[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
SYRIA STUDY GROUP: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE MIDDLE EAST, NORTH AFRICA, AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 16, 2019
__________
Serial No. 116-75
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov,
or http://www.govinfo.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
36-156 PDF WASHINGTON : 2019
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman
BRAD SHERMAN, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York Member
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida JOE WILSON, South Carolina
KAREN BASS, California SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts TED S. YOHO, Florida
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
AMI BERA, California LEE ZELDIN, New York
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
DINA TITUS, Nevada ANN WAGNER, Missouri
ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York BRIAN MAST, Florida
TED LIEU, California FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota JOHN CURTIS, Utah
ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota KEN BUCK, Colorado
COLIN ALLRED, Texas RON WRIGHT, Texas
ANDY LEVIN, Michigan GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania GREG PENCE, Indiana
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey STEVE WATKINS, Kansas
DAVID TRONE, Maryland MIKE GUEST, Mississippi
JIM COSTA, California
JUAN VARGAS, California
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas
Jason Steinbaum, Staff Director
Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa, and International
Terrorism
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida, Chairman
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia JOE WILSON, South Carolina,
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island Ranking Member
TED LIEU, California STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
COLIN ALLRED, Texas ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey LEE ZELDIN, New York
DAVID TRONE, Maryland BRIAN MAST, Florida
BRAD SHERMAN, California BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
JUAN VARGAS, California STEVE WATKINS, Kansas
Casey Kustin, Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
INFORMATION REFERRED
Syria Study Group Final Report and Recommendations submitted for
the record from Chairman Deutch................................ 2
WITNESSES
Stroul Ms. Dana, Co-Chair, Syria Study Group (joint statement)... 89
Singh, Mr. Michael, Co-Chair, Syria Study Group (joint statement) 89
APPENDIX
Hearing Notice................................................... 116
Hearing Minutes.................................................. 117
Hearing Attendance............................................... 118
SYRIA STUDY GROUP: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
Wednesday, October 16, 2019
House of Representatives
Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa, and International
Terrorism
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Washington, DC
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:51 p.m., in
room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Theodore E.
Deutch (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Deutch. This hearing will come to order. We welcome
everyone.
The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on the
findings and recommendations in the Syria Study Group's final
report.
Given the timing of this hearing, we will have the
opportunity to discuss the ramifications of recent U.S. policy
changes in Syria and how the study group recommendations can
still address our challenges there.
I thank our witnesses for appearing today and without
objection I move to enter the full Syria Study Group report
into the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Deutch. I now recognize myself for the purpose of
making an opening statement.
[Pause.]
Mr. Deutch. Ms. Stroul and Mr. Singh, thanks very much for
testifying today and for your work on the final report of the
Syria Study Group.
Your report is a thoughtful, informed overview of the
Syrian conflict and provides pragmatic recommendations for how
American policymakers can protect U.S. interests and stabilize
Syria.
Now, it is well known that President Trump does not like to
read, but I wish that he had skimmed the executive summary of
your report before his recent phone call with Turkish President
Erdogan.
Your assessment notes the liberation of ISIS-held territory
does not eliminate the group's threat to the United States. It
also notes the ISIS detainee population is a long-term
challenge that is not being adequately addressed, that Iran
continues to entrench itself in Syria, Russia and Iran show few
serious signs of divergence, that the United States
underestimated Russia's ability to use Syria as an arena for
regional influence, and that Turkish insurgence into
northeastern Syria would represent a major setback to U.S. aims
in Syria and a new crisis for the U.S.-Turkish relationship.
And despite these challenges, the United States maintains
leverage to shape an outcome in Syria that protects core U.S.
national security interests.
In the 10 days since President Trump's decision to hastily
withdraw U.S. forces in northeastern Syria and consent to
Turkey's invasion of the region, your assessment has in fact,
sadly, borne out.
Rarely has a foreign policy decision by a United States
president yielded this many disastrous consequences this
quickly.
Most importantly, President Trump's irresponsible choice
makes the American people less safe. The chaos in Syria has
allowed hundreds and likely thousands of ISIS fighters and
supporters to break out of prison.
Yesterday, senior U.S. officials told Foreign Policy that
Turkish-backed forces are deliberately releasing ISIS detainees
previously held by Kurdish fighters, and as your report notes,
ISIS has already transitioned to an insurgency and in the
absence of effective pressure against it, will utilize its
Syrian sanctuary for organizing, instructing, and inspiring
external attacks.
Tragically, like other aspects of your assessment, I expect
this prediction to ring true in the coming weeks and months.
The President also forced Kurdish forces to reach an agreement
with Bashar al-Assad, allowing his soldiers and Russian troops
to expand their presence in northeastern Syria.
Yesterday, Russian media circulated videos showing Russian
soldiers and their proxies taking over recently abandoned U.S.
bases in the region.
This outcome will also benefit Iran by reinforcing the
position of its ally, Assad. It is unclear how allowing Tehran
to fortify a land bridge to the Mediterranean, enabling it to
threaten our ally, Israel, is consistent with the President's
maximum pressure policy on Iran.
It is also unclear how ceding the field to Putin in Syria
supports the Administration's great power competition strategy.
The President's rash decision also put American soldiers in
danger. On Friday, Turkish troops fired artillery at an
American base. A day later, Turkish-backed forces cut the main
highway in northeastern Syria, effectively isolating U.S.
soldiers in the region.
And while I am thankful no Americans were hurt in either
case, both incidents placed American troops directly in harm's
way and were a direct result of President Trump's shortsighted
choice.
The President justified his decision by claiming that he is
reducing our presence in the Middle East and terminating
America's endless wars.
But the Administration just sent an additional 1,800 troops
to Saudi Arabia. Secretary of Defense Esper noted on Friday
that an additional 14,000 American personnel have been deployed
in the Middle East since May.
These deployments include airborne early warning aircraft
squadrons, maritime patrol squadrons, Patriot air and missile
defense batteries, B-52 bombers and an aircraft carrier strike
group.
I support the objective of this increased troop presence--
to deter Iran. But the President's claim that he is reducing
the U.S. role in the Middle East is simply a lie and the
American people see right through it.
The situation in Syria is tragic because it could have been
avoided with real strategic diplomacy. The American presence in
Syria was not an endless war but a limited sustainable
efficient deployment, one of the notable successes of recent
U.S. policy in the Middle East.
But President Trump threw it all away, yielding U.S.
leverage, putting American troops and civilians in danger,
undermining our credibility, dividing NATO, removing pressure
on ISIS, giving a strategic victory to our adversaries, and
betraying our Kurdish partners who fought valiantly in recent
years to counter ISIS with American support.
This is not just my opinion but one that most Republicans
share. Senator Graham labeled President Trump's decision the
biggest blunder of his presidency and noted, ``We are
witnessing ethnic cleansing in Syria by Turkey, the destruction
of a reliable ally in the Kurds, and the reemergence of ISIS.''
Representative Cheney said the President's choice was
impossible to understand. Senator Rubio claimed, ``The damage
to our reputation and national interests will be extraordinary
and long lasting,'' and President Trump's former Ambassador to
the United Nations, Nikki Haley, argued, ``The Kurds were
instrumental in our successful fight against ISIS in Syria.
Leaving them to die is a big mistake.''
I could go on. That one decision could unite both Democrats
and Republicans on Syria policy and yield this many calamitous
results says a lot about President Trump's capabilities as
commander in chief.
The current unrest in Syria, sadly, epitomizes the
strategically confused and morally bankrupt approach to the
world, and I finally would just urge my Republican colleagues
to remember that Syria is not the only example of the president
abandoning a partner in the face of an aggressor.
President Trump withheld $391 million in congressionally
appropriated security assistance to Ukraine, a State that is at
war with Russia in a conflict that has killed more than 13,000
people, as part of an effort to compel the Ukrainian government
to dig up dirt on his political opponent.
That behavior should unite us all--Republican, Democrat,
independent--in rejecting a foreign policy that has put
personal ambition over national interest and sullied our
Nation's honor and credibility.
I look forward to our witnesses' testimony and suggestions
on how the U.S. can salvage our policy and achieve our national
interests in Syria, end the conflict that has led to the deaths
of over 600,000 people, and help the Syrian people build a
better future, one that is not dictated by Bashar al-Assad, by
Russia, and by Iran.
And with that, I yield to Mr. Wilson for his opening
statement.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Chairman Ted Deutch, for calling
this important and timely hearing.
Tragically, the United States' Syria policy has been a
failure from the very start. It has been an example of
America's strategic failure at every point, from the notorious
red line by President Barack Obama that was never enforced to
the reckless betrayal of the Kurds in the recent days.
But I believe that our failure in Syria is far greater than
a strategic misstep. Our Syria policy over the last 8 years
represents a deep moral challenge to all of us.
How could we stand by while a brutal authoritarian regime
massacres its people indiscriminately? How can we talk of red
lines?
We sit here over 8 years after Bashar Assad began
butchering the Syrian people using poison gas and barrel bombs,
still trying to figure out what our policy should be.
But it is not just us. It is the entire international
community that is complicit in the privations of the Assad
regime and its backers in Iran and Russia.
The international system as we know it was founded in the
aftermath of the humanitarian horror and catastrophe of the
Holocaust.
But it has failed as well to prevent the very tragedy that
it was supposed to act as a bulwark against. The enemies of
freedom and democracy have hijacked our multilateral
institutions. Instead of promoting liberty, they are exploited
to cement tyranny and oppression.
