[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
STATE OF AVIATION SAFETY
=======================================================================
(116-28)
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
AVIATION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 17, 2019
__________
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available online at: https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-
transportation?path=/browsecommittee/chamber/house/committee/
transportation
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
37-561 PDF WASHINGTON : 2020
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COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon, Chair
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, SAM GRAVES, Missouri
District of Columbia DON YOUNG, Alaska
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas ERIC A. ``RICK'' CRAWFORD,
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland Arkansas
RICK LARSEN, Washington BOB GIBBS, Ohio
GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
JOHN GARAMENDI, California RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois
HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr., ROB WOODALL, Georgia
Georgia JOHN KATKO, New York
ANDRE CARSON, Indiana BRIAN BABIN, Texas
DINA TITUS, Nevada GARRET GRAVES, Louisiana
SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina
JARED HUFFMAN, California MIKE BOST, Illinois
JULIA BROWNLEY, California RANDY K. WEBER, Sr., Texas
FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida DOUG LaMALFA, California
DONALD M. PAYNE, Jr., New Jersey BRUCE WESTERMAN, Arkansas
ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California LLOYD SMUCKER, Pennsylvania
MARK DeSAULNIER, California PAUL MITCHELL, Michigan
STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California, Vice GARY J. PALMER, Alabama
Chair BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland JENNIFFER GONZALEZ-COLON,
ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York Puerto Rico
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey TROY BALDERSON, Ohio
GREG STANTON, Arizona ROSS SPANO, Florida
DEBBIE MUCARSEL-POWELL, Florida PETE STAUBER, Minnesota
LIZZIE FLETCHER, Texas CAROL D. MILLER, West Virginia
COLIN Z. ALLRED, Texas GREG PENCE, Indiana
SHARICE DAVIDS, Kansas
ABBY FINKENAUER, Iowa
JESUS G. ``CHUY'' GARCIA, Illinois
ANTONIO DELGADO, New York
CHRIS PAPPAS, New Hampshire
ANGIE CRAIG, Minnesota
HARLEY ROUDA, California
(ii)
Subcommittee on Aviation
RICK LARSEN, Washington, Chair
ANDRE CARSON, Indiana GARRET GRAVES, Louisiana
STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands DON YOUNG, Alaska
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky
District of Columbia SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois ROB WOODALL, Georgia
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee JOHN KATKO, New York
HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr., DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina
Georgia LLOYD SMUCKER, Pennsylvania
DINA TITUS, Nevada PAUL MITCHELL, Michigan
JULIA BROWNLEY, California BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
GREG STANTON, Arizona BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
COLIN Z. ALLRED, Texas TROY BALDERSON, Ohio
JESUS G. ``CHUY'' GARCIA, Illinois ROSS SPANO, Florida
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas PETE STAUBER, Minnesota
SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York SAM GRAVES, Missouri (Ex Officio)
DONALD M. PAYNE, Jr., New Jersey
SHARICE DAVIDS, Kansas, Vice Chair
ANGIE CRAIG, Minnesota
GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon (Ex
Officio)
(iii)
CONTENTS
Page
Summary of Subject Matter........................................ vii
STATEMENTS OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Hon. Rick Larsen, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Washington, and Chair, Subcommittee on Aviation:
Opening statement............................................ 1
Prepared statement........................................... 3
Hon. Garret Graves, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Louisiana, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Aviation:
Opening statement............................................ 4
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Hon. Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Oregon, and Chair, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure:
Opening statement............................................ 5
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Hon. Sam Graves, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Missouri, and Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure:
Opening statement............................................ 9
Prepared statement........................................... 9
Hon. Eddie Bernice Johnson, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Texas, prepared statement............................. 95
Hon. Donald M. Payne, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the
State of New Jersey, prepared statement........................ 95
WITNESSES
Panel 1
Paul Njoroge, on behalf of the families of Ethiopian Airlines
flight 302, husband of Carolyne Karanja, father of Ryan
Njuguna, Kelli Pauls, Rubi Pauls, and son-in-law of Ann
Karanja, victims of flight ET302, accompanied by Michael Stumo,
father of Samya Stumo, victim of flight ET302:
Oral statement............................................... 10
Prepared statement........................................... 12
Panel 2
Dana Schulze, Acting Director, Office of Aviation Safety,
National Transportation Safety Board:
Oral statement............................................... 23
Prepared statement........................................... 25
Captain Joseph G. DePete, President, Air Line Pilots Association,
International:
Oral statement............................................... 38
Prepared statement........................................... 40
Lori Bassani, National President, Association of Professional
Flight Attendants:
Oral statement............................................... 51
Prepared statement........................................... 53
Michael Perrone, President, Professional Aviation Safety
Specialists, AFL-CIO:
Oral statement............................................... 54
Prepared statement........................................... 56
John Samuelsen, International President, Transport Workers of
America:
Oral statement............................................... 61
Prepared statement........................................... 63
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
Letter from Sara Nelson, International President, Association of
Flight Attendants--CWA, AFL-CIO, Submitted for the Record by
Hon. Larsen.................................................... 70
APPENDIX
Questions from Hon. Eddie Bernice Johnson for Dana Schulze,
Acting Director, Office of Aviation Safety, National
Transportation Safety Board.................................... 97
Questions from Hon. Garret Graves for Dana Schulze, Acting
Director, Office of Aviation Safety, National Transportation
Safety Board................................................... 97
Questions from Hon. Eddie Bernice Johnson for Captain Joseph G.
DePete, President, Air Line Pilots Association, International.. 100
Questions from Hon. Garret Graves for Captain Joseph G. DePete,
President, Air Line Pilots Association, International.......... 100
Questions from Hon. Eddie Bernice Johnson for Lori Bassani,
National President, Association of Professional Flight
Attendants..................................................... 101
Questions from Hon. Eddie Bernice Johnson for Michael Perrone,
President, Professional Aviation Safety Specialists, AFL-CIO... 102
Questions from Hon. Eddie Bernice Johnson for John Samuelsen,
International President, Transport Workers of America.......... 102
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
July 12, 2019
SUMMARY OF SUBJECT MATTER
TO: Members, Subcommittee on Aviation
FROM: Staff, Subcommittee on Aviation
RE: Subcommittee Hearing on ``State of Aviation
Safety''
PURPOSE
The Subcommittee on Aviation will meet on Wednesday, July
17, 2019, at 10:00 a.m. in Room 2167 of the Rayburn House
Office Building for a hearing on aviation safety. The hearing
will gather government and stakeholder perspectives on the
state of aviation safety, including identifying current
challenges facing the aviation system and actions needed to
maintain and ensure the safety of the traveling public. The
Subcommittee will first hear testimony from Paul Njoroge, who
lost five family members in the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302
accident this year. Mr. Njoroge will be accompanied by Michael
Stumo, who lost his child in the same accident. The
Subcommittee will then hear testimony from the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), Air Line Pilots Association
(ALPA), Association of Professional Flight Attendants (APFA),
Professional Aviation Safety Specialists (PASS), and Transport
Workers Union (TWU).
BACKGROUND
Each year, more than 800 million people fly safely on U.S.
air carriers.\1\ While the risk of a fatal commercial aviation
accident in the United States has fallen by 95 percent since
1997, serious aviation accidents \2\ and incidents \3\ still
occur regularly in the United States and abroad.\4\ According
to preliminary NTSB data, there were 219 fatal aviation
accidents (365 fatalities and 269 serious injuries) in the
United States in 2018, involving U.S.-chartered flights,
business jets, general aviation airplanes, balloons, gliders,
and helicopters. And in the span of five months, 346 lives were
tragically lost abroad in the Lion Air Flight 610 and Ethiopian
Airlines Flight 302 accidents alone, both involving U.S.-
manufactured aircraft. In total, according to preliminary data,
the NTSB has investigated more than 700 aviation accidents that
have occurred in the United States involving U.S.-registered or
public use aircraft since the Lion Air accident in October
2018. The Federal Government and U.S. aviation industry must
remain steadfast in ensuring the highest level of aviation
safety and strive for zero deaths in air transportation.
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\1\ U.S. Bureau of Transp. Statistics, ``Passengers,'' https://
www.transtats.bts.gov/Data_Elements.aspx?Data=1.
\2\ The NTSB defines an ``accident'' as ``an occurrence associated
with the operation of an aircraft that takes place between the time any
person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight and all such
persons have disembarked, and in which any person suffers death or
serious injury, or in which the aircraft receives substantial damage.''
49 C.F.R. Sec. 830.2.
\3\ The NTSB defines an ``incident'' as ``an occurrence other than
an accident that affects or could affect the safety of operations.''
Id.
\4\ There has been one domestic airline passenger fatality in the
United States in the past decade. On April 17, 2018, Southwest Airlines
Flight 1380 experienced an uncontained engine failure, resulting in
loss of an engine inlet and cowling. Engine fragments struck the
airplane's fuselage and damaged a cabin window, killing one passenger
onboard. Prior to that, the last fatal domestic airline accident
occurred in February 2009, when Colgan Air Flight 3407 crashed near
Buffalo, New York, killing all 49 onboard and one person on the ground.
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RECENT EVENTS
The NTSB--an independent Federal agency charged with
investigating civil aviation accidents in the United States and
recommending safety improvements--is investigating or assisting
in the investigation of recent aviation accidents listed below.
This list is non-exhaustive, capturing only select accidents
occurring within the past nine months. The list does not
include other general aviation accidents or serious incidents
the NTSB is investigating or otherwise monitoring.
I. LION AIR FLIGHT 610 AND ETHIOPIAN AIRLINES FLIGHT 302
In the span of five months, there were two fatal commercial
airline accidents involving U.S.-designed and manufactured
Boeing 737 MAX aircraft operated by foreign air carriers
outside the United States.
On October 29, 2018, Lion Air Flight 610 (JT610)--a Boeing
737 MAX--en route to Pangkal Pinang from Jakarta, crashed
approximately 11 minutes after takeoff into the Java Sea at 450
miles per hour, killing all 189 on board (184 passengers and 5
crew members). The Indonesian government's final accident
report, which will include a determination of the probable
cause(s) of the accident, is expected later this year. The NTSB
is assisting with this investigation and will have the
opportunity to review and comment on the draft final report.
The Indonesian government will either amend the draft final
report to include the substance of the comments received or, if
requested by the United States, append the comments to the
final report.\5\
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\5\ See International Standards and Recommended Practices, Annex 13
to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, Aircraft Accident
and Incident Investigation, Chapter 6.3, available at https://
www.emsa.europa.eu/retro/Docs/marine_casualties/annex_13.pdf. See also
ICAO, Aircraft Accident Reporting Resources for Media (Jan. 16, 2017),
https://www.icao.int/Newsroom/Documents/ICAO-Fact-Sheet_Accident-
Investigation_2017-01.pdf.
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On March 10, 2019, Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 (ET302)--a
Boeing 737 MAX--en route from Bole International Airport in
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to Nairobi, Kenya, crashed approximately
six minutes after takeoff. The accident resulted in the death
of all 157 people on board (149 passengers and 8 crew members).
The Ethiopian government's final report detailing its
determination of probable cause(s) of the accident is expected
later this year. The NTSB is also assisting with this
investigation and will enjoy the same comment process as for
the Indonesian government's report described above.
Immediately following the March 10, 2019, accident, foreign
civil aviation authorities began grounding the Boeing 737 MAX
planes. On March 13, two days later, and after receiving
detailed air traffic data and additional evidence from the
scene of the accident, the FAA ordered a temporary grounding of
the fleet operated by U.S. airlines or in U.S. territory. The
Boeing 737 MAX remains grounded today.
II. OTHER NTSB INVESTIGATIONS INITIATED SINCE OCTOBER 2018
February 23, 2019, in Trinity Bay, TX: Boeing
767-375ER operating as Atlas Air 3591 from Miami to Houston
crashed near Houston airport, killing all three aboard.\6\
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\6\ See NTSB Aviation Accident Preliminary Report, DCA19MA086,
available at https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/
ReportGeneratorFile.ashx?EventID=20190223X60222&AKey=
1&RType=Prelim &IType=MA.
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March 4, 2019, in Presque Isle, ME: Embraer EMB-
145XR operating as CommutAir Flight 4933 (dba as United
Express) from Newark to Presque Isle landed between runway 1
and taxiway A. This was the second approach to runway 1 after
having conducted a missed approach during the first approach.
Radar track data show that the airplane was aligned right of
runway 1 during both approaches. Of the 31 passengers and crew
onboard, there were three minor injuries. The airplane was
substantially damaged.\7\
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\7\ See NTSB Aviation Accident Preliminary Report, DCA19FA089,
available at https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/
ReportGeneratorFile.ashx?EventID=20190304X65511&AKey=
1&RType=Prelim &IType=FA.
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April 29, 2019, in Kailua, Hawaii: Robinson R-44
Helicopter crashed into a residential neighborhood, killing all
three aboard.\8\
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\8\ See NTSB Aviation Accident Preliminary Report, WPR19FA123,
available at https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/
ReportGeneratorFile.ashx?EventID=20190429X61624&AKey=
1&RType=Prelim &IType=FA.
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May 5, 2019, in Northern Mexico: Bombardier
Challenger 601 jet flying from Las Vegas to Monterrey, Mexico,
with three crew members and ten passengers crashed in northern
Mexico. No survivors were found. The NTSB is assisting foreign
authorities.\9\
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\9\ See NTSB Identification: CEN19WA137, available at https://
www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.aviation/
brief2.aspx?ev_id=20190506X61405&ntsbno=CEN19WA137&akey=1.
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May 13, 2019, in Ketchikan, Alaska: Havilland
DHC-2 Beaver and a float-equipped de Havilland DHC-3 Turbine
Otter collided in mid-air. Both were operating for-hire, with
six fatalities, nine serious injuries, and one sustaining minor
injuries.\10\
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\10\ See NTSB Aviation Accident Preliminary Report, CEN19MA141A,
available at https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/
ReportGeneratorFile.ashx?EventID=20190514X70427&AKey=
1&RType=Prelim &IType=MA.
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May 20, 2019, in Metlakatla, Alaska: Float-
equipped de Havilland DHC-2 overturned and partially sank upon
landing, killing both aboard.\11\
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\11\ See NTSB Aviation Accident Preliminary Report, ANC19FA019,
available at https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/
ReportGeneratorFile.ashx?EventID=20190520X14645&AKey=
1&RType=Prelim &IType=FA.
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June 10, 2019, in New York City: Agusta A109E
Helicopter departed from East 34th Street Heliport to Linden,
NJ, and crashed into the roof of a skyscraper in midtown
Manhattan. Pilot was fatally injured.\12\
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\12\ See NTSB Aviation Accident Preliminary Report, ERA19FA191,
available at https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/
ReportGeneratorFile.ashx?EventID=20190610X53445&AKey=
1&RType=Prelim &IType=FA.
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June 21, 2019, in Mokuleia, Hawaii: Beechcraft
King Air A90 crashed shortly after takeoff in Oahu, Hawaii,
killing all 11 aboard.\13\
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\13\ See NTSB Aviation Accident Preliminary Report, WPR19MA177,
available at https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/
ReportGeneratorFile.ashx?EventID=20190622X23034&AKey=
1&RType=Prelim &IType=MA.
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June 30, 2019, in Addison, TX: Beechcraft Super
King Air 350 (Addison to St. Petersburg) crashed into an
airplane hangar, killing all 10 people aboard.\14\
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\14\ See NTSB Aviation Accident Preliminary Report, CEN19MA190,
available at https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/
ReportGeneratorFile.ashx?EventID=20190630X33829&AKey=
1&RType=Prelim &IType=MA.
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July 4, 2019, in Walker Cay, Bahamas: Agusta SPA
AW139 Helicopter crashed, killing all seven aboard, all of
which have been recovered to the Bahamas. The Air Accident
Investigation Department of the Bahamas has requested the NTSB
lead the investigation.\15\
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\15\ See Wash. Post, NTSB Takes Over Investigation of Bahamas
Helicopter Crash, July 8, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/
national/ntsb-takes-over-investigation-of-bahamas-helicopter-crash/
2019/07/08/f693b94e-a1c2-11e9-a767-d7ab84aef3e9_story.html?utm_term=
.d25f55aba44f.
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AVIATION SAFETY ISSUES
In addition to the accidents and safety incidents occurring
in U.S. aviation over the past year, below are descriptions of
several aviation safety issues being monitored by the
Subcommittee on Aviation. Congress addressed some of these
issues in the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 (Pub. L. 115-
254), signed into law on October 5, 2018. See APPENDIX 1 for a
list of several safety provisions included in the 2018 law.
I. CABIN EVACUATIONS
The Federal Aviation Regulations require that the design of
part 125 aircraft, by virtue of the locations and types of
emergency exits, must permit all passengers to evacuate the
aircraft within 90 seconds with half the exits blocked.\16\
Aircraft manufacturers such as Boeing and Airbus are
responsible for demonstrating to the FAA's satisfaction that
each new aircraft design meets this standard. These
manufacturers and global aviation safety regulators, including
the FAA and European Union Aviation Safety Agency, often rely
on computer analysis, rather than live evacuation drills, to
demonstrate compliance.
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\16\ See 14 C.F.R. Sec. Sec. 25.803, 25.807; 14 C.F.R. part 25,
app'x. J.
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Recent accidents have raised questions about whether all
passengers can, in fact, evacuate an airliner in 90 seconds,
given passenger behavioral shifts over the last decade and
failure to comply with evacuation instructions. For example,
the NTSB concluded that it took at least 2 minutes and 21
seconds--51 seconds longer than the FAA assumes--for 161
passengers to evacuate a lightly-loaded American Airlines 767-
300ER after an uncontained engine failure and fire at Chicago
O'Hare in 2016.\17\ In its January 2018 report on that
accident, the NTSB concluded that ``evidence of passengers
retrieving carry-on baggage during this and other recent
emergency evacuations demonstrates that previous FAA actions to
mitigate this potential safety hazard have not been
effective.'' \18\
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\17\ NTSB/AAR-18/01, Uncontained Engine Failure and Subsequent
Fire, American Airlines Flight 383, Boeing 767-323, N345AN, Chicago,
Illinois, October 28, 2016, at 27 (2018).
\18\ Id. at 66. The Board found that ``some passengers evacuated
from all three usable exits with carry-on baggage. In one case, a
flight attendant tried to take a bag away from a passenger who did not
follow the instruction to evacuate without baggage, but the flight
attendant realized that the struggle over the bag was prolonging the
evacuation and allowed the passenger to take the bag. In another case,
a passenger came to the left overwing exit with a bag and evacuated
with it despite being instructed to leave the bag behind.'' Id. at 65.
The Board recommended that ``the FAA conduct research to (1) measure
and evaluate the effects of carry-on baggage on passenger deplaning
times and safety during an emergency evacuation and (2) identify
effective countermeasures to reduce any determined risks, and implement
the countermeasures.'' Id. at 66.
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In addition to passengers' apparent propensity to evacuate
with their carry-on bags and film evacuation efforts, smaller
seat sizes in newly manufactured or refurbished aircraft may
affect cabin evacuation times. The FAA has not regulated seat
dimensions, having traditionally asserted that it is
responsible for regulating safety, not comfort, imposing
``minimum standards required in the interest of safety.'' \19\
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\19\ 49 U.S.C. Sec. 44701(a)(1).
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The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 requires the FAA to
review its aircraft cabin evacuation certification and report
to Congress with results and any recommendations for revisions
to the agency's assumptions and methods for assessing
evacuation certification.\20\ In addition, the law requires the
FAA to issue regulations establishing minimum dimensions for
passenger seats necessary for the safety of passengers.\21\
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\20\ Pub. L. No. 115-254, Sec. 337 (2018).
\21\ Id. Sec. 577.
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II. RUNWAY SAFETY
In multiple incidents in the span of six months, airliners
either landed or almost landed on taxiways or incorrect
runways. On July 7, 2017, an Air Canada flight crew lined up
with a crowded taxiway instead of the landing runway at San
Francisco International Airport and performed a go-around less
than 100 feet above the ground, narrowly missing the tail of a
Boeing 787 loaded with passengers and awaiting takeoff. On
November 29, 2017, a Delta Air Lines flight on approach to the
Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport in poor
visibility also lined up with a taxiway instead of the landing
runway and performed a missed approach at low altitude. And on
December 29, 2017, a Horizon Air flight on approach at night to
the Pullman, Washington, airport actually landed on the taxiway
instead of the runway.
The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 requires the FAA to
report to Congress on improving runway safety, which will
include a review of systems capable of detecting wrong surface
alignment and an assessment of technologies that could be used
at airports to provide a direct warning to flight crews or air
traffic controllers of potential runway incursions.\22\
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\22\ Id. Sec. 334.
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III. LITHIUM BATTERIES
Lithium batteries transported as cargo pose special risks
to the safety of flight. When ignited, either through self-
induced thermal runaway within a single cell or by an
independent source, they burn at extremely high temperatures,
and in some cases, traditional fire suppressants cannot
extinguish the ensuing fire. FAA testing in 2015 established
that if ignited, just eight lithium-ion batteries at 50 percent
charge in the cargo hold of a passenger airplane can and likely
will bring down the aircraft. Moreover, in a joint submission
to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
Dangerous Goods Panel in April 2015, the world's largest
airframe manufacturers cautioned that ``continuing to allow the
carriage of lithium batteries within today's transport category
aircraft cargo compartments is an unacceptable risk to the air
transport industry.'' \23\
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\23\ Int'l Coordination Council for Aerospace Industries Ass'ns,
Working Paper on Transport of Lithium Batteries as Cargo by Air, DGP-
WG/15-WP/4 (2015) (presented before the ICAO Dangerous Goods Panel).
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Recognizing the safety hazards associated with lithium
battery shipments, ICAO member states voted to ban bulk
shipments of lithium batteries from the cargo holds of
passenger jets in 2016 until safety regulators and airframe
manufacturers can understand more about preventing and
containing lithium-fed fires. ICAO member states are also
considering whether to ban portable electronic devices (PEDs)
in checked baggage, because lithium batteries in those devices
could catch fire and burn undetected. A U.S. submission in
October 2017 to the ICAO Dangerous Goods Panel stated that FAA
testing ``indicates that large PEDs in checked baggage mixed
with an aerosol can produce an explosion and fire that the
aircraft cargo fire suppression system . . . may not be able to
safely manage,'' leading to ``the loss of the aircraft.'' \24\
The Panel was unable to reach consensus and now is waiting for
further direction from the ICAO Council.
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\24\ Angela Stubblefield (FAA), Portable Electronic Devices Carried
by Passengers and Crew (Oct. 27, 2017), available at https://
www.icao.int/safety/DangerousGoods/DGP26/DGP.26.WP.043.2.en.pdf.
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Some have expressed concern that ICAO standards have not
kept pace with our growing knowledge of the safety hazards of
bulk shipments of lithium batteries in aircraft. The 2012 FAA
reauthorization act included a prohibition on any U.S.
rulemaking in excess of ICAO standards unless an accident has
occurred, where there is credible reporting that batteries were
present, not packed and transported in accordance with ICAO
technical instructions, and substantially contributed to the
initiation or propagation of onboard fire.\25\
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\25\ FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95,
Sec. 828 (2012). In 2010, UPS Flight 006, a Boeing 747-400F with a
cargo of lithium batteries, crashed in Dubai after an in-flight fire
propagated so quickly and generated such dense smoke that one pilot was
incapacitated and the other lost the ability to see flight instruments
and maintain controlled flight while maneuvering for an emergency
landing. In 2011, Asiana Cargo Flight 991, also a Boeing 747-400F with
a cargo of lithium batteries, crashed in the Korea Strait after the
crew reported an in-flight fire.
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While the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 did not address
the 2012 prohibition on U.S. rulemaking, the law requires the
FAA to conform U.S. regulations on the air transport of lithium
batteries with 2016 ICAO standards, banning them as cargo on
passenger aircraft.\26\ The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018
also directs the Secretary of Transportation to establish a
lithium battery safety working group to promote efforts related
to the promotion of the safe manufacture, use, and
transportation of lithium batteries and cells, in addition to a
lithium ion and lithium metal battery safety advisory committee
to facilitate communication between manufacturers, air
carriers, the Federal Government, and others regarding the safe
air transportation of lithium ion and lithium metal cells and
batteries and provide the Secretary with timely information
about new lithium metal battery technology and transportation
safety practices and methodologies.\27\
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\26\ Pub. L. No. 115-254, Sec. 333.
\27\ Id.
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IV. FLIGHT CREW REST
A. Cargo Pilots
In 2012, the FAA finalized a long-delayed rule to
strengthen restrictions on the amount of time airline pilots
can spend at the controls and on duty.\28\ The rule was one of
several required under the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation
Administration Extension Act of 2010 (Pub. L. 111-216), enacted
in response to the Colgan Flight 3407 accident. Notably, at the
end of a lengthy rulemaking process, the FAA determined that
the 2012 fatigue rule would apply only to pilots in all-
passenger operations and not to pilots at all-cargo carriers
such as FedEx and UPS. Although the FAA initially proposed to
apply the same flight and duty time limits to all airline
pilots, the FAA and the Office of Management and Budget
concluded after analysis that the costs of applying the new
limits to all-cargo pilots would inordinately exceed the
benefits.
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\28\ 77 Fed. Reg. 330 (Jan. 4, 2012).
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B. Flight Attendants
While pilots for U.S. commercial airlines must be provided
a rest period of at least 10 consecutive hours preceding a
flight duty period,\29\ the same is not true for flight
attendants, despite their important safety duties. The first
rule for flight attendant duty period limitations and rest
requirements was promulgated in 1994 \30\ and has not been
updated since. This rule allows a flight attendant to remain on
duty for 14 hours with only an eight-hour break between
flights.
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\29\ See 14 C.F.R. part 117.
\30\ 59 Fed. Reg. 42974 (Aug. 19, 1994). See also 60 Fed. Reg.
52625 (Oct. 10, 1995) (detailing the date of compliance with respect to
the duty limitations and rest requirements in the 1994 final rule).
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The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 requires a 10-hour
minimum rest period for flight attendants between duty periods,
establishing parity with pilots. The provision also requires
airlines to adopt and submit to the FAA for acceptance fatigue
risk management plans, similar to those adopted for pilots, to
reduce the incidence of fatigue among flight attendants.\31\
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\31\ Pub. L. No. 115-254, Sec. 335.
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V. AIRCRAFT CERTIFICATION
All aircraft and aviation products are subject to FAA
certification prior to their sale and use in the United States.
The FAA is responsible for regulating aviation safety, which
includes approving the U.S. design and manufacture of new
aircraft and aviation products before they enter service.\32\
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\32\ See 49 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 44702, 44704; GAO, Aviation
Manufacturing: Status of FAA's Efforts to Improve Certification and
Regulatory Consistency (July 31, 2014), GAO-14-829T, at 1.
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Since even before the FAA was formed over 60 years ago, the
Federal Government has delegated some safety certification
responsibilities to technical experts in the industry. As
airplanes, engines, and their constituent systems became
increasingly complex, Congress authorized the FAA to leverage
the product-specific knowledge among appropriately-qualified
employees of manufacturers to determine a new product's
compliance with the applicable provisions of the Federal
Aviation Regulations. A designee may receive authority to
examine, inspect, and test aircraft and persons for the purpose
of issuing certificates.\33\
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\33\ GAO-14-829T at 4.
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The delegation program allows the FAA to leverage limited
resources to focus on the areas of highest-risk and make timely
certification decisions. According to the Government
Accountability Office (GAO), in terms of the breadth or scope,
FAA designees are able perform more than 90 percent of FAA's
certification activities.\34\ However, the FAA has the ultimate
responsibility to oversee delegated activities and to certify
aircraft.
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\34\ GAO, Aviation Safety: FAA Efforts Have Improved Safety, but
Challenges Remain in Key Areas (Apr. 16, 2013), GAO-13-442T, at 3-4. In
a May 7, 2019, email to Committee staff, the GAO clarified that the 90
percent number refers to the breadth or scope of FAA activities on
which designees can do rather than the amount of certification work
done by designees.
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Following the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines accidents
described above, significant Congressional and public attention
has been placed on the FAA's certification and delegation
processes, including whether the agency is performing
sufficient oversight over these processes. The FAA
Reauthorization Act of 2018 included multiple provisions aimed
at improving these areas.
For example, the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018
establishes the Safety Oversight and Certification Advisory
Committee (SOCAC) comprised of various aviation stakeholders to
provide advice and recommendations to the Secretary of
Transportation on ways to improve the FAA's certification and
oversight processes; \35\ an expert review panel to assess
these activities; \36\ and a safety workforce training strategy
to ensure appropriate workforce training, identify a systems
safety approach to oversight, and foster an experienced and
knowledgeable inspector and engineer workforce, among other
things.\37\
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\35\ Pub. L. No. 115-254, Sec. 202.
\36\ Id. Sec. 213.
\37\ Id. Sec. 231.
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VI. FOREIGN REPAIR STATIONS
In several reports since 2003, and most recently in 2015,
the Department of Transportation (DOT) Inspector General (IG)
has identified weaknesses in the FAA's oversight of FAA-
certificated overseas repair stations where mechanics work on
U.S. air carriers' fleets.\38\ Specifically, ``[r]epair
stations conduct a range of repairs and maintenance, from
critical components--such as landing gear and engine
overhauls--to heavy airframe checks, which involve a complete
teardown and overhaul of the aircraft.'' \39\
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\38\ See Dep't of Transp. Office of Inspector General, FAA Has Not
Effectively Implemented Repair Station Oversight in the European Union,
Rpt. No. AV-2015-066 (2015); Dep't of Transp. Office of Inspector
General, FAA Continues to Face Challenges in Implementing a Risk-Based
Approach for Repair Station Oversight, Rpt. No. AV-2013-073 (2013);
Dep't of Transp. Office of Inspector General, Air Carriers' Outsourcing
of Aircraft Maintenance, Rpt. No. AV-2008-090 (2008); Dep't of Transp.
Office of Inspector General, Review of Air Carriers' Use of Aircraft
Repair Stations, Rpt. No. AV-2003-047 (2003).
\39\ Rpt. No. AV-2013-073 (2013), at 1 n.2.
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Airlines' spending on contract maintenance and repair
services nearly tripled between 1996 and 2011, the DOT IG
reported, rising from $1.5 billion in 1996 to $4.2 billion in
2011.\40\ Today, ``[i]t is estimated that nearly 50 percent by
dollar volume of maintenance work done by operators of U.S.
registered aircraft is done in . . . FAA certified repair
facilities located outside'' the United States, according to
one association.\41\ The DOT IG found in 2013 that the FAA's
repair station oversight ``lacks the rigor needed to identify
deficiencies and verify that they have been addressed.'' \42\
The DOT IG concluded that ``[u]ncorrected maintenance
deficiencies such as these could lead to the use of improperly
repaired aircraft parts on U.S. air carriers'' and that ``some
repair stations may not be operating in full compliance with
Federal aviation regulations.'' \43\
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\40\ Id. at 1.
\41\ Transport Workers Union, Risks Associated with Foreign Repair
Stations, May 21, 2018, available at https://www.twu.org/wp-content/
uploads/2018/05/Risks-Associated-with-Foreign-Repair-Stations.pdf.
\42\ Rpt. No. AV-2013-073 (2013), at 2-3.
\43\ Id. at 3.
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The FAA reauthorization acts in 2012 and 2016, through
several provisions, addressed the FAA's foreign repair station
oversight. For example, in 2012, Congress directed that
employees who perform safety-sensitive functions at foreign
repair stations be subject to a level of screening for drug and
alcohol use equivalent to the screening required in the United
States and consistent with the applicable laws of the country
in which the repair station is located.\44\ While the FAA
published in 2014 an advance notice of proposed rulemaking on
this subject,\45\ the agency has taken no further action to
date. In addition, in 2016, Congress required the FAA to ensure
that each foreign repair station worker who performs safety-
sensitive work has undergone a pre-employment background
investigation sufficient to determine that the individual is
not a threat to aviation safety.\46\ The FAA has not yet
implemented this mandate either.
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\44\ Pub. L. No. 112-95, Sec. 308 (2012) (codifying 49 U.S.C.
Sec. 44733).
\45\ 79 Fed. Reg. 14621 (Mar. 17, 2014).
\46\ FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016, Pub. L. No.
114-190, Sec. 2112(c).
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VII. INTEGRATION OF NEW ENTRANTS
A. Commercial Space
Commercial space transportation--the use of orbital and
suborbital vehicles owned and operated by private companies or
other non-Federal organizations \47\--moves objects such as
satellites and cargo, scientific payloads, and passengers to,
from, and in space.\48\ The FAA's Office of Commercial Space
Transportation (AST) is the office responsible for regulating
the launch and reentry components of the U.S. commercial space
transportation industry.
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\47\ FAA, Office of Commercial Space Transportation, Commercial
Space Transportation Industry,https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/
headquarters_offices/ast/industry/.
\48\ FAA, The Economic Impact of Commercial Space Transportation on
the U.S. Economy in 2009 at 8 (Sept. 2010).
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In addition to regulating this industry to protect public
health and safety, safety of property, and national security
and foreign policy interests of the United States, the FAA is
also required to encourage, facilitate, and promote the
industry. The FAA operated under a similar ``dual mandate''
with respect to civil aviation from its inception in 1958 until
1996, when investigations of the ValuJet Flight 592 and Trans
World Airlines Flight 800 accidents prompted Congress to
eliminate the FAA's statutory duty to ``promote'' as well as
regulate the civil aviation industry.
The FAA's responsibility for protecting people and property
on the ground and in U.S. airspace is critical. An accident
involving a spacecraft during launch or reentry can present a
serious risk to people on the ground. An example is the
wreckage of the Space Shuttle Columbia, which broke apart
during reentry on February 1, 2003. Parts of the shuttle were
scattered through East Texas, Louisiana, and Arkansas, with one
piece of wreckage--an 800-pound main engine piece--hitting the
ground at nearly 1,400 miles per hour, and another 600-pound
engine component impacting the ground with enough force to
create a six-foot crater.
To ensure public safety, the FAA accommodates commercial
space transportation launches and reentries by establishing
aircraft hazard areas across wide swaths of airspace. These
hazard areas generally preclude operations by aircraft for
several hours surrounding a launch window, which can result in
flight delays and ground stops. As launch cadences increase,
disruptions to NAS operations will become more frequent and
potentially more severe. The FAA is working with the aviation
and commercial space transportation communities to better
integrate, rather than accommodate, commercial space launches
into the normal operation of the NAS. With new technologies and
improved understanding of commercial space transportation
launch vehicle performance, the size and duration of hazard
areas can be reduced while maintaining and improving aviation
safety.
B. Unmanned Aircraft
Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), or drones, can be small
and lightweight, inexpensive, easy to operate, and equipped
with various technologies, such as cameras and infrared or
thermal sensors, that unlock a virtually unlimited number of
applications. While UAS have a large economic and social
impact, they can also pose a risk to the safety of the NAS. The
FAA receives more than 100 UAS sighting reports each month,\49\
although reports cannot all be verified.\50\ The volume of
reported sightings still reflects the continuing risk of
collision between UAS and manned aircraft near airports,
critical infrastructure, and over populated areas. While there
have been collisions between UAS and manned aircraft,\51\ no
resulting fatalities or injuries have been reported in the
United States.
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\49\ FAA, UAS Sightings Report, https://www.faa.gov/uas/resources/
public_records/uas_sightings_report/.
\50\ See GAO, Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, FAA Should Improve
Its Management of Safety Risks, GAO-18-110 (May 2018). The FAA informed
the GAO that it does not attempt to validate all UAS reports received
and that some of the reports may have in fact involved authorized UAS
operating in a safe manner.
\51\ For example, in 2017, a UAS collided with and damaged a U.S.
Army UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter near Staten Island, New York, and
another UAS struck a commercial plane with eight passengers onboard as
it approached Jean Lesage International Airport in Quebec City, Canada.
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A collision between a UAS and manned aircraft could be
catastrophic. In 2017, the FAA's Center of Excellence for UAS
Research, ASSURE, released the results of its first phase of
research evaluating the severity of the risk of collisions
between UAS and manned aircraft. The initial findings--based on
a collision between a small UAS and airframe parts only--showed
that a conventional aircraft's collision with even a small UAS
could result in severe damage to aircraft structures. The
structural damage would be greater than that caused by a bird
strike of an equivalent impact energy level.\52\
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\52\ See ASSURE, UAS Airborne Collision Severity Evaluation Final
Report (Nov. 2017), available at http://assureuas.org/projects/
deliverables/sUASAirborneCollisionReport.php.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 contained multiple
provisions aimed at reducing the safety risks that UAS can pose
to the NAS and its users.\53\ Most notably, the law establishes
a statutory framework for the regulation of model aircraft
flown for hobby or recreational purposes, including requiring
operators of these UAS to pass an aeronautical knowledge and
safety test and seek FAA authorization before flying in
controlled airspace (e.g., near airports). The framework
further allows the FAA to issue any requirement on these
operators necessary to ensure the safety and security of U.S.
airspace, which includes mandating their UAS be equipped with
specific technologies that allow for electronic identification
and tracking of the operator.\54\
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\53\ See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 115-254, Sec. 345 (establishing a
process for the FAA to accept risk-based consensus safety standards for
the design and production of UAS); Sec. 335 (authorizing funding for
the FAA's ``Know Before You Fly'' educational campaign to broaden UAS
safety awareness); Sec. 363 (prohibiting UAS from being armed or
equipped with dangerous weapons); Sec. 382 (creating a criminal
penalty for UAS interference with wildfire suppression or emergency
response efforts); Sec. 384 (creating a criminal penalty for UAS
interference with aircraft carrying one or more occupants).
\54\ See id. Sec. 349.
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WITNESSES
PANEL 1
Mr. Paul Njoroge, on behalf of the Families of
Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302, Husband of Carolyne Karanja,
Father of Ryan Njuguna, Kelli Pauls, Rubi Pauls, and Son-in-Law
of Anne Karanja, Victims of Flight ET302
Accompanied by Mr. Michael Stumo, Father of
Samya Stumo, Victim of Flight ET302
PANEL 2
Ms. Dana Schulze, Acting Director, Office of
Aviation Safety, National Transportation Safety Board
Capt. Joe DePete, President, Air Line Pilots
Association, International
Ms. Lori Bassani, National President, The
Association of Professional Flight Attendants
Mr. Mike Perrone, National President,
Professional Aviation Safety Specialists
Mr. John Samuelsen, International President,
Transport Workers Union
APPENDIX 1.
Summary of Select Aviation Safety Provisions Included in the FAA
Reauthorization Act of 2018 (Pub. L. 115-254).
Title II--FAA Safety Certification Reform
Sec. 202--Safety Oversight and Certification Advisory
Committee
This section establishes a Safety Oversight and Certification
Advisory Committee (SOCAC) comprised of various aviation
stakeholders and the FAA. The SOCAC is charged with providing
advice and recommendations to the Secretary of Transportation
to improve aircraft certification and oversight processes,
including workforce development, among other things.
Sec. 213--ODA Review
This section establishes an expert review panel to conduct a
survey of organization designation authorization (ODA) holders
and receive feedback on FAA's efforts involving the ODA program
and make recommendations to improve the program. The FAA is
required to submit a report to Congress on its findings.
Sec. 216--ODA Staffing and Oversight
This section directs the FAA to report on ways to identify and
improve ODA oversight staffing and resource needs.
Sec. 222--FAA Task Force on Flight Standards Reform
This section directs the FAA to establish the Task Force on
Flight Standards Reform comprised of industry stakeholders. It
is charged with providing recommendations for improvements to
flight standards processes, training for aviation safety
inspectors, and achieving regulatory consistency.
Sec. 231--Safety Workforce Training Strategy
This section establishes a safety workforce training strategy
designed to create an effective risk-based approach to safety
oversight, utilize best available resources, ensure appropriate
training, identify a systems safety approach to oversight,
foster an experienced and knowledgeable inspector and engineer
workforce, and seek knowledge-sharing opportunities between the
FAA and industry.
Title III--Safety
Sec. 303--Safety Critical Staffing
This section instructs the DOT Inspector General to conduct an
audit of the staffing model used by the FAA to determine the
number of aviation safety inspectors that are needed to fulfill
the mission of the FAA and adequately ensure aviation safety.
Upon the completion of this audit, the DOT IG is required to
report the results to Congress.
Sec. 305--Aircraft Data Access and Retrieval Systems
This section requires the FAA to conduct a study of aircraft
data access and retrieval technologies for commercial aircraft
used in extended overwater operations to determine if such
technologies provide improved access and retrieval of the data
in the event of an accident. The FAA is required to report to
Congress on the results of the study.
Sec. 307--Emergency Medical Equipment on Passenger
Aircraft
This section requires the FAA to evaluate and revise, as
appropriate, the regulations regarding the onboard emergency
medical equipment requirements, including the contents of the
first-aid kit. In conducting this evaluation, the FAA would
consider whether the minimum contents of approved emergency
medical kits include appropriate medications and equipment to
meet the emergency medical needs of children.
Sec. 308--FAA and NTSB Review of General Aviation
Safety
This section requires the FAA and NTSB to study general
aviation safety, including a review of all general aviation
accidents since 2000. Based on the results of this study, the
FAA, in consultation with the NTSB, shall make recommendations
to address general aviation safety issues, protect persons and
property on the ground, and improve the safety of general
aviation operators. These recommendations should subsequently
be submitted in a report to Congress.
Sec. 309--Call to Action Airline Engine Safety Review
This section directs the FAA to initiate a Call to Action
safety review for airline engine safety with stakeholders to
discuss best practices and implement actions to address airline
engine safety. The Administrator will submit a report to
Congress on the results of the review.
Sec. 311--Part 135 Accident and Incident Data
This section requires the FAA to determine, in collaboration
with the NTSB and part 135 industry stakeholders (commuter, on
demand or air tour operators), what, if any, additional data
should be reported as part of an accident or incident notice.
The FAA shall then submit a report to Congress on its findings
in an effort to more accurately measure the safety of on-demand
part 135 aircraft activity, to pinpoint safety problems, and to
form the basis for critical research and analysis of issues for
more risk-based, data driven safety oversight.
Sec. 315--Aviation Rulemaking Committee for Part 135
Pilot Rest and Duty Rules
This section establishes a rulemaking committee comprised of
industry representatives, labor organizations, and safety
experts to review and provide recommendations on pilot rest and
duty rules for operations in part 135. The section further
requires the FAA to submit a report to Congress on the
committee's findings and issue a notice of proposed rulemaking
based on the consensus recommendations of the committee.
Sec. 317--Helicopter Fuel System Safety
This section requires that all newly manufactured helicopters
meet certain standards to improve helicopter fuel system crash
resistance within 18 months of the bill's enactment.
Sec. 318--Applicability of Medical Certification
Standards to Operators of Air Balloons
This section requires second-class medical certifications for
operators of a commercial air balloon.
Sec. 320--Voluntary Reports of Operational or
Maintenance Issues Related to Aviation Safety
This section requires the FAA to automatically accept voluntary
disclosures of operational or maintenance issues submitted
under the Aviation Safety Action Program even if they have not
undergone a review by the event review committee; however,
these disclosures will have disclaimers that they have not gone
through review. If the event review committee determines that
the disclosure fails to meet criteria for acceptance, the
disclosure will be rejected.
