[House Hearing, 116 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] LOOKING FORWARD: U.S.-AFRICA RELATIONS ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION __________ TUESDAY, MARCH 26, 2019 __________ Serial No. 116-19 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov, or http://http://www.govinfo.gov __________ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 35-615PDF WASHINGTON : 2019 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office, http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center, U.S. Government Publishing Office. Phone 202-512-1800, or 866-512-1800 (toll-free). E-mail, [email protected]. COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman BRAD SHERMAN, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York Member ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia STEVE CHABOT, Ohio THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida JOE WILSON, South Carolina KAREN BASS, California SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts TED S. YOHO, Florida DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois AMI BERA, California LEE ZELDIN, New York JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin DINA TITUS, Nevada ANN WAGNER, Missouri ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York BRIAN MAST, Florida TED LIEU, California FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania DEAN PHILLPS, Minnesota JOHN CURTIS, Utah ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota KEN BUCK, Colorado COLIN ALLRED, Texas RON WRIGHT, Texas ANDY LEVIN, Michigan GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania GREG PENCE, Indiana TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey STEVE WATKINS, Kansas DAVID TRONE, Maryland MIKE GUEST, Mississippi JIM COSTA, California JUAN VARGAS, California VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas Jason Steinbaum, Staff Director Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director ------ Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations KAREN BASS, California, Chair SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania CHRISTOPHER SMITH, New Jersey, DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota Ranking Member ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania RON WRIGHT, Texas TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee Janet Yarwood, Staff Director C O N T E N T S ---------- Page PREPARED STATEMENT Prepared statement submitted by Chairperson Bass................. 4 WITNESSES Thomas-Greenfield, Linda, Senior Counselor, Albright Stonebridge Group, Former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. 14 Coulibaly, Dr. Brahima, Director, The Brookings Institution...... 34 Meservey, Joshua, Senior Policy Analyst, The Heritage Foundation. 45 LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING Amnesty International report submitted from Representative Omar.. 66 APPENDIX Hearing Notice................................................... 79 Hearing Minutes.................................................. 80 Hearing Attendance............................................... 81 Additional materials submitted for the record.................... 82 RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD Questions submitted from Representative Smith.................... 87 LOOKING FORWARD: U.S.-AFRICA RELATIONS TUESDAY, MARCH 26, 2019 House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:50 p.m., in Room 2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Karen Bass (chair of the subcommittee) presiding. Ms. Bass. Good afternoon, everyone. This hearing for the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations will come to order. The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony. And the title of our hearing is ``Africa Looking Forward: U.S.- Africa Relations.'' Without objection all members may have 5 days to submit statements, questions, materials for the record, subject to the length limitation in the rules. I will now make an opening statement and then turn it over to the ranking member for his opening statement. The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on Looking Forward: U.S.-Africa Relations. Basically, we are here to ask what U.S. engagement with African countries should look like moving forward. We mentioned in the first hearing that we wanted to take our first few hearings as an opportunity to really provide an overview of the jurisdiction that this committee covers. And recognizing that the only two members on this committee that have been on this committee for a while, we have all new members, and so for that reason wanted to take a step back and really provide an overview. The African continent is comprised of 50-plus countries and more than 1.2 billion culturally distinct peoples in different geographic regions. This diversity results in diverging political, economic, and social experiences across the continent. This means that our policy has to take that diversity into consideration. The continent cannot be painted with one brush. After years of democratic progress, African democracies have faced ups and downs. Some countries are progressing while others appear to be backsliding. Meanwhile, African citizens favor democracy and continue to take to the streets to demand responsive and accountable governance. How do we encourage countries to support the desire for democracy by their citizens? What tools should we be using? Regarding issues around good governance, democracy, and human rights, there are a number of countries that I look forward to hearing about in your testimony or in the Q&A. Cameroon is very concerning at the moment, and the government's reaction to protests in Sudan is also an area of concern. In addition, sub-Saharan Africa is experiencing major demographic changes, including a youth bulge and urbanization. People age 35 and under account for more than 75 percent of Africa's population, with the continent expected to become the world region with the highest urbanization. While the continent is undergoing this major urban transition and youth bulge, some of the world's fastest growing economies are in African countries. In fact, several international observers have named the continent the future economic growth engine of the world. Other nations are deepening their relationships with countries across Africa, and instead of critiquing, we have to find ways to show up and engage. I look forward to hearing witnesses' recommendations on what this engagement should entail. Most of you know that I advocate for increased trade, investment, and business activity between Africa and the U.S. From my perspective this is a win/win situation. We help U.S. businesses again access to new markets while creating jobs and building capacity across Africa. And we know that this is increasingly essential, given the youth bulge. We are often critical of China's involvement on the continent. And I am not sure what we expect the African countries to do, but the solution that I like to promote is that the United States needs to step up. In his December 2018 public remarks, National Security Advisor Bolton identified three core U.S. interests in Africa: expanding U.S. trade and commercial ties with African countries; countering the threat from terrorism and violent conflict; and imposing more stringent conditions on U.S. aid and U.N. peacekeeping missions in the region. My hope is that the witnesses can highlight other areas that we should focus on when we consider U.S.-Africa relations. I have been disappointed that the Administration has not emphasized democracy, good governance, or human rights. That said, the Administration has maintained most Africa-focused aid initiatives launched by previous Congresses and, in some cases, has sought to fund them, however, at far lower levels. These include the global President's Emergency Plan for AIDS, or PEPFAR, and Feed the Future, and Africa-specific Young African Leaders Initiatives, and Electrify Africa. Electrify Africa and Feed the Future were initiatives that were put in the statute by the former Chair Ed Royce. And I am glad that those initiatives have continued, but concerned about the cuts in funding. I will conclude by stressing that U.S.-Africa relations with--that U.S. relations with Africa has always enjoyed bipartisan support here in Congress. And we expect to continue to work together. Each time the Administration has sought to reduce funding to the State Department or USAID, especially those that would impact African countries, we have worked together in a bipartisan manner to restore that funding. I now recognize the ranking member for the purpose of making an opening statement. [The prepared statement of Ms. Bass follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Wright. Thank you, Madam Chair. And I want to thank the witnesses for coming forward today and spending time with us. I believe I speak for all of us when I say that the importance of U.S. engagement in Africa cannot be overstated. I was pleased to see the Administration recognize this and release a dedicated Africa strategy in December. It's critical for the American people to understand our interest in Africa, and for Africa to see our commitment to the continent. In my opinion, the strategy goes a long way in both respects. In recent years, policy and debate on Africa has centered on counterterrorism, foreign assistance, conservation, women empowerment, development, good governance, and human rights, among other things. While I am proud of the progress we have made in our counterterrorism efforts, we must continue to be proactive, particularly in the Sahel. As we have seen in the Middle East, left unchecked, extremist organizations have the potential to carry out deadly attacks across the globe and spur tragic humanitarian crises as people flee from harm's way. The same can be said on development and women empowerment. The BUILD Act and the Women's Entrepreneurship and Economic Empower Act, which were both signed into law last Congress, will have a tremendous impact, but we must do more. Africa continues to grapple with high