[House Hearing, 116 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] [H.A.S.C. No. 116-9] OUTSIDE PERSPECTIVES ON NUCLEAR DETERRENCE POLICY AND POSTURE UPDATE __________ COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION __________ HEARING HELD MARCH 6, 2019 [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] ___________ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 36-235 WASHINGTON : 2019 COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES One Hundred Sixteenth Congress ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman SUSAN A. DAVIS, California WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island Texas RICK LARSEN, Washington JOE WILSON, South Carolina JIM COOPER, Tennessee ROB BISHOP, Utah JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio JOHN GARAMENDI, California MIKE ROGERS, Alabama JACKIE SPEIER, California K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California MO BROOKS, Alabama ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland, Vice PAUL COOK, California Chair BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama RO KHANNA, California SAM GRAVES, Missouri WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York FILEMON VELA, Texas SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee ANDY KIM, New Jersey RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana KENDRA S. HORN, Oklahoma TRENT KELLY, Mississippi GILBERT RAY CISNEROS, Jr., MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin California MATT GAETZ, Florida CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania DON BACON, Nebraska JASON CROW, Colorado JIM BANKS, Indiana XOCHITL TORRES SMALL, New Mexico LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan PAUL MITCHELL, Michigan MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey JACK BERGMAN, Michigan KATIE HILL, California MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas DEBRA A. HAALAND, New Mexico JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine LORI TRAHAN, Massachusetts ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia Paul Arcangeli, Staff Director Leonor Tomero, Counsel Sarah Mineiro, Professional Staff Member Justin Lynch, Clerk C O N T E N T S ---------- Page STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1 Thornberry, Hon. William M. ``Mac,'' a Representative from Texas, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services.................... 4 WITNESSES Blair, Bruce G., Research Scholar, Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University................................. 7 Miller, Hon. Franklin C., Principal, The Scowcroft Group......... 9 Rohlfing, Joan, President and Chief Operating Officer, Nuclear Threat Initiative.............................................. 5 APPENDIX Prepared Statements: Blair, Bruce G............................................... 69 Miller, Hon. Franklin C...................................... 87 Rohlfing, Joan............................................... 57 Documents Submitted for the Record: [There were no Documents submitted.] Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing: [There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing: Mrs. Davis................................................... 113 Mr. Kim...................................................... 113 OUTSIDE PERSPECTIVES ON NUCLEAR DETERRENCE POLICY AND POSTURE UPDATE ---------- House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 6, 2019. The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith (chairman of the committee) presiding. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES The Chairman. Thank you, and I want to welcome our witnesses, members of the audience, members of the committee. We are here today to discuss the Nuclear Posture Review and nuclear policy going forward, in terms of our nuclear weapons. Before we get to that, a couple of housekeeping issues. For the hearing today, as I understand it, the witnesses don't have a hard stop. I do at 12:30. If there are still members around that want to ask questions at that point, I will have somebody else on the Democratic side take the chair to get through those questions, and we will go from there. We will stop at 12:30. And tomorrow, when we have our first posture hearing, we are going to, for questioning purposes--and you should have gotten notice on this--go from the bottom up. So we will start with Mrs. Luria and work our way up for questioning. So just in terms of your planning tomorrow, we are going to try and do it--no, we are actually going to succeed, we are going to do it that way--have the more junior members get to go first, because we have so many members of committee, frequently we have hearings and they don't get an opportunity to ask their questions. With that, we will start this hearing. I want to start by welcoming our witnesses: Ms. Joan Rohlfing, president and COO [chief operating officer] of the Nuclear Threat Initiative; Dr. Bruce Blair, who is research scholar, program on science and global security at Princeton University; and the Honorable Franklin C. Miller, principal at The Scowcroft Group. I think this is an incredibly important topic to discuss. Two things I want to make clear at the start. I completely support a strong and robust nuclear deterrent. We need nuclear weapons in the world that we live in today in order to deter our adversaries and meet our national security objectives as a country. Personally, I don't think that is debatable. We have, certainly, Russia, with their nuclear weapons; China, as well; rising threats from North Korea and Iran. And the best and most straightforward way to deter people from using nuclear weapons is if you are in a position to assure that they will be destroyed if they do. So having a nuclear deterrent is incredibly important. Second, our nuclear weapons have been around for a long time, and I have no question that we need to update and upgrade those weapons, look at what is working, what isn't working. We need to recapitalize our nuclear structure. What I question is whether or not we need to do it to the tune of more than $1.2 trillion, as both the 2010 and the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review has called into question. And this hearing, I hope, will help us answer that question. Do we have to have absolutely everything that we have had before, plus some of the weapons systems that the Trump administration is now talking about adding, including a new, long-range stand-off missile, which was requested before the Trump administration, and a new low-yield nuclear weapon, launchable from our submarines, which is new to the Trump administration? The Congressional Budget Office just recently went through and analyzed all that is in the Nuclear Posture Review, and gave some options, in terms of we could not do that and here is how much money we would save. And I think those are questions that need to be asked, for several reasons. First of all, we have a $22 trillion debt that is going up by about $1 trillion. In fact, it increased dramatically in the first quarter of this year over the first quarter of last year. We also have a large number of needs within the national security environment. Forget for the moment everything else that the Federal Government does. Just within national security we have had a number of studies that have come out. We have heard the Secretary of the Air Force say that she needs 25 percent more aircraft for the Air Force. We just had a review of our missile defense program, which also said we need a dramatic increase. The Navy still says they need a 355-ship Navy, which is significantly more than we have now. The Army would like to build towards an end strength that is substantially larger than it is right now. And the question I have is--well, not the question. The statement is, that math doesn't work. We are not going to have enough money to do all of that. So what we have to, at least in part, think about is what can we not do. Where can we save money? And within the nuclear weapons area, I believe that a credible deterrent can be presented for less than is called for in the Nuclear Posture Review. Now, I understand that a bipartisan group of people disagree with me on that. But a bipartisan group of people to some degree agree with me. So we are here to have that discussion and that debate. So number one is, you know, can we save money in here and still meet our national security objectives, still deter our adversaries? Because if we can, it is something we should talk about. And these are things that many people have contemplated. Former Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis, you know, when asked about whether or not the triad was necessary, said he wasn't sure, and talked about, well, if we had a dyad and didn't have the ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles], then we would have a much smaller risk of miscalculation, based on a false alarm. You know, very, very hawkish people have contemplated the notion that we don't need as many nuclear weapons as are contemplated in the Nuclear Posture Review, and that having that many is potentially destabilizing. And those are the other two points of this hearing that I really hope we will get into a discussion on. Number one is the concept of arms control. We, I feel, need to have a discussion with the Russians and, yes, with the Chinese about that issue. A number of former defense officials, including former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee Sam Nunn, former Secretary William Perry, former Secretary George Schultz, have said that we are stumbling towards a nuclear catastrophe because we have not rebooted any sort of arms control discussion or any sort of discussion with the Russians since the end of the Cold War about how we prevent an accidental nuclear war. So those are our other two--we are now pulling out of the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty, there is the potential for us to pull out of the New START [Strategic Arms Reduction] Treaty. And I am not presupposing at the moment that any one treaty is the exact right one, but I am deeply concerned about the fact that the administration right now has no interest in discussing any such treaty with China or Russia, not even having the conversation. We are now about to kick off another nuclear arms race. Is that a smart thing to do, without at least talking to our adversaries, and which brings us to the third issue, and that is stumbling into a nuclear war. Throughout the Cold War--and if you read Secretary Perry's book about the number of times during the Cold War when we were this close to having a nuclear war, based on false alarms, based on information that was wrong--how do we make sure that we prevent that? Well, a big part of it is dialogue. And right now we don't have that dialogue with the Russians or the Chinese. We do have that dialogue with North Korea. But I think making sure that we have a dialogue, and we learn the lessons of the Cold War and what--frankly, President Reagan was the one who put those two things most in place: arms control treaties and open discussion with our then Soviet adversaries about how to prevent a nuclear war. So I believe in the deterrents, I know we need nuclear weapons. But do we need $1.2 trillion's worth? And it may be more than that, once the final bill comes done. I have served on this committee long enough, I have a hard time remembering a single program that actually came in for less than they projected it, much less one that's spread out over 30 years and encompasses as many items as the Nuclear Posture Review does. So how does that affect our other needs in the defense, and are we not able to meet our nuclear needs for less money than is contemplated? It is a discussion I hope to have today. And with that, I will yield to the ranking member for his opening statement. STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too want to welcome our witnesses here. I completely agree with your statement that this is a very important topic, and I believe it is useful to have some different perspectives on our nuclear deterrent. I start from a few fundamentals that I believe have been at the center of U.S. strategic thought for 75 years in both parties. One of those fundamentals is that a strong nuclear deterrent is the cornerstone of American national security. And while various books may say we have come close--and obviously, there have been some instances, Cuban Missile Crisis, et cetera, that were far too close--it still is the fact that since the end of World War II nuclear weapons have not been used. And I believe that is largely the result of U.S. nuclear superiority made it clear that an aggressor could not benefit from it. We have had numerous Secretaries of Defense testify before this committee over the years that this was the highest priority of the Department of Defense. A second fundamental is that the Russians and the Chinese are modernizing their nuclear forces. I would simply quote from an article in RealClearDefense by Peter Hussey that says, in fact, early in the next decade, around 2021, Russia will have modernized close to 100 percent of its bombers, land-based missiles, and submarines, and China will, by the end of the next decade, have a fully modernized and expanded nuclear deterrent as well, with mobile ICBMs, a new missile-armed submarine, and long-range cruise missiles. Now, I hope that this committee will get into a classified session at some point with our intelligence community and get their assessment of what the Russians and the Chinese are doing. But the point is it is not just about us. It is about them, as well. Third fundamental, I believe, is that our weapons and delivery systems were designed and built for a different time, with different circumstances, and need to be updated. Part of it is just because of aging. It is kind of like anything else in life. If you neglect your health, if you neglect your roof, sometimes the bills are going to come due. And unfortunately, we are still dependent upon delivery systems and weapons that were largely built during the Reagan era. And so it makes sense that we will have to make up for past neglect, although at no point does that make-up require more than 6.4 percent of the defense budget. Now, can we afford 6 percent of the defense budget for the cornerstone of American national security? Well, that may be an issue where we have differences. A couple other fundamentals. Number one--I mean number four in my list, we cannot wish away the existence of nuclear weapons. It seems to me that some of the writings that one comes across can kind of hope we can negotiate or wish away their existence. That is not going to occur. If we are going to fulfill our responsibilities to defend the country, we have to make sure that our deterrent is without question. And that leads me to my fifth fundamental assumption that has been at the center of American strategic thought for 75 years, and that is America and our allies depend on a U.S. nuclear deterrent that is credible, safe, and reliable without question. And I think the big issue before us this year, and at this time, is the credibility of that deterrent. And if you are allies in Europe or allies in Asia, if that credibility starts to wane, you start to think about other options. And that is part of the reason, whether we modernize our delivery systems--in my view, all three legs of the triad-- whether we modernize the weapons themselves is not just a question for us, it is a question of whether our allies trust that our superiority will be to such an extent that they can rest secured, and not having to have their own nuclear deterrent, that they can rest secured in depending on it, as well. All of those are part of the reasons, Mr. Chairman, I agree with you that this is a big, important topic that we should not take lightly, or assume that slogans can somehow overcome the U.S. policy of the last 75 years. I look forward to hearing these witnesses and others to come. I yield back. The Chairman. Thank you. We will start with Ms. Rohlfing. STATEMENT OF JOAN ROHLFING, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE Ms. Rohlfing. Good morning, and thank you. I come before you as the president of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a non- partisan, global security organization---- The Chairman. I am sorry. You have to have that microphone, like, right here in front of you. Ms. Rohlfing. Even closer? The Chairman. Yes. Ms. Rohlfing. Is that better? The Chairman. Yes. Well, to the side. Just speak right into it, and that way we can hear you better. Ms. Rohlfing. Great. The Chairman. Thank you. Ms. Rohlfing. I come before you as the president of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a non-partisan, global security organization working to reduce the risk of use of weapons of mass destruction and disruption. As a former professional staff member of this committee during Les Aspin's chairmanship, I am honored to appear before you, and I commend you for your leadership on this important issue. The topic of today's hearing is one of critical importance for our country and the world. In the short time that I have for my opening statement, I want to highlight a few key points. First, we have arrived at a very dangerous moment, where the risk of nuclear use is as high as it has ever been since the height of the Cold War. Today we live in an environment where new technologies like cyber pose significant challenges for the integrity of nuclear forces, where terrorists are trying to acquire nuclear capabilities, and where nuclear weapons have spread to nine states, some of which, like India and Pakistan, are engaged in ongoing regional conflict. We have reached a nadir in our relationship with Russia, with no strategy for how to manage the existential nuclear threat between us, with no ongoing dialogue between the United States and Russia. And with regularly occurring close calls between our two militaries, we are at a high risk of blundering into conflict. Second, we are headed in the wrong direction. Instead of focusing on policies, practices, and deployment decisions that move us out of danger and reduce the risk of nuclear use, we are taking actions that increase the chances of use. We have been increasing, rather than decreasing, our reliance on nuclear weapons. The administration is proposing to move forward with new types of weapons and new scenarios for their use. And, perhaps most troubling, we have been systematically removing the guardrails that have regulated nuclear competition and reduced nuclear threats for more than five decades: the agreements, treaties, dialogue, negotiations, and verification that have helped to keep us safe. We are now at a point where the only protective guardrail still in place is the New START Treaty, which will expire in less than 2 years, unless it is extended, something the United States and Russia can and should do on a priority basis. Finally, Congress has a critical role to play in supporting policies, forces, and actions that reduce the risk of use, prevent proliferation pressures, and keep in place the guardrails of nuclear stability, predictability, and transparency that keep our country safe. What can Congress do to help reduce nuclear dangers? Several specific recommendations for your consideration include: number one, Congress must take the lead in creating the political space for re-engagement with Russia on nuclear threat reduction. Despite all of our differences with Russia, we still have an existential common interest in preventing a nuclear weapon from being used by accident, mistake, or blunder. Congress should work with the administration to encourage the resumption of dialogue and negotiations in multiple channels: diplomatically, militarily, and among legislative leaders on both sides. Second, Congress should work to increase leadership decision time for nuclear use by supporting the removal of nuclear weapons from prompt launch. Our most vulnerable, least survivable force, the ICBM force, would be a logical place to begin this effort. The United States and Russia should move on this together. Third, the United States does not need to build or deploy new low-yield weapons. We have a robust nuclear deterrent today, one that is capable of being used anywhere on the globe. Deploying new low-yield weapons lowers the threshold for nuclear use, increases our reliance on nuclear weapons, and undermines U.S. efforts to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. It is folly to bet our children's future on the premise that a use or exchange of nuclear weapons could remain limited and controllable. Fourth, Congress should encourage the administration to extend New START this year. And fifth, and finally, on nuclear use policy, Congress should consider legislation to ensure that any decision to authorize the use of a nuclear weapon is deliberate, justifiable under international law, and consistent with authorities granted in the Constitution. Legislating a congressional role in the authorization of the use of nuclear weapons, in particular one that would limit the executive branch's ability to use a nuclear weapon first, is one option that should be considered. I will stop here, and look forward to taking your questions. