rivals, we must respond on all fronts, to include research and
development, rapid prototyping, accelerated learning, and partnership
with industry. These efforts and partnerships will be built on shared
risks and shared benefits. We are now working with industry in a true
partnership to achieve a sustainable acquisition process that will
provide us solutions to problems we face in order to remain ahead of
the competition.
The Department of the Navy has an overarching plan to meet
warfighting requirements in support of the NDS. For example, the long
range ship acquisition plan:
(1) Establishes acquisition profiles to grow the force at a
steady, sustainable rate. This includes sustainment of the industrial
base at a level that supports more affordable acquisition while growing
an experienced workforce to support more aggressive growth if
additional resources become available.
(2) Implements Service Life Extensions (SLE) based upon return on
investment--we will modernize rather than replace when appropriate as
good stewards of taxpayer dollars.
(3) Provides options for aggressive growth as resources and
industrial capacity permit. President's Budget 2019 includes four
additional DDG 51 Flight IIIs over the FYDP, for a total of 14 Flight
III ships and three additional fleet oilers across the FYDP. New ship
construction totals have increased since last year's plan, with three
additional ships (1 DDG 51 Flight III, 1 Expeditionary Sea Base, and 1
fleet oiler) added in this request for fiscal year 2019. Throughout the
FYDP, the Department added a net total of 11 battle force ships.
With sustained funding and SLEs, President's Budget 2019 puts the
Navy on a path to 355 ships while we are simultaneously increasing our
capabilities. By setting the conditions for an enduring industrial base
as one of our priorities, the Navy is postured to take advantage of
additional funding that may be provided through reform initiatives in
future years. This can be achieved without threatening the long-term
competitive posture of a balanced warfighting investment plan while
retaining an option to accelerate a targeted portfolio of weapons
systems.
The Navy is aggressively pursuing cost reduction opportunities to
deliver fully capable assets at the most efficient possible cost. The
Ford-class Aircraft Carrier program refined the ship construction
process for CVN 79 by, capitalizing on technological improvements, and
enhancing shipbuilder facilities to drive towards the targeted 18
percent reduction in labor hours from CVN 78. The Navy is also
executing advance procurement and negotiating long-lead time material
for CVN 80, and full funding for CVN 81 begins in fiscal year 2023.
Naval Aviation continues to operate forward, fully prepared for
conflict across the ROMO while managing near-term service life
extensions, mid-term procurement and modernization, and long-term
investment in research and development. With the support of Congress,
the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps are implementing our ``Vision for Naval
Aviation 2020.'' The Department has initiated a Next Generation Air
Dominance Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) study that is investigating
technology and program investment requirements to recapitalize Navy F/
A-18E/F and EA-18G tactical aviation platforms. The future of DON
tactical aircraft relies on a combination of F-35B and F-35C 5th
generation aircraft. Continued investment in capability upgrades for
both platforms is required to improve the lethality of the CSG and ARG/
MEU. We will see our first operational deployment of F-35Bs later this
year with our ARG/MEUs in the Pacific.
The MV-22B Osprey's unique combination of vertical flight and
fixed-wing capabilities continues to enable effective execution of
missions that were previously unachievable. Marine Corps MV-22B's
continue to extend operational reach, revolutionizing our ability to
operate from the sea, austere locations, and previously damaged
airfields within a contested environment. The DON begins procurement of
the Navy CMV-22B variant in support of the Carrier On-Board Delivery
mission in fiscal year 2018.
Navy and Marine Corps Expeditionary Forces will soon receive the
next generation protected mobility. The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle
begins fielding in 2019. In fiscal year 2019, the Marine Corps is set
to receive the first Amphibious Combat Vehicle Low Rate Initial
Production units in preparation for Operational Test and Initial
Operational Capability in 2020. These capabilities are vital for our
continued efforts to adapt and modernize our expeditionary forces with
the requisite protected mobility. As we work through the programmatic
schedule with these vehicles, we are continually looking at ways to
improve their ability to counter ever changing threats from potential
engagement with peer adversaries.
The Department of the Navy is determined to lead the way in the
development and responsible integration of cyber metrics and artificial
intelligence, establishing aggressive goals for the acceleration of
integrating these unmanned systems. One of these future systems is the
Snakehead Large Displacement Unmanned Underwater Vehicle which is
designated as a Maritime Accelerated Capability Office program to fast-
track this capability. Surface operations will be augmented through an
integrated team of manned and unmanned enhancing capabilities and
capacity. Investments in autonomous platforms and mine countermeasure
technology will reduce the threat of mines in contested waters while
reducing risk to our sailors conducting this dangerous mission.
Steady progress will continue in developing and fielding unmanned
aviation assets. Today the MQ-4C Triton Unmanned Aircraft System
enhances awareness of the operational environment and shortens the
sensor-to-shooter kill chain. The Navy is committed to future unmanned
carrier aviation with the MQ-25 Carrier Based Unmanned Aerial System
that will deliver an unmanned tanker. The Marine Corps continues
development of the unique Marine Unmanned Expeditionary (MUX) system to
further increase lethality and resilience of the fleet while also
enhancing aggregate ISR capability.
We are also investing in strike weapons as well as theater and high
value target multi-layer area defense weapons for the Fleet.
Investments are enhancing warfighting capability and increasing
magazine depth. Along these lines, the Marine Corps is pursuing ground
based fires to restrict freedom of movement along sea lanes while
requesting the integration of Vertical Launch Systems to amphibious
shipping.
Efficiently operating Navy and Marine Corps installations are
essential in generating naval forces. Over the last decade the DON has
taken risk by underfunding infrastructure capital investments and
installation operations to fund other warfighting, readiness, and
modernization requirements. Under-investment has created a backlog of
maintenance and repair requirements and reduced facility effectiveness.
The DON's fiscal year 2019 budget request acknowledges and begins to
address these installation investment challenges. The budget funds
infrastructure that supports new platforms and an increase in
infrastructure sustainment funding; begins to address the significant
requirement to recapitalize our naval shipyards; and recapitalizes
critical enabling infrastructure.
processes
The Department is actively reforming business processes and driving
efficiencies to increase speed, value, and support to the warfighter,
while concurrently enhancing lethality and increasing readiness. We are
identifying and clearing constraints caused by burdensome policies and
regulations, and are increasing adoption of agile business models and
technologies to support our need for urgency. Layers of overhead are
being removed and organizations are being flattened to return decision-
making authority further down the command structure. We are also
demonstrating progress in the area of data-driven decision making and
problem solving. The Department of the Navy's fiscal year 2019 budget
request reflects extensive use of modeled campaign and mission level
outcomes to evaluate capabilities and force structure and maximize
naval power. We stood up a Digital Warfare Office to harness the power
of data by executing digital pilot projects that informed decisions on
operational effectiveness and readiness. Moving forward, the fiscal
year 2020 Navy budget features additional force level analytic tools,
developed at our Federally Funded Research and Development Centers and
in conjunction with industry that will further assist us in integrating
valuation and capability assessments to optimize the Navy's budget for
the highest warfighting return on investment.
Growing the Fleet requires a strong and integrated relationship
with our private sector partners. We are working closely with our prime
contractors to ensure suppliers are prepared to support the increasing
demand of building a larger Fleet. We need industry to provide
solutions and capabilities at the speed of relevance and at an
affordable value. As the same time we also need to be a better
customer. Industry needs predictable and stable programs, which require
a stable budget. If we are effective at long-range planning, we can
increase our buying power by using all of our tools to provide stable
commitments to our industrial partners. We appreciate the much needed
two year budget deal and look forward to working with you to produce
stable and flexible funding that will drive improved productivity,
efficiency, and competitiveness across the supplier base.
We continue to pursue acquisition reforms contained in recent
legislation, with emphasis on provisions that increase Service
acquisition oversight and the role of the Service Chiefs in the
process, along with those that provide opportunities to accelerate the
fielding of critical capabilities. We are employing new constructs, to
include the Maritime Accelerated Capabilities, the Marine Corps Rapid
Capability Office, and an Accelerated Acquisition Board of Directors.
These solutions will improve innovation, speed, and agility through
strategy-driven investments addressing our highest priorities.
The DON is undergoing its first full audit of all financial
statements, which will help us gain a clearer picture of the
effectiveness and an opportunity to improve our processes and internal
controls. The Marine Corps was the first from our Department to
complete the Full Financial Statement Audit for fiscal year 2017,
sharing lessons learned across the Department. As our data quality
improves, we will be able to harvest savings generated through process
reform and reinvest in lethality. We are committed to full
accountability for every dollar.
conclusion
I deliver you today a plan with a sense of urgency. The fiscal year
2019 President's Budget request seeks to provide sustained and
predictable investments to modernize and increase the readiness of our
Navy and Marine Corps team. We cannot and will not allow our
competitive advantage to erode.
These planned investments will provide combat-credible maritime
forces for the future. I commit to you that we will not just look
forward but will lean forward. I will focus the Departments support to
the NSS and NDS. We will gain efficiencies and effectiveness through
business reforms at my level while supporting both the Chief of Naval
Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps' programmatic efforts
to fulfil their needs to meet the challenges our Nation faces in the
evolving strategic environment and maritime domain. We are grateful to
Congress for their support and efforts. We will ensure we are good
stewards of the provided resources, drive efficiency across the
department to maximize every dollar, and invest smartly to leverage the
return on our investments.
I appreciate this opportunity to present our plan and will continue
to work with the Congress to provide our Nation the Navy and Marine
Corps team it requires.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Admiral Richardson.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL JOHN M. RICHARDSON, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS
Admiral Richardson. Senator Inhofe and Ranking Member Reed,
and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify today to discuss our Navy.
I'm honored to be here with Secretary Spencer and General
Neller, two great leaders with whom I am working to increase
the warfighting lethality and readiness of our Navy-Marine
Corps team.
That Navy-Marine Corps team is the Nation's response force,
and a strong and responsive Navy matters to America's security
and economic prosperity now more than ever. As our National
Defense Strategy makes clear, more naval power is essential in
a new era of great-power competition. With a rising China and a
resurgent Russia, America no longer can enjoy a monopoly on
seapower or sea control. Meanwhile, regimes like North Korea
and Iran threaten global stability.
Given these challenges, it's absolutely critical that we
increase American naval power with a sense of urgency, just as
Secretary Spencer said. Every day, we must earn our place as
the world's best Navy. To do that, we must take a balanced
approach to building the Navy the Nation needs.
The Navy the Nation needs requires a bigger fleet, as you
said, Senator, more ships, submarines, aircraft, and special
operating forces. Congress agreed with the conclusions of
several thoughtful studies, and a 355-ship Navy is the now the
law of the land. This will increase our Navy's ability to
protect our Homeland and our allies, to expand our influence as
America's global maneuvering force, and to support American
prosperity by safeguarding access to critical waterways. And,
while there will always be a debate about the eventual number
of ships to build, we can all agree on one thing: the Navy must
get bigger, and we must start building now.
The Navy the Nation needs requires a better fleet, more
capability achieved through modernization, networking, and
agile operating concepts. The Navy the Nation needs requires a
ready fleet, more at-sea time, more flying, more maintenance,
and more weapons of increased lethality that go faster and
farther. All of these things demand a talented force of sailors
and civilians, with officers of character and competence to
lead them.
Thank you, to the efforts of this committee and the
Congress, the readiness funds in 2017 and the enactment of the
fiscal 2018 authorizations and appropriations has put us on a
strong trajectory towards increasing American naval power. As
we discuss the 2019 budget request today, that will help us
achieve a bigger, a better, and a more ready fleet, I commit
that your Navy will be a good steward of every precious
taxpayer dollar.
Finally, on behalf of all the sailors serving around the
globe, I think we all agree and wish Senator McCain a speedy
recovery. I look forward to being grilled by him in this room
in the future. I am grateful for his work, and that of the
entire committee, to increase our naval power.
We've started down a good course, and I look forward to
navigating with Congress to build the Navy the Nation needs, a
Navy lethal to our enemies, committed to our partners, and safe
for our sailors.
Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Richardson follows:]
Prepared Statement by Admiral John M. Richardson
Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished members of
the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the
Navy's fiscal year 2019 budget.
This hearing comes at a critical time in our Navy's and our
nation's history as we confront a dynamic security environment. The
maritime domain--which I define as the sea floor to the stars--is
indisputably more complex than it was when I took my oath in 1978.
Within the past quarter century, global waterways have become more
congested, with maritime traffic increasing by a factor of four. On the
seabed, transoceanic cables carry 99 percent of all information, and
new technologies are making undersea resources more accessible. The
polar ice caps are receding, opening new trade routes, exposing new
resources, and redrawing continental maps. People are migrating to
megacities dotting the coastlines. Rapid technological advancements in
cyberspace, artificial intelligence, robotics, and directed energy are
changing the face of naval warfare. There can be no doubt that
stability and economic prosperity both here in the United States and
around the world are inherently linked to freedom of movement and
security on, below, and above the world's oceans.
But just as we have come to depend on this rules-based security
order, there are those who would seek to turn the tide and upend it.
For the first time since the fall of the Soviet Union, we are
experiencing a return to great power competition. With a rising China
and a resurgent Russia, the United States does not enjoy a monopoly on
sea power or sea control. Rogue regimes like North Korea and Iran
persist in taking actions that threaten regional and global stability.
Given these challenges, a balanced strategic approach is more important
than ever.
Our priorities have been clearly defined by the President's
National Security Strategy, which directs our Navy to protect the
American Homeland, promote American economic prosperity, and advance
American influence throughout the world. The National Defense Strategy
(NDS) operationalizes these imperatives and articulates our plan to
compete, deter and win in the new competitive security environment of
our time.
The maritime expression of the NDS--what we are calling Navy the
Nation Needs--articulates the Navy's role as part of the broader
military joint force across three lines of effort. First, we must
restore readiness while building a more lethal joint force--the prime
objective of the Navy's fiscal year 2019 budget submission. Next, we
must strengthen traditional alliances while building new partnerships
to expand American influence and fortify global resolve. And finally,
we must reform the Department to achieve greater performance through
agile acquisition processes, early engagement with industry, capability
iterations that ride the technological curve, and thoughtful
stewardship of America's tax dollars.
As the NDS makes clear, unstable funding over the past decade has
contributed to ``erosion of military advantage,'' and recent action by
Congress to restore stable and predictable funding demonstrates that
you share this viewpoint. The recent passage of the Bipartisan Budget
Act of 2018 (BBA-18) and the fiscal year 2018 defense appropriations
are major steps in the right direction, underscoring our shared
responsibility to provide, maintain, and operate a global Navy. The
importance of stable and predictable funding cannot be overstated. It
facilitates more planning time, productivity, and purchasing power;
restores readiness through planned and precise resource allocation;
sharpens perishable warfighting skills by steaming ships and flying
planes; stabilizes the industrial base--especially shipbuilding--so
that it is efficient, agile, postured to respond; enables us to mature
technologies on a thoughtful path; and allows us to maximize every
taxpayer dollar spent.
In fiscal year 2017 we arrested readiness decline with the Request
for Additional Appropriations, and the fiscal year 2018 enacted
appropriations and fiscal year 2019 budget request further restore
readiness while beginning to increase warfighting capacity and
capability. The fiscal year 2019 budget submission is strategy-based,
seeking a $2.4 billion increase for the Navy over fiscal year 2018
enacted levels. The single most effective way to maintain the strategic
momentum started in fiscal year 2017 and fiscal year 2018 is to enact
the fiscal year 2019 President's Budget by the start of the fiscal
year. This funding will help us fulfill our responsibilities in the NDS
by building the Navy the Nation Needs. Everything we do must contribute
to increasing America's naval power, which must be balanced in six
specific dimensions to achieve needed wholeness.
To increase America's naval power, we'll build a bigger fleet--more
platforms like ships, submarines, aircraft, and more special operations
forces. Congress made a 355-ship Navy the law of the land, and this
increased capacity will strengthen our ability to prevail in any
warfighting contingencies, meet demand signals from Combatant
Commanders, expand global influence, and support American prosperity by
safeguarding access to critical markets, waterways, and chokepoints. In
fiscal year 2019, this budget requests over $55 billion in procurement
accounts, funds a 299-ship deployable battle force, procures 10 new
ships and submarines, and buys 120 fixed and rotary wing, manned and
unmanned aircraft for the Navy and Marine Corps. Expanded across the
Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), President's Budget 2019 funds
construction of 54 battle force ships--11 more than the President's
Budget 2018 baseline--and extends the service life of six guided
missile cruisers, four mine countermeasure ships, and one attack
submarine to further increase the size of the fleet. Just as they have
every day since the early 1960s, our ballistic missile submarines
continue to patrol the deep as the only survivable leg of our nuclear
triad. President's Budget 2019 includes $3 billion in ship construction
(SCN) funds to ensure lead Columbia-class ship construction commences
on time in fiscal year 2021, guaranteeing defense of the Homeland into
the 2080s. Additionally, our Annual Long Range Plan for Construction of
Naval Vessels, which accompanies the budget request, outlines a path to
reach the Navy the Nation Needs. While there will always be debate
about the final number of ships for our Navy, we can all agree on one
thing. The Navy must get bigger, and we must start building NOW.
To increase America's naval power, we'll build a better fleet--more
capability across all our naval platforms. This means fielding state-
of-the-art systems and continually modernizing legacy ones. Keeping
pace with advances in technology demands consistent, unwavering, and
aligned financial, programmatic, and operational commitments. To that
end, the fiscal year 2019 budget includes almost $18 billion for
research and development in addition to other modernization efforts.
For example, President's Budget 2019 includes $276 million for guided
missile cruiser modernization and $79 million to upgrade eight cruisers
to AEGIS Baseline 9, enabling them to perform critical Integrated Air
and Missile Defense (IAMD) and Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
operations simultaneously. By the end of fiscal year 2019, the Navy
will have 41 ships modified for BMD missions to defend our ships and
the Homeland. President's Budget 2019 also invests over $2 billion per
year over the FYDP in land- and carrier-based aviation modernization
and training to include improved radars, common avionics, structural
enhancements, sensor upgrades, and refreshed mission computers. The
budget maintains fiscal year 2018 enacted funding levels for acoustic
superiority modernization to improve large vertical arrays, advanced
hull coating, and ship machinery quieting technology. The budget also
requests $420 million for Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement
Program (SEWIP), which will enhance shipboard electronic support
capabilities and continue delivery of Block 2 systems currently in full
rate production. We are also leveraging accelerated acquisition and
rapid prototyping--for directed energy, lasers, STANDARD Missile (SM)-
2/6 weapons, MQ-25 Stingray, and Unmanned Underwater Vehicle
capabilities, just to name a few--to deliver capability faster.
To increase America's naval power, we'll build a networked fleet--
allowing our fleet and the broader joint force to connect and combine
in rapidly adaptable ways. History is replete with examples where
networked forces that shared information executed more efficiently and
effectively. The fiscal year 2019 budget builds on the progress made in
fiscal year 2018 by requesting an additional almost $500 million
investment in command, control, communications, computers;
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and cyber resiliency.
By establishing and requesting $27 million to fund the Digital Warfare
Office under the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information
Dominance (N2/N6), we continue to centralize our efforts to identify
material and non-material solutions to mitigate warfighting gaps.
Finally, critical upgrades to our E-2D Hawkeyes, F/A-18 E/F Super
Hornets, and EA-18G Growlers will improve Naval Integrated Fire
Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA) architecture and introduce sensor netting
and Cooperative Engagement Mode, allowing air- and seaborne units to
optimize sensing, tracking, shooting, and controlling functions.
To increase America's naval power, we'll build an agile fleet--more
innovative concepts of operating to increase our competitive advantage.
This past year alone, we leveraged the global maneuver power that is
inherent in our Navy through concepts like Distributed Maritime
Operations, in which fleet commanders are able to distribute but still
maneuver forces across an entire theater of operations as an integrated
weapon system, leveraging multi-domain capabilities and harnessing the
power of the fleet tactical grid; Third Fleet Forward, during which our
San Diego-based numbered fleet commander retained command and control
for forces operating west of the International Date Line; and
electromagnetic spectrum management, which safeguards our units and
preserves our capabilities. Over the past year, we also established the
Navy Analytic Office to better integrate the results of wargames, fleet
exercises, and experimentation and continually learn and improve our
technical and tactical operations at sea. We are focusing four global
wargames--facilitated through the Naval War College but sponsored by
the Commanders of the Pacific Fleet and Naval Forces Europe--on peer
competitors and high-end warfare. Finally, we are sharpening our focus
on countering unmanned threats through programs such as the Surface
Navy Laser Weapons System, as well as targeted experimentation,
wargames, and innovation competitions to more rapidly integrate
capability against these continuously emerging threats. In fiscal year
2019, we are investing over $300 million in research and development to
develop and field laser weapon systems which include advanced
capabilities to destroy unmanned threats. Additionally, our fiscal year
2019 budget requests $60 million to improve existing systems and other
equipment to be able to identify and destroy unmanned aerial systems.
To increase America's naval power we'll build a talented fleet--
more recruiting, training, education and retention. America's sons and
daughters have always been our greatest source of strength. But make no
mistake, we're in a competition for talent. So the fiscal year 2019
budget requests an additional $1.6 billion for military personnel,
which will increase the size of the active force by 7,500 billets, thus
providing more accessions and support personnel to meet projected
shipbuilding and special operations forces growth. Additionally, our
Sailor 2025 initiative seeks to maximize all authorities and non-
monetary incentives to attract and retain skilled teammates in all
warfare disciplines. We are transforming Manpower, Personnel, Training,
and Education by investing in user-friendly systems and by updating our
personnel detailing and assignment processes. Finally, while we remain
on track for mandatory headquarters reductions, the fiscal year 2019
budget adds about 1,400 critical civilian billets above current fiscal
year 2018 estimates for ship depot maintenance, base security,
intelligence, contracting, and training.
To increase America's naval power, we'll build a ready fleet--more
at-sea time, more flying, more ammunition and parts, more maintenance.
Readiness--both materiel and practice time--transforms our Navy from
potential power to actual power. The fiscal year 2019 budget continues
the readiness and wholeness commitments we made in fiscal year 2017 and
fiscal year 2018 by funding ship operations to 100 percent of the
requirement and ship depot maintenance to 100 percent of executable
capacity. It also funds flying hours to the maximum executable
requirement and increases aviation depot maintenance funding to 92
percent (the maximum executable capacity) as we grow capacity on our
flight lines. In addition, $1.9 billion requested in fiscal year 2019
for military construction will fund 33 Navy projects--the largest such
request in over a decade. Recognizing the inherent link between
readiness and lethality, the budget also increases procurement of high-
end ship-, sub-, and air-launched munitions over the FYDP, including
Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM), SM-2/6, Rolling Airframe Missile
(RAM) Block II, Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) Block II, Advanced
Lightweight torpedo, and Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile
(AARGM). Because the element of time is unforgiving, still other
investments over the FYDP accelerate the delivery of critical
capabilities and capacities into our magazines and launchers, such as
multi-mission Maritime Strike Tomahawk ($239 million), Mark-48
Heavyweight torpedoes ($184 million), and Littoral Combat Ship Over-
the-Horizon (LCS OTH) missile system ($177 million). Finally, we
continue to work to stabilize and incentivize the industrial base. The
fiscal year 2019 budget also includes 12.7 percent capital investment
in public shipyard depot facilities, exceeding the six percent
legislative requirement, underscoring our commitment to increase our
capacity to maintain and modernize our fleet.
As part of building readiness, we are also making immediate
readiness improvements by funding the recommendations in our recent
Comprehensive Review (CR) and Strategic Readiness Review (SRR). Across
all appropriations categories, the budget requests $79 million in
fiscal year 2019 and continues to invest an average of $130 million
each year across the FYDP to address the individual and unit training,
navigation equipment, command and control, and manning issues
identified in the reports. We are also committed to improving the
quality and duration of our training--both at sea and in realistic,
shore-based simulators. The fiscal year 2019 requests $81.9 million
over the FYDP to upgrade and integrate navigation, seamanship, and
shiphandling trainers in Fleet Concentration Areas. We are already
seeing progress: as just one example, a U.S.-based guided missile
destroyer today has at least 30 more crew members onboard during the
training phase before they are scheduled to deploy than a similar ship
had in 2012 while on deployment. Additionally, we restored funded
billets for our United States- and overseas-based destroyer squadrons
across the FYDP from 64 percent to 100 percent of the validated
requirement, an increase of 306 total billets. This will add more
experience in critical waterfront positions, improve the quality of our
assessments, and ensure our units sail over the horizon ready to meet
any challenge they may encounter. We are exploring ways to adjust
assignment policies and expand incentives because our commitment to
prioritize manning for our deploying units--particularly those ships,
submarines, squadrons, and platoons based in Guam, Japan, and Spain--
remains steadfast.
A fundamental tenet of our budget request is that naval power is
about maintaining balance across all six dimensions of naval power.
Naval power is not a choice between increased capacity or better
capability--it is a combination of both. Naval power is not a choice
between readiness and modernization--it requires a balance of both.
Naval power is not a choice between more complex stand-alone
technologies or networked systems--it is achieved through both. The
talent to operate and sustain a larger and more lethal force is not a
choice between more people or better training--it must draw on
components from both. Optimizing this balance ensures the fleet can
maneuver as desired, respond when directed, and win in a short or
prolonged fight.
Of course, no number of ships, no new technologies, and no crews of
talented sailors are, by themselves, sufficient to respond to today's
complex challenges without commanders of competence and character to
lead them--they are the glue that binds our Navy team together. Just as
we have done throughout our history, we will continue to develop and
empower leaders who are obsessed with building teams that win.
From the Black Sea to the Bab el Mandeb, from the North Atlantic to
the South China Sea, and from the Indian Ocean to the waters off the
Korean Peninsula, the stakes are high. As we have learned from history,
war at sea--whether lasting a day or a decade--is unforgiving: the
winners sail away and the losers sink to the bottom of the ocean.
Let there be no doubt: America is a maritime nation and a maritime
power, and our way of life and our economic prosperity have always been
linked to the sea. For 242 years, in rough seas and calm, America's
Navy has operated around the world protecting our Homeland from attack,
ensuring common domains remain open, and advancing our interests to
include defending our allies from military aggression.
In the competitive environment we face now and in the future, we
must increase naval power in a balanced approach to meet our national
strategic objectives. I am grateful to this committee and to your
colleagues in the Congress for starting this important work, and we
look forward to sailing alongside you to build the Navy the Nation
Needs--a lethal Navy for our enemies, a steadfast Navy for our allies
and partners, and a safe Navy for our sailors.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Admiral.
General Neller.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL ROBERT B. NELLER, USMC, COMMANDANT OF THE
MARINE CORPS
General Neller. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, I
would just associate myself with the comments of the Secretary
and the CNO.
You expect a lot of your marines, and 34,000 of them are
deployed right now outside the continental United States, doing
what you expect them to do: prepare to fight and win. We
appreciate the appropriation, and we're hopeful that we'll get
the same in 2019 so that we have consistency and stability in
our budgeting process.
That's--I'll curtail the rest of my comments, because I
think it's more important we get to the questions. I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Neller follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Robert B. Neller
marines--vital to our nation's defense
As set forth by the 82nd Congress and reaffirmed by the 114th, the
purpose of our Corps is to provide maritime expeditionary combined arms
air-ground task forces that are ``most ready, when the Nation is least
ready.'' We are a naval force whose mission requires us to be ready--a
fight-tonight, forward deployed, Next Generation force--able to respond
immediately to emergent crises around the globe either from the sea,
forward bases, or home station. While our organization, training, and
equipment must continually adapt to meet changes in the operational
environment, this fundamental purpose is unchanging. Our adaptation
requires consistent, predictable funding--a reality we haven't
witnessed in nine years. Your Corps continues to be responsible
stewards of our Nation's resources, innovating to meet new challenges
and leverage new opportunities to further increase the lethality of our
marines. As our annual requirement to meet before this body and report
our status, this statement aims to do three things: Broadly describe
how your Marine Corps is adapting to increase its competitive advantage
against pacing threats; explain our budget priorities for the
President's Budget Fiscal Year 2019 (PB19) submission; and describe how
continued support from Congress will result in a more lethal force,
postured to prevent conflict, yet ready to prevail in the next fight.
our contribution to national defense
Combatant Commander (CCDR) demand for Marines and tailored Marine
Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) continues to drive an aggressive
operational tempo. We consistently maintain about 35,000, or one-third,
of our operating forces forward deployed across the globe. Of those
forward deployed forces, more than 11,000 served aboard Navy warships
last year. Furthermore, our current posture encompasses several global
tasks: Marines supporting multiple CCDRs with offensive air support and
strikes from our Amphibious Ready Groups / Marine Expeditionary Units
(ARG/MEU) afloat; building partner capacity in both Iraqi and Afghan
Armies confronting Islamic State and Taliban fighters; providing
critical fixed-wing and artillery fire support to coalition-enabled
Syrian Democratic Forces as they fought to clear the Islamic State from
Raqqa, Syria; providing tailored military combat-skills training and
advisor support to foreign forces as part of Marine Corps Forces
Special Operation Command (MARSOC); deterring aggressive behavior in
the East and South China Seas through the forward posturing of 5th
Generation aircraft within the Pacific; providing immediate disaster
response from our ARG/MEU and Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task
Force (SPMAGTF) to Americans in the wake of four hurricanes; supporting
continued efforts to ensure freedom of navigation through the Bab al-
Mandab strait; and enabling full spectrum cyberspace operations while
supporting Joint and Coalition Forces as part of Marine Forces Cyber
Command (MARFORCYBER).
Marines continue to foster and strengthen relationships with our
allies and partners, executing 62 joint, bilateral, and multinational
exercises last year. Exercises like Balikatan in the Philippines, Eager
Lion in Jordan, and Joint Viking in Norway, increase our effectiveness
and help us to gain an understanding of how to best complement one
another's strengths. The Marine Corps also maintains a vital
relationship with the State Department, providing security at our
Embassies and Consulates worldwide. Today, Marines routinely serve at
178 Embassies and Consulates in 148 countries around the globe. Marine
Security Guard Security Augmentation Unit teams deployed 36 times last
year at the request of the State Department, executing 17 Embassy /
Consulate and 18 VIP (POTUS/VPOTUS/SECSTATE) security missions. In
short, as the Nation's ``911 force,'' we are forward postured across
the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs), engaged daily in deterrence
and security cooperation efforts, all while remaining capable of
rapidly aggregating marines from adjacent GCCs and the Homeland to
effectively respond to national crises.
adapting to increase our competitive advantage
The strategic environment continues to be complex, uncertain,
technologically charged, and dangerous. The proliferation of modern
conventional and cyber weapons to a broader range of state and non-
state entities, along with the erosion of our competitive advantage in
areas where we have long enjoyed relative superiority, is likely to
continue as rival states and organizations attempt to contest our
influence. Competition for natural resources, violent extremism,
natural disasters, social unrest, cyber-attacks, regional conflict, and
the proliferation of advanced weaponry and weapons of mass destruction
create a wide range of challenges for a globally responsive force.
Further, complex terrain, technology proliferation, information as a
weapon, the battle of signatures, and contested domains are driving
change across the strategic environment. Through the lens of these
drivers, your marines look for ways to adapt and modernize to increase
our competitive advantage against pacing threats.
The ascendant threats posed by revisionist powers and rogue states
require change--we must become more lethal, resilient and as a
consequence, a more capable deterrent. The Navy-Marine Corps team can
no longer rely on concepts and capabilities premised on uncontested sea
control. We have begun to re-evaluate our capabilities to operate in
all domains and conduct sea control, power projection, maritime
security, and deterrence knowing that we must consider the tactical and
operational details of a contingency--and how our contributions could
shape the strategic environment to prevent conflict. Modern sensors and
precision weapons with expanding ranges and lethality are redefining
how we assess our posture and relative combat power. Advanced defensive
networks are forcing us to re-consider the methods of power projection
required to compete against rising peers.
We have focused on preventing and deterring conflict by providing
combined-arms task forces to theaters either already in crisis or at
the risk of crisis to meet the Congress' mandate to be `` . . . ready
to suppress or contain international disturbances short of large-scale
war.'' We remain poised to quickly respond within the Contact Layer
should deterrence fail to keep local disturbances from cascading into
larger contingencies requiring the attention and resources of the
larger Joint Force. As stated within the recently released National
Defense Strategy (NDS), we must re-posture in a manner consistent with
being the Nation's sentinels--preventing large-scale war and managing
crises as an extension of the naval force. Steady-state requirements
have degraded our readiness to support naval campaigns and degraded our
combined-arms training necessary to create credible combat deterrent
forces. Two challenges must be addressed to remedy these problems--(1)
the resilience of our posture and (2) the pace of our naval force's
availability and modernization. We require Congress' assistance with
aspects of each.
First, our global posture must adapt. To best adapt we must
increase our strategic flexibility and freedom of action. The NDS
introduces a Global Operating Model consisting of four layers--Contact,
Blunt, Surge, and Homeland Defense--and apportions a combination of
U.S.-based forces and theater-based ready forces to provide a method to
mitigate the challenges outlined above. Your Marine Corps operates
regularly within three of the four layers--Contact, Blunt, and Surge.
ARG/MEUs, allocated forces, MARSOC, and MARFORCYBER are part of the
Nation's Contact Layer--that competitive space where the military
element of national power preserves the alignment of shared interests
with our partners and allies. When competition escalates to conflict,
these forces must be able to rapidly transition to combat operations.
They are more often than not operating within the maritime domain, an
area proving to be increasingly contested, compounding the challenges
presented by the strategic environment. We must do so while
simultaneously preparing to conduct challenging naval campaigns against
adaptive competitors such as China and Russia. Despite being
responsible and prudent with our Nation's resources, the cost of war
and war readiness today is higher than ever. We have been innovative in
meeting past challenges and leveraging emergent opportunities, yet we
face ever growing threats from rising peers and irregular foes that
require us to take a hard look at our global disposition.
The development and acquisition of long-range precision weapons by
our Nation's chief competitors and threats--China, Russia, North Korea,
Iran, and Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO)--have placed many of
our forward deployed forces within the effective range of their weapons
systems, or ``threat rings.'' Forward deployed and stationed marines
are now vulnerable to attacks in ways we have not considered for
decades. To operate within the Contact and Blunt Layers, Marine forces
must be combat-credible and oriented on warfighting to provide credible
deterrence. Marines who are stationed at and rotate through III Marine
Expeditionary Force (MEF) in the Pacific are forward postured,
providing expeditionary forward presence. The Blunt Layer requires a
resilient, dispersed basing posture with sufficient forward stockpiles
of logistics items and a reliable command and control (C2) network to
delay, degrade, and deny aggression. Conversely, most of our forward
bases and stations lack sufficient resilience against long-range
kinetic and non-kinetic attacks; thus, jeopardizing our ability to
prepare, project, and sustain combat power. Efficiencies in the
construction and configuration of these bases made possible by relative
security now pose as risks; however, there are remedies to these
problems. We need additional hardening of our facilities to include
aircraft hangars and command posts, the capability to rapidly repair
damage to our air stations, and counter-precision guided munitions and
advanced air-defense capabilities.
From our current posture, rapidly aggregating Surge Forces will
prove challenging. Responding to global contingencies against peer
rivals in an expeditious manner may be contested every step of the
way--we are going to have to fight to get to the fight. Surge Forces
are those war-winning forces that deliver capable mass to the fight,
primarily from the Continental United States, but also from across
GCCs. They are highly ready and able to fight in all domains, degrading
and penetrating anti-access area denial (A2AD) networks, as well as
assuring access and projecting power with C2, fires, maneuver, and
logistics. The rapid aggregation of Surge Forces is a problem that is
not unique to the Marine Corps. Sea control has become more important
now than in past decades, and the Marine Corps must further develop and
integrate force capabilities in support of the Navy. This will require
measured shifts from a focus on a near symmetric land-based enemy to an
asymmetric view in which Marine forces ashore threaten enemy naval and
air forces from expeditionary advance bases. There are elements of
naval security cooperation concerning maritime security, all domain
access, and power projection that could be assumed by the Marine Corps
to alleviate pressure on our over-stressed fleets, particularly in the
Pacific.
Secondly, the operationally available inventory of amphibious
warships and connectors is well below the requirement to satisfy a
competitive global strategy. This is forcing CCDRs to rely on shore-
based MAGTFs that lack the advantages resident in shipborne formations.
38 L-class Amphibious warships are required to meet a 2.0 MEB Joint
Forcible Entry requirement, and upwards of 50 would be needed to meet
CCDR demand. Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) and Expeditionary-
class ships offer cost effective alternative platform options to help
mitigate a lack of warship capacity and for low-end, low-risk missions
in an uncontested maritime domain; however, they do not supplant our L-
class warship requirement.
Ships acting within a networked fleet must contribute to the
lethality of the fleet with the ability to protect themselves from air,
surface, and sub-surface attack, while also possessing organic ship-to-
ship and ship-to-shore strike weapons. Current amphibious ships lack
these capabilities and therefore must rely on support from other
combatants to perform sea control and power projection missions. This
could be remedied by upgrading command and control suites, introducing
vertical launch systems and organic air defense, decreasing ship
signatures to become less targetable, and installing the ability to
launch and capture the MAGTF's growing arrangements of unmanned aerial
systems (UAS). Incorporating these capabilities, with the help of
Congress, would increase the lethality of our ARG/MEUs and the entire
Joint Force while supporting operations throughout the Range of
Military Operations (ROMO).
increasing the lethality of our corps
Your marines continue to innovate and build a Next Generation
Marine Corps--a lethal, adaptive, and resilient Corps that implements
combined arms as a means to conduct maneuver warfare across all
domains, no matter the challenge--directly supporting the NDS, ready to
fight and win across the ROMO. This transformation began in 2016 with
the implementation of the Marine Corps Operating Concept (MOC). The MOC
represents our institutional vision for how the Marine Corps will
operate, fight, and win despite the challenges described above. As
mentioned at the outset of this statement, while the Corps' fundamental
purpose does not change, our concepts--and the organization, training,
and equipment changes they drive--must adapt to effectively accomplish
it. The MOC provides the foundation and context for subordinate
operating and functional concepts--like Littoral Operations in a
Contested Environment and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations
(EABO)--and it guides our analysis, wargaming, and experimentation.
Further, the MOC drives the evolution of our Service doctrine,
organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel,
and facilities (DOTMLPF) through a detailed and thorough Capabilities
Based Requirements System.
Whereas the MOC provides the concept for how marines will fight and
win, it is through extensive experimentation and wargaming that we
validate our capability development choices and inform our investment
strategies. Our experimentation and wargaming focuses on designing a
balanced MAGTF, optimized for the future that incorporates marines
capable of leveraging cyber, information, and artificial intelligence
capabilities. As a driver of innovation to identify these future
capabilities, our Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL) completed the
first phase of our long-range experimentation plan called Sea Dragon
2025, which focused on augmenting an infantry battalion with
experimental equipment, developing an analytically-based wargaming
process, and leveraging commercial technological advances through our
Advanced Naval Technical Experiment series. Phase two of Sea Dragon
2025 is underway, initiating our Experiment Campaign Plan. This plan
spans three years, focusing on MAGTF hybrid logistics, operations in
the information environment, and EABO. Through these efforts, the
Marine Corps will continue to adapt and refine our capability
development, force structure, and investment strategy that modernizes
the force.
our 2019 budget
Our overall theme for President's Budget 2019, Modernizing for the
Future Force, focuses on three key budget priorities--modernization,
readiness, and manpower--directly aligning with the Secretary of
Defense's guidance to improve warfighting readiness, achieve program
balance, and increase lethality. Driven by Marine Corps Force 2025 (MCF
2025), the capability investment strategy which modernizes the force
toward implementing the MOC, we plan to rebuild a more lethal,
maneuverable, and resilient force able to operate in the emerging
strategic environment. To accomplish this goal, we require a budget
that is delivered on-time, with consistency--adequate, sustained, and
predictable funding is needed to properly plan for and resource a
ready, capable force. That said, your Marine Corps remains committed to
building the most ready force our Nation can afford, allocating $40.4
billion to our ground and aviation baseline budget, and an additional
$3.1 billion in Overseas Contingency Operations funding as part of the
President's Budget 2019 submission--a 7 percent increase over last
year's submission. We plan to use the resources to increase our
lethality to maintain our military advantage in a fiscally prudent and
executable manner, addressing critical modernization requirements and
investing in key warfighting capabilities without sacrificing near term
readiness. Additionally, we plan to resource our infrastructure reset,
Indo-Pacific strategy, new structure, materiel, munitions, maintenance
and training requirements that together generate the right capability
and capacity required. Allocating money across our budget priorities
supports Department of Defense (DOD) guidance to restore military
readiness and provide solutions that proactively shape the strategic
environment.
The Marine Corps is committed to audit readiness and business
reform, viewing both as critical enablers to Warfighter readiness. The
Marine Corps recently completed the Full Financial Statement Audit for
fiscal year (FY) 2017, the first within the DOD. Although a disclaimer
was issued for this first-year effort, the Marine Corps continues to
push forward as the lead military service for a full audit of its
financial statements. The Marine Corps has a commitment to achieve and
sustain favorable audit opinions regarding the presentation of its
annual financial statements. The transparency afforded with auditable
financial statements demonstrates our commitment to the prudent
management of taxpayer provided resources. Efficiencies gained through
audit efforts enhance the overall support to the Warfighter and ensure
the effective use of funds received. Progress will be measured not by
the auditor's opinion in 2017, but by the velocity of corrective action
as we continue to improve financial processes, systems, internal
controls and accountability of equipment to achieve a clean financial
opinion in the years to come. As the rest of the military services
commence their full financial statement audits in fiscal year 2018, the
Marine Corps continues to share our lessons learned across the
Department.
As part of ongoing business reform initiatives, the Marine Corps
has identified more than $3.6 billion in savings and cost avoidance,
$567 million in fiscal year 2019 alone, to provide for reinvestment in
warfighting readiness. We continue to make strategic choices in the
divestiture of certain programs to reallocate funds toward building a
more lethal, modern, multi-domain, expeditionary force. This has
included reducing depot level maintenance for the legacy Light Armored
Vehicle (LAV) and Assault Amphibious Vehicle (AAV) as we look to
accelerate the replacement of each vehicle. Similarly, the Marine
Corps' Infrastructure Reset Strategy seeks to improve infrastructure
lifecycle management and ensure infrastructure investments are aligned
with Marine Corps installations that are capable, adaptive, and
economically sustainable platforms from which to generate readiness and
project combat power in a fiscally constrained environment.
Implementation of this strategy consolidates and appropriately resets
the infrastructure footprint within existing installations to improve
operational readiness and generate resources for reinvestment.
Marine Corps business reform initiatives have also included the
more effective use of operating resources and force restructuring
throughout our military and civilian manpower. An in-depth
organizational structure and design review of Marine Corps Systems
Command, for instance, led to a reorganization to enhance MAGTF
alignment across product lines, maximizing economy of force by reducing
overall program office structure, achieving better rank and
responsibility alignment, and optimizing alignment with key
stakeholders. In another example, a review of our ground conventional
ammunition portfolio led to training requirements refinement; the use
of new, less-expensive training munitions; and the elimination of
duplicative munition requirements. We are focused on continuing
business reforms in fiscal year 2019 that foster effective resource
management and streamline the requirements and acquisition process.
modernization--the foundation of our future readiness
Our Marine Corps must be modernized to meet the demands of the
strategic environment. Given this urgency, we appreciate the
Congressional action to improve acquisition through the National
Defense Authorization Acts of fiscal year 2016 and fiscal year 2017,
and we continue to leverage the opportunities provided by this
legislation. While we are leveraging technology to advance promising
capabilities in a range of information related areas, funding stability
and flexibility must be increased to enable us to keep up with the
rapid pace at which technology evolves. What we desire to achieve is a
Corps capable of exploiting, penetrating, and destroying advanced
adversary defenses in all domains in support of naval or Joint Force
operations. That modernized force would deter adversaries, prevent
conflict, and provide capabilities required to `` . . . suppress or
contain international disturbances short of large-scale war;'' thus,
preventing the consumption of readiness from the larger Joint Force. To
do that, we must be afforded the flexibility to experiment with new
technologies available on the market, determining what will work best
in the future operating environment, and then delivering those
capabilities to the force quickly to mitigate the rapid rate of
technological change. Our newly chartered Marine Corps Rapid
Capabilities Office (MCRCO) accomplishes that end, seeking emergent and
disruptive technologies to increase our lethality and resiliency. The
MCRCO leverages fiscal year 2016 and fiscal year 2017 NDAA provisions
and partnerships to accelerate the acquisition process--with the
consistent and steadfast support of Congress--we will continue to fund
this office. Accelerated modernization is the most effective remedy to
our long-term readiness problems and we must abstain from burying our
modernization efforts under cumbersome acquisition processes--we have
to get this right.
President's Budget 2019 provides $13.8 billion towards our
investment accounts, nearly 32 percent of our total request to
modernize the force. This represents a 19 percent increase in
investment funding over our fiscal year 2018 budget submission. The
President's Budget 2019 investment approach is synched with the
implementation of MCF 2025, specifically investing in areas such as:
Information Warfare (IW), long range precision fires, air defense, C2
in a degraded environment, and protected mobility / enhanced maneuver.
These capability areas support building a Next Generation Marine Corps
across the Active and Reserve components of the force. This approach
includes changes to the structure of our Tables of Equipment into
equipment sets that balance affordability with the need for a
networked, mobile, and expeditionary force. Over the past decade and a
half, fiscal instability, funding decreases, and operational demand
increases have forced us to take risk in modernization to preserve
readiness, deferring critical future aviation and ground programs.
President's Budget 2019 continues the efforts started by the fiscal
year 2017 Request for Additional Appropriations and President's Budget
2018 to reverse this trend by investing in, and in some cases
accelerating, our modernization programs that directly correlate to
improved readiness by reducing unit costs, increasing efficiencies, and
providing needed operational capabilities sooner.
President's Budget 2019 invests in our C2 capabilities needed to
build a Next Generation Marine Corps that will dominate the information
domain. This requires transforming MAGTF C2 through a unified network
environment that is ready, responsive, and resilient, with initiatives
that integrate Navy and Marine Corps systems. Enhanced C2 and digitally
interoperable protected networks are modern capabilities that will
facilitate improved battlefield awareness to and from small, dispersed
tactical units--achieving this end is my top acquisition priority. Such
programs as Tactical Communication Modernization (TCM), Common Aviation
Command and Control Systems (CAC2S), and Networking On-the-Move (NOTM)
provide significantly increased capabilities associated with maneuver
and fires across the battlespace. As warfare evolves into a battle of
signatures and detection, these information capabilities are vital to
maximize the lethality, maneuverability, resilience, and effectiveness
of our multi-domain, naval expeditionary forces.
We continue to prioritize the integration of information
capabilities throughout the MAGTF. Within the Command Element,
investments in the Marine Intelligence Program allowed the formation of
the MEF Information Group (MIG) to establish IW coordination centers
for MAGTF Commanders, filling the IW gap at the operational level.
Additionally, we have increased funding to MARFORCYBER to man, train,
and equip cyber forces and conduct full-spectrum cyberspace operations.
The coordination, integration, and employment of information and cyber
capabilities will enable the MAGTF Commander to facilitate friendly
forces maneuver and deny the enemy freedom of action in the information
environment.
The Ground Combat Element (GCE) is likewise being adapted to
operate and fight more effectively in the strategic environment through
the incorporation of information-related capabilities and the overall
modernization of its ground formations. President's Budget 2019
continues to invest in key ground systems like the ACV 1.1, Ground /
Air Task Oriented Radar (G/ATOR), High Mobility Artillery Rocket System
(HIMARS), and Increment 1 of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV).
Furthermore, investments are being made to ensure more technological
advances are being incorporated into our infantry units. We continue to
increase the maneuverability, lethality, and resiliency of our infantry
by decreasing loads, enhancing Company Level Operations and
Intelligence Centers, increasing small UAS capacity and unmanned
teaming with robots, adding engineering capacity to provide direct
support to every infantry battalion, and increasing long range fires
capacity. It is in areas like these that we need to garner flexibility
within our acquisition process to assist in the streamlining of our
modernization efforts. We must be able to outfit the individual Marine
with the most modern technology and gear as soon as it becomes
available. The investments being made across the GCE will result in a
more lethal fighting force able to better support the Joint Force
across the ROMO.
President's Budget 2019 invests in our aviation systems to
modernize the Aviation Combat Element (ACE) by funding increases in the
procurement of 5th Generation aircraft. The Marine Corps is challenged
to replace aging aviation platforms that have reached the end of their
service lives or suffered accelerated wear in ongoing combat
operations. Our aviation modernization plan is a phased multi-year
approach to modernization that encompasses aircraft transitions,
aircraft inventory shortfalls, manpower challenges, safety and fiscal
requirements. Our modern expeditionary force requires fixed-wing
aircraft capable of flexible basing ashore or at sea in support of our
Marine units. A top priority is the F-35B/C and its future sustainment.
This aircraft is not just a replacement for three aging platforms; it
provides transformational electronic and information warfighting
capabilities for the future naval and Joint Force. Maximizing the
potential of this aircraft requires further analysis of our joint
training ranges to ensure our aircrews are able to train to its full
capability. Other priorities for aviation include investing in lethal,
persistent, multi-role intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) Vertical Take-Off and Landing (VTOL) UAS like our MAGTF Unmanned
Expeditionary (MUX) program; supporting capabilities such as electronic
attack; implementing robust strike weapons programs; creating manned-
unmanned teaming capabilities; and pursuing other sustainable modern
aviation platforms ultimately increasing our competitive advantage
against current rivals. Additionally, the CH-53K (Heavy Lift
Replacement) remains a critical replacement to the CH-53E, as it has
triple the lift capacity and is the only maritime, heavy-lift
helicopter capable of supporting current and future warfighting
concepts. Much like the MV-22 Osprey, this helicopter will change the
scope of our amphibious operations through its increased lift and load
capacity.
The Next Generation Logistics Combat Element will optimize tactical
distribution with unmanned platforms, flatten the supply chain through
additive manufacturing (AM), and enhance preventive and predictive
supply / maintenance with sense and respond logistics. Further, state-
of-the-art logistics C2 / Information Technology, enabled by artificial
intelligence, will extend the operational reach of the MAGTF. Our MCWL
and Next Generation Logistics (NexLog) organizations continue to stay
at the cutting edge of military innovation. Marines are at the
forefront of this effort, optimizing the potential of AM in garrison
and overseas in austere environments. Our marines are the world's
military leaders in the realm of 3D printed tactical level unmanned
aerial vehicles and using AM to produce time and mission critical
components. We have more than 70 3D printers throughout the Marine
Corps, and are fostering innovation through the establishment of
``makerspaces'' (areas where 3D printers are made available for use by
Marines) in the operating forces and supporting establishment. Once
fully integrated, this capability will enable our marines to create
custom solutions to tactical problems, enhancing flexibility and speed,
while fundamentally altering the supply chain and wartime logistics. We
are experimenting with various unmanned aerial and surface platforms to
increase our ISR and logistical capacity and capability on the modern
battlefield. Lastly, we are conducting a series of innovation
symposiums and challenges to harness the creative energy of all marines
in the development of Next Generation warfare capabilities for this
century's five domain warfighting environment. This is the future and
your marines are working to change the way we conduct logistics in
combat.
readiness--the core of our ethos
The Marine Corps is unique among the Armed Services because your
expectations require marines to be a fight-tonight, forward deployed
force, ready and capable of acting with minimal preparatory time--we
should therefore be resourced accordingly. Our ability to rapidly
deploy Marines to support missions across the spectrum of conflict is
incompatible with tiered readiness. Marines do not get ready when a
crisis occurs; we must be forward deployed and ready to respond
immediately from within our rival's threat rings. President's Budget
2019 provides $13.1 billion towards our operation and maintenance
accounts, over 30 percent of our total request, enabling us to meet all
of our steady state and contingency requirements within established
timelines, while balancing efforts across the force to meet operational
demands.
The Marine Corps is committed to building the most ready force ``to
suppress and contain international disturbances short of large-scale
war,'' and one capable of gaining and maintaining sea control as
required by the larger naval force. Readiness, however, is the product
of two metrics. The first is the ability of the force to execute its
mission with ready people, ready equipment, and the right training. The
second metric compares the force against potential adversaries in
various circumstances. Within the context of global competition against
rising peers, the scope of the second metric grows dramatically. For
instance, if our units are ready (near-term readiness levels), then by
the first metric we are ready. If, however, the force is outranged or
outpaced by potential adversary capabilities (long-term capability
modernization), then by the second metric we are not ready. We either
assume risk to mission or modernize our capabilities to mitigate
against the second metric.
The Marine Corps is ready to execute missions assigned with
deployed and next-to-deploy forces, but maintaining this readiness has
come at the expense of the readiness of non-deployed forces,
modernization, and infrastructure sustainment. This shortfall in
readiness of our non-deployed forces limits our ability to respond to
unexpected crises or major contingencies. In the event of a major
contingency, degraded units could either be called upon to deploy
immediately at increased risk to the force and the mission or require
additional time to prepare, thus incurring increased risk to mission by
surrendering the initiative to our adversaries. The fiscal year 2017
RAA provided the investment needed to arrest this decline, and the
President's Budget 2018 and President's Budget 2019 budget submissions
provide the resources needed to accelerate our readiness recovery.
Another aspect of our readiness for major combat operations
involves the capacity of our War Reserve Materiel to enable and sustain
large-scale force mobilizations for major contingencies against rising
peers. Historically, readiness of deployed and next-to-deploy forces
also takes precedence over War Reserve Materiel, increasing risk and
cost in the event of a major contingency. President's Budget 2019
invests in our War Reserves in such areas as munitions and emerging
starter stocks, maintenance modernization, and our MPF fleet; all vital
parts of our Surge Forces. It also invests in our prepositioning
programs in Norway, which includes the maintenance of our prepositioned
equipment. The security threats to our Nation, as articulated by the
Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, demand
that America has a globally responsive, truly expeditionary,
consistently ready, forward-postured naval force. This is beyond
dispute. To deliver on that requirement, there are four primary
challenge areas within readiness that the fiscal year 2019 budget
addresses: aviation; amphibious, maritime, and expeditionary ships;
deployment-to-dwell; and infrastructure.
aviation
Our most acute readiness issues are in aviation units. A
combination of aging aircraft, a lack of ready basic aircraft, an
unresponsive supply of parts and spares, and maintenance backlogs at
the depots contribute to high over-utilization rates of available
aircraft needed for training and certifications. This in turn hastens
the induction of these aircraft into maintenance cycles. Lack of
predictable and stable funding affects industry. Often when funding
becomes available late in the year through Continuing Resolutions, the
industrial base is not energized to meet demand. This negatively
influences training and certification opportunities for our maintainers
and aircrew.
Our priority remains building aviation readiness for combat by
balancing modernization with readiness recovery. President's Budget
2019 works to assist with this by providing support to our
comprehensive aviation recovery plan that, if sufficiently resourced
and supported by our industrial base, recovers the force to an
acceptable readiness level by fiscal year 2020 with a ready bench by
fiscal year 2022. Further, President's Budget 2019 plans to fund
aviation readiness accounts at maximum levels and spares at 93 percent
of the requirement across both legacy and Next Generation platforms. We
are also continuing to fund and support readiness initiatives to the F/
A-18, CH-53E, and MV-22B. Budget challenges, production delays, and
increasing sustainment costs for aging aircraft place the recovery plan
in a fragile state--this readiness goal has already been delayed once.
While aviation readiness recovery remains a priority--the introduction
of the F-35B/C and accelerated modernization of our Next Generation ACE
is just as important. Furthermore, the continued funding of legacy
aircraft is a necessary bridge to the future as we continue to increase
the size of our Next Generation fleet of aircraft.
amphibious, maritime, and expeditionary ships
The Joint Force must maintain access to and the ability to maneuver
through the global commons, project power, and defeat a competitor
attempting to deny freedom of action via the employment of A2AD
capabilities. To meet these challenges, the naval force must be
distributable, resilient, and tailorable, as well as employed in
sufficient scale and for ample duration. Due to existing shortfalls
within our amphibious, maritime, and expeditionary ship capacity, the
naval force currently struggles to satisfy these basic requirements--an
issue that will only grow worse over time if we cannot remedy our
current budgetary issues. President's Budget 2019 puts us on a path to
address these issues, but we need Congress to act on this in a timely
manner, consistent with a return to the regular order of business.
The naval services must have optimally trained and equipped
amphibious forces tailored to each theater and threat and ready to
deploy with a suitable quantity of forces, on the designated timeline,
and with the reservoir of non-deployed yet ready forces that can surge
to meet the demands of large-scale operations or unplanned
contingencies. The operational availability of the existing amphibious
fleet is insufficient to meet global demands, negatively impacts the
unit training necessary to recover full spectrum readiness, and does
not support CCDR requirements for power projection. Consequently, the
strategic risk to the larger Joint Force and mission is increased. The
Navy possessed 62 amphibious ships in 1990, yet possesses only 32
today. Of the 32 amphibious ships, 18 are available to support current
or contingency operations. The stated requirement of 38 amphibious
warships is the minimum number to fulfill our title 10 obligation.
Resourcing to a lower number puts CCDRs requirements and contingency
response timelines at risk. The Navy and Marine Corps are currently
operating below the minimum acceptable level and will continue to do so
until fiscal year 2033 when we reach the minimum amphibious ship
requirement of 38 per the fiscal year 2017 30-year shipbuilding plan.
That said, we recommend exploring the acceleration of LHA-9--a project
that can begin within the out years of the FYDP, bringing continuity to
our industrial base and directly increasing the lethality of our Navy
and Marine Corps team.
While some ships in the amphibious inventory have undergone
upgrades to support the F-35B and are fundamentally more capable
platforms than those they replaced, the naval force lacks the capacity
necessary to conduct requisite training to build total force amphibious
readiness and simultaneously prevent conflict. The Marine Corps, in
coordination with the Navy, is exploring innovative ways to employ
alternative platforms for amphibious operations in more permissive
environments in order to provide more global coverage in the most
resource-appropriate manner. These alternatives are by no means
replacements for amphibious warships, but instead provide cheaper,
additive alternatives in certain environments. Tailored MAGTFs afloat
on these vessels would replace those on shore due to limited shipping.
Regardless of the ship, whether an LHD equipped with F-35Bs and MV-22s
or an Expeditionary Sea Base with embarked crisis response forces,
Marines require additional maritime expeditionary shipping to satisfy
current requirements and the NDS. Congress could help remedy this by
supporting the President's Budget 2019 request.
Ship-to-shore connectors move personnel, equipment and supplies,
maneuvering from a sea base to the shoreline. These are critical
enablers for any naval force. Modern aerial connectors, such as the MV-
22 Osprey and CH-53K, extend operational reach and lift capacity,
revolutionizing our ability to operate from the sea, austere locations,
and previously damaged airfields within a contested environment. Aerial
connectors alone do not suffice; the Navy is in the process of
modernizing the surface connector fleet by replacing the aging Landing
Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) and the 50-year-old fleet of Landing Craft
Utility (LCU). This system of surface and aerial connectors would
enable the Joint Force to establish a web of sensor, strike, decoy, and
sustainment locations based on land and sea that would complicate the
strategic and operational decision making of our most advanced rivals,
thus attacking their A2AD strategies. Continued funding of the
modernization, maintenance, and service life extension programs of our
existing fleet of connectors is critical to enabling our success in
future security environments.
Mine Countermeasure (MCM) capabilities are consistently
underfunded, affecting the Joint Force's ability to operate in the
littorals. The assault element of an amphibious task force, as well as
any amphibious force maneuvering to establish expeditionary advanced
bases, requires assured maneuver through very shallow water, surf
zones, and beach zones to inland objectives. The Naval force has a
deficiency in MCM capability and capacity in these areas, which has a
direct effect on options available to fleet commanders within contested
seas. Naval MCM is in a transitional period where legacy systems are
reaching the end of service life. Although President's Budget 2019
extends the service life of four MCM systems, we must accelerate future
capability to ensure continuous MCM coverage during the shift from
legacy to future MCM systems. Future MCM systems could provide
solutions to identified gaps in detection and neutralization in very
shallow water, the surf and beach zones. Sufficient, sustained, and
focused resourcing for this transition is needed to provide required
capabilities and capacities--a critical capability to support
amphibious operations. If the naval force possessed the capability to
easily overcome layered mine defense in contested near-seas, such as
the South and East China Seas, through a more robust MCM capability,
then we would in effect be attacking the adversary's A2AD strategy.
This would demonstrate our ability to penetrate their defenses at a
time and place of our choosing, and force them to revalidate
assumptions, change decisions, and invest in other more costly
capabilities. Assured naval surface access and assured sea control
cannot be achieved without an acceleration of our MCM capabilities.
deployment to dwell
The rate by which Marines deploy largely depends upon what unit
they are assigned to and the operational demand for those units.
Currently, that rate is favorable for Marines assigned to many of our
headquarters elements; however, a majority of the Active Force is
experiencing a deployment to dwell (D2D) ratio that is unsustainable.
We confront this challenge daily. While these demands are clear and
unmistakable evidence of the continued relevance of Marines, this tempo
is not sustainable as it limits time to train to our full naval mission
sets. We must return to a 1:3 D2D force to have the time required to
train for the high-end fight and achieve balance with our Marines and
their families at home. Continued high operational tempo is affecting
our ability to retain Marines and we need to ensure we are doing what
we can to sustain our career force.
There are three types of Marines in our Corps: those who are
deployed, those getting ready to deploy, and those who just returned.
President's Budget 2019 supports an 186,100 Active and 38,500 Reserve
component end-strength force while maintaining an approximate 1:2 D2D
ratio in the aggregate. Funding at a 1:2 D2D ratio, although not
sustainable, is a conscious, short-term decision we must make to
balance modernization while meeting current demand and simultaneously
recovering our readiness. We owe our Marines and their families the
necessary time to reset and train for the next deployment or
contingency. Historically, Marines have benefited from being a 1:3 D2D
force. The Marines that were not deployed, had adequate time to prepare
across the full spectrum of conflict and could be counted on to be
ready when called upon to reinforce their teammates if a major
contingency happened. This would require a substantive increase in
supply or decrease in demand--we are not asking for the former in this
year's budget. Consequently, a temporary reduction of our operational
tasking is required to improve our D2D ratio. Although accepted in the
short-term for the reasons outlined above, we must not accept a 1:2 D2D
as the new normal. We routinely talk about our readiness--fixing these
dwell challenges will help to better our readiness.
infrastructure
We must prioritize Infrastructure Reset--we must improve
infrastructure lifecycle management and ensure infrastructure
investments are aligned with Marine Corps capability-based requirements
to support the warfighting mission and contribute directly to current
and future Force readiness. President's Budget 2019 funds the
Infrastructure Reset Strategy with realized long-term cost savings
through a reduction of 1056 failing structures (14 million square feet)
during the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) and yield savings in
Facilities Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization (FSRM) accounts.
Our installations provide three critical force enabling functions.
First, they are deployment platforms from which our expeditionary
forces fight and win our Nation's battles; second, they are where our
MAGTFs train and hone their combat readiness; and third, they house our
Marines and families.
The Marine Corps has historically taken risk in facilities funding
to protect near-term readiness and service-level training. While
proposed investments in FSRM will allow our facilities to maintain an
average condition, if long term underfunding of FSRM requirements
continue, the progressive degradation of our infrastructure will
result, potentially creating a bow wave of long-term costs and in a
manner inconsistent with the National Security Strategy (NSS), NDS, or
National Military Strategy (NMS). President's Budget 2019 begins the
work to ensure our infrastructure is resilient against not only long-
range precision strike, but also cyber-attacks. The greatest need of
enhanced resilience exists on our strategically significant overseas
bases in the Pacific on Okinawa and Guam. These locations are vital to
reassuring partners and allies in the region.
manpower--growing and sustaining our high quality people
Our people--Marines, civilians, and their families--are the
foundation of all that we do; they are our center of gravity.
President's Budget 2019 provides $15.7 billion towards our manpower
accounts, over 36 percent of our total request as it begins to
implement MCF 2025. It also supports building a more experienced,
better trained, and more capable force by increasing the number of
Marines we have with special skills like MARSOC; those required for
intelligence operations; and electronic, information, and cyber
warfare. Our manning requires leaders with the grade, experience, and
technical and tactical qualifications associated with their billets,
which is essential to the Marine Corps as a ``fight tonight'' force.
The resources we dedicate to recruiting, retaining, and developing our
people directly contribute to the success of our institution. Our
commitment to our Marines, their families--and the civilians who
support them at bases, stations, and depots across the globe--must
never waiver.
Marine recruiters consistently meet our recruiting goals by finding
motivated and qualified men and women within our Nation who are willing
to raise their hands and volunteer to wear the Eagle, Globe, and
Anchor. These men and women are smarter and more capable than past
generations and we continue to effectively lead them, both at home and
in combat. Devoted to upholding our values of honor, courage, and
commitment, we are dedicated to holding ourselves to the highest
standard of personal conduct. To this end, we have taken an
introspective look at our culture in light of social media
controversies and have created a task force and permanent office to
examine and correct conditions that enable disrespect or misconduct to
exist. We are committed to ensuring Marines treat each other with
dignity and respect. As issues arise, our commanders take necessary
action to ensure we maintain an organization that values the
contributions of all Marines based on their individual merit and
commitment to warfighting excellence.
Increasing the effectiveness of our Marines requires constant
reflection on how we conduct training; training to prepare for combat
and training that sustains the transformation of Marines into resilient
leaders who are mentally, morally, and physically fit. That
transformation begins with entry-level training, whether it be recruit
training or Officer Candidate School, and continues throughout a
Marine's service--whether it be a single enlistment or 40 years. We
believe in returning quality citizens to society when they leave the
Marine Corps--entry-level training is where that begins.
Over the last year, we have examined how we conduct recruit
training and made adjustments, while strictly maintaining the standards
necessary to ensure all Marines are proficient in the skills required
of our Nation's premier warfighting force. We have integrated a
majority of the recruit training phases at Marine Corps Recruit Depot
Parris Island. Additionally, the Recruit Depots have redesigned the
last 11 days of entry-level training--as a new, fourth phase--to
enhance a recruit's new identity as a Marine. The training focuses on
mentorship and leader-led instruction aiming to better prepare the new
Marines for the transition to follow-on training and the operating
forces. The newly created Transformation Enhancement Program (TEP)
improves our existing curriculum at our Formal Schools--reinforcing the
values and principles emphasized during the Fourth Phase of recruit
training. The TEP has been implemented at our combat training
battalions and Schools of Infantry with plans to continue
implementation into all formal schools over the next year.
Our Marines want to deploy, serve our Nation, and protect our
country from threats overseas. As Marines, we pride ourselves on being
ready and on training for combat in conditions that are as close to
reality as possible to enable success when called to fight. To ensure
their success in future conflicts, we continue to build upon our
lethality as we adapt our training, driving changes in our programs.
Conducting combined arms in multiple domains, counter-unmanned aerial
systems, managing signatures, and increasing integration of simulation
technologies are all part of the new training regimen. Innovation
remains a critical aspect of our Corps as Marines continue learning
through the testing and evaluation of new methodologies and
technologies to gain advantage over our rivals. Cyber operations,
information and electronic warfare, more capable command and control,
intelligence, engineering, civil-military operations, manned-unmanned
teaming, robotics, AM, and the leveraging of artificial intelligence
are critical skills we need for the future fight. Accordingly, we are
updating course materials and developing new programs of instruction to
ensure the Marine Corps remains a step ahead of our rivals.
Taking care of our Marines, civilians, and their families is a key
element of overall readiness, combat effectiveness, and warfighting.
Today's requirements mandate that we not only provide equipment, but
also focus on other important aspects of readiness, such as family
stability, housing, spousal support, behavioral health, education,
professional development, transition assistance, financial literacy,
and wounded warrior support. Deployment Readiness Coordinators help
ensure our families get the support needed before, during, and after
their Marines deploy. Additionally, our comprehensive packages of
services (Sexual Assault Prevention and Response; Suicide Prevention
and Response; Behavioral Health; Wounded Warrior Regiment; Personal and
Professional Development; and Transition Assistance) support the
complete fitness and readiness of our Marines and their families. The
Marine Corps remains focused on solutions to reduce destructive
behaviors, particularly sexual assault, suicide, hazing, and excessive
alcohol consumption. The abuse of alcohol is a known factor and
contributor across the spectrum of force preservation issues and
negatively impacts the readiness of our force. We are keenly focused on
dramatically reducing these destructive behaviors.
conclusion
Today, the Marine Corps faces many challenges; some as a
consequence of rival adaptations, and some as a result of unpredictable
funding. Years of sustained operations ashore in Iraq and Afghanistan
have increased the divide between the Marine Corps and the Navy. For
years, the Marine Corps and Navy have taken presumptive sea control for
granted, despite warnings. We have focused on power projection and
assured access, assuming sea control would remain uncontested. Since
the fall of the Soviet Union, the Sea Services have enjoyed well-
earned, uncontested global dominance. Those days are over. We need to
modernize and address peer competition or risk falling further behind.
Our budget priorities, coupled with the evolution of our global
posture, will provide our Nation's leaders the right instruments of
power and the right places to create the decision-making space
necessary for competition and contingency at the lowest cost in
resources possible.
The Marine Corps will adapt its global posture. As a naval force,
deployed Marines predominately reside aboard ship, fully integrated
with the Navy and expanding the competitive space and advantage of the
Joint Force. The ocean provides flexibility, freedom of maneuver,
survivability, and agility. Despite being the subject of competitor
tracking, hitting a moving target is much more difficult than one that
has been in the same position year after year, and thus affords much
greater unpredictability--imposing a cost on any competitor. In recent
history, we have found our forces tied to fixed locations in special
arrangements to support necessary requirements during times of
increased instability throughout specific regions of the globe. We must
put these forces back on ship, whether on upgraded amphibious warships
postured to respond to conflict or on alternative platforms. This
postures us to assure partners and allies, compete with rivals, and
defeat VEOs. We recognize the continued issues with our amphibious,
maritime, and expeditionary ship inventory; however, we must focus on
increasing the capabilities of the ships we do have, while developing
cheaper alternatives for more permissive environments.
We will continue to foster and strengthen our partnerships and
alliances as today's strategic environment requires strong global
partners. When our adversaries choose to test our will or capabilities,
we must be ready with our allies to act with the appropriate force to
overcome those hostile acts with such speed and decisiveness as to
prevent further acts of aggression. We will prioritize those joint,
multinational and bilateral exercises that offer the greatest return on
investment as measured in readiness gains with select partners. These
exercises increase our lethality as we gain an understanding of where
we can strengthen each other's weaknesses.
Despite the challenges facing us in today's strategic environment,
our Marine Corps remains the Nation's forward deployed, agile,
Expeditionary Force in Readiness. As the service with unique readiness
requirements, we require sustained, adequate, and predictable funding
to develop the correct mix of advanced capabilities and ensure a ready
force. As we look ahead to the 2019 budget, we have prioritized the
modernization of our Corps, the recovery of our current readiness, and
investments to resource the next generation of Marines. The continued
investment in these priorities will ensure Marines are capable as a
high-end, conventional combat deterrent, able to respond to immediate
contingencies and conduct crisis response across the continuum of
conflict. With the Congress' support and sustained commitment, we can
begin to restore our competitive naval advantage, enhance global
deterrence, and ensure that we send our sons and daughters into the
next fight with every advantage our Nation can provide.
Senator Inhofe. Well, you know, your last comment was
significant, when you say in fiscal year 2019. My concern is,
fiscal year 2020 and fiscal year 2021. I think that we--maybe
during the course of these questions, you'll be asked, What
happens if we don't continue what we started with the 2-year
budget? It could be a disaster.
Let's start off with China a little bit. A few of us--four
of us on this committee just got back recently from South China
Seas, visiting with our allies there and just--it's--most
people don't know what really is going on with China in that
part of the world. You know, they hear about the islands that
are out there, and they talk about reclaiming islands. It's not
reclaiming, because there's nothing to reclaim. It's building,
creating, and now they're up to seven different areas, very
important areas for our movement in that part of the world.
Everything that we see there is as if they're preparing for
World War III. Everything's military--not offenses, it's
defense, and it's really gotten the attention of our allies.
One of the things that I think all of us would agree on is
that, whether it's the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, Japan,
they're all concerned and kind of covering both bases. This
sounds pretty extreme. But, it's almost as if they're trying to
decide whose side are they going to be on when this happens. I
mean, that's the kind of preparation that's taking place, and
we know that China is producing at least a dozen warships a
year, developing new long-range weapon systems and fifth-
generations.
So, I'd like to have--let's start with you, Admiral
Richardson. What do you see those potential challenges in--what
are they up to in this, what they refer to as--they were
reclamation projects that they have, that now exceeds, what,
3,000 acres, I guess?
Admiral?
Admiral Richardson. Sir, I think you've characterized that
exactly right, and I would say that the Chinese have been very
clear about what they're up to with their discussions of the
Belt and Road Initiative, which may begin in the South China
Sea, but actually extends around through the Straits of Malacca
into the Indian Ocean, up into the Middle East, and into
Europe. And so----
Senator Inhofe. Yeah. No, it's all around. We understand
that. We know what they're doing right now in Djibouti. This is
the first foreign-based operation that they've had, I guess, in
recent history. And so, it's not just there, it's in--it's
certainly in Europe, the same. But, that's a place where we
recently were, and that is--it really does affect the Navy's
attention more than the other areas.
How about you, Mr. Secretary? What's your thinking about--
what are they up to over there in the South China Seas?
Secretary Spencer. Well, Senator, I--we know what their
activity is in the South China Seas. I'd like to actually
elevate it and tell you what they're--what we're observing
they're doing across the whole spectrum.
Senator Inhofe. I understand that, yes.
Secretary Spencer. Just the other day, we were about to let
a contract to one of our primes, and we found out that, in that
division that we were going to contract to, Wahweh was a joint
venture partner. We turned around and said, ``Whoa, stop the
horses. We'd like to know what this means.'' Talked to the
prime. The prime said, ``No problem, we're not going to use any
of the assets of Wahweh North Software.'' It was a very
enjoyable call. Then all of a sudden we said, ``Great. Can we
see the governance documents of the joint venture?'' Things got
very frosty. We have now put prophylactic language in this
agreement to prevent any creeping further.
I bring this up as an example, so it's not just the South
China Sea, it's across the full spectrum that China is coming
at us.
Senator Inhofe. I agree. This is fresh in our minds right
now, and it's something very overt, and it's one that is
considered serious enough in that part of the world that our
allies--historically, our allies are kind of divided as to what
they think, where their allegiance may be changed to. That's
very concerning.
Let's talk a little bit about the pilot shortage. I know--I
understand it's not quite as serious with you guys as it is
with the Air Force. But, are you looking down the road, now
that we've made some changes, and we're looking at 2 years--in
fiscal years 2018 and 2019, we're going to be able to make some
changes--any--express your concern right now. But, maybe with
you, General Neller, in the Marines, or----
General Neller. So, we share the same concern. Our numbers
are not as drastic or dramatic as the Air Force, but we have
instituted a bonus that we haven't paid for many, many years.
And we've extended it out to 16 years. We're looking at
different ways to take advantage of people that might be
leaving, to keep them in the Reserves. We're in direct
competition with the commercial airlines, because they have a
huge pilot shortfall around the world. It's not just pilots,
it's maintainers. We just offered a reenlistment bonus to our
younger maintainers, and a significant number of them took it,
which will give us some stability, because that's an experience
base that you----
Senator Inhofe. What about flying hours?
General Neller.--Senator, they've gone up. I can show you--
--
Senator Inhofe. Okay, that's good.
General Neller. Probably 4 hours per model-type series
across the force in the last year. I saw a story the other day
that said it was really only the forward-deployed forces, so I
got the data call on that. Actually, depending upon what model-
type series you're talking about, some of the home-station
forces are actually flying more than the forces that are
forward deployed. Is it where we want to be? No, and this
budget that you have given us will allow us to create a steady
stream of parts and spares. Because a lack of parts and spares
is the number-one downing requirement for aircraft. Again----
Senator Inhofe. Well, in the Marines, specifically, the F-
18 has been a problem, in terms of what's ready to fight. I
know that that's gone up from about 40 to 50 percent right now.
Do you project getting on up where you need to be, which I
understand to be about 65 percent?
General Neller. We want to get it as high as we can. We
funded, in this budget--this budget funds parts and spares and
aviation maintenance at a higher level than we ever have
before. So, is--there's a certain flash-to-bang time on that.
The Secretary has done some work with the depots to require
them to provide back to us, upon completion of depot
maintenance, an aircraft in a better state of condition so that
it's more ready to fly at a sooner time.
Senator Inhofe. Okay.
General Neller. We're resetting the 53s, so you are
correct, the two most distressed communities in marine aviation
are F-18s and CH-53s.
Senator Inhofe. The Secretary and I share in our
backgrounds some of these things, and I think you pretty much
agree with the comments that he's making.
Thank you.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary and Admiral Richardson, I mentioned, in my
comments, the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund. Could you
tell us how you're using that to provide for the efficient
acquisition of Columbia, which is a--not only a big-ticket
item, but actually essential to the national security? Whoever
wants to go first.
Secretary Spencer. Senator, I'll go first on that.
Yes, that vehicle does provide us authorities that do
provide us the flexibility to address Columbia specifically,
which is going to be, as you know, the biggest modernization
leg of the nuclear triad. It is our number-one priority in the
Navy. That--like I said, that vehicle has been very helpful in
providing us authorities for future buy, long-lead buy to keep
Columbia on track. We will continue to use it, the authorities
in there, primarily. I'll tell you that we now have no margin--
no time margin at all involved in Columbia. We are marking this
program with great sight, going forward, because we can't have
any slippage.
Senator Reed. Right.
Admiral Richardson. I would just----
Senator Reed. Admiral.
Admiral Richardson.--pile onto that, sir. As I see the
combination of appropriations and authorities that are going to
be required to get this major acquisition program delivered on
time, I see that the flexibility of the National Sea-Based
Deterrent Fund both lowers cost and lowers risk, at the end of
the day. You can buy material at its optimum time rather than
the last time, and it allows you to move things to the left as
much as possible to buy margin back into the schedule.
Senator Reed. I only would ask, if there are additional
authorities or additional techniques that you want to apply
because of the importance of this program, please let us know
as we go forward.
Commandant--General Neller, the Marine Corps has a series
of accusations and cases of sexual misconduct. You're not the
only service that's facing this. But, some of them have been
quite notorious--Marines United, a recent incident involving a
colonel who had a record of misbehavior and--but was only
discovered when he abused a young child; and then you have,
also, a marine brigadier general whose responsibility included
sexual assault prevention, and he made some comments that are--
I think, have drawn appropriate criticism. Can I ask you very
seriously--and with the difficult challenge that you face, is--
how are you addressing a culture that might be contributing to
this issue?
General Neller. Senator Reed you and I have talked about
this, and I appreciate the question.
Aside from those events, as disturbing as they are, I think
today you look at our Marine Corps, we're as diverse, as
integrated and inclusive as we've ever been. I would give
credit to members of this committee for holding the mirror up
and making us look at ourselves and ask ourselves some hard
questions.
So, since the Marines United, we've clarified policies and
rules and regulations, so all marines know what's expected of
them. We had to clarify commanders, what they could do to hold
people accountable. That doesn't mean we're perfect. I've had a
couple of my senior officers--one was an allegation and one was
investigated by ourselves, and was substantiated, where I had
to say that I didn't have confidence in them to lead their
organization. They are not the majority. They're not even close
to the majority, and yes, you should expect more from a more
senior officer.
So, are we where we want to be? Are we where you want us to
be? No. Are we in a better place than we were a year ago? I
believe we are. That's on me, and I'd just remind everybody
that, in my heart of hearts, I've gone out and talked to
thousands and thousands and thousands of marines. I'm not going
to use as an excuse that 62 percent of the Marine Corps is 25
years old or less. That's no excuse. But, it's going to take us
some time, and I assure you--give you my word that anyone who
does violate the rules, regardless of whether they're a general
or a private, they're going to be held accountable. With the
help of this committee, we'll continue to work to make
ourselves even more inclusive than we are today.
Senator Reed. General, are you concentrating on senior
leadership? I know you're addressing the entire Corps, but
making a special effort to ensure that senior leadership is
fully attuned with your views?
General Neller. Yes, Senator.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
One other issue, too, is, Do you reflect adherence to these
standards specifically in the efficiency reports for marines?
Is there something in the efficiency report that the rater
would have to indicate yea or nay, follows Marine Corps policy
regarding sexual harassment, sexual conduct?
General Neller. If someone--obviously, were to do something
which would cause them to--the commander, their senior. to lose
confidence, then they would receive an adverse report. But, in
the actual report, itself, that was something that would have
to be in the narrative. We are in the process of reviewing our,
what we call, fitness reports or OERs, and one of the
categories we're going to put in there is something to do with
diversity. Because I believe that we need a command climate.
We're in a tough business, and it's taken some people some
adjustments. Those that can't adjust are going to have to
either get onboard or get out. But, to answer your question,
right now our fitness report does not reflect that unless the
reporting senior chose to write it in. But, in the future, it
will.
Senator Reed. Well, I think that is a--an important step.
My time is expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Cotton.
Senator Cotton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen.
Admiral Richardson, I want to discuss the littoral combat
ship (LCS). In my view, it's some concerning news. According to
a U.S. Naval Institute story published this week, the Navy will
not deploy an LCS in 2018, 11 LCS ships have been delivered to
the Navy as today, but we'll have none deploy. Two days ago, at
a Seapower hearing, Admiral Mertz testified, quote, ``The
typical deployment model is three to five ships to one, to keep
one deployed. So, this is really just math. There's going to be
gaps that'll fill in over time. We're not concerned about
that,'' end quote.
However, in September, just 8 months ago, the Commander of
Naval Surface Forces in the Pacific Fleet said that you can
maintain three to four littoral combat ships deployed when you
take on the Blue/Gold crew system. What is the answer, here, to
the actual deployment ratio?
Admiral Richardson. Senator, as you know, the littoral
combat ship has been a program that has been through some
troubled times. I would say that, in the past, we probably
pushed that ship out forward deployed a little bit ahead of its
time, before the program had stabilized and we'd done the
appropriate testing and gained the confidence. As soon as I got
in as the Chief of Naval Operations, I directed the Commander,
Naval Surface Forces, to take a look at that program,
rationalize it, and make it look a lot more like a normal
shipbuilding program and a ship-operating program. So, this is
what led to changes in the maintenance approach, changes in the
Blue/Gold crewing, the way that we are going to home port these
squadrons, and forward deploy them.
The year 2018 is really a reflection of that shift. And so,
it is--starting in 2019, we're going to start forward deploying
those. They'll be sustainable, they'll be more lethal by virtue
of the enhancements we're putting on those littoral combat
ships. We have 24 deployments planned between 2019 and 2024.
And so, you know, it really--2018 is a reset year to get
maintenance and manning in place so that we can deploy this in
a sustainable fashion.
Senator Cotton. So, starting in 2019, then, which of those
ratios will be correct? Will we be able to keep three out of
four ships deployed, or one-fifth to one-third of those ships
deployed?
Admiral Richardson. Senator, I'll tell you what. There's a
little bit more to the math. If I could get back to you for the
record on exactly how that ratio works out, I'll be happy to
show you the way this all----
Senator Cotton. I would appreciate that----
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir.
Senator Cotton.--for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Admiral Richardson. When at full maturity, the Blue/Gold crewing
model implemented on Littoral Combat Ships will enable a higher forward
presence rate than can be achieved in a traditional single-crew model.
LCS will initially be organized into six, four-ship divisions--three
per coast (Mayport, FL and San Diego)--with focused mission areas of
anti-surface warfare (SUW), mine countermeasures (MCM), and anti-
submarine warfare (ASW). Within each four-ship Division, the Blue/Gold
Crew concept generates two ships forward, a third in either
maintenance, pre-deployment training or deployed, and a fourth serving
as a dedicated training ship to certify the six Blue/Gold crews that
will man the three deployable ships of each cohort. This new divisional
structure is designed to provide Fleet Commanders approximately two
(out of every four) ships for continuous mission capability. Blue/Gold
deployments will begin in 2019 and increase in numbers as additional
LCS join the fleet.
Senator Cotton. There's a second question I want to ask, as
well. Even by Admiral Mertz's statement of one-fifth to one-
third of ships deployed, we should still have two or three LCS
ships deployed this year. I think you may have just answered
that question, though, by saying that this is a reset year to
try to get----
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir.
Senator Cotton.--to your future model.
Admiral Richardson. This is part of that plan that Surface
Forces put together.
Senator Cotton. We've spent $6 million now on these ships.
I think the taxpayer deserves to have them out, performing
their job.
Admiral Richardson. Could not agree more.
Senator Cotton. I hope that's the case, starting next year.
General Neller, I want to speak to you about some changes
in foot-march standards at the infantry officer course. It was
recently changed from requiring infantry officers to pass five
out of six evaluated foot marches to only three evaluated foot
marches. I find that a little worrisome, given that the overall
physical fitness testing standards have increased for everyone,
to include enlisted marines, which means we may be lowering
standards for our infantry leaders compared to our enlisted
marines on something that is, I would say, a pretty core
competency for an infantry leader. I assume you would agree
with that?
General Neller. Senator, there was a change, because we
looked back at what was going on at infantry officer course. At
one time, you had to pass five of six events to graduate. A
couple of those events, we could not relate them to events in
the training and requirements manual for infantry. So, I got a
group of my senior infantry leaders together and I said, ``Why
are we doing what we're doing?'' One event in particular, ``I
thought that I wouldn't think I would ever have anybody do
that.'' So, they came back to me and they said, ``Look, these
are three that equate. We're still doing all of them. They're
still all done. They are all still a part of the overall''----
Senator Cotton. But, the--but fewer are being evaluated.
General Neller. They're all evaluated.
Senator Cotton. Evaluated is a----
General Neller. They're all evaluated, and overall is the
performance of that officer to graduate from that course. But,
three of three, now, to include the one with the heaviest load
and the time and duration, those three all have to be passed in
order for an officer to graduate from that course.
Senator Cotton. Let me just read you a statement from
General Bohn, the commanding officer of the Marine Corps
Training Command. He said, quote, ``The principal driver behind
us making modification to the course, it was not about lowering
attrition, it was about making students more successful to
complete the course.'' I don't really understand the difference
between lowering attrition and making students more successful
to complete the course. Both of those sound like you're
tailoring the standards not to the mission, but to the
graduation rates that you have at the course.
General Neller. I'm not going to speak for General Bohn,
but my view is, when I was approached with this, says, ``This
is what we can equate to training in our requirements manual
for the infantry. These are the three that we should evaluate
as go or no-go for graduating from the course.'' That's what we
did.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
My time is expired.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Admiral, long ago we learned a lesson from
having too many assets in one place at Pearl Harbor. Today we
have six aircraft carriers at Norfolk. But, it's not only an
aircraft carrier problem. I understand we face a dispersal
problem with other ships, as well, including those that make up
the amphibious readiness groups.
I know you'll be releasing a strategic laydown and
dispersal plan shortly, so I don't want us to get ahead of
that, but what are some of the viable options, as far as home
ports, for helping to achieve dispersal objectives when it
comes to these ships? And knowing that different infrastructure
exist at these ports, once you decide to move ships or to place
new ships at a port, typically how long does it take to get
that specific base ready for having those ships? How critical
is it that we begin the planning and design now in order to
support these ships that will be moving in the future?
Admiral Richardson. Senator, I thank you for that question.
And we've had a number of conversations about this critical
strategic issue of laydown and dispersal, particularly on the
East Coast. As you mentioned, we're in the final phases of
putting together the strategic laydown and dispersal plan. I
look forward to coming to you with that final plan.
As part of the considerations in that plan, there is not
only the warfighting strategic dispersal that we have to take
into consideration, but also the infrastructure in each of
those ports. And so, as we consider Norfolk, Little Creek,
Mayport, primarily for our surface ships on the East Coast, our
submarines there at Norfolk, King's Bay, and Groton, there is
the geographic dispersal from a force-protection standpoint,
there is the infrastructure of the port itself to be able to
accommodate those ships pierside, particularly under heavy-
weather conditions if we're talking a port like Mayport, and
then there's the maintenance capacity of those ports so that we
can keep them repaired and ready to go to sea.
So, in terms of how long it takes to get a port ready, it
really sort of depends on where you're starting and what your
goal is. But, 3 to 4 years is not an unreasonable number to
start to consider these sorts of plans. As you know, the sooner
you get started, the more prepared you are.
Senator Nelson. Okay, thank you, Admiral.
Mr. Secretary, it's good to see you. Thank you for the good
job that you're doing.
We have the E-2D Hawkeye. It's manufactured in Florida.