poverty rates, food insecurity, insufficient healthcare and education systems, and infrastructure deficiencies. Addressing these issues is not only in the best interests of Africans but in the best interests of Americans. For this reason, I introduced the Digital Global Access Policy Act which promotes expanding internet access in developing countries and, in turn, will help Africa overcome many problems I just mentioned. It is my hope that this committee and the House of Representatives will soon take up this critical legislation. While many of the previous issues I have highlighted will continue to dominate our efforts in Africa, we must turn our attention toward countering China and Russia as they expand their financial and political influence across the continent. Through its Belt and Road Initiative, China has secured significant leverage over many African countries, and access to Africa's precious natural resources. China's construction of its first overseas military base in Djibouti is also a cause for concern, given its close proximity to ours. We see similar interest from Russia, albeit it even more defense-focused. Checking Chinese and Russian investment and influence in the region, and the rest of the world, is critical to U.S. national security. We cannot write blank checks or discount requirements that come along with U.S. assistance, but we must think critically and innovatively about how we can offer an alternative. I look forward to what will certainly be a productive and enlightening discussion about our next steps in Africa. Thank you, and I yield back. Ms. Bass. Thank you very much, Mr. Ranking Member. I now want to introduce our witnesses. First, Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield. She joined ASG as a senior counselor after serving as the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from 2013 to 2017. In this capacity, Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield led U.S. policy toward sub-Saharan Africa with a focus on peace and security, democracy and governance, economic empowerment, and investment opportunities. Prior to this appointment she served as Director General of the Foreign Service and Director of Human Resources where she oversaw all personnel functions for the U.S. Department of State's 70,000-strong work force. Previously, Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield served as the U.S. Ambassador to Liberia from 2008 to 2012, and held posts in several other African nations. Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield is also a distinguished resident fellow in African affairs at the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University. Dr. Coulibaly is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Africa Growth Initiative at the Brookings Institute. His research focuses on creating economic opportunities and prosperity in sub-Saharan Africa by improving development, finance, local trade, monetary policies, and banking, financial institutions, and markets. His most recent work includes the research papers ``Mobilization of Tax Revenues in Africa,'' ``Meeting Africa's Employment Challenges in the Changing World,'' as well as serving as the editor for the Initiative's Annual Flagship Report, ``Foresight Africa: Top Priorities for the Continent.'' Joshua Meservey is a Senior Fellow Policy Analyst, Africa and the Middle East, at the Heritage Foundation. He specializes in African geopolitics, counterterrorism, and refugee policy. In 2009 he joined Church World Service based out of Nairobi, Kenya, and traveled extensively in East and Southern Africa interviewing refugees. He ended his time at CSW as, as field team manager responsible for a multinational team of nearly 100 staff. In 2012 he worked at the U.S. Army Special Operations Command and helped write an Army concept paper. He is the lead author of a monograph on al-Shabaab's insurgency, and his other work has appeared in many other publications. I want to thank the witnesses for taking the time. Again, I want to thank you for your patience. Apologize for the delay. And ask you to begin your testimony. We do not have a clock. I will be keeping track on my trusty iPhone here, and will notify you when 5 minutes are up. I know that you all have written testimony that you have submitted, so within 5 minutes if you could summarize your testimony. And could you begin, Madam Ambassador. STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR LINDA THOMAS-GREENFIELD, SENIOR COUNSELOR, ALBRIGHT STONEBRIDGE GROUP, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. Thank you very much. I will do my best. Chairwoman Bass, Ranking Member Wright, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to testify at this important hearing on the future of United States policy toward Africa. Allow me to thank all of you for your commitment and service to Africa, and some of you for your support during my tenure as Assistant Secretary from 2013 to 2017. I also want to take a moment to acknowledge the dreadful situation in Mozambique, Malawi, and Zimbabwe as a result of Cyclone Idai which has led to hundreds of deaths, and thousands of displacement, and millions of dollars in destruction. This should be at the forefront of our thinking on Africa today. 2019 is a critical time for Africa policy. There have been a series of long-term trends and recent developments which have put the continent at the forefront like never before. That is why it is crucial that there be sustained and consistent U.S. engagement on the content. The U.S. has consistently shown great bipartisan leadership on African issues. The bipartisan focus of our government led to the passing of programs as the--as Congresswoman Bass mentioned, such as the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, the President's Malaria Initiative, the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act, YALI, the Millennium Challenge Account, Feed the Future. All of these programs have withstood the tests across, of time across administrations. And these programs are laced with our value system at the core: democracy, good governance, human rights, and prosperity, all of which made the U.S. a major player on the continent of Africa. The positive bipartisan engagement with Africa continued with the current administration's BUILD Act and PROSPER Africa initiatives. These initiatives seek to further strengthen trade ties with a still burgeoning Africa market full of opportunities. The United States brings many resources to the table that other countries do not. The United States hosts a large and vibrant African diaspora community who have made significant contributions to America, both economically and socially. And as we commemorate the 400-year anniversary since the first African arrived to this land in bondage, we must remember the deep historical connections between the U.S. and Africa. Allow me to touch briefly on a few issues we should address. My full testimony is provided in writing and gives a more fulsome list. First, Congressman Bass, you mentioned the youth bulge. Africa is facing an unprecedented demographic evolution with half the population under the age of 19. Estimates are that by 2050, the population of the African continent will have doubled from 1.2 million to 2.--1.2 billion to 2.5 billion, representing a quarter of the world's population. It is vital that the United States work to help African countries use this growth to foster prosperity. Security and terrorism, maybe one of the most critical areas of collaboration with African States, involves security. Continued U.S. engagement with African stakeholders to tackle these threats is necessary. The proposed reduction of 10 percent of American troops deployed on the continent sends the wrong message to our partners. On democracy and democratic transition, the fact that the national security advisory did not mention democracy in his December Africa policy speech did not go unnoticed on the continent. The United States must continue to promote democracy programs across the continent. In the long-term, democracy contributes to better governance, human development, security, and economic growth. Climate change. It is important that we engage African policymakers on climate change and adopting environmentally conscious policies. Renewed international commitments to elements of the Paris Climate Change Agreement would benefit Africa's efforts to address some of the environmental changes it now faces. And while I cannot emphasize enough how important it is to engage on the entire continent, there are some countries that I believe decisionmakers should prioritize. First, Nigeria. The importance of the most populous country in sub-Saharan Africa and its No. 1 economy is self evident. And as President Buhari embarks on his second and final term, the U.S. needs to remain supportive of reforms that will help entrench democratic values. South Africa will hold elections in May of this year. And as the next administration in South Africa deals with institutional corruption and the tricky waters of land redistribution, the U.S. needs to support the country's transition to let the South African people know we are standing side by side with them. Ethiopia. Ethiopia is an example of the profound change that African countries can go through quickly with principled leaders at the helm. The United States should ramp up its engagement with the Government of Ethiopia to ensure these reforms continue unhindered, and that they become institutionalized within Ethiopia. The United States should not squander the opportunity to build closer relationships with this vital player. South Sudan. In South Sudan the U.S. has fallen behind on diplomatic leadership, and I believe we have abdicated responsibility for a State we helped birth. The United States should designate a special envoy to provide U.S. leadership who can work with leaders in the region to break the cycle of continued conflict in South Sudan. I welcome in DRC the appointment of Dr. Peter Pham as the Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region of Africa in November 2018. It is important following the election that the U.S. continue to engage with the Congolese president. And I see you are about to grab, so I am going to skip. But I have mentioned Ghana. And I do mention Tanzania, Sudan, Cameroon that I know in particular that you think is very important. But finally, let me just say that to achieve our goals in Africa and around the globe we must have sustained, strong diplomatic efforts. The visit, recent visit of Deputy Secretary Sullivan to South Africa and Angola, and Assistant Secretary Nagy to Cameroon, DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda, highlight the type of engagement that is needed. But they need help from more senior officials in the administration to engage. And I think for this reason it is time for a second Africa Leaders Summit. And also, we have, we have too many Ambassadorships in Africa that are still vacant. And many of them are in some of these important countries that I mentioned. And in order for us to have successful engagement with the African continent we need to invest in more diplomatic presence on the ground, particularly our Ambassadors. Ms. Bass. Thank you. Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. Ultimately, the United States should take a more positive, proactive approach to Africa, emphasizing the potential of the continent rather than its risks. It is absolutely in the interests of the United States to see the continent of Africa grow and thrive. I look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Ms. Bass. Thank you. Dr. Coulibaly. STATEMENT OF BRAHIMA COULIBALY, PH.D., DIRECTOR, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION Mr. Coulibaly. Thank you, Madam Chair Bass, and Ranking Member Wright. So let me begin by applauding your leadership as well as that of Congressman Smith, and your active role in fostering the bipartisan collaboration that has traditionally characterized the U.S. legislation in Africa. And my appreciation to the members of the committee for the opportunity to share my views on the subject. This is indeed an opportune time to reassess the future of U.S.-Africa relations because there is an emerging consensus, which I share, that the U.S. is falling behind in Africa. In my view, this is not because U.S. policies toward Africa have failed. In fact, and as was mentioned earlier, U.S. policies and programs such as AGOA, PEPFAR, the Malaria Initiative, Power Africa, YALI, have all been successful in impact overall. But whether it is because Africa is transforming rapidly and the architecture of our engagements needs to adapt to this dynamism and to the evolving aspirations of the African countries. So, following a period of political and social instability, as well as weak economic growth, Africa's fortunes have begun to turn around the year 2000. Since then, thanks to better domestic policies and favorable global environment, economic growth has been strong, boosting commercial opportunities. Importantly, Africa is experiencing a demographic boom and rapid urbanization. By the turn of the century, 40 percent of the world's population, and 42 percent of its work force will be African. And to better respond to the growing needs of the populations, Africa's leadership and institutions are becoming more assertive in the ownership and advancement of the continent's agenda. The unprecedented dynamism on the continent is creating tremendous commercial opportunities in trade and investment, and it is not an exaggeration to say that Africa is on a course to be the world's next big growth market. Earlier this month the cover page of the Economist magazine read, ``The New Scramble for Africa.'' It was capturing what those following developments on the continent already knew. Commercial opportunities that Africa presents, as well as some of the transnational threats originating from the region are attracting interest from an increasingly diverse group of foreign countries working proactively to strengthen diplomatic, defense, and commercial ties with the continent. The most active foreign countries are non-traditional partners, and their emergence is challenging the partner of choice status that traditional partners, including the United States, have enjoyed. While diplomatic and the defense ties are broadening and strengthening, shifts in commercial ties have been the most significant. Between 2010 and 2017, Africa's trade with countries such as Russia, Thailand, Turkey, Indonesia, and China, have risen very fast. In contrast, trade with the United States fell by more than half over this period. And the United States is no longer among Africa's top three trading partners. Although the United States still has the largest stock of foreign direct investment, this stock has barely increased since 2010, while investment from other countries, particularly China, has increased significantly. So, in this new scramble for Africa what can the United States do to keep up? First, I think the U.S. should articulate a clear bipartisan, long-term vision for its U.S.-Africa policy following broad consultation with key stakeholders, including U.S. and Africa businesses but, importantly, the African Union. The vision should align to the extent possible with the African Union's Agenda 2063 and the U.N.'s Agenda 2030 that African countries have adopted. Given increasing interdependencies between defense, diplomacy, and development, the vision should encompass engagements on all three dimensions but with greater emphasis on the commercial ties with the most potential to yield the most significant mutually beneficial outcomes. Second, to accelerate the commercial engagement, the United States should appoint a high level White House official with a mandate to work across U.S. agencies to advance U.S. commercial policy. Third, the U.S. should initiate a regular high level summit between the United States and African States, as the external partners, including China, India, Japan, Turkey, and the European Union, all have held two or more high level summits in recent years which have advanced their engagement with Africa. In contrast, the U.S. has held only one high level summit, and that was in 2014. While not a panacea, I believe these recommendations will go a long way to provide the needed clarity, predictability, and stability in U.S. engagement with Africa. The presence of other countries on the continent will only strengthen with time. And the United States does have a solid foundation and the legacy in Africa on which to build. However, without more proactive approaches the U.S. is just falling further behind. Ultimately, the future of U.S.-Africa relations will be determined more by U.S. policy and actions, or lack thereof, toward Africa than by those of other countries toward Africa. Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Coulibaly follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Ms. Bass. Thank you very much. STATEMENT OF JOSHUA MESERVEY, SENIOR POLICY ANALYST, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION Mr. Meservey. Chairwoman Bass, Ranking Members Wright, and members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to testify. Thank you as well for your continued focus on and championing of deeper U.S.-Africa ties. The views I express in this testimony are my own and should not be construed as representing any official position of The Heritage Foundation. In may remarks I will focus on what I consider to be the four most important U.S. strategic priorities in Africa. First, the U.S. must retain sufficient influence and positioning to protect its national interests on the continent. This is an evergreen challenge that has grown more urgent given the rising great and middle power competition in Africa. As is often commented upon, Djibouti is a good example of this problem. Its port is critical to U.S. military operations in East Africa, yet the Chinese government has built such influence there that there is concern the U.S. will be unable to maintain the necessary level of access. The U.S. is already far behind in the competition to develop and deploy 5G mobile network technology in Africa. The winner of this competition will gain great economic and other advantages. Chinese companies Huawei and ZTE have built most of the existing telecoms infrastructure in Africa, and several large African telecom companies are already negotiating with Huawei on building 5G networks. Huawei's and ZTE's dominance in Africa is also an obvious counterintelligence problem for the United States. Relatedly, Chinese companies have built, or renovated, or Beijing has financed at least 63 sensitive government buildings in at least 29 African countries. We should assume most, if not all, of those buildings are bugged or otherwise compromised, as was the Chinese-built African Union headquarters. Second, the U.S. should facilitate regulatory and normative environments that ensure U.S. companies can compete on an even footing in Africa. By 2030, an estimated 19 African economies will be growing by 5 percent or more per year and the continent will likely constitute a $3 trillion economy. It will harm the U.S. and ordinary Africans if anti-competitive behavior becomes the norm and further disadvantages U.S. firms. Third, the U.S. should encourage the growth of African democracy. It is the political system that best promotes human flourishing. And shared democratic values facilitate mutually beneficial relationships between the U.S. and other countries. After years of progress on the continent in this regard there has been worrisome backsliding in a number of countries. Finally, the U.S. must ensure terrorists cannot use Africa as a staging ground for attacks against the U.S. There have been gains against some of the continent's worst groups, but we are also in the midst of a resurgence of terrorist activity in the Sahel region. The Islamic State West Africa Province and Jama'at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimeen have been particularly active and ambitious. A long-term component of the terrorism problem is the spread of the Wahhabist practice of Islam in Africa. Saudi Arabia in particular