[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE UNFOLDING CONFLICT IN ETHIOPIA
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH,
GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 3, 2020
__________
Serial No. 116-136
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov,
or http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
42-439 PDF WASHINGTON : 2023
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman
BRAD SHERMAN, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York Member
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida JOE WILSON, South Carolina
KAREN BASS, California SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts TED S. YOHO, Florida
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
AMI BERA, California LEE ZELDIN, New York
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
DINA TITUS, Nevada ANN WAGNER, Missouri
ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York BRIAN MAST, Florida
TED LIEU, California FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
DEAN PHILLPS, Minnesota JOHN CURTIS, Utah
ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota KEN BUCK, Colorado
COLIN ALLRED, Texas RON WRIGHT, Texas
ANDY LEVIN, Michigan GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania GREG PENCE, Indiana
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey STEVE WATKINS, Kansas
DAVID TRONE, Maryland MIKE GUEST, Mississippi
JIM COSTA, California
JUAN VARGAS, California
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and
International Organizations
KAREN BASS, California, Chair
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania CHRISTOPHER SMITH, New Jersey,
DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota Ranking Member
ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania RON WRIGHT, Texas
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
WITNESSES
Badwaza, Mr. Yoseph, Senior Advisor, Africa Freedom House........ 9
Lemma, Ms. Tsedale, Editor-in-Chief, Founder, Addis Standard
Magazine....................................................... 20
Ploch Blanchard, Ms. Lauren, Specialist in African Affairs,
Congressional Research Services................................ 29
Stigant, Ms. Susan, Director of Africa Program, United States
Institute of Peace............................................. 43
APPENDIX
Hearing Notice................................................... 68
Hearing Minutes.................................................. 69
Hearing Attendance............................................... 70
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE LETTER
Letter submitted for the record from Mary Mazanec................ 71
THE UNFOLDING CONFLICT IN ETHIOPIA
Thursday, December 3, 2020
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health,
Global Human Rights, and International
Organizations,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:11 p.m., in
via Webex, Hon. Karen Bass [chairwoman of the subcommittee]
presiding.
Ms. Bass. The Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Human
Rights, and Internal Organizations will come to order. Without
objection, the chair is authorized to declare a recess of the
subcommittee at any point, and all members will have 5 days to
submit statements, extraneous material, and questions for the
record, subject to the length limitation in the rules. To
insert something into the record, please have your staff email
the previously mentioned address or contact full committee
staff.
As a reminder to members, please keep your video function
on at all times, even when you are not recognized by the chair.
Members are responsible for muting and unmuting themselves, and
please remember to mute yourself after you finish speaking.
Consistent with House Resolution 965 and the accompanying
regulations, staff will only mute members and witnesses as
appropriate when they are not under recognition to eliminate
background noise.
I see that we have a quorum, and I will now recognize
myself for opening remarks.
Pursuant to notice, we are holding a hearing on the
unfolding conflict in Ethiopia. Today we are hearing testimony
on the conflict in Ethiopia, and would like to hear
recommendations on what the United States and the international
community can do to help stabilize the region and decrease the
tensions between the Government of Ethiopia and the Tigray
People's Liberation Front.
There are several intra-ethnic conflicts regarding politics
and social standing in Ethiopia covering decades. This
highlights the country's long dispute over group and individual
rights and whether centralized government is the way to true
democracy for citizens of Ethiopia.
During my many visits to Ethiopia, I have expressed to
leaders that the government must have representation for all
ethnic groups, and most importantly, always protect its
citizens. The current State of Ethiopia, not only has a ripple
effect on its citizens, but neighboring countries such as
Somalia, Sudan, and Eritrea are negatively affected.
Ethiopia's instability and ethnic strife are producing
security repercussions in Somalia. African Union forces depend
heavily on Ethiopian troops to help combat violent extremism in
the region.
Somalia has upcoming elections that may be tense, and the
Trump administration is planning to withdraw U.S. Special
Operation Forces from the country soon, which will strengthen
Al Shabaab and weaken anti-forces.
Recent reporting noted that Tigray forces fired missiles
toward the capital of Eritrea after Ethiopian troops pushed
them from their regional capital. These actions certainly have
political ramifications, but one of my major concerns is that
far too often during conflict innocent civilians are the ones
who are killed, injured, or displaced and have to flee across
borders.