Knowing that these planes are vital to the Navy mission in
combatant commander requirements, we have an opportunity to
block buy these planes at a significant savings to the
taxpayer. Have you got any comments that we might have been
able to see cost savings when negotiating the next multiyear
contract? If so, is it in line with industry standards?
Secretary Spencer. Senator, it's underway and there is more
to come. I think is the best explanation that I can give you.
We will share with you what we see as we come to closure with
the options available to us. But, you're exactly right, that is
one path that we can extract savings and efficiencies. As
you've heard, we've said it since my feet were on the ground--
we're looking to industry to be our partner now, not simply
just a transaction orientation. And, in that light, we hope
that we can work together to get the best goal; i.e., What do
we both need to succeed? That's the conversations that are
having now.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Perdue.
Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you guys for being here today, and for your service.
No kidding.
Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson, Admiral Harris,
in repeated visits to the Hill in the last couple of years, has
previously stated that approximately 230 of the 400 foreign
national submarines worldwide are located in the Indo-Pacific
region. And, of those, 160 belong to China, Russia, and North
Korea. We've got about 74 submarine capabilities around the
world. Without asking how many are in the Pacific, the question
I have is, As the NDS focuses more pressure on naval marine
capabilities, particularly with regard to the near competitors
of Russia and China, how does this bode--what--how does it--
what does this--how does this impact the shortfall in undersea
capability? Talk to us a little bit about unmanned
capabilities, in terms of development. I know Admiral Moran has
talked to us a good about it. In this setting, can you talk to
us about how you're going to mitigate the potential attack
submarine shortfalls in the 2020s?
Admiral Richardson. Sir, I'll tell you. We're looking at
this from a very integrated approach. And I'll just speak to
the U.S. Navy approach, and the Secretary will speak to his
efforts with our allies.
Maintaining our superiority in the undersea domain is going
to rely on a integrated approach between manned and unmanned
technologies. And so, we're working very closely with the
undersea submarine industrial base to make sure that, as we
move through the Columbia-class program, as we move through
enhancing the Virginia-class submarine with the Virginia
payload module and look forward to all those manned types of
approaches, that we are doing so in a way that really maximizes
the capacity of the industrial base to deliver those submarines
on time.
Senator Perdue. Do we have the supply chain now? If not,
how long will it take to develop that supply chain to meet
those needs?
Admiral Richardson. The supply chain, particularly the
second- and third-tier vendors, have really--has really been
leaned out over the past years. And so, the signal that has
started in 2018 and hopefully will continue in 2019--they had
the 18 months of uninterrupted, stable, and sufficient
funding--will be a tremendous bolster of confidence to those
second- and third-tier suppliers, will allow them to make some
investments to bring that system back to health.
But, even if we do all that, sir, I don't think that an
only-manned approach is going to get us where we need to go.
That's why I've made a family of unmanned undersea vehicles an
acquisition priority. It's in the accelerated acquisition
program for the Navy. And so, you can start to see this
combination of manned enhanced by unmanned vehicles as being
the key to maintaining our superiority undersea.
Senator Perdue. Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Spencer. Senator, coupled with that, the second
pillar of the National Defense Strategy is a robust
constellation of partners and allies.
Senator Perdue. Sure.
Secretary Spencer. I will tell you that we are spending a
good amount of time out there hugging our allies and partners,
to include Australia, Japan, Singapore, Korea, and, more
recently coming into the fold, India and even Vietnam. And it's
going to be a collective effort that's going to make up any
gapping that we have there. They are committed. They are buying
the right equipment. They are working with us. I invite
everyone on the Senate Armed Service Committee--this is a
formal invitation to join us in RIMPAC, where you're going to
see a complete coordination of faces and partners.
Senator Perdue. Will China be a part of that this year?
Secretary Spencer. China has been invited.
Senator Perdue. Will they be a part of it?
Secretary Spencer. I don't know what the response was from
the invitation, but they have been invited----
Senator Perdue. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Spencer.--to select series.
Senator Perdue. With my time remaining, I'd like all three
of you, or certainly Admiral Richardson and General Neller, to
comment on the risk we have with regard to space and cyber
domains. These are the two new domains that you guys are having
to deal with. Particularly with our precision munitions and our
communication capability, on the ground and on the sea, what
are we doing right now to mitigate the risk that we now are
realizing we have in the space domain and in the cyber domain?
General Neller. Well, Senator, I think you characterize it
correctly. We recognize that we've built a way of war which is
not totally, but significantly, dependent upon----
Senator Perdue. Yes, sir.
General Neller.--on space and the network. And so, we
realize that we have to keep our network up, it has to be
resilient, and we have to be able to operate with a minimum of
bandwidth, and we've got to make, in the requirements for
anything else that we buy, that it has more than one way to
find its way to its destination.
Senator Perdue. Yes, sir.
General Neller. So, the cyber piece is first defend,
protect yours and deny the adversary theirs, and then make sure
that the munitions you have are going to operate, even if that
network is degraded or the constellation is degraded. So, space
is a place where we're going to operate in a different kind of
way. If General Hyten were here, he would tell you that there
is maneuver in space and there is shaping operations in space,
and, other than that, we'd probably get into a classified
domain beyond my capacity to explain it to you.
Senator Perdue. Yes, sir.
General Neller. But, clearly it's something that's on
everybody's mind. It's--the number--and, for us, in the Marine
Corps, and with the Navy, through the Secretary's leadership,
we realize we've got to have integrated network, we've got to
have a naval grid so that all ships can communicate, and
airplanes can communicate with the ships and ground forces. And
so, that's a big effort, and that's part of the modernization,
and that's partly what the appropriation that we have is going
to help us figure out a way to do.
Admiral Richardson. Sir, I'll just pile on quickly, because
I know we're getting out of time.
Senator Perdue. Yes, sir.
Admiral Richardson. But, I will tell you that, in addition,
the command and control of the entire battlespace, including
those two new domains that you mentioned, has got to be
something that is completely integrated, as well. And so,
we've--are starting to wargame more and more robustly how you
would command and control those two domains, really down to
nanosecond timing to be effective there.
Finally, just to address your comments on GPS, we're
accelerating our efforts to get precision navigation and timing
techniques that will allow us to continue to operate in the
absence of GPS, if that's the way it goes.
Senator Perdue. Yes, sir.
Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Perdue.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for your service and for being here today.
Secretary Spencer, I was really pleased to hear your
anecdote about the contract with Wahweh, and how the Navy
handled that. I think, just as we saw with Kaspersky Software,
the threat from our adversaries is not just external, based on
weapon systems and firepower, but it's also internal, based on
information--disinformation campaigns and cyber. According to a
February 2018 article in Breaking Defense, the commander of
Naval Information Forces, Rear Admiral Matthew Kohler, said
that--well, he actually likened the Navy's IT [Information
Technology] workforce situation to that of recent ship
collisions in the Pacific. He's concerned about the assumption
that if IT professionals are operating all the time, they're
getting all the practice they need, and they don't need
training. So, can you talk about the extent to which the Navy
is looking at training that our IT professionals need and what
you might need also in the way of equipment?
Secretary Spencer. Yes, Senator. We've brought this up--not
only IT, but collectively in the cyber community. We look at
the work that N-1 has done with Admiral Burke on our future
force needs. We are tailoring. We are looking at new ways to
get at this. We're going to be coming in front of you all
possibly to nibble on the sides of DOPMA [Defense Officer
Personnel Management]. As an example, the ability to have
people come in and out of the service to remain current, this
would specifically pertain to our cyber community, and probably
also to parts of our IT community. We have to start thinking
outside the box in order to accommodate, access, and retain the
talent that we need in these areas.
Turn it over to the CNO, if he had any further----
Admiral Richardson. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
I'll just pile onto that, ma'am, is--I would highly
encourage you to take a quick visit down to Suffolk, Virginia,
where we--Admiral Kohler has his command, and you get to see
the stunning talent that the Secretary alluded to in our
sailors and civilians that are actually prosecuting this fight
in the cyber domain. Right now, our recruiting and our
retention is good there, which is a tribute to the values and
ideals and dedication of that team. But, I do take the point
that you cannot assume that, just because you're doing
operations, that you're doing the sets and reps that are
necessary for full readiness. And so, Admiral Kohler and I,
Admiral Tighe and the rest of the information warfare community
are looking at that very closely.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. I'm pleased to hear that,
and I'm sure this committee is interested in supporting those
efforts.
There is a report to Congress on extending the service life
of the Los Angeles-class sub. I support this effort. I think it
is important to span the gap between 2021 and 2031, where we
will need those submarines to address the threat that we face.
I was pleased to see that the report proposes that most of the
work be done at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, which obviously
I'm very interested in, and that it includes the need for
investments in infrastructure in order to support that effort.
But, it doesn't really speak to the workforce that's going to
be needed. Given what we're seeing already at the shipyard, in
terms of the challenge of getting the STEM [Science,
Technology, Math, and Engineering] workers that we need for
those jobs, can you speak to what your thinking is about how we
make sure the workforce is there to do this work on the Los
Angeles-class subs?
Admiral Richardson. Yes, ma'am, thank you. Just a-- kudos
to the team at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. They really do
terrific work on our nuclear powered submarine force.
Senator Shaheen. Absolutely. I'm going to be meeting with
some of the superintendents later. I will share that with them.
Admiral Richardson. Thank you, ma'am.
But, I'll tell you that the workforce is, I think, the
central challenge when we talk about expanding capabilities,
whether it's in acquisition or in maintenance, repair. Finding
those talented people is the principal challenge. We are on a
plan to increase our shipyard workforce up north of 36,000
nationwide. We think that that will be the proper number to get
our arms around the workload, which includes the potential life
extension of Los Angeles-class submarines. One is in the
budget, and we're looking at the engineering basis for more.
We address this through, one, you know, heavy-duty
recruiting, but also successful intern programs and all of
those--the word escapes me right now, but the schools that
really go out to the community and bring these people in and
give them the essential training that they need to be effective
shipyard workers.
Secretary Spencer. I want to just put a footnote on there,
Senator, which is addressing workforce. One of the beauties of
this job is to go incognito and wander around the assets. And,
two weekends ago, with my bluejeans on and a hat, I wandered
into the STEM festival, which was going on at the Walter
Washington Convention Conference. And, first of all, I was
wildly invigorated seeing the number of kids that were there.
But, on the first floor, front and center, is Lincoln Welding,
with its welding exhibition. And had to them--and I went up to
them, and I said, ``Bravo. This is exactly what we need to get
people interested in science, technology, engineering,
mathematics, and manufacturing.'' So, it's happening.
Senator Shaheen. Absolutely. I applaud the Navy's work to
support those kinds of programs, like the CPARS [Contractor
Performance Assessment Reports System] challenge that Admiral
Richardson and I were talking about.
Secretary Spencer. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Richardson. These apprentice programs is the thing
that----
Senator Shaheen. Yes, absolutely. That's critical if we're
going to get the workforce we need for the future.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Thank you.
Secretary Spencer, how often do you go around incognito?
[Laughter.]
Senator Wicker. Do you feel safe?
[Laughter.]
Secretary Spencer. I do. I do, Senator.
Admiral Richardson. I don't when he does that.
[Laughter.]
Senator Wicker. Okay.
Well, let me ask both of you. The Navy is at 324,000 Active
Duty sailors. I'm told that is the lowest in almost a decade.
The Navy reportedly is 11,000 sailors short of the required
manpower levels in the near term, and 50,000 short of the
estimated force needed to crew a 355-ship Navy, which is the
requirement that was set by the admirals and generals. Senator
McCain and I have introduced the Surface Warfare Enhancement
Act. And, Secretary Spencer, you and I have discussed this
previously. The legislation, among other things, includes
provisions to help the Navy retain critical personnel by
offering some relief from DOPMA and Goldwater-Nichols. What
steps do each of you recommend that we take in Congress to help
the Navy attract and retain the personnel required to operate a
355-ship fleet?
I might mention, thank you for the decision to extent the
service lives of destroyers. Of course, this will give us 355
ships much earlier, but we must also accelerate the end
strength of the force. So, if you would discuss that. I guess
we'll begin with you, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Spencer. Thank you, Senator.
I think starting with 355 and working down, you know, we
will get there. We've told you we'll get there, and I think,
when--in October, when we came to a coalescion on this, we said
there were a couple of plans underway. You see the extension of
the DDG-51s for 45 years, Los Angeles-class. We also have some
other plans we're working on. So, stand by. We also realize
that we have to drive the anvil and build new, also, and we're
going to work every way we can to find the resources necessary
to do that.
When, in fact, we do sign up for new platforms--i.e.,
ships--just putting my business hat on, that's just one tube,
that's just one column of the resources needed. We also need
the maintenance column, and we also need to have on the graph
the personnel column, so--to really have the full lifecycle
cost of the weapons platform, itself. If you see----
Senator Wicker. But, let's talk about the sailors----
Secretary Spencer. Yeah.
Senator Wicker.--aspect.
Secretary Spencer. As we see--I'm working into that--as we
see 7500 that we're asking for, going forward, we are going to
have to work in--at tooth and nail, because we're fishing in
the same pool as the Air Force and the Army. We believe we have
a very compelling story. We believe we have the ability right
now to attract those necessary. We're not seeing a tremendous
stress yet, although we are going to prepare for it. ``Forged
from the sea'' is the message going out there. Right now, we
believe that the 7500 we're looking for is within reach and not
threatened by any targets to date.
Admiral Richardson. Senator, I'll just pile onto what the
Secretary said.
As you know, the budget does request 7,500 new sailors this
year, which is really more--you know, more than--an increase in
the end strength, which really is regulated by about the
maximum capacity that we can bring them through the training
program and get them to be useful sailors.
With respect to DOPMA reforms, I can't thank this committee
enough for their support in our proposals to allow-- I would
say, sort of, three things would provide some tremendous
flexibility. One is sort of merit reordering so that we can get
our talent to go to the top, and accelerate that talent. One is
the opportunity to maybe postpone your board for promotions so
that you can make sure that you've got all of the wickets met
before you go before the promotion board. Then, finally, the
opportunity, as we've hinted at earlier, to bring in talent
horizontally, particularly in areas like cyber and those niche
skills that would allow us to inject, you know, those highly
skilled people at the appropriate level.
Again, you know, the committee's been very supportive in
these efforts, and I--you know, I thank you for that.
Senator Wicker. Thank you.
General Neller, the--let's talk about lethality and the tag
line, ``If it floats, it fights.'' Do you have any thoughts for
us on increasing the lethality of our amphibious ships?
General Neller. Well, Senator, I think every surface
combatant is exactly that, it's a warship, and there's
capabilities that we could leverage on--LPD hull form, for
example.
Senator Wicker. What if we put the vertical launch system
on the Flight II LPDs?
General Neller. I think that's a great idea.
Senator Wicker. Do you agree, Secretary Spencer?
Secretary Spencer. Most definitely.
Senator Wicker. All right.
Thank you very much, gentlemen.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just want to be clear, for the record, that the
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard is in Kittery, Maine. We just want to
clarify that.
[Laughter.]
Senator King. Senator Shaheen is--have some--she and I sued
each other over that, 20 years ago.
[Laughter.]
Senator King. United States Supreme Court solved that
question.
[Laughter.]
Senator Inhofe. How many years ago?
Senator King. It was about 25.
Senator Inhofe. Who won?
Senator King. The answer is contained in the fact that it's
Kittery, Maine.
[Laughter.]
Senator King. First, I want to compliment our naval
personnel for having the foresight to hire the pilot of the
Southeast Airlines who did such a marvelous job landing that
plane, who, by the way, was rejected by another armed service,
which we won't mention in this hearing, at the time, who did
not take female pilots. The Navy did, and the training and work
that she performed in the Navy saved a lot of lives this week.
So, I want to acknowledge that.
Admiral, can you give us a quick update, given the time
constraints, on the collision review, what happened, root
causes, and what's--what we're doing to prevent that kind of
tragedy in the future?
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir. Thank you, Senator.
I'll tell you, I'd just echo the impressive performance of
the pilot, and representative of the professionals in--naval
aviators, men and women, in all parts of our naval aviation
force right now.
With respect to the collisions, you know, we are moving out
briskly on the plan that addresses, to our very best ability,
the root causes of those collisions. Those root causes being,
you know, the fact that, as we discussed earlier, you must
spend some time on just--first of all, completing the
maintenance completely, and then, once out of maintenance,
doing the training required to get those skillsets up to where
they need to--to do the combat missions and just the basic
operations, and then certifying that that training has met all
of the requirements before you go on out and do that. And so,
we've taken a number of steps, from examining the career path
of surface warfare officers to make sure that they are getting
the requisite time at sea as they execute their career and go
on up to becoming competent and confident commanding officers.
Along that career path is not only at-sea experience, but also
education and certification. We've adjusted the command-and-
control structure to make sure that we've got firm advocates
for training and certification in each of our home ports.
Senator King. Let me interrupt, because of the time
constraints.
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir.
Senator King. Could you supply, for the record, a--an
outline of where you are?
Admiral Richardson. I'd be happy to, yes, Senator.
Senator King. Next steps--root causes, next steps.
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
Admiral Richardson. Readiness reform remains a critical Navy
priority in the wake of the tragic USS Fitzgerald and USS John S.
McCain collisions. Following the accidents at sea, the Navy
commissioned the Comprehensive Review (CR) and Strategic Readiness
Review (SRR) to identify causal factors and recommend corrective
actions. In January 2018, the Navy established the Readiness Reform
Oversight Council (RROC) to oversee implementation of CR/SRR
recommendations as well as related recommendations from other sources
(e.g., Government Accountability Office, Navy Inspector General).
Chaired by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations and Undersecretary of the
Navy, the RROC is currently addressing 111 recommendations. To date, 35
of 111 recommendations have been fully implemented with over 70 percent
expected to be implemented by the end of September 2018. Along with
aggressively implementing the remaining recommendations, the Navy is
simultaneously developing the tools and processes to ensure that
implemented recommendations are effective. $38.3 million was
appropriated for readiness reform in fiscal year 2018, $79.1 million
requested for Presidents Budget 2019, and $601 million programmed for
Surface Warfare readiness reform through the fiscal year 2019-2023
FYDP. The RROC also seeks to expedite an additional $66 million of
unfunded priorities during the Mid-Year Review. The status of a select
few key actions taken to improve readiness across the fleet are
described below. 7th Fleet Operations--7th Fleet has adopted new
scheduling and force generation processes that identify mismatches in
force employment and force generation while protecting training/
certification periods for ships. Naval Surface Group Western Pacific
(NSGWP) has been established to oversee maintenance and training for
surface ships assigned to Forward Deployed Naval Forces Japan. Command
and Control--The Navy is undertaking a clean sheet review of the
Administrative Chain of Command to optimize readiness, clarify C2 at
all echelons and provide clear responsibility and accountability for
force generation. As part of this initiative, 2nd fleet has been re-
established to focus on warfighting and certification of deploying
forces. Mitigating Risk of ``Can-Do Culture''--Multiple steps have been
taken to properly manage supply and demand of operational forces to
prevent overstressing individuals and units and avoid putting ship COs
in a position to commit forces that do not meet full readiness
standards. In addition to the above changes to C2 and operational
scheduling practices, force-wide circadian rhythm implementation is
underway to allow COs to better manage crew fatigue and properly
mitigate operational risk. Manning--Navy manning policies now
prioritize Japan based ships. Six of 11 Japan based Cruisers and
Destroyers meet their manning targets with 10/11 expected by June 2018.
New incentive policies have been enacted place to encourage sailors to
select and extend in Japan-based billets. Manning statuses are reviewed
monthly by Fleet Commanders to identify shortfalls. Surface Warfare
Officer (SWO) Career Path--The SWO career path is being restructured to
emphasize mastery of seamanship and navigation skills. First and second
tour lengths for Junior officers have already been adjusted to maximize
at sea experience while changes to Senior Officer tour lengths are
under review. Proficiency assessment and tracking mechanisms are also
under consideration by senior Navy leadership. SWO Training--Short and
long term improvements are underway to expand training for bridge watch
standers, emphasize higher-stress scenarios representative of high
density shipping and extremis situations, and better utilize integrated
simulator systems and yard patrol craft. Surface Force Navigation
Equipment-Plans are ongoing to accelerate replacement of surface search
RADAR, modernize bridge equipment and transition to next generation
electronic navigation systems.
Admiral Richardson. As you know, we've committed to come
over and briefing both the staff and the members quarterly on
our execution of that plan. The Vice Chief of Naval Operations
and the Under Secretary have already provided the first of
those updates. We look forward to continuing those.
Senator King. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, the Navy and the Marine Corps are undergoing
their first full audit. Can you give me a quick update on where
that process is and any lessons learned, thus far?
Secretary Spencer. Yes, Senator. You'll find out here, if
not today, that we, at the Navy side, will have a qualification
announced by the auditors. I want to manage everyone's
expectations as to what that means. As we said originally, the
audit process is not only creating a tool for us to manage by,
but it's also an educational process. As the auditors get in
there and start drilling down, we are already started learning.
The qualification comes from the fact that--the number of
transactions the Navy has, the dissimilar systems that we're
using to actually collate this information. And it's--I believe
this is actually a benefit, because what the auditors must stop
doing is sample testing and actually get down to rolling up the
sleeves and doing individual education on systems to understand
how the buildup comes.
Senator King. When can I tell the people of Maine we're
going to have a final audit?
Secretary Spencer. A clean audit?
Senator King. Yes, sir.
Secretary Spencer. Maybe 5 to 7 years.
Senator King. But, you're in the process now of----
Secretary Spencer. We are clearly in the hunt.
Senator King. Thank you.
I spent some time earlier this week with the joint force in
Florida that does drug interdiction. This is just a request. We
are only able to interdict 25 percent of drug shipments by sea
that we know of. In other words, we have intelligence to tell
us there are 100 units out there; we can only stop 25 of them.
The problem is assets, particularly in the Coast Guard. My
request is simply that you think creatively, cooperatively with
the Coast Guard to see if there's a way to improve that
miserable record.
Secretary Spencer. Senator, timely observation requests,
the CNO and I have been working on this now for a couple of
months to see what we can put down there as usable resources,
because we're painfully aware of the situation. It's not a
quick and easy fix, in that we--you have the difference between
our titled responsibilities, and we will have to cooperate, and
gladly cooperate, with not only the Coast Guard, but with the
Department of Homeland Security.
Senator King. Well, I understand the limitations, but in
the--since we've been talking for the last hour, four people in
America have died from drug overdoses, and we're under attack.
This is a place where we should be able to shore up our
defenses. So, thank you for taking that initiative, and I'll
look forward to updates.
Secretary Spencer. Yes, sir.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator King.
Senator Ernst.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Secretary Spencer, Senator King brought up some great
questions about incidents and collisions at sea. I'm going to
move that up a little bit. Let's go to the air. I've been
closely following the physiological episodes, those incidents
that have plagued the Air Force and the Navy aviation
platforms. Just yesterday, it was reported that the T-6 Texan
II trainer aircraft pilots have experienced 12 PEs
[physiological episodes] since the 1st of March. I know that
you're working with the Air Force to solve the problem, but,
going back to Senator King's point earlier, is--what is that
root cause? We still don't have a root cause for those
physiological episodes. And so, can you please update our
committee on the efforts to identify and remedy the Navy's
physiological episodes?
Secretary Spencer. Senator, I'd be more than happy to, for
the record, put our latest update, which has--it's quite
voluminous, as far as efforts. I will provide a topical
overview, though, which is fascinating when you come to a
numbers analysis.
[The information referred to follows:]
Secretary Spencer. Please forgive me in advance for the length of
this response as I outline our many efforts to identify and correct the
root causes of Physiological Events (PEs) in our high performance
aircraft, however our efforts are extensive. Tremendous combined
efforts are being put forth by Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR),
Commander Naval Air Forces (CNAF) and Bureau of Naval Medicine (BUMED)
to identify, correct and address the causes of PEs. Corrections to the
machine are being identified by our engineers and vary by aircraft.
However, we remain challenged by differences in human physiology to
determine what variables are causing our aviators to be negatively
impacted. We have found individual aviators react differently to
environmental variations thereby adding to the complexity of
identifying contributing problems. There is not a single cause for PEs
but rather multiple contributing factors that are negatively impacting
our aviators. We are making progress in our efforts which include
training, material requirements, emergency procedures, maintenance
procedures, depot/industry repair acceptance procedures, direct
engagement with Fleet and external reporting of corrective actions
identified by our Root Cause Corrective Actions (RCCA) team. To date we
have made tremendous progress with our T-45s, are reducing the severity
and rate in our F/A-18 series, and are working in concert with the USAF
to address T-6 PE events though we are not experiencing the same rate
or severity of PE events on our T-6s. The next few paragraphs will
highlight lines of effort and root causes identified to date. We have
turned the corner on PEs in the T-45 training aircraft. Due to the
simplicity of the system and through the installation of the CRU-123
solid-state oxygen monitor, we identified marginal oxygen pressure to
the pilot's mask in some of the aircraft that could contribute to a PE
in specific regimes of flight. We took immediate action to increase the
oxygen flow through the On-Board Oxygen Generating System (OBOGS) by
increasing low airflow from the engine and reducing flow constrictions
in the system. Additionally, we added warnings to the pilot to alert
them of low flow in the system so they can take immediate steps to
ensure their safety. We were able to mitigate the problem and have
observed a marked reduction in the T-45 PE rate. Development of longer
term corrections to the system are in progress which include items such
as an automatic backup oxygen system (ABOS) to improve the flow. Since
we have returned to flight there have been only 2 PEs tied to OBOGS
malfunction and both were indicated in the cockpit, which enabled the
pilots to safely land. We also have removed any concerns regarding
toxins in the system through the analysis of over 20,000 OBOGS air
samples with no contamination found. We have a full understanding of
the T-45 breathing system challenges and we have implemented data
driven corrections to the aircraft. While F/A-18 is showing
improvements in the PE rate and severity, the complexity of the system
continues to challenge our engineering force. The aircraft has two
contributing factors that we have identified as detrimental to our
pilots; failure modes of the environmental control system (ECS)
resulting in cockpit pressurization anomalies (loss of pressure,
fluctuating pressure and overpressure) and breathing gas anomalies
resulting in respiration impacts. We are pursuing root causes in both
the aircraft and the pilot. For the aircraft, we are working closely
with industry partners to accelerate their progress and make corrective
modifications to improve aircraft performance. Our Boeing partners,
with NAVAIR, are addressing the F/A-18 series environmental control
system (ECS) software to ``smooth out'' the cabin pressurization flow,
identifying valve deficiencies/failures and compromised muscle pressure
ducting that contribute to pressure instability. We are developing and
fielding performance and reliability improvements to the primary and
secondary bleed air regulators. For our oxygen system, we are accepting
proposals for a next generation OBOGS concentrator which will not only
comply with the MILSTD 3050 released in 2015 but will also provide data
logging of oxygen and pressure provided to the pilot's mask. NAVAIR and
Boeing have accepted a new digital cabin pressurization system to
replace the current F/A-18's analog cockpit-pressure altimeter--a
needle that moves up and down on the instrument to reflect cabin
pressurization. The Cockpit Pressure and Oxygen Monitoring System
(CPOMS) will constantly display cabin pressure to the aircrew and alert
them visually and aurally--through their headset--if there is a change
in air flow. CPOMS also will record cabin pressurization data
throughout the mission for post-flight review. CPOMS phase one will
allow data logging as well as indications and warnings of pressure
anomalies in the cockpit while phase two will automatically actuate
emergency oxygen for the aircrew. We realize that data recording is
critical to identifying the root causes of PEs and we are leaning
forward to find better ways to obtain the data and warn the aircrew.
Recognizing that we may have future problems with the Navy T-6s, we are
assisting the Air Force Safety Investigation Board (SIB) with both a
member from the PEAT and an engineer from NAVAIR. Our close
coordination with the U.S. Air Force has already enabled us to develop
joint solutions and achieve a better understanding of the cockpit
environment and our oxygen systems. We are also working closely with
the Unexplained Physiologic Events (UPE) Integration Team that serves
as Air Force's focal point for identifying solutions to optimize human
performance in tactical aviation and eliminate or minimize the impact
of PEs. To address the human side of PEs, data and research are
critical. While we have been challenged to identify and field sensors
for the pilot that function accurately in the challenging environment
of our fighter aircraft, we do have a few systems showing promise and
are currently in testing. Cobham's VigilOX pilot breathing sensor
system has been tested on our F-18 and T-45 aircraft. VigilOX is a
pilot-worn sensing system that captures real-time physiological,
breathing gas and cockpit environmental data during flight, and helps
identify conditions around unexplained physiological episodes. We are
reviewing the post-flight data, which is correlated to reported
hypoxia-like symptoms. This data will form the basis of a predictive
algorithm that will ultimately drive oxygen equipment to automatically
adjust oxygen dosage as needed to protect the pilot. Cobham's sensor
that measures the inhaled gas is functioning but there are issues with
their exhalation sensor block. The Inhalation Sensor Block (ISB) is
filling in gaps of data at rates that are not measured by a CRU-123 or
any other current system we have. We can now see the effects of G-loads
and changes in cabin pressures on breathing patterns, O2 concentration,
and gas flow. In short, we can accurately measure how much product gas
(hopefully with enough O2 concentration) is being used by the aircrew
and will no longer need to rely on estimates. These data points will
support our medical community in understanding what TACAIR flying does
to the human system, and after the ESB is consistent enough, we will
start picking up on what effects too much or too little O2 has on the
aircrew. While extremely promising, the Exhalation Sensor Block (ESB)
still remains a few iterations away from fielding. The team also is
looking at how the flight gear fit might restrict aircrew breathing,
such as an overly tight harness or a leaky mask. A test set has been
fielded to test aircrew breathing systems to ensure proper form, fit
and function. Utilizing our Navy and USAF laboratories, testing will be
done to develop a better understanding of gear function in the
centrifuge, impacts of pressure fluctuations on human physiology and to
better understand oxygen delivery impacts such as variations in oxygen
content. BUMED is actively supporting this research as well as our
treatment regimens for aviators impacted by a PE by establishing
centers of knowledge and excellence at Navy Portsmouth and Balboa
hospitals. Finally, we are conducting cross talks with major academic
and medical research agencies to increase the pool of expertise being
brought to bear against the physiological aspects of PEs. I hope that
this brief update is useful and provides insight into our current
efforts to counter PEs in our aircraft. The application of measurement
and data remains key to our discovering and resolving the root causes
of these events. We are dedicated to addressing PEs in our tactical and
training aircraft and this issue remains the number one safety concern
for the entire Naval Aviation community. As we move forward to
implement numerous technical and operational measures to mitigate the
risk to aircrew, we are achieving a notable reduction in the number of
PE occurrences. We continue to utilize every available resource, the
knowledge of internal and external partners, and our subject matter
experts to resolve these issues. Admittedly, this is a complex issue
with no single root cause or single solution. However, we are making
progress with identifying multiple contributing factors and
incorporating the associated mitigating solutions. Thank you for your
continued support to help us resolve this challenging problem.
Secretary Spencer. We are not--the Navy is not witnessing
the same failures that the Air Force is witnessing in the same
type aircraft. I'm not saying that one's better than the other.
We're doing the same type maintenance and analysis, and we're--
this is kind of a confounding issue. We are working the root
causes. We are replacing parts--OBOGs [Onboard Oxygen
Generation Systems]. We are replumbing. We are resoftwaring.
When it comes to the F-18, as you know, some of those
depressurizations were just due to age of aircraft. But, it
still means we have to come to solutions. We are at it. We are
tooth and nail, and we are also reaching across to the Air
Force to work hand in hand with them.
Senator Ernst. I appreciate the collaboration on that.
Is there a way that Congress can provide additional
supports in that effort?
Secretary Spencer. We will definitely let you know when
we----
Senator Ernst. I'm sure you will.
Mr. Spencer.--find more, yes.
Senator Ernst. I expect it. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
General Neller, through my work as chairman of the Emerging
Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee, which has jurisdiction
over SOCOM, I've really learned a lot about the care and the
treatment programs that our special operators have, as well as
their families. And one of the programs that I feel that has
been very, very helpful in this regard is the Preservation of
the Force and Family (POTFF). Senator Heinrich and I recently
held a hearing with our SOCOM and--with the SOCOM and its
component commanders, and they all agreed that this particular
program of POTFF has been very, very successful in getting our
warfighters back into the fight.
Would you be able to speak to the value that POTFF provides
for MARSOC [Marine Special Operations Command]? Is this a
program that you think could be expanded to the rest of the
Marine Corps?
General Neller. Well, clearly the Preservation of Force are
in the efforts that SOCOM is able to deliver, as far as mental
health and fitness to their family, because their smaller
numbers is a big deal, and because of the frequency of their
appointments, albeit shorter, and the type of actions that they
take when they deploy, it's very critical for them to keep
those soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines in the fight.
So, we fully support that. I'm in--I was talking to General
Mundy, our MARSOC Commander, about what they're doing, as far
as health of the force. Several years ago, the Marine Corps,
from our aviation community, used that. We adopted almost--
every unit has a--what's called a Force Preservation Council,
where they sit down with--the leadership sits down--when a new
marine checks in, they go over, they review their record, any
stressors in their life. When people have an issue or something
happens that would elevate--whether it's a discipline or
something like that--then they become reviewed by the Force
Preservation Council to see, ``Okay, what do we have to do to
help this individual marine?'' We have the Marine Life
Intercept Counselors that go. And we do this--we're still--the
mental health capacity of the force is much better than it was
15 years ago, but it's probably never going to be what we want
it to be. So, I think that that type of activity has
transitioned itself into the Active Duty or the conventional
force.
Senator Ernst. Okay.
General Neller. We work with it, but we're never going to
get the results we want, which is everybody's healthy and
nobody--everybody's successful as they can be.
Senator Ernst. I think the point is that we try to do the
absolute best we can for our warriors. So, if there are best
practices that we can take from Preservation of the Force and
the Family, we certainly would like to make sure that those are
extended into the Marine Corps and then, as well, of course,
across the Navy, as well.
Admiral Richardson. Working with Naval Special Warfare,
they also have a very vigorous----
Senator Ernst. Yes, they do.
Admiral Richardson.--Preservation of the Force and Family,
and ask that exact question, What can we do across the entire
Navy to adopt best practices?
Senator Ernst. Absolutely, and if there are ways that we
can support it, we certainly want to do that.
Thank you, gentlemen, very much for being here today.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Ernst.
Senator Warren.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, to our witnesses, for being here today.
So, the Defense Department spends hundreds of billions of
taxpayer dollars every year on goods and services provided by
contractors. Federal workplace safety inspectors have found
that some companies, including Navy shipbuilding contractors,
have endangered their workers, resulting in deaths, extensive
burns, and other serious injuries, and they keep right on
getting massive government contracts. We have plenty of laws
requiring these Federal contractors to operate more safely, but
all the laws on the books won't do any good unless there's
serious enforcement.
So, Secretary Spencer, I appreciate your willingness to
work with me to ensure that American workers employed by the
Navy can work in safe conditions. Can you briefly describe the
efforts that you've directed the Navy to undertake to improve
contractors' compliance with worker protection laws?
Secretary Spencer. Thank you, Senator. When I first
testified to take this position, I think you and I had this
conversation.
Senator Warren. Yes, we did.
Secretary Spencer. I promised you that we would take
action. What we have done--this really is a whole-of-government
solution, and I'm certainly not taking the responsibility off
the back of the Navy whatsoever, but OSHA is in here, front and
center. They, like many organizations, have their constraints,
both fiscally and manpower--does not alleviate the fact the
situation is being focused upon. We have spoken to those that
we are contracting with that have violations and said, one, we
will not tolerate this on our next--if, in fact, there is a
breach from normal safety manners to cause accident and/or a
detriment to the workers, we have the ability, through funds,
to correct behavior.
Senator Warren. Okay. So, I'm glad you've started with them
in a conversation, but I think we're going to have to be
systematic about this in order to make sure that they keep
everyone safe.
Let me ask you about some examples. To comply with Federal
rules, Navy contractors must have a safety officer onsite to
identify dangerous conditions and enforce occupational safety
standards. But, the person could be anyone, from a trained and
certified professional to the most junior person hanging out at
the site. So, when the Navy signs a contract, the contracting
officer can designate a list of key personnel. These are
specific skilled or technical individuals who are identified as
being critical to the success of the work.
Secretary Spencer, for contracts that meet a threshold of
cost or complexity, do you think that the Navy should consider
designating the safety officer as key personnel?
Secretary Spencer. Yes.
Senator Warren. Good. I like that. And are--the contractors
need to know that the Navy expects them to protect their
workers if they're going to get taxpayer dollars. Last year,
the NDAA required the Government Accountability Office to study
DOD's procedures for evaluating workplace safety records for
the contractors. But, we don't have to wait for a GAO report.
We can start now. I appreciate your help on this.
Secretary Spencer. Most definitely.
Senator Warren. Good. So, let me ask about another area.
The Trump administration recently released National Defense
Strategy says that, quote, ``Long-term strategic competitions
with China and Russia are the principal priorities for the
Department of Defense.'' The strategy stresses the need to
invest in advanced capabilities for a high-end fight. The Navy
has a number of ambitious technological goals in the coming
years, from unmanned autonomous systems to electronic warfare
to nanotechnology. Today, a lot of this cutting-edge technology
is not developed within the Pentagon, it comes from the
commercial sector or laboratories at our colleges and
universities.
So, Secretary Spencer, how does the Navy intend to
capitalize on commercial and academic developments in advanced
technology? Can you just say a brief word about what steps
you're taking to make sure that the Navy is closely tied to
outside innovators?
Secretary Spencer. Senator, it's a--it warms my heart to
answer this question, because we do have a tall task in front
of us. One of the things we're doing right now, just to start
at the top, is, we are binning our science and technology
investments to align with the National Defense Strategy, the
ten buckets that Mike Griffin is helping us identify and bin.
It is imperative that we do not only our work internally within
the Office of Naval Research, but it is imperative that we
reach out into the--our private-sector community. As you know
up in Massachusetts, between Lincoln Labs and other efforts we
have up there, Woods Hole, we have some amazing research going
on outside the organization.
One of the things that I have taken on at the turn of the
year was a crown jewel, Senators, that we have in the Navy,
which is the Naval Postgraduate School. It is a research-
oriented educational institutional. We are now supercharging it
to put it into its next orbit. We had conversations with the
likes of Eric Schmidt and some others from the Innovation Board
and said, ``We continue to try to have a relationship with you
and drive up and say, What can we buy? What we can we do
together?'' The thesis that I had was, what better way to
create a relationship than to research--basic, relevant
research, where we can get two organizations working together
on a solution? If, in fact, they commercialize that solution,
we'll take a licensing agreement and provide some value to us
and value to them, and then we can take that intellectual
property and apply it within the DOD. The Naval Postgraduate
School will be the center of excellence for this for, not only
the Navy and the DOD, but, we hope, all of government.
Senator Warren. Good. I'm very glad to hear this, Secretary
Spencer. You know, the Navy needs to stay closely integrated
with our innovators, whether they're in government or out of
government. I'm glad to see you take this approach.
Secretary Spencer. Actually, the conversation I had just
last week, Senator, was with Bob Millard at MIT, who----
Senator Warren. Yeah.
Mr. Spencer.--welcomes this and looks forward to doing what
he can do with the Naval Postgraduate School.
Senator Warren. Good. Well, let us know how we can help.
Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Warren.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
Thank you all for your service.
That was a good discussion about the high-end fight. I want
to get down to the trenches on how we protect this Nation from
radical Islam.
To the American people, you may be tired of fighting these
people, but they're not tired of fighting you. You can build a
wall on the southern border, but that's not going to protect
you from Mid-East threats. If some of us are not over there
working with our partners, they're going to come here again.
So, that's my general theme. If you want to be safe against
radical Islam, you need to be in their backyard so they're not
in our backyard. Does that make sense to the Marine Corps?
General Neller. We don't want to play any home games,
Senator.
Senator Graham. Great answer.
What about the Navy? Just say, ``I agree with the
Marines.''
Admiral Richardson. I agree with the Marines, sir.
[Laughter.]
Senator Graham. Never thought I'd hear the Navy say that.
[Laughter.]
General Neller. I think that----
Senator Graham. Okay. So, this is a----
General Neller.--goes without saying----
Senator Graham.--breakthrough moment.
General Neller.--doesn't it?
Admiral Richardson. There's no daylight between us. No
daylight between us.
Senator Graham. He objects.
So, let's talk about what that means. Do you support a
residual force in Iraq to make sure ISIS [Islamic State in Iraq
and Syria] never comes back if the Iraqis would agree to that
force?
General?
General Neller. If the Iraqis were to ask us to stay, it
would be my opinion that that would be a good decision for us.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
Syria. We have 2200 people in eastern Syria, working with
the Syrian Democratic Forces to make sure ISIS is destroyed. Is
that correct, General?
General Neller. The mission of that force is to defeat
ISIS.
Senator Graham. Right. About 250 marines. Is that correct?
General Neller. I'd rather not get in the exact number of
marines.
Senator Graham. That's all right. Some marines.
General Neller. There are some marines there, yes, sir.
Senator Graham. Okay. So, here's my question. To hold the
territory, there has to be a holding force, or they'll come
back.
General Neller. If there's a vacuum, then they will move
into it, yes.
Senator Graham. I like partners helping us hold. Do you
believe it would be smart for America to be part of that
holding force?
General Neller. In order to get to some sort of a political
settlement at Geneva or elsewhere, there--we have to have
stability, and if the decision were made that our partners were
to come in there, I think our present--we cannot create a
vacuum, because it'll be filled by somebody that we don't want.
Senator Graham. Right.
General Neller. And so, I think that that would be part of
the negotiation as to who would be in there. But, I agree with
you, there has to be stability. Someone's got to be there.
Senator Graham. Right. So, as to that ``someone,'' would
you agree that we have capabilities no army in the region has,
and that we add some value that probably can't be replaced by
somebody else?
General Neller. I would agree with that.
Senator Graham. Okay.
Secretary Spencer, on 12 June 2017, Secretary Mattis said,
``No enemy in the field has done more to harm the combat
readiness of our military than sequestration.'' Do you agree
with that?
Secretary Spencer. I do.
Senator Graham. Would you tell every member of this
committee, without hesitation, ``Don't put me back into
sequestration''?
Secretary Spencer. Don't put me back in sequestration.
Senator Graham. There you go. Y'all are really good.
[Laughter.]
Senator Graham. I think it's the single biggest mistake
I've seen since I've been here. That's saying a lot, given
Congress's record for the last 20 years.
Navy. Do you agree that a bigger Navy provides more
deterrence, Admiral?
Admiral Richardson. I do, sir.
Senator Graham. Have you ever seen a time when we need more
deterrence than now?
Admiral Richardson. It's as complex as it's been in my
career.
Senator Graham. So, as a matter of fact, the threats have
gone up since sequestration, not down. Is that fair to say?
Admiral Richardson. Absolutely.
Senator Graham. So, as we cut our force, the threats did
not reduce proportionally, did they?
Admiral Richardson. The assumptions of the security
environment didn't pertain. It got more complex, not less.
Senator Graham. So, as we were trying to deal with the
chemical weapons attack in Syria, I think a more than a handful
of ships were sent to the region to provide that capability and
deterrence. Is that correct?
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. So, a bigger Navy means that you'll have
more ships in more places, which will hopefully make some of
our adversaries think twice. Is that a fair statement?
Admiral Richardson. That's a very fair statement.
Senator Graham. So, you think 355 ships in 2030 gets the
job done?
Admiral Richardson. That's the best estimate we've got
right now. In light of the National Defense Strategy, we're
going to reassess those numbers in the context of great-power
competition and the other threats that face us.
Senator Graham. So, final question. A bigger Navy and a
bigger Marine Corps provides more deterrence, more capability.
Don't you think it also improves the quality of life for those
who serve, because they don't have to be gone so much and
they'll have more help?
Admiral Richardson. Absolutely. You get that rotational
math going, and you get more time to recover.
Senator Graham. Do you agree with that, General?
General Neller. We would like to get back to a three-to-
one, because it's better for the preparation, the training of
the force, and it's better for our families.
Senator Graham. Well, I think the Department of the Navy
should be proud of what it's done. And you're the best in the
business. And, pound for pound, the Marine Corps is the best on
the planet.
So, thank you all.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Graham.
Senator Peters.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today, as always.
I'd like to take an opportunity to follow up on Senator
Cotton's questions regarding the LCS. I think I agree with
Senator Cotton that those ships need to be out to sea, they
need to be deployed. I certainly understand that this may be a
reset year, as described by Admiral Richardson, in terms of
that deployment. But, I would follow up to say that shipyards
don't get a reset year, as you may have with deployment.
Today's Navy's acquisition strategy certainly underpins the
ability to deploy for many years in the future.
Secretary Spencer, earlier this week, I joined my
colleagues, Senators Baldwin, Stabenow, and Johnson, as well as
a number of House members from Michigan and Wisconsin,
including Speaker Ryan, in sending you a letter on acquisition
strategy for the littoral combat ship in fiscal years 2018 and
2019. We're all concerned that, under the current acquisition
strategy, the Navy may be missing out on a variant that
provides the best value when accounting for differences in
capabilities, service life, and total lifestyle cost. Given the
transition from LCS to the competition for a new frigate, the
decisions that are made today will impact the shipbuilding
industrial base for years to come, as well as impact the Navy's
ability to grow to the fleet size that it needs in an
affordable and timely way. I know the Navy has used an
alternating contracting strategy for LCS, awarding two ships to
one shipyard and then one ship to the other in alternating
years, which the shipyards have optimized for. But, my question
to you, Mr. Secretary, as I look forward to your response,
certainly, to the letter, but, in the meantime, could you
please provide an update on LCS acquisition strategy?
Specifically, will the Navy award two Freedom variant LCSs
across the fiscal years 2018 and 2019?
Secretary Spencer. Senator, I've said this before, and I
just want to highlight it, one of the jobs, and one of my
responsibilities wearing the title 10 hat, is to care and
beware and nurture, when necessary, the industrial base. I want
to make sure that everybody in here knows that that does not
mean it's a welfare situation and that our pocketbook is open
just to be open. It is not. We will use the contracts that we
have in the most meaningful manner to keep everybody healthy
within the bounds that we can. And we are portfolio managers.
There is a lot of demands, obviously, on our resources, and we
have to manage a full portfolio of acquisitions.
That being said, Senator, we will provide you the letter.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Secretary Spencer. The overview is that there will be the
ability for the Secretary to be involved in the allocation of
the ships and the awarding of the ships. As you know, when it
comes to Wisconsin, the Saudi award is up there. One of the
other levers that we'd like to see what we could do is see how
do we pull that to the left, how do we manage the industrial
base with all the tools available to us in light of the awards
that we have? But, rest assured that the health of all the
organizations involved in supplying goods and services to the
Navy are being taken care of and analyzed.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, I appreciate
that.
General Neller, as you are well aware, the future of
warfare will be changing dramatically. We've had the--those
discussions on many occasions, as I've had with the other two
gentlemen here. But, as we bring in new technology, whether
it's autonomous vehicles or AI [Artificial Intelligence]
systems, you need to make sure that you can actually deploy
those, and that the men and women who are out in the field are
able to integrate that into doctrine and tactics.
I was taken by an article that recently came out that
showed the Marines are giving quadcopters to every squad, that
are actually integrating that technology into the field as we
speak. Could you speak to that and the importance of it and how
we need to continue to be looking at integrating this
technology in our units every day?
General Neller. Senator, thanks for the question.
That's a fact, that we are going to deploy, whether we make
them ourselves in our own fab labs or we procure them, that
every rifle squad is going to have this ability to fly a
quadcopter in front of them so that they can get a better
appreciation of what lays in front of them. But, it's not just
that. It is all the things that you mentioned, whether it be
autonomy, robotics. I think we're still trying to figure out
what AI can do, as far as the analysis of big information,
making decisions, the future of biomedicine, things like that.
So, the way we're doing it--and I think the other
services--certainly my shipmate, Admiral Richardson's folks are
the same--where you take an exercise that we're going to do,
and we'll take some technologies, and we'll apply them in that
exercise so we don't have to create another event. And we'll
use the exercise as an experiment. And whether it be autonomous
ships or undersea vehicles or swarming drones under the water
to find mines or to find pathways or to destroy mines, unmanned
aircraft provide radio relay or electronic warfare, or to give
you better ISR, all those things are doing on. What we're
trying to do is, we realize that we need it to go faster.
As was mentioned about the development of technology in the
commercial world, we all have officers out in Silicon Valley.
They maintain contacts through an office called DOAX. There's
also one in Boston and Austin that was developed by the
previous administration, Secretary Carter. So, we're out there
kind of doing reconnaissance of what's out there so that we
know what's happening. We look at these different technologies
and we take a chance and play with them. We make a bunch of
small bets, and then, if anything works and we let the Marines
look at it, and they say, ``Yeah, this is good,'' or, ``This is
not,'' and then we'll try to figure out how we're going to put
some money down on it and further develop it.
Senator Peters. Thank you, General, appreciate it.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Peters.
Senator Sullivan.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good to see you, gentlemen. Thank you very much. I really--
very much appreciate your fine leadership, as demonstrated by
your decades of service to your country and by your testimony
today. I think it's been outstanding and direct.
I want to get back to this topic of the National Defense
Strategy and the return to great-power competition, which means
countries like Russia, China, North Korea--not that they're a
great power, but that kind of battle. As you know, gentlemen,
through history, that also means, particularly when you're
looking at that part of the world or those countries, that
means cold weather, that means mountainous terrain, that means
large-scale maneuver in high-end fights. The last time we did
that as a country was in the Korean War. I know all of you have
read T.R. Fehrenback's ``This Kind of War,'' but, as you know,
that didn't go so well initially in that fight, because we
weren't ready.
So, a couple of questions that relates to getting back to
that. You may have seen, in the Arctic Strategy that was
required by this committee, Secretary Mattis stated that, ``The
Arctic is key strategic terrain. Russia is taking aggressive
steps to increase its presence there. I will prioritize
development of an integrated strategy and training for the
Arctic.''
Two questions. General Neller, I was glad to see that the
Marines had just taken part--I think several hundred marines--
in Arctic Edge 2018, up in Alaska. I would welcome your
thoughts on more cold-weather training, more large-scale
maneuver training, lessons learned, perhaps, from your Alaska
training, more opportunities for training in cold-weather
places, like Alaska, which has enormous ranges, as you know.
Mr. Secretary--Secretary Spencer, I would like to get your
views, just on--you know, the NDAA last year required the DOD
and DHS to look at the strategic Arctic port idea. The Arctic
Strategy talks about FONOPS [Freedom of Navigation Operations]
in the Arctic, which Admiral Richardson has mentioned. It's a
good idea, but right now we don't have the capacity or
capability. So, your thoughts, actually, both of you gentlemen,
you know, on the 355-ship Navy, the idea of ice hardening. I
mean, what are we doing, in terms of a strategy? A high-end,
great-power competition fight could be in the Arctic, certainly
could be cold-weather mountain training, large-scale, high-
intensity. What are the Marines and Navy doing? Basically,
focused on those questions, maybe, General Neller, if we can
start with you, sir.
General Neller. Well, Senator, you know that we've gotten
back into the cold-weather business. When Soviet Union was the
only pacing threat, we were at a mission in Norway as part of
the defense, the NATO mission. And whether it be at the end of
Desert Shield, Desert Storm, and the dismemberment of the
Soviet Union, and then operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, you
know, we just kind of went away with it. We still sent units up
there, because going to cold weather is a good training--is a
good discipline-builder. But, the skillsets, the equipment, and
the expertise atrophy.
General Neller.--to lead to more than small units. And so,
we realized we needed to get back into it. So, part of it was
what we did up there on Arctic Edge. We've had engineers, as
you know, up there, working on a road project. We've got 300
marines in Norway. We're waiting for the Norwegian Government
to potentially give us the opportunity to send more there to
work with our NATO partners, because it's an opportunity to
learn from them, because they really do understand how to
operate and move large formations.
There will be a large exercise in--NATO exercise this fall,
called Trident Juncture, which will be a big amphibious
exercise, where the Navy--many navies will be there, operating
in a cold environment, for all the reasons you say. We can't
assume that we're going to fight in a desert. It's not going to
be a temperate climate. It could be in the Arctic. It could be
in the northern edges of any portal latitude or longitude of
the world.
And so, we're working hard on that. The whole force is not
going to be able to get trained in that. We need--just need
enough people who know what they're doing so, if we get there,
particularly the maneuver forces are able to function in--
effectively in that type of an environment. But--we're a work
in progress, but we're headed in the right direction.
Senator Sullivan. You see more opportunities for training
in Alaska?
General Neller. You know, I've been up there with--at your
invitation, in Alaska. We send our aircraft up there, because,
at Eielson Air Force Base, the range up there is three times
the size of the range at Nellis. It's a great place for our
partners to go. But, I do think we're going to try to do our
very, very best to get certainly more deployments for training
up to Alaska to take advantage of the terrain and the climate.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Spencer. Senator, you and I have spoken about
what Alaska has to offer. Suffice it to say that I'm a bull in
that regard. You have infrastructure up there, you have the
ranges up there. And we have the ability, as the Commandant
just said, to access that. And we look forward to seeing how we
can maximize that, going forward.
When it comes to the Navy and the Arctic--how we're
handling the Arctic--as you know, in 2014, we had our Arctic
Roadmap. And now you will see, this summer, we will deliver the
Navy's Arctic Strategy. In October of last year, one of my
first trips, OCONUS [Outside the contiguous United States], was
to go to the Arctic Conference in Reykjavik. And before that, I
stopped off with our terrific allies in Norway who are just
doing yeoman's work monitoring the gap. But, they opened my
eyes as to what's going on in the Arctic. I had read about it,
but, when you see what's going on there, what Russia is doing,
repaving 12,000-foot runways, 10,000 spetznaz up there in
Barracks four, search and rescue, we need to have presence up
there.
The complication, as you well know, because we've talked
about this, is--icebreaking is one of the complications. It's
not a mission of the Navy. We are working hand in hand with the
Coast Guard. In fact, we have just finished helping them design
in requirements for the next class of icebreaker. But, that is
their mission.
That being said, we do not have ice-hardened ships. There
is a new terminology up there, called the Blue Water Arctic,
that there now is open blue waters up there. The CNO and I have
talked about, How do we have presence up there? We're working
on that. And when we see our strategy roll out, you will see
more this summer.
Senator Sullivan. Great. I appreciate it.
Thank you, gentlemen.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Richardson and General Neller, General Milley told
me, last week, that there were, quote, ``precisely zero reports
of issues of cohesion, discipline, morale, and all sorts of
things in the Army as a result of open transgender service.''
Are you aware of any issue of unit cohesion, disciplinary
problems, or issues with morale resulting from open transgender
service?
Admiral Richardson. Senator, I'll go first on that. You
know, by virtue of being a Navy sailor, we treat every one of
those sailors, regardless, with dignity and respect that is
warranted by wearing the uniform of the United States Navy. By
virtue of that approach, I am not aware of any issues.
Senator Gillibrand. General Neller?
General Neller. Senator, by reporting, those marines that
have come forward--there's 27 marines that have identified as
transgender, one sailor serving--I am not aware of any issues
in those areas. The only issues I have heard of is, in some
cases, because of the medical requirements of some of these
individuals, that there is a burden on the commands to handle
all their medical stuff. But, discipline, cohesion of the
force, no.
Senator Gillibrand. Can you amplify what burdens on the
command are related to medical issues?
General Neller. Some of these individuals--and, you know,
they've resolved whatever it was that--as they went through the
process of identifying other than their birth sex, and so
they're going forward. And I think those that came forward, we
have a--we have to honor the fact that they came out and they
trusted us to say that, and that we need to make sure that we
help them get through that process. Some of them are in a
different place than others. And so, there is--part of it's an
education, but part of it is that there are some medical things
that have to be involved as they go through the process of
transitioning and real-life experience and whatever their level
of dysphoria is. So, for commanders, some of them have said,
``No, it's not a problem at all.'' Others have said that there
is a lot of time where this individual is--may or may not be
available.
We're all about readiness, we're looking for deployability.
But, in the areas that you talked about, no, I have not--I have
not heard of or have reported to me any issues.
Senator Gillibrand. Have you had the opportunity, General
Neller, to meet with any of your transgender troops?
General Neller. Yes.
Senator Gillibrand. What did you learn from those meetings?
General Neller. I learned that--I learned a lot about the
experience that they had. I learned that--I met with four--
actually, one was a naval officer, one was an Army staff
sergeant, one was a marine officer, and one was a Navy
corpsman--and I learned about their desire to serve. I learned
about, you know, where their recognition of their
identification opposite their birth sex. We had a very candid,
frank conversation. I respect--as CNO [Chief of Naval
Operations] said--respect their desire to serve. All of them,
to the best of my knowledge, were ready and prepared to deploy,
and they-- as long as they can meet the standard of what their
particular occupation was, then I think we'll move forward.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, General Neller.
Admiral Richardson, what are you doing to ensure readiness
at the personnel and unit level, in light of this new policy
that's come forward from the White House, in terms of a new
burden placed on transgender sailors and marines?
Admiral Richardson. Ma'am, I will tell you that we're--it's
steady as she goes. We have a worldwide deployable Navy. All of
our sailors, or the vast, vast majority of our sailors, are
worldwide deployable. We're taking lessons from when we
integrated women into the submarine force. And one of the
pillars of that was to make sure that there were really no
differences highlighted in our approach to training those
sailors. That program has gone very well. And so, maintaining
that level playing field of a standards-based approach seems to
be the key to--a key to success, and that's the approach we're
taking.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Admiral.
You and I had a long conversation about military justice.
We talked about some of the sexual harassment and assault
issues that are within the Navy. We had a issue with regard to
``Bad Santa,'' as you know, where your public affairs officer
was allowed to stay in his position for several months despite
his clearly inappropriate behavior. Do you have a sense of what
message members serving under you received from him being
allowed to stay in that position? Have you changed your
approach because of that incident?
Admiral Richardson. The beginning of that approach was
really defined by making sure that we got a thorough
investigation into a complicated scenario there with
allegations and counter-allegations. So, that--the
investigation took some of the time.
Having said all that, I've become acutely aware that that
may have sent a bad message, particularly to the survivors of
the behavior. And so, that--you know, my radar has been
completely retuned, in terms of sensitivity to that message. I
hope that we've arrived at a good place at the end of the--at
the end of this event. It took longer, in hindsight, than it
should have. If I was going to do it again, I would move
faster.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, sir.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Scott.
Senator Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, to the panel. Thank you all for your service to
the country.
Secretary Spencer, good to see you again. I'm sure that
you're fully aware of the Navy Working Capital Fund created
back in 1949. These working capital funds insulate the military
services from Government shutdowns, labor strikes, and other
destructions. They ensure many of our Government-owned repair
depots and facilities can stay operational and keep our most
highly skilled workers employed when Navy requirements for
similar work slows down.
We have some of the greatest capabilities in and around
Charleston. SPAWAR [Space & Naval War Systems Command], to be
specific. The capitals--their capabilities are pretty powerful.
My question is: As you look at the restrictions on the work
that the SPAWAR and other facilities like that can do outside
the scope of the Navy--I know that there were some restrictions
placed on how those resources can be used--do you see any
restrictions being lifted? Because, as I think through the
process of finding the talent that we see at SPAWAR, it's
really difficult to replace that talent if we don't use and
maximize their potential outside the scope of the Navy.
Secretary Spencer. Senator, that's a question that is front
and center when it comes to our human resources allocation and
what we're going to do to keep people. Obviously, whether a
pilot, you want to give them flight hours; whether an IT
technician, you want to give them challenges, you want to
provide work; whether SPAWAR is doing exploratory work, you
want to keep them engaged, because that's the quality of life,
that's what they're there for. We are working right now at any
way possible to make sure that we're at 100 percent capacity
for the people, to give them the desire to stay and have a
career in the Navy.
Senator Scott. Does that suggest that looking for work in
other service branches outside of the Navy is something that's
on the table?
Secretary Spencer. If, in fact, we have the bandwidth, yes.
Senator Scott. Okay.
I understand that Russia is building several new classes of
submarines. Are you concerned that Russia may develop an
advantage in this area?
Secretary Spencer. Always concerned, Senator. If you look
at the era that we're entering now with the power competition,
they did not put down their research pens and pencils over the
past 20 years. They have launched a new submarine that I can
safely say is closing the gap on some of our technologies. But,
we are hard at work, also, to make sure that gap does not close
and that the rate of the gap does not increase.
Senator Scott. All right. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Senator Hirono.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Neller, I share Senator Reed's concerns regarding
what you are doing to address sexual harassment and assaults in
the Marines, and the importance of staying the course. So,
thank you for what you're doing. Keep doing it. And, of course,
the concern regarding sexual harassment extends to the other
services and--as brought out by Senator Gillibrand.
I have a question for Secretary Spencer. The Navy has laid
out an ambitious plan to spend $21 billion over 20 years to
modernize our public shipyards, which I applaud, because, as
you know, Hawaii has one of these public shipyards. But, I am
concerned that, as we talk about shipbuilding and service-life
extensions to get to the 355-ship Navy, we might lose focus on
maintenance capacity and capability. What is the impact on the
shipyard modernization plan now that the Navy is pursuing
service-life extensions of five attack submarines? Will the
modernization timeline be sufficient to meet this new demand in
addition to other work already programmed and still meet the
biggest challenge of being ready to handle the Virginia payload
module-equipped ships in the future?
Secretary Spencer. Senator, the maintenance equation in the
three pipes that I talked about--platform, people, and
maintenance--is front and center. Just last week--we have a
terrific repository of institutional knowledge in a fellow by
the name of Ev Pyatt, who worked under the Reagan
administration in building and maintaining the Navy's growth
during that period of time. He has been charged by me to go
look specifically at the present state of shipyard maintenance
and what is needed going forward with our projected plan to
grow the fleet and maintain the fleet.
Right now, as we look at the steady-state, as the report
said, we can accommodate what we have now. As we grow, we're
going to obviously need to not only fix--and when I say
``fix,'' that means improve the flow through our existing
yards--and also enhance the processes available to our existing
yards. We're going down to speak to--it's fascinating--speak to
some of our civilian counterparts to talk about flow control.
That's the key thing when it comes to maintenance through
yards.
Senator Hirono. Well, I'd like to have your commitment that
we will continue to focus on the need to modernize and increase
the capacity and capability of our people at the shipyards,
because they are all ready and eager to go, but they need the
tools in which to proceed. I'd also like to point out that the
Pearl Harbor Navy Shipyard has a special challenge, in that a
huge percentage of that shipyard is historically preserved. So,
you know, it takes more to get the kind of modernization
infrastructure changes that we need to do at Pearl Harbor----
Secretary Spencer. Senator, I will put a footnote on there
that we are going to have to come back to you all about
historical preservation, because historical preservation and
industrial modernization do not go hand in hand.
Senator Hirono. Often there is----
Secretary Spencer. Yes.
Senator Hirono.--big tension there. I am well aware. So, I
want to work with you to figure out how we can make sure that
our shipyard in Hawaii gets what they need also.
Admiral Richardson, in your written testimony, you
mentioned that the Navy was able to arrest the decline in
readiness with the request for additional appropriations, RAA
in 2017, while using 2018 and 2019 funding to further restore
readiness. How long will it take to get fleet readiness to an
acceptable level that we are able to sustain?
Admiral Richardson. Ma'am, thanks. A lot of that's going to
depend on the continuation of stable and adequate funding and,
you know, the passing of budgets on time. The most toxic thing
to readiness has been continuing resolutions and the Budget
Control Act. And so, you know----
Senator Hirono. Assuming that we give you adequate funding
and it's not a start-and-stop every 3 months of CRs [continuing
resolutions]----
Admiral Richardson. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Hirono.--how long will it take?
Admiral Richardson. We see--you know, it took some time, a
decade, to get into this. We anticipate in getting out of this
in about half of that time. And so, I look to the early 2020s--
2021 and 2022--to start getting back to that level of
readiness.
Senator Hirono. Totally dependent on the steadiness of our
funding.
Admiral Richardson. One-hundred percent----
Senator Hirono. Understand.
Admiral Richardson.--dependent on that, ma'am.
Senator Hirono. Secretary Spencer, you noted in your
written testimony that the Department has taken risks by
underfunding infrastructure investment in installation
operations over the last decade. I'm pleased to see the budget
request includes the largest request for MILCON [Military
Construction] in quite some time. Besides the public shipyard
plan, how long and how much MILCON funding will be required to
dig out of the hole we have in infrastructure and
installations? And again, let's assume steady funding.
Secretary Spencer. Yes. Underscoring, again, steady
funding. Right now, Senator, we're going to--I think that that
what--the number is, we're coming up to funding 80 percent of
our needs, which, to me, is an anathema, but I realize we are
portfolio managers. Our infrastructure is a key component of
readiness, and we have to address it in such. With the present
line, you're probably looking at the same for readiness with
the fleet, which is in the early '20s.
Senator Hirono. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Hirono.
Senator Tillis.
Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here and for your service.
General Neller, I had the pleasure of sitting next to Ms.
Neller yesterday in a meeting with a few dozen military
spouses. I tallied up the number of years that they have
experience, about 467 years of experience in the room as
military spouses, some as--in your case, as far as 40 years
back. Can you tell me a little bit about your belief or
agreement that making sure that we take care of the families
and we take care of the issues of multiple deployments as
having some effect on the readiness of the marine?
General Neller. Well, Senator, first, thanks for taking the
time to meet with our spouses. A lot of experience in the room,
a lot of wisdom, a lot of PCS moves, a lot of overseas time, a
lot of time without us being around. But, clearly, we all know,
when we serve, that--or even in the corporate world--I think
you recruit the individual, and then you've got to retain the
family. The family's got to be onside with doing what they're
doing, particularly this kind of a life. So, I don't think they
expect everything, but they do have a certain expectation that
there's going to be housing available and schools available,
and they're going to be able to live their lives, and that
those that wear the uniform are going to be around on occasion.
If they have a profession--and the demographics has
changed. When I came in, not that many, particularly of the
officer spouses, worked. Now that's very different. And so,
there's an expectation that they'll have an opportunity at
least to compete for a job. Certain places where we are, you
know, we're in a more rural area or more isolated area, finding
that job, particularly if you have a profession, is difficult.
And so, I don't think they expect special treatment. I think
they just would appreciate, you know, recognition and some
opportunity.
Obviously, in a place like Washington, D.C., or in southern
California, it's not anywhere near the issue as it is in some
place like Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, or 29 Palms.
So, we have to work to make sure that, not just the
servicemember wants to stick around, but the family does, too.
And so, that's part and parcel, whether it be facilities or
recreational opportunities or schools or stuff for the
children, mental health. Medical is a big deal. All those
things go together as a whole package to try to retain the best
and most capable members of our force.
Senator Tillis. Well, we're working with the staff on some
specific ideas that came out of the meeting yesterday, and that
I've heard time and time again. But, I think that many--people
need to understand that the unemployment rate among military
spouses, depending upon which numbers you want to believe, is
somewhere between 12 and 28 percent. National average is about
4 percent. That's a problem. If you've got a marine worried
about paying the bills and putting their kids through school,
that's a problem. It's a distraction they don't need. So, we're
going to work on that, but I think we're--we also need to
gather better data so we can be directed. It's not only the
professional positions, it's somebody that just wants a job.
We've got to figure out a way to do it, make them more mobile,
make it less costly and less disruption to them as they're
deployed.
In my remaining time, Mr. Secretary or Admiral, we tend to
get caught up with numbers here, and we have a checklist. I
know the magic number for the Navy is 355. I believe that we're
going through a period of time now that I'm more worried about
the capabilities that that current 355 number looks like than
the number 355. So, as you move forward and you think about
modernization over time, I'd be kind of curious to see how
you're going to come back to us and say, ``Guys, the number is
a little bit different, because we've got--we may have to have
fewer or more, but we're going to a capability for the least
amount of money spent, particularly because Congress is not
particularly good at completing its mission, giving you
certainty over funding.'' So, I'd like to get your thoughts on
exactly how you're going to deal with that. Because you're not
going to go to another hearing in the foreseeable future where
people aren't going to be ticking off, ``Where are my ships
going to be built, particularly if it's in my State? How am I
getting to that 355 number?'' I want to really start changing
our thinking on that so you're focused on capabilities and not
hitting one number target.
Admiral Richardson. Senator, that's a great question. I
would tell you, as I think about it, it's about naval power.
And naval power has a lot of components: capacity--you know,
we--there is a big convergence of intellectual thought that
says we do need a bigger Navy, right?--capacity, quantity has a
quality all of its own. But, to your point, we also need a
better Navy, right? We need a more capable Navy that
incorporates new technologies, directed energy, high-power
microwave, hypersonics, you know, and so forth, that make each
one of those platforms more capable. Then, finally, we need to
find a way to increase the power of that force by networking it
together to allow it to adapt and reconfigure on the fly in the
face of threats. So, there's much more to naval power than just
number of ships.
Senator Tillis. Thank you.
Secretary Spencer. Senator, I'd just reverberate that. I
mean, the whole goal is, whether in a F-22 in the air,
targeting a target and pushing a button and the GMLRS rockets
hit it, or the Tomahawk out of the submarine hits it, or the
Standard Missile 6 off the DDG hits it, it's all going to be
intertwined. That is the game-changer. So, it's power we're
really focused on. Yes, we need a goal to increase the
capacity, totally agree. But, we need to focus on the power,
which is exactly what--we're going to use technology as a force
multiplier.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Tillis.
Senator Kaine.
Senator Tillis, presiding.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you, to the witnesses, for your service and your
testimony.
General Neller, I was also at the event yesterday with
Darcy, who is a great example, and the folks around the table
were really, really sharp in offering us perspectives. I have
two pieces of bipartisan legislation, the Military Spouse
Employment Act of 2018 and the Jobs and Childcare for Military
Families Act, that have been introduced with bipartisan
colleagues on this committee, that we're hoping to add to the
NDAA as we work in the coming weeks. But, I appreciate Ms.
Neller's leadership in this area.
I want to ask each of you sort of a budget question. I'm
happy with the budget we passed, the fiscal year 2018 budget,
in terms of support for investments to do the kinds of things
you're talking about. But, there can always be a challenge.
When the budget gets done 6 months into the fiscal year, and
then the money comes at the end of the fiscal year, there's the
question about whether you can spend the money and do it
responsibly. So, we want to increase the investment. We also
want to do it responsibly. We made that challenge harder by
being so late. What are you doing to grapple with that issue?
Secretary Spencer. I'll start at the top, Senator, and then
defer to my two business partners, here.
But, we have started the message, before the turn of the
year, with the BSOs, in saying, ``We are going to hopefully
have the pressure to put resources out in a very responsible
manner, so get your teams lined up. At this point, large--let's
start executing to 100 percent of where we were, which, at that
point, was fiscal year 2017, and get the muscle movements
correct.'' We now have the new dollars and cents, the curve is
now working on the fiscal year 2018 curve. We have teams set
up, and the arc now of de-obligating money down to a--much more
of a science than we had before, to be very frank with you, and
if, in fact, teams are saying, ``I don't think I can make my
goal,'' we're going to come back to you--we're going to hit the
BTR at 25 percent or we're going to come back to you for the
reallocation. And we're having the other projects lined up so
we can use as much of these funds as totally possible. That's
the mindset everyone's working at in both services.
Senator Kaine. Admiral Richardson and General Neller, you
want to add to that?
Admiral Richardson. Sir, I'll tell you, it's like that
quote about real estate. For us, it's just--the three most
important things are execution, execution, and execution. And
we are monitoring that day by day to make sure that we are,
one, you know, executing those funds; two, executing them on
things that are going to deliver naval power; and the--three,
executing them in a way that is auditable and transparent to
you.
Senator Kaine. General Neller?
General Neller. Sadly, we're getting pretty good at this
because we've gotten a lot of practice. Last fiscal year, we
got the money late, and we had to spend a certain amount of
money every day, and everybody kind of raised their game up. It
would be nice, one year, to just get the money at the beginning
of the year and have the whole year to spend it. I think we'd
make better decisions. I think it would settle the force down.
I think everybody would realize that, hey, we're going to get--
it's going to be there. I think our vendors would appreciate
it.
But, to answer your question, Senator, you know, we're pre-
stage, we're ready to go, we watch it every single day. At a
certain point, if people can't spend it, then we'll move it to
other people who have other things that are viable that we can
put on contract. Contracting is kind of the long pole in the
tent, just to write the contract in a proper way so that the
money is spent properly. And we're not going to go out there
and buy furniture and carpet. You know, we've got other really
more important things to do.
Senator Kaine. General Neller, I want to ask you just an
example of this, because it affects readiness. I'm looking at
your written testimony, how you're dealing with this challenge.
Page 12, ``Our most acute readiness issues are in aviation
units. A combination of aging aircraft, a lack of ready basic
aircraft, an unresponsive supply of parts and spares, and
maintenance backlogs at the depots contribute to high
overutilization rates of available aircraft needed for training
and certifications. This, in turn, hastens the induction of
these aircraft into maintenance cycles. Lack of predictable and
stable funding effects industry. Often, when funding becomes
available late in the year through CRs, the industrial base is
not energized to meet demand.'' Talk a little bit about how
you're trying to grapple with this aviation issue in light of
the budget that we just passed.
General Neller. There are a number of things that we're
trying to do, the most important of which is buy new aircraft
and make sure that the aircraft we get are of sufficient
quality that we can replace old aircraft and we don't have to
spend money twice to buy new but, you're always in a legacy
fleet, whether it's ground equipment or air equipment. So,
first, buy new. Second, we've funded readiness in this budget
at a much, much higher level than we ever have before, so we
got more money for parts and spares. The flight-hour program is
out there. Flight hours are up--not yet to where we want it to
be. It's hard to say that you could ever fly too much. But,
we've--part of our recent readiness issues, and some of the
things that have happened is, we've got a whole, like, 5 or 6
years of pilots who were--used to be, if they were senior
captain and major, they are, like, 1,500 to 2,000 hours; now
they've got under 1,000, because they haven't been flying
enough. And so, we're trying to remedy that. And, just like CNO
said, if we didn't--it didn't happen overnight to get to this
point, it's not going to get fixed overnight.
So, steady, consistent funding is what's going to allow
suppliers out there to get us parts, because they're going to
believe that the Government's going to be there, that they can
keep their workforce, they can order the stuff that they need
to build the parts, and then we can get it faster and get more
airplanes and other equipment ready.
Secretary Spencer. Senator, let me add something on there.
One of the things that we've been working on, obviously, is a
statement that I make that the best solution provider for a
problem is the person looking at the problem. This bubbled up
through the wings all the way up to our depot maintenance.
We have a new pilot program underway, called Depot
Readiness Initiative. What we were finding out was, in the case
of a legacy plane, it goes up into depot, it's 1,000 man hours
to take it apart and do the depot-level maintenance, while,
back at the squadron, the calendar maintenance clock was still
running. So, down the plane comes back to the squadron, and
you've got to spend another 500 hours taking things apart and
putting things back on to make sure that it's brought up to
certification. Why not do that up at the----
Senator Kaine. Right.
Mr. Spencer.--depot-level maintenance? Sounds like a very
simple thing to do, but there were funds that had to be
arranged from different pools of money. We're trying this. The
flow is increasing. We think this is something we're going to
do. But, this is an example of how we're getting at it.
Senator Kaine. Excellent. Thank you.
I'm over my time. I appreciate it, Mr. Chair.
Senator Tillis [presiding]. Senator Kaine, I also wanted to
thank you for participating in the marine spouses meeting
yesterday morning. Appreciate your focus on the issue.
Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
I want to reiterate my thanks to all of the families. As
the numbers of deployments have increased and the proportion of
Americans involved directly in these wars over the last 15
years has diminished, we've been fighting a longer period of
time in our history than ever before, with a smaller part of
the population, which exacts a heavy toll on our families. I
appreciate your sensitivity to those issues. And we need to do
more, and do better, to support them.
Mr. Secretary, in last year's NDAA, I required, through an
amendment that I offered, or the NDAA did, the Navy to submit a
report on how the maintenance backlog will be addressed. I know
there's been some discussion already this morning. The report,
delivered in February, stated, quote, ``The Navy intends to
execute all the workload programmed at the naval shipyards with
no availabilities moving from public to the private sector.''
In the House Armed Services Committee just last month, you
stated and acknowledged that private yards have to be more
involved with maintenance. It's a simple fact that there's more
work than the public yards can be done. Is that still your
view?
Just for the record, let me state my view, that, with
respect to submarine maintenance, the private yards are
tremendously important, and use of them is vital, not only
because there's more work than the public yards can do, but
also because our defense industrial base, our workforce, needs
to be retained and, in fact, enhanced because of the need to
smooth the maintenance work and new work, and keep those people
on the job. So, perhaps you'd care to comment.
Secretary Spencer. I'd--I'm going to use your statement as
my answer, Senator. Definitely, the way that we are looking at
it is, we'll load the public yards to 100 percent, and then we
have to look at elsewhere to relieve the pressure. This goes in
concert with not only the efficiencies that we'll get by
putting ships through the maintenance process on a flow-control
basis, but this also addresses your concern, and mine also,
which is the health of the industrial base.
Senator Blumenthal. So, you would commit to shifting a
number of near-term backlog maintenance availabilities to the
private yards to help smooth out the workload.
Secretary Spencer. If--yes. If, in fact, Senator, we have
the workflow charts that we can actually work with to make sure
that we're not overloading someone, yes. We're going to do it
for efficiencies.
Admiral Richardson. Yes, Senator. I think, in fact, we've
already decided to do some of that, so our behavior is really
the biggest indicator of where our thinking is. It's just a
plain fact that we've got to work together to get this done.
Senator Blumenthal. Well, I agree that actions speak louder
than words, and I'm glad those actions are taking place.
Secretary Spencer. The public yards--I mean, behind the
private yards, Senator, are also very engaged in this.
Senator Blumenthal. Let me ask you--General Neller and I
spoke a little bit yesterday about the F-35. Could you give me
your assessment, in terms of the Navy and the Marine Corps,
about the capabilities of the F-35 and your commitment to
continuing that program?
Secretary Spencer. Senator, the F-35 is an amazing piece of
gear in many fronts. In fact, I'll say all fronts, including
the procurement side and the sustainment side. It's proving
out, in the Marine Corps, to be what we've advertised it to--
what they advertised it to be. It's hitting the requirements. I
would not be--I'd be remiss if I was to say that we don't have
our challenges, as far as procurement price and sustainment,
which we are working on tooth and nail right now, from the
Deputy Secretary on down to the JPO [Joint Program Officer],
Ms. Lord, and the service secretaries, Air Force and Navy.
You saw our latest move that was made. We are going to be a
responsible client, and we are not going to accept gear that is
not of quality. We will work with the prime to make sure we
come to a conclusion on how we're going to handle that. But,
going forward, all parties are focused on, as I said earlier,
not only the acquisition cost, but, almost more importantly,
the sustainment costs.
Senator Blumenthal. I think there's agreement among all of
the contractors, from the prime to the subs, that driving down
the cost is a priority. The war on cost----
Secretary Spencer. Exactly.
Senator Blumenthal.--as it's been called, is a common
objective, here.
Secretary Spencer. We are partners in that regard.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Tillis. Senator Donnelly.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank the witnesses for being here with us.
Secretary Spencer, I've had the privilege of having Admiral
Richardson and General Neller at Naval Surface Warfare Center
Crane. I am hopeful that you'll be able to come out, as well,
and see the hard work of all those good people.
Secretary Spencer. Most definitely. It's on the list,
Senator.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you very, very much.
Additionally, Admiral Richardson and General Neller, I
appreciate all the work you've done on addressing military
suicide. You know that suicide risk, it often isn't tied to
deployments or combat experiences. We can't be restricting our
most rigorous mental health assessments just to the deployment
cycle. You've been incredibly helpful in all of this and in
implementing legislation. You told me, last year, that your
services were on track for full implementation of the Sexton
Act requirement for the annual mental health assessment by
October of 2017. Can you confirm that you've reached that
milestone? Were there any difficulties, or are there any other
things that you feel we might be missing in this area on this
end?
Admiral Richardson. Sir, we've reached that milestone, last
July, ahead of the October deadline. We've conducted close to
100,000 of these types of assessments. I will tell you that it
is a vexing problem. Last year was not a great year for us with
respect to suicide in the Navy. It is not linked, all the time,
to deployment cycles, as you say, or even deployment in any
sense.
We've also had some tremendous, stories, where
servicemembers have seen their shipmate in trouble, have
intervened, and have saved a life. I think that is where the
center of gravity of our efforts are, is at that peer-to-peer
level.
Senator Donnelly. Pushing it down.
Admiral Richardson. Exactly right, yes, sir. And so, those
are the people that have the most sensitivity, the most
awareness. I think that they are the most capable, in terms of
stepping in, making feel--making that sailor feel like they're
not alone, there's hope at the end of the tunnel, here, and
shepherding them through that hard time.
Secretary Spencer. Senator, as an example--and I'll throw
out a vignette, because I think it's important--last Christmas
holiday time, one of our sailors out at Joint Base Andrews was
coming back from an engagement with a fellow airmen and noticed
something was wrong. They checked into their rooms, and the
sailor went back to knock on the door and prevented a suicide.
Senator Donnelly. General, how is the Corps doing? Is there
anything on our side here that we can do to be of help to you,
sir?
General Neller. With regard to suicides, like the Navy, we,
despite our best efforts--I mean, your goal is none. We know
we're never going to get to zero. The people that have issues,
then we do the health assessment, that are willing to come out
and say they have issues, then we get them help, and there's
things that we can do. All too often, though, we find--I mean,
in some cases, when someone is--does take their own life, you
know, there was some knowledge--the command. In many cases,
though, Senator, there's--it comes as a complete surprise,
despite our best efforts to know our people, then get involved
through force preservation, particularly the more senior. We've
had a number of officers, some senior enlisted, and not
everybody just kind of sits around and goes, ``I mean, I just
talked to him or other the other day, and we can't explain
it.''
So, I think the Congress, and you particularly, have been
very helpful. I think we have all the tools that we need. This
is--you know, it's a mystery of life. I'm not going to blow it
off. We're never going to stop trying to get to zero and make
sure that people know that if they have an issue, there's no
problem that can't be solved if you're willing to come forward
and talk about it.
But, it's kind of a steady-state. I'm not saying that's
where we are, but I could show you the numbers, and it's been
pretty consistent over the last few years.
Senator Donnelly. Well, please let us know if there's
anything else we can do here to be of assistance to you.
I just want to mention quickly, Mr. Secretary, Admiral,
yesterday the USS Indianapolis was launched. Our city is very
proud of it. Our State is very proud of it, and it is going to
be going into harm's way, and you have extraordinary
crewmembers, an extraordinary group of people who are serving
to make that successful.
I just want to follow up on Senator King's discussion about
opioids, very quickly, and the role the Coast Guard is playing
and anything you can do to help. We lost 60,000 young people
last year, 40,000 to opioids, another 20,000 on top of that to
overall losses to drug abuse. And so, this product's coming in
from Mexico. It's coming in through our shores, and at the end
of the road on each of these is somebody who makes a tragic
decision, where we lose the next nurse in Jennings County or
the next teacher in Marion County or the next sailor or marine
from Evansville. And so, anything you can do as you coordinate
with the Coast Guard, as you work with them to help with this
scourge, and anything you, as you look at--and do it in a very
unvarnished way--anything you see that we can do better--
because, as I said, 60,000 this year, and next year's expected
to be even more. It is an American tragedy and an American
crisis.
I want to thank you both for all your service. Mr.
Secretary, also, you for your service. It is the highest honor,
and we're really grateful to have you here.
Thank you.
Senator Tillis. Thank you, Senator Donnelly.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here, for your service.
This committee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:39 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
strategic readiness review and comprehensive review
1. Senator Wicker. Secretary Spencer, please provide an update on
the status of implementing the recommendations contained in the SRR and
CR to help prevent future collisions at-sea.
Secretary Spencer. The Navy has identified readiness reform as a
critical priority in the wake of the tragic USS Fitzgerald and USS John
S. McCain collisions. In January 2018, the Navy established the
Readiness Reform Oversight Council (RROC) to oversee implementation of
CR/SRR recommendations as well as related recommendations from other
sources (e.g., Government Accountability Office, Navy Inspector
General).
Chaired by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations and Undersecretary of
the Navy, the RROC is currently addressing 111 recommendations. To
date, 35 of 111 recommendations have been fully implemented with over
70 percent expected to be implemented by the end of September 2018.
Along with aggressively implementing the remaining recommendations, the
Navy is simultaneously developing the tools and processes to ensure
that implemented recommendations are effective. $38.3 million was
appropriated for readiness reform in fiscal year 2018, $79.1 million
requested for President's Budget 2019, and $601 million programmed for
Surface Warfare readiness reform through the fiscal years 2019-2023
FYDP. The RROC also seeks to expedite an additional $66 million of
unfunded priorities during the Mid-Year Review.
The status of a select few key actions taken to improve readiness
across the fleet are described below.
7th Fleet Operations--7th Fleet has adopted new scheduling and
force generation processes that identify mismatches in force employment
and force generation while protecting training/certification periods
for ships. Naval Surface Group Western Pacific (NSGWP) has been
established to oversee maintenance and training for surface ships
assigned to Forward Deployed Naval Forces Japan.
Command and Control--The Navy is undertaking a clean sheet review
of the Administrative Chain of Command to optimize readiness, clarify
C2 at all echelons and provide clear responsibility and accountability
for force generation. As part of this initiative, 2nd fleet has been
re-established to focus on warfighting and certification of deploying
forces.
Mitigating Risk of ``Can-Do Culture''--Multiple steps have been
taken to properly manage supply and demand of operational forces to
prevent overstressing individuals and units and avoid putting ship COs
in a position to commit forces that do not meet full readiness
standards. In addition to the above changes to C2 and operational
scheduling practices, force-wide circadian rhythm implementation is
underway to allow COs to better manage crew fatigue and properly
mitigate operational risk.
Manning--Navy manning policies now prioritize Japan based ships. 6
of 11 Japan based Cruisers and Destroyers meet their manning targets
with 10/11 expected by June 2018. New incentive policies have been
enacted place to encourage sailors to select and extend in Japan-based
billets. Manning statuses are reviewed monthly by Fleet Commanders to
identify shortfalls.
Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) Career Path--The SWO career path is
being restructured to emphasize mastery of seamanship and navigation
skills. First and second tour lengths for Junior officers have already
been adjusted to maximize at sea experience while changes to Senior
Officer tour lengths are under review. Proficiency assessment and
tracking mechanisms are also under consideration by senior Navy
leadership.
SWO Training--Short and long term improvements are underway to
expand training for bridge watch standers, emphasize higher-stress
scenarios representative of high density shipping and extremis
situations, and better utilize integrated simulator systems and yard
patrol craft.
Surface Force Navigation Equipment--Plans are ongoing to accelerate
replacement of surface search RADAR, modernize bridge equipment and
transition to next generation electronic navigation systems.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
national maritime intelligence center facility
2. Senator Cotton. Admiral Richardson, why was the Office of Naval
Intelligence parking garage replacement--located on the National
Maritime Intelligence Center facility--not included in your fiscal year
2019 budget submission or the Future Years Defense Program?
Admiral Richardson. First and foremost, the parking garage is safe
for continued use. Project development is underway for the parking
garage replacement project. The Navy intends to request funding in a
future budget, not via the 10 U.S.C 2803 Emergency Construction
authority as the estimated cost exceeds the $50 million statutory
limit.
The Navy uses a rigorous process for prioritizing construction
projects that evaluates requirements based on support to global
posture, basing decisions, Fleet readiness and corrections required for
documented life, safety, and health deficiencies. The Navy considers
more than $4 billion of valid requirements each year.
As a result of multiple engineering studies, the Navy has completed
$12 million of repairs to keep the garage safe and operational. To
ensure the garage remains safe, the Navy conducts quarterly structural
inspections.
Although there are no plans to demolish the garage in 2021, we are
developing the replacement project. As required by the National Capital
Planning Commission, a traffic study and site master plan are ongoing
and scheduled for completion by the end of 2019.
Thank you for your continued support for the Navy and our maritime
mission. I assure you we will continue to provide safe parking at NMIC,
and look forward to continuing to work with the Congress regarding this
issue.
3. Senator Cotton. Admiral Richardson, what are you plans for
replacing the critical parking infrastructure at this important
intelligence facility, and what is the current state of those plans?
Admiral Richardson. First and foremost, the parking garage is safe
for continued use. Project development is underway for the parking
garage replacement project. The Navy intends to request funding in a
future budget, not via the 10 U.S.C 2803 Emergency Construction
authority as the estimated cost exceeds the $50 million statutory
limit.
The Navy uses a rigorous process for prioritizing construction
projects that evaluates requirements based on support to global
posture, basing decisions, Fleet readiness and corrections required for
documented life, safety, and health deficiencies. The Navy considers
more than $4 billion of valid requirements each year.