Developments over the past week have only underscored the
importance of the work that our esteemed witnesses here today
have spent so much time.
I was deeply disappointed by the Administration's decision
to withdraw U.S. troops from northeastern Syria and effectively
green light a Turkish incursion, putting our Kurdish allies at
great peril.
The Syria Study Group, presciently, warned against such a
withdrawal and outlined the potential negative consequences
that we are, unfortunately, witnessing today.
Like Chairman Deutch, I am increasingly concerned about the
resurgence of ISIS on the heels of the U.S. withdrawal. Our
withdrawal from Syria creates dangerous breathing room for ISIS
elements in the region, which can ultimately endanger American
families back home from terrorist safe havens overseas.
In order to prevent them from coming here, we must fight
them over there. Our force of about a thousand American
soldiers in Syria was a minuscule percentage of all American
military forces in uniform today.
But the role of this small contingent was outsized. They
helped protect the world from the dangers of ISIS establishing
safe havens to threaten American families. This was extremely
cost effective military investment.
It seems to me the only real winners of our withdrawal are
Russia, Iran, Turkey, and the Assad regime, in addition to the
ISIS terrorists.
But the bigger problem is that our withdrawal from Syria
could have consequences in virtually every other arena of U.S.
foreign policy.
In a single stroke, we have, sadly, undermined U.S.
credibility everywhere. The move solidifies a concern and fear
that America is receding from the world's stage, inspiring and
enabling the forces of tyranny everywhere, which has not been
the President's policy of peace through strength.
Furthermore, the Assad regime, backed by Russia and Iran,
continues its barbaric assault on Idlib, Syria as we speak.
Reports over the past few days indicate that Russia has
intentionally bombed over a dozen hospitals in the province.
Russia, clearly is not a partner in Syria but an adversary.
How many Syrians must be killed until we take action to stop
this killing machine?
There is simply no solution for Syria with Assad in power.
As the chairman has indicated, I would like to conclude by
saying that we know America has been the moral actor on the
world stage. We have always aimed to do the right thing and the
people of the world know that. They know the values America has
stood for.
We believe that we still can return to that ideal. In my
opinion, there is simply no substitute for American leadership
to preserve peace through strength.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Wilson.
I now will recognize members of the subcommittee for a 1-
minute opening statement should they choose to make one.
Mr. Lieu, you are recognized.
Mr. Lieu. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you, Ranking
Member Wilson, for your opening statement.
I do not object to withdrawing U.S. troops in Syria. I
object in how that was done. Because of Donald Trump's
impulsive decision with no planning and no coordination, we now
have ISIS terrorists that have been set free in Syria. We have
Turkish forces slaughtering our allies, the Kurds, and then we
have Russian military forces gleefully taking over U.S.
military facilities.
If you look at Donald Trump's foreign policy, many of his
actions have principally benefited Russia, from attacking NATO
to blocking military aide to Ukraine to now his decision in
Syria.
So I think it is appropriate for the American people to ask
the question of when it comes to Vladimir Putin, why does it
always seem like Donald Trump bends the knee?
I yield back.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Lieu.
Mr. Chabot, you are recognized for 1 minute.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As a former chairman of this subcommittee, let me just say
that the situation in Syria has been truly a tragedy to watch
unfold.
Over the past now 8 years, we have witnessed just how
brutal Bashar al-Assad truly is and the barbaric lengths He is
willing to go to hold on to power.
Hundreds of thousands of civilians have been killed and
millions forced to flee, creating one of the world's worst
refugee crises today.
The civil war also created a vacuum for groups like ISIS
and al-Qaida to flourish, while opening a doorway for Iran to
advance its goal of regional hegemony and further enabling it
to threaten our key ally in the region, Israel.
Defeating ISIS, al-Qaida, and Iran as well as supporting
Israel remain critical national security priorities that I
believe most Americans support.
So I look forward to discussing the report, especially in
light of the changes in our Syria policy since it was released
and how we can move forward to accomplish our objectives.
I yield back.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Chabot.
Mr. Sherman, you are recognized.
Mr. Sherman. it is not surprising that huge bipartisan
majorities rejected this action by the president in a vote just
half an hour ago on the floor.
This is an unforced error. We saw northeast Syria stable,
our costs and our casualties contained, ISIS in prison camps,
and the Kurds who guarded them in prison camps and who are
allies safe.
Now the Kurds are subject to slaughter and ISIS may very
well be liberated. This is a mistake of such magnitude it is
hard to imagine that it is a mistake made in good faith.
One possibility--is it an intentional gift to Putin? The
other possibility is that Turkey threatened to wage war against
the United States, and rather than level with the American
people the president decided to pretend that this was sort of
voluntary withdrawal.
This cutting and running will not only imperil our policy
in the Middle East, it will undercut our alliances everywhere
in the world.
I yield back.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cicilline, you are recognized.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and the ranking
member, for holding this important and timely hearing.
Ten days ago, President Trump sealed the fates of our
Kurdish partners in Syria when he gave President Erdogan of
Turkey the green light to invade, setting off a humanitarian
disaster and reigniting chaos in northern Syria.
I believe this callous and reckless decision will go down
in history not only for its disregard for human life but for
the strategic malpractice of placing American troops in harm's
way, allowing thousands of ISIS prisoners to go free and ceding
influence over the region to Russia and the Assad regime.
Like many, I have been mystified by the Administration's
decision to allow this invasion to go forward in their ham-
fisted attempts to clean up the colossal mess they have made.
No matter what they do, the Administration cannot bring
back murdered Kurdish children. They cannot reclaim our
American military positions and equipment seized by the
Russians, and they cannot bring back our credibility, which has
been squandered as we betray the trust of our Kurdish allies.
Thank you to our witnesses for being here today. I look
forward to your views on what efforts we can make as a Congress
and what actions you would recommend to the Administration to
try to salvage this horrific situation.
And with that, I yield back.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Cicilline.
Do any other members of the subcommittee wish to make an
opening statement?
Seeing none, without objection all members may have 5 days
to submit statements, questions, and extraneous materials for
the record, subject to the length limitation in the rules.
And it is now my pleasure to introduce our witnesses.
Ms. Dana Stroul is co-chair of the Syria Study Group. She
is a senior fellow in the Washington Institute for Near East
Policy's Program on Arab Politics and previously served for 5
years as a Senior Professional Staff Member on the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee where she covered the Middle East,
North Africa, and Turkey.
Before Capitol Hill, she worked on Middle East policy in
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, at the U.S. Embassy in
Cairo on economic political affairs, at the U.S. Institute of
Peace on civilian-military relations in Iraq, and at the
National Democratic Institute on Gulf Affairs.
Mr. Michael Singh is also co-chair of the Syria Study
Group. He is the managing director of the Washington Institute
for Near East Policy and previously served as senior director
for Near East and North African affairs at the White House,
from 2007 to 2008, and director for several Middle Eastern
countries including Iran and Syria, on the NSC staff from 2005
to 2007. He also served as special assistant to Secretaries of
State Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice as well as staff aide
to the U.S. Ambassador to Israel.
Thank you both for being here today. Let me remind the
witnesses to please limit your testimony to 5 minutes. Without
objection, your prepared written statements will be made part
of the hearing record.
I thank you both sincerely for being here at this timely
moment, in particular, and we will now start with Ms. Stroul.
You are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF DANA STROUL, CO-CHAIR, SYRIA STUDY GROUP
Ms. Stroul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Wilson,
and members of the committee. Thank you for this opportunity to
present the final report of the congressionally mandated Syria
Study Group.
It was an honor to co-chair this bipartisan group of
experts along with my colleague, Mike Singh.
When the Syria Study Group released its final report last
month, we intentionally started by articulating why Syria still
matters. Making this case is not something that our group took
for granted, especially at a time of heightened public debate
about the U.S. role in the world and what we should invest to
achieve U.S. objectives.
The group was unanimous in its conclusion that what happens
in Syria does not stay in Syria. Moreover, we argue that if
sufficiently resourced and prioritized, the United States
retained compelling forms of leverage to influence an outcome
in Syria that protects U.S. interests.
Decisions made in Washington over the last 10 days have
enormous implications for the future trajectory of the conflict
in Syria and for U.S. interests.
Mr. Singh will discuss the Study Group's specific
assessments and recommendations, but needless to say, Syria
still matters.
The fundamental drivers of conflict and violence in Syria
are unchanged today. Notably, there is bipartisan
acknowledgment of these points here in Congress.
The conflict in Syria was largely relegated to the margins
of public attention before last week. Now it is front and
center of international headlines and has captured domestic
attention.
As the executive and legislative branches of the U.S.
Government work to articulate what U.S. policy can
realistically achieve when the majority of U.S. forces in Syria
are withdrawn, our report proposes a series of specific
nonmilitary recommendations.
But it is also important to take a step back and remind
ourselves of the origins of this conflict and situate Syria
within the broader strategic landscape of U.S. national
security.
Syria poses five strategic challenges: international
terrorism, Iran, Russia, refugees, and international norms. The
current conflict began as peaceful protests against an
autocratic dictator, one of the many uprisings of the so-called
Arab Spring in 2011.
Though many hoped that protests in Syria might open the
door to positive change, those hopes were quickly dashed as
Syria rapidly devolved into a crucible of intersection
conflicts that have reverberated well beyond the Middle East.