Sec. 324--Comptroller General Report on FAA
Enforcement Policy
This section directs the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
to conduct a study on the impact of a June 2015 order changing
FAA's Compliance Policy and report to Congress on whether
reports of safety incidents increased and whether reduced
enforcement penalties increased the overall number of safety
incidents that occurred.
Sec. 325--Annual Safety Incident Report
This section requires the FAA submit for the next six years an
annual report to Congress describing the FAA's safety oversight
process, the risk-based oversight methods applied to ensure
aviation safety, and in the instance of specific reviews of air
carrier performance to safety regulations, a description of the
cases where the timelines for recurrent reviews are advanced.
Sec. 326--Aircraft Air Quality
This section directs the FAA, in consultation with relevant
stakeholders, to establish and make available on a website,
educational materials for flight attendants, pilots, and
aircraft maintenance technicians on how to respond to incidents
on board aircraft involving smoke or fumes. This section also
requires the FAA to issue guidance on reporting incidents of
smoke or fumes on board an aircraft, and requires the FAA to
commission a study by the Airliner Cabin Environment Research
Center of Excellence on bleed air in the cabins of commercial
aircraft.
Sec. 328--Report on Airline and Passenger Safety
This section requires the FAA to submit a report on airline and
passenger safety, including the overall use, age, and flight
hours of commercial aircraft, the impact of metal fatigue on
usage and safety, a review of contractor assisted maintenance,
and a re-evaluation of rules regarding inspection of aging
airplanes.
Sec. 330--Report and Recommendations on Certain
Aviation Safety Risks
This section directs the FAA to submit a report that identifies
safety risks associated with airport power outages and
recommends actions to improve resilience of aviation systems in
such events, and reviews alert systems for pilots and air
traffic controllers in the event of a failure of runway lights
and provides recommendations on further implementation of these
systems.
Sec. 333--Safe Air Transportation of Lithium Cells
and Batteries
This section directs the Secretary to ensure shippers of
lithium ion and lithium metal batteries for air transport
comply with ICAO Technical Instructions and Hazardous Material
Regulations in the U.S. and work with international partners to
ensure enforcement of regulations. It also allows exceptions
for transportation of medical device batteries, and it
establishes the Lithium Ion Battery Safety Working Group and
the Lithium Battery Air Safety Advisory Committee to facilitate
communications between and among key stakeholders regarding the
effectiveness and economic impacts of regulation of the
transportation of lithium ion cells and batteries.
Sec. 334--Runway Safety
This section requires the FAA, in consultation with the NTSB,
to submit a report to Congress on improving runway safety.
Sec. 335--Flight Attendant Duty Period Limitations
and Rest Requirements
This section requires the FAA to ensure a flight attendant
scheduled to a duty period of 14 hours or less is given a
scheduled rest period of at least 10 consecutive hours. The
rest period cannot be reduced under any circumstances, and
airlines are also required to develop fatigue risk management
plans for flight attendants.
Sec. 336--Secondary Cockpit Barriers
This section requires the FAA to issue an order requiring the
installation of secondary cockpit barriers on all new passenger
aircraft.
Sec. 337--Aircraft Cabin Evacuation Procedures
This section requires the FAA to review the evacuation
certification of transport-category aircraft. In conducting
this review, the FAA is required to consult with the NTSB,
relevant aircraft manufacturers, air carriers, and other
relevant experts and Federal agencies, and is required to
review relevant data with respect to evacuation certification.
At the review's conclusion, FAA must submit a report to
Congress.
Sec. 339A--National In-Flight Sexual Misconduct
Onboard Aircraft
This section establishes a Task Force comprised of relevant
stakeholders and federal agencies to develop recommendations
for air carriers in regard to training, reporting and
collecting of data for incidents of allegations of sexual
misconduct that occur on flights.
Sec. 339B--Reporting Process for Sexual Misconduct
Onboard Aircraft
This section directs the Attorney General to establish a
streamlined reporting process for the reporting of incidents of
alleged sexual misconduct onboard aircraft.
Title IV--Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Sec. 349--Exception for Limited Recreational
Operations of Unmanned Aircraft
This section creates a framework for the safe operation of
recreational unmanned aircraft, including operating
requirements, aeronautical knowledge and safety testing, and
the qualifications for community-based organizations that
support recreational activities. The section allows the FAA to
regulate any unmanned aircraft in order to ensure the safety
and security of the National Airspace System.
STATE OF AVIATION SAFETY
----------
WEDNESDAY, JULY 17, 2019
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Aviation,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in
room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Rick Larsen
(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Larsen. The subcommittee will come to order.
I ask unanimous consent the chair be authorized to declare
a recess during today's hearing. Without objection, so ordered.
I ask unanimous consent that Members not on the
subcommittee be permitted to sit on the subcommittee for
today's hearing and ask questions. Without objection, so
ordered.
Good morning, and thank you to today's witnesses for
joining the subcommittee's hearing today on the state of
aviation safety.
Recent tragic aviation incidents at home and abroad have
shed new light on what is required to ensure the safety of the
traveling public.
In addition, the integration of new entrants, such as
drones, into the national airspace now present new safety and
security challenges.
Last Congress this committee passed the Federal Aviation
Administration or the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018,
bipartisan legislation which set a solid foundation to improve
the safety of the Nation's airports, pilots, crew, and
passengers.
Today's hearing is an opportunity to get the public's
perspective on current risks and challenges facing our aviation
system and necessary safety improvements.
This testimony will also shape our priorities as we
continue our investigation into the Boeing 737 MAX and the
oversight of the FAA's implementation of last year's FAA
reauthorization bill.
For the sake of time, I am just going to speak first about
panel two, and then shift to the first panel.
So later this morning, we are going to hear from a second
panel, and this fall the committee will discuss the
implementation of the FAA Reauthorization Act.
So later at today's hearing, the subcommittee will hear
from witnesses on that second panel who are on the front lines
of aviation and are critical to ensuring the safety of U.S.
aviation. Their testimony will help us prioritize issues for
oversight on that legislation.
So from the NTSB, when they testify about recommendations
outlined in the NTSB Most Wanted List of Transportation Safety
Improvements, I particularly want to hear about part 135 flight
ops and ensuring the safe integration of new technologies.
As Congress works to improve the pipeline for the next
generation of pilots, debate continues on the strong pilot
training rules requiring 1,500 hours of flight time mandated
after the Colgan crash.
Congress cannot undermine our safety rules simply to
respond to market forces of supply and demand. If there is a
pilot shortage, I am interested in hearing ALPA's thoughts on
ways to address that without sacrificing safety.
Flight attendant fatigue is a pressing aviation issue;
however, the FAA continues to delay the implementation of a
mandate requiring at least 10 consecutive hours of rest for
flight attendants between duty periods. So I want hear from the
Association of Professional Flight Attendants about the
immediate and long-term impacts of that inaction.
And as evidenced by recent events, the FAA certification
process is critical to aviation safety. So Professional
Aviation Safety Specialists can shed more light about that role
of safety inspectors and engineers in the process and
improvements that are necessary to ensure the safety of U.S.
aircraft.
And last week Chair DeFazio and Vice Chair Davids,
Congressmen Davis and Ferguson and I introduced the Fair and
Open Skies Act to prevent foreign air carriers from exploiting
a ``flag of convenience'' to avoid the regulation of the home
countries or otherwise undermine labor standards.
So when we get to the panel, I would appreciate
Transportation Workers Union, as well as ALPA and APFA's,
support of this bill and on behalf of the committee would like
to hear more about the importance of maintaining strong labor
protections on safety.
I now want to turn to the first panel.
The issue of the 737 MAX is not just about stakeholders in
the aviation industry. This committee is a public body and
therefore has a responsibility to hear from those most
impacted, which, unfortunately, includes at times of tragedy.
And on today's first panel are Mr. Paul Njoroge and Mr.
Michael Stumo, who both lost family in the Ethiopian Airlines
flight 302 or ET 302 crash, which itself claimed the lives of
157 people.
Chair DeFazio and I asked Mr. Njoroge to testify today on
behalf of ET 302 families and to give a voice to the 157
victims of that tragic accident.
Mr. Njoroge and Mr. Stumo, I can't imagine the immeasurable
grief that you and your families are experiencing. So on behalf
of the entire committee, for Members here today and for those
who can't join us, I want to extend our sincerest condolences
to both of you and your families and all the families during
this very difficult time, and we appreciate your willingness to
come testify in front of our committee.
Your testimony is a crucial reminder of the international
role the U.S. aviation system operates within. These crashes
occurred on U.S.-made, U.S.-assembled, U.S.-regulated
airplanes. The FAA's actions and this committee's efforts
clearly have implications for travel around the world.
A majority of the victims of ET 302 and Lion Air 610 were
not Americans, and therefore it is only right to hear from
someone who can better represent the global community impacted
by these tragedies.
So I want to thank you, Mr. Njoroge, for coming in from
Canada last night. Thank you for meeting with us, with Ranking
Member Graves and I last night as well. Mr. Stumo as well.
And I want to as well recognize Tor Stumo, who is here,
Michael's son and Nadia's son.
Tomra Vecere is in the audience and her husband Charles.
She lost her brother Matthew as well.
And there are, of course, many other family members who are
not here but are certainly represented in our thoughts, our
prayers, and in today's testimony.
With that, I want to turn to the ranking member, Garret
Graves, for opening comments.
[Mr. Larsen's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Rick Larsen, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Washington, and Chair, Subcommittee on Aviation
Good morning and thank you to today's witnesses for joining the
Subcommittee's hearing on the ``State of Aviation Safety.''
Recent tragic aviation incidents at home and abroad have shed new
light on what is required to ensure the traveling public's safety.
In addition, the integration of new entrants, such as drones, into
the national airspace presents new safety and security challenges.
Last Congress, this Committee passed the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) Reauthorization Act of 2018, bipartisan
legislation which set a solid foundation to improve the safety of the
nation's airports, pilots, crew and passengers.
Today's hearing is an opportunity to get the public's perspective
on current risks and challenges facing our aviation system and
necessary safety improvements.
The testimony will also help shape our priorities as we continue
our investigation of the Boeing 737 MAX and oversight of the FAA's the
implementation of last year's FAA reauthorization bill.
This fall, the Committee will discuss the implementation status of
the FAA Reauthorization Act.
Later on during today's hearing, the Subcommittee will hear from
witnesses on the second panel, who are on the frontlines of aviation
and are critical to ensuring the safety of U.S. aviation. Their
testimony will help us prioritize issues for oversight on the
legislation.
I look forward to hearing more from the National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB) about the recommendations outlined in the NTSB Most
Wanted List of Transportation Safety Improvements for 2019-2020,
particularly on Part 135 flight operations and ensuring the safe
integration of new technologies.
As Congress works to improve the pipeline for the next generation
of pilots, debate continues on the strong pilot training rules
requiring 1,500 hours of flight time mandated after the Colgan crash.
Congress cannot undermine an airline safety rule simply to respond
to the market forces of supply and demand.
If there is a pilot shortage, I am interested in the Air Line
Pilots Association (ALPA)'s thoughts on ways to address it without
sacrificing safety.
Flight attendant fatigue is a pressing aviation safety issue.
However, the FAA continues to delay the implementation of mandate
requiring at least 10 consecutive hours of rest for flight attendants
between duty periods.
I would like to hear more from the Association of Professional
Flight Attendants (APFA) about the immediate and long-term impacts of
this inaction.
As evidenced by recent events, the FAA's certification process is
critical to aviation safety. Professional Aviation Safety Specialists
(PASS) can shed more light about the role safety inspectors and
engineers in this process and improvements that are necessary to ensure
the safety of U.S. aircraft.
Last week, Chair DeFazio, Vice Chair Davids, Congressmen Davis and
Ferguson and I introduced the Fair and Open Skies Act, to prevent
foreign air carriers from exploiting a ``flag of convenience'' to avoid
the regulations of their home countries, or otherwise undermining labor
standards.
I appreciate TWU's, as well as ALPA and APFA's, support of this
bill and the Committee will hear more about the importance of
maintaining strong labor protections on safety.
The issue of the 737 MAX is not just about stakeholders in the
aviation industry.
This Committee is a public body and therefore has a responsibility
to hear from those most impacted, which unfortunately includes at times
of tragedy.
On today's first panel are Mr. Paul Njoroge and Mr. Michael Stumo,
who both lost family in the Ethiopian Airlines flight 302 (ET302)
crash, which claimed the lives of 157 people.
Chair DeFazio and I asked Mr. Njoroge to testify today on behalf of
the ET302 families and to give a voice to the 157 victims of that
tragic accident.
Mr. Njoroge and Mr. Stumo, I cannot begin to imagine the
immeasurable grief you and your families are experiencing.
On behalf of the entire Subcommittee, for Members here today and
those who cannot join us, I extend our sincerest condolences to you and
your family during this difficult time.
We appreciate your willingness to join our discussion on this
important issue.
Your testimony is a crucial reminder of the international role the
U.S. aviation system operates within.
The crashes occurred on U.S.-made, assembled and regulated
airplanes.
The FAA's actions and this Committee's efforts have implications
for travel around the world.
A majority of victims of the ET302 and Lion Air JT610 crashes were
not Americans, and therefore it is only right to hear from someone who
can represent the global community impacted by these tragedies.
Thank you for your advocacy.
As always, this Subcommittee's top priority is safety.
It is our job to provide the resources and oversight necessary to
ensure the safety of the U.S. aviation system.
Again, thank you again to today's witnesses and I look forward to
your insights.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you for holding this hearing today.
First, and most importantly, I want to express my
condolences, and I think on behalf of everyone here, for the
loss that you have experienced. And I appreciate the time and
dedication that you have committed yourself to, to ensuring
that every single lesson learned from this can be extracted,
and, most importantly, that no one ever has to go through this
again.
You know, there are some amazing statistics about aviation
travel. We can sit here and talk about how since 2000, I think
it was--no, excuse me--since 1997--since 1997 there has been a
95-percent reduction in aviation accidents. And you can look at
the World Health Organization statistics talking about how
there are 1.35 million deaths and up to 50 million injuries due
annually to road crashes. In comparison, there was 1 death for
every 3 million flights in aviation.
And so we could sit back and say, look, these statistics
are great, things are going well. But that is absolutely,
absolutely not appropriate. And we are going to continue to
ensure that we learn every single thing that we can, because
the hundreds, over 300 lives that were lost and the experience
that you all are going through is completely unimaginable to
me.
We met last night and I made a commitment to you that the
process that was used to certify this aircraft will not in any
way be used to unground these aircraft.
And I look forward to hearing from you. I know that you all
have committed an extraordinary amount of time to ensuring that
every single thing that we can learn from this, every single
step in this process, can be thoroughly examined to ensure that
as we move forward, that no other family has to go through this
again. And I just want to reiterate the commitment that we
made.
We are going to take every lesson learned, no matter how
painful, no matter the change that it requires, and ensure that
appropriate solutions are put in place, not just for this
aircraft but for all aircraft moving forward, and ensuring that
these lessons learned are shared with the international
community.
I know we have a number of stakeholders that are here
today, pilots, we have some of the service technicians, we have
the flight attendants and others that are represented, a lot of
other stakeholders that I think have important perspective.
But I want to thank you very much for being here today.
Your all's strength and power has been absolutely amazing
through this.
And, Tor, thank you for being here as well. It was great to
meet with you last night.
And I look forward to hearing from your testimony in the
second panel as well.
[Mr. Graves of Louisiana's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Garret Graves, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Louisiana, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Aviation
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling today's hearing.
I want to express my condolences, on behalf of everyone here today,
to the witnesses, families, and friends of those lost in the two Boeing
737 MAX accidents. We appreciate your time and dedication in working to
ensure no one else ever has to go through the unimaginable experience
you are enduring.
We are all aware of how safe aviation is--in general. For example,
according to the World Health Organization, worldwide there are 1.35
million deaths and up to 50 million injuries annually due to road
crashes. In comparison, worldwide there was one fatality for every
three million commercial passenger flights in 2018.
And we could sit here all day and talk about statistics, but that
absolutely is not appropriate today, and that's not why we are here.
Our witnesses today didn't lose statistics.
I maintain my promise to those here today and others, we will leave
no stone unturned in the process for safely ungrounding these aircraft
and ensuring this doesn't happen again.
We need to learn every lesson possible from these accidents and put
in place any solutions necessary, not just for this aircraft, but for
the aviation system as a whole. Despite the progress we have made in
safety, we can never stop striving for safer skies in the United States
and around the world.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for holding today's hearing.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Representative Graves.
The Chair recognizes the chairman of the full committee,
Mr. DeFazio.
Mr. DeFazio. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
And again, thanks, to the families who are here today for
having the bravery to testify and to persevere as we move
forward.
We lost 346 lives in 2 flights in 5 months, and that is why
it is so fitting that you are here today to represent those
lives, those families.
You know, I have been on this subcommittee a long time. And
back when I was first on the subcommittee, we had what we
called the tombstone mentality at the FAA. Too often we were
chasing after an accident to figure out what steps should have
been taken, what maintenance should have been required, what
went wrong.
And I tried for a number of years to say, you have got this
archaic mandate from the thirties that was moved over from the
Civil Aeronautics Board to the FAA, that you both promote and
regulate the industry. That was when it was a nascent industry.
It is a mature industry, I would say, and I think that there is
a conflict. And I was told, no, there is no conflict, no
conflict.
And then I had--we were doing an FAA bill, and actually I
offered an amendment to strip the promotional authority. I lost
here in the committee. It was not in the Senate bill either.
But then ValuJet went down, and suddenly it was, hmm, there are
some problems here with oversight, maintenance, sub-
subcontracting, all these things.
And I got a phone call--I was a pretty junior Member--
saying, you know that amendment you offered?
Yeah, I said, the one that was rejected.
Well, where would we put it in the bill?
And I got about 90 percent of what I wanted in that bill to
strip FAA of its promotional duties and focus them on what they
are supposed to be doing, is keeping people safe.
And it took a number of years, really, for that to--you
know, there is like the agency--you know, it has memories, and
there were people there. It took a while. But we had been doing
pretty well.
And then along comes ODA. And when it was first offered, I
said, I don't understand how this is going to work, and what
are the firewalls between the Boeing person who works for
Boeing and the Boeing person who works supposedly in the public
interest for the FAA?
I voted against it when it first went forward, but then
when we got around to reauthorization, it seemed like it was
working pretty well. We knew we didn't have enough FAA
inspectors to do proper oversight. We raised concerns about
that during the reauthorization.
But now we see that there are very, very significant
questions being raised in this matter. The committee is
involved in a very in-depth investigation, in addition to other
investigations, and the Justice Department and inspector
general and others are undertaking into how this all happened.
And we will be hearing from Boeing in the future when we
finish going--we have received a trove of documents, and we are
poring through them. So that is a work in progress.
But we are here today to talk about some concerns that are
ongoing and hear from the families.
There are a few other things in that bill that the FAA has
stonewalled. Flight attendant rest, fought for that for years.
Mike Capuano did a great job, got it in the bill. We held it,
against the wishes of some of the airlines and those in the
Senate, and we persevered.
But now the FAA is slow-walking that, saying, well, gee, we
can't do that until 2020. I understand one of the airlines is
pushing really, really hard to not allow flight attendants to
get proper rest.
Secondary barriers, we got that in. We know now, which I
guess a lot of us hadn't thought about, that you hardly ever
have a new type. I mean, there is a 50-year-old plane, and it
is still the same type. And the industry tried to say, we will
only have secondary barriers in new types of planes.
You know, I fly a lot, and the flight attendant behind the
food cart with their arms crossed is not much of an obstacle to
getting into the flight deck.
So, again, we are pushing hard to make certain that the FAA
goes forward.
There are others that weren't properly addressed. Lithium
batteries. We have already lost two freighters to lithium
battery fires.
Foreign repair stations, been raising that issue for a
couple of decades now. They are not properly overseen by the
FAA. Some problems with the State Department, other issues.
They don't have drug testing, they don't have alcohol testing,
they don't have background checks.
And then finally, of course, the stupid Government shutdown
and all the damage that caused at the FAA, the disruption it
caused at the FAA. And we had legislation that would rectify
that to draw on the Airport and Airway Trust Fund, which has
more than $7 billion in it, and not have more dumb shutdowns of
the FAA.
So there is still work to be done, and this committee will
leave no stone unturned as we go forward to make things better
and safer in the future.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Mr. DeFazio's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in
Congress from the State of Oregon, and Chair, Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure
Thank you, Chair Larsen, for calling today's hearing on aviation
safety.
Ensuring the safety of our nation's transportation systems is the
most important job of this Committee, and today we will hear about many
areas in which safety needs to be improved.
Although fatal commercial aviation accidents in the United States
have fallen by 95 percent since 1997, we must do better. In the span of
five months, 346 lives were tragically lost abroad in the Lion Air
Flight 610 and Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 accidents, both involving
U.S.-manufactured aircraft. That is why it is fitting that we will
begin today's hearing with testimony offered on behalf of the families
of those whose lives were lost on Ethiopian Airlines flight 302.
To that end, I would like to welcome Mr. Paul Njoroge and Mr.
Michael Stumo.
It is important this Committee and the public hear from those whose
lives have been forever altered by these accidents. I know that Chair
Larsen will introduce you both in just a moment, but I wanted to
express my heartfelt condolences for your loss. Thank you for being
here on behalf of the families of those who died on Ethiopian Airlines
flight 302. I sincerely admire your bravery and appreciate your
advocacy before Congress.
Please know that for decades I have been a staunch safety advocate,
and have time and time again opposed the ``tombstone mentality'' in
transportation. Meaning, we cannot afford to wait for accidents to
occur to make travel and our transportation system safer, across all
modes.
As Chairman, I will always remain vigilant and make certain the
Committee conducts vigorous oversight of the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) and the aviation industry, and is prepared to
respond when needed to protect the safety of our airspace, its users,
and those on the ground. And our work extends across borders; we must
ensure the safety and integrity of products designed and made in the
United States to be shared with those around the world.
So as the investigations into the probable cause or causes of the
Ethiopian Airlines flight 302 and Lion Air flight 610 accidents
continue, and this Committee continues examining the role of the FAA's
oversight, certification, and delegation processes in these events, we
cannot and must not stop there.
Twenty-three years ago today I (along with Congressman Lipinski's
father) introduced a bill that would strip the FAA's authority to
``promote'' the industry. It is also 23 years ago to the day that TWA
flight 800 crashed into the Atlantic killing all 230 crew and
passengers onboard.
I said then, and I will say it now, that the FAA's primary mission
must be to ensure the safety of aviation--our skies, planes, crews and
the flying public. My bill became law, but it unfortunately took a
tragic accident and loss of lives. I think it is worth noting that this
is something that the Committee is investigating now. As a critical
safety regulator, the FAA must not promote the industry it oversees,
but the recent events into the fatal MAX accidents on U.S.-certified
aircraft call this into question: is FAA still playing a role to
``promote''?
This Committee is committed to ensuring the highest level of
aviation safety and will strive for zero deaths in air transportation.
We must continuously explore ways to identify and address other safety
challenges facing our aviation system.
To this end, just last year, we were able to enact the longest FAA
reauthorization in decades that included dozens of provisions that will
enhance aviation safety. We will have an opportunity today to hear from
some stakeholders on what progress has been made--and where the FAA is
falling short in meeting its statutory mandates.
Some of these key safety provisions include a mandate that flight
attendants receive a minimum of 10 hours of rest between duty periods
and a requirement that the FAA review its cabin evacuation assumptions
to ensure safe evacuation during an emergency.
Flight attendant rest: While pilots for U.S. commercial airlines
must be provided a rest period of at least 10 consecutive hours
preceding a flight duty period, the same is not true for flight
attendants, despite their important safety duties.
The law requires the FAA to close this gap, ensuring flight
attendant rest is on par with commercial airline pilots. However, the
FAA has not yet implemented this mandate and doesn't plan to take
action until the spring of 2020 despite being directed to implement the
provision more than eight months ago. While the FAA is not here to
defend its delays today, we will bring the agency up very soon. As
Chairman of this Committee, I will not sit by idly and watch the FAA
fail to act.
Secondary barriers: Another key provision requires all newly
manufactured aircraft to have a secondary cockpit barrier. I am pleased
to hear that the FAA is interpreting this provision as Congress
intended--in that it applies to every new plane rolling off the
assembly line, and not just newly type-certificated aircraft as some in
industry have proffered. We have learned during our investigation into
the 737 MAX that seldom is a transport category aircraft given a new
type-certificate. So it would not make sense to have this critical
safety and security provision tied only to a new plane certified a
decade from now. It must be apply to every plane that is manufactured.
And while the FAA agrees with this interpretation, I am concerned that
the agency is slow-walking this mandate.
Our work does not stop here. There were many critical issues--for
which I have been advocating for years--that were not included or
adequately addressed in last year's law, such as the risks posed by
lithium batteries.
Lithium batteries: Current law foolishly prohibits the FAA from
imposing regulations greater than the lowest common denominator of
international guidelines unless there has been an accident. This is the
perfect example of the ``tombstone mentality'' that we should not
tolerate.
If ignited, just eight lithium batteries at half-charge can bring
down an airplane, according to the FAA's own testing. In fact, I went
up to the FAA Technical Center in New Jersey with the Committee earlier
this year and saw first-hand what these batteries can do. You don't
need 800 pounds of lithium batteries to bring down a plane. You just
need eight. I will not give up this fight until this prohibition is
repealed.
Foreign repair stations: In addition, I have been concerned for
years over the FAA's lax oversight over overseas aircraft repair
stations. Report after report from the Department of Transportation
Inspector General has detailed deficiencies in FAA oversight and
monitoring of foreign repair stations that continually perform more and
more critical safety work on U.S.-registered aircraft.
Congress included in the 2012 and 2016 reauthorization laws
requirements that the FAA issue rules requiring safety-sensitive
workers at foreign repair stations be subject to alcohol and substance
abuse screening and background investigations, just as workers at U.S.
facilities are. However, to date, the FAA has failed to implement these
important mandates. We will continue to explore ways to ensure parity
between U.S. and foreign entities, which will enhance the overall
safety of our system.
Shutdown bill: I would also like to take this opportunity to talk
about legislation that Chairman Larsen and I introduced earlier this
year, H.R. 1108, the ``Aviation Funding Stability Act of 2019.'' This
bill would ensure all FAA programs function uninterrupted and that all
FAA employees remain at work and paid during any future lapse in
appropriations.
Our aviation system is the largest, busiest, and safest system in
the world. I can say, without a doubt, that our system was weakened
each day the FAA was shut down earlier this year--the safety; the
security; and the overall health of U.S. aviation was put at risk. And
unfortunately, the effects of the shutdown--the longest in U.S.
history--will be felt for years to come.
The FAA plays too critical of a role in ensuring the safety of the
traveling public to be shut down again, and it is our responsibility to
make sure that nothing stalls the FAA's safety efforts, particularly
the failure of Congress to do its job.
I will conclude by saying that there is nothing that this Committee
does that is more important than its safety work. I look forward to
hearing from the witnesses. Thank you and I yield back.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
The Chair recognizes the ranking member of the full
committee, Mr. Graves of Missouri.
Mr. Graves of Missouri. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
calling the hearing.
I want to join my colleagues in expressing my sincere
condolences to the family and to the friends of the victims of
both Lion Air flight 610 and Ethiopian Airlines flight 302.
You know, none of us can truly understand the pain and
sorrow that they are going through. And we thank you for being
here today to share your perspective with the subcommittee as
we continue to review the impacts of these two terrible
tragedies.
There is no doubt in my mind that all of us share the
common goal of seeking the safest aviation system and striving
to improve it here in the United States, and all over the
world, for that matter. And our efforts in this regard, they
have to be constant, they have to be consistent, and they have
to be constructive. This means mitigating risks and developing
contingencies in all of the areas.
And to this end, I am pleased that we will also hear today
from the NTSB as well as labor organizations. These unions
represent the men and women who are operating, maintaining, and
servicing U.S. airlines, as well as those regulating and
inspecting U.S. airlines and manufacturers every single day.
Their views are going to assist us in our understanding of the
state of aviation safety in the United States and abroad.
And I also look forward to testimony from the many other
aviation stakeholders and from the Federal Aviation
Administration directly on the state of aviation safety that is
coming up at a future hearing.
Again, I want to thank the family members for being here
and express my condolences.
And with that, I yield back.
[Mr. Graves of Missouri's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Sam Graves, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Missouri, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling today's hearing.
I want to join my colleagues in expressing my sincere condolences
to the families and friends of the victims of both Lion Air flight 610
and Ethiopian Airlines flight 302. None of us can truly understand the
pain and sorrow you are enduring. We thank you for being here today to
share your perspective with the Subcommittee as we continue to review
the impacts of these two terrible tragedies.
There is no doubt in my mind that all of us share the common goal
of seeking the safest aviation system and striving to improve it here
in the United States and around the world. Our efforts in this regard
must be constant, consistent, and constructive.
This means mitigating risks and developing contingencies in all
areas. To this end, I am pleased that we will also hear from the
National Transportation Safety Board as well as labor organizations.
These unions represent the men and women operating, maintaining, and
servicing U.S. airlines, as well as those regulating and inspecting
U.S. airlines and manufacturers every day. Their views will assist our
understanding of the state of aviation safety in the U.S. and abroad.
I also look forward to testimony from the many other aviation
stakeholders and from the Federal Aviation Administration directly on
the state of aviation safety at a future hearing.
I again want to thank the family members for being here and express
my condolences.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
We will now move to testimony.
Just for the committee members, Mr. Njoroge will be
testifying, and Mr. Stumo will be here in support and may be
available to answer questions as well. Mr. Njoroge will be
testifying.
Just since this is your kind of first time--first time for
everybody--be sure you are up to the microphone, that it is
turned on. And if it is pointed at your chin, it is probably
better for the sound.
And then as well, although we tend to limit to 5 minutes,
in agreement with talking to Mr. Njoroge, if he is going to go
over 5, we are not going to hold him to a fast 5 on this.
So we will let you testify until you are done and then move
to questions.
Mr. Njoroge, you are recognized.
TESTIMONY OF PAUL NJOROGE, ON BEHALF OF THE FAMILIES OF
ETHIOPIAN AIRLINES FLIGHT 302, HUSBAND OF CAROLYNE KARANJA,
FATHER OF RYAN NJUGUNA, KELLI PAULS, RUBI PAULS, AND SON-IN-LAW
OF ANN KARANJA, VICTIMS OF FLIGHT ET302, ACCOMPANIED BY MICHAEL
STUMO, FATHER OF SAMYA STUMO, VICTIM OF FLIGHT ET302
Mr. Njoroge. Thank you, Chairmen Larsen and DeFazio and
Ranking Members Graves and Graves, for allowing me to testify
today.
The Boeing 737 MAX crashes killed my wife, my three
children, my mom-in-law, and 341 others. Today I speak not only
with my voice, but the voices of my departed family, my mom-in-
law, and the other 341 victims.
My wife Carol was a dedicated homemaker and a full-time
accountant who wanted to change the world through God's Child
education in marginalized communities of Kenya.
My 6-year-old son Ryan was a super intelligent boy who was
fascinated by the galaxy and aspired to be an astronaut.
My 4-year-old daughter Kelli's singing delighted everyone.
My 9-month-old daughter Rubi was bubbly and a joy in our
family.
And my mom-in-law Ann was a retired teacher who for over 40
years who has shaped the world of young men and women through
her teaching and counseling.
I think about their last 6 minutes a lot. My wife and my
mom-in-law knew they were going to die. They had to somehow
comfort the children during those final moments, knowing they
were all their last. I wish I was there with them.
It never leaves me that my family's flesh is there in
Ethiopia mixed with the soil, jet fuel, and pieces of the
aircraft.
In Canada, Independence Day was celebrated on July 1. I
stayed buried in my little house in my grief, hearing the
sounds of celebration and fireworks in the sky, but all I could
think about was the 737 MAX struggling to gain height and
eventually diving to the ground, killing my whole family and
152 others.
If my wife, my children, and my mom-in-law were alive, they
would have enjoyed all family activities on Canada Day. Every
minute of every day, they would be all around me full of life
and health. I miss them every minute of every day.
On April 4, 3 weeks after the deaths of my family in what I
have since learned is a shameful pattern of behavior by Boeing
and airplane manufacturers, Boeing shifted focus from the root
cause of the crashes, which is the design flaws in the 737 MAX
and MCAS, and started talking about foreign pilot error. This
distracted from correcting the real causes of the crashes and
is an insult to humanity.
Boeing and their apologists want to shift scrutiny from
their single-minded quest for short-time profits over safety
and place it on foreign pilots who, like domestic American
pilots, were left in the dark by Boeing.
Would they have used the term ``domestic pilot error'' if
the crash happened in the United States? The term ``foreign
pilot error'' is utter prejudice and a disrespect to pilots and
Boeing customers across the world.
Boeing used this fallacy of foreign pilot error to avoid
the grounding of the 737 MAX after the crash of Lion Air flight
610 on October 29 last year. That decision killed my family and
152 others in the crash of Ethiopian Airlines flight 302 4
months later.
The FAA should have known that the failure to have triple
redundancy in critical safety systems could cause crashes and
death. They recklessly left Boeing to police itself.
The families demand that the 737 MAX8 be fully recertified
as a new plane because it is too different from the original
certified plane. We demand that simulator training be required.
Recertification must take place in combination with a full
legislative fix for the aviation safety system.
The FAA clearly needs a budget sufficient to fulfill safety
obligations. The U.S. Senate should only confirm a new FAA
Administrator if that person agrees to safety reforms.
Boeing should not be allowed to act like a mere investment
company extracting wealth to supercharge their holder returns
at the expenses of safety and quality. Their leadership should
change in favor of engineering safety focus.
Other safety critical industries have early warning system
data collection with immediate responsiveness. The FAA and
aviation industry need to have such systems in place.
If Boeing's wrongful conduct continues, another plane will
dive to the ground killing me, you, all your children, all the
other members of your family. It is you who must be the leaders
in this fight for aviation safety in the world.
Now, future hearings of this committee should include those
who wrote the MCAS software, technical dissenters,
whistleblowers, safety engineers, and families. You hear
multiple testimony from pilots and unions. We, the victims'
families, need to continue to be included in these hearings.
Thank you for allowing me to speak today.
[Mr. Njoroge's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Paul Njoroge, on behalf of the families of
Ethiopian Airlines flight 302, husband of Carolyne Karanja, father of
Ryan Njuguna, Kelli Pauls, Rubi Pauls, and son-in-law of Ann Karanja,
victims of flight ET302
Thank you Chairman Larsen and Chairman DeFazio, and thank you
Ranking Members Sam Graves and Garret Graves, and all Distinguished
Members of this Committee for allowing me to testify before you today.
My name is Paul Njoroge and I come before you with a broken heart.
It is not something that this Committee or that Congress can fix, but I
push myself every day to try to do something in the memory of my
family, my entire family that was killed in the second Boeing crash in
Ethiopia. My wife, Carolyne, a wonderful mother to our children, and
who we talked about getting old together. Our three children, Ryan, six
years old with the whole world ahead of him as he dreamed of being an
astronaut one day. Kelli, just four years old, and the light of
everyone's eye. And little nine-month-old Rubi, a baby who sat on her
mommy's lap who I wish I could hold just one more time. I have
nightmares about how they must have clung to their mother, crying,
seeing the fright in her eyes as they sat there helplessly. And there
was nothing I could do to save them. My mom in law sat beside them with
tickets I had purchased for them that was to be a trip of a lifetime. I
paid for plane tickets that was to be a safe flight. I did not know all
of the information of which Boeing knew about how dangerous that plane
was yet the corporation allowed 157 people to board that dangerous
plane that could not land safely. I never knew it would be the last
time I would ever see them.
I miss their laughter, their playfulness, their touch. I am empty.
I feel that I should have been on that plane with them. My life has no
meaning. It is difficult for me to think of anything else but the
horror they must have felt. I cannot get it out of my mind.
But I speak for more than myself who are trying to cope with this
insufferable loss. I speak for all of the families who lost loved ones
whom they will never see again and who were tragically torn from their
lives because of reckless conduct on the part of so many, particularly
Boeing, a company who became steadfast in its single-minded quest to
place blame on so-called ``foreign pilots.'' Since the first Max8 crash
in October, Boeing began a pattern of behavior blaming innocent pilots
who had no knowledge and were given no information of the new and
flawed MCAS system that could overpower pilots. No manual, no training,
no information was provided to pilots on how that new MCAS system
worked, yet they were put in those cockpits and expected to know what
to do. Instead of accepting responsibility and informing pilots around
the word, Boeing continued its blame game on pilots, to shift focus
from its own responsibilities until the second plane crashed. Then the
world turned its focus on those who were really culpable. It could no
longer be denied by Boeing.
Little did passengers around the world know of the close
relationship that Boeing had with the FAA. So close that apparently the
FAA was allowing Boeing to certify planes, like the Max8, for flying
without supervising those doing the certification. The FAA should have
known that the failure to have triple redundancy in critical safety
systems could cause crashes and death. This has to become part of an
improved FAA, checking safety and certification requirements. No
excuses can replace this necessity. The FAA allowed a flawed software
package to rely upon data from a single angle of attack sensor. These
sensors have a relatively high rate of error, a rate that normally
would require at least two levels of redundancy. Not only was this
redundancy mandate not followed, the FAA and Boeing did not simulate
sensor failures when testing the 737 MAX8.
The families demand that the 737 Max8 be fully recertified as a new
plane because it is too different from the original plane designed at
the beginning of the Vietnam War. The FAA's practice of grandfathering
old designs and granting waivers on new designs has significant human
costs. Boeing persuaded the FAA to certify the Boeing 737 MAX8 as a
737, a plane designed in 1966. The 737 has a low fuselage compared to
modern planes. The low fuselage is a relic from more than 50 years ago
when staircases to the tarmac were the method of getting passengers on
and off planes. Boeing wanted to incorporate bigger and more fuel-
efficient engines to compete with Airbus. But it also wanted to
minimize its certification and training costs. The problem with these
new engines was that they could not fit under the 737's wings. Rather
than scrapping the 1960's design in favor of a modern design, Boeing
fit the engines onto the old fuselage by moving them up and forward.
This caused the plane to be prone to handle differently than the older
737s and nose up in unfamiliar ways. Boeing's response was the now-
infamous MCAS software to take control of the plane in ways the pilot
would not detect.
We demand that the FAA require simulator training, as do airline
passenger groups, and the famous pilot, Captain Chesley ``Sully''
Sullenberger. After the two crashes, the FAA surprisingly proposed only
requiring an hour-long iPad tutorial for cost reasons and the simple
fact that only two 737 MAX simulators exist in North America, Boeing
and the FAA are resisting this basic requirement that could have
prevented these two crashes. The lack of foresight and greed behind
this inadequate training hurts the core of my very being. I will never
understand how any person, how any corporation, can be so selfish and
so sightless in its duty to allow passengers to travel safely from one
place to another.
As an investment professional, allow me to inform Congress as to
how Boeing has viewed this whole crisis--only through the lens of its
stock price and the security of their executives' jobs. By focusing
only on cutting costs and spending profits to pump up the stock price,
rather than reinvesting in safety, Boeing's CEO has managed to steer
the company's stock (NYSE:BA) from a price of $140 on July 1, 2015 to
last week closing price of $365. Some investors and traders might have
even banked higher profits when the price reached $446 some days before
the second March 10 crash of its Boeing 737 Max8 in Ethiopia.
But, let me give my thoughts about how the stock price has moved
exponentially since late 2016. Although the first 737 MAX planes were
delivered in May 2017, by the end of 2012, the company had received
2,500 orders for these planes. This translated to expected revenues
totaling to $140 billion. Boeing's executives at the time started
employing an aggressive equity-repurchase program; $2.8 billion in 2013
and $6.0 billion in 2014. And when Boeing's current CEO took over in
2015, the stock-repurchase dollar values started to swell even
further--$6.8 billion in 2015, $7.0 billion in 2016, $9.2 billion in
2017, and $9.0 billion in 2018. And in December 2018, barely two months
after the crash of the Boeing 737 Max8 in the Java Sea., the board
authorized repurchase of NYSE:BA stock worth $20 billion in 2019. By
March 10, $2.3 billion worth of stock had been repurchased. And after
the 737 MAX was grounded, on April 24, 2019, Boeing's CEO and his
executive team realized that the company's revenues were at risk, and
so they suspended the stock repurchase program.
Boeing increased dividends by 10.2 percent in Q1 2013, 50.5 percent
in Q1 2014, 24.7 percent in Q1 2015, 19.8 percent in Q1 2016, 30.3
percent in Q1 2017, 20.4 percent in Q1 2018 and 20.2 percent in Q1
2019. Over the last six years, Boeing has revised the revenues and
earnings guidance a number of times; all these based on the expected
and realized revenues from the sale of the poorly designed 737 MAX
plans. All these actions; the aggressive share-repurchase program, the
dividends increase, the revisions of revenues and earnings guidance,
had an enormous signaling effect to investors. The Boeing executive
team knew that such actions would cause excitement on Wall Street, and
continually increase the company's stock price. Boeing acted as a
financial company rather than a provider of safe and innovative
airplanes. Management cut safety engineers, captured the FAA,
outsourced aggressively to foreign countries, and avoided
recertification of the 737 MAX as a new plane.
I know that CEO Dennis Muilenberg and Boeing's executive team have
been the primary beneficiaries of this strategy to extract wealth from
this storied company. They have benefited from the stock-based
compensations. They also have benefited from bonuses based on company
performance; with this performance significantly being boosted by the
revenues from the sale of the 737 MAX planes. Could that be the reason
Boeing did not feel obliged to ground the MAX even after the second
crash of the Boeing 737 Max8? Do Boeing executives now understand why I
and many others across the world have said that the entire Boeing team
focused on profits, stock price and overall company financial
performance at the expense of the safety of human life? Did the lure of
numbers make Boeing lose sight of its fundamental responsibility, which
is to ensure that all of its planes are safe to fly? Back to my very
essential question; why wasn't the Max8 grounded in November after the
first crash in the Java Sea? One hundred and eight nine lives were
lost, and executives at Boeing cared more about its stock price than
from such a tragedy occurring again.
I and other families want any recertification to take place only
after all investigations are completed. Any future ungrounding must not
precede a full legislative fix of the FAA and the aviation safety
system. Indeed the FAA should be taking the lead to fix its captured
status. Recertifying the MAX without a legislative fix would represent
Congress' and the FAA's endorsement of the system as is. Congress
cannot continue allowing Boeing to unduly influence the FAA, avoiding
safety engineering oversight and cutting corners.
FAA has jeopardized its standing as the global leader in aviation
safety. Boeing has surrendered its top spot in global commercial
airplane manufacturing to Airbus. How else can the FAA and Boeing
regain its status in the world of aviation unless it has guaranteed a
full investigation and a full fix of these issues?