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Ms. Rohlfing can be found in the Appendix on page 57.] The Chairman. Thank you. Dr. Blair. STATEMENT OF BRUCE G. BLAIR, RESEARCH SCHOLAR, PROGRAM ON SCIENCE AND GLOBAL SECURITY, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY Dr. Blair. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Thornberry, and other distinguished members of this committee, thank you very much for the invitation to appear here today. It is a great honor for me to testify. Like many other Americans of my generation, I first learned about nuclear weapons in 1962, when President Kennedy threatened the Soviet Union to--that we would unleash our nuclear might against them if they were to launch nuclear weapons from Cuba against the United States. At that time it was quite reassuring to me to hear that we had a secure second- strike force capable of inflicting unacceptable damage in retaliation to such an attack. Now I first learned that simply being able to destroy Russia as a viable country was not, in fact, the reality of our nuclear weapons policy when I became a nuclear missile launch officer and a support officer for the Strategic Air Command's Looking Glass airborne command post. Our planners saw nuclear weapons quite differently. They saw them as tools for the actual or coercive use during a nuclear conflict, primarily to destroy the deterrent capabilities of the Soviet Union and China/North Korea. This warfighting strategy thus ran contrary to and contradicted the idea of stability based on mutual deterrence, which is the very foundation of our nuclear security. And as we tried to neutralize each other's second-strike forces, we managed only to fuel an arms race and increase the chances of nuclear war by design or by accident. Thousands of U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear weapons aimed largely at each other stood--and still stand today--ready for immediate first use or launch on warning. Back then, as now, the President would have just a few minutes to authorize launch on warning, on the basis of enemy attack indications that could be false or misleading, and today possibly caused by cyber interference. We heard during the opening remarks about false alarms during the Cold War. None of them rose to the level of a President of the United States. Over the last 10 years we have had, on multiple occasions, ambiguous ballistic missile threats that have risen to the level of Presidents. So this is not a historical concern. Our and Russia's hair-trigger launch postures, driven by vulnerabilities of our own making, continue to run the risk that fear, miscalculation, misperception, accident, or false warning could trigger a nuclear exchange. As you have heard-- and I agree--the risk of blundering into nuclear war presents what is, by far, the greatest immediate threat to the United States today. So what do we do? I agree with all the suggestions that I have heard from Joan. But I would also propose that we return to first principles, and design for ourselves a posture for assured retaliation that is smaller, but is more survivable and more stable than the one we presently have and the one that we currently plan to have. This posture would hold at risk Russia's, China's, and North Korea's key elements of state power, economy, and leadership. It would require, by my estimation--and I think the Pentagon planning is in--aligned with this--it would require covering about 450 aim points in those 3 countries, coverage that, in my view, would easily meet any reasonable judgement of actual deterrent requirements. But pivoting away from targeting opposing forces and from the fantasy of controlling and dominating nuclear escalation would allow us to eliminate most of the 4,000 weapons in the current active stockpile. Only five or six of the planned Columbia-class submarines would be needed to be built. That is it. All other existing and planned U.S. nuclear weapons could be scrapped. This would mean eliminating the land-based missile force, the ICBMs. But it is a vulnerable force that weakens, not strengthens the triad. We are better off without it. If you want a stable triad that includes land-based missiles, then a mobile basing mode is required. Are you prepared to go that way? The most important project in this modernization program should be fixing our vulnerable command, control, communications, and intelligence systems, C3I. It has always been the Achilles heel of our posture. It would likely collapse within hours into a nuclear conflict. So fixing this is essential for any strategy, including assured retaliation, and for enabling the President to intelligently choose a response if deterrence should fail. So instead of modernizing the--all three of these legs, I think it is most important that we--as Joan indicated--increase Presidential decision time. That should be our top priority. And last but not least, pivoting away from warfighting means recognizing that the sole purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter their use by others. It is not to deter conventional aggression. We have ample capabilities with our allies to deter, defeat, and punish conventional aggression. And the flip side, the operational side of sole purpose, is no first use. No first use is axiomatic and true deterrence because it means threatening to respond to an attack, not to initiating one. No first use is further justified by the absence of foreseeable scenarios, in my view, that would ever motivate a U.S. President to use nuclear weapons first. Let me close there, and thank you for your attention and look forward to questions, discussion. [The prepared statement of Dr. Blair can be found in the Appendix on page 69.] The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Miller. STATEMENT OF HON. FRANKLIN C. MILLER, PRINCIPAL, THE SCOWCROFT GROUP Mr. Miller. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Thornberry, members of the committee, I appear before you today in my capacity as a private individual, not representing or speaking for any other individual, institution, or entity. And the answers and positions I take before you reflect solely my personal views, except when I quote specifically official U.S. policy. I thank you for inviting me to discuss a subject to which I have dedicated my entire professional life, and I spent most of three decades actively formulating deterrence in defense policy in the Department of Defense and at the National Security Council. In the two Bush administrations I led reviews that lowered the number of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons by 65 percent and 37 percent, respectively. Those reductions created the START II Treaty, enabled the 2002 Moscow Treaty, and resulted, cumulatively, in about an 80 percent cut from U.S. force levels in 1989. So I sit before you this morning as neither an advocate of massive arsenals, nor an opponent of arms control. My principal purpose this morning is to distinguish fact from rhetoric and fiction. For starters, the nuclear deterrence policy and posture of the United States today is squarely in the mainstream of U.S. policy as it has existed in Democratic and Republican administrations for over almost 60 years. That policy and that posture is premised on the firm belief that a nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought. That recognition on our part, however, is not sufficient. It is essential that potential enemy leaders understand and accept that, as well. And the greatest risk of nuclear war today lies in a potential enemy leadership miscalculating and believing it can carry out a successful attack against ourselves or our allies. As a result, U.S. policy seeks to deter, to prevent nuclear and major conventional attack against ourselves and our allies. It is not what some call a warfighting policy. It is a deterrence policy. Deterrence rests on the premise that we will maintain the capability to retaliate against the assets which potential enemy leaders value most. In the case of Russia and China, those valued assets are the elements of state power: the senior leadership itself; yes, their military forces; their internal security forces; their ability to command and control their nation; and the industrial potential to sustain war. For almost 60 years the United States has accomplished this goal principally by maintaining a triad of nuclear forces undergirded by a command and control infrastructure in a nuclear weapons complex. And that triad has been recognized by all administrations since President Eisenhower, Democratic and Republican alike, as unique and vital. Its combination of three basing modes, each with unique strengths and different but offsetting vulnerabilities, separate attack azimuths, and complementary alert postures, presents potential enemy offenses and defenses with insurmountable obstacles. It is that combination which provides for deterrent stability, because an aggressor cannot preemptively destroy the triad or prevent the retaliation it would impose. That is why it is the underpinning for our nuclear forces today. And Mr. Chairman, you mentioned Secretary Mattis's doubts about the triad when he came to office. But this is what the nuclear posture--as you said, using Secretary Mattis's voice, ``I have questioned the triad and I cannot solve the deterrent problem reducing it from a triad. I have been persuaded that the triad, in its framework, is the right way to go.'' Due to deferrals of modernization that should have started about 15 years ago, our nuclear forces are well beyond their expected service lives, and they must either be modernized or retired. History has demonstrated that modernization is the surer path towards limiting the chances of nuclear war. There are two fundamental facts with regard to that modernization I would like to point out to the committee. First, the U.S. program is not creating a nuclear arms race. Russia and China began modernizing and expanding their nuclear forces in the early 2000s, and they have been and continue to field many new and advanced nuclear systems. In sharp contrast, the United States will not begin to field replacements for its Cold War-era triad until the mid to late 2020s. And any notion, therefore, that the U.S. modernization is spurring a new arms race is counter-factual and wholly without merit. Second, modernizing the triad is eminently affordable. Critics of modernization have dramatically inflated that cost, throwing around a 30-year life cycle to produce a sticker shock. The truth is that the cost of maintaining the nuclear modernization program, even when in full swing by the 2020s, is not expected to exceed between 3 to 4 percent of the defense budget. When including the cost of operating the deterrent, the total cost of protecting America and our allies from nuclear and major non-nuclear attack is between 6 to 7 percent of the defense budget, not too much to pay to prevent an existential threat. I look forward to elaborating on these points and other topics of the committee. In particular, I look forward to elaborating on why the concepts of de-alerting our nuclear forces and adopting a policy of no first use, while of superficial and popular appeal, will in fact produce instability, undercut deterrence, and cause great concern among U.S. allies, while having no effect on Russia or China. Importantly, I look forward to discussing arms control, the New START Treaty, the INF Treaty, and I look forward to discussing why the introduction of a small yield--a small number of low-yield Trident warheads into our force is so very important today. I cannot think of another weapons system in the recent past which is so misunderstood, mischaracterized, or demonized as the low-yield Trident. I have submitted formal written testimony to the committee and respectfully request that it be included in the record. [The prepared statement of Mr. Miller can be found in the Appendix on page 87.] The Chairman. Thank you. I have more questions than I have time for. I will try to be quick about it. On the triad issue, the ICBMs are stationary, they are easily identifiable by the enemy, in terms of knowing where they are. And also, since they are not as survivable as, you know, the bombers and the nuclear subs, which can--which they will not know where they are, in all likelihood, you know, if they are launched on, it is sort of use it or lose it at that point. If you think there is missiles coming in, you had better launch them, or the ICBMs are gone. So what exactly do the ICBMs add to that deterrence? And I completely agree with you, we have to have the capability that they know that even if they try and strike us, that they can't take out our weapons. That is the beauty of the submarines and the bombers, is that they are far easier to conceal. But what exactly do the ICBMs add to the deterrents? Yeah, I will start with Mr. Miller and then go to Dr. Blair. Mr. Miller. Thank you, sir. First of all, I point out that, on a day-to-day basis, we only have two legs of the triad. The bombers are not on alert, they are not armed, and so you are basically dealing with ICBMs and submarines. Second, we don't have a launch under--attack launch-on- warning posture that the deterrent relies upon. Many, many years ago we came up with plans and procedures so that the President has the option to launch ICBMs or not. But our deterrent does not rely on launch on warning. The Chairman. Right. Mr. Miller. Third, 400 ICBM silos scattered across the United States. If an enemy wants to neutralize those, that means putting at least 400 to 800 warheads in the air. There is no question that that is a massive attack on the United States, which will draw a massive response. And that is an important indicator of what is going on in the world at that time. And last, the ICBMs are single-warhead systems. So that provides flexibility in a crisis, as a single warhead. The Chairman. Dr. Blair. Dr. Blair. As Frank mentioned, we actually have a monad today because the bombers are off alert and vulnerable. The ICBM force is vulnerable, and offers nothing to second-strike deterrence. Our second-strike deterrence capability resides entirely in our submarine force at sea. What is worse is that it not only doesn't contribute to deterrence as the way I define it, as opposed to, let's say, the use of those weapons in a first strike, in a warfighting capacity, that those weapons on hair-trigger alert--and I will define that, if you would like, because I use the term in a very specific sense--create pressure on the President to consider the launch of those weapons very quickly, if there are indications of an attack against North America. And I use the term ``hair-trigger'' in the following sense. First, those Minuteman missiles are armed, they are targeted, they are fueled, and their gyroscopes are spinning. And they will fire instantly upon receipt of three short bursts of computer code. The weapons themselves, they will fire if they get that code. Hopefully, it only would come from authorized sources directed by the President. Secondly, because of the pressure to use or lose those forces, we would start a launch emergency procedure involving the President that--it is almost like, you know, showdown at O.K. Corral at high noon. You get indications of a possible attack against us, or even a flinch or a false alarm, a process begins that I describe as the rote enactment of a prepared script. There is no deliberation involved. The Chairman. I have got to move on, because I want to get some other people. Dr. Blair. Right, okay. The Chairman. Dr.