has proselytized this fundamentalist practice, important components of which most current Islamist terrorist groups subscribe to. Responding in a constructive way to the problems and prospects of Africa requires a thoughtful, committed approach. In that spirt, I think the U.S. should do the following, and this is not a comprehensive list: Assess with which governments it can reasonably expect to have a mutually beneficial partnership. Good candidates should receive a full suite of U.S. engagement, while poor candidates should be more economy-of-force operations. Assist African countries to become more business friendly; foster African entrepreneurs; aid African countries to get the best possible deals from Chinese investments; task U.S. embassies with identifying and facilitating commercial opportunity for U.S. companies, foster good governance in Africa by assisting civil society, fighting corruption, and deepening cooperation with non-African allies active on the continent; create a strategic messaging plan that explains to African countries the benefits of partnering with the United States; make the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit a routine event; and ensure that the new International Development Finance Corporation achieves its stated purpose of supporting the U.S. in its strategic competition with China. The U.S. already has a strong foundation of African engagement of which it should be proud. But it also can and should do more. I thank the committee again for doing its part to ensure that U.S. policies protect American interests and contribute to a safe, prosperous, and free Africa. I look forward to any questions you may have. [The prepared statement of Mr. Meservey follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Ms. Bass. Thank you very much. I want to thank all three of our witnesses today for your testimony. And would now like to begin with members asking questions. And I actually will hold my questions and ask them last, since I know members have numerous conflicts. So, I will go to the ranking member. Mr. Wright. Thank you, Madam Chair. And I was happy to hear you mention Cameroon in your opening statement because I also have very deep interest there. I have a number of constituents in my district from Cameroon. And I have heard from both sides. And there is a concern that as the resistance in Anglophone Cameroon continues that security forces of the Government of Cameroon will continue to clamp down which will cause even further growth in resistance and the whole thing will spiral. And so, my question is what can and should, in your opinion, the U.S. Government do in Cameroon? And, Madam, I am going to ask all of you that question. Madam Ambassador, I am going to start with you. Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. Thank you very much. I think the first thing that we can do, and this has already, was already done by Assistant Secretary Nagy, was engage with the government on this issue. I think for a number of months and for the past year we have ignored what was happening in any consistent way. So Assistant Secretary Nagy was there and I know that he did raise this issue with the government. I do not know the gist of the conversation, but I can imagine that he expressed our concerns about this issue. I think in the long run we may have to take some actions against the government and other parties who are committing human rights violations. I am sure you have seen the pictures that we have all seen coming from that situation. And the pictures are coming from both sides. The atrocities are being committed by both sides, and people should be held accountable for that to send a strong message, that this is not the way you address these kinds of issues. Mr. Wright. Dr. Coulibaly. Mr. Coulibaly. Yes, I would echo off Ambassador Thomas- Greenfield's sentiment for the U.S. to take a stronger stance where it deems there to have been some already violations of the human rights and an opportunity to put as much pressure on the government as possible to respect the rights of all. Mr. Wright. Mr. Meservey. Mr. Meservey. Yes, I agree with my colleagues comments. I think it is very important that the Cameroonian Government understand that the U.S. is watching. I think regional engagement is always very important in these sorts of conflict, so the U.S. should be working very actively with neighbors and other concerned countries, the Africa Union. This doubtlessly concerns many African countries, and the U.S. should be playing the unique role that it can as a facilitator and a convener to try to get them working or pulling in the same direction, working with a singular purpose on Cameroon. Mr. Wright. Thank you, Madam Chair. Ms. Bass. Oh, wonderful. Representative Omar. Ms. Omar. Thank you, Madam Chair. Very excited to see all of you and hear your testimony. Ambassador, I do not know if you remember me, but we met in Minneapolis right after I had been elected to the Minnesota House. And so, as you probably know, there is a little crisis right now that is happening to many of my constituents and friends and neighbors who are from Liberia, who are on a DED status. And I know that in your history that you served as an ambassador to Liberia. And so, I wanted to see if we can maybe chat about this particular crisis that is being visited upon many of my constituents. Last week was a recess week for us, and so I got home. And, you know, we visited many workplaces. There are the majority of the Liberians in my district and in Minnesota are healthcare workers, and so one of the places that I visited was an assisted living center where 177 of their employees were DED recipients. And their status ends on the 31st of this month. And so if that is not renewed, most of them are most likely going to be returned back to Liberia. And so I know that there is going to be a great impact on our community. There is going to be a great impact on my district. But I wanted to see if you maybe can help us sort of fully understand the impact that it might have on the folks in Liberia. Do you know how many, how much money in remittances do Liberians here in this country send back to Liberia? Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. I do not know that exact figure. But I know that it is significant, just as it is across the continent of Africa. It plays a huge role in the economy of Liberia. But I appreciate the question related to Liberians who are beneficiaries of DED. This was an issue that came up numerous times during my tenure as the Ambassador to Liberia. I will admit that at the time, given the fact that President Sirleaf was president of the country, and the country was going through significant transformation in a positive way, that I wanted to encourage Liberians who were living in the U.S. to come back and be part of the success that was Liberia. In the meantime, you know, as I have returned to the U.S., this is a much more comprehensive and bigger issue than Liberia. I met a young Liberian women a few--last week, in fact, who was a DACA recipient. And she had lived here in the United States since she was 4 years old. She does not know anyone in Liberia. She is currently a student at a university here in the United States, doing quite well, interning in Washington, DC. And she is fearful of what she will find in Liberia. And I tried to encourage her by telling her there is nothing to fear. But it is easy for me to say that sitting here without the fear of being returned to a place that I do not know. And I left that discussion with her extraordinarily sympathetic to her plight. And I do believe that as we look at the broader DACA issues related to all of the nationalities here in the United States, the Liberians have to be part of that comprehensive solution. Whether that can happen by the end of March, I do not know. But I do know that if they are to return to Liberia, right now they are going to return to a country that is at peace. But I think the economy there is in a bit of a downfall. And so it will be very, very difficult for these individuals to reintegrate back into Liberia, having been out of Liberia as long as they have been out of Liberia. Ms. Omar. Yes. Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. In addition, their family members who have been dependent on their remittances will no longer have that benefit. Ms. Omar. Yes. Thank you for that broad overview of the issue. And that brings me, actually, to the second question I was going to ask you is that while you say it is at peace, many of my constituents and my friends and neighbors say that it is not economically or physically safe for them to return. And we know that an assessment usually is done for a country before we decide to terminate the temporary status. And so, do you think that this president and Secretary Nielsen have done or at least asked for that assessment to be made before making a decision to terminate? That is the first part of my question. And then the second part is do you think Liberia is ready to absorb all of the people that are going to be returned back to it? And will that maybe harm any peace or stability it might currently have? Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. I would assume, and I do not know, that any assessments that are required have been done either by our embassy or by the State Department. But I cannot answer that question with any---- Ms. Omar. We have not been able to see one, so. Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. So, again, I do not know the answer to that. Again, having lived in Liberia for 4 years and worked on Liberia, Liberian issues my entire life, I know the country quite well. I think the country will have difficulty absorbing a large number of people because they are having difficulty dealing with the economic challenges of the people who are living there now. That said, in terms of the safety factor, we were dealing with a country that was at war for 14 years, where people were being killed regularly. That does not happen in Liberia anymore. I did find Liberia to be safe. Ms. Bass. I am going to go to Mr. Burchett and then we will do another round. Mr. Burchett. I can yield a minute if she wants to finish her thoughts. I hate to come back. She might have to go somewhere. I have got to go somewhere, too, but I would be---- Ms. Omar. I have got time. I am good. Mr. Burchett. You are good? Ms. Omar. Yes. Mr. Burchett. OK. I thank the chairlady, ranking member, Ms. Omar. I have just about two or three different questions, and I will try to hit them pretty fast because I know our time is limited. As you all know, violent extremist groups threaten State stability, regional security, and international interests in Africa. And I want to focus mainly on the Lake Chad Basin region and Boko Haram. What are your thoughts on this terror group now that the Islamic State has recognized a rival faction as opposed to Abubakar Shekau; does this fragmentation make them more or less of a threat? Go ahead, ma'am, in that pretty outfit. I am going to call on you first, if that is all right, Chairlady. Am I allowed to do that. Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. You know, I think the threat that Boko Haram and any groups that have spiraled from that organization continue to have a major impact in the region. We have seen that impact in Northern Nigeria, we have seen that in Chad, in Niger, and further afield. And this is why I think it is important that we continue to engage with African countries to address this issue, because terrorism, wherever it happens, impacts all of us. When there was an attack on a hotel in Mali a couple years ago an American citizen was killed in that attack. So we are not safe if we are not working with those countries to address these issues. Mr. Coulibaly. Yes. I think the Lake Chad region more broadly to look at it is basically where issues like terrorism, climate change, State fragility all come together. And the solution in my view today has to be a long-lasting one that is able to encompass both economics as well as security interventions. If you take the Lake Chad region, for example, in 1963 we have the bed shed of about 25,000 square kilometers. Now it is only 2,500 square kilometers due to climate change. So it is now one-tenth of what it used to be. So, what that has done is create conditions for conflict that is affecting now about 50 million people or so in that region. So, I think a comprehensive approach needs to be taken to a solution if we want it to be really long-lasting and impactful. Mr. Meservey. And I think the terrorism challenge associated with Boko Haram and its splinter group is profound. The good news is that Boko Haram has lost most of its strongholds over the last number of years because of this multinational force. But the Nigerian Government has been unable to deliver the security and the services and other things that are necessary to really stabilize the northeast, so Boko Haram has survived and is now actually resurgent, I would say, as is its splinter group ISIS West Africa Province, which just at the beginning of this year conquered hundreds of square miles of territory in three different countries. They are establishing a State. They are now administering it in some ways. They have--it is not nearly as extensive, of course, as the ISIS State in, or was in the Middle East, but those are clearly their aspirations. And they have made very serious gains in recent times. So it is a very difficult problem set in a belt, as my colleague just mentioned here, where you have all sorts of very negative trends converging that makes it very hard to eliminate these groups. Mr. Burchett. Thank you. One more, if I have time, Chairlady, for one more question? Ms. Bass. Yes. Mr. Burchett. Thank you, ma'am. I am concerned about the investments that China is making. And I am wondering what the U.S. should be doing to counter some of the influence that they are having in Africa? And to what extent are some of these investments a threat to our interests, including our diplomatic development and security objectives? And the followup of that, if the United States were to significantly reduce its foreign aid to Africa, would China, do you all feel like China would seek to fill the gap, and how they would do that? Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. China, over I would say the past decade, has gone into Africa fast and furiously. They have changed their approach. It has evolved over, over time. Initially, they would go in and do a stadium or some small project and to buy influence. Now they are doing major infrastructural projects. The issue at hand is that all of these infrastructural projects, some of them better than others, are needed on the continent of Africa. Africans need railroads, they need roads, they need refurbished airports and ports. And we have ceded that space to China. And it is important if the U.S. sees its role as competing--and I do not see us as competing with China because I think we have different resources that we bring to the table; we are not going to bring those large projects--I think the better approach for us to take is to work with our African partners to ensure that they have the capacity to strike and negotiate better deals with the Chinese. Because, again, the kind of deals that they are getting with the Chinese, we do not have the wherewithal to do that. But we need to pay attention to what is happening because our influence on the continent is waning in comparison to China. And if we start to decrease our foreign aid the Chinese will come in in some way or another to support these countries. They are not going to come in with the same values that we bring to the table. And in my conversations with African leaders and business people alike, their preference is to have the United States there. And their question to us every day is: Where are you? Why are you not there? And you cannot tell us we cannot engage with the Chinese if you are not prepared to engage with us. Ms. Bass. Did anybody else want to respond to that? Mr. Coulibaly. Yes. I just wanted to underscore the Ambassador's point. So, the really best way to counter China, if that was the objective, really is to solve Africa's infrastructure problem. It is really huge. Mr. Burchett. Say that again. Mr. Coulibaly. Is to solve---- Mr. Burchett. I am sorry, I am from East Tennessee and I did not understand that. Mr. Coulibaly. Is to solve Africa's infrastructure problems. I mean, the demand there is huge, huge because of the low point where they are starting from given the stage of economic development. But also huge because they are experiencing very rapid demographic growth and rapid rate of urbanization. Estimates put it at about $130 to $170 billion a year. That is what is needed for infrastructure financing in Africa. And two-thirds of that amount, or 60 percent or more, is unfunded. And I think that is what China has aligned itself with the African nations, and that is why they are responding positively. But I am hopeful that at least as we roll out the Development Finance Corporations that was part of the BUILD Act, that is going to be able to come in and allow the U.S. to begin to play more in that space. Ms. Bass. Thank you. Thank you very much. Did you want to say something? Go ahead. Mr. Meservey. Just briefly. Ms. Bass. Sure. Mr. Meservey. I think it is I agree, I do not think the message to our African partners should be us or them. That is not going to work because China does provide certain things that African countries need. But helping African countries strike better deals, as the Ambassador mentioned, with China is really important, but also providing an alternative. We cannot do that, frankly, on most big infrastructure projects because we do not have a lot of companies that do that sort of thing. We do not heavily subsidize them as the Chinese Government does with its State-owned, obviously, enterprises. So, we need to look at competitive advantages that the United States has, which industries do we have a real, obvious advantage, focus on those. And I think that we need to in terms of the larger competition with China, where we do compete is around the model. And, you know, Beijing is increasingly pushing this idea to African countries that you can have economic growth but you just need to crack down on the pesky journalists and the civil society and things of that nature, as we do. And look at how successful we have been. So that is, there is an obvious competition there. And the U.S. needs to engage in that competition of ideas especially, and make sure we are messaging properly about the benefits of democracy, of the free enterprise system, and things of that nature. Ms. Bass. You know, I would continue with that because I think one of the big concerns right now is we are not really sending a strong message from the Administration in that regard to counter that. And, you know, my experience, along with the witnesses, and I am sure many people in the room, is that the African countries would rather do business with us. But we cannot, we are not in a position to tell them they should turn their backs on China when China is there and we are not. And really, the question is, you know, for us to step up our involvement. And so, to my colleague from Tennessee, two things. You know, one, hopefully, because you were asking the question about security, hopefully, if you are available, you could attend the CODEL, the congressional delegation. Because that is exactly what we want to look at. And then in terms of Africa's infrastructure, we are working on a piece of legislation we are calling Move Africa that the purpose is to incentivize U.S. businesses to do transportation-related infrastructure projects. And so, I think that overall our perspective on Africa, we treat the continent, frankly, like we treat inner city communities, which is from a point of view of charity as a point of view, as opposed to partnership, and recognizing that on the African continent there are tremendous opportunities. It seems like the rest of the world knows that but we are a little bit, you know, late to the party. So we need to, you know, improve our game. One of the--so my