The Congress should require that the FAA return to the Designate
Engineering Representative (DER) which existed before the supervision-
free delegation of the Organization Designation Authorization (ODA)
system was implemented in 2005. The DER system allowed the safety
culture of aviation engineering be supervised by and to report problems
directly to FAA, without being silenced or intimidated by company
managers and their timeline and financial pressures. While the Acting
FAA Administrator estimated that eliminating the entire Organization
Designation Authorization system would cost the FAA $1.8 billion and
would require 10,000 more employees, but that cost estimate is not
relevant to returning to the DER system. But if an even more
substantial FAA overhaul costed $1.8 billion per year, with over 950
million flights per year in the United States alone, that cost
represents less than $2 per flight. My point is that fundamental safety
improvements are affordable and well within our reach.
The U.S. Senate should only confirm a new FAA Administrator if the
nominee agrees to safety reforms. Any nominee for FAA Administrator who
does not unequivocally agree to safety reforms at the FAA is not
qualified to serve as the leader of this critical organization. The FAA
surrenders too much of its authority to Boeing, and if Congress decides
to endorse the FAA's status quo, Congress would be surrendering its
authority to Boeing as well. The problems are known. Congress cannot
punt on this issue any longer. The credibility of the US aviation
system, and perhaps Boeing itself, cannot survive a third crash.
FAA should establish an effective system requiring manufacturers,
airlines, pilots and others in the industry to report potential safety
problems or defects as an ``early warning system.'' Other safety
critical industries have early warning system data collection with
immediate responsiveness, so those industries can prevent deaths rather
than respond to them. In 2002, Congress required the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration to enact early warning procedures. Motor
vehicle manufacturers and equipment manufacturers are required to
report information that will help NHTSA identify defects related to
motor vehicle safety. The FAA and aviation industry need to mandate
such systems in place.
As the Boeing CEO and other senior executives certainly enjoyed
their July 4th holiday watching fireworks in the skies with their
families. All I could think of in Canada on July 1, a day celebrated
much like July 4th in America, was of the deadly skies of Bishoftu,
Ethiopia, of a 737 Boeing Max plane repeatedly taking control from the
pilots to push the nose down and eventually crashing into the ground at
500 miles an hour. Nothing was left but a crater. I sat huddled in a
small apartment, not being able to return to my house ever. I thought
of all the celebrations I will be missing with my family. No more
birthdays, no more anniversaries, no more holidays, no weddings for my
children, no grandchildren. Boeing has never reached out to families
about the impossible sorrow and grief we will carry for our entire
lives. Instead they have a press relations strategy to apologize to
cameras and propose half-baked promises to give $100 million to local
governments and nonprofit organizations.
Future hearings of this Committee should include testimony from
those who wrote the MCAS software, technical dissenters, whistle
blowers, safety engineers and, in every hearing, families who each have
their own grief to explain to this Committee. You hear multiple
testimony from pilots, associations, unions, and government agencies. A
true investigative hearing would include these persons with direct
knowledge who are not presenting oral organizational press releases.
Thank you.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Njoroge, for your testimony,
your moving testimony, and your recommendations.
We are going to now, as we discussed yesterday, we will
move to questions. And we will go one at a time, each side. I
am not sure if all Members have questions for you, but I will
start.
And I know you have come with some recommendations for the
committee to consider, and I wanted to ask you specifically
about your written testimony and the issue of the changes that
we have made about 14 years ago in what we call the ODA, in the
Organization Designation Authorization. And I wanted to give
you a chance to amplify your oral testimony with your written
testimony.
Can you explain, at least in your mind, the change that you
think the committee ought to be making and why we ought to be
making any changes to that authority.
Mr. Njoroge. Michael, do you want to----
Mr. Larsen. And it is fine if Michael wants to answer as
well, that is fine.
Mr. Njoroge. Then I will supplement it later.
Mr. Larsen. That is fine.
Mr. Njoroge. Thank you.
Mr. Stumo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We, as families, have become not experts, but we do have
some opinions. And we are in touch with a lot of the families
from both crashes all over the world, and we will continue
providing input and recommendations. It is not just us, but all
the families, because we want to include all of them.
And our understanding at this point--and I have talked to
Boeing safety engineers who have been in the system back in the
DER program versus--and through the transition to ODA. It was
explained to me like this.
There have always been timeline pressures and financial
pressures, but under the older DER program, when, of course,
Boeing still paid these engineers but they reported to FAA,
there were two lines of authority, two chains of command, one
up through the FAA side, one through the Boeing side, and the
safety culture could put a stop to things if something looked
wrong.
After the ODA system--and I am not sure this is entirely
clear from the black-and-white text of reading about these
systems--after the ODA system there was only one chain of
command up through Boeing. It was very difficult for the safety
culture to stop something, and that was a big change.
Group think was encouraged. Being creative in fault tree
analysis, thinking about what could go wrong and documenting it
and preventing against it, you were encouraged not to be
terribly creative or you might have to find another--they might
encourage you to go find another place to work elsewhere maybe
in the company.
So that is our understanding of going back to ODA, is that
dual chain of command. There may be others.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
Anything to add, Mr. Njoroge?
Mr. Stumo. Sorry?
Mr. Larsen. Anything to add, Mr. Njoroge?
Mr. Njoroge. Well, yeah, essentially what we are saying
with the ODA program, it is that Boeing has an oversight of
itself.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
I am going to turn to Mr. Graves, recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you.
When I gave an opening statement, I talked about
statistics. You both being here today and the conversations
that we have had make it clear that these aren't statistics,
that these are lives, these are family members, and it is
something that--it is a message that cannot be overstated to
us.
Again, I want to thank you for your strength. I want to
thank you for your resilience and your commitment to ensuring
that no family has to go through this ever again. And it
doesn't matter if we get to 99.9 percent improvements. If there
is one life, if there is one injury, we need to keep striving
to make sure that we get to perfection.
And I just want to say it again, any process to unground
this aircraft, as far as I am concerned, will not be allowed to
resemble the process that was allowed for these accidents to
occur. In fact, I can't even call them accidents. These
disasters.
So thank you very much, both, for being here. And I want to
remind you that my door is open, my phone is open at any time,
and I look forward to continuing a dialogue with you. But thank
you very much for your recommendations.
Mr. Njoroge. Thank you.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
The Chair recognizes Mr. DeFazio for 5 minutes.
Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Njoroge, I read your entire testimony. It is very, very
thoughtful, compelling.
And you are an investment professional, and one of your
observations is about the pressures from Wall Street, the
concerns regarding how executive compensation is determined on
stock price and stock buybacks.
Would you like to just comment on that a little bit, since
you didn't--you abbreviated your testimony for oral purposes,
which we appreciate. But would you like to perhaps elaborate on
that a little bit or at least make that point?
Mr. Njoroge. Sure. Thank you.
Basically, when companies repurchase their own stock, they
try to send a message out there to the investors that, we are
bullish about our own company, we believe that our financial
performance is good.
And it seems that since the CEO, Dennis Muilenburg--
obviously, before that, they still had the equity repurchase
program going on. But since he took over, the numbers, the
dollar values of the repurchase of the stock went up.
And I do believe it is in 2017 when they started selling
the 737 MAXes, their revenues swelled, the revenues were
growing. And earnings were growing as well. And they decided,
while we have a good amount of retained earnings, we can throw
the money out there. And the stock price--obviously, when you
send those--the signal, in effect, to the Wall Street, the
stock price will keep going, because investors will keep buying
the stock.
And the beneficiaries of these are actually the executives,
because they benefit from equity compensation; that is, the
exercise of stock options.
We also saw them raising their revenues and earnings
guidance. And obviously this was based on the expectations of
the sale of the 737 MAX. We saw them increase dividends.
You rarely see a company that increases dividends and at
the same time continues to repurchase their own stock. When
that happens, then the company is so bullish about their own
achievements, and they just want the stock to keep going.
Mr. DeFazio. Thank you for that.
So the money that they used for repurchasing, it is not
constrained in any way, they could spend that money for--on
personnel or plant equipment or anything else. Is that correct?
Mr. Njoroge. Well, yeah. And I really felt that when the
board of directors authorized the repurchase of stock, what,
$20 billion, that was in December of 2017--December of 2018--
that is just a couple of months ago, about 6 months ago, that
was barely 2 months after the crash of Lion Air flight 610. So
at that point, they knew that there were safety concerns with
their jet, and they should have invested on safety instead of
repurchasing stock.
Mr. DeFazio. Yeah. I recently read--and this is something
we are looking into--but a news story where they were laying
off senior engineers and hiring contractors, some paid less
than $10 an hour, in dispersed locations around the world,
which is obviously hard to supervise and integrate in
developing software for this airplane.
And that, when you talk about the amount of money that they
had on a discretionary basis that they could use for bonuses or
dividends or buybacks, it raises some real concerns. So thank
you for expanding on that.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
What we have now going forward is a few other Members have
some questions for you. And so we are going to go a little out
of order in that regard.
Ms. Davids from Kansas, who is the vice chair of the
subcommittee.
Ms. Davids. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to the ranking
member of the committee and the full committee.
First I want to start off by saying thank you to everybody,
who I know is in the middle of a grieving process right now,
for being here.
This is an intimidating place to be in general, and to take
the time to come and force everyone who sits on this committee
and all of us who sit in Congress to stop and think about--we
hear a lot about the stakeholders in this. Certainly everyone
who gets onto a plane is a stakeholder in this.
And so your voice is just as important here as the people
who are in the industry, making money, and running businesses.
So I appreciate you.
Mr. Njoroge. Thank you.
Ms. Davids. As someone who is on this committee, I am very
committed to a thoughtful review of the entire process that is
going on for us to--you know, the responsibility that we have
as Members of Congress is not just to legislate, but also to
perform oversight functions to keep people safe.
And when I read through your testimony, there are two
things I would love to hear. Both of you speak about actually,
one, you talked a little bit already about who we should hear
from, that the testimony should be from, the engineers and from
executives and whistleblowers and everybody.
I would love to hear you talk a little bit more about that
in the context of how do we make sure that you have the trust
of the industry? Because so much of this is built on trust. And
this is where we see a breakdown of that trust?
The fact that you have to talk about earnings and
statements and bringing your professional capacity of
understanding that stuff into a conversation that really
centers on how do we keep people safe is, I think, part of the
trust conversation.
And then the other thing, when I read your testimony, the
fact that you said that Boeing has never reached out to the
families really stuck out to me. And I would like to hear you
comment on that publicly, because I think that is really
important.
Mr. Njoroge. Well, I will answer the second question first.
Boeing, they have been in front of cameras acknowledging
that there were mistakes in the installation of MCAS. Obviously
they don't talk about the flaws in the design of the 737 MAX.
And they have apologized to the families in front of cameras.
Now, they know who the next of kin of these victims are,
but they have not come to us and they have not apologized in
person. Ethiopian Airlines did send letters to us, not to
apologize, but to offer their sympathies and their messages of
condolence.
So the expectation is--you know, it is hard to trust Boeing
with their apologies, given that they have not reached out to
us. And I do believe that they did that in the days leading up
to the Paris Air Show, because it is for commercial reasons. I
believe it is a publicity stunt, that they just appeared on
cameras to apologize to the families.
Mr. Stumo. I think the families are in agreement that
Boeing's apologies to cameras have not been apologies to the
families.
We were in Ethiopia, our family, after the crash, and the
Ethiopian Airlines sent letters, they invited us in, they were
reaching out directly. And so it was very much warmer.
And the recent offer of $100 million to something seemed
like a PR stunt to us. They never reached out to families to
discuss what the needs of the families are.
And on the future hearings, the technical dissenters should
be heard from, those who dissented from a potential group think
force consensus process at FAA, if any. If the committee has
identified any, the public should hear them, not just the
investigators.
Any whistleblowers who may have been fired and maybe have a
gag order pursuant to a settlement, who have complained about
safety issues with regard to the 737 MAX should be called to
testify with protective subpoenas so the public can hear what
they had to say and what their experience is.
And the aviation software writers, do they have the same
level of engineering safety culture that regular engineers,
aviation safety engineers. We are getting more software in
these planes. In this case it took control of the plane and
pushed it into the ground.
We need triple redundancy in every part of these systems as
they merge with software and hardware. And do software writers
really have that kind of culture? We need to hear who wrote
that software and what they have to say and what their culture
is.
Mr. Njoroge. And, well, to just reinforce what Michael
said, for this committee to have achieved its objective, and
that objective is to do a thorough investigation as to what
happened within Boeing and the FAA, the weakness in their
internal oversight processes that a jet that is flawed was
designed, certified, and allowed to fly. Then we need to hear
from the technical dissenters, from the whistleblowers, the
safety engineers as well.
Ms. Davids. Well, I will just close by saying thank you,
again, Mr. Njoroge and Mr. Stumo, for coming here and being the
voices that are sharing with the Members of Congress what we
need to do to make sure that the trust of the folks who are
getting onto planes exists.
Thank you.
Mr. Njoroge. Thank you.
Mr. Larsen. Just two more Members, Mr. Lynch and Ms. Craig.
So I will call on Mr. Lynch for 5 minutes from Massachusetts.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks for holding
this hearing. And I thank the ranking member as well.
Mr. Njoroge, thank you so much for coming here, and Mr.
Stumo, for giving voice to your loved ones who cannot speak for
themselves.
I also want to thank Ms. Milleron, Nadia, Michael's wife,
for spending about an hour with me after the last hearing and
talking about her daughter Samya.
I know that Tor and Adnaan are here, Samya's brothers.
And I know that Tomra Vecere is here on behalf of her
brother Matt, who also perished.
I want to thank you all for, first of all, being willing to
come here and express your grief and trying to hold us all
accountable--Boeing, the FAA, and Congress--for our
responsibility in this.
I also want to thank you for your courage, in turning your
tragedy, your loss, into something that might benefit the
general public, by making this real, by putting this on us and
holding our feet to the fire to make sure that we take every
step possible to correct this situation going forward.
In my earlier conversations with Nadia, Michael--and I know
this is something that Mr. Njoroge has raised as well--at our
last hearing, we heard from Captain Sullenberger regarding the
retraining of pilots during the recertification process and
once that certification process begins, if and when this 737
MAX8 is allowed to resume flights.
And there is a controversy or some difference of opinion of
whether the training for those pilots--or retraining for those
pilots--should be conducted by simulator or--which is what
Captain Sullenberger recommended--or whether it should be
allowed to occur by computer, a simple computer program.
And I know that Nadia had some strong opinion on it. I
think there is a need to make sure we get this right. And I am
not sure--I know that inadvertently, you have delved into some
of the issues. I see some of the recommendations that you have
made here in your opening testimony.
What are your thoughts on the requirement that we make sure
that, in light of the fact that we had reports that the
aircraft was acting like a bucking bronco, how important do you
think it is that we give each and every pilot the full
knowledge and experience on a simulator versus allowing them to
be retrained on a computer, if you will?
Mr. Njoroge. Well, first of all, Boeing should never be
allowed to conceal information from the aviation industry, from
the pilots and the public, because they did that with MCAS.
Eight days after the crash of Lion Air flight 610, they
issued a flight operations manual bulletin. And even after,
knowing that 189 people died, they did not mention MCAS, they
did not want to mention the software.
And that means they were just trying to conceal the
information, because when you talk of MCAS, then you talk of
the design flaws in the 737 MAX.
And a lot of times in our lives, we tend to rely on
experiences of other people. And when Captain Sullenberger
spoke, he said that even knowing that--even--he knew that
what--he knew what would happen. And so when he was trying to
do the simulator thing, he got to understand why the pilots
could not control that aircraft. And that means that just that
iPad training is not enough at all.
And so what I would like--my recommendation is that the
pilots should go through a simulator training, and the flights
operations manual should always disclose everything that is in
an aircraft.
And that should never happen again. I mean, that is
criminal. Why would you conceal information of an important
software that can take control of the plane? And that is what
happened, MCAS took control of that plane, the pilots could not
recover it, and it just dived to the ground.
So that is something that this committee should look into.
Mr. Lynch. Michael.
Mr. Stumo. Thank you for the question.
You know, this plane, we definitely want simulator
training, as families. My wife and I came to Washington after
Samya's death far earlier than we would ever want to, because
we heard that the Flight Standardization Board was proposing
another hour of computer or iPad training as the remedy for
pilot training after our daughter died. And we were very
unhappy and worried that there was going to be a rush to
unground this plane. Plus the comment period, instead of 30
days, was 14 days.
And so we got involved then, even though we weren't ready
to do so. And we had a meeting with FAA early, and we got
families to sign a letter requesting that that comment period
be extended so that we could comment and say this is
insufficient, we need simulator training. And the FAA was
gracious enough to grant that extension of time to comment. And
we did, and other members of the public submitted comments that
simulator training is needed.
And as Captain Sullenberger said, when you have an
undisclosed, or at the very most, partially disclosed, software
system that can take control from the pilots and cause
startling things to happen in the cockpit, the simulator didn't
make sense to me. What he said, that doing the simulator
training is far better than one of many checklists; you have to
get it into your muscle memory when those startling things
happen, and you don't have much time to react.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you.
I thank the chairman for his indulgence, and I yield back.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
We have one more Member. It is Ms. Craig from Minnesota.
And after she is done, we are just going to do a 5-minute
transition to the next panel.
So Representative Craig from Minnesota, 5 minutes.
Ms. Craig. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Stumo and Nadia, it is great to see you here again.
Thank you for giving me time to speak with you and to talk
about how we honor your daughter Samya's memory with action,
because that is what we need to do.
Mr. Njoroge, I can't imagine the pain that you are enduring
with the loss of your wife and your children. But thank you for
finding the strength to testify here today.
I want to continue focusing on what more we can do to
develop those robust post-market--after these planes are out
and they are bucking like broncos, as my colleague said, what
more we can do to make sure that we have a robust system for
identifying these red flags before crashes occur.
I keep wondering how an industry fundamentally rooted in
safety can lack robust mandatory reporting requirements by
manufacturers, pilots, mechanics, et cetera.
In the last hearing, I asked about the Aviation Safety
Action Program and the Flight Operations Quality Assurance and
whether these operational reporting schemes were catching the
mechanical malfunctions or red flags in this country.
I also have wondered how Boeing could not be required by
law to compile and publish near-miss malfunctions. It is hard
to believe that not a single pilot anywhere in the world went
head to head with this malfunctioning MCAS system, overcame the
software, landed with information about that experience, and
that the public did not know that.
I worked for a company that produced pacemakers, before I
came here, that control irregular heart palpitations, machines
that by design are there to save lives. Yet we had those kind
of robust reporting requirements. Why don't the airlines and
manufacturers?
Mr. Njoroge and Mr. Stumo, you testified in support of the
FAA creating a system that would require manufacturers,
airlines, pilots, and others to develop this kind of early
warning system.
The industry, though, has advocated in favor of the
Aviation Safety Action Program and the Flight Operations
Quality Assurance Reporting Systems.
Do you think these are currently enough? And what other
changes do you think the FAA must incorporate for all parties
to be held accountable for putting safety first and make sure
adverse events don't go unreported or unnoticed?
Mr. Stumo. Thank you for that question.
We, as the families, at least my family and others we have
talked to, do think that a more robust early warning system is
necessary, rather than to state, oh, it has been a long time
since there has been a crash, that is really good. But if you
have a 99.9-percent safety record, that is 1 crash every 1,000
flights, which we don't have. But that is not good enough.
And I know that in other critical safety industries--or I
have heard, I am not an expert--that there is that mandatory
reporting. There is not only the reporting, but you need a
system that can analyze and recognize patterns and then have
some ability to get in front of those patterns.
And I know you have had experience with that in the medical
device industry, where the combination of software and hardware
interact, indeed more often the software fails than the
hardware.
We have talked to a former Administrator of NHTSA who said
that there was some sort of an auto--mandatory reporting in the
auto industry and an analyzing of those records. It may very
well be, I don't know, that there is a more mature reporting
and analysis on the auto side. I don't know the state of that
program right now.
But there is a lot of information to collect besides GPS
data and where these planes are on these functions. And for us,
we wish the FAA had gotten ahead of it and not--you know, I am
sure they are doing their job as best they can, but to get
ahead of it. And like it was said, that it was Mr. DeFazio
said, we now have 346 tombstones. If it is a tombstone agency,
let's make some changes, and that is part of it.
Ms. Craig. Thank you.
Mr. Njoroge, do you have anything to add?
Mr. Njoroge. Not at the moment. Thank you.
Ms. Craig. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Larsen. Mr. Njoroge, Mr. Stumo, and the families, thank
you very much for being willing to testify today. I want to
commend to the Members your written testimony. If everyone has
not had a chance to read the written testimony, it is equally
compelling.
What you offered us today is not just additional pathways
for us as a committee to explore in our oversight. More
importantly, you are putting a face to what can seem to the
outside to be a very bureaucratic, very step-by-step, very
incremental investigation.
But your presence is a reminder to all of us that the
flying public, the individuals who get on these airplanes, the
families who get on these airplanes, are much more important
than the other folks that we tend to listen to around here. And
I appreciate your willingness to spend some time with us to
remind us of that.
Thank you very much.
With that, the committee will excuse, and we will do a
transition for 5 minutes.
Thank you.
Mr. Stumo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Njoroge. Thank you.
[Recess.]
Mr. Larsen. We will get started.
I would like to welcome our witnesses to the second panel.
Ms. Dana Schulze, Acting Director, Office of Aviation
Safety of the NTSB; Captain Joe DePete, president of Air Line
Pilots Association, International; Ms. Lori Bassani, national
president, the Association of Professional Flight Attendants;
Mr. Mike Perrone, national president, Professional Aviation
Safety Specialists; and Mr. John Samuelsen, international
president, Transport Workers Union.
Thank you for being here today. We do look forward to your
testimony.
In my opening statement, I made comments about what I would
like to hear from each of you. And without objection, though,
our witnesses' full statements will be included in the record.
And since your written testimony has been made part of the
record, the subcommittee requests that you limit your oral
testimony to 5 minutes.
With that, Ms. Schulze, you may now proceed.
TESTIMONY OF DANA SCHULZE, ACTING DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF AVIATION
SAFETY, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD; CAPTAIN JOSEPH G.
DePETE, PRESIDENT, AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL;
LORI BASSANI, NATIONAL PRESIDENT, ASSOCIATION OF PROFESSIONAL
FLIGHT ATTENDANTS; MICHAEL PERRONE, PRESIDENT, PROFESSIONAL
AVIATION SAFETY SPECIALISTS, AFL-CIO; AND JOHN SAMUELSEN,
INTERNATIONAL PRESIDENT, TRANSPORT WORKERS OF AMERICA
Ms. Schulze. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Larsen,
Ranking Member Graves, and members of the subcommittee. Thank
you for inviting the National Transportation Safety Board to
testify. I am the Acting Director of the Office of Aviation
Safety within the NTSB.
First, I would like to express my condolences to the loved
ones of those lost in recent aviation disasters. We must learn
from their pain and strive to close the gaps in safety that
allowed these tragedies to happen.
The NTSB is an independent Federal agency charged by
Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident and
certain incidents in the United States and issuing safety
recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. We
conduct about 1,400 investigations each year.
In the last decade, the number of aviation accidents and
deaths have declined overall, from 539 fatalities in 2009 to
401 in 2018. Nearly 92 percent were in general aviation. The
remainder, primarily part 135 operations, represent a prominent
gap in aviation safety that is on our Most Wanted List.
Currently, air medical, air taxi, charter, and on-demand
operators are not required to meet some of the same safety
requirements that have proven effective at enhancing the safety
of commercial airline operations.
In March, the board completed an investigation of a part
135 Learjet that crashed in Teterboro, New Jersey. Based on the
findings, the NTSB again reiterated recommendations to the FAA
to require flight data monitoring programs and safety
management systems for part 135 operations.
Since completing this investigation, we have initiated
another 13 investigations into part 135 accidents and
incidents.
The safety issues were not new to the Teterboro accident.
The NTSB had originally issued these recommendations following
a 2015 crash in Akron, Ohio, reiterated them following a 2016
accident in Togiak, Alaska, and again following the Teterboro
accident.
We have also made recommendations to the FAA that aircraft
operating under part 121 and 135 be equipped with a crash-
protected cockpit image recording system. These recorders would
help focus and expedite investigations and the development of
targeted safety recommendations to reduce risks to the
traveling public. These recommendations are currently open--
unacceptable response.
Unfortunately, there are also cases of paying passengers
aboard aircraft where the operation is exempt from part 135. On
June 21, a skydiving flight crashed in Hawaii, killing 11. In
March 2018, a sightseeing flight crashed in New York, killing
five. Both flights were operating under less stringent part 91.
Regardless of the purpose of the flight or the type of
aircraft, commercial aviation should be safe.
Our Most Wanted List also includes strengthening occupant
protection. Seatbelts and restraints do reduce injury and
death. Without their use, preventable deaths will continue to
occur.
We have recommended that the FAA require all general
aviation airplanes be retrofitted with shoulder harnesses. The
FAA has not required them on aircraft manufactured before 1986
for economic reasons. This recommendation was closed--
unacceptable action.
This week marks the 30th anniversary of the United flight
232 crash in Sioux City, Iowa, where 111 were killed and 172
injured. Four infants were on board that aircraft. In
preparation for the emergency landing, all were held by adults
as instructed by the crew. The forces were too great, all were
ejected from the adults' grip and injured, one fatally.
We recommended the FAA prohibit children from being lap
held on commercial flights. Children are safest when they are
properly secured in their own seat.
Even when occupants use appropriate restraints, inadequate
evacuation procedures can also cause otherwise survivable
crashes to turn fatal.
Evidence of passengers retrieving carry-on baggage during
recent emergency evacuations demonstrates that previous actions
to mitigate this potential safety hazard have not been
effective.
We recommended the FAA develop best practices through an
industry working group for evacuation. This recommendation is
currently open--unacceptable response.
Last, another area of concern for emerging transportation
technologies, such as unmanned aircraft and commercial space
systems operations. The NTSB continues to grow its expertise in
both areas, completing our first commercial space investigation
in 1993 and first investigation of a mid-air collision between
an aircraft and a drone in 2016.
As the number of these operations grow, it is inevitable
that the need for our investigations will, too. We continue our
focus in these areas and appreciate this committee's commitment
to ensuring we have the resources to proactively be ready to
advance safety into the future.
Thank you again for the opportunity to discuss the work
that the NTSB is doing to make transportation safer. There
continues to be room for improvement, and the NTSB stands ready
to work with you to improve the safety of our Nation's aviation
systems for all users.
I am happy to take your questions.
[Ms. Schulze's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dana Schulze, Acting Director, Office of Aviation
Safety, National Transportation Safety Board
Good morning, Chairman Larsen, Ranking Member Graves, and Members
of the Subcommittee. Thank you for inviting the National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB) to testify before you today. I am the Acting
Director of the Office of Aviation Safety within the NTSB.
The NTSB is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with
investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and
significant accidents in other modes of transportation--highway, rail,
marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents
we investigate, and we issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing
future accidents. In addition, we conduct special transportation safety
studies and special investigations and coordinate the resources of the
federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their
family members who have been impacted by major transportation
disasters. The NTSB is not a regulatory agency--we do not promulgate
operating standards nor do we certificate organizations and
individuals. The goal of our work is to foster safety improvements,
through formal and informal safety recommendations, for the traveling
public.
We investigate all civil domestic air carrier, commuter, and air
taxi accidents; general aviation accidents; and certain public-use
aircraft accidents, amounting to approximately 1,400 investigations of
accidents and incidents annually. We also participate in investigations
of airline accidents and incidents in foreign countries that involve US
carriers, US-manufactured or -designed equipment, or US-registered
aircraft.
I would like to thank the committee for being a continued partner
in safety. Last year, you addressed multiple NTSB safety
recommendations in the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018. Based on our
investigations, the NTSB recommended applying second-class medical
requirements to commercial balloon operators, requiring all rotorcraft
to meet certain minimum crashworthiness requirements to protect fuel
systems, and sufficiently marking and maintaining in a database all
meteorological evaluation towers.\1\ When Congress passed the FAA
Reauthorization Act of 2018 you required the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) to close these safety gaps.\2\
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\1\ National Transportation Safety Board, Safety Recommendations
A-17-034, A-15-012, A-13-016, and A-13-017.
\2\ Public Law 115-254.
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This testimony will address the state of aviation safety from the
NTSB's perspective and is based on our investigations. It will include
a description of safety issues we have identified and recommendations
we have made, and will conclude with a description of the work we are
doing with emerging transportation technologies in aviation.
For the last decade, the US aviation system has experienced a
record level of safety, and the number of US-registered civil aviation
accidents has declined overall.\3\ Deaths associated with US civil
aviation accidents decreased from 539 in 2009 to preliminarily 401 in
2018. Nearly 92 percent of aviation fatalities in 2018 occurred in
general aviation and non-commercial accidents, with the remainder
primarily in Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135
operations, which include charters, air taxis, and air medical services
flights. Until 2018, there had been no passenger fatalities as a result
of accidents involving US air carriers operating under the provisions
of 14 CFR Part 121 since the crash of Colgan Air flight 3407 in
2009.\4\ This unprecedented period of safety came to an end on April
17, 2018, when the Southwest Airlines Flight 1380 accident involving an
uncontained engine failure resulted in a first passenger.\5\ Over the
last several decades, significant advances in technology, important
legislative and regulatory changes, and more comprehensive crew
training have contributed to the current level of aviation safety.
However, we continue to see accidents and incidents that remind us of
the need to be ever vigilant.
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\3\ National Transportation Safety Board, 2017 preliminary
aviation statistics. Accident data for calendar year 2018 are still
being validated and have not yet been released.
\4\ National Transportation Safety Board, Loss of Control on
Approach, Colgan Air, Inc., Operating as Continental Connection Flight
3407, Bombardier DHC 8 400, N200WQ, Rpt. No. AAR-10/01 (Washington, DC:
NTSB, 2012). In 2013, there were two fatal accidents involving
nonscheduled cargo flights operating under Part 121--National Air Cargo
crash after takeoff at Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan, and United Parcel
Service flight 1354 crash during approach in Birmingham, Alabama.
\5\ The Southwest Airlines flight 1380 investigation is ongoing.
An investigative hearing was conducted on November 14, 2018.
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On February 4, 2019, we announced our Most Wanted List of
Transportation Safety Improvements for 2019-2020.\6\ This list
identifies 10 focus areas for transportation safety improvements based
on issues identified through our investigations. Many of the issues on
the Most Wanted List address multimodal challenges for improving
safety, including many that have been identified in some of our
aviation accident investigations, such as alcohol and other drug
impairment, distraction, occupant protection, fatigue, medical fitness,
and safe shipment of hazardous materials.
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\6\ National Transportation Safety Board, 2019-2020 Most Wanted
List.
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most wanted list--improve the safety of part 135 flight operations
On the Most Wanted List, one issue area is specific to aviation:
improving the safety of Part 135 flight operations. Regardless of the
purpose of the flight or the type of aircraft, all passenger-carrying
flights should be safe. However, currently, air medical service, air
taxi, charter, and on-demand operators are not required to meet some of
the same safety requirements that have proven effective at enhancing
the safety of commercial airline operations. On March 12, 2019, the
NTSB issued three new safety recommendations and reiterated six
previous safety recommendations to the FAA as a result of the
investigation of an accident that occurred on May 15, 2017, in
Teterboro, New Jersey.\7\ In this accident, a Learjet 35A, operated by
a Part 135 operator, Trans-Pacific Air Charter, departed controlled
flight while on a circling approach to Teterboro Airport and impacted a
commercial building and parking lot. The pilot-in-command and the
second-in-command died; there were no passengers on the aircraft and no
one on the ground was injured. While the aircraft was operating as a
Part 91 positioning flight at the time of the accident, the accident
raised concerns about the safety of Part 135 operations and the need
for effective flight data monitoring (FDM) programs, safety management
systems (SMS), procedures to identify pilots who do not comply with
standard operating procedures, programs to address pilots with
performance deficiencies, and the need for enhanced guidance for crew
resource management training and leadership training for upgrading
captains.
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\7\ National Transportation Safety Board, Departure From
Controlled Flight, Trans-Pacific Air Charter, LLC, Learjet 35A, N452DA,
Teterboro, New Jersey (Abstract), Rpt. No. AAR-19/02 (Washington, DC:
NTSB, 2019).
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The safety issues identified in the Teterboro accident were not
new; the NTSB had previously identified these issues and made
recommendations to address FDM equipment and programs and SMS as a
result of the investigation of the November 10, 2015, crash of
Execuflight flight 1526 in Akron, Ohio.\8\ The recommendations were
reiterated following the October 26, 2016, crash of Ravn Connect flight
3153 in Togiak, Alaska, and again following the Teterboro accident.\9\
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\8\ National Transportation Safety Board, Crash During
Nonprecision Instrument Approach to Landing, Execuflight Flight 1526,
British Aerospace HS 125-700A, N237WR, Rpt. No. AAR 16/02 (Washington,
DC: NTSB 2016).
\9\ National Transportation Safety Board, Collision with Terrain,
Hageland Aviation Services, Inc., dba Ravn Connect Flight 3153, Cessna
208B, N208SD, Rpt. No. AAR 18/02 (Washington, DC: NTSB 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since completing the investigation in Teterboro, New Jersey and
issuing safety recommendations, the NTSB has initiated another 13
investigations into Part 135 accidents and incidents, of which five
were fatal crashes--including the May 13 midair collision between two
aircraft on sightseeing flights in Ketchikan, Alaska.\10\ Further,
there are cases of paying passengers aboard aircraft where the
operation is exempt from Part 135, such as the June 21 crash of an Oahu
Parachute Center skydiving flight in Mokuleia, Hawaii, where all 10
passengers and one crewmember were fatally injured, and the March 11,
2018, crash of a FlyNYON sightseeing flight in New York City where five
passengers were fatally injured. Both flights were operating under Part
91.
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\10\ See Appendix for list of open Part 135 investigations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A list of the safety recommendations we have made regarding Part
135 operations is appended to this testimony. Implementation of these
and other recommendations could prevent or mitigate many of the Part
135 crashes that the NTSB investigates, and that is why ``Improve the
Safety of Part 135 Aircraft Operations'' is included on the Most Wanted
List.
most wanted list--reduce fatigue-related accidents
Fatigue is a pervasive problem in transportation that degrades a
person's ability to stay awake, alert, and attentive to the demands of
safely controlling a vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or train. By including
``Reduce Fatigue-Related Accidents'' on our Most Wanted List, we are
calling for a comprehensive approach to combatting fatigue in
transportation, focusing on research, education, and training;
technology; sleep disorder treatment; hours-of-service regulations; and
on- and off-duty scheduling policies and practices.
Over the last 20 years, the NTSB has investigated many air carrier
accidents involving fatigued flight crews, including Colgan Air flight
3407. As a result of that investigation, we recommended that the FAA
require operators to address fatigue risks associated with
commuting.\11\ The FAA's final rule for Fatigue Risk Management Plans
for Part 121 Air Carriers did not address this recommendation. In 2006,
we issued a safety recommendation to the FAA as a result of our
investigation of the October 19, 2004, crash of Corporate Airlines
Flight 5966 in Kirksville, Missouri, to ``modify and simplify the
flight crew hours-of-service regulations to take into consideration
factors such as length of duty day, starting time, workload and other
factors shown by recent research, scientific evidence, and current
industry experience to affect crew alertness.'' \12\ On January 4,
2012, the FAA published a final rule that prescribed new flight- and
duty-time regulations for all flight crewmembers and certificate
holders conducting passenger operations under Part 121, but excluded
operators who conduct cargo operations.\13\ The NTSB disagrees with
this exclusion, as many of the fatigue-related accidents that we have
investigated over the years involved cargo operators. We also believe
that, because of the time of day that cargo operations typically occur,
such operations are in greater need of these requirements. The NTSB
believes that the FAA should include all Part 121 operations, including
cargo operations, under these requirements.
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\11\ National Transportation Safety Board, Safety Recommendation
A-10-016.
\12\ National Transportation Safety Board, Collision with Trees
and Crash Short of the Runway, Corporate Airlines Flight 5966 BAE
Systems BAE-J3201, N875JX Kirksville, Missouri, Rpt. No. AAR-06/01
(Washington, DC: NTSB, 2006). National Transportation Safety Board,
Safety Recommendation A-06-010.
\13\ Federal Aviation Administration, Flightcrew Member Duty and
Rest Requirements, 14 CFR Parts 117, 119, and 121.
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most wanted list--strengthen occupant protection
Seat belts and restraints reduce the risk of injury and death to
pilots and passengers in the event of an accident. To minimize deaths
and injuries, we must increase the use of existing restraint systems,
otherwise preventable deaths will continue to occur. In 2011, we
conducted a study on airbag performance in general aviation, which
supported the idea that shoulder harnesses can reduce injury in an
accident.\14\ As a result of that study, we recommended that the FAA
require that all general aviation airplanes be retrofitted with
shoulder harnesses if they don't already have them. In 2013, the FAA
reported that, because the economic burden on the general aviation
community would outweigh any potential benefit, the agency would not
mandate that aircraft manufactured before December 12, 1986, be
retrofitted with shoulder harnesses or with a two-point inflatable lap
restraint. The recommendation has been classified as ``Closed--
Unacceptable Action.'' \15\
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\14\ National Transportation Safety Board, Airbag Performance in
General Aviation Restraint Systems, Rpt. No. SS-11/01 (Washington, DC:
NTSB, 2011).
\15\ National Transportation Safety Board, Safety Recommendation
A-11-004.
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This week marks the 30th anniversary of the United Airlines flight
232 crash in Sioux City, Iowa.\16\ Of the 296 people on board the
aircraft, 110 passengers and 1 flight attendant were fatally injured,
and another 172 sustained varying degrees of injury. On this flight,
there were four infant passengers; all were being held by adults, as
instructed during preparation for the emergency landing. All the
infants were injured, one fatally. Following this crash and another in
1994 in Charlotte, North Carolina, the NTSB recommended the FAA remove
the exemption that allows for children to be lap-held on commercial
aviation flights.\17\ We issued similar recommendations again in 2010.
These recommendations are all classified as ``Closed--Unacceptable
Action.'' \18\ Children are safest when they are properly secured in a
child safety seat in their own seat when flying.
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\16\ National Transportation Safety Board, United Airlines Flight
232 McDonnell Douglas DC-10-10, Rpt. No. AAR-90/06 (Washington, DC:
NTSB, 1990).
\17\ National Transportation Safety Board, Flight into Terrain
during Missed Approach USAir 1016, DC-9-31, N954VJ, Rpt. No. AAR-95/03
(Washington, DC: NTSB 1995).
\18\ National Transportation Safety Board, Safety Recommendation
A-90-078, A-95-051, A-10-121, A-10-122, and A-10-123.
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Airplane Evacuations
Additionally, even when occupants use appropriate restraints,
deaths and injuries may still occur because of inadequate evacuation
procedures. In many cases, otherwise survivable crashes turn fatal
because occupants cannot evacuate before a postcrash fire consumes the
aircraft. On October 28, 2016, American Airlines flight 383, bound for
Miami, Florida, experienced a right engine uncontained failure and
subsequent fire during takeoff at Chicago O'Hare International
Airport.\19\ The flight crew aborted the takeoff and stopped the
aircraft on the runway, and an emergency evacuation was conducted. Of
the 161 passengers and 9 crewmembers onboard, one passenger was
seriously injured during the evacuation. A turbine disk in the right
engine fractured into at least four pieces, with one piece going
through the inboard section of the right wing, over the fuselage, and
into a warehouse facility a half mile away. The airplane was
substantially damaged by the fire, which was caused by a fuel leak from
the right wing fuel tank that resulted in a pool of fire under the
right wing.
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\19\ National Transportation Safety Board, Uncontained Engine
Failure and Subsequent Fire, American Airlines Flight 383, Boeing 767-
323, N345AN, Rpt. No. AAR-18/01 (Washington, DC: NTSB 2018).
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We held a Board meeting on January 30, 2018, to determine the
probable cause of the Chicago accident and to issue relevant safety
recommendations. The Board determined that the failure was caused by an
internal defect in a turbine disk, which was likely undetectable when
the disk was manufactured in 1997 and during subsequent inspections.
The investigation also found numerous problems with the evacuation,
including a lack of communication between the flight deck and cabin
crew, deviation by a flight attendant from emergency evacuation
procedures, and the crew's lack of coordination following the
evacuation. The Board adopted nine new recommendations--seven to the
FAA and one each to Boeing and to American Airlines--and reiterated two
recommendations to the FAA.
One of the recommendations to the FAA addresses passengers
evacuating airplanes with carry-on baggage, which has been a recurring
concern. Flight attendants are trained to instruct passengers not to
evacuate with carry-on baggage because doing so could potentially slow
the egress of passengers during an evacuation and block an exit during
an emergency. In June 2000, we released a safety study on emergency
evacuations of commercial airplanes, which found that passengers
exiting with carry-on baggage were ``the most frequently cited
obstruction to evacuation.'' \20\
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\20\ National Transportation Safety Board, Emergency Evacuation of
Commercial Airplanes, Rpt. No. SS-00/01, (Washington, DC: NTSB 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Video taken during the Chicago evacuation and postaccident
interviews with flight attendants indicated that some passengers
evacuated from all three usable exits with carry-on baggage. In one
case, a flight attendant tried to take a bag away from a passenger who
did not follow the instruction to evacuate without baggage, but the
flight attendant realized that the struggle over the bag was prolonging
the evacuation and allowed the passenger to take the bag. In another
case, a passenger came to the left overwing exit with a bag and
evacuated with it despite being instructed to leave the bag behind. In
addition, videos from an evacuation due to a fire on a British Airways
aircraft in Las Vegas on September 8, 2015, and a Dynamic International
Airways aircraft in Fort Lauderdale on October 29, 2015, showed
passengers evacuating with carry-on baggage despite the standard
instruction to leave their baggage and similar items behind in the
event of an emergency.\21\
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\21\ National Transportation Safety Board, Aviation Accident Final
Report for accident number DCA15FA185.
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Evidence of passengers retrieving carry-on baggage during recent
emergency evacuations demonstrates that previous actions to mitigate
this potential safety hazard have not been effective. As a result of
the Chicago investigation, we recommended that the FAA (1) measure the
potential delays associated with passengers retrieving and carrying
baggage during an emergency evacuation and (2) determine the
appropriate countermeasures to mitigate any related potential safety
risks.\22\
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\22\ National Transportation Safety Board, Safety Recommendation
A-18-009. Classified ``Open--Acceptable Response.''
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We have also seen positive outcomes from implementing NTSB safety
recommendations and successfully evacuating an aircraft post-accident.
On March 8, 2017, a Boeing MD-83 overran a runway during a rejected
takeoff in Ypsilanti, Michigan. Seconds after reaching the takeoff
decision airspeed of 158 mph at about 5,000 feet down a 7,500-foot
runway, the captain's attempt to raise the nose and get the plane
airborne was unsuccessful due to an undetected mechanical malfunction
of an elevator. The pilot called ``abort.'' The airplane decelerated
following the rejected takeoff but was traveling too fast to be stopped
on the remaining runway. It departed the end of the runway at about 115
mph, traveled 950 feet across a runway safety area (RSA), struck an
airport fence and came to rest after crossing a paved road. An
evacuation was ordered. Flight attendants described that during the
evacuation the passengers were incredibly calm and responsive, followed
flight attendant directions, and did not take or attempt to take
luggage or personal belongings with them. The 110 passengers and 6
flight crewmembers evacuated the airplane via emergency escape slides
without any serious injuries.\23\
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\23\ National Transportation Safety Board, Runway Overrun During
Rejected Takeoff Ameristar Air Cargo, Inc. dba Ameristar Charters,
flight 9363 Boeing MD-83, N786TW Ypsilanti, Michigan March 8, 2017,
Rpt. No. AAR-19/01 (Washington, DC: NTSB 2001).