As a result of multiple engineering studies, the Navy has completed
$12 million of repairs to keep the garage safe and operational. To
ensure the garage remains safe, the Navy conducts quarterly structural
inspections.
Although there are no plans to demolish the garage in 2021, we are
developing the replacement project. As required by the National Capital
Planning Commission, a traffic study and site master plan are ongoing
and scheduled for completion by the end of 2019.
Thank you for your continued support for the Navy and our maritime
mission. I assure you we will continue to provide safe parking at NMIC,
and look forward to continuing to work with the Congress regarding this
issue.
4. Senator Cotton. Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson, what
has the Navy done to acknowledge and act upon specific Fiscal Year 2017
Appropriations language, urging the Department and Services to
prioritize needed workplace replacement projects, including the NMIC
parking structure, in fiscal year 2018 and future budget submissions?
Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson. First and foremost, the
parking garage is safe for continued use. Project development is
underway for the parking garage replacement project. The Navy intends
to request funding in a future budget, not via the 10 U.S.C 2803
Emergency Construction authority as the estimated cost exceeds the $50
million statutory limit.
The Navy uses a rigorous process for prioritizing construction
projects that evaluates requirements based on support to global
posture, basing decisions, Fleet readiness and corrections required for
documented life, safety, and health deficiencies. The Navy considers
more than $4 billion of valid requirements each year.
As a result of multiple engineering studies, the Navy has completed
$12 million of repairs to keep the garage safe and operational. To
ensure the garage remains safe, the Navy conducts quarterly structural
inspections.
Although there are no plans to demolish the garage in 2021, we are
developing the replacement project. As required by the National Capital
Planning Commission, a traffic study and site master plan are ongoing
and scheduled for completion by the end of 2019.
Thank you for your continued support for the Navy and our maritime
mission. I assure you we will continue to provide safe parking at NMIC,
and look forward to continuing to work with the Congress regarding this
issue.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
section 811
5. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Spencer, as a result of the
misrepresentation of section 811 of the Fiscal Year 2010 National
Defense Authorization Act, any small business, Native 8(a) sole-source
contract above $22 million has to be approved by the head of Agency, in
the Navy's case the Secretary of the Navy. This is an onerous
requirement based on transgressions that occurred seven years ago and
it has led to valuable contractors being excluded from sole-source
contracts; zero in 2014. Per your commitment to me during your
nomination, you stated you would determine if you could delegate down
the level of approval authority below the Secretary level to approve
Native 8(a) small business contacts above $22 million. If you found
that you legally could, you committed to sending a memo to your
contract officers telling to not hesitate to bring you 8(a) contracts
over $22 million. What progress have you made on these two issues?
Secretary Spencer. I have signed a memo to Department of the Navy
contracting activities reaffirming that section 6.302-5(a)(4) of the
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) provides the authority to enter
into sole source awards under the 8(a) program, including those valued
over $22 million. Those sole source awards exceeding that value must be
justified in accordance with FAR 6.303, and approved in accordance with
FAR 6.304 by a flag or general officer or a civilian serving in a
position above GS-15 under the General Schedule. The authority to
designate approval authorities for all Justification and Approvals that
do not require the approval of the Navy Senior Procurement Executive is
delegated to the Department of the Navy's Heads of Contracting Activity
(HCAs). The memo states that HCAs must ensure that dollar approval
thresholds in the regulations do not unduly influence a contracting
officer's business decisions. These thresholds are not intended as
barriers to executing contracts that reflect the best business
decisions for the Department of the Navy. I have asked that HCAs
streamline the approval process for these and other actions within
their contracting activities, consistent with the exercise of sound
business judgment.
aviation readiness
6. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Spencer, General Neller and Admiral
Richardson, following recent accident data, Military Times published
online a database of records that outline the rise of aviation mishaps
during the past five years. Listed in the Marine Corps Times article
``Aviation in Trouble'' on April 16, 2018, reports show that the
problem in the Navy and Marine Corps appear to be much more severe than
those in the Air Force. What steps are being made to mitigate these
deficiencies in aviation readiness? Can you provide a detailed response
to the assertions addressed in this article?
Secretary Spencer. The Department of Navy (DON) is capable today
and will become more capable in the future. Recovering readiness and
reversing years of strain on the force will take time, predictable and
sustained funding and balanced investments. To recover aviation
readiness and get aircraft back to the fleet, the DON has deliberately
prioritized investments in both its primary and enabling readiness
accounts. The enacted 2018 budget and the President's 2019 Budget
request fund the Flying Hour Program and Aircraft Depot Maintenance to
maximum executable levels. Equally important, the 2018 enacted budget
with the budget enhancement and the DON's 2019 request increases
funding for aviation logistics, air systems support and aviation
spares. Aviation spares are funded above historical levels to reduce
repair part shortages and improve the range and depth of afloat spare
parts in line with our intended operational availability. These efforts
are beginning to take effect, with a steady reduction in aviation
maintenance backlogs and with greater parts availability, more Fully
Mission Capable and Mission Capable aircraft will be available for
essential aircrew training and proficiency. This is a very high
priority for the Department.
General Neller. Although mishap trends have nearly doubled since
2013, the increase has been attributed to Class ``C'' mishaps (damage
to aircraft of $50,000 or more, but less than $500,000; or a nonfatal
injury or illness that results in one or more days away from work, not
including the day of the injury).
The more serious Class A and B mishap rates, among manned
aircraft, have remained relatively steady over the last 5 years and are
not contributing to the increasing trend we observed.
Marine aviation's focus is readiness for combat. We
continue to make moderate gains and recover readiness across every
type/model/series aircraft while simultaneously transitioning to a
modern fleet.
We are incrementally stepping up to T 2.0 levels to
ensure the Marine Corps remains the Nation's Force in Readiness. Our MC
and FMC rates are steadily improving. The Marine Corps expects to
recover training capability in fiscal year 2020 and a ready bench by
fiscal year 2022.
Flight hours are the true metric of health. Aircrew
averaged 19.3 flight hours per pilot in March fiscal year 2018--an
increase of nearly 20 percent from last year, and up almost 50 percent
from two years ago. All communities have improved--some more than
others. The Hornet community, for example, is flying 50 percent more
hours today than it was two years ago.
Previously underfunded readiness enabler accounts were
funded to their maximum executable levels in fiscal year 2017 and
fiscal year 2018. This allows us to focus on our number one readiness
degrader: the lack of spare and repair parts. Fully funding our spares
accounts is critical to recovery and modernization. We must have spares
to recover readiness in our legacy aircraft and we must have spares to
build up and sustain readiness in our new aircraft.
We have a comprehensive approach to building readiness
that includes several maintenance, supply, and manpower initiatives.
These initiatives require stable, predictable funding and time in order
for us to receive a return on our investment.
Admiral Richardson. Our Navy is capable today and will become more
capable in the future. Recovering readiness and reversing years of
strain on the force will take time with predictable and sustained
funding and balanced investments. To recover aviation readiness and get
aircraft back to the fleet, the Navy has deliberately prioritized
investments in both its primary and enabling readiness accounts. The
enacted 2018 budget and the President's 2019 Budget request fund the
Flying Hour Program (FHP) and Aircraft Depot Maintenance to maximum
executable levels. Equally important, the 2018 enacted budget with the
budget enhancement and the Navy's 2019 request increases funding for
aviation logistics, air systems support and aviation spares. Aviation
spares are funded above historical levels to reduce repair part
shortages and improve the range and depth of afloat spare parts in line
with our intended operational availability. These efforts are beginning
to take effect, with a steady reduction in aviation maintenance
backlogs and with greater parts availability, more Fully Mission
Capable and Mission Capable aircraft will be available for essential
aircrew training and proficiency. We are giving this very high
priority.
training standards
7. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Spencer and General Neller, ``This
Kind of War'' by T.R. Fehrenbach details the devastating loss of
American lives at the start of the Korean War due to a lack of
readiness. Would you agree that we must continue to ensure our military
training standards are hard and rigorous to reflect the realities of
combat, and that they should not be influenced by politics? In your
personal opinion, do you think that training standards should be
delegated to the service chiefs as directed by section 531 of the
Senate-passed Fiscal Year 2018 National Defense Authorization Act?
Secretary Spencer and General Neller. Yes, training standards
should reflect the realities of combat. For the Marine Corps, a good
standard is measureable, able to be evaluated, and demonstrated during
those conditions units will most likely encounter during combat
operations such as cold weather, jungle, or littorals. The Secretary of
the Navy must retain ultimate responsibility for training of the Marine
Corps as required by 10 USC 5013. However, 10 USC 5043 assigns
responsibility to the Commandant to transmit plans and recommendations
to the SECNAV and to execute when approved. As a practical matter, Navy
Regulations have delegated training requirements to the Commandant.
Paragraph 0504 charges HQMC (under the direction and control of SECNAV)
with training of the Marine Corps. Paragraph 0505.2.a assigns CMC
responsibilities ``to plan for and determine the needs of the Marine
Corps for equipment, weapons, or weapon systems, materials, supplies,
facilities, maintenance, and supporting services. This responsibility
includes the determination of Marine Corps characteristics of equipment
and material to be procured or developed, and the training required to
prepare Marine Corps personnel for combat.''
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator David Perdue
audit
8. Senator Perdue. General Neller, in 2017 the Marine Corps became
the first military service within the Department of Defense to ever
undergo a full financial statement audit although you received a
disclaimer. In 2013, the Marine Corps came very close to reaching a
clean opinion on a limited financial audit. We are gaining momentum in
this area and I want to ensure that the Department continues to pursue
completing the audit and eventually reaching a clean opinion in every
fiscal year. What is the current status of the Marine Corps' fiscal
year 2018 audit?
General Neller. The Marine Corps is currently undergoing the fiscal
year 2018 Full Financial Statement audit. We recently completed the
Planning Phase of the audit and transitioning to the Internal Control
Phase. To date, the Marine Corps has delivered supporting documentation
for over 1,080 Provided-by-Client (PBC) requests and responded to a
total of 210 follow-up-questions.
We considered the Planning Phase of the audit a success. During
this phase, auditors visited 11 locations to include commands located
in Okinawa Japan and Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. Auditors also
visited supporting establishments located in Cleveland, Columbus,
Indianapolis, and Kansas City. This successful planning effort required
collaboration across multiple Marine Corps commands, service providers,
the Department of Defense Inspector General and the Independent Public
Accountant (IPA) Kearney & Company.
In the review of the Marine Corps' financial statements, auditors
have started testing the Statement of Budgetary Resources (SBR) and the
Balance Sheet. To support the SBR testing efforts, we provided official
documentation for sample requests that includes unpaid obligations
consisting of 218 sample transactions. During the site visits, auditors
performed a thorough analysis of Marine Corps' assets. This includes
the Existence and Completeness testing of 2,591 samples transactions
related to Garrison Property, Real Property, Military Equipment,
Garrison Mobile Equipment and Operating Materials and Supplies (OM&S).
To date, auditors have observed 49 conditions that could
potentially result in noted deficiencies. Of the 49 observations, 38
were previously noted during the fiscal year 2017 Full Financial
Statement Audit. We worked hard to correct these deficiencies and
continue to make notable improvements. The auditors plan to highlight
our progress in the correction of these repeat deficiencies during the
formal Notification of Findings and Remediation (NFR) process which may
reduce their impact and severity. We anticipate this iterative process
will continue for years to come as we move toward our goal of obtaining
a clean opinion.
9. Senator Perdue. Admiral Richardson, what is the current status
of the Navy fiscal year 2018 Audit?
Admiral Richardson. Navy met the NDAA requirement and commenced a
full scope audit in January of 2018. In mid-April, Navy's audit firm
sent notification that they intend to issue a ``disclaimer of opinion''
later this year--meaning that during this year's audit, they cannot
gather enough information to form an opinion about the accuracy of the
Navy's statements. This is an expected outcome for a first-year audit
of a large, complex agency, and of course there are few organizations
worldwide which match the size and intricacy of the Military
Departments.
Factors which contributed to audit team's conclusions:
Navy's challenge to account for all of its financial
transactions, owing to a complex array of business IT systems and the
prevalence of ineffective manual internal controls governing this
data's flow.
Large volumes of accounting adjustments, resulting from
weak internal controls--which we are strengthening but many of which
are still inadequate--over business processes and IT systems.
Navy's ability to account for and accurately value its
global, diverse asset portfolio--worth hundreds of billions of
dollars--because of weak process and system controls.
We are identifying and correcting our deficiencies as quickly as we
can. The Navy's senior leaders are relaying this sense of urgency to
the rest of the Department, and they recognize that correcting business
process and system deficiencies is a Departmental priority. Flag
officers or senior executives manage each corrective action plan.
In addition, because the audit team has signaled its intent to
disclaim, they no longer are required to gather documentation generated
by thousands of Navy business transactions, as they would have done had
they continued the audit's course. This brings two beneficial
consequences: the auditors can divert their attention from testing and
instead help the Navy identify business areas which need the most
improvements; and it also relieves operational commands from the
resource-intensive task of gathering volumes of documentation to pass
to the audit team.
10. Senator Perdue. General Neller, Admiral Richardson, and
Secretary Spencer, on April 17, a former Defense official told the
House Armed Services Committee, quote, ``If I were the master of the
universe, I would give up the audit . . . Five billion dollars over
five years, I'd say it's not worth it . . . I would say that we already
know . . . the deficiencies we have in our financial systems. We know
we have a laundry list of things that need to be fixed--and until we
fix them, we're going to continue to fail audits.'' Do you agree or
disagree with these claims?
General Neller. The Marine Corps believes that the audit is
critical to mission readiness and should continue. The transparency
afforded with auditable financial statements demonstrates our
commitment to responsible full financial statements and the prudent
management of taxpayer provided resources. Efficiencies gained through
audit efforts enhance the overall support to the Warfighter and ensure
the effective use of funds received.
In an effort to reduce the cost of audits to the Department, the
Marine Corps understands the importance of forming partnerships with
our service providers. The Marine Corps is reviewing our shared
processes and systems in an effort to gain efficiencies. Paramount to
working with our service providers is ensuring that we have adequately
written and agreed upon service level agreements (SLA) in place to
ensure the establishment of partnerships with respect to the audit and
the remediation of audit findings. We are currently working with our
service providers to determine that SLAs are complete and are being
periodically reviewed to ensure they accurately reflect the roles and
responsibilities for each party.
As a result of fiscal year 2017 audit findings, the Marine Corps
was made aware of issues effecting the accounting for property, plant,
and equipment. Several key issues were brought to our attention
regarding real property to include assets that were not being reported,
assets that were reported but belonged to other entities, and assets
that were not valued correctly. Similarly, the Independent Public
Accountant concluded that the Marine Corps did not properly record the
value of ammunition. These conditions can cause a misstatement of the
Marine Corps financial statements and are not a true reflection of our
financial position. The Marine Corps is dedicated to making corrective
actions that include upgrades to systems, formalized operating
procedures, and training to ensure that account balances on the
financial statements are accurate and can be fully supported by
evidential documentation.
Each year we continue to see improvements and gain benefits from
the audit. It has provided the Marine Corps with an honest assessment
of our organization and processes. Each audit cycle serves as an annual
checkup, not unlike an annual physical conducted by a doctor, providing
us critical feedback on the health of our operations. Some of our
processes require reengineering. For example, we are reviewing our
method to record, report and document assets listed on our balance
sheet inclusive of Property, Plant and Equipment, and Operating
Materials and Supplies. The audit has also identified processes that
are operating efficiently which we are leveraging in a road map to
assess inefficient processes. Lastly, the Marine Corps will continue to
improve our collaboration across the enterprise in regards to our
internal controls, internal reviews, and audit support efforts.
Admiral Richardson and Secretary Spencer. The Department of the
Navy is investing in transforming its business operations to comply
with accepted accounting principles and audit standards. These changes
are necessary to adhere to existing legislation, and the future result
will be a favorable audit opinion. Our Department can then better
assure the public that appropriated funds are being spent and accounted
for as Congress intended.
The framework provided by annual financial statement audits is
necessary for a successful business transformation. Audit activity and
subsequent findings focus our Department's attention top-to-bottom on
the sustained fixes which must be made and give a sense of urgency to
the pace of remediation. Without the rigor and discipline required by
the audit process, the Defense Department will not be able to readily
make the required leap to a ``clean'' opinion--a hurdle already crossed
by every other federal agency.
11. Senator Perdue. Secretary Spencer, how have your services
benefited from undertaking the audit?
Secretary Spencer. Benefits include:
Expanding the sphere of accountability for spending
appropriated funds as intended. End-to-end ownership of each of the DON
business processes has been assigned to senior leaders, who report
audit remediation progress to the DON Audit Committee. Internal
controls governing business processes are being strengthened to bring
them in compliance with accepted accounting principles and audit
standards. These improved controls will be performed by the tens of
thousands of Departmental personnel who spend dollars for goods and
services to support warfighters.
Ensuring security controls for business information
systems are being performed. Audit procedures include assessing
physical security of information systems; ensuring system access lists
are updated using a regular, methodical process; and ensuring that user
roles performed within the system are properly segregated.
Reducing the risk of funds misuse. Strengthened business
internal controls, coupled with a rigorous testing and monitoring
program, reduce the risk of unscrupulous or unlawful exploitation.
Efficiencies will continue to accrue. As business
controls are strengthened, some processes will become more efficient,
and savings and cost avoidance will result. Examples include: one major
command was able to re-purpose approximately $50 million annually in
current year funds by strengthening its contract close-out controls; a
fleet command also increased its buying power in one year by about $50
million through improving its controls over requisition validation and
fuel billing.
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraft & future
threats
12. Senator Perdue. Admiral Richardson and Secretary Spencer, the
Navy's P-8 Poseidon is a maritime intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance aircraft. Like other aircraft across the services to
include the Air Force's Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System,
it is built on a Boeing civilian aircraft platform. The P-8 has some of
the same capabilities and performs similar missions in the maritime
domain as the Air Force's JSTARS does over land. The Navy plans on
buying more P-8s to bolster its ISR resources in its fiscal year 2019
budget request. Meanwhile, the Air Force plans to divest completely in
the JSTARS platform recapitalization and cites that it will not be a
viable capability in the future due to survivability concerns in a
contested environment. How does the P-8 fit into the Navy's role in the
future fight?
Admiral Richardson and Secretary Spencer. The P-8A's primary
mission is broad area Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW). The P-8A's primary
role during major combat operations is to conduct ASW operations in
support of Strike Group operations. The P-3C Orion, which retires in
2020, and the P-8A are the only fixed-wing, long range platforms
capable of performing this ASW mission set.
Secondary missions for the P-8A include Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW)
and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions. As
an ISR asset, the P-8A has a robust systems suite and the longest range
and endurance of any manned airborne ISR platform. The P-8A ISR systems
suite includes a radar capable of surface search, inverse synthetic
aperture radar (ISAR), and synthetic aperture radar (SAR), an electro-
optical and infrared (EO/IR) high definition camera, and an electronic
support measures (ESM) system capable of detecting, locating, and
identifying threat emissions from long range. Additionally, the P-8A is
capable of carrying the Advanced Airborne Sensor (AAS) active
electronically scanned array radar. Onboard systems automatically
correlate data from many sensors, synthesize this information, and
provide input to national and regional intelligence databases. When
used in conjunction with other fleet and joint assets, the P-8A
Poseidon expands the reach and lethality of our military forces in the
current and future fight.
The P-8A is not designed to perform JSTARS airborne battle
management missions or participate in the high-end air-to-air battle.
Like most large profile, non-radar evading aircraft, the P-8A has a
considerable radar cross section and it presents a large target for
radar guided missiles. As our adversaries and near-peer competitors
develop longer range surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles, the Navy
continues to study and evaluate radar counter-measure systems to
provide onboard protection for the P-8A. When dictated by mission
location and increased threat levels, P-8A can be supported by Strike
Group or theater fighter escorts to perform their primary mission.
Through use of advanced long range stand-off sensors, netted C4I
systems, and well-developed Strike Group procedures, the P-8A will
remain aware of threats and will operate away from the high-end air
fight.
13. Senator Perdue. Admiral Richardson and Secretary Spencer, what
are your concerns about the survivability of the P-8?
Admiral Richardson and Secretary Spencer. The P-8A's primary
mission is broad area Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW). The P-8A's primary
role during major combat operations is to conduct ASW operations in
support of Strike Group operations. The P-3C Orion, which retires in
2020, and the P-8A are the only fixed-wing, long range platforms
capable of performing this ASW mission set. Secondary missions for the
P-8A include Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW) and Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions. As an ISR asset, the
P-8A has a robust systems suite and the longest range and endurance of
any manned airborne ISR platform. The P-8A ISR systems suite includes a
radar capable of surface search, inverse synthetic aperture radar
(ISAR), and synthetic aperture radar (SAR), an electro-optical and
infrared (EO/IR) high definition camera, and an electronic support
measures (ESM) system capable of detecting, locating, and identifying
threat emissions from long range. Additionally, the P-8A is capable of
carrying the Advanced Airborne Sensor (AAS) active electronically
scanned array radar. Onboard systems automatically correlate data from
many sensors, synthesize this information, and provide input to
national and regional intelligence databases. When used in conjunction
with other fleet and joint assets, the P-8A Poseidon expands the reach
and lethality of our military forces in the current and future fight.
The P-8A is not designed to perform JSTARS airborne battle management
missions or participate in the high-end air-to-air battle. Like most
large profile, non-radar evading aircraft, the P-8A has a considerable
radar cross section and it presents a large target for radar guided
missiles. As our adversaries and near-peer competitors develop longer
range surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles, the Navy continues to
study and evaluate radar counter-measure systems to provide onboard
protection for the P-8A. When dictated by mission location and
increased threat levels, P-8A can be supported by Strike Group or
theater fighter escorts to perform their primary mission. Through use
of advanced long range stand-off sensors, netted C4I systems, and well-
developed Strike Group procedures, the P-8A will remain aware of
threats and will operate away from the high-end air fight.
14. Senator Perdue. Admiral Richardson and Secretary Spencer, why
will the P-8 continue to be a valuable ISR asset to the Navy?
Admiral Richardson and Secretary Spencer. The P-8A's primary
mission is broad area Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW). The P-8A's primary
role during major combat operations is to conduct ASW operations in
support of Strike Group operations. The P-3C Orion, which retires in
2020, and the P-8A are the only fixed-wing, long range platforms
capable of performing this ASW mission set.
Secondary missions for the P-8A include Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW)
and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions. As
an ISR asset, the P-8A has a robust systems suite and the longest range
and endurance of any manned airborne ISR platform. The P-8A ISR systems
suite includes a radar capable of surface search, inverse synthetic
aperture radar (ISAR), and synthetic aperture radar (SAR), an electro-
optical and infrared (EO/IR) high definition camera, and an electronic
support measures (ESM) system capable of detecting, locating, and
identifying threat emissions from long range. Additionally, the P-8A is
capable of carrying the Advanced Airborne Sensor (AAS) active
electronically scanned array radar. Onboard systems automatically
correlate data from many sensors, synthesize this information, and
provide input to national and regional intelligence databases. When
used in conjunction with other fleet and joint assets, the P-8A
Poseidon expands the reach and lethality of our military forces in the
current and future fight.
The P-8A is not designed to perform JSTARS airborne battle
management missions or participate in the high-end air-to-air battle.
Like most large profile, non-radar evading aircraft, the P-8A has a
considerable radar cross section and it presents a large target for
radar guided missiles. As our adversaries and near-peer competitors
develop longer range surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles, the Navy
continues to study and evaluate radar counter-measure systems to
provide onboard protection for the P-8A. When dictated by mission
location and increased threat levels, P-8A can be supported by Strike
Group or theater fighter escorts to perform their primary mission.
Through use of advanced long range stand-off sensors, netted C4I
systems, and well-developed Strike Group procedures, the P-8A will
remain aware of threats and will operate away from the high-end air
fight.
concerns regarding hypersonic threats
15. Senator Perdue. General Neller and Admiral Richardson, in an
Emerging Threats Subcommittee hearing, we heard from Dr. Griffin, the
Under Secretary for Research and Engineering about some alarming
developments. Dr. Griffin told us that China has fielded, or is close
to fielding, hypersonic delivery systems for conventional prompt strike
that can reach out thousands of kilometers from the Chinese shore and
hold our carrier battlegroups or our forward deployed forces on land
that we have based in the region. Equally troubling, DARPA, which has
done some of the most significant work on hyper-sonics in the nation,
has only one wind tunnel that they can use for hypersonic research.
What are your concerns regarding the growing threat from China and
Russia on hyper-sonics to hold your forward deployed forces or your
carrier battlegroups at risk?
General Neller. This spring, the Secretary of Defense directed the
Joint Staff to conduct a competitive area study of all five battle
domains in order to address threats in each domain. This study takes
into consideration the National Defense Strategy and the Defense
Planning Guidance. The Marine Corps is actively engaged in this joint
study. This combined effort includes working with the Strategic
Capabilities Office, DARPA, and with industry to examine how we can
improve the capabilities we have and develop future capabilities to
detect, track, and defeat hypersonic threats. Further, we recognize
that we must both defend against hypersonic threats, as well as, pursue
hypersonic offensive capabilities to counter land and sea-based
threats. These on-going efforts can be addressed in a classified
setting at your convenience.
Admiral Richardson. Navy is focused on the hypersonic problem.
Because of their long range and high speed, these weapons can deny
access to vital areas of operation, diminish our ability to exert
influence, and endanger our forces in theater. Navy has been working
closely with the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) \1\ for the past two
years to assess and perfect our ability to detect, track, and engage
these difficult threats. The Navy works collaboratively with the Air
Force, DARPA, MDA, Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) Office, and NASA on
hypersonic research and leverages the advances to apply to Navy and
Marine Corps warfighting needs. We are giving this project highest
priority because of the seriousness of the hypersonic threat, and the
offensive opportunities hypersonic weapons provide.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ In accordance with Section 1687 of Public Law 114-328, National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, which designates the
MDA Director as Executive Agent for development of Hypersonic Defense
(HD), MDA, working with the Services and Defense Agencies, is
developing defensive architectures from detection to intercept.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
More details can be provided in a classified setting.
16. Senator Perdue. General Neller and Admiral Richardson, how are
you working to defeat and defend against the hypersonic threat?
General Neller. We recognize that we must both defend against
hypersonic threats, as well as, pursue hypersonic offensive
capabilities to counter land and sea-based threats. These on-going
efforts can be addressed in a classified setting at your convenience.
Admiral Richardson. Navy is focused on the hypersonic problem.
Because of their long range and high speed, these weapons can deny
access to vital areas of operation, diminish our ability to exert
influence, and endanger our forces in theater. Navy has been working
closely with the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) \1\ for the past two
years to assess and perfect our ability to detect, track, and engage
these difficult threats. The Navy works collaboratively with the Air
Force, DARPA, MDA, Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) Office, and NASA on
hypersonic research and leverages the advances to apply to Navy and
Marine Corps warfighting needs. We are giving this project highest
priority because of the seriousness of the hypersonic threat, and the
offensive opportunities hypersonic weapons provide.
More details can be provided in a classified setting.
cyber
17. Senator Perdue. General Neller, I understand the Marine Corps
has created a cyber military occupational specialty with enlisted
positions and offensive and defensive officer roles. Will Marines in
these cyber MOS's rotate into non-cyber related jobs or will they
primarily be able to remain in the cyber field?
General Neller. The Marine Corps traditionally fences off its new
investments to assure mission success. Every Marine seeks personal and
professional satisfaction.
Our specialists in cyber are no different; they are first and
foremost Marines. ``We will make them as we make all other Marines,
deliberately and with due consideration for our investment in human
capital.''
Wisdom dictates that we apply the best Marine into the most
appropriate fit. We anticipate many of these Marines will be thrust
into the throes of cyber operations and be fully occupied from day one
of their careers. We continue to plan for cases where some marines may
pursue additional challenges such as Drill Instructor, Marine Security
Guard or Recruiting Duty, but they will be exceptional instances.
There are cross-functional advantages to be had and the Marine
Corps is not limiting itself in this new endeavor. We are excited at
the road which lies ahead and our marines are chomping at the bit. It
is gratifying to see Marines from all walks of life and more than two
dozen different occupational fields seek lateral entry into
Occupational Field 17.
18. Senator Perdue. General Neller, what will be the career
progression of Marines in the cyber MOS's?
General Neller. Our Cyber Marines will cut their teeth in the
Marine Expeditionary Forces Information Groups. After Boot Camp and
initial schooling they will learn the role of the network defender,
protecting those deployed furthest from the shield. This will ensure
that Cyber Marines operating at the tactical edge understand the
integrated nature of the Marine Air Ground Task Force and can master
effects in cyberspace. Proficiency with the tools of the trade and
familiarity with the operational tactics, techniques and procedures
that prevail in amphibious environments keep us grounded, focused on
the Navy-Marine team in every domain of warfare.
As those marines gain experience and expertise, we anticipate they
will advance as Non-Commissioned Officers into the ranks of the Cyber
Mission Forces. The diversity of missions will lead to a well-rounded
and enthusiastic cadre of Staff Non-Commissioned Officers who can then
specialize into the restricted officer ranks where they might grow into
Chief Warrant Officers and Limited Duty Officers. Or perhaps even
pursue commissions as 1702 Cyberspace Operations Officers.
Marines coming from the cyber forces will naturally align to
positions of greater responsibility where their operational savvy and
technical acumen raise them to advise our Marine Expeditionary Forces
and Marine Corps Forces worldwide. Our aim is to establish a virtuous
rotation where Marine leadership is the first lesson learned and placed
into practice to guide fulfilling careers.
marine corps logistics base--albany
19. Senator Perdue. General Neller, as you know, Marine Corps
Logistics Base Albany suffered hundreds of millions of dollars in
damage to equipment and facilities in the 2017 tornados. Could you give
the total dollar amount of that damage?
General Neller.
Funding for Equipment Repairs (Mar 18)
- Fiscal year 2017: $7.8 million in expenditures approved by
HQMC
- Fiscal year 2018: LOGCOM expects to receive $61.2 million
ISO of storm regeneration
- Fiscal year 2019: $61.2 million programmed, controls
currently reflect $52.0 million, a reduction of $9.2 million
- Fiscal year 2020: $106.7 million programmed, controls
currently reflect $103.8 million, a reduction of $2.9 million
Total facilities related costs for clean-up, emergency
repairs and permanent repairs and construction = $208 million
- Fiscal year 2017--$88 million (MC O&M) funded and contracted
for facility repairs
- Fiscal year 2017--$15 million (DLA WCF) funded and
contracted for facility repairs
- Fiscal year 2018--$16 million (MC O&M) approved in the
straddle program for facility repairs
- Fiscal year 2018--$43 million (MILCON) funded for
replacement warehouse
- Fiscal year 2020/21--$46 million (MILCON) requested for a
2nd replacement warehouse (not approved)
20. Senator Perdue. General Neller, what is the status of the
recovery and repair of Albany?
General Neller.
Equipment
- Equipment storm regeneration LTIs is 73 percent complete (4
May 18)
- Of the 47,390 Principle End Item requirement:
- 34,681 have been completed
- 12,709 require Limited Technical Inspection (LTI)
Sixty-four facilities damaged and in various stages of
disrepair
- All forestry related clean-up and replanting is complete
- Twenty facilities repairs are complete
- Fourty-four facilities repairs are underway
- Sixty-five percent of the overall repair work is completed
- On track to award the final $16 million in O&M funded
repairs NLT 30 June 18
- The first MILCON project (P977 200,000SF Climate Controlled
Combat Vehicle Warehouse) is in the pre-award phase and is on track to
be awarded by NAVFAC before 31 Dec 2018.
21. Senator Perdue. General Neller, what was the impact of
Congress's inability to pass the 2018 budget on time to the recovery
efforts in Albany?
General Neller. No reportable impacts based on the CR specifically
to storm recovery.
use of defense logistics agency for services
22. Senator Perdue. Admiral Richardson, the military services have,
to varying degrees, transferred retail supply, storage, and
distribution functions at their depot-level industrial sites to the
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and achieved some efficiencies.
Specifically, Air Force Air Logistics Complexes (ALC) and Navy Fleet
Readiness Centers (FRC) transferred all retail supply, storage, and
distribution functions to DLA over the course of several years, which
has led to a number of benefits, including a 20 percent reduction in
on-hand inventory and a 10 percent reduction in backorders at the Air
Force ALCs over a 5-year period. By contrast, the Army and Marine Corps
have retained most supply functions at their depots and DLA manages
inventory at the Navy shipyards while still using Navy systems and
processes, rather than those of DLA. What steps are the Navy pursuing
in collaboration with DLA to improve the efficiency and effectiveness
of retail supply, storage, and distribution functions at the depots and
shipyards?
Admiral Richardson. The Navy's transfer of SS&D functions within
the depots and shipyards to DLA have been completed. The Navy and DLA
continue to finalize a Strategic Memorandum of Agreement (SMOA) to
align the command and control structure within the shipyard to improve
the efficiency and effectiveness of supply support functions executed
by both DLA and Navy.
23. Senator Perdue. General Neller, why has the Marine Corps been
reluctant to transfer aspects of the noted functions to DLA and are
there plans/efforts underway to do so?
General Neller. MARCORLOGCOM transferred depot-level industrial
retail storage and distribution functions to the Defense Logistics
Agency (DLA) in 2009. In Q1 of fiscal year 2018, MARCORLOGCOM launched
a study to develop a Business Case Analysis (BCA) that would provide an
objective, third-party perspective on the merits of transferring the
depot-level industrial ``Supply'' functions to DLA. Based on the
results of the BCA, LOGCOM intends to move forward with transferring
industrial supply functions to DLA in order to gain additional
efficiencies in support of depot-level maintenance.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill
upgrades to e/a 18g growler
24. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Spencer, I understand that the
Navy plans to request upgrades for Tactical Targeting Network
Technology, Engine Enhancements, and Reactive Electronic Attack
Measures for the E/A-18G Growlers, but the current plan begins funding
in fiscal year 2020. What benefits will exist for the Navy and
warfighter if these capabilities were funded earlier?
Secretary Spencer. The President's Fiscal Year 2019 Budget (PB19)
reflects the best balance of warfighting requirements given available
resources. If additional funds are made available, the Navy's Fiscal
Year 2019 Unfunded Priorities List (UPL) includes requests to
accelerate recovery from capacity and capability risk that has
accumulated in Naval aviation. The list includes: Tactical Targeting
Network Technology (TTNT); F/A-18E/F Super Hornet engine enhancements;
and EA-18G Reactive Electronic Attack Measures (REAM) Cognitive
Electronic Warfare (EW). Tactical Targeting Network Technology (TTNT):
Additional fiscal year 2019 funding accelerates TTNT System Design and
Development, accelerating platform integration for the E-2D, EA-18G and
F/A-18E/F to achieve an Initial Operational Capability (IOC) of 2021.
Engine Enhancements: Additional fiscal year 2019 funding accelerates
timelines by 1 year. Reactive Electronic Attack Measures (REAM)
Cognitive EW for the E/A-18G Growlers: Additional fiscal year 2019
funding accelerates timelines by 1 year.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
submarine maintenance
25. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Spencer, through last year's
NDAA, I required the Navy to submit a report on how they plan to
address this maintenance backlog. The report delivered in February
stated, ``The Navy intends to execute all the workload programmed at
the Naval Ship Yards, with no availabilities moving from the public to
the private sector.'' Just last month at a HASC hearing and this month
before this committee, you acknowledged that private yards will be more
involved with maintenance. As we are receiving mixed messaging, can you
please provide more clarity on how you plan to proceed?
Secretary Spencer. The Navy intends to continue to utilize the
entire industrial base as it annually assesses future workload
requirements and seeks to mitigate workload peaks within any given
year. As such, consideration will be given to balancing the workload
across the public and private sectors to support future maintenance and
modernization requirements, as well as supporting the growth of the
private sector workforce to prepare for the new construction of future
ship classes.
26. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson,
does the Columbia-class Program remain the Navy's top priority program?
Do you agree we must do everything to ensure it remains on track? As
such, do you agree that ensuring a healthy workforce in the yards
building this program is in the Navy's best interests? Will you commit
to reviewing the feasibility of shifting a small number of near-term,
backlogged maintenance availabilities to the private yards to help
smooth out this workload valley?
Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson. Columbia is the Navy's
top acquisition program. The Navy is committed to taking all necessary
actions to ensure the fulfillment of U.S. STRATCOM requirements as it
balances other priorities within the enterprise. Ensuring a healthy and
capable private sector workforce is critical to satisfying this
commitment. As such, consideration will be given to balancing the
workload across the public and private sectors, including shifting
backlogged submarine maintenance availabilities to the private yards to
support the growth of the private sector workforce to prepare for the
new construction of future ship classes.
columbia-class and submarine industrial base
27. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson, I
spoke with STRATCOM Commander General Hyten last month on the
importance of the defense industrial base for the Columbia-class. He
said, ``the shipyards are a critical national asset to America. It's
one of our strengths, and that workforce is essential to us being able
to build Columbia, to be able to build Virginia. And I think it's the
responsibility of all of us, including the Federal Government, to make
sure that that workforce--which is a strategic asset--is supported
across the board.'' He went on to say, ``Every worker that's at a
shipyard that is working on the Columbia is part of our national
security infrastructure.'' Do you agree with General Hyten?
Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson. Yes. A skilled shipyard
workforce is critical to the infrastructure that produces the Navy's
submarines, carriers, and other combatant ships that are vital to
national security. With respect to the shipbuilding industrial base
supporting our submarine and carrier construction, the Navy is actively
engaged with the shipbuilders to ensure the right skillsets and
capacity are available as the nation ramps up production.
28. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson,
would you support increased advance procurement funding to add capacity
and capability to prepare the industrial base for a substantial
increase in work?
Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson. The Navy appreciates the
additional $225 million Advance Procurement (AP) funding added by
Congress in the fiscal year 2018 appropriations bill for the Virginia-
class submarine program, specifically for industrial base expansion.
This additional funding will be used to improve the supplier base's
ability to support future submarine construction demand. Investments in
2018 in supplier base risk reduction will begin to address specific and
validated facility, skilled labor, and machinery shortfalls. AP funding
helps the industrial base prepare for increased work. Additional
funding reduces the schedule risk for the Columbia-class construction
along with the Virginia-class construction, and supports facility
investments, workforce increases, vendor equipment decisions, and
workload leveling.
The Navy is continuously looking for ways to reduce the risk to
Columbia-class procurement while also balancing these investments
against other Navy priorities.
29. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson,
do you agree that worker training grants provided by the Federal
Government play an important role in supporting the defense industrial
base, and therefore DOD? Do you think we should increase funding that
helps train workers that build our systems?
Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson. Yes, the worker training
grants (such as the U.S. Department of Labor Sector Partnership
National Emergency Grant and U.S. Department of Labor Workforce
Innovation Fund) play an important role and have directly benefitted
the defense industrial base. Grants such as these have resulted in the
support of the hiring needs and the critical competencies required by
the defense industrial base. The Navy is projecting a significant
workload increase across the entire shipbuilding industry, especially
in the submarine industrial base with the addition of the Columbia-
class. This increase in work will require training and hiring outside
of the current shipbuilding industry, and these grants help to ensure
there are enough people with the right skills available in the right
places to support the Navy's shipbuilding plan. An increase in funding
to these programs would be beneficial to the Navy and its partners.
fiscal year 2019 shipbuilding plan
30. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson,
the Fiscal Year 2019 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan considers adding three
Virginias per year in a dozen of the out years--with the nearest
possibilities being fiscal years 2022, 2023, 2025--to reach the
required 66 attack submarines sooner than the late 2040s. How can
Congress best support you in this goal to further accelerate
production?
Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson. The 30-year shipbuilding
plan, and the Navy's fiscal year (FY) 2019 submission establishes an
acquisition profile that grows the force at a sustainable, affordable
rate while protecting the overall balanced warfighting investment
strategy. Should additional funding become available to pursue a more
aggressive acquisition strategy, principally to reach 66 attack
submarines sooner than the late 2040s, the Government will need to
commit as early as possible to building additional Virginia-class
Submarines to support facility/fixture additions, workforce increases,
and vendor equipment manufacturing decisions. An early commitment in
the form of three-year Advance Procurement (AP) funding in fiscal year
2019 and funding for additional fixtures is required as detailed below.
1. Three-year AP for the Nuclear Industrial Base (NIB) is required
to support the additional submarines in fiscal year 2022 and fiscal
year 2023 and then in fiscal year 2025 (outside the Future Years
Defense Program (FYDP)). Given the current capacity of the NIB and
manufacturing lead time associated with nuclear propulsion plant
equipment, the ability to provide funding three years prior to
authorization is critical to the efficient construction of these
submarines.
2. Three-year AP for contractor furnished equipment is also
required to support the additional submarines in fiscal year 2022,
fiscal year 2023 and fiscal year 2025. This funding would be used to
procure critical parts in advance thereby reducing risk to
manufacturing. Additionally, to further reduce the risk to the fiscal
year 2022, fiscal year 2023 and fiscal year 2025 ships, the Navy would
accelerate its AP buys--what would traditionally be purchased with two-
year and one-year AP would now be purchased with three-year AP and two-
year AP respectively--to purchase items such as Virginia Payload Module
tube components, air conditioning plants, and other critical path
items. Procuring material via three-year AP has the added benefit of
allowing for more efficient production without the need to facilitize
to support a short-term increase to three-per-year production.
3. Fourty-six million dollars in direct facilities funding is
necessary in fiscal year 2019 to allow for additional fixtures (tube
insertion and tube pairing) required for the increase in production.
Other funding for acceleration of or additional facilities will be
addressed through contract incentives.
4. Comparable amount of economic order quantity (EOQ) funding is
included early in the Block V for the third ships in fiscal year 2022
and fiscal year 2023 and in Block VI for the third ship in fiscal year
2025.
Additionally, within projected Navy top line in the FYDP, without a
commitment to provide the funding for the additional ships during the
construction of the Columbia-class SSBN, Navy will be forced to reduce
funding for other necessary procurement programs.
31. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson,
what changes or planning is required for the near-term additions in
fiscal years 2022, 2023, 2025? Do you believe you are ready to meet
this challenge?
Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson. The Navy is ready to meet
the challenge, but lacks the funding to do so. The 30-year shipbuilding
plan, and the President's Fiscal Year 2019 Budget submission
establishes an acquisition profile that grows the force at a
sustainable, affordable rate while protecting the overall balanced
warfighting investment strategy. Within the projected Navy top line in
the Future Years Defense Program, without a commitment to provide the
funding for the additional Virginia-class Submarines (VCS) during the
construction of the Columbia-class SSBN, Navy will be forced to reduce
funding for other necessary procurement programs.
The near term need is three-year advance procurement and economic
order quantity funding of $1 billion in fiscal year 2019 for additional
VCS in the fiscal year 2022 and 2023.
In addition to supporting additional funding requirements for VCS
in fiscal year 2022, 2023 and 2025, facility additions and upgrades,
beyond sustained two VCS per year requirements, are necessary across
General Dynamics Electric Boat and Huntington Ingalls Industries--
Newport News Shipbuilding manufacturing, outfitting, and final assembly
and test facilities. These facilities requirements reflect the
increased pace and capacity needed to support all stages of
construction. The shipbuilders would require acceleration of their
current facilities master plans as well as new facilities and fixtures.
As the VCS program has used a Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) provision in
prior Multi-Year Procurement (MYP) contracts to encourage facility
investment, the Block V MYP (and Block VI, as necessary) contract will
contain a similar CAPEX/Construction Readiness provision to incentivize
executing the accelerated, increased facilities footprint. Therefore,
there is minimal direct funding associated with fixtures as the
majority of the facilities changes would be incentivized through CAPEX
provisions and would come from each ship's funding.
Executing the increased VCS production, while not impacting the
stated priority of Columbia on-time delivery, will likely result in
increased construction spans for all VCSs in the three per year build
years. It is expected that shipbuilder facility additions, additional
labor resources, and efforts to shorten construction cadences will
serve to mitigate construction span increases to some degree.
submarine strike capacity
32. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson,
what can you tell us about the Navy's desire to continue building
additional Columbia-class submarines beyond the 12 boats to be
completed in the 2030s?
Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson. The Navy the Nation Needs
(NNN) strategy is sized to ensure a minimum of 10 operational SSBNs are
available. This force structure is based on force survivability. A
minimum force of 12 total Columbia SSBNs ensures that the nation has at
least 10 operational SSBNs to accommodate the ship's planned mid-life
overhaul. The Navy could potentially procure additional Columbia-class
SSBNs or similar platforms if necessitated by changes in the strategic
environment.
isr capabilities in the pacific
33. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson,
in PACOM Commander Admiral Harris' recent statement to this Committee
before PACOM's posture hearing he stated, ``the challenge of gathering
credible, deep, and penetrating intelligence cannot be overstated. The
Indo-Pacific presents a dynamic security environment requiring
persistent and intrusive ISR to provide indications, warning and
situational awareness across a vast geographic area . . . The rapid
modernization of our peer competitors requires additional advancements
in how our intelligence is collected and processed, including the
associated risks. Our ISR capabilities must be suited to our unique
operating environment.'' Do you believe the Navy possesses the ISR
capabilities to accomplish its missions in the Pacific?
Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson. ISR Capabilities are in
very high demand across the globe, including the Indo-Pacific. The
Indo-Pacific operating environment presents a dynamic set of
challenges. To address these challenges, Navy has taken steps to field
capabilities that are agile, resilient, persistent, and networked
ensuring all Naval and Combatant Commander (CCMD) requirements are met.
The Maritime Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance & Targeting
(MISR&T) capabilities fielded by the Navy are integral to achieving a
more lethal, agile, and responsive Naval Force.
The initiatives included in the Navy's Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 budget
submission advance the ability to operate effectively in all warfare
domains. Fiscal year 2019 programmatic adjustments represent the best
balance of cost effective capabilities necessary to meet challenges in
the Pacific and around the world. The following programs highlight a
few of the key initiatives Navy is taking to improve capabilities:
The Navy is pursuing Integrated Undersea Surveillance
System (IUSS) recapitalization that supports Combatant Command and
Fleet requirements and partner nation agreements in the Pacific. This
effort includes consideration of a replacement for the Navy's aging
cable repair ship and a mix of mobile and deployable sensor systems to
provide flexible coverage against shifting current and future threats
across large areas of ocean. Navy also funds research and development
designed to improve our ability to detect and classify submarines in
large expanses of ocean.
The Navy has funded design and procurement of the
Surveillance Towed Array Senor System (SURTASS) T-AGOS replacement, all
five of which are currently stationed in the Pacific Area of
Responsibility. The seven new T-AGOS vessels are expected to be more
capable than the current vessels and more responsive to fleet
operational needs. Construction of is scheduled to begin in fiscal year
2022. Navy is also investigating the options for an Expeditionary
SURTASS capability which will allow rapid fielding on vessels capable
of hosting the system.
The MQ-4C Triton Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) will
provide the Fleet and CCMD with a persistent, robust, and agile network
of sensors to provide indications and warnings (I&W) and situational
awareness across vast geographic areas like the Pacific. Triton's high-
altitude, long-endurance, and advanced maritime sensors provide
capability in high-density sea-lanes, littorals, and areas of national
interest. When fully operational, Triton will provide near worldwide
coverage through a network of five orbits. Triton will field in a
baseline configuration in fiscal year 2018, with an Advanced Radar
system, Automatic Identification System, Electronic Support Measures,
Link-16, and Common Data Link. Baseline capability will be replaced in
fiscal year 2021, by a multiple intelligence (multi-INT) configuration
which adds additional SIGINT apertures. Throughout the lifecycle of the
MQ-4C Triton system, the Navy will implement phased capability upgrades
to outpace the evolving threat, to better adapt to near-peer
competitors.
As part of the Distributed Maritime Operations Concept,
Navy is integrating the Government owned Minotaur geo-fusion engine
across the fleet. Minotaur provides a platform agnostic decision
superiority tool which allows for single and multi-platform cueing,
collection, detection, classification and identification which bring
the ability to better network all Navy assets. Minotaur is already
resident on the Navy's EP-3E ISR aircraft and planning is in progress
for future integration across all air, surface, and subsurface
platforms.
The Navy also leverages National Technical Means (NTM) to support
persistent wide-area ocean surveillance as well as naval intelligence
functions such as: I&W, current operational intelligence, intelligence
preparation of the operational environment, intelligence assessment,
and security. NTM capabilities also feed all-source intelligence
analysis to inform Navy warfighting decisions, planning, and actions at
the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare.
34. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson,
what options are you considering to improve ISR capabilities in the
Navy; specifically, those suited for the vast expanse of the Pacific?
Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson. The Navy plans, develops,
and deploys Maritime Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance &
Targeting (MISR&T) capabilities and capacity to satisfy Combatant
Command requirements. The MISR&T capabilities funded by the Navy are
integral to achieving a more lethal, agile, and responsive Naval Force.
Navy continues to leverage our service partners and the intelligence
community to ensure full spectrum Battlespace Awareness is available in
the Pacific during all phases of warfare.
The initiatives included in the Navy's Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 budget
submission advance our ability to operate effectively in all warfare
domains. Fiscal year 2019 programmatic adjustments represent the best
balance of cost effective capabilities necessary to meet and defeat
challenges in the Pacific and around the world. The following programs
highlight a few of the key initiatives Navy is taking to improve
capabilities:
The Navy is pursuing Integrated Undersea Surveillance
System (IUSS) recapitalization that supports Combatant Command and
Fleet requirements and partner nation agreements in the Pacific. This
effort includes consideration of a replacement for the Navy's aging
cable repair ship and a mix of mobile and deployable sensor systems to
provide flexible coverage against shifting current and future threats
across large areas of ocean. Navy also funds research and development
designed to improve our ability to detect and classify submarines in
large expanses of ocean.
The Navy has funded design and procurement of the
Surveillance Towed Array Senor System (SURTASS) T-AGOS replacement, all
five of which are currently stationed in the Pacific Area of
Responsibility. The seven new T-AGOS vessels are expected to be more
capable than the current vessels and more responsive to fleet
operational needs. Construction of is scheduled to begin in fiscal year
2022. Navy is also investigating the options for an Expeditionary
SURTASS capability which will allow rapid fielding on vessels capable
of hosting the system.
The MQ-4C Triton Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) will
provide the Fleet and Combatant Commander (CCMD) with a persistent,
robust, and agile network of sensors to provide indications and
warnings (I&W) and situational awareness across vast geographic areas
like the Pacific. Triton's high-altitude, long-endurance, and advanced
maritime sensors provide capability in high-density sea-lanes,
littorals, and areas of national interest. When fully operational,
Triton will provide near worldwide coverage through a network of five
orbits. Triton will field in a baseline configuration in fiscal year
2018, with an Advanced Radar system, Automatic Identification System,
Electronic Support Measures, Link-16, and Common Data Link. Baseline
capability will be replaced in fiscal year 2021, by a multiple
intelligence (multi-INT) configuration which adds additional SIGINT
apertures. Throughout the lifecycle of the MQ-4C Triton system, the
Navy will implement phased capability upgrades to outpace the evolving
threat, to better adapt to near-peer competitors.
As part of the Distributed Maritime Operations Concept,
Navy is integrating the Government owned Minotaur geo-fusion engine
across the fleet. Minotaur provides a platform agnostic decision
superiority tool which allows for single and multi-platform cueing,
collection, detection, classification and identification which bring
the ability to better network all Navy assets. Minotaur is already
resident on the Navy's EP-3E ISR aircraft and planning is in progress
for future integration across all air, surface, and subsurface
platforms.
The Navy also leverages National Technical Means (NTM) to support
persistent wide-area ocean surveillance as well as naval intelligence
functions such as: I&W, current operational intelligence, intelligence
preparation of the operational environment, intelligence assessment,
and security. NTM capabilities also feed all-source intelligence
analysis to inform Navy warfighting decisions, planning, and actions at
the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare.
navy rotary wing aircraft report
35. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Spencer, last year's NDAA
included a reporting requirement that directed you to submit a report
that describes and assesses production of anti-submarine warfare
helicopters and search and rescue helicopters in support of the 355-
ship Navy; however, the letter you provided to this Committee merits
further consideration. Does the current rotary wing aircraft inventory
meet the needs of a 355-ship Navy--regardless of the mix?
Secretary Spencer. In accordance with House Report 115-219,
accompanying the Department of Defense Appropriations Bill for Fiscal
Year 2018, the Navy recently completed a Force Structure Assessment and
force level study for its helicopter fleet. This assessment and ensuing
Report to Congress, which we are providing to the Congressional
Committees under separate cover, assessed the increasing capacity
requirements for MH-60R/S aircraft as ship inventories grow to achieve
the Navy's 355-ship objective outlined in the 30-year shipbuilding
plan. This report concluded that, assuming current deployment ratios
and aircraft-support requirements for the Navy's surface fleet remain
as they are today, the Navy's inventory of MH-60 helicopters is
sufficient to meet demands until the early 2030's, though some modest
service-life extension measures may be required. However, a gradual
increase in the surface ship inventory is expected to create demand
that will eventually exceed current inventory. The report concluded
that the Navy will require adjustments in rotary wing aircraft
inventory, principally the MH-60R, in order to meet this demand. The
MH-60R capacity requirement is driven primarily by the number of
Carrier Air Wings, Large Surface Combatants, Small Surface Combatants,
and their requisite air wing and helicopter detachment compositions.
Options to achieve the increased capacity requirements include
procurement of Future Vertical Lift (FVL). The Navy is participating in
the Army-led, FVL effort. FVL will address concerns about the
increasing demand signal while accounting for service life of existing
MH-60R/S aircraft. FVL will phase in modern, state-of-the-art manned
and unmanned air vehicles that will meet all of the Navy's future
warfighting needs both in terms of capability and capacity. Other
options include Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) for MH-60R/S,
continued minimum sustaining rate procurement of MH-60R, and
combinations of FVL, SLEP, and continued MH-60R procurement.
36. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Spencer, on the 40 aircraft you
mention that are to be put in storage for future use, is there a
current plan for them? Will they be used as spares?
Secretary Spencer. Those aircraft will eventually be returned to
the active inventory as demand increases. In the interim, the storage/
preservation of aircraft--to include the nearly 40 that are in storage
today--will be used to manage flight-hour expenditures on our high-hour
airframes.
37. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Spencer, the letter mentions,
``the Navy will also employ modernization efforts, mid-life upgrades,
and service life extension programs as needed to meet unforeseen
variations in inventory demand.'' Is the Navy considering moving away
from a service life extension program for the MH-60 fleet?
Secretary Spencer. The cost and scope of service-life extensions
needs to be balanced against available resources and competing
priorities. It is likely the production timeline of follow-on Future
Vertical Lift will necessitate some sort of limited MH-60 extension
program.
38. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Spencer, the mid-life upgrades
you reference in your letter have not yet been budgeted for the MH-60
fleet. If the Navy is going to conduct a service life extension program
for the MH-60 fleet, should it also plan for a mid-life upgrade?
Secretary Spencer. The fiscal year 2019 President's Budget request
includes limited funding in the PE 0604216N budget exhibit (R-1 Line
#108) to commence mid-life upgrade capability studies. The results of
these studies coupled with the timeline for production of Future
Vertical Lift, will drive requirements for a mid-life upgrade.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie Hirono
navy rotc
39. Senator Hirono. Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson, the
University of Hawaii provides an ideal location for the establishment
of a Navy ROTC unit, given its close proximity to the Pacific theater
and excellent educational programs. Senior Navy leadership have
promoted the idea of bringing Navy ROTC to the University of Hawaii due
to the strong Naval presence in the state, the university's diverse
pool of talented students and because the nearest Naval ROTC detachment
is at least 2,500 miles away in California. The University of Hawaii
has been home to Army and Air Force ROTC programs which have produced
excellent officers for many decades. If you agree with the rationale I
just described, will you work with me to help make Navy ROTC at the
University of Hawaii a reality?
Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson. We agree that University
of Hawaii has high potential as a NROTC unit, and we look forward to
working with you on making it a reality. Given our program's current
excess capacity, it would be essential to disestablish some under-
performing units to better align capacity with the true officer
commissioning requirement, and to serve as a funding offset for
consideration of any new units. Toward that end, we would request your
assistance with gaining statutory relief from the prohibition in recent
Department of Defense Appropriations Acts against planning for and
executing Senior ROTC unit disestablishments as a path for establishing
a new unit at the University of Hawaii.
aviation mishaps
40. Senator Hirono. Admiral Richardson and General Neller, in 2017
the Navy and Marine Corps combined had 20 Class A aviation mishaps,
which was the worst year for the Marine Corps since 2004. Already there
have been several Class A mishaps in 2018 as well, including several
fatalities. This tragic loss of life and significant damage to aircraft
comes on top of significant issues with Physiological Episodes in
tactical aircraft. While each mishap is unique and requires its own
investigation into root causes, I hope that both services are looking
deeply to find trends that apply across all Naval Aviation. Have any
trends or causal factors common to these incidents been identified at
this time?
Admiral Richardson. Mishaps can be characterized which allows for a
year-to-year comparison. The characterizations typically include:
aircrew human factors, maintenance human factors, facilities human
factors, and material failure (including bird-strike mishaps).
Especially in cases where investigations are immature or the aircraft
has not been salvaged, ``unknown'' is the only possible
characterization. In some cases, two or more characterizations are
assigned to a mishap (e.g. material failure followed by aircrew human
factors).
In fiscal year 2017 Naval Aviation experienced 19 Class A Flight
Mishaps (One mishap was recently downgraded to a Class B). The initial
analysis of those mishaps shows, 14 had an aircrew human factors
component, one had a maintenance human factors component, two had a
facilities human factors component, two have a material failure
component, and one is unknown.
Thus far in fiscal year 2018, Naval Aviation has experienced 12
Class A Flight Mishaps. The initial analysis of those mishaps shows,
five have an aircrew human factors component, zero have a maintenance
human factors component, zero have a facilities human factors
component, five have a material failure component, and three are
unknown.
When comparing mishap characterizations to the total number of
mishaps in a fiscal year the percentage trends indicate a decrease in
mishaps with an aircrew human factors component and an increase in
mishaps with a material failure component.
Despite a short term spike (in conjunction with recent and pointed
media coverage), Class A Flight Mishap rates have changed very little
over the last decade. Mishap prevention is always an utmost priority to
the Naval Aviation Enterprise.
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
General Neller.
It goes without saying that safety is our top priority.
Although mishap trends have nearly doubled since 2013, the increase has
been attributed to Class ``C'' mishaps (damage to aircraft of $50,000
or more, but less than $500,000; or a nonfatal injury or illness that
results in one or more days away from work, not including the day of
the injury).
The more serious Class A and B mishap rates, among manned
aircraft, have remained relatively steady over the last 5 years and are
not contributing to the increasing trend we observed.
We must eliminate all factors that cause or contribute to
mishaps. We have determined that the increase in Class C mishaps is
attributed to human error--primarily due to reduced supervision and
attrition of experienced maintainers.
We learned from the Navy's 2017 Strategic Readiness
Review that we must develop a more structured data-driven learning
culture to increase the institutional attention to the core
fundamentals. We are doing that in our aviation communities by
developing a consolidated Naval Air Forces Safety Management System
policy to refocus commands on getting ``back to the basics.'' This
effort includes methods to increase awareness and oversight on
Squadrons, Wings, and Carriers maintenance processes.
assignment of forces
41. Senator Hirono. Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson,
following the collisions in the Pacific last year there have been
several competing recommendations made regarding the responsibility for
readiness generation in the Pacific. Given that China and Russia have
significant naval capabilities in the Pacific and are clearly named as
strategic competitors in the National Defense Strategy, it appears to
me that it will be more important than ever to protect the speed,
flexibility, and agility of our Pacific forces to respond to potential
emergencies, crises, and contingencies in an expeditious manner. Do you
consider speed, flexibility, and agility to be essential to carrying
out naval operations in the Pacific?
Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson. Yes. Speed, flexibility,
and agility enable the U.S. Navy to maneuver rapidly to gain advantage
and are essential to carrying out naval operations in the Pacific.
42. Senator Hirono. Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson, do
you support any changes to the existing command and control Naval
Forces in the Pacific, including readiness generation, to the extent
that such changes would limit the speed, flexibility, and agility of a
response, and/or place into question our resolve and commitment to our
adversaries and allies in the Indo-Asia Pacific region?
Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson. Our in-depth C2
examination and several table top exercises have revealed that force
generation capacity as well as force employment authority are
capabilities that must be retained by both the Pacific Fleet and Fleet
Forces Commanders because of the large areas and scope of
responsibility their positions hold. Their authority must be
commensurate with their responsibility in repairing, training, and
deploying units as required in time of crisis or war.
energy resilience and assurance
43. Senator Hirono. Admiral Richardson and General Neller, U.S.
energy resilience is a vital component to our national security. The
need to reduce energy consumption, use clean alternative energy
sources, and increase U.S. security is closely tied to our overall
national security and an important goal for all our branches of the
military. How has the Navy and Marine Corps prioritized long-term
energy resilience needs in this budget request in terms of operational
fuel and delivery of electricity to installations?
Admiral Richardson. The Navy addresses energy as a strategic
resource that is essential to the successful execution of the Navy's
afloat and ashore missions. Accordingly, the Navy Energy Strategy
encompasses robust investments in people, technology, and programs
across the Aviation, Expeditionary, Maritime, and Shore enterprises.
I. Operational Energy Investments
The Navy's fiscal year 2019 Energy investments prioritize efforts
that increase lethality and effectiveness of forces through resilience,
operational reach, and forward presence. To increase combat readiness
and mission success, the Navy will make significant short-term gains by
adjusting policies to enable more energy efficient operations,
encouraging awareness and energy-conscious behavior, optimizing
existing technologies to reduce energy consumption, and accelerating
the implementation of new technologies. This includes making
investments in technologies for both our maritime and aviation
platforms, as well as researching the technical feasibility of cost-
effective alternatives for diversifying energy supply and increasing
flexibility.
II. Installation Energy Investments
The Navy recognizes installation energy security as a critical
component to our national security. The fiscal year 2019 budget
emphasizes Energy Security Framework as the model for investments in
our installations, focusing on the three pillars of reliability,
resiliency, and efficiency. The Navy is making investments in
infrastructure to enable a more efficient use of our facilities and
utility systems. We are working with our partners in industry and in
the community to incorporate emerging technologies and processes, as we
continue to leverage third party financing and in kind consideration to
improve mission critical assets. We are enhancing cyber security for
our utilities and other facility-related control systems. Finally, we
are conducting mission assurance assessments to identify
vulnerabilities that will help to prioritize energy security and
infrastructure investment decisions in support of the Navy's mission.
General Neller. The Marine Corps has identified energy resilience
as a priority to ensure that our installations are able to generate
combat power and our ability to protect our nation's interests are
assured through the delivery of reliable and resilient power. We are
reducing our energy consumption and partnering with industry to make
our installations both energy efficient and resilient.
The Marine Corps is making strategic investments that enable
efficiency, cost savings, infrastructure improvements, increased
security and resilience, and increased productivity. Future investment
focuses on six installations that represent approximately 60 percent of
the Marine Corps' total energy consumption including some of the
following projects:
Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune has undergone a large
steam decentralization project that transitioned the installation from
the use of coal-generated steam plants to individual high-efficiency
natural gas-fired boilers. The $150 million project is planned to
produce 636,000 MBTU annual savings (accounting for approximately 6
percent reduction in total USMC energy consumption).
The Marine Corps is also taking advantage of OSD-level
funding not only to address energy efficiency, but to increase the
resilience of our installations. Utilizing funding under the Energy
Resilience and Conservation Investment Program (ERCIP), a micro grid is
being constructed (targeting completion March 2019) at MCAS Miramar
which will provide power and control, including the ability to restore
electrical power to continue full operations during times of
compromised energy supply, of electrical distribution systems
supporting mission critical buildings along the flight-line.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Angus King
navy shipbuilding
44. Senator King. Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson, the
Navy awarded conceptual design contracts for the FFG(X) to five
companies worth $15 million each. Does the current acquisition timeline
still support the release of the request for proposals (RFP) in 4th
quarter fiscal year 2019, and to award a detailed design and
construction (DD&C) contract for the FFG(X) program in fiscal year
2020?
Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson. Yes, while the
acquisition timeline for FFG(X) is aggressive, the Navy is maintaining
the schedule to release the DD&C RFP in the fourth quarter of fiscal
year (FY) 2019 and to award the DD&C contract in the fourth quarter of
fiscal year 2020.
45. Senator King. Secretary Spencer, by ending LCS procurement in
fiscal year 2019 and starting procurement of FFG(X) in fiscal year
2020, what do you assess the implications are for the non-selected
shipyards?
Secretary Spencer. The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) industry teams
have the ability to compete for, and already are competing for,
Government, non-U.S. Government, and commercial work. Should the LCS
industry teams not be successful in securing sufficient workload beyond
LCS, they will have to make business decisions to align with the market
place.
46. Senator King. Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson, the two
DDG-51 shipbuilders are in the process of responding to the Navy's
fiscal year 2018-22 DDG-51 Multiyear Procurement RFP. Are you committed
to a DDG-51 multiyear outcome that will sustain both yards in the large
surface combatant shipbuilding base?
Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson. Yes, the Department is
committed to a DDG 51 multiyear outcome that will sustain both yards in
the large surface combatant shipbuilding base. The Navy considered both
Government and industry objectives, including workload stability and
the opportunity to earn a fair profit, in developing the competitive
strategy for the fiscal year 2018 to fiscal year 2022 DDG 51 Multiyear
Procurement. The solicitation included 10 firm ships (minimum award
quantity of four ships to each shipbuilder). The solicitation also
includes a request for priced option ships to provide further
opportunities to increase DDG 51 workload at each shipyard. This option
ship strategy will be used to award the additional ships included in
the President's Fiscal Year 2019 Budget request, one per year in fiscal
years 2019, 2021 and 2022. This approach maintains a stable and
efficient workload at each builder while fostering competition across
the procurement.
47. Senator King. Secretary Spencer, what hull designs and other
existing technologies are under consideration for the new CG(X)
program?
Secretary Spencer. The President's Fiscal Year 2019 Budget Request
contained funding to commence the Future Surface Combatant Force
Analysis of Alternatives (AOA). The planned force level AOA will
produce the Future Large Surface Combatant Capabilities Development
Document which will inform the hull designs and other existing
technologies to be incorporated into the Future Large Surface Combatant
(LSC). The Future LSC capability requirements will be targeted, in
part, at recapitalizing the capabilities associated with the CG 47
Ticonderoga-class cruisers as they retire.
As part of the Future Surface Combatant Force AOA, a number of hull
designs and existing (as well as developmental) technologies will be
analyzed to determine the contribution to the warfighting effectiveness
of the Future LSC as well as their contributions to the effectiveness
of the overall force. Efforts will be made to utilize design and
development work already completed through the Research and Development
of earlier programs to incorporate lessons learned in a fiscally
responsible manner.
acquisition
48. Senator King. Admiral Richardson, you mentioned in your opening
statement that the Navy is trying to achieve greater performance
through more agile acquisition processes. How is the Department of the
Navy making it easier for small businesses to compete for contracts and
partner with the Navy?
Admiral Richardson. The Department of the Navy (DON) has undertaken
a number of initiatives to make it easier for small businesses to
compete for contracts and partner with the Navy. These initiatives
include the following:
Small Business Advocacy: Each Deputy Program Manager
(DPM) is tasked as a Small Business Advocate responsible for
identifying opportunities for small business within their program.
Specific actions include:
o In fiscal year 2017, Small Business Advocate training was
provided to DPM's to educate the workforce on advocacy responsibilities
and expectations; and,
o Contracting Commands and Program Executive Offices have a
written Small Business Strategy focused on fiscal year 2017 to 2018,
with specific actions to increase opportunities for small businesses to
participate in procurements as prime and subcontractors. Strategies
will be updated over the summer with focus on fiscal years 2019 to 2020
and posted on a public facing website.
Contracting: The Chief of Naval Research is planning a
``Catapult'' initiative which is designed to minimize the time it takes
to bring a solution from discovery to deployment. This initiative will
allow small businesses the opportunity to speak directly with subject
matter experts from the DON to promote their solutions.
Small Businesses offer innovative, flexible, agile and affordable
options in achieving the DON's mission. As stated in the National
Defense Strategy, ``Maintaining the Department's technological
advantage will require changes to the industry culture, investment
sources, and protection across the National Security Innovation base.''
The DON is committed to streamlining our contracting processes and
making it easier for small businesses to compete for contracts and
partner with the Navy.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
uss los alamos
49. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Spencer, this year is the 75th
anniversary of Los Alamos National Laboratory. The people of Los
Alamos, and the national laboratory, have had a strong relationship
with the Navy, supporting the Department since World War II, through
the Cold War, and continuing to enable it today. This support was
critical during the Manhattan Project, through the creation of the
nuclear Navy, and the development of the sea-based leg of the strategic
nuclear triad. In recognition of the contributions of the people of Los
Alamos and the national laboratory, the full New Mexico delegation is
hopeful you will consider naming the next nuclear-powered fast attack
submarine the USS Los Alamos. When are the next opportunities for
naming nuclear-powered fast attack submarines?
Secretary Spencer. Ship and submarine naming packages are initiated
once a contract has been awarded. The next expected availability for a
fast-attack submarine is early 2019. Traditionally, and in accordance
with the established naming convention, Virginia-class submarines are
named after states but exceptions exist in USS Rickover and USS John
Warner. The earliest opportunity to name a Columbia-class ballistic
missile submarine is expected to be in the 2021 timeframe. As you
pointed out, the patriotic men and women who have worked at the Los
Alamos National Laboratory over its 75-year history have made a lasting
and monumental contribution to national security and global stability.
Honoring Los Alamos on this significant anniversary is a worthy
recommendation, and one which I will give every consideration at the
next opportunity to name a submarine.
naval installation energy resilience
50. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Spencer, I am concerned about the
vulnerabilities of the military's energy infrastructure to cyber-
attacks, physical attacks and severe weather, which threaten our
ability to recover from multiday utility disruptions. Our adversaries
are actively targeting our utilities infrastructure and have the
potential to disrupt energy supplies to our military facilities at
critical times, putting the nation at risk. I understand that the
Navy's Resilient Energy Program Office has been working to improve
energy resilience through microgrids, fuel cells, and bulk battery
facilities.
Can you discuss the advances the Navy is making in energy
resilience, particularly in energy storage improvement?
Secretary Spencer. The Department of the Navy is indeed working
hard to identify vulnerabilities and mitigation strategies to close
critical energy security gaps. Through our Energy Security Framework
(ESF), our installations commands are working closely with the DOD
mission assurance community to prioritize investments and operational
procedures to ensure critical facilities on priority installations can
operate under any scenario/situation. While always searching for the
most cost-effective solutions and remaining technology agnostic,
targeted investments in island-capable micro grids, advanced control
systems, distributed generation resources, and energy storage systems
are intended to ensure critical missions will remain operational during
disruptions in the power grid.
51. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Spencer, where else do you see
opportunities to improve energy resilience?
Secretary Spencer. In addition to the Energy Resilience and
Conservation Investment Program (ERCIP), the Department is primarily
relying on private capital and alternative financing mechanisms to
obtain energy resilience. Additional opportunity exists to improve
reliability, resiliency, cyber security and efficiency of our existing
utilities and facilities infrastructure but the Facilities Sustainment,
Restoration and Modernization (FSRM) account in the Operations and
Maintenance (O&M) appropriation is consistently pressurized to meet
critical and significant deficiencies in poor and failing facilities
across the Department.
Additional FSRM investment levels in the modernization of electric
and water distribution systems, metering/data acquisition, advanced
cyber control/monitoring systems and data analysis capabilities would
greatly improve the Department's energy resilience. Given the current
state of FSRM accounts, the Department will continue to plan and
program energy investments that provide greatest improvement to
critical facilities on priority installations and those that have
financial payback within the FYDP.
52. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Spencer, what obstacles, if any,
are delaying implementation of these emerging technologies?
Secretary Spencer. As the Department modernizes and expands our
warfighting capabilities, installation infrastructure continues to
compete for scarce funding resources. Years of underinvesting in
facilities and utility systems has resulted in a significant backlog in
sustainment, restoration and modernization across the Department. Some
additional obstacles that delay the implementation of emerging
technologies, include:
Business case--many new technologies do not provide a
lower life-cycle cost in the initial stages of implementation. As
responsible stewards of taxpayer dollars, DON has made a conscious
decision to be technology agnostic and to conduct life-cycle cost
analyses on all proposed energy security solutions.
Design criteria of existing facilities may not
accommodate emerging technologies. Established criteria such as UFC 3-
520-1 ``Interior Electrical Systems'' that prohibit lithium batteries
in occupied DOD facilities prevent us from implementing modern
Uninterruptible Power Supplies (UPS) systems in critical operations and
data centers. Prudent concerns over ventilation, fire suppression, and
heating and air conditioning design standards require additional study
before this technology can be used in occupied facilities
The pace of evolving cyber threats and the lengthy
timelines to assess, test, authorize, acquire and implement new control
systems to operate on DOD infrastructure delays implementation of the
latest ``smart'' technology in our utilities and facility related
control systems. The Department is working to streamline the DOD Risk
Management Framework processes to reduce the timeline necessary to
obtain Authority to Operate (ATO) for modern control systems but
competing requirements in the IT and Cyber domains continue to burden
the system.
The Department of the Navy works closely with DOD and Congress to
ensure the highest priority missions are protected and implementation
of emerging technologies is expedited where needed to minimize the risk
to critical facilities.
uss desert ship
53. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Richardson, New Mexico is proud to be
the home for USS Desert Ship (LLS-1), one of only two land-locked ships
in the U.S. Navy. USS Desert Ship has a long history of testing the
Navy's next generation of weapon systems. What role will USS Desert
Ship play in the testing and development of weapon systems like the
electromagnetic railgun and the Navy Laser Family of Systems?
Admiral Richardson. Electromagnetic Railgun (EMRG) and Hyper
Velocity Projectile (HVP) have conducted or plan to conduct significant
tests at the New Mexico White Sands Missile Range (WSMR) in the near
term. The EMRG Test Site at WSMR was purposely located adjacent to the
Desert Ship in order to enable future testing in combination with the
AEGIS combat system and fire control capabilities provided by Desert
Ship.
The Navy has decades of experience evaluating laser weapon
technology at the WSMR High Energy Laser System Test Facility (HELSTF)
and such testing will continue in the future. One of the Navy Laser
Family of Systems (NLFOS) initiatives, the Solid State Laser Technology
Maturation (SSL-TM) project, will be conducting land-based testing at
HELSTF in fiscal year 2019 before installation on USS Portland (LPD
27). The interface between SSL-TM and the Ship Self Defense System
combat system on LPD 27 precludes using Desert Ship, which is AEGIS-
based.
The NLFOS HELIOS project will install laser weapons on DDG51 Flight
IIA ships and will be integrated with the AEGIS combat system. Test
locations and requirements are still being evaluated in the context of
schedule requirements, cost, and operational fidelity of the
environmental conditions. Desert Ship may be a viable facility for
testing and development of HELIOS and/or other follow-on systems in the
future.
directed energy
54. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Richardson, I am pleased to see that
the Navy is placing a high priority on developing directed energy
weapons systems in the fiscal year 2019 budget request. The necessary
technology for directed energy weapons is nearly there and I think the
$299 million in the budget for the Navy Laser Family of Systems will do
a lot to drive this home. If funded, do you think this budget well get
directed energy weapons through the valley of death and into
operationally fielded prototypes?
Admiral Richardson. Yes. The Navy has formally designated its Naval
Laser Family of Systems (NLFOS) as Rapid Prototyping, Experimentation,
and Demonstration (RPED) programs. This puts NLFOS at the top of the
Navy's acquisition priorities behind only Columbia and near-term safety
issues. The Navy's strategy with the NLFOS projects is structured to
provide near-term capabilities that bridge the ``valley of death''
between technology and capability while simultaneously increasing the
pace of learning that enables the Navy to make informed decisions in
the future on how to incorporate laser weapons into a layered defense.
The Navy's budget request for fiscal year 2019 provides essential
funding to keep the Navy on track to install several NLFOS prototypes
and demonstration units on Navy ships in fiscal year 2019, including
two Optical Dazzling Interdictor Navy (ODIN) systems on DDG 51 Flt IIA
ships and the Solid State Laser Technical Maturation (SSL-TM) system to
be installed on USS Portland (LPD 27). The Navy's fiscal year 2019
request also includes funds to continue development of the High Energy
Laser with Integrated Optical-dazzler & Surveillance (HELIOS) systems
that could be available for installation on DDG 51 Flt IIA as early as
fiscal year 2020. It is anticipated that all of these systems will be
operationally fielded as part of the normal deployment schedules of the
ships they are installed upon.
55. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Richardson, what is the path from
here to a program of record for these weapon systems?
Admiral Richardson. Yes. The Navy has formally designated its Naval
Laser Family of Systems (NLFOS) as Rapid Prototyping, Experimentation,
and Demonstration (RPED) programs. This puts NLFOS at the top of the
Navy's acquisition priorities behind only Columbia and near-term safety
issues. The Navy's strategy with the NLFOS projects is structured to
provide near-term capabilities that bridge the ``valley of death''
between technology and capability while simultaneously increasing the
pace of learning that enables the Navy to make informed decisions in
the future on how to incorporate laser weapons into a layered defense.
The Navy's budget request for fiscal year 2019 provides essential
funding to keep the Navy on track to install several NLFOS prototypes
and demonstration units on Navy ships in fiscal year 2019, including
two Optical Dazzling Interdictor Navy (ODIN) systems on DDG 51 Flt IIA
ships and the Solid State Laser Technical Maturation (SSL-TM) system to
be installed on USS Portland (LPD 27). The Navy's fiscal year 2019
request also includes funds to continue development of the High Energy
Laser with Integrated Optical-dazzler & Surveillance (HELIOS) systems
that could be available for installation on DDG 51 Flt IIA as early as
fiscal year 2020. It is anticipated that all of these systems will be
operationally fielded as part of the normal deployment schedules of the
ships they are installed upon.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
marine mammal protection act (mmpa)
56. Senator Warren. Secretary Spencer, the Navy submitted a
proposal to the Committee for the fiscal year 2019 NDAA to amend the
Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), which ensures protections from
human harm to whales, dolphins, and other marine mammals. The current
process requires the Navy to participate in an MMPA rulemaking every
five years, to analyze impacts to marine mammals and propose mitigation
measures to the extent ``practicable,'' and to obtain an Incidental
Take Authorization for five years (known as a Letter of Authorization,
or LOA). The Navy's proposal would strike the requirement to obtain
these MMPA permits every five years, leaving the final permits obtained
by the Navy in place indefinitely.
Has the Navy ever been denied an Incidental Take Authorization from
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)?
Secretary Spencer. To date, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) has been able to make the requisite statutory
findings that taking associated with the Navy's actions would: (1) have
no more than a negligible impact on those marine mammal species or
stocks, and (2) not have an immitigable adverse impact on the
availability of the species or stock for subsistence use, and issue the
Navy incidental take authorizations (ITAs) it has requested. However,
the rulemaking process to finalize the ITAs consistently takes us to
the 5-year expiration date, and requires extraordinary effort to ensure
timely MMPA coverage and maintain Fleet readiness. The 5-year
limitation unnecessarily risks Navy training and testing activities
without benefiting the species.
The Navy's fiscal year 2019 NDAA proposal seeks only to remove the
5-year limitation on the duration an MMPA permit can be authorized.
This would allow the duration of future MMPA permits to be consistent
with the duration of the action so long as the action and effects do
not substantively change. This change would align the MMPA's permitting
process with that of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) consultation
process. The ESA allows the regulatory agency's Biological Opinion to
have a duration that is aligned with that of the action, or that
extends into the foreseeable future, provided the action and its
effects on protected species do not substantively change and no other
provisions outlined in 50 CFR 402.16 are triggered that would require
re-initiation of formal consultation.
57. Senator Warren. Secretary Spencer, what is the overall annual
financial cost that the Navy incurs to comply with the current five-
year LOA permitting process?
Secretary Spencer. The administrative cost for the Navy's At-Sea
environmental compliance for the years 2005 through 2017 was $362.5
million. This translates to an annual average cost of $28 million.
The estimated annual average financial cost (fiscal year 2019-
fiscal year 2023) that the Navy will incur to comply with the aspects
of the at-sea compliance program that are strictly associated with the
current five year LOA permitting process is 8$20 million per year. This
cost is broken up into two main aspects: (1) costs associated with the
modeling, analysis, and development of compliance documentation; and
(2) manpower to execute and provide oversight to the compliance
processes.
On average, $13-15 million per year of the costs are associated
with the modeling, analysis and development of compliance
documentation. This money funds the following key tasks:
the development of new or updating of existing marine
mammal density models;
the acoustic modeling of Navy sound sources (e.g. sonar,
explosives, airguns, etc.) and their associated impacts to marine
mammals;
the analysis of acoustic modeling results and the
development of other qualitative analyses of Navy activities;
the development of an MMPA LOA application and an ESA
Biological Assessment consultation package
the generation of National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) documentation to support the LOA rulemaking \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Because issuance of five year regulations under the MMPA is
classified as a major federal action it requires the development of
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) documentation. Therefore, each
five year permit requires the Navy to update or re-do its existing NEPA
documentation. The National Marine Fisheries Service is a cooperating
agency on the Navy's NEPA documentation and adopts the Navy's NEPA
document as their own. However, all costs associated with the NEPA
documentation to support NMFS's issuance of the five year regulations
are borne by the Navy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The remaining $5 million per year in costs, are associated with the
Navy's manpower to provide oversight, and review of all of these
products. There are over 50 Navy employees (Military and Civilian),
throughout the following commands DASN(E), OPNAV N45, USFF, CPF,
NAVAIR, NAVSEA, ONR, SPAWAR, and NAVFAC, whose primary responsibilities
are to support the above functions. Therefore, the manpower costs
associated with these staff are estimated to add up to 8$5 million in
additional costs per year that the Navy incurs to comply with the
current five year LOA permitting process.
These annual requirements cost the Navy an additional $11-12
million dollars per year (fiscal year 2019-23), and are associated the
following:
Marine mammal monitoring requirements of the LOA
Sonar and explosive reporting requirements of the LOA
Marine mammal mitigation requirements of the LOA (e.g.
North Atlantic Right Whale aerial surveys, updating the Navy's PMAP
program with mitigation requirements)
Lastly, the above costs also do not include research investments
the Navy voluntarily makes as part of its environmental stewardship
role, to improve the general knowledge about marine mammals and to
advance the Navy's understanding of the potential impacts of our
activities to marine mammals. The Navy invests between $14-15 million
annually in basic and applied research on marine mammals. This research
is primarily funded through two main programs: Office of Naval
Research's Marine Mammals and Biology Program, and the Chief of Naval
Operation N45's Living Marine Resources program. A small amount of
research is also funded through the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR),
Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), and the Space and Naval Warfare
Systems Command (SPAWAR).
58. Senator Warren. Secretary Spencer, what percentage of the
Navy's total annual budget is represented by the overall annual
financial cost incurred by the Navy to comply with the current LOA
permitting process?
Secretary Spencer. The Navy's total financial costs to comply with
the 5-year LOA permitting process is approximately $20 million per year
(see response to Question 56, for additional details).
As laid out in the Department of Defense Presidential Budget
Exhibit #28 submitted to Congress, the average annual cost of the
Navy's entire Environmental Compliance, Pollution Prevention, and
Conservation Program is approximately $470 million (fiscal year 2019-
23). The costs associated with complying with the 5-year LOA permitting
process all fall within the Conservation program area. The average
annual cost of the Navy's Conservation portfolio is $76.1 million per
year (fiscal year 2019-23). Therefore, the $20 million annual cost of
complying with the 5-year LOA permitting process represents 826.3
percent of the entire Conservation Program Area, and 84.25 percent of
the Navy's entire Environmental Compliance, Pollution Prevention, and
Conservation Program.
The Navy's total financial cost to comply with the 5-year MMPA
permitting process represents a very small percentage (0.01 percent)
when viewed in the context of the Navy's total annual budget, currently
proposed at $194.1 billion (Base and Overseas Contingency Operations)
for fiscal year 2019.
59. Senator Warren. Secretary Spencer, to your knowledge, has the
Navy's readiness been compromised in any manner due to the current
five-year LOA permitting process required by the MMPA?
Secretary Spencer. Litigation under the MMPA has on various
occasions unreasonably restricted Navy training and testing activities,
and does limit the time, place and types of training and testing
activities that Navy is able to conduct. Two examples are illustrative.
Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System (SURTASS) Low Frequency
Active (LFA) Sonar: There have been nine cases that have sought to
restrict the Navy's use of SURTASS LFA sonar. Three cases concerned
Navy's employment of SURTASS LFA sonar as authorized by regulators in
2002, 2007, and 2012 under the MMPA and ESA. In two of these cases, the
Navy's activities were subject to significant geographic restrictions
beyond what had already been imposed by the regulators. In 2002, for
example, the court granted plaintiffs' request for a preliminary
injunction, which limited to four areas the locations in the western
Pacific where the Navy could use SURTASS LFA sonar. In 2007 the parties
entered into a stipulated settlement after the judge again ruled that a
preliminary injunction was appropriate. In this settlement, use of
SURTASS LFA sonar was prohibited in portions of the western Pacific.
Hawaii and Southern California Testing and Training: In 2015,
plaintiffs filed suit against the Navy and the NMFS alleging violations
of NEPA, the ESA and the MMPA. The subject of the lawsuit was the Navy
proposal to conduct training and testing activities using mid-frequency
active (MFA) sonar in waters surrounding Hawaii and off the southern
California coast, and NMFS issuance of MMPA letters of authorization
for these activities. The lawsuit was filed in the Hawaii district
court and that court ultimately ruled in favor of plaintiffs on all
claims on March 31, 2015. Before the judge could rule on the remedy,
the Navy, NMFS and plaintiffs settled the case; settlement included
significant geographic restrictions to MFA sonar related testing and
training activities in Hawaii and Southern California waters.
To date, the Navy has taken the necessary steps to mitigate impacts
on readiness as a result of the current five year LOA permitting
process required by the MMPA. Although the MMPA was amended to make it
more efficient for military readiness activities, the Navy has
requested that the Secretary of Defense invoke the Department's
National Defense Exemption (NDE) to the MMPA three times since the
provision was inserted into the law in 2004 in order to maintain Fleet
readiness. Additionally, the Navy has expended funds on environmental
compliance documentation at the expense of other priorities. Given the
temporal limitation under the MMPA for letters of authorization (five
years), the record shows Navy will continue to confront this risk on a
recurring basis.
60. Senator Warren. Secretary Spencer, has the Navy conducted an
assessment of any kind of the impact of its proposal on marine mammals?
If yes, can you please share that assessment with the Committee? If no,
please explain whether the Navy will conduct such an assessment.
Secretary Spencer. The Navy's assessment is that this proposal will
have no impact on marine mammals. Currently the Navy requests Marine
Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) take authorization based upon training,
testing and other military needs such as in water construction. Under
the MMPA in the case of military readiness activities, the Secretary of
Commerce or the Secretary of the Interior (Commerce or Interior)
``shall allow'' the incidental taking of marine mammals upon request
after notice and an opportunity for public comment so long as certain
findings are made by the Secretary and once regulations are prescribed.
These authorizations are currently issued under Letters of
Authorizations (LOA) that are only valid for up to 5-years.
Removal of the 5-year time limit on MMPA authorizations will not
result in Navy requesting greater take authorization. The Navy's
request will continue to be based upon the forecasted future level of
required military activity. Under the proposal either Commerce or
Interior will continue to have to find that the total taking authorized
will have a negligible impact on such species or stock. Commerce or
Interior will also still be required to publish regulations setting
forth permissible methods of taking, and other means of effecting the
least practicable adverse impact on such species or stock. Although
under the Navy proposal the 5-year limit will be removed, either
Commerce or Interior will retain the discretion to issue LOAs for
whatever time period the applicable Secretary deems appropriate. As
under current law, the Navy will not be authorized to exceed this level
of take without seeking additional authorization from Commerce or
Interior. And as under current law, should Commerce or Interior find
that Navy was not substantially complying with its authorization, or
that the taking allowed under the authorization was having more than a
negligible impact on the species or stock, Commerce or Interior would
be required to withdraw or suspend permission to take marine mammals.
readiness and operational tempo
61. Senator Warren. Admiral Richardson, last year, the 7th Fleet
suffered three collisions in the Western Pacific, and 17 sailors lost
their lives. I recently returned from a trip to Japan, where I visited
the 7th Fleet at Yokosuka. We discussed the results of the Navy's
review and what has changed for them.
In October 2017, the Comprehensive Review concluded that: ``the
pressure to meet rising operational demand over time caused Commanders,
staff and crew to rationalize shortcuts under pressure.'' However, when
I spoke to the 7th Fleet earlier this month, they told me that their
operational tempo had not changed very much.
