[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
KEEPING OUR SIGHTS ON MARS:
A REVIEW OF NASA'S DEEP SPACE
EXPLORATION PROGRAMS AND LUNAR PROPOSAL
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE,
TECHNOLOGY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 8, 2019
__________
Serial No. 116-16
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
36-255PDF WASHINGTON : 2020
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY
HON. EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas, Chairwoman
ZOE LOFGREN, California FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma,
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois Ranking Member
SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon MO BROOKS, Alabama
AMI BERA, California, BILL POSEY, Florida
Vice Chair RANDY WEBER, Texas
CONOR LAMB, Pennsylvania BRIAN BABIN, Texas
LIZZIE FLETCHER, Texas ANDY BIGGS, Arizona
HALEY STEVENS, Michigan ROGER MARSHALL, Kansas
KENDRA HORN, Oklahoma RALPH NORMAN, South Carolina
MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey MICHAEL CLOUD, Texas
BRAD SHERMAN, California TROY BALDERSON, Ohio
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee PETE OLSON, Texas
JERRY McNERNEY, California ANTHONY GONZALEZ, Ohio
ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
PAUL TONKO, New York JIM BAIRD, Indiana
BILL FOSTER, Illinois JAIME HERRERA BEUTLER, Washington
DON BEYER, Virginia JENNIFFER GONZALEZ-COLON,
CHARLIE CRIST, Florida Puerto Rico
SEAN CASTEN, Illinois VACANCY
KATIE HILL, California
BEN McADAMS, Utah
JENNIFER WEXTON, Virginia
------
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics
HON. KENDRA HORN, Oklahoma, Chairwoman
ZOE LOFGREN, California BRIAN BABIN, Texas, Ranking Member
AMI BERA, California MO BROOKS, Alabama
ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado BILL POSEY, Florida
DON BEYER, Virginia PETE OLSON, Texas
CHARLIE CRIST, Florida MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
KATIE HILL, California
JENNIFER WEXTON, Virginia
C O N T E N T S
May 8, 2019
Page
Hearing Charter.................................................. 2
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Kendra Horn, Chairwoman, Subcommittee
on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science, Space, and
Technology, U.S. House of Representatives...................... 9
Written Statement............................................ 10
Statement by Representative Brian Babin, Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science,
Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives........... 11
Written Statement............................................ 13
Statement by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson, Chairwoman,
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of
Representatives................................................ 14
Written statement............................................ 15
Statement by Representative Frank Lucas, Ranking Member,
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of
Representatives................................................ 16
Written statement............................................ 16
Witnesses:
Mr. William H. Gerstenmaier, Associate Administrator, Human
Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate, NASA
Oral Statement............................................... 18
Written Statement............................................ 21
Mr. Mark Sirangelo, Special Assistant to the Administrator, NASA
Oral Statement............................................... 32
Written Statement............................................ 21
Dr. Patricia Sanders, Chair, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
Oral Statement............................................... 34
Written Statement............................................ 36
Dr. Jonathan Lunine, Director, Cornell Center for Astrophysics
and Planetary Science; Co-Chair of the Former Committee on
Human Spaceflight, National Academies of Sciences, Engineering,
and Medicine
Oral Statement............................................... 40
Written Statement............................................ 42
Mr. J. Walter Faulconer, President, Faulconer Consulting Group
Oral Statement............................................... 47
Written Statement............................................ 49
Discussion....................................................... 70
Appendix I: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Mr. William H. Gerstenmaier, Associate Administrator, Human
Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate, NASA........... 96
Mr. Mark Sirangelo, Special Assistant to the Administrator, NASA. 96
Dr. Patricia Sanders, Chair, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel..... 111
Dr. Jonathan Lunine, Director, Cornell Center for Astrophysics
and Planetary Science; Co-Chair of the Former Committee on
Human Spaceflight, National Academies of Sciences, Engineering,
and Medicine................................................... 114
Mr. J. Walter Faulconer, President, Faulconer Consulting Group... 116
Appendix II: Additional Material for the Record
Article submitted by Mr. William H. Gerstenmaier, Associate
Administrator, Human Exploration and Operations Mission
Directorate, NASA.............................................. 122
KEEPING OUR SIGHTS ON MARS:
A REVIEW OF NASA'S DEEP SPACE
EXPLORATION PROGRAMS AND
LUNAR PROPOSAL
----------
WEDNESDAY, MAY 8, 2019
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics,
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
Washington, D.C.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:18 p.m., in
room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Kendra
Horn [Chairwoman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairwoman Horn. This hearing will come to order.
Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare
recess at any time.
Good afternoon, and welcome to today's hearing entitled,
``Keeping our Sights on Mars: A Review of NASA's Deep Space
Exploration Programs and Lunar Proposal.'' I want to thank our
witnesses for being here and thank you all for joining us.
So, today, we're examining NASA's deep space exploration
programs--the capabilities and plans that will enable Americans
to go beyond our low-Earth orbit neighborhood and into deep
space. Successive NASA Authorization Acts have authorized a
stepping-stone approach to human exploration, with the most
recent, the NASA Transition Authorization Act of 2017,
establishing Mars as the long-term goal. The law also directed
NASA to prepare a human exploration roadmap.
In hearings from the last Congress to the present, Members
of the Subcommittee and Full Committee have repeatedly asked
for this roadmap, only to receive a response--in response a
high-level strategy that was delivered over a year and a half
late. I refer to this roadmap because, as the authorizing
Committee, it is our responsibility to the American taxpayers
to ensure that human space exploration plans and budget
requests are based on sound analyses and clear goals and
objectives.
We support NASA and we want it to succeed, so I am
concerned that as we prepare to reauthorize NASA again, we have
many unanswered questions about the future of our Nation's
human space exploration program: How and when will we get to
Mars? What technologies and systems are needed to get us there?
What are the interim destinations and precursor missions that
scientists and engineers have determined to be the most
effective means to get us there? What is the future of the
International Space Station (ISS), and what are the priorities
to enable an eventual Mars mission? How long should it be
operated, and what follow--and what will follow in low-Earth
orbit?
Mars is the horizon goal, and I want Americans to be the
first to set foot on the red planet. But make no mistake about
it, there's an elephant in the room, and it's the Moon. In the
absence of an integrated roadmap, the Administration decided
that the Moon is the place to go with humans, that we should go
there sustainably, and that--and be there permanently, though
not necessarily with humans. And, as of just 6 weeks ago, the
Vice President said that we need to get there fast, in 5 years
rather than 9 years.
While I can't argue with the desire to invigorate our human
exploration efforts and find near-term milestones to
demonstrate success, the lack of planning evident so far, is no
way to run our Nation's human space exploration program. The
2024 missive left NASA in a tizzy, scrambling to develop a plan
and hastening to pull together a budget amendment that still
has not been delivered to Congress, and upending groundwork
with international partners on future exploration goals.
What are the primary goals and objectives for going to the
Moon? Are they geopolitical, scientific, commercial, or as
risk-reduction efforts for an eventual Mars mission? On which
goal is NASA basing its architecture and mission decisions?
Simply saying ``yes'' to all of them is not an adequate way to
determine our priorities. And how will we get there by 2024?
NASA's solution? Get the private sector to do it and do it
fast. Whether or not that will be through cost-plus or firm-
fixed-price contracts, which are not typically used for
development projects, whether or not contracts would involve a
cost-sharing and at what level NASA oversight would be involved
have not been made clear.
While public-private partnerships have a role to play,
their use in human spaceflight programs has not yet been
demonstrated. Commercial crew providers were awarded contracts
in 2014 with an initial plan for certification by 2017. It's
2019, and while they're making good progress, we're still
hitchhiking rides with the Russians to low-Earth orbit. Not
only that, under those contracts, it's the companies, not NASA,
that decide what information the public should be entitled to
should something go wrong. We all know that spaceflight is
risky, and things do go wrong. So let me be clear. I absolutely
support America's robust, growing, and innovative space
industry. A United States human space exploration program that
leads the world should be leveraging private-sector innovation.
The question is how.
At present, we have a White House directive to land humans
on the Moon in 5 years but no plan and no budget details on how
to do so and no integrated human space exploration roadmap
laying out how we can best achieve the horizon goal, Mars. In
essence, we're flying blind.
I'll close with this thought. I believe all of us--
Republicans and Democrats alike--share the goal of a successful
and ambitious human space exploration program that enables the
United States, in concert with its international partners, to
explore destinations in deep space such as the Moon and Mars.
Such ambitious civil space goals are not only inspiring but
essential to enabling discovery, providing benefits to society,
and sustaining U.S. leadership in the peaceful uses of outer
space.
The Space Exploration Initiative of 1989 and the 2004
Vision for Space Exploration were unfulfilled attempts to
achieving deep space exploration goals to go to the Moon and
Mars. Will our efforts this time be an opportunity lost or an
opportunity gained? If they are to be an opportunity gained, we
will need an integrated and stable plan, adequate and sustained
resources, and a commitment that transcends political party and
election timelines to get us there.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Chairwoman Horn follows:]
Good afternoon and welcome. I'd like to extend a special
welcome to our witnesses. Thank you for being here.
Today, we're examining NASA's deep space exploration
programs-the capabilities and plans that will enable Americans
to go beyond our low-Earth orbit neighborhood and into deep
space.
Successive NASA Authorization Acts have authorized a
stepping-stone approach to human exploration, with the most
recent-the NASA Transition Authorization Act of 2017-
establishing Mars as the long-term goal. The law also directed
NASA to prepare a Human Exploration Roadmap. In hearings from
the last Congress to the present, Members of the Subcommittee
and Full Committee have repeatedly asked for this Roadmap, only
to receive in response a high-level strategy that was delivered
over a year and a half late. I refer to this Roadmap, because
as the Authorizing Committee, it is our responsibility to the
American taxpayers to ensure that human space exploration plans
and budget requests are based on sound analyses and clear goals
and objectives. We support NASA and we want it to succeed.
So I am concerned that as we prepare to reauthorize NASA
again, we have many unanswered questions about the future of
our nation's human space exploration program:
LHow and when will we get to Mars?
LWhat technologies and systems are needed to get
us there?
LWhat are the interim destinations and precursor
missions that scientists and engineers have determined to be
the most effective means to get us there?
LWhat is the future of the International Space
Station and what are the priorities for it to enable an
eventual Mars mission? How long should it be operated, and what
will follow it in low-Earth orbit?
Mars is the horizon goal and I want Americans to be the
first to set foot on the Red Planet. But make no mistake about
it. There's an elephant in the room, and it's the Moon.
In the absence of an integrated Roadmap, the Administration
has decided that the Moon is the place to go with humans, that
we should go there sustainably, and be there permanently,
though not necessarily with humans. And, as of just 6 weeks
ago, the Vice President said we need to get there fast-in 5
rather than 9 years. While I can't argue with the desire to
invigorate our human exploration efforts and find near-term
milestones to demonstrate success, the lack of planning evident
so far, is no way to run our nation's human space exploration
program. The 2024 missive left NASA in a tizzy-scrambling to
develop a plan and hastening to pull together a budget
amendment that still have not been delivered to Congress; and,
upending groundwork with international partners on future
exploration goals.
What are the primary goals and objectives for going to the
Moon? Are they geopolitical, scientific, commercial, or as
risk-reduction efforts for an eventual Mars mission? On which
goal is NASA basing its architecture and mission decisions?
Simply saying ``yes'' to all of them is not an adequate way to
determine priorities. And how will we get there by 2024? NASA's
solution? Get the private sector to do it and do it fast.
Whether or not that will be through cost-plus or firm-fixed-
price contracts, which are not typically used for development
projects, whether or not contracts would involve cost-sharing
and what level of NASA oversight would be involved have not
been made clear.
While public-private partnerships have a role to play,
their use in human spaceflight programs has not yet been
demonstrated. Commercial crew providers were awarded contracts
in 2014 with an initial plan for certification by 2017. It's
2019 and while they're making good progress, we're still hitch-
hiking with the Russians to low-Earth orbit. Not only that,
under those contracts, it's the companies, not NASA, that
decide what information to make public should something go
wrong. Spaceflight is risky, and things do go wrong.Let me be
clear. I support America's robust, growing, and innovative
space industry. A United States human space exploration program
that leads the world should be leveraging private sector
innovation. The question is how.
At present, we have a White House directive to land humans
on the Moon in 5 years, but no plan or no budget details on how
to do so, and no integrated Human Exploration Roadmap laying
out how we can best achieve the horizon goal-Mars. In essence,
we're flying blind.
I'll close with this thought. I believe all of us-
Republicans and Democrats alike-share the goal of a successful
and ambitious human space exploration program that enables the
United States, in concert with international partners, to
explore destinations in deep space such as the Moon and Mars.
Such ambitious civil space goals are not only inspiring but
essential to enabling discovery, providing benefits to society,
and sustaining U.S. leadership in the peaceful uses of outer
space. The Space Exploration Initiative of 1989 and the 2004
Vision for Space Exploration were unfulfilled attempts at
achieving deep space exploration goals to go to the Moon and
Mars. Will our efforts this time be an opportunity lost or an
opportunity gained? If they are to be an opportunity gained, we
will need an integrated and stable plan, adequate and sustained
resources, and a commitment that transcends political party and
election timelines to get us there.
Thank you.
Chairwoman Horn. All right. The Chair now recognizes
Ranking Member Babin for an opening statement.
Mr. Babin. Thank you, Madam Chair. We appreciate it. And I
want to say thank you to all you witnesses that are here today.
I'm looking forward to hearing your testimonies.
As this is the first formal hearing of the Space and
Aeronautics Subcommittee of the 116th Congress, I would like to
formally welcome you to the Committee, and I look forward to
working with you, Chairwoman Horn, on one of the most exciting
issues that we deal with here in Congress, and that is space
exploration.
This is not only one of the most exciting issues, but it is
also one of the most exciting times for space exploration. We
have a renewed sense of urgency and purpose that is coupled
with focus, leadership, and enthusiasm. I am excited to be
involved in our Nation's space enterprise at this moment in our
history.
We have a unique opportunity before us. We have an
Administration that put forth a bold direction, and we have an
agency that stands ready to meet that challenge. We've seen
proposals to reinvigorate NASA before, but we are uniquely
positioned at this moment to capitalize on the investments made
over the last 2 decades.