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In Ypsilanti, the RSA likely contributed to the lack of serious
injuries. In response to an NTSB recommendation, the FAA in 1999 began
a national program to add RSAs to many commercial airports.\24\
However, there are additional gaps in runway safety.
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\24\ National Transportation Safety Board, Safety Recommendation
A-03-011. Classified ``Closed--Acceptable Action.''
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additional safety issues
Runway safety
Around midnight on July 7, 2017, Air Canada flight 759 was cleared
to land on runway 28R at San Francisco International Airport (SFO), but
instead lined up on a parallel taxiway where four air carrier airplanes
were awaiting takeoff clearance. Flight 759 descended below 100 feet
above the ground, and the flight crew initiated a go-around about the
time it overflew the first airplane on the taxiway. The airplane
reached a minimum altitude of about 60 feet and overflew the second
airplane on the taxiway before starting to climb.\25\
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\25\ National Transportation Safety Board, Taxiway Overflight, Air
Canada Flight 759, Airbus A320-211, C-FKCK, San Francisco, California,
July 7, 2017, Rpt. No. AIR-18/01, (Washington, DC: NTSB 2018).
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We held a Board meeting on September 25, 2018, to determine the
probable cause of the SFO incident and to issue relevant safety
recommendations. The Board determined that the flight crew
misidentified a taxiway as the intended landing runway, which resulted
from the crewmembers' lack of awareness of the parallel runway closure
due to their ineffective review of notice to airmen (NOTAM) information
before the flight and during the approach briefing. Contributing to the
incident were (1) the flight crew's failure to tune the instrument
landing system frequency for backup lateral guidance, expectation bias,
fatigue due to circadian disruption and length of continued
wakefulness, and breakdowns in crew resource management, and (2) Air
Canada's ineffective presentation of approach procedure and NOTAM
information. The Board adopted six new recommendations to the FAA.
These recommendations include developing and requiring technology to
alert pilots and air traffic controllers when an airplane is not
aligned with a runway surface.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ National Transportation Safety Board, Safety Recommendations
A-18-025, A-18-026, and A-18-027.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lithium-ion Batteries
On July 28, 2011, a scheduled cargo flight from Incheon, Republic
of Korea, to Shanghai, China, crashed into international waters. The
Korean Aviation and Railway Accident Investigation Board (ARAIB)
completed its investigation on July 24, 2015 and determined that the
cause of this accident was a fire that developed on or near two pallets
containing dangerous goods packages, including hybrid-electric vehicle
lithium ion batteries and flammable liquids. The NTSB aided the ARAIB's
investigation. Based on our participation, on February 9, 2016, we
issued two recommendations to the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration (PHMSA) to (1) require the physical segregation
of lithium batteries from flammable liquid cargo and (2) establish the
maximum loading density of lithium batteries on board an aircraft. Both
of these recommendations are classified as ``Open--Acceptable
Response.'' \27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ National Transportation Safety Board, Safety Recommendations
A-16-001, A-16-002.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On June 3, 2016, a FedEx delivery truck was making its final
delivery of four large, custom-designed, lithium-ion batteries to a
Brampton, Ontario, Canada, address. The driver discovered that one of
the large battery shipments contained a smoking package and, shortly
after the discovery, the package burst into flames. The fire spread to
the remaining packages in the cargo area and eventually destroyed the
truck. The driver was not injured. The four batteries were designed and
packaged by Braille Battery, Inc., and transported from their Florida
facility on two FedEx cargo flights. They were then loaded onto the
FedEx truck for final delivery when the incident occurred, 10 hours
after they were offloaded from the second aircraft.
Although this fire occurred in Canada, we are investigating this
incident because the shipment involved a US air carrier and included
lithium-ion batteries that were presumably shipped in a configuration
that would ensure safe shipment and containment of any battery failure.
We believe our investigative findings may have significant implications
on current regulations addressing the safe transportation of lithium
batteries.
international aviation accident investigations
The NTSB participates in the investigation of aviation accidents
and serious incidents outside the United States in accordance with the
Chicago Convention of the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) and the Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPS) provided in
Annex 13 to the Convention.\28\ If an accident or serious incident
occurs in a foreign state involving a US-registered civil aircraft, US
operator, or US-designed or -manufactured aircraft, and the foreign
state is a signatory to the ICAO Convention, that state is responsible
for the investigation and controls the release of all information
regarding the investigation.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ ICAO is a UN specialized agency that manages the
administration and governance of the Convention on International Civil
Aviation (Chicago Convention), (https://www.icao.int/about-icao/Pages/
default.aspx).
\29\ There are 193 Member States of ICAO, including both Indonesia
and Ethiopia, (https://www.icao.int/MemberStates/
Member%20States.English.pdf).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In accordance with the ICAO Annex 13 SARPS, upon receiving a formal
notification of the accident or serious incident that may involve
significant issues, the NTSB may designate a US Accredited
Representative and appoint technical advisors to assist the foreign
investigation and facilitate the sharing of safety information. The
advisors may include NTSB investigators with subject matter expertise,
as well as others from US manufacturers, operators, and the FAA.
The following are the key objectives of our participation in
international aviation accident investigations:
Identify safety deficiencies affecting US aviation
interests
Capture safety lessons learned to prevent accidents in
the US
Facilitate credible and comprehensive accident
investigations where US interests are concerned
Given the international nature of air transportation and the
leading role the United States plays in developing aviation technology,
our participation in foreign investigations is essential to enhancing
aviation safety worldwide. In 2018, we appointed accredited
representatives to 328 international investigations, and traveled to
support work on 18 of those investigations.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ The NTSB appointed an accredited representative to 206
accidents, 98 incidents, and 24 other safety-related occurrences in
2018. NTSB traveled in support of 9 of these accidents and 9 of the
incidents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Boeing 737 MAX Investigations--Jakarta, Indonesia, and Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia
On October 29, 2018, a Boeing 737 MAX 8, operated by Lion Air,
crashed into the Java Sea shortly after takeoff from Soekarno-Hatta
International Airport, in Jakarta, Indonesia, killing all 189
passengers and crew on board. The Komite Nasional Keselamatan
Transportasi (KNKT) of Indonesia, who is leading the investigation,
released a preliminary report on the accident on November 27, 2018.\31\
On March 10, 2019, a Boeing 737 MAX 8, operated by Ethiopian Airlines,
crashed after takeoff from Addis Ababa Bole International Airport in
Ethiopia, killing all 157 passengers and crew, including 8 American
citizens. The investigation is being led by the Ethiopia Accident
Investigation Bureau (AIB), which released a preliminary report on
April 4, 2019.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ Komite Nasional Keselamatan Transportasi, Preliminary Report
No. KNKT.18.10.35.04.
\32\ Ethiopia Accident Investigation Bureau, Report No. AI-01/19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Because the MAX 8 was designed and manufactured in the United
States, in accordance with ICAO Annex 13, the United States is afforded
the right to participate in both investigations. Accordingly, the NTSB
appointed accredited representatives to assist in both ongoing
investigations.
Following last year's Lion Air crash, the NTSB immediately
dispatched investigators to Indonesia to participate in the Indonesian
government's investigation. An NTSB investigator was stationed onboard
one of the search vessels during the search for the critical ``black
boxes''--the flight data recorder (FDR) and cockpit voice recorder
(CVR). When the CVR was recovered on January 14, 2019, the NTSB
recalled four investigators from furlough (due to the partial
government shutdown) to assist with properly transcribing the
recorder's content.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ Due to a lapse of appropriations from December 22, 2018,
through January 25, 2019, the NTSB furloughed all investigative staff.
In accordance with the provisions of the Anti-Deficiency Act (including
sections 1341(a)(1)(B) and 1342 of Title 31, United States Code),
allowable agency functions were limited to those where ``failure to
perform those functions would result in an imminent threat to the
safety of human life or the protection of property.'' Due to the
potential safety issues associated with the Lion Air crash, the NTSB
responded by recalling four investigative staff from furlough to
participate in the CVR readout.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response to the Ethiopian Airlines crash, an NTSB team of
investigators was dispatched to Ethiopia. Once the recovered recorders
were sent to the Bureau d'Enquetes et d'Analyses pour la Securite de
l'Aviation Civile, we sent recorder, flight crew operations, and human
factors investigators to France to assist with downloading and reading
out the recorders' contents.
In accordance with ICAO Annex 13, technical advisors from the FAA,
Boeing, and General Electric have accompanied NTSB investigators to the
Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines accident sites to provide their
specialized technical knowledge regarding the aircraft and its systems.
Although the NTSB is actively involved in these investigations,
ICAO Annex 13 requires that, as the states of occurrence, Indonesia and
Ethiopia are responsible for leading their respective investigations.
As such, they control the release of all investigative information to
the public related to those accidents. Annex 13 provides for other
involved states to gain timely access to investigative information for
the purposes of continued operational safety. As a result, NTSB
participation in foreign accident investigations enables safety
deficiencies to be promptly addressed by the FAA, the manufacturer, or
the operator, as well as others deemed appropriate, and through NTSB
safety recommendations, when needed. Because the United States is the
state of design and certification of the aircraft involved in these
accidents, we are examining relevant factors in the US design
certification process to ensure any deficiencies are captured and
addressed, including by NTSB safety recommendations, if necessary.
emerging transportation technologies
Advances in technology are transforming transportation and hold
promise for improving transportation safety, but they also pose new
challenges. Among those advancing technologies are commercial space
transportation and unmanned aircraft systems (UASs).
Commercial Space
We have been involved in commercial space accident investigations
for over 25 years, since leading the investigation of a procedural
anomaly associated with the launch of an Orbital Sciences Corporation
Pegasus expendable launch vehicle in 1993.\34\ Most recently, we led
the investigation of the fatal in-flight breakup of SpaceShipTwo in
October 2014.\35\ Foremost among the safety issues identified in the
2014 accident was the need to consider and protect against human error
for safe manned spaceflight, which is the responsibility of designers,
operators, and regulators. We made recommendations to the FAA and the
commercial spaceflight industry to establish human factors guidance for
commercial space operators and to strengthen the FAA's evaluation
process for experimental permit applications by promoting stronger
collaboration between FAA technical staff and commercial space vehicle
operators.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ National Transportation Safety Board, Commercial Space Launch
Incident, Launch Procedure Anomaly, Orbital Sciences Corporation,
Pegaus/SCD-1, Rpt. No. SIR 93/02 (Washington, DC: NTSB 1993).
\35\ National Transportation Safety Board. In-Flight Breakup
During Test Flight, Scaled Composites SpaceShipTwo, N339SS, Near Koehn
Dry Lake, California, October 31, 2014, Rpt. No. AAR 15/02 (Washington,
DC: NTSB 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Our work in commercial space transportation supports our broader
mission of improving transportation safety through investigating
accidents and serious incidents, collaborating with others to conduct
outreach and education related to commercial space vehicles, and
developing and disseminating accident investigation techniques in
commercial space within the international community. To develop and
maintain the necessary investigative expertise and tools in this
emerging segment of transportation, we are focused on training for NTSB
staff and continuing outreach with commercial space stakeholders.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems
The growing number of UASs and reports of near-collisions with
manned aircraft have raised safety concerns regarding UAS integration
into the national airspace system. In August 2010, we revised our 14
CFR Part 830 regulations to indicate that accident and incident
notification requirements also apply to unmanned aircraft.\36\ An
advisory to operators was released in July 2016 clarifying the
reporting requirements (i.e., if there is death or serious injury, the
aircraft weighs more than 300 pounds and sustains substantial damage,
or other specific serious incidents occur).\37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ 49 CFR Sec. 830.2 (2010).
\37\ National Transportation Safety Board, Advisory to Operators
of Civil Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the United States, July 29, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On September 21, 2017, the pilot of a US Army UH-60 helicopter
reported an in-flight collision with a small UAS just east of Midland
Beach, Staten Island, New York. The helicopter sustained damage to its
main rotor blade, window frame, and transmission deck. We determined
that the probable cause of the incident was the failure of the UAS
pilot to see and avoid the helicopter due to his intentional flight
beyond visual line of sight. Contributing to the incident was the UAS
pilot's incomplete knowledge of regulations and safe operating
practices.\38\ As the number and complexity of UAS operations continues
to grow, it is inevitable that the number of NTSB UAS investigations
will also increase.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ National Transportation Safety Board, Inflight collision of
UAS and helicopter, Staten Island, NY.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We are also using UASs as an accident investigation tool in all
modes. The NTSB appreciates this Committee's and Congress' support of a
provision in our 2018 reauthorization that authorized the agency to
acquire small UASs for investigative purposes.\39\ UASs are rapidly
becoming a standard tool in the domestic and international accident
investigation community. Small UASs can be very rapidly deployed, which
allows wreckage fields to be documented quickly and thoroughly when the
accident area must be cleared expeditiously for safety or operational
purposes. In addition, small UASs can access unique points of view
useful to the investigator as well as areas otherwise inaccessible.
Data collected is shared immediately within the investigative process,
allowing investigators, managers, and support staff in distant
locations instant access to accident site information in order to help
focus the investigation on critical aspects of the accident.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ 49 USC Sec. 1113(b)(1)(J) (2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
conclusion
Over the last decade, general aviation safety has improved and
commercial aviation accidents have become exceedingly rare. However,
while accidents and incidents still occur, there will always be room
for improvement. The NTSB and staff stand ready to work with the
Committee to continue improving the safety of our nation's aviation
system for all users.
Thank you again for the opportunity to be here today to discuss the
work that the NTSB is doing to make transportation safer. I am happy to
answer any questions.
appendix to ntsb's testimony concerning aviation safety
Ongoing Major Part 121 Investigations (as of July 8, 2019)
Southwest Flight 1380 engine failure, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, April 17, 2018, one fatality, eight injuries
Atlas Air Flight 3591 crash, Baytown, Texas, February 23,
2019, three fatalities
Miami Air Flight 293 departed runway, Jacksonville,
Florida, May 3, 2019, no serious injuries
United Airlines Flight 4933 missed runway, Presque Isle,
Maine, March 4, 2019, three minor injuries
Ongoing Major Part 135 investigations (as of July 8, 2019)
Taquan Air scheduled commuter flight crash, Metlakatla,
Alaska, May 20, 2019, two fatalities
Mid-air collision of sightseeing flights, Ketchikan,
Alaska, May 13, 2019, six fatalities and nine serious injuries
Novictor Aviation sightseeing flight crash, Kailua,
Hawaii, April 29, 2019, three fatalities
K2 Aviation sightseeing flight crash, Talkeetna, Alaska,
August 4, 2018, five fatalities
Ongoing Major Part 91 investigations with paying passengers (as of July
8, 2019)
Oahu Parachute Center skydiving flight crash, Mokuleia,
Hawaii, June 21, 2019, 11 fatalities
The Jumping Place Skydiving Center skydiving flight
crash, Swainsboro, Georgia, August 25, 2018, four fatalities
FlyNYON sightseeing flight crash, New York City, New
York, March 11, 2018, five fatalities, one injury
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Safety Recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration on the
Most Wanted List-- Improve Safety of Part 135 Flight Operations (as of
July 8, 2019)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Safety
Number Date Issued Status Recommendation
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A-07-018 2/27/07 Open-- TO THE FEDERAL
Acceptable AVIATION
Response ADMINISTRATION: In
cooperation with
Hawaii commercial
air tour operators,
aviation
psychologists, and
meteorologists,
among others,
develop a cue-based
training program
for commercial air
tour pilots in
Hawaii that
specifically
addresses hazardous
aspects of local
weather phenomena
and in-flight
decision-making.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A-07-019 2/27/07 Open-- TO THE FEDERAL
Acceptable AVIATION
Response ADMINISTRATION:
Once a cue-based
training program
that specifically
addresses hazardous
aspects of local
weather phenomena
and weather-
related, decision-
making issues is
developed (as
requested in Safety
Recommendation A-07-
18), require all
commercial air tour
operators in Hawaii
to provide this
training to newly
hired pilots.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A-07-112 12/21/07 Open-- TO THE FEDERAL
Acceptable AVIATION
Response ADMINISTRATION:
Ensure that the
minimum equipment
lists for
helicopters used in
helicopter
emergency medical
services operations
require that radar
altimeters be
operable during
flights conducted
at night.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A-09-092 9/24/09 Closed-- TO THE FEDERAL
Acceptable AVIATION
Action ADMINISTRATION:
Permit the
helicopter
emergency medical
services (HEMS)
Aviation Digital
Data Service
Weather Tool to be
used by HEMS
operators as an
official weather
product.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A-10-029 2/23/10 Open-- TO THE FEDERAL
Acceptable AVIATION
Response ADMINISTRATION:
Require 14 Code of
Federal Regulations
Part 121, 135, and
91K operators to
(1) routinely
download and
analyze all
available sources
of safety
information, as
part of their
flight operational
quality assurance
program, to
identify deviations
from established
norms and
procedures; (2)
provide appropriate
protections to
ensure the
confidentiality of
the deidentified
aggregate data; and
(3) ensure that
this information is
used for safety-
related and not
punitive purposes.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A-13-012 5/6/13 Open-- TO THE FEDERAL
Acceptable AVIATION
Response ADMINISTRATION:
Require the
installation of a
crash-resistant
flight recorder
system on all newly
manufactured
turbine-powered,
nonexperimental,
nonrestricted-
category aircraft
that are not
equipped with a
flight data
recorder and a
cockpit voice
recorder and are
operating under 14
Code of Federal
Regulations Parts
91, 121, or 135.
The crash-resistant
flight recorder
system should
record cockpit
audio and images
with a view of the
cockpit environment
to include as much
of the outside view
as possible, and
parametric data per
aircraft and system
installation, all
as specified in
Technical Standard
Order C197,
``Information
Collection and
Monitoring
Systems.''
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A-13-013 5/6/13 Open-- TO THE FEDERAL
Acceptable AVIATION
Response ADMINISTRATION:
Require all
existing turbine-
powered,
nonexperimental,
nonrestricted-
category aircraft
that are not
equipped with a
flight data
recorder or cockpit
voice recorder and
are operating under
14 Code of Federal
Regulations Parts
91, 121, or 135 to
be retrofitted with
a crash-resistant
flight recorder
system. The crash-
resistant flight
recorder system
should record
cockpit audio and
images with a view
of the cockpit
environment to
include as much of
the outside view as
possible, and
parametric data per
aircraft and system
installation, all
as specified in
Technical Standard
Order C197,
``Information
Collection and
Monitoring
Systems.''
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A-15-007 1/22/15 Open-- TO THE FEDERAL
Unacceptab AVIATION
le ADMINISTRATION:
Response Require that all
existing aircraft
operated under
Title 14 Code of
Federal Regulations
(CFR) Part 121 or
135 and currently
required to have a
cockpit voice
recorder and a
flight data
recorder be
retrofitted with a
crash-protected
cockpit image
recording system
compliant with
Technical Standard
Order TSO-C176a,
``Cockpit Image
Recorder
Equipment,'' TSO-
C176a or
equivalent. The
cockpit image
recorder should be
equipped with an
independent power
source consistent
with that required
for cockpit voice
recorders in 14 CFR
25.1457.
(Supersedes Safety
Recommendation A-00-
30)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A-15-008 1/22/15 Open-- TO THE FEDERAL
Unacceptab AVIATION
le ADMINISTRATION:
Response Require that all
newly manufactured
aircraft operated
under Title 14 Code
of Federal
Regulations (CFR)
Part 121 or 135 and
required to have a
cockpit voice
recorder and a
flight data
recorder also be
equipped with a
crash-protected
cockpit image
recording system
compliant with
Technical Standard
Order TSO-C176a,
``Cockpit Image
Recorder
Equipment,'' or
equivalent. The
cockpit image
recorder should be
equipped with an
independent power
source consistent
with that required
for cockpit voice
recorders in 14 CFR
25.1457.
(Supersedes Safety
Recommendation A-00-
31)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A-16-034 11/7/16 Open-- TO THE FEDERAL
Acceptable AVIATION
Response ADMINISTRATION:
Require all 14 Code
of Federal
Regulations Part
135 operators to
install flight data
recording devices
capable of
supporting a flight
data monitoring
program.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A-16-035 11/7/16 Open-- TO THE FEDERAL
Acceptable AVIATION
Response ADMINISTRATION:
After the action in
Safety
Recommendation A-16-
34 is completed,
require all 14 Code
of Federal
Regulations Part
135 operators to
establish a
structured flight
data monitoring
program that
reviews all
available data
sources to identify
deviations from
established norms
and procedures and
other potential
safety issues.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A-16-036 11/7/16 Open-- TO THE FEDERAL
Acceptable AVIATION
Response ADMINISTRATION:
Require all 14 Code
of Federal
Regulations Part
135 operators to
establish safety
management system
programs.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A-17-035 5/9/17 Open-- TO THE FEDERAL
Acceptable AVIATION
Response ADMINISTRATION:
Implement ways to
provide effective
terrain awareness
and warning system
(TAWS) protections
while mitigating
nuisance alerts for
single-engine
airplanes operated
under 14 Code of
Federal Regulations
Part 135 that
frequently operate
at altitudes below
their respective
TAWS class design
alerting threshold.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A-17-037 5/9/17 Open-- TO THE FEDERAL
Acceptable AVIATION
Response ADMINISTRATION:
Work with members
of the Ketchikan
air tour industry
to improve existing
training programs
aimed at reducing
the risk of weather-
related accidents
involving
continuation of
flight under visual
flight rules into
instrument
meteorological
conditions, with
special attention
paid to the human
factors issues
identified in this
investigation,
including (1) the
need to help pilots
better calibrate
what constitutes
safe weather
conditions to
conduct flights
based on objective
standards and
requirements, such
as set criteria for
what landmarks must
be clearly visible
from which
locations in order
to proceed on a
particular route;
(2) the need to
help pilots who are
new to the area
recognize dynamic
local weather
patterns that can
place them in a
dangerous
situation; and (3)
operational
influences on pilot
decision-making.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A-17-038 5/9/17 Open-- TO THE FEDERAL
Acceptable AVIATION
Response ADMINISTRATION:
Expand the
application of
Federal Aviation
Administration
Order 8900.1,
volume 3, chapter
19, section 6,
``Safety Assurance
System: Flight
Training Curriculum
Segments,''
paragraphs 3-
1251(B) and 3-1252,
which address
controlled flight
into terrain-
avoidance training
programs for 14
Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR)
Part 135 helicopter
operations, to all
14 CFR Part 135
operations.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A-17-042 5/9/17 Open-- TO THE FEDERAL
Acceptable AVIATION
Response ADMINISTRATION:
Analyze automatic
dependent
surveillance-
broadcast data from
Ketchikan air tour
operations on an
ongoing basis and
meet annually with
Ketchikan air tour
operators to engage
in a nonpunitive
discussion of any
operational hazards
reflected in the
data and
collaborate on
mitigation
strategies for any
hazards identified.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A-17-043 5/9/17 Open-- TO THE FEDERAL
Acceptable AVIATION
Response ADMINISTRATION:
Develop and
implement special
operating rules for
the Ketchikan air
tour industry that
include en route
visual flight rules
weather minimums
that are tailored
to the industry's
unique requirements
and are more
conservative than
those specified in
14 Code of Federal
Regulations Part
135.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A-18-013 4/26/18 Open-- TO THE FEDERAL
Acceptable AVIATION
Response ADMINISTRATION:
Although controlled
flight into terrain
(CFIT)-avoidance
training programs
are not required by
federal regulation
for Title 14 Code
of Federal
Regulations Part
135 fixed-wing
operations, work
with Part 135
operators in Alaska
to improve any
voluntarily
implemented
training programs
aimed at reducing
the risk of CFIT
accidents involving
continuation of
flight under visual
flight rules (VFR)
into instrument
meteorological
conditions, with
special attention
paid to the human
factors issues
identified in
recent Alaska
accident
investigations,
including, but not
limited to, (1) the
challenges of
flying in
mountainous terrain
in Alaska and low-
altitude VFR flight
in an area subject
to rapid changes in
weather; and (2)
limitations of the
Alaska
infrastructure,
particularly
weather
observations,
communications, and
navigation aids.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A-18-014 4/26/18 Open-- TO THE FEDERAL
Acceptable AVIATION
Response ADMINISTRATION:
Work with Title 14
Code of Federal
Regulations Part
135 certificate
holders that
operate under
visual flight rules
in the aircraft's
required terrain
awareness and
warning system
(TAWS) class to (1)
ensure that
management and
pilots are aware of
the risks
associated with
distraction (from
continuous nuisance
alerts) and
complacency
(brought about by
routine use of the
terrain inhibit
feature); (2)
develop plans for
mitigating those
risks and
minimizing nuisance
alerts; and (3)
develop procedures
that specifically
address when pilots
should test,
inhibit, and
uninhibit the TAWS
alerts, considering
the operator's
typical operations
and the TAWS
manufacturer's
guidance.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A-18-016 4/26/18 Open-- TO THE FEDERAL
Await AVIATION
Response ADMINISTRATION:
Install
communications
equipment
throughout Alaska,
after determining
what would be most
effective, to allow
increased access to
the instrument
flight rules
system, giving
priority to those
areas used by Title
14 Code of Federal
Regulations Part
135 operators.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A-18-017 4/26/18 Open-- TO THE FEDERAL
Await AVIATION
Response ADMINISTRATION:
Ensure that Alaska
airports that are
served by Title 14
Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR)
Part 135 operators
and have instrument
approaches are
equipped with
weather-reporting
capabilities to
enable instrument
flight rules
operations in
accordance with 14
CFR 135.225(a).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Safety Recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration on the
Most Wanted List-- Reduce Fatigue Related Accidents (as of July 8, 2019)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Safety
Number Date Issued Status Recommendation
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A-13-003 3/1/13 Open-- TO THE FEDERAL
Acceptable AVIATION
Alternate ADMINISTRATION:
Response Require that
personnel
performing
maintenance or
inspections under
14 Code of Federal
Regulations Parts
121, 135, 145, and
91 Subpart K
receive initial and
recurrent training
on human factors
affecting
maintenance that
includes a review
of the causes of
human error,
including fatigue,
its effects on
performance, and
actions individuals
can take to prevent
the development of
fatigue.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A-14-072 9/25/14 Open-- TO THE FEDERAL
Acceptable AVIATION
Response ADMINISTRATION:
Require principal
operations
inspectors to
ensure that
operators with
flight crews
performing 14 Code
of Federal
Regulations Part
121, 135, and 91
subpart K overnight
operations brief
the threat of
fatigue before each
departure,
particularly those
occurring during
the window of
circadian low.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A-94-194 11/30/94 Open-- TO THE FEDERAL
Acceptable AVIATION
Response ADMINISTRATION:
Revise the Federal
Aviation
Regulations
contained in 14 CFR
Part 135 to require
that pilot flight
time accumulated in
all company flying
conducted after
revenue operations--
such as training
and check flights,
ferry flights and
repositioning
flights--be
included in the
crewmember's total
flight time accrued
during revenue
operations.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A-95-113 11/14/95 Open-- TO THE FEDERAL
Acceptable AVIATION
Response ADMINISTRATION:
Finalize the review
of current flight
and duty time
regulations and
revise the
regulations, as
necessary, within 1
year to ensure that
flight and duty
time limitations
take into
consideration
research findings
in fatigue and
sleep issues. The
new regulations
should prohibit air
carriers from
assigning flight
crews to flights
conducted under 14
Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR)
Part 91 unless the
flight crews meet
the flight and duty
time limitations of
14 CFR Part 121 or
other appropriate
regulations.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Safety Recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration on the
Most Wanted List-- Increase Occupant Protection (as of July 8, 2019)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Overall Safety
Number Date Issued Status Recommendation
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A-15-012 7/23/15 Open-- TO THE FEDERAL
Acceptable AVIATION
Response ADMINISTRATION:
Require, for all
newly manufactured
rotorcraft
regardless of the
design's original
certification
date, that the
fuel systems meet
the
crashworthiness
requirements of 14
Code of Federal
Regulations 27.952
or 29.952, ``Fuel
System Crash
Resistance.''
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A-16-025 10/6/16 Open-- TO THE FEDERAL
Acceptable AVIATION
Response ADMINISTRATION:
Require 14 Code of
Federal
Regulations Part
121 operators to
provide (1)
guidance that
instructs flight
attendants to
remain at their
assigned exits and
actively monitor
exit availability
in all non-normal
situations in case
an evacuation is
necessary and (2)
flight attendant
training programs
that include
scenarios
requiring crew
coordination
regarding active
monitoring of exit
availability and
evacuating after a
significant event
that involves a
loss of
communications.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A-16-026 10/6/16 Open-- TO THE FEDERAL
Unacceptabl AVIATION
e ADMINISTRATION:
Response Develop best
practices related
to evacuation
communication,
coordination, and
decision-making
during emergencies
through the
establishment of
an industry
working group and
then issue
guidance for 14
Code of Federal
Regulations Part
121 air carriers
to use to improve
flight and cabin
crew performance
during
evacuations.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A-18-009 2/6/18 Open-- TO THE FEDERAL
Acceptable AVIATION
Response ADMINISTRATION:
Conduct research
to (1) measure and
evaluate the
effects of carry-
on baggage on
passenger
deplaning times
and safety during
an emergency
evacuation and (2)
identify effective
countermeasures to
reduce any
determined risks,
and implement the
countermeasures.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Larsen. Thank you very much.
Captain DePete, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. DePete. Yes, good morning.
Thank you, Chairman DeFazio, from the full committee, and
Ranking Member Graves, Sam Graves, and also Chairman Larsen and
Ranking Member Garret Graves, and the subcommittee members.
On behalf of the 62,000 pilots that I represent at 34
airlines in the United States and Canada, I wish to express our
sincere condolences to the loved ones of the victims of the
Ethiopian Airlines and Lion Air accidents. We cannot know the
depth of your grief. But we can share in your determination to
leave a legacy of safety improvements for those you have lost.
As a 40-year pilot, the highest standards of safety have
been at the forefront of my flying career. As president of the
Air Line Pilots Association, the world's largest
nongovernmental aviation safety organization, I can tell you
that all pilots, all airline pilots, share this dedication.
While airline accidents are rare, even one fatal accident
is one too many. Over the years, ALPA has helped develop an
investigation process to identify all of the contributing
factors, evaluate needed changes, and most importantly,
implement those changes to improve safety.
The results include the first officer qualification
experience and training requirements that emerged from the
Colgan 3407 investigation. These requirements are a major
reason why the U.S. industry has not experienced a pilot
training or operational related fatality on a U.S. passenger
airline in more than 10 years. And this is why ALPA has called
upon the International Civil Aviation Organization to set
global pilot standards.
But incredibly, even when safety improvements like these
are codified in law, thanks to many of you here in this room
today, some still seek to undermine them.
While we have made strides, we have more to do. ALPA will
continue to help identify improvements, not only during these
investigations, but also in the long term, through the
industry's risk predictive, data-driven approach to enhancing
safety.
We will never stop fighting against those who put profits
before the safety of our passengers, cargo, and crew.
Our safety commitment means that ALPA will be fully
involved in understanding what went wrong and evaluating how to
move forward with the Boeing 737 MAX once the FAA final review
is complete.
We have made clear that questions must be answered in the
areas of oversight, aircraft certification, and delegation of
authority. ALPA will work tirelessly to ensure that industry
and Government make the changes necessary to safeguard our
system.
Equally important, our industry must be more determined
than ever to prevail against special interests that would have
us ignore the lessons from the past.
For example, we must deliver on Congress' intent to install
secondary flight deck barriers on all newly manufactured
passenger aircraft, a lesson we all learned from the 9/11
Report.
And we still have work to do to achieve one level of
aviation safety by applying science-based flight duty and rest
requirements to pilots, like myself, who fly cargo, and
mandating intrusion-resistant flight deck doors on cargo
aircraft.
Likewise, our industry must continue to make improvements
to safeguard the shipment of dangerous goods and lithium
batteries and eliminate shipments of undeclared dangerous
goods.
Today, ALPA released a new report that lays out the
indisputable safety benefits of the presence of at least two
fully qualified, adequately rested, and highly trained pilots
on the flight deck. We know, as do our passengers, that the
presence of at least two pilots on board our airliners not only
contributes to a proactive, risk predictive safety culture, it
is the reason why U.S. air transportation is so safe today.
The importance of a strong safety culture is one reason
that ALPA opposes allowing foreign airlines with flag of
convenience business models to serve the United States. These
schemes create an unstable work environment for employees that
can discourage proactive safety reporting.
I commend Chair DeFazio, Aviation Subcommittee Chair
Larsen, Vice Chair Davids and Representative Davis, and this
subcommittee for supporting legislation to enable the
Department of Transportation to determine whether airlines
using these harmful business practices should fly to the United
States.
The House included a similar provision in the recent FAA
reauthorization, and I hope the Fair and Open Skies Act will
move quickly.
And to finish, as pilots, our priority is always safety. We
make certain our industry learns from the tragedies we see and
we make improvements. Whether it is the decision on the return
to service of the Boeing 737 MAX or to take off on every
flight, it is safe to fly when the pilots in command say it is.
Thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak to you all
today. Thank you.
[Mr. DePete's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Captain Joseph G. DePete, President, Air Line
Pilots Association, International
Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify on the State of Aviation Safety. On behalf of
the world's largest non-governmental aviation safety organization, I
can report that the view from the flight deck is that the state of
safety in our skies remains sound. However, it is our organization's
top priority to stay focused on continual improvement and judicious
oversight to ensure that air travel is as safe as humanly possible.
The Air Line Pilots Association, International (ALPA), represents
more than 62,000 professional airline pilots flying for 35 airlines in
the United States and Canada. ALPA is the world's largest pilot union.
We are the recognized voice of the airline piloting profession in North
America, with a history of safety and security advocacy spanning more
than 85 years. As the sole U.S. member of the International Federation
of Airline Pilots Associations (IFALPA), ALPA has the unique ability to
provide active airline pilot expertise to aviation safety issues
worldwide, and to incorporate an international dimension to safety
advocacy.
The pilots of ALPA express our deepest condolences to the families
and loved ones of the victims of both the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302
and Lion Air Flight 610 accidents. We cannot know the depth of the
grief that they feel, but we can share in their determination to leave
a legacy of a safer air transportation system for those they lost.
As a 40-year airline pilot, achieving the highest standards of
safety has been a personal commitment throughout my career. As the
president of ALPA, the world's largest nongovernment aviation safety
organization, I can tell you that all airline pilots share my
dedication to advancing aviation safety and that safety has been the
foundation of ALPA's work for more than 85 years. In fact, across town
this week, we are hosting our 65th annual Air Safety Forum where we
facilitate discussion between regulators, pilots and other safety
experts and stakeholders on critical safety and security issues.
While aviation accidents are increasingly rare, ALPA has advocated
and helped develop a forensic approach to accident investigation
designed to identify every factor involved in an airline accident and
develop corrective actions to address them, with the sole goal of
preventing similar accidents from occurring in the future. In the U.S.
airline industry, we collect data, evaluate it, identify mitigations,
and implement them to make a safe system even safer.
Because of this commitment, ALPA is fully informed and involved in
efforts to bring the Boeing 737 MAX safely back into service following
the completion of the current U.S. Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) process. I have led our Air Safety Organization pilots and staff
in contacting all appropriate regulatory authorities and stakeholders
in the United States, Canada, and across the globe.
ALPA has offered our airline pilot perspective on the issues
related to the accidents, including the process and procedures used to
certify aircraft in the United States. We have been in communication
with Boeing, the FAA, the National Transportation Safety Board,
airlines, as well as with the U.S. Department of Transportation Special
Committee.
So to the families and loved ones who are here today, I can assure
you that the 62,000 pilots of ALPA resolve to be vigilant in ensuring
that the Department of Transportation and the FAA make any and all
changes necessary to enhance the safety of our air transportation
system. You have my word.
overview
Based on current statistics, 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)
Part 121 airlines carry approximately 900 million passengers and 18
million tons of cargo annually. U.S. passenger airlines operated under
14 CFR Part 121 have had one passenger fatality resulting from an
accident since 2009. This safety record is due to the efforts of the
aviation industry and our government partners but also due to the
efforts of Congress and this Committee, in particular. During the 20
years prior to the passage of the Aviation Safety and Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) Reauthorization Act of 2010, the U.S. passenger
airline industry lost approximately 1,100 passengers in aircraft
accidents. Since the passage of that bill there has not been a single
passenger fatality due to ``pilot error.''
Strikingly, since 2009, there have been 93 fatal passenger airline
accidents around the rest of world, which includes more than 4,700
fatalities. The United States passenger airline record is truly
remarkable. For that reason, we believe that the most important work
this Committee can accomplish is to ensure the United States maintains
the highest safety levels in the world and continues to lead by example
in all areas of aviation including aircraft certification, flight crew
training and licensing, crew-duty and rest requirements, airport design
standards, the safe introduction of new entrants, safety data analysis,
and many other areas. This comprehensive safety mindset allows
passengers to board a 14 CFR Part 121 passenger airline and know, with
a very high degree of confidence , that they will get there safely.
From day one in 1931, ALPA has maintained our motto of ``schedule with
safety.'' It hasn't changed; safety is still our top priority.
This Committee's continued focus on safety is to be commended, and
we thank you for using your time and resources--including today--to
shine a spotlight on safety. Unless we keep airline safety the top
priority, we risk digression and an increase in accidents, which impact
our ability to make progress on other important aspects of aviation
such as investments in increasing airspace capacity and the
introduction of new types of aviation and space operations into the
National Airspace System.
faa reauthorization implementation
In October 5, 2018, the Federal Aviation Administration
Reauthorization Act of 2018 became law (P.L. 115-254). The members of
this Committee demonstrated significant leadership to ensure that the
legislation ultimately became law, and you are to be commended for your
efforts to advance aviation safety. This law, if enacted appropriately
and as Congress intended, will improve the air transportation system
for years to come.
retention of congressionally mandated first officer qualifications
In 2018, Congress retained the current airline pilot training and
qualification requirements that are the law of the land. ALPA was
pleased with both this Committee and Congress for making this life-
saving, and wise decision. The best and most important safety feature
of any airline operation is at least two skilled, well trained, fully
qualified, highly experienced, and adequately rested professional
flight crew members. With a solid foundation of training and
experience, pilots are essential in maintaining the safety of our
system and ensuring that aviation safety continues to advance. Several
regional airline accidents from 2004 to 2009 identified numerous
training and qualification deficiencies that ultimately led to
Congressional action and regulatory changes that significantly improved
airline safety. The last of these accidents occurred February 12, 2009,
near Buffalo, N.Y. Fifty lives were lost--49 in the aircraft and one on
the ground. This accident was a ``watershed event'' for the airline
industry and aviation safety by resulting in regulations that enhanced
pilot training, qualification, flight experience requirements, and the
implementation of science-based flight, duty, and rest requirements.
The pilot training and qualifications regulations specifically
require that all airline pilots flying under 14 CFR Part 121 must hold
the air transport pilot (ATP) or Restricted ATP (R-ATP) certificate.
The restricted R-ATP certificate pathway, can be obtained with fewer
flight hours than the ATP, if the pilot applicant receives integrated
academic and flight training from the military or an accredited
aviation college or university.
Today's training and qualification regulations emphasize
significantly greater focus on academics and instruction, areas of
knowledge, and flight experience in various weather and operational
situations. The rules also require a type rating in the aircraft to be
flown for the airline if operated in 14 CFR Part 121 service and
increased experience in multi-engine aircraft. among other numerous
safety improvements. The FAA made a specific mention of the importance
of academic training when it published the final rule, and how the
accredited academics along with ground and flight training was
necessary to qualify for a reduction in hours. We applaud this
Committee for its leadership in preserving the training and
qualifications requirements last year and urge you to continue to do
so. We are confident that lives have been and are being saved because
of your steadfastness on this issue.
safety regulations vs. bad airline economics
Despite the clear message sent by Congress in 2018, there are some
people and organizations who want to address business-related industry
issues by reducing the requirements currently in place to obtain an ATP
or a R-ATP. These changes would weaken the First Officer Qualification
(FOQ) rules. They believe that rolling back provisions in P.L. 111-216
is the best way to fix their business challenges by widening the
employment pool. We do not believe that those who are advocating for
such measures are properly representing the issue of pilot
availability, which is not pilot qualifications requirements, but an
airline's attractiveness to the pilot community as an employer.
It is somewhat ironic that some who originally called for the
changes in P.L. 111-216 have since become critical of the rules,
arguing that the First Officer Qualifications have created a pilot
shortage. Small communities which have experienced changes to the
levels of airline services are also citing a pilot shortage. However,
in both cases, there is no reliable data to support these positions
and, in fact, the data says just the opposite.
In 2018, the FAA reported that it had issued 5,788 ATP
certificates, which includes 1,762 R-ATP certificates. Our research
revealed that the airlines hired approximately 4,600 pilots in 2018,
which is considerably fewer than the number of pilots who became
qualified to fly for the airlines that year. In fact, the number of ATP
certificates issued by the FAA has been higher than the number of
airline pilots hired for multiple years in a row. Clearly, the supply
of pilots is currently keeping up with the demands. But we realize that
as the industry expands, more pilots will be needed. ALPA continues to
promote the pilot profession far and wide, as a career of choice for
men and women who enjoy all the benefits that the career has to offer.
pilot experience before airline flying is critical
The length of time from when a pilot obtains his or her commercial
pilots license to when they have accumulated the hours and flight
experience necessary to qualify for the ATP or R-ATP certificate is
measured in months, not years or decades. Pilots who graduate from an
accredited, structured university and are qualified for the R-ATP
pathway can currently expect to spend 12 months or less flying in entry
level commercial operations or flight instruction before transitioning
to an airline.
Some regional airlines would like pilots to come pre-programmed
directly from a flight training environment that is directly similar to
the flying environment of that specific carrier's, without having to
make any training adjustments. While accredited universities produce
pilots with the fundamental skills and knowledge to obtain a commercial
pilot certificate, pilots who bring a more holistic, real-world set of
skills, including training in a variety of weather, terrain, and air
traffic control environments is beneficial. In our view, this
versatility of experience far outweighs a small amount of airline
training that is specified to mold the pilot into a single airline's
operation.
It is important to note that airlines do not provide training to
pilots (or allow them to take aircraft out to practice) so that they
can obtain experience in factors such as weather (e.g., thunderstorms,
snow, tropical storms), terrain (e.g., high altitude, mountain flying),
and high-density air traffic (e.g., New York City and Los Angeles
metroplex). Today's flight simulation environment cannot adequately
replicate these factors. Therefore, it is critical for pilots to obtain
flight time and experience in entry-level commercial operations after
they have obtained the commercial pilots license, but before being
inserted into the higher demands of 14 CFR Part 121 airline operating
environment so they are equipped with real-world flying experience. The
FAA wisely recognized that a military pilot background, or the
combination of an accredited university, structured FAA approved flight
training, and some commercial piloting experience in pre-airline
commercial operations was the best and safest training pathway to fully
address the shortcomings identified from fatal passenger airline
accidents.
taking the first officer qualifications requirements to icao
Soon after Congress passed the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018
without making changes to the first officer qualifications regulations,
ALPA began to take stock of the training and experience requirements
beyond our borders. In coordination with IFALPA, we have tracked pilot
training and qualifications globally for years. It is clear that in
nearly every other country, the training and minimum flight experience
requirements to qualify as a flight crew member on a transport category
airliner is less than the U.S., and in some cases, much less. And the
non-U.S. global accident rate shows that. Based on the safety record
that the U.S. has achieved under the current training and
qualifications framework, and knowing that global airline safety levels
could be positively impacted by a review of the pilot training and
qualification standards, ALPA recently asked ICAO Secretary General
Fang Liu to evaluate the need for review of the global minimum training
and qualifications.