What changes has the Navy has made in the Pacific Command (PACOM)
area of responsibility (AOR)?
Admiral Richardson. Within the past year, the Navy has established
Naval Surface Group, Western Pacific (NSGWP) to provide training and
readiness oversight to surface ships assigned to Seventh Fleet, as a
result of implementing recommendations of the Comprehensive Review and
Strategic Readiness Review. The Navy continues to increase the
capability and capacity of air, surface, and subsurface assets by
assigning more and more capable platforms to the AOR to bolster combat
credible forward presence.
Additionally, a few key actions have been taken to improve
readiness:
7th Fleet Operations--7th Fleet has adopted new scheduling and
force generation processes that identify mismatches in force employment
and force generation while protecting training/certification periods
for ships. Through restoring the Optimized Fleet Response Plan-Japan
(OFRP-J) construct, Japan-based Cruisers and Destroyers now have
dedicated time to accomplish maintenance, training, and certification.
Operational tasking is being adjusted to protect training requirements.
Risk Assessment Mitigation Plans (RAMPs) replaced by Certification
Deficiency Risk Management Plans (CDRMP)--All pre-existing RAMPS have
been cancelled. Ships only conduct missions they are certified for. If
a ship is ever required to conduct operations before completing its
Basic Phase, a CDRMP must be prepared by NSGWP, agreed to by CNSP and
C7F, and approved by COMPACFLT.
Ready for Sea Assessments (RFSAs)--In order to determine their
material and operational readiness, RFSAs have been completed for FDNF-
J ships not currently in a maintenance availability. All remaining
FDNF-J ships are being closely tracked for RFSA completion, as they
transition out of maintenance and resume normal operations.
62. Senator Warren. Admiral Richardson, what steps, if any, has the
Navy taken to reprioritize mission demands across combatant commands?
Admiral Richardson. The Navy generates maritime capability (defined
as forces which are properly manned, trained, equipped, and certified)
in support of Joint Staff adjudicated combatant commander requirements
and consistently reviews its force posture to best support the National
Defense Strategy. The Joint Staff prioritizes and balances combatant
commander mission requirements across the Joint Force in accordance
with the strategic priorities found in our governing strategic
documents. Ultimately, The Secretary of Defense approves all
operational deployments and the assignment of forces to combatant
commanders.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2019 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 24, 2018
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
AIR FORCE POSTURE
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in Room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M.
Inhofe, presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker,
Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Cruz, Scott,
Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal,
Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, Heinrich, Warren, and Peters.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Senator Inhofe. The committee meets today to receive
testimony on the posture of the U.S. Air Force and its fiscal
year 2019 budget request.
We welcome our witnesses: Secretary Heather Wilson and
General David Goldfein. Fein is fine. We all remember that.
The Air Force is at a critical moment in its history. It
faces a dual task of digging out of a readiness crisis while at
the same time managing a broad modernization effort. You do not
have the luxury of choosing one or the other. You got to do
both.
I was pleased to see increases in the budget request for
fiscal year 2019 to address both readiness and modernization,
but I am interested to hear from you how the Air Force will
manage this balance in the years ahead, particularly if the
Budget Control Act funding levels return in 2020.
I continue to be concerned with the availability of
aircraft and the preparedness of our airmen. Trends in pilot
retention remain troubling with the current shortage of some
2,000 pilots. It was not long ago that we were using the figure
1,500. So it does not seem to be getting any better and we need
to address that.
The NDS [National Defense Strategy] makes clear that space
is and will continue to be a contested environment. Both Russia
and China continue their robust efforts to extend warfighting
into outer space, and we can no longer take our space-enabled
capabilities for granted. All of this makes our dismal space
failures even more detrimental.
Despite recent reforms, lasting change will require your
leadership and vision to sustain a whole-of-the-government
approach.
Finally, I look forward to hearing about the progress of
the Air Force nuclear modernization efforts. As we heard in the
Nuclear Posture Review earlier this year, we cannot afford to
stand still in this area when our adversaries have been
investing in their nuclear forces for the last 2 decades. I
know the Air Force has been working hard on the new bomber and
missile programs, as well as new engines for the B-52. New
engines for the B-52. I just noticed that the life extension
now is going to be 2050. It is going to be 100 years old by
that time.
But anyway, Senator Reed.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me
join you in welcoming Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein.
Thank you for your service and thank you for your great
leadership of the United States Air Force. We are grateful also
to the men and women of the Air Force who do so much, and
please convey to them our deep appreciation and thanks, as you
always do.
Our witnesses this morning face huge challenges as they
strive to balance the need to support ongoing operations and
sustain readiness with the need to modernize and keep the
technological edge in the three critical domains of air, space,
and cyberspace.
The Air Force has produced a budget that even with proposed
budget increases reflects very tough decisions. The budget
increases the Air Force is proposing for fiscal year 2019 would
seek to increase readiness, address shortfalls in munitions,
address shortfalls in pilots and maintenance personnel, and
modernize our strategic deterrent capability.
In addition, the Air Force faces a continuing challenge in
managing the cost and progress of its major acquisition
programs, including the Joint Strike Fighter, the most
expensive DOD acquisition program in history, and a new tanker
and a new bomber. We should hear from our witnesses on the
progress of all three of these programs this morning.
I would also like to hear more about another modernization
program. In this budget, the Air Force is proposing to truncate
the program to modernize the Joint Surveillance and Target
Radar System, or JSTARS program. The Air Force deserves our
careful consideration of this proposal, but we must consider it
against the recent history of abrupt Air Force program changes.
The Air Force tried several years to retire the A-10 fleet.
Congress turned down the proposals. Now the Air Force is
keeping the A-10 and will continue experimenting with a new
light attack aircraft (OA-X) that would undoubtedly be less
survivable than the A-10. Spending for OA-X could cost the Air
Force several hundred million dollars or more.
The Air Force supported a Nunn-McCurdy certification that
the Global Hawk remotely piloted vehicle was critical to
national security and then proposed canceling the program in
favor of the U-2 program within a few months of the Global Hawk
certification. Later the Air Force wanted to cancel the U-2
program in favor of the Global Hawk.
The Air Force first proposed to retire nearly half of the
Compass Call aircraft without replacement, then decided that
modernizing the Compass Call program was so important that they
had to pursue a sole-source contracting strategy for the
program.
The Air Force was pursuing a program to buy the C-27
airlift aircraft because Air Force witnesses said that the C-
130 airlift aircraft could not meet their requirements. Later
the Air Force canceled the C-27 program and said that the C-130
was perfectly fine for meeting the direct support mission.
With regard to the JSTARS program, the Air Force originally
proposed to retire a sizeable portion of the current fleet of
JSTARS aircraft with no immediate replacement in sight. When
Congress turned down that proposal, the Air Force submitted a
modernization plan to replace the existing capability with a
new business jet and a new radar. The contract to implement the
JSTARS modernization plan is currently in source selection. But
now, as I mentioned earlier, the Air Force's fiscal year 2019
budget proposes to cancel that JSTARS solicitation and pursue
another path. The Air Force has mentioned the National Defense
Strategy as a reason for making this decision, but the
indication about this decision seems to have been made before
the National Defense Strategy.
I look forward to hearing about updating these efforts and
all your efforts, including progress on improving shortfalls
within the remotely piloted aircraft community and shortfalls
within the larger pilot personnel community.
Again, thank you very much for your committed leadership to
the Air Force, and thank you for being here today.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, we want to hear your
opening statements. We will start with you, Secretary Wilson.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE HEATHER A. WILSON, SECRETARY OF THE
AIR FORCE
Dr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like, with consent, to put my entire statement in
the record.
Senator Inhofe. Without objection.
Dr. Wilson. And just summarize a few points.
First of all, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Reed, thank
you very much for the hearing today.
I would like to highlight a few things that are in our
fiscal year 2019 budget proposal.
The budget proposal for fiscal year 2019 does align with
the National Defense Strategy, and we developed this budget
proposal at the same time the National Defense Strategy was
being drafted. And so there is a direct influence there.
The National Defense Strategy recognizes that we face a
more competitive and dangerous international security
environment than we have faced in decades. Great power
competition has reemerged as the central challenge for U.S.
security and prosperity.
There are what I would say are two bold moves in this
budget and one continuing theme.
With respect to the bold moves and the changes, we are
accelerating defendable space to deter, defend, and prevail
against anyone who seeks to deny our ability to freely operate
in space. There is an 18 percent increase from the fiscal year
2018 5-year defense plan to the fiscal year 2019 5-year defense
plan in space, and there are significant changes there.
The second bold move is the shift to multi-domain
operations, particularly with respect to command and control
and the way in which we do command and control in a
disaggregated way rather than relying on a platform-centric
upgrade, which is the JSTARS program.
So those are the two large shifts and changes driven by the
environment within which we find ourselves.
The continuing theme and the continuing effort is to keep
improving the readiness of the force to win any fight anytime.
In fiscal year 2017, we kind of started to turn the corner. The
additional resources added by the Congress in fiscal year 2018
are helping us to start to climb out of a readiness deficit,
and the fiscal year 2019 proposal with the budget certainty
that the Congress has given us will help us to restore the
readiness of the force. And I wanted to thank you publicly for
that effort. We need that certainty and we are committed to
using the dollars which you appropriate wisely in the defense
of the nation.
Chief?
[The prepared statement of Dr. Wilson and General Goldfein
follows:]
Prepared Statement by Honorable Dr. Heather Wilson and General David L.
Goldfein
strategic environment
The United States now faces a more competitive and dangerous
international security environment than we have seen in generations.
Great power competition has reemerged as the central challenge to
U.S. prosperity and security. China is rapidly modernizing its military
and seeks regional preeminence. Russia aims to restore its national
prestige and has shown its willingness to use military force and
coercion in Europe and the Middle East. North Korea uses the threat of
nuclear weapons to secure the survival of the regime. Iran has been a
source of instability in the Middle East through the sponsorship of
terrorism and exploitation of internal conflict in the region. Violent
extremist organizations rooted in the Middle East, North Africa, and
South Asia create instability and threaten the United States Homeland
and our allies and partners.
With global trends and intensifying pressure from major
challengers, our relative advantage in air and space is eroding in a
number ofcritical areas. The projected mismatch between demand and
available resources has widened. Any American weakness emboldens
competitors to subvert the rules-based international order and
challenge the alliance and partnership network that underpins it.
In accordance with the National Defense Strategy, the Air Force
must build a more lethal and ready force, strengthen alliances and
partnerships, and deliver greater, more affordable performance. The Air
Force requires the right size and mix of agile capabilities to compete,
deter, and win in this environment, brought to bear by Airmen steeped
in the business of joint and combined warfare.
air and space power in demand
Air and space power is indispensable to every joint force
operation. The Air Force's first responsibility is to integrate air and
space capabilities across the domains--delivering unmatched global
advantage as an equal member of the joint team. We must be ready to
design and lead joint and combined operations in support of national
objectives.
We have five core missions:
Air and Space Superiority . . . freedom from attack and
freedom to attack. Air and space superiority gives our military and
coalition forces the freedom to operate. Accelerating the campaign to
defeat ISIS, airmen conducted more than 172,000 sorties and 98,000
precision air strikes last year--over 70 percent of the total in the
campaign--to support Iraqi and partner forces in Syria and Iraq. In the
NATO-led mission in Afghanistan, the Air Force executed a sustained air
interdiction campaign of over 4,000 sorties to support Afghan partners,
targeting Taliban so-called safe zones, command and control nodes,
illicit revenue-generating ventures, and logistical networks. In space,
the Air Force operates 6 constellations and 12 satellite systems vital
to national security that provide communications, command and control,
missile warning, nuclear detonation detection, weather, and GPS for the
world. In 2017, the Air Force supported 28 space launches from our
facilities at Vandenberg and Cape Canaveral, a 40 percent increase from
2016. We are planning 45 launches in 2018, sending both national
security payloads and an increasing number of commercial payloads into
orbit.
Global Strike . . . any target, any time. Airmen maintain
the continuous alert of our missile forces. Last year, Airmen conducted
16,425 intercontinental ballistic missile alert tours and 248 missile
convoys across 3 missile wings and 5 states. Our bombers flew 580
missions in the Indo-Pacific, strengthening security and stability in
the region and reassuring our partners. Reinforcing NATO's eastern
flank, American bombers flew 70 assurance and deterrence missions.
Rapid Global Mobility . . . delivery on demand. In 2017,
airmen transported nearly 1 million personnel, the equivalent of moving
the population of Montana, and delivered over 738 million pounds of
warfighting equipment and humanitarian supplies, the weight of 82 U.S.
Capitol Domes. Our tanker force extended joint power projection at
intercontinental distances by passing more than 1 billion pounds of
fuel in-flight, which could fill the Rose Bowl to the top, while
aeromedical evacuation airmen airlifted more than 5,000 patients to
safety. Closer to home, airmen delivered 13,600 short tons of relief
supplies following the string of record-setting hurricanes, and helped
combat multiple wild fires in the western United States.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) . .
. global eyes and ears on adversaries. Last year, the Air Force was
tasked with nearly 25,000 ISR missions, collected 340,000 hours of full
motion video, and produced 2.55 million intelligence products--which
averages almost 5 products every minute that close intelligence gaps
and support target analysis and development. Persistent ISR closely
tied to precision weapons from the ground and air has been a linchpin
element in the destruction of ISIS.
Command and Control . . . right info, right person, right
time. Last year, our E4-B National Airborne Operations Center--
thesurvivable mobile command center--conducted 53 alert tours and
provided travel support to the Secretary of Defense. Our E-8C Joint
Surveillance Target Attack Radar System flew over 5,000 hours, enabling
a range of support for combatant commanders from command and control in
the ISIS campaign to the interdiction of over 12,500 kilograms of
illicit drugs before they entered our Nation's borders. The E-3
Airborne Warning and Control System was integral to coordinating search
and rescue efforts during the 2017 hurricane season.
Increasingly, we are conducting these missions with allies and
partners. The Air Force engaged in more than 85 exercises with
international partners last year, including 5 focused on high-end
combat. We furthered the international role of the F-35, training with
partners in both Europe and South Korea, and began delivery of F-35s to
Israel, Norway, and Italy. We concluded 42 International Arms
Cooperation agreements worth $2.95 billion, including a cost-sharing
agreement that launched the ninth Wideband Global SATCOM satellite
which enables international partners access to shared high-capacity
global communications. In 2017, Foreign Military Sales expanded nearly
three-fold from the year prior to $22.7 billion. These sales strengthen
the United States' position as the security cooperation partner of
choice, and expand interoperable airpower.
strategic direction
The Air Force budget request of $156.3 billion for fiscal year 2019
builds onthe progress made in 2018 to restore the readiness of the
force, increase lethality, and cost-effectively modernize. Sustaining
these efforts requires predictable budgets at the requested funding
levels.
In alignment with the National Defense Strategy, this budget
prioritizes long-term competition with China and Russia.
This budget moves the Air Force in the direction of multi-domain
operations. Future wars will be won by those who observe, orient,
decide, and act faster than adversaries in an integrated way across
domains--land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace.
The squadron remains the foundational fighting unit of the Air
Force. The Air Force currently has 301 frontline operational squadrons
\1\ to execute our core missions, supported by squadrons that directly
enable the fight and provide reachback capability. Based on the new
National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Nuclear
Posture Review, the Air Force is in the process of determining how many
squadrons we need to deliver the combat capability required to execute
the new defense strategy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Fighters, bombers, airlift, intelligence/surveillance/
reconnaissance, command and control, special operations, space, cyber,
missile, and personnel recovery squadrons are counted here.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
continuing efforts
Some elements of this budget continue programs and strategies that
are well established:
Readiness: Restoring readiness to win any fight, any
time remains a primary objective. The budget funds 1.5 million flying
hours--1.2 million executable peacetime training flying hours and
300,000 flying hours supporting overseas contingency operations--at a
cost of $8.7 billion. We propose to buy 54,443 preferred munitions to
reverse previous declining inventories at a cost of $1.8 billion. This
budget also funds training ranges, simulators, instructors, and key
infrastructure required to improve the quality of our training in
alignment with the National Defense Strategy prioritization of peer
competition.
People: The fiscal year 2019 budget proposal represents
an increase in the size of the Air Force by 4,700 airmen. \2\ Our five-
year plan calls for achievable, steady growth to approximately 339,000
Active Duty airmen while we simultaneously review existing manning
across the Active Duty, Guard, and Reserve components. In addition,
this budget submission funds important support to airmen and families
with a 2.6 percent military pay raise, increased housing and
subsistence allowances, and family support programs. We will invest in
purposeful development of airmen to strengthen our joint warfighting
excellence--integrating education, training, and experience for our
leaders and teams.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Total Force number including Active Duty, Guard, and Reserve.
Nuclear Deterrence: Our budget proposal supports the
Defense Department's principal priority to maintain a safe, secure, and
effective nuclear deterrent that safeguards the Homeland, assures
allies, and deters adversaries. The budget improves our nuclear
command, control, and communication systems as directed in the Nuclear
Posture Review. It initiates development of B-52 replacement engines,
continues development of the Long Range Stand Off missile, and
continues development of the replacement for the Minuteman III
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
intercontinental ballistic missile.
Modernization: The budget funds our priority
modernization initiatives with the purchase of 48 F-35 fighters, 15KC-
46 tankers, and continued development of the B-21 bomber. This year, we
will decide the new T-X advanced trainer aircraft and the replacement
for the UH-1 helicopter. Critical to mission success is continued
investment in our classified portfolio, which will be briefed in a
closed session.
changes to implement national defense strategy
Some elements of this budget reflect a change to confront the
reemergence of great power competition:
Space Superiority: The fiscal year 2019 budget
represents a 33 percent increase from last year in the research,
development, test, and experimentation budget for Air Force Space to
meet the threat from China and Russia. We will build more jam-resistant
GPS satellites, improve missile warning, improve space situational
awareness, and increase our ability to defend our Nation's most vital
assets on orbit. We are taking advantage of changes in legislative
authorities to return program decision authorities back to the Air
Force, including 14 of the 19 Major Defense Acquisition Programs within
the space portfolio. Using tools such as the Defense Acquisition
Workforce Development Fund, we are investing in our people, ensuring
they have theright skills and training to succeed.
Multi-Domain Command and Control: Technological advances
are changing the character of warfare. The budget proposes to change
the way we execute battlefield management command and control in the
multi-domain environment. We propose to modernize 7E-3 Airborne Warning
and Control System (AWACS) aircraft and keep the current E-8C Joint
Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) operational through
the mid-2020s, as we developand transition to an advanced battle
management system. This approach will integrate space, air, and ground
based sensors on manned and unmanned platforms and satellites to meet
more combatant commander requirements in both contested and non-
contested environments.
Air Superiority: Central to lethality is our ability to
gain and maintain air superiority when and where needed against
potential adversaries in 2030 and beyond. Over the next five years, we
will develop an integrated family of systems that can establish and
maintain air superiority in a contested environment. The fiscal year
2019 budget includes $1.0 billion as part of a $63.8 billion effort
over the five-year plan. This will be a multi-domain effort with a
renewed emphasis on electronic warfare, networked capabilities, and
control of the electromagnetic spectrum.
Light Attack: Retaining irregular warfare as a core
competency at a lower cost and strengthening our alliances are key
elements of our National Defense Strategy. The Air Force proposes to
continue the light attack experiment, developing concepts of operation
and further defining requirements in preparation for fielding a force
of U.S. light attack aircraft during this five-year plan. We are
focusing on rapid fielding and rapid procurement strategies that
leverage existing capabilities with little or no development. Designed
to be coalition at the core, we will invite and lead allies and
partners to train in the U.S., buy common equipment for their own
affordable light attack squadrons, and build those international
squadrons on a network that shares information.
Science and Technology: The Air Force launched a review
of our science and technology strategy that will be complete later this
year. This budget increases emphasis on basic and applied research to
drive long-term innovation and dominance in air and space power.
budget priorities
Improving Warfighting Readiness: Readiness is first and foremost
about having enough trained people. We continue to address the aircrew
shortage through a multi-pronged approach. This budget boosts pipeline
capacity, expands pilot training and addresses experience shortfalls,
continues incentive pay and bonuses, improves administrative support at
the squadron level, and funds flying hours to executable levels. It
also addresses gaps in space, nuclear, cyber, and intelligence career
fields, and supports Battlefield Airmen, our air-to-ground integration
force.
The budget proposal funds aircraft depot maintenance, parts,
logistics support, and invests $2.8 billion in operational training
infrastructure needed for relevant, realistic training for the multi-
domain environment. It fully funds preferred munitions to industry
capacity. This includes Hellfire missiles, Joint Direct Attack Munition
bombs, the Small Diameter Bomb, and the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon
System.
The Air Force recruits airmen, but we retain families. To improve
family support, the budget funds expanded childcare hours, increases
off-base childcare support, and funds more respite care and support
coordinators for special needs families. We are improving the
assignment system so families can better plan for future assignments,
sustaining our morale and resilience programs, and implementing
initiatives that support unit cohesion in our squadrons.
The Air Force is also significantly changing the way we collect
operational tempo metrics. Prior methods underreport how much time
airmen are away. By now accounting for temporary duties away from home
station for training exercises or mission-related requirements in
addition to deployment time, we more accurately capture the true impact
of service demands on airmen, families, and home units.
Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear Deterrent: Deterrence works if
our adversaries know that we can hold at risk things they value. We
must concurrently modernize the entire nuclear triad and the command
and control systems that enable its effectiveness. The Air Force
stewards two legs of the triad and operates 75 percent of the Defense
Department's nuclear command, control, and communication (NC3)
capabilities.
Modernizing the air-based leg of the nuclear triad, the budget
continues development of the replacement air-launched cruise missile,
which is 25 years past its design life and faces improving adversary
air defense systems.
This weapon will equip the B-52, B-2, and forthcoming B-21 bombers
to maintain flexible and effective stand-off capability that can
penetrate and survive the most challenging environments.
This budget continues to update the B-52 bomber fleet and funds
development of replacement engines. With adequate sustainment and
modernization, including new engines, the B-52 will remain a key part
of the bomber enterprise well into the future. Additionally, the budget
proposal begins to replace our Vietnam-era UH-1N helicopter.
The budget moves forward modernization of the ground-based leg of
the nuclear triad. The Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent program will
replace the retiring Minuteman III, which has remained viable four
decades past its design life through a series of costly service life
extensions, but cannot be extended further beyond 2030.
Today's nuclear command, control, and communications system was
last comprehensively updated almost three decades ago. The budget
targets investments to modernize the integrated land, air, and space-
based systems to ensure secure, survivable connectivity with the
President and national command leadership.
Cost-Effective Modernization: Underfunded in modernization for
over a decade, the Air Force must manage a bow wave in modernization
over the next ten years.
The budget proposes to upgrade F-16 and F-15 C/D aircraft to retain
affordable capacity. We propose to buy 48 F-35A aircraft in FY19 and
258 F-35A aircraft over the next five years. The F-35A fighter brings
unparalleled global precision attackcapability. The Air Force will
integrate the F-35 with fourth-generation aircraft as well as space and
unmanned aircraft, to maintain air superiority in highly contested
environments.
Tanker recapitalization remains a top acquisition priority. The
multi-role KC-46 is capable of refueling joint and coalition aircraft
with both boom and drogue in the same sortie, and augments the airlift
fleet with improved cargo, passenger, and aeromedical evacuation
capabilities. This budget proposes to buy 15 more KC-46 tankers in
fiscal year 2019.
Our budget proposal continues to develop the B-21 bomber as a key
component to the joint portfolio of conventional and nuclear deep-
strike capabilities. The B-21 will be able to deliver both gravity
bombs and the Long Range Stand-Off missile, ensuring options for our
Nation's leaders to hold targets at risk around the world.
Moving Faster to Defendable Space: The fiscal year 2019 budget
accelerates our efforts to deter, defend, and prevail against anyone
who seeks to deny our ability to freely operate in space. The budget
recognizes that adversaries are developing the ability to deny our free
use of space and includes capabilities to confront that threat. The
development of these capabilities will continue over the future years
defense plan and beyond.
Fore going the continued buy of today's Space Based Infrared System
satellites 7 and 8, the Air Force will develop the next-generation
Overhead Persistent Infrared system. This system will detectandreport
on current, emerging, and anticipated threats, and will be designed for
survivability.
The budget adds resilience features and user protection to the
Advanced Extremely High Frequency and Wideband Global Satellite
Communications systems, and continues to fund development of next-
generation protected satellite communications services for both
strategic and operational military users. We continue to explore more
affordable and innovative ways to acquire satellite communications
services with investment in both commercial industry and international
partner capabilities.
The budget proposal increases funding for anti-jam, anti-spoof, and
anti-tamper military GPS development and integration into multiple
joint platforms, and continues to grow Space Situational Awareness and
Space Control capabilities to enhance our ability to identify,
characterize, and attribute threatening actions. The budget also funds
a Weather Satellite Follow-on program using rapid acquisition
authorities.
Building upon the foundational architecture for space warfighting,
we will deliver highly responsive capabilities to connect tactical and
operational systems to strategic-level decision makers. The recentst
and-up of the National Space Defense Center supports this mission. The
budget also funds the Standard Space Trainer that provides realistic,
live, virtual, constructive training to prepare our Space Mission Force
Airmen to prevail in a contested space domain.
Networked Battle Management: Integrating capabilities that span
all domains of warfare will be required for success in future combat.
With the other Services, we are shifting from a model of
interdependence to one of integration, which includes better integrated
communications systems, development of tailorable units, and policies
in key areas that enable adaptability and innovation. Concurrently, we
will advance our command and control systems to reflect the changing
character of warfare.
The Air Force capability that delivers persistent battle management
command and control and ground moving target indications to joint
warfighters is in high global demand that far exceeds supply. We
currently conduct battlefield command and control from JSTARS, AWACS,
Combined Air Operations Centers, Tactical Operations Centers, and
mobile Control and Reporting Centers, and monitor many targets on the
ground from JSTARS, Global Hawk, and other unmanned aerial systems. We
had planned to recapitalize our aging fleet of E-8C JSTARS on a newer
aircraft, however, we believe that system will not be viable in future
contested environments and the recapitalization plan brought no
additional capability or capacity to meet future demands despite over
$15 billion in total lifecycle costs. In developing an alternative
approach that will meet more warfighter needs, we propose to keep the
current E-8C JSTARS operational through mid-2020s and replace the
recapitalization program as we transition to an advanced battle
management system for the future. This approach, as directed in the
National Defense Strategy, will network sensors from space, air, land,
and sea, and fuse information to create a more comprehensive picture to
support the jointfight, even in a contested environment.
Strengthening Alliances: The National Defense Strategy emphasizes
the importance of alliances and partnerships. The fiscal year 2019
budget reinforces the Air Force commitment to our allies and
international partners through programs such as the European Deterrence
Initiative and Indo-Pacific security initiatives.
reforming the department
While this budget proposes additional resources for the Air Force,
we have to gain full value from every taxpayer dollar we spend. We will
drive innovation, reinforce budget discipline and affordability, and
deliver performance with the funds entrusted to us.
Zero-Based Review: For the first time in more than two decades, we
are conducting a zero-based review of all Air Force programs, budget
accounts, and manpower authorizations to prepare for fiscal year 2020
and the future years defense plan. We will examine the relevance of
every requirement and program to align with the new defense strategy.
Everything we do is ``on the table'' during this review.
Headquarters Air Force Staff Review: Simultaneously, we are
reviewing the structure and manning of the Headquarters Air Force
staff. We are the smallest and most integrated of the service staffs
and intend to stay that way. We will ensure each position is used
efficiently and effectively to support the warfighter.
Acquisition: Enabled by the fiscal year 2016 and fiscal year 2017
National Defense Authorization Acts, we are streamlining Air Force
acquisition. We have mile stone decision authority for more programs
and we are pushing authority to run programs down to lower levels and
using new techniques to innovate, including rapid proto typing and
experimentation. We appreciate Congress' continued support of the
Acquisition Workforce Development fund and expedited hiring authorities
to attract, recruit, hire, develop, and retain a high-quality
workforce.
Streamlining: We are systematically reviewing, reducing, and
clarifying onerous internal instructions, additional duties, and
computer-based training. There are over 1,300 Air Force instructions
that levy 85,000 requirements on our wings and squadrons. Every one of
them will be reviewed, rescinded, or rewritten over a 24-month period.
We will significantly reduce the number of Air Force publications and
ensure the remaining ones are concise, current, and relevant. We have
already rescinded over 100 Air Force Instructions. While this review
reduces stifling bureaucracy and associated cost, the more important
impact is on our ability to fight. This supports the culture of
centralized intent and decentralized execution we need for competent
and entrusted airmen to make decisions in future highly contested
environments, where we cannot expect continuous centralized control.
Air Force Warfighting Integration Capability (AFWIC): The Air
Force is implementing changes to program development that will better
integrate the budget across the force and allow for more rapid change
to meet emerging threats. This will improve force design analysis to
support national defense priorities and improve our ability to engage
in multi-domain operations.
Revitalizing Squadrons: Squadrons are the warfighting core of our
Air Force. We organize, train, and equip to deploy from the squadron
up. By revitalizing our squadrons, we are reinforcing cohesive, ready,
and agile fighting forces to defend our Nation's interests in the
complex security environment. We depend on exceptional leaders to lead
the world's most powerful Air Force and joint teams. We will develop
future leaders, address cultural shifts to embrace 21st Century talent
management, and unlock the true potential of our airmen.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL DAVID L. GOLDFEIN, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED
STATES AIR FORCE
General Goldfein. Thank you, Senator Inofe, Ranking Member
Reed, distinguished members of the committee. It is an honor
for Secretary Wilson and I to represent 670,000 airmen as we
update you on the Air Force and our budget proposal for 2019.
And I will begin by thanking this committee for its
leadership in building and then gaining approval for a historic
budget that will continue the rebuilding of the U.S. military
as we return to an era of great power competition. And central
to this effort was the perseverance, tenacity, and leadership
of Chairman John McCain, who we know is recovering today in his
beloved Arizona. As airmen we will never forget that he shared
his Vietnam POW experience with men like Bud Day and Lance
Sijan. We admire his leadership and wish him and his family our
warmest regards as he takes on this latest challenge and we
hope to see him soon in these hallowed chambers.
A fitting testimony to his unwavering dedication and
commitment, this budget request allows our nation to confront
today's threats and moves us towards an Air Force we need to
face tomorrow's challenges. As airmen, we first defend the
Homeland and our allies with a safe, secure, and effective
nuclear deterrent, and we are expected to own the high ground
with air and space superiority. And as stated in the National
Defense Strategy, we are expected to project America's military
power forward with our allies and our partners as we bring
global vigilance, global reach, and global power to the joint
team.
This historic budget we discuss today continues the
recovery you set in motion in 2017 when we stopped the
continued erosion of our readiness following years of budget
instability. In 2016, our pilots averaged just 17 hours of
flying time per month. We were able to advance that number to
19 hours in 2018, and with this budget, we begin restoring
pilot proficiency to 21 hours per month in 2019. Pilots join to
fly and this budget gets them back in the air.
In 2016, we faced a shortage of over 4,000 maintainers. In
2018, we will reduce that number to almost zero. 10 years of
maintenance experience lost cannot be gained overnight. Yet,
this budget builds the foundation for a full recovery.
Nine years of continuing resolutions have negatively
affected our munitions manufacturers and the industrial base
that we will need in a peer fight. Under CRs [Continuing
Resolutions], we placed industry in a difficult situation to
retain capacity and a roster of highly skilled workers with
appropriate security clearances without being able to clearly
identify what we could afford to purchase each year. This
budget request fully funds preferred munitions to industry
capacity, allowing for 9,000 line items above fiscal year 2018
totals. With your continued support of this 2019 budget, for
the first time in years, we have a National Security Strategy,
a National Defense Strategy, and a Nuclear Posture Review and
the resources required to support them.
Strategic alignment. Said another way as has been argued so
loudly by this committee, for the first time in years, we have
a strategy-driven budget versus a budget-driven strategy. And
on behalf of all of our airmen, I can only say thank you.
However, we also know that we only have visibility on this
plan through 2019, and a return to the disastrous budget caps
of BCA [Budget Control Act] in 2020 would repeat the damage
caused by the 2013 sequester from which we are still recovering
as a service.
And finally, we are acutely aware that every dollar we are
given is a dollar that was earned by Americans. It is our
solemn obligation to remain good stewards of those dollars.
Thank you again for the opportunity this morning to testify
on behalf of airmen who are standing the watch.
Secretary Wilson and I welcome your questions.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, General Goldfein.
I appreciate your comments about Senator McCain, and on his
behalf right now, I will read his statement since a quorum is
present.
Since the quorum is now present, I ask the committee to
consider a list of 256 pending military nominations. Included
on this list are the nominations of Admiral Davidson to be
Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet; General O'Shaughnessy to be the
Commander of the U.S. Northern Command (NORAD). All these
nominations have been before the committee the required length
of time.
Is there a motion to favorably report this list of 256
pending nominations to the Senate?
Senator Reed. So moved.
Senator Wicker. Second.
Senator Inhofe. All in favor, say aye.
[Chorus of ayes.]
Senator Inhofe. The motion carries.
[The information referred to follows:]
Military Nominations Pending with the Senate Armed Services Committee
Which are Proposed for the Committee's Consideration on April 24, 2018.
1. MG Dorothy A. Hogg, USAF to be lieutenant general and Surgeon
General of the Air Force (Reference No. 1110)
2. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of captain
(Edward M. Crossman) (Reference No. 1276)
3. RADM Richard P. Snyder, USN to be vice admiral and Inspector
General, Department of the Navy (Reference No. 1555)
4. In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of
major (Douglas R. Burian) (Reference No. 1590)
5. VADM John C. Aquilino, USN to be admiral and Commander, US
Pacific Fleet (Reference No. 1596)
6. In the Air Force there are 4 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Richard G. Anderson) (Reference No. 1597)
7. In the Air Force there are 14 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Ronnelle Armstrong) (Reference No.
1600)
8. In the Air Force there are 51 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Alison Lee Beach) (Reference No.
1601)
9. VADM Charles A. Richard, USN to be vice admiral and Commander,
Naval Submarine Forces/Commander, Submarine Force, US Atlantic Fleet,
and Commander, Allied Submarine Command (Reference No. 1668)
10. Capt. Gregory N. Todd, USN to be rear admiral (lower half)
(Reference No. 1721)
11. Capt. John S. Lemmon, USN to be rear admiral (lower half)
(Reference No. 1723)
12. In the Navy there are 2 appointments to the grade of rear
admiral (list begins with Ronald C. Copley) (Reference No. 1725)
13. In the Navy there are 3 appointments to the grade of rear
admiral (list begins with Brian K. Corey) (Reference No. 1726)
14. RADM(lh) Darse E. Crandall, USN to be rear admiral (Reference
No. 1727)
15. In the Navy there are 2 appointments to the grade of rear
admiral (lower half) (list begins with Kristen B. Fabry) (Reference No.
1729)
16. In the Navy there are 3 appointments to the grade of rear
admiral (lower half) (list begins with Heidi K. Berg) (Reference No.
1732)
17. Capt. John J. Adametz, USN to be rear admiral (lower half)
(Reference No. 1733)
18. Capt. Thomas J. Anderson, USN to be rear admiral (lower half)
(Reference No. 1734)
19. In the Navy there are 19 appointments to the grade of rear
admiral (lower half) (list begins with James A. Aiken) (Reference No.
1735)
20. In the Navy there are 11 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant commander (list begins with Nana K. Appiawiah) (Reference
No. 1741)
21. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Tia W. Caphart) (Reference No. 1753)
22. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Napoleon A. Campos) (Reference No. 1754)
23. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Kevin R. Embry) (Reference No. 1755)
24. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Andrew J. Furjanic) (Reference No. 1756)
25. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(Daniel L. Lee) (Reference No. 1757)
26. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(John M. Williams) (Reference No. 1758)
27. General Terrence J. O'Shaughnessy, USAF to be general and
Commander, US Northern Command/Commander, North America Aerospace
Defense Command (Reference No. 1770)
28. Col. Michael T. Gerock, ANG to be brigadier general (Reference
No. 1771)
29. MG Stephen G. Fogarty, USA to be lieutenant general and
Commanding General, US Army Cyber Command (Reference No. 1772)
30. BG Raymond S. Dingle, USA to be major general (Reference No.
1774)
31. MG Francis M. Beaudette, USA to be lieutenant general and
Commanding General, US Army Special Operations Command (Reference No.
1775)
32. In the Army Reserve there are 16 appointments to the grade of
major general and below (list begins with Eugene J. LeBoeuf) (Reference
No. 1776)
33. Admiral Philip S. Davidson, USN to be admiral and Commander,
US Pacific Command (Reference No. 1777)
34. RADM David M. Kriete, USN to be vice admiral and Deputy
Commander, US Strategic Command (Reference No. 1778)
35. RADM(lh) Michelle C. Skubic, USN to be rear admiral (Reference
No. 1781)
36. In the Navy there are 14 appointments to the grade of rear
admiral (list begins with Eugene H. Black III) (Reference No. 1782)
37. RADM(lh) Brent W. Scott, USN to be Chief of Chaplains of the
Navy (Reference No. 1783)
38. Capt. Darin K. Via, USN to be rear admiral (lower half)
(Reference No. 1784)
39. LTG Michael G. Dana, USMC to be lieutenant general and
Director, Marine Corps Staff (Reference No. 1785)
40. LTG David H. Berger, USMC to be lieutenant general and Deputy
Commandant for Combat Development and Integration, Headquarters, US
Marine Corps (Reference No. 1786)
41. In the Marine Corps there are 8 appointments to the grade of
brigadier general (list begins with Stephen E. Liszewski) (Reference
No. 1787)
42. In the Air Force Reserve there are 65 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Michael J. Abbott) (Reference No.
1788)
43. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Roberto Sorianoolivas) (Reference No. 1789)
44. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Jason Palatas) (Reference No. 1790)
45. In the Army there are 2 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Jose R. Reveles, Jr.) (Reference No. 1791)
46. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (D012279) (Reference No. 1792)
47. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Russell B. Gilliland) (Reference No. 1793)
48. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(Erik M. Bauer) (Reference No. 1794)
49. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(Lawrence W. Henry) (Reference No. 1795)
50. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Kenneth A. Willeford) (Reference No. 1796)
51. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (D012941) (Reference No. 1797)
52. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Roxanne T. Sickles) (Reference No. 1798)
53. In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (Chad R. Fitzgerald) (Reference No. 1799)
54. MG Charles G. Chiarotti, USMC to be lieutenant general and
Deputy Commandant, Installations and Logistics (Reference No. 1813)
55. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (James F. Huggins II) (Reference No. 1814)
56. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Denny L. Rozenberg) (Reference No. 1817)
_______________________________________________________________________
TOTAL: 256
About a month ago, several of us on this committee, Senator
Ernst, Senator Rounds, Senator Sullivan, myself, and also a
couple of members from the House Armed Services Committee were
in the South China Sea. It is kind of hard to convince the
American people that our image in that area is not really up
and equal to China's image. We all know about what has happened
in terms of the islands that they have created, and they are up
over 3,000 acres right now. It is all as if they are preparing
for World War III, and those words came from our allies over
there, not from me. It is pretty frightening when you see some
seven islands that were illegally created and have nothing
except really military equipment, cannons, and all of that.
And so we are finding allies that we have there, and we
talked to all of them, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan,
Japan. It is almost as if they are taking sides. Who shall it
be? China or the United States? Whether we like it or not, that
is our current image there, and I am really concerned about
giving some kind of assurance to our allies that we are being
prepared in a different way that may not be visible now.
Do you have any thoughts about that, Secretary Wilson,
about reassuring our allies over there that we are in the game?
Dr. Wilson. Mr. Chairman, our responsibility is to be
strategically predictable to our allies and to be there and to
be operationally unpredictable to our adversaries.
The Chief and I went to the Pacific to the Philippines,
South Korea, Japan. The Chief then went on to India.
Senator Inhofe. When was this?
Dr. Wilson. In January to reassure them. Last week, we had
a Five Eyes meeting, as well as meetings with the Japanese, the
French, the Norwegians, and others about our space partnerships
and opened up our space schoolhouse to more allies and
partners. We are stronger together than we are alone.
I do not know if the Chief wants to talk a little more
about our operational partnerships.
Senator Inhofe. And, Chief, what I am getting at here is
the image that we have over there, which I am sure you saw at
the same time that you were there.
General Goldfein. Yes, sir. And what I will tell you is
that a big part of the air component story in the Indo-Pacific
region is the stability of our forces over time. If you take a
look at the drastic reductions that we have taken over time
across the Air Force, where we have had to pull forces is
primarily from CONUS [Continental United States], or here in
the United States, and in Europe where we have come down
significantly over the years. If you look at where we are in
the Pacific, it has actually been fairly stable over time. And
so our commitment to our fellow air chiefs there and how we
exercise, how we operate, whether that is on the Korean
Peninsula or throughout the region, has remained stable, and I
project it will remain stable over time. Then with this
increased budget, it gives us an opportunity to further
reinforce that air component solidarity with our allies and
partners there in the region.
Senator Inhofe. I think that is significant, and I
appreciate that very much. I wanted to get that on record.
Senator Reed mentioned several of the vehicles that are out
there that we are modernizing right now. The one that is of
greatest interest to me perhaps is the KC-46. When you stop and
think about the KC-135 having endured--what--59 years, I look
at this as something that is going to be probably in that same
situation.
Secretary Wilson, we are anxious for the first KC-46 to get
delivered to the Air Force. We understand that is going to
happen this year. We have had some delays on the first
delivery, and we are all very interested in that.
The President's Budget had, I think, 15 coming on board,
the KC-46. Do you agree that that is an adequate number, an
achievable number, and a desirable number?
Dr. Wilson. Yes, sir. I think that is a desirable number.
We have had meetings with Boeing and additional meetings
last week to get an agreement on a schedule. We believe, the
Air Force believes, that the schedule that Boeing has is still
overly ambitious, and we would like to get agreement on a
delivery date and drive to that delivery date.
Senator Inhofe. What do you think about the President's
Budget having 15 in it, General Goldfein?
General Goldfein. Sir, also I agree with the Secretary that
it is absolutely a desirable number and a sustained number over
time as we bring that weapon system on. As you know, I would
offer that we are a global power because of our global reach,
and it is all the services that rely on that tanker force and
our allies and partners to be able to project power globally.
So it is a critical capability that we need to bring on as fast
as we can bring it on.
Senator Inhofe. Agreed. Thank you.
Senator Reed?
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
First, let me note that I had the opportunity to go down
and visit the B-21 facilities in Florida and was very impressed
with the management, both the Air Force and the contractor. I
know you are paying quite a deal of attention to that, and
thank you for your efforts in that regard.
I want to go back to the JSTARS issue I raised. My sense of
the back and forth--and it has been over several years. So this
is not a recent development--is that originally the aircraft
was going to be retired without replacement, and then Congress
said no. Then the Air Force came back with a modernization plan
for a business jet with a radar and then went into a source
solicitation process for that. Then now in 2019, the proposal
is they canceled that solicitation and pursued another path.
And some rationale has been the National Defense Strategy, but
we got a sense that this was going to be the 2019 proposal even
before the NDS came out.
So either the Secretary or the Chief of Staff, can you give
us some ideas about what is going on?
Dr. Wilson. Senator, we were working on the National
Defense Strategy for about 9 months before it was published,
and I think the last version that I saw had version 67 on it.
So we understood the direction we were going to be guided to go
before it was actually published in January. So it did
influence our fiscal year 2019 budget submission.
There are several things that have changed. And I was on
the National Security Council staff in 1991 when JSTARS was a
new invention. We pushed it forward into the fight when Saddam
Hussein invaded Kuwait, and it was a transformative capability.
But in 1991, I did not have a cell phone. Nobody in this room
had a cell phone, and technology was different. So is the
threat.
So the threat is changing and we have been guided to say
what do we need to do in a contested environment to support the
ground operators because that is what this is about. We know
that it will not survive close to the battle area. It looks
forward about a couple hundred miles onto the ground to look at
what troops are amassing out there to attack us.
So we asked them to see if they could come up with a better
way to solve the problem. The proposal we put forward
integrates multiple sensors, space, air, manned, unmanned,
ground, fuses that data instead of having one aircraft doing a
loop close to the battle area. We also know that we can keep
JSTARS. We have looked at the airframes. We think we can keep
them a little longer than we thought. That opens this
opportunity. We will extend and bring back some AWACS [Airborne
Early Warning & Control] to help as well, and they are a little
further off from the forward edge of the battle area. We had
the engineers come in and scrub this plan so that the
technology readiness level is high. We think this is a better
answer, and that is why we put it forward in the budget.
Senator Reed. General Goldfein, your comments, please.
General Goldfein. Yes, sir. First, I would like to make
sure that there is no question in anybody's mind that we are
committed to staying shoulder to shoulder with Army, Navy,
Marine Corps as we continue to look at the fight in the future.
I have been fighting side by side with the Army my entire
career, and it is my obligation I believe, as the Secretary
organized train and equip, to ensure that any soldier, sailor,
marine, airman who are on the ground who hear jet noise--I
never want them to look up. I want them to know it is us, and
we owe that to them.
So this is about ensuring that we understand the problem
that we have to solve, and the problem, as the Secretary has
laid out, is that we have to simultaneously be able to provide
a common ground picture to an individual on the ground of enemy
movement in both a contested and a non-contested environment.
And we do not have the luxury of doing it either/or.
And so given that challenge, we went and looked at original
assumptions. And you asked what has changed that caused us to
change. The Secretary laid this out. The most fundamental
change is when we did a deep dive into the fuselage, we learned
that we can fly the current frame through the mid to late
2020s, 2028. So the fundamental assumption we started with was
that these airplanes were going to stop flying in 2018. So we
had to solve the platform problem with a platform solution.
That gave us time to step back and say is this the best plan to
be able to solve both the contested and uncontested because we
do not want someone in a contested environment on the ground,
which is where we will be, to be blind to enemy movement on day
one of that campaign.
So given the fact that we can fly longer, we looked at how
could we use those resources in a different way to be able to
provide that ground moving target and the battle management
simultaneously for both Yemen and Kaliningrad. The best way
forward for us is to move into a multi-domain sensing
capability that uses space, leverages where commercial space is
going, leverages every platform that we are building as a joint
team that does ground moving target indicator, or GMTI [Ground
Moving Target Indicator], and look at disaggregated command and
control.
And so the plan we moved forward allows us to keep the
current capacity through 2028, possibly longer, and gives us 10
years now to build a multi-domain capability to be able to fill
in the gaps. The gap that we have got to fill is that
Kaliningrad, China campaign gap in a contested environment.
Senator Reed. Just quickly because my time has expired. I
understand that. It is a very logical presentation. But we are
starting now with a new concept and we are at the very
beginning stages of trying to develop the many different parts.
Is that fair?
General Goldfein. I will just say that here is one of the
things that we are able to do. Previously we were going to
retire seven E-3 AWACS. This allows us to not only bring those
airplanes up but to modify them so we can get top secret feeds
into AWACS so they can start getting feeds from all kinds of
different platforms and capabilities to do that battle
management. Every airplane and every platform the joint force
is building that has an electronically scanned radar does that
business. And so we have access to more capability.
The other thing we are going to do is we are going to take
MQ-9's and build a GMTI capability on MQ-9's. So a soldier now
will have the capability that he does not have today to find,
fix, and finish on a single platform based on being able to see
movement, put a sensor against it, validate it, fix it, and
destroy it with weapons on the wing. So to the soldier on the
ground, this is going to be transparent to them. The soldier on
the ground in a contested environment is going to be served by
the better plan.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Wicker?
Senator Wicker. Thank you.
Thank you for a bit more optimistic report than we have had
in the past years.
Let me talk about a problem we still have, the pilot
shortage problem in the Air Force, the pilot shortage problem
generally, and also pilot training.
It has been estimated that there is approximately a 2,000
pilot shortage in the Air Force, including 950 fighter pilots.
Boeing reports that North America will need 117,000 more pilots
over the next 20 years.
So what are we doing about this? Are we going to max out
the UPT [Undergraduate Pilot Training] bases? And what about
this somewhat controversial proposal to add a new contractor-
run undergraduate pilot training facility? Do you want to start
first, Madam Secretary?
Dr. Wilson. Senator, I will.
You are right that there is a national shortage of pilots.
The airlines are going to be hiring over 4,500 pilots a year
for the foreseeable future, and they cannot hire anyone for the
airlines who have less than 1,500 hours of flying time or 750
hours with the Air Force. There is an inverse relationship
between hiring in the airlines and retention in the services.
We are going to have to face that challenge.
We are facing it in three different ways.
The first is to validate our requirements, how many pilots
do we really need, and really scrub those numbers.
The second is we are trying to do everything we can to
retain the pilots we have with quality of service, quality of
life, reducing the operating tempo, giving them more choice and
options to be able to manage their own careers so that we keep
more pilots on Active Duty. They came to serve. So there are
ways to increase retention but retention cannot be the only
answer.
Third is we have to increase the number of pilots we are
training. The first step is to maximize the capacity of the
pilot training bases that we have. We trained about 1,100
pilots last year I think was the number. The maximum capacity
of our current infrastructure is about 1,400 pilots a year.
Senator Wicker. So that is three UPT bases?
Dr. Wilson. Yes, sir. Shepherd--the current UPT bases we
have--it is about 1,400. And it is to do with the airspace,
training ranges, runways, ramp space. But it is about 1,400.
When you get beyond that, we are looking at whether we
should have some flexibility with some contractor undergraduate
pilot training, and we are looking at that option. It gives us
the ability to increase for a bit and to recover faster and
also to ramp back down without affecting the indigenous Air
Force capability. So it is an option that we are looking at.
Chief?
General Goldfein. Sir, I will just add that as we look at
this, as you might imagine, we have been out eyeball to eyeball
with our pilot force listening to them, squinting with our ears
to make sure we understand what are those actions that we could
take that would keep them in the Air Force because the part we
cannot control is the overall problem statement, and that is
that we as a nation do not produce the pilots we need to
adequately service business, commercial, and military aviation.
That is a national challenge. We cannot control that.
But what we can control are those things that we do within
the service. And as the Secretary laid out, it is about
increasing production. It is about increasing retention through
quality of service and quality of life initiatives, and it is
about ensuring that we understand with great fidelity the data
that drives the requirement for pilots to go to do the nation's
business.
Senator Wicker. General, on that last statement--and that
follows up what the Secretary said about validating the
requirement. Are you saying that the requirement might not
quite be 2,000 pilots and it might not quite be 950 pilots? Is
that what you are saying?
General Goldfein. No, sir. What I am saying is that where
we actually place pilots--because to have a healthy and mature
weapon system, you have to have enough pilots that actually fly
the aircraft.
Senator Wicker. Okay, well, are you pretty sure that we are
in the ballpark on a 2,000 pilot shortage?
General Goldfein. Yes.
Senator Wicker. Do we need to be part of a larger
conversation with industry and frankly with our allies about
the international pilot shortage? Yes, ma'am.
Dr. Wilson. Sir, I think we do. This is a national
shortage. I would say that the only pathway for someone outside
of the military to get into the airlines--I mean, there are
very few of them--crop dusting, flight instructing, or going
overseas and flying with a foreign commercial carrier because
they do not have the 1,500-hour requirement.
Senator Wicker. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Since we are talking about pilots, I was struck by the news
coverage of the Southwest problem last week with its engine and
the pilot did such a terrific job. And one of the pieces of
that news story was that she had hoped to join the Air Force
and had wound up joining the Navy because the Air Force was not
as open to women. I assume that is no longer a problem.
Dr. Wilson. Senator, I came into the Air Force at about the
same time. The Navy opened fighter pilots flying to women
earlier than the Air Force, but they could not fly in combat.
And I was also part of the effort to change that law back in
1991.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much. I appreciate that. I
thought it was important to make that point.
I want to thank you, Secretary Wilson, for taking time to
meet with me last week and for the responsiveness of the Air
Force to the issue we have at the former Pease Air Force Base
with perfluorinated carbon, or PFCs, which have affected the
groundwater. It is an issue not just in New Hampshire but at
military installations across this country.
And I also appreciated Assistant Secretary Henderson coming
up and meeting with folks in the community. As you know,
through the defense bill last year, the authorization and
through the appropriation in the omnibus, we have funding for a
health study that is going to be done by the Agency for Toxic
Substances and Disease Registry through the CDC. And I just
wanted to urge you to do everything you can to make sure that
that funding gets transferred as expeditiously as possible. We
have 1,500 people who have been tested with elevated levels in
the Portsmouth area who are anxious about their future and
their children's future. And I know there are many people
throughout the Air Force and our other military installations
who share that concern.
Dr. Wilson. Senator, we will work with you and with HHS, as
well as CDC, to make sure that study is done.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much.
You talked about the bold new move, one of which was
accelerating defendable space. General Hyten testified at a
recent STRATCOM posture hearing regarding his view that the
U.S. military should eventually stand up a separate branch for
space domain but that now is not the right time to do so. Do
you share that view, or do you feel differently about it?
Dr. Wilson. Senator, I feel that the United States is the
best in the world at space, and our adversaries know it and
they will seek--I know they are developing the capabilities to
deny us the ability to freely operate in space in crisis or
war. This budget reflects an alignment of the American
leadership. The President has set out a National Security
Strategy and a National Space Strategy, restarted the Space
Council, which the Vice President is chairing. The Secretary of
Defense and the Air Force are all aligned on the need to
accelerate capabilities which are here in the President's
Budget. We are building a more lethal and more agile force, and
I think this fiscal year 2019 budget has a significant
commitment to being able to defend ourselves on orbit.
Senator Shaheen. So does that mean you think we do not need
to set up a separate space force, at least in the foreseeable
future?
Dr. Wilson. Senator, we are open to discussing ideas that
people have in this realm. I think the most important thing is
not the organization but what we actually do and that is to
defend ourselves on orbit and make clear to any adversary that
if they take us on in space, we will prevail.
Senator Shaheen. And is there a role for our National Guard
in the space domain?
Dr. Wilson. Senator, we have National Guard units that are
involved in aspects of space, as well as Reserves.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
General Goldfein, you were talking about our efforts in
Kaliningrad. And I know one of the things that our European
allies are very interested in is our support for the European
Deterrence Initiative. Can you talk about what more the Air
Force is doing to support that initiative?
General Goldfein. Yes, sir. We talked earlier a little bit
about our stable presence in the Pacific. The air component
story in Europe is actually slightly different. We have taken
down significantly over time. And we as an Air Force have
gotten so much smaller over time. I mean, if I had been the
Chief in 1991 with the Secretary, we would be talking to an Air
Force of just shy of a million Active, Guard, Reserve, and
civilians. And just to give you one force element, 134 fighter
squadrons. Today we have 56 total and 670,000. So a lot of that
reduction came in Europe.
And so with this smaller force, the European Defense
Initiative from the air component perspective has been an
investment in access and basing so we can take this smaller
force and push it forward very quickly to compete, deter, and
then win, if required, working side by side with our NATO
allies. So that is why you have seen so much investment in
basing, so much investment in infrastructure as our part of
EDI, and I think as we go forward, you will see that continue.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Fischer?
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, the RC-135 is the latest in a family of platforms
that have served as the backbone of the Air Force's manned ISR
mission since 1962. And I am very proud that Nebraska's 55th
Air Wing at Offutt Air Force Base is the home of this very
unique mission. And as we race to match the pace of new
threats, it is critical that we adequately fund this aircraft.
The fiscal year 2019 Air Force budget requests funds to
make upgrades to the platform. And how have global threats
generated a need for this capability?
General Goldfein. Yes, ma'am. Thank you.
Not only is it a critical capability, as you know, it is a
critical capability for our allies. And we share this with the
United Kingdom who has this capability as well. So we are
finding that this particular capability, without going into the
operational details on what happens on that airplane, as we
look at peer threats and the return to great power competition,
our ability to understand the global picture to be able to
ensure that we understand more than our adversaries and can
then decide and act in ways that can produce dilemmas for our
adversaries and enhance 21st Century deterrence, the RC-135 is
central to that effort and it will remain so.
Senator Fischer. You mentioned it is important for our
allies. What about our combatant commanders? What do you hear
from them?
General Goldfein. Same. As a matter of fact, the demand
signal for RC-135 and its capabilities are going up, especially
as we look at the peer competitors, the China, the Russia
threats, when we look at our posture vice Iran, North Korea.
And it has been very successful in our fight against violent
extremism. So it actually works across the spectrum of
conflict.
Senator Fischer. You have also requested funds to convert
three KC-135R aerial refueling tankers into a specialized WC-
135R aircraft used to detect evidence of nuclear detonations.
And how will this conversion, I guess, help to improve the WC-
135R mission?
General Goldfein. It allows us to give more time to be able
to continue to accomplish this mission because the current
airplanes are old. They are wearing out. Our mission-capable
rates and, more importantly, our aircraft availability rates to
be able to do this mission are much lower than not only the
Secretary of Defense but the combatant commanders require under
that mission. So being able to convert this into the KC-135
gives us more longevity for that critical mission.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
And I would also like to thank the dedicated men and women
that we have at the 55th wing and the missions that they
perform.
Madam Secretary, the Air Force's physical infrastructure is
essential to the lethality and the readiness of our nation's
forces, both key goals of the NDS. Put simply, maintaining
readiness means maintaining our runways. Unfortunately, there
are several instances where Air Force installations are
operating with runways in increasing states of deterioration
and in need of substantial repair. Offutt in my home State of
Nebraska is one such example. And while I am encouraged that
the Air Force is working on a planned solution, I do worry
about this in a systemic sense as an issue.
To what degree do you believe the Air Force is experiencing
a larger runway maintenance problem?
Dr. Wilson. Senator, I have actually stood on that runway
and seen some of the problems with the concrete there. And it
did not last to the extent it was supposed to. And as the
engineers there know and as you know, there were problems in
the way they built that runway, and it is going to have to be
replaced earlier than it should have been. We do not see that
as a systemic problem across the Air Force. I think it was a
problem with that contractor.
Senator Fischer. I thank you for your interest and your
commitment to the runway at Offutt. And I thank you for coming
to stand on the runway. It is important to see that firsthand,
the issues that our airmen are facing there.
What system do you have in place to monitor the risk that
is posed to installations, though, as a result of any kind of
degradation to the runways?
Dr. Wilson. Senator, we have civil engineers who are at our
bases who monitor the condition of the runways and other
critical facilities.
Senator Fischer. Do you believe that is sufficient to
mitigate any risk?
Dr. Wilson. Senator, I do, but I can also kind of take that
for the record and go back and push on that a little bit, if
you would like me to.
[The information referred to follows:]
Dr. Wilson. The Air Force has several systems in place which work
in tandem to assess and track the condition of airfield pavements,
predict current and future degradation, identify current and future
requirements.
These systems include:
a. Airfield Pavement Evaluations Team: Performs complete
assessments providing Pavement Condition Index and Structural
evaluation every 12 years and complete Pavement Condition Index every 4
years (via contract) for Active Duty airfields. The Airfield Pavement
Evaluation Team presents reports documenting the condition and
recommending maintenance/repair requirements to the installations and
enters findings into the database of record (PAVER).
b. PAVER Sustainment Management System: Department of Defense
mandated software system that uses assessment data collected by the
Airfield Pavement Evaluation Teams and contractors to catalog airfield
condition in detail; to include pavement section, predict future
condition, identify current requirements, and predict future (out year)
airfield requirements.
c. Transportation Network & Airfield Pavements Activity Management
Plan and its pavement Sub-Activity Management Plans: Uses assessment
data and PAVER products to manage the activity (airfields), identify &
prioritize requirements, and predict future needs. The Air Force uses
PAVER information to develop a risk-based integrated list of airfield
priorities, which is coordinated with installation civil engineers and
Major Command staffs.
d. Base Civil Engineer Squadron and Airfield Manager: Works in
concert to monitor all aspects of the airfield continuously and
identify future requirements.
Senator Fischer. Okay. I thank you very much, and I
appreciate your support for us. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
Senator Heinrich?
Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman.
Secretary Wilson, General Goldfein, welcome to you both.
I wanted to ask you a little bit about the plans by the Air
Force to divest of its HH-60G Pave Hawks as the new Whiskey
models become available. The entire New Mexico delegation wrote
to you a few months ago and expressed support for transitioning
some of those legacy helicopters to the 150th Special
Operations Wing. Doing so would help the Air Force with pilot
production but also help alleviate the stress on the 58th
Special Operations Wing to train both the legacy and the new
airframes.
So as the Air Force upgrades to the HH-50W combat rescue
helicopter, would you agree that an interim location using the
legacy airframe would be beneficial to that transition? For
either of you.
General Goldfein. Yes, sir. We appreciate that option and
we are looking into it. So we do agree.
Senator Heinrich. I would very appreciate it if you would
look at the New Mexico Air National Guard as having the
potential to fill that role.
Secretary Wilson, I was really encouraged to see the Air
Force prioritization on modernization in this year's budget. It
is a very welcome focus.
I am, however, concerned that it is not necessarily
adequately reflected in the basic and applied research
accounts, which is really the foundation for a lot of the
defense labs. So the fiscal year 2019 budget request increases
RDT&E by almost 19 percent, but the basic and applied research
lines stayed pretty flat.
Do you think we are putting enough emphasis right now on
basic and applied research?
Dr. Wilson. Senator, I actually share your concern. Our
research, development, test, and evaluation did go up
significantly in this budget, but it is more on the test and
evaluation end of things. We have a science and technology
strategy review underway to help identify what are the areas
where the Air Force needs to focus for the future and how can
we best conduct that research. We expect that review to be done
this fall and into the end of the year, and that will help
guide us with the future.
Senator Heinrich. I am very happy to see the focus on
RDT&E. I just worry that if we do not pay attention to that
foundation that it is going to catch up to us.
One of the other things I wanted to ask your opinion on,
Secretary, I have long been an advocate for a more resilient
and responsive space architecture that allows us to move faster
and counter threats that we are facing in the current
environment. So I was incredibly pleased to see that the Space
Rapid Capabilities Office received such priority in resources
in this year's budget request.
Can you just talk a little bit about the importance of this
newly designated office, Space Rapid Capabilities, and how it
is going to contribute to our nation's resilience and fit into
the overall architecture?
Dr. Wilson. Senator, the Operationally Responsive Space
Office has been renamed the Space RCO. There are four different
satellites that that office is working on now.
But I think even more than just renaming the office, we
have been going through a series of sprints with the Space and
Missile Systems Center since December of 2 and 3 weeks in
duration to look at how do we buy satellite systems, how do we
need to change the way in which we buy satellite systems. There
are a number of results of that work, but one of them will be
to robust or strengthen the Space Rapid Capabilities Office to
be able to drive forward on prototyping and rapid responses to
combatant commander needs.
Senator Heinrich. Great.
General Goldfein, I wanted to ask you a little bit about
light attack aircraft. You recently announced that the Air
Force will undergo another experiment at Holliman this year
rather than the originally planned combat demonstration. How is
this experiment going to be different than the one conducted at
Holliman last year?
General Goldfein. Sir, three ways.
Number one, we are taking a really deep dive on this one on
the sustainment aspects of it, how many maintainers we need,
how we sustain them both at home and forward. We determined
that we could actually get a better outcome by not doing a
combat experience downrange but doing an experiment at Holliman
Air Force Base like we did the last time.
Second, we are looking at this through the lens of allies
and partners because a big part of the light attack experiment
is a common architecture and information and intelligence
sharing network so that those who would join us would be able
to be part of the counter-violence, the campaign against
violent extremism.
The third thing that we are looking at is how do we
integrate this particular weapon system in ways that allows us
to get to a price point where those that we are affecting in
the fight against violent extremism for the long term, that we
are able to do that in the $2,000 per flying hour range over
time as opposed to the $20,000, $30,000, $40,000 per flying
hour range. Given the fact that we are going to be in this for
a long time, it is why it has been in the National Defense
Strategy.
So as we go look at this, we are hopeful that we will get
the outcomes that will allow us possibly to come back to you
and look at even accelerating this to the left if, in fact, we
think that is worth pursuing.
Senator Heinrich. I look forward to that. It has taken
quite a long time to get this moving. So we are looking forward
to seeing that capability fielded.
Thank you, Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Heinrich.
Senator Rounds?
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Wilson, General Goldfein, first of all, thank you
for your service to our country.
Secretary Wilson, you said that if you currently have a
bomber base, you will be getting the B-21. We are very happy
with that decision, and we are looking forward to getting the
B-21 at Ellsworth Air Force Base. The aircraft is expected to
arrive in the mid-2020s, which is only about 7 years away. To
prepare for the arrival, there are significant amounts of work
that have to be completed. The MILCON work that would have to
be done is going to take some time.
I have just got a couple of questions with regard to what
the planning is for this particular movement.
It is my understanding that the Air Force still must
complete the strategic basing process in order to make the B-21
basing decision official. Am I correct in that assumption? When
would this be done?
Dr. Wilson. Senator, you are correct that if you have a
bomber base now, you will have a bomber base in the future. We
expect a minimum of 100 B-21's, as a minimum. The rest of the
fleet will be B-52's. The Chief has also directed a review of
the entire number of squadrons that we have of all kinds of
aircraft in light of the National Defense Strategy, which
should be done by the end of August.
We would not expect to move forward with a strategic basing
initiative in the near term honestly because this is still 7
years out or so. If we get a validation of numbers, I suppose
we could move forward earlier on it, but there is really
probably not a need to move on it for another couple of years
at least.
Senator Rounds. That is the reason for my question. It
would appear to me that with the amount of work, the military
construction that is going to have to be done and the fact that
it is going to have to move through an appropriations process,
it seems to me that there would be at some point a plan in
which the MILCON would start to become a part of that process.
That is really what my question is. How soon would it be before
we expect to see the Air Force making recommendations with
regard to MILCON activity for these improvements in those bases
in order to be able to receive the B-21 in a timely fashion?
Dr. Wilson. Senator, it is not on my radar screen now for
the basing actions that we expect in the near term. So the B-21
will start coming on in the mid-2020s and then there is a ramp-
up after that. I will take this under advisement as to whether
we should move this forward to give communities some certainty.
But I do not know. Chief, do you have anything on the
bomber structure, the force structure?
General Goldfein. Yes, ma'am.
So, sir, what I would just offer is that if you look at our
MILCON submission in this budget, our priority starts with new
mission MILCON and then we go to combatant commander critical
requirements, and then we get to what we call worst first,
those worst facilities that we have got to build across all of
the major commands. So the top of our submission is in new
mission beddown. So that is why you see MILCON going in on the
F-35, MILCON going in on the KC-46. So the process that we use
to align that MILCON with new mission to ensure that it is in
place before the aircraft arrive because you have got to go do
the maintenance and sustainment of the weapon system before you
actually operate it, that same process will be used for the B-
21.
Senator Rounds. So what I am hearing you say is that
because of the time frame and you have got other items such as
the 135 that has got to bed down first, and that is where your
priority is going to be or the next couple years with regard to
the MILCON mission. Am I saying that correctly?
Dr. Wilson. Senator, we generally do not plan MILCON
outside of the 5-year window. And so this is for us beyond the
5-year window of where we would be planning.
Senator Rounds. Today just now, once again, we have used
the term that we would have a minimum of 100 B-21's, or at
least that is the structure today. Is it not about time that we
really started talking about what our needs are and about what
the real discussion should be?
I understand that when we are talking about 100 aircraft,
there is a cost involved because on a per-copy basis, the more
you build, the less expensive per copy it can become. The
sooner you have certainty with regard to that, perhaps the
better off we all are in terms of how we budget for it. Is it
not fair to say that under most analyses that have been done,
we are somewhere between 170 and 200 B-21's or at least that
number of bombers necessary to fulfill the missions as you
currently understand them?
General Goldfein. Yes, sir. That is why I have directed the
study that will be done by August on exactly what the size of
the Air Force needs to be, bombers, fighters, command and
control, personnel recovery, all those elements that we bring
to do the missions of the Air Force.
The National Defense Strategy--the Secretary said we were
on version 67. We had folks that were helping the Secretary of
Defense with the writing of that document. We were getting
periodic updates, and we were looking at the 2019 budget
throughout that time frame.
As we look forward to the future, we owe you now what the
size of the Air Force needs to be to be able to accomplish the
National Defense Strategy tasks, and that is where we will come
back to you with telling you what the requirement is for the
force of bombers we need. Right now, what we know is the
minimum is 100. I fully expect that the requirement is going to
be above that.
Senator Rounds. Let me, just for the record, ask you once
again just so that I understand it. When would you expect to be
able to come back to the committee with a recommendation as to
what our force should look like?
General Goldfein. Our plan is to do that by August.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has expired.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
Senator Peters?
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
To our witnesses, thank you for your testimony here today
as always.
Secretary Wilson, when you appeared before this committee
in December, you said you are--and I am going to quote you
here--a big fan of the A-10, which I certainly like to hear.
But I am concerned because a significant number of A-10's will
have to be grounded unless they receive new wings. So that is a
big concern. The Air Force's fiscal year 2019 budget request
included $80 million for additional wing sets for the A-10. But
last week in the Airland Subcommittee, we heard testimony that
the Air Force has only committed to maintaining a minimum of
six of the nine A-10 squadrons through 2032.
Secretary Wilson, could you please clarify the Air Force's
intent for the future of the A-10, and has there been a
decision made to reduce from nine to six?
Dr. Wilson. Senator, there has been no decision to reduce
from nine to six. The current fiscal year's budget includes the
funds to restart the line for the rewinging of the A-10 and to
buy the first four wing sets. The fiscal year 2019 proposal has
$80 million, which should get us somewhere between 8 and 12
additional wing sets. Earlier this week, I asked our
acquisition folks to see whether that production can be
accelerated for delivery so that we do not have groundings, and
they are taking a look at that. But there has been no decision
made to reduce the number of A-10 squadrons.
Senator Peters. Is that decision based on current funding,
or will you require additional appropriations in fiscal year
2019 above the budget request for the A-10?
Dr. Wilson. Senator, we have the money in the budget
request I think for between 8 and 12 additional wing sets. We
have not gotten the final proposals and made a decision to be
able to analyze how many wing sets per year is the maximum that
industry could produce, but I may be able to get that
information to you.
Senator Peters. I would appreciate that, if you could,
Secretary.
Dr. Wilson. Yes, sir.
Senator Peters. You mentioned the contract. Could you
please provide an update on the competition for the A-10 wing
contract? I know there were some issues in the supply chain. Do
you expect any issues in the industrial base to delay this
program?
Dr. Wilson. Senator, I do not expect any now, but it is a
good example of supply chain problems. The prime contractor for
the A-10 no longer exists. North American was the aircraft
producer at the time. There are, as I understand it, 102,000
parts on an A-10 wing. So I do not know how many of those are
different part types, but I am hoping a lot of them are the
same rivet. But it is a complicated wing.
Senator Peters. Right.
With disruptive technologies making it easier and less
expensive to put satellites in orbit, we are likely to see the
beginning of a satellite boom. Several companies have applied
for and received licenses to launch large satellite
constellations in the next 20 years. Recently, as you know,
SpaceX was approved to launch a constellation of more than
4,000 satellites to provide rural broadband, certainly a very
important issue for the United States, but one particularly
important for me and for northern Michigan in the upper
peninsula of Michigan. But needless to say, space situational
awareness or space traffic management is going to become far
more complicated in the upcoming years.
Recently Vice President Pence, as the head of the National
Space Council, announced that the Department of Commerce will
become responsible for a basic level of space situational
awareness using data provided by the Air Force. However, I am
personally concerned that the orbital debris regulatory
landscape is already extremely complicated, and adding a new
organization in the Department of Commerce would probably only
add to that complexity.
So my question to either one of you is, what steps do you
recommend to improve our whole-of-government approach to space
situational awareness? What role specifically should the Air
Force play, and what other agencies and departments do you want
to see in leading roles?
Dr. Wilson. Senator, a number of questions there.
The Air Force has been doing notification of possible
collisions in space since the 1950s, not only for the United
States but for the world and for companies. We track any object
greater than about a softball size, and there are 20,000 of
those currently orbiting the earth. Last year our group out of
Annenberg, California gave notice of about 300,000 potential
collisions in space.
We are increasing our space situational awareness
capabilities. We have four satellites on orbit. We will put two
more satellites on orbit for co-orbital space situational
awareness, but we also have a ground-based system to be able to
watch things and not just keep a catalogue, but to be able to
see things in near real time. So if anything is moving, we
figure out why, and we are able to protect our assets on orbit.
With respect to who we cooperate with, I had a meeting last
week with the Secretary of Commerce. They are going to come out
to our Schriever wargame this fall, and we will have a civil
cell there so they can start to learn how we do this now. We
are quite happy to move that to the Commerce Department and
stand up their capability. The sensors will probably all come
from us, but there may be some advantages to having the
Commerce Department doing this as well. There are other sources
of data on space situational awareness, and they may be able to
do some things that, honestly, right now we just--our sensors
track and we notify off of our sensors. They may be able to do
some additional things based on other people's data sets, and
that may be an advantage for all of us.
Senator Peters. Thank you so much.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Peters.
Senator Cotton?
Senator Cotton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, General Goldfein, thank you for being here
today. I am sorry I am late. I just came from the White House
arrival ceremony for President Macron. I will say that your Air
Force platoon performed excellently, almost as good as the Army
platoon.
[Laughter.]
Senator Cotton. Secretary Wilson, we passed a 2-year budget
a couple months ago and an omnibus spending bill for the rest
of this year. Obviously, that has given a bit of a reprieve
from the budget caps and sequestration under the Budget Control
Act. However, we still have to implement the second year of
that budget agreement.
Could you explain to me the impacts that continuing
resolutions have had on the Air Force and why it is important
that we pass a DOD appropriations bill in a timely fashion this
summer?
Dr. Wilson. Yes, sir. Senator, I think that nothing has
done more damage to the United States Air Force than budget
uncertainty or sequester over the last decade. Certainty allows
us to do things like work with industry to maximize the
munitions production up to industry capacity. It allows us to
sign contracts other than in the last half of the year. So
probably the most important thing is industry certainty. We
have not sequestered ourselves this year. We have acted as if
the budget was ultimately going to be passed, but the
uncertainty with industry is a major issue.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
Then, of course, we will be back in this situation in about
18 months because the last 2 years of the Budget Control Act,
fiscal years 2020 and 2021, remain. I assume that it is
imperative that Congress act to eliminate those caps and the
risk of sequestration for the same reasons for those two fiscal
years?
Dr. Wilson. Yes, sir.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
The Air Force's unfunded priorities list states that the
ground-based strategic deterrent and long-range standoff weapon
programs are both expected to run out of funding by the end of
the year due to accelerated timelines. Please explain a little
bit more about the acceleration of the timelines of those
programs.
Dr. Wilson. Senator, they are ahead of schedule. They are
making very good progress and they are ahead of schedule.
Senator Cotton. So that is a good news story then, not a
bad news story.
Dr. Wilson. Yes, sir.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
What impact, if any, would the Air Force face on these
programs if it does not receive the extra funding that is
identified in that unfunded priorities list?
Dr. Wilson. Senator, our unfunded priorities list this
year, because of the increase in the money that the Congress
appropriated in the budget deal, is actually smaller than it
has ever been, at least in probably the last decade. But what
we did in those unfunded priorities, which we are required by
statute to provide, is accelerate things that are already in
our 5-year plan. So pull more things to the left if there were
an additional top line.
We are actually executing on the nuclear modernization, on
the research and development phase of that faster than we
thought, and that would be a good place to keep the progress
going.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
General, how many fighter aircraft does the Air Force have
today?
General Goldfein. Sir, currently we have 2,151 aircraft.
Senator Cotton. How many are combat-coded?
General Goldfein. Approximately 75 percent of those.
Senator Cotton. A little over 1,500 then?
General Goldfein. Yes.
Senator Cotton. So you are in compliance with the NDAA
provision from a couple years ago----
General Goldfein. We are.
Senator Cotton.--to maintain a minimum of 1,900 aircraft
and 1,100 combat-coded.
Does the new National Defense Strategy have any impact on
what our requirements are today for both total aircraft and
combat-coded aircraft?
General Goldfein. It does, and in fact, we are going to be
coming back to this committee by August with our assessment of
not only the number of aircraft, but more importantly, the
number of squadrons that are required, not only with fighters
but with fighters, bombers, command and control, personnel
recovery, all those elements that are required to successfully
support the National Defense Strategy.
To the previous discussion on A-10, we discussed earlier
that we have gone from 134 fighter squadrons to 56. One of the
reasons that the Secretary and I are looking at all of those
fighter squadrons is because the last thing we want to do right
now is get smaller. We need to work with this committee to get
larger and make sure that we can source the number of
airframes, the maintainers, the people in the squadrons we need
to adequately support the strategy.
Senator Cotton. Thank you, General.
Madam Secretary, thank you for your visit to Arkansas to
sit with our National Guard and Little Rock Air Force Base.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
Senator Hirono?
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Wilson, peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific
is essential. I am glad that you are paying a lot of attention
to the region given its importance.
You made some recent visits to the region, which also
included a stop in Hawaii where you discussed recognizing that
we have returned to an era of great power competition and that
adversaries in the Indo-Pacific area are rapidly modernizing
and we need to keep pace in this highly contested region to
ensure our national security.
From your visits, as well as your thinking about the
region, being the Indo-Pacific region, what concerns you most
as Secretary of the Air Force?
Dr. Wilson. Senator, what concerns me most is the pace of
innovation of China and their rapid growth in their military
capabilities.
Senator Hirono. So do your budget requests reflect
recognition that you have a concern and that we are stepping up
in terms of our pace of modernization acquisitions?
Dr. Wilson. Senator, I think it does.
Senator Hirono. Do you believe additional assets and
investments are needed for the Air Force to maintain its
competitive advantage against our adversaries in the Indo-
Pacific region? If so, in what areas?
Dr. Wilson. Senator, we have put an unfunded priorities
list together that would accelerate things faster. I would say
that one of the things we are trying to do in the Air Force is
to accelerate the pace of acquisition, to do more prototyping,
more experimentation, to use the authorities that this
committee has given us to get to capability faster, from the
lab bench to the flight line faster. I think you have given us
a lot of authorities. We now have to execute on those
authorities.
Senator Hirono. You talk about your concern, the pace of
innovation of China. So in what areas are they innovating that
causes you great concern? General?
General Goldfein. Ma'am, I will talk first and foremost
about some of the work they are doing in space. It is very
aggressive. We built our space architecture in an era where
space was a rather benign domain, and so as the Secretary has
laid out, we are very focused and taking some bold moves in
this budget to increase our ability to defend what we have in
space. I would also tell you that in areas of hypersonics, in
the areas of some of the game-changing technologies that we
have investments in, we are also watching very clearly what
China is investing in the same.
Senator Hirono. What about Russia? Are they not investing
in the space domain?
General Goldfein. They are investing, but they do not have
the economic base that China has to be able to advance as
quickly.
Senator Hirono. General, you are an advocate of Air Force
readiness consistently testifying on its importance. I also
believe in the importance of readiness for our airmen.
This March, I visited the Guard unit at Joint Base Pearl
Harbor-Hickam, where I revisited a readiness challenge that I
have been working on with Air Force leadership for a number of
years now. The challenge involves adversary air capability. And
you are nodding because I think you are familiar with the
situation in Hawaii. There the Guard unit is forced to go F-22
against F-22 in many cases. Unlike other bases, Joint Base
Pearl Harbor-Hickam does not have T-38's or aggressor squadrons
that are there to conduct adversary air operations. I
understand that the Air Force is looking at some commercial
solutions for adversary air, and of course, I would like to see
T-38's or other aggressors based at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-
Hickam as a future goal.
But in the meantime, as you work the new contract adversary
air capability, are there other solutions being considered?
General Goldfein. Ma'am, primarily we are looking at this
from a contract solution for Hawaii specifically. I will tell
you this is a home station training challenge. When those
squadrons deploy to a Red Flag to Alaska and to other areas,
they are able to actually then train against a robust
adversary. When they train in the simulator, they are able to
train now against a rather robust adversary. This is about
filling that gap for daily home station flying training. The
primary vehicle we are looking to fill that gap is through a
contract.
Senator Hirono. So you are telling me that you are making
progress so that our airmen do not have to go F-22 against F-22
because that is not the way we would like to use our resources.
General Goldfein. Less than optimum, yes, ma'am.
Senator Hirono. One more question to both of you. I know
you often have to wave priorities and readiness, modernization,
and additional capabilities versus MILCON. In your recent
MILCON fiscal year 2019 budget request, the Air Force states
that MILCON investments support the combatant commanders'
highest construction priorities such as the posture of forces
in Europe and Indo-Pacific resiliency. I am encouraged by the
prioritization of MILCON investments in the Indo-Pacific region
in support of your mission.
Can you discuss very briefly the importance of MILCON
investments to improve your capabilities to deter our
adversaries in the Indo-Pacific region? We will just go with
you, Secretary Wilson.
Dr. Wilson. Senator, I take a point, and it is a priority
not just to put MILCON in the Pacific but to pursue agile
basing in the Pacific and the ability to move in unpredictable
ways in a crisis and disperse forces.
I would say that our budget--when we look at the actual
numbers, the way things fell out, we may have overemphasized
the European Defense Initiative a little bit and possibly
underemphasized what we are doing in the Pacific Security
Initiative a little bit. That seems to show up on the agile
basing issue.
Senator Hirono. But because of your understanding of the
importance of the Indo-Asia-Pacific area to our national
security, you are placing more emphasis on what we need to be
doing there.
Dr. Wilson. Yes, Senator.
Senator Hirono. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Hirono.
Senator Ernst?
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you very much.
General Goldfein, thank you for mentioning Iowa, Colonel
Bud Day. He is gone but will never be forgotten. He really is a
true hero to so many of us.
Secretary Wilson, thank you very much for your service. It
is good to have you in front of the committee.
I am going to start with an issue that has been very
important to me and for our aviators, something that I continue
to be concerned about, the physiological episodes that our
aviators experience. It is burdening not just the Navy but our
Air Force pilots as well.
In March alone, we have 12 episodes that were reported
amongst the T-6 trainer aircraft fleet. Last week during the
Navy hearing, Secretary Spencer provided an update to the
committee on some of the efforts that the Navy and the Air
Force have undertaken to solve this problem. As I told him, the
fact that we have not been able to find the root cause is very
disturbing.
Secretary, do you have any updates for the committee from
the Air Force's perspective?
Dr. Wilson. Senator, we are working with the Navy and with
NASA, as well as with different elements of the Air Force, to
try to bear down on a root cause and figure these out. The most
recent incidents have been with the T-6, which both the Navy
and the Air Force fly. We pulled all of ours off the line, took
out those systems, rebuilt the systems. We now have over 270 of
them back flying, but we have experienced some other incidents.
We have, in recent weeks, set up a safety investigation
board which for the Air Force has the advantage of being able
to get information without consequence. We have used that
mechanism in the Air Force in the past to get more information
from the pilots, the maintainers, try to really figure this
out.
Chief, do you want to add anything on this one?
General Goldfein. Ma'am, I will just tell you just to give
you a sense of how serious we took it, we stood the whole fleet
down. I was involved in that discussion, as you might imagine.
We just had too many that we could not connect to one
particular causal effect. So when we pulled those off, we put a
team of engineers, operators, physiologists, brought the Navy
in, brought NASA in to really drive in. So although we have
fairly high confidence that we have identified the highest
brake rate items that could contribute, we do not have the
smoking gun yet. We are not going to stop until we find it.
Senator Ernst. I appreciate that. I know we have talked
about in the past monitoring the oxygen that is exiting the
system and also perhaps what is coming out of the aviators as
well. So monitoring the levels.
I know we are studying equipment and potential equipment
malfunctions. You mentioned physiologists. Are we examining the
pilots as well and conducting surveys of the pilots? Maybe are
they drinking too much coffee in the morning, you know, just
things like that? Is there something that maybe perhaps is
going on outside of the realm of the equipment?
General Goldfein. Yes, ma'am. I will just share with you
that we learned a lot when we started the F-22 and we were
having some very similar issues. And because--pilots, we all
grow up and we go to the altitude chamber and we are actually
deprived of oxygen so we know what our individual symptoms are.
So once we recognize our individual symptoms, we know how to
react.
And so when we looked at the F-22, we started with an
engineering analysis of the F-22, and we were going subsystem
by subsystem to try to find it. It was not until we actually
looked at the entire ecosystem with the pilot as part of that
system that we determined that what we were experiencing was
not actually hypoxia, loss of oxygen, but actually hypocapnia,
which is a completely different issue but has very similar
symptoms.
So we are using the same structure of looking at the entire
ecosystem of the T-6 with the pilot as a part of that system,
and that is why that safety investigation board now is so
important.
Senator Ernst. Very good. Again, we need to figure out the
root cause of the issue looking at all aspects there.
Just very briefly, General, during our STRATCOM hearing a
few weeks ago, I visited with General Hyten about the need for
the United States to really articulate a new space strategy.
Our last national security space strategy was published in
2011, and the threats have exponentially increased since then.
Can you talk to us, please, about the need to update this
national security space strategy?
General Goldfein. Yes, ma'am. I will tell you that the
Secretary mentioned the strategic alignment that we have right
now from the President to the Vice President, who has stood up
the National Space Council, and Secretary Wilson has been very
helpful to the Vice President in that. And so from the top
leadership of the nation through those of that are entrusted
with the mission of space superiority, we have this strategic
alignment right now, and the space strategy that the National
Security Council is working its way through is going to be very
important.
Senator Ernst. I appreciate it.
My time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Ernst.
Senator King?
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Goldfein, I think you have acknowledged
previously--and I think the Secretary has as well--the
excessive operations and sustainment costs of the F-35. The
recent estimate is, I think GAO said, $1 trillion over the
lifecycle of the airplane. You are the largest customer on the
F-35. What do we need to do to reduce those numbers? I think a
specific question I would ask, could you give me a ratio of
sustainment cost for an F-35 versus a fourth generation
fighter? Is it twice as much, a third again as much? I just
want to get a flavor of what we are talking about here.
General Goldfein. Yes, sir. So I will start with the last
part of the question first. So our initial estimate right now
is that the sustainment costs of the F-35 are in some cases
upwards of about two-thirds as much or two-thirds more than
what we are finding in a fourth generation fighter. It is why
you have seen me on record to say that our target for
sustainment costs is equivalent to a fourth generation
airplane. We want to get those sustainment costs so that it
costs the same amount for an F-35 as we currently fly in an F-
16 or an F-18. That is because those are the airplanes we are
replacing, and those are the costs that we have funded in.
Senator King. What I would like to ask is if you could give
me for the record what you are doing to meet that goal, given
the limited time we have here. But that would be very helpful.
And are we making progress and how is it played out.
[The information follows:]
The Air Force continues to work closely with the Joint
Program Office (JPO) and Industry to evaluate and analyze
actual data to find opportunities to reduce operations and
sustainment and production costs, and build better sustainment
strategies. JPO's Affordability War Room is dedicated to
reducing operations and sustainment costs. The affordability
war room includes participants from JPO, Services, Office of
Secretary of Defense, and industry. The team will provide an
actionable plan for each initiative with subsequent impacts on
F-35 sustainment affordability. Some specific examples of the
F-35 affordability war room initiatives for cost reduction
include:
a. Depot Standup
b. Spares Increase
c. Strategic Sourcing
d. Reliability and Maintainability Improvement Plan (RMIP)
e. Flight Line / Joint Technical Data
f. Electro-Optical Distributed Aperture System Reliability
Improvements
You also raised the issue of the combat pilot shortage. As
of October 2017, the Air Force is short approximately 2,000
pilots, including Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) pilots,
across the Total Force. The shortage is most acute in the
fighter community, but that shortage generates second and third
order effects for other pilot communities who backfill
shortages from the fighter community, most notably in initial
flying training and non-flying staff positions.
In order to recover from this shortage, the Air Force
established the Aircrew Crisis Task Force (ACTF) in 2017 to
build a comprehensive strategy to address the Air Force's pilot
shortage. After studying the problem, the ACTF created a
holistic approach to resolve the pilot shortage by focusing
resources along three lines of effort: retention, production,
and requirements. Our objective is to rebuild pilot manning to
95 percent by FY23, and so far we are on track.
The retention line of effort explores initiatives to retain
pilots in service past their initial commitment. Two sub-
efforts address retention through a package of talent
management initiatives and compensation reform. The talent
management package is designed to allow aircrew to master their
primary combat duties while maintaining a sustainable work/life
balance. Initiatives include rebuilding administrative support,
reducing operational tempo, exploring possible technical
tracks, and creating incentives for individual deployments.
Compensation reform will explore transitioning from the current
bonus and incentive pay structure to a professional pay
structure similar to medical professionals.