Another regional concern for Sudan, after 30-plus years of
authoritarian rule, Sudan, which borders Tigray, is trying to
peacefully transition to a democracy and strengthen its economy
in the
[inaudible] Tigray People's Liberation Front to have a
continued peaceful dialog with the help of African Union
mediation to resolve this issue once and for all.
Citizens on all sides of this conflict should have a right
to be heard and peacefully protest, and there should be the
freedom to disseminate what is going on in the country by
journalists.
I appreciate and I am looking forward to hearing from
Tsedale Lemma, who can give a firsthand report on what is
happening in the country.
The Ethiopian diaspora is also critical in resolving this
conflict. My office meets with and hears the concerns of this
multiethnic community. We have taken meetings with groups
representing the Amhara, Oromo, and Tigrayan, and other
communities. We have heard from activists, journalists,
political actors, and regular citizens who are concerned about
their loved ones in the country. I hear you, my office hears
you, and Congress hears you.
That said, I want you to know that the purpose of this
hearing is to explore the deteriorating social and political
situation in the country, the recent conflict, while attempting
to find ways for the United States to be helpful and hear
policy recommendations for how to resolve this conflict.
The purpose is not to provide a space for any one ethnic
group to lay out their grievances. We understand various
ethnic, religious, regional, and political communities have
been affected, and we want to acknowledge that. That is the
reason why we are holding this hearing. Each witness here will
contribute to our understanding of the situation.
But you must know also that this is not the only source of
our information. You know that the members present at this
hearing today care about their constituents who are among the
Ethiopian diaspora, recognizing the long-standing bilateral
relations with Ethiopia and consider the country an important
regional partner, but we must maintain a diplomatic posture and
ensure that this hearing does not contribute to tensions back
in Ethiopia. You will notice that we will raise your concerns
and ask questions that you have raised in meetings or via email
or written correspondence.
I hope that you trust that we will continue to be champions
for human rights in Ethiopia. I recently led the bipartisan
resolution 1183, supporting respect for human rights and
encouraging continued democratic progress in Ethiopia and
condemning the targeted violence and destruction of property
directed against ethnic and religious minorities, the excessive
use of force by Ethiopian forces against peaceful protesters,
the arrest of journalists and peaceful protesters who exercise
their constitutional rights, and hate speech and disinformation
that fuel ethnic and political violence by groups raised in
Ethiopia and in the diaspora. I heard from constituents that
the language did not go far enough. We hear you, and we will
consider this feedback as we revise and prepare the legislation
for the new Congress.
I would like to thank our witnesses for participating in
this important hearing. We all look forward to hearing your
insight into the current situation in the country and
recommendations for possible ways forward.
When we decide to have a hearing, it is with great
consideration, and mainly the push to have this hearing came
from the diaspora. Sometimes it is difficult for us, though, to
make a decision to have a hearing because then when we do,
people want us to represent one side or the other, and that is
not the role for us to play here in Congress. So hopefully you
will find this hearing productive, and you will understand that
we are committed to the U.S. playing a productive role in
assisting Ethiopia find its way to peace and unity. And this
hearing is just--and the resolution--is just one step forward.
It will not be the last.
Thank you very much, and I now call on the ranking member
for his comments.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very, very much, Karen, Chairwoman
Bass, for convening this very, very important hearing. And as
you said, we are listening, and I think it is important that we
do it. It is totally bipartisan, and I want to thank you for
that. It has been a real joy to work with you as ranking
member, and at one point you were my ranking member. So I
think, you know, it just shows it is all about the issues and
the concerns. And obviously what has happened in Tigray region
is very, very serious. The loss of life has been horrific, and
so I think it is very important that we have this hearing
today. So thank you very much.
Indeed, it is my belief that Ethiopia is one of the most
strategically significant countries in the middle of Africa;
Nigeria, in my opinion, being the other one; and there are
others that are very important as well. But what happens there
is amplified throughout the region.
While I am hopeful that the Ethiopian Government, since
they have captured the regional Tigray capital of Mekelle,
coupled with the announcement just made, that the government
will allow United Nations humanitarian assistance to flow into
the region under their control, that hopefully that signals an
end to armed conflict. But there is a concern, and I know you
share it, Chairwoman Bass, that the fall of the capital does
not necessarily mark the end of the armed conflict. It could be
part of a stage, and we are very worried, all of us, about a
protracted civil war characterized by guerrilla attackers, all
the more reason why there must be a robust response by
everyone.