In response, Secretary Liu called an ad-hoc meeting at ICAO to
discuss this topic, which was held this month at ICAO headquarters in
Montreal. The IFALPA attendees reported that the discussion was robust,
and it is clear this issue will garner additional discussion at ICAO in
the near future.
promoting the profession and increasing diversity
ALPA continues to promote the airline pilot profession. This
includes a team of ALPA pilots who promote the profession at several
large aviation events including Women in Aviation; the Organization of
Black Aerospace Professionals; AirVenture in Oshkosh, Wisconsin and the
National Gay Pilots Association. Hundreds of ALPA pilots also promote
the profession to students of all ages in thousands of schools
nationwide. And for those college students who are in the midst of
their flight training activities, we work alongside them, to help
prepare them for their future airline career. You can see some of our
work at www.clearedtodream.org.
All of these activities to promote the profession have included a
focused effort to diversify the pilot community. This includes our
efforts to reduce barriers to entry for minorities and women. We
believe that there is no shortage of individuals who have the
motivation, skills and aptitude to serve as airline pilots for a U.S.
airline.
We were pleased to support provisions in the Aviation Safety and
FAA Authorization Act of 2018 promoting women in aviation. We
wholeheartedly applaud the leadership by this Committee to include that
section, and we strongly support the establishment of a board that will
be solely focused on women in aviation. We look forward to engaging on
this topic with our fellow industry colleagues.
two pilots are needed in today's airline cockpit
The FAA Reauthorization importantly did not include a requirement
for the FAA to establish a program related to the concept of single-
pilot 14 CFR Part FAR 121 all-cargo airline operations. The program
would have created a new multi-year funding obligation for the FAA to
run a promotional program--despite, the agency's foundational safety
mandate--in support of unsafe, single-piloted commercial operations.
Upon learning about the proposal, ALPA took the initiative to measure
public perception of the concept of a single pilot at the controls of
an airline aircraft. In a public poll in 2018, 80 percent of
respondents agreed that at least two pilots working together in the
cockpit are best equipped to handle flight emergencies, while 96
percent said federal aviation research dollars should be directed at
projects other than those aimed at eliminating pilots from the cockpit.
Even when the proposal for an FAA program was removed from the
legislation, we continued to assess the feasibility of single pilot
airline operations. In short, we documented many technical, regulatory,
and financial barriers that indicate that single pilot operations are a
non-starter either financially or due to safety and operational
factors. Today, I am pleased to announce that ALPA has released a
white-paper on single pilot operations titled ``The Dangers of Single-
Pilot Operations,'' which is available on our website at www.alpa.org/
whitepapers. We hope this paper will create a foundation from which
ALPA can engage with anyone and everyone who would like to discuss this
important topic with us.
Maintaining today's level of safety, security and efficiency is
much more important than any dubious benefits of moving a pilot from
the cockpit to a remote location. Further, the aviation industry's
collective efforts to focus on higher priorities for the benefit of
passengers and shippers, should not be distracted by the establishment
of a federal program to evaluate or study this project at any agency or
with any federal dollars.
addressing all-cargo airline safety
Many of the safety and security layers working to protect our
passenger airline industry are absent from all-cargo operations. Cargo
airlines fly the same aircraft, takeoff and land from the same
airports, utilize the same airspace, and fly over the same cities as
passenger aircraft. From a safety and security standpoint, there is
every reason to hold all-cargo operations to the same safety and
security standards as passenger operations. All-cargo airline
operations currently experience an accident rate that is seven times
higher than passenger airline operations worldwide.
While many of the same regulations are used for both commercial
passenger and all-cargo airlines, there are lesser requirements placed
on all-cargo operations in several very important areas, which result
in unnecessary safety risk.
One example of this safety double standard between cargo and
passenger operations is flight crew flight, duty, and rest regulations.
While updated science-based flight- and duty-time regulations for
passenger operations were issued in 2011 and implemented in 2014, those
rules apply only to flight crew members at passenger airlines and do
not include all-cargo pilots. The FAA's original rules were developed
to include all pilots, passenger and cargo operations, but the cargo
sector was removed at the 11th hour, a move that caught many by
surprise. We believe that science-based flight, duty, and rest
regulations must be developed for flight crew members of all-cargo
operations.
Although there are other differences in all-cargo airline and
passenger airline operations under 14 CFR Part 121, as discussed below,
the correlation of reduced flight- and duty-time regulations and the
tarnished safety record cannot be dismissed as a coincidence. With
relatively few differences in the regulations between all-cargo and
passenger airline operations, the differences in flight- and duty-time
regulations are an obvious area that needs to be addressed.
However, unless we make meaningful changes soon, all-cargo airline
operations will likely continue to have preventable accidents and
fatalities at elevated levels relative to 14 CFR Part 121 passenger
operation. Congress has a role to ensure that the disparity between
all-cargo airline and passenger airline is eliminated. Accordingly, we
request that this Committee take the necessary action to ensure that
flight- and duty-time regulations, and other differences between all-
cargo and passenger airline operations under 14 CFR Part 121 are
resolved.
Another example of a significant safety gap is that all-cargo
operations are exempted from Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF)
requirements contained in 14 CFR Part 139. This means that ARFF is not
required to be staffed or even present at airports during operations of
all-cargo aircraft.
Further, cargo aircraft carry very hazardous cargo, such as blood-
borne pathogen, chemical, and radioactive material. Not only should
ARFF be staffed during all-cargo operations, but ARFF personnel must be
trained for dealing with fires on all-cargo airliners. Measures need to
be developed and implemented that will properly prepare firefighters
for dealing with a cargo aircraft fire. There is a lack of proper ARFF
equipment needed to fight all-cargo aircraft fires at some airports,
including nozzle tips designed for penetrating cargo airliner hulls,
and a lack of funding, because the exemption of cargo from 14 CFR Part
139 requirements interferes with fire departments' ability to get the
resources they need for staffing, equipment, training, and developing
strategy for cargo-specific events.
ALPA has maintained a strong stance that all-cargo operations must
have the same level of safety as passenger airlines. The facts,
however, speak for themselves. There have been five (5) fatal all-cargo
14 CFR Part 121 accidents in the U.S. in the past decade, with 15
fatalities. This includes the fatal accident on February 23, 2019 of an
Atlas Air Boeing 767, not far from Houston, Texas.
missing cockpit doors on all-cargo aircraft
After September 11, 2001, the federal government required existing
and future passenger airliners and existing all-cargo airliners having
cockpit doors, to be equipped with reinforced flight deck doors.
Today, however, a significant number of all-cargo airliners are
still operated without the benefits of hardened flight deck doors,
leaving them without a means of adequately separating the flight crew
from personnel riding aft of the bulkhead, and potential cargo-hold
stowaways. In fact, new wide-body cargo airplanes such as the B777 and
the B767 are being built and delivered to all-cargo operators without
the protections afforded by the reinforced door. The potential for a
significant lapse in security due to these conditions is magnified by
the fact that all-cargo airliners frequently carry third-party, non-
crew personnel (known as ``supernumeraries''), such as couriers and
animal handlers, who are not subject to criminal history-based security
background checks required of other airline employees. These animal
handlers carry strong sedatives and syringes that can be used on the
animals if necessary during flight. There is a significant concern by
our members that these improperly-vetted individuals are able to use
these sedatives or otherwise take hostile actions against the flight
crew absent the protections of a primary door. This situation is
exacerbated by the fact that all-cargo airliners and their cargo are
not afforded the same security protections as their passenger-carrying
counterparts while on the ground.
The lack of a mandate for reinforced flight deck doors on cargo
aircraft is hard to justify when the TSA has formally stated that it
considers the ``hostile takeover of an all-cargo aircraft leading to
its use as a weapon'' to be a critical risk. Events in the post-9/11
era have proven that stowaways represent a very real and significant
threat to all-cargo airliners. To deter those persons with malicious
intent and impede their ability to attack all-cargo flight crewmembers,
gain access to aircraft controls, or otherwise execute a hostile
takeover of an all-cargo airliner, physical barriers must be designed
and installed to separate the all-cargo airliner's flight deck from
accessible passenger and cargo areas.
In order to ensure one level of security of all 14 CFR Part 121
operations, all-cargo flight decks must be clearly delineated and
physically protected in the same fashion as the flight decks of
passenger airliners. This includes the provision of reinforced flight
deck doors and the associated flight deck access procedures for
crewmembers.
secondary barriers delayed
Reinforced flight deck doors, mandated on passenger airliners by
the U.S. Congress after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, do not
provide a complete solution to the problem they were intended to
resolve. There are times when operational necessity requires that the
flight deck door be opened in flight. That period, however slight,
represents a vulnerability that must be addressed. An installed
physical secondary barrier, accompanied by standardized crew procedures
for protecting the flight deck when the reinforced door is opened in
flight, will significantly augment the intended benefits of the
fortified door and other TSA-approved onboard protective measures, and
add an important layer of security to prevent hostile takeover of the
flight deck. ALPA has been calling for mandated secondary cockpit
barriers for more than a decade.
At the behest of this Committee, section 336 of P.L. 115-254
requires ``not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration
shall issue an order requiring installation of a secondary cockpit
barrier on each new aircraft that is manufactured for delivery to a
passenger air carrier in the United States operating under the
provisions of part 121 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations.''
However, with a deadline in 3 months, the FAA has inserted
unnecessary roadblocks to stall progress on this important security
provision. Last month, the agency tasked the Aviation Rulemaking
Advisory Committee (ARAC), over ALPA's stated objections, with forming
a working group to establish recommendations to the agency on the
implementation of the Section 336 directive.
Clearly, this is a move to slow down or otherwise not fulfill the
obligations Congress placed on the FAA to implement the secondary
cockpit barrier mandate. We would note that 110 members of this body,
including many members of this Committee, recently transmitted a letter
[https://carson.house.gov/newsroom/press-releases/rep-carson-leads-
effort-to-protect-planes-from-hijacking] to the DOT unequivocally
reinforcing the statutory intent of Section 336: specifically, the FAA
must issue an order, without delay, by October 5, 2019 requiring the
installation of secondary barriers on all new manufactured passenger
aircraft off the assembly line. Failing to meet this requirement will
delay implementation and evade congressional intent.
Some may argue there are questions about how to implement the
legislation. However, these questions were answered years ago by
request from the FAA to RTCA--a private, not-for-profit corporation--to
develop secondary barrier system guidelines containing design
characteristics, minimum performance criteria, and installation and
certification guidance.
RTCA Special Committee (SC)-221 developed and published these
guidelines in September 2011 as DO-329. This document provides the FAA
with guidance needed to develop and issue a clear interpretation of 14
CFR Part 121.584 to its principal operations inspectors as they
evaluate an airline's security procedures for compliance. It also
provides airlines and manufacturers with approved performance standards
that are suitable for meeting FAA aircraft equipment requirements for
the production and installation of secondary barriers.
We urge the Committee to continue to monitor this situation, and to
ensure that the FAA carries out its requirements under the law and
issue the requirement for secondary cockpit barriers by October 5,
2019.
safe shipments of hazardous materials
ALPA has long advocated for improved transport requirements for
hazardous materials both as a member of IFALPA, and here in North
America as well. We have worked with this Committee to ensure that the
safe transport of lithium batteries can occur with adequate risk
mitigation techniques in place and are especially appreciative of
Chairman DeFazio's longstanding commitment to improving the safety of
lithium battery transport by air.
Although lithium batteries represent a significant technological
improvement over older battery technology, their high energy density
and flammability make these batteries more prone to failure, resulting
in fire and explosion. The lack of comprehensive hazardous materials
regulations for the carriage of lithium batteries as cargo onboard
commercial aircraft, both passenger and cargo, continues to pose risks
to air transportation.
New standards implemented by ICAO on April 1, 2016, made
significant improvements to provisions under which lithium batteries
are shipped as cargo by air around the globe. We are pleased that
Section 333 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 directed the DOT to
harmonize the U.S. regulations with those put in place by ICAO. This
important and critical step ensures that until there are technologies
that can fully contain a lithium battery induced fire, the shipments
are limited.
While the harmonization of the US regulations to ICAO limitations
is a good first step, it does not go far enough in addressing the
safety risk created by lithium batteries. Work must continue to develop
and mandate performance-based packaging standards that will prevent
and/or contain a lithium battery fire. These standards must also
address the threat from external fires.
undeclared hazardous materials pose a threat
We are pleased that undeclared hazardous materials were addressed
by Section 583 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, which directs
the Department of Transportation (DOT) to develop an undeclared
hazardous materials public awareness campaign. The DOT's Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) has developed the
`Check the Box' educational program to begin to address the risks posed
by undeclared hazardous materials shipments, as well as the FAA's
program on undeclared hazardous materials. This is an important effort
that should help raise awareness among shippers.
Hazardous materials, comprised of liquids, flammables, and other
materials, shipped as cargo without being identified by the shipper are
considered undeclared hazardous materials. There are no official
estimates of what percentage of parcel shipments contain undeclared
hazardous materials; however, the FAA tracks incidents where hazardous
materials shipments create safety hazards for various reasons, such as
a leaking package or other type of external evidence that the package
is a safety concern. In 2018, the FAA received 1,346 reports of such
events, and 644 of the incidents involved undeclared hazardous
materials.
training with simulation--there are limits
As is well recognized, the U.S. airline pilot training standard is
the gold standard, and significantly more advanced than most other
countries. However, there are many airline business leaders who believe
that they can manage training costs through innovative training
methods. One such example is the expanded use of non-motion aircraft
simulators. Ironically, non-motion simulators have been historically
viewed as inferior due to their lack of ability to replicate the sense
of flight that pilots experience as the operate the aircraft in all
flight regimes. But non-movement simulators appear to be making a
comeback.
While they may be acceptable to train pilots on checklist
execution, or to help pilots learn the basic flow of cockpit
procedures, there are some airlines that desire to begin to use non-
movement simulators to evaluate pilots in training. The safety benefits
of using simulation with full-motion are well documented and the use of
motion-based simulation is mandated for some airline pilot training. We
question the viability and benefit of re-introducing non-motion
simulators for anything beyond basic initial aircraft cockpit
orientation and procedures development.
Conversely, there are others who believe that nearly all the
training needed to become an airline pilot can be conducted with
motion-based simulation. They argue that a pilot's basic skills can be
taught using carefully scripted ``real world'' scenarios to teach
pilots basic knowledge and to leap-frog critical operating experience
in the airspace system. An example of this simulation-based licensing
scheme is an ICAO licensing option called the multi-crew pilots
license, or MPL. Pilots flying for airlines with an MPL do not pass
through the individual licensing levels such as the private pilot
license, the instrument rating, the commercial pilot license, a multi-
engine rating, high-altitude operations endorsement, etc. Instead, MPL
pilots ``hit the sim'' on day number one of their training and within a
very short time, without adequate real-world experience, they are
placed into a transport category aircraft flying for an airline. They
are essentially apprentice pilots, requiring the captain to overcome
any training and experience shortcomings that the first officer may
have, alone.
From our view, both of these ``extremes'' need to be carefully
monitored. Expanding the motion-based simulation technologies as a
replacement for tried-and-true real-world flying is nearly impossible
to achieve. And permitting airline pilot training and testing to be
conducted with non-motion simulators will not give pilots the added
benefits that have long been documented for a suitable training
environment. We urge the committee to engage the FAA on these topics,
and we stand at the ready to expand upon our concern in this area.
safe integration of unmanned aircraft systems and drones
ALPA applauds Congress for its clarification of the FAA's authority
to fully regulate all Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) operations in the
2018 FAA Reauthorization, to include model and hobby drone operators,
who previously were exempted from regulation. We are especially
grateful for this Subcommittee and Chairman DeFazio for the dedication
to promote safe operations of all unmanned aircraft regardless of size,
speed, or their intended purpose.
With the rapidly growing use of UAS for any number of applications
and uses, the safety risks to airline operations need to be monitored
very closely. We applaud this Committee's commitment to ensure UAS
safety, by holding a hearing earlier this year that focused on aviation
in 2050. Clearly, at some point in the future, UAS will be integrated
into the national airspace system (NAS), interacting with other
aircraft in a manner similar to ``pilot on board'' aircraft today.
Recently, a company approached the FAA to obtain exemptions that
would allow them to bypass more than 200 regulations in order to start
a commercial UAS package delivery service without any limitations to
flying over residential or other populated areas.
Granting this petition for exemption would allow the petitioner to
bypass the FAA UAS implementation policy of ``crawl, walk, run'' for
the introduction of new technology, capability, and procedures. The FAA
has historically established regulations based on accidents and
incidents to establish the current FARs. Aviation regulations represent
a safety framework for which commercial for-hire operations are
conducted. Issuing exemptions to so many of the requested areas appears
to erode the safety levels established by the FAA through regulation,
many of which were established as a result of accidents and incidents
with injury and loss of life to passengers and people on the ground.
As required under 14 CFR Part 11.35 (b), the FAA withheld
proprietary company manuals and related material, including the
petitioner's safety case justification. Therefore, many of the
exemptions requested could not be thoroughly evaluated by industry
stakeholders. If successful, we can anticipate that other manned and
unmanned operators would seek similar exemptions from the same
regulations included in this Petition for Exemption, awarding them to
others without a clear safety justification. This is not how UAS
operations should be implemented in the NAS if the objective is to make
UAS a standard participant in routine NAS operations.
FAA appears to be struggling to keep pace with the expansion of the
UAS industry. Issuing waivers to a multitude of regulations, with
minimal input from existing airspace users, raises concerns about the
amount of additional risk being introduced into the airspace system.
We must not allow pressure to rapidly integrate UAS into the NAS
without appropriate safeguards in place. This process must be focused
on safety as the highest priority. Risk mitigation plans, which have
yet to be fully developed, combined with consensus-based technology
standards that will ensure interoperability with manned aircraft, must
be in place before a UAS can occupy the same airspace as manned
aircraft or operate in areas where it might inadvertently stray into
airspace occupied by airliners. When UAS operate in the same airspace
as airline aircraft, the pilots will need to be able to see them on
cockpit displays, and air traffic controllers will also need to see
them on their displays to safely separate air traffic. Further, the UAS
must be equipped with active collision-avoidance technology. We will
oppose any integration that does not include collision avoidance
systems that are interoperable with airline collision avoidance
systems.
If a UAS operator does not intend to fly in the same airspace as
airliners, then limitations that ensure that the UAS stays out of the
airspace must be programmed into the UAS in a way that cannot be
overridden.
sUAS Identification and Tracking Technologies are Needed
As has been widely reported, a drone collided with a U.S. Army
helicopter in 2016, one mile east of Midland Beach in Staten Island,
New York. From the investigation, we know that a Temporary Flight
Restriction (TFR) was in effect for the area of the flight, and that
the UAS was not equipped with any type of identification or tracking
technology. The National Transportation Safety Board examined pieces of
the sUAS that were found lodged in the aircraft, and using the
information from these pieces, the hobbyist pilot of the sUAS was
identified and located. The individual operating the sUAS routinely
operated his hobby aircraft in the vicinity of the collision site,
which was beyond his visual line of sight. After losing control of the
aircraft, and because it failed to return to his position, he indicated
that he simply believed his aircraft had ``gone down'' and he was
unaware that it had been involved in a mid-air collision.
Now that Congress has removed the FAA's barriers to regulating
model and hobby small UAS, the FAA urgently needs to implement
mandatory identification and tracking capabilities.
If an identification and tracking system had been in place prior to
the October 2016 collision with the Army helicopter, much more
information would have been immediately available to accident
investigators and law enforcement. Such a system would likely have
prevented the collision in the first place, because law enforcement may
have observed the sUAS operating on a previous flight, and proactively
contacted the hobbyist about the illegal use of the aircraft. Until
there is a way for law enforcement to identify and track down the sUAS
operators, there is very little incentive for non-conformist hobby
operators to operate sUAS safely.
integrating commercial space operations improves safety
Commercial space operations are not new. In fact, it has been more
than 30 years since Congress established the Office of Commercial Space
Transportation in the DOT, which now resides at the FAA. The industry
is mature, and thanks to a series of events over the past decade, it is
thriving through an expansion in proposed spaceports and significantly
increased operational frequency.
These are truly exciting times for America as we experience
innovation and advancements that are literally blasting off before our
eyes. However, we must continue to make commercial aviation part of the
discussion on commercial space. Future growth and success of U.S.
commercial aviation depends upon continued safe, dependable, and
efficient access to shared public resources such as the National
Airspace System, air traffic management, ground infrastructure, and
airport services. The need to integrate commercial space operations and
commercial aviation operations into the NAS is an urgent one that
requires careful planning and commitment from many different parts of
the industry.
One thing is clear: expanded markets and technology advances in
space are enabling new commercial companies to access these limited
resources, which has become a critical challenge for the aviation
community. Air traffic management, airports, and the NAS are regulated
and managed according to strict operational and safety regulations,
which will not sufficiently accommodate the projected growth and
evolution of space transportation, without enhancements to how space
flight is accommodated by the NAS. There must be a means to safely
integrate with existing aircraft operations and infrastructure without
decreasing the level of safety or efficiency for existing operations.
Full integration will allow space operations to plan and execute
launches without extensive coordination like they do now, and full
integration will also eliminate the need for segregation of space
operations from commercial airline flights. Bottom line: commercial
space integration improves safety and efficiency of the NAS for all
airspace users. A strategy to fully integrate commercial space
operations into existing NAS operations is a critical first step to
achieving this important goal.
Neither industry would be successful today without the other. Each
sector generates hundreds of billions of dollars in annual economic
returns for the United States and immeasurable benefits to society. The
FAA has coordinated the activities of both airplanes and rockets
successfully for more than 60 years. In many ways, there is a false
distinction between the two sectors, since several aircraft types
travel into outer space, and all space vehicles travel through the
atmosphere. As spaceflight becomes more diffuse and routine, both
sectors must cooperate to create policies, regulations, and procedures
to manage shared national aerospace resources safely and efficiently.
An important reason to keep the commercial space industry a part of
the aviation discussion is that there are going to be innovations in
safety and efficiency that will likely find their way into commercial
aviation. For example, Virgin Galactic plans to utilize a spacecraft
for multiple flights with paying passengers (technically speaking, they
are ``participants''), and this experience will likely help the
commercial airlines better understand the interest in hypersonic travel
and the potential issues that would accompany a transition to this type
of travel in the future.
ALPA is very interested in supporting the commercial space
industry's efforts to advance through the full integration into the
NAS. To fully articulate the complementary nature of commercial space
and commercial aviation, we published a white paper, ``Addressing the
Challenges to Aviation from Evolving Space Transportation'' that
documents the role of the government agencies and industry, both
historically as well as today. That whitepaper can also be found at
www.alpa.org/whitepapers.
safety data analysis is critical to ensure risks are proactively
identified
When thinking about aviation advancements over the next several
years, there is one aspect above all others that needs our full support
in order to continue to improve: aviation safety. The efforts of the
Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) combined with Aviation Safety
Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) have led to dramatic
improvements. Data analysis by CAST and ASIAS has resulted in a
proactive safety culture that cuts across all airlines and stakeholders
with unprecedented levels of collaboration, even when those same
stakeholders disagree about many other aspects of industry policy. The
predictive risk analysis conducted by the CAST and ASIAS allows the
aviation community to collectively reach heightened levels of safety
without waiting for a single drop of blood to be shed. We believe that
the resource needs for the ASIAS activity are likely going to increase
in order to keep up with the accelerated pace of operations. We urge
Congress to closely monitor the resource requirements for this activity
to ensure that critical safety risk identification activities are not
tabled because of inadequate resources.
necessary resources to ensure safety of our skies
A safe airline industry is only possible when the FAA has the
resources necessary to carry out its safety mission. The FAA needs to
receive consistent and reliable funding for its safety oversight role,
as well as its role as an air navigation service provider.
The partial government shutdown earlier this year has perhaps faded
from the memories of most Americans. But the shutdown has not faded
from the memories of ALPA pilots, who found themselves faced with new
and different types of risks than they had experienced in the past. The
FAA's rank and file air traffic controllers, ATC system safety
specialists, certification engineers/specialists, and FAA safety
inspectors as well as the Transportation Security Administration's
(TSA) Transportation Security Officers were expected to do the
unthinkable for multiple pay periods: work without pay. And while it
may be no surprise to the members of this Committee, their service to
this country during that period was phenomenal.
But the realities of work without pay started to set in quickly,
and our airspace system was put at risk for no good reason whatsoever.
Political gamesmanship put our national transportation system at risk.
Fortunately, the system's safety net worked, and the shutdown ended
without serious ramifications to air travel.
ALPA was pleased to be among the first to support Chairman
DeFazio's legislation that will allow the FAA to temporarily use funds
from the Airport and Airway Trust Fund during a government shutdown
situation. The Aviation Funding Stability Act needs to be passed as
soon as possible, and we continue to fully support the legislation.
The FAA is seemingly accustomed to being asked to do more, while
not always receiving the funding that they need. The FAA oversight of
aircraft certification and manufacturing, maintenance, airline
certificate management should not be put in jeopardy because the FAA is
now being tasked with the work of approving new types of operations in
the NAS such as UAS, small drones, supersonic, hypersonic, and multi-
rotor vertical lift operations. All of these ``additional types of
operations'' require resources that are above and beyond those needed
for safety oversight. Introduction of these new types of operations
safely requires resources that the FAA likely does not yet possess. We
urge the Committee to keep a close eye on the agency's needs.
The new types of operations the FAA must operationally approve as a
safety regulator will also drive new demands on the air traffic control
system. While the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen)
establishes a foundation for safely increasing capacity in our skies,
the FAA will likely need to develop additional capabilities to support
commercial space, UAS, and other new operations. The resources needed
by the FAA will likely be significant. However, from the view of
airline pilots, we will want air traffic controllers--as the shepherds
of the skies--to have the tools they need to ensure our safe passage.
To make sure they have the tools they need, Congress must ensure that
the FAA has stable and reliable funding.
strengthening voluntary safety reporting programs
Voluntary safety reporting programs such as the Aviation Safety
Action Program (ASAP) and Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA)
are important, collaborative tools that enhance aviation safety through
the analysis of voluntarily reported safety events and discrepancies
that lead to the prevention of accidents and incidents. The purpose of
ASAP and FOQA is to encourage and use voluntarily reported safety
information provided by frontline employees and airlines, respectively,
to identify safety risks. Without these valuable safety reports,
unidentified risks go unmitigated and remain within the system.
For example, more than a decade ago the implementation of
stabilized approach technology and procedures became a top safety
priority upon discovering the frequency of non-stabilized approaches
being reported by pilots. More recently, data sources have been
combined to identify potential risks that are initially identified
through the voluntary safety programs. Ground radar data, historical
weather information, and other data sources were used to identify
instances when aircraft traffic and terrain warning systems were
repeatedly alerting to false alarms. These voluntary safety programs
triggered studies of these alarms, which ultimately led to the
discovery that improvements to airspace and procedures design would
reduce the false alarms. These examples prove that the underlying
voluntary safety program reporting by the operators is the best source
to identify potential risk areas and to investigate and ultimately
mitigate these risks.
Automatic Acceptance
We were pleased to see that Section 320 of the FAA Reauthorization
Act of 2018 included the provision that ``there shall be a presumption
that an individual's voluntary report of an operational or maintenance
issue related to aviation safety under an aviation safety action
program meets the criteria for acceptance as a valid report under such
program.'' Directing the FAA to change ASAP programs to reflect this
presumption will improve and increase the safety benefit of ASAP and
voluntarily submitted aviation safety information by automatic
acceptance of ASAP reports. Several airline ASAP programs already have
automatic acceptance protocols built in (e.g., American and Delta Air
Lines). However, where ASAP reports are not automatically accepted, the
safety benefit is delayed, sometimes by weeks or longer, waiting for an
Event Review Committee (ERC) to meet, review, and accept these reports.
Under an automatic-acceptance scenario, the safety benefit of the
information will be realized immediately. As recognized in Section 320,
a report could still be ultimately excluded when the ERC convenes, and
it is determined to meet established exclusionary criteria. The
automatic-acceptance model works and will now be universal to ASAP,
thanks to the work of this committee.
fair and open skies--ensuring that aviation in america remains safe and
strong
ALPA would like to thank Chairman DeFazio and Chairman Larsen, as
well as Representatives Davis, Davids and Ferguson, for their strong
leadership on an important issue that threatens thousands of high-
quality airline jobs in our country. On July 10th they introduced, H.R.
3632, the Fair and Open Skies Act. The legislation provides a
bipartisan solution to ensure the enforcement of our Open Skies
agreements by bolstering the DOT's oversight of an air carrier when it
seeks an operating certificate to conduct service to the United States.
Specifically, the Fair and Open Skies Act clarifies in statute that a
multi-factor public interest test must be given consideration before
the issuance of foreign air carrier permit, revises the public interest
test to examine whether a foreign air carrier is a flag of convenience
or is otherwise undermining U.S. labor standards, and requires European
air carriers abide by the labor chapter of the U.S.-E.U. Open Skies
Agreement as ratified by our government, ALPA has traditionally
supported the opportunities created by our more than 120 Open Skies
agreements. When properly enforced, these agreements promote benefits
for U.S. carriers, workers, and passengers. Collectively, the reforms
provided in the Fair and Open Skies Act will help ensure these
agreements operate as intended and that the liberalization of air
services is beneficial to all parties, including nation states, U.S.
employees, and air carriers. This legislation will ensure that DOT
gives proper consideration of a foreign airline's business practices--
including those who may employ businesses practices with questionable
safety oversight or regulatory schemes to be fully vetted before
granting a permit to fly to the U.S.
conclusion
We appreciate the Committee's invitation to offer our insights and
perspectives on these important aviation safety issues today. More
importantly, we appreciate the leadership that continues to be
demonstrated by the Committee to advance these high-priority safety
issues. The airline industry is best positioned to fully meet the needs
of all passengers and shippers when safety levels remain at, or exceed,
their current levels. It is in our collective best interest as
legislative leaders, labor organizations, companies, and regulators, to
ensure the foundation of safety is solid, and continues to lead the
rest of the world. We look forward to working on these issues with you
in the coming months as we strive to make meaningful safety
improvements to aviation.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
Ms. Bassani, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Bassani. Good morning, Chairman DeFazio, Chairman
Larsen, Ranking Member Graves, and members of the Aviation
Subcommittee. My name is Lori Bassani, and I am the president
of the Association of Professional Flight Attendants.
First, I would like to extend my deepest condolences to Mr.
Njoroge, Mr. Stumo, and all of the families who are impacted by
the Ethiopian Air and Lion Air crashes. Your testimony was very
compelling and heartfelt.
APFA represents over 28,000 flight attendants of American
airlines and is the largest independent flight attendant union
in the world. APFA is also a member of the Coalition of Flight
Attendants, where labor organizations that represent virtually
all U.S.-based flight attendants come together to promote
aviation safety and our profession.
Today, I am proud to be the voice for the nearly 100,000
flight attendants across the Nation.
I know many of you on this committee travel each week and
personally understand the challenges of air travel today.
Believe me, we feel your frustrations.
As both first responders on board the aircraft and the last
line of defense should the unthinkable happen again, your
safety and security is our top priority.
The 2018 FAA reauthorization bill included many safety
improvements that we are all eager to see implemented and that
need the continuing oversight of this important committee. We
applaud the passage of this bill with overwhelming bipartisan
support. It is a genuine tribute to leadership of this
committee and the importance of these issues.
There are several safety provisions I would like to speak
to today.
First, in section 337, the FAA is instructed to review
cabin evacuation procedures and the changes to passenger
seating configurations.
Stop. In the time that I have been speaking, it has been 90
seconds. My crew would be charged with evacuating a full
aircraft with 291 lives aboard. I hope that we saved all of
those lives. But here are some of the ways that we can do this.
APFA has previously testified regarding our concerns on
seat size, pitch, and our ability to evacuate an aircraft using
just half of the exits in 90 seconds or less. This is the
certification requirement mandated by the FAA.
The truth is that passengers are now older, some are
larger, and sometimes less mobile. As seat size and legroom
continue to shrink, frustrations rise. We are seeing
unprecedented levels of air rage.
In an emergency landing, passengers no longer have enough
space to assume the proper brace position. Under these
conditions, is a 90-second evacuation still realistic?
APFA believes that a comprehensive review of evacuation
procedures under real-world conditions is long overdue.
Second, the FAA recognizes that toxic fumes jeopardize
flight safety but has no process to collect reports from crew
and no procedures to investigate such incidents. This means
that the true extent of toxic fume contamination remains
largely unknown.
Last year, at our airline alone, 1,500 fume events were
reported to our safety department. My members have been
hospitalized and have suffered chronic and permanent
neurological damage.
Section 326 of the FAA bill takes first steps in addressing
this issue by requiring the collection data and providing
educational information to crewmembers. The Cabin Air Safety
Act, introduced this year by Congressman Garamendi,
specifically mentions carbon monoxide detectors and takes the
FAA bill a needed step further, and we urge its adoption.
Third, Congress amended the minimum flight attendant rest
requirement from 8 to 10 hours. When Congress passed this
legislation, the intent was clear: simply modify the 1994 rule
relating to flight attendant rest within 30 days of passage.
Sounds simple, makes common sense, but apparently not.
We are now hearing from the DOT and the FAA that it will
take months to implement this modest change. Given the broad
bipartisan support of this provision, we ask that the committee
reengage and insist on its timely implementation.
Lastly, we want to thank the committee for your work
providing oversight on the 737 MAX tragedies. When the aircraft
regains flight status, we will be the ones in the aisles
reassuring our passengers.
Flight attendants must have absolute confidence in the
aircraft and in the process that will return it to service. We
continue to look to you to ensure that that process is fully
transparent.
As flight attendants, safety is in our DNA. On any given
flight, on any given day, we can be called upon to attend to a
heart attack victim, to fight fires, to avert security risks,
to comfort a child traveling alone, to deescalate enraged
passengers, identify sex traffickers, and deal with turbulence
and delays, all while being prepared to evacuate a plane
stuffed full of passengers at a moment's notice, within 90
seconds.
We need to know and be able to communicate to the traveling
public, our guests, that we have and will continue to have the
safest aviation system in the world.
Thank you. My testimony is now complete.
[Ms. Bassani's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Lori Bassani, National President, Association of
Professional Flight Attendants
Good morning Chairman DeFazio, Chairman Larsen, Ranking Member
Graves and members of the Aviation Subcommittee. Thank you for inviting
me to testify. My name is Lori Bassani. I am the National President of
the Association of Professional Flight Attendants (APFA). APFA
represents the more than 28,000 Flight Attendants of American Airlines
and is the largest independent Flight Attendant union in the world.
APFA is also a member of the Coalition of Flight Attendant Unions where
the multiple labor organizations that represent virtually all US-based
Flight Attendants work together to promote aviation safety and this
profession. I am honored to be here speaking on behalf of our
profession.
The issues that matter to Flight Attendants are the same ones that
matter to passengers. I know many of you on this Committee travel each
week and personally understand the many challenges of air travel today.
While we represent more than 28,000 Flight Attendants, what we are
fighting for is a safe and comfortable travel experience for all our
passengers. As both first responders on board the aircraft and the last
line of defense should the unthinkable happen again, safety and
security are our top priority.
faa oversight
We were gratified when the 2018 FAA Reauthorization Act passed by
this Committee, was signed into law in October and we applaud that it
was passed with overwhelming bipartisan support--an increasingly rare
occurrence in this town and a genuine tribute to leadership of this
Committee, so I thank you Chairman DeFazio, Chairman Larsen, Ranking
Member Graves as well as former Chairman Shuster. It is a testament to
the importance of these issues.
There are safety provisions in the bill that we are all eager to
see implemented, some of which are overdue and all of which need the
continuing oversight of this Committee. We are tracking many components
of the bill but there are several I would like to speak to today.
seat size and evacuations
Section 337 requires the FAA to broadly review cabin evacuation
procedures and the changes to passenger seating configurations,
including seat widths, pitch, leg room and aisle width. In light of
recent accidents and incidents in which passengers have had to
evacuate, it is important to review seat dimensions. At American
Airlines, our Flight Attendants had to evacuate a Boeing 767 on the
runway at O'Hare International Airport in Chicago in October of 2016.
While everyone was evacuated safely, the process raised many questions.
So simply put: it's time to seriously review evacuation procedures
under current, real-world conditions.
In addition, every aspect of personal space, except first class and
business class aboard commercial aircraft is shrinking. In the main
cabin where most passengers fly, personal space is constrained more
than it has ever been. Airplanes are flying at near capacity, and not
just during the busy travel seasons. Airplanes are packed full. Air
rage is on the rise. Flight Attendants are inevitably drawn into the
conflicts. Finally, with 28 or 29 inch seat pitch, many passengers no
longer have enough space to assume the proper ``brace position'' in the
event of an emergency landing, let alone comfortably work on their
laptops.
In order to be certified, a carrier must demonstrate to the FAA
that an aircraft can be safely evacuated using just half of the exits
in 90 seconds or less. The truth is that many passengers are older,
larger and in many cases have less mobility. When these facts are
combined with reduced seat pitch and size we believe a comprehensive
review of evacuation procedures is overdue. Our understanding is that
the FAA has yet to initiate any formal action on this Congressional
instruction.
cabin air quality
While the FAA recognizes that toxic fumes jeopardize flight safety,
the Agency has no standard process to collect reports from crew about
fume events and no procedures to investigate such incidents. This means
that the true extent of toxic fume contamination remains largely
unknown and likely underreported. Last year alone, we had over 1500
fumes events reported to our union's Safety Department. My members have
been hospitalized and have suffered chronic and permanent neurological
damage. Once a fume event has injured a crewmember, we are forced to
fight with our company and state laws to receive any type of workers'
compensation which are routinely denied.
Section 326 of the FAA Bill takes important first steps in
addressing this issue by collecting data and examining potential
monitoring of the cabin air. Exposure to toxic fumes can be insidious.
Passenger and crew can be largely unaware of their exposure until after
the event. The bleed air system that is common in almost all commercial
aircraft lends itself to feeding contaminated air into the cabin and
ought to be at the center of any new investigation. We also support HR
2208 introduced by Rep. Garamendi which would mandate a much more
specific course of action in investigating this problem and we look
forward to supporting its passage. No one should ever have to question
whether the air they breathe in the cabin of an aircraft is safe.
Again, our focus is crew and passengers' health.
10-hour minimum rest
In Section 335, Congress amended the minimum Flight Attendant rest
requirement from 8 to 10 hours. We know that when Congress passed this
legislation the intent was clear. Simply modify the final rule
published in the Federal Register on August 19, 1994 relating to Flight
Attendant duty period limitations and rest within 30 days to read as
``a flight attendant scheduled to a duty period of 14 hours or less is
given a scheduled rest period of at least 10 consecutive hours; and the
rest period is not reduced under any circumstances.'' Sounds simple,
makes common sense, but apparently not. We are now hearing from the DOT
and the FAA that it will take months to review and implement this
modest change. Given the broad bipartisan support of this provision we
would ask the Committee to reengage and order its timely
implementation. Passengers deserve Flight Attendants who are well-
rested and ready to respond at a moment's notice.
emotional support animals
Section 437 of the FAA Bill addresses emotional support animals and
harmonizes service animal standards. We have seen a variety of animals
including monkeys, chickens, pigs, a kangaroo, a miniature penguin and
even a miniature pony all brought onto the aircraft under the guise of
being ``service'' or ``emotional support'' animals. These so-called
emotional support animals have been known to bite passengers and Flight
Attendants, urinate, defecate, cause allergic reactions to neighboring
passengers and in general be disruptive to the normal flight
experience. Unregulated, these untrained animals present health and
safety issues. To their credit, individual carriers are now moving to
address the abuse of emotional support policies and we thank the
Committee for its attention to this important matter. We doubt whether
the carriers would have acted as they have without this Committee
paying attention. Nobody wants passengers with legitimate and
documented needs to have their trained, ADA-certified animals denied
boarding. But anything short of proper regulation is unfair to other
passengers and a disaster in the making.
737 max
Lastly, we want to thank the Committee for the work you have done
providing oversight on the 737 MAX tragedies. As stakeholders we
appreciate that you have ensured our input into the process is heard.
Not a day goes by that passengers don't ask about the MAX. As Flight
Attendants we know we are in a unique position and when the aircraft
regains flight status we will be the ones in the aisles answering
questions. We need to have complete confidence in the aircraft and in
the process that returns it to service. We continue to look to you to
ensure that that process is fully transparent.
closing
On any given day we, can be called upon to provide medical care,
fight fires, thwart security risks, provide comfort to a child
traveling alone, deescalate a potential passenger conflict, explain
weather delays or mechanical delays and so on, all the while being
prepared to evacuate an aircraft at a moment's notice. Passengers look
to us for reassurance in all of these difficult situations. Along with
our flight deck, we want to know and be able to communicate to the
traveling public that we have, and will continue to have, the safest
aviation system in the world.
Thank you. My testimony is now complete.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
I now recognize Mike Perrone for 5 minutes.
Mr. Perrone. Thank you.
Chairman DeFazio, Chairman Larsen, Ranking Member Graves,
and the members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me
to testify on behalf of the Professional Aviation Safety
Specialists to discuss the current state of aviation safety.
While the United States remains the world leader in
aviation, PASS agrees with the subcommittee that it is time to
examine all factors that influence aviation safety.
First of all, I would like to acknowledge the family
members here today who lost their loved ones in the Ethiopian
Airlines accident. On behalf of all members of PASS, I extend
our deepest condolences to you and to the families of the Lion
Air victims who also suffered great loss.
PASS represents approximately 11,000 FAA employees
nationwide. These employees are the backbone of the aviation
system. Technical operations employees install, maintain,
support, and certify air traffic control equipment. Aviation
safety inspectors, or ASIs, oversee and inspect commercial and
general aviation.
PASS-represented employees also develop flight procedures,
perform quality analysis of aviation systems used in air
traffic control, and aid in building and restoring air traffic
control facilities.
When I last appeared before the subcommittee, it was in the
wake of the longest Government shutdown in U.S. history. ASIs
and support personnel were furloughed and no longer providing
safety oversight, while technicians, TSA agents, and others
worked without pay. Layers of safety were being stripped away.
Unfortunately, we find ourselves approaching a similar
situation without a funding agreement in sight. It is
imperative to the integrity and safety of the National Airspace
System that Congress and the White House work to avoid another
shutdown.
The uncertainty of the current political environment also
threatens the FAA's ability to attract and retain the highly
skilled workforce that it requires. Staffing and training
challenges have plagued the FAA for years.