In the production line of effort the Air Force recently
initiated a thorough reexamination of its 30-year-old pilot
training syllabus. Updating the Undergraduate Pilot Training
(UPT) syllabus will transform pilot training by incorporating
new learning technology, improving the quality of instruction
pilots receive, and gaining efficiencies. After maximizing
production at each of the Air Force's existing UPT bases,
adding contract UPT will enable the service to produce
approximately 100 more pilots per year. Stringent contract
requirements and oversight, combined with military instruction
in subsequent training, will ensure all pilots arrive at their
operational unit with the same high-quality training. The
potential introduction of light attack will enable higher crew
manning and utilization rates over current fourth and fifth
generation aircraft; providing the Air Force the opportunity to
get experience for pilots more quickly.
The Air Force is constantly reviewing and managing non-
flying requirements for pilots, the third line of effort, to
ensure any positions out of the cockpit use and effectively
complement a pilots flying training. For example, the plan
realigns some staff positions to be filled with RPA pilots,
which will provide them with career progression opportunities.
Senator King. A different question. Madam Secretary, the
Air Force is undergoing its first full audit. The first
question, how is it going? Second question, how long do you
think till we can get to a place for a clean audit?
Dr. Wilson. Senator, the audit so far is going well. The
auditors are on board. The Air Force has worked up to this over
the last 2 years. So we are kind of going from spring ball into
the real season.
To me, the value of these audits is identifying things that
we need to fix and get better. And so I would expect that it is
going to be a while before the Air Force has a completely clean
audit.
I would say that the things that they are identifying early
on as areas of concern or areas of focus are going to be, at
least initially, in real property management and accountability
there. So we know we are going to have some work there. But as
they identify things, we will work on them and get better.
Senator King. I would urge you to make this a priority. We
are all talking about funding and increasing funding. Some of
the pressure I get back home in Maine is they are not even
audited. Why should we be spending all this additional money? I
am just saying, as we look forward for the next few years as we
are looking toward increasing funding for what amounts to
deferred maintenance in many cases, modernization, having that
audit or the closer we can get to the real audit will be a
defense for you that I think is important.
Dr. Wilson. Senator, this is our first full audit this
year. So we will have an audit--this is an audit for the first
full year.
Senator King. Yes, and I do not think anyone expects it to
be a clean audit the first year. The Navy testified I think it
would be about 4 or 5 years before they feel they are going to
get to a clean audit. But I just wanted to urge you to make
that a priority because I think it is part and parcel of our
funding decision.
Dr. Wilson. Yes, sir.
Senator King. It will help us to be able to provide you
with the funding that you need if we can tell our constituents
they are being audited and we are doing that work.
On the pilot shortage, we have got all these projections. I
know it is a very serious problem. Senator Cotton and I had a
meeting on that with a group of pilots.
What about the effect of UAVs? Will that mitigate the
problem 5-10 years from now? I mean, autonomous automobiles are
going to change the world in the next 10 years. Is there a
greater role there?
Dr. Wilson. Sir, our UAVs are remotely piloted, so you
still need a pilot there. We have actually recovered and put in
place a recovery plan.
Senator King. But do those pilots of UAVs have to be--they
do not have to be officers and there is a different----
Dr. Wilson. Senator, for the Global Hawk, we have enlisted
pilots. I would say that the pilot retention issues will be the
same for enlisted or officers because they can be hired by the
airlines. So we face that same issue.
We are close to recovery for the remotely piloted aircraft,
and we will continue to have the need for pilots----
Senator King. Close to recovery. You mean close to where
you need to be?
Dr. Wilson. Yes, sir.
Senator King. So UAV pilots--we are doing okay.
Dr. Wilson. Sir, we had a deficit and we recovered, and
part of the way we recovered was there is an insatiable demand
for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. We told the
combatant commanders we can provide 60 combat air patrols a day
of remotely piloted aircraft. We have got to get to recovery
because we were burning out. You know, the pilots were flying
remotely 6 days a week, 12 hours a day, never a break.
Senator King. Well, let me follow up on this question, as I
did on my first question. I am out of time. For the record, if
you could provide a page summary of the steps being taken to
remedy the pilot shortage----
Dr. Wilson. Yes, sir.
Senator King.--what is being done, what is working, what is
not working. The conclusion from the meeting that Senator
Cotton and I had was that it was not necessarily about bonuses.
It was more about we have got pilots that want to be pilots,
and they do not necessarily want to be moved into the path
toward leadership. They want to fly airplanes. So anyway, I
would like to see a little write-up on exactly how you are
addressing this issue.
Dr. Wilson. Senator, I am happy to.
[The information follows:]
The Air Force continues to work closely with the Joint
Program Office (JPO) and Industry to evaluate and analyze
actual data to find opportunities to reduce operations and
sustainment and production costs, and build better sustainment
strategies. JPO's Affordability War Room is dedicated to
reducing operations and sustainment costs. The affordability
war room includes participants from JPO, Services, Office of
Secretary of Defense, and industry. The team will provide an
actionable plan for each initiative with subsequent impacts on
F-35 sustainment affordability. Some specific examples of the
F-35 affordability war room initiatives for cost reduction
include:
a. Depot Standup
b. Spares Increase
c. Strategic Sourcing
d. Reliability and Maintainability Improvement Plan (RMIP)
e. Flight Line / Joint Technical Data
f. Electro-Optical Distributed Aperture System Reliability
Improvements
You also raised the issue of the combat pilot shortage. As
of October 2017, the Air Force is short approximately 2,000
pilots, including Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) pilots,
across the Total Force. The shortage is most acute in the
fighter community, but that shortage generates second and third
order effects for other pilot communities who backfill
shortages from the fighter community, most notably in initial
flying training and non-flying staff positions.
In order to recover from this shortage, the Air Force
established the Aircrew Crisis Task Force (ACTF) in 2017 to
build a comprehensive strategy to address the Air Force's pilot
shortage. After studying the problem, the ACTF created a
holistic approach to resolve the pilot shortage by focusing
resources along three lines of effort: retention, production,
and requirements. Our objective is to rebuild pilot manning to
95 percent by FY23, and so far we are on track.
The retention line of effort explores initiatives to retain
pilots in service past their initial commitment. Two sub-
efforts address retention through a package of talent
management initiatives and compensation reform. The talent
management package is designed to allow aircrew to master their
primary combat duties while maintaining a sustainable work/life
balance. Initiatives include rebuilding administrative support,
reducing operational tempo, exploring possible technical
tracks, and creating incentives for individual deployments.
Compensation reform will explore transitioning from the current
bonus and incentive pay structure to a professional pay
structure similar to medical professionals.
In the production line of effort the Air Force recently
initiated a thorough reexamination of its 30-year-old pilot
training syllabus. Updating the Undergraduate Pilot Training
(UPT) syllabus will transform pilot training by incorporating
new learning technology, improving the quality of instruction
pilots receive, and gaining efficiencies. After maximizing
production at each of the Air Force's existing UPT bases,
adding contract UPT will enable the service to produce
approximately 100 more pilots per year. Stringent contract
requirements and oversight, combined with military instruction
in subsequent training, will ensure all pilots arrive at their
operational unit with the same high-quality training. The
potential introduction of light attack will enable higher crew
manning and utilization rates over current fourth and fifth
generation aircraft; providing the Air Force the opportunity to
get experience for pilots more quickly.
The Air Force is constantly reviewing and managing non-
flying requirements for pilots, the third line of effort, to
ensure any positions out of the cockpit use and effectively
complement a pilots flying training. For example, the plan
realigns some staff positions to be filled with RPA pilots,
which will provide them with career progression opportunities.
Senator King. Thank you.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator King.
Senator Sullivan?
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just want to first commend General Goldfein, Madam
Secretary. Your leadership--I think it raises a broader issue.
You know, there has been a strong bipartisan approach to
national security, foreign policy nominees and confirmations.
General Goldfein, you were nominated by President Obama, and I
think President Obama did a great job in nominating outstanding
admirals and generals to run our military services. I think
both of you are doing an outstanding job, and I just want to
commend you. Madam Secretary, you have been responsive. I know
you are meeting with some of my constituents tomorrow. I
appreciate that.
There is a broader point here, though. I certainly hope my
colleagues on both sides of the aisle here recognize this is
really a historic, important tradition in the United States
where Presidents put forward exceptional individuals, whether
it is the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense. It
might not have been the person we would have chosen if we were
President, but they are still good people. On the issue of Mr.
Pompeo, I certainly hope we do not have a really partisan vote
here. That would be I think unfortunate and moving in dangerous
territory.
You two are an example of an Obama nominee, a Trump
nominee, strong support on both sides of the aisle, both doing
an outstanding job, and I just want to commend you for that.
But I emphasize the broader point. We cannot go into the
dangerous territory of full-blown partisanship when there are
good people on both sides of being nominated.
Both of you know that I have taken a lot of interest in the
OCONUS basing of the KC-46. General, you know that prior to
your confirmation, I sent you a letter on that and got some
commitments from you. Importantly, in the NDAA in both 2017 and
2018, this committee and the Congress put forward kind of
characteristics that they thought would be important. I am
going to review a few of those, and if you can just say yes or
no. I would like to get your sense.
So on the OCONUS selection, do you think it is important,
if possible, to have the KC-46's located near not just one but
several COCOMs? Can you just quickly answer a yes or a no?
General Goldfein. Yes.
Senator Sullivan. Madam Secretary, I know you are going to
be part of that.
How about collocated near outstanding training facilities
with joint and international partners?
Dr. Wilson. Yes, sir.
General Goldfein. Absolutely.
Senator Sullivan. How about sufficient airfield and
airspace available? I am paraphrasing the NDAA. This is the
law. Two NDAAs.
Airspace availability and capacity to meet KC-46 refueling
requirements?
Dr. Wilson. Yes, sir.
General Goldfein. Yes.
Senator Sullivan. How about collocated near facilities that
have runways, hangars, aircrew and maintenance operations, and
very large fuel storage and distribution capabilities?
Dr. Wilson. Yes, sir.
Senator Sullivan. How about collocated where there are
dozens, over 100, fifth generation fighters?
Dr. Wilson. Sir, I am not so sure on that one. I am not
sure I would put that in a criteria for a base.
Senator Sullivan. For basing of air refueling aircraft? I
am not talking about a base. I am just talking about the OCONUS
location of the KC-46. You would not put it next to the place--
--
Dr. Wilson. Sir, I am not sure on that one. If somebody
gave me the criteria for selection, I am not sure that one,
collocation with over 100 fighters, would be one of the
criteria.
Senator Sullivan. How about collocation to where most
aircraft from the Lower 48 going to the Asia-Pacific fly over?
General Goldfein. Sir, what I think what you are driving at
is this idea of mission synergy which we do factor into every
one of our basing decisions, which is how do we get to a point
where what we placed there--you know, one plus one equals three
because you are actually able to get the synergy of the
mission. And so in that regard, I agree.
Senator Sullivan. I am summarizing, but these are all
characteristics in the law. I just hope you take those very
seriously as you committed in your confirmation, General, you
would.
Let me ask one final question kind of switching topics
here.
In your personal opinion, do the Chinese or Russian cruise
missiles that are being developed and they have now present a
significant to United States air bases in the European and
Indo-Asia-Pacific theater, including installations in Alaska
like JBER or Eielson or Fort Greeley?
General Goldfein. I am concerned, Senator, but I am also
confident, as others before me have testified, that we have
what we need to defend the nation at this time.
Senator Sullivan. So you think the Army is capable to
provide you the Air Force and the bases that you are in charge
of globally with sufficient short-range air defense systems to
defend overseas air bases?
General Goldfein. I believe the Army has--and I cannot
speak for my fellow joint chief, General Milley, in terms of
what is in his budget submission, but I will tell you that I
know the Army is invested and committed to their responsibility
for base defense.
Senator Sullivan. But not just ballistic missile. I am
talking cruise missile.
General Goldfein. Right.
Senator Sullivan. Madam Secretary, do you have a view on
that?
Dr. Wilson. Senator, I do think that when it comes to air
base defense, that is an area where we probably need to look
really carefully. It is one that long term I think all of us as
airmen have concerns about. Are we going to be able to defend
the bases from which we fight?
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
Senator Gillibrand?
Senator Gillibrand. Hi, General Goldfein. Hi, Madam
Secretary. Thank you so much for being here.
General Goldfein, in the last 2 weeks, General Milley,
General Neller, and Admiral Richardson have told me that they
have seen zero reports of issues of cohesion, discipline, and
morale, as a result of open transgender service in their
respective service branches. Are you aware of any specific
issues of unit cohesion, disciplinary problems, or issues of
morale resulting from open transgender servicemembers in the
Air Force?
General Goldfein. Not the way you have presented the
question, ma'am, I am not. I will tell you that I have talked
commanders in the field, first sergeants, senior NCOs, and I am
committed to ensure that they have the right levels of guidance
to understand these very personal issues that they are dealing
with. And so we continue to move forward to ensure that we
understand the issues.
Senator Gillibrand. Have you personally met with
transgender servicemembers?
General Goldfein. Yes, ma'am, I have.
Senator Gillibrand. What did you learn from those meetings?
General Goldfein. A combination of, one, commitment to
serve by each of them, and then number two, how individual each
particular case is. It is not a one-size-fits-all approach. It
is very personal to each individual. That is why I go back to
we have an obligation to ensure that we understand this
medically and that we can provide our commanders and
supervisors the guidance they need to be able to deal with this
so we do not have issues.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
Secretary Wilson, on April 3rd, 2018, the American Medical
Association wrote a letter to Secretary decrying the recent
policy released by the White House. Echoing concerns raised by
the American Psychological Association and two former Surgeon
Generals, the American Medical Association said, quote, we
believe there is no medically valid reason, including a
diagnosis of gender dysphoria, to exclude transgender
individuals from military service. The memo mischaracterized
and rejected the wide body of peer-reviewed research on the
effectiveness of transgender medical care. Yet, this DOD panel
of experts came to a drastically different conclusion from the
preeminent medical organizations in America about gender
dysphoria, the effectiveness and impact of gender transition on
medical and psychological health, and the ability of
transgender servicemembers to meet standards of accession and
retention.
Do you know who represented the Air Force on this panel?
Dr. Wilson. On the advisory panel to the Secretary of
Defense?
Senator Gillibrand. Yes.
Dr. Wilson. Yes, ma'am, I do.
Senator Gillibrand. Who?
Dr. Wilson. Ma'am, it as our Under Secretary of the Air
Force.
Senator Gillibrand. What Air Force health professionals
were on the panel?
Dr. Wilson. Ma'am, I do not know.
Senator Gillibrand. Do you know whether there were any
health professionals from within the government and outside of
it to testify before or consult with the panel?
Dr. Wilson. Ma'am, I do not know who testified or was
involved in those discussions.
Senator Gillibrand. Can you provide that to the committee,
please?
Dr. Wilson. I would be happy to provide that.
[The information follows:]
Under Secretary of the Air Force, the Honorable Matthew
Donovan
Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Stephen
Wilson
Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force, CMSAF Kaleth O.
Wright
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
Are you aware of any organizations or people outside of the
government who contributed to the work of the panel?
Dr. Wilson. Ma'am, I was not involved in the panel.
Senator Gillibrand. At any point since your confirmation,
have you recommended to the Department of Defense leadership or
to the panel of experts on transgender service any change in
policy from the guidelines established by Secretary Carter?
Dr. Wilson. Ma'am, this is a matter that is in the courts,
and I think it is probably best, when things are under
litigation, that that process play out. The guidance that the
Chief and I have given in the service is that all airmen are to
be treated with dignity and respect, and we comply with the
court order on accessions, as well as retaining airmen who have
disclosed that they are transgender.
Senator Gillibrand. Well, the White House has not taken
your advice about leaving it to the courts. They have issued
policy and they have a panel of experts that have listed a
recommendation that is contrary to what the Service Chiefs have
said in terms of good order and discipline and unit cohesion
and morale.
Dr. Wilson. Ma'am, that is now in the courts, the new
recommended policy change. While that is being considered by
the courts, the court order that we are under continues, and we
continue to assess transgender members in accordance with court
order.
Senator Gillibrand. Ms. Wilson, recently the Air Force
Academy's handling of sexual assault cases made national news.
Several current and former cadets recounted their experiences
of being assaulted and how they were disbelieved, retaliated
against, and denied justice.
Since your confirmation as Secretary of the Air Force, what
specific actions have you taken to protect survivors at the
academy and hold its leadership accountable?
Dr. Wilson. Senator, the Sexual Assault and Prevention
Office at the academy when through a command-directed
investigation shortly before I was confirmed. The Chief and I
have made sure that those positions were filled as a matter of
priority and worked with the current superintendent of the
academy to make sure that other resources were available for
sexual assault prevention and response at the academy while
they were hiring to fill those positions.
Senator Gillibrand. Have you personally spoke to the Air
Force Academy cadets about the academy's current climate
surrounding sexual harassment and assault?
Dr. Wilson. Senator, I have talked to cadets at the
academy. I do not think I have talked to them particularly
about that issue, but I had a number of meetings with cadets
with no one else there other than the cadets and me for them to
talk about whatever they wanted to talk to me about.
Senator Gillibrand. I would recommend you make the effort
to do that.
Dr. Wilson. Thank you.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Scott?
Senator Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning to the panel. Thank you both for being here,
and thank you for your service to our country.
I was happy to read about the Air Force's efforts to
advance its hypersonic weapons program. It is no secret that
our nation and our military are facing competition from both
Russia and China. It was during a recent HASC hearing when
Under Secretary Griffin stated concerns about our country's
slow pace of advancement in hypersonic technology. He said we
will, with today's defensive systems, not see these things
coming. That is a little disconcerting.
My question, Secretary Wilson, what is the Air Force doing
in the field of hypersonic weapons to ensure the U.S. does not
lose its technological advantage?
Dr. Wilson. Senator, we had a summit on hypersonics in the
Air Force last summer in July and made the decision to pursue
two different prototypes as part of that work. One of those
prototypes we are doing in partnership with DARPA. The other
one was the one that you saw announced in the paper last week.
I think the other piece of good news is that the services
are working very closely together on these technologies, and
the guidance is to go fast and to leverage the best technology
available.
Senator Scott. Thank you.
If funded to the level requested in the President's Budget,
when do you expect we will be able to deploy a hypersonic
weapon on Air Force aircraft? Either. General?
General Goldfein. Sir, there are actually two programs that
we are working on right now. One is a hypersonic conventional
strike weapon, and the other one is an air-launched rapid
response weapon. Both of those are what you see in our budget
in terms of our investment in hypersonic technology. I do not
have right now a prediction of when we can actually field
those. I can just tell you that we are committed to them and we
are moving out.
Senator Scott. Thank you.
I was very pleased to hear earlier this year that South
Carolina's Shaw Air Force Base was chosen to be the home for a
new remotely piloted aircraft group flying the MQ-9 Reaper.
Shaw Air Force Base is already home to the 20th Fighter Wing,
the largest F-16 wing in the Air Force. So I certainly welcome
the new and different mission. I understand the Air Force has
already started moving personnel to Shaw in support of this new
group.
To either you, Secretary, or General, would you give me an
update on where we are in that move and how close we are to
seeing things happen?
General Goldfein. So the wing at Shaw is going to be a
mission wing. We chose Shaw Air Force Base because of the
mission synergy associated with the command and control
headquarters there, the 9th Air Force, 3rd Army, all those. So
right now we are in the process of moving the personnel and
equipment there. Right now my look of our timeline for the full
beddown of being able to bring us to initial operating
capability is we are on track. So I do not see any show
stoppers right now with what we are going at Shaw.
Senator Scott. Can you talk about the MQ-9 Reaper program
and the importance it plays in our future Air Force?
General Goldfein. I can, and I can talk to you about this
as an MQ-9 pilot. I had a chance to check out and fly that
aircraft as a general officer. I will tell you, sir, that I
believe that we have only scratched the surface on the true
capability of what happens when you separate the aircraft and
the cockpit. And it is our young RPA drivers-- we call them our
A teen Xers--who are going straight into that program, the
oldest of which right now are reaching major to lieutenant
colonel. They are going in and coming up with absolutely new
ways of being able to employ this weapon system in areas that
we had not anticipated before.
There is one thing about these remotely piloted aircraft.
They are absolutely fearless. You send them anywhere. I think
not only in the fight against violent extremism, but if you
look at the National Defense Strategy and where we look at
China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, all those areas, I think the
MQ-9 but more broadly unmanned aviation is going to bring some
significant dilemmas to future adversaries.
Senator Scott. Thank you very much. That is exciting news,
frankly.
The Air Force has been emphasizing the importance of
distributed, adaptive, and resilient basing to address the
challenges posed by both Russia and China's advanced area
denial capabilities. However, in this year's budget, Air Force
investments in prepositioned equipment and improved
infrastructure in Europe are at least 10 times the investment
in the Pacific.
What explains this enormous disparity?
Dr. Wilson. Senator, I think as I mentioned before, I think
the European Defense Initiative was out ahead of what we were
starting in the Pacific, and I think it got a higher priority
and perhaps better refinement earlier. And it may be something
that we need to look at rebalancing.
Senator Scott. Thank you.
General Goldfein. Sir, I will just offer that if you take a
look at the air component in the Pacific, in the Indo-Pacific,
the story there is as we got smaller as an Air Force,
significantly smaller over the last several years, we reduced
our footprint in Europe primarily and in the CONUS, in the
continental United States. But our footprint in the Pacific has
been fairly stable over time. And so to take this smaller Air
Force that needs to go forward very quickly in support of
operational planning by virtue of the fact that we can get
there very quickly to blunt and stop adversary activity, you
saw us investing in the European Defense Initiative on basing
and access so that that smaller force can be more agile as the
chairman, as the global force integrator determines where he
wants to move forces. That is one of the reasons why you saw so
much investment in infrastructure in Europe. To our Secretary's
point, it is time for us that we are looking at what does that
commensurate investment need to look like for agile basing in
the Pacific.
Senator Scott. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Scott.
Senator Warren?
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to our witnesses for being here today.
Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, you may know that I
have been asking questions about the future of the F-15C and D
variants, which the Massachusetts National Guard flies to keep
24/7 watch over our country. Frankly, it seems like I am
getting a different answer every time I ask the question.
I think part of the challenge here is that the Air Force
does not seem to have a strategic road map for its fighter
force. We know that the Navy wants 355 ships because the CNO
put out a strategy that said so. We know the Air Force wants to
buy fifth generation fighters because you have told us that,
but you have not explained your budget plans or how you will
prioritize tradeoffs between capability and capacity and how
that will translate into the aircraft that we keep and the new
aircraft that we will buy.
So let me ask. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, is
the Air Force working on that kind of a road map? When can we
expect this committee to get a look at it?
Dr. Wilson. Senator, just to clarify a couple of things.
Senator Warren. Sure.
Dr. Wilson. With respect to the F-15 and F-16, the budget
puts $1.7 billion into those aircraft for radar and electronic
service life extension programs.
The Chief directed and we took a look at how do we think
about the Air Force, what is our current structure. We did a
deep dive on readiness as well. We have about 300 operational
squadrons, bombers, fighters, attack, intelligence,
surveillance, reconnaissance. Then the question becomes with
the new National Defense Strategy released in January, what do
we really need given the threats that we face. The Chief has
directed a review, and we expect in August to have a review of
what are the squadrons we need, not just where are we now and
how can we keep things in pretty good shape. So August is when
we----
Senator Warren. So August we expect to see a road map.
Thank you. I think this is really important because we are
having to make decisions now about upgrading and retiring
platforms, and it is hard for this committee to know what to do
until we get a look at the full strategy.
The Air Force says that it is a total force, including the
Guard and Reserve, and we have moved a lot of capacity into the
Guard, so much so that today the Air Force could not complete
its mission without the Guard.
So with that in mind, can you give me your commitment that
our Guard flying wings will be made whole on the planes that
they will have available as part of whatever the final strategy
calls for?
Dr. Wilson. Senator, I think the review that we are doing
is probably going to show that we need more force structure
than we currently have. As General Goldfein mentioned, at the
beginning of the Gulf War, we had 134 fighter squadrons. Today
we have 56, Active, Guard, and Reserve. The operations tempo
for the last 27 years for the Air Force has been very, very
high and has stressed our airmen across Active, Guard, and
Reserve. You are absolutely right. We cannot do the missions
that we do without the Guard.
Senator Warren. Well, I appreciate that. I hope that is a
commitment to make our Guard whole. But I appreciate that you
fully understand how important our Guard is in protecting us.
Dr. Wilson. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Warren. I want to ask about one other area, if I
can. I know you mentioned this to Senator Heinrich, but I want
to follow up, Secretary Wilson. Last September, you announced
that the Air Force research lab would lead a yearlong review of
the Air Force's science and technology portfolio to update
research priorities and strategy. I was very glad to be able to
host you earlier this month at MIT [Michigan Institute of
Technology] Lincoln Lab where there is so much incredible
cutting-edge research going on.
I understand that your review is also focused on how the
Air Force can more productively engage with places like Lincoln
Lab and with States, universities and the commercial sector to
be able advance your priorities.
Can you just say a word about how you plan to build on
these partnerships and what role they will play in the future
of the Air Force's efforts to modernize its capabilities?
Dr. Wilson. Senator, it is my perception that when the Air
Force went through sequester, we reduced research and
development, particularly basic and applied, which is kind of
the seed corn of the Air Force long term, and we kept it
largely internal. I think we are better and stronger when we
partner particularly with universities, research universities,
on basic and early stage applied research for a variety of
reasons, which you and I probably understand. I am looking
forward to the science and technology review which had helped
to highlight the areas in which we need to do research and will
also tee up ways in which we can partner with others to do
research better.
Senator Warren. I very much appreciate that. You know, I
understand that the AFRL [Air Force Research Laboratory] is
doing a number of research center site visits. I hope they come
to the commonwealth. But I was very pleased to see the
increased emphasis on basic and applied research in the Air
Force's fiscal year 2019 request.
But as you know, I think we can still do better in this
area. Our technological superiority is not guaranteed in the
future. We have to fund these programs today because they are
the seed corn for our technological advances in the future.
Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Warren.
Senator Tillis?
Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for your service and for being here today.
I probably will not use my 5 minutes. I got a couple of
business questions to ask you. I think you all know I do not
focus much on the job that I think you all do well, which is
how to position us best against our adversaries.
But, General Goldfein, when you were doing your opening
comments or it may have been an answer to the chair's question,
you were talking about--first off, I think both of you talked
about your 5-year plan. I think that is great, but you have got
2 years of certainty to execute that plan.
Let us take a look at China's modernization program. Do
they historically fund those programs in 1-year or 2-year cliff
intervals?
General Goldfein. No, sir, they do not.
Senator Tillis. So when is the last time that we would ever
have intelligence that China was about to dramatically cut
their out-year spending in connection with their strategic
plans to grow their air force?
General Goldfein. Sir, we have not seen that----
Senator Tillis. Like never in modern history?
General Goldfein. Not that I know of.
Senator Tillis. So when you look at your 5-year plan and
you know you only have 2 years of certainty, another Congress
to deal with, then how do you handicap the likelihood that you
are really going to reach that 5-year objective? I mean, you
got to look at it the way I would in business. I have gotten my
investors to give me 2 years. I go back and convince them to
give me 2 to 4 more years. So when you look at the probability
of succeeding on your 5-year objective with the uncertainty of
spending in the out-years, how do you handicap your probability
of being successful? I know everybody in uniform says we are
going to make it work no matter what, but there has got to be
something behind the scenes that says there is a major risk
here because Congress has not done its job and given us any
long-term spending trail. And, Secretary, you can start with
that and, General, follow up.
Dr. Wilson. Senator, to us, having a 2-year certainty is so
much better than we have been in the last 10 years. In 9 out of
the last 10 years, the military has started out the year with a
continuing resolution. Budget certainty matters a lot to us.
But we also accept that this is a constitutional republic and
that we propose a budget and that the Congress appropriates and
authorizes that budget. I would much prefer this system than
many of the others, including honestly what China deals with.
Senator Tillis. I agree, Madam Secretary, but we also have
created a construct that was one of the worst ideas out of
Congress, and that is called the Budget Control Act. So on the
one hand, we have exactly what you say is a need to come back
and appropriate every couple of years. But now we have got this
construct that is punitive to the Department of Defense when we
do not do our job. That is where some of the weight of your
argument, which was very well put, loses its steam because we
have created this condition that if we fail to do our job, then
you all suffer.
I think when we look at these modernization plans, we take
a look at these weapon systems acquisitions, we ask ourselves
why it is costing so much more money. Every once in a while,
Congress ought to look in the mirror because it is because we
are not providing any level of consistent certainty for you all
to do your jobs.
You have got your own work to do, and that is the next
thing I want to talk about. How well are you doing on getting
to the business of the Air Force, improving procurement,
acquisition, sourcing, and all the things that you all--to me I
have got a third, third, third view of the world. A third of
the problems here are constructs like the Budget Control Act
that Congress has imposed on the process. A third of them are
events out of our control. You just got to deal with it. And a
third of them are your own self-imposed regulatory burdens and
things that you do to yourself that you have not gone back and
looked at modernizing. And I view acquisitions, procurement,
sourcing as being one of the big ones. So what progress have
you made since you were before us last?
Dr. Wilson. Senator, with respect to procurement, we put
out and I think delivered to all of you a report on how did we
do on acquisition last year for all of our programs. And where
we had problems, there was a common theme and that was
software. We are looking actually at standing up a particular
program office specific to software and digital systems because
we do not do that well. But we are also implementing a lot of
the authorities that you have given us in prototyping and
experimentation to be able to go faster.
Senator Tillis. Shorter cycles?
Dr. Wilson. Exactly. Shorter cycles, learn what we can, and
then come back with a program of record. The adaptive engine is
a great example of that, $1.8 billion over the fiscal year
defense plan, prototyped engines intended to get 10 percent
increase in thrust, 25 percent increase in fuel efficiency.
We just let a contract using your other transactional
authorities, which you gave to us, for $100 million put towards
space systems. The first two contracts were let for micro-
satellites to go direct to geosynchronous orbit using these
very rapid other transaction authorities.
So we are trying to move forward at speed to get great
capability, to learn and fail fast, and use everything you have
given us to defeat and dissuade the adversaries.
Senator Tillis. Good. Thank you both.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Tillis.
Senator Nelson?
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just a quick couple of points. General, we have been in
touch over and over about things trying to keep your Gulf
testing and training range without incursion and development. I
see that we are going ahead with your investment down there on
additional telemetry and so forth.
I was just down there flying with some of your folks and,
again, looking at it from a different perspective, up in the
air, about how necessary it is to protect your training range.
Likewise, you know, we had a little dust-up down there
because fortunately when you stepped in as the top general, the
Chief, and said you do not want your undeveloped barrier island
messed with because it is going to mess up your training
mission, and then I stepped in pursuant to that and stopped the
cutting of a pass through there that would increase all of that
boat traffic and start to mess up your situation.
So I just want to thank you for standing on that. It is one
thing for a colonel down there at Eglin to say it, it is
another thing for the Chief of Staff of the Air Force to say
it. And so, I think we have all of that under control.
But do you want to just--maybe a sentence or two to say how
important your Gulf training and testing range mission is?
General Goldfein. Yes, sir. And what I will emphasize for
the committee is the test part of it because the training piece
is clearly important, but having a pristine range that we are
able to test, whether it is low observable capability and all
the things that we do with weapons procurement and testing it
at Eglin there, is absolutely critical that we protect that.
Senator Nelson. Without going into all the background, are
you all aware of the single-point failure of the bridge going
across the Indian River to get to not only the Kennedy Space
Center but also the Cape Canaveral Air Force Station?
Dr. Wilson. Senator, yes, I am.
Senator Nelson. Well, as you know, it is actually owned by
NASA [National Aeronauticcs and Space Administration], but
obviously the Air Force uses it and it is critical to the Air
Force getting your various missions across there and then to
their facilities to prepare. Do you want to say anything about
that?
Dr. Wilson. Senator, it is an important way for us to
operate there at Cape Canaveral. With respect to that bridge,
of course, the property is not owned by the Department of
Defense. So with respect to military construction, we cannot
fix the bridge, but it is owned by NASA.
Senator Nelson. But it is my understanding that you can
participate with NASA in some way to--basically the bridge is
going to have to be rebuilt.
Dr. Wilson. Senator, I understand that the bridge does not
meet the structural requirements. It is a piece of property
that we do not own. So it is not something that we have
assessed from an engineering point of view.
Senator Nelson. Do you think that that bridge is important
to you? If it is not repaired, are any of your launch missions
going to be impacted on the eastern test range?
Dr. Wilson. Yes, sir.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Perdue?
Senator Perdue. Well, I thank both of you for being here
again. It seems like you spend more time on the Hill talking to
us than you do with your command. But thank you for being here.
General Goldfein, as you and the Secretary have been more
than patient with us in both open and in classified briefings
about the advanced battle management system, ABMS, that you are
envisioning--and I fully support that. As we have also talked
about, there is this gap somewhere in the 2020s on ISR
[Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance] capabilities.
For today, though, I want to talk about how that decision
to move to space capabilities and protecting assets in space,
given what is going on in particularly the China development in
space--you know, in our past in the United States, we have
always looked at space as sort of the scientific endeavor.
China looks at it totally differently. It is a military
endeavor. They just recently launched this supposedly debris
clearer and other snuggler satellites behind our GPS [Global
Positioning System] capability.
So help me understand how moving capability from air domain
to the space domain actually increases survivability? In this
open environment, help us understand what your long-term plan
is, including the gap that we have sometime in the 2020s.
General Goldfein. Yes. Thanks, Senator.
I would offer to you that the gap that we are required to
fill is that gap between both a contested environment and an
uncontested environment. As we have discussed, the challenge we
face today with the current Joint STARS is that the threats can
actually keep them far enough away not to be able to do its
job. So this is about supporting soldiers, sailors----
Senator Perdue. I am sorry to interrupt, General. I
apologize. I hate to do that with somebody with four stars on
their shoulder.
But with regard to the Navy, the Navy is going in a little
bit different direction. Can you tell us the difference in
their demand structure versus what our demands on ISR in that
regard?
General Goldfein. It is based on mission. But actually the
Navy long term is going in the same direction. I can tell you
that the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations], Admiral Richardson,
and I have--we have had warfighter talks. We are talking about
going to a network disaggregated architecture. But the gap that
we are filling now is that we have got to make sure that
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines on the ground in a
contested environment, being Kaliningrad, understand enemy
ground movement on day one of that campaign at the same time,
that I have got it in an uncontested environment, Yemen.
The fact that we can fly Joint STARS [Surveillance Target
Attack Radar] longer through 2028 and possibly longer allows us
to take a look at moving now to a disaggregated architecture.
It is more than just space. It is actually how you connect
space and air and sea and land together to produce a common air
picture, a common ground picture that equally serves someone in
Kaliningrad inside a contested domain where Joint STARS cannot
help today and in Yemen where Joint STARS can.
So this has got to be transparent to those on the ground,
and as the service that organizes, trains, and equips and
presents forces, we got to fill that gap. That gap exists
between contested and uncontested.
Senator Perdue. In the recent action that the United States
took in Syria, those weapons were GPS-benefited weapons.
Because of that, as we know today, I think it is still true
that no collateral damage was incurred because of the pinpoint
action. We also know that Russia and China can jam and can
affect GPS.
I know this is an open environment, but again, are we
moving in a direction where those capabilities are hardened and
can be protected in the new battlespace? Secretary?
Dr. Wilson. Senator, the current plan for the Air Force is
to move to jam-resistant GPS, and that is in the budget
proposal. Of our 77 satellites that the Air Force operates, 31
of them are GPS. We not only provide position navigation, we
also provide timing to the New York Stock Exchange and to the
ATM machine that you get your cash from. So it enables a huge
industry. It also enables a lot for the warfighter.
Senator Perdue. I have one last question. On a recent trip
to China, we were so privileged to stop in Alaska and met the
F-22 squadron there. I have to tell you it is a lot of money,
but boy, is that impressive, the people, the equipment, the
mission, the capability. I slept better for the next week or
two.
The commanding officer, though--I asked a question. I said,
you know, the primary mission up here--and we had pictures and
we saw this information about how the F-22 is tailing a TU-95.
So you have a pre-gen one aircraft being tailed by a fifth gen
aircraft. My question, obviously not being an expert--I said
why do we have a gen five chasing a gen one, and he said, sir,
because we are here.
Can you speak to that? I mean, this is a very
sophisticated, very expensive piece of equipment. It is now
aging, even though it is in the first few years. What are the
replacements for that? What is the future of that? We got to
fly the wings off it to train people. I get that, but help me
understand. This, again, is a limitation of money and funding,
but help me understand the mission and strategy of that fifth
gen capability.
General Goldfein. Thank you, sir.
It is true that we use those assets and we place those air
superiority assets, be that F-15, F-22, F-35, F-16, and we
place those where we need to be able to intercept, whether it
is Chinese or Russian long-range aviation. So no surprise that
we would be using the F-22 to intercept Chinese long-range
aviation.
Very important, though, that I think we acknowledge because
the previous question talked about sustainment costs of the F-
35. I will tell you from the Secretary of Defense on down with
Secretary Shanahan, we are all involved in wire brushing down
sustainment costs of new aircraft.
But what has not been talked enough about is the
operational successes that we have enjoyed. Just to share with
you a couple. We took the F-35 to Red Flag last year. 86
percent mission-capable rate of our newer F-35's, a 20 to 1
kill ratio against the most advance adversaries we could put
up, more advanced than anything we might face because we were
up against ourselves. 26 of 27 direct hits on air-to-ground
targets in the most difficult threat environment that we could
put them in from both an air and a ground perspective.
We went to Combat Hammer and Archer, which is where we test
capabilities, and they were a 100 percent hit rate on air-to-
ground munitions and 11 for 11 on shooting AMRAAMs. So the
newer F-35's, which is a fusion machine that allows it to
actually take information from space and cyber, fuse it
together with onboard and off sources, is allowing this weapon
system to become the quarterback for the team.
I will just finish by saying I had a great conversation
with the Israeli Air Chief, who are now flying the F-35, and he
said it is an absolute game-changer for them. They are able to
see and sense and fuse information that they have never seen
before across the region. So this F-35 and fifth gen is a game-
changer for us.
Senator Perdue. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I am so gratified that the rebuilding and the
future of our Air Force is in the hands of these two former
U.S. Air Force Academy classmates. Thank you both.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Perdue.
I might add that was quite a discussion when they cut that
back to--I think we currently have 177 of the F-22's. It was
considerably more than that I believe. Do you remember the
figure?
General Goldfein. Yes, sir. We were on track for upwards of
plus 300 to 500, and it was cut to 187.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, it was about half.
Senator Donnelly?
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank you both for testifying here.
Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, I do not want to
talk too much of our time on the subject today, but I do want
to quickly touch on the manned fighter mission in Fort Wayne. I
know you are aware of all the great work that the men and women
do there every day. General Goldfein, I am sure you will recall
our conversation prior to your nomination, in which you told me
that you would honor General Welch's commitment that he made to
me personally as Air Force Chief of Staff that the Air Force
would be maintaining a manned air combat mission in Fort Wayne
that would continue to identify opportunities for mission
conversion going forward.
Secretary Wilson, you likewise said that you would stand by
the commitment.
It is my understanding that the platform transition that we
are looking for requires a strategic basing action. That action
is still awaiting a final formal decision. Those decisions are
made at the Secretary level.
Madam Secretary, what is the status of the strategic basing
action?
Dr. Wilson. Senator, we have the A-10's there. 173 of the
A-10's have had rewings. The fiscal year 2018 budget restarts
the line for rewinging the A-10 and buys four more wing sets.
The fiscal year 2019 budget, which is in front of you, will buy
somewhere between 8 and 12 additional wing sets, and we have
asked the acquisition folks to see, once they get the contract
in place, whether we can continue to accelerate the rewinging
of the A-10.
Senator Donnelly. But the platform transition. Is there
anything regarding the status of the strategic basing action
regarding that?
Dr. Wilson. Senator, we expect to fly the A-10 through the
2030s. So there is no strategic basing action with respect to
that.
Senator Donnelly. As you know, this is an issue of great
concern to me. They were talking about the F-16's, and what we
want more than anything is a combat mission, as you talked
about. So I would appreciate it, in regards to the discussion
today, if you will come back and meet with me again for that
purpose in my office. We have talked before. This is very, very
critical to Fort Wayne, to the promises that have been made to
us, the word of the Air Force Chief of Staff, and I would
appreciate it if you would commit that you--I can come over to
the Pentagon or have you come by my office, either way. But I
would appreciate it if we can get together again soon.
Dr. Wilson. Yes, sir. Happy to.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Donnelly.
Any further--Senator King?
Senator King. Secretary Wilson, a couple of weeks ago, the
Defense Department stopped taking deliveries on the F-35's
because of a disagreement about the priming of some fastener
holes. I guess two questions. I think we have had 200 of these
that have been delivered. Was this a defect that should have
been picked up sooner, and is this a change in the Air Force's
quality requirement, or is this a problem in terms of the
contractor?
Dr. Wilson. Senator, as I understand it, in this case, it
was identified--I do not know whether it was the Navy, Marine
Corps, or Air Force aircraft that identified corrosion around
those rivet holes. The root cause was a failure to prime the
rivet holes. Lockheed was apprised of that.
The reason that the joint program office, because this is
not an Air Force-run program, but the joint program office
stopped deliveries because there is a disagreement with
Lockheed about who bears the cost of going back to fix that. It
was a requirement of the contract, and they, in my view, need
to fix the problem over time so that we do not have corrosion
around those rivets.
Senator King. That is your position that it is the
contractor's responsibility to take care of this problem.
Dr. Wilson. Yes, sir.
Senator King. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator King.
Thank both of you, the witnesses, for your patience and
your great knowledge and sharing that with us.
We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:38 a.m., the committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Joni Ernst
pilot shortage
1. Senator Ernst. General Goldfein, how does the Air Force plan to
address its critical pilot shortage, given the lack of needed aircraft
and the Physiological Episodes its current trainer fleet are
experiencing?
General Goldfein. The Air Force is focusing on three main lines of
effort: increased retention of current pilots, increased production of
new pilots, and optimizing pilot requirements. The Air Force has an
Aircrew Task Force that is implementing a plan with major efforts in
each of these areas. The unexplained physiological episodes in a small
number of aircraft will directly affect production, but does not alter
the Air Force plan.
training aircraft
2. Senator Ernst. Secretary Wilson, does the Air Force see a need
for the procurement of a low-cost primary and evaluation aircraft to
extend its capacity for candidate evaluation in the early stages of
training?
Secretary Wilson. Not at this time. Currently, we have the
efficiency and training capacity with our initial flying training
program located in Pueblo, Colorado.
low-cost airframe requirements
3. Senator Ernst. Secretary Wilson, outside of the Light Attack
Aircraft program currently being demonstrated, does the Air Force have
a need for additional low-cost airframes to free up more complex and
expensive aircraft?
Secretary Wilson. Not at this time. With the acquisition of the T-X
advanced pilot trainer, the Air Force will be able to perform mission
tasks of the high-end fighters on a trainer aircraft, at a reduced
cost. If the light attack platform is acquired and once it is proven in
combat, it will free up 4th and 5th generation fighters executing
missions against violent extremist organizations resulting in the same
capability being executed at a lower cost per flying hour.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
readiness for large-scale air-land battle
4. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, the
National Defense Strategy emphasizes the threat of near-peer
competition with China and Russia where the United States military
could face large scale, air-land conflict. In your personal opinion, is
the Air Force fully prepared for a potential great power, joint, Air-
Land conflict?
Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. The Air Force still enjoys a
relative advantage over Russia and China, however without continued
investment in new platforms and realistic training our advantage can
erode. Readiness for near-peer large scale conflict requires
integration of joint capabilities across all domains. Over the past two
decades the Air Force supported the land component in counter-
insurgency operations and perfected air support tactics, techniques,
and procedures in an uncontested environment. To prevail in a large
scale air-land conflict and reduce risk to mission accomplishment, the
Air Force continues to integrate the newest survivable and lethal
weapon systems, such as the F-35, to support joint operations with the
land component. At the same time the Air Force is divesting itself of
the least survivable systems such as JSTARs, which are not suited for a
contested Russia or China environment. Planned increases in manpower,
flying hours, munitions production, and new systems purchases are all
geared at restoring full capability to USAF units.
5. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein,this
committee has discussed the need for high-end readiness for both the
Air Force and Army. In order to properly prepare for near-peer
conflict, would you agree that we need large-scale Joint Air and Ground
combat exercises that improve our Air Land Battle joint readiness?
Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. Yes. The Air Force is
committed to preparing for near-pear conflict and works closely with
the Army to improve joint readiness. The bilateral agreements between
the Air Force and the Army exist to improve and facilitate joint
interoperability in the air and land domain. In addition to supporting
Army large scale exercises at the National Training Center, the Joint
Readiness Training Center, the Joint Multinational Readiness Center,
and through the Army's Mission Command Training Program, and the Joint
Warfighting Assessment, the Air Force conducts a total of 20 Air Land
Battle tactically focused exercises at Green Flag East and Green Flag
West. These and other exercises provide the opportunity to practice the
critical tactical skills which enable joint operations. The Air Force
also provides numerous training opportunities aimed specifically at
jointly combating near-peer enemies and integrating joint capabilities
in high end exercises such as Red Flag Alaska and Red Flag Nellis, each
of which are conducted three times a year.
6. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein,the
Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex (JPARC) in Alaska is the largest
joint overland training area in the U.S. with airspace the size of
Florida. Would you agree that the JPARC it is an ideal location for the
type of advanced integrated training we will need to best counter high-
end and near-peer threats?
Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. The weather and the cost of
moving forces to and from Alaska for exercise participation are
sometimes challenging. The size of the JPARC combined with the
extensive organic training resources located on the range, creates a
significant advanced integrated training opportunity. The Air Force
routinely takes advantage of this capability during Exercise Red Flag
Alaska, which is the Pacific Air Forces' premier tactical joint and
coalition air combat employment exercise. Red Flag Alaska has also seen
a steady increase in joint participation due largely to the robust
capabilities provided by JPARC. Additionally, JPARC supports Exercise
Northern Edge hosted by Alaskan Command which trains 6000 joint
servicemembers and is Alaska's largest exercise.
7. Senator Sullivan.Secretary Wilson, what in the fiscal year 2019
President's Budget will fund training range improvements for the JPARC
in Alaska?
Secretary Wilson. Funds for activities like the Alaska JPARC fall
within the Range Infrastructure Modernization and Communication
(RIMCOMM) program and are programmed in PE 0207429F in the President's
Budget. The Air Force Air Combat Command manages the RIMCOMM program
and prioritizes the equipment requirements for the ranges and
distribute the funds as required by the highest priority mission.
commitment to visit alaska
8. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Wilson, I've met with you several
times in the last year and repeatedly asked for your commitment to
visit Alaska. I recommend that you visit the state during a Red Flag-
ALASKA exercise: The perfect opportunity would be the exercise
scheduled for August 11-24, 2018, during the Senate recess. When can I
expect you to visit Alaska?
Secretary Wilson. Unfortunately, my schedule precludes attendance
at Red Flag-Alaska. However, I'll be visiting Alaska from 8-10 August,
2018 to visit our Airmen and partners at Joint Base Elmendorf-
Richardson and Eielson AFB. I will ensure my team coordinates with your
office on potential opportunities to meet with you or your staff
members during my trip. Thank you for your continual support to our
Airmen.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator David Perdue
jstars--hedging for risk and capability gaps
9. Senator Perdue. General Goldfein, the Air Force has opted to
cancel its JSTARS recapitalization plan, arguing that the proposed
replacement is not survivable in the high-end fight. The Navy, on the
other hand, is investing heavily in the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye and P-8
Poseidon, which both have similar vulnerability concerns as the
proposed JSTARS recap program. Could you explain the Air Force's
approach to airborne battle management?
General Goldfein. Currently, the Air Force executes airborne battle
management with the E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System
(AWACS) and the E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
(JSTARS) platforms. In highly contested environments the E-3 has a
longer range radar to support the Air Force's goal of air supremacy,
and the E-8C's radar is optimized for detecting the enemy ground scheme
of maneuver. In the future, the Air Force will transform the AWACS into
a multi-domain platform by fusing its active and passive sensors with
space-to-surface information feeds across multiple classification
levels.
10. Senator Perdue. General Goldfein, can you explain how the Air
Force and Navy intend to jointly execute airborne battle management in
a high-end fight?
General Goldfein. The Air Force and Navy routinely train and
execute battle management across the full spectrum of warfare. The E-3,
E-8, P-8 and E-2 platforms are equipped to share air, ground, and
surface data across all four platforms via Link-16 and other data
links. The crews of all four platforms are trained to communicate and
synchronize each platforms' abilities to present a coherent air,
ground, and surface picture to combatant commanders. In the high-end
fight, the two services are moving forward aggressively to find new
ways to share data, produce common operational pictures, and execute
multi-domain operations.
11. Senator Perdue. General Goldfein, the legacy JSTARS aircraft
are due to be divested in the early to mid-2020s, starting with 3
aircraft in fiscal year 2019, although you have stated that divestiture
may be stretched out to the late 2020s but only as late as 2028. While
the Air Force is proposing an incremental approach to fielding ABMS,
much of the proposed plan remains aspirational. This committee remains
concerned that the Air Force is divesting existing capability before
its replacement is mature, let alone fielded. What are the specifics of
the plan for the Air Force to manage the risks inherent in fielding the
Advanced Battle Management System, particularly in the mid-2020s to
early 2030s, when there will no longer be legacy JSTARS to fill in
should the Air Force's plan be delayed or deemed unfeasible?
General Goldfein. The Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS)
focuses on conducting combat operations in the highly contested
environment. The Air Force's proposed incremental approach to replace
JSTARS will develop and integrate space, air, and ground based sensors
on manned and unmanned platforms to meet combatant commander
requirements in both contested and non-contested environments. The Air
Force's plan to continue to support the joint force is built into three
increments.
The first increment focuses on integrating current technologies
into existing platforms and investing in anti-access/area denial
capabilities. Increment one includes buying back the seven E-3 AWACS
planned to be retired and expanding the entire fleet of 31 E-3's battle
management capacity to better support ground operations; maintain the
fleet of 11 RQ-4 Global Hawk Block 40 aircraft and further utilize the
ground moving target indicator capability of the MQ-9 fleet.
Increment two focuses on work on converting to a multi-domain
battle management/command and control (BMC2) model by further enhancing
data link capability and capacity amongst fourth-and fifth-generation
aircraft, and integrating higher classification level information into
the E-3G and Control and Reporting Centers.
Increment three completes the transformation of BMC2 by
implementing the results of the ABMS Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) to
deliver a multi-domain, multi-sensor, and resilient BMC2 system.
12. Senator Perdue. General Goldfein, by what criteria will the Air
Force evaluate progress towards achieving implementation of advanced
battle management system?
General Goldfein. While the Advanced Battle Management System
(ABMS) analysis of alternatives (AOA) is ongoing (concludes in the
summer of 2020), the Air Force is investing in technology and procuring
systems to (1) build an agile, resilient communication architecture
that expands data pathways; (2) develop advanced sensors for near-peer
competition; and (3) modify battle management software to enable
command and control of multi-domain operations. The Air Force will
utilize authorities provided by Congress to the fullest extent, e.g.
prototyping and experimentation, to allow the fielding of capabilities
to the warfighter as soon as possible. Upon completion of the AOA, the
Air Force will define the technological end-state for ABMS fielding.
13. Senator Perdue. General Goldfein, are you planning to take
steps to make JSTARS legacy maintenance more cost effective?
General Goldfein. Yes, the Air Force is taking steps to increase
the cost effectiveness of JSTARS legacy maintenance. Program Depot
Maintenance (PDM) is currently done by Northrup Grumman and we will
continue to rely on them for maintenance support. The Air Force plans
to bring an E-8C JSTARS into the Warner Robins Air Logistics Complex at
Robins Air Force Base, Georgia, for PDM later this summer. This will be
a proof of concept initiative intended to supplement the work being
done at Lake Charles, Louisiana.
jstars survivability and threats to space
14. Senator Perdue. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, the Air
Force has argued that the JSTARS Recap would not be survivable in a
highly contested environment. A key component of the Air Force's ABMS
alternative is space-based. However, Air Force leadership, including
both of you, have repeatedly stated that space is now a contested
domain. This committee is concerned that the Air Force is simply moving
capability from one contested domain to another. Can you explain how
moving capability from the air domain to the space domain increases
survivability when concerns remain about the survivability of our space
assets?
Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. While the majority of this
conversation is classified, two key characteristics of the Advanced
Battle Management System (ABMS) are agility and resiliency. The Air
Force is working to spread the capabilities of ABMS across multiple
domains: air, space, and surface. Spreading the capabilities and the
components of ABMS across multiple domains forces a targeting problem,
driving adversarial forces to expand (and dilute) their targeting
plans. By taking this approach, we mitigate the risk of losing
exquisite capability associated with one complex system by having a
variety of smaller scale components should an adversary conduct
offensive operations in any domain.
15. Senator Perdue. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, do you
plan to invest more in ISR analysis for the ABMS system in the future
to make up for the loss of real time analysis that occurs on JSTARS
now?
Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. No, there is no need to
invest more in analysis. JSTARS combines a ground sensing radar with
on-board battle managers trained to assess movement. The Air Force's
plan may disaggregate sensors from the battle management personnel, but
it will still be accomplished real-time by Air Force air battle
managers.
16. Senator Perdue. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, are you
concerned about the loss of real-time ISR for combatant commanders and
troops on the ground and the impact on the kill chain? (Clarification
from Sen Perdue's office: This is related to the connections between
the family of systems and space threats. Sen Perdue is asking about the
effect of the loss of a satellite to the proposed ABMS. What would
happen to the troops on the ground if a satellite (being used in real
time) was lost during their ground operations? Is there a concern there
on par with JSTARS survivability concerns?)
Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. This is not an ISR issue.
The ground moving target indicator capability provided by the RQ-4
Block 40 and MQ-9 fleets can provide the same real-time data to battle
managers and ground commanders to inform them of enemy ground scheme of
maneuver. With the data that is gathered by other airborne sensors and
those that are space-based, there is no impact to the kill chain. The
data links and information architecture in-place and under development
provide the warfighter real-time and near real-time battle management
capability.
jstars--low cost options
17. Senator Perdue. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, could
you please explain the impact to the Air Force if Congress directs the
Air Force to continue the Recap program as previously envisioned?
Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. Without an additional
topline increase of $7 billion, the Air Force would have to make
difficult budgetary choices significantly affecting the readiness and
warfighting capability of the force. The Air Force would be forced to
spend less money on developing capabilities to accomplish the mission
in contested environments.
18. Senator Perdue. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, yes or
no, has the Air Force ever considered finding a cheaper, faster way to
do recap, for example a used airframe and existing radar technology?
Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. Yes. The Air Force
considered a variety of options as part of the 2011 Analysis of
Alternatives. However, recapitalizing the E-8C fleet on a commercial
derivative aircraft with an enhanced radar, modern battle management
command and control suite, and robust communications was the best
option during that timeframe.
19. Senator Perdue. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, if the
Air Force has considered a low cost option referenced in Question 10,
can you provide all documentation and analysis associated with all
recapitalization solutions the Air Force has considered?
Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. As previously referenced in
Question 18, a variety of options were considered in the 2011 Analysis
of Alternatives (AOA), and recapitalizing the E-8C was the best option
at that time. The 2011 AOA can be provided, upon request.
20. Senator Perdue. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, could a
low cost solution be cheaper than extending the service life of the
legacy fleet?
Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. It is possible that a low
cost solution would be cheaper than extending the service life of the
legacy JSTARS fleet. However, a proper comparative analysis would be
contingent upon a low cost solution being identified. The problem
remains that, while cost is a factor, the primary issue we are
addressing with advanced Battle Management is the expected threat
environment.
21. Senator Perdue. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, would
getting a new platform online faster mean you would have greater
capacity and capability in the near-term, save on maintenance costs to
the legacy fleet, and hedge against the risk of a capability gap,
should the Air Force's plan for ABMS not come to fruition in time?
Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. While there would be savings
in maintenance costs and an increase in capacity as compared to today's
availability rate of the E-8C, there will not be an increase in
capability. The current recapitalized program was intentionally
established to quickly replace the legacy E-8 fleet with little
improvements to the 30 year old requirements. The Capability Decision
Document (CDD) and Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) as written for the
Recap program to do not address a significant increase in command and
control capability needed as compared to the legacy E-8C or the
evolving capability of the adversary to render Recap ineffective in a
contested environment. Advanced Battle Management System is intended to
provide command and control in highly contested environments.
22. Senator Perdue. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, would
you agree that a new platform that extended the life of the JSTARS
capability into the 2030s, and possibly beyond, still be useful in
counter-drug operations, counter-insurgency operations, and wartime
operations in battlespaces where ground troops are operating but the
U.S. has gained air superiority?
Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. Yes. However, the 2018
National Defense Strategy directs the Air Force to equip and prepare
itself for the high-end fight. We are behind as a nation in our ability
to project power in anti-access environments. Engagements and conflicts
against near-peer threats must drive capabilities developed today and
in the future. Given these facts and with the limited resources
available, the Air Force must develop a ground moving target indicator/
battle management command and control capability that is survivable in
the high-end fight. Anything developed must enhance warfighter
capability across the entire range of military operations.
jstars--cost of recapitalization program
23. Senator Perdue. Secretary Wilson, in your testimony, you state
that the JSTARS recap would cost the Air Force $15 billion in total
lifecycle costs. Can you provide the documentation for how this number
was determined?
Secretary Wilson. Yes. The JSTARS Recap Milestone A Independent
Cost Estimate is attached.
24. Senator Perdue. Secretary Wilson, can you provide documentation
for how much the Air Force plans to spend in life cycle costs and
maintenance on the current fleet if its life is extended to 2028 or
beyond?
Secretary Wilson. Yes. If the current fleet, of 16 aircraft, is
extended until 2028 the total for life cycle costs and maintenance
would be $4.180 billion. The breakdown is shown below:
Table 1. Plan Choices for Military Beneficiaries Compared to Federal Civilians
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amount per/year ($
Fiscal Year millions) Cumulative
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2019........................................................ $373.1 $373.1
2020........................................................ $382.5 $755.6
2021........................................................ $392.0 $1,147.6
2022........................................................ $401.8 $1,549.4
2023........................................................ $411.9 $1,961.3
2024........................................................ $422.2 $2,383.4
2025........................................................ $432.7 $2,816.1
2026........................................................ $443.5 $3,259.7
2027........................................................ $454.6 $3,714.3
2028........................................................ $465.9 $4,180.3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
airborne data link plan
25. Senator Perdue. General Goldfein, Air Force leadership has
discussed the importance of networks in their visions of the future Air
Force. The committee is concerned the Department of Defense's ideas for
airborne data links have lacked vision and been disjointed. Could you
explain the Air Force's efforts in this area?
General Goldfein. The Air Force is investing in a diverse and
flexible communications architecture that leverages open standards and
modular approaches to enable interoperability within the Air Force and
across the Services. The Air Force fiscal year 2019 budget invests in
the following capabilities to support data link interoperability and an
open architecture:
Battlefield Airborne Communications Node (BACN)--A high-
speed, resilient airborne communications network to enhance current
command and control capabilities across all domains through tactical
data links. In fiscal year 2019, this program transfers from Overseas
Contingency Operations funding to the baseline budget.
Joint Aerial Layer Network (JALN) High Capacity
Backbone--Upgrades airborne communications to enable data-sharing
between 4th Generation (e.g. F-15, F-16) and 5th Generation (e.g. F-22,
F-35) aircraft in both permissive and contested environments.
Tactical Data Link Modernization--Air Force is
modernizing data links, including Link 16, to extend and improve the
capacity and resilience of Joint airborne tactical networks.
Mobile Unmanned/Manned Distributed Lethality Airborne
Network (MUDLAN) Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD)--Air
Force is working with USD(R&E) and the Navy on MUDLAN, which will
demonstrate a fused Tactical Data Link/Common Data Link network for
easy Joint interoperability at the tactical edge, with a high data
capacity to enable new tactical applications.
AERO Net--Air Force is developing AERO Net, a fully
exportable data link to enable secure information sharing with any
mission partner, empowering our allies in combating violent extremist
organizations worldwide.
More generally, we take your point on cohesion and share your
concern. The Air Force is seeking to promulgate and require all
programs to use standard interfaces for communications and we are
working with the other Services to achieve alignment. This Open Mission
System and Universal Command and Control Interface standard will drive
interoperability and interconnectivity across services, contractors,
and equipment. If everything can connect, and everthing can share,
multi-domain operations are enabled.
26. Senator Perdue. General Goldfein, how are you ensuring Air
Force airborne data links are interoperable within your own elements as
well as across the joint force?
General Goldfein. Link 16 is the primary data link for the U.S. Air
Force, and is the cornerstone for interoperable airborne data
communications across the Joint Force today. Link 16 is employed across
the DOD, and by 43 of our partner nations. The Air Force is
implementing enhanced Link 16 terminals, Multifunctional Information
Distribution System Joint Tactical Radio System (MIDS JTRS), on most
platforms to improve security and better utilize network capacity. In
addition to Link 16, the Joint and international F-35 enterprise is
interoperable through the Multifunction Advanced Data Link.
To connect Air Force and Joint tactical edge users using disparate
or disconnected communications systems, the Air Force uses airborne and
ground gateways to translate and relay voice and data. Notably, Air
Force investments in the Battlefield Airborne Communications Node
(BACN) gateway provides an airborne hub for disparate signals.
Internal to the Air Force, Air Combat Command is the lead
organization synchronizing tactical communications and networking
requirements. To ensure alignment across the Joint Force, the Air Force
participates in a number of joint venues to promote data link
interoperability, including the Joint Aerial Layer Network Council,
Joint Air Dominance Organization, Joint Datalink Acquisition Working
Group, and the Joint Technical Coordinating Meeting.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
programming and budgeting for contracted services
27. Senator Reed. Secretary Wilson, the Defense Business Board did
a February 2018 study that noted that in fiscal year 2016, DOD spent
$141 billion on 777,000 service contractors, double the $71.5 billion
it spent on 740,000 civilian employees. The DOD spent roughly as much
on contract services as it did on MILPERS ($141 billion compared to
$136 billion). When is the Air Force planning to implement the GAO
recommendation to more transparently budget for contracted services
workforce spending in the same manner as currently exists for weapon
systems, military and civilian force structure?
Secretary Wilson. The Air Force is working with the Office of the
Secretary of Defense to establish greater transparency in how mission
dollars are allocated for services. Services acquisitions are not
stand-alone requirements; they are interrelated to the on-going every
day missions of the Air Force.
service requirements review boards
28. Senator Reed. Secretary Wilson, are the Air Force's Service
Requirements Review Boards mainly focusing on better buying practices
for contracted services or are they also challenging requirements and
looking for duplication between other contracts and work done by the
military and civilian workforces?
Secretary Wilson Air Force Service Requirements Review Boards vet
requirements through a Requirements Approval Document, an early
strategy and issue session, and an Acquisition Strategy Panel.
Likewise, requirements are assessed against commercial capabilities,
existing contracts and contract vehicles and input from Air Force
manpower organizations.
29. Senator Reed. Secretary Wilson, are the Service Requirements
Review Boards being made part of Air Force budget and programming
process or are they still focused on near term spending for contract
services?
Secretary Wilson Service Requirements Review Boards are not a part
of the Air Force budget and programming processes. Mission owners
maintain responsibility to budget and plan for their contracted
services. The Requirements Approval Document, early strategy and issue
sessions, and market research are considered when the mission owners
budget and plan for their contracted services.
air force civilians
30. Senator Reed. Secretary Wilson, explain the role of the Air
Force civilian workforce to achieving your readiness recovery goals.
Secretary Wilson The Air Force civilian workforce plays a critical
role in enabling AF readiness recovery. Our civilians work side-by side
with our military to support and train the force and ensure readiness
of Air Force systems. For the air mission, our civilians boost training
pipeline capacity to develop and train the force, expand pilot and
maintenance training as instructors, and maintain and repair aircraft.
In operational units, they are part of the workforce that generate
aircraft sorties to train our pilots. Air Force Civilians play this
same role across the range of operations to include Space, Cyber and
Intelligence. Our civilian force is also the predominant force
supporting our Airmen and families at home and abroad, from child care
to lodging and various Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR) programs.
31. Senator Reed. Secretary Wilson, is there a link between years
of directed reductions to the Air Force's civilian workforce and the
current state of readiness in the Air Force?
Secretary Wilson Yes. Prior year civilian reductions and
sequestration hiring controls created significant shortfalls in
critical occupations required to accomplish the Air Force mission
(e.g., cyber, depot maintenance, childcare providers). With the dynamic
environment and changing requirements at the installation level,
technical skills and expertise are in high demand. Direct Hiring
Authorities under National Defense Authorization Acts of 2016, 2017 and
2018 have assisted our ability to directly hire qualified candidates to
meet mission needs. We are making maximum use of these authorities.
32. Senator Reed. Secretary Wilson, what challenges will reductions
to its civilian workforce create in efforts to generate readiness for
the Air Force?
Secretary Wilson The Air Force civilian workforce is vital to the
readiness of the Air Force. When we don't require a military
authorization, the civilian force provides a cost effective solution
for our work force. As the Air Force seeks to improve and sustain
mission readiness, it must have the right mix of military and civilian
resources to accomplish the mission. Arbitrary civilian reductions
without readiness assessments can result in skills gaps in the force,
to include mission critical areas such as maintenance, Cyber, air
operations, and support functions, as well as readiness impacts when
uniformed Airmen don't have the support they need.
33. Senator Reed. Secretary Wilson, would the capability and
lethality of the Air Force be improved if you were able to grow your
civilian workforce?
Secretary Wilson The Air Force five year plan includes an increase
of $1 billion for civilian personnel. While we do not manage end
strength for civilians in the same way that we manage the military,
this increase will result in approximately 700 additional Air Force
civilians.
34. Senator Reed. Secretary Wilson, Do you have military members
performing jobs that are more appropriately and affordably able to be
done by civilians?
Secretary Wilson The sizing of the military presence is determined
by wartime and overseas requirements. We are assessing this requirement
in light of the new National Defense and Military Strategy. That review
will be complete this fall with a full report due to Congress in March
2019.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
security force helmets
35. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Wilson, since 2009 the U.S. Air
Force Security Forces (SF) has been upgrading their equipment and
training to combat adversaries and protect the force. This effort has
been done in a piecemeal format and the various equipment items do not
integrate well with each other. In the past, we have seen several
individual units purchase ballistic plate carriers with no soft armor
backers, helmets of various types, helmet suspension systems, Night
Vision Goggles front mounts and rails. By using this approach, the SF
career field struggles with reliable standardized equipment that could
potentially severely hurt or kill an SF member. To date, the Air Force
Security Forces Center (AFSFC) has yet to make a decision on a high cut
helmet for the SF career field. There has not been a Broad Area
Announcement (BAA), Request for Information (RFI), Industry Day or
contracting vehicle identified for the procurement of high cut helmets,
but the AFSFC is currently in the process of fielding their new
communication headsets that are required to be attached to the helmet
for use. Additionally, units like the 820th Combat Operations Squadron
(COS), AFGSC Tactical Response Forces and Phoenix Raven Teams are
forced to procure their own high cut helmets to support their missions
and there is no standardization across the career field, thus
potentially wasting taxpayer money. Given the confusion among industry
on this topic, can you please provide an overview of the SF plan for
procurement regarding head protections systems?
Secretary Wilson The Air Force Installation and Mission Support
Center (IMSC) established centralized acquisition processes to address
the provisioning of the high cut helmet for the SF career field.
Subsequent to a complete assessment of all available options, IMSC
determined that rapid fielding using the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)
or Government Services Administration (GSA) was the best practice to
obtain the required helmets and ensure a systemic solution for
integrating vital communication headsets and to provide the optimum
protection and operational capability for the warfighter.
Following market research and wear testing, IMSC pursued the high
cut helmets through a GSA Blanket Purchase Agreement for Government
Off-The Shelf /Commercial Off-The Shelf processes. The outcome of the
market research and wear tests resulted in the Item Manager approving
the Team Wendy high cut helmet. The Air Force Security Forces Center is
developing a prioritized fielding strategy and replacement plan based
upon a data call being conducted with Security Forces Squadrons to
assess operational needs. The data call will be completed by the end of
June 2018 with a follow-on resourcing prioritization strategy.
clean up efforts at pease air national guard base
36. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Wilson, I understand that in August
2017 the Air Force agreed to pay the city of Portsmouth (New Hampshire)
$1.3 million to continue ongoing clean-up efforts at Pease Air National
Guard Base. Would you please provide an update regarding these efforts?
Secretary Wilson The Air Force Base Realignment and Closure program
is providing the funding to the City of Portsmouth. The Air Force
entered into an Environmental Services Cooperative Agreement (ESCA) for
$1.3 million with the City of Portsmouth in 2017 to fund design of an
upgraded treatment facility to remove PFOS/PFOA from drinking water to
the Pease Tradeport. The design is now 60 percent complete and the City
expects to complete the design in the next two months. The Air Force
will negotiate a new ESCA with the City before the end of fiscal year
2018 to fund construction of the upgraded drinking water plant.
combat rescue helicopter
37. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, I led a
bipartisan letter to both of you in October expressing concern about
any change in the current acquisition plan, as had been rumored.
Secretary Wilson, you responded in December that the program is on
track and confirmed the program of record remains 112 aircraft. Does
the Air Force's commitment to the full build plan remain ironclad?
Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. Yes, the Air Force remains
committed to buying the Combat Rescue Helicopter program of record of
112 aircraft.
38. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein,
numerous force structure studies have shown the need for between 141
and 171 aircraft to meet rescue requirement demands. Is the Air Force
considering the possibility of expanding the number of CRH aircraft?
Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. Currently the Air Force plan
is to procure 112 Combat Rescue Helicopters. The 112 program of record
balances risk of world-wide capacity needs from the combatant
commanders with full life cycle cost of the Combat Rescue Helicopter
Program.
c-130hs
39. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein,
according to the Air Force's Budget Request for fiscal year 2019, the
Primary Aircraft Authorization (PAA)--the number of aircraft authorized
to a unit for its operational mission--across the entire C-130H fleet
will be reduced by ten aircraft. There are 13 C-130H units across the
Air National Guard, including the 103d Airlift Wing stationed in
Connecticut. Since 2001, over 1,700 Connecticut Air National Guard
personnel of the 103d Airlift Wing have deployed in support of global
operations. Given the continuous high operational tempo of our Air
National Guard C-130H units like the 103d, I am concerned that a
reduction in Primary Aircraft Authorization (PAA) could impact C-130H
squadron readiness to meet both federal and state mission requirements.
Can you discuss the Air Force's intention to reduce the PAA of Air
National Guard C-130H units? Has the Air Force identified which Air
National Guard units will see a reduction of C-130Hs on their flight
line?
Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. The fiscal year 2019
President's Budget (PB) takes a necessary step to better position the
Total Force to balance the demands of the steady-state depot
maintenance schedule and modernization initiatives that are crucial to
long-term fleet viability. Currently, the Air Force has 11 percent of
the fleet in Depot with just 4 percent of the inventory in Backup
Aircraft Inventory (BAI). Existing programmed modifications to the C-
130 fleet are projected to increase depot levels to approximately 18
percent for the next 5 years. The Primary Aircraft Authorization (PAA)
to BAI shift the Air Force programmed in the fiscal year 2019
President's Budget establishes the BAI at 11.3 percent to more closely
account for the forecasted depot levels. Additionally, the rebalance of
PAA to BAI more accurately reflects the status and availability of the
fleet to the warfighter and will not reduce the Air Force C-130 Total
Aircraft Inventory (TAI).
Specifically, the PB transitions 16 (3 C-130J and 13 C-130H) ANG
combat-delivery C-130 units from 8 PAA to 7 PAA, 6 Active Component
units from 14 to 13 PAA and 2 Air Force Reserve units from 8 to 7 PAA,
and 1 unit from 10 to 9 PAA.
This programmatic action does not reduce the number of aircraft on
any Total Force flight line. If inventories at individual units are
adjusted in the future, it would be for reasons other than the PAA to
BAI conversion. Additionally, the Air National Guard and Air Force
Reserves retained all of their manpower, effectively increasing crew
ratios, which should improve their readiness metrics.
next generation ejection seat
40. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, the Air
Force has established a funded program of record with the Next
Generation Ejection Seat (NGES) to improve the level of safety
protection for aircrew flying with the remaining Advanced Concept
Ejection Seat (ACES) II on legacy aircraft; however, it is rumored that
the program's schedule has been pushed to the right and delayed until
2021. Considering the risk to our aircrew, would you agree that it
would be prudent for the Air Force to accelerate NGES and prioritize
the upgrade to ejection seats to reduce the risk, or prevent fatalities
resulting from high-speed ejections with helmet mounted devices?
Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. The Air Force plans to move
forward with the Next Generation Ejection Seat efforts and as such have
allocated funding to start the Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation activities in fiscal year 2021 as reflected in the Fiscal
Year 2019 President's Budget submission. At this time there is no plan
to accelerate the program. We continue to balance funding challenges
with the acceptable level of risk while minimizing safety concerns for
our aircrews.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie Hirono
readiness: adversary air training
41. Senator Hirono. General Goldfein, this March, I visited the
Hawaii Air National Guard at Joint Base Pearl Harbor Hickam (JBPHH),
where I revisited a readiness challenge that I have been working on
with Air Force leadership including General Robinson and General
O'Shaughnessy for a few years. The challenge involves adversary air
capability. In Hawaii, the Guard unit is forced to go F-22 against F-22
in many cases. Unlike other bases, JBPHH F-22 Raptors do not have a
locally based aggressor squadron to carry out this adversary air
requirement.
You mentioned during the hearing that this was a home station issue
and Hawaii based F-22 crews receive training when they are away from
JBPHH and during flight simulator training at their home station. Given
that we'd like to also have them trained for readiness with live
exercises when they are home, in addition to the commercial solutions
you mentioned, can the Air Force consider having additional fighter
units either designated aggressor units or regular flying units spend
more time at JBPHH to provide training for the home unit as well as
units visiting on TDY?
General Goldfein. The Air National Guard (ANG), Pacific Air Forces,
and Air Combat Command are pursuing contracted adversary air (ADAIR) to
train Hawaii-based F-22 crews. The Environmental Impact Analysis
Process (EIAP, 32 CFR 989) has been initiated for JBPHH and is expected
to be completed by February 2019. When a favorable EIAP is completed,
contracted ADAIR jets and pilots will be permanently stationed in
Hawaii to allow more realistic training for F-22 crews and to avoid
having to use limited and expensive F-22 flying hours for red air when
training Hawaii-based F-22 crews.
Additionally, the ANG sponsors three Sentry Aloha exercises at
JBPHH to bring jets and crews from 4th Generation fighters from CONUS-
based units to Hawaii to train with Hawaii-based F-22 crews. These
exercises provide valuable deployment training to CONUS-based units as
well as dissimilar aircraft training to F-22 crews. The ANG has
recently reallocated equipment from the closure of the Total Force
Training Center at Davis Monthan Air Force Base in Tucson, Arizona to
JBPHH to reduce the cost of hosting Sentry Aloha, making it a more cost
effective option for exercises and increasing the value of the exercise
by including more units and securing airlift for units to travel with
less equipment because it is now permanently assigned to the 154th
Wing. Sentry Aloha focuses on air-to-air fighter training and
integrates a wide range of military capabilities into the scenarios and
realistic training.
42. Senator Hirono. General Goldfein, will you commit to working
with me to ensure that the 199th Fighter Squadron at JBPHH is provided
the level of training required to ensure readiness levels are
maintained in the unit without sacrificing airframe hours on the F-22's
by serving in adversary roles?
General Goldfein. Yes, we will continue to work with you as we
explore options for adversary air training at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-
Hickam.
sexual harassment in the military
43. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, the
Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO) report released
in February covering 2016-2017 determined that the Air Force Academy's
Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) program mismanagement put
it out of compliance with Department and Air Force victim assistance
and advocacy policy--putting the Air Force Academy in partial
compliance overall. As a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee
as well as on the Board of Visitors for the Air Force Academy, I want
to continue to work with you as well as the leadership at the Air Force
Academy to continue to make progress on this critical issue. Can you
update me on how the Air Force is doing on the issue of sexual
harassment, assault, and retaliation at the Academy as well as the Air
Force as a whole?
Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein.
Sexual Assault Prevention & Response (SAPR):
Since 2015 the Air Force has been implementing a comprehensive
sexual assault prevention and response strategy that focuses on
developing and implementing effective sexual assault prevention,
effectively preventing behaviors that co-occur with sexual assault, and
ensuring a robust response system. Ongoing monitoring of the strategy
implementation indicates that the Air Force is making strides in
creating a climate of dignity and respect and empowering all Airmen to
prevent and report assault and harassment.
As a result of the command-directed investigation earlier this
year, USAFA leadership restructured and added new positions to the
USAFA SAPR program. With support from the Secretary of the Air Force,
the Chief of Staff and Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC), USAFA now has
a robust SAPR office with a new Program Manager, a USAFA Sexual Assault
Response Coordinator (SARC), three Victim Advocates (VAs), a 10th Air
Base Wing (ABW) SARC and two Violence Prevention Integrators (VPIs).
In October 2017, the USAFA Superintendent published a policy
outlining his views on sexual misconduct and set his expectations of
treating everyone with dignity and respect. Additionally, since privacy
was a prominent concern before the current office was staffed, the
Superintendent wrote and distributed a memo that emphasized all who are
involved in the SAPR process have an obligations to protect privacy.
At all times during the investigation, restructuring and hiring
process, victim care and prevention was and continues to be priority
number one. It is important to note that the USAFA SAPR office is just
one part of a multi-pronged approach to prevention and response
effort--taking care of victims and combating sexual assault. Sexual
assault prevention and victim/survivor care are too important to have a
single point of failure. We have a comprehensive safety net of helping
agencies for victim care that includes medical care, counseling,
chaplains, peer support, law enforcement and a special victims'
counsel--an independent legal expert who is with them every step of the
way, if they choose. Leaders up and down the chain of command emphasize
prevention through education and a healthy culture and climate.
Most recently, USAFA hosted a Pathways to Thriving Summit, 9-10 May
2018. The summit invited sexual assault victims and supporters,
including current and former cadets and graduates, to discuss current
issues and potential solutions, and was designed to give survivors a
voice and open a dialogue on how to improve USAFA. In that same light,
the Superintendent has offered to meet 1-1 with current sexual assault
survivors. So far, a few, both men and women, have requested and met
with the Superintendent.
Cadets receive two and a half hours of SAPR training yearly. These
trainings address awareness, response, bystander intervention, and
their role in preventing sexual violence. They are conducted in a
variety of ways to include large group presentation, small group
discussions, subject matter expert guest speaker presentations,
classroom lessons, and squadron briefings. Additionally, educated peers
are on-site in the squadron to answer any questions or provide
resources if needed. Permanent party to include instructors,
commanders, coaches and staff receive annual training in their roles in
sexual assault prevention and response.
Retaliation:
The issue of addressing retaliation is at the forefront of DOD and
the service academies prevention strategy. DOD is developing action
plans in five issue areas, which include standardizing definitions,
improving data collection/analysis, building strong and supportive
systems of investigation/ accountability, providing comprehensive
support to reporters, and creating a culture intolerant of retaliation.
While there have not been any reports of retaliation made to USAFA
leadership by cadets this year, we are aware of three cases that were
reported through the USAFA Inspector General (IG) office and are now
with the DOD IG for investigation. It is important to note that even if
behavior does not meet the legal criteria to be considered reprisal,
ostracism, or maltreatment that does not mean that the behavior cannot
or will not be addressed in some manner. USAFA leadership has a wide
range of options including discipline, education, etc., to address
these behaviors regardless of how they are legally defined.
The USAFA IG provides training to SAPR personnel and Volunteer VAs
on retaliation based on procedures for ``Reporting and Tracking Victim
Retaliation in Sexual Assault Cases''. While the IG covers
``retaliation'', the training focuses primarily on ``reprisal''.
Additionally, ``reprisal'' definitions/actions are covered during
Newcomers, Cadet Squadron Leadership Training, 4-degree (freshman)
Helping Agency Briefings, New commanders briefings, and semi-annual
commanders' briefs.
When a victim meets with a VA or Special Victims' Counsel (SVC) to
make a report of sexual assault, the VA and SVC are required to discuss
retaliation/ostracism/reprisal with the victim, to include the
definitions. If the victim experiences any of those, they are
encouraged to share the information with their VA/SVC. If the victim
wishes to file a formal report to the appropriate agency, the VA/SVC
will assist them. In addition, during the Case Management Group (CMG--a
monthly meeting chaired by the Superintendent or Vice Superintendent
which discusses the well-being of unrestricted victims of sexual
assault) the SVC or VA is asked whether there have been any incidents
of reprisal, ostracism, or retaliation. If a report of any of those is
made, the case will remain open at the CMG until the allegation is
resolved. Also, all reports of reprisal for sexual assault are
investigated by DOD IG.
Sexual Harassment:
The Air Force goal is to continue to educate members on sexual
harassment and encourage commanders to promote and maintain a healthy
human relations climate, as well as foster teamwork and support in the
workplace. Sexual harassment policies and procedures set forth in Air
Force Instruction AFI 36-2706, Equal Opportunity Program, Military and
Civilian; address mechanisms for reporting, responding to, and
resolving incidents of sexual harassment, including procedures for
reporting anonymously. The Air Force will continue to reinforce this
guidance to ensure commanders and equal opportunity professionals are
aware of their responsibilities when addressing sexual harassment
concerns or allegations.
Specifically for cadets at the U.S. Air Force Academy (USAFA),
equal opportunity program training starts the first week of basic cadet
training when the basic cadets receive 1.5 hours of instruction on
sexual harassment policies. This training continues throughout the 4-
year cadet career. Permanent party members receive training upon
assignment to the installation and then annually.
Formal Sexual Harassment Complaints Across the Air Force:
The number of substantiated formal complaints have slightly
decreased since the fiscal year 2016 reporting period. In comparison,
there were a total of 15 formal sexual harassment complaints lodged in
fiscal year 2017; 18 in fiscal year 2016; 43 in fiscal year 2015 and 29
in fiscal year 2014. Females in the grades of E1-E4 continue to account
for the majority of formal substantiated complaints which is consistent
with previous years. Out of the 15 formal complaints filed in fiscal
year 2017, 11 were substantiated and 4 were unsubstantiated. All formal
complaints in fiscal year 2017 were reported to the General Courts
Martial Convening Authority (GCMCA) within 72 hours of the commander
receiving the complaint. Alleged offender demographics for fiscal year
2017 were consistent with previous years; the majority of first time
offenders were identified as white, males in the graded of E-5 - E-6.
The majority of final dispositions for substantiated formal complaints
fell under the Administrative, Adverse or Administrative (not NJP)
actions category, which was fairly consistent with final dispositions
for fiscal year 2013--fiscal year 2016.
Informal Sexual Harassment Complaints Across the Air Force:
The Air Force equal opportunity informal complaint process allows
members to address their sexual harassment concerns with their
commander or local Equal Opportunity (EO) Office. There were a total of
145 informal sexual harassment complaints processed in fiscal year
2017, as compared to 123 in fiscal year 2016 and 237 in fiscal year
2015. Out of 145 informal complaints, 102 were substantiated, 36 were
unsubstantiated and 2 were still pending resolution at the time this
report was completed. Five cases were dismissed.
Of the 145 informal complaints, commanders resolved 120 at their
level. The complainant's gender demographics in substantiated informal
complaints consisted of 19 males and 83 females, with the majority of
complainants in the grades of E-1 thru E-4. The alleged offender's
gender demographics consisted of 87 males and 7 females with the
majority 29 in the grades of E-5 thru E-6. As compared to fiscal year
2016, gender and rank demographics were similar. The majority of final
dispositions for substantiated informal complaints in fiscal year 2017
fell into the Administrative, Adverse or Administrative (not NJP)
category, which was consistent with fiscal year 2016 and fiscal year
2015 dispositions.
uniform code of military justice/domestic violence charge
44. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, in
November 2017, I introduced the Military Domestic Violence Reporting
Enhancement Act (S.2129), legislation to close a potential loophole in
the processing of outcomes from a military court action related to the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) that can allow convicted
abusers to purchase firearms unabated when they should actually be
placed in national databases to prevent such actions. The bill would
close this dangerous loophole by creating a charge for domestic
violence under the UCMJ, and could help prevent mass shootings such as
the church shooting in Sutherland Springs, Texas in November 2017. Do
you support legislation to help close loopholes and reduce the
opportunities for individuals convicted of domestic violence to
purchase firearms? Do you support this bill? If passed, will you make
the administration of this legislation a priority?
Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. We share your concern of
ensuring instances of domestic violence are appropriately handled and
charged within the military justice system. We also stand committed to
ensuring that those prohibited from possessing firearms under federal
law are properly entered in appropriate federal databases. As such, we
have supported legislation that strengthens the uniform application of
reporting requirements under federal law, such as the recent Fix NICS
Act (S. 2135).
While your proposed legislation will create a new punitive article
specifically addressing domestic violence, such behavior has already
been addressed by enhanced punishments for acts of domestic violence
charged under the UCMJ committed against a spouse or intimate partner.
The Uniform Code of Military Justice already addresses the full
spectrum of misconduct that falls under the broad topic of domestic
violence and provides the authority to prosecute such cases through a
number of offenses (for example, stalking, sexual assault, destruction
of property, communicating threats, etc.). Domestic assault is
encompassed under Article 128, Uniform Code of Military Justice,
Assault. Adding a separate offense for domestic violence neither
enhances the prosecution of these offenses nor better protects the
victims. Currently, there is a well-defined body of case law regarding
Article 128. A new offense would drive a requirement for clarification
and interpretation through the appellate process, as the new offense
develops its own case history. In addition, it potentially complicates
an offense that historically enjoys a high conviction rate. By way of
example, over the past two years the Air Force conviction rate in
courts-martial with specifications of assault involving domestic
violence charged under Article 128 is 82 percent.
It is important to note that even if a separate domestic assault
charge, such as the one you are proposing, is created in the UCMJ, such
an offense would not have prevented the failure in reporting the
conviction of Devin Kelley in the FBI's National Crime Information
Center (NCIC) database. The Air Force already annotates qualifying
convictions for crimes of domestic violence on the Result of Report of
Trial at time of conviction, independent of the offense charged. In the
Kelley case, the Report of Result of Trial was properly annotated to
indicate that the court-martial conviction was for a crime of domestic
violence. This bill would not close a loophole. Even had Devin Kelley
been convicted of a new separate domestic assault offense as proposed,
this would not have changed the reporting requirements; requirements
that, if followed, would have resulted in Devin Kelley's conviction
being reported in NCIC.
In the end, the current UCMJ provisions, and their implementation
by the Manual for Courts Martial give military justice practitioners
the necessary tools to ensure crimes of domestic violence are
effectively prosecuted and offenders are appropriately held accountable
within the military justice system.
six decades of acquisition reform
45. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson, since the establishment of
the Department of Defense in 1947, the procurement process has been
studied, enhanced, and improved over many decades with many
commissions, blue-ribbon panels, think-tanks, and congresses looking at
the issues. However, both Department officials and industry continue to
mention the slow procurement processes that hinder acquisition and we
continue to have significant cost overruns which impact public
confidence in our use of tax-payer resources. In your testimony, you
discuss that based on the fiscal year 2016 and fiscal year 2017
National Defense Authorization Acts, the Air Force is streamlining and
improving its acquisition processes. Now with Dr. Roper being hired to
the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology
and Logistics, there is an opportunity to put ideas into action to
recognize improvements and savings.
Secretary Wilson, can you provide a status on what you are doing to
streamline your acquisition process? What timelines have you set for
these actions?
Secretary Wilson. We are aggressively using the authorities for
rapid prototyping and rapid fielding provided in section 804 from the
fiscal year 2016 National Defense Authorization Act. Since the end of
February, eight large activities--ranging from Next Generation OPIR to
the B-52 re-engineering to hypersonics--are being accelerated. If
properly resourced, over 25 years of total program acceleration could
be achieved. We are presently working reprogramming to determine how
much of this acceleration can be realized.
46. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson, the Department reported that
in fiscal year 2016 total operational energy demand for fuels was 85.7
million barrels. Air Force demand was 49.6 million barrels in fiscal
year 2016 and over time has consistently been over 50 percent of the
Department's total demand--primarily tied to Air Force aviation fuels.
The Department and Air Force have issued a number of policies and
procedures to ensure that the life-cycle costs of these fuel demands
are incorporated in its acquisition processes, also referred to as the
fully burdened cost of energy. What actions over the last year has the
Air Force taken to ensure the fully burdened cost of energy has been
integrated into your acquisition process? What are the next steps for
the Air Force to ensure energy priorities are incorporated in
acquisition processes?