Unlike President Kennedy's challenge to put a man on the
Moon within the decade, we have already made the investments in
the systems that will turn that challenge into a reality. And
we now have robust centers and infrastructure, an eager
workforce, a modern industrial base, a hungry commercial
sector, a vibrant space market, and years of hardware
development already under our belts. We are in the final stages
of developing the Space Launch System (SLS). We've already
conducted a test flight of the Orion capsule, and ground
systems at the Kennedy Space Center are being built as we
speak. The President has provided direction, focus, and
enthusiasm, which will only help us in making continued
progress.
And that isn't to say that we don't have work to do.
Specifically, we need a clear plan and a realistic budget
proposal. We need to be cautious about developing a plan that
is overly ambitious or too costly, and we need to ensure that
OMB sufficiently funds the plan in subsequent budget requests.
We must develop next-generation spacesuits and human-class
landers, scale up in-space propulsion and life support systems,
and properly mitigate radiation hazards. We must also develop
these capabilities in an extensible manner that enables an
evolvable architecture that can explore not only the Moon, but
also Mars and beyond. And as the National Academy's Pathways to
Exploration report recommended, NASA should develop
technologies that feedforward from one mission to the next and
reduce or eliminate the development of dead-end technologies.
Furthermore, Space Policy Directive 1 directed NASA to
``Lead an innovative and sustainable program of exploration
with commercial and international partners to enable human
expansion across the solar system and to bring back to Earth
new knowledge and new opportunities.'' Developing a plan that
takes into account both the principles of extensibility and
sustainability will be very challenging and will require NASA
to make difficult decisions going forward, but I believe that
NASA is well up to this task.
We must also be mindful of artificial schedule pressures.
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel has noted in several
reports that it's important to set challenging but achievable
schedules and not allow undue schedule pressure to lead to
decisions that adversely impact safety and mission assurance.
Maintaining a balance between setting challenging yet
achievable goals and taking prudent steps to ensure safe
operations will certainly need to be addressed in any future
plans.
Humanity will commit to the task of exploring the cosmos.
The only real question is whether the United States will be the
one to lead in that effort. I, for one, will do everything that
I can to ensure that this happens.
Before I yield back my time, I would like to make one final
observation. The Administration is still finalizing their lunar
plans, and while this hearing is very helpful, and I realize
that NASA previously committed to delivering a plan to the
Committee by now, holding the hearing without new details does
seem premature. I would respectfully recommend that we hear
from NASA once this plan is finalized.
And so, with that, I'll yield back. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Babin follows:]
Thank you, Chair Horn. As this is the first formal hearing
of the Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee in the 116th
Congress, I would like to formally welcome you to the
Committee. I look forward to working with you on one of the
most exciting issues we deal with here in Congress--space
exploration.
This is not only one of the most exciting issues, but it is
also one of the most exciting times for space exploration. We
have a renewed sense of urgency and purpose that is couple with
focus, leadership, and enthusiasm. I am excited to be involved
in our nation's space enterprise at this moment in history.
We have a unique opportunity before us. We have an
Administration that put forth a bold direction, and we have an
agency that stands ready to meet that challenge. We've seen
proposals to reinvigorate NASA before, but we are uniquely
positioned at this moment to capitalize on the investments made
over the last two decades.
Unlike President Kennedy's challenge to put a man on the
Moon within the decade, we have already made the investments in
the systems that will turn that challenge into reality. We now
have robust centers and infrastructure, an eager workforce, a
modern industrial base, a hungry commercial sector, a vibrant
space market, and years of hardware development under our belt.
We are in the final stages of developing the Space Launch
System, we've already conducted a test flight of the Orion
capsule, and ground systems at the Kennedy Space Center are
being built as we speak. The President has provided direction,
focus, and enthusiasm, which will only help us continue making
progress.
That isn't to say that we don't have work to do.
Specifically, we need a clear plan and a realistic budget
proposal. We need to be cautious about developing a plan that
is overly ambitious or costly, and we need to ensure that OMB
sufficiently funds the plan in subsequent budget requests.
We must develop next generation space suits and human-class
landers, scale-up in-space propulsion and life support systems,
and properly mitigate radiation hazards. We must also develop
these capabilities in an extensible manner that enables an
evolvable architecture that can explore not only the Moon, but
also Mars, and beyond. As the National Academy's ``Pathways to
Exploration'' report recommended, NASA should develop
technologies that feed-forward from one mission to the next and
reduce or eliminate the development of ``dead-end''
technologies.
Furthermore, Space Policy Directive 1 directed NASA to ``
`[l]ead an innovative and sustainable program of exploration
with commercial and international partners to enable human
expansion across the solar system and to bring back to Earth
new knowledge and opportunities.'' Developing a plan that takes
into account both the principles of extensibility and
sustainability will be challenging and require NASA to make
difficult decisions going forward, but I believe NASA is up to
the task.
We must also be mindful of artificial schedule pressure.
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel has noted in several
reports that it is important to set challenging, but achievable
schedules and not allow undue schedule pressure to lead to
decisions that adversely impact safety and mission assurance.
Maintaining a balance between setting challenging yet
achievable goals and taking prudent steps to ensure safe
operations will certainly need to be addressed in any future
plans.
Humanity will commit to the task of exploring the cosmos.
The only real question is whether the United States will lead
in that effort. I, for one, will do everything I can to ensure
that we do.
Before I yield back my time, I would like to make one final
observation. The Administration is still finalizing their Lunar
plans. While this hearing is helpful, and I realize NASA
previously committed to delivering a plan to the Committee by
now, holding the hearing without new details seems premature. I
would respectfully recommend that we hear from NASA once the
plan is finalized.
Thank you.
Chairwoman Horn. Thank you very much. Dr. Babin, I
appreciate that.
And the Chair now recognizes Chairwoman Johnson for her
opening statement.
Chairwoman Johnson. Thank you very much, and good
afternoon. I want to join the Chairwoman and Ranking Member in
welcoming our witnesses to today's hearing, and I look forward
to your testimony. I'll try to be brief in my remarks.
It is now more than 6 weeks since Vice President Pence
announced that NASA was being directed by the President to
undertake a crash program to land astronauts on the Moon within
the next 5 years. Over that 6-week period, the President has
been uncharacteristically silent, making no public statements
or tweets in support of his lunar initiative.
NASA, for its part, has provided no specifics on either the
plan or the required budget for the proposed accelerated Moon--
well, this must be a sheet--I hope that when NASA delivers that
plan and its revised budget to Congress, it will also provide a
compelling rationale for the proposed crash program that
justifies the additional resources that will be required to
meet the President's arbitrary deadline. Because, as Chair of
the Science Committee, I cannot look at NASA's proposal in
isolation, nor can my colleagues on the Appropriations
Committee.
I just came from a hearing on the National Science
Foundation's (NSF's) Fiscal Year 2020 budget, where we heard
that the President's request would cut NSF's budget by $1
billion. As you know, NSF is one of the Nation's premier
research agencies, funding research across a range of important
scientific disciplines. That billion-dollar cut will have
serious negative impacts on major research areas if enacted.
A week ago, we had a hearing on the NOAA (National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration) budget request, and the news
was similar: The President's request would cut NOAA's budget by
$1 billion. And 3 weeks before that, we heard that the
President's request would cut the discretionary budget of the
National Institute of Standards and Technology by more than 30
percent or almost $300 million. Finally, the Department of
Energy's research programs would be cut by $4.5 billion. So if
Congress is to increase NASA's budget simply to speed up a
lunar landing relative to what was already planned, Congress
will have to weigh the opportunity costs of doing so.
That said, I want to make it clear that I do not support
the alternative of cannibalizing NASA's other important
research activities just to speed up the human lunar
exploration program.
On Monday, Ranking Member Lucas and I visited NASA's
Goddard Space Flight Center and heard about all the important
space and Earth science research activities being undertaken
there. We should be investing more in such inspiring and
consequential research rather than cutting it, as is proposed
in NASA's 2020 request.
As I close, I want to reiterate my support for a strong,
forward-leaning human and robotic exploration program. I
believe that human missions to the Moon and Mars, as well as
robotic exploration, will continue to inspire, as it did when
Americans first walked on the Moon. But we need to get it right
as we pursue such a program, and we need to strike the right
balance across all of our important national research
priorities. Thus, I expect that this Committee will need to
have NASA appear before us again once it provides us with the
information it has promised.
And with that, I again want to welcome our witnesses, and I
yield back.
[The prepared statement of Chairwoman Johnson follows:]
Good afternoon. I want to join the Chairwoman in welcoming
our witnesses to today's hearing, and I look forward to your
testimony.
I will be brief in my remarks. It is now more than six
weeks since Vice President Pence announced that NASA was being
directed by the President to undertake a crash program to land
astronauts on the Moon within the next five years. Over that
six week period, the President has been uncharacteristically
silent, making no public statements or tweets in support of his
lunar initiative. NASA, for its part, has provided no specifics
on either the plan or the required budget for the proposed
accelerated Moon program, saying it hopes to have something for
Congress ``soon''.
I hope so. And I hope that when NASA delivers the plan and
revised budget to Congress, it will also provide a compelling
rationale for the proposed crash program that justifies the
additional resources that will be required to meet the
President's arbitrary deadline. Because as Chair of the Science
Committee, I cannot look at NASA's proposal in isolation, nor
can my colleagues on the appropriations committee.
I just came from a hearing on the National Science
Foundation's FY 2020 budget, where we heard that the
President's request would cut NSF's budget by a billion
dollars. As you know, NSF is one of the nation's premier
research agencies, funding research across a range of important
scientific disciplines. That billion dollar cut will have
serious negative impacts on major research areas if enacted. A
week ago, we had a hearing on the NOAA budget request, and the
news was similar: the President's request would cut NOAA's
budget by a billion dollars. And three weeks before that, we
heard that the President's request would cut the discretionary
budget of the National Institute of Standards and Technology by
more than 30 percent, or almost $300 million. Finally, the
Department of Energy's research programs would be cut by $4.5
billion.
So if Congress is to increase NASA's budget simply to speed
up a lunar landing relative to what was already planned,
Congress will have to weigh the opportunity costs of doing so.
That said, I want to make it clear that I do not support
the alternative of cannibalizing NASA's other important
research activities just to speed up the human lunar
exploration program. On Monday, Ranking Member Lucas and I
visited NASA's Goddard Spaceflight Center and heard about all
the important space and Earth science research activities being
undertaken there. We should be investing more in such inspiring
and consequential research, rather than cutting it as is
proposed in NASA's FY 2020 request.
As I close, I want to reiterate my support for a strong,
forward-leaning human and robotic exploration program. I
believe that human missions to the Moon and Mars, as well as
robotic exploration, will continue to inspire as it did when
Americans first walked on the Moon. But we need to get it right
as we pursue such a program, and we need to strike the right
balance across all our important national research priorities.
Thus, I expect that this Committee will need to have NASA
appear before us again once it provides us with the information
it has promised us.
With that, I again want to welcome our witnesses, and I
yield back.
Chairwoman Horn. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
The Chair now recognizes Ranking Member and fellow
Oklahoman Mr. Lucas.
Mr. Lucas. Thank you, Chair, and fellow Okie.
Two days ago, I toured the Goddard Spaceflight Center with
Chairwoman Johnson and Administrator Bridenstine and Director
Scolese. The enthusiasm and focus of the NASA family is
contagious.
And, as I said at our last hearing, our Nation's space
program is a source of pride. It exemplifies the greatest
aspects of our country: The pursuit of knowledge, heroism,
technical excellence, perseverance, and the intrepid spirit to
chart a course into the unknown. Exploration is in our DNA, and
no other nation embraces that gift more than the United States.
NASA and this Administration are harnessing that gift and
focusing our efforts to pioneer space. By continuing the
investments made over the last 2 decades, we are progressing
toward our national goal to send Americans to the Moon, Mars,
and beyond.
The Vice President challenged the Nation to return
astronauts to the Moon by 2024. It's an exciting and ambitious
goal that will ultimately establish a long-term presence on the
Moon, allowing us to explore its resources and conduct
pioneering scientific research. I look forward to reviewing a
proposal to achieve that goal. NASA, the Administration,
Congress, the private sector, and ultimately the American
people will all have a role to play in making that happen.
As we move forward, we would all benefit from remembering
the lessons of previous proposals. The transition from Apollo
to Shuttle, Space Station Freedom, the proposal to cancel the
International Space Station program, the Space Exploration
Initiative, the Vision for Space Exploration, the Constellation
cancellation, and the Asteroid Retrieval Mission all provide
unique lessons.
We should also realize that we can no longer take America's
preeminence in space for granted. Other nations also have
exploration plans. Urgency is now required to maintain our
leadership.
NASA must provide a detailed plan for this next phase of
exploration. The Administration and OMB (Office of Management
and Budget) must provide a realistic funding proposal, and
Congress must approve and appropriately fund the plan. This is
not impossible, but it will require tough decisions, and, as
Americans, we are up to that challenge.
And since this is our first hearing of this Subcommittee,
Chair, I think there's a video that staff has that really kind
of summarizes all this. I'd like to ask that the staff play a
brief video in my remaining time.
[Video shown.]
Mr. Lucas. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Sometimes we need to
remember where we came from and where we are to be able to go
forward. I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lucas follows:]
Two days ago, I toured the Goddard Spaceflight Center with
Chairwoman Johnson, Administrator Bridenstine, and Director
Scolese. The enthusiasm and focus of the NASA family is
contagious. As I said at our last hearing, our Nation's space
program is a source of pride. It exemplifies the greatest
aspects of our country: the pursuit of knowledge; heroism;
technical excellence; perseverance; and the intrepid spirit to
chart a course into the unknown. Exploration is in our DNA, and
no other nation embraces that gift more than the United States.
NASA, and this Administration, are harnessing that gift and
focusing our efforts to pioneer space. By continuing the
investments made over the last two decades, we are progressing
towards our national goal to send Americans to the Moon, Mars,
and beyond.
The Vice President challenged the Nation to return
astronauts to the Moon by 2024. It's an exciting and ambitious
goal that will ultimately establish a long-term presence on the
Moon, allowing us to explore its resources and conduct
pioneering scientific research. I look forward to reviewing a
proposal to achieve that goal. NASA, the Administration,
Congress, the private sector, and ultimately the American
people, all have a role to play in making that happen.
As we move forward, we would all benefit from remembering
the lessons of previous proposals. The transition from Apollo
to Shuttle, Space Station Freedom, the proposal to cancel the
International Space Station program, the Space Exploration
Initiative, the Vision for Space Exploration, the Constellation
Cancellation, and the Asteroid Retrieval Mission, all provide
unique lessons.