The Assad regime survived in power for decades by operating
at the intersection of criminality and terrorism. The United
States designated Syria as a State sponsor of terrorism in
1979. We know the nature of this regime.
Assad facilitated the movement of al-Qaida operatives
during the Iraq War to attack U.S. forces and he will seek to
leverage al-Qaida and ISIS fighters in Syria again when it
suits his needs.
Syria today provides safe haven to the world's most
dangerous terrorist groups. Idlib, for example, is home to the
greatest concentration of foreign fighters since Afghanistan in
the 1980's.
ISIS no longer holds territory but was already
reconstituting as an insurgent force. It will replenish its
ranks with fighters breaking out of detention facilities today
and will prey on vulnerable communities as the humanitarian
situation deteriorates.
Iran seeks to turn Syria into a forward base for its
missiles and advanced weapons, and has exploited the conflict
to entrench itself in Syria's economic and social fabric.
Israeli strikes and U.S. sanctions prevented Iran from
consolidating these gains, but come at the increased risk of
war between Iran and Israel. That risk is now increased today.
Russia, too, has exploited the conflict. Through its
intervention in Syria, Moscow established itself as a major
player in the Middle East for the first time in decades.
U.S. partners across the region have expanded ties and look
to Moscow, not Washington, for mediation. Russia is positioning
itself to broker an agreement between Assad and Turkey and also
played a role in the agreement reached between the Syrian
Democratic Forces and Assad.
The arc of crisis and xenophobic discourse from the Middle
East to Europe follows Syrian refugees who fled a deliberate
campaign of violence against civilians by Assad, Russia, and
ISIS.
Refugees have strained the economies of Syria's neighbors
and roiled politics in Europe. Yet, conditions in Syria are not
suitable for safe, voluntary, or dignified return.
Finally, the Assad regime and its partners have smashed
every norm of conflict by targeting hospitals and schools,
deploying chemical weapons and barrel bombs, and using
starvation and mass murder as weapons of war.
To date, there have been no meaningful consequences for
these actions. We should expect that future authoritarians,
when faced with peaceful protests, may look to the Syrian case
and assume that mass civilian homicide will not be challenged
in any credible way, setting new precedents for conduct in war.
I only have a few seconds left. Syria is a conflict where
the two great U.S. concerns--international terrorism and great
power rivals--come together. It is not a conflict that can be
contained or ignored.
The rapid development shaping both the battlefield and
political realignments in Syria will not end this conflict.
They will only set conditions for the next phase of war.
The Study Group's final report remains relevant today,
which my colleague will now detail.
Thank you.
[The prepared statements of Ms. Stroul and Mr. Singh
follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Ms. Stroul.
Mr. Singh, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL SINGH, CO-CHAIR, SYRIA STUDY GROUP
Mr. Singh. Chairman Deutch, Ranking Member Wilson, and
members of the committee, thanks so much for this opportunity
to testify and thank you to Congress for the opportunity to
serve as chairman--co-chair, I should say--of the Syria Study
Group and it was an honor to serve alongside Ms. Stroul as my
co-chair.
As Dana noted, Syria does matter and Syria has resisted all
of our efforts over the years to ignore it, to contain the
conflict, to cauterize the conflict, as some used to say, and
it still matters.
The report that we put out just a couple of weeks ago
offers what I think is a pretty sobering assessment of the
conflict there.
I would not want to give the impression that everything was
hunky dory before recent decisions. It was not. But in the last
few days, things have gotten much worse, I would say.
The report at its core is a strategy of consolidating our
gains in northeastern Syria, of working toward a political
settlement to the conflict, which is, ultimately, what is
necessary to address all of those problems that Ms. Stroul was
talking about, and taking steps to protect American interests
if such a settlement could not be reached--if it proved
elusive.
At the time we put out our report, our view was the U.S.
had such a strategy but that, essentially, that strategy was
undermined by a couple of big things.
One was inadequate resourcing. A good example of this was
the Administration's decision not to spend the stabilization
funding in northeastern Syria that Congress had appropriated.
And it was also undermined by the perception around the
world that the high-level leadership in the U.S. Government
simply was not committed to this strategy we are talking about.
You know, when our officials were going around the world
trying to recruit other countries to contribute militarily to
the conflict, the question that they had in their minds was is
the United States really going to be committed to this mission,
and I think that that question has, unfortunately, been
answered in the negative in recent days.
Fast forwarding to today, now the United States, I think,
lacks a strategy for Syria, if I can put it bluntly, and U.S.
officials are going to need to scramble to reverse engineer a
strategy to conform with the decisions that have been made by
the White House in recent days.
Rather than consolidating our gains, my fear is those gains
that we have made in northeastern Syria are now going to be
reversed, and a political settlement on terms favorable to U.S.
interests I think is now less likely.
And this is not just the result of a poor decision being
made by the White House. I think this is also the result of,
frankly, poor planning because, as I think Congressman Lieu
said, in many ways this was a long time in coming and yet we
have no--we see no evidence that this decision by the Turks was
met with any kind of contingency planning by the U.S.
Government.
Instead, we have U.S. forces retreating under fire,
withdrawing under fire, for maybe the first time since Somalia
except that fire is coming from a NATO ally, and I think that
if we all stop for a moment and let that sink in, it is really
extraordinary.
The consequences of a U.S. withdrawal--I worry that what we
are going to see is a cascade effect in Syria and, obviously,
the report does not get into this because this is all
relatively new but it is based upon what we learned in the
course of our briefings.
My concern is now you will see and have seen already Syrian
Democratic Forces moving forth to meet the Turkish incursion
and U.S. forces moving out of Syria, and this creates a vacuum
in most of eastern Syria.
And ISIS will use that vacuum to regroup and, potentially,
to not just break out of prison but to conduct attacks in
Syrian cities to try to reconsolidate some of its control of
territory.
The SDF, as has already been noted, faced with this choice
between Assad and the Turks, has chosen to make a deal with the
Assad regime, and we have seen regime forces now move into
eastern Syria.
With regime forces come the Iranians and Russians. That
raises the prospect of Iran linking its Syrian and Iraqi
proxies in a way that will also perhaps prompt an expansion of
Israeli air strikes and, thus, an increase in the chance of
outright conflict between the two.
I think we will also see security conditions deteriorate as
the population is brutalized in eastern Syria as it has been
elsewhere in areas the regime has retaken.
We may also see a breakout of al-Qaida linked groups from
Idlib along that northern border corridor.
There still are problems elsewhere in Syria which are not
linked necessarily explicitly to what is happening in the
northeast.
Those include things like Idlib, like the security that is
deteriorating in other regime-held areas, the entrenchment of
Iran in Syrian society, the stalled political process, and the
shattering of international norms with no real justice or
accountability, as Ms. Stroul was pointing to.
So what does the United States need to do? And I will just
take a few seconds more, Mr. Chairman. In the northeast, I
think it is vital that we halt and/or limit the Turkish
incursion and press the Turks for humanitarian access, to sever
their links to terrorist groups, and not to forcibly resettle
Arab refugees in Kurdish areas or in areas they are not from or
do not want to go back to.
It is important that we try to keep pressure on ISIS. I
think that probably means trying to keep American troops in
eastern Syria if that is viable and if--and certainly keeping
up the air campaign--air strikes against both ISIS and al-Qaida
linked groups.
Also, it means ensuring that we hold on to the U.S.
presence in Iraq, which has also come under pressure in recent
months, both politically and also perhaps here in Washington.
I think it is important we keep pressure on Iran by
supporting Israeli air strikes and by maintaining that garrison
at al-Tanf, which I anticipate itself may now come under some
pressure as Russians, Iranians, others try to sort of complete
the withdrawal of American forces from Syria.
And I think we will need to see a diplomatic push to hold
our anti-ISIS and our sort of anti-Assad coalition together,
maintaining this policy of withholding economic reconstruction
funds, imposing sanctions, and diplomatically isolating the
Assad regime.
Many of our allies may now be inclined to peel off of that
coalition.
Just in closing, our report warned that this was not a
conflict that was over--that it remained dynamic. It remained
dangerous, and I think that, unfortunately, recent events have
borne that out.
I think it is important now that we stop relinquishing our
leverage and we start using that leverage. My fear is that we
are not going to see an end to the endless wars as a result of
recent decisions.
We are going to find that American forces were actually
sort of helping to keep the peace and stability there, and what
will really contribute to endless conflict is that
deterioration of American credibility throughout the region.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Singh. Thank you, Ms. Stroul.
Now I will begin the questioning. We are going to do that
subject to the 5-minute rule. I will begin, followed by Mr.
Wilson.
Mr. Singh, I want to start with where you left off talking
about American leverage, and Ms. Stroul, you laid out the five
areas. And I just want to suggest--I want to ask you this
question.
If our actions over the past couple weeks in Syria mean
that we are at risk of--a greater risk of terrorism, expanded
number of refugees, Russia is stronger, Iran is stronger, that
when you talk about international norms, which I think is too
often left out of this_mass civilian homicide as a policy_
barrel bombs, chemical weapons, targeting hospitals and
schools, starvation hasn't one of the international norms for
decades been American leadership?
And if in all five of these areas we are weaker, not to
mention the fact that we have left our partner, the Kurds, to
be slaughtered, then isn't that fundamental norm of American
leadership and American influence challenged and weakened
dramatically?
What leverage do we have, Mr. Singh, is my question, after
we take action like this?
Mr. Singh. Thank you, Congressman.
I think we do have leverage. I mean, we remain, obviously,
a very capable and powerful actor on the world stage.