---- Dr. Blair. Sorry. The Chairman. Ms. Rohlfing, sorry, do you have anything? Ms. Rohlfing. Thank you. So I would go back to first principles, and just note that we, as a nation, ought to be really focused on preventing the risk of use of nuclear weapons. And when I evaluate the ICBM leg of the triad, I am concerned about its lack of survivability. And I agree with Bruce. The fact that they are use it or lose it weapons puts pressure on a decision maker to make a rapid decision in a very short amount of time---- The Chairman. And I think that that is the ultimate question from all three. There is not a lot of disagreement here, in terms of what the purpose of the nuclear weapons are. The question is how much is enough. And that is really what I am debating. And yes, when you look at the number of nuclear weapons that we had during the height of the Cold War, we have a lot less now. But the number of nuclear weapons we had during the height of the Cold War--and this may be--it was enough to, like, destroy the world, like, seven times over or something. So, you know, a nuclear weapon packs a hell of a lot of punch. And China's approach--and I know they are modernizing their force, but China has less than 300 nuclear weapons, and they figure that is enough to inflict an enormous amount of damage on anyone who would try to attack them, enough to discourage them. And that is what I question. And I know the New START Treaty has pulled it way down. I think the number is 1,550 delivery systems. But keep in mind delivery systems--there is an unlimited amount of weapons that you can have in storage. There is no limit on that. These are merely the ones that are ``deployed.'' So you got 15--and also 1,550 delivery mechanisms. That is not 1,550 warheads. It can be more warheads than that. So--and I guess, Mr. Miller, I will close with you and two questions. One, 1,000 nuclear weapons, I mean, that is a pretty powerful amount, in and of itself. And we have a lot more than that. What is the calculus that says that we need more than that? And then I will ask you a quick question about the low- yield thing. Mr. Miller. The calculus as to what it takes to deter is something that is worked out by Strategic Command and given to the President through the Secretary of Defense, based on what are the strategic valued assets of the Russian and Chinese leaderships, not mirror imaging what we hold dear, but what they hold dear, what---- The Chairman. See, do you think that we couldn't sufficiently discourage that? I mean if we dropped 100 nuclear weapons on Russia, that wouldn't be enough of a discouragement? Mr. Miller. I think that the Russian leadership looks at nuclear war differently than we do. And I am not going to give you a number. You can always say take the 10 least important weapons off. I mean I did that. I cut the force dramatically in---- The Chairman. You did. Mr. Miller. But the question is what do you need to hold that risk? And I think the current answer is what you get from Strategic Command. It is what you need to hold Russia and China and a reserve force for other contingencies. The Chairman. Just quick--one thing I have learned on this committee is within the Defense Department and within the people who make the weapons and lobby them, I have never had them come up and say, ``We are good, don't buy any more.'' There is a certain bias built into that system that says we always need a little more. And to some extent, as chairman of the committee, that is something I am trying to do differently. I have been here for 22 years, and that is what we do. We come in, oh my gosh, we are not ready. We need more, more, more, more, more. So I hear what you are saying. But I have seen that bias over and over again. So I want that bias balanced against some actual numbers. And, you know, when I asked you if 100 nuclear weapons would discourage Russia, the look on your face was basically yes. I mean you didn't say it, but, you know, that is a pretty powerful punch. So that is what I am trying to balance out. Now, quickly on the low-yield thing, the problem with the low-yield thing is when you start contemplating--the argument is you contemplate the discussion that you could win a nuclear--that you could launch a low-yield nuclear weapon and it wouldn't trigger a catastrophic response. Okay? I don't agree with that. Mr. Miller. I don't, either. The Chairman. I think it is unbelievably risky if you---- Mr. Miller. I agree with that. The Chairman. So the benefit of a low-yield nuclear weapon, supposedly, is, well, if they hit us with a low-yield, we can have a proportionate response. When it comes to nuclear deterrents, I don't really care about a proportionate response. I think we need to make it clear if you use a nuclear weapon, it is a nuclear weapon. And if the smallest thing we have is bigger than the one you launched at us, well, too damn bad. Okay? We are going to hit you with it. So I don't get the notion that a low-yield nuclear weapon does anything other than potentially make people think wrong, and doesn't add anything to our deterrent capability. Mr. Miller. Well, back to the broad discussion, Congressman Smith, I agree with that. You and I may absolutely agree on that point. But I think where we start is the fact that, beginning at the--in the late 1990s, early 2000s, the Russian military devised a strategy for the use of low-yield nuclear weapons to win on the battlefield. They then went out and bought new weapons to carry out that strategy, and they have practiced that strategy. And they did all of that in the face of our existing triad---- The Chairman. Got that. Sorry to interrupt, but why don't we tell them that, okay, if you do that, we are going to hit you with a nuclear weapon---- Mr. Miller. Well, again---- The Chairman [continuing]. And we don't care what size it is. Mr. Miller. My point is they seem to be convinced that they--that there was a gap in our deterrence structure, and that they spent a lot of money to go out and build these weapons. Now, deterrence is about getting in the mind of the other person. Not in your mind, sir, or in mine. And if they spent that money, and if they have exercised it, and if they have threatened it, the point is to have something that goes back and says, ``We are not going to match your whole theater nuclear force structure. We are going to have a small number of these weapons that can respond to meet what you thought was a deterrent gap.'' That is all. Don't go there in the first place, don't use a nuclear weapon, because it could escalate out of control. Are you prepared to bet Mother Russia on a small piece of Latvia? The Chairman. All right, fair enough. I have got to get to Mr. Thornberry. Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Mr. Miller, I thought that was a helpful conversation. One of the largest problems we have, I think, in thinking about nuclear deterrents, is that credibility is in the mind of the adversary. And we can make all sorts of proclamations, and we can sign all sorts of pieces of paper and do all sorts of things, but it--the question is what is in their mind, in their calculation, what do they see as vulnerabilities, and what do they see that they can get away with. If they think we are just a little bit better than they are, then the tendency is to test it. If we are a whole bunch better than they are, then you have less of a tendency to test it. At least that is part of my theory. I may stretch you for a second in going back in history, so tell me if you are not comfortable with this. Ms. Rohlfing talked about coming--working on the committee during Les-- Secretary Aspin's time. My staff time in Washington goes back a little further than that, when Glickham and Pershing II deployments were being debated. And it--I am struck by the fact, with all of this debate on the INF Treaty, that so little discussion occurs around the vicious opposition that President Reagan got to deploying the intermediate-range systems in Europe to begin with. We heard a lot of the same arguments: ``Well, this will lower the threshold of nuclear weapons,'' ``This is provocative to the Russians,'' even though the Russians already had their systems there. All sorts--that there is less flying time, so that will make it more likely that there will be a nuclear exchange. There were demonstrations here, demonstrations in Europe-- some of which we later found out were paid for by the KGB [Soviet Committee for State Security], by the way--but the tremendous opposition to those deployments. And yet NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] stuck together, NATO deployed those systems, and it was only because NATO deployed the systems that an INF Treaty was able to be signed by Reagan and Gorbachev. I would be interested in your historical reflection, because sometimes I think we get the cart before the horse. We think the paper is the thing that matters, but what really matters is the military strength that leads both sides to believe that it is in their best interest to sign some sort of treaty, or reach some sort of agreement. To me, that is the lesson of INF. But again, I am stretching you. I don't know. We didn't talk about this. Do you have reflections over your 30 years? Mr. Miller. Mr. Thornberry, I think you are right. I think that was an interesting time, when the Russians thought they could intimidate the NATO allies and that they could break the consensus on deployments. What I find disturbing is that, in a period where after the Bush 41-Gorbachev initiative, where we virtually eliminated our theater-based nuclear forces, the Russians who had signed that same pledge decided in the late 1990s to start building those forces up. Again, one can say that the Russians are foolish, that they waste their money, that this is a wrongheaded thing, that the leadership didn't know what the military was doing. I don't believe any of that. What I am concerned about is the Russian military believes that there are advantages that they could obtain by putting those weapons in the field and threatening our allies. So again, a small deterrent capability in the form of a limited number of low-yield Trident, I believe, answers that without having to return to a whole panoply of theater nuclear weapons to defend the alliance. And I think the lessons apply. Yes, sir. Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will give other folks a chance. The Chairman. Mr. Courtney. Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for the witnesses and, you know, very thoughtful hearing, important, because the Nuclear Posture Review kind of came over late last year, and it really, I think, had some substantive changes that really need to be drilled down and explored much more deeply. And one point I just would like to get clarification from you, Mr. Miller, is that, you know, as Ms. Rohlfing said, New START, the clock is ticking, in terms of its expiration. Do you support extending New START? Mr. Miller. I believe that New START is a necessary, but not sufficient approach to our current condition. If I could describe, New START caps the traditional strategic forces of both sides. New START does nothing to cover the threat of the exotic weapons that Mr. Putin has been waving around. New START does nothing to cover the short-range threat to our allies. I would like to see New START extended in the context of a new negotiation which captures all U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons of all ranges and all types. That, I think, would cover our security---- Mr. Courtney. Well, actually, I think there would probably be agreement across the table about the fact that New START should be enhanced, as well as extended. But, I mean, frankly, I think we are--with this administration, I mean, we may be looking at a situation where there is no effort made to extend it. And I just think it is important to really emphasize that, you know, that is a foundational backdrop to this, you know, nuclear posture policy of the country. In terms of low-yield, which, again, was really, I think, one of the real differentiating aspects of the review that came over last year, you know, coming from a district where there is a submarine force, and talking to folks there--and maybe, you know, I will talk to one of the other witnesses about this--is that--I mean one of the concerns that I have heard is just that if you have got a submarine out there that has got, you know, sort of mixed and matched missiles, in terms of low-yield/high- yield, if the decision is made to fire one of those, it is really--for the adversary, it is impossible to determine what kind of missile is coming at them. I mean they are not sort of color-coded. And I guess, you know, again, Ms. Rohlfing, I just sort of wonder if you would sort of talk about, you know, that question about whether or not you can really control a nuclear conflict once the missiles start flying, regardless of whether they are high-yield or low-yield. Ms. Rohlfing. Thank you. I want to reply and say, first of all, I don't believe there is a deterrence gap at low-yield. We have other low-yield options in the arsenal. And even setting that aside, I think our deterrent today is robust, comprehensive, and is perfectly capable of deterring a nuclear attack at any yield. So you raised the question of could an adversary discriminate, if we were to launch a submarine-launched ballistic missile, whether it is a low-yield or a regular-yield weapon, and the answer is no. I think, from the standpoint of watching an incoming launch, our adversary would expect--would have to anticipate that it is a regular--that is, high, you know, highly capable weapon, capable of enormous destruction. So that is another issue. But I think we are also focused on the wrong question here. We are putting so much emphasis into figuring out what does it take to persuade the adversary that we have a credible deterrent. And while that is certainly important, I believe we have today a robust comprehensive deterrent. I believe that a reasonable modernization program can sustain that deterrent over time, and we need to step back and balance our investments in our deterrent force against not only other needs of the Defense Department and our military, but also we need to look at the implications of our current posture for increasing the risk of use and the spread of these weapons. Mr. Courtney. Thank you. And actually, just to follow on that point--and you know, again, Dr. Blair, you talked about a possible smaller fleet of subs, of SSBNs [ballistic missile submarines]. I think it is important to note that the fleet today is 14 SSBN Ohio-class. They are going to be over 40 years old. The hull life is giving out. So, I mean, it is really not even a question of nuclear policy, it is really a question of just--you know, they are not going to be safe for sailors. And the number of subs that are going to replace it is 12, so we are actually reducing the fleet from 14 to 12, and reducing the missile tubes from 24 to 16. I mean if you do the math, I mean, we are actually going to have a smaller fleet. But maintaining that second-strike capability does seem to be somewhat of a consensus issue here. I just wanted to make that point before yielding---- The Chairman. The gentleman's time has---- Mr. Miller. Mr. Courtney, may I make a factual---- The Chairman. The gentleman's---- Mr. Miller. May I make a factual statement? The Chairman [continuing]. Time has expired. I am sorry. Mr. Miller. A factual statement, may I, please? The Chairman. Oh, sure. But I just--I try not to do this, because if this happens we wind up in big trouble. Go ahead. Mr. Miller. Mr. Courtney, right now the Trident force carries two different types of warheads. One, a W76 warhead, and a W88 warhead, a much larger warhead. So if you are talking about discrimination problems, that exists right now today. The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Miller. And it is contextual. The Chairman. Mr. Wilson. Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all of our witnesses for being here today. And Mr. Miller, I want to thank you for your decades of service with the Department of Defense and the National Security Council. And with your background, in your testimony you identified the overall age of our nuclear deterrent capabilities as a weakness in the strategic triad, and argue for the modernization of nuclear forces. U.S. nuclear weapons are surpassing their intended service lives, with the average age of our nuclear warheads at 26 years. The Nuclear Posture Review addressed the importance of tritium production and the increase of pit production to 80 pits per year by 2030. Both of these critical missions are connected to the Savannah River Site that I am very grateful to represent. What negative impacts do you see if the U.S. fails to modernize our nuclear inventory? Mr. Miller. Mr. Wilson, the United States today is the only nuclear weapon state that cannot produce a nuclear pit to be placed into the operational force. The nuclear enterprise, run by DOE [U.S. Department of Energy], is on its back legs. It is--it desperately needs to be modernized. We need to be able to replace weapons, some of which are 60, 70 years old, in the arsenal. So the infrastructure in DOE must be upgraded, or the deterrent over time will not have credibility. Mr. Wilson. And then that relates to the next question, and the National Defense Strategy rightfully addresses the great power competition and dynamic threats the U.S. faces. I believe this provides a clear path for the U.S. to modernize, reform, and build partner capacity through an emphasis on peace through strength. Deterrence, specifically nuclear deterrence, is critical to protect the U.S. and our allies across the globe by projecting strength. Can you discuss how essential it is for a nuclear triad to maintain both a first- and second-strike capability, with a flexible response option? How does this deter a massive conventional or nuclear attack by the enemy? Mr. Miller. I think that the triad, in its overall strength, as I have described earlier, is capable of deterring a massive Russian or Chinese attack. I believe that our capability to respond flexibly is necessary to assure our European allies that a Russian land grab, where they have conventional superiority to date all along the NATO-Russia border would not succeed, and it could not succeed because they can't use a nuclear weapon to cement their victory. So they--the tie between our strategic forces and the defense of NATO is, I believe, a critical element of our deterrence. Mr. Wilson. And the deterrence is so absolutely critical. In 2016 the Secretary of Defense, Ash Carter, and General John Hyten both testified that funding for nuclear weapons modernization of the nuclear triad was affordable. Secretary of Defense James Mattis then made it his number one priority, since our inventory has atrophied. Can you discuss how modernizing our nuclear triad over 30 years is a minimal percentage of the defense budget and explain the urgent need for the investment in our nuclear inventory? Mr. Miller. As far as the urgency, as Mr. Courtney pointed out, the submarines are getting old and will, at some point in the 2020s and beyond, have to be retired, one by one. They are not safe to operate. Minuteman systems are about 1970s vintage. They have been upgraded, but they are to the point where they can't be upgraded. The air-launched cruise missile, introduced in 1980, had a projected service life of 10 years. So the modernization of the force is critical. You either have to modernize it or retire it. You can't afford to retire it. And even the CBO [Congressional Budget Office] agrees that the full modernization program in the 2020s is going to cost between 6-7 percent of the defense budget. Mr. Wilson. And---- Mr. Miller. Six to seven percent. Mr. Wilson. And it should be known by the American people that the Russian state-owned media has reported that hypersonic missiles that Russia is developing would be able to hit multiple sites in the United States, and they actually identified Maryland, California, and Washington. These threats only reinforce the need for an effective deterrent strategy. General Hyten recently testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee that our defense against hypersonic missiles is our nuclear deterrent. What component of the nuclear triad is most in need of modernization to counter and deter the use of hypersonic missiles? Mr. Miller. I don't think any--again, sir, each leg is getting to the end of its service life. If you believe in a triad--and I do--because we didn't do it during the George W. Bush administration, the force needs to be modernized. The entire force needs to be modernized. Mr. Wilson. And again, I appreciate your efforts, because it is so clear it is peace through strength. And it comes from--and Congressman Thornberry has identified how that has been successful in the past. Thank you very much. The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Moulton. Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Miller, you stated that a no first use policy would be destabilizing. In other words, would create a higher likelihood of nuclear conflict. Why is this the case? Mr. Miller. I think there are four points, Mr. Moulton. The first is our allies have, for decades, depended on a U.S. policy that we would escalate to nuclear use to end a conventional war in Europe. If we were in these very tumultuous transatlantic times to remove that guarantee, we would cause allies to doubt the U.S. guarantee of their safety. Second, because some of those allies can build their own nuclear weapons, if we remove that guarantee, we could well lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapon states in the world. Third, we are not going to change Chinese and Russian views. The Russian view is first use. The Chinese say they have a no first use policy, but there is enough intelligence to indicate that that is a very questionable condition, and it could change in a moment, with an authoritarian government. And fourth, there is absolutely no reason in the world why the Russian or Chinese leaderships would believe in a no first use pledge on our part. So it wouldn't have any effect in managing a crisis. Those are the four reasons no first use makes no sense. Mr. Moulton. Ms. Rohlfing, how would you respond to Mr. Miller's argument? I hate the idea that a single person, especially this President, could make a decision to launch nuclear weapons in a matter of minutes. But how else do we defer a--we deter, rather, a preemptive attack on us? Ms. Rohlfing. So I think no first use is the right goal. It is the right aspiration for United States policy. Mr. Moulton. Well, it is wonderful if it is an aspiration, but we live in a real world, where we have an adversary that advocates first use. So how do we deter first use---- Ms. Rohlfing. So I think we need---- Mr. Moulton [continuing]. Without having that in our---- Ms. Rohlfing. You know, we need to step back and think about, again, what are the consequences of continuing with a first use policy, in terms of implications for the spread of these weapons to other states, in terms of increasing the risk of use---- Mr. Moulton. That is all well and good, but that is not my question, Ms. Rohlfing. My question is how do you deter a preemptive attack from an adversary that has a policy of being open to first use, if you do not--if you require---- Ms. Rohlfing. So---- Mr. Moulton [continuing]. Congressional authorization for a response? Ms. Rohlfing. We have a policy of deterrence, and we have the world's most powerful conventional forces. We also have said that we will retaliate using nuclear weapons. Mr. Moulton. Okay, I mean---- Ms. Rohlfing. That is a---- Mr. Moulton. I just don't---- Ms. Rohlfing [continuing]. That is a very solid deterrent-- -- Mr. Moulton. The argument that--so we respond to a Russian first use, a massive attack, with conventional forces? I mean it just seems totally unrealistic. Now---- Ms. Rohlfing. Well, that is where our policy of retaliating comes in. I mean that is at the heart of our deterrent---- Mr. Moulton. Okay, so let's get to the heart of that. You have criticized ICBMs as a ``use it or lose it weapon.'' But isn't that the fundamental purpose, that if the Russians were to launch a massive attack on our ICBM force, we would, in fact, respond immediately? And that is what prevents, that is what deters that attack? Ms. Rohlfing. So the issue with ICBMs is twofold. One is it increases the risk of use, because these are weapons that, because they are so vulnerable, decrease crisis stability and could invite an attack. And, by the way, I would just---- Mr. Moulton. How would they invite an attack, Mr. Rohlfing? Ms. Rohlfing. Well, because they are sitting-duck targets. They are vulnerable. They are not survivable. So we have to worry that in today's world, where---- Mr. Moulton. But the point of having them is that it deters an attack because that is how we respond. So if we just get rid of them, or we say we are not going to use them on the hair- trigger we have now, how does that make it less likely for the Russians to attack us? Ms. Rohlfing. So I think if we could stand down with the Russians and, frankly, all other nuclear weapon states, we would be in a much safer world. Mr. Moulton. Okay. Ms. Rohlfing. We would be---- Mr. Moulton. So I agree with you on that point. Ms. Rohlfing. And I think that---- Mr. Moulton. I mean that is not---- Ms. Rohlfing [continuing]. Is why we should---- Mr. Moulton. That is not an answer to my question. But I agree with---- Ms. Rohlfing. That is why we should set it as a goal, and work toward it. Mr. Moulton. That is wonderful, it is a goal. But we live in a real world where the Russians have hundreds of nuclear weapons targeted at us, and a policy of being willing to---- Ms. Rohlfing. Correct. Mr. Moulton [continuing]. Use them for--use them preemptively. Ms. Rohlfing. And I believe the United States threat to retaliate using the full force of our nuclear arsenal is plenty of deterrent capability. I also cannot imagine a world where we, as the world's strongest superpower, would be prepared to use nuclear weapons first in a preemptive way, and be willing to bear the---- Mr. Moulton. Well, I agree with you. Ms. Rohlfing [continuing]. The opprobrium that would come with that---- Mr. Moulton. The fact--it is pretty clear from this discussion that the Russians are less likely to attack us because we have ICBMs than if we were to just get rid of them. Now, Mr. Miller, with regards to low-yield weapons, you stated that the Russians there see a deterrence gap, where they don't see it with ICBMs, as we just discussed with Ms. Rohlfing. But what is wrong with Chairman Smith's argument? You can't tell whether it is a low-yield weapon or a high-yield weapon as it is being used. If they think that we have a deterrence gap, it is about the fundamental willingness to use nuclear weapons. It shouldn't matter what size they are. Mr. Miller. It--because they have invested so much in a new strategy and have fleshed that out with new weapons systems, I believe they think we have a weakness in our posture. Why would they do this, from a standing start, without any good reason? They don't invest money foolishly. And the---- The Chairman. Sorry, Mr. Miller. I hate to keep doing this to you, but we are again over time. Mr. Moulton. I think the Russians do invest money foolishly sometimes, Mr. Miller. But thank you. The Chairman. I am sorry, I have to address a couple issues here. On the no first use issue, the point there, the reason that no first use makes sense is we are saying that the purpose of our nuclear arsenal is to stop nuclear war. And I think this point has not been yet made at the hearing, that nuclear war is one of the few things that can actually destroy the planet. Wars are like--stopping us from getting into an all-out nuclear war is enormously important. Now, I get all the arguments about can you really trust the no first use policy, can you--and then back and forth, what good is it going to do. I don't agree with the argument that somehow there is ever a scenario where we need to use nuclear weapons first. I simply don't agree with that. Our nuclear weapons should exist to stop nuclear war, not to start it. That is the purpose of no first use. And as far as the ICBMs, and whether or not they are useful or not, the problem with them is they are identifiable targets. And also, I don't think they are necessary for deterrence because of the submarines we have. And the bombers you mentioned, yes, they are not deployed. They are quickly deployable, and can be used. That is the answers--I think Mr. Moulton raised some very good questions, but those are the answers that I think would better address that. Mr. Turner. Mr. Thornberry. Mr. Chairman? Mr. Chairman? The Chairman. Sorry, Mac, go ahead. Mr. Thornberry. Yeah. And I know it is tempting to get into a back-and-forth debate on a whole variety of things. I would say, for my standpoint, I don't want to simplify the calculations of the Russians on any issue. I--you know, are we going to be the first to use nuclear weapons? I cannot imagine such a scenario. Do I want to tell the Russians what we are never going to do? No. I want them to guess. I want to have a wide panoply of nuclear deterrents, and I want to not say what we are not going to do, so that they are more cautious in making their decisions. So I do think--back to the point of getting into the minds of the adversaries--I don't want to make that easier. The Chairman. Yeah. The only thing I would raise on that issue, in the spirit of good conversation here, is that having an adversary completely freaked out, not knowing what we are going to do with a whole lot of nuclear weapons, and not sure when they would use them---- Mr. Thornberry. I don't want to completely freak them out. The Chairman. That has a downside, as well. Mr. Thornberry. I want to have uncertainty. The Chairman. That is fair. Mr. Turner. Mr. Turner. Mr. Chairman, I come here usually to hear the witnesses testify. If we have every member ask questions and then the chairman intervene, I think it is certainly going to make for a very, very long hearing. I appreciate---- The Chairman. It is. I did it once. Mr. Turner [continuing]. The time that I have received. The Chairman. I apologize. Go ahead---- Mr. Turner. I do want to associate myself with Mr. Moulton's comments and certainly Mac Thornberry's. It is the threat, not the use of the weapons that keep us safe. And the proof that they have kept us safe, obviously, is that they have kept us safe the entire time that we have had the triad. So to all of our witnesses, I am going to ask you a series of questions and ask if you--I am going to make a series of statements and ask if you agree or disagree. They are actually fairly simple statements, there is no tricks here. And then after we go through these agree or disagrees, then I am going to ask for your comments on them, and have a discussion with you. But I want to get these agree-disagree to see to the extent that we have a disagreement among the members. My first statement is, over the last 20 years the United States has reduced its number of nuclear warheads. Agree or disagree, Mr. Miller? Mr. Miller. Agree. Mr. Turner. Dr. Blair. Dr. Blair. Agree. Mr. Turner. Ms. Rohlfing? Ms. Rohlfing. Agree. Mr. Turner. Over the last 50 years the United States has decreased its number of nuclear warheads. Mr. Miller. Mr. Miller. Yes, sir. Mr. Turner. Dr. Blair. Dr. Blair. Yes. Mr. Turner. Ms. Rohlfing. Ms. Rohlfing. Yes. Mr. Turner. Okay. Over the last 20 years the number of nuclear warheads on the planet have increased. Over the last 20 years the number of nuclear warheads on the planet have increased. Mr. Miller. Mr. Miller. Yes. Mr. Turner. Dr. Blair. Dr. Blair. Yes. Mr. Turner. Ms. Rohlfing. Ms. Rohlfing. The total number of warheads---- Mr. Turner. Yes. Ms. Rohlfing [continuing]. On the planet? Mr. Turner. Yes. Ms. Rohlfing. No. Mr. Turner. Over the last 20 years, the number of nuclear warheads on the planet has not increased. Ms. Rohlfing. Yes. Mr. Turner. Yes. Okay. Over the last 50 years, Mr. Miller, has the number of nuclear warheads on the planet increased? Mr. Miller. No, not given the large--no. Mr. Turner. Dr. Blair. Dr. Blair. No. Mr. Turner. Okay, Ms.---- Ms. Rohlfing. No. Mr. Turner. Ms. Rohlfing, no. Okay. So my next statement is a statement based upon the answers that you just gave. There appears to be no relationship between the reduction of the number of United States nuclear warheads and the reduction of the total number of nuclear warheads on the planet. You both--all of you just answered yes at the number-- you agreed that the number of nuclear warheads in the United States over the past 20 years has decreased, and you have all agreed the number of nuclear warheads on the planet over the last 20 years has increased. Therefore, the conclusion of there is no correlation between the reduction of the United States nuclear warheads resulting in the total reduction in nuclear warheads on the planet. Do you agree, Mr. Miller? Mr. Miller. Yes, sir. Mr. Turner. Dr. Blair. Dr. Blair. I didn't quite follow that. I would have to think about that, sorry. Mr. Turner. If we reduced our nuclear warheads and the total number on the planet did not go down, there is no correlation between our reduction of our nuclear warhead numbers and the aggregate number on the planet. Correct, Dr. Blair? Agree? Dr. Blair. I think so, yes. Mr. Turner. Yes. Mr. Rohlfing. Ms. Rohlfing. I don't buy the logic of it. I think it is the wrong---- Mr. Turner. It is just math, Ms. Rohlfing. It is not logic. Ms. Rohlfing. I think it is the wrong question. Mr. Turner. It is just math. If our number goes down and the number---- Ms. Rohlfing. I don't dispute the math. Mr. Turner [continuing]. On the planet does not go down---- Ms. Rohlfing. I dispute---- Mr. Turner [continuing]. There is no correlation between the aggregate number---- Ms. Rohlfing. I dispute the conclusion that you are making. Mr. Turner. And that is why I ask these questions, because, Ms. Rohlfing, your answer is fantasy. I mean it is absolutely total numbers. It is just math. Let's go to the next one. Would you rather--if the United States was forced to use a nuclear weapon, would you rather that the United States use a high-yield nuclear weapon or a low-yield nuclear weapon? Mr. Miller. Mr. Miller. I would rather deter any Russian use in the first place. Mr. Turner. I am just saying if the United States was forced to use a nuclear weapon. Mr. Miller. Low-yield. Mr. Turner. Would you rather them use a high-yield or a low-yield? Mr. Miller. Low-yield. Mr. Turner. Mr. Miller. Dr. Blair. Dr. Blair. A nuclear weapon is a nuclear weapon, and a low- yield weapon is a misnomer, because it is actually a very high- yield weapon. Mr. Turner. So you say there is no difference. Ms. Rohlfing. Ms. Rohlfing. I agree with Bruce. Mr. Turner. That there is no difference. The Russian nuclear policy states that they will use nuclear weapons to escalate a conflict for the purposes of de- escalating the conflict. It has been said that the fact that they have low-yield nuclear weapons factors into this nuclear posture statement, and that it is because they believe that if they use a low-yield nuclear weapon and the only thing we have to respond with is a high-yield nuclear weapon, that, in fact, we would not respond. That, in fact, we would be forced to pause. Now, Mr. Miller, do you agree with that? Mr. Miller. Yes, sir. Mr. Turner. Dr. Blair, do you agree with that? Dr. Blair. Totally disagree. Mr. Turner. Ms. Rohlfing, do you agree with that? Ms. Rohlfing. I disagree, as well. Mr. Turner. Well, I am going to now do my portion of testimony, as the chairman has. I agree with Mr. Miller. If you are Putin, and you think we only have big ones and we are not going to use them because they are big, I think that you actually change the calculus of first use for Russia. Now, on no first use, since Russia believes in escalating to de-escalating, wouldn't our adopting a no first use have no effect on their nuclear posture? Because their calculus is use to--escalate to de-escalate. So if we say we are no first use, it has no calculus in their military strategy to use or not use nuclear weapons. Correct, Mr. Miller? Mr. Miller. That is absolutely correct. Mr. Turner. Dr. Blair. Dr. Blair. That is right, because the Russians rely on the escalation to the use of nuclear weapons to compensate for their conventional weakness. Mr. Turner. Ms. Rohlfing. Ms. Rohlfing. So I am not sure I am following the question about the linkage---- The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Carbajal. Mr. Turner. Well, let me just say I agree with Dr. Blair in what he has just said, because it is very important that it does not affect the Russian calculus if we have no first use. Thank you---- The Chairman. Mr. Carbajal. Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Mr. Miller, you reiterate in your testimony that we have to have confidence in our deterrent and potential adversaries must have respect for it. Currently, the U.S. nuclear force consists of nearly 4,000 deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons. Mr. Miller, do you have confidence in our current deterrent, in our retaliatory capability? Mr. Miller. I have confidence in it today. I have a lack of confidence in it in 10 to 15 years, if those systems aren't replaced. Two commanders of Strategic Command, the retired admiral--retired previous admiral and currently General Hyten say those forces are going to have to leave the inventory, replaced or without replacement. That is a simple fact. Not modernizing will leave us without a triad. Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. Dr. Blair and Ms. Rohlfing. Dr. Blair. So yes, we have ample forces to underwrite deterrence. I think the number of primary aim points in our current nuclear planning is on the order of 1,000 aim points in Russia, China, and North Korea, in total. And we have at sea in our Ohio-class submarine force enough warheads to cover all of those aim points. So we have the forces, but I do have serious reservations and concerns about the viability and performance and resilience of our nuclear command and control system. This, as I said in my testimony at the opening, has always been the Achilles heel of our nuclear deterrent. So yes, it is extremely robust, in terms of forces. But it is creaky and somewhat fragile and worrisome, from the standpoint of command and control. Mr. Carbajal. Ms. Rohlfing. Ms. Rohlfing. I have confidence in our force today, and I think here the issue is not whether or not we modernize. We must continue to support a safe, secure, effective nuclear deterrent for our security. But the issue is, you know, what do we invest in, and how much do we need? Mr. Carbajal. I am interested to hear from all of you how you think Russia and China are perceiving us, the United States, moving forward with a significant nuclear modernization effort, while at the same time disengaging in the arms control front. All of you. Mr. Miller. First of all, Russia and China have been modernizing their forces for the last 10 years. And they continue to do so. We won't have new forces in the field until the middle of the next decade, at the beginning. So there is no suggestion of an arms race here. Ash Carter, former Defense Secretary, said there is a nuclear arms race, it is between Russia and China. We are not playing. On arms control, and specifically with respect to the INF Treaty, the treaty was killed by the Russians. It was a clear, cynical act by the Russian Government beginning in about 2013 to develop and field a system that broke the treaty. And despite the fact that the United States has been engaged in negotiations with the Russians since 2013 on that, the only thing those negotiations have produced is over 100 of these treaty-busting SSC-8 missiles in the field. So we didn't disengage from the INF Treaty, the Russians killed it. Mr. Carbajal. But wouldn't you agree that the INF Treaty provides more opportunities than just this treaty to have some objectives in it, provides for ongoing communication---- Mr. Miller. The INF Treaty was a vitally important treaty, which the Russians have gone out and killed. We were fully within the treaty. We respected the treaty. The Russians covertly developed a cruise missile. They tried to hide it from us. Our intelligence caught it. There are 100 of these things in the field, and the Russians still claim that they are part of the treaty. Mr. Carbajal. But wouldn't you agree that that was a vehicle for ongoing communications, to try to come back---- Mr. Miller. Until---- Mr. Carbajal [continuing]. To the table, and to address those challenges? Mr. Miller. We tried for 5 years under the Obama and Trump administrations to engage them in diplomacy in that treaty. And all they did was produce more missiles. Mr. Carbajal. Well, I disagree with you in that it wasn't of utility to continue to stay in it. Mr. Blair. Dr. Blair. I think we pulled out too abruptly, and it did not give an adequate opportunity for further work to try to save the treaty, nor did we consult adequately with our allies in NATO. So I think that it was a mistake. There are consequences from pulling out of these treaties, as well. We pulled out of the ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty very abruptly in 2002. That was John Bolton's wrecking ball for arms control. And, as a result, today we are seeing appear on the scene all these novel nuclear weapon systems that President Putin has been brandishing over the last several months: the hypersonic vehicles, the cruise missiles, the undersea autonomous nuclear submarine that can travel for 6,000 kilometers. All these systems were stimulated by Putin's desire to deal with the elimination of the ABM Treaty and develop weapons that could defeat it. And it took them about 15 years. So we have to keep in mind these timescales. Russia, China, the United States, we all know that we have been going through overlapping modernizations for, like, 40 years. Mr. Carbajal. Thank you---- Dr. Blair. Every 25 years we all modernize. And as long---- The Chairman. Sorry, the---- Dr. Blair. [continuing]. As we keep these weapons---- The Chairman [continuing]. Gentleman's time is expired. Dr. Blair [continuing]. We have to modernize---- Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, I yield back. The Chairman. Mr. Lamborn. Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this hearing. Thank you all, witnesses, for being here. And I would like to speak to Ms. Rohlfing and Mr. Miller about the low- yield option first, and then I have another follow-up question for Mr. Miller. If we are in a context where a low-yield tactical nuclear weapon is used by Russia against us or one of our NATO allies or a country under our nuclear umbrella, and we have to use a submarine-based response, we cannot make a proportional response. So, to me, that leaves only three options: we use a conventional response, we use a high-yield nuclear response, or we make no response. Ms. Rohlfing, do you prefer one of those three options to a proportional, low-yield response that we would otherwise have? Ms. Rohlfing. I think there is little difference between a so-called proportional, low-yield response and a response of another kind. I think Bruce hit the nail on the head when he said a nuclear weapon is a nuclear weapon, and even these so- called low-yield weapons are still quite powerful in their destructive power. So I think we should not be sanguine that a low-yield response is not going to yield massive retaliation. And therefore, it is very risky. Lowering the threshold for nuclear use is risky business, and very destabilizing. Mr. Lamborn. Mr. Miller, how do you respond to that? Mr. Miller. My response is the Nuclear Posture Review says a small number of these weapons will raise the nuclear threshold as a matter of official policy, not seek to lower it. I think that your description is exactly right. I don't think there is any doubt that anybody in this room would disagree with the fact of what Bruce said: a nuclear weapon is a nuclear weapon. That is a huge, explosive charge. Sadly, we are not trying to get agreement among ourselves on deterrents. We are worried about the Russian military, which has come up with a doctrine and forces and exercises which seem to indicate they believe they can use a low-yield nuclear weapon. That is my concern. Mr. Lamborn. Well, I--and I have to agree with that. If our threat of a high-yield response hasn't deterred them for all the work that--and money that you say has been invested, why would it deter them in the future? Mr. Miller, I want to ask you about the triad versus a dyad. If we were to get rid of our land-based nuclear missiles, the Minutemen, in 3 fields, 450 or so missiles around the U.S., and only relied on a dyad of bombers and submarines, would that make us more vulnerable because of either a technological problem that we had with bombers or submarines that came up in the future, or a technological breakthrough on the part of an adversary that would make either of those forces more vulnerable? Mr. Miller. Mr. Lamborn, you have described the reason why we have had a triad since the Eisenhower administration, that the various potential vulnerabilities of each leg offset the other. As we were saying, if we only have today ICBMs and SLBMs [submarine-launched ballistic missiles] on alert, if there was a breakthrough in ASW [anti-submarine warfare], then all you have got is the ICBMs. And a massive attack on the ICBMs triggers an all-out war, which no one wants to go to. So the Russians shouldn't go there. You have described exactly the reason for the triad, sir. Mr. Lamborn. So you wouldn't be in favor of a unilateral disarmament, going from a triad to a dyad? Mr. Miller. No, sir. I would maintain the triad. Mr. Lamborn. Okay, thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Keating. Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This has been a very important and enlightening hearing. And even though there are differences of opinion on these issues, I really respect the way they are being discussed. But I think there is an area where I can find some common ground, and I want to get back to the comments of Dr. Blair, when he talked about the issues of miscalculation. Just a couple of weeks ago I was in Europe as part of an international discussion with Senator Nunn and former cabinet officials, international leaders, discussing this issues. So I want to just gear in on one specific area. What would you say, Doctor, is the importance of interagency coordination and communication within the administration on these issues? And what is the importance of intelligence agencies and the coordination and communication and integrity of the security of those different agencies to try and prevent miscalculation? What are the dangers in that-- if that doesn't happen? Dr. Blair. Well, we are living in an era that is becoming increasingly fraught with risk. And one of the reasons for that is the proliferation of ballistic missiles around the world. Everybody wants a ballistic missile, and everyone is getting them. There are thousands of ballistic missiles that didn't exist 10 years ago that have been deployed. They have technological features that make it difficult to predict where they are going to land, because they are more maneuverable. They can take a right turn at the apex of their trajectory, and we don't know where they are going to land. So, as a result of that, we have entered an era in which we face false alarms, ambiguous ballistic missile threats all the time that we didn't during the Cold War. As I said earlier, some of them have risen to the level of Presidents, which never happened during the Cold War. So we have--we are--have to creatively solve the problem of developing confidence-building measures and other mechanisms that involve the intelligence community and require---- Mr. Keating. I am just talking about---- Dr. Blair [continuing]. Interagency---- Mr. Keating. I understand that. I think you are bringing up some good points that exacerbate the situation. But I am talking within our own administration, when there is gaps, interagency gaps in communication and coordination. When there is gaps in the intelligence field, what are the dangers there? And do you think that Congress has a role in oversight to really do our best to make sure those gaps don't exist? Dr. Blair. Well, I guess I am not exactly clear what you are talking about---- Mr. Keating. Within our own administration---- Dr. Blair [continuing]. In terms of a gap. Hmm? Mr. Keating. There has been instances where there is gaps that I don't think we have seen before in the administration, in our intel people, in our intelligence agencies. Now, if those gaps are there, and the communication isn't seamless, isn't that a major factor in miscalculation? Dr. Blair. Yeah. I mean one of the important factors in assessing the nature of the threat, assessing whether North America is under attack or if there are other nefarious activities underway, we rely heavily on our intelligence community to be able to provide the decision maker---- Mr. Keating. And---- Dr. Blair [continuing]. With the background---- Mr. Keating [continuing]. Is the role of Congress as an oversight agent critical in that regard, to maintain that we are doing all we can so those gaps do not exist between different agencies and our intel agencies? Dr. Blair. Well, yes, I think so. I think that you have the power of the purse over space and other assets---- Mr. Keating. Thank you, Dr. Blair. Dr. Blair [continuing]. That are critical---- Mr. Keating. I yield back my time. The Chairman. Thank you. Thank you. Mr. Wittman. Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank the witnesses for joining us today. Dr. Blair, I wanted to go to you first. In your testimony you had spoken about reducing the number of ballistic missile submarines down to 5, and strategic bombers down to 40. I am troubled by that, because if you look at the availability of those submarines, we have the number we have to be able to put at sea any one time the necessary number to deter. Some of those are in port being overhauled, some of the sailors are on break or in training. So to have five, you don't have five at one time. And the same with bombers. Bomber availability today is based on the maintenance schedules for the aircraft, the bomber crews, deployment. So having 5 and 40 doesn't get us 5 and 40 at one time. It gets us significantly less than that. And obviously, that is a classified number, but significantly less than what is available in those raw numbers. Secondly is that our adversaries today are building attack submarines to take out our ballistic missile submarines at a record pace. In fact, some of the most advanced submarines in the world are the attack submarines, like the Severodvinsk class that the Russians are building. And they are doing everything they can to build those, as well as the Chinese. I am wondering how you believe that those will be significantly impactful deterrents to our adversaries, as they are building up, having more opportunities to take those assets out, and we have fewer of those assets. And even with the numbers there, fewer of those assets ever available at one time. I am wondering how the strategic deterrents adds up with those. I wanted to get your perspective on that. Dr. Blair. In general, you take the number of submarines that you build, and you can safely deploy roughly two-thirds of those at sea. So two-thirds of the 14 we have now is around 9. We can put nine at sea---- Mr. Wittman. But--no, but your number is five. So---- Dr. Blair. So, yeah, I am just saying---- Mr. Wittman. Two-thirds, so you---- Dr. Blair. I am just giving you the---- Mr. Wittman. No, you deploy three---- Dr. Blair. I am giving you the formula, and then--of--so I guess we would need--if we wanted to have five at sea, we would probably have to have roughly eight, all together. So---- Mr. Wittman. But that is---- Dr. Blair [continuing]. Two-thirds of---- Mr. Wittman. That is not what your number says. Your number says 5 SSBNs and 40 bombers. It doesn't qualify that---- Dr. Blair. Five with--actually, with five SSBNs, if you could keep three at sea, that would be sufficient to cover the aim points that I have defined as constituting a fully adequate deterrent threat. Mr. Wittman. In the face of the multiples of attack submarines so they could deploy out there. If all I had to worry about was three of our submarines being out there at any one point, don't you think that they would try to hunt those down and destroy them? Doesn't that take it out with the---- Dr. Blair. I think---- Mr. Wittman. Literally---- Dr. Blair. I think both sides try to do that, and we are actually very good at---- Mr. Wittman. We are actually on the down side of attack submarines. We are going to be down to 42 in 2028, so we don't even have a deterrent to go after their ballistic missile submarine---- Dr. Blair. Well, the Russians and the Chinese are the sides that have to worry about the attack submarine problem, not us at the present time. Mr. Wittman. I---- Dr. Blair. You can get a classified briefing from the Navy, and they may refute what I say, but I think that there is no credible intelligence for now or in the foreseeable future that would suggest that a ballistic missile submarine on patrol at sea is vulnerable to any form of Russian or Chinese attack. Mr. Wittman. That--really? That--there is no risk to our submarines by the attack submarines from our adversaries? Dr. Blair. I think that the Navy--you can ask them, but I think that they would say that the submarines that we have on-- -- Mr. Wittman. Well, if---- Dr. Blair [continuing]. Patrol, on launch-ready status, are---- Mr. Wittman. If there is no risk there, then why do we have submarines and ships to try to hunt---- Dr. Blair [continuing]. Invulnerable to any--are completely invulnerable for the foreseeable future. Mr. Wittman. Mr. Miller, I would like to get your perspective on that. Mr. Miller. Sir, I believe that the best way we hide those submarines is to give them vast amounts of ocean to patrol in. A force of 12 gives you 10 operational boats. That is enough to have a Pacific base and an Atlantic base. I think if that number came down much smaller, we would be driven to one base, which means we would lose an ocean's worth of patrol area. Second, if you want to maintain the same number of warheads at sea with a much smaller number of submarines, you have to put more warheads on each missile. By the basic physics, that reduces the range of the missile and it again reduces the patrol area. All of this moves towards instability and threatening the overall force. So I believe what the posture review says, that a minimum of 12 SSBNs is required, is in fact the--where we should go. Mr. Wittman. Okay, very good. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Kim. Mr. Kim. Thank you, and thank you so much, the three of you, for coming out and talking about such a critically important issue. Dr. Blair, I would like to start with you. Something that caught my attention during your opening statements, and it is something that I have seen in previous work that you have, talking about the command, control, communications, the C3 component of this. You have previously said that it is required that we have a C3 network that is highly survivable, flexible, impervious to cyberattack, and fail-safe. Yet you also recognize that--and have pointed out that our network was last comprehensively updated some three decades ago. In fact, some of the components, you have said, date back to the 1950s, especially with some of the Minuteman capabilities that we have. So I just wanted to dig into this some more, and just ask how confident are you in our current nuclear command, control, communications, especially with regards to cybersecurity? Dr. Blair. I am not confident at all. And I don't think anyone knows the answer to that question with any degree of high confidence, because we have lost control over the chain of supply of our electronic components and our command and control system writ large, including our nuclear, from the level of the President of the United States all the way down to the cell towers built by Huawei that are deployed around our Minutemen missile fields. The--every now and then we conduct a study and we find new and worrisome vulnerabilities in this arena. The last study that I am aware of happened after a squadron of 50 ICBMs went black in 2010 because of a breakdown in our obsolete command and control systems. No one could monitor those weapons, no one could launch them on authority, or prevent their unauthorized launch. When President Obama ordered a study of the possible cyber vulnerability of Minuteman, it took a year. And they came up with some pretty interesting findings, including the fact that we had actually wired our nuclear launch facilities, our silo complexes, with the internet, and created a vulnerability to outside hackers. So there are ongoing concerns about this, and we are not really going to get a handle on it unless and until we can figure out a way to actually manage the chain of supply of these components. Mr. Kim. And that is very helpful. I mean, certainly from my perspective, when I try to think of worst-case scenarios, when it comes down to it, the possibility of a foreign agent, you know, to be injected into the launch procedures of this, or about a launch could be set off by false early detection and early warning, these are the same concerns that you share, it sounds like. Dr. Blair. That is right. And I think, if you talk to professionals in this arena, they would tell you that one of the most worrisome parts of this C3I complex, in terms of cyber vulnerability, is the early warning network. Because there are so many apertures in that network: satellites that have to link with ground sites, et cetera. And there is concern that the President, who has only about 5 minutes under current strategy, to make a decision on whether and how to retaliate to an attack, 5 minutes, may have to rely on information that has been corrupted. Mr. Kim. When I am thinking about what can we do today to make sure we are moving in that process, where we have greater control over this and a more secure system--you have mentioned just now the supply chain and making sure that we can better understand where that is coming from, and having control over that. What are some of the other steps that we should be taking right now to be able to get this---- Dr. Blair. We---- Mr. Kim [continuing]. In a better place? Dr. Blair. We really have to look at the whole question of the insider threat. We have a threat model that is about 50 years old for assessing whether an insider could cause something really bad to happen with nuclear weapons. That threat model doesn't work, because a single insider, which is the threat model, aided by some outsiders today could cause far more damage, as we know from the case of Edward Snowden. A single insider could cause much more damage than ever. The C3I system is more vulnerable because of these new technologies coming along that defeat the ability to detect an attack. Space is becoming more vulnerable. We rely extremely heavily on space for our nuclear command and control systems. The list goes on and on and on. We are falling behind. That has to be the first priority of our nuclear modernization program. That and modernizing the submarines. Mr. Kim. Thank you---- Dr. Blair. Don't bother with the ICBMs. Mr. Kim. Well, thank you. This is critically important, and an area where I hope all of us can find common agreement on. I yield back the balance of my time. The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. DesJarlais. Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There seems to be, you know, a bit of debate on whether the low-yield nuclear weapons are effective as a deterrence. But let's assume that we say they are. Mr. Miller, are we currently at a significant disadvantage, in terms of tactical, low-yield nuclear weapons, in--compared with Russia? Mr. Miller. The Russians, sir, have about 2,000 low-yield weapons of all types: artillery shells, land mines, torpedoes, cruise missiles, short- to medium-range ballistic missiles. The United States has a very small number of air-drop weapons that are carried by aging aircraft in Europe, period, full stop. But the United States made a decision in the late 1980s, early 1990s, that we did not need to match the Russian arsenal. That is in the Nuclear Posture Review, we don't need to mirror or match that. We simply need to deter Russian use of their tactical arsenal. That is where the low-yield Trident weapon comes in. Dr. DesJarlais. Do you feel that their intention is to arm the hypersonic glide weapon with a nuclear warhead, as well, perhaps low-yield---- Mr. Miller. It is a possibility. I can't tell you. I don't know what Putin's--what his intentions are. Dr. DesJarlais. I have heard your colleagues say that a low-yield and a high-yield, there is really no different--they are both very destructive. But if you talk about the Russians having capabilities to arm an artillery shell, certainly that wouldn't pack the same punch as some of the other low-yield weapons that you have described. Mr. Miller. I keep saying, sir, that what we think here doesn't matter. What the Russian planner and the Russian leadership believes does matter. And the Russian leadership and the Russian planners seem to believe that there is tactical utility, battlefield utility, in low-yield weapons. And that concerns me. And that we have to deter. Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. Well, the chairman made a statement earlier in his opening, I guess, that all we simply need to do is tell Russia that if they use a low-yield weapon, we are going to respond with a high-yield. Does that hold water? Mr. Miller. I don't think it holds water in Moscow. Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. Why is that? Mr. Miller. Because, given all of our capabilities, in the late 1990s, early 2000s, they began to develop the new weapons to support the new strategy. Dr. DesJarlais. So you are saying---- Mr. Miller. So clearly---- Dr. DesJarlais. In your mind they believe that they can use a low-yield tactical weapon without us doing what the chairman said, that perhaps we would pause, and that we would not retaliate with a large-scale, because if we did that would ultimately lead to nuclear annihilation, in all likelihood. Mr. Miller. I believe that is the essence of Russian strategy today. Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. So getting back to the importance of our needs, we have a gravity bomb that can be dropped from an airframe, but nothing that can be delivered in any other fashion. Is that right? Mr. Miller. That is correct. It cannot get there with an assured payload. And the other thing is we are not interested in fighting a nuclear war on any battlefield. The Trident weapon indicates that we are prepared to escalate this war, which means to Mr. Putin, ``Are you prepared to try to seize a piece of the Baltics, and are you prepared to bet Mother Russia in the gamble? Don't use a nuclear weapon at all.'' And that is what the low-yield Trident does. Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. And back to our current delivery system, is it capable of penetrating Russian air defenses as well as a cruise missile or Trident III? Mr. Miller. Russian air defenses are extraordinarily capable. We have got brave young pilots and very old airframes. In 10 years, when the F-35 is in the field, then it will be a more capable force. But again, the legs are much shorter than what a Trident could cover. Dr. DesJarlais. And do we have air defenses in Eastern and Western Europe that are comparable to what Russia has around Moscow? Mr. Miller. No. Dr. DesJarlais. So they could perceivably launch a strike of a low yield on Eastern Europe, and we would really have no means to stop it? Mr. Miller. Yes, sir. Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. So I guess your point is that there is a deterrence factor that would be beneficial in advancing the low-yield nuclear weapon. Is that right? Mr. Miller. Yes, sir. Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. Do you think that having these weapons and deploying them in Europe would strengthen our hand in negotiating the--Ranking Member Thornberry went down this road with you and how Reagan used that in the 1980s to bring Gorbachev to the table on the INF. Do you feel that if we did that again we could see a similar result? Mr. Miller. No, not in this case, because it is 30 years later. The allies would fracture over whether or not we were going to deploy a new nuclear weapons system. That is exactly what Mr. Putin wants. He would like to fracture the NATO alliance. So the need to deter Russian low-yield weapon use has to be an offshore platform, and that is why the Trident is the best way to do it. Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. So you are saying that the only course of action that we really have right now--and that we should take this course of action--is to build the low-yield weapon you are talking about. Mr. Miller. Yes, sir. Dr. DesJarlais. All right. I guess my time has run out. I was going to ask you a question about the nuclear infrastructure modernization, but hopefully we will get to that. I yield back. The Chairman. Thank you. Ms. Hill. Ms. Hill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is to the entire panel. As I understand it--and again, I think I feel a little bit like I am behind the curve, in terms of understanding a lot of this, but what is being referred to as a low-yield nuclear warhead has about a third the power as the atomic weapons dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Can you help put that into perspective for me, how widespread the damage would be from the blast, and how long-lasting the radiation fallout would be? Dr. Blair. I will start. Ms. Hill. And, I guess, does it matter? Dr. Blair. If this 5 kiloton weapon is being produced for the submarine force were detonated over the White House right now, it would kill about 100,000 people and injure about 125,000 people. It is extremely powerful. It is 2,500 times more powerful than that big bomb that destroyed Oklahoma City, by Timothy McVeigh. So we are really not talking about, you know, a low-yield nuclear weapon. It would be a horrendous amount of devastation that would be--that would result just from the immediate effects. That is what I am talking about. There would be the potential, you know, fires and other things that could cause even more damage than what I described. Ms. Hill. Mr. Miller. Mr. Miller. The first point about the low-yield weapon is to prevent any nuclear weapon use at all. Russian nuclear use in the theater would have catastrophic effects. But your--Dr. Blair's description of what this weapon would cause assumes that it would be aimed at a population center. And again, if one wants to get into the nuclear exchange game-- and I don't recommend doing that, I think the risk of escalation is too high--then it would be insane to fire that weapon at a populated area. Is it destructive? Yes. The point is to deter nuclear use by the Russians so the nuclear weapons are never used and the nuclear war cannot be fought. Ms. Hill. So it is having the effectiveness of that tool that would deter it. Is that the idea? Mr. Miller. Yes, ma'am. Ms. Hill. Okay. So a kind of unrelated question. France and Germany recently signed a treaty where the French agreed to use their nuclear deterrent to protect Germany. What--am I--is that an incorrect assessment? Do you--why do you feel they felt the need to do this, on top of the existing NATO alliance? Mr. Miller. Well, there were obvious transatlantic problems at this time. But the news article, in my estimation, is completely wrong. And having checked with friends in the Quai d'Orsay, France will never fully extend its nuclear deterrent to any other country. The French deterrent is based on the principle that it is-- it responds to France's vital interests. And if you ask a senior French official, ``What are France's vital interests,'' you will be told that the president of the republic will determine that at the moment of crisis. That is not a strong reed to bend--to lean on. Ms. Hill. Do either of you have any thoughts on--I guess, to me, I am--my question is whether that is an indication of this broader instability, and what we need to do to sort of---- Dr. Blair. Well---- Ms. Hill [continuing]. Attempt to---- Dr. Blair. Yeah, I think there is clearly a sign this--even having that kind of a discussion amongst semi-serious people is a clear sign of a splintering of the NATO alliance that is underway. And if it continues, it could become a very serious problem for alliance maintenance, and could lead to all kinds of unanticipated and adverse consequences. We are not managing NATO alliance very well, in the way that we have pulled out of INF abruptly, the way that the President talks about the importance of the alliance, et cetera. So this is something that is worrisome, but it is symptomatic of some deeper issues here. I just would like to comment once--I think we have missed the boat on this whole question of Russian strategy. You know, their escalate to de-escalate strategy has really emerged in the year 2000 under Putin in response to the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 in the Balkans. And the Russians looked at that and said, ``Wait a minute. What if this happens to us? We are inferior, we can't match NATO. What do we do?'' This is when Russia was on its knees, of course. And so they came up with a last-ditch approach to use nuclear weapons under this strategy that has been discussed, that it was--really highlights their--the weakness of their hand, and the fact that they would only resort to such use of weapons as a, you know, as a last resort, because they are losing a conflict with NATO. It is not like they have said, ``Wow, we can come up with some new weapon that, you know, fills some gap in the spectrum of Western--of U.S. nuclear weapons and exploit it and, you know, we can go forward with that.'' That is just not the way that this comes down. Now, if Russia were to use a so-called low-yield weapon because they are losing a conventional conflict, we could--we have several options. One is just to let them continue to use-- -- Ms. Hill. Sorry---- Dr. Blair [continuing]. Lose the conventional---- Ms. Hill. Dr. Blair, I just have a little bit of time left. I wanted to--I appreciate that, but in the remaining time I just want to ask all three of you. Top line, as we are going into this next phase of planning, new Congress, we have got--we are looking at 2 years, but we are also looking at the long term. What are the top one or two things that we need to consider, and recommendations as we move forward? Just really, really top line, as we are going back and explaining to our constituents why we are choosing to invest money in this regard, as opposed to anything else. And given the dynamics with this administration, with the weakening of the NATO alliance, or the perceived weakening of the NATO alliance, and everything else. Ms. Rohlfing. So I would like to give just two recommendations to that question. Number one is Congress needs to create space for re- engagement with Russia on this issue of existential common interests. We have got to get back to the negotiating table if we are going to try and lower tensions and maintain the guardrails around nuclear forces that have served us well over 50 years. Ms. Hill. I am going to cut you off in, like, six---- Ms. Rohlfing. That is not much time for another answer. Just number two, you need to filter your investments in modernization through the prism of reducing nuclear risk and stability of forces. Ms. Hill. Thank you---- Ms. Rohlfing. And I think that will lead you to certain answers. Ms. Hill. Thank you. Mr. Miller, and then I will go back to Dr. Blair. Mr. Miller. Quickly, modernize the triad and its supporting command and control, which has preserved the peace. Second, understand that there is no place today on the NATO-Russia border where Russia does not have military superiority. And third, if we are concerned--and I am--about keeping the NATO alliance together, no first use will create a huge schism. Ms. Hill. Dr. Blair. Dr. Blair. I think no first use is the first order of business, by far, along with modernization and fixing of the command and control weaknesses that we have. The Chairman. I am sorry, the---- Dr. Blair. Thirdly, reviving our relationship with Russia and restoring a dialogue that could lead to real arms control talks. The Chairman. You will have to---- Ms. Hill. Thank you all. The Chairman [continuing]. Close there. Mr. Bacon. Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate all three of you being here today. In my 16 assignments in the Air Force, my very first one was at SAC [Strategic Air Command] headquarters, and I remember General LeMay, who was retired at the time, walking in, quite the sight to see. And as a general officer, I was airborne emergency officer in case the ground command and control was taken out. So I was the person airborne to make sure that we had the second-strike capability. But from that I have made the assessment that I do think we need to modernize our nuclear inventory, our nuclear enterprise, to include all three legs of the triad. I think it is important for deterrence that we do that. Russia and China are clearly modernizing their forms of the triad, as we speak, while we have been falling behind. And I think if we continue this, or make the decision we are going to go from a triad to a dyad or a triad to a monad, if you will, I think that makes us vulnerable. And do we want to--how close do we want to make it? You know, I believe in--in my 30 years in the Air Force I never wanted a close fight. We want to win overwhelmingly. But in a nuclear deterrence we don't want to fight at all. How close do you measure what deterrence is? I would rather make sure that we have clear deterrence. I don't want to just make it close. A nuclear war should never be fought, and I think that--the triad provides us that assurance. And this modernization is very critical. If you look at our B-52s, they are created under--or built largely under John F. Kennedy's era. We have granddaughters today flying them that their grandfathers used to fly. Our Minuteman III was primarily built with Lyndon Baines Johnson era. Our nuclear C3 under Jimmy Carter's era. And we got our B-2s and our submarines that are 20 to 30 years old now. I think it is clear that we need to start this modernization. So, with that, my first question is with Mr. Miller. I believe the nuclear command and control--the nuclear C3 is very important. Can you just explain to us why this has to be included into this nuclear modernization plan? We think of the triad a lot. We tend to forget the nuclear C3. Can you give us a little more reasons why we've got to make this as an emphasis? Mr. Miller. I absolutely agree with Bruce, that the nuclear command and control system is the backbone of the triad. If you can kill the nuclear command and control system, the forces don't work. The airplanes are old, the communication systems are old. The satellites are old and vulnerable. And so one of the key elements of the Nuclear Posture Review is to modernize the nuclear command and control system. You probably know that General Hyten was put in charge of that recently by---- Mr. Bacon. Right. Mr. Miller [continuing]. Then-Secretary Mattis. That is absolutely critical. Mr. Bacon. When I flew on it, it was 1970s technology, and that is what we still have today. I am concerned about our airborne NC3 [nuclear command, control, and communications]. We used to have the ability--we, for decades, always had an airborne alert or capability airborne--not just alert--on the ground. I am not sure we can sustain that. Do we need to invest more to ensure that we have a 24-hour airborne capability? And I just open that up to any of you three. Dr. Blair. You know, I think you have served in the 55th STRAT RECON [Strategic Reconnaissance] wing? Mr. Bacon. In fact, I was the commander. Best wing in the Air Force. Dr. Blair. Well, I was in that wing, myself. Mr. Bacon. I digress. Dr. Blair. I was in that wing, and I supported---- Mr. Bacon. Awesome. Dr. Blair [continuing]. The Looking Glass. Mr. Bacon. Right. Dr. Blair. So I know what you are talking about. And as you know, the endurance of the airborne system in an environment of nuclear war is not going to be very long. So I don't think the airborne system should be the backbone of our command and control system. We--in the 1980s, under Reagan, we started to look at ground mobile systems to support continuity of government and all the rest. I think we need to completely relook at the architecture of our command and control system. Airplanes don't last nearly as long as our forces. Submarines can operate for months at sea. And our command system collapses in 24 hours. It doesn't make sense. So yeah, and then we modernize--if you like the triad, you really want to have a triad, Congress, I think, should ask for some new ideas beyond and besides putting new ground-based strategic deterrent missiles, 642 of them, available to put into vulnerable silos. That doesn't make--that is not eliminating vulnerability, that is just compounding a problem that already exists. Mr. Bacon. If I may, I would just like to ask you a separate question, Dr. Blair, and it is something that you mentioned earlier. I feel like what Russia is doing, they are producing more cruise missiles, nuclear-armed cruise missiles, hypersonic weapons. They admit to having low-yield weapons. They have almost fully modernized their ICBMs, they are looking at bombers. Who--sometimes--and I hear the critical--or people being critical towards the President, as if he is creating an arms race. Isn't Russia initiating an arms race? And so far we have not really been participating. What is your thoughts on that? Dr. Blair. Like I say, I think, going back for half a century, you will see cycles of modernization that we like to call an arms race, but they are actually just replacing aging and obsolete systems. The Chairman. And we are, unfortunately, out of time, this witness. I apologize. Ms. Houlahan. Ms. Houlahan. Thank you very much to the panel for coming and speaking to us on this really important topic. Similarly, I served in the Air Force, as well. Also in the late 1980s and early 1990s was my time in the military. And actually, in terms of what my job was, was about command and control decisions in the event of a nuclear apocalypse, or Armageddon, and helping to think about human-in-the-loop, and what sort of information was needed by whom at what point in time to make really good decisions. And interestingly, I was there being told that my job was to predict and build for the next generation's worth of technologies. So 25 years later, here I sit. And so, theoretically, what I was working on in the field then should be deployed now, hopefully--or maybe not hopefully. So here I am. Everything old is new again; 20, 25 years later I am having a conversation about a threat that I thought went away in the early 1990s. And so, my questions have to do a little bit with Chairman Smith's statement that we need to figure out what we need to do, and where we don't need to spend money, we shouldn't be spending money, how we can be most effective in modernizing, how we can be most effective in helping the President and other decision makers make effective decisions with modern technology, specifically with C3I. And so I know that Andy Kim, Representative Kim, asked you questions about cyber, cyber vulnerabilities. My questions have to do with artificial intelligence, and whether or not we have thought about the use of AI in the command and control structure as we are modernizing. If we are using something like AI as it is currently evolving, is that something that would help us minimize costs at all? Or it is something that is not yet kind of developed enough that we can effectively think about employing it because it is not really this generation when we are thinking about something as terrifying as nuclear weapons and their deployment? Should we be developing these technologies that--can they save us any money in testing? And what are the risks? And my next question has to do with whether our adversaries are, in fact, thinking about AI, since they are ahead of the curve, in terms of modernization with command and control issues. Ms. Rohlfing. So I would like to jump in on that, if I could. I would just observe that the deployment of new technologies is outpacing our understanding of the threats they pose at the same time as, you know, we know that they bring benefits. And