Secretary Wilson. In the past year, the Air Force has updated our
key acquisition guidance, Integrated Life Cycle Management, Air Force
Instruction 63-101/20-101, to include the cost of energy and fully
burdened cost of fuel into the Systems Engineering Design
Considerations section. This has led to the incorporation of energy
demand in the system trade space along with other performance issues to
support informed decision-making.
To ensure energy priorities are incorporated in the acquisition
process, the Air Force is including operational energy considerations
before an acquisition program even begins. Energy Key Performance
Parameters are now mandatory components of requirements documentation.
47. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson, how are you integrating
recruitment and retention of a skilled acquisition workforce into these
actions?
Secretary Wilson. To support operational energy considerations into
our acquisition processes the Air Force has worked diligently to
recruit and retain science, technology, engineering and mathematics
talent at our laboratories and in our systems engineering shops. We are
appreciative of the Congressional adds for alternative energy research
and the Operational Energy Capability Improvement Fund that enable our
workforce to research and test innovative technologies that will
improve our operational effectiveness.
48. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson, what additional changes would
you recommend to improve the acquisition process?
Secretary Wilson. I recommend the following changes to improve the
acquisition process:
1. Delegate cost and fielding target approval to Milestone
Decision Authority (MDA). Section 807 of the fiscal year 2016 National
Defense Authorization Act requires program cost and fielding targets be
approved by the Secretary of Defense/Deputy Secretary of Defense. We
believe the change to the MDA is aligned and consistent with the push
of acquisition authorities to the Services.
2. Delegate responsibility for conducting independent cost
estimates down to the same level as the Milestone Decision Authority.
Currently 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2334, Independent cost estimation and cost
analysis, requires the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation
to conduct or approve independent cost estimates and cost analyses for
all Major Defense Acquisition Programs no matter who is the Milestone
Decision Authority.
north korea--air force nuclear deterrence capabilities
49. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, I take
the threat of North Korea launching a ballistic missile toward the
United States and the state of Hawaii very seriously. And, the false
alarm alert of an incoming ballistic missile in Hawaii forced us to
learn a hard lesson on this matter. In your testimony, you discuss that
nuclear deterrence underpins national security for the U.S. and our
allies, and that the Air Force operates 75 percent of the nuclear
command, control, and communications capabilities. Despite what is
being reported about North Korea willing to stop its testing of nuclear
missiles, we must remain vigilant against this threat. We must ensure
the appropriate measures are taken so that North Korea, as well as
other adversaries are deterred from using ballistic missiles.
Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, is the Air Force's current
nuclear deterrent capabilities sufficient to deter our adversaries from
a nuclear attack?
Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. As reflected in the 2018
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the U.S. Nuclear Triad of land-, sea-,
and airborne-based nuclear delivery systems is the most cost-effective
and strategically sound means of ensuring nuclear deterrence. Although
the Air Force's current nuclear capabilities contribute to successful
deterrence of nuclear attack by our adversaries today, to remain
effective we must recapitalize all of our Cold War legacy nuclear
forces. The United States has initiated a series of programs to sustain
and replace existing nuclear capabilities before they reach the end of
their service lives. These programs, along with modernized dual-capable
aircraft and associated nuclear command and control, will be critical
to preserving our ability to continue to deter existential threats to
the Nation.
50. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, what Air
Force nuclear deterrent capabilities can be strengthened in the future
to better counter current and future adversary capabilities in this
domain?
Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. As stated in the 2018
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), to address the changing threat and
operating environments, we must modernize all components of the Nuclear
Triad, including our dual-capable aircraft, and the nuclear command,
control, and communication (NC3) systems that enable their
effectiveness. We need replacements for Cold War-era ICBMs and air
launched cruise missiles, which were last modernized in the 1980s and
which will not keep pace with these evolving environments. The NPR
commits to fielding the B-21 while sustaining and modernizing the B-52
to ensure it remains effective into the future. Our Long Range Stand
Off missile will replace the air launched cruise missile and ensure the
bomber force can continue to hold high-value targets at risk in an
evolving threat environment, to include targets within an anti-access
environment. The Ground based Strategic Deterrent delivers an
integrated weapon system to replace ICBM requirements. We are also
incorporating nuclear capability onto the F-35 to be used as a
replacement for our current aging dual-capable aircraft. Finally, we
need to modernize the integrated NC3 systems to ensure secure,
survivable connectivity with the President and national command
leadership.
eagle vision
51. Senator Hirono. General Goldfein, Eagle Vision is a deployable
ground station capable of downlinking commercial, unclassified remote-
sensing satellite imagery and rapidly processing the data into a
variety of formats. It is a unique capability that provides releasable
imagery for United States and allies, DHS, FEMA and HADR assistance in
the U.S. and world-wide in a timely and expedient manner--minutes/hours
as opposed to days. With the increased level of severe weather
incidents in the Pacific and elsewhere, our National Defense Strategy
to improve and increase our relationships with friends and allies,
Eagle Vision provides a cost-effective capability with a high return on
investment.
General Goldfein, will you commit to working with me to do what you
can to ensure that this valuable capability is kept ready and capable
to provide support in exercises as well as actual HADR missions?
General Goldfein. In recent fiscally constrained environments,
Eagle Vision, like many other Air Force programs, was forced to be
funded at minimum levels. Now the program will be funded at ready and
capable levels.
Over the past two years, Eagle Vision worked Theater Security
Cooperation initiatives with partners, provided intelligence support,
worked National Guard State Partnership programs, and was used for
Combatant Command outreach and support. It also satisfied data requests
from numerous humanitarian and disaster response requests from in
garrison. Eagle Vision's great utility for partnership engagement led
us to ask the Air National Guard to take control of Eagle Vision
beginning in fiscal year 2019. The Guard are experts in these mission
areas.
space capabilities
52. Senator Hirono. General Goldfein, in your remarks at the 34th
Space Symposium this April, you emphasized that each Airman, should
understand the business of space superiority. And, that we are
strongest when we fight together with our allies and partners in this
integrated battlefield. In Hawaii, we also see the value of space
superiority. Hawaii is the home of the Maui Space Surveillance Site
(MSSS), which is the only facility of its kind in the world that
provides state-of-the-art electro-optical capabilities for space
situational awareness.
General Goldfein, can you provide an update on the MOU between
Space Command, NRO and AFMC which I understand is up for renegotiation?
The MSSS provides a great resource for the signatories.
General Goldfein. A new Memorandum of Agreement for Maui space
Surveillance Site is being worked by the Air Force Research Lab. There
will be two bilateral Memoranda of Agreement replacing the original
Memorandum of Understanding. There will be a Memorandum of Agreement
between Air Force Research Lab and Air Force Space Command, and a
Memorandum of Agreement between Air Force Research Lab and National
Reconnaissance Office. The Memorandum of Agreement will capture
requirements and mission needs for the next five years, to include
sustainment of infrastructure, operations and research. I do not expect
any major shifts or impacts to operations, research or mission as a
result of these new Memoranda.
53. Senator Hirono. General Goldfein, what are some areas that you
believe we could make greater investments in the space domain? What
types of integrated cyber defensive and offensive capabilities are
incorporated into your thinking?
General Goldfein. The Air Force is the best in the world at space,
and our adversaries know it. Since the 1950s, we have been the leader
in National Security Space. Until recently, space was a benign
frontier. Space doesn't just affect the military, most Americans use
space every day. America's military space assets are integrated into
100 percent of operations.
The stakes are high and America's leadership is aligned in
recognizing space as a warfighting domain. In an era of great power
competition, Russia and China continue to develop anti-satellite
capabilities that could become operational in the next few years. We
will continue to make bold moves to accelerate defendable space and
protect the interests of America and our allies.
The fiscal year 2019 space budget allows us to posture ourselves to
meet the challenges of tomorrow. In the coming years, our military will
undertake steps to ensure we build a more lethal, resilient and agile
force. The Air Force will invest in expansive architecture to ensure
multi-domain operations. Acquisition processes will be standardized. We
will continue to work with our allies and industry partners to develop
an Air Force prepared to deter, defend and prevail in space.
Currently, the USAF has four main Defensive Cyber Operations
initiatives related to the space domain. These four initiatives
include:
1. Implementing the Cyber Squadron-Initiative to provide
persistent active cyber defense for weapons system that will be
building out by one wing per year;
2. Establishing a Cyber Defense Correlation Center for Space that
will report to the 24th AF Cyber Defense Operations Center;
3. Completing the ongoing AF Materiel Command led weapons systems
cyber evaluations of space systems using the insights to improve
cybersecurity throughout the acquisition process system lifecycle for
space systems; and
4. The Air Force is expanding the Cybersecurity Service Provider
role from administrative systems to include space mission systems. This
will initially provide limited passive cybersecurity to AF weapons
systems enhancing our situational awareness. In fiscal year 2018,
Cybersecurity Service Providers are being established initially in the
missile warning and protected communication mission areas with
additional space mission areas to follow in subsequent fiscal years.
54. Senator Hirono. General Goldfein, can you discuss the
importance in using a whole-of-government approach to work with our
allies and partners in this integrated and interdependent battlefield?
General Goldfein. The Air Force and DOD routinely collaborate with
Interagency partners and directly support the National Security Council
and National Space Council to develop and implement national space
policies and strategies. And as commercial space capabilities continue
to expand, the Air Force and DOD will continue to work closely with
commercial partners to augment our capabilities and more quickly
develop more capable and resilient space systems.
cyber security: national strategy and plan
55. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein,
committee witnesses have expressed significant concern related to the
number of illicit cyber actors worldwide. For example, Russia and China
have incorporated cyber into their joint warfighting doctrine and
routinely exercise these capabilities. We have also seen the lengths
Russia has gone to disrupt our democracy in United States elections.
China values cyber so highly it has created its Strategic Support Force
to consolidate, integrate, and synchronize cyber operations.
Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, as our adversaries, such as
China and Russia, continue to consolidate and integrate their cyber
operations, are we losing a competitive advantage by not doing so as
well?
Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. Gaining and maintaining an
information advantage is critical to all aspects of warfighting and
warrants necessary near- and long-term investment. Each service needs
to operate and fight uniformly in the joint environment and
simultaneously bring our own complementary, service-unique cyber
operations capabilities to bear.
The Air Force is balancing cyber operations requirements of our
joint combatant command partners, as well as our institutional
requirements. Air Force cyber warriors are operating globally as a
maneuver and effects force in this contested domain, delivering cyber
superiority for our Service and joint partners. Cyber operations
personnel exist to preserve our freedom of maneuver in, through and
from air, space and cyberspace while denying our adversaries the same.
56. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, do you
believe the U.S. should develop a national strategy to consolidate and
integrate our cyber operations? What is the greatest concern to you by
a lack of national cyber strategy?
Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. The fiscal year 2018 NDAA
directed the President to deliver to the appropriate congressional
committees a report on his policies relating to cyberspace,
cybersecurity, and cyber warfare. As one of the Armed Services, our
role is to train, organize, and equip the Air Force. The Air Force
remains committed to nesting and aligning our Service's cyberspace
efforts outlined in the DOD Cyber Strategy as well as to applicable
national policies and/or strategies.
energy resilience and assurance
57. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, the need
to reduce energy consumption, use alternative energy sources, and
increase energy resilience and assurance is closely tied to our
national security. I am concerned of threats in the Pacific region that
could disrupt fuel delivery or electricity supplies. In the region, DOD
relies on vulnerable fuel and electric supplies to conduct its military
operations, where electric power outages on military bases or fuel
supply disruptions could disrupt critical military operations.
Specifically, the Department and the military services have documented,
for example, that deferred maintenance or the lack of testing
associated with energy systems and infrastructure on military
installations can lead to disruptions to critical defense missions.
Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. Consistent with the National
Security Strategy, the Air Force is committed to supporting energy
initiatives that will attract investments, safeguard the environment,
and strengthen our energy security. For the Air Force, this means
prioritizing projects which improve our energy resilience, followed by
those projects which only result in cost savings or renewable project
development where the power is going to the electric grid, but made
available to an installation in time of power disruption, as opposed to
only serving the installation.
58. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, where is
the Air Force prioritizing its energy needs in this budget request? Can
you provide a description of these priorities in terms of both
operational fuel and delivery of electricity to your military
installations?
Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. Air Force missions require
uninterrupted access to electricity and are currently reliant upon an
increasingly fragile and outdated U.S. electric grid. The Air Force,
through a combination of 3rd-party and direct funding, is funding
initiatives to identify and implement comprehensive approaches to
energy challenges, and ensure access to resilient, cleaner, cost-
competitive power. $20 million of the Air Force's Operations &
Maintenance funding from the Facility Sustainment, Restoration, and
Modernization (FSRM) account will go towards stand alone, direct energy
opportunities. The Air Force also gets indirect energy benefits when it
sustains or recapitalizes facilities (e.g., replacing a HVAC system
gives us a more energy efficient and reliable HVAC system); the Air
Force estimates this cost to be about $156 million.
59. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, can you
commit that that Air Force will prioritize energy resilience and
assurance at military installations and facilities to ensure you can
accomplish your core Air Force missions? Specifically, will you
prioritize installation energy systems and infrastructure, and the
maintenance and testing of these systems to ensure your mission
requirements are met?
Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. Air Force missions require
uninterrupted access to electricity and are currently reliant upon
fragile electric grid. Through a combination of 3rd-party and direct
funding, the Air Force is funding initiatives to identify and implement
solutions to energy challenges, and ensure access to resilient power.
The Air Force is committed to enhancing mission assurance through
energy assurance by improving its energy resiliency, reducing our
demand, and assuring our energy supplies.
60. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, air and
space superiority, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
are clearly highlighted as two of the five core Air Force missions and
priorities in your testimony. Has deferred maintenance or the lack of
testing on energy systems and infrastructure on military bases caused
the degradation or failure of these core Air Force missions, which
enable key areas such as space situational awareness and ballistic
missile detection and defense?
Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. Ready and resilient Air
Force installations are critical, integral components to support the
priorities of the Air Force to build a more lethal and ready force.
However, the Air Force has chosen to accept risk in the infrastructure
accounts in order to allocate resources to high priority warfighting
readiness and modernization requirements in an era of limited funding.
Deferring these investments will likely increase sustainment and
restoration costs over the long-term. Denial of service due to the loss
of energy supplies has generated challenges. For example, due to an
extended loss of commercial power to Incirlik Air Base in 2016,
facilities were required to run on internal generated power to sustain
operations and the Air Force flew in supplies, including food, water
and fuel, in order to sustain missions.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Angus S. King
f-35 sustainment costs
61. Senator King. General Goldfein, you've previously acknowledged
that F-35 operations and sustainment costs are a major concern, and the
U.S. Government Accountability Office projected in 2017 that total
sustainment costs over the life of the F-35 program could amount to
more than $1 trillion during a 60-year life cycle. As the Air Force is
the largest customer of the F-35, what steps are being taken to reduce
the operations and sustainment costs to reach the same levels as
current fourth generation fighters?
General Goldfein. F-35 sustainment costs are a concern and as the
program matures, we are focusing efforts on reducing the sustainment
cost of the F-35. We will continue to work closely with the Joint
Program Office (JPO) and industry to evaluate and analyze actual data.
JPO's affordability war room is dedicated to reducing operations and
sustainment costs. The affordability war room includes participants
from JPO, Services, Office of Secretary of Defense and industry.
pilot shortfalls
62. Senator King. Secretary Wilson, what is the Air Force doing to
address its pilot shortage issue?
Secretary Wilson. To achieve this, the Air Force is focusing on
three main lines of effort: increased retention of current pilots,
increased production of new pilots, and optimizing pilot requirements.
The Air Force has an Aircrew Task Force that is implementing a plan
with major efforts in each of these areas. The unexplained
physiological episodes in a small number of aircraft will directly
affect production, but does not alter the Air Force plan.
63. Senator King. Secretary Wilson, how are you making long-term
careers a more attractive option for our most talented pilots?
Secretary Wilson. The Air Force has already made strides in
increasing retention though the reduction of individual deployments,
the introduction of contract administrative support to flying
squadrons, the improvement of assignment management through IT
modernization, and the introduction of an expanded pilot bonus. There
is still more to do. The Air Force is continuing to increase retention
in two ways. First, we are improving quality of service and work/life
balance through further reduction of non-flying duties, the right-
sizing of operational tempo in units, incentivizing individual
deployments, and the exploration of a possible ``fly-only'' track.
Second, the Air Force is examining compensation reform designed to
modernize incentives to continue service.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
64. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, I was
pleased to see the Air Force include $47.6 million in its budget
request for procurement of small satellite launch and rideshare
services. I agree that a responsive and resilient launch architecture
is important for preserving our dominance in space. Currently, all of
our launch facilities are on the coastline competing with busy
commercial air corridors, and they could be targeted in a contested
environment.
In recent years, inland Space Ports have been built for commercial
purposes, but they also have significant military value. Spaceport
America, for example, partners with White Sands Missile Range. There
are also several emerging commercial launch providers capable of
launching from runways at inland spaceports, and I am glad the
Department is giving them a closer look with the new Small Launch
Service program.
Given the nation's increased dependence on satellites, the
replenishment cycle of current defense satellite constellations, and
the increasing global threats to U.S. national security assets in
space, has the Air Force conducted a vulnerability assessment of
continuing to rely solely on coastal space launch locations?
Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. Vulnerability assessments
are maintained for all installations and the DOD will continue to
explore use of non-federal launch sites, to include inland spaceports,
to support National Security Space launches as we contract for launch
services. There are emerging launch providers that show promise as we
work to provide resiliency options, particularly for small to medium-
class launches. Some of these providers are exploring use of inland
spaceports.
65. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, in a
contested environment, what value could a protected inland space launch
facility and emerging small launch providers offer to the Department in
terms of a disaggregated launch?
Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. Inland space launch
facilities could offer options in providing additional secure launch
facilities, primarily with emerging small launch providers by
conducting airport style operations using reusable launch vehicles,
though public safety must be balanced with mission profiles. The Air
Force, when contracting for launch services, takes all aspects and
requirements in consideration when awarding a launch contract. The
advantage of coastal launch facilities is related to range safety in
the event of launch failure, which happens over water rather than
inhabited areas. Safety assessments may change over time as reusable
vehicles and smaller launch systems approach reliability and safety
confidence levels we have come to expect from aircraft or industrial
operations.
joint directed energy test center
66. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Wilson, the Air Force proposed a
``Joint Directed Energy Test Center'' in its Directed Energy Flight
Plan. I fully support this proposal, which is aimed at providing more
rapid and cost effective testing and fielding of directed energy weapon
systems. Doing so could also allow the broad, standardized collection
and evaluation of data at the High Energy Laser System Test Facility
(HELSTF) to establish test references and support policy decisions in a
more reliable fashion. What is the status of the Joint Directed Energy
Test Center proposal?
Secretary Wilson. OSD Test Resource Management Center is overseeing
the Joint Directed Energy Test Center study.
67. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Wilson, what are the infrastructure
and personnel needs at HELSTF to accommodate the growth and maturity of
directed energy weapon systems across the military services?
Secretary Wilson. It is premature for the Air Force to comment on
infrastructure and personnel needs prior to the release of the Joint
Directed Energy Test Center study from the Test Resource Management
Center.
light attack aircraft
68. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Wilson, I understand that the Air
Force is planning to spend $2.4 billion over the next five years for
rapid fielding and procurement of light attack aircraft. Does the Air
Force intend to field the aircraft concurrently between the Active and
Reserve components?
Secretary Wilson. Concept of operations development is currently
underway as well as the basing strategy and a decision on the component
mix is expected late this summer or in the fall.
69. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Wilson, do you think the light
attack aircraft mission is one that the Air National Guard and Air
Force Reserve will thrive in while providing maximum lethality in a
fiscally responsible fashion?
Secretary Wilson. At this time, a concept of operations is under
development. The Air Force has not made a basing decision for the light
attack aircraft mission. We are exploring for a potential acquisition
effort. If we procure aircraft, we will consider total force basing
options. The Air Force will consider putting some light attack aircraft
in the Guard or in Active Associate units. The ability of Guard units
to develop close partnerships with Allies has been well demonstrated.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2019 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
THURSDAY, APRIL 26, 2018
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET POSTURE
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:29 a.m. in Room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe,
presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker,
Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue, Cruz,
Graham, Sasse, Scott, Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King,
Heinrich, Warren, and Peters.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Senator Inhofe. Our meeting will come to order.
The committee today meets to receive testimony on the
budget posture of the Department of Defense [DOD] and the
fiscal year 2019 request and the future years defense program.
We welcome our witnesses: Secretary of Defense Mattis,
Under Secretary Norquist, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,
General Dunford.
Secretary Mattis, we wish to commend you for your work in
developing a strategy that correctly prioritizes the current
threats that we face. Now comes the more difficult task and
that is implementing the strategy. We agree on the strategy,
but it has got to be implemented.
One of Chairman McCain's priorities has been considering if
the Department is properly structured to take on this huge
task. And as the committee looks toward the upcoming NDAA
[National Defense Authorization Act] process, we welcome your
thoughts about what we can do to help you.
In the end, we must recognize that even if we get the
strategy and structure exactly right, you cannot be successful
if Congress does not deliver the resources needed to implement
this strategy. We know how damaging that can be and has been,
as we have time and again failed to do our job by passing
appropriations bills, instead passing CR [continuing
resolution] after CR. We welcome your testimony about exactly
how this would impact it. In fact, that will be one of my first
questions as to what would happen if we had not done this and
what will happen if we do not do it again for 2020 and ensuing
years.
This is especially important because we are not yet out of
the woods on sequestration. Although we did come to a budget
agreement for this year and the next, we still have to go back
and try to take care of the problems that will be in 2020 and
ensuing years after that.
We cannot dig ourselves out of the current readiness crisis
in just 2 years. It will take much longer to undo the damage
that has been done in the past 8 years to our military, and the
lack of any real growth in the future years defense program
exemplifies this.
So we look forward to your testimony and thank you for
being here and for the great job that you continue to do year
after year.
Senator Reed?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And I want to join you in welcoming the Secretary of
Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the
Comptroller. Thank you, gentlemen for your service to the
Nation over many, many years--your continued service.
Today we are considering the fiscal year 2019 budget for
the Department of Defense, which seeks $617 billion in base
funding and $69 billion for overseas contingency operations.
Fortunately, we find ourselves in a moment of budget stability,
having passed an agreement in February that removed the threat
of sequestration for fiscal years 2018 and 2019 and added
funding for both defense and non-defense programs. However,
additional challenges loom on the horizon, as the caps and
sequestration will be back in force for fiscal year 2020. As
the chairman mentioned, we still have to focus on that issue.
Secretary Mattis, I commend you for the careful and
thoughtful and hard work that went into the National Defense
Strategy, or NDS. It accurately recognizes that the central
challenge facing our Nation is the reemergence of long-term
strategic competition with Russia and China. I am also pleased
to see that the President's Budget reflects the beginnings of
investment in some of the technologies we will need for this
competition, such as hypersonics and artificial intelligence.
However, the perennial challenge facing any Secretary of
Defense is preparing for the future while reacting to the
present. And unfortunately, there are many urgent situations
not delineated in the NDS that will require our attention in
the coming weeks and months.
At the present time, the White House is attempting to focus
its efforts on negotiating an agreement to denuclearize North
Korea. Given where we were a few months ago when the
administration was threatening limited strikes on North Korea,
I am relieved to say we have come a long way, but we still have
a long, hard road ahead.
We all hope that President Trump's summit with the North
Korean leader presents us with an opportunity to craft a
comprehensive negotiated settlement. However, we must recognize
that if the negotiations fail and if that happens, we could
find ourselves in a more challenging position than before the
negotiations with a renewal of dangerous rhetoric about war
with North Korea, but now more supercharged by those advocating
for military action, claiming that diplomacy has failed.
While working through these issues with a depleted
diplomatic corps, the President must also decide by May 12
whether to continue to waive nuclear-related sanctions on Iran
as required by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or
JCPOA. I support preserving the JCPOA. The United States and
the world is safer with it. By all accounts, the JCPOA is
working as intended, and Iran is verifiably meeting its
commitments under the deal. If not for this agreement, Iran
would likely be a nuclear power today, and withdrawing from it
could accelerate Iran's path to nuclear weapons and make
America less safe.
Furthermore, withdrawing from the deal could be a
devastating blow to our efforts at diplomacy with North Korea
and, for that matter, any further diplomatic efforts to contain
aggressive or destabilizing behavior by our adversaries. Why
would any nation engage with us in serious dialogue to resolve
differences if they fear we will later withdraw unilaterally
and without cause? Furthermore, abandoning the JCPOA would
isolate the United States diplomatically from the international
community at the very time we need worldwide cooperation to
address the threat posed by North Korea.
Additionally, President Trump's mixed messages about our
military commitment to Syria could accelerate the declared
intentions of Israel to conduct more sustained attacks against
Iranian forces and proxies in Syria and Lebanon. The level of
violence and Iran's reaction are unlikely to be restricted to
Syria and a confrontation including Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and
others in the region is a real risk.
If any of these situations becomes a crisis, it is going to
take all the attention and resources of the Department of
Defense. So I am interested in hearing more about how you plan
to balance the present and the future.
Turning back to the NDS, when we think about great power
competition, we tend to think and plan for conventional
conflict. But I believe we must take into account that much of
the threat already posed by China and Russia is asymmetric.
The growing Russian asymmetric threat below the level of
military conflict continues to target the United States, our
allies, and partners. Russia attacked the heart of our
democracy in the 2016 presidential election through a Kremlin-
directed hybrid warfare campaign using all tools of national
power. Because we have failed to impose sufficient costs for
this assault, not only has Russia not been deterred, it has
been emboldened and we are already seeing Russian attempts to
interfere with the 2018 midterm elections. I am interested in
hearing what is being done to harden our defenses and develop a
whole-of-government approach that utilizes both the military
and non-military tools in our arsenal to counter this Russian
aggression.
We should also keep in mind that by next spring, the
Congress will be debating whether to raise sequestration caps
once again, as the chairman mentioned. I have learned from my
time in Congress that if you show me your budget, I will tell
you your strategy. But what will happen to the NDS if we return
to the Budget Control Act [BCA] caps? This debate will be
colored by concern about the debt, which was made worse by the
$1.5 trillion deficit-financed tax cuts passed last year. In
CBO's [Congressional Budget Office] recent projection, debt
held by the public rises from 78 percent of GDP [gross domestic
product], or $16 trillion, at the end of 2018 to 96 percent of
GDP, or $29 trillion, by 2028. That percentage would be the
largest since 1946 and well more than twice the average over
the past 5 decades.
The growing deficit and impending sequestration will have
severe consequences. They will constitute a major distraction
from thoughtful debate and responsible action on the issues of
national security. They will likely lead to stopgap measures
like recurring continuing resolutions that disrupt planning at
DOD and every other federal agency and, ironically, add cost
and inhibit readiness and modernization. If our Nation's fiscal
strategy does not take into consideration the need for revenue,
deficit-driven measures like these will likely make it
exceedingly difficult to follow through with a long-term
strategy with regard to any serious challenge facing us from
the international arena.
Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, you have been
consummate professionals. You have served in tumultuous times.
We face many difficult decisions ahead. We are all gratified
and, indeed, grateful that you are where you are.
I look forward to working with you and all of my colleagues
in a bipartisan fashion to help you and help us all resolve
these issues.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
For our panel, all of your statements will be a part of the
record, but you are recognized for your opening statement,
General Dunford. Let us start with Secretary Mattis.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JAMES N. MATTIS, SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE; ACCOMPANIED BY THE HONORABLE DAVID L. NORQUIST, UNDER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, COMPTROLLER
Secretary Mattis. Senator Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and
distinguished members of the committee, I appreciate this
opportunity to testify in support of the President's Budget
Request for fiscal year 2019.
And General Dunford and I are joined by Mr. David Norquist,
the Department's Comptroller and Chief Financial Officer.
Thank you for accepting my written statement for the
record, Chairman.
I am now in my second year as Secretary of Defense. And
with your help, we have made steady progress during the past 14
months. I must note today's absence of Chairman McCain, a
longstanding, respected, even revered member of this committee
and one whose influence is deeply felt and echoed in our
National Defense Strategy.
In January, the Department published that strategy, the
first in a decade. Framed within President Trump's National
Security Strategy, the 2018 National Defense Strategy provides
clear direction for America's military to restore its
competitive edge in an era of reemerging long-term great power
competition.
The Department next released the 2018 Nuclear Posture
Review, which calls for America's military to provide a safe,
secure, and effective nuclear deterrent that is modern, robust,
flexible, resilient, ready, and appropriately tailored to deter
21st Century threats and reassure our allies.
In South Asia and Afghanistan, uncertainty in the region
has been replaced by the certainty of the administrations?
South Asia Strategy. Concurrently in the Middle East, we have
dramatically reduced ISIS' [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria]
physical caliphate using a coordinated, whole-of-government
approach that works by, with, and through our allies and
partners to crush ISIS' claim of invincibility and to deny them
a geographic haven from which to plot murder.
Last month, thanks to the bipartisan support and political
courage of Congress and the dedication of this committee,
President Trump signed the omnibus spending bill that funds the
government for the remainder of this fiscal year. This law,
along with the 2-year budget agreement passed as part of
February's Bipartisan Budget Act, finally freed us from the
inefficient and damaging continuing resolution funding process,
now providing the predictable and sufficient funding needed to
continue implementing the 2018 National Defense Strategy.
Our fiscal year 2019 budget requests the resources
necessary to fulfill the Department's enduring mission, to
provide the combat-credible military forces needed to deter war
and, if deterrence fails, to win in any conflict. These forces
reinforce America's traditional tools of diplomacy, ensuring
that the President and our diplomats negotiate from a position
of strength.
To restore our Nation's competitive military edge, the
fiscal year 2018 budget funds our National Defense Strategy's
three overarching lines of effort: first, to build a more
lethal force; second, to strengthen our traditional alliances
while building new partnerships; and third, reform the
Department's business practices for performance and
affordability.
Our first line of effort is to build a more lethal force.
All our Department's policies, expenditures, and training must
contribute to the lethality of our military. We cannot expect
success fighting tomorrow's conflicts with yesterday's
thinking, yesterday's weapons, or yesterday's equipment. As
President Washington said during his first State of the Union
address, ``to be prepared for war is one of the most effectual
means of preserving peace,'' and today our lethal military arm
will enhance our diplomats' persuasiveness.
The paradox of war is that an adversary will move against
any perceived weakness. So we cannot adopt a single preclusive
form of warfare. We must be able to fight across the entire
spectrum of combat. The Nation must field sufficient capable
forces to deter conflict, and if deterrence fails, we must win.
Following this logic, we must maintain a credible nuclear
deterrent so these weapons are never used and a decisive
conventional force that includes irregular warfare capability.
Preserving the full range of our Nation's deterrent options
requires the recapitalization of our Cold War legacy nuclear
deterrent forces, as initiated during the previous
administration. Modernizing the Nation's nuclear deterrent
delivery systems and our nuclear command and control is the
Department's top priority, and these programs are fully funded
in the fiscal year 2019 budget.
The 2019 budget further funds enhancements to the U.S.
missile defense capabilities to defend the Homeland, our
deployed forces, allies, and partners against an increasingly
complex missile threat. In accordance with the soon to be
released 2018 Missile Defense Review, this budget requests
continued robust support for missile defense capacity and
capability to keep pace with advancing threats.
The proposed budget will modestly increase the end strength
for the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps to restore
readiness, adding 25,900 to the active and reserve force. The
budget will also continue to invest in the military's most
important asset, its warfighters, with a 2.6 percent military
pay increase.
The 2019 budget continues to increase procurement of
preferred and advanced munitions, a necessity due to the
ongoing operations in the Middle East and the need for war
reserves. Ten combat ships and eight support ships are funded,
arresting the downward trajectory of our Navy's size and
lethality. We will continue production of 77 F-35's and 24 F-
18's, evaluating the performance of both to determine the most
appropriate mix moving forward.
This budget requests funds for systems to enhance
communications and resiliency in space, addressing overhead
persistent infrared capabilities, positioning, navigation, and
timing, plus space-launched systems.
Our 2018 National Defense Strategy also prioritized
investing in technological innovation to increase lethality,
and that continues in this budget. Cyber, advanced computing,
big data analytics, artificial intelligence, autonomy,
robotics, miniaturization, additive manufacturing, directed
energy, and hypersonics are the very technologies we need to
fight and win wars of the future.
Every investment in the strategy-driven fiscal year 2019
budget is designed to contribute to the lethality of our
military, ensuring that subsequent secretaries of defense
inherit a military force that is fit for its time. Those
seeking to threaten America's experiment in democracy should
know if you challenge us, it will be your longest and worst
day.
Our 2018 National Defense Strategy second line of effort is
continued this year to strengthen our traditional alliances
while building new partnerships. In the past, I had the
privilege of fighting many times in defense of the United
States, but I never I fought in a solely American formation. It
was always alongside foreign troops. Easier said than done,
Winston Churchill noted the only thing harder than fighting
with allies is fighting without them. History proves that we
are stronger when we stand united with others. Accordingly, our
military will be designed, trained, and ready to fight
alongside allies. Working by, with, and through allies and
partners who carry their fair share remains a source of
strength for the United States.
Since the costly victory in World War II, Americans have
carried a disproportionate share of the global defense burden
while others recovered. Today the growing economic strength of
allies and partners has enabled them to step up, as
demonstrated by the 74 nations and international organizations
participating in the Defeat ISIS campaign and again in the 41
nations standing shoulder to shoulder in NATO's [North Atlantic
Treaty Organization] Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan.
This year, every NATO ally has increased defense spending, and
15 NATO allies are increasing their defense budget as a share
of the gross domestic product, giving credence to the value of
democracies standing together. Further, our Pacific partners
are also strengthening their defenses.
Our third line of effort is the urgent reform of the
Department's business practices to provide both solvency and
security. We will continue to establish a culture of
performance where results and accountability matter on every
expenditure to gain full benefit from every single taxpayer
dollar spent on defense. We are committed to exercising the
utmost degree of financial stewardship and budget discipline
within the Department. In this regard, this year we will
deliver our Department's first full financial audit in history.
We will find the problems it reveals and take swift action to
correct our deficiencies, thereby earning the trust of Congress
and the American people.
I am confident we have the right leaders in place to make
meaningful reform a reality: Pat Shanahan as Deputy Secretary
of Defense, Jay Gibson as Chief Management Officer, Ellen Lord
as Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment,
Michael Griffin as Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering, Bob Daigle as Director of Cost Assessment and
Program Evaluation, and David Norquist who joins us here today,
as the Department's Chief Financial Officer. Each brings the
intellect, the energy, and experience required to implement and
sustain meaningful reform, ensuring the Department provides
performance and affordability for the American taxpayer.
The Department is transitioning to a culture of performance
and affordability that operates at the speed of relevance. We
will prioritize speed of delivery, continuous adaptation and
frequent modular upgrades. With your continued critical
support, we will shed outdated management and acquisition
processes while adopting American industries' best practices.
Our management structure and processes are not engraved in
stone. They are a means to an end. If current structures
inhibit our pursuit of lethality, I have directed service
secretaries and agency heads to consolidate, eliminate, or
restructure to achieve their mission.
Here I will note that I have also issued direction about a
particular cancer in our ranks: sexual assault. Unit cohesion
built on trust and mutual respect is what holds us together
under stress and keeps our forces combat effective against
daunting odds. This Department is committed to assertively
preventing and swiftly responding to any sexual assault in our
ranks. While battlefield casualties are a reality of war, we
will accept no casualties due to sexual assault in our military
family. I personally discussed this with all senior Department
leaders. Earlier this month, I issued a memo making this clear
to all members of the Department. I ask that it also be
submitted for the record.
Senator Inhofe. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
Secretary Mattis. The 2018 National Defense Strategy's
three primary lines of effort, building a more lethal force,
strengthening our alliances, and reforming our business
practices, will restore our competitive military advantage
ensuring we are prepared to fight across the full spectrum of
combat both now and in the future.
I want to thank this committee for your strong, spirited
bipartisan collaboration. While our trajectory is going in the
right direction, our work has just begun. This is a year of
opportunity and a chance to continue to work together building
on a strong start as we turn the National Defense Strategy into
action.
The points I need to emphasize in this hearing are that
this budget, which is designed to execute the defense strategy,
is building a more lethal force and it is also building for the
future by improving our military technological competitive
edge, and we will reform the Department's business processes to
establish that culture of performance and affordability to
ensure security and solvency. The strategy is the guidepost for
all our actions, including this year's strategy-driven budget
request, driving meaningful reform to establish an enduring
culture of performance, affordability, and agility.
I cannot appear before you without expressing my gratitude
to the men and women of our Department. They are the ones who
must ultimately turn the National Defense Strategy into action.
Every day more than 2 million servicemembers and nearly 1
million civilians do their duty honoring previous generations
of veterans and civil servants who have sacrificed for their
country. It is a privilege for me to serve alongside them, and
I thank them for their tireless efforts and unyielding
standards in defense of our Nation.
General Dunford is prepared to discuss the military
dimensions of the budget.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Mattis follows:]
Prepared Statement by Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis
Senator Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished members of the
committee; I appreciate the opportunity to testify in support of the
President's Budget Request for fiscal year 2019. I am joined by
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Dunford, and the Department's
Comptroller/Chief Financial Officer, Mr. David Norquist.
I am now in my second year as Secretary of Defense. With your help,
we have made steady progress during the past 14 months. I must note
today's absence of Chairman McCain, a longstanding, respected, and
revered member of this committee, and one whose influence is deeply
felt.
In January, the Department published the 2018 National Defense
Strategy--the first national defense strategy in a decade. Framed
within President Trump's National Security Strategy, the 2018 National
Defense Strategy provides clear direction for America's military to
restore its competitive edge in an era of reemerging long-term
strategic competition. The Department next released the 2018 Nuclear
Posture Review which calls for America's military to provide a safe,
secure, and effective nuclear deterrent that is ``modern, robust,
flexible, resilient, ready, and appropriately tailored to deter 21st
Century threats and reassure allies.''
In South Asia and Afghanistan, uncertainty in the region has been
replaced by the certainty of the Administration's South Asia Strategy.
Concurrently in the Middle East, we have dramatically reduced ISIS'
physical caliphate, using a coordinated, whole-of-government approach
that works ``by, with, and through'' our allies and partners to crush
ISIS' claim of invincibility and deny them a geographic haven from
which to plot murder.
Last month, thanks to the bipartisan support and political courage
of Congress--and the dedication of this committee--President Trump
signed an omnibus spending bill that funds the government for the
remainder of the fiscal year. This law--along with the two-year budget
agreement passed as part of February's Bipartisan Budget Act--finally
freed us from the inefficient and damaging continuing resolution in
2018, providing the funding needed to start implementing the 2018
National Defense Strategy.
We in the Department of Defense (DOD) are grateful to the American
people for their sacrifices on behalf of military readiness and for the
priority given the military at a time when numerous competing demands
must be met by our government. We recognize and embrace our
responsibility to gain full value from every taxpayer dollar spent on
defense. As such, every decision we make will focus on lethality and
affordability as we rebuild readiness and provide the combat
capabilities required for our Nation's security.
I want to thank this committee for your strong spirit of bipartisan
collaboration. We continue to implement the range of reform initiatives
directed by the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act. For example,
your establishment of Under Secretaries for Research and Engineering
and for Acquisition and Sustainment is already paying dividends in
current and future readiness. This change--and others called for by
Congress in its oversight role--sets the right course and we are
aggressively implementing them.
While our trajectory is going in the right direction, our work has
just begun. This is a year of opportunity and a chance to build on a
strong start as we turn the 2018 National Defense Strategy into action.
Continuing our close collaboration will address our security
challenges, thereby enhancing the protection of our way of life.
Initiatives such as codifying reform efforts to further streamline the
defense acquisition process and employing feedback loops to reduce the
number of Congressionally-mandated annual reports are areas that need
our combined attention.
strategy--driven budget
The DOD's fiscal year (FY) 2019 budget is the second complete
budget request from President Trump's administration. This budget will
provide the resources necessary to fulfill DOD's requirements to meet
the National Security Strategy's four vital national interests:
Protect the American people, the Homeland, and the
American way of life,
Promote American prosperity,
Preserve peace through strength, and
Advance American influence.
The DOD fiscal year 2019 base budget requests the resources
necessary to fulfill the Department's enduring mission to provide the
combat-credible military forces needed to deter war and, if deterrence
fails, win in the event of conflict. Our Armed Forces reinforce
America's traditional tools of diplomacy, ensuring that the President
and our diplomats negotiate from a position of strength.
The 2018 National Defense Strategy provides clear strategic
direction for America's military to reclaim an era of strategic
purpose. Although the Department continues to prosecute the campaign
against terrorists, long-term strategic competition--not terrorism--is
now the primary focus of U.S. national security.
Nations as different as China and Russia have chosen to be
strategic competitors as they seek to create a world consistent with
their authoritarian models and pursue veto power over other nations'
economic, diplomatic, and security decisions. Rogue regimes like North
Korea and Iran persist in taking outlaw actions that undermine and
threaten regional and global stability. Additionally and despite our
successes against ISIS's physical caliphate, violent extremist
organizations continue to sow hatred, incite violence, and murder
innocents.
Due to our open, multi-cultural, democratic society and
strengthening economy--more than any other nation--America can expand
the competitive space, challenging our competitors where we possess
advantages and they lack depth. In order to restore our competitive
military edge, the fiscal year 2019 budget funds our defense strategy's
three overarching lines of effort to:
build a more lethal force,
strengthen traditional alliances while building new
partnerships, and
reform the Department's business practices for
performance and affordability.
build a more lethal force
The Department's policies, expenditures, and training must
contribute to the lethality of our military. We cannot expect success
fighting tomorrow's conflicts with yesterday's thinking, weapons, or
equipment. As General Washington said during his first State of the
Union address, ``to be prepared for war is one of the most effectual
means of preserving peace,'' and a lethal military arm will enhance our
diplomat's persuasiveness.
The paradox of war is that an adversary will move against any
perceived weakness, so we cannot adopt a single, preclusive form of
warfare. Rather, we must be able to fight across the entire spectrum of
combat. This means the size and composition of our force matters, and
the Nation must field sufficient, capable forces to deter conflict. If
deterrence fails, we must win. In today's environment we are determined
to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent so these weapons are never
used, and a decisive conventional force that includes irregular warfare
capability.
Our military remains capable, but our competitive edge has eroded
in every domain of warfare--air, land, sea, space, and cyber. The
combination of rapidly changing technology, the negative impact on
military readiness resulting from the longest continuous period of
combat in our Nation's history, and a prolonged period of unpredictable
and insufficient funding, created an overstretched and under-resourced
military. The fiscal year 2017 Request for Additional Appropriations
and fiscal year 2018 Omnibus Appropriation provided the funding needed
to address immediate readiness shortfalls and accelerate modernization
programs in a sustained effort to solidify our competitive advantage.
As indicated below in Figure 1, America can afford survival. The fiscal
year 2019 strategy-based budget is affordable and will continue to
enhance U.S. military capabilities, but the budget can only be fully
effective if passed on time, not later than October 1st.
The National Defense Strategy prioritizes major power competition
and, in particular, reversing the erosion of United States military
advantage in relation to China and Russia. The fiscal year 2019 budget
request invests in key capabilities to implement the National Defense
Strategy through:
modernization of nuclear deterrence forces and nuclear
command, control and communications (NC3) capabilities;
additional missile defense capabilities;
modest increases in end strength for Army, Navy, Air
Force, and Marine Corps;
a 2.6 percent military pay raise;
continuing increased procurement of certain preferred and
advanced munitions;
acquisition of 10 combat ships and 8 support ships;
continued production of F-35 and F/A-18 aircraft;
increasing funds to enhance communications and resiliency
in space, and;
investment in technological innovation to increase
lethality, including research into advanced autonomous systems,
artificial intelligence, and hypersonics.
As noted earlier, one of the key elements of the 2018 National
Defense Strategy is to ensure America's military provides a safe,
secure, and effective nuclear deterrent that is fit for our time.
The global situation is sobering. Russia is modernizing its full
range of nuclear systems while espousing a theory of nuclear escalation
in military conflict. China, too, is modernizing and expanding its
already considerable nuclear forces, pursuing entirely new
capabilities. China is also modernizing its conventional military
forces to a degree that will challenge United States military
superiority. While recent events have given rise to a sense of positive
movement, North Korea's nuclear provocations threaten regional and
global peace and have garnered universal condemnation by the United
Nations. Iran's nuclear ambitions also remain an unresolved concern.
Globally, nuclear terrorism remains a tangible threat.
The recently completed 2018 Nuclear Posture Review reaffirms the
findings of previous reviews that the nuclear triad--comprised of silo-
based intercontinental ballistic missiles, bomber aircraft, and
nuclear-armed submarines--is the most strategically sound means of
nuclear deterrence. Given the range of potential adversaries, their
capabilities and strategic objectives, the review calls for a nuclear
deterrent fit for its time--a tailored and diverse set of nuclear
deterrent capabilities that provides a flexible, tailored approach to
deterring one or more potential adversaries.
Deterrence exists in the mind of an adversary. Given today's
complex security environment and the dynamics of deterrence, our
Nuclear Posture Review introduces two supplemental nuclear capabilities
to strengthen our deterrent stance. Both capabilities deny any
adversary the confidence that limited nuclear use can provide an
advantage.
First is the near-term modification of a small number of existing
submarine-launched ballistic missile warheads to reduce their yield.
From submarines this provides a survivable capability to credibly hold
at risk heavily-defended targets, which an adversary might believe
could be successfully defended against current air-delivered nuclear
weapons. This is consistent with the New START Treaty and does not
increase the number of deployed U.S. strategic nuclear weapons. It
counters any misconception on the part of Russia that they could
escalate a conventional war through the use of a low yield weapon and
we could only respond with a high yield weapon, which they calculate we
would not do. In terms of deterrence, this submarine-launched low yield
weapon gives us an option other than surrender or suicide, thus
strengthening our deterrence to adversary use of nuclear weapons.
Second is the pursuit of a nuclear sea-launched cruise missile.
This is not a new or novel capability. The U.S. had these weapons for
decades before dismantling them after the Cold War. If we subsequently
choose to go into full production, this INF Treaty-compliant capability
will close a capability gap. Currently this effort is meant to
incentivize Russia to return to compliance with its obligations under
the INF Treaty.
These capabilities do not lower the nuclear threshold. Rather, by
convincing adversaries that even limited use of nuclear weapons will be
more costly than they can tolerate, it raises that threshold.
Preserving this range of options requires the recapitalization of
our Cold War legacy nuclear deterrent forces as initiated during the
previous Administration. Modernizing the Nation's nuclear deterrent
delivery systems, including our nuclear command and control, is the
Department's top priority, and these programs are fully funded in the
fiscal year 2019 budget. Most of the Nation's nuclear deterrence
delivery systems, built in the 1980's or earlier, reach the end of
their service life between 2025 and 2035, with all currently-fielded
systems extended well beyond their original service lives. Replacement
programs are underway to ensure there are no gaps in capability when
the legacy systems age out.
Investments include the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent system;
Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine; Trident II submarine-
launched ballistic missile service life extension program; B-21 Raider
strategic bomber; replacing the air-launched cruise missile with the
Long-Range Standoff weapon; and B61 Mod 12 life extension program to
consolidate four legacy B61 variants into a single variant for carriage
on heavy bombers and dual-capable aircraft.
Our modernization estimates align with a recent Congressional
Budget Office report that estimated $1.2 trillion to (1) modernize and
(2) operate our nuclear deterrent forces over 30 years when combined
with the costs incurred by the Department of Energy to develop and
sustain the warheads. However, the cost of our nuclear modernization
program is significantly less than the cost of failing to deter war by
underinvesting in these capabilities.
Nuclear deterrent forces, along with our conventional forces and
other instruments of national power, help deter aggression and preserve
peace. Our goal is to convince adversaries they have nothing to gain
and everything to lose from the use of nuclear weapons. I note again
that our deterrent stance does not lower the nuclear threshold, and it
remains U.S. policy to consider employing nuclear weapons only in
extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United
States, its allies, and partners.
The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review reaffirms the mutually reinforcing
role of nuclear deterrence in a complex and dynamic security
environment and continued U.S. commitment to non-proliferation,
counter-nuclear terrorism, and arms control. The United States remains
committed to its global leadership role to reduce the number of nuclear
weapons, and to fulfill existing treaty and arms control obligations,
including the New START Treaty. While Russia and United States both met
their agreed New START strategic weapons reduction requirement on time,
Moscow has violated the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty over
the past several years. While our intent is to bring Russia back into
compliance, the duration of Russia's INF violation illustrates the
challenging environment for progress in arms control efforts and
undermines United States confidence in Russia as a reliable treaty
partner.
The fiscal year 2019 budget funds enhancements to U.S. missile
defense capabilities to defend the Homeland, deployed forces, allies,
and partners against an increasingly complex ballistic missile threat.
In accordance with the soon-to-be-released 2018 Missile Defense Review,
this budget requests continued robust support for missile defense
capacity and capability to keep pace with advancing threats. The budget
includes $12.9 billion for missile defense, including $9.9 billion for
the Missile Defense Agency. The Department will develop an additional
missile field in Alaska and increase the number of operational deployed
Ground-Based Interceptors to 64 missiles as early as fiscal year 2023.
While our efforts remain focused on increasing interceptor capacity in
Alaska, the Department has completed environmental impact studies for
four possible ballistic missile defense sites on the East Coast should
the Iranian ICBM threat materialize.
The fiscal year 2019 request will continue development of the
Redesigned Kill Vehicle to address the evolving threat along with
development of a 2nd / 3rd-stage booster selectable capability to
expand battlespace for ground-based interceptor engagements for
Homeland defense. The budget also uses available technology to improve
existing sensors, battle management, fire control, and kill vehicle
capabilities to include a Long-Range Discrimination Radar in Alaska, a
Homeland Defense Radar in Hawaii, and an additional Medium Range
Discrimination Radar in the Pacific.
For regional missile defense capabilities, the fiscal year 2019
budget request supports improved missile defense capability on the
Korean peninsula; provides funding for development of advanced missile
defense technologies to counter future threats; supports the Aegis
Ashore site in Romania and deployment of a second site in Poland as
part of NATO's Ballistic Missile Defense architecture; increases BMD
capability and capacity of the Aegis fleet; integrates SM-3 Block IIA
into the Aegis weapon system; provides funding for Terminal High
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) development efforts and software
upgrades; and continues support for Israeli Cooperative BMD Programs,
including the Iron Dome system to defeat short-range missiles and
rockets, and co-development/co-production of the David's Sling Weapon
System and Arrow-3 System.
Modest increases in end strength for the Army, Navy, Air Force and
Marine Corps are critical to restoring readiness. DOD's fiscal year
2019 budget funds a total end strength increase of 25,900 as depicted
in figures 2 (Active Force) and 3 (Reserve Force) below.
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Our joint culture remains one of our military's greatest strengths,
and a force multiplier on the battlefield. Each service's manpower
needs remain unique to their specific missions. For example, the Army
will continue to rebuild manpower readiness with a new ``Sustainable
Readiness'' force generation model, making greater use of Reserve
forces, updating the force structure model, and providing greater home
station training against a broad range of threats. The Navy will ensure
sailors with the right skills are assigned to the most appropriate
jobs, using the increase in end strength to reduce identified gaps in
critical manning areas. The Marine Corps will implement a 1:2 deploy-
to-dwell ratio for Active Duty forces, providing more recovery time
between deployments and for home station training. The Air Force is
closing gaps in aircrew and skilled maintenance personnel, targeting
their increased personnel to get more planes in the air.
Increasing lethality requires us to change our approach to talent
management. We must reinvigorate our military education and training,
and hone our civilian workforce's expertise. The creativity and talent
of the Department is our deepest wellspring of strength and warrants
greater investment. The fiscal year 2019 budget will continue to invest
in the military's most important asset--its warfighters--with a 2.6
percent military pay increase. This pay raise and the increase in
manpower will improve readiness and lethality by reducing personnel
tempo and retaining skillsets like cyber, electronic warfare, and
special operations. With changes to our forces' posture, we will
prioritize for warfighting readiness in major combat, making us more
strategically predictable and reliable for our allies but operationally
unpredictable to any adversary.
The U.S. Military's predominant mission is to be prepared to fight
and win our Nation's wars. No human endeavor is more demanding
physically, mentally, and emotionally than the life and death struggle
of battle. High standards for military service are designed to ensure
our military remains the most professional and lethal force in the
world. While not everyone in the military sees combat, every soldier,
sailor, airman and marine must be physically and mentally qualified and
prepared to endure the hardship of war, for the U.S. military to carry
out its demanding missions.
Acknowledging that infantry units take over 80 percent of combat
casualties, the Department's Close Combat Lethality Task Force is
integrating human factors and technology to ensure our forces retain
their hard won superiority in battle. We will expose troops to as many
simulated tactical and ethical challenges possible before they see
combat, ensuring that their first time in combat doesn't feel like
their first time in combat. The Task Force will also provide
recommendations regarding the fundamentals of performance, including
physical fitness and nutrition standards. The end result is to ensure
that U.S. close quarters battle is conducted in a way that ferociously
destroys the enemy's spirit and brings back as many as possible in top
physical and mental shape.
To ensure the most lethal and effective fighting force in the
world, the Department maintains high mental, physical, and behavioral
standards. These necessarily high standards mean that 71 percent of
young Americans (ages 17-24) are ineligible to join the military
without a waiver. The Department's detailed 44-page report thoroughly
explains why and under what circumstances transgender persons without
gender dysphoria can serve, and why transgender persons with gender
dysphoria cannot, except in limited circumstances. I'm confident that
my recommendation to the President is in the best interests of the
military and is consistent with the Constitution. The report also
explains why transgender persons who entered under the prior
administration's policy will be retained. The Department will continue
to comply with the court orders that require the accession and
retention of transgender persons until this issue is fully resolved,
and I must remain careful with my comments on this matter while it is
in active litigation.
Continued increased procurement of preferred and advanced munitions
is necessary due to ongoing operations in the Middle East and the need
for war reserves.
Specifically, the DOD has expended a significant number of
munitions, primarily to defeat Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).
Many preferred munitions are precision-guided, low-collateral damage
munitions, used by all Services and by U.S. allies. Addressing the
Department's need to maintain critical munition inventories, the fiscal
year 2017 and fiscal year 2018 funds you provided have strengthened the
Department's lethal posture, enabling our industrial base to increase
production capacities. The fiscal year 2019 budget provides $4.4
billion to continue to procure munitions at maximum production
capacity, lowering the price for each unit and ensuring greater buying
power for those munitions as we rebuild our war reserve.
The United States remains the world's preeminent maritime power.
During peacetime and in times of conflict, sailors and marines are
deployed at sea, enabling forces to arrive sooner and remain longer,
while bringing everything they need with them. These forces reassure
allies and temper adversaries' designs. The U.S. Constitution vests
Congress with the authority to ``provide and maintain a Navy,'' and the
fiscal year 2019 budget provides $23.7 billion to fund 10 combat ships
and 8 support ships. These funds arrest the downward trajectory of the
Navy's size and lethality. Consistent with the National Defense
Strategy, the Fleet will continue to grow to meet capabilities needed
in the future and to maintain an industrial base healthy enough to
adapt and evolve in a dynamic environment. The fiscal year 2019 budget
provides for a deployable battle force of 280 ships growing to 355,
supporting the requirements to respond to persistent and emerging
threats. We are also increasing near-term capacity by investing in
service life extension programs for six guided missile cruisers (adding
five years of service life) and one Los Angeles-class submarine
(extending service life by 11 years). We are committed to expanding the
Navy while making it fit for operations in the face of future threats.
Along with shipbuilding, the fiscal year 2019 budget prioritizes
capabilities to enhance air and sea power through the continued
production of F-35 and F/A-18 aircraft. The F-35 program is developing,
producing, and fielding three variants of the F-35 to support the needs
of the U.S. Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy. The budget requests 77
F-35s and 24 additional F/A-18 Super Hornets in fiscal year 2019,
increasing the readiness of the Navy's fighter fleet and relieving
pressure on its aging, legacy F/A-18A-D aircraft. It remains imperative
that our air fleet deliver performance, affordability, and capability.
The F-35 aircraft is performing well, but the contractor is not
delivering the affordability that keeps solvency and security as our
guideposts. We are working with the contractor to reduce the costs
associated with purchasing and sustaining the F-35. We will evaluate
the performance of both F-35s and F/A-18s to determine the most
appropriate mix of aircraft as we move forward.
The fiscal year 2019 budget request provides $9.3 billion for space
and space-based systems to enhance communications and resiliency in
space, addressing needs for overhead persistent infrared capabilities;
positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT); and space launch systems.
The Department will sustain existing systems, while developing follow-
on capabilities to support operations in a contested space environment.
The Air Force will continue the production of space-based infrared
systems (SBIRS) and advanced extremely high frequency space vehicles
currently in production to meet military satellite communication needs.
Facing rising threats to our space capabilities, however, the fiscal
year 2019 budget request transitioned the SBIRS space vehicles 7 and 8
procurements to the Next Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared effort
in order to field rapidly a more survivable system by the mid-2020s.
The Air Force will incorporate a technology refresh of the sensor to
assure missile warning capabilities equal to or greater than today's
SBIRS, taking advantage of sensor technology improvements.
The fiscal year 2019 budget request supports resiliency
improvements in the PNT mission, incorporating military protection
capability into the next generation global positioning system (GPS) III
constellation. This enhancement assures PNT capabilities in contested
environments and funds improvements to the GPS ground segment to
improve anti-jamming and secure access of military GPS signals.
Successful implementation of the 2018 National Defense Strategy
includes investing in technological innovation to increase lethality.
Rapid technological change includes developments in advanced computing,
big data analytics, artificial intelligence, autonomy, robotics,
miniaturization, additive manufacturing, directed energy, and
hypersonics--the very technologies that ensure we will be able to fight
and win wars of the future. Ultimately, these technologies will change
the character of war, a reality embraced by DOD.
The Department's fiscal year 2019 Science and Technology (S&T)
program invests in and develops capabilities that advance the
technological superiority of the U.S. military to counter new and
emerging threats. The Congressionally-directed split of my office's
Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) into
two portfolios (Acquisitions and Sustainment, and Research and
Engineering) has enabled a stronger focus on urgently needed
innovation, aligned with our defense strategy.
The fiscal year 2019 budget request for science and technology is
$13.7 billion, focusing on innovation to advance DOD's military
dominance for the 21st Century. Highlights include: a robust basic
research program of $2.3 billion; funding the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency budget of $3.4 billion to develop technologies for
revolutionary, high-payoff military capabilities; and continuing to
leverage commercial research and development to provide leading edge
capabilities to the Department while encouraging emerging non-
traditional technology companies to focus on DOD-specific problems.
The 2018 National Defense Strategy recognizes cyberspace as an
increasingly contested warfighting domain, where malevolent cyber
incidents and attacks present significant risks to national security.
Long-term strategic competitors like Russia, China, North Korea, and
Iran are using increasingly aggressive methods and levels of
sophistication to conduct malicious activities. The challenge facing
the Department is equally applicable to public and private networks
across the United States, networks that are already held at risk.
In terms of cyber as a contested domain, the Department of Defense
has two broad portfolios: First is DOD's requirement to defend its
networks, weapons, infrastructure, and information while providing
integrated offensive cyber capabilities as options if needed. Second is
our responsibility to Defend the Nation, which we perform by defending
forward against significant cyber threats, and by supporting the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) which has the lead responsibility
for integrating various governmental roles, missions, and
responsibilities. Because DOD has offensive and defensive cyber
capabilities in U.S. Cyber Command (title 10) and the National Security
Agency (title 50) on a scale and scope not available through other
agencies and departments, we have a responsibility to the President and
the Secretary of DHS for effectively aligning our capabilities to
support cyber deterrence and responses to malicious cyber actions as
part of a whole-of-government approach. Further, protection of our
Nation's economy is fundamental to protecting our open society's way of
life and ultimately to maintaining our military power. There are
critical sectors (e.g., energy/electricity, finance, communications)
vulnerable to disruption which must be reflected in our Nation's
strategy and DOD's role.
The fiscal year 2019 budget provides $8.6 billion to build and
maintain offensive and defensive capabilities for cyberspace
operations. This funding also provides the resources needed to
organize, train, and equip the 133 Cyber Mission Force teams whose
purpose it is to perform DOD's cyber missions. This budget further
provides the resources to elevate U.S. Cyber Command to a 4-star level
command as required by the 2017 NDAA, to ensure DOD's organization
accounts for the new threats facing our Nation.
Across manpower, research, procurement, operations and maintenance,
and construction--every investment in the fiscal year 2019 budget is
designed to contribute to the lethality of our military as we adapt the
size and composition of our force to address the current international
situation while adjusting our stance to account for an evolving future.
The enduring departmental theme is derived from our National Defense
Strategy and Congressional intent: that we field forces sufficient and
capable of deterring conflict or dominating the battlefield if we must
fight and win. This year's budget reinforces a message to those seeking
to threaten America's experiment in democracy: if you challenge us, it
will be your longest and worst day.
strengthen traditional alliances while building new partnerships
The 2018 National Defense Strategy's second line of effort is to
strengthen traditional alliances while building new partnerships.
In the past, I had the privilege of fighting many times in defense
of the United States, but I never fought in a solely American
formation; it was always alongside foreign troops. Easier said than
done. Winston Churchill noted that the only thing harder than fighting
with allies is fighting without them. History proves that we are
stronger when we stand united with others. Accordingly, our military
will be designed, trained, and ready to fight alongside allies.
Acknowledging the lessons of World War II, the Greatest Generation
invested in this approach to security, and our Nation's resulting
prosperity helped much of the world develop. Working by, with, and
through allies who carry their fair share remains a source of strength
for the U.S. Since the costly victory in World War II, Americans have
carried a disproportionate share of the global defense burden while
others recovered.
Today, the growing economic strength of allies and partners has
enabled them to step up, as demonstrated by the 74 nations and
international organizations participating in the Defeat-ISIS campaign,
and again in the 41 nations standing shoulder-to-shoulder in NATO's
Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan. This year, every NATO ally has
increased their defense spending, and 15 NATO allies are also
increasing their defense budgets as a share of gross domestic product,
giving credence to the value of democracies standing together. Our
Pacific partners are also doing so.
To strengthen and work jointly with more allies, our organizations,
processes, and procedures will be ally friendly. The Department will do
more than just listen to other nations' ideas--we will be willing to be
persuaded by our partners, recognizing that not all good ideas come
from the country with the most aircraft carriers. This line of effort
will bolster an extended network of like-minded nations capable of
promptly and prudently meeting the challenges of our time.
The fiscal year 2019 budget prioritizes investment where it is
needed today and tomorrow. In the Middle East, we will work with
responsive governments to ensure a more stable and secure region that
denies safe haven to terrorists; is not dominated by any power hostile
to the United States; and that contributes to stable global energy
markets and secure trade routes. The $69 billion requested for the
Overseas Contingency Operations account maintains our regional presence
to protect the Homeland, allies, and partners from terrorist threats.
The budget request supports United States Forces in Afghanistan as part
of the Administration's South Asia Strategy; continues operations to
prevent the resurgence of ISIS; and continues our security partnership
with Iraqi Security Forces to support Iraq's long-term stability and
independence.
NATO remains our key security alliance. The Overseas Contingency
Operations request also provides $6.5 billion for the European
Deterrence Initiative (EDI). Established in 2015, the EDI supports a
strong and free Europe, reaffirms America's commitment to the security
and territorial commitment of NATO member states, and enhances
activities in Eastern Europe to deter Russian aggression such as we
have observed in Georgia and Crimea/Ukraine. This initiative also
increases bilateral and multilateral exercises and training with allies
and partners to ensure our deterrent stance is built on a strong, joint
military capability.
A free and open Indo-Pacific region provides prosperity and
security for all. We will continue to strengthen our alliances and
partnerships in the Indo-Pacific to a networked security architecture
capable of deterring aggression, maintaining stability, and ensuring
free access to common domains. With key countries in the region, we
will bring together bilateral and multilateral security relationships
to preserve the free and open international system.
In our own hemisphere, the Canadian-American North American Air
Defense Command is a long-standing, allied effort to protect both our
nations. We maintain mature relations with both Canadian and Mexican
militaries with a high degree of quiet collaboration. Further South we
work jointly with Latin American nations on counter-narcotics and other
operations and training efforts.
Our efforts in Africa are largely focused on assisting nations
facing violent terrorists to develop their own capability to provide
internal security and mutual support against insurgents and terror
groups. Ethical use of force is inherent in all training we provide.
reform the department's business practices for performance and
affordability
As we take proactive steps to ensure our military is ready to fight
today and in the future, we must urgently reform the business practices
of the Department to provide both solvency and security. We will
continue to establish a culture of performance where results and
accountability matter on every expenditure, thereby gaining full
benefit from every single taxpayer dollar spent on defense. We also
have a commitment to exercise the utmost degree of financial
stewardship and budget discipline within the Department, and we will
deliver our Department's full financial audit this year. We also have
the right leaders in place to make meaningful reform a reality: Pat
Shanahan as Deputy Secretary of Defense; Jay Gibson as Chief Management
Officer; Ellen Lord as Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisitions and
Sustainment; Michael Griffin as Undersecretary of Defense for Research
and Engineering; Bob Daigle as Director of Cost Assessment and Program
Evaluation; and David Norquist as the Department's Comptroller/Chief
Financial Officer. Each brings the intellect and energy required to
implement and sustain meaningful reform, ensuring the Department
provides performance and affordability for the American taxpayer.
The Department began a consolidated financial statement audit in
fiscal year 2018. For the first time, the Department will complete an
independent and full audit across its business processes and systems,
as required by law. A financial statement audit is comprehensive,
occurs annually, and covers more than just financial management. During
a financial statement audit, an independent public accounting firm or
the DOD Office of Inspector General examines the Department's books and
records. Financial statement audits give management independent
validation and feedback on the effectiveness of each reporting entity's
business systems and internal processes and controls. The financial
statement audit helps drive enterprise-wide improvements to standardize
our business processes and improve the quality of our data. Audits also
ensure Department leaders have visibility over the counts, locations,
and conditions of DOD property to inform current readiness and inform
future programming, budgeting, and investment decisions. While we fully
expect to find deficiencies, we will take swift action to correct them,
thereby earning the trust of Congress and the American people.
Remediating audit findings is at the center of our financial
improvement strategy. The Department owes accountability to the
American people. The taxpayers deserve a level of confidence that the
Department's financial statements present a true and accurate picture
of its financial condition and operations. Transparency,
accountability, and business process reform are some of the benefits
the Department will receive from the financial statement audit even
before achieving a positive opinion.
The Department is transitioning to a culture of performance and
affordability that operates at the speed of relevance. We will
prioritize speed of delivery, continuous adaptation, and frequent
modular upgrades. With your continued, critical support, we will shed
outdated management and acquisition processes while adopting American
industries' best practices. Our management structure and processes are
not engraved in stone. They are a means to an end--empowering the
warfighter with the knowledge, equipment, and support needed to fight
and win. If current structures inhibit our pursuit of lethality, I have
directed Service Secretaries and Agency Heads to consolidate,
eliminate, or restructure to achieve the mission.
Here I will note that I have also issued direction about a
particular cancer in our ranks--sexual assault. Unit cohesion built on
trust and mutual respect is what holds us together under stress and
keeps our forces combat effective against daunting odds. This
department is committed to assertively preventing and swiftly
responding to any sexual assault in our ranks. While battlefield
casualties are a reality of war, we will accept no casualties due to
sexual assault in our military family. I personally discussed this with
all senior department leaders. Earlier this month, I issued a memo
making this clear to all members of the Department. I ask that it also
be submitted for the record.
Deputy Secretary of Defense Shanahan has established the Reform
Management Group (RMG), which relies on cross-functional teams to drive
efficiency by using shared, centralized services throughout the
Department with the goal of making each area maximally effective and
improving our performance. The RMG's central goal is to leverage best
practices, centers of excellence, and private sector sources to
benchmark and best align business operations. Improved performance in
the Department's business operations leads to a more effective force,
and savings will be reinvested to increase lethality.
Initial Reform Teams are focused on evaluating operations in the
following areas:
Information Technology,
Healthcare,
Real Property,
Human Resources,
Financial Management,
Contracted Services and Goods,
Logistics and Supply Chain,
Community Services, and
Testing and Evaluation.
Goals and performance metrics are crucial to measuring the benefit-
to-cost and value generated as business processes are optimized. Key to
this reform effort is generating relevant, accurate, and timely data.
Displaying this data will ensure that all decision makers have access
to the best information on a real-time basis. As reform efforts are
underway, the longer-term objective is to institutionalize the behavior
of continuous improvement throughout the culture of the Department.
As the Department implements reform initiatives that reduce the
operating costs of institutional activities, those resources will be
reallocated to readiness, modernization, and recapitalization. The
Department is ensuring that the savings associated with better business
practices from previous Presidents' Budgets are implemented fully,
including streamlining major headquarters activities and eliminating
redundancy. This effort includes a systemic review of past Inspector
Generals' findings to ensure remedial action has been fully
implemented.
There are several efforts currently underway to improve the
Department's ability to acquire and field products and services that
provide for significant increases in mission capability and operational
support in the most cost effective and schedule efficient manner
possible.
A Defense Acquisition System that facilitates speed and agility in
support of mission accomplishment is key. The Department is engaging
with the independent advisory panel on streamlining and codifying
acquisition regulations established by section 809 of the fiscal year
2016 NDAA and amended by section 863 of the fiscal year 2017 NDAA. This
effort also includes potential recommendations for new statutes as well
as amendments or repeal of existing statutes.
The Department looks forward to working with the Congress to
provide the right capabilities to the warfighters when needed and at an
affordable cost. A Defense Acquisition System that facilitates speed
and agility in support of the aforementioned objective is key in this
regard.
current issues update
Syria: Syria's civil war began in 2011 and now spans two
administrations, providing ISIS an ungoverned space from which to
commit murder and oppression, fomenting attacks globally. Our chosen
strategy is to act by, with, and through allies and partners,
diplomatically and militarily. The reason we have troops in Syria is
solely to surround and annihilate ISIS as part of the 70-nation Defeat-
ISIS Coalition. No military solution is possible in the Syrian civil
war, and we continue to support a diplomatic solution as part of the
U.N.-led peace process, led by U.N. Special Envoy to Syria Steffan de
Mistura. The 13 April use of military force was a distinct military
operation exercised in the face of compelling evidence that chemical
weapons were used in Duma and, as U.N. Secretary General Stoltenberg
stated the following day, our ``response to Syria's use of chemical
weapons was targeted, measured, and appropriate.'' This proportional
response, conducted under President Trumps Article II Constitutional
authority, does not signal an escalation in the ongoing conflict in
Syria.
Aviation Mishaps / Deaths: Recent aviation mishaps across each of
the Services are tragic and troubling, with 133 servicemembers killed
over a five year period. In the last four weeks alone, 16
servicemembers have been killed. I am concerned that these recent
mishaps represent lagging indicators, a tragic manifestation of
readiness that has degraded during 17 years of war and made worse by
budget cuts and fiscal instability.
The two-year Bipartisan Budget Act and 2018 Omnibus appropriation
will begin restoring the flight hours, equipment, and manpower needed
to regain readiness, but it took us years to get to this point and
measurable improvements will take time.
Border Security Support: In support of the Department of Homeland
Security, and as directed by the President, I have authorized use of up
to 4,000 National Guardsmen in title 32 duty status. They will be
assigned supporting roles requested by DHS along our southern border
region under the command of their respective governors. Current
requested support is for aviation, surveillance, intelligence analysis,
and planning support in priority sectors. I anticipate additional
requests for construction and logistical support. National Guard
personnel will not perform law enforcement duties or interact with
migrants. Previously employed title 10 forces (approximately 195)
conducting ongoing counter-narcotics support missions remain under U.S.
Northern Command's control. We have nearly completed our fiscal year
2018 baseline that would allow us to request your approval to reprogram
funds and are quickly initiating the full mid-year review to examine
execution, emerging requirements, program performance and year-of-
execution realities. We will work closely with Congress to identify
assets and sources to protect readiness as we pay for National Guard
support for the Southwest Border.
Cancellation of Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
(JSTARS) Recapitalization and Space-Based Infrared Systems: The Air
Force has proposed replacing JSTARS--the aircraft that performs battle
management, command and control, and ground moving target sensing--with
a network of sensors, fusing information from space, air, ground, and
sea sensors. In a contested environment with integrated air defenses,
the currently planned JSTARS replacement would be unable to get close
enough to the fight to accomplish its mission, leaving our forces
potentially blind to enemy activity. These functions must be adapted if
they are to survive in the changed threat environment. We will move
swiftly to Advanced Battle Management and Surveillance, and the Next
Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared procurements, rapidly fielding
capabilities with more survivability.
Niger Incident and Loss of Four Soldiers: This incident and
contributing factors have been extensively investigated by United
States Africa Command. I have completed my review of the investigation
and the Department has begun notifying the families of our fallen
Soldiers. We will brief Congressional leadership once all families have
been notified, followed by a public release.
Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA):
President Trump signed CAATSA into law on August 2, 2017, imposing new
sanctions to counter aggressive actions from Iran, Russia, and North
Korea. I look forward to working with Congress to address the national
security implications created by this act. It is important for us to
have a flexible waiver authority, otherwise we prevent ourselves from
acting in our own best interest and place an undue burden on our allies
or partners.
Transition to the Cloud: DOD must remain on the cutting edge of
advanced computing capabilities to support warfighting and lethality.
Our cloud initiative simplifies the ability to provide enterprise-wide
access to information and improves security to safeguard critical
information. Despite what you have heard in the media, the contract is
not a sole source contract. The contract, which will have a 2-year base
period, will follow a fair and open competition with the ultimate
decision made based on performance and affordability. We are pursuing
this path to ensure cloud providers are competitive and responsive to
DOD needs.
conclusion
Again, thank you for your bipartisan support and strong spirit of
collaboration between this committee and our Department.
The 2018 National Defense Strategy's three primary lines of
effort--building a more lethal force, strengthening traditional
alliances while building new partnerships, and reforming the
Department's business practices for performance and affordability--will
restore our competitive military advantage, ensuring we are prepared to
fight across the full spectrum of combat now and into the future.
Department of Defense readiness degraded over the course of many
years. It will take continued budgetary stability to rebuild the
readiness and increase the lethality required to expand the American
military's competitive space. Now that we have a strategy-driven
budget, the fiscal year 2019 budget request needs a timely
appropriation enacted before October 1st to deliver the best return on
readiness and modernization programs.
This budget request requires each and every one of us in the
Department to be good stewards of every taxpayer dollar spent on
defense. This budget also holds me accountable to the men and women of
the Department of Defense, for they are the ones that must ultimately
turn the 2018 National Defense Strategy into action. Every day, more
than two million Servicemembers and nearly one million civilians do
their duty, honoring previous generations of veterans and civil
servants who have sacrificed for their country. I am reminded every day
of the privilege I have to serve alongside them, and I thank them for
their tireless efforts and unyielding standards in defense of our
Nation.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. An excellent
statement.
General Dunford?
STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., USMC, CHAIRMAN OF
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
General Dunford. Senator Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to join Secretary Mattis and Under Secretary
Norquist here today. It is an honor to represent your men and
women in uniform. And I join the Secretary in acknowledging
Senator McCain's leadership and support.
We are here for a candid discussion of the challenges we
face. I want to begin by assuring you that the U.S. military
has a competitive advantage over any potential adversary today.
I am confident we can deter a nuclear attack, defend the
Homeland, meet our alliance commitments, and prevail in any
conflict. But as we previously discussed, after years of
sustained operational commitments, budgetary instability, and
advances by our adversaries, our competitive advantage has
eroded and our readiness has degraded.
Driven by the National Defense Strategy and building on the
fiscal year 2017 and 2018 appropriations, the 2019 budget
submission supports rebuilding the lethal and ready joint force
that the nation needs. The Secretary has addressed their
defense strategy that recognizes Russia and China as the
priority while also meeting the immediate challenges posed by
rogue regimes and violent extremist organizations. China and
Russia continue to invest across the full range of nuclear,
cyber, space, and conventional capabilities. Both states are
focused on limiting our ability to project power and
undermining the credibility of our alliances. They are also
increasingly adept, as Senator Reed has pointed out, at
advancing their interests through coercive, competitive
activity below the threshold of armed conflict.
North Korea has been on a relentless pursuit of nuclear and
missile capability, and they have been clear these capabilities
are intended to threaten the United States and our allies in
the region.
Iran continues to spread malign influence and create
instability across the Middle East.
And while we have made a great deal of progress over the
past year, we are still grappling with the challenges of
violent extremism, including ISIS, al Qaeda, and associated
movements.
Defending our Homeland and our allies and advancing our
interests in the context of these and other challenges requires
us to maintain a balanced inventory of ready, lethal, and
flexible forces that are relevant across the range of military
operations.
Fortunately, with your support, we have begun to arrest the
erosion of our competitive advantage and we are on a path
towards developing the force that we need. This year's budget
again builds on the readiness recovery that we started in
fiscal year 2017 and accelerates our efforts to develop the
capabilities we need for both today and tomorrow.
In requesting your support for this year's budget, I, along
with all the senior leaders in the Department, are making a
commitment to you that we will make every dollar count. We
fully support the auditing initiative led by Secretary Norquist
who is with us here today and will maintain an ongoing dialogue
with you about the return that you are getting on your
investment.
To restore our competitive advantage and ensure our men and
women never find themselves in a fair fight, the U.S. military
requires sustained, sufficient, and predictable funding. The
funding in this budget is sufficient. I look forward to working
with Congress to make sure that it is sustained and predictable
in the future.
Thank you again for your support and the opportunity to be
here today.
[The prepared statement of General Dunford follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr.
Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished members of this
committee, thank you for the opportunity to join Secretary Mattis and
Under Secretary Norquist in appearing before you today. It is an honor
to represent the men and women of the United States military.
Today, the U.S. Armed Forces have a competitive advantage over any
potential adversary. We are capable of meeting all the requirements
associated with defending the Homeland and our way of life, and we can
meet every one of our alliance commitments. I am confident we can
prevail in any armed conflict. That said, one of my greatest concerns
as Chairman is the erosion of our competitive advantage over time.
Last summer, I testified that after years of sustained operational
commitments, budgetary instability, and advances by our adversaries,
our competitive advantage was eroding. I assessed that, without
sustained, sufficient, and predictable funding, within five years, the
U.S. military would lose its advantage in power projection--the basis
for how we defend the Homeland, advance U.S. interests, and meet our
alliance commitments.
I estimated that arresting the erosion of our competitive advantage
required real budget growth of at least three percent above inflation
across the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP), and restoring it would
cost more. This figure represented the minimum investment necessary to
rebuild readiness and modernize key warfighting systems while
continuing to meet operational requirements.
Driven by the National Defense Strategy (NDS), the fiscal year 2019
Budget Request builds on the fiscal year 2017 and fiscal year 2018
budgets and supports rebuilding the U.S. military into the lethal and
ready Joint Force the Nation needs. However, we cannot reverse a
decade-plus of erosion in one fiscal year. The Department must continue
to receive sufficient, sustained, and predictable funding for the
foreseeable future to restore our competitive advantage and ensure we
never send our sons and daughters into a fair fight.
strategic environment
The 2018 NDS recognizes that ``The central challenge to U.S.
prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic
competition by . . . revisionist powers.'' The Joint Force must face
this long-term threat while still managing the immediate challenges
posed by rogue regimes and terrorists. With China and Russia as the
priority, we continue to use North Korea, Iran, and violent extremist
organizations to inform our planning, force design, force development,
and risk assessments.
Our adversaries--particularly China and Russia--continue to develop
concepts and invest in capabilities specifically designed to counter
our advantages. The United States military is in a fierce competition
to harness the benefits of emerging technologies--including
hypersonics, artificial intelligence, directed energy, and
biotechnology--as these developments will fundamentally change the
character of war. China and Russia are also increasingly active and
adept at what we call ``competition short of armed conflict'':
integrating economic coercion, political influence, criminal activity,
military posturing, unconventional warfare, and information and cyber
operations to coerce opponents, advance their interests, and create
strategic advantages without triggering a conventional armed response.
China intends to become a global military power and is building the
capability to do so. Militarily, China seeks to limit our access and
undermine our important alliances in the Indo-Pacific. They are
developing a full range of air, maritime, space, and cyber capabilities
while modernizing their nuclear enterprise. Their continued
militarization of the South and East China Seas reflects their
disregard for a rules-based international order. They are increasing
their diplomatic and economic influence through the Belt and Road
Initiative, and their military interests have followed this enterprise
into South Asia, the Indian Ocean, and beyond. We continue to seek
Chinese cooperation on a number of fronts, especially with respect to
North Korea, but their ``strong-rule-the-weak'' foreign policy approach
is incompatible with United States interests.
Russia also continues to modernize and invest across the full range
of military capability, including new aircraft, submarines, armor,
counter-space, air defense systems, and conventional and nuclear strike
capabilities. These investments and activities are specifically
designed to limit our power projection capability and undermine the
credibility of U.S. alliances, especially NATO.
While modernizing and preparing for long-term competition and
potential armed conflict with these revisionist powers, we must also
manage the ongoing challenges of rogue regimes and violent extremist
organizations.
Although I remain cautiously optimistic about the potential for
talks in the near future, North Korea's reckless pursuit of nuclear and
missile capability is perhaps the most immediate threat to the security
of the United States and our Allies. In 2017, North Korea conducted an
unprecedented 17 ballistic missile test events, two of which overflew
our treaty Ally, Japan. Last year also saw North Korea's first
successful tests of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) capable
of ranging the continental United States--and they tested a nuclear
device designed for ICBM delivery. I have testified to Congress several
times in recent months about Pyongyang's accelerated capability
development and the threats it poses to United States interests, to our
Allies in the Pacific, and to the Homeland.
Iran continues to project malign influence and threaten freedom of
navigation in the Middle East. They are also modernizing their space,
cyber, missile, and conventional maritime capabilities, which pose a
direct threat to our Allies and our interests in the region.
We continue to grapple with the challenge of violent extremism,
including ISIS, a resurgent al Qaida, and associated movements. Our
strategy remains focused on cutting the flow of finances, foreign
fighters, and their disruptive narrative, while working by, with, and
through local partners to sustain pressure on their networks, disrupt
attacks, and dismantle their capabilities.
Defending our Homeland, our Allies, and our interests in the near-
term while restoring our competitive advantage and building lethality
will require a focused and sustained effort over many years.
where we are today
Fortunately, with your support, we have begun to arrest the erosion
of our competitive advantage. The additional appropriation in fiscal
year 2017 supported immediate investments in readiness, including
increases to end strength, funding for critical training, initial
restoration of ammunition stocks, and continued modernization of
critical systems.
President's Budget 2018 builds on the readiness recovery started in
fiscal year 2017 and begins to balance the program. It allows the
Department to meet operational requirements, begin rebuilding mid- and
long-term readiness, and restore warfighting capability and capacity.
While we are grateful for the fiscal year 2018 appropriation, we
spent the first six months of fiscal year 2018 with fiscal year 2017
funding levels. The flexibility provided in recent legislation will
enable the Department to execute the fiscal year 2018 budget
responsibly. This includes easing the 80/20 rule (that prevents
obligating more than 20 percent of a one-year appropriation in the last
two months of the fiscal year) and raising the Below Threshold
Reprogramming amounts. Though these measures will help the Department
utilize fiscal year 2018 funds effectively, we need predictable funding
in fiscal year 2019 and beyond to restore our competitive military
advantage.
The Department's fiscal year 2019 budget funds ongoing operations,
builds on fiscal year 2018 readiness improvements, and supports the NDS
by investing in modernization for high-end competition against near-
peer adversaries.
Operations. Our first budget priority is to provide our deployed
servicemembers the resources they need to effectively accomplish their
missions--whether in active contingencies, deterring adversaries,
assuring Allies, or building partner capacity.
President's Budget 2019 supports deterrence and assurance efforts
around the world. In the Pacific theater, this budget accelerates
substantial construction projects to improve the infrastructure that
facilitates power projection in the region. It funds prepositioning of
critical munitions, increased intelligence activity, and increased
rotational troop presence. President's Budget 2019 also improves
missile defense by deploying 20 additional Ground Based Interceptors,
with redesigned kill vehicles, at Fort Greely, Alaska across the FYDP.
To deter Russian aggression, this budget fully funds the European
Deterrence Initiative, increasing the number and quality of exercises
with our NATO Allies, deploying key United States-based enablers, and
modernizing prepositioned stocks. It also recapitalizes the Integrated
Undersea Surveillance System, enhancing our ability to detect Russian
submarines.
This budget provides $69 billion for Overseas Contingency
Operations (OCO), the bulk of which funds operations in Afghanistan,
Iraq, and Syria. In Afghanistan, we are working toward a sustainable
approach to stabilizing the Afghan Government and denying terrorist
sanctuary. In Iraq and Syria, we remain committed to eliminating the
remnants of ISIS and setting the conditions to ensure ISIS cannot
return. OCO funding also supports Operation Enduring Freedom-Horn of
Africa and counterterrorism efforts in northwest Africa and the
Philippines.
The fiscal year 2019 funding for ongoing operations not only
ensures our deployed servicemembers have what they need to execute
missions in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan, but also makes conflict less
likely by assuring Allies and deterring aggression in key strategic
theaters.
Readiness. Ensuring our forces are able to meet current operational
requirements and rebuild the readiness required for great power
competition requires significant, continued investment in readiness.
President's Budget 2019 builds on the readiness gains of PB18 by adding
end strength, accelerating training, and increasing capacity to extend
our readiness focus to the mid- and long-term.
This budget adds modest end strength to each of the services,
allowing them to fill gaps in existing combat formations, address
critical shortfalls in aviation maintenance, and increase manning in
cyber and information warfare. The Air Force will address pilot
shortages by adding two new training squadrons, enabling the production
of 125 additional new pilots per year.
President's Budget 2019 funds flight hour programs and ground
combat training accounts to near-maximum executable levels. The Air
Force upgrades training ranges and funds weapons system sustainment,
while the Army funds an unprecedented 20 Combat Training Center
rotations for Brigade Combat Teams.
President's Budget 2019 also increases available capacity for all
of the Services. The Navy funds service life extensions for six
cruisers, as well as infrastructure, spares, and ship depot
maintenance. The Army will create a 16th Armored Brigade Combat Team
while accelerating fielding of four Security Force Assistance Brigades.
This budget also adds necessary capacity in air defense, mobile rocket
artillery, and operational command and control in Europe. President's
Budget 2019 also funds munitions inventory levels sufficient to meet
multiple demands across theaters.
Finally, we will improve readiness by refining our global force
management processes to achieve strategic flexibility and freedom of
action. As directed by the NDS, Dynamic Force Employment will allow us
to proactively shape the environment through scalable military presence
and quickly deploy forces for emerging requirements while preserving
long-term warfighting readiness.
President's Budget 2019's investments in readiness build on the
gains made in the past two years and are foundational to ensuring the
U.S. military is ready to meet the challenges of today and tomorrow.
what we must do
The competitive military advantage we enjoy today is the result of
capabilities developed by our Services in an era of unchallenged
technological dominance. That era has now passed. Seventeen years of
combat and seven years of budget instability have forced us to postpone
modernization investments for the sake of near-term readiness.
Meanwhile, our adversaries' investments in modernization have outpaced
our own. As a result, the distinction between readiness and
modernization has grown harder to discern. We must modernize now in
order to be ready.
Restoring our competitive advantage in an era of great power
competition will require a joint approach to concept and capability
development, an ability to leverage cutting edge technology and
asymmetric solutions, and sustained and predictable budgets.
President's Budget 2019 begins this restoration through targeted
investments that develop the lethal, agile, and innovative Joint Force
demanded by the threats of 2025 and beyond.
The Service Chiefs recently briefed you on their investments in the
lethality of their individual Services. The following are priority
investment areas for joint warfighting.
Nuclear. A safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent is
essential to defending the Homeland. Starting in the early 1990s, the
Joint Force deemphasized the role of nuclear weapons, reducing our
nuclear forces in both weapon types and overall size, and trading
nuclear strength for arms control. Other nuclear-armed states did not
follow our lead, choosing instead to embark on modernization and
expansion efforts.
In accordance with the recently published Nuclear Posture Review,
we will invest $24 billion in fiscal year 2019 to sustain and
recapitalize the nuclear enterprise. This is a significant step in a
23-year program to recapitalize the all three legs of our aging
strategic triad, our non-strategic nuclear forces, and our command and
control systems. Initial delivery of modernized bombers and dual-
capable aircraft (F-35s) is slated for the mid-2020s; we will achieve
initial operating capability of modernized ground-based missiles in
2029; and the first modernized ballistic missile submarine will be
operational in 2031. Nuclear deterrence is the highest priority mission
for the Joint Force, and a truly joint enterprise. There is no margin
remaining in the modernization schedule--we must deliver these critical
programs on the established timelines.