We should also realize that we can no longer take America's
preeminence in space for granted. Other nations are also have
exploration plans. Urgency is now required to maintain our
leadership.
NASA must provide a detailed plan for this next phase of
exploration. The Administration and OMB must provide a
realistic funding proposal. And Congress must approve and
appropriately fund the plan. This is not impossible, but it
will require tough decisions. As Americans, we are up to that
challenge.
I'd like to now ask the staff to play a brief video for my
remaining time, which captures the vision and work ahead for
NASA.Thank you.
Chairwoman Horn. Thank you, Mr. Lucas. That was
inspirational. I think it's clear that this Committee, there's
a lot of agreement on both sides that we are fully in support,
but we have some unanswered questions, and so I want to again
thank the witnesses for being here today.
And at this time I'm going to begin with introduction and
allow you all your opening statements.
Our first witness today is Mr. William Gerstenmaier,
Associate Administrator for the Human Exploration and
Operations Mission Directorate at NASA. Mr. Gerstenmaier
provides strategic direction for all aspects of NASA's human
exploration of space and cross-agency space support functions
of the space communications and space launch vehicles.
Prior to his current position, Mr. Gerstenmaier served as
the Manager for the International Space Station program. He
also served as the Associate Administrator for the Space
Operations Mission Directorate during the completion of the
Space Station.
Mr. Gerstenmaier holds a bachelor of science in
aeronautical engineering from Purdue University and a master of
science degree in mechanical engineering from the University of
Toledo. Welcome, Mr. Gerstenmaier.
OK. I apologize. I'm going to do the whole introductions
and then I'll turn it over to you all.
Our second witness today is Mr. Mark Sirangelo, Special
Assistant to the NASA Administrator, who is developing plans
for deep space exploration. In this role, he will manage the
programs to develop the Gateway, human-rated lander, and
surface systems needed for a lunar program. Previously, Mr.
Sirangelo headed Sierra Nevada Corporation's Space Systems, a
producer of satellites, space transportation vehicles,
propulsion systems, and space subsystems.
Mr. Sirangelo holds a bachelor of science and a master's of
business administration and a doctorate. Welcome, Mr.
Sirangelo. Thank you for being here today.
Our third witness is Dr. Patricia Sanders. We're going to
go a little bit out of order from where you are. I promise, Dr.
Lunine, I'll get back to you. I haven't forgotten about you.
Dr. Patricia Sanders, Chair of the Aerospace Safety
Advisory Panel and an independent aerospace consultant.
Previously, Dr. Sanders served as Executive Director of the
Missile Defense Agency. She has also previously held positions
in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Air Force
Operational Test Center, and the U.S. Space Command.
Dr. Sanders is a fellow of the American Institute of
Aeronautics and Astronautics and has received the three
Presidential Rank Awards for executive achievements.
Dr. Sanders received her doctorate in mathematics from
Wayne State University. Welcome, Dr. Sanders. We're glad you're
here.
Our fourth witness is Dr. Jonathan Lunine--see, I didn't
forget--Director of the Cornell Center for Astrophysics and
Planetary Science. Dr. Lunine is the David Baltimore
Distinguished Visiting Science--Scientist at NASA's Jet
Propulsion Laboratory. Dr. Lunine works on the Cassini mission
and the James Webb Space Telescope and is a coinvestigator on
the Juno mission. He is also a member of the National Academy
of Sciences where he has been involved in numerous advisory and
strategic planning committees, including Pathways to
Exploration: Rationales and Approaches for a U.S. Program of
Human Space Exploration, which he co-chaired in 2014.
Dr. Lunine holds a bachelor's degree in physics and
astronomy from the University of Rochester and a master's and
doctorate degrees in planetary science from the California
Institute of Technology. Welcome, Dr. Lunine.
And our fifth and final witness is Mr. Walter Faulconer,
President of Faulconer Consulting Group, which provides
strategic planning and business management services. Mr.
Faulconer is currently a member of the NOAA Science Advisory
Board and Executive Secretary for the Department of Defense
Strategic Capabilities Office Advisory Group. He previously
held the position of Director of Business Development for Space
Transportation at Lockheed Martin. He also served as a Director
of Strategic Planning and Development for Space Systems
Company.
Mr. Faulconer holds a bachelor's from Florida Institute of
Technology and master's degree from the University of Southern
California. Welcome, Mr. Faulconer.
As our witnesses should know, you each have--will each have
5 minutes for your spoken testimony. Your written testimony
will also be included in the record for the hearing. When you
have completed your spoken testimony, we'll begin with
questions. Each Member will have 5 minutes for questions. And
we will start today with Mr. Gerstenmaier.
TESTIMONY OF MR. WILLIAM H. GERSTENMAIER,
ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR, HUMAN EXPLORATION
AND OPERATIONS, NASA
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Thank you very much for allowing me to
testify on behalf of the NASA team. I think, as you saw on the
video, this is an amazing time in human spaceflight.
We have more hardware in development than at any time in
the history of NASA. There are three different capsule designs
in work: Starliner, Dragon 2, and Orion. Multiple flight
vehicles exist for each of these designs, and the purpose of
the designs, either for low-Earth orbit or for deep space, are
very different.
There's also a new winged commercial cargo vehicle also in
work for the International Space Station. We also have a large
heavy lift launch vehicle in work. The first launch vehicle
core is scheduled for completion this year for further testing
and assembly. The second launch vehicle core is also under
construction. Today, you can go, see, and touch the vehicles
that will return crews to the Moon and enable research and
technology development that will allow us to go to Mars.
Further, we have an amazing international research facility
in low-Earth orbit. We've had crews in space continuously since
October 2000, almost 19 years. The International Space Station
is allowing commercial industry to experiment with revenue
concepts in low-Earth orbit, NASA to test the next generation
of life support systems, NASA to understand how to keep crews
healthy for long durations in deep space, and perform
fundamental research in a variety of fields. All of this ISS
research ultimately supports improving life here on Earth.
With all this activity and work, there's a new excitement
in the space workforce. It is very timely and fitting today
that we have this hearing entitled, ``Keeping Our Sights on
Mars: A Review of NASA's Deep Space Exploration Programs and
Lunar Proposal.'' Ultimately, all of these hardware development
efforts are tied together, and they all support building
systems that will allow us to move human presence into the
solar system. By taking the long view, we can keep the
individual activities linked. We do not have time or funds to
build unique one-of-a-kind systems. We need to build systems
that can improve technical knowledge and can be used to support
multiple objectives.
The challenge of Mars with humans is large and requires all
of us with commercial industry, universities, the public,
international partners to work together to make this goal a
reality. Interoperability standards being developed such as the
international docking standard will allow all to participate in
this goal.
Recently, we were challenged to return to the surface of
the Moon with humans in 2024. Having a sense of real urgency is
critical. This can help focus our efforts and create a
framework for timely decisions. Keeping the long view but
creating the urgency for near-term objectives can create a
strong framework for us to work together.
NASA's building off the systems already in work, as
mentioned earlier. We will select partners to develop the first
element of Gateway, the power and propulsion element, by this
summer. We will select partners to begin studying the lunar
descent systems, transfer vehicles, and investigate refueling
options. We have a synopsis out for review of the human lunar
lander system. All--some of these systems for the Moon such as
the ascent vehicle can be used for Mars. The transfer vehicles
and power systems all have applications toward Mars.
Learning to operate reusable systems at Gateway and
navigate around the Moon are all helping us to learn how to
keep crews safe on journeys toward Mars. The Gateway itself can
help us to understand Mars transit vehicle requirements. The
Moon is a great proving ground, a great place to learn for deep
space systems that are necessary for Mars.
We are taking the next generation of space engineers, and
we are training them for the future. The risk and challenges
are huge, but so are the gains. The challenges that we face all
help to improve life here on Earth. The recycling systems on
ISS needed for deep space travel have applications here on
Earth. We must never think that tests or operations are easy or
routine. We will stay vigilant with a sense of urgency. We will
look forward to continuing to work with this Committee to
achieve amazing things in space.
This Committee has been tremendously supportive in the past
and often asks for concrete plans for human exploration. We are
ready to finalize those plans and work together with a sense of
urgency. Working together, we can accomplish amazing things.
I look forward to your questions and to the dialog.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gerstenmaier and Mr.
Sirangelo follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairwoman Horn. Thank you, Mr. Gerstenmaier.
Mr. Sirangelo.
TESTIMONY OF MR. MARK SIRANGELO,
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE ADMINISTRATOR, NASA
Mr. Sirangelo. Good afternoon. Thank you for having me.
It's really an amazing time to be able to come here and
talk about America's deep space program. It's been 50 years
since we first went to the Moon and 47 years since we've been
back. I believe it's time we take another step. That step will
be the first on a renewal that we will have not only to the
Moon but to Mars and beyond, and from NASA's perspective the
next step will be taken by the first American woman on the
Moon.
We will return to the Moon this time not just to visit but
to stay. After building on our success in low-Earth orbit,
we'll be combining the expertise of NASA, along with our
commercial partners, our universities, our laboratories, and
our international partners to develop the exploration
capabilities we'll need and the architecture that will get us
back to the lunar surface as safely and as quickly as possible.
But there's more to that. We will create new jobs. We will
create new economic opportunities. We will motivate generations
of young people. The science and technology we'll develop along
the way will improve our life on Earth.
Even though our eyes are on 2024, we're not beginning
there. This year, coming up in the next few months, we will
start with a small series of commercial robotic missions--
precursor missions, we call them--to the Moon. We will use
these landers and robots and technology to conduct science
across the lunar surface.
Throughout my long history in the space industry, I've been
fortunate to lead teams that have participated in hundreds of
space missions, including missions to multiple planets,
asteroid, the sun, and of course the Moon. Whenever I get asked
questions, most of the time I get asked about the shiny
spaceships or the rockets or the technology, and that's a
wonderful thing to do, and as a technologist, as a builder,
it's a--it is wonderful to talk about those.
But today, I'm here is a futurist and now as a proud new
member of the NASA team and as an American. I want to put the
technologies aside and talk a little bit about the why. Why go
back to the Moon? Why now? Why this expedited effort? Why
America? Just as Apollo inspired previous generations, NASA
today is uniquely positioned to continue that inspiration to
inspire the future generations, we already work with over 60
universities and have created thousands of internships which
have turned--sparked thousands of dreams, but we're not
satisfied. There's more that we can do.
By bringing the capabilities of our country together to
return to the Moon and on to Mars we'll demonstrate to the
young people of this country and around the world the power of
dreaming big. We hope to create an unparalleled example that
humankind can do when it comes together to do an uncommon task
for the common good.
These next generations may or may not take the power of
this lesson to space or to the space industry, but they will
take them somewhere. In my view, the biggest legacy of the
Apollo program was not the rocks that we brought back but it
was the people that we inspired, generations of those people,
some sitting in this room today that went on to make America a
better place.
The Moon is a treasure chest of science. The lunar samples
returned by the Apollo program dramatically changed our view,
but it's just the beginning. We believe the South Pole, which
is our first destination, holds millions of tons of water ice.
That ice represents power, it represents fuel, it represents
scientific discoveries. As we go further into space, it's going
to become even more necessary for us to learn how to live in
space without the connection to Earth. We need to learn to do
this, and the Moon is a good place to make it happen.
As was said earlier today, the exploration is in our DNA.
The ability for humans to want to go to places we haven't been
has been around as long as humans have been around not only
through the oceans, underneath the oceans, across the lands,
but now into vast regions of space. It's really part of our
psychological makeup. But more importantly, it fuels our soul.
You don't have to go any further than just see the faces of the
young kids who come to visit NASA or to know that the Air and
Space Museum is the most visited museum in the world.
We believe the Moon is a test bed, a test bed for learning
and a test bed for Mars that provides opportunities to
demonstrate new technologies that are necessary for those
missions. But along this path we're also going to be creating a
new revolution, an economic revolution. Generations past had
the Industrial Revolution, the computing revolution, the
internet revolution, all of which helped make the U.S. a leader
in the world. The next revolution in our view is going to be
happening in space.
Finally, as we approach this Memorial Day, I'd like to take
a moment to reflect on all those who have given their lives for
us, and today, everywhere in the world, they're standing watch
for us. If you ask those people who are doing that why they're
doing it, most of them will say to protect their families, to
protect their homes, to protect their country, and I think one
more thing they'd say is to protect the American way of life.
As part of that, I believe that American way of life not only
has all the things that we live for and exist every day, but
it's also an important part to understand that it gives us the
chance to dream, to dream big, and to chase those dreams. I
know I had this chance, and it brought me to this hearing and
gave me a chance to touch the stars, and we want to make that
happen for a lot of other young people in the world.
Even now, 50 years later, people around the world would
point to the Apollo landings as one of the most important
things that we've ever done, and we think it is, but we think
the way to honor those people who have been part of that Apollo
program is to not only look at those grainy videos and pictures
but to create new high-definition views of the future. Thank
you very much.
Chairwoman Horn. Thank you, Mr. Sirangelo.
Dr. Sanders.
TESTIMONY OF DR. PATRICIA SANDERS,
CHAIR, AEROSPACE SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL
Dr. Sanders. Chairman Horn and Members of the Committee,
thank you for the opportunity to discuss NASA's deep space
exploration program.
A principal role of my panel is advising NASA and the
Congress on the safety and risk of human spaceflight. I
emphasize that our responsibility is to provide advice driving
down risk to the lowest level consistent with accomplishing the
mission. Space exploration is inherently dangerous. The
environment is hostile; the systems needed to survive in it are
complex. The aim is not to avoid risk at all costs but manage
the risk intelligently.
Over the--our advice over the years has had consistent
themes. One, as Representative Babin has quoted, is the
importance of setting challenging but achievable schedules and
not allowing undue schedule pressure lead to decisions
adversely impacting safety and mission assurance. A second is
addressing the question of how safe is safe enough within the
context of the overall risk-benefit equation. The third is the
importance of constancy of purpose, and fourth, holding to the
fundamentals of risk management or recognizing that no single
approach dictates the success of such an approach. I'll speak
briefly to each of them in the context of the current programs.
The Administration's policy of the--is to return astronauts
to the Moon within the next 5 years, adding urgency to a
complex and ambitious endeavor. Our panel continues to caution
that targeted launch dates, while useful to impart a sense of
urgency, should be used judiciously. Unrealistic schedules can
result in poor decisions at least from a safety perspective if
they lead to unwise shortcuts or elimination of critical
testing.