This concern is based in part on the history of the Tigray
People's Liberation Front, or the TPLF, and the geography of
the Tigray region in Ethiopia. The TPLF, as we all know, came
to rule all of Ethiopia following a successful guerrilla
campaign against the Derg, a case of Marxist-inspired movement,
overthrowing a Marxist government in the early 1990's. As
guerrillas, the TPLF used the highland terrain of Ethiopia,
including Tigray, to their advantage.
During the years of TPLF rule, the subcommittee was at the
forefront of raising concern about human rights abuses.
Following a critical hearing that I chaired in the spring of
2005, I traveled to Ethiopia, met with Prime Minister Meles
that August, as well as with human rights leaders. I raised
concerns directly with him in about a 2-hour meeting,
especially the egregiously flawed election--national election--
and the killing of dissidents that was occurring in the streets
and the mass arrests.
In the next year, I introduced the Ethiopia Freedom,
Democracy, and Human Rights Advancement Act. And following the
passing of Prime Minister Meles, domination by the TPLF
continued, and this subcommittee again held another critical
hearing: Ethiopia after Meles, and the future of democracy and
human rights. And there was a resolution which I introduced,
along with you, Chairwoman Bass, H. Res. 128, Supporting
respect for human rights and encouraging inclusive governance
in Ethiopia. It passed the House on April 10, 2018, and it laid
out milestones for transition from rule by the TPLF.
Following Prime Minister Abiy's ascension, you and I met
with him in Addis in August 2018, and we were encouraged by his
words, by his actions, including the release of thousands of
political prisoners.
The removal of the TPLF, as we all know, as the dominant
power in Ethiopia, has brought a reform-minded Prime Minister
Abiy to leadership in 2008, but it also unleashed protracted
jockeying between other ethnic groups, most notably, the two
largest, the Oromo and the Amhara, as well as intra-ethnic
conflict.
Indeed, the prime minister's position among his own Oromo
group is not completely solidified, and his pan-Ethiopian
vision is challenged by Oromo separatists, just as the--or such
as the Oromo Liberation Front and now jailed firebrand Jawar
Mohammed.
These ethnic tensions are further exacerbated by a
constitutional order bequeathed by the TPLF commonly called
``ethnic federalism,'' which has led to the pitting of one
group against another and fueled regional separatism and a
desire to cleanse regions of other ethnicities.
While it may not be considered polite to discuss issues
such as ethnicity and religion, one cannot understand the
current crisis in Ethiopia without reference to the ethnic
tensions which are often overlaid with religious ones. We in
the Congress must be careful, however--and I think you pointed
it out in your opening statement, Chairwoman Bass--not to
inadvertently stir up further ethnicity-based division by
taking the side of one group over another, but rather, urge a
path of reconciliation and negotiation, which will likely lead
to no one being fully satisfied but will help reduce tensions.
Many individuals and groups can point to grievances, we
know that--and they are well-founded grievances, whether
historical or ongoing--and they are real. The war in Tigray
threatens to exacerbate an already severe humanitarian problem.
We have seen crisis upon crisis beset Ethiopia in this year
alone. Not only did COVID-19 impact Ethiopia, as it did so many
other countries including our own, but on top of that, there
was a major locust plague which has created major food
insecurity throughout Ethiopia, the Horn, East Africa, and
beyond, and now armed conflict.
There needs to be a time for justice and accountability for
the atrocities committed by all sides. No matter what the
exigent circumstances, civil liberties--which Prime Minister
Abiy Abiy to his credit helped restore in 2018--cannot be
curtailed indefinitely. But first we need to stop the bloodshed
and address the humanitarian crisis, and the anti-ethnic
violence and hateful rhetoric must end.
As Secretary Mike Pompeo related in his call with Prime
Minister Abiy on November 30, there should be a complete end to
the fighting and a constructive dialog to resolve the crisis.
He also stressed the need to protect civilians from further
harm, including those fleeing the conflict, crossing the border
into Sudan, and respect for the human rights of all ethnic
groups, including Tigrayans.