Within air traffic, inadequate technician staffing at
critical airports across the country remains a challenge,
resulting in increased restoration times during an outage and
more air traffic delays.
Staffing shortages can also put FAA employees at risk. The
safety of the system starts with the safety of all FAA
employees.
The agency does not even know how many employees are
adequately needed to perform safety-critical work. For example,
this committee saw fit to include in the provision of the 2018
FAA reauthorization directing the FAA to reexamine the ASI
staffing model. However, it remains unclear when this work will
be completed.
ASIs are vital to the FAA's certification processes that
ensure aircraft and equipment that meet FAA airworthiness
requirements. PASS-represented employees in flight standards
issue certificates and approvals for commercial air carriers,
repair stations, pilots, and others to operate in the NAS.
While the FAA inspectors are integral to the certification
process, individuals and ODAs are often granted more authority
to conduct certification functions traditionally performed by
FAA inspectors. Designees are now performing more than 90
percent of the FAA certification activities, despite serious
concerns by the inspector general and PASS that oversight is
lacking.
While the delegation of this authority may be deeply
integrated into the certification process, now is the time to
make sure that the FAA is providing the proper oversight of the
program to ensure its success moving forward.
Unfortunately, after the two tragic accidents that led to
the grounding of the 737 MAX, and with the agency facing
intense scrutiny, the FAA continues to rapidly expand the
delegation program, further removing ASI oversight from the
certification process.
PASS has urged the FAA to halt further expansion of
delegation until the investigations relating to the 737 MAX are
issued and would appreciate the committee's support on this
matter.
This is but one example where risk is continually being
introduced into the system that may not manifest itself for
years to come.
I would also like to highlight the work performed overseas
on U.S. aircraft at foreign repair stations.
Domestically, FAA inspectors perform unannounced
inspections of repair facilities. However, foreign facilities
receive announced inspections, giving those facilities advanced
notice to ensure compliance before inspectors arrive. Foreign
facilities should be subject to the same requirements as
domestic repair stations.
No other technology will alter the makeup of our airspace
like the integration of drones. With over 1 million drones
registered, the agency is facing a new set of safety, staffing,
and training challenges. As drones are now sharing airspace
with manned aircraft, ASIs and aviation safety technicians are
tasked with ensuring the safe operation and compliance with
Federal regulations.
PASS fears that similar to the many other areas of aviation
safety, FAA employees will be forced to oversee this booming
industry without the proper guidance and training. It shouldn't
take a tragedy before the agency recognizes and reconsiders
this approach.
In closing, PASS emphasizes that the safety of our airspace
starts and ends with the investments in the employees who
oversee and maintain it. Anything short of that is simply
gambling with aviation safety.
Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify on this
important issue, and I look forward to any questions.
[Mr. Perrone's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael Perrone, President, Professional Aviation
Safety Specialists, AFL-CIO
Chairman Larsen, Ranking Member Graves, and members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify on behalf of the
Professional Aviation Safety Specialists, AFL-CIO (PASS) to discuss the
state of aviation safety in the United States.
PASS represents approximately 11,000 Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) and Department of Defense employees throughout the
United States. PASS-represented employees in the FAA install, maintain,
support and certify air traffic control and national defense equipment,
inspect and oversee the commercial and general aviation industries,
develop flight procedures, and perform quality analyses of complex
aviation systems used in air traffic control and national defense in
the United States and abroad. PASS members work to ensure the safety
and efficiency of the aviation system that transports over 800 million
passengers to their destination each year. The diversity of the PASS-
represented workforce provides insight into the safety of the system
they maintain and the industry they oversee. PASS members are tasked
with ensuring that the U.S. aviation system remains the safest in the
world 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
Following recent events related to the Boeing 737 MAX, including
two fatal accidents overseas and the worldwide grounding of the
aircraft, PASS agrees with the Subcommittee that this country must
examine all factors that influence aviation safety. In support of that
effort, the union presents the following detailed analysis of events
and situations that we believe have introduced increased challenges and
risk into the system. These are issues that must be addressed in order
for the United States to maintain its reputation as the world leader in
aviation safety.
agency funding and government shutdown
When PASS testified before this Subcommittee in February of this
year, it was in the wake of the longest government shutdown in U.S.
history. During the shutdown, aviation safety inspectors represented by
PASS were furloughed, leading to a reduction in safety oversight, and
FAA technicians worked without pay, which resulted in a lower employee
morale and employees distracted by whether they would receive a
paycheck.
According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the 35-day
partial government shutdown cost the U.S. economy $11 billion and that
net discretionary funding for the agencies impacted by the shutdown--
including the Department of Transportation (DOT)--totals $329 billion
in fiscal year 2019, or about 25 percent of the total discretionary
funding for the federal government.\1\ The CBO could not precisely
estimate the total workers furloughed during the shutdown since
guidance issued by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) changed, as
was the case in relation to aviation safety inspectors and support
personnel.\2\
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\1\ Congressional Budget Office, ``The Effects of the Partial
Shutdown Ending in January 2019,'' p. 2, January 2019.
\2\ Id., p. 3.
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At the onset of the shutdown, aviation safety inspectors in the
Flight Standards Service and in Manufacturing Inspection District
Offices (MIDOs) within the Aircraft Certification division were told
not to report to work, essentially stripping away an entire layer of
safety oversight. This meant that a number of tasks, including
development of Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen)
safety standards, aviation rulemaking and full range of air traffic
oversight, were not being performed or were being performed at a
reduced level. During a government shutdown, safety oversight can come
to a virtual halt, leaving airlines and aircraft manufacturers, and
repair stations to police themselves.
Support personnel were also furloughed for the duration of the
shutdown while the backlog of paperwork grew and industry requests were
delayed. Without these employees on the job every day, and with those
at work worrying whether they will receive a paycheck, the aviation
system is not prioritizing safety. While the government might not have
been functioning at full capacity for 35 days, planes continued to fly
and air traffic operations were needed despite there not being the
proper level of safety.
The technicians in the FAA's Air Traffic Organization (ATO)
represented by PASS were not furloughed during the shutdown. Instead,
they did report to work every day without pay in order to fulfill their
responsibility to the agency and the flying public. These employees--
many of them military veterans--take their commitment to the United
States very seriously and simply want to perform their jobs and be
recognized for their dedication. When they go to work, they should only
have to focus on the job of making sure equipment is properly
maintained and certified, not whether their families are financially
secure or when they will receive their next paycheck.
While legislation eventually made FAA employees impacted by the
shutdown financially whole, the agency and many of these federal
workers are still struggling to recover. This makes the current debate
over spending agreements even more concerning. Without an agreement in
sight, the threat of another government shutdown looms. Congress and
the White House are showing no signs of settling the debate and
avoiding a government shutdown this fall. PASS hears from many of our
members their worry and concern over the situation, not only for
themselves personally but for the overall safety of the aviation
system. Aviation plays a critical role in today's economy and delivers
invaluable services to the flying public and the military. The FAA is
simply not operating at full potential during a shutdown. The flying
public should not be subjected to unnecessary risk due to political
disagreements. The situation must not be repeated.
To that end, PASS supports H.R.1108, the ``Aviation Funding
Stability Act of 2019,'' introduced by Transportation and
Infrastructure Committee Chair Peter DeFazio and Aviation Subcommittee
Chair Rick Larsen. When it comes to aviation safety, any uncertainty
introduces more risk into the system with the potential to ripple
throughout the country. By drawing from the Airport and Airway Trust
Fund (AATF) during any lapse in government appropriations, H.R.1108
would authorize the FAA to keep all programs running without
interruption while all FAA employees would report to work without fear
of missing their next paycheck. PASS encourages Congress to pass this
legislation with urgency.
staffing and training
PASS has long been drawing attention to the need for additional
agency staffing and enhanced training. FAA employees are highly skilled
individuals who often come to the agency from industry and many with
significant military training. The current political environment and
threat of another shutdown has not done anything to make the federal
government a more attractive place to work. In fact, according to a CBO
report, ``funding lapses were probably beginning to reduce the
credibility of the federal government as an employer and a contracting
party, making it more difficult for federal agencies to attract and
maintain a talented workforce and more expensive to enter into
contracts with private firms.'' \3\ This is no way to run the federal
government; it is certainly no way to ensure attracting and maintaining
the skilled workforce that PASS represents within the FAA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Id., p. 11.
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There is little doubt that PASS and other FAA unions play a vital
role in aviation safety. As such, these employees should be paid at
compensation levels to ensure that the agency can recruit and retain
qualified employees in order to fulfill such important safety
responsibilities or else face the consequences. As evidence, during the
shutdown, many PASS-represented employees indicated that they were
looking for new jobs outside of the federal sector and many who came
from industry have considered going back for higher pay. To maintain
the current workforce and attract new employees to public service, the
agency should consider starting salaries that are more competitive with
the private sector and other incentives to recruit a new generation of
highly skilled and dedicated workers. Recruiting and retaining properly
skilled FAA employees can only offer the flying public further
reassurances that the aviation system is safe and that ensuring that
safety is the agency's top priority.
Unfortunately, in many instances, the agency does not even know how
many employees are needed to adequately perform safety critical work.
For example, this committee took input provided by PASS and saw fit to
include a provision in the 2018 FAA reauthorization \4\ directing the
FAA to reexamine the aviation safety inspector staffing model. PASS
agrees that this is necessary to properly determine the number of
inspectors needed to protect the system and acknowledged the importance
of this issue. However, it remains unclear when this work will be
completed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Public Law No.: 115-254.
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In addition, proper technician staffing at critical airports
throughout the country remains a challenge. To be sure, hiring and
training new technicians is not a quick or easy process. Inadequate
technician staffing will no doubt result in increased restoration times
during an outage and more air traffic delays. It can also make it
difficult to ensure 24-hour safety coverage, a potentially dangerous
situation that increases the risk of major air traffic issues. Airports
across the country face many issues and technicians often work in
difficult conditions as they must maintain thousands of pieces of
equipment 365 days a year. For example, when a tower elevator was out
of service at Los Angeles International Airport, a PASS-represented
technician was tasked with climbing air traffic control equipment in
the southern California heat for simple repairs. A routine task was
quickly transformed into a dangerous and time-consuming undertaking
that diverted efforts from other duties. The safety of the system
starts with ensuring the safety of the employees who maintain it.
PASS consistently hears from members that training is a significant
issue and that without proper training, increased risk to aviation
safety is a real possibility. PASS learned that in some instances,
management appears to feel that the systems are sophisticated enough
and general training is acceptable rather than anything specific to one
system or piece of equipment. For example, for over eight years with
the agency, one PASS member has been assigned to oversee airships and
other balloon-based aircraft. And yet, this member has never received
balloon-specific training even though such focused training is usually
provided in the industry. Many inspectors are assigned to oversee
particular aircraft models but never given specific training on those
models. Emphasizing the concern regarding training is the fact that
technology is changing every day. ``General knowledge'' of the work is
simply not sufficient when it comes to aviation, we should expect these
men and women to be experts at their craft. Training must be a priority
throughout the agency in order to ensure these critical workers are
fully familiar with and thoroughly skilled on the systems or equipment
they encounter during duty hours to ensure they are maintained and
certified to the highest safety standards.
certification and the delegation program
The FAA's certification process is a layered system intended to
ensure aircraft and equipment meet FAA's airworthiness requirements,
which are codified in the Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs). PASS-
represented aviation safety inspectors in the FAA's Flight Standards
Service division issue certificates and approvals for individuals and
entities to operate in the National Airspace System (NAS), including
commercial air carriers, repair stations, pilots and others. Inspectors
within the MIDOs, which is part Aircraft Certification division, ensure
that manufacturers comply with production certificates issued by the
FAA.
While FAA inspectors and engineers are integral in the
certification process, individual and organizational designees are
often granted authority to verify compliance to specific portions of
the federal regulations in the certification process and make findings
of compliance in support of the type and production certificates
through the Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) program. The
ODA program is the means by which the FAA grants authority to
organizations or companies. ODA holders are typically authorized to
conduct the types of FAA functions that would normally be performed by
the FAA. For delegated projects, FAA involvement is reduced based on
the ability of the designees involved and their technical capabilities.
As this program has proliferated, designees are now performing more
than 90 percent of FAA's certification activities despite serious
concerns that oversight is lacking.\5\ This alone creates a concerning
dynamic whereby designees who are paid by the aircraft manufacturers,
airlines, or repair stations are simultaneously overseeing for the FAA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ United States Government Accountability Office, Aviation
Safety: FAA Efforts Have Improved Safety, but Challenges Remain in Key
Areas, April 16, 2013, p. 3.
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Why allow individuals and companies outside the agency to perform
work with the ability to impact the safety of the aviation system? The
answer is so clear that the FAA even includes it on its website: ``The
FAA doesn't have the resources to do all the certification activities
necessary to keep up with an expanding aviation industry.'' \6\ If that
is the case, then the least the agency can do is guarantee that there
are enough inspectors to oversee the ODA program, yet they fail to
achieve this baseline. Robust oversight of the delegation process is
essential to ensure companies that use ODAs maintain the highest
standards and comply with FAA safety regulations. Over the years, the
DOT Office of the Inspector General has consistently identified
management weaknesses with a number of FAA's oversight processes.\7\
Aviation safety is the backbone of the entire aviation industry. Recent
events have highlighted the ripple effect that a failure in safety
oversight can have on the system not just here in the U.S., but
worldwide.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Federal Aviation Administration, ``About the FAA Designee
Program,'' modified January 31, 2019. Accessed July 10, 2019: https://
www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/designees_delegations/about/.
\7\ Department of Transportation Office of Inspector General,
Perspectives on Overseeing the Safety of the U.S. Air Transportation
System, March 27, 2019, p. 6.
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The constant and rapidly expanding delegation of inspector duties--
including bilateral delegation to foreign authorities--ultimately
embeds risk into the system that is difficult to identify and quantify.
It is also difficult to eliminate that risk once embedded. Unlike
pilots who may achieve success by safely flying from point A to point
B, impacts from the lack of safety oversight only manifest over time.
In other words, simply reviewing the data from a delegated authority
immediately after certification does not always produce the most
accurate picture of aviation safety. The reaction can be delayed, and
it can impact the system for years to come.
As previously highlighted, the accidents involving the Boeing 737
MAX and its subsequent grounding illustrate this level of embedded
risk. Unfortunately, it took multiple tragic events for the flying
public and the FAA to take a harder look at the delegation and ODA
process. An issue that has been important to PASS for years, the
delegation process goes to the core of aviation safety. While
investigations are ongoing, what we do know is that the FAA delegated
primary oversight of the MAX to Boeing--the company that would benefit
the most from a quick approval process. While we await the results of
the ongoing investigations surrounding the 737 MAX, the FAA continues
to move toward increased delegation and further removing FAA inspectors
from the certification process. Simply put, the more the FAA reduces
safety oversight of the certification process, the more risk is
introduced. And, as the families of those lost due to the two Boeing
737 MAX accidents can no doubt tell you, mistakes and embedded risks
can result in tragedies.
While the Boeing 737 MAX sits idle and several agencies conduct
investigations into the failures surrounding the aircraft, we know
there are questions that may never get answered. Based on the
information we do have coupled with the number of unknowns, PASS has
urged the FAA to halt further expansion of the delegation program until
these reports are issued.\8\ PASS stands by this request and asks for
the committee's support on this matter. While the delegation program
has become deeply integrated into the FAA's certification process, now
is the time to ensure that it has the proper safety oversight and that
the agency is allocating the proper staffing and resources to ensure
its success moving forward.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Professional Aviation Safety Specialists, AFL-CIO, Letter to
Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety Ali Bahrami, May 13, 2019.
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Another area where risk is being unnecessarily introduced into the
system occurs when work performed overseas on U.S. aircraft is not held
to the same standards as work performed in this country. In a June 26,
2019, letter to DOT Secretary Elaine Chao, PASS joined the
International Association of Machinists, Transport Workers Union and
Transportation Trades Department, AFL-CIO, in calling on the secretary
to fulfill obligations related to background investigations and drug
and alcohol testing of foreign repair station workers who perform
safety-sensitive work on U.S. aircraft. Additionally, oversight of the
maintenance work is critical to ensuring the work is performed in
accordance with FAA regulation and FAA-approved aircraft maintenance
programs. Currently, FAA inspectors perform unannounced, periodic on-
site inspections of domestic facilities to ensure compliance with
important safety standards. However, FAA inspectors of foreign
facilities are required to be announced, giving those facilities and
its workers advanced notice and time to take necessary actions to
regain compliance before the inspector arrives. It is long past the
time for this gap to be closed. Foreign repair stations should be
subject to the same standards and procedures, including unannounced
inspections, as domestic repair facilities. This is something PASS has
been endorsing for years, and the union would appreciate the support of
this committee in relation to these efforts.
emerging technologies and new safety challenges
The aviation industry is constantly evolving as new technology is
being introduced at a record rate. This could not be more clearly
displayed than through the growing Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS or
drones) industry. As of July 2017, there were 879,696 registered UAS
and over 21,000 UAS remote pilots.\9\ And in January 2018, DOT
Secretary Chao announced that the total number of drones now registered
with the FAA is over one million.\10\ That number has no doubt risen
over the past 16 months. Furthermore, according to NextGov, the FAA
predicts the commercial drone market will triple over the next five
years.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration,
Aviation Safety Workforce Plan 2017-2026, pp. 46-47, 2017.
\10\ Department of Transportation, ``FAA Drone Registry Tops One
Million,'' updated January 10, 2018. Accessed July 9, 2019: https://
www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/faa-drone-registry-tops-one-
million.
\11\ Corrigan, Jack, ``FAA Predicts the Commercial Drone Market
Will Triple by 2023,'' NextGov, May 3, 2019. Accessed July 9, 2019:
https://www.nextgov.com/emerging-tech/2019/05/faa-predicts-commercial-
drone-market-will-triple-2023/156743/.
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This technology is proof that the agency must address a number of
issues previously mentioned as UAS will now be sharing the airspace
with manned aircraft. If drones are expanding at such a rapid rate and
aviation safety inspectors and aviation safety technicians are tasked
with ensuring their safe operation, certainly increasing staffing and
training of this workforce should be a priority. It is of crucial
importance the FAA not let the mounting pressure from industry to
rapidly integrate UAS into the NAS move forward without stringent
safeguards in place. There is a significant lack of training when it
comes to emerging technologies. For example, there is currently no UAS-
related compliance and enforcement training on UAS for FAA aviation
safety inspectors. The FAA must make it a priority to ensure the
training is current and comprehensive.
With the advent of new entrants into the NAS, the FAA claims it is
attempting a balanced approach that involves collaboration between
government and industry, yet we have serious concerns about the lack of
aviation safety inspector involvement. As the representative of the
workforce tasked with ensuring regulatory compliance, PASS has almost
no voice in the conversation regarding integration. This is glaringly
highlighted on the Drone Advisory Committee (DAC), which was formed in
2016. While it claims to be a collaborative working group with a
diverse membership, PASS has serious concerns about the lack of
regulatory representation. For example, PASS's application for
membership was denied without justification or comment while the
committee is heavily composed of drone operators and other industry
representatives. PASS fears that, similar to many other areas of
aviation safety, FAA employees will be forced to oversee this booming
industry without the proper guidance and training and it will take a
tragedy before the agency reconsiders its approach.
The agency will no doubt claim that its safety risk management
systems, including the Safety Management System (SMS), of which the
Safety Assurance System (SAS) is a key component, are sufficient for
addressing and prioritizing risk. While SAS is a key tool for the
aviation safety inspector workforce, PASS believes oversight is
significantly hindered by inherent limitations of these internal
systems. SAS allows FAA inspectors to collect data as a part of their
oversight functions and enter this data into the program that then
identifies safety issues and assists in assessing risk. Yet, the DOT
Inspector General found that the FAA's UAS oversight was neither data-
driven nor proactive and lacked key elements of a risk-based oversight
system.\12\
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\12\ Department of Transportation Office of Inspector General,
Perspectives on Overseeing the Safety of the U.S. Air Transportation
System, March 27, 2019, p. 11.
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Currently, FAA safety inspectors are experiencing problems with SAS
that restrict their ability to accurately and completely assess risk.
For example, SAS language often does not reflect safety oversight
regulations and can conflict with written certification guidance.
Inspectors input data using the program's unique automated prompts that
limit the depth of detail and quality of information collected by the
system. In a risk-based system, this is not only unacceptable but also
completely avoidable. Safety critical maintenance procedures for
aircraft are increasingly complex, and inspectors must have an in-depth
understanding of them to recognize whether safety regulations are being
followed. The agency needs to collaborate with the workforce to ensure
that that aviation safety inspectors are equipped with the best tools
to uphold the safety of the world's most complex aviation system--a
system that only grows in complexity by the day.
closing
As you are all aware, aviation plays a critical role in today's
economy and delivers invaluable services to the flying public and
military. However, those services will face scrutiny if aviation safety
is questioned. The aforementioned areas are essential to ensuring
continued safety of U.S. airspace and aircraft operating in this
country and, in particular cases, abroad. PASS calls on this committee
to consider our areas of concern and recognize the critical
contributions made by the employees we represent. As always, we stand
ready to work with you to ensure that the United States remains the
safest aviation system in the world.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
I will now recognize Mr. Samuelsen for 5 minutes.
Mr. Samuelsen. OK. Thank you.
And thank you, Chairman DeFazio, Chairman Larsen, and
Ranking Member Graves for holding this hearing today.
My name is John Samuelsen, international president of the
Transport Workers Union, representing over 150,000 members in
the U.S.A. and the Caribbean.
In the aviation industry, our members work as mechanics,
flight attendants, ramp workers, pilot instructors, airline
dispatchers, and fleet service workers. Frontline aviation
workers are responsible for maintaining our air safety and
security system. We often have the best view of airline safety
gaps. So giving all of us the opportunity to share our
experience and recommendations is very important.
Today I would like to highlight two important safety
issues. Legally, the FAA requires that all U.S.-flagged
commercial aircraft be maintained to the same standard.
However, the FAA has actually exempted maintenance work done
outside the United States from many safety standards. The
result is now a two-tier safety system that encourages airlines
to offshore more and more work, introducing more and more risk
into our aviation system.
Foreign repair stations are exempt from regulations
requiring mandatory security and background checks for workers,
risk-based safety and security evaluations for facilities, drug
and alcohol testing, unannounced FAA inspections, and FAA
certification standards for mechanics and technicians.
Congress has already directed the FAA and the DOT to
address several of these safety gaps twice in the past decade.
Compliance with these mandates are years overdue.
FAA delays led to a boom for foreign repair stations. The
number of these facilities has grown by more than 30 percent in
just the past 4 years. There are now more than 900 FAA-
certified foreign repair stations, including 200 that have been
approved since 2017.
The amount of maintenance work being performed at these
stations with lower safety standards is already extremely high,
with coordinated efforts underway right now to increase those
numbers.
DOT data shows that the three leading U.S. airlines all
sent about 30 percent of their maintenance work to foreign
facilities.
U.S. mechanics, technicians, and pilots are increasingly
alarmed by the incompetent work and often nefarious actions
performed on aircraft outside of the United States of America.
Their discoveries have included critical engine components held
together with tape and wire, mid-flight cabin depressurization
caused by incorrectly installed exterior door parts, aircraft
covered with flammable paint, drug smuggling in aircraft noses,
wheel wells, avionics, and lavatory panels.
The country with the most FAA-certified foreign repair
stations is China, and that represents significant cyber and
other security questions.
This unlevel playing field for safety regulations is also
costing American jobs. More than 8,200 aircraft maintenance
jobs left the country in recent years. The job loss is caused
by regulatory loopholes that allow airlines to cut costs by
diminishing safety.
We often hear that airlines do not compete on safety, but
right now that is what they are doing. Congress and the
administration have to live up to this ideal by immediately
closing all the loopholes that encourage moving this important
maintenance work outside of the country.
I would also like to highlight another problem, which was
touched on by President Bassani, and that is cabin air quality.
The atmosphere surrounding aircraft at 40,000 feet above sea
level is too thin to breathe. So modern aircraft heat air from
around the wings and over the engines and then compress that
air before circulating it into the cabin.
These nerve agents are absorbed by both inhalation and
through the skin. Repeated or prolonged exposure to these
agents, like that endured every day by flight attendants and
frequent air travelers, can have devastating health effects.
These incidents are being reported more and more often now
because of rising public awareness and because of trade union
advocacy. Just 3 days ago, a commercial plane made an emergency
landing because of a fume event that made passengers and crew
alike sick.
Aircraft aren't even equipped with sensors to alert the
crew when fume events are occurring. This makes reporting and
responding to these events extremely difficult.
I want to say thanks to Representatives John Garamendi and
Pete Stauber for introducing the Cabin Air Safety Act. It
directly addresses the health and safety concerns presented by
these toxic fume events. The TWU fully endorses this
legislation, and we hope the committee will take action on it
soon.
Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify. Again,
looking forward to questions.
[Mr. Samuelsen's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of John Samuelsen, International President,
Transport Workers of America
Chairman Larsen, Ranking Member Graves and distinguished members of
the House Subcommittee on Aviation, thank you very much for holding
this hearing on aviation safety and for providing the Transport Workers
Union (TWU) the opportunity to present testimony on issues of vital
concern to the American people. Air safety is essential to our economy
and no one knows more about the safety and security of our aviation
system than the frontline employees who work in it every day.
My name is John Samuelsen and I am the International President of
the Transport Workers Union of America. The TWU represents 151,000
members across the U.S. and I am here today representing those employed
in the aviation industry as mechanics, flight attendants, ramp workers,
airline dispatchers, and fleet service workers. For decades, the TWU
has been at the forefront of efforts to increase the level of safety in
the aviation industry for the protection of airline workers, as well as
the travelling public. Our members continue to be devoted to creating
and maintaining the safest aviation system possible.
I appreciate the opportunity to address this committee today and to
share our concerns about several ongoing issues which threaten the
safety and security of our airspace.
foreign repair and maintenance facilities
The TWU continues to have grave concerns regarding the outsourcing
of aircraft maintenance to foreign repair facilities. In theory, the
FAA requires that all U.S.-flagged commercial aircraft be maintained to
the same standard, whether maintenance work is performed in-house or
outsourced and regardless of whether the work is done in the U.S. or
abroad. In reality, our regulatory structure has created a second,
inferior set of safety standards for aircraft maintained outside of the
United States.
While international air commerce requires qualified mechanics and
technicians to be available around the globe, regulatory loopholes have
created a second tier of safety requirements. This two-tier system is
driving U.S. airlines to offshore a significant amount of their
maintenance and repair operations because the lower safety standard
abroad is cheaper. Insufficient safety regulations, fewer government
inspections, and lower minimum qualifications for maintenance workers
drive down the cost to the airlines. Because of this structural
incentive, we are now seeing the foreign maintenance industry boom at
the expense of jobs and safety here in the U.S.
More than 900 overseas aircraft maintenance and repair stations
have been certified by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in 65
countries around the world. The number of these facilities has grown by
more than 30 percent in just the past four years. These foreign repair
stations are located across the globe, including, for example: China
(78), Singapore (54), Brazil (22), Thailand (6), Costa Rica (3), and El
Salvador (2).
Thailand and Costa Rica are particularly interesting locations for
these repair facilities. These countries' air safety regimes are
classified as ``category 2'' by the FAA--meaning our government does
not have confidence in their regulators to guarantee that regulations
in these countries meet international safety standards. In the case of
Thailand, this designation was reviewed and renewed in February of this
year when the Civil Aviation Authority of Thailand failed on 26
different metrics essential to aviation safety.
Thai and Costa Rican airlines are not allowed to initiate new
service to the U.S. or to enter into codeshare agreements with U.S.
carriers because we cannot certify that they are capable of adequately
overseeing their aviation system. Inexplicably, despite this fact, our
government continues to allow maintenance of U.S.-flagged aircraft in
facilities whose day-to-day operations are overseen exclusively by
these governments.
El Salvador is another interesting example. Despite currently
having zero commercial flights to the United States, U.S. airlines
regularly ferry empty planes to El Salvador for maintenance and
repairs. This naked pursuit of a separate safety standard should give
regulators and the travelling public pause.
The amount of maintenance being performed on this lower safety
standard is already at worryingly high levels. While a lack of
consistency in reporting methods makes it difficult to determine
exactly how much maintenance and repair work is being outsourced, data
from the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) shows that, in 2018,
the three leading U.S. airlines--American, Delta, and United--consigned
31%, 30%, and 28% (based on dollars spent) of their maintenance work,
respectively, to foreign facilities. Frontier Airlines reportedly
outsourced 50% of its maintenance work.
More than 8,200 aircraft maintenance jobs have been moved abroad
since the early 2000s. The loss of these high quality, middle class
jobs should be disturbing in itself. But the additional safety concerns
created by moving aircraft repair and maintenance to often unqualified,
uncertified, uninspected foreign workers raise significant issues with
the existing public policies which are enabling this regime. The
dedication, skill, and professionalism of FAA-certified U.S. mechanics
and technicians has been a major factor in creating the stellar safety
record of U.S. airlines. The decreasing use of this labor force in
favor of cheaper, less skilled workers has a consequential increase in
risk for our air safety system.
American mechanics, technicians, and pilots are regularly alarmed
by egregious examples of incompetent work performed on and nefarious
modifications made to aircraft maintained outside of the U.S. Their
discoveries have included:
Critical engine components held together with tape and
wire;
Parts on the aircraft exterior doors installed
incorrectly, leading to mid-flight cabin depressurization;
Aircraft covered with flammable paint; and
Drug smuggling in aircraft noses, wheel wells, avionics,
and lavatory panels.
That U.S.-flagged aircraft are flying in these conditions is only
possible because sovereign laws allow foreign repair stations to remain
exempt from the vast majority of regulations governing U.S. facilities,
including those requiring:
Mandatory security background checks for workers;
Risk-based safety and security evaluations for
facilities;
Employee drug and alcohol testing;
Unannounced FAA inspections; and
FAA certification standards for mechanics and
technicians.
Congress has directed the FAA and the DOT to address these safety
gaps several times over the past decade. The TWU fully supports
existing statutory requirements directing our regulators to close these
gaps--requirements which are now years overdue. In late June of this
year, the TWU, in conjunction with several other unions, wrote to
Transportation Secretary Chao, imploring her to act immediately on
these directives.
Since 1991, all mechanics at U.S. aircraft repair stations have be
subject to federally mandated testing as a condition of employment. The
2012 FAA Reauthorization Act directed the FAA to issue a proposed rule
mandating that all repair station employees responsible for safety-
sensitive maintenance on U.S. aircraft be subject to an alcohol and
controlled substance testing program no later than February 14, 2013.
An advanced notice of proposed rulemaking was issued by the Obama
Administration in 2014 and the 2016 FAA Extension Act also included
another requirement for the FAA to issue a proposed drug and alcohol
testing rule within 90 days of enactment and a final rule within one
year. To date, no such rule has been enacted.
The 2016 FAA Extension Act also required that, within six months of
enactment, the FAA would guarantee that all workers at foreign repair
stations who perform safety-sensitive work undergo a pre-employment
background check to ensure that they are not a threat to aviation
safety. Minimizing risks to airline passengers and crew must be our
highest priority. As aircraft systems increase the amount of software
and interconnectivity, they become more vulnerable to dangerous cyber
attacks. By allowing workers at foreign repair stations access to these
aircraft systems without having been vetted through extensive
background checks, we are recklessly exposing our skies to an increased
number of serious security hazards. Workers at U.S. repair facilities
are subject to background checks and it only makes sense that workers
at overseas stations should be as well.
In addition, the 2016 bill required the FAA to increase risk-based
safety oversight of foreign repair stations with demonstrated records
of poor performance. A key element to this provision is the requirement
that airlines report data to the FAA related to the seriousness and
frequency of corrective measures undertaken as a result of substandard
work performed at overseas repair facilities. Distressingly, this
mandate has yet to be implemented either.
Simply put, the FAA is failing to exercise the minimum oversight
mandated by Congress and necessary to protect the flying public. The
recent, tragic crashes of two Boeing 737 Max aircraft demonstrate the
consequences of negligence on behalf of our air safety regulator. For
years, the FAA has allowed companies like Boeing to self-certify
components of their aircraft designs without the oversight necessary to
ensure this self-certification was meeting minimum standards. The TWU
is concerned that the FAA's indifferent approach to aircraft type
certification is being replicated in their oversight of foreign repair
stations--potentially opening our air safety system up to other
systemic failures in the future.
Our safety regulators must do a better job on all fronts. The FAA
must properly regulate foreign repair stations--including conducting
unannounced inspections and ensuring a minimum set of qualifications
for the workers repairing our flagged fleet.
The TWU supports these commonsense directives contained in previous
FAA Reauthorization bills, as well as all efforts to improve safety in
the aviation industry. We thank this committee for acting on a
bipartisan basis to move the FAA to take these necessary actions.
flags of convenience airline legislation
The TWU supports H.R. 3632, the Fair and Open Skies Act, which was
introduced last week by Representatives Peter DeFazio, Rick Larsen,
Rodney Davis, Sharice Davids, and Drew Ferguson. This act would require
the U.S. Department of Transportation to exercise more scrutiny prior
to issuing foreign air carrier permits to flag of convenience carriers.
Flag of convenience airlines split pieces of their operations across
several countries in order to skirt tax, labor, and safety regulations
in their home countries. These airlines present a long-term threat to
the safety of our air system.
As we have witnessed in the maritime shipping industry, where the
flag-of-convenience business model predominates, companies will seek a
minimum safety standard if allowed to compete on safety. These
companies destroy safety cultures by threatening their employees with
retribution should they decline to utilize unsafe machinery--a practice
which is only possible due to forum shopping for the very lowest labor
and safety standards around the world. Even when the minimum
international standards are violated by these companies, there is
little chance that they will face any consequences because they
effectively report to no government regulator. This business model will
cause a race to the bottom in all our existing standards, which puts
both crews and passengers at great risk.
The TWU strongly supports the Fair and Open Skies Act in order to
enhance the safety of the travelling public.
cabin air safety
The TWU is also concerned about the quality of the air in our
aircraft cabins. In order to create breathable air at 40,000 feet above
sea level, aircraft pull air from the surrounding atmosphere, heat it
over the engines, and compress it before circulating this air into the
cabin. This process of ``bleeding'' air from around the plane has
enabled modern jet travel; however, when the mechanical pieces of this
process malfunction, cabin air can become toxic and extremely harmful
to both passengers and crew members. The fact that our aircraft
currently are not equipped to monitor cabin air quality is of great
concern.
Engine oil, hydraulic fuel, and other aircraft fluids, when
gasified, become potent nerve agents that can cause respiratory,
neurological, and psychiatric symptoms as well as cancer. These nerve
agents can be absorbed both by inhalation and through the skin.
Repeated or prolonged exposure to these agents--such as that endured by
flight attendants--can have devastating effects. Concern about toxic
exposure in aircraft cabins is not theoretical or abstract. We have
documented cases of TWU flight attendants who have suffered severe and
career-ending disabilities due to this chemical exposure.
Passengers are at equal risk to the negative health effects from
these fumes caused by bleed air. Because these fumes can smell like
dirty socks or other everyday items, travelers may not recognize the
health threat as it is happening. Some passengers mistake the symptoms
of toxic fume exposure for jetlag. Recently, however, there has been a
spate of incidents in which air travelers have become severely ill due
to toxic cabin air, including on board aircraft on which TWU members
served as crew. For example, eight passengers on a recent flight were
hospitalized after one such event while waiting to take off.
Federal legislation recently introduced in Congress addresses the
serious issue of bleed air. The Cabin Air Safety Act, H.R. 2208,
sponsored by Representative John Garamendi, will help ensure that the
air we breathe when we fly is healthy and safe. The TWU fully endorses
this important bill.
10-hour rest for flight attendants
Last year, Congress recognized the importance of establishing a 10-
hour minimum rest period for flight attendants between shifts by
directing the DOT to change the existing regulations as part of the
2018 FAA Reauthorization bill. The deadline for implementing this rule
change passed in December without any action taken by the Department of
Transportation.
Flight attendants are safety professionals who are responsible for
ensuring the well-being of passengers throughout their flights. The
flying public expects and relies on flight attendants to act with the
highest level of professionalism, especially in cases of emergency.
Adequate rest is essential to their performing their crucial duties to
the highest standards. The 10-hour minimum rest rule will help ensure
that the passengers are served by well-rested workers ready to react
immediately to safety threats. We thank the members of this committee
for their bipartisan efforts to implement this important safety
improvement.
national in-flight sexual misconduct task force
Safety onboard our aircraft requires passengers and cabin crew to
be confident they will not be harassed during a flight. The TWU
applauds the bipartisan efforts of this committee to direct the
Department of Transportation to establish the National In-Flight Sexual
Misconduct Task Force, pursuant to the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018.
The task force is charged with reviewing and evaluating U.S. airlines'
current policies and procedures for responding to and reporting
passengers' allegations of sexual misconduct onboard commercial
aircraft. Their report, complete with recommendations on best practices
for training, reporting, and data collection related to sexual
misconduct on the part of airline passengers, is due to Congress later
this year.
TWU Local 556 President Lyn Montgomery is representing flight
attendants on the task force. Ms. Montgomery's insights as a frontline
employee representing workers responsible for maintaining a safe cabin
will be essential for the task force to meaningfully address sexual
assault and misconduct onboard our aircraft.
Flight attendants are safety critical workers. Passengers
interfering with their operations, including through sexual misconduct,
is illegal. However, TWU's members report that incidents involving
passengers harassing flight attendants are an ever-present threat
onboard our aircraft. These incidents distract our workers from their
mission and pose serious safety threats. The TWU believes that any
final report from the task force that does not address passenger-on-
flight attendant misconduct would be incomplete.
conclusion
I greatly appreciate the opportunity to testify before the
committee on these important aviation industry issues. The TWU looks
forward to working with the committee to advance policies that will
improve aviation safety and health for airline passengers and crew
members.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, President Samuelsen.
Thank everyone for your testimony today.
We are going to move now to Member questions. Each Member
will be recognized for 5 minutes, and I will start by
recognizing myself for 5 minutes. My first question is for Ms.
Schulze of the NTSB.
With regards to emerging technologies and the need for
growing expertise at the NTSB to match the use of the airspace,
does NTSB have a plan to develop that expertise? And if not,
what is your plan to develop a plan for that expertise?
Ms. Schulze. Well, thank you for your question, Chairman
Larsen.
We do have a plan with regard to the drones in the
airspace, in the National Airspace System. We have, since our
first investigation of a drone accident back in 2006, been
looking at this issue very seriously. We recognized at that
time that this new segment of the industry was coming.
In 2010, we actually changed our regulation to address
unmanned aircraft systems in our rule. We added UAS accident in
our accident definition, in our regulation. And then shortly
thereafter, we also issued guidance to the industry for
reporting standards, to help them understand what is reportable
to us.
And so we have also continued along that line by having a
specialist identified, an expert internally within our
organization, who has helped us develop our investigative
protocols for investigating drone accidents.
As I mentioned, in 2016 we investigated our first drone
mid-air collision with an aircraft, a helicopter, over New York
City--I am sorry--near Staten Island. And so we are very
interested and very engaged in that technology, and we do
appreciate the committee's support in helping us get there.
Mr. Larsen. Yeah. And the investigation protocol, is it
drone on anything or is it drone on aircraft, aircraft on
drone? Or is it drone on drone?
Ms. Schulze. So our reporting standard----
Mr. Larsen. What do you care----
Ms. Schulze. That is a very good question.
We do not investigate hobbyists. So we are looking more--we
are focused more on those operators who are certified under one
of the FAA requirements.
But in terms of our accident definition, any UAS accident
involved that would result in a serious injury would be
considered an accident, no matter what the size of the drone.
If there is not an injury involved but there is substantial
damage, it is for drones that are 300 pounds or greater.
Mr. Larsen. Maybe have further questions later.
President Perrone, there is an ongoing debate on whether
the FAA is adequately including aviation safety inspectors in
the certification process, particularly those overseeing ODA.
How do safety inspector staffing challenges impact your
members currently, and then the traveling public as well?
Mr. Perrone. So the problem that we have, PASS believes
that the FAA doesn't have enough inspectors. They don't have
the staffing and also training to keep up with it. The ODA
program is expanding, like I said, more than the FAA can handle
it.
And we just want the FAA to be able to understand, they
need to have the oversight available. We understand industry
has the expertise. They are going to do what they need to do.
But the bottom line for FAA, the regulatory side of the house,
they have to have enough inspectors with the knowledge to
understand what is going on. And if they are going to sign off
on the ODA program, they have to be there.
The FAA's position right now is they are data collectors.
So our inspectors used to go out, kick the tires, visit the
aircraft industry, and see and have a rapport with the industry
as well as the folks working on the equipment.
They have changed that philosophy. They have and rely on
the industry giving data to the FAA, and our inspectors just
look at that data and then sign off.
That is not, again, a good position to be in. And with the
Government shutdown during that timeframe, industry kept
rolling, and our inspectors were sitting at home because they
were furloughed. So all of that backlog work, plus their normal
work once they came back was a rush to get everything done.
Things could fall through the cracks.
Mr. Larsen. So given the staffing issues and training
issues, and combining that with these emerging technologies in
the airspace, are you changing how you train incoming
inspectors to address issues like drones or the commercial
space transportation issues? How is training changing?
Mr. Perrone. So we are trying to get the FAA to work on the
training issues as well. One of the things that we tried also,
we twice put in for the Drone Advisory Committee, and the DOT
did not put PASS on there. Again, our folks represent the
inspectors who are going to end up ultimately overseeing the
regulation.
We have asked the FAA why we were not included. They said
DoD--excuse me--DOT made the decision. So we have asked can we
get a response.
So we agree training needs to be modified and changed. And
since it is a permissible subject, the agency can or not
include us.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
Turn to Ranking Member Graves for 5 minutes.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate it.
I want to thank all of you for your testimony today.
Captain DePete, earlier today there were calls for more
proactive early warning system type programs be put together to
identify any safety concerns associated with aircraft.
Could you explain right now--I think pilots are
stakeholders in this as well--can you explain right now what
type of system is provided for that allows for that type of
reporting to bubble up?
Mr. DePete. Sure. Absolutely. Thank you for the question,
Ranking Member Graves.
You know, back in 1997, 1998 time period after a series of
major accidents occurred and the commercial air safety team was
formed, a very aggressive data collection effort came underway,
where measurements of over 150 streams of data come in, with
the ASAP program. The Aviation Safety Action Programs are
inclusive. And the FOQA program, the Flight Ops Quality
Assurance was also included in that.
And then very soon after, we saw four accidents occur,
culminating with Colgan. And that led to taking a look at
completing the circle and looking at the way pilots were
trained. We instituted, thanks to the work of this committee,
flight time and duty time regulations, although cargo was
carved out ultimately, as you know, not always looking for one
level of safety.
But that led to the safest period in aviation history in
America, where I can say that we have moved close to three-
quarters of the world's population in metal composite tubes in
the lower stratosphere without a single pilot-caused fatality,
with the exception of the one Southwest aircraft that had the
fan blade.
So it is my belief here that the absence of accidents is a
wonderful thing, but it is all the more important that we
remain diligent and committed to safety, to look more and more
into how we can better report.