For example, we know that NASA is exploring options for
launching Exploration Mission (EM) 1 as early as possible. This
could have positive results, perhaps achieve greater decision
velocity, restructured and more efficient work flow, a more
streamlined approach. But we should not forget that the
ultimate purpose of that flight is to mitigate risk and
understand operational margins prior to the first crewed
flight. Critical data is required to ensure as much as possible
a safe EM-2 mission, including a successful green run, an
effective heatshield, effective operation of parachute systems,
abort mechanisms, and environmental control and life-support
systems, among other things.
In addressing safety in human space exploration, balancing
the risk with value is important. It's paramount. As
Congresswoman Horn had said, NASA's role in advancing space
exploration pushes the envelope with great uncertainties and
inherent risks, but safe as a term in this context does not
have the same connotation as in a typical day-to-day life. With
no excuse for negligence, it is impossible to control,
eliminate, or mitigate every risk. So determining an acceptable
level of risk balances many factors to decide if the chance of
a mishap is outweighed by the likely mission benefit. Return to
the Moon should not be an end in and of itself but considered
in a risk-value framework.
We should ask, as she has, is the objective--what is the
objective of the mission? Is it part of a cohesive long-term
strategy? Will it buy down risk for future exploration? Will it
provide infrastructure-enabling next steps? Does it further the
national goal of commercial space self-sufficiency? Does it
support national leadership and foster international
cooperation? Great exploration has involved major risk whether
it was Magellan or Lewis and Clark, but it has been undertaken
with an expectation of great benefits.
Hand-in-hand with the risk-value proposition is constancy
of purpose, national steadfastness, and pursuing stated goals
that do not waiver over time and a willingness to support those
goals with the necessary resources. Fluctuating policy,
ambiguous objectives, budget inadequacies, and uncertainties
add complexity and inefficiency to program management. They
detract from meeting technical goals, and they dilute focus on
safety and mission assurance.
Last, as NASA embarks on the next phase of space
exploration, I encourage them, in partnership with the
Congress, to sustain the foundational standards of risk
management while embracing new approaches. To that end, we can
learn from and expand on the positive aspects of the experience
with the Commercial Crew Program. We evolved there over time,
and the establishment of mutual trust and transparency, the use
of ``badgeless'' teams, early engagement, and appropriate
engagement of the government, appropriate contract flexibility,
and timely decisionmaking. These bring the potential to not
only lower cost and shorten development time but also to reduce
risk.
In closing, I note that NASA and the Nation have made great
progress in the last few years, but a lot of work remains
ahead. It is a time for excitement, optimism, and reasoned
caution.
Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Sanders follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairwoman Horn. Thank you, Dr. Sanders.
Dr. Lunine.
TESTIMONY OF DR. JONATHAN LUNINE,
DIRECTOR, CORNELL CENTER FOR ASTROPHYSICS
AND PLANETARY SCIENCE;
CO-CHAIR OF THE FORMER COMMITTEE ON HUMAN
SPACEFLIGHT, NATIONAL ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES,
ENGINEERING, AND MEDICINE
Dr. Lunine. Chairwoman Horn, Ranking Member Babin, and
Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today to discuss NASA's deep space human
exploration program, including proposed lunar activities.
In June 2014, the National Academies of Science,
Engineering, and Medicine released a report entitled,
``Pathways to Exploration: Rationales and Approaches for U.S.
Program of Human Space Exploration.'' I co-chaired that
committee together with Mitch Daniels, President of Purdue
University. The Pathways report was a response to a charge from
Congress in the 2010 Authorization Bill to review NASA human
spaceflight and to determine the value and benefits of the
program if possible.
The key findings of our report were the following: First,
Mars is the horizon goal for human spaceflight for a number of
reasons, but it is also decades away due to the enormous
distance and the need for substantial technology development.
Second, a program to send humans to Mars ought to be based
on a pathways approach, the pathways being different options by
which to get there through intermediate steppingstones that
provide short-term successes and technologies that can
feedforward to an eventual Mars mission. The Moon represents--
and particularly the surface of the Moon, represents one
intermediate destination, and although it was not in our
purview to choose, we found that it had the highest feedforward
to humans on Mars.
Third, crucial to such a long-range endeavor are
international partnerships in which the space agencies of other
nations play significant and meaningful roles.
And fourth, key technologies that must be developed for
humans on Mars are entry, descent, and landing on Mars;
advanced in-space propulsion and power; and radiation safety,
among others.
So why the Moon? The Moon offers a number of opportunities
and advantages over the direct-to-Mars approach. First, the
Moon is less than 5 days away, greatly simplifying logistics in
response to emergency situations.
Second, the Moon provides a superb opportunity to do
important planetary science, particularly regarding planet
formation and evolution in the earliest history of the Earth.
Third, the Moon allows a more permanent rather than a
sortie concept of operations over time as surface systems are
developed, including continued development of environmental
control systems that are more nearly closed and require less
provisioning from Earth than does the International Space
Station.
So what lessons then should the human spaceflight program
and its return to the Moon take from the Pathways report? Well,
first and foremost, we must be in it for the long haul. An
Apollo-style sprint to the Moon in and of itself is not a
steppingstone to more distant goals in deep space exploration.
And second, the agency has to balance schedule against
budget. Schedule-driven programs will cost considerably more
per year than budget-driven programs, and the 2024 goal of
putting humans on the Moon should not be undertaken without
resources adequate to that goal but also without cannibalizing
other important programs that NASA is conducting, including its
remarkable space science program, which has made groundbreaking
discoveries from the cosmos to the planets to the Earth.
Third, engage international and commercial partners in the
program as they are crucial to a successful program of sending
humans to the Moon and Mars, but the U.S. civil space program,
NASA, must lead the effort.
And finally, recognize that if the Nation wishes to
undertake a program of deep space exploration, it must always
bear in mind and never forget that the Moon is a steppingstone.
It's a steppingstone to Mars.
In remarks last month to the University Space Research
Association, Scott Pace from the National Space Council talked
about sustainability of exploration. One of the points he made
was the programmatic sustainability in human exploration
requires sustained political support, and, in turn, sustained
political support requires a good cadence of successes.
Taxpayers can see a return on their investment in a short
enough time for the relationship between investment and payoff
to be clear. And it is precisely that approach which our
Pathways report endorsed and detailed in order to assure that
Americans will return in a timely manner to the Moon and one
day walk on the red soil of Mars.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today, and I
look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Lunine follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairwoman Horn. Thank you, Dr. Lunine.
Mr. Faulconer.
TESTIMONY OF MR. WALT FAULCONER,
PRESIDENT, FAULCONER CONSULTING GROUP, LLC
Mr. Faulconer. Chairwoman Horn, Ranking Member Babin, and
Members of the Subcommittee, I am honored to be here today to
discuss and support NASA's deep space exploration program,
first returning United States to the surface of the Moon by
2024 and onto Mars in the 2030s.
This year, while we're celebrating the 50th anniversary of
the Apollo 11 Moon landing, China, India, and Israel are
sending their craft to the Moon. Where is the United States?
We are currently facing a formidable challenge from China
to surpass our leadership. I for one actually welcome this
challenge because it helps us to focus and galvanize to
maintain our leadership in space. Leveraging over 60 years that
has brought us the Space Shuttle, the International Space
Station, and now new craft like SLS and Orion, CST-100, New
Shepard, Dream Chaser, Cygnus, Dragon, we have an armada of
capabilities to build upon to return to the Moon and head onto
Mars.
I applaud the goal of returning to the surface of the Moon
by 2024 because it provides needed urgency and focus. It is
also very achievable. It took us 7 years from President
Kennedy's speech in September 1962 starting with very little to
get to the Moon by July 1969 with Apollo 11. In fact, when
President Kennedy gave us the challenge to go to the Moon, only
three Americans had ever flown in space, Shepard, Grissom, and
Glenn. That was it.
And this time it will be different. When we go back to the
Moon, because besides investing in all these different
spacecraft over the last 10 years, we'll be going with
international partners and a very robust commercial industry.
The second core requirement is to go back to the Moon in a
sustainable way. We are going back to stay. That means we have
to address what are we going to do on the Moon after we get
back in 2024? As I addressed in the paper I provided you, there
are key questions we'll be able to answer on the Moon in our
endeavor to explore, including science questions. We have
discovered many new questions in science pursuits since the
Apollo program that include things called lunar swirls,
skylights, and the applied science providing ground truth to
the resources and minerals that we have seen from orbit.
Exploration questions: Do humans have a future in space?
Can we live off the land? What adjustments do our plans to Mars
do we have to make along the way?
Business questions: Is there a sustainable commercial
business case on or around the Moon?
National interest questions: How do we ensure American
leadership in space?
The third core requirement is keeping our sights on Mars.
The National Academy Pathways study that Dr. Lunine represents
had a key recommendation to maintain long-term focus on Mars as
the horizon goal for human space exploration. It is correct,
but let's face it, we're not ready to go to Mars today because
the risk is too high.
One of the studies going on at JPL (Jet Propulsion
Laboratory), for example, is quantifying the risk and
determining how much of the risk can be retired by going to the
surface of the Moon or identifying what risks are not being
retired by anything we're currently planning. That will be
important to help us create an extensible exploration
architecture starting with the end goal in mind. When we go
back to the Moon, we need to learn how to live off the land,
live for longer durations on the surface, and deal with the
hazards that the astronauts will be facing on Mars.
We can achieve all of these goals, but our largest
challenge is not the technology, engineering, or ingenuity.
Rather, it's overcoming the institutional momentum that slows
down the process, keeps the status quo, and protects rice
bowls, stifling innovation. We need to organize and streamline
for success.
When Dr. George Mueller came to NASA from Bell Labs to lead
us to getting to the Moon in 1963, he recognized that NASA,
even in its infancy, needed to be reorganized and refocused
from top to bottom. He bravely and fearlessly took on the
establishment and streamlined program efficiencies borrowing
from the successes of the Air Force Minuteman program while
strengthening independent systems engineering by bringing on
Bellcomm to provide the needed enterprise-level systems
engineering and integration. All of this can be accomplished
with courageous leadership.
I really look forward to very soon seeing Americans walking
on the surface of the Moon and soon after walking on Mars. As
President Kennedy stated, the goal will serve to organize and
measure the best of our energies and skills, a challenge we are
willing to accept and one we are unwilling to postpone.
Thank you very much for the invitation to appear in front
of you today, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Faulconer follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairwoman Horn. Thank you very much, Mr. Faulconer, and
thank you to all the witnesses for your opening statements. I
know we have a lot to discuss today, and I'll start with
questions and then we'll go from there.
So the Chair recognizes herself for 5 minutes for the first
round of questions if I can find my questions, that is. Here
they are.
So, Mr. Gerstenmaier and Mr. Sirangelo, thank you for being
here. I think was a great reminder that the Full Committee
Ranking Member played that video. There's a lot of really
important and inspirational things that NASA has brought to us
that each of you has touched on.
So I have a series of questions because we've got to get
this right for so many reasons that many of you have mentioned.
The NASA Administrator committed to providing the Committee
with an amended budget request very close to April 15, so it's
now May 8, and my question is what is the reason for the delay,
and can you commit to providing this Committee with a lunar
plan and budget amendment on what date?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. I guess I can start. I think, first of
all, we recognize that this is a really serious challenge we
have to lay in front of us, and we need a really solid plan.
And it was discussed by many of the testimonies here. We need
to make sure it's all integrated and all put together in a way
that really makes sense.
So we've been taking the time. We brought Mark on board.
He's been working with us. We've been working to develop
detailed plans building off of what we've already done, so
we're taking a lot of the equipment that we've already been
doing, the teams we've had in place, and we're figuring out how
to use those in a new, creative way moving forward. So we're
busy establishing those plans.
We also have to go through the Administration, get budget
approval, make sure we understand where we are, even look at
the out years because if we work just near-term and we think
about just the next year and we don't have those future plans
all the way through 2024, answer some of your questions about
how the ``why'' fits in, and then how this feeds to Mars, we
need to put all that together. So we're taking the time to get
that right.
We're probably several weeks away, maybe 1 week to 2 weeks
away from being able to give you a plan and show you what we
have moving forward with specifics. But we can--at a high level
we can describe to you today some of the things that we're
doing and moving forward and how we build off of the existing
programs.
Chairwoman Horn. Mr. Sirangelo, do you have anything to add
to that?
Mr. Sirangelo. Thank you for the question. It's a serious
question, and we take it that way. This isn't just about moving
a date forward. It's about trying to figure out how to do
something different and better at the same time. The process
that we've gone through is to make sure that the architecture
that we need to design makes sense.
One of the--I think the highest things we have to do for
this Committee and for Congress is to come back with answers
that we can really believe in that we can speak to, and those
are in the works. We have gone through the architectural
design, we've gone through the understanding of what it's going
to take to make that happen, but it's also more than that. How
does NASA change? How does NASA organize? How do we incorporate
the commercial and other parts of our industry to enable this?
I think, as Bill said, we are well on that way to doing it.
We also have an obligation to make sure that we work together
with the budgeting process. So from our perspective at NASA
we're very close to doing that, and we understand that the
delay is frustrating, but this is a big challenge and we want
to get it right.
Chairwoman Horn. So thank you very much. It is a big
challenge, and we absolutely have to get it right, which is why
we need detailed plans and proposals. We'll look for that in a
couple of weeks. And I think, as Ranking Member Babin and
Chairwoman Johnson mentioned, there will likely be follow up
within this Committee on that issue.
So following up on those questions about these plans
because sustainability and long-term planning is critical for
something that is this challenging and this important, who in
the Administration will have final approval and signoff on the
plan? And who in the Administration will have final signoff and
approval on the budget amendment?
Mr. Sirangelo. From the NASA perspective, the NASA
Administrator is responsible for the plan and for the
delivering of the plan. We are supporting that. The budget is
then provided as an estimate to OMB, and OMB would then provide
the budget when it's thoroughly completed it.
Chairwoman Horn. OK. Thank you. So what--and following up
further, what acquisition approach--when you're looking at
this, what acquisition approach is NASA planning to use to
procure the elements needed for the 2024 lander? Are you
looking at firm-fixed price, cost-plus? What is the approach
that you're looking at right now?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. I think we're looking kind of at a
mixture of approaches depending upon the hardware and systems
that we put together. We've been using broad agency
announcement called BAAs that have been pretty effective.
They're typically a contracting instrument that has a fixed-
price provision in them. I think there's also a role for some
cases to have some cost-plus activities, but I think you'll see
a mixture of acquisition approaches moving forward depending
upon the risk level, the speed, and the maturity of the
industry.