Fortunately, it looks like an agreement has been reached
between the Ethiopian Government and the United Nations to
allow for unimpeded humanitarian access to areas of Tigray
under government control. I hope that at a minimum the basic
needs of those who have been displaced due to fighting, which
some estimate to be a million people, can now be addressed
while political issues remain to be resolved.
Ethiopia, as we all know, is a great country--a great
country--a proud nation whose roots date back thousands of
years, to the Old Testament. It retained its independence where
others did not. It is the seed of the African Union and a world
leader. Its soldiers help keep peace in other countries in
conflict, and its cultural and artistic influence is
widespread. It is, therefore, absolutely imperative that
Ethiopia not succumb to internal division and ethnic hatred.
Ethiopia is far too important, not just for the Ethiopian
people, but for the entire Horn and Africa as a whole. It must
overcome this year of crisis and crises and return to being an
example, an inspiring example, to be followed.
Again, I thank you, Madam Chair, and I yield back.
Ms. Bass. And let me just thank you once again because you
have always been, for so many decades, such an incredible
champion for human rights. And I remember our visit to
Ethiopia, and I just hope that we see peace, that the bombing
stops, and that also full communication is opened up. I was
encouraged that I know that humanitarian relief can go in, but
obviously so much more needs to be done.
Before I introduce our witnesses, let me just mention that
Members of Congress, whether on this panel today or not,
represent many different Ethiopian communities, many different
Ethiopian ethnic groups. And I suspect that some of the members
that are here today might, when it gets to their questions,
reflect the questions from that perspective. That is one of the
ways that we will try to handle the incredible amount of text
messages, emails, phone calls that we have received from
various sectors of the Ethiopian diaspora.
And as Congress Member Smith said, it is really important
that we try to maintain a neutral position. As much as various
diaspora groups would like for us to take one side or another,
it is just not appropriate for us to do that as a Member of
Congress.
So now I want to introduce our witnesses, and I will
recognize each witness for 5 minutes. And without objection,
your prepared statements will be made as part of the record. I
will first call on witness No. 1 for their testimony, but
before, let me read the bio of all of the witnesses.
Our first witness, Mr. Yoseph Badwaza, is a senior regional
adviser at Freedom House, managing Ethiopia programs. Prior to
joining Freedom House, he was Secretary General of Ethiopian
Human Rights Council, Ethiopia's foremost human rights
organization most known for monitoring and reporting on human
rights violations. After systemic and persistent attacks in
response to the Human Rights Council, Mr. Badwaza fled the
country. Once relocated to the United States, he continues to
be a leading voice for human rights protection and good
governance in Ethiopia through advocacy, policy, and research.
In 2010, he won the Human Rights Award for extraordinary
activism.
Our second witness is Ms. Lauren Blanchard, is a specialist
in African affairs with the congressional Research Service,
where she provides nonpartisan analysis on African political,
military, and diplomatic affairs, and on U.S. policy toward the
region to Congress Members. Ms. Blanchard's portfolio has
focused on East Africa, Chad, and Nigeria, and on security
issues and military engagement on the continent. Previously,
Ms. Blanchard managed democracy and governance programs in East
and Southern Africa.
Ms. Tsedale Lemma began journalism in 2000 and worked until
2005 with three local newspapers, including as a senior
reporter at the now defunct but prominent Addis Tribune. From
2005 to 2010, she served at the Ethiopian Embassy in Israel,
focusing on communication, regional, political affairs, and
media. In 2011, Ms. Lemma established the Addis Standard
monthly magazine, and over the last 10 years, has made it one
of the most influential magazines in the history of independent
media in Ethiopia.
Our final witness, Ms. Susan Stigant, is the director of
Africa Programs at the U.S. Institute of Peace, that last month
established an Africa Center to deepen, elevate, and expand the
Institute's commitment to stem violent conflict in Sub-Saharan
Africa. Ms. Stigant oversees the Institute's programming on
strategic regional engagement in the Greater Horn of Africa,
with the African Union, as well as constitutional reform and
national dialog processes. She is also a co-convener of the
senior study group on peace in the Red Sea arena, convened by
the U.S. Institute of Peace.
I would now like to call on our witnesses for their
testimony. And remember, each witness will have 5 minutes, and
we will let you know when the 5 minutes are up. I will tap
lightly on my gavel at the 30-second mark, and then we will ask
you to conclude. Thank you very much.