questions are really focused on what we need to do here in Congress to improve the situation. So, one of the issues is our designation of middle income countries that then make some countries not eligible for, like, MCC and other programs. And I wanted to know if anybody on the panel has any solution as to how we should come up with the--what formula we should use. Because if we just use income, it does not take into account the inequity. So, you know, the annual income of somebody might be $15,000 but we know that that is, that is averaged because people at the top are making so much. So, I would like to take a look at middle income countries, that designation, since I believe it excludes so many other countries. In terms of Mozambique, want to know your thoughts on if we are doing enough. Should we be providing more assistance? On the issue of Sudan, there is a lot of people that are concerned with what is happening in Sudan right now. And the Obama Administration and the Trump administration was continuing, I do not know about a rollback but, I mean, you know, the different phases, and we have not gotten to Phase 2. But there is some push here in Congress to actually move back to sanctions, you know, in a much bigger way as opposed to the movement forward toward normalization and relationships. And so my question is, given what is happening in Sudan right now, do you think the time is now for us to strengthen sanctions, strengthen State-sponsored terrorism in terms of that designation. And by strengthening it I mean in moving it from the administration deciding to, you know, having to have congressional approval, which is actually kind of the way it is now, but restating it and making it stronger, stricter before we would consider lifting it. So, I will start with those. And I will start with Madam Ambassador, go down the row. And then if Representative Omar has additional questions she would like to ask, we will go there. Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. I am going to bunt a little bit on the designation of middle income countries because I think, I am not sure it is a U.S., it is just the U.S. that makes that designation. And I do, I am aware of several countries who benefited from the MCC---- Ms. Bass. Right. Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield [continuing]. And then suddenly they no longer benefited because they had moved up the scale. So, we punish them for their improvement. Ms. Bass. Yes. We do that domestically, too. Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. Yes. So we---- Ms. Bass. As soon as you get better we cut you off. Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. So we need to look at, I agree that we need to look at it. I do not know how. Ms. Bass. But where does that designation come from? That is not--is it U.N. or? Mr. Coulibaly. No. I am not aware of really a precise scientific method that has allowed for that limitation. Ms. Bass. Well, I am sure it is not scientific. I just wondered where it came from. I am glad you guys do not know. That means there is room there then. Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. There is room there. Ms. Bass. OK. Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. On Mozambique, Madam Chair, there is so much to be done there. The pictures that we are seeing coming out of Mozambique are just horrifying. And I know that the U.S. is there on the ground, along with others. I think we were a little bit late in responding. It was almost a week before it even started getting press coverage here in the United States. So, again, I think our colleagues from USAID and the State Department are actively engaged. Our military is engaged. But I think it is going to take more engagement and more resources for them. So I think we need to look at the resource, resource base that they are working from and see if there are any possibilities of increasing the funding and the resources that they have to respond to this. Ms. Bass. Well, it is appropriations season, so it is definitely time for us to look at that. Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. And on Sudan, you know, your question was an interesting one. I think part of what is happening in Sudan is because of what we have been working toward in the Sudan. So I do think, and again I am coming from a position of having worked on this issue during the Obama Administration, but I do think that we should continue the path we are on with them, continue pushing and pressuring the government. Part of the reason the government is responding to our pressure is because they want this to continue. And on the issue of State sponsor of terror, they have regularly told us that we have continued to move the goalposts on them on that particular issue. And I believe that this is an unrelated issue, but I suspect that the handwriting is on the wall in Sudan, and the transition and the changes that are taking place are changes that we have all been watching and waiting for. And I think any efforts on our part to pull back now may send the wrong signal. The government may decide there is no reason that they cannot really crack down. And they have, I think they have been somewhat restrained. Ms. Bass. Thank you. Mr. Coulibaly. On the issue of the middle income country, the limitation, so, although I am not aware of a scientific method that determines it, one of the guiding principles for this is that is these are countries that have reached a certain stage whereby they can now tap into the markets. They can use their other sources for financial needs. Ms. Bass. But it is not true; right? Mr. Coulibaly. Yes, it is not exactly always true. One perhaps approach, and I think you are right that with inequality sometimes you may have the income and the country as a whole at a high level of income, but many parts of it are still struggling. And I think that was an important clause of the BUILD Act in setting the U.S. IDFC to recognize there could be needs even for upper-middle income countries where it is showing that some segments of the population are still, still struggling. So one possibility then is to, to start there, but then to also look at the Sustainable Development Goals. Ms. Bass. Yes. Mr. Coulibaly. The Sustainable Development Goals trackers are now just coming out. Ms. Bass. Yes. Are you saying maybe look at both? Because if you look at, if you add in the Sustainable Development Goals then it goes south. You know what I am saying? Because just because you reached an income status does not mean you achieved those goals at all. Mr. Coulibaly. Well, I think the Sustainable Development Goals, of course, should be taken certainly into account, particularly some of the priority area targets. Right? So we can start there. Ms. Bass. Yes. Mr. Coulibaly. And then see, which are the countries that are way off track. If you look at, for example, sub-Saharan Africa, the poverty rates we have been tracking out of Brookings, some of my colleagues' work, show indeed that the continent, the number of people, poor people is actually increasing. If you take a closer look, a large part of it is due to Nigeria, for example, which it would classify as being in a better income level than some other countries. But Nigeria is one of the countries that is way off track. Ms. Bass. Do you know a country where they graduated to middle income status where they cannot actually tap into the world markets? Mr. Coulibaly. So, I think you take a country like South Africa, I think they can tap into markets. And over the past years, since 2006, we have had about over a dozen countries across Africa that have tapped into the global financial markets for the first time. But I also subscribe that some of them may have tapped into it while not being fully ready to---- Ms. Bass. Yes. Mr. Coulibaly [continuing]. To take on more debt than they should be taking on. And you may very well know that there is now an issue of whether Africa is facing another debt crisis. Ms. Bass. To China? Mr. Coulibaly. Yes. Reminiscent--China is part of it. Ms. Bass. Right. Mr. Coulibaly. But there is also the markets precisely, a lot of Euro bonds that have been issued. And then there is a question then as to whether we are facing, again, another debt forgiveness episode like what we have seen earlier in the decade. So I think starting with the SDGs, trying to see whether we can come in and then assess the alternative sources of financing that they might have. Do they really have access to markets at a reasonable cost like it is somewhat portrayed today. And then speaking of debt and Mozambique, to get to your question on Mozambique, I think they could definitely use help because it is one of the countries that has had a debt level over 100 percent of GDP. And they are now classified as being in debt distress. So there is really not much scope from them to mobilize their own resources to deal with this tragedy. And I think they could use as much help as possible, especially through regional actors as well as the U.S., to step in a leadership role to galvanize more support for Mozambique. Ms. Bass. Mr. Meservey? Mr. Meservey. Yes. On Mozambique I agree, I think the critical part of this will also be a sustained effort. Because the level of devastation is really extraordinary. And this is going to be a long-term challenge. So, yes, obviously the disaster response is crucial and the U.S. is involved in that and should continue to look for options to ramp up its engagement. But certainly thinking through, OK, after, you know, a week has passed, or two or 3 weeks, how do we continue to help ameliorate some of the fallout of this crisis. And then just quickly on Sudan. I think it is important to keep what is happening as far as protestor concerns separate from Phase 2 because they are in some ways separate issues. So, I do not think that the any sort of activity or actions by the U.S. to punish what Sudan is doing, and they have engaged in a brutal crackdown, to use the Phase 2 negotiations as a vehicle, I do not think that is the best vehicle to use. I think it is very appropriate to think about Magnitsky, for