As you see, we talked--Mark talked a little bit about the
commercial lander services program that the Science Mission
Directorate is doing. That's a small lander system that--when
we land small payloads on the Moon. We'll get a chance to see
how that works in the Science Mission Directorate where they
can take significantly more risk than we can. And depending on
how well that works, we can get a chance to judge how ready
industry is to go take on the challenges of human-class
landers. So we'll use these acquisitions to inform other
acquisitions moving forward, but it's a variety of acquisition
instruments.
Chairwoman Horn. Thank you. And will the acquisition
approach be included as a part of the plan when you submit it?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Yes, at a top level, and we're actually
implementing some of that acquisition approach today as we sit
here.
Chairwoman Horn. OK. I know I am a little bit over time.
I'm just going to--have a couple more and then we'll turn it
over to Ranking Member Babin.
Will--so will NASA--my next question is about authorities
because there have been a few things. Will NASA be seeking any
statutory authorities to achieve this 2024 Moon landing level
in the overall program, and if so, when do you plan to provide
those to the Committee?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. They would be provided when we provide
the overall plan to you.
Chairwoman Horn. OK. I mention this because I want to note
that the reason that I question this is that the approach of
using a reprogramming request rather than going through the
authorizing committee to propose major reorganizational
changes, especially since NASA still--we don't have the plan
yet, and it hasn't been provided to the Committee with any
specific plan changes or budget amendment to evaluate it, and
the request to the Appropriations Committee takes that
approach.
Following up, do you have any--do you have a lunar--and I
think this is--we've seen--you know where I'm going--questions
about this. Do you have a lunar surface spacesuit that will be
ready for the 2024 mission right now? If so, which suit is it?
And if not, when do you anticipate that being available?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. We don't have a suit that's appropriate
for the activity for the Moon today. We have portions of the
suit that are sufficient but not the entire suit. Again, we're
going to understand the test that we want to do on the first
mission in 2024 and then, based on that, we're going to
probably develop a suit to move forward in that direction.
In the past, we started suit activities before. We did it
in the Constellation program. That suit cost for that program
became very prohibitive. We need to look at a way that we
understand the requirements and we incrementally move forward
and build off of what we've got, so we need to do some work,
and that'll be discussed again. And there's a plan is--will--
there will be a discussion of the plan for suit acquisition as
part of the overall lunar plans moving forward.
Chairwoman Horn. Thank you very much. I know we'll have
many more questions for the rest of you. For now, I'm going to
wrap that up.
And I recognize Ranking Member Babin.
Mr. Babin. All right. Thank you. Thank you very much.
I guess, first, I want to recognize two interns from Texas
A&M University we have out there in the crowd. Josh Mendez back
there and Rachel Gill in the back as well, thank you for being
here.
In 2011, this Committee held a hearing entitled, ``NASA
Human Spaceflight Past, Present, and Future: Where Do We Go
from Here?'' Former NASA Administrator Mike Griffin testified,
and I'd like to quote from several passages from his testimony
and seek very brief yes or no answers from our witnesses. And
if you would like to elaborate more, please wait until the end.
So to start, this is, quote, ``What does a real space
program look like and not look like? A real space program sets
and meets stable national strategic goals for the leadership on
the space frontier by developing, evolving, and preserving
national capabilities to operate on that frontier. It does not
allow that capability to be held hostage to the goodwill of
other powers or to the vagaries of a nascent and fragile
marketplace.'' All very briefly, I would like to go down the
line, start with you, Mr. Gerstenmaier, do you agree with this
sentiment, yes or no?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Yes.
Mr. Sirangelo. I do.
Dr. Lunine. Partially, I agree.
Dr. Sanders. Yes.
Mr. Faulconer. Yes.
Mr. Babin. Thank you very much.
All right, second, ``A real space program may'', I'm still
quoting, ``and, indeed, should offer a stable market to be
addressed by commercial providers, but it cannot be dependent
upon such providers for strategic capabilities. A real space
program recognizes that this Nation has interests that rise
above the fortunes of individual private contractors, and it
protects those interests. The proper role of government is to
reward winners, not to pick them, nor to step in as an investor
in enterprises which cannot pass the test that the capital
markets impose.''
Mr. Gerstenmaier, yes or no, do you agree with that?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Yes.
Mr. Babin. Mr. Sirangelo?
Mr. Sirangelo. Yes, I do.
Mr. Babin. Yes, sir. Dr. Lunine.
Dr. Lunine. I agree with that statement.
Mr. Babin. OK.
Dr. Sanders. Yes.
Mr. Babin. Yes.
Mr. Faulconer. Yes, I agree.
Mr. Babin. All right, thank you.
Going on, a real space program is grounded in physics, not
politics, and stepping outward beyond low-Earth orbit and the
ISS a human return to the Moon is the next logical goal from a
host of scientific, engineering, operational, and even
commercial perspectives. From there, and with the experience
thus gained, we should proceed onward to Mars, and should do so
in a timely way, else Mars will always be the destination in
the future.
Mr. Gerstenmaier.
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Yes.
Mr. Sirangelo. Yes, I do.
Dr. Lunine. Absolutely.
Mr. Babin. Dr. Sanders?
Dr. Sanders. Yes, with a caveat.
Mr. Babin. OK. Well, if I have time at the end, we'll hear
about that.
Mr. Faulconer. I agree.
Mr. Babin. All right, thank you.
And then finally, these truths were recognized in the NASA
Authorization Act of 2005, and again in 2008, both of which
were originated by this Committee. The course for this Nation's
future in space that was laid out in those Acts does not need
to be changed, it needs to be followed. We must stay that
course. If we do so, the right rocket designs will emerge. If
we cannot, the rocket design doesn't matter.
Concerning the larger perspective of this hearing, I can
thus offer no better counsel to this Committee than the
guidance which it has previously issued.
Mr. Gerstenmaier, do you agree?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Yes.
Mr. Babin. Mr. Sirangelo?
Mr. Sirangelo. I do.
Mr. Babin. Dr. Lunine?
Dr. Lunine. I do.
Mr. Babin. Dr. Sanders?
Dr. Sanders. Yes.
Mr. Babin. Dr. Faulconer?
Mr. Faulconer. Yes.
Mr. Babin. OK. Now, we still have about an--1 minute and 6
seconds left, would any of you like to elaborate further on
these? Dr. Lunine?
Dr. Lunine. So first, I'd like to know if I passed the pop
quiz or not, being a professor. Second, my one caveat with the
first question was that it is crucial that we engage other
agencies of other countries in any program going to Mars. The
cost of the undertaking is going to be such, and the magnitude
is going to be such that not engaging with international
partners, I think, would be a mistake. Certainly, we should be
leading, and we need to lead from the front, not from behind,
but I just want to make clear that international participation
in sending humans onto Mars is crucial.
Mr. Babin. Do you think that those international partners
should be on that critical path as well?
Dr. Lunine. I think that the answer for Mars at least, not
necessarily for the Moon, but for Mars the answer is yes, in my
view.
Mr. Babin. Dr. Sanders?
Dr. Sanders. The statement said that the space program
should be physics-based and not politics-based, and I agree
that the solutions, the technical means, are physics- and
engineering-based, but sometimes the reason why a program is
important is--has to do with national goals beyond the
technical goals.
Mr. Babin. I would agree. I would agree. Thank you very
much.
And I think my time has expired, so I want to thank you
all, witnesses. And I yield back, Madam Chair.
Chairwoman Horn. Thank you, Mr. Babin.
The Chair now recognizes Full Committee Chairwoman Johnson
for 5 minutes.
Chairwoman Johnson. Thank you very much.
I'm just filled with questions, and I know there's not time
to answer all of them, but I am very impressed with all of the
research that's going on now with NASA, and I'm very concerned
that much of it might be interrupted to afford the new
direction. And I need your opinions on that. Could you start,
and just go down the line?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Sure. I think do we need the--we need to
invest in new research and new technology to achieve the kind
of goals for Mars. So we need to balance the near-term urgency
with the need to do the investment into long-term research and
science and technology development.
Chairwoman Johnson. Does that include discontinuing or
slowing down substantially the type of research that's going on
now at NASA in Maryland?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. We should not slow down the research
that's--that fits our objectives moving forward. It needs to
continue in parallel. And we can use some of that research
directly in what we're doing. I think Space Station is a great
example. The OCO-3 experiment, the carbon experiment, is going
to station. It'll be installed Thursday night. That was a spare
instrument that was available on the ground that was able to go
fly from Goddard up to Space Station, and it essentially takes
advantage of Space Station. So the human spacecraft has
essentially provided a home for this instrument that's going to
give us a new look at carbon generation that we would not be
able to see without the tie between human and research.
Chairwoman Johnson. Um-hum.
Mr. Gerstenmaier. So I think there's not a--necessarily an
incompatibility between the two objectives.
Chairwoman Johnson. What is the future of the Orion, of the
SLS?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. They look strong. We've got a lot of work
in place. As I described in my opening remarks, there's a lot
of hardware in place, a lot of hard folks working on that
hardware. We're in the middle of very heavy integration down at
the Kennedy Space Center with Orion. We're in the final
construction of the core stage at Michoud Assembly Facility in
New Orleans--outside New Orleans. It's a very busy time for us;
turning kind of dreams, aspirations into real hardware that
will take us to the Moon and on to Mars.
Chairwoman Johnson. Thank you.
Mr. Sirangelo. I agree with Bill's comments, but I want to
take it one step further because I think your question is
really an important one.
As a technologist, one thing to do is to develop the
technology. The second part of it is to actually put it into
service, to make it work. And I think one of the aspects of
this program, by accelerating what we actually are doing, is
enhancing the science. We're not just doing the technology,
doing the science in theory, or in prototype, but we're
bringing it to a place where we can actually use it, make it
better, and bring it back and improve it for the next
generation. And that's a really key and critical part of what
we're trying to accomplish.
I think the other thing which is really important on this
plan is that by going and getting ourselves in service by 2024,
what we actually are doing is then starting operations in 2024
going forward, many years sooner than what we would have done.
And it's in that operational phase, it is in that ability to
continue to move forward that we really see the strides that
are necessary.
If you go back and look at any part of our history in
aviation, the difference between the airplane when we entered
World War II and when we came out of World War II was
incredible. The difference in the airplane when we entered
World War I and we came out of World War I is incredible. And I
think what we're seeing here is this opportunity over the next
5 years to enhance that science, to bring it to the next level,
and to put it out in the field where it can do some good, is
really the difference-maker because that's what creates the
jobs for the future, that's what takes that technology and
makes it useful for the American people.
Chairwoman Johnson. Thank you.
Dr. Lunine. Thank you, Chairwoman Johnson. It's a pleasure
to be testifying in front of you again.
With respect to research having to do with space science,
as you mentioned Maryland, there are places that robots can go
that humans cannot. Our committee was serious about Mars being
the horizon destination for a number of reasons. NASA's
spacecrafts have gone out through the whole solar system, have
looked at the universe, virtually to the end of the universe,
and those kinds of discoveries must continue as we continue to
develop this human spaceflight capability. Having said that,
there are things that robots and humans can do together on the
Moon and Mars that will open up a whole new dimension of
science and exploration if we can implement that kind of dual
approach.
Dr. Sanders. NASA's portfolio is a lot bigger than just
human space exploration and deep space exploration. There's a
lot of Earth science work that's very important to a lot of our
Nation. There's very deep space probing sensors that we'll see
with the James Webb Space Telescope when it get--and the first
A in NASA aeronautics, what they're doing with low-boom
technology and other things, that shouldn't go away just in
order to make this one happen.
Mr. Faulconer. So coming from the Johns Hopkins Applied
Physics Laboratory in Maryland, I am very much concerned about
the science portfolio as well. But I think it's healthy, and if
you look at the portfolio, there's a great raft of missions
being planned. And I agree with Mark that I believe that this
initiative will actually help us accelerate not only the
science missions, but also the technology that will then
benefit the science missions.
Chairwoman Johnson. Thank you very much. My time has
expired.
Chairwoman Horn. Thank you, Chairwoman.
The Chair now recognizes Full Committee Ranking Member
Lucas for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lucas. Thank you, Chair.
Mr. Faulconer, the Vice President has challenged NASA to
return to the Moon by 2024. Your testimony indicates this is
the appropriate course for NASA to pursue. Based on your
experience with other programs, let's talk for just a moment
about the greatest challenges to achieving the goal, and how we
can mitigate those challenges.
Mr. Faulconer. Well, as I mentioned, the institutional
momentum was one issue, but another one I agree with Dr.
Sanders about is the consistency of purpose. You know, quite
honestly, a lot of us in this industry suffer from professional
whiplash because every few years we change what direction we're
going, and where we're going, and how fast we're going. We need
that consistency of purpose so that we can stay focused. And so
I--that's one reason why I welcome it's logical to go back to
the Moon and get on to going to Mars.
Mr. Lucas. Mr. Gerstenmaier and Mr. Sirangelo, speaking of
that, President George H. W. Bush's Space Exploration
Initiative was challenged by a $400 billion price tag, which
Congress at the time rejected. President George W. Bush's
vision for space exploration was challenged by a lack of
support from OMB, which failed to request sufficient funds to
support the plan. We've made considerable progress since those
two proposals. NASA's exploration budget now eclipses $10
billion per year, and we're invested in the Space Launch
System, the Orion Capsule, and the supporting ground
infrastructure. We've already made investments in next-
generation systems that are necessary for lunar exploration and
a steppingstone to the Moon. What's NASA doing to implement
lessons from those previous initiatives, and specifically, what
is NASA doing to ensure that any plan it submits to Congress
for review is sufficient, that being a very key phrase,
sufficient to achieve the goal, but also focusing only on the
necessary investments?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Again, I think as we take a look at the
lunar objective for 2024, again, as I described kind of in my
opening testimony, we're taking the hardware we've already
built that's already in pieces, and we've figured out how to
implement that hardware to go to achieve the lunar goal. And
the discussion about the spacesuits, again, we've got to be
careful we don't put more than we absolutely need for the
suits, for the missions to begin with, but they're evolvable
and they're sustainable moving forward.
So I think we need to take this in steps, the way it's been
described where we put pieces in place, that we can build and
build the next piece moving forward.