I would like to call on Mr. Badwaza.
STATEMENT OF YOSEPH BADWAZA, SENIOR ADVISOR, AFRICA FREEDOM
HOUSE
Mr. Badwaza. Chair Bass, Ranking Member Smith, and members
of the subcommittee, it is an honor to testify before you
today. I ask that my full testimony be admitted into the
record.
The devastating developments of the past 4 weeks, have
brought immeasurable human suffering and the destruction of
livelihoods and appear to have returned Ethiopia to yet another
protracted civil war, nearly 30 years after it emerged from its
last. These tragic events have also dealt a deadly blow to what
would have been one of the most consequential democratic
transitions on the African continent, with significant
repercussions for enduring peace and stability in Africa.
Hostility between the leaders of the Tigray People's
Liberation Front, which ruled Tigray region for nearly three
decades, and the Federal Government in Addis Ababa had simmered
for 2-1/2 years prior to the dramatic escalation of tensions on
the night of November 3. This animosity contributed to
deepening rifts among communities and has caused profound
damage to the prospect of an inclusive and democratic pan-
Ethopia project that could have been an inspiration to millions
of across Africa.
With a communication blackout in the region since the start
of the fighting in November, and the entrenched practice by
both parties of using public communication tools to disseminate
highly politicized propaganda messages, efforts to
independently assess the situation have been difficult.
A series of missed opportunities in the last 2-1/2 years
led to the tragic derailment of a promising democratic
experiment. A half-hearted effort at implementing reforms by a
ruling party establishment reluctant to shed its deeply
authoritarian roots stands in the way of a genuine, inclusive
political process. This is consistent with the core feature of
the old EPRDF establishment, which has repeatedly failed to see
a middle ground on anything throughout its tenure. The latest
descending of political differences into an armed confrontation
is a consequence of this winner-take-all delusions held by
parts of the old EPRDF establishment, which have plagued
Ethiopia's democratic progress for decades.
I now offer a few recommendations on how to get out of this
political deadlock and return Ethiopia to a democratic
transition.
While Ethiopia's political problems have complex,
historical, and cultural roots, many of them can be addressed
by adopting a political culture that prioritizes dialog as a
means of managing different views. To support this endeavor and
efforts to bring Ethiopia back to the democratic transition,
the United States should take several steps.
One, the United States should urge Ethiopian Government and
all political actors to engage in broad-based and comprehensive
national dialog to address the core national issues and reach a
political settlement ahead of the 2021 national elections.
Significant resources have been spent on mainly State-led
dialog initiatives. None of them have succeeded, as they
followed the same ineffective model of organizing large
gatherings without clearly defined set of objectives and
agreed-upon rules of engagement.
For dialog initiatives to be effective and get political
process back to track, they should incorporate several steps.
One, dialog should be preceded by an audit of political actors,
conducted by independent groups, including civil society. And
the dialog should be inclusive and reject the idea of what many
call an elite pact, but should also be preceded by an audit of
the political groups.
There are 170 political parties in Ethiopia, but very few
have active membership. The audit would serve the purpose of
determining which ones have--which ones represent legitimate
views and have interest of communities at heart.
No. 2, dialog should be guided by rules agreed upon by all
parties. Among others, the rules should identify independent
facilitators and sanctions for noncompliance.
All parties must renounce the use of violence as a
political tool and agree to refrain from inciting supporters to
engage in illegal activity.
To foster the legitimacy and confidence in the dialog
process, individuals in prison because of their political views
should--and journalists and dissidents should be immediately
released.
Independent civil society, community, and thought leaders
should be represented at all levels of the dialog.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Badwaza follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Bass. Thank you. Thank you, thank you. Thank you very
much.
I would like to now move on to our next witness. Tsedale
Lemma, the journalist, if she would please speak.
And witnesses know that when it comes to the Q&A period,
you will have further opportunity to speak.
Ms. Tsedale.
STATEMENT OF TSEDALE LEMMA, EDITOR-IN-CHIEF, FOUNDER, ADDIS
STANDARD MAGAZINE
Ms. Lemma. Thank you, Chairwoman Bass, Ranking Member
Smith, and honorary members of the House subcommittee. I am
honored to be here to testify about the tragicpolitical
trajectory my beloved country Ethiopia is confronted with
today. The timing for this hearing could not have come at the
right moment, provided that the topic to be covered not only
deals with the conflict itself, but its complex root cause and
recommendations on how to address the crisis in order to help
prevent the security situation further deteriorating in
Ethiopia and the wider region on the Horn of Africa.