instance, or some other avenue that we have because the Sudanese Government has responded brutally and it should be held accountable. But it is a separate issue from the Phase 2 negotiations. Ms. Bass. Thank you. Representative Omar. Ms. Omar. Dr. Coulibaly, you talked about the use in Africa on the continent that 40 percent of the world's population are going to be in Africa and 42 percent of the work force will be in Africa. And when we were in Ethiopia and Eritrea just recently, a lot of the young people talked to us about the hopes and aspirations that they have as we move into the world in ways that we can invest. So, I just wanted to see if you had an idea of one particular investment we can make as a country to assist the youth in Africa that would make a real impact. Mr. Coulibaly. Yes. I would emphasize the area of education and skills. I think, as I mentioned, 42 percent of the global work force, and now imagine that work force being imparted with the skills of the 21st Century. This would really be a global, not just African, economic success. And the opportunity is going to really expand the global middle class and create market opportunities that everybody is going to benefit from. But when you look at the educational systems they are being crammed because of demographic growth, the infrastructure in classrooms--we touched on that earlier--is not keeping up. So, in classes where they are supposed to have 40 students they now have, like, 80 students or 100 students. In that context, it is becoming difficult to test them. The quality of education itself, even the lucky ones who get one, could be decreasing. And another area that could be helpful is to leverage technology, for example, initiatives that can bring technology to education can allow to maintain that quality and be able to scale up. Ms. Omar. That is wonderful. I was just meeting with some tech folks from Africa. And when the Black Caucus has its conference in September I hope that that will be my sort of sessions around technology and investments that we could make in Africa. So, we will see how that goes. But I wanted to come back to something that was in the testimony of Mr. Meservey. Right? Mr. Meservey. Yes. Ms. Omar. All right. You had mentioned in your testimony that Saudi Arabia has promoted Wahhabism in Africa, and that has contributed to the rise of jihadist thinking and terrorist recruitment on the continent. I would say, you know, we could, we could sort of agree on that. Is it fair to say that our unwavering support for the Saudi Government has been counterproductive to our security goals in Africa? Mr. Meservey. Saudi Arabia is one of those very difficult situations because there is no doubt that they are an important counterweight to Iran in the Middle East which, as we know, is involved in all sorts of nefarious activities in Syria and beyond. But I also, as you referenced in my testimony, I think there is no doubt that their activities--and it is not just Saudi Arabia that is engaged in this but they have been the primary and the most aggressive in proselytizing this way, that I think that is a long, that presents a long-term strategic challenge to the United States, and to African countries frankly. There are African governments concerned about this phenomenon as well. So, I think that the U.S. has addressed this, or I know it has, with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Needs to do more. And I also think it needs to press Saudi Arabia to think, OK, how do you put the genii back in bottle so to speak because they have proselytized this all across the world. Now what? How do you start rolling this back? Because I think it is very much part of their responsibility to work on that. Now, whether their domestic politics will ever allow them to do that is an entirely different question. But I think that is part of the message the U.S. should be sending. Ms. Omar. OK. So let me see if I understand. They are spreading this ideology. And then we have reports that they are actually funding terrorists. But we are partnering with them to help us fight the ideology and terrorism? Is that what you are saying? That is the suggestion? Mr. Meservey. Well, it is two separate ideologies we are talking about. Ms. Omar. You are the problem and we need you to fix the problem? Mr. Meservey. Yes. Well, so Iran is, is---- Ms. Omar. No, no, I, I get that. I am just saying on Saudi Arabia,---- Mr. Meservey. Sure, sure. Ms. Omar [continuing]. So they are the problem but they are, we are also going to partner with them to fix themselves. And the problem that they are creating is precisely what you said; right? Mr. Meservey. Well, it is, I mean, unfortunately these are the sorts of decisions you have to make in foreign policy sometimes. And so in the Middle East arena we have this very obvious problem of a country, talking about Iran, that has, for instance, during the Khobar Tower bombings killed scores of American soldiers. They did it in Afghanistan. They have been aggressive enemies of the United States. Ms. Omar. Yes. Mr. Meservey. So, so there is that sphere. And then you have this other sphere of this Wahhabist problem that I referenced. And I think you can do both. It is one of those strange bedfellow situations but it is the unfortunately reality, frankly, of the Middle East. Ms. Omar. Right. Mr. Meservey. So I---- Ms. Omar. No, I, I hear you. I appreciate that. It is a challenge but one that is not often looked at with clear lenses. So, in your testimony you also mentioned that 12 of the 23 countries most affected by terrorism are in Africa. In the report you reference Somalia, which is where my family is from and I was born, and it is ranked sixth in the world and second in Africa after Nigeria in terms of impact of terrorism. As you know, the major part of U.S. strategy of combating al-Shabaab in Somalia has been the use of drones. Under the Trump administration, drone strikes in Somalia have tripled, now totaling more than Libya and Yemen combined. AFRICOM denies any civilian casualties resulting from drone strikes in Somalia. But this is contradicted by reports from numerous investigative journalists and human rights organizations. Just last week Amnesty International released a report, which I will be submitting for the record, a report documenting the killings of 14 civilians in just five drone strikes. [The information referred to follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Ms. Omar. AFRICOM confirms that four of the strikes were conducted by the United States but denies any civilian casualties took place. Their spokesperson said that the way they determine civilian casualties is not available to Amnesty International or, indeed, any other non-military resource. My question to you is do you find this to be credible in the face of overwhelming reports that are to the contrary? And that we have not killed any civilians in the decades of drone strikes that we have had in Somalia? Mr. Meservey. Sure. Thank you for the question. So, a couple thoughts. One, it is I know that the U.S. military takes every effort to avoid civilian casualties. It is part of their SOPs, it is part of the ethic to which they subscribe. I also know that there is a fog of war in a place like Somalia and that, given the context of the conflict there, it is very difficult to sometimes distinguish between combatants and non-combatants. So it is, you know, you can either have indiv---- Ms. Omar. Could a drone strike be 100 percent accurately, right, attacking? Or could---- Mr. Meservey. I think it is possible. Ms. Omar [continuing]. A report that says 100 percent no civilians---- Mr. Meservey. Yes, so that is actually---- Ms. Omar. Would that be correct, is what I am asking you? Mr. Meservey. Yes. I think it is possible. But I think it is, frankly, impossible to know given how, what a non- permissive environment it is. How do you even gather the facts on the ground in some of these places that are still controlled by al-Shabaab? You cannot go there safely. And, again, how do you distinguish between a combatant and a non-combatant when, you know, you have farmers who are armed sometimes? Some join al-Shabaab and leave, and then join again and leave. So it is incredibly difficult. And so I think it is possible that civilians have been killed. I also think it is possible, maybe not. For me it is, frankly, impossible to know, I think. Ms. Omar. Right. I hope it is not. It is a very challenging thing which, you know, it is one of those situations where they were making an investment to infrastructure, or figuring out if we invest in education, or how to best fight terrorism if we are not truly finding a path to have partnerships with the individual countries that are being impacted. Then we sort of kind, you know, are short-ending ourselves and them. And any investment that we are making, really, truly it is not ever going to have the kind of impact that we want it to have because there is a correlation between every--some of the reports say that there are correlations between every drone attack and the increase of suicide bombs that happen in Somalia. And so when we are trying to be effective in combating terrorism but our actions could lead to an increase, and we get to have a problem for investing in education, and we, we are saying, you know, we are going to be sending you books but we do not really make the investment that the communities themselves need where they need the brick and mortar investment, then there is a problem if we are talking about diplomacy. And we are not really having a conversation about what it means for us to send thousands and thousands of Liberians back to a country that could be fractured by that, without having the proper conversations with the Government of Liberia whether they could sustain that. Then it is a problem. And I hope that as we continue to have a conversation about Africa, that we engage Africa and what that process looks like. Ms. Bass. OK. I just have one last question and then we will wrap up. I believe a couple of you mentioned the idea that we needed to have a second African Leaders Summit. And I wanted to know if you would just expand on that. How do we do that now? Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. I was part of the planning for the first Africa Summit that took place in 2014. I saw the positive impact that came from that summit, bringing African leaders from across the continent to the United States to engage with our leaders. Other countries are doing it on a regular basis. China has one I think every other year. The Japanese host one every other year. The Europeans are hosting one. Ms. Bass. So the question would be who would host it? Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. Who would host that? Ms. Bass. Right. I mean, you know, the issue would be would the African leaders respond to Congress. Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. I think they would. Ms. Bass. You do. Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. I think they would respond to a request to come to the United States by President Trump. They want to engage with our leadership. They want to engage on issues that are important to them. And I think it will send a positive signal if the president were to invite them to attend. Ms. Bass. So, what I said was Congress. Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. Yes. Ms. Bass. I mean, you know, and I am just saying that just because I do not know. You know what I mean, in terms of the Administration, if the Administration was not interested in doing it, you know, is there another way you would convene a leaders summit. Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. You know, when I think about the prayer breakfast and how many leaders come to that, I think an invitation from our Congress would probably--you may not get all 54 but you would get a significant enough number that it would, it would be successful. And others would be, the ones who did not come would regret that they had not come. And it would, you know, you can set some goals to achieve during this conference. And I think leaders would respond. Ms. Bass. You know, to my ranking member, when we, as Representative Omar mentioned, we went to Eritrea and Ethiopia. And, you know, just so excited about the potential in Ethiopia and the fact that the prime minister has established peace with Eritrea. And, you know, they are trying to come together in the Horn. That it would be nice to invite the prime minister over. Maybe he could even, you know, address both houses of Congress. We have that happen occasionally as to send a strong signal. If either of you have any other closing thoughts? Mr. Coulibaly. I would like to even go a step further to suggest a regular, every three or 4 years, kind of a summit between U.S. and African head of States. That gives us an agenda to work toward and some clear targets to achieve by then. But then in between obviously lower level staff can engage across the different African governments and the U.S. agencies, et cetera, to prepare for the summit, also to work on what came out of the summit. And as the Ambassador mentioned, it has been a resounding success for all the countries who are holding those regular summits in terms of advancing their agenda in Africa. And it is really one place where there is a feeling that the U.S. is missing. So I think that is very critical. When the U.S. held the summit in 2014, I think about $14 billion or so was mobilized as far as U.S. businesses' investments intentions in Africa. So, clearly, there is scope for it to really boost the U.S. commercial ties with the continent. Just one point in closing. It is basically the level of engagement with Africa, there is really a strong tendency now or aspiration for Africa to unite and then to take some regional approach to some issues that are of mutual interest. And you may be very well aware of the Africa Continental Free Trade Area. Ms. Bass. Yes. I am familiar with that, yes. Mr. Coulibaly. That is advancing. And I think as of---- Ms. Bass. How many countries are left to sign on? Mr. Coulibaly. As of last---- Ms. Bass. Just one? Who is that? Mr. Coulibaly. As of last week we are one vote away, from it coming into effect. Ms. Bass. Good. Mr. Coulibaly. However, I think as outlined, too, in Ambassador Bolton's strategy but also some commentary that came out of the AGOA summit over the summer, the U.S. approach and that of the African counterparts is not quite fully syncing yet. The U.S. is currently talking bilateral engagement while the African countries---- Ms. Bass. Right. Mr. Coulibaly [continuing]. Are talking regional engagement. Ms. Bass. Right. Mr. Coulibaly. So, hopefully, there could be some middle grounds where they will feel like---- Ms. Bass. That is a little bit of a disconnect. Mr. Coulibaly. Yes. So they will feel like that their viewpoint is important---- Ms. Bass. The administration as Congress'. Mr. Coulibaly. But it is an important one because it is going to signal to what extent the U.S.---- Ms. Bass. Right. Mr. Coulibaly [continuing]. Is supportive---- Ms. Bass. Right. Mr. Coulibaly [continuing]. Of the regional initiatives for integration. And we know that they need that integration because the States are sort of small States---- Ms. Bass. Right. Mr. Coulibaly [continuing]. And it is going to scale that integration that can help boost economic opportunities and competitiveness on the continent. For example, intra-Africa trade is only 17 percent. Ms. Bass. Uh-huh. Mr. Coulibaly. And if you look at intra-European trade, 70 percent. Asia, 60 percent plus. Here in North America you are looking at 30 percent or more. So it is indeed quite important and critical. So as I begin to think about the post-AGOA architecture for U.S.-Africa engagement, taking into account that regional dimension would be important. Ms. Bass. And I think it is right to think about post-AGOA. But we do still have a few more years left. And so I would also like to think about how do we maximize the time that we have. Mr. Coulibaly. Yes. To be able to have something even earlier---- Ms. Bass. Right. Mr. Coulibaly. --I think that is better. Ms. Bass. It is right to think about that. Mr. Coulibaly. But clearly the thinking should be---- Ms. Bass. Yes. Mr. Coulibaly [continuing]. Going on now. And if you look at the European Union at their summit in 2017, they made a promise to actually go toward a continent-to-continent kind of arrangement. If you look at China during FOCAC, they try to align their programs with Africa's aspirations such as the Continental Free Trade Area, for example. So it is important also in the U.S.'s engagement to incorporate the views and aspirations of the African people to align the two agendas. Ms. Bass. You would think? Any more thoughts? Mr. Meservey. Yes. I think I would like to see a routine U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit as well for all the mentioned, or for all the reasons that Dr. Coulibaly laid out. I also think regular meetings between the presidents in the Oval Office with a head of state or African head of state maybe once a quarter or something. These high level engagements really matter. Ms. Bass. Yes. Mr. Meservey. The, you know, CODELs are important. I am glad when those happen. Ms. Bass. Yes. Mr. Meservey. Just to maybe give some--to put a point on this, you know, President Xi Jinping his, in each of his two terms his first overseas trip was to Africa. The Chinese foreign minister's first overseas trip every year is to Africa. They understand the importance of this high level engagement. And the U.S. just, this is one of the areas the U.S. needs to be better. Ms. Bass. Yes. And I think, you know, one of our challenges is to, you know, as I have learned in Congress, administrations come and go but Congress stays the same. So I think all of us would love to see high level engagements but we cannot, you know, control that. And so, and I do know from talking to a number of heads of State that they want to come over here. But, frankly, it is a little inappropriate unless they meet the head of State. And they have not received an invitation from the President. So a number of them have not come because it is like, you know, I cannot go over there until, you know. So that is, that is a little bit of a dilemma. And I would really like to---- Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. I would argue against that though, Madam. Ms. Bass. OK, please. Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. I know that the President of Ghana has been here several times. Ms. Bass. Yes, that is true. Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. And he has had very good meetings on The Hill, with the private sector, with its diaspora. When I meet with African leaders and they tell me they do not want to come because they cannot get a meeting with the president, I tell them they are missing out on the opportunity to meet with you. Ms. Bass. OK. OK. And you know what, as actually the President of Ghana is in the U.S. right now. I mean, he is going to be speaking at Harvard in a day or so. And we both recently met with the President of Sierra Leone. And maybe we could ask them to take that message back. Because I could see us having consistency with leaders, but it is not--you cannot speak for whatever, you know, administration is going to come and go. Well, I want to thank everyone for the time, the patience. And just in closing, a couple of closing comments. You know, we have said that we were doing this hearing. And we are going to do several more that really we are calling Africa 101. It is to just give the broad strokes as to where the continent is, where U.S. policy is, to figure out where we go from here, recognizing that we do have some immediate crises and issues that we need to attend to right away, but to provide the members of the committee with a broad overview of U.S.- Africa relations. So, I want to thank the witnesses and members for being here today. And if there is no further business, without objection, the committee stands adjourned. [Whereupon, at 4:13 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] APPENDIX [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] [all]