The ascent vehicle that we'll look at for the lunar
activity, that ascent vehicle has direct applications to the
Mars ascent vehicle on Mars. So if we look at where our
hardware fits and how it moves forward, we don't have dead
ends, we don't build hardware that's unique to one application
and move forward. And we need to be very cautious about how we
build our contracts, how we acquire our hardware, to make sure
we get good value for ourselves, and to continue to do the
right--or don't drive the budget to the levels that are not
sustainable.
Mr. Sirangelo. Sir, I think one of the things that is
really different this time is that we are--when you're
investing in technology as the way we have done as a government
and as a country, it's an accumulative process. We are a lot
smarter not only because we've learned the lessons of the past,
but because we now are--exist in an industry that has
significantly more space flight activity, more significant,
more technology on orbit, and we have just understood the
environments that we're working in to a greatly different
level.
I know in your district you have farmers who are working
many generations, and in doing that you learn from generation
to generation, and I think we have done the same thing in our
area. We are also backed now by commercial industry throughout
the United States, which has invested heavily on its own. So it
isn't just government that's making that investment; we're
making that investment throughout our entire economy.
Mr. Lucas. So understand when I make this next comment, in
many ways as my town meeting constituents speak through me to
the body, I speak through you to those who make decisions. Your
folks are the can-do people; but OMB, the Administration at the
top levels, there are so many elements there. So when I make
this following comment, bear that in mind. The previous
Administration submitted budget requests that required on what
I would describe as creative bookkeeping; switching NASA
funding from discretionary to mandatory spending, tying it to
increases in gasoline taxes. Those proposals were rejected by
Congress. I hope that the proposals we'll receive are not
funded in a similar fashion to the things done in the previous
Administration, because that will cut the legs out from under
us. If we don't accomplish this this time, I don't know when
we'll have a fourth opportunity in certainly my lifetime.
Thank you. I yield back.
Chairwoman Horn. Thank you, Mr. Lucas.
The Chair now recognizes Congressman Bera for 5 minutes.
Mr. Bera. Thank you, Chair Horn, and Ranking Member Babin.
You know, I got my colleague from Colorado riled up when I
was mentioning the Mars 2033 report suggested that we couldn't
get to Mars until 2037, and he said he's invested a lot of time
and effort into making these bumper stickers. And, you know, he
made some really good points, and I think I want to touch on a
couple.
Mr. Faulconer, you touched on consistency of purpose. Part
of what made us successful in the 1960s was congressional
support, Administration support, and a consistent goal and a
consistent timeline. And I have no doubt that if we set 2033 as
a goal, put the resources and focus on it, we couldn't
accomplish that. What I worry about is the politics, and the
politics of going from one Administration to the next. You
know, you have the Constellation Program that said let's go to
the Moon, and then Constellation got canceled, and we were
going to go do asteroid retrieval. New Administration comes in,
we're no longer doing the asteroid retrieval, we're now going
to go back to the Moon. And unless we have that consistency of
purpose, we won't get there by 2033.
So, you know, I'll leave it to the scientists to decide,
you know, if going to--a return to the Moon is the right next
step or something different, but for us to do our job and
provide the support to not just NASA, and the difference today
is, you know, in the Apollo Program, NASA was the launch
vehicle, they were the Lunar Lander, they were, you know, the
science mission. Well, today's world is much more complicated.
You've got commercial launch vehicles, you've got much more
robust international engagement, you certainly have the
subcontractors that are out there. And when we think about
going to Mars by 2033, we're not thinking about doing this by
ourselves, so we really do have to then bring in that
international community.
A couple of questions that, you know, I haven't been able
to find answers for, but I think it would make our jobs easier
as Members of Congress to advocate for that consistency of
mission. We always look at programs and Congress as an expense
item, and I haven't really been able to get an answer on what
was the return on investment of the Apollo Mission, the number
of jobs created, the number of discoveries, inventions, new
companies found, what was the benefit to not just our economy,
and I don't know, maybe, Mr. Gerstenmaier, would you have those
numbers, or is there a good place that you could direct those,
or should we direct the Academies to perhaps do a study so it's
not just the cost, but here's our return on investment that
we're going to get?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Yes, I think that would be best if I took
that question for the record, because there's been numerous
studies in the past, and rather than recall those from memory,
we could actually pull those, we could provide those to you,
and then you could determine if they're sufficient or you want
to pursue something else.
Mr. Bera. That'd be great, because again, it certainly
would help us make our case. You know, we're going to spend
billions of dollars, you know, both going to the Moon, but then
if the goal beyond the Moon--you know, and another question
that--you know, one of the opening comments, there's--you know,
China is going to the Moon. They're not putting a person on the
Moon. India is going to the Moon, et cetera. Our focus is to go
to the polar icecaps. And, you know, one question--and I've
talked to my colleague; he's a lawyer, I'm a doctor, when
they--when we get there or they get there, and they start
extracting some of that ice, who actually owns that ice? I
mean--and, you know, I don't just put that out there, because
it--you know, what are our property rights? Is it the gold
rush? Is it whoever gets there first can claim that? Because in
my mind, you know, we're going to think of the Moon a little
bit as a gas station if we're looking at it in the context of
going to Mars. We're going to take that ice, turn it into fuel,
and obviously it'll be a lot easier to launch from the Moon.
I don't know if that's too simplistic, but I'd toss that
out there, and whoever--anyone want to take a gander at that?
Or is that the type of thing that we ought to think about
proactively and set the parameters? Will this be like
Antarctica where, you know, this is really an international
resource for an international project? But I do--because
commercial companies are already talking about trying to get
there as well and, you know, is that the right question that we
should be asking or thinking about, or should we be working--
anyone want to take a crack at it?
Mr. Sirangelo. I think the question is an appropriate
question. When we're talking about doing the plans for what
we're doing, it's not just a plan for the hardware or the
technology, it's a plan to be there, which means all aspects of
being there; the human life, the science, the research, but
also the understanding of how to do it properly. Exploration
has been going on for quite a long time in the human race, and
there have been these issues before. We've sorted out those
issues on the oceans. For example, there is the maritime law
that handles it. So I think as we do this, it's beyond our
scope today and we can't really answer the question. But I
think the question is an appropriate one that we need to
consider as part of our longer-term plan.
Mr. Bera. Right. And I certainly think that's a question
that, you know, American space industry ought to think about,
and we ought to grapple with and take it to the international
community.
So thank you. And with that, I'll yield back.
Chairwoman Horn. Thank you, Mr. Bera.
The Chair now recognizes Congressman Brooks for 5 minutes.
Mr. Brooks. Dr. Sanders, the Aerospace Safety Advisory
Panel previously cited a number of safety concerns with both
Boeing and SpaceX commercial crew vehicles. One item in your
report cited was parachute-related concerns. Have there been
any recent tests of the parachute system conducted?
Dr. Sanders. Yes, there's actually been a large number of
tests of the parachute systems conducted, both for Orion in the
longer-range program, and both--and the SpaceX and Boeing
commercial crew programs. And I think they've made a great deal
of progress in understanding those uncertainties involved with
that. It's one of the largest risks they have to solve.
Mr. Brooks. Can you tell us about the results of recent
tests, say, in the last month or two?
Dr. Sanders. I think Mr. Gerstenmaier probably could do a
better job with that, but there have been a number of very
positive tests, results confirming that--what we would expect
or would desire in terms of re-entry performance of the
parachutes. There have been a few less satisfactory results,
and some tests that are indicating that there may need to be
some redesign or some adjustments made to the design that they
have as now. And those are important to get right before you
launch humans.
Mr. Brooks. More specifically then, did SpaceX conduct in
April 2019 a parachute test in Delamar Dry Lake, Nevada?
Dr. Sanders. Yes, I believe.
Mr. Brooks. And what happened in that test?
Dr. Sanders. I cannot answer that right now. Mr.
Gerstenmaier might have better data than I have at the moment.
Mr. Brooks. Mr. Gerstenmaier, do you know what the result
of that test was?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Yes, the test is going to force us to go
back and look at some potential--well, I--we're not sure
exactly. The test did not--was not satisfactory. We did not get
the results we wanted, but we learned some information that's
going to affect potentially future parachute designs. The other
thing we need to understand, was it a test-unique circumstance?
Was it driven by an actual design problem in the hardware, or
was it driven by the set-up of the test or the particular
equipment that was used during the test?
Mr. Brooks. Can you get more specific when you say it
wasn't what we wanted?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Yes, it didn't fail--it failed. The
parachutes did not work as designed. It was a one single-out
test for this parachute, so typically that test would involve
four parachutes. One was--proactively failed ahead of time, and
then the three remaining chutes did not operate properly.
The good thing on the test was we had instrumented lines
going up to the parachute, so we know exactly what the loads
were in the system, but we still need to understand whether it
was a test set-up configuration coming out of the aircraft, or
if there was something associated with the packing of the
parachutes, the rigging, all that. But this is part of the
learning process. By these failures, we're going to learn the
data and information to effect a design, to end up with a safe
design for our crews.
So I don't see this as a negative. This is why we test.
This is why we want to push things. This is why we want to
learn----
Mr. Brooks. What was the impact on the vehicle of the
parachute failures?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. It was a test sled, and the test sled was
damaged upon impact with the ground.
Mr. Brooks. And you're comfortable that corrective measures
will be undertaken?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. There's no question. I am very
comfortable. Their teams are fully engaged. We are
understanding this is a gift to us. We have--we've gotten data
that is unique that will help us design and understand if this
is something that needs to be fixed, or if it's something that
was just a nuance of the test and the configuration. And the--
--
Mr. Brooks. All right, let me----
Mr. Gerstenmaier [continuing]. NASA teams are fully engaged
in----
Mr. Brooks. Let me move on to another one because I've only
got 60 seconds left.
Mr. Gerstenmaier. The NASA teams are fully engaged in----
Mr. Brooks. The goal, as I understand it from the Vice
President, is to reach the south pole of the Moon by 2024. Can
any of you tell me what the additional cost will be, or
appropriations needed by NASA in order to achieve a landing on
the south pole of the Moon by 2024?
Mr. Sirangelo. Not at this time, sir. We are--we have
provided preliminary estimates to OMB. OMB is reviewing those
along with our CFO, and that information is imminent.
Mr. Brooks. What is the preliminary estimate?
Mr. Sirangelo. I'm sorry, sir, we can't--right now it is
under review, and we can't come up with a number.
Mr. Brooks. How would it be paid for? Where would the money
come from?
Mr. Sirangelo. That's why we're not here today to be able
to speak to the money side of the equation because at this
point in time there's--it's still under discussion with OMB and
NASA.
Mr. Brooks. And do you have a judgment as to when we will
know what the requested amount of additional budget will be?
Mr. Sirangelo. That will come when OMB releases it. We've
provided the information. I will say there have been
significant discussions. The discussions have been very
positive and open, and as soon as those discussions are
complete and OMB has approved the numbers, they'll provide it
to you.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chairwoman Horn. Thank you, Mr. Brooks.
The Chair now recognizes Congresswoman Hill for 5 minutes.
Ms. Hill. Thank you, Madam Chair. And thank you all for
being here.
A couple of questions. For NASA's deep exploration systems,
nearly 4,000 employees in California supplier companies work on
SLS, Orion, or the Exploration Ground Systems, which is the
largest supplier workforce of all 50 States. These programs
are, of course, critical to our national space exploration
program, and engineers, technicians, and software programmers
in my district help contribute to the space program and our
return to the Moon and beyond.
The Chairwoman already mentioned acquisition. I know you've
spoken about it some, but I'd like to learn more about how NASA
will utilize existing contracts and supply chain infrastructure
in getting to the Moon by 2024, and beyond to Mars.
Mr. Gerstenmaier. In the case of SLS and Orion, we're--and
Exploration Ground Systems, those contracts are--we're
completing the design phase, and then we're going to go into
production and operation. So we're starting to put out requests
for proposals for sustained cadence of buying those vehicles,
and we're looking for ways to buy multiples of the vehicles at
one time to get a more effective cost plan for us. And that
also allows industry to then plan for a more stable workforce
moving forward.
Ms. Hill. Great. Mr. Gerstenmaier and Mr. Sirangelo, I
understand that NASA believes there are a small number of basic
elements needed for the 2024 lunar landing, a power and
propulsion element, a small habitat, and an Integrated Landing
System. Given the rapid timeline in which work would need to
occur to meet the 2024 deadline, can you please explain a few
things? What are the dates when each of these elements will be
on contract?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. We've received proposals for the power
and propulsion element. Those are being evaluated now by the
NASA teams, and it should be probably by this summer we should
make an award or awards for that activity, for the power and
propulsion element.
The mini habitation piece that will need to be on the
Gateway, that's still kind of an early acquisition. We're going
to go through acquisition strategy meetings at the agency
probably in the next couple of weeks, then we'll be ready to go
out with some kind of activity.
For the lander systems, we've done a synopsis already for
the descent portion, the transfer vehicle, and the refueling
piece. We've received proposals for those. We're evaluating
those now. Probably again, in probably a month or so we're
ready to go make some awards for study phases for that.
And then we just recently dropped a synopsis out which
looks at the entire Integrated Landing System from Gateway down
to the surface, and the surface back to Gateway. After we
receive comments to the synopsis, we'll put out an instrument--
a broad agency announcement to go acquire that. And that's
probably also within about a month or two.
So in probably 2 months, all the pieces necessary to get to
2024 will be in some serious study phase, or will be in serious
acquisition for the hardware and systems to move forward.
Ms. Hill. OK. You're in agreement, Mr. Sirangelo?
Mr. Sirangelo. I am in agreement. I would also add that
what Bill has been speaking to represents a substantial
utilization of the American industrial base to make that
happen. And the idea of being able to contract this out, and
contract this out in this rapid fashion, is one of the benefits
of being able to move forward quickly, is to make sure that
industrial base stays strong and stable, and that we have
access to that for the long-term.
Ms. Hill. So that relates to would either NASA or the
contractor be willing to provide Congress with a clear
understanding of the details of the contracts? So, you know,
who would be responsible for cost growth and development or
testing, the government or the contractor, and what's the
timeline involved in the test program, et cetera, et cetera?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. We can provide that when we get to that
phase, or when the plan comes out we can describe that to you.
I think the thing that's important is in the past NASA had
to do all of this development on its own in the Apollo era.
What's really unique now is industry is very capable of doing
some of these things, and we need to utilize industry where we
can and take expertise from industry, and work approaches where
we share risk with them, we share acquisition approaches with
them. We're doing that in the Commercial Crew Program that we
just discussed where there's a shared accountability for
resources and for safety kind of aspects, and we're working
those. And we'll build off of what we've learned in the
Commercial Crew Program, and take that forward as we go to the
lunar systems.