I think on AI, as well as with cyber, we need to be sitting down with our adversaries and having a much better understanding of potential implications and red lines. On cyber, I would just say, echoing what we have already heard a number of people in the room say, I think it is essential that we invest in secure communications. That is an important priority for this committee and the Congress' investments in general. But I would just note that, even as we do that, we should not be sanguine that we can buy our way out of the cyber vulnerability of nuclear systems. And this is a really important point. And I don't think it is one that has had any airtime here today, and that is in 2013 the Defense Science Board issued a report that basically said we cannot have confidence that any of our nuclear weapons systems have not been compromised, meaning---- Ms. Houlahan. No, and I---- Ms. Rohlfing [continuing]. Right, they all have. Ms. Houlahan. Trust me, I understand. And I am also concerned about cyber. But I am also, in terms of emerging threats and uses of technologies, concerned about artificial intelligence, too, and making sure that it is sophisticated enough and developed enough to be useful. So I would love it if we could focus on artificial intelligence and the deployment of that, in terms of command and control. If--to the degree that we have any understanding of whether we are going to be implementing it or not. Ms. Rohlfing. So in that--I would just say to that I think what we need to be doing is talking with Russia, with China, with others on making sure we understand red lines, rules of the road. And we should also be looking at, if we cannot come up with the perfect technical solution, what kind of policy and posture changes should we be thinking about putting into effect to make us safer. And that goes for both cyber and AI in the future. Ms. Houlahan. Mr. Miller, do you have anything to add? Mr. Miller. Congresswoman, there is nobody in this room more ignorant on AI than I am. [Laughter.] Mr. Miller. That said, it does--I would be concerned that, in the process of a nuclear launch decision or execution, that AI is involved. These are hugely life-shattering events. I think a human in the loop is absolutely critical. Ms. Houlahan. And I agree with you. And when I served, human-in-the-loop was absolutely--you know, and it sounds like to this day, you know--kind of a important procedure. But if we are talking about seconds, you know, milliseconds that can be saved by decisions that can be helped by AI that are helping the human-in-the-loop, that is what is alarming and concerning to me that I would love to hear a little bit about. Mr. Miller. I agree with that. But I do think that we have overloaded our people. And, you know, we don't want robotics to take over the nuclear decision and execution process. But they can be very useful, I think, in---- The Chairman. We are out of time, we have to move on. Mr. Miller [continuing]. Relieving the overload. The Chairman. I completely agree with you, don't want a robot in charge of launching nuclear weapons. I think that---- Mr. Miller. The Russians have one. The Chairman. Yeah, fun thought. Mr. Waltz. Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I just want to reiterate my colleagues that--statements, that U.S. modernization, or anticipated modernization, is not kicking off a renewed arms race. It is Russian and Chinese modernization that have already occurred, or is occurring that is kicking off this new arms race, and that also--the United States didn't withdraw from INF unilaterally; the Russians withdrew effectively about 10 years ago. And we have since matched that withdrawal. And then also need to address the Chinese continually growing missile threat. So, question on low-yield, because I am still a little confused where you are, and I know we beat this dead horse, but just one more question on it. Do you believe, as expert witnesses, that if the Russians launched low-yield--meaning carrier battle group, port, took out critical capability--that the United States would and should--and should signal that we will mount a full retaliation, and then, therefore, that is our--should be our posture, going forward? Do you believe the United States would essentially destroy the world in response to a low-yield attack? Ms. Rohlfing. Ms. Rohlfing. Well, again, I think the goal here--and I agree with Frank--is to prevent these weapons from---- Mr. Waltz. Totally agree, but the Russians---- Ms. Rohlfing [continuing]. Ever being used. Mr. Waltz. Getting in the Russian mindset---- Ms. Rohlfing. But I think---- Mr. Waltz [continuing]. If they are going to launch it, and they do launch it---- Ms. Rohlfing. I think---- Mr. Waltz [continuing]. Our response? Ms. Rohlfing. I think we have an arsenal today that is a fully capable deterrent, capable of deterring any kind of nuclear use by the Russians. Mr. Waltz. Do the Russians believe that? Ms. Rohlfing. That---- Mr. Waltz. In your estimation. Ms. Rohlfing. That is a debatable proposition that is-- there is, in fact, one thing that has not even come up, whether the Russians even truly have adopted a policy of escalate to de-escalate is under debate within the community of people who follow this very closely. Mr. Waltz. Dr. Blair. Dr. Blair. That is right. And I think that they have been working hard to dig themselves out of that hole. I think they did have a escalate to de-escalate, or--early on, but that they recognized that that is a liability, that Russians, like us, would like to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons. And so they have developed a very sophisticated doctrine of attacking critical civilian infrastructure using special operations, cyber, and conventional forces that I think they understand would be even more devastating---- Mr. Waltz. Let me ask you differently. Do you---- Dr. Blair. So if they did---- Mr. Waltz. If we had a---- Dr. Blair [continuing]. If they did use a low-yield---- Mr. Waltz. Sorry, I have very limited time, so---- Dr. Blair. If they did use a low-yield weapon, I think we have three choices. One is to continue to win the conventional conflict and keep the burn of escalation on the Russians. Second---- Mr. Waltz. Right. Dr. Blair [continuing]. We have a lot of low-yield weapons. We could use those. And third, if--Russians believe escalate to de-escalate is a---- Mr. Waltz. But we have testimony that many of our current low-yields are not effective. Dr. Blair. If they think it is a viable doctrine, then they must understand that we could escalate to de-escalate. And---- Mr. Waltz. Dr.---- Dr. Blair [continuing]. And we are in an infinite loop. Everyone loses, because the ultimate escalate to de-escalate is an all-out nuclear war. Mr. Miller. I think, Congressman, you have described the reason that the Russians have proceeded to develop a new generation of low-yield weapons, a doctrine to support that use, and the exercise of those weapons. Mr. Waltz. Dr. Miller, do you think that the Russians would be less likely and, therefore, to your point, Ms. Rohlfing, to go to the bargaining table, or back to the bargaining table, if we had a credible low-yield deterrent---- Mr. Miller. I think---- Mr. Waltz [continuing]. For them to use low-yield nuclear weapons? And therefore, I think we would be in a safer place. Mr. Miller. Bargaining table, sir? Mr. Waltz. Well, would the Russians be less likely to use their now-modernized--if we modernized ours, as well, and matched---- Mr. Miller. That is the purpose of the low-yield Trident. The Nuclear Posture Review says that. It is to raise the nuclear threshold and to discourage any miscalculation by the Russian leadership. Mr. Waltz. We are moving towards the expiration of New START, as we have talked about. We are--we have moved beyond an era. We have bilateral treaties, and now a--in a previous bilateral nuclear world. Now we have a multi-lateral nuclear world. Should we move--I mean where do you think we should go? Obviously, we have talked about extending New START, we have talked about broadening it to get the full capability of weapons, including China. Mr. Miller. I think we should continue to talk to the Chinese, but there is absolutely no indication that they have any interest in entering into any arms control discussion. The Russians have violated--are violating, as we sit here-- nine arms control agreements. I think that we need to proceed ahead to try to get our arms around their strategic weapons, their novel weapons, and their non-strategic weapons. Mr. Waltz. Doctor---- Dr. Blair. Global Zero---- Mr. Waltz. Please, very quickly. Dr. Blair [continuing]. My organization, convened a panel at the Munich Security Conference, at which a senior Russian-- sorry, Chinese--general laid out their position, which is that the United States and Russia need to deeply reduce their nuclear forces. Mr. Waltz. I am sure they do think so. Dr. Blair. And then they would be prepared to enter into-- this is a long-standing position that goes all the way back to Huang Hua in 1982. What the Chinese are willing to talk about are confidence-building measures at this point. And they propose a no first use agreement to everyone. Everyone has spurned it, except for the Russians. And so the Chinese and the Russians have a no first use agreement to-- with each other right now. And so they are---- Mr. Waltz. Which I have very little confidence in. But finally, do you--just very quickly, do you agree the number of countries marching towards a full nuclear capability, or even a partial, is growing in the world. Back to my colleague's questions, Iran, of course, North Korea, Pakistan, with its growing arsenal, potentially the Saudis, is that--a proliferation and a growing, fully capable missile command and control and nuclear threat, is that increasing or decreasing, in terms of the threat around the world? Ms. Rohlfing. Increasing. Dr. Blair. Definitely increasing, particularly in South Asia. Mr. Miller. Actually, I think the non-proliferation treaty has worked, and I think--I worry about Iran and North Korea, but I don't see major nuclear programs developing at this time. The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Waltz. Thank you. I yield my time. The Chairman. Mrs. Luria. Mrs. Luria. Well, thank you for being here today. In the recent nuclear review, the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, the review found that ``the nuclear triad supported by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, dual-capable aircraft, and a robust nuclear command, control, and communications system is the most cost-effective and strategically sound means of ensuring nuclear deterrence.'' One could read this statement and think, of course, coming from the current administration, but I also want to point out that the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review under President Obama said, quote, that the ``nuclear triad continues to play an essential role in deterring potential adversaries, and reassuring allies and partners around the world. And thus, maintains strategic stability at a reasonable cost.'' As a committee we should be steadfast in our support for maintaining and modernizing the nuclear triad. So while I appreciate the differing points of view today, I think it is dangerous to allow someone to come before this committee and suggest that the United States should reduce or completely eliminate its nuclear stockpile, and I base that off reading previous writings that some of the committee members had previously published. And to suggest that other countries would follow suit out of goodness of their heart--in fact, I think we have seen the opposite in the past 10 years. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review contained the following quote: ``Russia and the United States are no longer adversaries, and prospects for military confrontation have declined dramatically.'' Mr. Miller, do you agree that Russia and the United States are no longer adversaries? Mr. Miller. I think that the Russians think that we are adversaries. I think that the threats that Putin is making, which are reminiscent of the Khrushchev-like threats, are utterly out of place in the 21st century world. And I worry about where the Russian leadership is going. Mrs. Luria. So I take that you think we are still adversaries. Mr. Miller. Yes, ma'am, I do. Mrs. Luria. Okay. And I liked a quote that you used earlier. You said that deterrence is about getting in the mind of the other person, or not. And to use that, do you think that the 2010 statement of what I would see as appeasement contributed to the global security situation we find ourselves in today with Russia, such as their continuing modernization of their nuclear arsenal, the invasion of Crimea, meddling in our election process, et cetera? Mr. Miller. I think President Obama made a bold move to try to get the Russians to--to try to lead. I think 8, 9 years later, we find ourselves in the position where the evidence is overwhelming that the Russians have rejected that idea, as they have rejected other ideas to move towards nuclear stability, like moving to single warhead ICBMs. The Russians rejected that. They rejected getting out of the business of tactical nuclear weapons. So the notion that we can lead the Russians to some path where they will lay down their arms or become more peace-loving has been disproven over the last 10 years. Mrs. Luria. Okay. And do you think that the testimony we have heard today from Mr. Blair and Ms. Rohlfing could be construed by our allies and our potential adversaries as a lack of commitment on the part of the United States to modernization of our nuclear triad? Mr. Miller. No, I don't, because I think the strength and the essence of our democracy is that we have contesting views back and forth, and that is--we are a democratic alliance in NATO. And I think this is--this debate is good. And for this committee to hear this debate--and as we did last week in front of the Senate, this is an important part of democracy. Mrs. Luria. Okay. Well, thank you. And I just want to close by clearly stating my position is that I think the United States should be committed to maintaining and modernizing all three legs of the nuclear triad, and continuing to provide an effective and modernized nuclear umbrella--both the protection of ourselves and of our allies. Thank you. I yield my time. The Chairman. Ms. Cheney. Ms. Cheney. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to our witnesses. Mr. Miller, one of the threads that you hear frequently among those who advocate Global Zero is this notion that somehow, if we just cut our arsenal, our adversaries will follow suit. We saw this very clearly, for example, when President Obama was in Strasbourg, France, in 2009. And he actually said if the United States would just cut the size of its nuclear arsenal, we could then convince the Iranians and North Koreans to do the same. Have you seen any evidence in all of your years of work that this is an approach that would yield fruit? Mr. Miller. No, absolutely not. In fact, under your father's strong leadership, the Department of Defense, we dramatically reduced our non-strategic nuclear forces. The Russians pledged they would do the same thing, and they maintained their forces. And now they have modernized them. We said we would move to single warhead ICBMs to be more stable. The Russians have maintained multiple-warhead ICBMs and are now going back to this large, heavy ICBM, which is clearly known to be destabilizing. So I see no evidence that the Russians have bought into anything that we do in this area. Ms. Cheney. Thank you. And with respect to treaties, to INF, to New START, to some of the other treaties that we have discussed today, do you see any historic evidence of a treaty increasing American security if the United States is the only party to the treaty that is, in fact, adhering to the limitations of the treaty? Mr. Miller. If the United States is the only party in a treaty, it is unilateral restraint, it is not a treaty. And that is what happened to INF. It was a treaty. The Russians moved out, leaving us in a position of unilateral restraint. The treaty was dead. Ms. Cheney. Thank you. And I know all of us on this committee share the view that we have to ensure that a nuclear war is never fought. And part of that is, obviously, making sure that, in terms of deterrents, we also have the ability to have an effective extended deterrence. Could you talk about the impact on our ability to provide extended deterrence if we are, in fact, seen as failing to modernize our own strategic forces, if we are seen as failing to make the investments that are necessary, with respect to our own stockpile? Mr. Miller. I think it would break NATO. I think it could lead to the development of other nuclear weapon states inside the alliance, as they went to save themselves. I think it would be a terribly destabilizing thing. Ms. Cheney. Thank you. And then on no first use, that is another thing that we hear repeatedly, in terms of--that is supposed to bring some sort of stability to this entire issue. Could you talk about the damage that a no first use policy would do? Mr. Miller. I think it would have four effects. One, it would fracture NATO. This is the wrong time to get into more transatlantic angst, and it would create angst. Second, it could create a movement in some of our NATO allies to think about building their own weapons. Third, it would not change Russian and Chinese doctrine in the slightest. And fourth, I don't believe Russia or China would believe that we actually did it, because they are conspiratorial, and so it wouldn't change crisis management behavior. Ms. Cheney. Thank you. And then finally, in testimony by one of the other witnesses today ICBM--the ICBM force was referred to as ``sitting ducks that invite attack.'' Could you respond to that, and explain to me whether or not you view that as an accurate description of our ICBM force? Mr. Miller. The ICBM could, obviously, be fired if it was under attack. And any--an enemy leadership would have no confidence that it could preempt that force. That is a powerful deterrent. Launching 400 or 800 warheads to destroy that force is an unmistakable signal the United States is under massive attack. And therefore, again, it raises the bar to aggression and attack against us. I think the ICBM force is a critical part of the triad, the triad is a critical part of the deterrent. Ms. Cheney. Thank you very much. I had the opportunity to spend time on Friday with General Hyten at STRATCOM. I think that our strategic forces underpin absolutely everything we do. I think it would be the height of irresponsibility for us to be in a position where we decide that we are going to unilaterally disarm. We have to modernize. I think that we ought to be in a position where we are all absolutely affirming the importance of the triad. And I look forward very much to General Hyten coming to testify, and I hope that will be soon, Mr. Chairman, in front of this committee, the way he has in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Thank you to our witnesses, and I yield back my time. The Chairman. Thank you. I am not sure of the exact timing, but as part of our posture review hearings he is scheduled to testify. Ms. Gabbard. Ms. Gabbard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for being here today. We have heard a lot of discussion about how we must maintain our nuclear weapons systems, not to--not designed to be used, but to act as a deterrent because they are so powerful, so dangerous, and the effects of using these nuclear weapons would be so devastating that they are not