We have got a strong, resilient system right now, a very
robust system. It is working. Although, obviously we are here
today, and we heard from some of the families behind me,
something happened that wasn't supposed to happen.
We, many years ago, like I said, we had a forensic
approach, the tombstone mentality that you mentioned, Chairman
DeFazio. And now we have a risk predictive model.
So it is very important, like I said in my testimony, that
we examine closely the certification, the oversight, and the
designation authority and find out how we can make this better.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you.
Mr. Perrone, in your testimony you discuss Federal
regulations for the type of certification process. And so right
now who is it that establishes the certification basis for the
safety standards, including the safety standards that have to
be met in order for an aircraft to proceed?
Mr. Perrone. So the regulation is done by the FAA, and then
the industry has to follow that, whatever they come up with
for----
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. OK. And then who establishes the
certification plan and the means of compliance and the level of
FAA involvement in the verification process?
Mr. Perrone. So, again, I think the industry, Boeing or
whoever, comes up with a plan on how to do it, and the FAA
oversees that procedure.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. So wait a minute. You are saying
that the FAA--excuse me--that Boeing or the manufacturer would
actually come up with a certification plan, including the means
of compliance and the level of FAA involvement?
Mr. Perrone. They come up with--again, their engineering,
they do all the studies, they do what they need to do. Then the
FAA makes sure that that complies with the regulation, complies
with the system.
And then they have--once they do it and once they build the
aircraft, or whatever the particular certification piece is,
that they are following that compliance.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. So you are saying that the
companies actually establish the certification plan?
Mr. Perrone. They are the ones that--correct--they are the
ones that know the best way to come up with that engineering
design and then FAA oversees it.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. I don't think that is accurate.
And I am very anxious to hear from the FAA on actually that
certification process.
And then lastly, who is it that actually verifies that all
of the requirements have been met and the type of certification
that is issued?
Mr. Perrone. So just to clarify, the FAA procedure, the
certification procedure, if I miss-said it, they come up with a
plan, this is what you need to do, the engineers build that,
and then the FAA oversees that to make sure they follow that.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. I was concerned, because you noted
in your testimony, ``While investigations are ongoing, what we
do know is that the FAA delegated primary oversight of the MAX
to Boeing.''
And I was concerned about that, because I am concerned that
might have left folks with a different understanding than I
have in regard to the process--or the role that FAA plays
versus the manufacturer. I am not sure that FAA would concur.
And I just wanted to make sure you clarified.
Mr. Perrone. Yeah, I misspoke, is what I was trying to come
up with. Thank you.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
Before recognizing Chair DeFazio for 5 minutes, I ask
unanimous consent that the following item be entered into the
record of today's hearing, a letter from the Association of
Flight Attendants--CWA regarding child restraint.
Without objection, so ordered.
[The information follows:]
Letter from Sara Nelson, International President, Association of Flight
Attendants--CWA, AFL-CIO, Submitted for the Record by Hon. Larsen
July 17, 2019.
Hon. Peter DeFazio
Chairman, Transportation and Infrastructure Committee
Hon. Sam Graves
Ranking Member, Transportation and Infrastructure Committee
Hon. Rick Larsen
Chairman, Subcommittee on Aviation
Hon. Garret Graves
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Aviation
Dear Chairman DeFazio, Ranking Member Graves, Chairman Larsen, and
Ranking Member Graves:
This Friday, July 19, 2019 marks the 30-year remembrance of United
Flight 232 that crash-landed in Sioux City, Iowa after the DC-10
suffered a catastrophic failure of the tail engine and loss of most
flight controls. The crew is credited for saving 185 of the 296 lives
aboard in what most believe would have been a complete loss of life
without their heroic efforts. While the pilots' actions gave everyone a
chance to live, Flight Attendants did all that they could to prepare
the cabin for impact and get survivors safely off the burning aircraft.
Through their professionalism and dedication, our colleagues showed
the world the crucial role Flight Attendants have on board the aircraft
each and every day. We hold close the memory of United Flight Attendant
Rene LeBeau who lost her life in the crash as we pay tribute to the
crew that performed miracles to save lives: Flight Attendants Janice
Brown-Lohr, Georgeann Del Castillo, Barbara Gillaspie, Donna McGrady,
Virginia Jan Murray, Timothy Owens, Yeoung (Kathy) Shen, Susan L.
White, Rene LeBeau, Captain A.C. Haynes, First Officer William R.
Records, Second Officer Dudley J. Dvorak, and United DC-10 flight
instructor Dennis E. Fitch.
Tragically, one unrestrained infant perished when his mother could
not hold onto him after the airplane hit the ground. In response, the
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) recommended that the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) require all occupants be
restrained during takeoff, landing, and turbulent conditions, and that
all infants and small children be properly restrained.\1\
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\1\ NTSB Recommendation A-90-78, May 30, 1990
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On the 30th remembrance of United Flight 232, AFA again implores
the FAA to rule that every passenger must have a seat with a proper
restraint, regardless of age, and for lawmakers to take action to
ensure this is implemented as soon as possible. The current practice of
merely recommending that infants and small children under the age of
two be in child restraint seats (CRS) during critical phases of flight
is inadequate to protect our most vulnerable passengers.
Flight Attendants ensure that everything on board an airplane is
secured or properly stowed for takeoff and landing; and that passengers
are safely restrained in their own seats whenever the fasten seat belt
sign is illuminated. The exception to this is children under the age of
two. A coffee pot has more protection than an infant in the event of a
crash. The captain instructs everyone to buckle up for protection
against severe turbulence, with the exception of our smallest
passengers.
In 1979, the NTSB issued its first of multiple safety
recommendations on aircraft child restraints. The Board recommended
that the FAA ``[e]xpedite research with a view toward early rulemaking
on a means to most effectively restrain infants and small children
during in-flight upsets and survivable crash landings \2\.''
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\2\ NTSB Recommendation A-79-063, August 10, 1979
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In 1997, Representative Peter DeFazio (H.R. 754, 105th Congress)
and Senator Patty Murray (S.398, 105th Congress) introduced bicameral
legislation to require safe restraint of children, with age and weight
limits, much like laws pertaining to travel in cars.
In 2001, the American Academy of Pediatrics recommended requiring
aircraft-approved restraint systems and discontinuing? the policy of
allowing a child younger than two years to be held on the lap of an
adult in the aircraft cabin \3\. In 2015, the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) released guidance to promote the use of
approved child restraints on all commercial aircraft around the
globe.\4\ This demonstrates worldwide harmonization. It is past time to
mandate this protection for our youngest passengers.
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\3\ Restraint Use on Aircraft, Pediatrics, Vol. 108, No. 5,
November 2001
\4\ ICAO Doc 10049, p. vii, Second Edition 2019
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Any requirement to protect children under the age of two must also
reflect the reality of the modern aircraft cabin environment. The Cabin
Evacuation Standards Study, required in the FAA 2018 Reauthorization
Bill, will show what every crew member and air traveler knows--the on
board conditions for travel have changed dramatically in the last 30
years. There was a time when parents could find an empty seat to use a
car seat for their child. Those days are gone and gate agents are
trained to check car seats because the assumption is that parents did
not purchase a seat for their child under the age of two. In some
cases, this has created conflict for parents who attempt to follow the
FM recommendations of purchasing a seat and using an approved child
restraint.
AFA calls on the FM and lawmakers to ensure that every passenger is
secured in an aircraft seat, regardless of age.
Safety regulations are written in blood. Today we must recognize
and remember the 230 crew and passengers of TWA 800, who lost their
lives 23 years ago. We will continue work every day for the highest
standards in aviation security in their honor.
We commend the committee's work and focus on key aviation safety
issues including: 10 hours Minimum Rest and a FRMP for Flight
Attendants; prohibiting Flags of Convenience models that outsource U.S.
aviation jobs (H.R. 3632); the grounding of the 737 MAX; stable funding
for the FM (H.R. 1108); addressing sexual misconduct on planes; cabin
environment and evacuation standards; secondary flight deck barriers;
combating contaminated bleed air with the Cabin Air Safety Act of 2019
(H.R. 2208/S.1112); safety and security of foreign repair stations;
setting temperature standards in the cabin; banning voice
communications on planes; protecting Passenger Service Agents from
assaults; an evaluation and update of Emergency Medical Kit contents
including naloxone and epinephrine; protecting against cabin cyber
security vulnerabilities; and ensuring the safe transport of lithium
batteries.
The Association of Flight Attendants--CWA represents 50,000 of
aviation's first responders at 20 airlines. The flying public looks to
Flight Attendants when it comes to aviation safety. The work of this
committee directly affects our ability to do our jobs.
Sincerely,
Sara Nelson
International President
Mr. Larsen. The Chair recognizes Chair DeFazio for 5
minutes.
Mr. DeFazio. I thank the chair.
To Mr. Perrone, Mr. Samuelsen, you both raised the issue
of--Mr. Perrone raised the issue that the FAA cannot go to
foreign repair stations with no prior notice and that we are
not properly overseeing them, they aren't subject to drug
testing, alcohol testing, background checks, et cetera.
And then, Mr. Samuelsen, you talked about the flood of work
to these overseas.
And I would just like both of you to comment on this. You
know, there are no commercial flights to the United States from
El Salvador, yet airlines are taking empty planes to El
Salvador for maintenance and repairs. This causes some concern
to me.
I mean, either of you want to comment on that?
Mr. Samuelsen. Yeah. I would say that U.S.A.-flagged
carriers that perform work in El Salvador, particularly where
they fly empty planes there to have maintenance done, there is
only one reason for that, and the reason--well, they have been
permitted to do it by the FAA. But the only reason for that is
the pursuit of profit. There is no other reason for that. They
are certainly not sending planes to El Salvador because the
work is done safer in El Salvador than it is on United States
soil.
Mr. DeFazio. You listed a few pretty disturbing examples of
poor overseas maintenance work.
Mr. Samuelsen. Right. I mean, so there are plenty of those.
But one specific example is April 5, 2018, a plane that was
serviced in South America came into Chicago O'Hare, and TWU
mechanics found vital engine components that were held together
with duct tape, duct tape that was applied on foreign soil by
noncertified mechanics.
That is just one example. There are other examples as well
that we can provide the committee after this testimony.
Mr. DeFazio. We would love to have those examples. I have
been on this issue for years.
Mr. Perrone, you want to comment on your concerns about
this?
Mr. Perrone. Well, I just think it goes along the same
lines, that the FAA used to have inspectors in different
locations overseas, and they closed those offices down and
brought them back to the United States for money-saving
purposes.
And in the end, we believe if they were there, if they were
in different locations, if they are going to continue moving
the work overseas, that the inspectors should be available to
do oversight inspections.
We agree with our brothers in TWU as well that the work
should be done in the United States. I think we have got the
greatest country in the world to see and do the oversight, and
why not keep it here.
Mr. DeFazio. OK. And Ms. Bassani and Ms. Schulze, you both
raised issues about cabin evacuation, and we mandated the
procedures be reviewed.
Can you give us a quick update on where NTSB is on that?
Ms. Schulze. Yes. Thank you for your question.
We have made recommendations on a variety of areas for
evacuation. And one in particular was to ask the FAA to form a
committee, a group, to look closer at communication protocols
between the cockpit, the cabin.
And at this point, the recommendation is open, unacceptable
action. But we are committed to continuing that communication
with the FAA on the cabin safety side.
Mr. DeFazio. OK. Thank you.
Ms. Bassani, you raised the issue about the length of time
for one particular evacuation and problems with it and carry-on
bags and all that.
Could you just give us what--and you also raised the issue
of seat pitch and width. And, you know, I mean, are you
witnessing the people having trouble getting in and out of
those ever-narrower and closer-together seats?
Ms. Bassani. Thank you for that question, Chairman DeFazio.
First of all, I want to thank you for the seat I am in
today, because it is a lot more comfortable than what I flew
down here in.
Mr. DeFazio. Someday I am going to get the airline execs
all lined up there, and I am going to bring in the narrowest
coach seats I can find, and we are going to keep them there for
a few hours.
Ms. Bassani. You know, I think it is torture. And I will
tell you, from experience crossing my legs in one of those
seats, and for a passenger in front of me to lean their seat
back quickly, I think I almost got a broken kneecap the other
day.
But it is distressing to see our passengers smashed into
these airplanes now. As you know, it never used to be this way.
As flight attendants, a lot of times what we like to do to
accommodate our passengers who might be taller or bigger, we
like to move them to a seat that is more accommodating, which
is a lot of times up at the bulkhead or by the emergency exits.
However, now that the airlines are charging more for those
premium seats, we can no longer do that.
So we find that the seats are not only getting smaller, but
there is no padding on them anymore. It is a torture chamber
for our customers and for us that also fly in our own airlines.
I commend you so much for addressing that in this
committee. And we were so pleased to hear that that is being
addressed. Seat pitch is extremely important, mainly for
evacuating the aircraft.
The passengers already, in the normal case of getting on or
off the airplane, are having difficult times getting into the
aisle to sit down. Can you imagine, in a stressful situation,
trying to evacuate in a real-life scenario passengers from a
plane that is burning or that is half tilted or upside down.
Listen, these people are having a hard enough time, like I
said, getting in and out in a normal process, but in an
evacuation it is going to be almost impossible. So that is an
extremely, extremely important provision for us.
Thank you for that question.
Mr. DeFazio. OK. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Brownley [presiding]. Mr. Perry, I call on you for 5
minutes.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Earlier this month, the FAA announced that it has again
delayed the publication of its notice of proposed rulemaking on
remote ID and tracking for UAS, a rulemaking required by the
2016 FAA reauthorization. According to the FAA, the NPRM will
now be published in September after the agency acknowledged it
would fail to fulfill the congressional mandate by its July
deadline.
FAA's track record throughout this process offers us little
optimism that the new deadline will be realized, but the
importance of the issue demands their immediate action.
It is my understanding that Chairman Larsen, Chairman
DeFazio, Ranking Member Graves, and Ranking Member Graves
expressed their concerns to Secretary Chao in a letter earlier
this month. I appreciate this effort, and I share their
concerns about the safety implications of continuing to operate
without the remote ID and tracking system in place.
By its inaction, FAA is failing to mitigate significant
potential threats to the safety of the flying public.
I would also like to highlight the impact of FAA's inaction
on our global competitiveness in this up-and-coming industry.
Every day the bureaucrats at FAA are unable or unwilling to do
their job we cede more of our technological advantage in this
industry to our international competitors, friends and foe
alike.
Ms. Schulze, obviously this is in your wheelhouse, so I
want to offer you an opportunity to just respond. But I would
also like to hear from the other members on the panel their
thoughts about whether this drone identification increases or
decreases the safety in the aviation industry and the flying
public and if waiting another 2 years for this critical
rulemaking to be finalized in the interest of the aviation
community from either a safety or competitive standpoint is a
good idea.
Ms. Schulze. Thank you for your question.
At this time, based on the investigative work we have done,
we have not identified that. We don't have a position on that
issue.
I think we work very closely with the FAA and the drone
industry. We do act as observers on the Drone Advisory Group to
understand where these different technologies are going. And I
think what we are trying to do is ensure that we are prepared
to investigate accidents that might be caused in part by those
types of deficiencies. So that is where our focus is right now.
Mr. Perry. Thank you.
Mr. DePete. Representative Perry, great question. I
actually was going to try to integrate that into my comments
here today.
I am as frustrated as well, because the Air Line Pilots
Association has an unwavering commitment to safety, and we have
been part of the process of the introduction of UAS into our
National Airspace System.
And like any use of the airspace, we want it to be safe.
And we certainly recognize the socioeconomic benefits to
drones. It is a fascinating technology, and we support it. But
we support the safe integration.
So the delay is not a good thing, in my view. We have an
opportunity here to do it right the first time.
I shudder at the day that I hear about the accident when a
drone gets sucked into an engine and two well-trained, well-
rested experienced pilots safely get it on the ground. Let's
hope that is the outcome.
But what really adds fuel to the fire on this particular
issue is that ID and tracking, which we were a part of those
aviation rulemaking committees, are foundational technologies
that are going to be necessary for the safe integration.
So, yes, we work very closely with all our regulators, and
we are going to consistently compel them to move the process
along quickly, but we can certainly use your help.
Thank you.
Mr. Perry. Appreciate it.
Director Schulze, what is the U.S. aviation safety record
over the last three decades, and how does it compare to the
rest of the world, if you know?
Ms. Schulze. Well, I can say that, as I mentioned in my
statement, over the last decade it has improved in terms of the
numbers. We are always looking at the individual factors
involved in accidents, and we think that safety is something
that one must always be vigilant, no matter what the numbers
are reflecting.
I don't have three decades' worth of data with me. We would
be absolutely happy to follow up with you after the hearing on
that data.
But I would just reinforce that the numbers do tell one
side of the story, but it is critically important, as I think
some of the other witnesses have testified, to be proactive in
understanding these issues as they manifest through some of the
voluntary reporting programs and in terms of our role, under
accident investigations.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield.
Ms. Brownley. Thank you.
Mr. Cohen, you have 5 minutes.
Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I presume some of the--I know they are--I appreciate the
relatives testifying, very courageous and compelling testimony.
Thank you. I am sorry. I was here but I had to go to another
hearing.
Airplane safety is so important. And in those crashes, it
was death. It is a serious matter and the public deserves the
right to know when decisions to increase profit margins have an
impact on their health and safety.
The MCAS--that happened, but it happens in other places as
well.
Federal law requires the planes be capable of being
evacuated within 90 seconds of an emergency. That is Federal
law.
With half the aircrafts' exits inoperable, there have been
several recent occurrences that raise questions of whether all
passengers on an aircraft can indeed evacuate within 90
seconds.
In 2016, the NTSB concluded it took at least 2 minutes, 21
seconds, 51 seconds longer, over half the time longer than the
FAA assumes is the correct time, for 161 passengers to evacuate
a lightly loaded American Airlines flight.
In January 2018, the NTSB concluded that evidence of
passengers retrieving carry-on baggage during this and other
recent emergency evacuations demonstrates that previous FAA
actions to mitigate this potential safety hazard have not been
effective.
This should concern everybody. It is not the same as a
plane falling out of the sky. But when a plane does have an
emergency and they land and people can't get off in time,
injuries and deaths occur. They are preventable.
Emergency evacuation is a serious issue, as is the
potential for air rage as tensions mount inside more tightly
packed cabins.
Doctors have warned that deep vein thrombosis can affect
passengers, afflict them, who don't move their legs during
longer flights.
Despite this, seat sizes continue to shrink, and the seat
sizes shrink not on their own, but because the airlines want to
pack more people in, they want to emulate sardines in an
airplane. They pack people in, in their sides, in front, you
can't cross your legs, you can't get out.
That is why Representative Kinzinger and I introduced the
Safe Egress in Air Travel, or the SEAT Act, an acronym, that
requires the FAA to review cabin evacuation procedures and
issue regulations establishing minimum dimensions for passenger
seats necessary for the safety of passengers.
Pleased it was in the FAA reauthorization bill. Great work.
Nine months since it passed into law, and it appears very
little action has taken place. This is something that could
save lives, and in 9 months since the Congress said do it,
nothing has apparently been done.
Ms. Schulze, you are the Acting Director of the Office of
Aviation Safety, National Transportation Safety Board. As
mentioned in Ms. Bassani's testimony, it appears zero action
has taken place in implementation of the SEAT Act.
Has the FAA begun working with the NTSB on implementation
of the SEAT Act?
Ms. Schulze. Well, thank you for your question.
We have been contacted by the FAA, but I would say that
there are additional conversations that are going to ensue. I
think it is at the planning stage, would be our assessment. But
we have been contacted.
Mr. Cohen. And after 9 months after Congress said to do it
and lives are in the balance and you are in the conversation
stage?
Hello. How are you? I am here at the University of Michigan
as a freshman. Nice to meet you.
Don't you think you ought to take some action by now?
Ms. Schulze. Well, certainly the FAA requirement that was
in the legislation is clear. We have made a number of
recommendations, and we continue to work proactively with FAA
to have those implemented. But from our standpoint, we are
remaining fully open and ready to receive that work with FAA.
Mr. Cohen. Can I ask you to try to call them and urge them
to start to act on behalf of the flying public?
Ms. Schulze. We absolutely, on a routine basis, interact
with them to promote and advocate for those recommendations--
for our recommendations.
Mr. Cohen. Thank you.
Ms. Bassani, in your written testimony, you discuss the
importance of the SEAT Act and how important it is for FAA to
review cabin evacuation procedures.
Can you expand on why the implementation is so important
and how a new review of cabin evacuation procedures could
possibly affect your members?
Ms. Bassani. Thank you for the question, Congressman Cohen.
First of all, I want to thank you for spearheading that
act. It is one of the single most important things that flight
attendants find that we need right now and that our passengers
need.
Safety is so important. And like I said earlier, safety is
in our DNA. It is so important that we enact this soon, sooner
rather than later, because the airlines are smashing seats into
these airplanes. Come on.
And when I talk to them, as the president of my union, and
say this is ridiculous, we have a seat right up on an emergency
exit on one of the newer planes, we have to almost sit in a
passenger's lap to arm and disarm that door, and you know what
they say in response? Oh, my God, if we have to remove that
seat, that equates to $500,000.
In my mind, every inch equates to a customer, a passenger's
life, possibly. In their mind, every inch is real estate and it
is dollars, and it is ridiculous. And I implore this committee
to take that seriously. That is what we are here for. That is
what you are here for. That is what all of us are here for, the
safety in the aviation industry.
And when I see the frustration of Congressman Cohen, you
can triple that for us out here that have to deal with this
every single day. And the reason why--we know why our
passengers are enraged. Come on. By the time they get on the
flight, first of all, they are already traumatized by the whole
travel experience. And we inherit them, and it is our job, and
we learn how to diffuse situations.
But when you are up in the sky, there is no way you can say
you need to leave and go out that door now. You have to deal
with them. And it rests on us, it rests on us in the back of
the aircraft.
And it is extremely, extremely important that people not
only feel comfortable, but that we are able to evacuate them in
the case that we can save their life. And in some cases we can.
And Congressman Cohen very eloquently stated some of those
cases that have happened recently.
Thank you very much for listening.
Mr. Cohen. Thank you.
And in closing, this is like the 737 in regards that they
don't want to use actual people to test it, like simulators
would be best. They want to do a computer study and have people
who are all 150 pounds, 5,9", that just ran a marathon getting
off the plane in perfect tennis shoes.
Ms. Bassani. With a service animal, like a dog.
Ms. Brownley. Thank you, Mr. Cohen.
Mr. Cohen. You are welcome.
Ms. Brownley. I recognize Mr. Fitzpatrick for 5 minutes.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Thank you all for being here today.
Mr. Samuelsen first. The FAA certifies aircraft mechanics
and technicians in the United States. First question is, do the
workers in the foreign facilities have similar or equivalent
certifications? And is there any reason we shouldn't require
these workers to have at least an equivalent certificate from
their Government before we allow them to perform any safety-
critical work?
Mr. Samuelsen. Yeah. So the answer is absolutely not. There
is no lawful requirement that mechanics or so-called mechanics
on foreign soil have the same certification as those on U.S.A.
soil. And it should absolutely be required. The playing field
should be leveled.
It has been said many times that airlines should not
compete on safety, and that is exactly what is going on right
now. They are competing on safety by sending work into foreign
countries to try to save as much money as possible, even though
it is objective and factual that work done overseas--in most
overseas countries--is less safe than when it is done on U.S.
soil.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Thank you, sir.
Captain DePete, as you said in your testimony earlier, so
that there is no confusion, it was Congress' intent that
secondary barriers be installed in each new aircraft that is
manufactured for passenger air carriers in the United States.
Do you believe that the formed Aviation Rulemaking Advisory
Committee Working Group is useful? And how can Congress act to
ensure that there are no more delays and that the requirement
is issued by October?
Mr. DePete. So we see this issue as so important right now
for the security of our passengers and crew. We have examined
this issue for so long that we view the current efforts
underway as nothing more than delay tactics.
Having a secondary barrier is so critical because it
preserves--let me make it clear--preserves the reactionary gap
that is absolutely essential when that door is opened.
And there have been tests done by the Department of
Homeland Security, and how they have tried to take a flight
attendant in a cart and see if they can get by them, and they
valiantly stand there and try to help as best as they can. But
we can do so much better. These have proven to be inexpensive,
lightweight, very easy to install anew and then design into
other airplanes. And then coming up with a million different--
and I have been on many of those working groups.
But here is the real critical part, if I will. Just walk
with me for this one. Somebody does get in. Without a secondary
barrier, since it is an intrusion-resistant cockpit door, they
lock themselves in the airplane in the cockpit. And now you
have an intruder that you can't get at. Because I have often
heard them say, this is never going to happen on a passenger
airplane. Passengers are just never going to take it. They are
going to, you know, run up and assault whoever is trying to do
it. But that is the risk.
One simple solution. It is so easy and it is so
inexpensive. I have heard a A4A even say, well, how much is it
going to cost in fuel burn? Well, we used to carry around 60-
pound bags with all our gear on it, all our flight pubs. And
now we have electronic flight bags that weigh a fraction of
that. I just suggest we call it even and put something in the
airplane that will keep our passengers secure and safe.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. So what is the cause of the delay, and
what can we as a committee do to fix that?
Mr. DePete. I think that we can say enough is enough,
number one, that we have enough information to go forward--it
has been mandated now--and get a concrete timeline for
installation.
And the other thing is to fight back special interests who
are starting to already make noise about the fact that we meant
type design and not--we were very careful about how we put that
language together. So that would be extremely helpful. We don't
need to know much more about this, but we do need a solution.
And we can make a difference, because if it happens what will
we say? What will we do? What do I tell my members?
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Nearly 18 years after the 9/11 Commission
Report, where they explicitly spelled out how the 9/11
hijackers would zero in on the cockpit and wait for that
exchange to occur, still no action.
Mr. DePete. Well, to add insult to injury, again, as a
cargo pilot, we have airplanes without hardened cockpit doors.
We have animal handlers, some of them foreign nationals, and
they have syringes and sedatives capable of taking down a large
animal sitting behind. The pilots, we have already had
instances where there has been confusion about what their
instructions are and how they are supposed to behave in a
cockpit. And it is so clear after 9/11. And the promises that
were made by the industry to make sure that hardened cockpit
doors--so--and that is just one of many of the shortfalls and
one level of safety between passengers and cargo, but these are
all--we know the solutions to these problems, but ALPA will
continue to focus and fight against the special interests that
seem to want to put hurdles in the way of the fine work that is
being done by this committee. By the way, thank you for the FAA
Reauthorization Act. Incredible, incredible. The question is
now can we push it forward without other folks trying to will
it away.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Thank you, sir, and thank you for your
service.
I yield back.
Ms. Brownley. Thank you, Mr. Fitzpatrick. Mr. Brown, you
are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Brown. Thank you, Madam Chair. I have a number of
questions, and I just ask the panelists to be brief in your
response if you could.
Captain DePete, in your written testimony, you discussed
the different pilot licensing requirements at the international
level.
Mr. DePete. Yes, sir.
Mr. Brown. Specifically, the international aviation
regulatory body recently introduced a license called the
multicrew pilot license. And you have mentioned some potential
safety issues associated with that. Can you elaborate?
Mr. DePete. Yes, sir, I can. Thank you for the question, a
really important question, especially given the discussions
today. So, most recently, I wrote a letter to Secretary Liu,
the Secretary General of the International Civil Aviation
Organization, asking for a global review of pilot training and
qualification standards. I want to qualify this conversation
before I begin, though.
The pilots in Ethiopia and Lion Air were at a significant
disadvantage by not knowing what was on the aircraft. If you
know anything about--we are specialists in human factors and
startle responses, and I think Captain Sullenberger was very
eloquent about how he described this. In these very automated
airplanes with these integrated systems, we need more training,
not less.
So the only thing that stands in the way--I have seen
automation all my life. I have seen good automation that helps
me do my function. And I have seen automation that tries to
replace me, and it is just dumb, and we have to figure out ways
to work around it. And those are the things that they become
distractions almost in a way.
So we have seen how it is supposed to work. Automation is
supposed to be assistive technology to help us do our job of
monitoring the flight path and making sure it is safe, not
replacing, because when you go down that road, there is not a
level of artificial intelligence that exists today where that
capability is sound.
The failure of the Boeing 737 MAX in particular, we are
looking at a series of--very typical to see in these types of
accidents a series of system breakdowns--not one thing. And we
have a very vast interconnected aviation ecosystem.
But, clearly, I want to ask you a question. You have your
family or yourself on an airplane. Do you want your crew to be
well-trained and experienced, or do you want them to just be
trained strictly to rely on automation? That is a simple
question, and I am not relating it to any other events at this
point, because that particular airplane had a system
malfunction that basically made it almost impossible or
difficult to control if you didn't know about it and you
weren't prepared for it, you didn't train for it.
We here in the United States--I know this is a long answer.
There isn't an airplane I have flown where I didn't have a
runaway trim system failure. But if you miss it or if there is
a startle response or some impact or other distractions--this
particular instance, that is why we have called for more robust
oversight into the oversight process, the designation
authorization and the certification process.
Mr. Brown. Thank you. Thank you.
Mr. DePete. Long answer, but I am sorry, it is the only way
to cover it all.
Mr. Brown. A lot of these issues require a lot more time
than we have from the dais here.
Mr. Samuelsen, in your written testimony--and you also
touched upon it today--you mention that more than 8,200
aircraft maintenance jobs have been moved abroad to foreign
repair stations since the early 2000s. Can you go into more
detail on your organization's observations of subsequent
shortages of qualified U.S. professionals and what we ought to
be doing to address those shortages?
Mr. Samuelsen. Yes. So I don't think the cause of that is--
in fact, the cause of that is not that there are untrained
professional mechanics in the United States. The cause of that
is that the FAA has allowed loopholes----
Mr. Brown. Let me clarify. I agree with you. I think it is
the effect. If you have got foreign overseas maintenance, then
you have less jobs in the United States and then you see a
decline in workforce as a result. Are there critical shortages
in the professional----
Mr. Samuelsen. No.
Mr. Brown. No? OK.
Mr. Samuelsen. No, there aren't. But I think the airlines
use that as one excuse to continue to export American jobs
overseas--and capital, $2 billion worth of capital.
Mr. Brown. Thank you.
Ms. Bassani, you mentioned the 10-hour rest period. You
also mentioned a lot of conditions that put a lot of strain and
stress on the ability of a flight attendant to do their job.
Can you sort of put a face on that? I mean, you know, if we are
not meeting 10-hour crew rest requirements, how difficult that
is to perform the job of the flight attendant?
Ms. Bassani. Thank you for that question, Congressman
Brown. First of all, it is important to recognize that that 10-
hour rule, that doesn't mean behind the hotel door. That is
from the time you leave the aircraft until the time that you
check into your next trip. So that in itself is already a
reduced rest. Ten hours is not enough, but it is what we have
now, and we hope that we can--we need to get that through. It
should not be being slow-walked at this point.
Flight attendants must be alert at any minute to be able to
perform something as important as an evacuation or perhaps
operate the AED machine to save your life if you are having a
heart attack. How can they be alert if they haven't had enough
sleep? And I am not talking about just on domestic soil, but
flight attendants also fly internationally. In America alone,
you have three different time zones.
So you factor in all of those different types of things,
and it is so important that they get their rest. Like I said,
that is minimal. They need more. But it is so important to get
that done for our flight attendants and for our passengers'
safety. Thank you for that question.
Mr. Brown. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Brownley. Thank you.
Mr. Stauber, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Stauber. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
I really appreciate the witnesses and your comments, in
particular a point about the safety. Every one of you, the
safety was the priority. And before I begin my questioning, I
will give you a little history of my background. I was a police
officer for 23 years, ended up as a commander. Safety was the
number one priority, that the men and women that I worked with
went home to their families. And to hear that there were family
members that didn't come back, it is heart-wrenching. And to
those family members, our thoughts and prayers. And we are
going to do something about it. We will make it better with the
experts here. And I appreciate all your comments.
Ms. Schulze, while the workers in the front lines are
critically important to aviation safety, it is also important
that we have the regulations and safety protocols in place to
ensure the safest possible experience. Much of the
responsibility falls on the shoulders of the FAA and the NTSB.
As you know, in July of 2017 at San Francisco Airport, an Air
Canada Airbus A320 nearly landed on a crowded taxiway,
mistaking it for a cleared runway. Information about a runway
closure that could have prevented this confusion was located on
page 8 of the 27-page list of San Francisco Airport NOTAMs. It
was the NTSB's finding that a contributing factor was the
ineffective presentation of the note of information.
How has the FAA responded to this recommendation?
Ms. Schulze. Thank you for your question. We did issue a
recommendation to ask that that type of information be--
methodology to better prioritize that information for pilots be
developed. I will need to get back to the committee on the
current status of that.
We have had some more recent conversations with the FAA,
but I think I would also comment that, because of our
engagement with the industry and the FAA, we do understand that
they have been looking at the NOTAM process for some time. Our
recommendations were more specific to the findings in San
Francisco.
Mr. Stauber. Thank you. And as you know, I put forth
legislation, the Notice to Airmen Improvement Act. And I think
it is important that industry experts have the ability to
prioritize that safety information, that the pilots understand
the importance. But, quite frankly, to have a 27-page NOTAM, I
think, Captain DePete, you would agree with me that let's
prioritize the information that is absolutely needed, so, as
you command that aircraft, you know the concerns around the
runway, concerns around the airport, and you can make a
decision whether it is safe or not.
Mr. DePete. Absolutely. And I appreciate that question,
because that was a bit of a game-changer when that one
happened. And in particular, it was a very alert crew on the
parallel taxiway from United Airlines that happened to comment
on it. And I venture to ask myself a question, if that was a
fatigued cargo crew under a different set of flight-time/duty-
time rules, would they have caught that like that? So, again,
that elaborate interconnectedness of a, you know, complicated
ecosystem, aviation ecosystem.
But wrong runway surface landings are a very big issue,
particularly of interest to us in the Airline Pilots
Association, but also in the FAA and the NTSB. There are
various technologies that could be very assistive, like FAROS,
Final Approach Runway Occupancy Signaling, and things like that
that can be employed. Better guidance.
We think that in 121 operations, airline operations, that
there should be precision approach guidance to every runway. It
was decided by the FAA it is the safest course of action in
2000, and yet some people are still trying to push that back.
Mr. Stauber. I think, with your input, the professionals'
input, the legislation I think will get much better.
My last question is, Ms. Bassani, and to go back to the
front lines, we really appreciate everything that flight
attendants do for our safety, much of what many of us don't
notice.
I appreciate you bringing up cabin air safety in your
testimony, because it matters and it matters especially because
of the long hours you all spend in that environment. I am a
cosponsor of the Cabin Air Safety Act that you also mentioned
in your testimony. Would you be able to talk a little bit more
about the legislation and how it can help?
Ms. Bassani. Yes, I sure can. In fact, first, I want to
thank you for helping with that. It is also very important.
One thing that I noticed, I have been flying for 33 years.
Since I have been president of our union, which is only a year,
we have seen an uptick in these incidents. And, in fact, in the
past, we didn't have very many of these types of occurrences.
Like I said in my testimony, last year alone, 1,500 reported
fume acts from our flight attendants. That is huge. And I know
the pilots are experiencing much of the same, and I know that
John Samuelsen also is an advocate for getting something done
with this as well.
It is really important that we have a way to record and to
collect data and reporting procedures are standard throughout
all of our airlines and systems, including management and the
unions. I have actually hired a specialist in this area about,
oh, 4 months ago, because we needed more help. We need someone
dedicated to help these flight attendants that are experiencing
these fume events. And it really is damaging their health.
There are a lot more stories. There are a lot of dedicated, you
know, Facebook pages and, you know, I am sure you have seen
some of the videos. And I want to thank you for stepping up and
helping us with this.
Mr. Stauber. You are welcome. We are going to work on it,
and I appreciate your comments.
Madam Chair, I yield back.
Ms. Brownley. Thank you, Mr. Stauber.
I now call on Mr. Carbajal for 5 minutes.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Captain DePete, in your testimony, you recognized the
difference in safety rest standards, flight time duty between
passenger airline and cargo airline operations.
Mr. DePete. Yes, sir.
Mr. Carbajal. The so-called cargo carveout.
Mr. DePete. Right.
Mr. Carbajal. Can you explain to me how this came to be and
why this is a problem, and what do you believe should be done
about this imbalance?
Mr. DePete. OK. Thank you for that question. Near and dear
to my heart, of course. And I know we have somebody in the
audience here who was also on the ARC, on the flight time/duty
time ARC, so I will try to get it right.
Obviously, after the Colgan accident, when it was
determined that fatigue played a part in the accident, through
an ARC process, we came out with--industry and regulators
worked together with labor to come up with FAR 117. I think it
is a pretty good rule.
And due to a cost-benefit analysis that was done, it was
determined--and I say a specious argument at best, because I
looked at what examples they cited to make the determination.
They eliminated cargo out of the rule, based on an ineffective
cost-benefit analysis. I think the cost was supposed to be
upwards of $500 million, and it was only a $31 million benefit.
Now, I would say that that is a dangerous way to go in the
sense that you could weigh and maybe weight the idea of what
the cost is or the benefit is. First of all, like I said, I
think it was flawed. They weren't measuring a 777 loaded with
dangerous goods barreling down into Los Angeles. They picked a
727, an old aircraft that fell short of a runway in Florida
somewhere in Tallahassee in a remote area. So a flawed cost-
benefit analysis.
But all the same, I think we should maybe look or you could
look, the committee could look at as to whether or not when we
are dealing with safety issues, do we want that to be the
number one weighted factor, or do we want it just somewhere in
the list.
Second of all, here is the real situation. Imagine this for
a moment, and I use this example a lot. You have a schoolbus in
one lane on a highway, and you got your children on that
schoolbus. You have got your children going to school on that
schoolbus. And right next to it is a tractor-trailer carrying a
bunch of freight on it.
It is a proven fact scientifically that time awake of 17
hours or more on task is equal to a blood alcohol level of
about .05. So you have a very sober driver driving your kids to
school and right next to him is a tractor-trailer. And my point
in bringing that up--who is impaired, obviously impaired. My
point in bringing it up is we share the same skies. We fly over
the same cities. We land at the same airports.
I remember even the--if you know traffic collision
avoidance system, it was included in passenger airplanes and
not in cargo aircraft. And it took an almost head-on collision
with Air Force One to make that change.
So it is a gaping--if I had to describe it as anything, you
are only as strong as your weakest link. You have a great
safety system, but that is one gap that needs to be closed. And
I will conclude with this, because it is an important
statistic.
When you look at the two individual risk factors of both
passenger ops and cargo ops and you look at the frequency with
which passengers fly and cargo fly, kind of tallied, if you
looked at the number of departures and we swapped and we did as
much flying as passengers did, in 1 million departures in 10
years, you would have 276 accidents in that 10-year period.
That is the difference in that risk profile. It is startling.
So we really need to close that gap because you are only as
strong as the weakest link.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
I will yield the remainder of my time to Representative
Napolitano as she has to go vote for another committee.
Mrs. Napolitano. Thank you, Mr. Carbajal.
Ms. Bassani, I fly twice a week back to California and
coming here, and I have the greatest respect for flight
attendants, the primary connection with customers. They get
asked every imaginable question about the safety, security, and
efficiency of the airplanes and the airlines. And I have
overheard flight attendants get asked questions that only an
aerospace engineer could answer, yet they have been very
diligent and intelligent in answering questions.
Do the airlines, the FAA, and the airplane manufacturers
give you sufficient training to handle any question, especially
technical questions? Should it be your job to handle them?
Ms. Bassani. First of all, I would like to thank you for
your question, Mrs. Napolitano. That is a loaded question. We
do receive annual training, emergency training. They don't
cover questions, you know, for every single incident. No, I
would say no.
Flight attendants themselves are a very inquisitive group,
and, of course, the longer that you are around the airline and
working in the airline, you do gain knowledge that you wouldn't
normally have just as a passenger. But there is so much now
that has changed in the airline industry; perhaps that is
something that we do need to pursue. And I thank you for that
question.
Mrs. Napolitano. I would think so. Thank you very much.
I have other questions for the record.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Ms. Brownley. Thank you, Mrs. Napolitano.
I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes.
I wanted to get back to the foreign repair stations, Mr.
Samuelsen. And I know in your testimony you talked about the
fact that I think both in 2003 and 2015, the IG has identified
on several occasions weaknesses in the FAA's oversight of
overseas repair stations. The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2012
and 2016 addresses repair station oversights. We are talking
about issues of drug testing, preemployment background checks,
and security screening. Now we have Thailand and Costa Rica
classified as category 2. And category 2 is defined as the
Government does not have the confidence--it does not have the
confidence--to meet safety standards.
So I just want to ask--it has been somewhat asked already,
but what are the FAA's stated reasons for the failure to
implement this law?
Mr. Samuelsen. I honestly don't know that the FAA has
articulated a good reason for allowing these loopholes to
continue and allowing the work to be sent overseas. And,
certainly, they don't have a good reason. There is no reason
for them to continue to allow U.S.-flag carriers to do work in
the countries that you mentioned that have been downgraded. It
is a potential disaster waiting to happen.
And we have heard a lot of conversation today about safety
being the paramount issue in not only the aviation industry but
across the entire transport sector. And I don't think that the
current situation with the FAA or passenger air carriers
recognize safety as their paramount function. I think they are
willing to jeopardize safety in order to maximize profit by
sending aircraft maintenance into foreign countries that have
objectively less safe standards than we do on U.S. soil.
Ms. Brownley. And have you yourself been to some of these
foreign repair stations to witness it for yourself?
Mr. Samuelsen. I have not. I have not. But we do have plans
to go to Brazil to try to access the hangar where American
Airlines is doing some work.
Ms. Brownley. Thank you.
Mr. Samuelsen. Some shoddy work.
Ms. Brownley. Thank you for that.
And, Captain DePete, is this a concern for you?
Mr. DePete. Oh, absolutely, ma'am. Chairman, over my entire
career, it is pretty clear whenever we have had an aircraft
come back from a foreign maintenance station, we are always
taking a good look, and we ourselves have found instances in
all our carriers where that can occasionally happen. It depends
on the carrier.
Some of the countries where we have these foreign
maintenance stations are decent players, and others aren't.
They typically go to lowest bidder. And I have always said
this: Skilled labor is not cheap. Cheap labor is not skilled.
And you end up getting what you pay for.
Ms. Brownley. Thank you.
Ms. Bassani, do you have concerns about these foreign
repair stations?
Ms. Bassani. Oh my god, yes, of course we do. In fact, we
have supported the TWU in their quest not to offshore American
jobs. We think it is very, very important to keep those jobs
not only on our soil, but for the reasons that John Samuelsen
outlined. It is going to keep our aircraft safer. And we fly on
those aircraft, so we have extreme interest in how those
aircraft are maintenanced. So we want to keep them here.
Ms. Brownley. Thank you.
Captain DePete, Mr. Sullenberger was here at our last
hearing and talked about the simulators and about the
importance of full motion simulators to create that muscle
memory. And in your testimony, you talk about this and you talk
about how there seems to be a movement within the industry now
to move more towards nonmotion simulators. You talk about, you
know, the pros and cons on both. If you could just speak to
that, I have 34 seconds left.