Ms. Hill. Thanks. So I guess the final question then, we're
almost 6 months into 2019, and elements are going to need to
be, of course, completed months in advance of the launch to
enable integration and with the launch vehicles and
preparations. How much real confidence do you have that a human
landing on the Moon in 2024 is achievable?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. I think it's very achievable. The
challenge will be can we get through the political process, can
we get the political stability, can we get the funding
necessary to go do this in the timeframe to move forward, can
we get any legislation relief that we might need, and get a
clarity of purpose, can we get united in this goal enough to
move forward at the pace that we'd like to go. That'll be the
biggest challenge.
Ms. Hill. The money my colleague was talking about.
Thank you all so much. I yield back.
Chairwoman Horn. Thank you, Congresswoman Hill.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Posey for 5 minutes.
Mr. Posey. Thank you, Madam Chair.
It was great to see that NASA has provided recently a
roadmap to go back to the Moon by 2024. Great step toward
getting to Mars. Exciting that it's finally happened. To
achieve, you know, the ambitious timeline, I think that we all
agree that we need to ensure that there's, number one,
sufficient funding to get that done. We've had a diagram of
missions to nowhere. I think we had over 2 dozen different
missions, over $20 billion up in smoke, because we couldn't
stay on one plan from Administration to Administration,
Congress to new Congress.
Both the Administration and Congress should continually
fund our critical space assets, such as the SLS, Orion crew
vehicle, Exploration Ground Systems, Mobile Launcher 2, and the
Lunar Orbital Platform, obviously.
Mr. Gerstenmaier, can you, without getting too deep in the
bushes, just give me a little brief summary of the benefits of
an SLS Green Run.
Mr. Gerstenmaier. OK. So I think that the simplest
advantage is that it allows us to see the integrated system
work is an integrated system. The engines actually pressurize
the tank for the Space Launch System, and that's a very complex
mathematical model of how the cryogenic propellants and things
interact, and the really--way to see all that is in a full-up
integrated test. You can test individual components but you
can't test it as an integrated system, as well as you can, for
a fairly long duration, test through the Green Run.
Mr. Posey. OK.
Mr. Sirangelo. I would add to that that what this test
essentially is, is a full-run test of the system. We're going
to take humans; Americans, and put them on top of this rocket.
We want to see the system work for its full duration burn, and
the best way to do that is to conduct a full-duration burn
before we then integrate the rocket and put people on top.
Mr. Posey. OK. Mr. Sirangelo, in order to support the 2024
launch date of the SLS with the Exploration Upper Stage (EUS),
NASA needs to award a contract for the second Mobile Launcher
at Kennedy Space Center. The Administrator mentioned that the
contract is likely to be awarded in May, and I wonder if you
can provide us with a status update on both the EUS development
and the schedule, as well as when the contract will be awarded
for the second Mobile Launcher.
Mr. Gerstenmaier. I can help. We're ready, we're poised to
go ahead and make the award for the Mobile Launcher as soon as
the teams do the evaluations. So that award is on track and it
will be either this month or next month, but it's on track
moving forward.
And then the Exploration Upper Stage, we slowed things down
a little bit. We're running it at a slower rate this year for
the Exploration Upper Stage. We went from 300 million down to
150 million expenditure this year for the Exploration Upper
Stage. That was so we could focus on Exploration Mission-1 on
the core rocket to make sure that the teams and the equipment
and effort are getting ready to go support Exploration Mission-
1.
Mr. Sirangelo. I would add to that, sir, that one of the
aspects we wanted to make sure the Committee understands is
that work has not stopped because we've changed the date. We've
continued to push forward on many elements of the program. We
continue to look to award, and you'll see several awards coming
off in the next quarter. So as we go forth and try to look at
the plan and find ways to accelerate it safely, we are also
keeping elements of the program which are not going to be
affected moving forward.
Mr. Posey. Thank you very much. Madam Chair, I yield back.
Chairwoman Horn. Thank you very much.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Beyer for 5 minutes.
Mr. Beyer. Thank you, Madam Chair. And thank you, guys,
very much for being here with us today.
On the NASA thing, you talked a number of times about
international partners. Could you talk more about who those
international partners are? Will they be China, will they be
Russia, or is this typically France and the U.K., or what's
left of the U.K.?
Mr. Sirangelo. We have a number of international partners
who have been working with us on the Space Station for many
years. That includes the European Space Agency, the agencies
within Europe, Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency, Canadian
Space Agency, and others around the world. We expect to
continue those relationships and move them forward.
Mr. Beyer. But not China? Despite how prominent they are in
The Martian.
Mr. Sirangelo. Currently, we're precluded from having those
discussions, sir.
Mr. Beyer. Yes. I was fascinated by the notion that one of
the driving forces for thinking about Mars was thinking about
the long-term sustainability of the human race. And if any of
you would like to specifically address that idea of building as
many alternatives into our possible human future, and how the
Moon-Mars mission builds upon that.
Dr. Lunine. So, Congressman, I'll try to address that. In
our Pathways report, we talked about the various reasons for
human spaceflight, both practical and aspirational, and one of
them is the aspiration not only to explore, but for humans to
become a multi-planet species at some point.
We recognize though the realities of humans living entirely
independently on a planet as inhospitable as Mars, and so we
put the two planet species rationale as an aspirational one
rather than a practical one, in the sense that I don't think
anybody is at all under the misapprehension that by putting a
base on Mars we would avoid human extinction should some
planet-wide catastrophe occur on the Earth. I mean very quickly
the Mars colony itself would also go away. So we must take care
of our own planet in order to ensure that we can survive as a
species, but in living on another planet and having the
aspiration and the goal to do that, I think it will change our
perspective as a species and perhaps lead to a future that we
might not otherwise be able to imagine.
Mr. Beyer. But you do talk about living off the land as an
aspirational goal also.
Dr. Lunine. Yes, we do in the report. That's right.
Mr. Beyer. But is this also part of the energetic search
for exoplanets that resemble Earth?
Dr. Lunine. So that search is, of course, going on
independently of the Human Spaceflight Program. Within our--I
think within the understanding today of technology and the
human condition, the ability to sustain humans beyond Mars is
something that doesn't seem practical, and the primary issue is
that there's a type of radiation: Galactic cosmic rays, which
are very, very difficult to shield against because they're very
high energy, and so they produce secondary particles when they
collide with spacecraft and with shields. So that's one of the
reasons why Mars is the horizon goal.
Sending humans to other planetary systems around other
stars is something that one can imagine, but the practicalities
of it, I think, are beyond us at this point in time. That
doesn't mean we should not be looking for other Earths, because
that again, if we find them, will change our perspective on
what our place really is in the universe.
Mr. Beyer. I would imagine the excitement has to be too if
there are other Earths, is there also then other intelligences.
Dr. Lunine. That's one of the great questions not only of
science but of humankind. Are we alone in the universe, and are
there other sentient self-aware beings that we can ultimately
communicate with.
Mr. Beyer. Dr. Sanders, you talk about the overall risk-
benefit equation, you know, how safe is safe enough. Who
determines that equation?
Dr. Sanders. Anyone who makes a decision on accepting risk.
When NASA--and usually that's done at a fairly high level in
NASA, in the administration, depending on how much risk it is
and what the specific causes are. But it's a decision that our
panel has advocated and strongly recommended that always be
documented, which we always say, you know, what are the
alternatives you looked at, what was your rationale for
deciding that you're ready to accept that risk and that there
isn't another--a safer alternative, and the--and what do you
expect to gain by going forward with that risk.
Mr. Beyer. Great. Great. Thank you very much.
Madam Chair, I yield back.
Chairwoman Horn. Thank you very much.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Olson for 5 minutes.
Mr. Olson. I thank The Chair. And welcome to our five
witnesses.
I'd like to start out by talking about a hero of mine and
probably all of yours, a man named Gene Cernan. Gene is the
only American to go to the Moon twice. Did that in Apollo 17,
when he landed, walked on the Moon, our most recent moonwalker,
and also Apollo 10, the flight that did everything Apollo 11
did except for land. Gene was here in this very room in 2009
when this Committee, in a bipartisan manner, fought to save the
last mission to go to the Moon. It was called Constellation. We
saved the crew capsule in that battle, but Gene was very
adamant the best reason to go to the Moon is because that's the
best place in the universe to train for going to Mars. He
pointed out a few things. First of all, the gravity. The Moon
is about one-sixth of our gravity. Mars is one-third of our
gravity. To train up there, it's much better training than in a
pool outside the Johnson Space Center. It's real training. In
fact, the first steps on the Moon were steps, they started
hopping, they realized I can hop quicker and go places quicker
by hopping instead of walking. He also pointed out that we
found out long after he left the Moon there is water on the
Moon. He said we don't know what we don't know about the Moon.
And it sounds like all of our panelists agreed that the
Moon is a good starting point to go to Mars. In fact, I think
the quote from you, Dr. Lunine, was the Moon is a stepping
stone for Mars. And, Brother Gerstenmaier, you said it's a
proving ground for Mars.
So could all of you go into detail about the benefits of us
going to the Moon to get us to Mars as quickly as possible? How
is the Moon tied directly for us going to Mars? Gerst, you're
up first.
Mr. Gerstenmaier. I think first of all that the Moon is a--
in a proving ground sense is a great place for us to check out
the technology to go beyond the Earth Moon system, to build the
rockets that need to go there, they can have application moving
forward, we can test them and check them out.
It's also good from a risk standpoint. Today, we're very
comfortable in low-Earth orbit where, if something goes wrong
on station, we can be back in an hour or so, hour and a half.
When we go out to the Moon, we're now 5 days away. That's a
challenge, but it's not months away like it is when you go to
Mars. So learning how to operate, build the procedures in,
build the stuff that the control center folks do in Houston,
and understand how to operate around the Moon will be
absolutely critical to build those skills, to build the
technology and prove it before it absolutely positively has to
work as we go toward Mars. And I think it's a--it's very strong
in that sense.
Mr. Olson. Mr. Sirangelo, sir. Thank you, Gerst.
Mr. Sirangelo. Thank you, sir. I would add to that that one
of the best things that one needs to do in order to get good at
something is to practice, and to practice consistently. Being
able to be 5 days away, being able to make the missions that
we're doing, and to be able to do them in a frequency that we
can actually learn, develop, reiterate, improve what we're
doing and do it again, allows us to get much better, much
sooner.
So being able to go to the Moon and doing all the things
that we've been talking about for the last 2 hours is very
good. Being able to do it on a frequency that we can actually
take the things back and do it better really makes it a much
more feasible and practical path. And what it does is actually
gets us to Mars sooner rather than later.
Mr. Olson. Thank you. Dr. Lunine.
Dr. Lunine. Lunine. Yes, thank you.
Mr. Olson. Sorry about that.
Dr. Lunine. No, thank you, Congressman. So a number of
technologies, as Mr. Gerstenmaier mentioned. Radiation safety,
if we spend a long time on the surface of the Moon we're going
to have to deal with shielding, that will also be critical for
transits to Mars. The environmental control and life support
systems for long-term stays on the Moon will also be applicable
directly to Mars. We talked about habitats as well. We talked
about crew health. And aspects of in situ resource utilization,
even though on Mars it would be primarily for the atmosphere,
there are aspects of it we would use--we would test on the
Moon.
And let me also say that successfully using the Moon as a
stepping stone, bringing humans back there, working and
exploring on the Moon provides a success that the public will
see and recognize as a critical moment, that will then project
us on to Mars. And we made that point in the report, but let me
say personally, as a 12-year-old watching--13-year-old watching
Gene Cernan and Harrison Schmitt in the last Apollo mission,
exploring the Moon for 3 days, I felt inside of myself that we
were going on to Mars, and that I would be a part of that. And
even though we're here almost 50 years later and we're not on
that journey, going back to the Moon, working on the Moon will
create that same sense that, yes, we can do that for Mars that
I felt back in 1972.
Mr. Olson. Thank you, sir. I'm sorry, Dr. Sanders and Mr.
Faulconer, I'm out of time, but one comment about Dr. Lunine's
comments. There's a big radiation belt between Earth and Mars.
It's called the Van Allen radiation belt. No human being has
ever gone through that intense radiation. So it sounds like
Mars has something like we've experienced in the Space Station
and radiation that we kind of take for granted because we've
been so short in terms of our time on the Moon or in the Space
Station compared to a trip right now to Mars with our current
propulsion systems.
Thank you, Madam Chairman. I yield back. Go Navy, beat
Army.
Chairwoman Horn. Thank you very much, Mr. Olson.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Perlmutter for 5 minutes.
Mr. Perlmutter. Thanks. And thank you to the panel for
being here today.
And, Dr. Lunine, I want to start with your last comments
about thinking that we would be moving on to Mars at some point
after we had traveled to the Moon. And that's really been my
driving motivation here is, OK, it's about time, it's about
time we move on and we get--and I've been agnostic as to
whether we go straight to Mars, we go to the Moon as a
waystation, but ultimately to get to Mars. And Mr. Gerstenmaier
has heard me say this a dozen times or more now, which is--and
we heard from some NASA experts that 2033 was a feasible
timeframe when the orbits, so the orbital mechanics, it's not
just schedule-driven, but it's actually driven by, you know,
the orbits of these two planets, that that's a shorter travel,
you know, shorter journey than before.
So as I listen to you all, I mean there's the rocket
science and how we deal with the potential radiation issues and
our astronauts' health, and I'm convinced that we have the
ability and the technology and the scientists who can work on
that; the doctors. So we need from you, if I were to get the
money, OK, and I've said this before, it's a chicken and egg,
if you were assured that you had unlimited funds to get to Mars
by 2033, Dr. Lunine, could we do it? We heard from NASA
earlier, like 2 years ago, that we could do it.
Dr. Lunine. So I would have----
Mr. Perlmutter. Not 2.5 percent, not a cadence of 4.4,
but----
Dr. Lunine. No, I----
Mr. Perlmutter [continuing]. Maybe 2.4 or 2.2.
Dr. Lunine. I understand. So I don't--you know, in all
honesty, Congressman, I don't know what infinite resources
actually mean. I will say----
Mr. Perlmutter. OK. I'll give you an example. Do you know
how much we came up for the banks over a weekend?
Dr. Lunine. No, I don't.
Mr. Perlmutter. $800 billion.
Dr. Lunine. $800 billion. So----
Mr. Perlmutter. OK? Now, they paid it back----
Dr. Lunine. Yes, that's right.