We have, obviously, this coalition that we have put
together to conduct air strikes against ISIS. We have
sanctions. We have withholding, as I said, of the economic
reconstruction funding or diplomatic recognition of any
settlement or of the Assad regime itself.
But I do think, Congressman, that you make an important
point about the role of American leadership because I think
that without the United States to sort of assemble an
international coalition to put together these tools, not just
our tools but contributions from others, they will not do it
themselves.
They will say, look, the writing is on the wall. Assad has
won. Russia is calling the shots here. And I think you will see
hedging strategies from those allies.
We have, generally, exercised that leadership, I think, for
a couple of reasons--one, because we have always found it to be
in our interest to do so, to be the ones setting out the
initiatives and having others, hopefully, sign up to those
initiatives, and second, because we have worried about the
vacuum that is created in the absence of that leadership and
who might step in, and I think those who step in are other
States--weaker States, frankly, like Russia, like Iran, who
lack the ability to challenge us directly except when we back
off.
And then non-State actors who, you know, in certain areas
where there, frankly, is no government, no authority, step in
and provide some of that themselves in ways which are quite
destructive.
Mr. Deutch. I agree, and on the issue of weaker States with
more power, Ms. Stroul, how does providing Assad and Iran a
freer hand in Syria undermine the Administration's maximum
pressure policy that had been our policy and apparently
continues to be, notwithstanding where we stand?
Ms. Stroul. The Syria Study Group talked about sanctions to
some extent being successful in denying Iran the opportunity to
consolidate its gains in Syria.
But on its own, a sanctions only policy combined with
Israeli target kinetic strikes was not sufficient to remove
Iran or eliminate Iranian influence from Syria.
I want to return to just what Mr. Singh was discussing and
your first question as well. The reason the Syrian Study Group
talked about needing to retain a U.S. military presence in that
one-third of Syria was not only about completing the anti-ISIS
fight.
It was about the broader leverage of that one-third of
Syria which is the resource-rich part of Syria which provided
us leverage to influence a political outcome in Syria.
While anything in terms of U.S. leadership is going to be
much more difficult, going forward, there are three categories
of leverage that still, if properly resourced and the State
Department and our diplomats are empowered to lead a coalition,
potentially provide some leverage to us.
The first is reconstruction. Russia and Iran simply do not
have the financing to reconstruct Syria. So even if Assad
regains control of that one-third of Syria, he does not have
the resources and his backers do not have the resources to
construct and provide economic stability or security for those
areas.
That comes through the United States, Europe, and access to
international financial institutions. Right now, that remains
relevant.
Sanctions--many other governments are at this point
contemplating whether or not to go back into Damascus,
especially as we see what happens with Assad on the ground.
But the risks of secondary sanctions and what it means to
materially support the Assad regime and his backers now remains
a possible and potent form of leverage if we apply it smartly
now.
And finally, political recognition--we still have
leadership with the Europeans and with international
organizations to deny political recognition and international
legitimacy to Assad and that still remains relevant today.
Mr. Deutch. Before I turn it over to Mr. Wilson, I will
respectfully suggest--and we will see how the rest of this
discussion goes--I acknowledge what you are saying. It feels--
though you wrote it only weeks ago, it feels like it is from
another time. When you talk about properly resourced decisions
on reconstruction and sanctions and political recognition were
all based on American leadership.
When you talk about America being a powerful actor on the
world stage, that is true. We are a less powerful actor when we
leave our partners open to slaughter, the partners that we have
relied upon to help us in this very difficult battle against
ISIS.
That is why this feels so, so problematic. But I am sure we
will get into this more.
Mr. Wilson, you are recognized.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Indeed, it is a bipartisan concern about everything we are
discussing today. it is quite obvious that, in a bipartisan
manner, we are all concerned and that is why we appreciate so
much both of you leading the effort for the study and providing
the study.
And Ms. Stroul and Mr. Singh, for each of you, the events
of the past weekend have been really completely upended our
counter-ISIS strategy.
What should we do to have the strategy to address what is
occurred in the last week? And begin with Ms. Stroul.
Ms. Stroul. We still have not--the U.S. forces presence on
the ground in Syria was not--we were not fighting ISIS
directly. We were working through a partner.
But we were also collecting intelligence and we had a large
air campaign as well. We do not have to abandon the air
campaign. Our coalition partners in the defeat ISIS coalition
have--the coalition has not collapsed yet.
And I would add that the anti-ISIS coalition has many
elements, not just military force on the ground. There also a
counter terror financing element. There is humanitarian aid.
There's working on countering ISIS propaganda and its
global ideological appeal. These are still things that we can
work on.
And at the end of the day, Turkey is still our NATO ally
and they have said that they are going to accept responsibility
for the rest of the defeat ISIS campaign.
Now, there are a lot of reasons why that is very
problematic. But at this point, they are still our partner in
the NATO alliance and if they--while we need to right now think
about what tools we can compel to shape Turkish actions and
prevent destructive Turkish actions that can cause the next
cycle of conflict, there may be still areas where we can work
with them if we can get to a cease-fire on going forward with
the anti-ISIS campaign.
Mr. Singh. So I agree with that. We have to, to the extent
we can, use the tools that we have, whether it is air strikes--
you know, frankly, whether it is keeping some forces in Syria,
which I think is not something we should take off the table or
assume is not possible now. We need to examine whether that is
in fact viable in current circumstances.
We need to keep that pressure on, and not just ISIS. But
there are groups like HTS, like Huras al--Din, who probably
will benefit from this situation as well because now there is
this corridor created along the Turkish-Syrian border which
might allow them to escape Idlib where they are currently sort
of holed up and spread into other areas.
Syria and Huras al-Din in particular is committed to
external plotting and so we need to pay attention to that.
There is also, though, this risk--and President Trump has
talked about it quite explicitly--of ISIS members now
exfiltrating Syria to places like Europe. And so there are
intelligence and a CT task that comes along with that as well.
And so I think it is important that we work very closely to
the extent, again, we can, given the state of the relationship
with the Turks, with other countries along the borders, with
Europe on making sure that we are tracking that, finding those
folks, arresting them if possible, and countering them as well.
I think all of this is more difficult now in the
circumstances we are in because, again, as Dana was saying,
part of the reason we had those forces there was to sort of
enable other activities in eastern Syria to promote stability
and good governance, which really would have been necessary to
keep ISIS from reemerging. It already was reemerging before
this.
Now it looks like those missions just will not be possible
in the current environment and that is going to sort of reduce
our CT effectiveness.
Mr. Wilson. I would like to thank both of you because I was
really concerned we were in a hopeless situation. But, indeed,
we are not, and we should always remember that Turkey is a
member of NATO for 70 years--has been such a valued ally, and
the Turkish people--their relationship to the American has been
so strong. It is just shocking to see whatever divisions are
occurring now that I believe will be just temporary.
On another note, the United Nations has different
associations with the Assad dictatorship. From each of you,
what is your view about the relationship of the Assad regime
with the U.N. organizations?
Ms. Stroul. The United Nations and the various
organizations that have been providing humanitarian assistance
inside Syria have received much criticism for acquiescing to
the manner in which the Assad regime would like that assistance
to be delivered to communities inside Syria.
Our report highlights a very important Security Council
resolution coming up for renewal at the end of the year, the
Cross-Border Resolution, which provides the international
underpinning for the United Nations to enter into areas of
Syria without the Assad regime acquiescing specifically to it.
Without that Cross-Border Resolution, all humanitarian aid
delivered by the United Nations inside Syria would be subject
to Assad regime approval, which means that delivery of that
assistance and provision would be weaponized and politicized to
suit Assad's purposes.
Mr. Wilson. And my time is up but thank both of you very
much.
Mr. Allred [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Wilson.
I will recognize myself for now for 5 minutes. I just want
to thank you both for your work. I am sure it must be
frustrating to have finished these recommendations and to
immediately thereafter have these events come up.
The Syria Study Group was put together to develop
comprehensive and thoughtful policy for the future. But
President Trump has instead acted on a whim and in doing so has
thrown our allies under the bus, I think has emboldened our
enemies, and I am deeply, deeply concerned about this.
And, of course, you have seen today with the vote that we
just took how bipartisan that rejection has been. I am most
concerned--I want to ask you first about the reputational
damage that has been done. You might have seen the same
comments I have seen from the SDF saying this is a stab in the
back.
Why would anyone ally with us, going forward, and your
comments about what we can do and the leverage we may still
maintain seems to me that it relies on the fact that anyone
would believe our word at all, which I find to be quite suspect
right now?
Mr. Singh. So I think it is a valid concern, Congressman,
this question of what will the broader reputational or sort of
credibility damage be to the United States, and we have already
seen other allies who are not necessarily heavily engaged with
this issue suggest that this does raise questions about our
reliability.
I think we saw some of that from some commentators from the
region. Some British MPs have raised this question of, you
know, does Britain now need to sort of play a stronger role in
some of these conflicts.
Look, I would say that we want other States, of course, to
step up and play greater roles in some of these conflicts and
burden sharing is something we can all agree on. But we do not
want them to do it----
Mr. Allred. I do not think we--I do not think we wanted it
to be this way.
Mr. Singh. Right. We do not want them to do it because they
do not think they can rely on the United States or because they
view the United States as unpredictable because my worry is
that that will not produce sort of strong allied coalitions
that are pursuing strategies that advance American interests.
It will produce things like hedging behavior where they
reach out to adversaries of the United States, whether that is
the Russians in this particular theater, China in other
theaters, because they sort of view that as something they need
to do for their own national security.