Space. Unlike previous eras, when space was considered a benign and
unchallenged environment, space is now a contested domain. The U.S.
military depends on space-based capabilities to enable successful joint
warfighting--specifically for intelligence collection; missile warning;
weather monitoring; global communications; and precision positioning,
navigation, and timing.
Potential adversaries understand the advantages space provides, and
they view our reliance on this domain as a vulnerability they can
exploit. Our near-peer competitors are increasingly challenging our
competitive advantage in space.
We must bolster our space sensor architecture to improve our
ability to characterize new and future threats. This budget builds on
fiscal year 2018 investments with a focus on space resiliency and
mission assurance. It accelerates procurement of the next generation of
space-based infrared systems to field a modernized, resilient space-
based missile warning capability. Other investments focus on resilient
systems for navigation, communications, and situational awareness.
Given rapid advances in our adversaries' capabilities, the space domain
will require continuous investment in future years.
Cyberspace. Cyberattacks threaten our military, our economy, and
our society. Although China and Russia remain the greatest threats to
United States security, Iran, North Korea, and violent extremist
organizations have all increased their capabilities and are
aggressively conducting malicious activities in cyberspace. Most of
these occur below the threshold of open warfare, but they are injurious
nonetheless, and their implications for armed conflict are clear.
Fiscal year 2019 cyber investments continue to prioritize defense of
DOD information networks while improving offensive and defensive
operations, building Cyber Mission Forces, and maturing command and
control.
Electronic Warfare (EW). From voice and data communication to
surveillance and targeting, every Joint Force operation today relies on
access to the electromagnetic spectrum. As with space and cyber,
potential adversaries see this reliance as a vulnerability they can
exploit. The proliferation of technology has made electronic attacks
both cheaper and more effective. To preserve our advantage in EW,
President's Budget 2019 invests in both offensive and defensive systems
while exploring new concepts to maximize the effectiveness of our
multi-domain EW capabilities.
Missile Defense. Our missile defense systems serve to protect the
Homeland, assure our Allies and partners, and deter adversaries. But
the breadth of missile threats facing the Joint Force continues to
increase in complexity and scope. Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran
are all extending their operational reach and fielding larger and more
capable arsenals. Their systems are increasingly mobile and resilient,
with increased range and accuracy, expanding the risks they pose around
the globe. Furthermore, they continue to develop means of complicating
our missile defense operations. Among other investments and activities
to counter this threat, we are increasing the number of Ground Based
Interceptors and investing in additional Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense and SM-3 interceptors.
While developing and refining the capabilities that will restore
our advantage in competitive areas like these, we must accelerate
research and development and experimentation in important fields with
military implications. President's Budget 2019 will see increased
investments in technologies such as hypersonics, artificial
intelligence, directed energy, and biotechnology. We will also continue
to refine our acquisition systems to enable rapid fielding of new
capabilities.
Across the Joint Force, President's Budget 2019 starts,
accelerates, or continues funding for critical modernization efforts.
These programs will require years of sustained funding to deliver
material results, but they are all vital to ensuring the future force
is capable of defending the Homeland and advancing U.S. interests in
the competitive security environment to come.
conclusion
To implement the National Defense Strategy, the Joint Force
requires sustained, sufficient, and predictable funding. The funding
levels in the recent Bipartisan Budget Agreement are sufficient; I look
forward to working with Congress to make our funding sustained and
predictable so we can fully restore our competitive military advantage.
President's Budget 2019 represents a significant investment in the
lethal Joint Force the United States will need to prevail in future
conflicts. We are committed to the responsible, disciplined, and
transparent use of that investment. With your continued help and
commitment, we will ensure we never send America's sons and daughters
into a fair fight.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, General Dunford.
Do you have a statement, Secretary Norquist?
Mr. Norquist. I have no prepared statement.
Senator Inhofe. All right. Well, thank you very much.
There are some basic questions that are going to be asked,
and I was going to get those out of the way first, one having
to do with the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty].
You know, when you get out of Washington and you talk to more
normal people back home, the question is China is not a
signatory to the INF. Russia is but they violate it. We are and
we do not violate it. I would ask you, Secretary Mattis, do you
think that currently as it stands, it becomes a unilateral
limitation on the United States and our capabilities?
Secretary Mattis. Senator Inhofe, it could become a
unilateral limitation on us. However, at this point, we are
trying to bring Russia back into compliance with the INF. That
does not address the entirety of your question, of course,
being that there are only two countries that have signed this.
Part of the reason we are taking some of the steps outlined
in the Nuclear Posture Review are to put Russia in a position
to see a benefit to themselves to coming back in compliance. We
will have to look more broadly at arms control, and I believe
that as we modernize the nuclear deterrent, that will put our
diplomats in a good position to initiate those discussions with
the other countries that are not signatories.
Senator Inhofe. Now, if Russia does not come back, though,
as we are hoping that they will, into compliance, what
situation would we be in then?
Secretary Mattis. Senator, when nations do not live up to
treaties, treaties are not sustainable. We would have to deal
with that if we are unsuccessful.
Senator Inhofe. That answers the question. I appreciate
that.
On end strength, one of the most critical parts of this
budget--I am sure that Secretary Norquist would agree with
that. As you point out, fiscal year 2018--it is going to be
9,500. Then in 2019, 15,600, and up to 2023, up to 56,000. Now,
it is already a problem in recruiting. So I would like to ask
either you or the Secretary or General Dunford are you
confident we are going to meet these goals because it seems to
me like you can only do it through two ways, either retention
or recruiting. What are your thoughts about meeting these
goals? Pretty ambitious.
Secretary Mattis. They are ambitious, Senator, especially
in light of the improving U.S. economy. It is a totally
volunteer force. We even call it a totally recruited force. Our
recruiters have to be very assertive in getting out there and
selling the military. I would tell you right now that the U.S.
Army's retention has allowed them to actually lower their
recruiting goal for this year because they are retaining more
than they anticipated, which is a good sign. So I am confident,
without lowering our quality standards, that we can maintain
this modest increase of troops.
I will pass it over to the Chairman for any thoughts he has
on that.
General Dunford. Senator Inhofe, I was going to highlight
that I think the Army is a bellwether for all of us. We just
actually had a conversation with the Army this week to talk
about their reduction of their recruiting efforts as a result
of high retention. But I think at the end of the day what the
Secretary said is what we are all focused on and that is making
sure that we are recruiting and retaining a high quality force.
My judgment is right now from getting out and visiting the
force, as well as discussing it with the chiefs, that today we
are recruiting and retaining a high quality force. We do not
take that for granted particularly in a competitive economic
environment, but I think the size of the force right now can be
sustained with quality people.
Senator Inhofe. Do you agree with those numbers from now
through fiscal year 2023?
General Dunford. I do, Senator, because the focus in the
budget this year and last year has been to make sure that the
force we have is capable and lethal. And so these numbers that
we are increasing really are filling holes to make the units
that we have complete.
Senator Inhofe. Now, lastly on the budget, the 2-year
budget for fiscal year 2018 and 2019, I have to say it was a
lousy budget. And it was a very difficult thing for me to vote
for, and the only reason I did is the same reason that we are
here meeting about this morning.
So what I would like to have each of you do, primarily you,
General Dunford--what would have happened instead of what we
did, if we just went the normal CR route and since we are going
to have to face this in the future and now is the time to start
working for it because we are talking about fiscal year 2020
and beyond--what will happen if we are successful in our goals
for fiscal years 2018 and 2019 and we do not have the same
opportunities to continue that for fiscal year 2020?
General Dunford. Senator, thanks for that question.
One of the things I think we all talk about a lot is our
overall competitive advantage. And I think back in 2000, 2001,
we could take it for granted that we had a competitive
advantage over any potential adversary. That was particularly
in our ability to project power anywhere in the world we needed
to to advance our interests.
What has happened over time is that competitive advantage
has eroded, and if we had not had the budget in 2017, 2018, and
2019 and the projections that we have beyond 2017 and 2018 and
2019, I think what really is at risk overall is our competitive
advantage over any potential adversary. I think that adversely
affects the relationship we have with allies and partners. It
adversely affects the deterrence against our potential
adversaries, and clearly it would affect our ability to respond
in the event that deterrence fails. I mean, I really there is--
in addition to the readiness issues and some of the other
important issues that we discuss, the overall strategic impact
of sequestration and not getting the budget that we had in 2017
and 2018, I think really is our ability to project power and
address all those areas I mentioned, assurance, deterrence, and
responsiveness.
Senator Inhofe. So from 2020 on, it would be a crisis if we
did not----
General Dunford. If we return to the Budget Control Act and
sequestration levels, we would not have completed the recovery
that we have been on. As you pointed out in the beginning,
Senator Inhofe, the challenges that we have right now took us
10 or 15 years to develop. It is going to take us more than 2
or 3 years to recover from those challenges.
Senator Inhofe. I understand that.
You agree, I assume.
Secretary Mattis. I agree, Senator, 100 percent, and as the
ranking member pointed out, we have future capabilities we must
develop now if we are going to carry out our responsibilities
to those who sit before this committee in the years ahead. So
the dangers we can see growing, and I think that we are going
to have to maintain ourselves at the cutting edge of
technology, organization, and combat lethality.
Senator Inhofe. I agree, and I think we need to be starting
to talk about that now.
Senator Reed?
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, in the wake of the annexation of Crimea and
the activity in Ukraine, Congress in the 2015 NDAA prohibited
bilateral military cooperation with Russia, which at the time
seemed to make perfectly good sense. At this moment, when we
are in a very challenging situation in many areas of the world,
would it make sense to review those provisions and give you
more flexibility and ways in which you could conduct military-
to-military dialogue with Russia in certain situations?
Secretary Mattis. Yes, Senator Reed, it would. And let me
be very specific here. There is no national security waiver to
what is referred to as the CAATSA [Countering America's
Adversaries Through Sanctions Act] act, the specific act that
says that if another nation buys military equipment from
Russia, then we will not sell them ours. There are nations in
the world who are trying to turn away from formerly Russian-
sourced weapons and systems like this. We only need to look at
India, Vietnam, and some others to recognize that eventually we
are going to paralyze ourselves.
And so what we ask for is the Senate and the House pass a
national security waiver in the hands of the Secretary of
State. I am not asking for myself. Foreign policy is driven
from Foggy Bottom. So if he has the waiver authority and I can
go to him and show it is in our best interests and we get an
internal management of this process, then it keeps us from
being boxed in by the Russians.
Senator Reed. Well, thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Let me turn my attention now to Iran. At your confirmation
hearing, Mr. Secretary, you indicated that when America gives
her word, we have to live up to it and work with our allies,
which was in my view confirmation of the strategic needs to
stay within the confines of JCPOA. What is your position today,
Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Mattis. Senator, I can assure you there has been
no decision made on any withdrawal from JCPOA. The discussions
are ongoing in the National Security staff and those of us who
are charged with that responsibility of giving the President
advice, and it is going on today as we speak. There are
obviously aspects of the JCPOA, of the agreement, that can be
improved upon. We are working with our European allies on it at
this time. And again, the decision has not been made whether we
can repair it enough to stay in it or if the President is going
to decide to withdraw from it.
Senator Reed. I appreciate this, Mr. Secretary. The issue
of repairing it, though, is unlikely to be fully accomplished
by May 12th. Is it your position that if there is an ongoing
effort to make such fixes to the agreement that we should stay
within the bounds?
Secretary Mattis. Yes, sir. We would have to look at what
degree of fix we anticipate is achievable and then put that
alongside America's broader interests and decide if it is
worthy or not.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
And, Mr. Chairman, General Dunford, you similarly indicated
that there would be consequences with withdrawing from JCPOA in
many dimensions. One would be our allies would be less likely
to cooperate with us countering destabilizing activities in the
region. And you seem to indicate a preference for remaining
within JCPOA. Is that still your position?
General Dunford. Senator Reed, when I look at it through
the military dimension, the thing that I have been bringing to
the debate is making sure that whatever we do, we have a
framework for dealing with all of the elements of the
challenges we face from Iran. So it is the nuclear threat. It
is the missile threat. It is the cyber threat. It is the
maritime threat. And it is the sponsorship of proxies. So at
the end of the day, it will be the President's decision as to
what the framework is for dealing with all those challenges. My
role is to try to highlight those challenges and to make sure
that whatever decision is made addresses them as effectively as
we can.
Senator Reed. Thank you, General.
Mr. Secretary, there has been an unfortunate escalation of
the cycle of violence between Israel and Iran and their proxies
in Syria beginning in February with the shooting down of an
Iranian drone over Israeli airspace, which is appropriate, and
then strikes against targets within Syria which seem to be
Iranian Hezbollah cooperative endeavors that could pose a
danger to Israel.
Is there a significant risk of escalation at this moment
that would not only engulf Syria but spread throughout the
region?
Secretary Mattis. A complex question. I believe the short
answer is yes, Senator. I can see how it might start. I am not
sure when or where. I think that it is very likely in Syria
because Iran continues to do its proxy work there through
Lebanese Hezbollah there and over into Lebanon. And so I could
imagine this sparking something larger.
Senator Reed. One other, if I may, just quickly. The Assad
regime continues to consolidate its position. One area which is
still under the control of rebel forces is the southern border
against Jordan. If they move there, which some people indicate
they might, would that be another sort of pressure point in
terms of not only Jordanian but Israeli counter-reaction?
Secretary Mattis. Assad's continued presence and his
forces' presence in light of what they have done over several
years to their own people, and then when you look at them
hosting Lebanese Hezbollah, any kind of position like that
along the southern border is a direct threat against Jordan,
against Israel, and it is something we are going to have to
address. We are trying to do that through the diplomatic
process, the UN [United Nations] process, which is referred to
as the Geneva process, but to date that has not been availing.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Wicker?
Senator Wicker. Mr. Secretary, just a quick follow-up on a
question Senator Reed asked. Can you give us any guidance as to
when a decision might be made about the JCPOA?
Secretary Mattis. Yes, Senator. I believe it will be made
before the 12th of next month.
Senator Wicker. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, the Ships Act makes the 355-ship Navy the
official policy of the United States of America. This enacts in
statute a requirement that came down to us from the admirals
and generals, not something that we arrived at here at the
congressional level. Do you agree that the 355-ship requirement
is now the official policy of the United States?
Secretary Mattis. I do, Senator.
Senator Wicker. In terms of getting there, the target date
was an unacceptable period in the 2050s. Recently a decision
was made to extend the lives of some destroyers. That moves it
to the 2030s. What do you need from us, and what are the plans
in the Pentagon for moving that date even earlier?
Secretary Mattis. Well, as we try to balance the force,
sir, if you gave me all the money in the world, I would go for
it in the next 5 years, of course. Right now, we are trying to
balance inside the administration. But for right now, we are
trying to balance solvency and security because solvency is
critical to the long-term national security of our Nation. But
at the same time, we are asking for this year 3.1 percent of
GDP, and we believe the Nation can afford that and perhaps even
increase that. That would depend, of course, on the level of
taxation you are willing to put in because we should not be
growing the national debt further, but at the same time, what
part of that tax base you are going to commit to national
defense. I believe we are moving toward a more maritime
strategy in terms of our military strategy to defend the
country. It is the nature of our time, and so I would be
supportive if the Senate found a way to increase the
shipbuilding budget.
Senator Wicker. Work with us on ideas about getting there,
sir.
Let me just ask you then my final question. The RAND
reports concluded actually some very alarming verbiage, that
the United States military would have difficulty deterring and
defeating a Russian conventional attack in the Baltics. The
committee has previously received testimony that United States
ground forces are outranged, outgunned, and overmatched. Our
own General Scaparrotti, the Commander of United States
European Command [EUCOM], has testified that, quote, the ground
force permanently assigned to EUCOM is inadequate to meet the
combatant command's directed mission to deter Russia from
further aggression.
Now, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs just testified that
we still have a competitive advantage over any adversary and
that our strategy is designed to keep that strategy from
eroding.
So I do not want to scare the American public, and I do not
want to alarm our allies. But is General Scaparrotti correct?
Is the RAND report correct? Is it a little more alarming than
our Chairman of the Joint Chiefs just said about an eroding
competitive advantage?
Secretary Mattis. Senator, I believe that we can all see
the growing threat that Russia has chosen to be. It has chosen
to be a strategic competitor. NATO opened the door to a
partnership of sorts. I still remember Russian marines and
United States marines training in Camp Lejeune for UN
peacekeeping missions back in the late 1990s-early 2000s. That
is a long distant memory as they have chosen to do what they
have done in the Ukraine and Crimea, with cyber against our
elections. I can go on, as you know. And you have seen
significant expulsion of diplomats, sanctions put on Russia by
this administration.
I believe we do have a competitive advantage today. It is
important we expand it over the Russians. They have a
geographic advantage that my geographic combatant commander is
rightly looking at. But looking at it more broadly, as we
address this, America is more capable than any nation of
expanding the competitive space against something like a ground
attack into the Baltics. There are a number of ways,
symmetrical and asymmetrical, we can make this a very, very
tough problem for the Russians. We do that by, with, and
through the NATO alliance, by, with, and through our whole-of-
government effort, everything from the Treasury Department to
the State Department.
So I think you have to look beyond the geography is my
point, Senator Wicker, to get the whole understanding of the
situation. I am not dismissing any of General Scaparrotti's
concerns, but we have strengths.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, sir.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Senator McCaskill?
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Sometimes I feel like a broken record on contracting. I am
going to try to keep my blood pressure down during my
questioning today because today we are issuing a report from
the minority staff on the Committee of Homeland Security and
Government Affairs looking into another egregious contracting
problem at the Pentagon. I would ask that this report, Fast
Cars, Easy Money, be entered into the record, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Without objection.
Please see Appendix A for information referred.
Senator McCaskill. I first would like a commitment from
you, General Dunford, that you will read this report in its
entirety.
General Dunford. I will do that, Senator. And I am familiar
with the report and with your engagement and what the Army has
done as a result of your engagement.
Senator McCaskill. Secretary Mattis, will you read the
report, please?
Secretary Mattis. I have no reservations. I am a voracious
reader of these kinds of things.
Senator McCaskill. I know you are.
Secretary Norquist?
Mr. Norquist. I always enjoy reading audit reports,
Senator.
[Laughter.]
Senator McCaskill. You and I have that in common. And if
the audit reports had been read on a timely basis, we would not
have taxpayer money paying for a Bentley, Alpha Romeo, Aston
Martin, Porsches for executives of a subcontractor on the
legacy contract in Afghanistan. We would not have the CEO
[Chief Executive Officer] and the COO's [Chief Operating
Officer] wives getting salaries averaging $190,000 a year with
absolutely no evidence of them doing any work.
You would know, if you had read all the audit reports, as
my staff has, and asked the questions, that in fact the
subcontractor not only directed the Pentagon towards this
contract, they got most of the work under the contract, and
that there was involvement in the Pentagon in helping steer
this contract to the subcontractor. You would know that they
figured out a way to find a contracting vehicle that they would
not have to compete.
The insulting thing about this is they found a contracting
vehicle that was for R&D [research & development], asking for
hard science proposals. Hard science proposals. In a 150-page
solicitation for hard science proposals, the HUMINT [human
intelligence] was mentioned one time, one word, human
intelligence. They used that one word to pretzel that proposal
into an ongoing mentoring program for Afghan intelligence
capabilities in theater. Hundreds and millions of dollars. And
audit after audit has said they cannot even find any metrics
that they made any progress.
I know there are criminal investigations going on. But the
question I have to ask, as I have asked repeatedly in this
committee, is what is wrong with the debarment process. This is
the whip cream and cherry on top of this incredible scandal.
They are still a contractor. They are getting taxpayer money as
we speak. Why in the world, when you have audit evidence of
this kind of egregious--I do not know at what point it becomes
criminal or just gross mismanagement by the Pentagon. I do not
know at which point it is criminal activity or not. But I do
know this that there is enough evidence in the audit reports,
Secretary Norquist and Secretary Mattis and General Dunford,
that these people should not be anywhere near one dime of
taxpayer money.
So I would like somebody to respond to me why in the world
we are still doing business with these crooks.
Secretary Mattis. Senator, I will not take issue with a
single word you said. The contract was awarded in 2012. The
SIGAR [Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction] report that alerted at least at the secretarial
level was released in 2017. There is the ongoing investigation,
and because it may result--will likely result in criminal
charges, we cannot go into a lot of detail in public because we
are not supposed to when something is under an investigation.
But there is not a word you just said that I would take issue
with.
Senator McCaskill. I really appreciate that, Secretary
Mattis. There are two things I would ask of you, of all of you,
and I would hope that I could get answers on those as quickly
as possible, and if it has to be in a setting where we can talk
about the criminal investigation, one, is how quickly they can
be debarred because there is nothing in the law prohibiting you
from debarring them right now. There is nothing in the criminal
investigation that requires a wait for debarment. So I want to
know how quickly they can be debarred.
And secondly, I want to know a list of everyone who
currently works for the United States military who should have
hands on this and did not, whether it is a CORs [Contracting
Officer's Representative] representative or whether it is
somebody at this office that this bizarre contract came out of.
But clearly, somebody over there said, hey, we can use this and
we can get you the money.
These guys have burrowed in. They have burrowed in at the
Pentagon. I have seen this before, and you guys know what
happens. Somebody builds a relationship and before you know it,
hundreds of millions of dollars are flying around, and frankly
nobody is paying close enough attention. Somebody's head has
got to roll on this, and I need a list of people that are going
to be held accountable for this happening.
Secretary Mattis. I just got to be careful saying
individually before the investigation is done----
Senator McCaskill. I understand.
Secretary Mattis.--because that could end up----
Senator McCaskill. I understand. I have confidence in you,
Secretary Mattis, that we will get to the bottom of it.
Secretary Mattis. I know.
Senator McCaskill. But I will tell you I am not going to
shut up about this until somebody is held accountable for
people driving Bentleys. We are losing soldiers. Families are
sacrificing. We are worried about their benefits and their pay.
And some jerk is driving a Bentley in the UK [United Kingdom]
on taxpayer money. If it does not make everybody upset, then
something is wrong with them. So let us get busy on this and
figure out whose head needs to roll because if somebody is not
held accountable for letting this happen, it is going to keep
happening.
Secretary Mattis. Senator, 100 percent with you on this.
You will notice last year when I came up here for confirmation,
I talked about business reform. This year, alongside business
reform, is accountability. I have learned the lesson since I
got there, and that is now right alongside business reform is
accountability for every dollar. So we are with you. I wish I
had been in the job in 2012 is all I can tell you.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
Senator Cotton?
Senator Cotton. Thank you, gentlemen, for your appearance
here today and for your continued service to our country.
Secretary Mattis, I want to return to a few points you made
in your opening statement about the budget picture, about the
budget levels and certainty. So this Congress passed a 2-year
budget a couple months ago. We passed a spending bill that
implemented the first year of that budget. That means we have 1
more year on that 2-year budget to pass.
How important is it to the Department of Defense that the
Congress pass a DOD appropriations bill in a timely fashion
this summer as opposed to having a continuing resolution as we
approach the end of this fiscal year on September 30th?
Secretary Mattis. Senator Cotton, one of the ways we avoid
the situation that Senator McCaskill just brought up is having
a methodical approach to reviewing every dollar going out.
Obviously, the narrower the window to spend the money, the
increased workload during that period. So it is critical, and I
think that budget certainty also reverberates into American
industry as we try to rearm the country with the modern
capability. They cannot do that in their responsibility to
their shareholders unless we give them that predictability.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
Well, since we have the top line number for fiscal year
2019, I hope that we will have the cooperation to pass a DOD
appropriations bill this summer in a timely fashion rather than
see the filibusters that have occurred in the past.
Looking out a little bit further, that 2-year budget deal
only lasts 2 years. We are now less than 18 months away from
fiscal year 2020, in which case the Budget Control Act caps and
potential sequestration return. How important is it to the
Department of Defense that we act now to eliminate the prospect
hanging over your head that the BCA caps and sequestration may
return in October of 2019?
Secretary Mattis. Again, we need that predictability, sir,
so that we can actually put a strategy into effect. It was
noted in opening comments by the committee if you do not have a
budget that reflects the strategy, it does not work.
I like quantifying problems to the degree possible. If this
were to go into effect, the first cut would be $85 billion in
fiscal year 2020. That means the strategy is not sustainable.
The strategy is designed to protect America and our interests.
I cannot provide you the same strategy. I would have to go back
and rewrite it. There would be reductions in what we are able
to do.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
I want to turn now to a question that Senator Reed raised
about the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions
Act and the specific point about a national security waiver. As
you mentioned, two specific countries, India and Vietnam, that
have legacy Russian systems--they might face real challenges
going cold turkey, so to speak, under CAATSA. So you are
suggesting the national security waiver as a way that this
Congress can empower soon to be Secretary Pompeo to address the
concerns that you have with those two countries. Is that right?
Secretary Mattis. That is correct. There are other
countries. Indonesia, for example, is in the same situation
trying to shift to more of our airplanes, our systems, but they
have got to do something to keep their legacy military going.
Senator Cotton. How urgent is it that Congress pass that
kind of waiver?
Secretary Mattis. Sir, every day Russia is in a position
basically to checkmate us with what they are doing. It is
urgent.
Senator Cotton. Would you recommend that we try to do so in
this year's National Defense Authorization Act?
Secretary Mattis. Absolutely.
Senator Cotton. There are only so many countries in the
world, and only so many of those use Russian legacy systems
that are defense partners. Should we just have a list of
countries that soon to be Secretary Pompeo might want to
consider? Is there a certain degree of criteria that we should
use instead?
Secretary Mattis. Sir, I would just put in a reporting
requirement that we keep the Congress informed every time we
exercise it. I would not make it where we have to come back to
Congress in order to add to it. In the dynamics of today,
issues can shift countries very, very quickly, Senator Cotton,
as you know, and we want to move when we see the opportunity at
the speed of relevance.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
I want to turn now to the Nuclear Posture Review and an
exchange you and I had in a classified setting. There is
nothing classified about my question or your answer, though. I
simply want to have it on the record here.
The Nuclear Posture Review did not include a foreswearing
no first use doctrine, which we have never done in our nuclear
history going back to 1945. It also advocates for a new sea-
launched cruise missile, which we had as recently as 8 years
ago, for a low-yield sea-launched warhead. We have numerous
low-yield warheads currently in our inventory.
The bottom line, Secretary Mattis, is there any concept
doctrine or capability in the new Nuclear Posture Review that
is novel or inconsistent with 73 years of nuclear doctrine and
practice for the United States?
Secretary Mattis. No, sir. It is a continuity of our
nuclear deterrent framework that you see, but it is also an
adaptation so that that deterrent is fit for anyone who thinks
that they have created something that they could then give us
the option of either surrender or suicide. We want to make
certain the deterrent works against any attempted use of these
weapons.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Secretary Mattis, General Dunford, and Secretary
Norquist, for being here and for the work that you do every day
for this country.
Secretary Mattis, the National Defense Strategy
deemphasizes the importance of counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency operations. There have been, however, a
number of reports lately that have suggested that we are
actually expanding our special operations footprint in Africa,
a report over the weekend about the drone base that is being
built in Niger.
Can you talk about what the long-term mission of our troops
in Niger is and how we are going to measure the success in
accomplishing this mission? I think it is particularly timely
given that the report on the deaths of our four servicemen in
Niger is coming out this week.
Secretary Mattis. While at the same time we are
deemphasizing irregular warfare, counterinsurgency is the
primary challenge to us as the realities of other nations that
are choosing to be strategic competitors raise their game. At
the same time, as we pointed out, the paradox of war is the
enemy always moves against your weak area. So in terms of
counterinsurgency in particular, we are going to do this fight
by, with, and through allies because most of the time they know
the terrain better. It is an intensely, I would call it, fight
among innocent people in many cases. It is a fight where
cultural understanding is important. our special forces are
ideally suited for that sort of thing, working with foreign
forces, what we call foreign internal defense.
The last administration in Africa began the airfield
construction, and you need to understand here that had the
French not moved when they did in Mali, if they had waited--as
President Hollande put it in those days, if they wait for the
international community, Mali is going to fall. So they moved
quickly and since that time, the last administration and this
administration, by, with, and through our allies, support the
French leadership. They have over 4,000 troops there. The
number we have there has grown. Many of them are construction
troops that are constructing the airfield. They will come out
when that construction is done. And we will continue to support
the French leadership of the African nations that are fighting
Boko Haram, al Qaeda in the Mahgreb, forces like that in what
we call the trans-Sahel.
Senator Shaheen. And so do you see us continuing to expand
the footprint in Africa and sending more troops there?
Secretary Mattis. I do not see any significant increase.
There could be temporary increases as we work with a
counterterrorism force in one of the countries that needs to be
brought up to a higher level of capability because the enemy is
trying to move out of the trans-Sahel into their area. As you
know, it is a transnational enemy. So we have to be able to
react. But I do not see a significant upgrade. Again, it is by,
with, and through allies. That is not something that calls for
large numbers of U.S. troops. The French, for example, are
providing by far the bulk of the troops in that part of the
world.
Senator Shaheen. I understand that NATO is not going to
rule out invoking article 5 of its charter should one or more
member nations find themselves under a serious cyber attack.
Can you clarify under what circumstances article 5 might be
invoked in the case of a cyber attack?
Secretary Mattis. It would be a hypothetical, as you
understand, Senator. But I think that as we come to grips with
cyber, if they get to the point of having a massive attack with
cyber, I mean, one that threatens life, that shuts off the
power to hospitals and communities in the middle of winter,
obviously that would be a significant attack. But it would have
to be weighed against all the other things that could be done
too. Even then, it does not mean the only response is military.
There might be better economic responses to whoever did it. As
you know, attribution is always a challenge in these things. So
we would have to make sure we are firing on the right target,
whether it be with economic sanctions, with military responses,
or whatever it took. But to go into the article 5 arena, it
would have to be very significant.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
There have been a number of comments made by the President
in the last month or so about withdrawing troops from Syria. If
we withdraw our troops from Syria now, will we have finished
the fight against ISIS?
Secretary Mattis. Right now, Senator, we are not
withdrawing. You will see a reenergized effort against the
middle Euphrates River valley in the days ahead and against the
rest of the caliphate, the geographic caliphate. You will see
increased operations on the Iraq side of the border. The French
have just reinforced us in Syria with special forces here in
the last 2 weeks. This is an ongoing fight right now.
Senator Shaheen. So we need to stay there in order to
finish the fight against ISIS.
Secretary Mattis. We are there with the other 70--I think
it is 73 nations and international organizations, NATO, Arab
League, INTERPOL, plus 70 of the most important nations on
earth in terms of capability. We are continuing the fight. We
are going to expand it and bring in more regional support is
probably the biggest shift we are making right now.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Sullivan?
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, gentlemen, thank you for your exceptional service. I
think it gives us a lot of confidence on some of the big
challenges we have before us.
In particular, I want to commend you, Mr. Secretary and
General Dunford on the National Defense Strategy. As you
probably see here from Senator Reed's comments and others,
there is a strong bipartisan support for that document. I think
that is a really important achievement. So thank you for that.
In particular, the emphasis on allies in the National
Security Strategy document is very important, certainly as you
mentioned time and time again, Mr. Secretary, one of our most
important strategic advantages. We are an ally-rich nation and
most of our adversaries or potential adversaries are ally-poor.
Are we in Congress doing enough? And is the Trump
administration doing enough to deepen our current alliances and
expand them, as you so frequently talk about? What more could
we do if we are not?
Secretary Mattis. Right. The most immediate effort is what
Senator Cotton brought up here about the CAATSA and getting a
national security waiver so that we can embrace new allies or
partners when they are ready basically to see the way forward
alongside us. That would be a critical enabler.
Are we doing enough? Some journalist, who did not have a
very rich nightlife, called and she told me that I used the
word ``allies'' 124 times in the National Defense Strategy.
Senator Sullivan. We noticed.
Secretary Mattis. Yes, sir. It is not subtle. It is not
meant to be subtle. We are going to do, whether it be the
fighting in Africa, by, with, and through them. I think
anything you can do to make it an open door for allies--and I
realize sometimes those allies do not share all of our values.
But if they are security allies, if they are allied with us on
security, and if you look at our record over many years of
creating democracies and reinforcing democratic impulses when
our troops are engaged--I need only point to South Korea and
the very vibrant democracy they are today. Yet, there was at
one time a move to keep us away from South Korea, to pull us
out of South Korea because it was a dictatorship. I think we
have got to be willing to work with imperfect allies while
being never reticent about what our values are and what we
stand for. And your support in that area would be very helpful,
Senator.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Let me turn--you have some difficult challenging decisions
ahead of you. The whole administration does on the JCPOA, North
Korea. Let me just mention a few things to consider, and if you
would like to comment on them. You know, Senator Reed mentioned
a number of things about America giving her word.
There was a number of us who thought this was such an
important document that it should have come to the Senate as a
treaty. It did not come that way. And interestingly a
bipartisan majority of U.S. Senators actually did not approve
of the JCPOA. A bipartisan majority of House members did not
approve of the JCPOA. As a matter of fact, it is the first time
in U.S. history that an agreement of this magnitude was
approved, quote/unquote, by the Congress by a partisan minority
of Senators and House members. So I think it is important to
caveat the idea of America's credibility when this body--our
credibility is not on the line.
Similarly, everybody talks about our allies and how
important it is to our allies. But as you know, Mr. Secretary,
a lot of our key allies, Israel, Gulf Arab nations, were also
not supportive.
And let me mention one other thing that I know you two in
particular have some, unfortunately, firsthand experience with.
The issue of what degree we can trust the Iranian leadership I
think should also be considered. Chairman Dempsey was here 2
years ago I believe and testified. I forgot the exact number,
but the sophisticated IEDs [improvised explosive devices] that
were supplied to Iraqi Shia militias by the Iranians killed or
wounded over 2,000 American troops in Iraq. You gentlemen were
witness to this carnage during your military service.
Have senior Iranian leaders ever admitted this? And can we
trust a country that does not admit this and was responsible
for the deaths of so many of our finest young men and women
that they have never admitted?
I know I have thrown a lot of things: allies, credibility,
trust. But they are all things that we think are very important
to consider and I do not think get the attention they deserve
when the JCPOA is being reexamined.
Secretary Mattis. Well, we all recognize the JCPOA was an
imperfect arms control agreement.
Senator Sullivan. And was not supported by the Congress.
Secretary Mattis. Yes, sir. I understand, Senator.
And I think that their use of denial and deception to hide
their nuclear weapons program--not their nuclear program, their
nuclear weapons program--over many years have them in a
position of being suspect. I have read it now three times, all
156 pages or whatever it is, including since I got into this
job, I was able to read the short classified protocol. And I
will say that it is written almost with an assumption that Iran
would try to cheat. So the verification--what is in there is
actually pretty robust as far as our intrusive ability to get
in, IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] to get in, that
sort of thing. Whether or not that is sufficient I think is a
valid question.
I also recognize that some people point out that this could
impact the North Korea negotiations. But I would say in that
case, in light of Kim's family and himself breaking every
international treaty, every agreement they have ever made,
whether it be with the Republic of Korea or with the United
States, I am less concerned with that ripple effect right now.
I think we need to focus on what is in the best interest of
Middle East stability and the threat that Iran poses, as the
chairman pointed out, with this nuclear program if it does not
get extended and maintain the verification, intrusive
verification that we need, but also look at what they are doing
with their support for terrorism from Bahrain to Yemen, from
Syria to Lebanon and elsewhere, their maritime threat, their
cyber threat. We have got to look at all these things, sir, as
a whole, but at the same time focus on this imperfect arms
control agreement and determine if that is in our best
interest.
Senator Sullivan. Trust factor?
Secretary Mattis. I think trust but verify would be an
exaggeration. I think it is distrust and verify.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Dunford, your fellow chiefs have told me that they
are not aware of any instances of issues with unit cohesion,
morale, and discipline as a result of open transgender service.
Have you heard of any such incidents?
General Dunford. Senator, thanks. I would not typically
hear of individual cases of cohesion or discipline issues.
Maybe just a comment on transgender. For me, the issue with
transgender has never been about cohesion or discipline anyway.
It was just about any individual, regardless of circumstances,
being able to meet the physical and mental qualifications of
being worldwide deployable. So if an individual is serving
without accommodation, then I do not think I would expect to
see discipline or cohesion issues in that unit.
Senator Gillibrand. During our last discussion on this
topic, you said that you would treat all servicemembers,
including transgender servicemembers, with dignity and respect.
The recommendations on transgender service and the
accompanying panel report were released as part of the DOJ's
[Department of Justice] filing on Friday night. Servicemembers
found out in the news that the Department had submitted a
report that cast dispersions on their fitness to serve, implied
they could harm the lethality of the force, and left their
futures in the military up in the air.
Do you think this rollout accords transgender
servicemembers with the dignity and respect they deserve?
General Dunford. Senator, one thing we have tried to
clarify for our men and women that are current serving is
that--and I cannot talk about any changes in the policy. But
one thing that did not change was the status of the men and
women that are currently serving.
Senator Gillibrand. That is not the impression the report
leaves.
Do you know whether this has created anxiety among these
troops? Have you met with any transgender troops given this
report?
General Dunford. I have not since the report was released,
Senator.
Senator Gillibrand. I recommend that you do so so you are
more informed.
Secretary Mattis, one of the things that struck me about
your panel's report was its claim that, quote, unlike past
reviews, the panel's analysis was informed by the Department's
own data and experience obtained since the Carter policy took
effect. That is why I have been asking the chiefs about unit
cohesion. In fact, General Milley put it with regard to the
Army as precisely zero instances of units with less unit
cohesion, morale, and discipline.
I am very concerned about this report because it says that
there is, quote, scientific uncertainty surrounding the
efficacy of transition-related treatments for gender dysphoria.
Yet, the American Medical, Psychological, and Psychiatric
Associations have all said the report misrepresents what is the
scientific consensus when it comes to gender dysphoria and
transition. In fact, despite the report's stated concerns about
deployability of transgender servicemembers because of gender
dysphoria or associated medical care, a report being issued
today by the Palm Center here, which I am going to give to you
so you can read in full, says that, quote, out of 994
servicemembers diagnosed with gender dysphoria in 2016 and the
first half of 2017, 40 percent deployed in support of Operation
Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom, or Operation New
Dawn, and only one had an issue during that deployment.
It appears that this report that your Department has issued
is not based on the Department's data or science but rather,
quote, potential risks that the authors cannot back up. In
fact, this seems to me to be the same uninformed and unfounded
concerns that led to the opposition of repealing don't ask/
don't tell, integrating women into the military, integrating
African Americans into the military. I think you need to do a
lot more work on this topic to inform yourselves.
What is so different about transgender service that makes
you think that though the data and medical science do not
justify it, transgender service will harm the readiness and
lethality of our force?
Secretary Mattis. Well, Senator, I regret the way you
characterize it. I would remind you that when I came into this
job, I said I do not come in with a preordained or agenda to
change something. I am in to carry three lines of effort
forward. One of them was to create a more lethal military. And
I believe that service in the military is a touchstone for
patriotic Americans. The military protects all Americans'
freedom and liberty to live as they choose, and we are proud of
that.
Seventy-one percent of 18 to 24-year-old men and women in
this country do not qualify for medical, legal, behavioral,
intellectual reasons to enlist as a private in the U.S. Army.
Seventy-one percent.
In this case, I was meeting with the Service Chiefs and the
Chairman--not the Joint Chiefs, the Service Chiefs--last
spring, and they were asking me questions because we were
coming up on the advent of the induction of transgender. They
wanted to know how they were going to deal with certain issues
about basic training, about deployability. I said, did you not
get all of this when the policy came out? The Carter policy we
call it. They said no. And I said, well, did you have input?
They said no, they did not.
So I convened that panel. That panel was made up of combat
veterans, the vice chiefs of the services, and the under
secretaries. They called together transgender troops. They
brought in commanders of transgender troops, and they brought
in and listened to civilian and military medical experts who
have provided care for transgenders both in the military and
outside. And I gave my 44-page advice. I would like to have it
entered, Chairman, for the record.
Senator Gillibrand. And a list of all experts you
consulted, please.
Secretary Mattis. Pardon?
Senator Gillibrand. I would like a list of all the experts,
medical experts, that were consulted for that report, please.
Secretary Mattis. Right now, this is under litigation. I
will see what I can provide or when I can provide it. I will do
that, Senator.
[The information referred to follows:]
I am unable to provide details regarding the names of individuals
who advised or provided information to the Panel of Experts because
this matter is subject to ongoing litigation in multiple federal courts
in which the government is asserting privileges, lodging objections to
requests for information, and relying on existing protective orders to
ensure robust deliberation and protect confidential and sensitive
information. However, the Department's Report and Recommendations on
Military Service by Transgender Persons describes the process and the
categories of individuals the Panel consulted (pages 17-18) and
provides a thorough explanation of the Department's recommendations
(pages 32-43).
But at the same time, basically my responsibility is to
give the best advice I can for making a lethal force. And I
think that right now the Carter policy is still in effect, and
we have the four cases being litigated.
Why these issues like this would not come to the Service
Chief level during this was a very, very, I would call it,
newsworthy situation. The reason is that under the Carter
policy, the reporting is opaque. We cannot report that a
problem emanated from a transgender. We cannot under the Carter
policy do that. So the question you have asked the Service
Chiefs and the Chairman are ones that right now the Carter
policy prohibited that very information from coming up because
it is private information. And it is specifically called out in
his policy statement. So it is impossible for them to have
responded to you.
And I would just say that right now we look at medical
conditions. If gender dysphoria has anxiety or it has some kind
of depression, we do not allow anyone in with that. I would
have to make a special category that said you can have these
disqualifying factors only if you are transgender, and then we
can bring you in. I think you understand why we have not chosen
to do that.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Senator Fischer?
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Mattis, in last year's NDAA, Congress required
the Department to evaluate whether existing cruise missile
systems could be converted into a ground-launched version as
part of our response to Russia's violation to the INF Treaty.
The Department's response, which was a letter from Under
Secretary Lord, was sent to the committee 2 weeks ago. And it
states that DOD is in the early stages of identifying the
system requirements and is therefore unable to conduct an
assessment at this time.
I know the Department is moving forward on a broader effort
beyond just a ground-launched cruise missile, but I am
concerned about the urgency of our response because, as we both
know, we can spend the next 3 years defining requirements and
analyzing alternatives and not conduct any actual research and
development.
So I would just ask, what is your expected timeline for
moving forward on this, and have you set any kind of internal
goals to ensure that we do not spend years in this preliminary
stage?
Secretary Mattis. It is a very applicable question. What we
are doing right now--as you know, we once had a sea-launched
nuclear cruise missile. We took those off after the Berlin Wall
and the years afterwards, off the Navy ships. So by going back
to a weapon that we had before, there is a fair amount of
already sunk technology costs that we will not have to redo,
will not have to come back up and ask for again.
I need to get back to you on the specific timeline. But
remember what we are trying to do here, Senator, is to put our
diplomats in the strongest position to force the Russians back
into compliance. I have been personally engaged with a high-
ranking Russian on this issue, and I would just tell you that
the NATO allies are also increasingly taking this message to
Moscow. But we are going forward with this, and I will have to
get back to you with a timeline. It is a very good question. I
do not have the answer but I will get it.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Department of Defense is developing options for pursuing
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty-compliant research and
development (R&D) of conventional, ground-launched, intermediate-range
missile systems that would not be compliant with the Treaty if produced
or tested. These options will enable the Department to initiate R&D on
specific concepts and includes development of a timeline for the
capability that will be consistent with the overall USG strategy. The
Department is refining the options for leadership consideration in the
next several months. After I have a chance to review these proposals, I
will get back to you with a more detailed timeline. The Department
appreciates Congress's continued support in our efforts to respond to
Russia's violation of the INF Treaty in a way that maximizes pressure
on Russia to return to full and verifiable compliance with its INF
Treaty obligations while placing the United States in a stronger
position should Russia ultimately cause the INF Treaty to collapse.
Senator Fischer. I would really appreciate your sense of
urgency because, as we all know, the Russians were in violation
4 years ago on that treaty. And I agree with you and obviously
Congress agrees with you as well that a response is necessary.
The administration has also stepped forward on that. So thank
you.
Also, Russia continues to expand the scope of its malign
activities in Syria. It is building up installations. It is
aiding the regime. It is expanding its footprint in the
country. And recent reports have also suggested that Russian
forces are jamming United States unmanned aerial vehicles. They
are conducting electronic warfare operations against the EC-130
aircraft.
Are the Russian forces actively harassing American forces
in Syria? And what do you believe is an appropriate response,
if you agree that they are?
Secretary Mattis. I cannot target the responsibility to the
Russians right now. As you know, it is a crowded battlefield,
and it has also got Iranians there and, of course, the regime
forces as well.
But you notice as we go forward with the--we have so far
sanctioned 189 individuals in Russia, and we are looking at
those who have--we have also, as you know, thrown six of their
diplomats out. And economic sanctions are going to be,
obviously, looked at for future violations as well. So we have
an asymmetric way, an indirect way of going back after them and
making them pay.
Right now, in Syria, we have an odd and somewhat open and
never interrupted deconfliction communication line that has
worked pretty well to make certain we do not run afoul of one
another's forces or one another's operations. They are not
coordinated. They are deconflicted in either time or space,
mostly in space, the river, for example. The Euphrates divides
our activities in some cases.
Senator Fischer. Did you use that deconflicted line and
communication with the Russians when it was reported in
February that there were large numbers of Russian irregular
forces that had attacked United States forces?
Secretary Mattis. It was used, Senator. The Russian high
command in Syria assured us it was not their people, and my
direction to the Chairman was the force then was to be
annihilated. And it was.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
Senator Heinrich?
Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman.
Secretary, in response to Senator McCaskill's contracting
concerns, you said that the best way to avoid these kinds of
problems was, quote, having a methodical review for every
dollar going out. And I could not agree more.
So I want to ask you about a particular RFP [request for
proposal] coming up. The Pentagon has announced that it intends
to bring all of its computing services under one cloud in a $10
billion single award contract. The Department issued an RFI
[request for information] last month which received over 1,000
questions and comments from industry and leading technology
experts who, for the most part, believed that the current
proposal is deeply misguided. Yet, the Department seems to be
rushing ahead to issue an RFP in early May and intends to issue
an award as early as September.
What is the rush here, and why is the Pentagon moving
forward so quickly despite the concerns of both Congress and
technology leaders?
Secretary Mattis. Senator, the rush right now is that we
have too many data banks that the front line commanders cannot
swiftly draw information from. So what we have been looking at
right now is how do we get faster access for the young folks on
the front lines and displaying the information they need, not
all the information in the world. The cloud is what they need.
So that is the driving impetus. It is the lethality. It is not
a sole source and there is no pre-select.
Senator Heinrich. But it is a single award.
Secretary Mattis. It will be for 2 years for about--I want
to say----
Senator Heinrich. It is a single award for a $10 billion
contract.
Mr. Norquist. The first contract is a single award. It has
I think a 2-year base, and then some options. Current
technology makes it----
Senator Heinrich. It is a big plum. That is why it deserves
attention. I do not want to quibble with you about sole source,
but I think it deserves some oversight. And we included
language in the omni that requires you to submit a full
justification for executing a single award--not sole source,
single award contract--instead of a multi-cloud approach. Are
you going to be able to submit that justification as required
by law? And will it happen before or after the RFP?
Secretary Mattis. We always align ourselves with the law,
Senator. When is it going to be brought in?
Mr. Norquist. Both reports will actually be submitted at
the time the first report is due. So there is normally a gap.
We are going to get them both in on May 7th, and that will be
before the RFP.
Senator Heinrich. Fantastic.
So to be perfectly clear, there are people speculating that
this is tailor-made for a single vendor. And I would just ask
you to assure me that those concerns are not justified.
Secretary Mattis. Sir, our goal is to get the best possible
service for the front line. I am aware that some people in
industry perhaps believe that this should be an equal
opportunity thing where everybody gets a piece of the pie. We
have got to go forward in a defensible way where you can go to
your constituents and say they did the right thing ethically,
as well as legally, in order to carry out the best possible
support for our front line troops. If we cannot do that----
Senator Heinrich. I want to just get the best deal for the
best product for the people who actually use it on the front
lines.
Secretary Mattis. Yes.
Senator Heinrich. I hate to go back to cyber deterrence,
but it is an endless topic.
So, General Dunford, Secretary Mattis, we keep hearing from
combatant commanders appearing before this committee that we
need a cyber doctrine. We hear a common refrain that this
requires a whole-of-government approach, which we have heard so
many times that now it is starting to sound more like it is
someone else's job. Our adversaries do not see any significant
consequences at this point for their cyber actions, and we need
to demonstrate an effective, credible deterrent.
When are we going to have that national cyber doctrine to
address this issue?
Secretary Mattis. I can tell you we are working on it, sir.
Inside the Department of Defense, we have got cyber orders out.
We have got 130 or 133 cyber teams already manned. There is
more training going on. We have got to get in place a
persistent cyber training environment to bring them to the top
of their game. So we are organizing for the defend the Nation
effort, which I think is what you are referring to, Senator.
You know we are in support of, obviously, the Secretary of
Homeland Security.
That said, this is a very challenging effort, and I believe
that congressional guidance will be necessary as we weigh life
and liberty right out of Constitution and what role do you want
the military to play inside the United States in a defense
mode. I think this is something that you need to lead us on
because this is not our normal operating location. Unless there
is, as you know, a forest fire or insurrection, we do not do
this stuff. We stay focused overseas.
So I think the more clarity we get from the Congress, the
better, and I think we have to work with the executive branch,
all of us there, including the Secretary of Treasury, for
example, and the Secretary of Energy. It is a very big issue
right now. We are going to have to break it down into bite-
sized pieces, and from the authorities that start here in the
spirit of Congress to guide us, we can go forward on this.
Senator Heinrich. We need to get started then, Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Senator Perdue?
Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I would like to echo the Secretary's opening comments about
expressing our gratitude to our folks in uniform around the
world. The best of the best is out there on the wall.
General Dunford, in your testimony, you now are calling
space a contested domain. In your words, potential adversaries
view our alliance on this domain as a vulnerability they can
exploit, and they are increasingly challenging our competitive
advantage in space.
You know, for the last few decades, we have used space as a
scientific endeavor where our potential adversaries in the last
decade have been using it as a potential military domain,
obviously.
China in 2007 conducted an ASAT, anti-satellite missile
test, that was successful and threw thousands of pieces of
debris into that orbit. In 2016, they put up a so-called space
debris clearer that could clear that in supposed terms, but
also could potentially wreak havoc on our satellites. Even DNI
[Director of National Intelligence] Coats talks about any
future conflict that would occur with Russia and China would
see this potentially be--the first opening salvo would be an
attempt to take out our satellite capabilities.
We now see China with a snuggler satellite capability that
is being talked about publicly.
In DNI Coats' words, of particular concern, Russia and
China could continue to launch experimental, in parentheses,
satellites that conduct sophisticated on-orbit activities, at
least some of which are intended to advance counter-space
capabilities.
And yet, with our advanced battle management system, it
seems to me that over the last several months we have been
briefed on the future direction--I am talking about 10 years
out in the future plan is that we have a strong dependence on
our space capabilities. In the interim term, can you give us
some comfort that the military is moving to protect any
dependence we have on this space capability? Then give us a
little of your thinking about moving more capability from the
air, land, and sea domains to the space domain.
General Dunford. Senator, I can. And you raise a good
issue. I think it is important to just go back and look at the
assumption that we made when we started to leverage space for
our command and control, for our intelligence, surveillance,
reconnaissance, for our navigation, for the precision weapons
we had. We made an assumption that space would be uncontested.
And many of the systems that we put into space were not
resilient, and so they were not able to survive against the
anti-satellite technology and other capabilities that the enemy
now has to either jam or destroy our space capabilities.
In the budget this year and really starting last year, we
have started to invest in broadly the category we call space
resilience, which is a variety of things. It is hardening some
of the capabilities we have in space today, making sure that
new capabilities have in the requirements documents the right
requirements to make sure they are resilient to the challenges
we expect in the future, and then also ideas of more
satellites, leveraging commercial satellites and so forth and
perhaps smaller satellites so that all of our capabilities are
not in one single satellite.
With regard to characterization of debris and so forth and
command and control, by no means am I suggesting where we need
to be. But, frankly, starting back a few years ago under
General Hyten, who is now at Strategic Command--he was formerly
at Space Command in the United States Air Force--we started an
initiative to establish a more effective command and control. A
key piece of that command and control in our Joint Space
Operations Center is the ability to characterize debris in
space and to be able to make adjustments in our operating
concepts to accommodate that debris in space.
This is absolutely an area of focus in the Department. I
think the budget this year reflects that in 2019. It reflects
it in 2018. And for me from a warfighting perspective, we have
to solve this problem. We have built a force that is dependent
on space.
On the other side, in our exercises, we are also now
increasingly making sure that we are able to operate in a
space-denied or degraded environment and make sure that we can
accommodate degradation to the capabilities that we have today
that leverage space.
All of those things are very much on our mind, Senator. I
appreciate you raising it because I think in the areas that we
are concerned about--we say there is not a war in space. There
is a war that involves the capabilities that we have in space.
Senator Perdue. I am about out of time, but would you
quickly just comment on the Israeli-Iran potential cataclysmic
confrontation potential that they are seeing there in Syria
with Iran. The Persian Empire throughout history had a land
bridge when they were at their height all the way to the
Mediterranean. It sure looks like everything Iran is doing
right now is trying to reestablish that land bridge through
Iraq and Syria and Lebanon into the Mediterranean.
But right now, we see a really dangerous crossfire with
United States and Russia forces in the area and also now
between Israel and Iran. You have talked publicly about this,
but give us some indication about the way you are thinking
about this right now.
Secretary Mattis. Senator, very quickly, the Iran regime,
the Tehran regime, not the Iranian people, are clearly in
strength using their proxies in Syria. We have seen them trying
to bring advanced weaponry in through Syria on its way to the
Lebanese Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. Israel is not going to
wait until those missiles are in the air.
Will it be cataclysmic? I hope not. I hope Iran pulls back.
Senator Perdue. Is there a nuclear threat in that potential
confrontation?
Secretary Mattis. A nuclear threat?
Senator Perdue. Yes, sir.
Secretary Mattis. No, sir, not at this time.
Senator Perdue. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Perdue.
Senator Warren?
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
For over 3 years, a Saudi Arabia-led coalition has been
bombing Yemen to counter Iranian-backed Houthi militia. The
United States military has been providing intelligence, mid-air
refueling, and munitions to the Saudis. In other words, we have
been helping and helping a lot.
Our refueling assistance to the Saudi-led coalition is
governed by something called the Acquisition and Cross-
servicing Agreement, or ACSA I think. The United States has
such an agreement with both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
Emirates [UAE]. The Secretary of Defense is authorized to enter
into these agreements with any non-NATO country, and it must
notify Congress 30 days before it signs such an agreement.
Secretary Mattis, can you give me a ballpark number for how
many acquisition and cross-servicing agreements that the United
States has entered into with other countries?
Secretary Mattis. I will have to take it for the record and
I will get back. I think I can get back to you very quickly on
that, Senator Warren. This was, as you know, a decision by the
previous administration we inherited, reviewed, and endorsed.
[The information referred to follows:]
Currently there are 115 Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements
in force.
Senator Warren. What I am trying to get at, though, is how
many of these agreements. You do not even have a ballpark for
what the number is?
Secretary Mattis. I do not, Senator.
Senator Warren. Okay.
You know, after an ACSA is signed, the Defense Department
is required to report to Congress. Or let me ask, is the
Defense Department required to report to Congress on a regular
basis about the type of defense assistance that is provided or
to report on any changes in the ACSA?
Secretary Mattis. I am going to have to get back to you,
Senator. I know we have many times testified about this, as did
people sitting in these chairs in the last administration from
President Obama's administration. You did characterize it
correctly what this one is about, however.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Defense Department is not required to report to Congress on a
regular basis about the type of defense assistance that's provided
pursuant to an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement. Any changes
to an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement must be made by formal
amendment. Amendments to Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements are
reported to Congress in accordance with the Case Act.
Senator Warren. And I think you will find that there is no
regular report required. And last month, I joined a letter with
Ranking Member Reed and Senator Blumenthal to the Defense
Department asking for details about the acquisition and cross-
servicing agreements that we have with Saudi Arabia and the UAE
as they continue their bombing campaign in Yemen.
Now, the DOD responded with copies of the congressional
notifications for these agreements. One was dated February 1988
and the other July 1992. Those are pretty old notifications,
given that we signed defense agreements with Saudi Arabia in
2016 and the UAE in 2006.
Now, I am concerned that these agreements have existed not
just with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, but with many other
countries and with very little oversight from Congress during
the administration of both parties. And I think that needs to
change.
There is another question I want to ask about, Secretary
Mattis, and that is the National Defense Strategy which says
that, quote, long-term strategic competitions with China and
Russia are the principal priorities for the Department of
Defense. The strategy stresses the need to modernize existing
equipment, to invest in advanced capabilities, and to enhance
the readiness of joint forces for a high-end fight.
Many analysts have said that a conflict on the Korean
Peninsula could bog us down for years, degrading our equipment
and potentially resulting in thousands of casualties to our
allies and to our own troops.
So my question, Secretary Mattis, is what would be the
impact of a long-term conflict on the Korean Peninsula on our
ability to prepare for a high-end conflict like those described
in the defense strategy.
Secretary Mattis. As you have seen, Senator, the full court
press has been for the last year on a diplomatic initiative
that is now bearing fruit. It has taken a long time, and I
think it can be fruitful. Obviously, we are hopeful but we are
just going to see how it works. Every effort is being made that
any resort to war is the last resort, as we----
Senator Warren. I appreciate that, Secretary Mattis, but
the my question is if we get bogged down in a long-term ground
conflict in Korea, what I am asking about is what would be the
impact on our ability to prepare for a high-end conflict like
those that are described in the defense strategy.
Secretary Mattis. War is such an such an unpredictable
phenomenon, Senator. I would not subscribe that we would get
bogged down. In other words, it might go a lot faster. Neither
you nor I can tell if it is going to take 2 years or 2 months.
Senator Warren. So I am going to try a third time. If there
is a long-term conflict on the Korean Peninsula, what impact
would that have on our ability to prepare for a high-end
conflict like the kind described in the defense strategy?
Secretary Mattis. It would be distracting, Senator.
Senator Warren. More than distracting?
Secretary Mattis. Well, if you look at what has happened
over the irregular fights over the last 15 years, you get a
sense of what happens when you are distracted over that time
from focusing on the primary threat. But we are not going to do
that. The Congress has reorganized the Department, and we now
have an Under Secretary who focuses on nothing but research and
engineering for the future. So he will continue what he is
doing. The Department will continue those efforts. Obviously,
this will be a distraction of enormous proportions.
Senator Warren. You know, I will point out that last week I
asked the nominee for Pacific Command, Admiral Philip Davidson,
the same question, and he put it differently. He said any long-
term conflict has significant financial costs and costs around
the globe and people costs within the armed services.
So I am concerned about what would happen if we were in a
position with both. But let me----
Secretary Mattis. So I am, Senator.
Senator Warren. Good. I am very glad to hear about your
commitment to a diplomatic solution with North Korea and that
we not get bogged down into a long-term conflict there. Thank
you, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Mattis. We have been committed the entire
administration's time, ma'am.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Ernst.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Gentlemen, thank you very much for your continued service
to our country.
Secretary Norquist, thank you and your team very much for
sitting down with me not all that long ago to review the DOD
audit and your progress there. I am very glad that you enjoy
reading those audit reports. So thank you for your work on
that.
Mr. Norquist. And, Senator, I appreciate your interest in
the subject. Thank you.
Senator Ernst. Thank you very much.
General Mattis, the Truman carrier strike group just
recently departed from Norfolk, and we wish them well. Recent
reports suggest that they may remain in the European theater,
which is breaking with tradition, rather than deploying to the
Middle East as they have during deployments of the past.
Can you speak about the need to make our military less
operationally predictable and how we can posture our joint
force to truly make our adversaries counter us in the multi-
domain?
Secretary Mattis. Yes, I can, Senator. Naval forces by
their very makeup, very composition are naturally agile forces
that can be deployed anywhere. In the past, we have focused on
simply maintaining a forward presence. Now, with the National
Defense Strategy saying that we are going to focus on large
power or great power competition, it means that without
breaking the families, without breaking the fleet or the field
forces of the Army, the Air Force, whatever, we are going to
make certain they are capable of deploying and fighting at a
higher level of capability. What that means is the Chairman,
under his global integrator role where I have given him the
authority with my oversight, civilian oversight, to maneuver
forces around in a manner that makes us strategically reliable
as an ally to our allies but operationally unpredictable to our
adversaries--and this is part of making certain that we get out
of acting with our Navy like we are shipping line and get back
into acting like a Navy.
Senator Ernst. And I greatly appreciate that. Thank you. I
think anything we can do to keep our adversaries off kilter, we
need to do that. So thank you.
As well, we have been talking a lot about the National
Defense Strategy. And, General Mattis, it does reference,
quote, expanding the competitive space. Russia has been very,
very successful in competing with the United States below the
threshold of actual conflict in what we call the gray zone.
They have been very aggressive through their military
posturing. They have used political influence. They have done
information operation campaigns.
What does expanding the competitive space mean for
competitions with Russia?
Secretary Mattis. We are going to have to be able to
compete across all the domains of warfare, and we had two of
them on this planet, land and sea, for several thousand years.
In the last 100 years, we added the air component, and in the
last 10 years now or 5 years, we are really focused in on the
cyber domain and the outer space domain. We are going to have
to be able to compete there.
But there is more than that. America is still a great
beacon of hope to people who want to run their own lives. We
support sovereignty and territorial integrity. We do not
believe nations should be requiring tribute from other nations
using the statement of One Belt, One Road. We do not believe
that Russia has a veto authority over the countries along its
periphery or has any right to change international borders
through the force of arms. And so we are going to have to be
able to compete across diplomatic, economic, information,
energy lines, and we are engaged in that on a routine basis in
the sit room in the White House as we orchestrate and integrate
this effort.
Senator Ernst. Very good. Thank you very much. Thanks for
the reference to DIME [Diplomatic, information, military, and
economic] as well. I think it is really important.
The fiscal year 2018 NDAA included a provision to provide
assistance to our partner forces to support U.S. special
operations combating irregular warfare threats. Have you
identified additional resources or new authorities that will
help support those lines of effort, especially when we are
trying to counter malign Russian influence?
Secretary Mattis. I have not seen where we do not have the
authorities we need, whether it be through the NATO support
that you are aware of and you fund. We are expanding the
special operations forces, mostly niche capabilities. It is not
a wholesale everything with respect to forces being expanded.
But let me just ask the Chairman to weigh in on this,
Senator.
General Dunford. There is, Senator, in the European Defense
Initiative a special operations component to training and
exercises as well, if you are talking specific to the European
theater.
Senator Ernst. Yes, absolutely. Thank you.
Thank you, gentlemen. My time has expired. I appreciate
your continued service. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Ernst.
Senator Peters?
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, gentlemen, once again thank you for your testimony
here today.
Secretary Mattis, you and I have spoken on many occasions
about advanced technologies, particularly artificial
intelligence and how those types of technologies will radically
change warfare and how we fight wars in the future. And we also
know that our near-peer adversaries are working very
aggressively on acquiring these as well. It is certainly
critical for us to be working on it with a great deal of
attention.
So my question to you, though, Secretary Mattis, is that I
know the Department is working on establishing a joint
artificial intelligence center. Could you talk a little bit
about that and give us some detail as to what you are thinking
about?
Secretary Mattis. I can, Senator Peters. Like you say, we
have discussed these issues many times, and this is probably
one of the leading efforts we have. But we also have these kind
of efforts going on on big data, on computing, and hypersonics.
In this case that you are asking about here what we are
doing, we are finding a number of efforts in the Department
that are funded separately. Some of them are making some good
progress. Some have not achieved what I would call outputs yet.
The Deputy Secretary, the Chief Management Officer are pulling
this together, and we are going to try to get a synergy going
so that all the money going into this is purposeful, it is
going for objectives. And we are not talking about 3 years from
now. We are talking 3 months, 6 months from now, what are we
doing to get these processes underway to deliver capability in
the near term.
Senator Peters. Is there something this committee can do to
help you in your efforts?
Secretary Mattis. I need to come back to you once we have
got it organized, sir. Believe it or not, it has taken me
several months just in order to identify everything we have got
going on in this regard. Once we have it aligned, I will be
back to you, I am sure, saying what we need. Right now, I think
we need to get our act together.
Senator Peters. I appreciate that. I look forward to
working with you as you continue down that road.
The other question that I have relates to the procurement
process. Yesterday the Government Accountability Office
released its 16th annual assessment of DOD weapon systems
acquisitions, which tracks the $1.6 trillion portfolio over 86
weapon systems. The report emphasized a troubling trend, that
too many programs are proceeding without, as they call it, key
knowledge essential to good acquisition outcomes. In fact, if I
look at the summary here, basically the Comptroller General
states, as we first observed in 2017, production is the
acquisition phase most closely associated with cost growth
where a lot of these projects are now moving into.
Consequently, DOD's continued willingness to accept knowledge
gaps in these newer programs, now over 8 years after the
implementation of acquisition reforms, indicates that reforms
have not yet taken hold to the extent that Congress intended.
Secretary Mattis, could you respond to that finding? And
anyone else on the panel, it would be appreciated.
Secretary Mattis. I believe the finding is accurate. This
is why a year ago, when I came in, I talked about reforming
business practices. Today I come back with the same words, and
then I add ``accountability.'' We believe this is a problem.
Now, there are specific processes to get at this. One of
them is make certain you keep people who are running programs
in the program long enough that you really get a result from
what they learn from the first year and they are not leaving
the second or third year.
The second point is you have to get the requirements right
up front, sir. Now, in some of these, I would call it, new
technology areas, that can be a challenge. And you understand
that when we come back in and say, well, we found something
through basic research that we did not know before. But we have
got to do better at getting the requirement right up front and
then do not have requirement growth midway. Specifically on
this, we cannot bring technology in that is not at a mature
level. If we do that before we prototype it--and I realize that
can create a time lag, but that is where we have seen some of
this growth come from.
So as we define the problem, it is people, it is processes,
and then there are actual technical reasons that we have got to
correct, and that is leadership's responsibility. Thus, we have
assigned accountability for each of these programs as a co-
equal priority.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Secretary.
In my remaining time--and it is low--I would just like to
ask a brief question about Yemen. All of you know that Yemen
remains a humanitarian disaster, disease, famine, unsafe
drinking water, violence, killing hundreds of Yemenis every
day. I previously asked General Votel about this issue, and he
attributed some of the civilian casualties that we see
associated with Saudi strikes as related to the competence of
the forces that were operating, referring to the Saudis there.
Secretary Mattis, General Dunford, briefly could you
comment on that? Has the competence of these forces operating
in Yemen increased? And what can we expect in the future?
Secretary Mattis. Sir, I will let the Chairman hit on a
couple things we have actually done to reduce the number of
innocents being hit. This is a tragedy. It is a catastrophe
humanitarian-wise. I will tell you that now, as of about 3
weeks ago, we have for the first time I believe a United
Nations envoy, a very experienced British diplomat, Michael
Griffin. I have met with him. The State Department has met with
him. We are going to give him full support as we did his
predecessor. For the first time I think we have someone with
the force of personality and the experience to help drive this
to a close and end it.
There are some specific things we have done to address the
innocent casualties.
General Dunford. Senator, I think mitigating the risk of
civilian casualties with strikes is probably two issues. There
is a cultural issue, and then there is a technical issue. And I
think we have had a positive impact with the Saudis in both
regards by the advising and assisting we have been doing. We
are collocated with them in their operation centers to help
them develop the techniques and tactics that will allow them to
conduct strikes while mitigating civilian casualties. And I
also think there has been a positive affect of the relationship
that we built with the Saudis over time and the training to
affect the changes and the culture that would have them take
that into account when conducting military operations. So it is
a long plodding process, in many cases with the countries we
are working on, addressing those two issues. But I think it is
paying dividends over time.
Senator Peters. Thank you, gentlemen.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Peters.
Senator Tillis?
Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here.
I have got one quick question and it has to do with the
budget. The President's Budget calls for a 2.6 percent pay
raise, another boost to military spending. One concern that I
have, if you see the trajectory for pay over time, we are going
to end up seeing some of that money to sustain that added
expense probably somewhere I think in the $47 billion range.
How are you going to be able to sustain--how are you going
to continue to do what we should do, which is continue to try
and keep up with the cost of living and the competition you all
mentioned earlier in terms of retaining people with a growing
economy and then deal with the erosion of resources that would
otherwise go to other priorities within the Department? And
General Mattis, or Secretary Mattis, I will start with you.
Secretary Mattis. Senator Tillis, one difference about the
way we look at people in the military, we look at them as an
investment not as part of our overhead. We educate them. We
train them. We screen them. We screen them again and again and
again. The idea is that we have best of breed going up and we
are pretty good at promoting the right people and keeping an
elite force. Part of this is making certain that the sacrifice
of military life that can never be mitigated----
Senator Tillis. No question.
Secretary Mattis. This is one way to do it.
Senator Tillis. But, Mr. Secretary, how do you deal with
the erosion? If you continue the trend line, how do you deal
with the erosion based on other DOD priorities?
Secretary Mattis. I believe we have to look at this as
America can afford survival, Senator. We are 3.1 percent of
GDP. If we can do better on our health care, in other words,
reduce personnel costs outside the pay raise, if we can do
better in our contracting so we are getting better return on
the dollar, we are looking at finding those savings inside the
Department and making the argument to you that we get to keep
them and apply them to the very direction that you are
concerned with and rightly so.
Senator Tillis. Thank you.
General Dunford, did you have something?
General Dunford. Senator, I would just say I think, as you
know, that the pay raise this year was benchmarked against a
pretty consistent index that we have used over time with the
ECI [employment cost index], and while acknowledging the
challenges we will face in balancing compensation with the
other pieces of the Department, I do believe--we had a
discussion about it earlier. I do believe that we are in a very
competitive market right now for high quality people, and I do
not believe that we are paying our people too much. And so we
do have to find efficiencies within the Department in a wide
range of ways to get the right balance.
But I would not argue at this point that the personnel
account is an anchor on the Department. Getting the right
people in is the cornerstone of us being successful.
Senator Tillis. Well, thank you all. You know, in my
capacity as the subcommittee chair on personnel, I am always
looking for good ideas to give you more flexibility, find those
efficiencies, and then plow them back in to making sure we are
paying our men and women.
I may have another question about funding, but I do have
something that is a little bit--I tend not to get too specific.
I focus on the business issues, but I want to talk about Turkey
for a minute and I want to talk about it on two fronts.
One, they are below the NATO guideline as a percentage of
GDP. Their participation I think is trending somewhere around
1.5 percent. The target is 2.
Two, I would also like to understand the complications that
come from having a NATO partner possibly acquiring a missile
defense system from Russia and the implications that that could
have for our assets in Russia, our manufacturing facilities for
the Joint Strike Fighter, et cetera.
Secretary Mattis. As you know, Senator Tillis, Turkey is
the only NATO ally with an ongoing insurgency inside its own
country. We assist them, as all of NATO does. We have got
Spanish and Italian antimissile batteries in Turkey to protect
them against any Iranian threat. The complexity of the Syria
fight has colored everything in that region to include Turkey,
which has had an enormous refugee influx, and they have gone
through an attempted haphazard coup that cost them innocent
people killed.
We are seriously concerned across NATO about the S-400 buy,
the Russian system----
Senator Tillis. Has there ever been another NATO ally that
has done something like that?
Secretary Mattis. Well, to a degree. As you know, the
Eastern European countries that were equipped with Russian
equipment----
Senator Tillis. They had a legacy. But I mean, after you
have gotten past that----
Secretary Mattis. I am not aware of any, sir.
Senator Tillis.--reaching out to a would-be adversary, has
that ever happened?
Secretary Mattis. I am not aware of any.
Senator Tillis. I know I cannot do your all's job, but are
there not other complexities just based on the inherent
infrastructure that comes with that system with respect to our
own intelligence, safety, and security? Look, I agree. We need
to protect Turkey. We need to help them make their Homeland
safe. But this seems like to be an outlier unlike any time that
has happened since NATO was established. Is that an
overstatement?
Secretary Mattis. I do not believe so, Senator. I think
that is accurate, and it is causing a lot of concern.
Senator Tillis. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Tillis.
Senator Hirono?
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank all of you gentlemen for your service to
our country.
And, Secretary Mattis, thank you very much for your
continuing commitment to end what you referred to as a cancer
of sexual assault in the military.
I wanted to further ask you, Secretary Mattis. The National
Defense Strategy mentions expanding and strengthening alliances
in the Indo-Pacific region. The Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific
Center for Security Studies is just one of several assets in
Hawaii that is tailor-made for this mission and your continued
support is very much appreciated.
I would like to applaud you for your efforts in building
partnerships and alliances, and it is not lost on me that you
have made several trips to the region and hosted several
regional leaders in the Pentagon since the National Defense
Strategy was released.
So besides our traditional allies in that part of the
world, where are the best possibilities for new partnerships in
the region, and what attributes do these countries share that
make them strategically important to the United States? I also
want to ask you about the importance of our compacts with
Palau, the Confederated States of Micronesia, and the Marshall
Islands.
Secretary Mattis. Well, Senator, the Pacific is a priority
theater, as you and I have discussed since my first days in
your office.
Senator Hirono. Yes.
Secretary Mattis. There is an ongoing effort to build our
military structure in the Pacific, and much of this is by,
with, and through our allies. And I would say from down under
in Australia all the way up through Japan and Korea, you see
this actively underway. We also have to be open to nations such
as Indonesia, the fulcrum of the Indo-Pacific region, Vietnam
as it comes of age and adapts with many of their students here
in our country being educated, as we build new ties for the
future.
But probably most importantly, as we look over all at this
region, I would look at India, the largest democracy on the
planet and one where we probably have a once-in-a-generation
opportunity to find more common ground. I think it is there. We
just have to find it. We do not have to search hard for it in
the sense of creating it. We just have to get an understanding
of each other's interests, and I think there is a lot of common
ground there.
So the attributes you see are geographic. They are based on
a potential military commonality in terms of threat, whether it
be, as you have seen in the Sulu Sea area where ISIS has come
in in strength and created a problem for Malaysia, Indonesia,
but especially so for the Philippines. These are all issues
that we have to work together if we want to keep the a Pacific
stable commerce zone for all countries to use.
Senator Hirono. What about the importance of our compacts
with the island nations that I mentioned, Palau, Micronesia,
and the Marshall Islands?
Secretary Mattis. I would just tell you, Senator, that we
recruit from there as you know. Their young men and women serve
in our Armed Forces, and we have got probably, in terms of
military relationships, an unusually high degree of trust
between the United States and those nations. There is probably
a lot more that we will be doing in the future along the lines
of the direction we are going right now, and I do not see any
inhibition on their side or our side to an even better
relationship, partnership.
Senator Hirono. Some of these compacts will come due, and I
assume that we are going to be negotiating with them again and
that these compacts are there for national security reasons. Is
that correct?
Secretary Mattis. They are there for that, and I think
there is also an affiliation that goes back many decades of
friendship that we share with them.
Senator Hirono. And we have certain continuing
responsibilities for our country's use of their lands.
Secretary Mattis, while current events may lead to
decreased tensions with North Korea, I applaud DOD's commitment
to defending the Homeland from ballistic missiles.
So the DOD budget request includes funding for additional
ground based interceptors but also funding for new sensor
capability such as the Homeland defense radar in Hawaii. How
will these new sensors increase our ability to defend Hawaii
and the continental United States?
Secretary Mattis. Senator, those capabilities will allow us
to detect launches from various angles. That means sooner track
them and determine if they are a threat or not to the Homeland.
The Homeland is Guam, Hawaii--let me be very particular here.
Guam, Hawaii, Alaska, and the United States. That means we have
more engagement time.
Senator Hirono. And I think that our ability to accurately
detect missiles coming our way is very important. I am sure you
are aware that we had a false alarm in Hawaii recently.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Hirono.
Senator Graham?
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for advocating for more funding for the
military. Without you, we could not have done it. So thank you
both.
Let us go to Afghanistan. Then we are going to work our way
around to Syria.
I talked to the Afghan Ambassador yesterday. He said that
the rules of engagement changing targeting the Taliban as part
of the enemy force is really beginning to pay dividends. Do you
see that, General Dunford?
General Dunford. I do, Senator.
Senator Graham. Secretary Mattis?
Secretary Mattis. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. The goal is to punish the Taliban to get
them at the table and end this thing through negotiation. Is
that correct?
General Dunford. The goal is to make sure they view that
the only solution is a political solution that they cannot win
on the battlefield.
Senator Graham. And we are making sure they are not going
to win on the battlefield. I want to compliment you and
President Trump for changing those rules of engagement.
Do you believe that a residual force is necessary in
Afghanistan for a while to come and it should be conditions-
based if we ever leave?
General Dunford. I do believe that, and that is consistent
with our strategy, Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Secretary Mattis, is that correct?
Secretary Mattis. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. To those Senators that advocate leaving
Afghanistan, on September the 10th, 2001, we did not have one
soldier in Afghanistan. Did we, Secretary Mattis?
Secretary Mattis. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Graham. We did not have an embassy. We did not have
a diplomat. We did not offer them a dime of aid. We got
attacked anyway.
Do you agree with me, leaving them alone does not mean they
are going to leave you alone?
Secretary Mattis. Problems in places like that do not stay
there, sir.
Senator Graham. So we cannot build a wall between us and
the threats coming from the Mid-East, but we certainly can
confront them. And I like your strategy in Afghanistan. I think
you got the right size force with the right abilities.
Iraq. What did we learn by leaving too soon, General
Dunford?
General Dunford. We learned that the Iraqi forces were not
capable of providing security inside the country, and that gave
the enemy an opportunity to resurge. That is where really ISIS
had the space to grow.
Senator Graham. I could not agree with you more.
General Mattis, working with our Iraqi partners and
coalition partners, we have done a pretty good job of
suppressing ISIS in Iraq. Do you agree with that?
Secretary Mattis. I do, sir, although the fight goes on,
but yes, sir, absolutely.
Senator Graham. Would you support a residual force based on
conditions-based withdrawal in Iraq if the Iraqis agreed with
it?
Secretary Mattis. Absolutely, and that force will be
augmented right now by a NATO training element that is there so
it will not be just the Americans.
Senator Graham. I could not agree with you more. More
people need to contribute money. President Trump is right. The
Arabs need to pay more and other countries need to contribute
more.
But do you agree with the following statement? There is
really no substitute for the American military when it comes to
a holding force. We have capabilities most people do not.
Secretary Mattis. That is correct, sir.
Senator Graham. Now, let us go to Syria. The goal is two:
to destroy ISIL, the total destruction of ISIS, and to combat
the malign influence of Iran. Is that the two goals that you
all have been articulating?
Secretary Mattis. Sir, our forces in Syria right now are
there to defeat ISIS. There is a political process underway to
end the civil war, but the chemical weapons are a separate and
distinct issue.
Senator Graham. We have known each other for a long time. I
am with you. I do not know. Is the President's statement about
withdrawing from Syria--is that conditions-based withdrawal or
is he just going to withdraw because he is tired of being in
Syria?
Secretary Mattis. It is conditions-based. As you know,
neither the last administration nor this administration sees
itself occupying Syria. What we have to do is keep our
diplomats in a position of authority so they can end this
through the Geneva process.
Senator Graham. Right. But when it comes to ISIS, the goal
is to make sure they are ultimately destroyed. Is that correct?
Secretary Mattis. Destroyed and also they cannot
regenerate. So we have to create local forces that can keep the
pressure on any attempt by ISIS to try to regenerate.
Senator Graham. Do you see those local forces being able to
accomplish that mission better than the Iraqi army when we left
Iraq?
Secretary Mattis. Sir, we will have to mature those forces.
We are engaged in it now. We have training going on by a number
of our international partners there on the ground right now, as
well as our own forces.
Senator Graham. I only have a few minutes.
Is it fair to say that a holding force right now without us
would be a risky proposition for a while to come?
Secretary Mattis. I am confident that we would probably
regret it.
Senator Graham. Turkey. If we leave too soon, Turkey is
going to go after the Kurds that helped us destroy ISIS. Are
you worried about that? We got to get that situation right
before we leave.
Secretary Mattis. We are working with Turkey to resolve
this.
Senator Graham. Is that a concern of yours?
Secretary Mattis. I do not know if that is Turkey's intent,
but we----
Senator Graham. We know what they have done in the past.
They have said they hate these guys more than ISIS. They have
actually attacked them. That to me needs to be a condition
because nobody else will help you in the future.
As to countering Iran, the military strike I thought was
not a big price. I do not think it is going to change the
battlefield equation. I do not see how you go to Geneva until
the battlefield changes. I do not see a change on the
battlefield until there is some credible force opposing Assad.
I think we should be part of that. If we are not, we are giving
Damascus to the Iranians. If we depart here, I think you need
to have some kind of element on the ground in Syria to combat
Assad. It is in our interest that we not give Iran to Damascus.
The good news is there are millions of Syrians who want Assad
to go, for another discussion for another time.
Thank you both.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Graham.
Senator King?
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Mattis, it occurs to me we have to make an
important decision here within the next hour, which is the
confirmation of Mike Pompeo to be Secretary of State. It occurs
to me, Secretary Mattis, that you may be a good witness in this
decision in the sense that you have worked with him directly on
the National Security Council. I suspect you have been in the
situation room and the Oval Office. What is your view of his--I
think two issues that are of concern--judgment and willingness
to tell the President--give the President his best advice based
upon his information and not necessarily what the President
wants to hear?
Secretary Mattis. Senator, you are right. I have worked
with him for over 14 months. I have worked with him intimately
during that time. I would just tell you I have seen a rigorous
intellect. His judgment has been mature and objective while
still applying subjective elements. It is not just a brittle
approach to problem solving. He is never shy about providing
his input to include when it was not the direction the
discussion was going and he had to stand in opposition to the
desires of some of us in the sit room.
Senator King. Thank you. That is very helpful. I appreciate
your providing that.
General Dunford, you were asked about what is going on in
Yemen, and you were saying we are making progress and it is a
cultural change. There was a report just this morning allegedly
3,500 schools in Yemen have been targeted by Saudi airstrikes.
I do not know if that is true. That is an allegation. But I
just worry that we are complicit in something that will turn
out in the hindsight of history to be a humanitarian tragedy.
And I would appreciate it if, for the record, you could supply
us with what controls we have, what limitations we have, what
we are doing to be sure that that is not the case.
General Dunford. Senator, I will. I will supply it for the
record.
But what I would say here this morning is we are not at all
involved in what we describe as the kill chain. So we are not
involved in what targets to strike.
Senator King. But my concern is that we can say that, but
if we are doing intelligence and refueling, we have got our
hands on this thing. We have got our fingerprints on it. And we
cannot then say, well, we do not know what they are going to do
with that fuel we put in their jets. I do not think that is
going to be an acceptable answer if we find out--well, I think
we are finding out now that some pretty bad stuff is happening
with our engagement. I really hope you will give this some
thought and give us some solid----
General Dunford. Senator, I fully understand your concerns.
We will outline that for you.
Senator King. Thank you.
To get back to the budget, which is the subject of this
hearing, just looking at the numbers, I think it is very
important that the public understand that we are talking about
the lowest percentage of GDP for the defense budget in
something like 70 years, 3.1 percent. I noticed in looking at
the absolute numbers, this year's proposal is actually below
the appropriation for 2010. So here we are 9 years later. 2010
was 691. You are talking about 686. So I just think it is
important to put those figures into context.
And, Mr. Norquist, a question to you. It occurs to me that
one of the things that is happening in the defense budget is
that we are recapitalizing. We are in a sense paying deferred
maintenance in terms of readiness, in terms of upgrading
systems like the Ohio-class submarine that have not been
upgraded in 30 years, the B-21. I would think in your position
it would be helpful to us who have to justify this budget to
our constituents to break that down a bit to say, okay, what is
it that is current operations and what is it that is paying
past due bills in effect. Do you agree that that is part of
what is happening here?
Mr. Norquist. I do. And just to put it in context, if
instead of the sequestration back in 2011, Congress had simply
capped defense at inflation, did not allow for pay raises and
everything else, that is the number you would be at now. The
difference is you would not have had several hundred billion
dollars of lost buying capacity. You would not have been
missing maintenance on equipment. You would not been having
older planes that are not getting replaced. So you are not even
in the same position. So the fact that it took Congress to
raise the ceiling by $85 billion just to get back to where
inflation alone would have put the defense budget shows you how
deep a hole the Department has been in during that period of
sequestration and the disruption to the military's readiness.
Senator King. It is very important to make that point to
the public because sometimes people just look at the number and
say this is a huge number. It is more than other countries.
Actually we are not the highest country in the world in terms
of percentage of GDP. I think we are fourth or fifth. That is
really I think the appropriate way to look at it.
Final question and this is a short one because I am already
out of time. Secretary Mattis, I presume, based upon your prior
testimony that you think it is important to maintain and
rebuild our diplomatic capacity at the State Department. That
is a part of our national security apparatus. Is it not?
Secretary Mattis. They are critical to our national
security, Senator.
Senator King. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator King.
Senator Scott?
Senator Scott. Thank you, sir.
Good morning to the panel. Thank you for being here and
thank you all for your service to this country.
Secretary Mattis, General Dunford, Secretary Norquist, I
may be a little biased here but I do not think that I am. I
think South Carolina is the epicenter of training and readiness
of our military, whether it is Fort Jackson where we train more
than half of the enlisted soldiers or Parris Island, Secretary
Mattis, where you know we actually make half of the marines, or
the Navy nuke school where we prepare our sailors, or Shaw Air
Force Base where we have the largest F-16 wing in the Air
Force, or if it is going to theater, it is likely going through
a C-17 at Charleston Air Force Base, not to mention both SPAWAR
[Space & Naval Warfare Systems Command] and the Savannah River
site which I think is a forward-leaning, forward-looking part
of our military.
So when the National Defense Strategy discusses a return to
great power competition with Russia and China, I am very
interested in seeing America leverage the ingenuity and the
imagination for our Nation to ensure that there is never a so-
called level playing field for our adversaries. To ensure
American dominance in all areas, we must innovate faster and
bring new capabilities like hypersonic weapons, directed
energy, and advanced unmanned aircraft to the field sooner.
With additional funding for R&D, how are we working to make
sure that we get those new technologies in the hands of our
warfighters as soon as conceivably possible? Secretary Mattis,
please begin.
Secretary Mattis. Senator, what we are doing right now is,
because the Congress reorganized us, you expressed your
displeasure over years with what we would call Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics. You broke it in half. Ellen Lord now
runs Acquisition and Sustainment. That is the current fighters
you see, F-16's there, the current C-17's. That sort of thing
is being addressed by Ellen Lord. But you also set up Research
and Engineering under Michael Griffin, our Under Secretary,
confirmed him. And he has the responsibility for directed
energy, for hypersonics, for joint artificial intelligence
efforts. So we are organizing now for an expeditious, output-
oriented exploration in research of these advanced technologies
that we know are going to play a role. As we speed this
forward, that is how we get them out in the hands of the troops
fast, not by having more studies done but by actually having
something developed and fly a hypersonic vehicle by X day. And
now everybody works together.
We are also concentrating the Department's efforts that
were somewhat diffuse, which is not uncommon with new
technology. But now we know what we need to focus on. So we are
pulling those together. So the Army, the Navy, the Air Force
are working together as service departments in making this a
synergistic effort.
Senator Scott. Thank you. Certainly looking at the comments
of Secretary Griffin in the HASC [House Armed Services
Committee] hearing about our inability to even see them coming,
it is important for us to expedite that process as quickly as
possible.
Did you want to add anything, General?
General Dunford. The only thing I would say is one of the
other things, Senator--you know, so we have talked a little bit
about science and technology research and development. A really
key piece too is our exercises in experimentation. One of the
key elements of the Secretary's strategy is to make sure that
we regenerate our exercise program. It has suffered admittedly
as a result of the operational tempo over the last decade. But
as we look forward, better joint exercises, a core element of
which is joint experimentation, will help move some of those
capabilities through the pipeline a bit faster. And so I think
there really is three pieces, two of which you spoke about, but
that third piece is really critical. Particularly going into
this summer, that is an area of particular interest for the
Secretary and I.
Senator Scott. Thank you.
I want to continue on the subject of keeping the perch that
we have.