Mr. Perlmutter [continuing]. With 15 percent interest.
Dr. Lunine. Right. So let me answer the question, and then
maybe yield to my colleagues at NASA, if you wish. So in our
report, we estimated the cost of getting humans to Mars as
being essentially in that range. Now, in the schedule-driven
version of our study where you're driven by a schedule, we
found that you could get to Mars in the mid-2030s, but bear in
mind that report was written in 2014, so that's already 5 years
ago. Our estimates based on the Design Reference Missions, and
so on, require that the human spaceflight part of the NASA
budget grow each year by about 4 times the inflation rate
through 2030 in order to make that happen. But again, that was
2014, and I think I'd like to, if you wish, yield to my NASA
colleagues now.
Mr. Perlmutter. Certainly. And I do want to welcome the two
Coloradans to the panel: Mr. Sirangelo and Mr. Faulconer. Thank
you.
Mr. Sirangelo. Thank you, sir. I can't answer the 2033
question as you asked, but what I can answer is to say that
this expediting the plan to the Moon, expediting our knowledge
of how to move in space, how to live in space, how to work in
space, how to build the systems that allow us to do these
things, is only going to have a positive effect on our ability
to get to Mars. So I think the two are linked.
Mr. Perlmutter. So let's talk about the politics of this
for a second. And, Dr. Sanders, I appreciate you talking about
you can't have too aggressive a schedule because the potential
risk is a problem. But on the other hand, if we don't have a
schedule, then you've got a problem up here. OK, this isn't so
much the engineering feats that you all will have to
accomplish, there has to be a financing sort of goal here,
otherwise you'll never see it. So it is a chicken and egg.
We've got to have something that says we can do this by this
date if you give us this kind of money. And that's what I need.
And Mr. Gerstenmaier spends about 2 weeks every month here
testifying before this Committee, so he's heard this before.
And it may be completely a Pollyannaish vision that I have, but
I have, Dr. Lunine, that drive that you talked about from being
a kid who wants to see us get to Mars, with the Moon being
maybe the stepping stone, but the goal being Mars. And I'm
saying that to my friend, Mr. Sirangelo, too.
With that, I yield back to The Chair.
Chairwoman Horn. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Perlmutter. And
thank you for your clear intention. I think we always know
we're going to see one of the bumper stickers every time.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Waltz for 5 minutes.
Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Thank you so much for coming today, and I'm really thrilled
to be on this Committee. My district runs just north of Cape
Canaveral, with Embry-Riddle University front and center there.
The world's leading aeronautical university. And the Chairwoman
and I are, I think, a handful of Members that are on both Armed
Services and the Space Committee. So we're seeing both sides of
what we're calling the 21st century space race.
The Acting Secretary of Defense likes to use the term new
space to describe the expanding role of the commercial space
industry and developing defense space technology and also
commercial space technology. Can you discuss the critical
importance of commercial space to NASA's deep space missions,
the lessons you're learning from their launches from Cape
Canaveral, we're expecting launches every week by 2021, and
then, you know, as you're in phase, I guess, phase alpha, or
phase A of your planning for the Moon landing, how are you
engaging commercial space in the private sector in your
planning sessions? We'll start with Mr. Gerstenmaier.
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Again, I think we're at a very unique
time where commercial space could really contribute in a major
way to what we're doing. And I think that's really important.
And I don't consider it new space and old space, I consider it
space.
We learn a lot from the new participants in the space
program. They don't have some of the concerns and some of the
slowness that we have. We can learn how to move fast again, but
then we also have some experience and some things that actually
help them too. So this working together actually makes us much
stronger working together and moving forward. We're very
actively engaged with them. We're asking them for ideas on how
to move forward. Where NASA would have probably done the total
design before, we're now actually involving them in the design
process. So we can get their good ideas to see what they've
learned, to see how we can keep manufacturing low, and how we
can meet the timeframes moving forward.
So I see this as a tremendously positive time. I think we
might be in a unique opportunity where we can really team
together, work together as a team and achieve these aggressive
goals toward 2024 and on to Mars.
Mr. Waltz. So the various companies, which we probably
don't need to go through, but they're being actively engaged
now, so that the budget and the plan that will come to the
Committee in the next, I hope in the next few weeks will have
commercial private-sector participation built into those
planning procedures?
Mr. Sirangelo. Yes, sir. And I'll go a step further. As
Bill mentioned, the teaming, you're seeing the teaming here
evidence in front of you, sir. I've spent my career in the
commercial space industry, was one of the founders of the
Commercial Spaceflight Federation, and chaired it for several
years. So the idea of NASA creating the team not only outside,
but inside, is a very useful thing for what we're trying to
accomplish.
One of the reasons for the delay in the planning process
here is that we did reach out to industry, and have had dozens
of meetings at the Space Symposium and since then, with
industry throughout the United States, throughout the different
types of companies in the industry to make sure we did hear
these voices, make sure we did understand what--how they could
be part of this. And I think the plan you will see will show a
balance of using traditional space, NASA centers, NASA space,
along with a very significant contribution from the commercial
industry.
Mr. Waltz. Thank you. Earlier this year, the Defense
Intelligence Agency released a report about Russia and China's
activities in space, and long story short, Russia and China
both explicitly intend to eclipse the United States in space,
and they are both developing rockets comparable to SLS. From
your perspective, why is it important that the U.S. have the
most powerful rocket for both exploration and national
security, and what do you make of the Chinese landing on the
backside of the Moon, but then also the recently announced
research station?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Again, I think having a heavy lift launch
capability is critical to us to be able to get large masses to
the vicinity of the Moon. That's really important. And I think
this is where this commercial and government approach works
well together. The SLS can launch as a backbone and carry the
pieces that have to be launched as one combined package in one
shot. Then you can use the commercial industry to launch
multiple other small pieces to aggregate around the Moon. So I
think that's critical to us keeping forward and being a leader
in space, to continue to push those things that don't yet have
a real opportunity yet for big revenue. That's the appropriate
role for government. Mark, anything?
Mr. Sirangelo. I agree with that, but I would--I also take
one step forward. You know from your time being a Green Beret
that sometimes you need to stand up and take a stand, and I
think in this instance what we're doing is saying that we're
not going to let that happen. It is part of America's DNA as we
talk about it be part of the leadership of this industry, and I
think what we are doing here and the whole aspect of our plan
is to be able to step up and ensure that we keep ourselves at
the forefront of that.
Mr. Waltz. Absolutely. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Chairwoman Horn. Thank you, Mr. Waltz.
And thank you to all the witnesses. But before we adjourn,
the Chair and Ranking Member have a few additional questions,
so if you'll indulge us for a few more moments.
So I think we've raised some really important issues, and
that was the critical component of having this hearing today,
even without the full plan.
So directing these first couple of questions for Mr.
Sirangelo and Mr. Gerstenmaier, so you've said that NASA has
come up with preliminary cost estimates for the moving of the
2024 program, but right now that those cost estimates are under
review by NASA CFO (Chief Financial Officer), and then OMB. So
we've got some more steps to go. So I can understand, of
course, having the CFO review it, but I'm curious about what
role--what OMB's review will entail. Do they have in-house
expertise in engineering or program management, and program
management that's going to be really sufficient enough to
credibly modify NASA's cost estimates, because you're clearly
the ones with the expertise on what it's going to take to do
this, and what it will take to carry out your mission.
So what is OMB's role in this, and what resources do they
have?
Mr. Sirangelo. OMB's role is as a statutory role, ma'am,
and from our perspective it's a--we have to go through this.
It's not just a technical plan that has to be done in order for
this to be communicated and brought to the Committee in the
proper manner, we have to have an entire plan put together that
includes not only the funding, but how do we get it, where does
it come from, and how does it fit into the Administration's
view.
Chairwoman Horn. Yes, I appreciate that and know that role.
I think the basic concern here, as it's pretty clear that
regardless of party, we are supportive of NASA, we want to see
this succeed, but we've seen in the past what happens when we
don't have all the pieces of the puzzle together. And so I
think the basic concern is whether NASA is going to be allowed
to ask for the budget it needs, that--going back to Mr. Lucas'
point about sufficient funding, the budget it needs to do these
lunar missions, or is it going to be a lesser amount, because--
that OMB would find acceptable, because, you know, OMB doesn't
have accountability if these things succeed or fail, they have
a different role, but we know if it fails, the blame is going
to fall to NASA. And that goes back to the need for the plan
and the sufficient budget. So if the mission fails, it's NASA
that's going to shoulder that burden, and I think all of us
lose in the end for so many reasons that we've discussed.
And so, Dr. Sanders, I want to turn to you for a moment and
ask you to talk for a moment about any risks related to a hard
goal that is insufficiently funding--insufficiently funded.
Dr. Sanders. It's a huge risk because it puts NASA in the
position of having to try to achieve something that's not
really achievable. And NASA is full of people who are can-do
people. I mean they're enthusiastic, they're technically
capable, they will work their hearts out to try and make it
work, and--but then it's easy--easy, it's possible then to
start to rationalize that, OK, well, we can take this shortcut
because it's important and we're going to get there, we'll do
it, we're going to--we'll make it work, whether it's actually
feasible to do it. So I think there's a huge risk if you don't
get the adequate resources to go with the schedule. You know,
it's always a three-legged stool. You have the cost, schedule,
performance. You fix two of them, the other one, that's where
it goes.
Chairwoman Horn. Thank you very much. And I think that goes
to the underlying need to see a more detailed plan so that we
can ensure the next steps and there's sufficient funding,
because I think many points, so we have to balance risk; what
is the right risk, and ensure that schedule pressure doesn't
overcome that, and that there's sufficient funding to do what
NASA is being asked to do.
And with that, I will yield to Ranking Member Babin.
Mr. Babin. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Just a couple more questions here. I wanted to ask about
the ISS, Mr. Gerstenmaier. It's one of our Nation's greatest
technological international achievements. Currently, the U.S.
and its partners are planning to operate it through 2024.
According to the National Research Council's Pathways report
from 2014, if NASA maintains their presence on the ISS past
2024 without significant increases to NASA's overall budget, it
will lack the resources to fund the development of systems that
will push human presence beyond low-Earth orbit until late in
the next decade. This would leave the Orion vehicle without a
clearly defined mission, yet abandoning the ISS could mean
ceding global leadership in low-Earth orbit to other nations
and our competitors.
How do we solve this dilemma? If additional funding is the
answer, where do you propose that we get this additional
funding? Mr. Gerstenmaier.
Mr. Gerstenmaier. I think our proposal is to do both: To
continue to use the ISS because it's a critical testbed to test
the technology that's going to be needed going forward. For
example, the carbon dioxide scrubbing system that's going to be
flown on the Orion capsule, it's actually been tested onboard
the International Space Station. So there's a synergy between
Space Station and the exploration.
I think a lot of times we see this as an either/or trade. I
really see it as an and. We need to go look at the needs for
Station and the budget required for Station. We can gain some
efficiencies potentially in ops. and maintenance a little bit,
reduce some of those costs, but I think ultimately we need to
be in low-Earth orbit at the same time we're moving out to deep
space to test technologies. Space Station is a good testbed to
do that. We need to utilize Station as long as it's viable from
a technical standpoint, and it's a piece of exploration. It is
truly the first step in exploration. Granted, if a couple of
crew members go almost a year in space, that's going to give us
tremendous insight into the health mitigations that are
required for crews when they go to Mars and other destinations.
Station is paying real benefits today for exploration that if
you remove Space Station, you actually cripple Space Station,
you slow down our goals to get to the Moon, you slow down our
activities to move to--on to Mars.
So we need to use Station today in an effective manner. We
need to figure out a way to fund both. It will not be easy for
you or for us to find that funding. We'll figure out a way to
do it.
Mr. Babin. OK.
Mr. Gerstenmaier. It's necessary for us in the future.
Mr. Babin. All right, thank you. Then another one to you as
well. Will NASA develop spacesuits for surface operations and
update NASA's aging extravehicular mobility units (EMUs)? EMUs
were designed over 40 years ago. They were designed to fit
astronauts who made up the Astronaut Corps at that time. Since
then the Astronaut Corps has diversified, requiring a broader
range of sizes. If we are to extend ISS, what are your plans
for EMUs?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Yes, we're working on both. The answer,
basically, is yes to both. We're working on a new spacesuit for
the Space Station. The goal was to demonstrate, I think in
2024, and that suit, the life support system on the back part
of the suit that provides oxygen and CO2 scrubbing
for the crew members, also a humidity control and temperature
control. That's common between an orbit spacesuit, and it's
common to potentially a spacesuit used on the surface of the
Moon. So there's applications there. But our intent is to
develop the suits necessary for both cases. And the Johnson
Space Center in-house team is working on that spacesuit
development today. They've actually been in NBL (Neutral
Buoyancy Laboratory) doing some activities with that suit.
Mr. Babin. OK. All right, great. Thank you.
And last, the European Service Module is currently
manifested through Exploration Mission-2. After that, should
NASA plan on using a European service module, or should it seek
other more capable alternatives that may facilitate a broader
architecture? Mr. Gerstenmaier.
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Again, I think there's real advantages
of--to us working with our partners in space, and we can
selectively choose where we put those partners in the critical
path. We have put the European Space Agency in the critical
path for the Orion service module. That's a propellant system
that maneuvers Orion around in space. They've delivered on
their promises. They were a little late with the first module--
--
Mr. Babin. Right.
Mr. Gerstenmaier [continuing]. They're doing well on the
second module, and they're actually starting to procure and
acquire hardware for the third service module. So----
Mr. Babin. OK.
Mr. Gerstenmaier [continuing]. But again, I think if they
continue to deliver, they're a strong partner, they can work
with us, they help achieve our goals in a more effective manner
and build the international strength that makes these future
activities possible.
Mr. Babin. Anybody else like to add to that? No. Nobody
wants to chomp on that one. OK, thank you very much, Madam
Chair.
Chairwoman Horn. Thank you very much, Ranking Member Babin.
I want to once again thank all the witnesses for being here,
before we close.
These are critical conversations that we need to have, and
information that we need to obtain. And I think it's safe to
say that Mr. Gerstenmaier, we'll probably see you here again,
and many of you, so hopefully, you like seeing our faces. So
thank you all for being here.
And need to say that the record will remain open for 2
weeks for any Members who wish to add statements to the record
or additional questions, and the questions taken for the
record. We'll look forward to getting those from you. And the
witnesses are now excused, and we're adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:26 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
Appendix I
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