So I think that even if we decide, we are going to
intervene less. We are going to try to push others to share
burdens.
Still, you want to be doing whatever we are doing around
the world in sort of a multilateral way as part of a coalition
rather than sort of simply sort of retreating to Fortress
America, as it were, and saying to other countries you are on
your own.
Mr. Allred. Ms. Stroul, before you address the same
question, I want you to also specifically note the people in
this region and how a message like this will be delivered and
heard in this region.
Because we are talking about great powers, our allies, the
U.K., the Russians, the Iranians. But how--in your assessment
having done this work now for months, how will this affect the
Kurds, the SDF, the people on the ground who we may hope to be
able to work with?
Ms. Stroul. Thank you for that question.
One of the things the Syria Study Group did over the course
of our work was travel throughout the region. We could not go
inside Syria but we went to Turkey and Jordan and Israel and
Lebanon, and what was striking--I led a delegation to Turkey
and Lebanon--was that much of the damage to U.S. credibility
and leadership had already been done from last December 2018
when there was the first attempt to withdraw U.S. forces
without much of a plan guiding it or much consultation with
either our local partners, the SDF, or our neighbors and other
partners in the coalition.
So, in general, most of the discussions we had, whether
with outside experts in these countries, with government
counterparts, with humanitarian activists in the region,
generally already doubted whether the United States had the
commitment and staying power to follow through on what we said
we were going to do.
And when it comes to the Kurds, very much the same thing. I
think a lot of the damage had already been done. We were very
clear.
If you look at U.S. official talking point that our
relationship with the SDF was temporary and transactional, and
even though no one expected the relationship to change the way
it did over such a short period of time, they understood what
temporary and tactical meant, which is why they were always
talking to everybody else anyway.
So over the entire course of our relationship with the SDF,
they maintained communications with Damascus. They always
talked to the Russians. They will talk to whoever can do
anything to ensure their survival.
Mr. Allred. Thank you.
I will yield to Mr. Kinzinger from Illinois.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you guys for
both being here and your good work.
And I am sad and I am also--the report is frustrating to me
because it is a bad report. it is a good report but--because of
how quickly everything has changed.
But I do not want you to think that your work is useless. I
think some day it will be a very studied report and you will
look at how history went and how it could have gone,
recommendations to prevent it as we WTF this whole thing,
looking back in history.
You know, a couple things I want to address before I get to
the meat of my questions. You know, I was looking--I was being
pretty nostalgic about Reagan lately and I remember quote. it
is ``Let's set the record straight. There's no argument over
the choice between peace and war but there's only one
guaranteed way you can have peace and you can have it in the
next second--surrender.''
And I saw a tweet by the president the other day where he
talked about peace and creating peace and we are creating peace
everywhere, and I will tell you, if you surrender and leave you
can create temporary peace for yourself.
But I do not think that is the mission of our country. When
you look at the post-World War II order when we finally
realized that isolation was not--did not work until we had this
strain of weird isolationism that kind of came back into our
body politic.
But in that history, you know, when we won the Second World
War we inherited the, basically, industrial capacity of Germany
and Japan and we had this massive industrial revolution, which
we all, you know, look back on today and we talk about in the
economy bringing manufacturing back.
And that was a result not of American isolationalism but of
actually America being involved in the world. And when we turn
the post-World War II order on its head, I think the
consequences are really difficult to see in the short term but
we are able to see an immediate result of that in the decision
made the other day.
Now, I want to compare that quote of Reagan to one that was
just made. ``Our soldiers are out of there. Our soldiers are
totally safe. Syria may have some help with Russians and that's
fine. It's a lot of sand. They've got a lot of sand over there
so there's a lot of sand that they could play with.''
It is a real difference in leadership styles, to put it
quite politely. This idea of war fatigue that I hear people
talk about, it really ticks me off, too. Yes, you are tired of
seeing it on television. In Congress, we probably are tired of
talking about it. It has been happening for a long time.
But if anybody had a right to be war fatigued it was my
grandparents after World War II, and what happened is America,
instead of leaving Europe and saying it has a lot of destroyed
property, America said, we are going to stay, and three
generations of Americans staying there.
Finally, the third generation behind the Iron Curtain tore
it down because they were desperate for a taste of what we had
and there was a whole world that's basically free right now
because of that.
Fifty soldiers were preventing an invasion by Turkey, and I
want to be very clear. Anybody that believes that 50 soldiers
that Turkey would have attacked if the president said we will
defend our soldiers with the might of the U.S. military, you
are fooling yourself, because Turkey never would have been that
stupid.
It would have been a short fight. Nobody wants to fight a
NATO ally, me especially. But I do want a president that is
going to stand up for American positions and this is weakness,
and I think there is no other way to put it.
Instead of turning out away from the world, now, you know,
we are spending a lot of time in Congress just fighting each
other like we are enemies because we are, like, drama queens
and we have to be addicted to drama.
So we got to fight somebody and so we just argue here. We
cannot get anything done, and we forget that there is a real
enemy out there that wants to destroy us.
So, Mr. Singh, let me just ask you a question, and when it
comes to Turkey, I introduced today the United States-Turkey
Relations Review Act.
It is a bipartisan bill with Mr. Cicilline and it would
require the Administration to review U.S.-Turkish relations and
report it to Congress, the feasibility of relocating American
personnel and assets from Incirlik because this is going to be
a big problem with the airbase there.
Let me ask you, Mr. Singh--the President said that he was
going to--his chief campaign promise was to defeat ISIS. It was
not end endless wars. That is new. It was defeat ISIS.
He said He is going to stay in Syria as long as Iran is
doing their nefarious activity there. Has Iran withdrawn their
support of the Assad regime and, if not, what kind of support
does Tehran still send Damascus?
Mr. Singh. Thank you, Congressman.
No, Iran has absolutely not withdrawn its support for the
Assad regime. We see the Iranians sending not only their own
forces. You do have Revolutionary Guard Corps officers, for
example, in Syria.
But we see them cultivating and sometimes sending over
proxies. Hezbollah, some Afghani and Pakistani forces have been
there as well as Syrian forces who they themselves have
recruited and organized and paid.
But we also see Iran really sort of entrenching itself in
the economic and social fabric of Syria, which tells you that
they are there to stay.
Iran would be turning Syria into sort of a forward
operating base for its missiles and other power projection
tools if it were not for Israeli air strikes which have
effectively stopped them from doing that.
But the Israelis themselves will tell you that those air
strikes have stopped Iran from engaging in certain activities
but they have not deterred Iran from continuing to sort of
focus on Syria as their power projection base.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Deutch [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Kinzinger.
Mr. Malinowski, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, guys. I
want to completely associate myself with Mr. Kinzinger's
remarks from start to finish.
First of all, you did a fantastic job and I wish you were
here under circumstances that were different. But here we are.
We have had maybe two and a half years in which there was such
a thing as the Trump Administration that was resisting Trump,
and I do not think there is an administration anymore.
We have a President who is acting on his impulses, and the
policy of the United States right now is that Syria is not our
problem. That is what he said. There is just a bunch of sand
and they can all play in their sand.
It is now the official policy of the United States that
Russia hates ISIS as much as the U.S. does and that the PKK is
a bigger threat than ISIS. These are all things that the
President said today.
Anyone who wants to assist Syria in protecting the Kurds is
good with me--Russia, China, Napoleon Bonaparte. This is our
policy and we know the second, third, fourth order of
consequences can be catastrophic.
I am a bit less worried right now about Turkey massacring
the Kurds because we know what is happened. The Kurds have
struck their alliance with the Assad regime and with the
Russians and that will provide some protection.
I am more worried about the Assad regime now moving into
eastern and northern Syria, which is populated not just by
Kurds.
I am worried about the inevitability, I think, of Turkey
now deciding that in order to deal with its security problems
it no longer has any interest in dealing with us because it is
not our problem; they are going to be dealing with the Russians
and with Iran.
We saw Putin was in the UAE and Saudi Arabia telling them--
I am sure we know what he was saying--you cannot trust the
United States but I have some things that I will offer to you
and you know that I will act in defense of our interests.
And I think, worst of all, He is a step closer to getting
the world he wants--a world with no values, no norms, no
rules--a world where powerful countries and leaders can do what
they want to whomever they want.
America, you go do your thing. Russia can do its thing, and
that makes me incredibly sad and I wonder what can we do about
it.
And I am struggling with certain things. One question is,
do we as a Congress push for maintaining some troops in Syria.
I have a bipartisan bill that was relevant a few days ago. I do
not know if it is still relevant. It basically says you cannot
go below a thousand in Syria unless you can report back to the
Congress the answers to certain obvious questions--the
questions we have been talking about here.
Is that still a relevant approach? And I would also like to
ask you both about our relationship with Turkey. There is a lot
of sentiment right now that we need to punish Turkey hard for
what it did and I hate what Turkey did. It was despicable.
But I also worry a little bit that we are obsessing right
now over punishment of Turkey because we want to absolve
ourselves of a decision that President Trump made and, frankly,
to be nonpartisan here, to absolve ourselves of mistakes that
we made in the Obama Administration as well.
it is very convenient to say that this is all now the fault
of one country that did a terrible thing rather than looking at
ourselves.
And so I wonder what your advice would be on those two
questions. On troops, is there something that Congress can and
should do? And on Turkey, is it actually wise to sanction
Turkey severely for doing something that the president told
them that they could do?