Secretary, you and several of your predecessors have stated
how important it is for us to address our adversaries? theft or
acquisition of intellectual property and sensitive defense-
related technology. You have officially endorsed the Foreign
Investment Risk Review Modernization Act, FIRRMA, which Senator
Cornyn and others on this committee, including myself,
introduced to modernize the way we screen for an investment for
national security risks.
Do you see FIRRMA, while not necessarily a silver bullet,
as one crucial step towards addressing the China threat?
Secretary Mattis. It is critical on China, on a number of
other threats that we face. Cyber, for example, is not only
from China, but I would also point out that one of the reasons
Secretary Mnunchin orchestrated the sanctions against China
goes to the very heart of what you were just talking about, the
intellectual property theft.
Senator Scott. Would you support including FIRRMA as a part
of the NDAA?
Secretary Mattis. I would have no reservations whatsoever
about it, Senator. It is a much broader effort than just
Department of Defense. So I would not want it to become a
military priority effort and not the same priority for others.
It has got to be a whole-of-government. For example, Treasury
Department, Commerce, Department of Energy, Homeland Security,
they all have a role in this.
Senator Scott. Yes. I am on the Banking Committee and we
are working on it as well on the non-defense side.
Do you believe, as the National Defense Strategy and your
previous public comments suggest, that China poses the
significant national security threat to the country still?
Secretary Mattis. Senator, I think the one thing that this
administration would be graded on most critically 10 or 15
years from now, historians will look back and say did we
develop a relationship with China, a mature relationship, a
productive relationship, did we do everything we could as we
look at the long-range competition to keep it out of war and
into a more productive stance. And at the same time, some of
the things that you have initiated are absolutely critical that
we take our own side in this competition. So I think this is
critical as you look at, but there is nothing that dictates
this has to go to a force of arms between us if we do this
right, along the lines I think you are doing right now.
Senator Scott. Thank you, sir.
I will just close, Mr. Chairman, with this comment. From my
assessment, China's successful acquisition of United States
technology is what helps them be a near-peer competitor.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Scott.
Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And I appreciate the witnesses' testimony. It has been an
instructive morning.
I want to do a Senator Kaine broken record topic and talk
to you about congressional authorization for military force.
You each appeared before the Defense Subcommittee of Senate
Appropriations about a year ago, March 22, 2017. Secretary
Mattis, you stated that, quote, I would take no issue with the
Congress stepping forward with an AUMF [authorization for the
use of military force]. I think it would be a statement of the
American people's resolve if you did so. I thought the same
thing for the last several years, I might add, and have not
understood why the Congress has not come forward with this, at
least a debate because I believe ISIS is a clear and present
danger we face.
General Dunford, the same day you stated, quote, I agree
with the Secretary. I think not only would it be a sign of the
American people's resolve but truly I think our men and women
would benefit from an authorization for the use of military
force that would let them know that the American people in the
form of their Congress were fully supportive of what they are
doing out there every day as they put their lives in harm's
way.
Are your feelings today generally consistent with the
testimony you gave in the Senate a year ago on this topic?
Secretary Mattis. Generally they are, Senator. I will say
that we believe right now the operations we are conducting are
legal and we have a feedback loop to the Congress to make
certain we are not doing anything where you are not kept
informed. We would need the right AUMF, and you and I have
discussed it. That would be the only caveat I would say. We
would not want to end up restricting ourselves.
Senator Kaine. General Dunford?
General Dunford. Senator, I feel the same way, and I think
what the Secretary said is what I would have said first. You
know, what I would be concerned about changes is just making
sure that we have the inherent flexibility that we have today
to be able to prosecute an enemy that does not respect
boundaries in time.
Senator Kaine. Secretary Mattis, you then after the March
hearing that I described, sent a letter I think actually to the
Senate Majority Leader in September of 2017, and then together
with Secretary Tillerson appeared before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee at the end of October 2017. And in that
letter and here, you talked about some of the sort of
limitations or concerns that you might have that the idea of an
authorization, the idea of congressional expression of resolve
would be good thing, but that on the operational side, you
would have concerns. And you shared in that letter and in that
testimony some of the concerns that you have. I do not need to
go through those, but you remember those.
Is that still generally your point that if we could do a
congressional authorization, great, but take into account some
of the reservations or concerns you expressed?
Secretary Mattis. Yes, sir. I am still aligned with those
comments.
Senator Kaine. I have worked on this matter, and I have
proceeded upon an additional assumption that I think is
important for Congress, that if we were to do an authorization,
it would be very important that the authorization be done in a
way that was bipartisan so that we would not be sending a sign
either to the American public or especially to our troops that
support for military action against non-state terrorist groups,
for example, is something that just one party supports and not
the other because then that would raise a question of, okay, a
good or bad election might then lead to a lack of resolution,
which would make people wonder whether they were being
supported out on the battlefield.
Do you share that thought that if we can do a resolution,
it should not only be one that protects operations but also
expresses a bipartisan resolve of Congress?
Secretary Mattis. I think it is critical that our
adversaries and our allies see a unified America when we make
the grave decision to put our troops in harm's way, sir.
Senator Kaine. Just as I close, Senator Corker and I have
introduced an authorization that is being taken up by the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee soon. We have attempted to
incorporate into that authorization, Secretary Mattis, some of
the concerns you expressed in the letter of September 2017 and
the subsequent congressional testimony. It is bipartisan and
thus involves compromises. But since the chair of that
committee has indicated a desire to take it up and put it
through a markup of the committee, I look forward to working
together with you and other administration officials so that we
can hopefully get this right and express that bipartisan
resolve that I think our troops deserve.
Secretary Mattis. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
Senator Donnelly?
I will remind those remaining that while our timer has
malfunctioned, we will remind you.
Senator Donnelly. Is there a reason you said that right
before I spoke, Mr. Chairman?
[Laughter.]
Senator Donnelly. Thank you very much to the witnesses.
I want to thank you all of you for your implementation of
the Sexton Act requirements regarding military suicide. I know
how hard you have worked on this. I know the efforts that have
been put in and how you have worked hard to reduce that.
As you look ahead, what are the top priorities now for you
when you look at this and you try to determine what else can we
do to move the ball here? What do you think are some of the
things that we can still accomplish?
General Dunford. Senator Donnelly, we actually had a brief
conversation about that with the House Appropriations Committee
yesterday. And I think one of the more promising things that we
have seen is this kind of interdisciplinary model of mental
health care. So that has had a big impact. But we do have
significant shortages of the right experts in the right places,
and it is hard to sometimes attract the right--you know, we
have a small population of uniformed experts. Then we rely on
some contract support. In certain places where our forces are--
and you have certainly seen the same scourge with veterans
where getting the right care to the right people is a difficult
thing. So leveraging things like telemedicine, finding ways to
deliver that multidisciplinary model even in locations that are
geographically difficult to attract the right people I think is
the key thing.
But in my own personal experience--and I spend a little
less time on it now than I have in previous assignments just
because of the nature of my assignment--the single biggest
change in my judgment has been the change in the culture of the
medical profession to that multidisciplinary approach and then
combined with the full visibility of what is going on with an
individual in the leadership realm or with the chaplain and so
forth. So what I used to tell people is if I knew as much about
people when they were alive as I found out about them after
they die, we would have been able to do something to help fix
this. So I think that that multidisciplinary approach is
probably the biggest thing in terms of investment, and then
making sure that we actually do know as much about our men and
women when they are alive as we sometimes find out after they
die is probably the biggest thing we need to continue to
emphasize. A piece of it is resources but a piece of it is
continuing to have the kind of decisive engaged leadership that
we have seen be successful.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
Another thing that you have been working with me and with
all of us on in Syria is to try and find the young men and
women who ISIS killed while they were there. We appreciate all
your hard work, and I just want to say one more time if we
could continue to keep looking and continue to make that
effort, it would mean the world to those families who have
young people who are still over there.
Secretary Mattis. Please assure them, Senator, that we are
doing exactly that. We track this. We get reports frequently
about leads. There is no stone left unturned as we try to
resolve this.
Senator Donnelly. And as we are looking at Syria, you hear
things from here, from over there, from wherever. When we talk
about leaving as soon as we have wrapped up ISIS, I have great
fears of seeing history repeat itself in some ways that we
simply head out, and the second we do, ISIS comes back in. And
I know that the Department of Defense, General Dunford, you
have all said, look, we are just not walking away, but I want
to make sure that we have a plan in place to protect those
people in those regions that we have stood with, who we have
given our word to, and who have relied on us as partners and
have stuck their necks out for us as well.
Secretary Mattis. Senator, what we are doing right now is
we are helping the local places that we have liberated put
together their own civilian leadership. Civilian councils we
call them. We are training their police chief, the deputy
chief, and a handful of others so when they bring people in,
they have got some professional folks there. So if ISIS tries
to come back at them, they are taken care of.
Then we are working the political process to make sure they
are not left to drift in terms of not having a seat at the
table for their future, their longer-term future. That is a
diplomatically led effort, but it is one that the State
Department, Brett McGurk, former Secretary Tillerson, Acting
Secretary Sullivan will have been working on. So there will be
no loss of momentum as we go forward.
Senator Donnelly. Yes. I worry about them looking up one
day--the local forces--and seeing the trucks coming back in
with ISIS. As they say, we do not want to buy the same real
estate twice.
I also want to ask, what does success in Afghanistan look
like a year from now?
Secretary Mattis. Sir, it is probably going to take more
than a year is the first point I would make.
Senator Donnelly. Right. If you are a year out, where do
you want to be, and then what does success look like?
Secretary Mattis. A more capable Afghan force between their
military and their police, the violence level going down. As
you know, the Taliban have been unable to take over any more
district or provincial centers since last August, and as a
result, they have turned to high visibility bombings for the
very outcome they have achieved, which is getting a lot of
news, that sort of thing.
I think too that we are going to see fewer casualties. We
dominate the area. In other words, we have got NATO air support
for them on the ground now with people from NATO countries
calling the support. We have sent over reinforcements.
And lastly, you will see elections ongoing. You will notice
that one of the targets of the Taliban is the election
campaign. We are going to sustain this effort under President
Ghani, get the elections in, and it will be a reminder to
everybody in the country that the Taliban know they cannot win
through ballots. That is why they turn to bombs. That does not
endear them to the population.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you all.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Donnelly.
Senator Cruz?
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Cruz, our timer is not functioning
properly. We will let you know.
Senator Cruz. I will try to take no more than 40 minutes.
[Laughter.]
Senator Cruz. Gentlemen, good morning. Welcome. Thank you
for your service.
Let us start with a topic that is much in the news, which
is Iran. Mr. Secretary, in your judgment, what would be the
national security implications for the United States if Iran
were to acquire nuclear weapons?
Secretary Mattis. I think the implications for the United
States and for every nation in the region--it would be an
increased level of danger at a level we have never experienced
from this regime.
Senator Cruz. General Dunford, anything to add on that same
question?
General Dunford. No. I think the Secretary captured that,
Senator. I mean, given the behavior of Iran and how difficult
it is to deal with all the other challenges they present,
certainly the possession of a nuclear weapon would be of great
concern.
Senator Cruz. Let us shift to another topic. Let us shift
to space. General Dunford, you have acknowledged that, quote,
unlike previous eras, when space was considered a benign and
unchallenged environment, space is now a contested domain. And
based on that shared assessment, I introduced language in last
year's NDAA, which my colleagues on this committee supported,
that officially labeled space as a combat domain, and it called
for a policy to develop and field an integrated system of
assets to protect our space-based capabilities, to deter or
deny attacks in space, and to defend the U.S. Homeland, our
allies, and deployed forces.
In your judgment, what is the United States' greatest
military comparative advantage in space relative to Russia and
China?
General Dunford. Senator, I think there is really a few, if
you do not mind me listing them. One is obviously we leverage
space for our command and control systems. We leverage it for
navigation, and that also includes our ability to deliver the
precision munitions. The other area that we leverage it for is
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. So, for
example, when North Korea was doing testing, just to put a
finer point on it, the first indicators we had that there was a
missile test came from our space-based assets. So we really do
have some--we do leverage space for some of the core
capabilities of the Department.
Senator Cruz. And what are our greatest vulnerabilities in
space, and what are we doing and should we be doing to mitigate
those vulnerabilities?
General Dunford. What we see with China, Russia, and to
some degree some other countries, they developed the ability to
jam our systems. They developed the ability to laser-blind our
systems. They are some of the biggest challenges. Then one that
was referred to earlier is we have got a lot of space junk out
there that puts at risk our targets, and as that increases,
that becomes a greater threat as well. So those would be the
three that I would highlight.
Senator Cruz. Let me shift to a related topic, which is
missile defense. In the last decade, near peer competitors like
Russia and China have been able to rapidly test and field
technologies that have given the edge in hypersonic flight.
These hypersonic weapon systems can be launched and flown in
methods traditionally associated with ballistic missiles. The
combination of speed, trajectory, and maneuverability make
these systems increasingly challenging for our missile defense
systems to defend against them and ultimately defeat them.
How do you view the dual necessity of, number one,
developing new missile defense capabilities to intercept
hypersonics earlier in flight and, number two, furthering the
development of our own hypersonics?
Secretary Mattis. Sir, the reorganization of Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics now has someone focused on these
areas, Mike Griffin with a NASA [National Aeronautics & Space
Administration], Lincoln Labs background. Hypersonics is the
number one priority, both having them for ourselves but also
the defense against them. We can go into a classified briefing
for you, sir, about where we are going with it. But I would
just register that it is our number one priority in the
developing technologies.
Senator Cruz. And obviously, please let this committee know
what else we need to be doing to assist in that.
Let me finally focus on--the administration has taken very
positive steps to strengthen missile defense in the Korean
Peninsula, particularly with the deployment of THAAD [Terminal
High-Altitude Air Defense] batteries. Even so, the capability
is calibrated for ballistic missiles and is ill-equipped to
defend against conventional threats like rockets, artillery,
mortars, of which North Korea has stockpiled a staggering level
both to hold Seoul hostage and also to target capabilities like
THAAD.
In your judgment, what steps should we take to further
protect South Korea against North Korean rockets, artillery, or
mortars?
General Dunford. Senator, I will start with that. Only so
much can be done with defensive capabilities. And a key element
of dealing with the challenges presented by North Korea is our
offensive strike capability as well. And one of the things that
we really have started working on over the last 15 months--
truth be told, we divert a lot of our intelligence,
surveillance, reconnaissance assets away from the peninsula for
a long period of time. So if you ask me right now what is the
best way to get after that problem, increase our intelligence,
surveillance, reconnaissance--we call that find the threat--and
then be in a position to conduct strikes against the threat.
And our plans, without speaking with specificity today, are
very much focused on more concerted strikes against that
artillery, rockets, and denying them that capability. So it is
really a combination in my view of there is a baseline of
defensive capabilities that we need to have in the greater
Seoul area in particular but also enhancing better the ability
to conduct offensive strikes against those systems.
Senator Cruz. Terrific. Thank you, gentlemen.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Cruz.
Senator Nelson?
Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I will be quick.
When we talk about challenges in space, we got to talk
about challenges in cyber. And I would like to take it from a
different standpoint. Not only does cyber threat to the country
but to what degree is the Department of Defense, our Cyber
Command going to be involved in cyber-enabled information
operations like the Russians did to us in the 2016 election? Is
that something you want to talk to in a different forum?
Secretary Mattis. It would be best in a different forum,
sir.
Senator Nelson. Okay.
Niger. One of those servicemembers was from Florida. They
are just about to produce the report, and in fact, the
families, as we speak, have been informed. Is there anything
that you can tell us, Mr. Secretary, about the report?
Secretary Mattis. Sir, we have a 200-page summary--I know
that sounds like a long summary, but it was a very involved
investigation spanning three continents. The last family will
be notified on Monday. Already in your classified vaults, the
SASC [Senate Armed Services Committee] has available the 200-
page. I can also get the 6,300 pages up. Many of those pages I
have read. But I think right now we have found what we believe
to be the crux of the problems, not problem but problems, that
contributed to this. It was not a delegation of authority
problem. So we know immediately how to address those. And we
are doing that right now, addressing those problems.
Senator Nelson. Finally--and I will. I will go and I will
read that report.
Quickly, you have touched a lot today on Syria, but the
truth is that Iran now has a land bridge all the way to Beirut
through Iraq, through Syria, on into Lebanon. Is there any
additional thing that you want to share, Mr. Secretary, about
how we are going to protect our interests in Syria, given that
that is a new significant threat?
Secretary Mattis. Well, the broader strategy, sir, has got
to take this into account. And if Iran does not change its
behavior--and I have no reason to think that they will under
the current regime. The Iranian people are held hostage by this
regime's leadership. So long as they continue to fund the level
of proxy warfare, whether it be in Yemen or the explosives they
send into Saudi Arabia or into Bahrain--and then you are
pointing out the crescent, as they try to resupply their proxy
in Lebanon and Syria through a land bridge. I would just
suggest that Iraq has not yet succumbed to the idea that they
need to be a rump state of the Iranian regime, and I believe
that we are well advised to continue to support the Iraqi
Security Forces and the legitimate government in Baghdad, as
one of the ways to avoid this becoming a reality.
I would also say that the Geneva process in resolving the
Syria civil war would set the conditions for more interruption
of that.
Then, of course, Lebanese Hezbollah has got to be looked at
as a separate and distinct problem inside Lebanon.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
The majority and the minority have agreed, in that there
are votes taking place right now, that at the conclusion of the
remarks and questions by Senator Blumenthal, we will be
adjourned.
Senator Blumenthal is recognized.
Senator Blumenthal. Am I recognized?
Senator Inhofe. Yes, you are.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
I will be brief because we do have votes, and I want to,
first and foremost, apologize for being absent for a large part
of the hearing. A lot has been going on in the Judiciary
Committee and other committees. And I will ask one brief
question and then perhaps supplement the record with others.
Have you seen any change in North Korea's cyber activities
since the diplomatic discussions concerning a meeting between
Kim and President Trump?
Secretary Mattis. We have not seen a change. Now, I did not
specifically go in and look at this in the last week or 2, but
I get the reports routinely frankly. So I cannot give you a
good answer on that, a straight answer on it, sir, but I can
get back to you, sir, and tell you what we find.
[The information referred to follows:]
[Deleted.]
Senator Blumenthal. Because I have the impression over the
years that I have been on the Armed Services Committee that
their cyber activities have mounted over the years. Obviously,
they have attacked us on a number of occasions. So I would be
very interested in your response.
As I say, I have other questions that I would like to put
to you. In light of the vote and in light of your very long and
valuable attendance here and your forthright answers, I am
going to spare you any more time. But thank you for your
service and thank you for all you do for the country. Thank
you.
Secretary Mattis. Thank you, Senator.
[Whereupon, at 12:18 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Deb Fischer
inf treaty-compliant research and development
1. Senator Fischer. Secretary Mattis, the administration's Nuclear
Posture Review states: ``The United States is commencing INF Treaty-
compliant research and development by reviewing military concepts and
options for conventional, ground-launched, intermediate-range missile
systems.'' Please provide an update on the status this research, as
well as an anticipated timeline and an identification of major
milestones associated with this activity.
Secretary Mattis. The Department of Defense continues to make
progress in exploring options for conducting Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces (INF) Treaty-compliant research and development on a
conventional, ground-launched intermediate-range missile system. The
Department has evaluated a range of potential solutions, and once a
discrete set of the most promising systems is identified, formal
development timelines and major milestones will be established.
open skies treaty
2. Senator Fischer. Secretary Mattis, do you believe continued
participation in the Open Skies Treaty is in the best interest of the
United States?
Secretary Mattis. Yes. It is my view that it is in our Nation's
best interest to remain a party to the Open Skies Treaty.
3. Senator Fischer. Secretary Mattis, would you agree that the
United States and our allies enjoy benefits from participation?
Secretary Mattis. Yes. The Open Skies Treaty contributes to greater
transparency and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region, which benefits
both the United States and our allies and partners.
4. Senator Fischer. Secretary Mattis, do you believe we would
negatively impact relationships and security cooperation with our
allies by withdrawing from the treaty?
Secretary Mattis. U.S. participation in the Open Skies Treaty
provides us with an important mechanism for engaging with our allies
and partners. The treaty contributes to greater transparency and
stability in the Euro-Atlantic region, which benefits both the United
States and our allies and partners.
5. Senator Fischer. Secretary Mattis, do you believe the current
OC-135 is limited in its ability to fly the full range of Open Skies
missions, and that a new platform would allow us to maximize the
benefit of our participation in the treaty?
Secretary Mattis. Yes. In order to maximize U.S. benefits from the
Treaty, the United States needs to recapitalize and modernize its
sensors and aircraft. The 1960s-era United States Open Skies aircraft
are ill-suited to extreme operating environments in Russia and
experience regular, unplanned maintenance issues, often resulting in
mission delays or cancellations. In order to ensure that the United
States can exercise its full treaty rights, I directed the Air Force to
begin an effort to recapitalize the U.S. Open Skies aircraft.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
authorization for use of military force and article i war powers
6. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, Article
I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the
power to declare war. Is it your understanding that before entering
into a ``pre-emptive or preventative ground war'' with North Korea on
the Korean Peninsula that the President of the United States would have
to come to Congress for an Authorization for the Use of Military Force
(AUMF)?
Secretary Mattis. I appreciate the support Congress continues to
provide on matters related to North Korea and remain committed to
cooperating with Congress going forward.
The President retains the authority to take actions in self-defense
in the event of an imminent North Korean attack. That decision will be
made based on the threat and immediacy, and informed by intelligence
and consultations with our allies and partners.
It is well-established that the President, as Commander in Chief
and Chief Executive, responsible for ``foreign and military affairs,''
as well as for national security, has the power to commit U.S. Forces
abroad, as well as to take military action, for the purpose of
protecting important national interests, even without specific prior
authorization from Congress. The administration is currently committed
to pursuing a diplomatic solution. Should circumstances change, the
administration remains committed to cooperating with Congress.
General Dunford. In the event of an attack or imminent threat of
attack from North Korea, we have the authorities required to protect
United States interests and meet our alliance commitments. In the case
of a pre-emptive strike or deliberate campaign on the Korean peninsula,
my military advice to the Administration would be to seek the support
of Congress.
Our Nation has a greater degree of success in war when the Joint
Force has the full-throated support of Congress.
7. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, Article
I, Section 10, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution states, ``No State
shall, without the Consent of Congress . . . engage in War, unless
actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of
delay.'' Article II, Section 2, clause one states, ``The President
shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,
and of the militia of the several states, when called into the actual
service of the United States.'' Additionally, Article II, Section 2,
Clause 2, states ``He shall have power, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the
Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors.'' In the
case of North Korea, how broadly or narrowly do you interpret the
President's Article II authorities to engage military forces in
hostilities and engage in foreign relations? How broadly or narrowly do
you interpret Congress' Article I authorities to declare war?
Secretary Mattis. I appreciate the support Congress continues to
provide on matters related to North Korea and remain committed to
cooperating with Congress going forward.
The President retains the authority to take actions in self-defense
in the event of an imminent North Korean attack. That decision will be
made based on the threat and immediacy, and informed by intelligence
and consultations with our allies and partners.
It is well-established that the President, as Commander in Chief
and Chief Executive, responsible for ``foreign and military affairs,''
as well as for national security, has the power to commit U.S. Forces
abroad, as well as to take military action, for the purpose of
protecting important national interests, even without specific prior
authorization from Congress. The administration is currently committed
to pursuing a diplomatic solution. Should circumstances change, the
administration remains committed to cooperating with Congress.
General Dunford. Among my responsibilities as Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff is providing military advice to the President,
Secretary of Defense, and National Security Council. I, along with all
other members of the Joint Force, swore an oath to support and defend
the Constitution of the United States.
I am committed to performing these duties, to working with the
administration, and providing candid advice to the President, Secretary
of Defense, and all members of the National Security Council. As
mentioned in the previous response, I would advise the President to
seek Congressional support before conducting a preemptive strike or
deliberate campaign on the Korean Peninsula.
missile defense and defeat--priorities
8. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, given
recent increases in Ballistic Missile Defense and Missile Defeat in the
NDAA and the upcoming release of the Missile Defense Review (MDR), what
do you see as the next short term steps to solidify the United States
against Ballistic Missile Threats from all threats in the near term?
What capabilities do we need to invest in this year?
Secretary Mattis. Today, the Ground-based Midcourse missile defense
system (GMD) provides protection for the Nation. In September 2017, DOD
requested the reprogramming of more than $400 million to counter the
North Korean missile threat. A portion of these funds support the
important Homeland defense activities, including initiating work on the
procurement of 20 additional ground-based interceptors in Alaska as
early as 2023, which will bring the total to 64 fielded interceptors.
This reprogramming also funded a service life extension to the Cobra
Dane Radar in Alaska and software upgrades to the Sea-Based X-Band
Radar, which are both essential elements of our Homeland defense. Last
November the President submitted an amendment to the fiscal year 2018
budget request for $4 billion of additional funding for missile
defense, which includes construction of a new missile field at Fort
Greely, Alaska, and additional procurement funding for the 20 necessary
GBIs. The fiscal year 2019 budget request includes $9.9 billion for
missile defense--for the Missile Defense Agency and $3 billion for air
and missile defense programs in the services. This budget funds a more
capable ground-based interceptor with a redesigned kill vehicle, the
deployment of new missile tracking and discrimination sensors in
Alaska, Hawaii and the Indo-Pacific region, and a new space-based kill
assessment capability. These near-term investments will enable us to
obtain substantially more performance and efficiency out of the GMD
system necessary to meet the evolving threat.
General Dunford. Prior to the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS),
the primary focus of our ballistic missile defense was on rogue
nations. However, the 2018 NDS directed reprioritization to major power
competition, in particular reversing the erosion of United States
military advantage in relation to China and Russia. In this
environment, we need to be concerned about ensuring that our ballistic
missile defense capability keeps pace with the increasing threats. Our
adversaries are developing missile defense countermeasures, hypersonic
glide vehicles and a wide range of nuclear-armed missiles that are
capable of posing a direct threat to the United States and our allies.
Current priority missile defense upgrades and capability
advancements include:
Sensor and discrimination capabilities. Continued development of
the Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) in Alaska. Upgraded and
expanded land, sea, and space based detection and tracking sensors.
Kill vehicles. Increase the reliability and lethality of our
interceptors including the development of the Redesigned Kill Vehicles
(RKV) for the GBI, and completion of testing and deployment of the SM-3
Block IIA capability.
GBIs. Increase the GBI inventory to 64 by completing Missile Field-
4 at Fort Greely, Alaska to provide silos for 20 additional fielded
interceptors as early as December 2023.
Capability and capacity. Increase the robustness of regional
missile defense capability and capacity including deployment of the
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (at sea, on land and Standard Missile-
3), the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) capabilities, and
implementation of recommendations from the Department's Joint Regional
Integrated Air and Missile Defense Capability Mix (JRICM) study.
Pending release of the Missile Defense Review (MDR), we are
reviewing non-materiel options aligned with the National Defense
Strategy and specific portfolio investment strategies that best posture
the Joint Force to reverse the negative trends against potential
adversaries. We are exploring efficiencies gained by fusing non-
kinetic, cyber, electromagnetic, and kinetic capabilities to deny,
defend, and defeat adversary threats.
Areas for priority technology investment include effective
discrimination in the current and future Ballistic Missile Defense
Sensor architecture and completion of the Defense against Hypersonic
Weapons Threats Analysis of Alternatives in 2018 to inform/guide any
future hypersonic defense capability development. We continue to gain
synergy through integrated missile defense planning, force management,
and operations support ensuring global coordination of regional missile
defense execution--thereby, matching the best interceptor with the best
sensor.
Finally, we must strengthen our collaboration with our allies and
explore further integration of our collective capabilities toward an
effective mutual defense. We are investing in collaboration with our
allies across multiple venues, including the USSTRATCOM-hosted Nimble
Titan: a global and regional multinational two-year ballistic missile
defense series of experiments executed within an integrated air and
missile defense context.
south china sea
9. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, China
continues to engage militarily in the South China Sea, despite United
States and international efforts to maintain freedom of navigation. In
your professional military opinion what are China's broad strategic
objectives in the South China Sea and how does that affect our allies?
Secretary Mattis. China's assertive activities in the South China
Sea are part of a broader strategy to leverage China's growing military
power to advance Chinese control over disputed territories and to
coerce rival claimants into showing deference to China's claims.
China's strategy is to change the status quo through incremental
actions that fall below the threshold of conflict. China's assertive
and coercive behavior is leading to increased anxiety in the region
over China's long-term intentions. The United States is committed to
upholding freedom of navigation and overflight, to seeking peaceful
resolution of disputes, and to fulfilling our obligations to our allies
and partners. We will also support and assist our allies and partners
in their efforts to improve maritime security, maritime domain
awareness, and interoperability and in boosting their capability and
capacity to reduce vulnerability to coercion from China.
General Dunford. China's primary objective in the South China Sea
is to exercise effective control overs it maritime claims. Although
disputed, these claims constitute nearly the entire South China Sea.
The infrastructure and assets China constructed and deployed on
reclaimed features enhance its presence in the South China Sea and
improve the Chinese military's ability to enforce China's maritime
claims--claims that conflict in carrying degrees with those of Brunei,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam.
A persistent Chinese military presence in the South China Sea
constitutes a latent threat of coercion against regional powers due to
the important shipping lanes traversing the area. For example, United
States allies and partners in Northeast Asia rely heavily on the flow
of commerce through these shipping lanes, which includes more than 80
percent of their crude oil supplies. China has also used maritime law
enforcement and paramilitary means to assert control over resources and
economic activities within dispute areas, such as fisheries and energy
extraction.
China is using its actions in the South China Sea to normalize its
presence and activities, and shape the regional political environment,
seeking to bring regional nations' interests into alignment with
China's, and discourage confrontation or criticism of China's approach.
10. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Mattis and General Dunford,
following up on the previous question, in your professional military
opinion, beyond continuing to ``fly, sail, and operate wherever
international law allows,'' what more should the United States be doing
to respond to China's on-going militarization of their features?
Secretary Mattis. The Department of Defense strongly supports the
whole-of-government approach to this crucial region and is working to
strengthen the lethality and readiness of U.S. Forces, while also
enhancing the military capabilities of key allies and partners in the
region. We are also working with allies and partners through DOD
programs like the Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative to
enhance shared capabilities, increase defense investment, improve
interoperability, streamline information sharing, and build networks of
capable and like-minded partners to address common challenges. The
United States will also continue to pursue a constructive, results-
oriented relationship with China in which we seek to improve
communication and reduce risks. However, we will not accept policies or
actions that threaten to undermine the international rules-based order,
a system that has benefited everyone in the region, including China.
General Dunford. Senator, given the current geopolitical
environment and the comprehensive national effort by China to support
their militarization of the region, our response must also exercise the
coordinated strength of the whole of the United States Government. We
continue to work closely within the interagency to ensure we approach
this challenge with such a whole-of-government response, enhanced by
our existing military efforts.
strategic competition in the arctic
11. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Mattis, after your confirmation
hearing last year, I asked what capabilities are needed to deter
Russian aggression and offset strategic competition in the Arctic,
which you coined as ``key strategic terrain.'' You responded that it
was a complex question and you would need to consult General Dunford,
the Service Chiefs and COCOM commanders for an assessment. Fifteen
months later, what's your opinion now?
Secretary Mattis. The National Defense Strategy (NDS) identifies
long-term strategic competition with China and Russia as the primary
challenge to the United States' national security. To address this
challenge, the NDS prioritizes building a Joint Force capable of
defending the Homeland as well as deterring and, if necessary,
defeating aggression by a major power. The NDS outlines capability
investment priorities that, although not unique to the Arctic, will
better enable the Joint Force to deter aggression by any major power
and defend our national security interests. These priorities include,
but are not limited to, the modernization of nuclear forces, missile
defense, and command, control, communications, computers, and
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.
The Department continues to work toward enhancing the Joint Force's
ability to operate within the specific challenges associated with the
Arctic environment, including domain awareness and long-range
communciations. The Commander of U.S. Northern Command, as the
Department of Defense Advocate for Arctic Capabilities, exercises
responsibility for identifying specific capability needs to support
such operations. The Department will continue to address these needs
through prudent investments and within existing budgetary processes.
The United States also recognizes that the Arctic is an area of
cooperation. The NDS recognizes our alliance and partner network as a
key element of the strategy and source of advantage for the United
States. As a result, close coordination with our allies and partners in
the Arctic is a key element of our approach to this strategic terrain.
Through the Arctic Council, all eight Arctic nations cooperate on
issues ranging from search and rescue to scientific, environmental, and
economic collaboration. This approach will ensure that we best leverage
our respective expertise and resources in the region.
12. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Mattis, the National Defense
Strategy says ``America can expand the competitive space, seizing the
initiative to challenge our competitors where we possess advantages and
they lack strength.'' Shouldn't this also be taken literally in terms
of Russia and the Arctic, especially with the importance they place on
the region?
Secretary Mattis. The National Defense Strategy (NDS) outlines a
comprehensive global approach to expanding the competitive space as
part of long-term strategic competition with China and Russia. Building
a more lethal, resilient, and agile Joint Force able to deter and
defeat aggression by any major power is a critical line of effort to
this strategic approach.
The NDS also affirms that in expanding the competitive space, the
United States will continue to be open to opportunities for engagement
with competitors. Implementing the NDS will ensure that the United
States is able to approach any engagement from a position of strength
and based on national interests. The Department's objective for the
Arctic is a secure and stable region where the Homeland is defended and
the United States' national interests are safeguarded. In support of a
stable Arctic region, the Department will be prepared to respond to
contingencies both independently and in cooperation with like-minded
nations.
withdrawing troops from korean peninsula
13. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Mattis, in mid-March, the
Washington Post obtained an audio recording from a fundraising speech
in Missouri wherein President Donald Trump appeared to threaten to
withdraw 32,000 United States troops from South Korea if he can't get a
better trade deal with Seoul. He also said, ``Our allies care about
themselves. They don't care about us.'' What are the strategic risks
associated with withdrawing United States troops from the Korean
Peninsula? How would our allies and adversaries view such a move?
Secretary Mattis. The Department of Defense is not considering the
withdrawal of United States Forces from the Korean Peninsula. Any
changes to United States Force posture or presence would begin with
close consultations with our allies in Seoul and Tokyo.
14. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, what are the operational and
tactical risks associated with withdrawing troops from the Korean
Peninsula?
General Dunford. The operational or tactical implications to our
operational plans should be addressed in a classified session.
Generally, the specific implications would vary based on the type,
quantity, and geographic locations a specific unit was redeployed to.
However, to reiterate, there are no plans to withdraw United States
Forces from the Korean Peninsula. The United States military presence
in Korea has brought stability to the peninsula and the broader region
for nearly 70 years. They symbolize the military's critical role in
securing United States interests in the Indo-Pacific region while
honoring our commitments to our partners and allies. We would evaluate
any proposed force posture adjustments against the ability to maintain
a sustained, positive impact on the security environment and in
consultations with our allies, to include the Republic of Korea.
15. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, in your
personal opinions, is withdrawing the troops a prudent course of
action?
Secretary Mattis. Our presence on the Korean Peninsula is based on
our alliance with the Republic of Korea, forged during the Korean War.
The presence of United States Forces in any country is contingent upon
the desires of the host government and the interests of the United
States, including our treaty commitments. Given the security conditions
that exist in the region today, the presence of U.S. Forces is a
demonstration of our ironclad commitment to defend our allies.
General Dunford. I do not believe withdrawing our forces would be a
prudent course of action, and to be clear, we have not been instructed
to make any changes to our Force Posture. Our presence on the Korean
Peninsula is a result of our strong alliance with the Republic of
Korea, forged during the Korean War, and strengthened over the last 68
years. The presence of U.S. Forces in any country is contingent on the
desires of the host government, the decisions of President of the
United States, and our treaty commitments.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
channels for military dialogue
16. Senator Reed. Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, in response
to Russia's annexation of Crimea and aggression against Eastern
Ukraine, the National Defense Authorization Act from fiscal year 2015
prohibited bilateral military-to-military cooperation with Russia, with
certain specified exceptions. That prohibition remains in place today.
As Russia continues its aggression towards us, our allies, and
partners, the risk of conflict resulting from miscommunication or
misunderstandings remains high and the margin for error is low. Do you
believe expanded engagement with Russia through military-to-military
dialogues at multiple levels would be beneficial for reducing the risk
of conflict as a result of misunderstanding and miscalculation?
Secretary Mattis. The Department of Defense continues to maintain
open lines of communication at multiple levels with the Russian
Federation on issues central to reducing the risks of misunderstanding
and miscalculation. This includes communication on topics including
operational deconfliction, strategic stability, and our existing arms
control obligations.
The Office of General Council closely reviews these engagements and
at no point to date did they constitute military cooperation in the
sense prohibited by section 1232 of the Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA or
section 1231 of the Fiscal Year 2018 NDAA.
Currently, we do not assess that expanded engagement with Russia
through military-to-military dialogue would have any effect on reducing
the risk of conflict as a result of misunderstanding or miscalculation.
General Dunford. I believe the current channels of engagement
between the United States and Russia militaries are sufficient to
minimize the risk of conflict. Our current military engagements with
Russia are focused on de-confliction in Syria, strategic stability, and
operational safety. The close proximity of our forces and Russian
forces in Syria requires the lines of communication remain open to
minimize the chance of accidents or miscalculations. The three meetings
between General Gerasimov and myself have further enhanced de-
confliction priorities between the United States and Russian
militaries.
17. Senator Reed. Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, are there
examples of such talks that you believe would be helpful?
Secretary Mattis. No. It is our assessment that existing channels
of military-to-military communication can continue satisfactorily under
the current legislation and that no further legislative intervention is
needed to facilitate additional talks.
General Dunford. As this point, we need to restart Strategic
Stability Talks with Russia. This venue permits us to address a broad
range of strategic issues of mutual concern. The last set of talks were
in September 2017 in Helsinki, Finland. However, we continue to await a
timeframe acceptable to Russia for our next set of talks. This is a
critical channel, co-chaired by Under Secretary of State Thompson and
the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, which allows both sides to
articulate strategic concerns and propose measures for mitigating the
risk of strategic miscalculation.
authorities of the usd-research & engineering
18. Senator Reed. Secretary Mattis, given the need to move
expeditiously in the development and deployment of technologies to
support the National Defense Strategy, and the common difficulties of
coordinating and focusing the efforts of disparate Services and
Agencies, do you feel that the USD(R&E) has sufficient authority to
direct activities and resources so as to optimize efforts in critical
technology areas?
Secretary Mattis. I am confident the Office of the Under Secretary
of Defense for Research and Engineering (OUSD(R&E)) is moving forward
to make modernization priorities a reality, and I am certain the
OUSD(R&E) is utilizing all of the tools and authorities given by
Congress through the reorganization. However, the Department welcomes
any additional authority or distinction necessary to realize
Congressional intent with regards to the execution of modernization
priorities and the roles and responsibilities of the OUSD(R&E).
19. Senator Reed. Secretary Mattis, what specific authorities will
the USD(R&E) have to direct activities to ensure that our efforts to
accelerate technological innovation and maintain or enhance our
battlefield technological superiority?
Secretary Mattis. The Under Seceretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering (USD(R&E)) will have many authorities to accelerate
innovation and ultimately improve lethality. While the complete
authorities of USD(R&E) are outlined in an excerpt from a July 13, 2018
memo from Deputy Secretary Shanahan, authorities of note include:
Establishing policies on, and supervising, all defense research and
engineering, technology development, technology transition,
prototyping, experimentation, and development testing activities and
programs, including the allocation of resources and unifying these
efforts across the Department; Before any decision to grant Milestone A
approval or Milestone B approval, any decision to enter into low-rate
initial production or full-rate production for Major Defense
Acquisition Program-1 D programs, or at any other time considered
appropriate or requested by the Secretary, provide independent
technical risk assessments and advise the Secretary on the progress
toward meeting key performance parameters, technology maturation,
reliability growth projections, interoperability, and cyber security
posture of including the maturity of critical technologies and
manufacturing processes that have not been successfully demonstrated in
a relevant environment; When requested by the Secretary of Defense,
Deputy Secretary of Defense, or the Milestone Decision Authority,
provide independent assessments of a major defense acquisition program
confirming that it incorporates program planning that anticipates the
evolution of capabilities to meet the changing threats, technology
insertion, and interoperability and be fielded when needed, prior to
the obligation of funds for technology development, systems
development, or production; When requested by the Secretary of Defense,
Deputy Secretary of Defense, or the Milestone Decision Authority,
provide independent sufficiency assessments of and advise the Defense
Acquisition Board Chairperson on major defense acquisition programs
prior to Milestone B and C decisions with respect to the sufficiency of
developmental test plans, schedules, resources, risks, and readiness
for operational testing and production, including the use of automated
data analytics or modeling and simulation tools and methodologies.
transparent budgeting for service contracts
20. Senator Reed. Secretary Mattis, I am concerned that DOD is not
providing sufficient transparency for its current and FYDP budget
request for spending on service contracts. This is in contrast to
information provided on either civilian personnel or military personnel
budgets.
Secretary Mattis, will you provide equivalent information on
service contractor spending, so as to promote accountability,
auditability, and transparency?
Secretary Mattis. I share your concern and the Department is
working a number of individual reform initiatives that will contribute
to addressing improved accountability, auditability, and transparency
in services budget and contracting. The Department is developing
implementation strategies to address your concern, which are mirrored
in both GAO Report 16-119, ``DOD Service Acquisition: Improved Use of
Available Data Needed to Better Manage and Forecast Service Contract
Requirements,'' dated February 18, 2016, and section 851 of the NDAA
for fiscal year 2018, Improvement of Planning for Acquisition of
Services.
As part of the Department's Business Reform, the Deputy Secretary
appointed a Reform Team for Services Contracting. The Reform Team, who
in conjunction with the major stakeholders (Under Secretaries of
Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, Comptroller, Personnel and
Readiness, the Chief Management Officer, and the Director of Cost
Assessment and Program Evaluation), is co-developing improved processes
supporting transparent services contracts budgeting. Initiatives
include:
Developing and implementing more transparent and
traceable tracking methodologies for individual contracted services
requirements throughout the programming and budgeting process. This
transparency is envisioned to provide more insight into the Total Force
management by detailing budgets for contracted services at (or near)
the same level of detail the Department tracks its personnel (military
and civilian) billets.
Developing and implementing a requirements prioritization
process, supported by data. Currently, requirements are validated
within organizations or budget lines at the lowest level, within
individual stove-piped functions and rolled up into the Operations and
Maintenance appropriation. This roll-up prevents Department-level
assessment and prioritization of contracted services in support of
mission areas, for example, asking whether one organization's need for
one kind of service is more important than the same, or a different
organization purchasing different types of services.
Improving contracted Services Requirements Review Boards
(SRRBs) in both scope, timing and traceability. The SRRB validations
must take place early enough in advance of the programming and
budgeting process to provide early input supporting trade-off and
prioritization decisions.
The Department has not yet completed implementation of these
initiatives and will continue to press implementation of services
contracting reform that will, in part, lead to the desired budget
transparency that will support accountability, auditability, and
improved trade-off decisions.
role of civilian workforce
21. Senator Reed. Secretary Mattis, what role do you envision that
the civilian workforce will have in your attempts to execute the
National Defense Strategy?
Secretary Mattis. As stated in the National Defense Strategy, a
modern, agile, information-advantaged Department requires a motivated,
diverse and highly skilled civilian workforce that is sufficiently
sized and appropriately resourced. Department of Defense civilians are
an essential enabler of our mission capabilities and operational
readiness. The Department must undertake a sustained effort to build an
appropriate, cost-informed civilian workforce that best serves mission
requirements. We must also free up uniformed personnel for military
essential needs, and conserve scarce resources for recapitalization,
modernization and readiness.
22. Senator Reed. Secretary Mattis, in what specific areas will
civilian personnel play the leading role in your efforts?
Secretary Mattis. Department of Defense (DOD) civilian employees
are an essential part of our National Defense Strategy. The
Department's civilians perform critical functions in intelligence,
equipment maintenance, medical care, family support, base operating
services and other activities that directly support readiness. The
Department's civilian workforce brings to bear capabilities, expertise
and skills that directly impact DOD's operational warfighting
capabilities. DOD civilians build and maintain weapon systems at depots
and shipyards; staff child care centers and schools around the world;
keep our airfields, ranges, and armories open; and form the backbone of
installation family programs and support. Our civilian workforce
provides institutional stability and continuity, and enables the
warfighter to focus on military essential needs--a critical component
to restoring readiness and lethality.
management hq reductions
23. Senator Reed. Secretary Mattis, what has been the impacts of
Congressionally-mandated management headquarters reduction on your
ability to implement management reforms and execute the National
Defense Strategy?
Secretary Mattis. While the Major Headquarters Activities
reductions limit the manpower that can be made available to support
simultaneous reform efforts, the Department will continue to work to
achieve reform within the mandated reduction requirements.
24. Senator Reed. Secretary Mattis, what is the impact of these
reductions on the morale of the workforce and the able to retain the
expertise that you need?
Secretary Mattis. In reducing the size and expenditures of
headquarters in accordance with statutorily mandated reductions, the
Department has leveraged the full suite of personnel and force
management authorities at its disposal--while ensuring mission
accomplishment and preserving talent and competency. While any
organizational reduction can impact the morale of the civilian
workforce, our employees recognize the value their work to the
execution of the National Defense Strategy, and they continue to put in
the extra effort required to get the job done.
25. Senator Reed. Secretary Mattis, what has been the specific
impact on the following organizations' ability to execute their
designated missions: Office of the Director of Cost Analysis and
Program Evaluation and Office of the Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation.
Secretary Mattis. Director of Operational Test and Evaluation
(DOT&E): In accordance with the mandated Major Headquarters Activities
(MHA) reductions, DOT&E conducted a 35 percent cumulative reduction in
civilian personnel which were fundamental to performing its assigned
mission. Pursuing MHA cuts would detract from DOT&E's ability to
maintain pace with a rapidly changing Department and address an
expanding workload.
Office of the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation
(CAPE): The MHA reductions limit CAPE's ability to reconstitute
operational warfighting models, conduct independent cost estimates,
detailed programmatic analyses, and strategic trade-offs necessary to
fully support the Department. Cost estimating workload has increased
while associated staff has decreased; as a result, CAPE is relying more
upon its new authority to approve Service Cost Estimates rather than
conducting its own Independent Cost Estimates. Although CAPE received
resources in fiscal year 2017 to support the Department's need to
refocus efforts on warfighting models, CAPE is facing limited ability
for additional workload including congressionally-mandated studies,
enterprise data initiatives such as the Cost Assessment Database
Enterprise, and other economic analyses on labor and contract
economics.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Kirsten Gillibrand
transgender service
26. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Mattis, you stated that ``under
the Carter policy'' permitting transgender service, ``we cannot report
that a problem [related to unit cohesion, morale, or discipline]
emanated from a transgender'' service member. What is the regulatory
language that prohibits commanders from reporting problems related to
unit cohesion, morale, or discipline that arise from implementation of
the Carter policy? Are the Service Central Coordination Cells created
by DOD Instruction 1330.28 designed to receive reports from commanders
and provide ``expert advice and assistance to commanders with regard to
service by transgender service members"?
Secretary Mattis. While the Department has allowed for service
members to change their gender marker since July 2016, the Department
did not establish--then or thereafter--specific reporting requirements
relating to military members who have initiated gender transition
plans. The Department does not track transgender Service members as an
individual group or category for the purpose of determining their
impact on unit cohesion, morale, and discipline. As noted at footnote
143 on page 37 of the Department's Report and Recommendations on
Military Service by Transgender Persons, this decision was taken in
consideration of the privacy interests of the individuals involved.
Specifically, Department of Defense Instruction 1300.28, ``In-Service
Transition for Transgender Service Members,'' paragraph 2.2.f, directs
the Military Departments to ``[e]nsure the protection of personally
identifiable information (PII) and personal privacy considerations in
the implementation of this issuance and Military Department and Service
regulations.'' See also paragraph 3.6 (``[I]n cases in which there is a
need to collect, use, maintain, or disseminate PII in furtherance of
this issuance . . . the Military Departments and the USCG will protect
against unwarranted invasions of personal privacy and the unauthorized
disclosure of such PII.''). Due to these limitations, the Panel of
Experts, as the Department's Report notes at page 18, instead met
directly with some commanders of transgender service members who
provided their input on the issues associated with accommodating gender
transition treatments for gender dysphoria.
The Service Central Coordination Cells created by Department of
Defense Instruction 1330.28 are designed to provide expert advice and
assistance to commanders with regard to service by transgender Service
members. They are not the forum for receiving reports or complaints
regarding unit cohesion, morale, or discipline.
27. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Mattis, you stated that, in order
to permit accession by transgender applicants under the Carter policy,
you ``would have to make a special category that says you can have
these disqualifying factors [of anxiety or depression], only if you're
transgender and then we can bring you in.'' You stated ``we don't allow
anyone in with that [anxiety or depression].'' Is it correct that
current, inclusive policy requires that an applicant with a history of
gender dysphoria ``has been stable without clinically significant
distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important
areas of functioning for 18 months,'' meaning that qualified
transgender applicants do not have anxiety or depression?
Secretary Mattis. DTM-16-005, ``Military Service of Transgender
Service Members,'' dated June 30, 2016 and signed by then-Secretary
Carter, established interim guidance for the retention, accession,
separation, in-service transition and medical coverage for transgender
persons. As required by existing court orders, this guidance was
extended indefinitely in a memorandum issued by Deputy Secretary of
Defense Patrick Shanahan on December 8, 2017, entitled ``Medical
Standards for Appointment, Enlistment, or Induction of Transgender
Applicants into the Military Services.'' Under DTM-16-005, ``a history
of gender dysphoria is disqualifying, unless, as certified by a
licensed medical provider, the applicant has been stable without
clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational,
or other important areas of functioning for 18 months.'' This means
that the applicant has not manifested any clinically significant
symptoms of anxiety, depression, or distress over the 18 months prior
to his or her application for accession. By contrast, a person with a
history of depressive disorder or anxiety disorder must demonstrate
stability for 36 continuous months.
28. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Mattis, is it correct that DOD
Instruction 6130.03 states that applicants, transgender or not, with a
history of anxiety or depression are qualified if they can demonstrate
the requisite period of stability, meaning that the military does in
fact allow enlistment by applicants with a history of anxiety or
depression?
Secretary Mattis. The most recent version of Department of Defense
Instruction 6130.03, ``Medical Standards for Appointment, Enlistment,
or Induction into the Military Services,'' dated March 30, 2018, lists
disqualifying medical conditions. As explained on page 20 of the
Department's Report and Recommendations on Military Service by
Transgender Persons, the vast majority of mental health conditions and
disorders, including bipolar disorder, personality disorder, obsessive-
compulsive disorder and body dysmorphic disorder are automatically
disqualifying, absent a waiver. However, for a select few mental health
conditions, such as anxiety and depression, persons may be accessed
without a waiver if they can demonstrate stability for 36 continuous
months immediately prior to their application date. Anxiety and
depression fall under section 5.28, ``Learning, Psychiatric, and
Behavioral Disorders,'' which provides as follows: Depressive disorder
is disqualifying if: (1) Outpatient care including counseling required
for longer than 12 cumulative months; (2) Symptoms or treatment within
the last 36 months; (3) The applicant required any inpatient treatment
in a hospital or residential facility; (4) Any recurrence; or (5) Any
suicidality (in accordance with Paragraph 5.28.m.). History of anxiety
disorders is disqualifying if: (1) Outpatient care including counseling
was required for longer than 12 cumulative months. (2) Symptomatic or
treatment within the last 36 months. (3) The applicant required any
inpatient treatment in a hospital or residential facility. (4) Any
recurrence. (5) Any suicidality (in accordance with Paragraph 5.28.m.).
Applicants with a history of a single episode of anxiety or depression
requiring treatment and who have been free of symptoms for the 36
months prior to their application may be eligible for accession into
military service. Any recurrence of anxiety or depression renders an
applicant ineligible for accession unless a waiver is granted. Under
the current court-ordered transgender policy, by contrast, persons with
a history of gender dysphoria are eligible for accession or enlistment
with only 18 months of stability.
29. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Mattis, can you please provide me
with a list of all health experts inside and outside government who
participated in or contributed to the panel on transgender service and
its final report?
Secretary Mattis. Given this matter is subject to ongoing
litigation in multiple federal courts in which the government is
asserting privileges, lodging objections to requests for information,
and relying on existing protective orders to ensure robust deliberation
and protect confidential and sensitive information, I am unable to
provide details regarding the names of individuals who advised or
provided information to the Panel of Experts. However, the Department's
Report and Recommendations on Military Service by Transgender Persons
describes the process and the categories of individuals the Panel
consulted (pages 17-18) and provides a thorough explanation of the
Department's recommendations (pages 32-43).
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
cyber
30. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Mattis, in February, Senators
Nelson, Shaheen, and I sent a letter to you urging you to order
CYBERCOM to prepare to engage Russian cyber operators and disrupt their
activities as they conduct clandestine influence operations against our
upcoming elections. Last month, we heard from CYBERCOM Commander ADM
Rogers that he has not been given such authority. The new CYBERCOM
Commander, GEN Nakasone, was just confirmed by the Senate this week.
During his nomination hearing before this committee he acknowledged a
need for a more aggressive posture toward Russia. Would you agree that
Russia has not been deterred by our actions thus far? Would you agree
that Russia will continue to seek to meddle in our elections?
Secretary Mattis. [Deleted.]
31. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Mattis, CYBERCOM's National
Mission Teams' mission is to defend the Nation from cyberattacks of
significant consequence. Since we heard from ADM Rogers, have you
authorized CYBERCOM to engage Russian cyber operators and allow
CYBERCOM to disrupt their activities as they conduct clandestine
operations? How can we best use CYBERCOM to counter Russia's
disinformation campaigns for our elections?
Secretary Mattis. We are working closely with our interagency
counterparts to develop and support implementation of whole-of-
government strategies to counter Russia's sophisticated disinformation
campaigns. The Department of Defense is only one part of the national
strategy to counter Russia's sophisticated disinformation campaign,
which employs a diverse set of cyber and non-cyber capabilities. The
Department's mission is to preempt, defeat, or deter adversary cyber
threats before they can impact the Homeland. In this context, the
Department's cyber forces operate to counter Russia's malicious cyber
activities aimed at the United States.
32. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Mattis, do you believe DOD
requires additional authorities or authorizations to engage Russian
disinformation operations?
Secretary Mattis. The Department is employing its current
authorities to address a wide range of issues associated with Russian
malign influence and continues to assess the need for any additional
authorizations that may be necessary to counter this threat.
afghanistan
33. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, last
year, the President announced a ``new'' strategy for South Asia which
deepened United States involvement in Afghanistan. This plan also de-
emphasized nation building, while focusing on a tougher stance on
Pakistan's terrorist safe harbors. In response, President Ghani
committed to a new Compact for reform initiatives across the Afghan
Government to take a more central role in improving the country. The
effectiveness of these new initiatives and our revised strategy is
unclear and violence continues to sow instability. Military commanders,
such as Generals Votel and Nicholson, have testified that the United
States is in a stalemate in Afghanistan. What are our objectives in
Afghanistan? Do you believe we are achieving those objectives? What
impact has the Administration's strategy had in Afghanistan?
Secretary Mattis. The main objective of the strategy announced by
the President in August is to prevent attacks against the United States
Homeland, our citizens, and our allies and partners from being planned
and carried out from Afghanistan. The strategy's conditions-based
approach removed timelines for withdrawal and added the appropriate
resources and authorities necessary to conduct both the train, advise,
and assist mission and the mission to counter terrorist threats.
The additional assets, authorities, and resources required to
support the strategy in Afghanistan arrived earlier this year, and the
results will not become clear until after the fighting season. Initial
feedback on initiatives such as tactical-level advising of Afghan
National Defense and Security Forces by the Security Force Assistance
Brigade have been positive. Additionally, the strategy appears to have
helped on the diplomatic front as evidenced by the Eid ceasefire.
Again, I believe that we will have better indicators of the strategy's
effectiveness at the end of the fighting season.
General Dunford. The South Asia strategy's core for Afghanistan is
to help set conditions for a political settlement between the
Government of Afghanistan and the Taliban, in order to bring about a
sustainable end to the conflict and prevent Afghanistan from re-
emerging as platform for terrorist attacks against the United States
Homeland, our citizens, and our allies. The United States Government
conditions-based approach is led by our diplomatic efforts to build
international consensus for an Afghan-led peace process and supported
by our military efforts to train Afghan security forces and maintain
pressure on elements of the Taliban that choose not to reconcile.
We are less than one year into implementation of the new strategy
and will need additional time to evaluate the effectiveness of our new
approach. We are encouraged by early indicators, the most significant
of which was the first nationwide ceasefire in 17 years over the June
Eid holiday. The international community, including leaders from
Muslim-majority countries and religious councils, have issued strong
appeals for a peace process. We will continue to monitor these and
other developments.
34. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Mattis and General Dunford,
according to a Reuters article this week, DOD estimates that 56 percent
of Afghanistan is under government control. Would you agree with this
estimate? Do you believe the Afghan Government is capable of attaining
its goal of securing 80 percent of its population under government
control by 2020?
Secretary Mattis. The Afghan National Defense and Security Forces
(ANDSF) remain committed to securing the majority of the Afghan
population and denying the Taliban its strategic and operational
objectives. Population control alone will not be sufficient to bring
peace and stability to Afghanistan. The key to success remains
sustained military pressure against the Taliban in order to convince
them that they cannot achieve their objectives through violence and
continuation of the conflict. The targeted investment of U.S. assets
and personnel has increased the lethality of the ANDSF this fighting
season. Properly utilized, the ANDSF can apply the military pressure
required to open the door for peace talks in the future.
General Dunford. The June 2018 Report ``Enhancing Security and
Stability in Afghanistan Report'' stated that, as of May 2018, the
Resolute Support headquarters assessed that the Afghan Government
maintained control or influence over approximately 65 percent of the
population, while insurgents had control or influence over
approximately 12 percent of the population, with the remainder
contested. The Afghan Government retains control of Kabul, major
population centers, most key transit routes, provincial capitals, and a
majority of district centers. The increase of U.S. advisors working
below the corps and zone levels, are better enabling the ANDSF to
sustain offensive pressure on the insurgency and secure the population.
It is important to remember that this is a conditions-based, not time-
based strategy, and the ultimate goal is a reconciliation process
between the Taliban and the government of Afghanistan.
35. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, the
President cut off aid to Pakistan to push it to stop harboring
terrorists. How has this impacted operations with Pakistan? Do you
believe withholding security assistance has prompted Pakistan to cease
providing sanctuary and support to militant groups that harm United
States interests? What more must be done?
Secretary Mattis. The suspension of security assistance froze
financial assistance to all three branches of Pakistan's military,
except for a very limited number of programs that directly support
United States national security interests. The United States and
Pakistan still share common security objectives, and although Pakistan
has taken initial constructive steps against externally focused
militant and terrorist organizations, it has not yet taken the decisive
or sustained actions that have been requested. The United States is
prepared to use the full range of tools at its disposal to encourage
Pakistan to cease policies that threaten United States interests and
regional stability.
General Dunford. The United States Government suspended security
assistance to Pakistan due to Pakistan's lack of effective actions in
response to our requests to take action against terrorist and militant
safe havens. We continue to engage Pakistan on our request and are
working with our interagency and international partners to convince
Pakistan that their interests are best served by a stable and secure
South Asia, free of terrorism.
syria and iran
36. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, as
the conflict in Syria continues to grow more complex, I remain deeply
concerned about the possibility of further instances that risk sparking
more serious confrontations between Israel and Iran. How are you
working to address malign Iranian activity on Israel's border?
Secretary Mattis. Our military efforts in Syria are focused on
annihilating ISIS, but we remain concerned about Iran's destabilizing
activity in Syria and attendant threats to Israel. We are working with
allies and partners to expose Iran's malign activity, and as always,
are working with Israel to ensure that it has the means to defend
itself from Iranian threats.
General Dunford. Our military efforts in Syria focus on
annihilating ISIS, but we remain highly concerned about Iran's
destabilizing activity in Syria, particularly efforts to use Syria to
foment attacks on Israel. We are working with allies and partners in
the region to expose Iran's malign activity, and as always, are working
with Israel to ensure that it has the means to defend itself from
Iranian threats.
37. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, I am
concerned that Iran is entrenching itself in Syria--establishing its
proxy militias along the Israel-Syria border and creating a land bridge
from Tehran to Beirut through Syria and Iraq. What more should we do to
address Iran's expansion? How can we confront the prospect of a long-
term Iranian military presence in Syria?
Secretary Mattis. We share your concern about Iranian presence in
Syria. We are working with Israel and other regional partners to ensure
they have the ability to mitigate this threat. The United States is
seeking support from partners and allies to exert diplomatic and
economic pressure on Iran to encourage Iran to end its destabilizing
activity, including its activity in Syria.
General Dunford. We share your concern about Iran entrenching
itself in Syria. We are working with Israel to ensure it has the
ability to mitigate any threat Iran may pose from Syria, and are
working to address the larger issue of Iranian military presence in
Syria through the diplomatic channels, and more broadly, the
interagency process.
38. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Mattis and General Dunford,
reporting this week highlighted a series of cargo flights from Iran to
Syria--following the April 13 United States and allies' strikes--that
potentially carried weapons for use by Assad and his allies that could
threaten Israel. What can be done to prevent this from continuing? How
can we best counter it?
Secretary Mattis. Iranian proliferation of weapons is a major issue
that is destabilizing the Middle East. We see this not only in Syria,
but also across the region in places like Yemen. We support efforts to
expose Iran's proliferation of weapons in violation of UN Security
Council Resolutions through our Iranian Materiel Display. We are also
ensuring that Israel has the means to defend itself from Iran or its
proxies.
General Dunford. Iranian proliferation of weapons is a major issue
that is destabilizing the Middle East. We see this not only in Syria,
but also in Yemen and Afghanistan. We are exposing Iran's proliferation
of weapons in violation of UN Security Council Resolutions through our
Iranian Material Display. We are also ensuring that Israel has the
means to defend itself should Iran or its proxies attack Israel.
russian submarines
39. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Mattis and General Dunford,
Russia's resurgence is a carefully calculated revision of their Cold
War playbook--similar tactics complemented by technological
advancements. The GIUK gap is Russia's gateway to the Atlantic Ocean,
and the increased presence of Russian submarines in the GIUK gap
requires the full attention of the United States and our allies. As you
know, vital communications cables run along the ocean floor not far
from the GIUK gap--providing internet and communications across the
world. In December, the Washington Post published an article about
increased Russian submarine activity near these cables and the British
military has raised alarms over this as well. How are you working to
address the vulnerability the GIUK gap presents? How can we prevent
Russian submarines from exploiting it? Are we doing enough to ensure
Russia does not gain a strategic advantage in this region?
Secretary Mattis. The Department of Defense is keenly aware of
Russia's activity in the North Atlantic, and is taking robust steps--
both multilaterally and through NATO--to preserve our security at sea
and on both sides of the Atlantic. In May, Admiral Richardson announced
that we would reconstitute the U.S. 2nd Fleet, which will oversee our
naval assets along the U.S. East Coast and northern Atlantic Ocean. It
will also plan and conduct maritime, joint, and combined operations and
will train, certify, and provide maritime forces to respond to global
contingencies.
General Dunford. We recognize the threat that this capability
represents. To address the growing Russian naval capabilities the
United States Navy is reviving the 2nd Fleet, which will be based in
Norfolk, Virginia and part of the NATO Joint Forces Command. The United
States and NATO do not seek to prevent Russian submarines from
transiting through GIUK gap, but will monitor them. We are
recapitalizing the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System, enhancing
our ability to detect submarines. The U.S. also has the means to combat
enemy submarines--with P-8 Poseidons from the air, Arleigh Burke-class
destroyers from the surface and U.S. nuclear-powered submarines
underwater. In addition, nearly all of NATO's 29 countries have navies
to assist in anti-submarine warfare. To ensure we do not lose our
strategic advantage, we are now dedicating more time for our Carrier
Strike Groups to operate in the Atlantic. This includes enhancing the
participation of these assets in exercises with allies and partners to
ensure appropriate levels of readiness and interoperability.
40. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, what
do you assess Russia's intentions to be with their activity near
undersea cables? How concerned should we be? Have you discussed this
issue with our allies?
Secretary Mattis. During the Cold War, the Soviet Navy had plans to
damage cables associated with underwater acoustic arrays in order to
protect their deploying submarines. Regardless of Russia's current
intent, the United States is prepared to respond to any challenge that
threatens its critical interests, and is working closely with Allies to
enhance its defense posture in the North Atlantic.
General Dunford. Russia is clearly taking an interest in NATO and
NATO nations' undersea infrastructure. We and our allies are
undertaking prudent measures to ensure that any such activity cannot
disrupt essential communications. The undersea lines carry nearly all
of the communications on the internet, facilitating trillions of
dollars of daily trade. The Russian underwater activity is a concern
and we are taking appropriate steps to mitigate the threat. As General
Scaparrotti has mentioned, the Russian undersea activity is on a scale
not seen since the 1980s. In the near future the U.S. Navy will be
reactivating 2nd Fleet in Norfolk, Virginia to better protect the
Homeland and address resurgent submarine activity. Our allies recognize
the need for a new Maritime Focused Command and are supportive of
creating a third NATO Joint Forces Command dedicated to protecting the
Atlantic.
f-35
41. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Mattis, the F-35 brings a
tremendous leap in capabilities over legacy 4th generation aircraft
that are fundamental to executing and surviving in multi-role fighter
missions in Anti-Access, Area Denial environments. This committee hears
your concern about affordability with sustainment costs, but I
understand there is a major effort underway to address that issue. The
Nation can ill afford to reduce the number of F-35s it plans on buying,
as we need 5th generation aircraft in large numbers. We have made that
mistake before on previous programs, and we should not do it again. In
your testimony this month before the House Armed Services Committee and
in your prepared statement before this Committee you stated, ``We will
evaluate the performance of both F-35s and F/A-18s to determine the
most appropriate mix of aircraft as we move forward.'' Would you agree
that these two aircraft are not equivalent from a performance and
capability stand-point, and that the F-35 has superior capabilities?
Secretary Mattis. I do agree that the F-35 and F/A-18 do not have
equivalent performance and capability characteristics. Stealth
technology and advanced integrated systems enable the F-35 to counter
rapidly evolving air-to-air and surface-to-air threats, which cannot be
matched by fourth-generation aircraft, even with planned modernization
efforts for aircraft like the F/A-18. In the case of the U.S. Navy, it
has always been the plan for the F-35 to complement the F/A-18E/F in a
mixed future Carrier Air Wing.
42. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Mattis, we are seeing progress
with the F-35 program as exhibited by the recent completion of the
System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase this month. To date,
we have been producing aircraft concurrently with development, which I
believe has saved taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars; however,
one way to drive down cost is to increase production. As we have yet to
reach full rate production, is the DOD committed to getting to full
rate production for the F-35? When do you anticipate we will reach full
rate production? Do you agree that production level increases will
contribute to cost savings?
Secretary Mattis. The Department is committed to reaching full rate
production with the F-35 program. Prior to reaching that decision
point, the program will conduct Initial Operational Test and Evaluation
(IOT&E). A robust, challenging, and stressing IOT&E enables the
Department to validate the operational suitability and effectiveness of
the aircraft prior to transition to full rate production. IOT&E is
projected to begin later this fall, with completion in 2019. The
Department will commence full rate production decision activities once
IOT&E completes and the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation
submits the required assessment. I agree that increased production
rates contribute to lower unit costs.
43. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Mattis, the fiscal year 2019 DOD
Budget Request includes a handful of requests for Multi-Year
Procurements (MYP) for aircraft like the F/A-18 Super Hornet and C-130J
Hercules. Will the DOD look to a five-year MYP of F-35s to reduce the
cost of procurement during full rate production and ensure stability
with the supply chain?
Secretary Mattis. The Department is currently assessing all
appropriate options for F-35 procurement; execution of the selected
option will commence once a full rate production decision is reached. A
five-year multi-year procurement is one of the options.
44. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Mattis, as the National Defense
Strategy has outlined, the primary concern in U.S. national security
will be inter-state strategic competition. What 5th generation
capabilities from the F-35 will counter the threats of inter-state peer
and near peer threats? How will the F-35 make the joint force more
lethal, survivable, and capable?
Secretary Mattis. The F-35 is the premier multi-mission, fifth
generation strike fighter operating today and provides our warfighters
unprecedented game changing technology. Stealth technology and advanced
integrated systems enable the F-35 to counter rapidly evolving air-to-
air and surface-to-air threats. With unmatched lethality the F-35 is
able to execute all assigned missions in Strategic Attack, Close Air
Support, Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD), Destruction of Enemy
Air Defenses (DEAD) and Offensive and Defensive Air Superiority. The
unique F-35 partnership features joint and coalition interoperability
together, ensuring that future operations can be executed more
efficiently and effectively. The F-35's interoperability allows
seamless information exchanges making every participant in the
battlespace smarter, more lethal, and more survivable. The F-35 offers
the U.S. military a transformational capability that will fundamentally
change the way our Nation operates around the globe--the F-35 aligns
with and plays a central role in driving the Department's National
Defense Strategy.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie Hirono
recruiting and retention
45. Senator Hirono. Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, DOD's
Fiscal Year 2019 Budget Request calls for end strength increases for
all of the services, totaling nearly 26,000 personnel across the
Active, Reserve and Guard components. All of the services have
testified that nearly 70 percent of young people in the United States
cannot qualify for military service. On top of that, we are seeing near
record low unemployment levels and the Army just announced this week
that it is not on track to reach its recruiting goal for this year. Do
you anticipate difficulties in being able to meet recruiting goals
given the current environment and required standards?
Secretary Mattis. The tightening of the labor market and the
increased recruiting missions will be a challenge in the coming year.
It is critical that the Military Services have the resources needed to
face these challenges.
General Dunford. The tightening of the labor market and the
increased recruiting missions will be a challenge in the coming year.
It is critical that the Services have the resources needed to face
these challenges.
civilian workforce
46. Senator Hirono. Secretary Mattis, while the DOD's Fiscal Year
2019 Budget Request includes a 2.6 percent pay increase for military
personnel, the President's Budget Request freezes civilian pay and aims
to decrease the frequency of step increases. The budget request
estimates there will be over 776,000 civilian employees at DOD in
fiscal year 2019. What is the impact on DOD's ability to recruit and
retain the highly skilled and qualified civilian workforce that
provides the backbone to our military forces if civilian pay does not
at least keep up with inflation?
Secretary Mattis. Annual pay raises are one element of the
Department's ability to attract and retain civilian personnel and
address pay disparities. Annual pay raises assist in meeting mission
critical recruitment and retention goals. The Department has a wide
range of authorities and incentives focused on the recruitment and
retention of a highly-qualified and talented civilian workforce. The
Department will continue to utilize all the authorities and tools at
its disposal in order to mitigate any impacts resulting from a
potential pay freeze while maintaining a mission-ready civilian
workforce sized to regenerate and sustain readiness and enhance
lethality.
47. Senator Hirono. Secretary Mattis, The Defense Business Board
did a February 2018 study that noted that in fiscal year 2016, DOD
spent $141 billion on 777,000 service contractors, or 24 percent of its
top line, nearly double the $71.5 billion it spent on 740,000 civilian
employees. Additionally, the Department spent slightly more on contract
services as it did on MILPERS ($141 billion compared to $136 billion).
Is this an appropriate balance of the MILPERS, Civilian and Contract
workforce?
Secretary Mattis. The Department's Total Force--Active and Reserve
military personnel, civilians, and contracted services--execute
missions of incredible breadth and scope, in locations around the
globe. Successfully executing these missions in a way that is not only
effective but also cost-efficient, requires the right type, mix, and
level of talent from all elements of our Total Force. There is no
single, pre-determined Total Force solution--the right mix or balance
will vary based on mission, operating environment, labor market, and
resourcing. It is therefore critical that we continuously review and
rationalize our Total Force mix, to ensure that the most appropriate
source of labor--be that military, civilian, or contracted services--is
being used to meet the Department's mission.
energy resilience
48. Senator Hirono. Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, Energy
resilience and assurance is a vital component to our national security.
The need to reduce energy consumption, use alternative energy sources,
and increase resilience is closely tied to our overall national
security. Specifically, I am concerned of threats in the Pacific region
that could disrupt fuel delivery or electricity supplies. In the
region, DOD relies on vulnerable fuel and electric supplies to conduct
its military operations, where electric power outages on military bases
or fuel supply disruptions due to natural disasters or intentional
actions could disrupt critical military operations in the Indo-Pacific
region. How has the Department prioritized its energy needs in this
budget request?
Secretary Mattis. As indicated in the National Defense Strategy,
resilient forces and facilities are an important component of deterring
and defeating adversaries. The Department continues to evaluate the
warfighting risks of our dependence on large amounts of energy,
primarily petroleum, and is adapting the training and equipment
employed by our forces around the globe. In support of this effort, the
Fiscal Year 2019 President's Budget Request includes over $2.8 billion
for new equipment, revised plans, concepts, and wargames to account for
increasing risks to logistics and sustainment, and enhancements to how
the Department considers energy in developing new capabilities. We
continue to conduct campaign analyses and wargames to identify the
tradeoffs and risks of energy dependence, and foster the development of
innovative mitigation strategies to ensure our success. To relieve the
dependence of contingency bases on vulnerable fuel supply chains and
increase our operational reach, the Department also is exploring
reliable and cost effective distributed energy sources and improved
power generation and storage. These initiatives are designed to reduce
risk from our dependence on petroleum and to increase our resilience
and improve future capability across the range of military operations.
General Dunford. The Department identified more than $2.8 billion
for the execution of operational energy initiatives in fiscal year
2019. These investments procure new or upgrade existing equipment,
improve propulsion, and adapt plans, concepts, and wargames to account
for increasing risks to logistics and sustainment, and enhance the role
of energy considerations in developing new capabilities. Separate from
these investments, the fiscal year 2019 budget also includes an
estimated $9 billion request for 86.2 million barrels of fuel.
49. Senator Hirono. Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, Can you
discuss these energy resilience priorities in terms of both operational
fuel and delivery of electricity to your military installations?
Secretary Mattis. The Department of Defense (DOD) has policies in
place to ensure all military installations are energy resilient and
they have the energy they need to operate their critical missions in
the event of power disruption. Installation energy resilience
priorities and requirements are articulated in DOD Instruction 4170.11,
Installation Energy Management (Change 1, Effective March 16, 2016).
This instruction requires the Military Departments to take necessary
steps to plan and have the capability to ensure available, reliable and
quality power to continuously accomplish DOD missions from our
installations and facilities.
Specifically, DOD Components are required to:
Clearly define, identify and update critical energy
requirements that align to critical mission operations in collaboration
with tenants, mission owners and operators of critical facilities on
DOD installations.
Perform periodic vulnerability assessments to gauge the
risk of energy disruptions on our installations and implement remedial
actions to remove unacceptable energy resilience risks.
Provide candidate energy projects that address the DOD
energy resilience requirements during the planning, programming,
budgeting and execution process.
Focusing on priority installations, DOD is developing Installation
Energy Plans to articulate strategies for addressing energy resilience.
General Dunford. The Services and Combatant Commands include risk
assessments for energy disruptions in planning activities.
Incorporating operational energy in wargames, exercises, and planning
creates a partnership with industry to test developing capabilities.
This government-industry partnership facilitates new operational
concepts and strategy development articulated in the operational energy
improvements section of the Fiscal Year 2019 Defense Budget. These
considerations help inform future system designs and help the
Department make holistic energy logistics and infrastructure decisions
to prioritize energy resilience with combat capability requirements.
Although the Joint Staff does not program for electricity
infrastructure, we are working in concert with Secretary Mattis and his
staff to prioritize and address energy requirements for support of
military missions.
cyber security
50. Senator Hirono. Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, over the
course of several hearings in this Committee this year, numerous
Combatant Commanders and Service Chiefs have testified to the lack of a
consolidated, whole-of-government strategy for cyber operations. As
other countries, such as China, begin to consolidate and integrate
their cyber operations, are we losing a competitive advantage in cyber
space by not doing so as well?
Secretary Mattis. The United States can most effectively advance
our interests in cyberspace through coordinated U.S. Government actions
that are tightly aligned and mutually reinforcing. The Department of
Defense already participates in a robust interagency policy development
and implementation process through the National Security Council (NSC)
and through direct communications with other departments and agencies.
The Department is working with the NSC and our interagency partners to
build on the direction provided by the 2017 National Security Strategy,
including supporting the development of a national cyber strategy and
with a new cyber strategy for the Department. I am confident that these
efforts will enable us to compete more effectively in cyberspace.
General Dunford. Yes. There is mounting empirical evidence that the
mitigation approaches used over the past decade have been ineffective.
Fortunately, the 2018 National Defense Strategy emphasizes that our
ability to prevail in strategic cyber competition requires the seamless
integration of all instruments of national power. A whole-of-U.S.
Government approach for protecting, defending, and operating in
cyberspace must include new, DOD operational concepts and authorities
to persistently defend forward, new cybersecurity legislation to
improve the resiliency of privately owned information technology, and a
national recommitment to improving STEM education.
51. Senator Hirono. Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, do you
believe the U.S. should develop a national strategy to consolidate and
integrate our cyber operations?
Secretary Mattis. The 2017 National Security Strategy provided
guidance to departments and agencies about how to advance U.S. national
interests in cyberspace. The Department is currently moving forward
with several interagency efforts to add additional cyber-specific
detail to guide implementation of the National Security Strategy,
including clarifying the United States' objectives in cyberspace and
detailing the cyber roles and responsibilities of Federal departments
and agencies. I am confident that these efforts will improve the U.S.
Government's ability to consolidate and integrate our cyberspace
activities.
General Dunford. The National Security Strategy and National
Defense Strategy highlight a robust U.S. cyber capability, integrated
across the interagency, as a key U.S. strategic priority. The
forthcoming DOD Cyber Strategy will implement this strategic vision
across the DOD. Currently DOD is working closely with the Department of
Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, the law enforcement
community, the State Department, and with the Intelligence Community,
as well as with our international partners to ensure our cyber efforts
are coordinated in a way that creates maximum advantage for the Nation.
A comprehensive national strategy would be helpful in formalizing the
roles and responsibilities for each member of the inter agency,
enhancing the WOG approach.
corrosion control
52. Senator Hirono. Secretary Mattis, in its April 2018 report to
Congress, the Department of Defense underscores the Corrosion
Prevention and Oversight Office's success in reducing the annual cost
of corrosion by $2 billion, achieving an 14:1 average return on
investment on its corrosion reduction projects, reducing downtime of
weapon I systems attributable to corrosion by 10 percent and enabling
and partnering with the Services and industry to continually improve
corrosion reduction efforts and reduce duplication. Considering the
significant reorganization taking place within the Department, how will
the Department assure that CPO continues to have the authority to
continue and build on its success in preventing and mitigating
corrosion of DOD weapon systems and infrastructure?
Secretary Mattis. In the April 2018 report to Congress, the
Department reaffirmed the value and necessity of the functions and
responsibilities of the Corrosion Policy and Oversight Office and
recognized its impressive achievements in reducing the cost of
corrosion, increasing the availability of weapons systems while
endeavoring to increase efficiencies and economies throughout the
Department. The Department supports the Corrosion Policy and Oversight
Office's functions and responsibilities. As the Department reorganizes
as directed in the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year
2017, the Corrosion Policy and Oversight Office has been placed within
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Sustainment and will be part of the responsibilities of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Sustainment. I believe this alignment will
allow for leveraging complementary processes and focus areas and better
integrate and enhance the Corrosion Policy and Oversight Office's
capabilities.
53. Senator Hirono. Secretary Mattis, in testimony before this
committee, you stated that the Department is pursuing acquisition
reforms that yield efficiencies that free up resources to be reinvested
to increase current and future readiness. However, the Department's
report shows a drastic decline in the amount of funding allocated to
the Corrosion Prevention and Oversight Office CPO, a program that
clearly fosters these reforms and efficiencies. What assurances can the
Department provide that CPO will have sufficient funding to support
current and future efforts?
Secretary Mattis. Continuously striving to increase efficiencies
and economies in our business processes is a key pursuit for the
Department and an effort that ultimately enhances our ability to
support the Warfighter. The Corrosion Policy and Oversight Office (CPO)
is at the forefront of Department's efforts to eliminate duplicative
corrosion functions across the Services, while minimizing corrosion
specifications, standards, and regulations. Given CPO's substantial
contributions towards efficiencies and reforms, the Department
continues to program and budget funds to support the full
implementation of CPO functions and requirements, both present and
planned.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
state department
54. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Mattis, I think it is safe to say
that our diplomatic personnel at home and abroad lacked sufficient
leadership and direction over the last year from the State Department.
How important is a strong and well-staffed State Department to the
military's mission overseas?
Secretary Mattis. It is extremely important. A strong, well-staffed
Department of State is critical to the success of our overseas military
mission. As I often say, our military enables our Nation's professional
diplomats; it buys time for diplomats to solve basic problems.
global engagement center
55. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Mattis, in February the Department
of Defense signed an interagency agreement with the Global Engagement
Center, which was tasked with developing, integrating, and
synchronizing efforts to counter foreign government disinformation and
propaganda across the United States Government in the Fiscal Year 2017
NDAA. DOD has a critical role to play in this effort, which is why the
fiscal year 2017 NDAA and the subsequent provisions in the fiscal year
2018 NDAA reinforcing it, clearly establish Congress' intent for DOD to
make operational and budgetary contributions to this important
interagency effort. The DOD portion of the funding was authorized at up
to $60 million per year for fiscal year 2017 and fiscal year 2018. DOD
has only pledged $40 million, and to my knowledge has not actually
transferred any of it--despite the interagency agreement to do so,
legislation calling for it, and multiple Congressional inquiries from
Members of this committee, SFRC, HASC, and HFAC. Secretary Mattis, what
is the status of the transfer of DOD funds to support the Global
Engagement Center?
Secretary Mattis. In May 2018, the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense (Comptroller)(OUSD(C)) will submit a request to reprogram $40
million in support of the Global Engagement Center (GEC) within the
Department of State (DOS).
Pursuant title 10 USC Sec. 2215, the Department of Defense (DOD)
will also be submitting a certification to the congressional defense
committees that making the funds available to the DOS in support of the
GEC is in the national security interest of the United States.
56. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Mattis, what operational support is
DOD planning to provide to the GEC with regards to staffing,
information-sharing, and leveraging unique DOD platforms and
capabilities?
Secretary Mattis. The Department of Defense (DOD) has a
collaborative relationship with the Department of State's (DOS) Global
Engagement Center (GEC) in which we are developing pilot programs
aligned with defense priorities for countering state and non-state
actors' propaganda and disinformation. The insights generated from
these pilot programs will be shared across the United States
Government. DOD contributes detailees to the GEC's staffing who aid in
information-sharing and integration with unique DOD platforms and
capabilities, including military information support operations web
operations capabilities. DOD seeks to maintain its collaborative
relationship with DOS's GEC and sees the potential for the GEC to play
a greater role in coordinating whole-of-government efforts to counter
state-actor disinformation and propaganda.
southwest border
57. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Mattis, to date, the estimated cost
of the National Guard deployments to the Southwest Border to support a
Department of Homeland Security mission is $182 million. How is the
Department of Defense going to pay for these deployments?
Secretary Mattis. National Guard personnel requirements are being
filled incrementally as available forces and assets are identified, and
as Customs and Border Patrol confirms its readiness to receive forces.
For estimating purposes, our projection assumes approved Guard
personnel will all arrive at their designated locations during the
month of April. The cost of the ongoing incremental deployment is being
cash flowed from the Guard's Operation and Maintenance and Military
Personnel accounts. The Army National Guard's Fiscal Year 2018
Operation and Maintenance and Military Personnel appropriations are
large accounts, which total to $7.3 billion and $8.3 billion,
respectively. Therefore, these accounts have the ability to initially
cash flow these costs, but how long depends on a number of factors,
which we are working, including how fast the National Guard can
identify personnel to fill the approved requirements. We will identify
options to reimburse the Guard's accounts once we have a full estimate
for the fiscal year 2018 costs. As we work to identify sources to pay
for the National Guard support to the Southwest Border we will protect
readiness.
technological overmatch / reform
58. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Mattis, during the Emerging Threats
and Capabilities Subcommittee hearing last week, Dr. Griffin told us
that your guidance to him was to ``make sure we never have to fight a
fair fight.'' I completely agree with this sentiment and think that one
of the most critical pieces of that is ensuring we maintain
technological overmatch against our adversaries. How can you instruct
the rest of the Department and the Services to prioritize results over
risk aversion, and do you believe you have the authorities, protections
and incentives you need to help drive these efforts?
Secretary Mattis. I will rely heavily on both the Deputy Secretary
of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense (Research & Engineering)
(USD((R&E))to promote an environment where we are not afraid of failure
in prototyping, learning quickly from those failures, and thereby
assuming acceptable risk and avoiding costly mistakes later in the
acquisition process. Leadership across the Department, including the
Services, must continue to be at the forefront of pursuing the
technologies and capabilities that will keep the United States far
ahead of our adversaries in the coming decades. While I appreciate
congressional support and authorities given to highlight the importance
of the office of the USD(R&E) in this effort, there are authorities,
protections, and incentives that we don't know yet, but will discover
as necessary in the coming months and years. I ask Congress continue to
be receptive to requests from myself, the Deputy Secretary, and the
USD(R&E) with regards to additional Congressionally-granted tools in
the future.
special operations forces op-tempo
59. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, our
special operations forces have met an insatiable demand for their
skills in the current counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency fight.
What are you doing to ensure the sustainable readiness of our special
operations forces?
Secretary Mattis. While the demand for Special Operations Forces
(SOF) remains high, SOF readiness is improving as U.S. Special
Operations Command (USSOCOM) takes steps to ensure that SOF are
deployed at more sustainable rates and to prioritize the demand for
these forces more effectively. The majority of SOF formations are
currently meeting or exceeding my deployment-to-dwell objectives. In
addition, I have directed the Department to undertake efforts to
evaluate our current SOF-assigned missions and identify for me any
missions that may be transferred to the conventional forces, our allies
or partners, or divested. I expect the outcome of these efforts to
improve SOF's readiness and align their missions and activities with
the National Defense Strategy.
General Dunford. Our Special Operations Forces (SOF) continue to
accomplish all assigned priority tasks in support of steady state
operations and are able to surge to support our most demanding
Operational Plans with limited impacts. Rotational sourcing currently
executes at a sustainable readiness level for the majority of SOF. In
line with Defense guidance, SOF prioritizes and synchronizes activities
to support geographic combatant commanders and protect our Nation's
interest, as challenges increase in frequency and complexity. Our
latest calculations show a continued positive trend--the vast majority
of SOF meet the Secretary's-directed goal of 1:2 deployment to dwell
(D2D) for active forces and 1:5 for reserve forces and we expect 100
percent compliance in 2018. Across SOF, we are implementing initiatives
and prioritizing requirements to balance demand and support
operations--while still improving capability for near-peer competitors.
These actions ensure SOF support the GCCs with an appropriately
tailored force while maintaining the dwell ration. Finally, I have
directed a review of current SOF tasked missions to identify those not
requiring SOF-unique capabilities that may be transitioned to
conventional or international forces.
60. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, are
there high demand capabilities for our special forces that we should be
investing in now as to address the reemergence of near-peer
competition?
Secretary Mattis. To address the scope and pace of our competitors'
and adversaries' ambitions and capabilities, we must invest in the
modernization of key capabilities through sustained, predictable
budgets. For our special operations forces, we will require additional
investments in special operations mobility and intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms that can operate in
denied areas in all domains (land, sea, air, and space). We need to
focus on technology advancements, including artificial intelligence,
directed energy, and cyber capabilities. Finally, we need to invest in
our most valuable resource: our people.
General Dunford. Yes, our Special Operations Forces (SOF) are
actively addressing the reemergence of near-peer competition by
instituting a deliberate budgeting solution in the Fiscal Year 2020
Program Objective Memorandum. This investment revitalizes USSOCOM's
ability to rapidly respond to emerging near-peer threats and enhances
critical combat capabilities that may be applied against principal and
strategic competitors through modernization and the development of
``Big Bets.'' These investments and developments do NOT come at the
expense of our on-going counterterrorism efforts and capabilities, but
are a deliberate shift to ensure supremacy against competitor
capabilities. Some of these investments include:
Laser-Enabled Platforms
Hyper-Enabled Operators
Next-Generation Targeting
Next-Generation Communications
Modification of Mobility platforms
Adaptive Countermeasures
Next-Generation Navigation
Fossil-Fuel-Divested Ground Mobility
Enhancements to national crisis response capabilities
Maritime-Assured Access
Next-Generation SOF rotary wing
SOF-Specific Space-Based capabilities
Next-Generation Radar Capability
Organic Precision Strike
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