actually intended to be used. Would you agree with that? [Nonverbal response.] Ms. Gabbard. So if we understand that, then we must also understand that low-yield nuclear weapons are not designed to act as a deterrent, but are instead actually designed to be used. Mr. Miller. I--Russian low-yield weapons are designed to implement a Russian strategy of use. The low-yield Trident that the NPR [Nuclear Posture Review] calls for is designed to prevent the Russians from reaching for that low-yield nuclear weapon and using it in the field. Ms. Gabbard. Dr. Blair. Mr. Miller. It is a deterrent. Dr. Blair. Well, I think it is--I think it--I think the Russians clearly understand, and I have been there dozens of times over many decades, and talked to their experts and their generals. I think they clearly understand that any use of nuclear weapons would run the risk of escalation to all-out use, and that the role--the Russians, essentially, accept that the role--sole purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter the use of nuclear weapons by others. But they also leave open the possibility that they could use nuclear weapons to defeat or to complicate conventional aggression against Russia. Ms. Gabbard. Ms. Rohlfing, you have anything to add on that? Ms. Rohlfing. I agree with what Dr. Blair just said. Ms. Gabbard. I think it is very clear to me that a nuclear weapon is a nuclear weapon. And if you are talking about a nuclear weapon as a deterrent, but then you want to develop low-yield nuclear weapons, it is clear that they would not be necessary if you see that a nuclear weapon is a nuclear weapon, and that the system that we currently have acts as a deterrent. Secretary of State George Shultz said, as they were negotiating and signing the INF Treaty, ``A nuclear weapon is a nuclear weapon. You use a small one, then you go to a bigger one. There is an inevitable chain of nuclear escalation that puts the world at risk,'' which is why these low-yield nuclear weapons being developed are so dangerous. I want to switch over to the INF Treaty. Mr. Miller, where do you see the path forward? You have said the INF Treaty is dead. What is the path forward? Mr. Miller. The INF Treaty is dead because the Russians now have 100 of the systems that are---- Ms. Gabbard. But what is the path forward? Mr. Miller. I would think that a new negotiation, which encompasses an extension of New START, in conjunction with new negotiations that cover all U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons, would be a preferred path forward. Ms. Gabbard. So it is the wrong move for the United States to withdraw from this INF Treaty---- Mr. Miller. I---- Ms. Gabbard [continuing]. Because of the repercussions that we are seeing already beginning. Mr. Miller. I dispute the--the treaty was dead. The Russians killed the treaty. There are 100 new treaty-busting missiles in the field, period, full stop. They have been-- developed them since 2013. We have been asking them about it since 2013. The end result is the fielding of at least 100 of these missiles, and more are coming. Ms. Gabbard. President Trump's withdrawal from this INF Treaty exacerbates the situation, and kicks off--and increases this nuclear arms race. Gorbachev and George Shultz wrote a piece on this, very clearly stating that they participated in INF negotiations, and abandoning this treaty threatens our very existence. They said, ``The answer to the problems that have come up is not to abandon the INF Treaty, but to preserve and fix it. Military and diplomatic officials from the U.S. and Russia should meet to address and resolve the issues of verification and compliance. Equally difficult problems have been solved in the past, once the two sides put their mind to it. We are confident this can be done again.'' That is quoting them. This is the direction that we need to take, not to add more fuel to the flames, but instead seek to strengthen, address the issues that have been raised, strengthen this treaty, and bring in others to join. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. The Chairman. Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, as well as our three witnesses, I want to thank you for an extraordinarily important discussion, perhaps more important than any other thing this committee will consider over the next 4 or 5 months, as we put together the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act]. So thank you very much. I do want to pick up on Mr. Moulton's questions, insofar as you were able to answer. One of the questions that he raised is do the ICBMs deter Russia's attack more than our other nuclear weapons, specifically the SSBNs. Mr. Blair. Dr. Blair. I think the SSBNs are a secure second strike. They are what underwrites deterrence. The ICBM force is a vulnerable force. I don't see how anyone could make any sense out of the view that they are a force to be replaced. Mr. Garamendi. With regard to that question, it also appears as though Russia and China both would agree with you that the ICBMs in a silo are vulnerable. And therefore, they have gone to mobile ICBMs. Dr. Blair. That is right. And we try very hard---- Mr. Garamendi. I think that is going to be a yes or a no, because I want to get on---- Dr. Blair. Oh, we try very hard to find, fix, and track their--both Russian and Chinese ICBMs. This is part of the---- Mr. Garamendi. And North Korea. Dr. Blair [continuing]. Warfighting mindset that is pervasive in both---- Mr. Garamendi. But with regard to the question of vulnerability, are--China, Russia, and North Korea have all decided that it has to be mobile, otherwise it is vulnerable. Is that correct, Mr. Miller? Mr. Miller. [Nonverbal response.] Mr. Garamendi. Okay, thank you. And I take that as a yes. Mr. Miller. Yes, but that Russia does maintain silo-based missiles, and the new monster SS-18 follow-on will be silo- based. And some Chinese missiles are still silo-based. But your point is correct. Mr. Garamendi. We are going to go around and around on this very, very fundamental issue for some time. We are going to have to deal with the issue. There may be questions, ultimately, of how fast we move forward with the new ICBM, and we will deal with that. However, there appears, Mr. Blair, that you have one thing very, very much in mind that the three of you would agree to, and that is the command and control systems. If we are to do anything useful, aside from the negotiations, which I think all three of you say we ought to push forward as far and as fast as possible--is that a yes from all three of you on negotiations, get on with it? [Nonverbal response.] Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. So that--take that as a yes from the three of you. Command and control. If we do anything useful in the upcoming NDAA, would you recommend that the command and control system be at the priority and the top of that list? Mr. Miller. Yes, sir. Ms. Rohlfing. Yes. Dr. Blair. Yes. Mr. Garamendi. Well, I have got 3 minutes to go back and plow this field again, but I heard very clearly that--well, let me just state my position. We are not going to solve this very, very fundamental debate about the very important differences--ICBMs and low- yield and the rest--in the near term. It seems to me that that is a fundamental negotiating thing. And I think, from my-- listening to this, that all three of you would say, ``Get on with the negotiations.'' There are things in the--and there are things that we can do in the next 4 months or 5 months, and that is command and control, put the money there, put the emphasis there, and get on with it. Is that correct? Mr. Miller. It is certainly part of the modernization of the triad, and I support the triad and the modernization, the C3. Dr. Blair. Top priority. Mr. Garamendi. I knew you were going to go there, Mr. Miller, but I take that as a yes, get on with the command and control. Mr. Miller. Dr. Blair. Yes. Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Blair, rather. Dr. Blair. Totally agree. Ms. Rohlfing. Yes, I would prioritize command and control. Mr. Garamendi. Very good. Beyond that, there are elements in the current law that make it very difficult for our military to have discussions with our counterparts in Russia, specifically, and somewhat in China. I think it was your--two of you, anyway, maybe all three of you--that we eliminate those hindrances for discussion. Is that agreed amongst the three of you, that we should eliminate those? Ms. Rohlfing. I would say yes. Those prohibitions embedded in the NDAA over the last several years should be repealed. And in fact, the administration should be encouraged to pursue military-to-military dialogue. Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Blair. Dr. Blair. Chairman Dunford has just recently just met with the chief of the general staff of Russia, Gerasimov, and I think that that kind of dialogue is absolutely critical in this period of tension. Mr. Miller. And CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] Richardson has just been to China. So yes, the military-to-military contacts are important. Mr. Garamendi. Okay. Well, there is at least agreement that there is something that we can accomplish in a positive way. My final point in the next 53 minutes is--or 53 seconds--is that we do not have an agreement on what deterrence is, nor the definition of deterrence. And until we have some sort of an agreement on what that is, it is going to be a round and round, and not much resolution. With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Langevin. Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank our witnesses for your testimony this morning. And let me begin with saying that, as you know, the United States has demonstrated strong leadership over the past decade to minimize and, where possible, all but eliminate the use of highly enriched uranium for civilian purposes. And I advocated for continued assessment to identify the feasibility of using low-enriched uranium in naval reactor fuel that would meet military requirements for aircraft carriers and submarines. So as I see it, using low-enriched uranium in naval reactor fuel has the potential to bring significant national security benefits related to nuclear non-proliferation, and lower security costs. It also supports naval reactor research and development at the cutting edge of nuclear science. Other nations do use low-enriched uranium to power their vessels, including submarines. Moreover, unless an alternative to using low-enriched uranium fuel is developed in the coming decades, the U.S. will have to resume production of bomb-grade uranium for the first time since 1992, ultimately undermining, I believe, U.S. non- proliferation efforts. So with all that being said, is this something that you considered in your research? And what are the risks associated with the recommencement of HEU [highly enriched uranium] production in the United States? Dr. Blair. It is not in my wheelhouse, but I have a colleague at Princeton, Professor Frank von Hippel, who has persuaded me of everything that you just said. So I think that you are on the right--totally on the right track with that set of proposals. Ms. Rohlfing. I would just add to that this is something that we have looked at at the Nuclear Threat Initiative, and I think that it would be a very important investment to see if we can develop a next-generation reactor that maintains only, you know, as much as possible, current operations with the low- enriched uranium fuel for our naval reactors. So I would encourage it. It is an important plank in our non-proliferation policy. We need to prevent the spread of these materials around the world. And if we are continuing to produce it ourselves, and stockpile it in large numbers, that is hard to do. Mr. Miller. Sir, in my time in the Navy I was on a conventionally powered ship. I am not competent to talk about HEU, LEU [low enriched uranium], and reactors, but I think it is a mistake to think that if the United States does something, the rest of the world will follow. I think the sad history of the past 20-odd years indicates that we have proposed bold initiatives and, except for the British and the French, it is very difficult to bring other countries along with us. Mr. Langevin. But I am primarily focused on U.S. use of LEU. As long as it is going to meet military requirements--and again, certainly France is already doing it, powering their nuclear submarines, as I understand it. So it is technically feasible, it is happening, and I see no reason why the United States should not pursue that, and that type of technology and use in our aircraft carriers and submarines. But---- Mr. Miller. Sure, and---- Mr. Langevin [continuing]. I appreciate your---- Mr. Miller. I am sure Admiral Caldwell will have a time in front of the committee. You can talk to that. Mr. Langevin. I thank you for your input on that topic. Next, though, the use of emerging technologies, such as machine learning to conduct predictive maintenance and additive manufacturing to help defray costs is something that we should be considering. The Defense Department has seen some success with these types of technology. However, the effort is in a nascent state. Do you see a place for these technologies in the nuclear force? And what do you think they will--what effect do you think they will have? Ms. Rohlfing. I think we need to do more research to better understand both the benefits and the disadvantages of pursuing those technologies as part of the nuclear force before I could make a recommendation. Dr. Blair. You know, I think existing technology, even 10 years old, it could be incorporated into our systems, including our nuclear command and control system, which operates on--in some cases, on 1950s technology. So I don't think we have to leap too far into the future with new technology to fix a lot of the problems that we currently confront. Mr. Miller. I am not competent to answer your question, sir. Mr. Langevin. Okay. Thank you all very much. I yield back. The Chairman. Thank you. I want to thank our witnesses. I think it was a very, very informative discussion, and I appreciate your expertise and your answers to our questions. And we learned a great deal. I just want to close by saying that I don't think there is anybody on this committee--there is probably people in the country, but there is not anybody on this committee who is not in support of modernizing our nuclear force. And I don't think there is anybody on this committee who is not in support of the idea that we need to have a nuclear deterrent. To the extent that some of the questions from members implied that somehow, if we don't do everything in the Nuclear Posture Review that means that we are in favor of unilateral disarmament and being weak, is exactly--the type of argument that has always troubled me on this committee is you can always build more. Well, okay if the Nuclear Posture Review is the gold standard for what makes you strong, why not another 1,000 missiles, you know? I mean what if someone came up with a Nuclear Posture Review that said no, you are wrong, you know, we need five more submarines. So then the Nuclear Posture Review becomes evidence that you are weak. So I am very--the only thing that really troubles me about the discussion is people say that if we don't build absolutely everything we say we are going to build, that means that our adversaries are going to perceive us as weak and attack us. That is--I think the analogy I have heard in the military--the ultimate self-licking ice cream cone. It will never stop. So I think a robust discussion about what is actually in the Nuclear Posture Review and whether or not it makes sense to maintain that deterrence, that is the debate we were having. I understand in politics it is always easier if you can set up a straw man and then knock it down--the straw man being that, you know, well, let's not be weak. That is not the discussion here. The discussion here: what is a credible nuclear deterrent? And I completely agree that that is what we need. I would point out that, over the course of the next 15 years, the nuclear modernization plan that we are talking about is going to add somewhere between $10 and $15 billion a year to what we already spend on nuclear weapons, and we already spend a great deal. That is $10 to $15 billion that isn't going to go to anything else. So we need to have that discussion, in my view. But it is not a matter of disarming or, you know, standing down. I think we need to have a strong nuclear deterrent, and we need to modernize. But we will continue to have this debate, going forward. Again, you were all excellent, and I really appreciate you taking the time to help inform our committee on this crucially important issue. With that, we are adjourned. I forgot something. I am going to ask unanimous consent to include into the record all members' statements and extraneous material. Without objection, so ordered. And now we are adjourned. [Whereupon, at 12:31 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] ======================================================================= A P P E N D I X March 6, 2019 ======================================================================= ======================================================================= PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD March 6, 2019 ======================================================================= [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] ======================================================================= QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING March 6, 2019 ======================================================================= QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. DAVIS Mrs. Davis. The Trump administration Nuclear Posture Review notes that the administration will ``seek arms control agreements that enhance security, and are verifiable and enforceable.'' The administration has also noted as recently as this month that Russia is in compliance with the Treaty. Do you believe the New START Treaty meets that threshold? Ms. Rohlfing. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] Mrs. Davis. The Trump administration Nuclear Posture Review notes that the administration will ``seek arms control agreements that enhance security, and are verifiable and enforceable.'' The administration has also noted as recently as this month that Russia is in compliance with the Treaty. Do you believe the New START Treaty meets that threshold? Dr. Blair. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] Mrs. Davis. The Trump administration Nuclear Posture Review notes that the administration will ``seek arms control agreements that enhance security, and are verifiable and enforceable.'' The administration has also noted as recently as this month that Russia is in compliance with the Treaty. Do you believe the New START Treaty meets that threshold? Mr. Miller. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] ______ QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KIM Mr. Kim. How confident are you in our current nuclear command, control, and communication (C3) systems, especially regarding cybersecurity? If no, why not? What can be done in the short and long term to reduce these cyber vulnerabilities? Dr. Blair. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] Mr. Kim. How confident are you in our current nuclear command, control, and communication (C3) systems, especially regarding cybersecurity? If no, why not? What can be done in the short and long term to reduce these cyber vulnerabilities? Mr. Miller. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] [all]