If we are ceding the Middle East to Russia, is it in our
interests really to pull out Incirlik now and potentially cede
a NATO ally to Russia as well?
What should we do?
Mr. Singh. So, thank you, Congressman.
I think they are both very relevant questions right now. I
would say that, look, had we negotiated a security mechanism or
safe zone with Turkey, which Ambassador Jeffrey was in the
process of doing right before the decision to end that and to
withdraw.
Presumably, we would have taken our troops and perhaps
moved them south. We would have continued activity south of
that buffer zone or security zone.
And so, in theory, there is not a reason we cannot do that
now. My question would be, because security for American forces
was largely being provided by the SDF--you know, we had a very
small number of troops, as you know, Congressman, working with
the SDF.
If the SDF itself has left these areas and the regime has
moved in, is there really an environment in which we can work?
I do not know the answer to that question. I think it is a
question that Congress has to ask DOD and get a clear answer
to, hopefully, in the days to come.
On the question of Turkey, look, I think that we need to
recognize, as many of you already have, that the seeds of this
crisis were sown when we made this decision to work with the
YPG Kurdish militia, knowing that it was considered a great
security threat by Turkey.
We apparently, as you said, Congressman, gave Turkey the
green light to do this. So the Administration has said that we
did not. But it does not seem like there was opposition to the
idea.
I think we have to take these things into account in our
response to Turkey. My own view is that we should be now trying
to shape Turkish actions.
Using sanctions or the threat of sanctions, not to punish
Turkey but to try to lay down sort of some conditions or red
lines for Turkey, whether it is humanitarian access, whether it
is limiting their incursion, whether it is, again, severing
their links with some of these extremist proxies that they seem
to be using, and if we do need to use sanctions to use them in
a way which is sufficiently strong that it will cause Turkey to
really reconsider some of these actions.
There is, I think, this overall question now hanging over
the U.S.-Turkish relationship, especially because of Turkey's
apparent targeting of U.S. troops. That is not behavior which
is sort of compatible with this NATO alliance that we have.
And so I think there will be a long-term cost for sure to
the U.S.-Turkish relationship. But in the sort of near-term
question of sanctions, I would say use them to shape, not
punish.
Ms. Stroul. The Syria Study Group spent a long time
thinking about the U.S.-Turkey relationship and I would just
like to highlight and underscore what we did say. We did not
call for severing the relationship with Turkey.
We acknowledge the links between the PKK, a U.S.-designated
foreign terrorist organization in Turkey, and the YPG element
of the Syrian Democratic Forces in Syria, and we acknowledge
that U.S. support for the SDF was a major irritant in the U.S.-
Turkey relationship.
We did not call for severing the U.S. relationship with the
SDF at this time and we also did not say that Turkey offered a
viable alternative military force to continue the anti-ISIS
fight, if not for the U.S. relationship with the SDF.
So there were very clear things that we said. At this
point, could the threat of sanctions shape some Turkish
behavior that would otherwise be very destabilizing, for
example, the forcible relocation of certain refugees into areas
that are not their homes in Syria.
There are reports of atrocities and war crimes being
committed by proxies--Turkish-supported proxies. These are
things that--well, I do not know the content of the President's
phone call with President Erdogan. Clearly, these are things
that sanctions may be able to shape.
So I would leave it there.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Malinowski.
Mr. Reschenthaler, you are recognized.
Mr. Reschenthaler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
For the last decade, Syria has been ground zero for a
devastating proxy war. The country presents some of the most
pressing humanitarian and national security challenges that our
Nation faces.
It is essential that the United States maintain a strong
footprint abroad. All right. I am not sure what is going on
with my mic.
All right. It is essential the United States maintain a
strong footprint abroad, and as history has shown, when the
United States turns its back, chaos erupts and our enemies fill
that power vacuum.
It is refreshing to hear my colleagues across the aisle
have concern over Syria and present a position of having a
strong U.S. presence abroad.
I wish I would have seen this kind of vigor and these
positions when President Obama allowed Assad to ignore a red
line and I would hope that this newfound vigor and these new
positions transfer when speaking about Venezuela, about
defending the Hong Kongers and others that are seeking liberty
and freedom from across the world.
But I applaud the new positions that my colleagues across
the aisle have found and I also applaud President Trump's
continued actions to hold the Syrian regime in check by
attacking military targets after its chemical attack on
civilians and for imposing sanctions on officials in Assad's
authoritarian government.
I also commend the President's swift actions in Turkey,
whose irrational actions have endangered a key U.S. ally,
empowered Iran and Assad, and set us back in the global fight
against ISIS.
There are no--these are not the actions of a NATO ally and
I am proud to cosponsor a sweeping sanctions bill introduced by
Republican Conference Chairwoman Liz Cheney.
With that said, I have two questions for the witnesses.
First, on August 25th, the Israeli air force acted in Syria
to prevent an Iranian drone attack on Israel. What does the
report recommend related to U.S. support for allies confronting
threats from Syria, in particular, Israel?
Mr. Singh. Thanks, Congressman.
Well, the Israeli campaign against Iran--I think, if you
step back, it is really extraordinary in many ways because they
have managed to sort of deter--maybe not deter, they have
managed to limit Iran's activities in Syria through these air
strikes.
And yet, Iran has not had an effective response against
Israel and they have managed to do this in coordination with
Russia, which is in this alliance with Iran.
And so I think that the Israeli campaign really sort of
deserves accommodation and we should support it however we can,
whether that is intelligence sharing, whether that is
diplomatic cover if they need it.
And we should also, frankly, use our own tools to counter
what Iran is doing, you know, sanctions, tools, and whatever
other tools are available to us.
Ms. Stroul. I associate myself with Mr. Singh's comments.
Mr. Reschenthaler. All right. You guys are making it easy.
All right. One more question. How do we ensure the
situation on the border between northeast Syria and Turkey is
not abused by Iran to expand its presence in the country and
solidify what I am seeing as a land bridge between Tehran and
Beirut?
Ms. Stroul. So this is where Mr. Singh talked earlier about
the U.S. forces that remain at the al-Tanf garrison, which is
not in the area of northeastern Syria that Turkey is currently
focused on.
So in the view of the Syria Study Group, maintaining those
U.S. forces at that garrison is critical for preventing Iran
from consolidating those lines of communication through Syria.
And given the movement or redeployment of other U.S.
forces, it is highly likely that Assad, Russia, the Iran--
Iranians or Iran proxies will challenge our position there.
They have done it before, and that was under former
Secretary of Defense Mattis who responded with overwhelming
force and sent a clear signal.
So this would--in terms of maintaining that U.S. force
presence, our adversaries need to believe that there is a
credible threat of military force on the table and that is
something that, hopefully, the executive branch will be
contemplating of making quite clear.
Mr. Reschenthaler. Thank you again. I commend you on your
work and I yield the remainder of my time.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Reschenthaler.
Mr. Vargas, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Vargas. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and again
thank the witnesses here today.
I remember the first time I had the opportunity to meet the
Kurds as a group. It was former Congress Members Darryl Issa
and John Mica and I. We traveled to Baghdad. Then we traveled
there.
We were briefed by our embassy and also military personnel.
We went up to Erbil. In Erbil, we met with Kurd leadership
there. Then we met with the military arm, the Peshmerga.
And during that time, it was interesting because our
military and our Special Forces in particular told us how we
were allied with the Kurds there and how in fact they were
doing very heavy fighting alongside of us and we could trust
them, and how they were our allies and our friends.
From them, of course, I heard of the situation in Syria
also. Of course, two different areas but very similar, they
said, was the situation.
And so anyway, I came away thinking that we were allies and
we could be trusted by them and they could be trusted by us,
and what has happened here recently, I think, is a disaster--a
terrible disaster--and to listen to some of the military
personnel--our military--say how they are ashamed of what we
have done is particularly devastating when you think of how our
military each and every day put their lives on the line, are
out there fighting with those that expect to have their backs
and we their backs. It has been sad.
With that being said, I am very nervous about the Kurds now
in Syria--in particular, ethnic cleansing. I know that they are
trying to cut deals now with Assad and it is like trying to cut
a deal with a snake.
You know, what assures them that they will not be wiped
out? I say this--that for 2 years we had a family of Kosovars
live with us because of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.
So I am very familiar with that, and I want to know what
can we do--what can be done so these Kurds are not wiped out?
As we saw, the atrocities are already happening.
What can we do?
Mr. Singh. Thank you, Congressman.
I think it is a valid concern. You know, we could be
concerned about this on, frankly, both sides of the sort of
Turkish line of advance, right, because we have not really had
insight into what is been happening in the other Turkish
occupied enclaves of Syria--the Afrin and Euphrates Shield
pockets.
And so one thing that we will want from the Turks, you
know, if we are going to go there and try to talk to them, if
we are going to be threatening them with sanctions is we will
want transparency and humanitarian access into any zone they
occupy to ensure that these things are not happening, whether
it is at the hands of Turkish authorities or probably more
likely at the hands of some of these extremist proxies who we
have seen up to no good in recent days.
On the other side of that line, I think it is even more
challenging because, obviously, the Assad regime has brutalized
the populations in areas that it has reoccupied, and so too
have Russian and Iranian-backed forces.
And I think they will view the SDF fighters and officers as
a threat to the Assad regime's reconsolidation of that rule. So
I think it is going to take things like not just sanctions, but
one of the things we talk about in the report is we should be
willing to threaten the Assad regime with the use of force if
it is deliberately targeting groups for, you know, war crimes
and atrocities and so forth. It should not necessarily be the
case that that type of response is only used when, say,
chemical weapons are used.