Mr. DePete. OK. That is a really great question, and I will
try to answer it quickly. We just recently had an instance
where--it is a requirement now to have upset and recovery
training. Who is in control of the aircraft, having our crews
trained to be able to handle that situation. And there were
some airlines that were looking at doing this in a non-full-
motion simulator. And you just simply wouldn't get the same
effect, in terms of the training. So, yes, it is really
important.
And simulators are great. They can do certain things, and
they cannot do others. They don't replicate a real flight. In
fact, I know, as a line check airman for FedEx, that there were
times when people that would teach only the simulator and would
be only in the simulator, and they were instructors. When they
would go back to actually flying the real airplane on the line,
they would actually have to take somebody with them just to
kind of go through because it is a different experience.
I know the fidelity has increased in some of these
machines, but they haven't reached the level to where it
equates to really flying air. Experience matters.
Ms. Brownley. Thank you very much. And I thank all the
witnesses for being here. This is a very important hearing, and
I appreciate you very, very much.
And I now recognize Ms. Norton for 5 minutes.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much. And I second what you just
said, Madam Chair.
I have a question first of Mr. Samuelsen because I remember
in your testimony that you had indicated that the FAA had
directed agencies--or workers, rather, at foreign repair--that
Congress had directed workers at foreign repair stations who
performed safety-sensitive work to undergo preemployment
background checks.
Do you have any information on the kinds of vetting that is
currently being done? I am particularly interested in whether
what happens abroad is consistent with the vetting we require
here.
Mr. Samuelsen. Yes. So what happens abroad is absolutely
inconsistent with what happens on U.S. soil. And certainly, it
is one of the reasons why the work is less safe when it is done
overseas in most overseas countries. And the FAA has failed to
follow through on what Congress has----
Ms. Norton. How long have they had so far?
Mr. Samuelsen. Several times over the last decade Congress
has acted, but the FAA is lax in their enforcement, and it is
potentially going to lead to a disaster. We have seen a
disaster in the air transport system recently. And certainly,
the FAA seems to be waiting around for another disaster to
occur to start addressing these things. They should be
proactively addressing these things and mitigating against the
introduction of risk into the passenger transport system,
aviation system.
Ms. Norton. This is an open hole, open obvious hole in our
system. It doesn't have to do with airplanes; it has to do with
people. I am very concerned and ask for followup so that we can
get a response from the FAA on when they intend to and how they
intend to conform with what Congress has apparently asked them
to do some time ago.
Ms. Bassani, I really can't resist asking you about
something you mentioned, the kinds of animals that you can
bring onto planes: monkeys, chickens, pigs. I can't believe
this. Miniature ponies, penguins. Come on. I can tell you if
you brought some of those onto a plane, I would have to get
off.
And so I must ask you if the FAA bill, this section 437--
and I don't know precisely what it requires, but I wonder if
you think it requires enough to address who gets onto planes,
who is really a legitimate passenger. And I would like to know
if Congress needs to do more to keep from frightening
passengers with who gets brought onto planes. I would like your
response and the response of any of you on this.
Ms. Bassani. Thank you, Congresswoman Norton. Yes, we
support section 337 of the FAA bill. And it should clarify----
Ms. Norton. 437, go ahead.
Ms. Bassani [continuing]. What constitutes a service animal
in the first place. And, you know, they are not trained, so
they need training on how to travel if they are going to bring
those service animals on board.
Ms. Norton. A service animal, is that defined in the
statute as just somebody that makes you feel better about being
on the plane? I mean----
Ms. Bassani. It is an emotional--I am sorry. It is
emotional support animal.
Ms. Norton. Well, that means anything can get on the plane.
Ms. Bassani. Well, we have seen almost anything on the
planes; that is for sure.
Ms. Norton. Yeah. Again----
Ms. Bassani. There needs to be some oversight on this,
definitely.
Ms. Norton. I hate to ask for a hearing on this, but I am
going to have to ask for Congress to try to clarify what we
mean. And it sounds so open-ended that it is not what we
intended.
Finally, Ms. Schulze, could I ask you, I am concerned about
the outsourcing of aircraft maintenance to foreign repair
facilities and whether there has been any investigation by NTSB
that has linked aircraft crashes to outsourcing of any kind.
Have you even investigated that?
Ms. Schulze. Thank you for your question. We do not have a
position. We have not established a position on that because we
have not seen that factor. But I will add that, clearly, we are
going to look at all factors that can contribute to an aviation
accident, including maintenance.
Ms. Norton. It is outsourcing I am particularly concerned
about.
Ms. Schulze. Right. So we have not addressed that at this
point.
Ms. Norton. Will you be addressing that? Will you be
looking at that?
Ms. Schulze. Certainly if the evidence points us in that
direction, we will do our normal comprehensive job of looking
at that.
Ms. Norton. Again, I would like to ask the committee to ask
that NTSB look at--any outsourcing when it comes to aircraft,
we ought to be looking at. Thank you very much.
Mr. Garcia [presiding]. Thank you, Congresswoman.
Next, I would like to recognize Representative Katko for 5
minutes.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you all for being here today. Good afternoon. It
was morning, now afternoon, and hopefully doesn't go into the
evening for you. I do thank you all for being here, and I again
want to acknowledge the parents in the corner, as you are there
at all these hearings, and our heart goes out to you all and
God bless you for what you are going through.
Obviously, the name of the game is safety and how can we
make it better. And so, for Ms. Schulze, the first question I
have is there seem to be efforts afoot to, you know, support
the efforts over the last several decades to change the
aviation regulatory culture from punitive to collaborative. And
I wonder if you could talk a little bit more about that and
what that would mean if we could try and get more collaboration
and less punitive going on, so we can have better procedures
going forward.
Ms. Schulze. I am sorry. Was that question for me?
Mr. Katko. I am sorry. It was for Dana Schulze.
Ms. Schulze. Yes, thank you.
Thank you for the question. I think that, from the NTSB's
standpoint, we have certainly supported the approaches that are
being taken. We are observers on the Commercial Aviation Safety
Team and the corresponding ASIAS activity that occurs to
integrate a lot of these programs that I know Captain DePete
mentioned with regard to flight operations, quality assurance,
and the Aviation Safety Action Program.
We also have actually, to the point of having a memorandum
of understanding with those organizations to obtain information
to help us when we are looking at safety issues in a particular
investigation. And I think what we have seen is that there is a
wealth of information in those systems, but it is really
predicated on people coming forward and being unafraid to come
forward and bring up information that could be very useful to
identifying previously unknown hazards in the aviation system.
So we do have a working relationship with those groups. We
have seen value to contributing to our investigations. We are
appreciative to the committee for our authority to use
voluntary safety information to inform our investigative
process. That is where we are at today.
Mr. Katko. Are there things we can do better even more in
that regard to improve the process?
Ms. Schulze. We don't have a position in terms of a
recommendation on those processes because we haven't seen a
particular deficiency. I think that for us, it is continuing to
be able to work collaboratively with the industry to get access
to that information. It can help us identify emerging issues in
the aviation safety system through our incident investigation
process, much like we did with the Air Canada 759
investigation. So we appreciate that authority.
Mr. Katko. Thank you.
Captain DePete, is there anything you want to add to that
before I ask you another question?
Mr. DePete. I am sorry. Add to that, you said?
Mr. Katko. Yes. Is there anything you want to offer in that
regard?
Mr. DePete. I very much believe in robust reporting. And,
in fact--and that is the question, right?
Mr. Katko. Pardon me?
Mr. DePete. That is the question you want to address?
Mr. Katko. Yes.
Mr. DePete. I just want to be sure that I was going to
answer it correctly for you. I was absolutely thrilled--and by
the way, thank you. Great to see you again and thank you for
all you do for safety and security.
Mr. Katko. You are welcome.
Mr. DePete. You do a lot. It was really fantastic to have
the automatic acceptance of ASAP reports, number one, because
the ASAP reports and other voluntary safety action programs
have contributed greatly to a period of safety in aviation
history that we haven't ever seen. So thank you for that.
It is so important, especially now, since we see fewer and
fewer accidents here in the United States, that that reporting
continue to be robust and we continue to look at new ways to
make it even better because the fact that we aren't seeing the
accidents and we need to know where the stress points in the
system are. So I can't overemphasize how important that is to
us all.
I would say that, since we talked about fumes quite a bit,
that we have been trying to work working across the board with
others, both industry and regulators, to implement reporting
for fume events as part of the ASAP program. And we worked with
some of our carriers to get that done.
But it would be very helpful if this body could help us in
the sense that there needs to be a repository for all that data
to analyze it, to see where we can go and really completely
understand from a very neutral position what is happening in
the airplanes.
Mr. Katko. I would ask you, I mean, if you have
suggestions, more details, please submit them to me. And I will
be happy to take a look and see what we can do from a
legislative standpoint.
Mr. DePete. Thank you very much.
Mr. Katko. Ms. Bassani, I don't think I have time to ask a
lot of questions, but I will note that Congresswoman Holmes
Norton's concerns are well founded. I think we need to get kind
of a handle on the extent of this program. I am all for
accommodating passengers as much as they can, but I also don't
want to see the process being abused and getting out of
control. And to some extent, I am a little concerned about that
as well. So I would just ask you if you have information on
that you would like to provide us with, I would like to hear
it.
Ms. Bassani. Thank you. We can provide that in writing.
Mr. Katko. Thank you very much.
And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Garcia. Thank you. I now recognize myself for 5
minutes.
In both 2012 and 2016, Congress directed the FAA to address
three safety gaps between domestic and foreign repair
facilities: One was security screening for safety-sensitive
personnel; another, risk-based oversight of facilities; and,
third, drug and alcohol testing. To date, the FAA has taken no
actions on any of these, to my knowledge. Since 2016, the FAA
has approved a net of 200 more overseas facilities.
As I understand from the testimony today, more than 8,200
maintenance jobs have been offshored. This outsourcing further
enables airlines to evade critical safety and maintenance rules
that apply at American facilities. It also appears to me also
an effort to avoid organized labor.
To Mr. Perrone and Mr. Samuelsen, how many new foreign
repair stations have opened since these directives beginning in
2012 were first passed into law and what safety gaps exist?
Mr. Samuelsen. So the answer to the question is it is 200
in the last 2 years and 300 since 2016. There are 900 in total.
I am not sure how many since 2012. But, certainly, the FAA has
created an atmosphere where American passenger air carriers,
U.S.-flag carriers, are exporting more and more work overseas.
And there is only one reason to do that, and that reason is for
profit. It is certainly not because the work is being done
safer.
And I would further say that the U.S.-based mechanics are
an effective stopgap. They are a stopgap for work coming back
from overseas facilities, China and South America, where the
work is done in an inappropriate way, and we have given some
examples of that. But they are a stopgap. And eventually work
being done overseas is going to lead to the potential of a
disaster happening to American citizens on a U.S.-flag carrier.
And the issue of avoiding organized labor, I think it is
maximizing profit at the risk of exposing crewmembers and
travelers to flawed safety planes. I think that is really the
goal. We have nonunion carriers that are doing it as well. So
it is a bad situation.
Mr. Garcia. Mr. Perrone.
Mr. Perrone. I got to put my glasses on because it is
getting into that point.
We have domestically about 3,000 repair stations, foreign
about 915, but that is growing rapidly. And the problem that we
have, the concern is that the FAA has to have inspectors now
travel overseas. And, again, with staffing issues, with money,
Government shutdowns, that gets delayed or backlogged.
Also, the oversight, as we have said, they don't have the
same standards as we do for domestic. So the folks that are
working there are not at that same high level that we have in
the United States.
Mr. Garcia. So how much maintenance work gets performed
outside the U.S. now, if you know, and how much of that work
would return to the U.S. if these safety gaps were closed, to
either one of you?
Mr. Samuelsen. So one of the issues that is going on is
that the FAA doesn't have a system for collecting data for
problematic work that comes back from overseas. They simply
don't collect the data.
So the only time the FAA receives data on it is if there is
a problem that leads them to make specific inquiries of
passenger air carriers, U.S.-flag carriers. And it is about 30
percent of the work is done overseas now. And that is up from 7
percent in 2003. So it is growing tremendously.
And the idea that this is somehow beneficial to American
air travelers or to the safety of American air travelers is
ludicrous. It is not beneficial at all. It is objectively less
safe, yet the airlines keep increasing the amount of work they
are doing overseas. And there is only one answer for that, and
I said it before: It is profit.
Mr. Garcia. As you know, Congress has already directed the
FAA to close these gaps. What next steps would you recommend we
take to bring the Administration into compliance, in 30
seconds?
Mr. Samuelsen. Because the FAA has ignored Congress, they
have just ignored Congress, there needs to be a moratorium on
any more certification of foreign stations until the situation
is under control.
Mr. Garcia. Mr. Perrone, anything else?
Mr. Perrone. No, I agree. And I think, you know, touching
on having an FAA Administrator would be beneficial. As you
know, we have had an actor for a while. So that there should be
somebody that is going to be in place that can hold the agency
accountable to Congress' wishes.
Mr. Garcia. Thank you. We are now going into a second round
of questions, so I would like to recognize Ranking Member
Graves.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you.
Captain DePete, I want to follow up on a question earlier
and just ask for a concise answer. So there were discussions
earlier in the hearing about establishing an early warning
system.
What I would like to understand is effectively what
process, what opportunities are there in place now for your
members to be able to report or identify concerns related to
safety? Does that make sense?
Mr. DePete. Yes, sir.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. OK. If we are creating an early
warning system, basically what do we have now?
Mr. DePete. Actually, and you have helped a great deal here
by the automatic acceptance of--because when these ASAP reports
are filed, they get processed immediately or within a
relatively short period of time, and they get analyzed. And
before, under the previous rules, as you know, it took time to
determine whether or not the report would meet the standards,
with a few exclusions.
But now we know that that information is so critical to the
functioning of the system to learn that early, as the early
warning, that we will put aside whether or not it is to be
accepted or not and provide the protections in the program.
We are more interested in seeing the data and making sure
we get the data. So it has been a very significant, effective
improvement in the past, so we have been really happy about
that.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. I want to understand sort of where
we are to understand, you know, sort of where we should go or
where the deficiencies are. So I appreciate you bringing that
up. Look, you have raised twice now in the hearing that the
disparity between cargo and passenger on the fatigue issue, and
I appreciate you raising the fatigue issue. It is something
that I think is important that we continue to take a close look
at and make sure that we understand.
I have a question for you, though. So I fly back and forth
from New Orleans every week, and I know that we have some
pilots that commute often with me, or I commute with them. How
does that factor into fatigue? And I am curious because, you
know, last night, I finished up at midnight 30, but I didn't go
to bed until 2:15. So just because I had an opportunity to
sleep, I didn't do it. I just want to understand how that
factors in.
Mr. DePete. No, I am familiar with the question. And the
committee of the ARC, the Aviation Rulemaking Committee, that
handled this, actually looked at the issue. The issue of
commuting was brought in. And many of our own--within our
union, many of our own companies institute policies to ensure--
when you show up for your job, whether you have driven 5, 10,
you know, 5 or 10 hours to get to your base to take a flight,
you are responsible when you sign for that flight to be fit to
fly, period.
It is just that when they looked at the complexities of
trying to figure out, well, did they drive, did they fly, did
they that; it just became you had to stay within your normal
allowable flight duty period, basically. And if you exceeded
it, then you couldn't sign for the flight. So it was up to the
pilot to make sure that he got himself in position, ready to
fly and fit to fly.
The sad part about, you know, the cargo end of it is, is
that last I looked I have the same physiology that any other
pilot flies, regardless of what they fly. And that is where the
real problem lies and the travesty in this, because we have got
people who clearly, from a scientific point of view, are flying
relatively impaired. And, obviously, it would have an effect on
the total system. So it is just time. And I want to thank the
NTSB, actually. They have been longstanding supporters of
ending the cargo carveout ever since Deborah Hersman's days.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. I appreciate the information. I
want to better understand that issue, and you bring it up. Do
you drive in or you drive long hours or what have you, and just
making sure that we are not looking in a vacuum as we move
forward.
Mr. Samuelsen, you have been pretty candid on the foreign
servicing facilities. And I do appreciate your candor, because
as we have talked about it, and I believe it was Captain Sully,
who was here at the last hearing, talked about how we have got
to look at every step in the process and not just become
myopically focused on one thing. And I think it is important.
And you are raising some really important concerns about safety
and making sure that we have safety parity with repair and
maintenance facilities. And I appreciate your candor.
I do want to ask a question, because I hear you talk about
it. I know maybe a little bit outside your lane, but do you
sense that it is a cultural safety issue, perhaps, at some of
these other facilities, that they don't have the same culture
of safety that you have with some of the facilities here?
Mr. Samuelsen. I think that is absolutely an element of it.
I think there are countries, such as countries in the EU, that
have extremely high safety standards and a safety culture that
parallels American U.S. soil safety culture. But, certainly,
there are countries that U.S.-flag carriers are sending work to
that simply don't have the safety culture and don't view safety
as the paramount reason for the maintenance work that is done
on these planes.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you. And do you think that
that culture of maybe lack of safety is limited to just the
servicing, or do you think that that expands perhaps to other
aspects of the airlines as well, including the pilots?
Mr. Samuelsen. I think that when you begin to compare the
safety of culture within the United States, it is hard to match
it. There are some countries that do. And I think it goes
across the entire aviation industry, not just related to the
technician work that we do on airplanes, on jets.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you.
And, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And I want to thank
all of you for your commitment to your suggestions on safety.
We have got to continue striving for perfection. Thank you.
Mr. Garcia. Thank you. Are there any further questions from
Members of the subcommittee?
Seeing none, I would like to thank each of the witnesses
for your testimony today. The contributions to today's
discussion have been very informative and helpful.
I ask unanimous consent that the record of today's hearing
remain open until such time as our witnesses have provided
answers to any questions that may have been submitted to them
in writing, and unanimous consent that the record remain open
for 15 days for any additional comments and information
submitted by Members or witnesses to be included in the record
of today's hearing.
Without objection, so ordered.
No other Members having anything to add, the subcommittee
stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:55 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
Submissions for the Record
----------
Prepared Statement of Hon. Eddie Bernice Johnson, a Representative in
Congress from the State of Texas
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It is with great appreciation that I thank the Chairwoman for
holding this hearing today, as it allows us to examine aviation safety
issues. Regarding the two Boeing 737 MAX aircraft tragic incidents, my
interests are how we as a legislative body can adequately address
challenges to aviation safety and potential avenues of reform in the
Federal Administration Aviation (FAA) certification processes. Safety
is key. No family should have to endure the experience that our witness
in the first panel has faced.
I am eager to hear from the stakeholders serving on the second
panel today about the safety and service challenges faced by the
professional crews and passengers.
Currently, we are experiencing a crisis of trust in aviation
safety. The importance of an appropriate certification process for
large commercial aircraft in the United States is now more critical
than ever. We must advocate for transparency when examining and
considering reforms of FAA's certification processes.
As recently as 2015, the U.S. Department of Transportation's
Inspector General issued a report identifying weaknesses in FAA's
oversight of FAA certified overseas repair stations that work on U.S.
air carrier fleets.
According to Mr. Samuelsen's written testimony, FAA has renewed
certification of overseas repair stations in Thailand this past
February even though the Civil Aviation Authority of Thailand failed 26
different metrics essential to aviation safety. This is very
concerning.
Passengers flying in the U.S. expect their aircraft to meet U.S.
safety standards, including when the aircraft undergoes repairs,
whether the aircraft is serviced in the U.S. or any other country. That
is a reasonable expectation. We, on this Committee, must make sure FAA
implements the safety mandates in current law.
I look forward to hearing your testimony and solutions from
stakeholders to improve aviation safety for professional crew and
passengers.
Thank you. I yield back.
Prepared Statement of Hon. Donald M. Payne, Jr., a Representative in
Congress from the State of New Jersey
I extend my sincere condolences to the families of these tragedies
and cannot imagine the tremendous grief that you are experiencing. One
life lost is too many and I am committed to a full and thorough
investigation to ensure the safety of the 737 MAX before it is back in
the air.
I commend Mr. Njoroge and Mr. Stumo for having the courage to speak
before this committee in what certainly are difficult circumstances. As
a father of three, the thought of harm coming to my children is
unbearable. I look forward to hearing how we can better improve
aviation safety.
I also look forward to engaging with aviation professionals to hear
their opinions on how best to ensure that planes, passengers, and crew
are safe during flights. I am committed to safe skies and am very
supportive of this Committee's investigative efforts. While we cannot
turn back the clock, but we can put policies in place that will
hopefully prevent future tragedies from occurring.
Appendix
----------
Questions from Hon. Eddie Bernice Johnson for Dana Schulze, Acting
Director, Office of Aviation Safety, National Transportation Safety
Board
Question 1. With regards to ensuring that outsourced maintenance
and readiness of airplanes are completed in compliance with FAA
standards:
a. Who is responsible for ensuring such compliance?
Answer. Regardless of where the maintenance is performed, the air
carrier is ultimately responsible for the maintenance program, how the
aircraft is maintained and the airworthiness of the fleet it operates.
In addition, the FAA along with international regulatory agencies,
would oversee the outsourced air carrier maintenance facilities.
b. What is the process to ensure such compliance?
Answer. The process for enforcing compliance with the standards is
the responsibility of the FAA. The NTSB is responsible for
investigating transportation accidents and issuing safety
recommendations based on our findings.
c. What is the consequence for failure of compliance?
Answer. Enforcing compliance with the standards is the
responsibility of the FAA. However, failure to comply with FAA
standards can lead to tragic consequences, as proper airplane
maintenance is critical to preventing accidents. Although the NTSB is a
nonregulatory agency (and therefore cannot impose any legal penalties
on an air carrier for failing to comply with FAA standards), we do
investigate accidents in which lack of oversight at outsourced
maintenance stations was a causal or contributing factor (for example,
the ValuJet flight 592 crash in Miami, Florida, on May 11, 1996, which
involved a domestic repair station, and the ValuJet flight 597 crash in
Atlanta, Georgia, on June 8, 1995, which involved a foreign repair
station).
Questions from Hon. Garret Graves for Dana Schulze, Acting Director,
Office of Aviation Safety, National Transportation Safety Board
Question 2. Ms. Schulze, to NTSB's knowledge, has maintenance
performed at a foreign repair station certified by the Federal Aviation
Administration under part 145 of Federal Aviation Regulations
contributed to a commercial aircraft accident in the United States?
Answer. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has been
conducting accident investigations and determining probable cause for
52 years, since 1967. One case in which NTSB determined that
maintenance performed at a foreign repair station certified by the
Federal Aviation Administration under Title 14 Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR) Part 145 to be a probable cause in aviation accident
occurred on June 8, 1995. That's when ValueJet Airlines flight 597, a
Douglas DC-9, had an uncontained engine failure during takeoff from
Hartsfield Atlanta International Airport in Atlanta, Georgia. The NTSB
determined the probable cause to be `` . . . failure of Turk Hava
Yollari maintenance and inspection personnel to perform a proper
inspection of a 7th stage high compressor disk . . . '' However, the
staff is not aware of additional cases in which maintenance by a
foreign Part 145 maintenance facility was found to be causal or
contributory to a 14 CFR Part 121 accident.
Question 3. Ms. Schulze, what recommendations has the NTSB made to
improve the safety of commercial aviation conducting operations exempt
from Part 135 and operating under Part 91 (e.g. certain air tours,
skydiving flights, etc.)?
Answer. Aircraft operations conducted under Title 14 Code of
Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135 receive more oversight by the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) than those operating under Part
91. This oversight covers all aspects of a carrier's operations,
maintenance, flight crew training, and establishes higher
qualifications for the flight crew. In addition, Part 135 carriers are
required to use FAA approved operations specifications addressing
multiple safety aspects of the conduct of flights.
Currently, 14 CFR Part 135.1 allows commercial air tour flights
departing and returning to the same airport and flying within 25 miles
of the airport to operate under Part 91. Based on the lack of oversight
and required operations specifications the NTSB issued recommendation
A-95-58 to the FAA to eliminate this exemption. The recommendation is
classified as ``Closed--Unacceptable Action.''
A-95-58: To the FAA, develop and implement national standards
by 12/31/95, within 14 CFR Part 135, or equivalent regulations,
for all air tour operations with powered airplanes rotorcraft
to bring them under one set of standards with operations
specifications eliminate the exception currently contained in
14 CFR Part 135.1.
The FAA's 2007 Commercial Air Tour final rule does require air tour
operators under Part 91 to obtain a letter of authorization (LOA).
However, the requirements for LOAs contained in the final rule are
limited in their ability to subject air tour operators to requirements
similar to operations specifications for Part 135 carriers.
The NTSB first issued significantly similar recommendation A-87-93
in 1987 to eliminate this exemption. It is classified as ``Closed--
Unacceptable Action/Superseded,'' as air tour crashes continued to be
investigated and new recommendations issued.
A-87-93: To the FAA, require all revenue air tour flights,
regardless of the distance flown, to be subject to the
regulatory provisions of 14 CFR Part 135, and not 14 CFR Part
91.
In 2008, the NTSB published a Special Investigation Report on the
Safety of Parachute Jump Operations, which found that parachute jump
operators, many of which advertise to the public and transport
parachutists for revenue, are allowed to maintain and service their
aircraft under Part 91 regulatory provisions that require little FAA
oversight and surveillance. In addition, parachute operations pilots
are not required to undergo operation-specific initial and recurrent
training, including preflight, weight and balance, and emergency
procedures training, or recurrent FAA examinations in the types of
aircraft that they operate. To address these safety issues, we issued
multiple recommendations to the FAA.
The FAA published revised guidance in advisory circulars (AC) 105-
2E, which provides suggestions to improve sport parachuting safety. The
FAA also revised Order 8900.1, to include maintenance and operation
inspections, aircraft configuration authorization, flight manual
supplements, placards, operational waivers, pilot certification and
training, and parachute airworthiness. In addition, the FAA revised
Order 1800.56, ``National Flight Standards Work Program Guidelines,''
to include surveillance of any parachute operation aircraft under Part
91 conducting parachute operations in accordance with Part 105.
Aviation Safety Inspectors must choose at least one airworthiness
inspection and one operations inspection from a list of 10 inspection
types (for example, one maintenance spot inspection and one operations
ramp inspection).
We remain concerned, however, that operators of aircraft used in
parachute jump operations are not required to develop and implement
FAA-approved aircraft maintenance and inspection programs, as
recommended. We also remain concerned that requirements for pilots of
parachute operations are not consistent with those for other revenue-
based operations pilots, such as the requirements for pilots flying on-
demand operations under Part 135. The recommendations below are
classified as ``Closed--Acceptable Action'' (CAA) and ``Closed--
Unacceptable Action'' (CUA).
A-08-63: To the FAA, require parachute jump operators to
develop and implement Federal Aviation Administration-approved
aircraft maintenance and inspection programs that include, at a
minimum, requirements for compliance with engine manufacturers'
recommended maintenance instructions, such as service bulletins
and service information letters for time between overhauls and
component life limits. (CUA)
A-08-64: To the FAA, develop and distribute guidance materials,
in conjunction with the United States Parachute Association,
for parachute jump operators to assist operators in
implementing effective aircraft inspection and maintenance
quality assurance programs. (CAA)
A-08-65: To the FAA, require parachute jump operators to
develop initial and recurrent pilot training programs that
address, at a minimum, operation- and aircraft-specific weight
and balance calculations, preflight inspections, emergency and
recovery procedures, and parachutist egress procedures for each
type of aircraft flown. (CUA)
A-08-66: To the FAA, require initial and recurrent pilot
testing programs for parachute jump operations pilots that
address, at a minimum, operation- and aircraft-specific weight
and balance calculations, preflight inspections, emergency and
recovery procedures, and parachutist egress procedures for each
type of aircraft flown, as well as competency flight checks to
determine pilot competence in practical skills and techniques
in each type of aircraft. (CUA)
A-08-67: To the FAA, revise the guidance materials contained in
Advisory Circular 105 2C, Sport Parachute Jumping, to include
guidance for parachute jump operators in implementing effective
initial and recurrent pilot training and examination programs
that address, at a minimum, operation- and aircraft-specific
weight and balance calculations, preflight inspections,
emergency procedures, and parachutist egress procedures. (CAA)
A-08-68: To the FAA, require direct surveillance of parachute
jump operators to include, at a minimum, maintenance and
operations inspections. (CAA)
The NTSB also issued recommendations to address safety issues
specific to commercial balloon operations. These were identified based
on its investigation of a 16-fatal balloon accident on July 30, 2016 in
Lockhart, Texas, which was operated as a Part 91 sightseeing passenger
flight. NTSB safety recommendations A-17-34 and A-17-45 addressed a
lack of medical oversight for commercial balloon pilots and a lack of
targeted FAA oversight of potentially risky commercial balloon
operations. We thank Congress for addressing the gap in medical
certifications identified in A-17-34, which should be closed once the
FAA issues regulations required by section 318 of the FAA
Reauthorization Act of 2018 (Public Law 115-254). Currently, Safety
Recommendations A-17-34 and -45 are classified ``Open--Acceptable
Response.''
A-17-34: To the FAA, remove the medical certification exemption
in 14 Code of Federal Regulations 61.23(b) for pilots who are
exercising their privileges as commercial balloon pilots and
are receiving compensation for transporting passengers.
A-17-45: To the FAA, analyze your current policies, procedures,
and tools for conducting oversight of commercial balloon
operations in accordance with your Integrated Oversight
Philosophy, taking into account the findings of this accident;
based on this analysis, develop and implement more effective
ways to target oversight of the operators and operations that
pose the most significant safety risks to the public.
Further, the NTSB has recommended that all Part 91, in addition to
Part 135 and 121, operated turbine-powered aircraft be installed with
crash-resistant flight recorder systems that include cockpit audio and
images, if they do not already have a flight recorder.
Since these recommendations were issued, the FAA has maintained
that it is unable to develop the recommended requirement for recorders
because it has been unable to develop a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) to
justify a recorder mandate. The FAA told us that the benefits of
recorders are difficult to identify and quantify because the absence of
a recorder will never cause an accident.
However, on July 20, 2017, the FAA stated it was working to develop
a preliminary CBA associated with these safety recommendations to
determine if pursuing rulemaking is cost beneficial. In our October 2,
2017, letter, we told the FAA that an adequate evaluation of these
recommendations should include reviewing safety improvements that would
not have been identified without recorder data. The evaluation should
also acknowledge the number of investigated accidents in which the
probable cause included ``for unknown reasons.'' As part of our
response, we supplied to the FAA an analysis listing accidents in the
NTSB database from 2005 through 2017 that involved turbine-powered,
nonexperimental, nonrestricted-category aircraft and in which flight
crew were killed. Of the 185 accident aircraft, 159 had no form of
recording equipment, and all 159 aircraft without recorders were
advanced with complex systems that are typically much more difficult to
investigate when there is a lack of information. Of the 159 accidents
involving aircraft without recorders, 18 had probable cause
determinations that contained ``unknown.'' Pending responsive action
from the FAA, Safety Recommendations A-13-12 and -13 are currently
classified ``Open--Acceptable Response.''
A-13-12: to the FAA, require the installation of a crash-
resistant flight recorder system on all newly manufactured
turbine-powered, nonexperimental, nonrestricted-category
aircraft that are not equipped with a flight data recorder and
a cockpit voice recorder and are operating under 14 Code of
Federal Regulations Parts 91, 121, or 135. The crash-resistant
flight recorder system should record cockpit audio and images
with a view of the cockpit environment to include as much of
the outside view as possible, and parametric data per aircraft
and system installation, all as specified in Technical Standard
Order C197, ``Information Collection and Monitoring Systems.''
A-13-13: To the FAA, require all existing turbine-powered,
nonexperimental, nonrestricted-category aircraft that are not
equipped with a flight data recorder or cockpit voice recorder
and are operating under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Parts
91, 121, or 135 to be retrofitted with a crash-resistant flight
recorder system. The crash-resistant flight recorder system
should record cockpit audio and images with a view of the
cockpit environment to include as much of the outside view as
possible, and parametric data per aircraft and system
installation, all as specified in Technical Standard Order
C197, ``Information Collection and Monitoring Systems.''
Questions from Hon. Eddie Bernice Johnson for Captain Joseph G. DePete,
President, Air Line Pilots Association, International
Question 1. With regards to ensuring that outsourced maintenance
and readiness of airplanes are completed in compliance with FAA
standards:
a. Who is responsible for ensuring such compliance?
Answer. Any maintenance done on a N-registered (U.S. registered)
aircraft must be done by an FAA certificated repair station and the
work performed must be signed off on by an FAA licensed inspector. The
work performed does not need to be performed by an FAA licensed
mechanic, but it must be signed off and approved by a FAA licensed
Inspector. This is the process utilized in the United States as well.
b. What is the process to ensure such compliance?
Answer. The airline is the first level of compliance and the FAA
the second and higher level of oversight to ensure compliance. FAA does
random and scheduled inspections of the facilities as does the airline.
c. What is the consequence for failure of compliance?
Answer. Penalty is the loss of the FAA Certificate and License,
fines, and loss of contracts.
Questions from Hon. Garret Graves for Captain Joseph G. DePete,
President, Air Line Pilots Association, International
Question 2. Captain DePete, voluntary safety reporting systems are
an important component of ensuring the safety of the aviation system.
Can you describe the all the voluntary reporting programs and data
sharing systems currently in use here in the United States?
Answer. Voluntary reporting systems are ``early warning systems''
which allow us to identify and address issues before they become
serious incidents or accidents. There are three programs which
illustrate the importance of these systems. The Aviation Safety Action
Program (ASAP) is an important program at all 14 CFR Part 121
operators. ASAP provides employee reporter and airlines with the
necessary protections and de-identification capabilities so that pilots
can submit safety concerns as frequently as is necessary to ensure that
all safety issues are being shared.
ASAP reports are evaluated by airline pilot representatives,
airline management, and FAA inspectors. Together they decide what
actions are needed to address the safety concern, and the actions are
assigned to address the shortfall. (Congress made a significant
improvement in voluntary safety reporting by requiring ASAP reports to
be automatically accepted for evaluation, which allows action on
possible safety threats in a more-timely manner. ALPA commends Congress
for this action.)
Another critically important program is FOQA--Flight Operations
Quality Assurance. FOQA monitors data--flight parameters--from the
aircraft and allow the airline and FAA to monitor flight operations in
near real time and look for anything that would appear to be
``unusual'' or out of the norm with respect to the standard, expected,
operation of an aircraft.
The ASAP and FOQA programs are also used to evaluate trends within
the airline, to ensure that repeated safety events do not occur. The
de-identified safety reports are sent to a central repository called
Aviation Safety and Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS). The ASIAS
program looks for trends and issues across the 14 CFR Part 121 airline
industry. The extensive use of ASAP reports and FOQA data for
individual safety improvements, improvements of the operations at the
airline enterprise level, as well as systemic safety enhancements at
the national level is clearly evidence of the importance of these
voluntary safety reporting programs.
Question 3. Why are proactive, voluntary reporting systems superior
to mandatory reporting systems and how have they improved safety in the
National Airspace System?
Answer. The voluntary nature of proactive reporting systems is
critical to ensuring that there is a foundation of trust between the
FAA (the regulator), management (airlines) and front-line employees.
The regulator must trust that the airline and employees are reporting
regularly. The airlines must trust that the regulator will not impose
sanctions on the operator for unsafe practices even when the operator
takes the initiative to eliminate the safety risk, and the front-line
employees must trust that the operator and the regulator will not use
safety data reports to take certificate action or employee punitive
steps against them. If any one of the organizations refuses to
participate in the voluntary safety programs, they can expect the other
parties in the program to negatively react to their actions. The three-
way arrangement of trust by all three parties ensures that all have
more to lose by not participating, than they do by participating.
Converting ASAP to a mandatory reporting program would invoke
punitive actions for failure to comply with the mandatory reports and
would likely result in employees withholding or ``watering down'' the
safety data reporting to temper the potential negative impacts of
submitting the safety report. It is important to remember that reports
from ``frontline employees'' are approximately 90% sole-source reports,
meaning that only the reporter knows of the event/issue. Without the
trust created through these voluntary reporting programs the sole-
source reports will disappear because of fear created due to loss of
trust. The airlines would also work to avoid submitting mandatory
safety reports to the regulator, and the regulator would be forced to
become much more investigatory in nature, and focus on rule infractions
(i.e. policing) instead of focusing on the overall safety culture and
safety mindset of the airline operation. Most if not all involved in
ASAP believe that mandating safety reporting would be a step backwards
in the safety risk mitigation efforts at a local and national level.
Questions from Hon. Eddie Bernice Johnson for Lori Bassani, National
President, Association of Professional Flight Attendants
Question 1. With regards to ensuring that outsourced maintenance
and readiness of airplanes are completed in compliance with FAA
standards:
a. Who is responsible for ensuring such compliance?
Answer. Compliance with FAA maintenance standards is a three-part
responsibility falling on the FAA, the operator, and the certified
workers on the line. The FAA is always short-handed when it comes to
inspectors so considerable responsibility rests with the operator's on-
site quality assurance team as well as on the actual workers and the
systems they have in place to ensure correct work is always done.
In the case of offshore repair facilities, it is our understanding
that the FAA conducts considerably less oversight. While this oversight
includes an annual visit, the visit is announced in advance, giving the
facilities time to prepare and thus limiting oversight effectiveness.
b. What is the process to ensure such compliance?
Answer. The system in place has worked well for domestic repair
stations. In the U.S., the FAA is aggressive in the oversight, their
inspections are usually unannounced, and the line workers understand
that the oversight from the FAA and from the operator is thorough and
intense.
The FAA oversight of foreign repair stations is considerably less
intense. Unannounced inspections are rare and worker certification is
largely non-existent which puts great pressure on the operator's
quality assurance team overseeing the work to see that it is done
right.
c. What is the consequence for failure of compliance?
Answer. The aviation safety community in the U.S. relies on a
layered approach with the involved responsible parties obligated to
oversee their own work and to speak out when something is not right.
The FAA oversight role could be strengthened but real attention should
be on the proliferation of offshore repair facilities. The FAA must be
given more resources to increase the number of inspectors for all
offshore stations, increase the number of inspections, and make them
unannounced.
Questions from Hon. Eddie Bernice Johnson for Michael Perrone,
President, Professional Aviation Safety Specialists, AFL-CIO
Question 1. With regards to ensuring that outsourced maintenance
and readiness of airplanes are completed in compliance with FAA
standards:
a. Who is responsible for ensuring such compliance?
Answer. While it can depend on the individual relationship of a
company or individual with the FAA, the FAA is responsible for
overseeing the safety of the entire aviation industry. The issue is
that in recent years FAA aviation safety inspectors have experienced a
dramatic shift in how they conduct oversight. Inspectors who used to
once go out and kick the tires, conduct hands-on safety oversight and
experienced strong relationships with the industry they oversaw are now
essentially overseeing paperwork submitted by industry stating that
standards set by the FAA are being met. The shift in the nature of
oversight has led to an agency that is assessing risk but no longer
directly oversees compliance with safety regulations while the industry
is vouching for itself.
b. What is the process to ensure such compliance?
Answer. The FAA will often work with industry stakeholders to
develop safety standards and protocols throughout the certification
process. Aviation safety inspectors and engineers are often tasked with
ensuring compliance with these standards. But with a growing aviation
industry and stagnant inspector staffing over the last decade,
oversight has largely been handed over to industry where manufacturers
are allowed to oversee themselves and inspectors oversee hundreds of
designees at a time.
c. What is the consequence for failure of compliance?
Answer. Depending on the severity of the failure, consequences
could range from requests for corrective action to be taken, fines,
delays bringing a product to market or revocation of certification.
Questions from Hon. Eddie Bernice Johnson for John Samuelsen,
International President, Transport Workers of America
Question 1. With regards to ensuring that outsourced maintenance
and readiness of airplanes are completed in compliance with FAA
standards:
a. Who is responsible for ensuring such compliance?
Answer. Compliance for maintaining FAA standards is generally a
joint responsibility of the FAA, the air carrier, and the workers. In
the U.S., this system has worked relatively well, with highly
qualified, certified mechanics performing safety sensitive work and an
engaged FAA physically present in all of the largest airports and
maintenance repair facilities. Outside of the U.S., however, this
question becomes significantly more complicated.
At foreign repair facilities, the minimum standards for maintenance
workers are, in most cases, non-existent. These workers are not
required to have any FAA-certification or any familiarity with the
aircraft they may be performing maintenance on. Additionally, the FAA
has no regular presence at these foreign facilities. There are no
quality controls in place from the regulator to ensure that foreign
facilities maintain U.S. minimum standards.
Ultimately, without real oversight from the FAA or qualified,
certified workers at these facilities, 100% of the compliance
responsibility has been vested in the airline itself. In many cases,
the airline then outsources this responsibility to a contractor--
further weakening the relationship between safety standards and
reality.
b. What is the process to ensure such compliance?
Answer. While, at least on paper, there is a robust system for
ensuring compliance inside of the U.S., almost all of these processes
break down or cease to exist at foreign facilities. In the U.S., FAA
inspectors make frequent, unannounced inspections of maintenance
facilities--both at overhaul bases and at airports. Certified mechanics
who fail to maintain safety standards are at risk of losing their FAA
credentials--potentially costing them their job, as well. Carriers who
do not correct systemic problems can be fined or lose their
certification.
Outside of the U.S., the FAA does not conduct unannounced
inspections. In fact, foreign repair facilities are subject to only one
scheduled inspection each year. Line maintenance performed at airports
outside of the U.S. is not subject to any FAA inspections.
Furthermore, the vast majority of workers performing maintenance on
aircraft outside of the U.S. have no certification--either from the FAA
or any equivalent agency. There is no risk to these workers of losing
their license to operate if they fail to safely maintain equipment.
In short, the entire process of ensuring compliance with FAA
regulations at foreign facilities is dependent on one scheduled
inspection per year and a trust that the airlines will police
themselves.
c. What is the consequence for failure of compliance?
Answer. Failure to comply with safety regulations can have dire
consequences for the travelling public. Our safety regulations have
often been written in blood following fatal accidents due to poor
maintenance. The incredible safety record of the U.S. airspace over the
past decade is a result of a century of learning from our mistakes.
Stepping back from these regulations would open our airspace to
significant safety threats.
Today, our U.S. mechanics have become a last line of defense
against these threats. Across the country, line maintenance mechanics
are finding examples of poor and failed repair work on aircraft
maintained abroad. Foreign repair facilities have approved aircraft to
return to service with tape and wire holding vital engine components
together; exit doors installed incorrectly that caused depressurization
mid-flight; flammable paint around the engines; and secret drug-
smuggling compartments installed in the aircraft nose. Every mechanic
that spots and corrects these maintenance failures is protecting the
travelling public from life-threatening system failures.
However, the airlines are clearly finding financial advantages to
non-compliance. U.S. carriers have more than tripled the proportion of
their maintenance performed outside of the country in the past fifteen
years. This maintenance is being performed on a significantly lower
safety standard without qualified mechanics or FAA quality controls.
Day-to-day, the carriers are not facing any consequences for failing to
live up to our national minimums. Without action by Congress, these
airlines will continue a race to the bottom in airline maintenance that
is exposing U.S. citizens to significant, pervasive safety risks.