I think the Assad regime, Iran, they need to understand
that we are watching and that there are going to be
consequences for war crimes, for atrocities, for ethnic
cleansing, as you said, Congressman.
Mr. Vargas. Ms. Stroul.
Ms. Stroul. I agree with what Mr. Singh said and I would
only add that when it comes to the Kurdish communities in
Syria, they never put all their eggs in the American basket.
For them, this is about survival. Whether that survival is
no autonomy and no integration of the force structure that they
created into Assad's army, which has been one of their
requests, or desire for Kurdish cultural rights and language in
schools.
But if Assad, with Russia, can guarantee their survival or
provide a security guarantee that the United States will not
and face between Turkish operations, which could result in
ethnic cleansing or demographic reengineering like we have seen
in places like Afrin or the Euphrates Shield area, versus
subjugation to Damascus, they are going to pick Damascus.
And then the next level of questions for the United States
is what does our policy look like or our approach to Syria look
like if our former partner is working with Damascus and Russia.
Mr. Vargas. Well, my time is up. But I do want to say that
I think it is very important then to have this transparency and
this humanitarian access because I do not think anything good
is going to come from this--anything at all.
Thank you.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Vargas.
Mr. Trone, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Trone. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The main point of the report is that Russia and Iran, they
share many interests when it comes to involvement with Syria.
Both are looking for increased regional influence, and they
have a willing partner now in Assad.
The withdrawal of U.S. counter terrorism efforts directly
enables Russia and Iran to be more enmeshed and exert greater
influence.
What concrete steps will the U.S. need to take, given the
recent events, to combat the outsized Russian and Iranian
influence in the region? Is it even feasible?
Ms. Stroul. We spent a lot of time debating in the Syria
Study Group whether or not what unites Russia and Iran in
backing Assad could--were there areas of tension or fracture
that we could exploit to break that alliance apart and then
provide us some opportunities via a political process our own--
our own leverage or military operations to then move forward.
Our conclusion is that Russia and Iran have more in common
and both have the goal of keeping the United States out and,
unfortunately, recent developments probably only solidify for
them that their alliance and their backing of Assad is working.
Mr. Trone. So you found no divisions of interests at all?
Ms. Stroul. There is certainly tensions about Security
Force activities, where certain Security Forces operate,
whether or not behavior of the Assad regime could be modified,
for example.
Russia is a member of the U.N. Security Council and would
probably like to enable some sort of political process that
could fold Assad back into the international community.
Iran is a pariah State and not in the international
community, in that sense, so probably does not share that same
objective. But, again, our conclusion at the end of the day was
that there was more unifying Russia and Iran specifically in
their opposition to the United States and minimizing U.S.
leadership in the region.
Mr. Trone. OK. So what does the Syria Study Group recommend
regarding Iran's presence, you know, in Syria? Assuming you
believe Iran should not maintain a military presence in Syria,
what recommendations do you have to achieve that goal?
Mr. Singh. Congressman, if you look at the report, we have
some recommendations, largely which sort of focus on things
like exposing Iran's role in Syria, because a lot of what Iran
is doing is not of a kind of overt military nature.
A lot of that is very much in the news because you see the
Israeli air strikes, for example, against Iranian missiles and
things like that. But there is this economic and sort of social
element to it as well, and I think that activity does not get
sufficiently exposed.
I think we should have a greater effort to sort of put it
into the sunlight, as it were. But what I would also encourage
is not to think of what Iran is doing in Syria as somehow an
isolated issue that we have to respond to just there.
One of my concerns is, you know, we now have still a very
significant presence across the Middle East. But there are a
lot of people who are questioning our commitment to that
presence, and I think that is actually a dangerous position to
be in.
We have seen the Iranians escalate regionally. You know,
their attacks on tankers, reportedly--reportedly, this attack
on Abqaiq in Saudi Arabia.
I think this adds even more importance to the idea that we
need to respond to those types of Iranian escalations lest they
look at this Syria decision and say, hey, where else can we
press on the United States to sort of get them out of other
places in the region we do not want them, right.
So I think it is important that we look at this from a
regional perspective and not just a Syria-specific perspective.
Mr. Trone. So they look upon us as an easy mark?
Mr. Singh. OK. I mean, you know, if--we had the Carter
Doctrine in 1980 and then the Reagan corollary, right, which
said that we had a sort of--we saw a vital interest in the
Gulf, for example, and we were willing to defend that interest
militarily.
Well, we did not at the time have a heavy presence in the
region and now, again, we have the opposite, right. We have
basically said that we are not sure we see a vital interest for
the United States.
President Trump has said we are not--He is not sure he sees
a vital interest for the United States, whether it is with
tanker traffic in the Gulf or here in Syria.
And yet, the presence--the U.S. military presence--is much,
much larger than it was at the time of, say, the Carter
Doctrine. And, again, this kind of asymmetry--heavy presence
but maybe receding commitment--I do fear will embolden or
encourage adversaries like Iran to try to take shots at us.
Mr. Trone. Quickly, the Russians have now--force have
indicated--entered northeast Syria with our withdrawal. what is
Russia's objective there in the region and how will it respond
to Turkey's incursion?
Ms. Stroul. Russia's objective in Syria is to take back all
of Syrian territory under Assad--to deliver a win for Assad,
not just militarily on the ground but politically.
So what the Russians want is not just full consolidation of
territorial control but reconstruction, return of refugees, and
international legitimacy for the Assad regime.
Mr. Singh. And I will just say, Congressman, that I think
that what they also want is to just deal defeat to the United
States. And, you know, I am one who would like to say that we
do not need to have a zero sum approach to Russia. Not
everything that Russia does is inherently threatening to the
United States.
You know, I would like to be able to say that maybe Syria
is a place in ideal conditions where you could find room to
agree or cooperate with Russia. But I think that is just not
the case because I think Moscow does not see it that way.
I think Moscow sort of wants to show the rest of the
region, again, that the United States is not reliable. They
want to thwart what they see as kind of a regime change effort
by the United States.
They want to paint our policy in those terms and they are
not, I think, interested in sort of win-win solutions and so
forth.
Mr. Trone. Thank you.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Trone.
And finally, Ms. Jackson Lee has joined us here today and
without objection happy to recognize her for 5 minutes of
questions.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me acknowledge the chairman and the ranking member for
their courtesies. This is a committee that I used to be on and
I have a great affection and respect for all of the leadership
of the committee.
I happen to serve on the Homeland Security Committee and
the Subcommittee of Crime and Terrorism. So it intermingles
with what I think is crucial is diplomacy. And the work that
you have done let me applaud you for the work.
I went to Syria many years before 2011 and went to
Damascus. Spoke to the then new and fresh Assad, which some
thought there might be a difference. To my dismay, there was
zero difference from his father but in another era.
I want to pose these questions, and as I do so let me just
read this statement from an Army officer who formally served.
``I cannot look at the atrocities,'' an Army officer who
served in Syria last year said of videos posted online, of
Turkish--backed fighters executing Kurdish civilians. ``The
ISIS mission is going to stop. ISIS is going to have a
resurgence. We are going to have to go back in 5 years and do
it all over again.''
Now, I want you to comment on that. But I do want you,
first of all, you are obviously doing your study. But what is
your assessment or maybe people who you met are calling you
about the shear violence and loss of life, particularly among--
because remember when the conflict first started and there were
Doctors Without Borders and the United States was in we were
seeing just the shear miserable violence that the Syrian people
were going through.
Certainly, the Kurds have taken their share. But help us
understand how deep the violence is, how children are impacted,
maybe from your discussions that you had or people calling you.
Thank you. Thank you to both of you as co-chairs.
Ms. Stroul. Thank you so much for that question.
We consulted, broadly, with humanitarian and human rights
activists and organizations as well as the Syrian-American
community and those organizations that are collecting evidence,
documenting evidence of atrocities, abuses, and war crimes.
What we heard consistently from all--from all of these
communities and individuals was a plea for the United States to
prioritize issues of civilian protection and a perception that
that has not been a front and center policy priority of the
United States.
Many asked us to recommend that the United States make very
clear its willingness to use military force in response to
civilian casualties and the shear mass homicide tactics of the
Assad regime--that it is not just chemical weapons but barrel
bombs, medical sieges, starvation, forced disappearances,
torture, et cetera--and that these issues are not front and
center and not talked about enough in U.S.-led situations and
that gives the perception that we do not care about those
issues.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And you would think that it is now
exacerbated in light of where we are today--violence,
decapitation, et cetera?
Ms. Stroul. The perception that President Trump greenlit a
Turkish operation in which we have seen Turkish-backed forces
firing on civilians, ISIS detainees escaping from prisons, and
the discussion that there will be involuntary resettlement of
Syrian refugees into areas that are not historically where they
come from all send the signal that issues of civilian
protection are not a priority of the United States.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me continue.
You mentioned the fact that at the time the conflict was
not winding down and you called it dynamic and dangerous. How
dangerous is it now, in light of the actions of the president
that allow Turkey to come in without restraint and killing
without restraint?
Mr. Singh. So I think, Congresswoman, that it is in fact
quite dangerous now, more dangerous now than it was before in
large part because you will now have potentially ISIS breaking
out of prisons.
you will have a reduction in the counter terrorism pressure
on ISIS as well as some of these other jihadist groups. You may
have an expansion of Iran into eastern Syria and, as I said,
sort of a linking of the Syrian and Iraqi proxies of Iran and
perhaps an expansion of the war that's taken place between
Israel and Iran over these issues.
And to the sort of very first part of your question,
Congresswoman, about the U.S. military operation, you know, I
think that this lumping of Syria into the endless wars category
has been incorrect, frankly.
I think that if you were opposed to the U.S. intervention
in Iraq in 2003 or if you were skeptical about our military
presence in Afghanistan, in a way you should be pleased by the
way the intervention in Syria has been conducted because you
had a very small American military footprint rallying a 60,000
to 70,000 strong partner force, and that partner force out
front really doing the bulk of the work and the fighting and
U.S. forces really playing an advisory role.
And I think that the U.S. military has considered that to
be a very significant success and perhaps even a model for
future interventions, and it is a shame that sort of we have
now relinquished a lot of those gains which that model was able
to deliver.
You know, I think that, again, to put it together in this
kind of endless war category is a big mistake and I do not
think that is how folks see it in the government.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I know my time has expired.
Mr. Chairman, if I could just squeeze in this national
security question, if I might.
In the report it says the liberation of ISIS-held territory
does not eliminate the group's threat to the United States,
which this was in your report.
We now have a circumstance of a free for all--Turkish
fighter jets, we have bombing, fleeing, and you already
indicated in your report preceding this how dangerous, and let
me just for the record put on my dismay, Mr. Chairman, of 2,000
troops in Saudi Arabia and troops that wanted to stay and were
being effective in Syria are now being, and I want to use the
term imploded--they are just being scattered--I mean, U.S.
troops.
And I think, Mr. Chairman, you mentioned that we might have
had a success that we could have modeled after--a few number of
soldiers. But they were a powerful statement.
But your assessment now of the level of the national
security threat that this region may be in light of where we
are in the aftermath of Turkish actions.
Ms. Stroul. So even though ISIS has been pushed out of the
territory that it holds, its command and control, its
leadership structure, is still in place. It still has the
ability to raise funds.
Now those 2,000 foreign fighters that were in detention
facilities under SDF control, not to mention the thousands of
Syrian and Iraqi fighters that were in detention, are likely
not going to remain in detention for much longer, which means
the ranks of ISIS will be replenished, access to finances,
global brand appeal, plus leadership.
We still have Baghdadi, the leader of ISIS, giving speeches
that end up on the internet, talking about its plan for waging
a long-term war.
So I would say the national security threat is very high
and ISIS----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Very--I did not hear you. Very----
Ms. Stroul. It is high.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Very high.
Ms. Stroul. ISIS still retains the means and the desire to
use territory in Syria to plan external attacks.
Mr. Singh. Congresswoman, I would just add just a couple of
specifics to this.
You know, President Trump criticized our European partners
a lot for not repatriating their own citizens among the ISIS
fighters. There were a couple thousand foreign fighters. And he
was right to do so, frankly.
But I think, you know, the irony is that the way things
have now developed over the last few days, this process of
repatriation, which requires visits to the camps and kind of
consular work is now essentially impossible to do.
So even if folks are kind of remaining contained within
this area, getting to them to sort of bring them out and sort
of put them into a judicial process of some kind or a national
security process is going to be impossible.
Another question would be to what extent were we able to
have completed the process of, say, cataloging the fighters who
were in these camps. Do we know who was there and who now may
sort of be on the loose.
My understanding, and we talk about this in the report, is
that was ongoing. I do not know if it was finished before this
decision was taken or not and that might be--it might be a
question to ask the government.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
One military person--as I close--called this a real mess
and I think he was being more than delicate or polite. I am
appalled at where we are today and I think you have done us a
good service but you have also emphasized that the national
security threat is heightened and we create this mess.
And I hope that maybe Congress can work together to try to
bring some aid, comfort, and redesign of where we are today.
Mr. Chairman, your committee is very important in this and
I thank you for allowing me to be here.
Mr. Deutch. Ms. Jackson Lee, thank you for being here.
Thank you for your contribution to our committee today.
Appreciate it.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Mr. Deutch. And finally, Mr. Sherman, you are recognized
for 5 minutes, and I would note to other members who may be on
their way that we have a hard stop at 4:30.
So, Mr. Sherman, you have time and you are recognized.
Mr. Sherman. The Turks are relying to a significant extent
on these Arab tribal militias. To what extent is Turkey relying
on them and to what extent are they ideologically simpatico
with ISIS?
Mr. Singh. Thank you, Congressman.
So I am not sure they are tribal militias. I think that----
Mr. Sherman. They have been described that way, but OK.
Mr. Singh. If you look at who they are, they are probably
composed of some people who were refugees--displaced persons
from other parts of Syria.
Some of them may be former ISIS or other sort of members of
other jihadist groups.
Mr. Sherman. Or al-Qaida. Yes.
Mr. Singh. Or other sort of--the rebel groups. I mean,
there were over a thousand of these different rebel factions in
Syria in the past and so some of them have probably made their
way into these groups who are now fighting at Turkey's behest.
I cannot tell you to what extent sort of Turkey's relying
on them versus its own forces. I just do not have that
information.
But, clearly, if you look at what we see in the open
sources, it does seem as though there is a very heavy component
of these sort of Arab proxies being used by the Turks.
Mr. Sherman. And to how--to what extent are these groups
that have similar ideology to either al-Qaida or ISIS?
Ms. Stroul. Over the course of 8 years of conflict in
Syria, there are no longer groups that we would describe as
moderate. We tried to support moderate forces. We called them
the Free Syrian Army.
That support no longer happened and a lot of it was because
many of those fighters that we wished to work with would not
meet U.S. vetting standards in terms of what their affiliations
were.
I would also note that----
Mr. Sherman. I would point out the Kurds qualify as
moderates.
Ms. Stroul. Congress put in place very serious vetting
standards before the U.S. could provide assistance and
equipping. So I assume that before U.S. forces provided that
support to the SDF those fighters and units met U.S. vetting
standards.
And I would also add that a lot of the forces and militias
that the Turks appear to be working with there has been some
good work done by other individuals trying to study what their
motivations are.
A lot of it at this point is criminality. There is not--
there is not much left for your average Syrian to do. There is
no economy. There is no economic opportunity.
So some of this is ideological or unsavory types that,
certainly, the United States would identify as violent
extremist organizations and affiliations. And on the other
hand, there are criminals and thugs that are working on behalf
of the Turks.
Mr. Sherman. Let's see. So how far do you expect Turkey to
go into the region? Is it going to limit itself to 70 miles to
the--70 kilometers south of their border or is their goal to
take over all the territory?
And I realize they may not achieve their goal because of
the Russians, Iranians, and the Saud forces. Is their goal 70
kilometers or is their goal something else?
Mr. Singh. So, Congressman, the real answer is I do not
know and I am not sure any of us--I am not sure anyone in the
Administration really knows.
The Turks had talked about creating a 30-kilometer deep
buffer zone and then sort of, you know, 300 miles across, which
would have been both a security zone for the Turks as well as
maybe an area in which to resettle some of the Arab refugees--
Syrian Arab refugees that had been in Turkey.
We have heard U.S. officials say, as I am sure all of you
have, that the Turks have gone farther than they anticipated,
and by the Turks I assume they really mean these kind of proxy
forces that you were asking about, Congressman.
So I assume they will be guided both by whatever military
objectives they have as well as by this now move by the regime
plus Iranian plus Russian forces, in a sense, to interpose
themselves between the Turks and the areas further south. So
there may be a little bit of a competition as well between the
Turks and the regime forces.
Mr. Sherman. Over the last year or two when the Kurdish
forces in Syria had control of territory to what extent was
that territory used as an identifiable source of terrorist
action inside Turkey?
Ms. Stroul. We asked that question to multiple different
briefers both in the U.S. Government and when we traveled
throughout the region, and while it is clear to us that there
are ideological affiliations between the PKK and the YPG, and
our report calls for specific actions for the YPG to
differentiate itself from the PKK, we did not find examples
where U.S.-provided arms to the YPG in Syria made itself across
the border into Turkey.
Mr. Singh. I will just add, Congressman, though, that you
will find plenty of examples, especially from earlier parts of
the war, support for ISIS and so forth coming the other
direction across the border, which is, again, one thing that we
have not been able to successfully address with the Turks.
Mr. Sherman. So the--so the Turks did a terrible job of
preventing ISIS from going into Syria and the Syrian Kurds have
done a excellent job of making sure that malevolent actors do
not go from their--the territory they controlled up into
Turkey, and yet Turkey begins this terrible conflict.
I yield back.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much, Mr. Sherman.
I thank the witnesses and all members for being here today.
Thank you both for your testimony. Thank you for your very
thoughtful leadership of this important Syria Study Group and
thanks for the report that you produced.
Members of the subcommittee may have some additional
questions for you. We ask them to please submit those within
the next 5 days and we ask that you respond in writing.
And I just want to thank you again for--over the past 9
years we have had many, many hearings on Syria, both here and
in the full committee.
We sit here at this moment, with Assad having slaughtered
over 600,000 people, and almost 6 million refugees and 6
million people displaced inside the country, and the world's
largest State sponsor of terrorists stronger now there than
before, the country most dedicated to sowing discord and
democratic--fighting democratic norms, stronger there than they
were before.
And what you have offered us here, I think, is a really
important and useful tool for discussion and I hope--I urge my
colleagues all to take this seriously and to read it and that
it informs the work that we do, going forward.
Sincere thanks again for being here.
And with that, we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:26 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
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