The source of the last 30 days' military conflict in Tigray
is fundamentally political, and as such, inseparable from the
cascade of other political crisis that rocked Ethiopia for the
last 2-1/2 years and which have contributed to their astounding
number of ethnic, religious, and political violence that
continued threatening the country, weakening the State, and
causing devastating suffering to Ethiopians across the country.
The conflict in Tigray, although alarming in the
immeasurable amount of the suffering it has caused to
civilians, especially Tigrayans, it should, therefore, be not
viewed in separate, an one-off event. In my view, the conflict
is a cumulative result of three major political failures.
The first one is the ill-timed and unceremonious collapse
of the then ruling party, the EPRDF, over which TPLF had a
monopoly.
The second is the ill-managed opening up of the political
space in Ethiopia, which lacked a comprehensive and inclusive
political dialog and political settlement aimed at charting out
an agreed-upon transition and roadmap.
And the third is the advent of COVID-19 pandemic, which
induced the postponement of the much anticipated elections in
Ethiopia and how the government handled the postponement of the
election. Instead of dealing with it with other political
parties and reaching a settlement--agreed-upon settlement, the
government has indefinitely postponed the election and caused
an agitation of the political space, which has resulted in
irreversible crisis that the country continued experiencing.
So these political failures were further compounded by
political assassinations, the last one of which, the
assassination of Hachalu Hundessa, being the most
consequential, that has stirred the political landscape from
that which failed to find the negotiated settlement to that
which saw the government as a jailer and its formidable
opponents as the jailed.
In light of this, I believe three things need to happen and
need to happen fast. The first one is Ethiopia needs a U.N.-
mandated team to investigate the war on Tigray, the
assassinations of senior officials and artist Hachalu Hundessa,
as well as the killings of countless civilians and the
displacement of millions since Prime Minister Abiy came to
office. He has blamed the TPLF for it, which would further
create more altercation in the ongoing war.
There are repeated recommendations, including one made by
Yoseph now, for independent and transparent investigations from
all corners around the world. But I do believe only a U.N.-
mandated team should be empowered and enabled to commence such
task. As a result of a deeply polarized society, no other
institution from Ethiopia's Human Rights Commission to Amnesty
International, to Human Rights Watch, earns the trust of
Ethiopia's polarized society to conduct such important tasks
the same way as a U.N.-mandated and a politically insulated
investigation team should.
In a global human rights update delivered at the 45th
session of the Human Rights Council on the 14th of September
2020, Michelle Bachelet, the U.N. Human Rights--High
Commissioner for Human Rights, said her office was ready to
support a thorough, independent, impartial, and transparent
investigation of the assassination of Hachalu Hundessa and
subsequent violence that really altered the political landscape
in Ethiopia. This offer has not been taken up yet, and I do
believe it is time we take Ms. Bachelet's offer and acted on
it.
What is at stake in post-Tigray's conflict is not the same
way what is at stake in post-Hachalu Hundessa's assassination
in Ethiopia, nor can the U.S. afford losing Ethiopia, one of
its staunch allies and a force of stability in the Horn and
beyond, and wishes to get away with it like it did with
Somalia.
Ethiopia's political crisis, which is haunting the
government of Prime Minister Abiy, needs to find its root
causes. A U.N.-mandated investigation team is the only place to
start looking for in order to hold to account those who have
wrecked havoc for the last 2-1/2 years and continue to find the
closure.
Ms. Bass. Thank you.
Ms. Lemma. Ethiopia must also commence an all-inclusive
political dialog as soon as possible----
Ms. Bass. Excuse me.
Ms. Lemma [continuing]. And that should be preceded by the
release of all political prisoners.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Lemma follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Bass. Excuse me. We are finished now. Excuse me. Let me
move on to the next witness, please.
Ms. Blanchard? Is Ms. Blanchard with us?
Ms. Blanchard. Can you see me?
Ms. Bass. No, but keep talking. I think the camera will
appear.
Ms. Blanchard. Okay. Sorry. I seem to be having a video
problem. Can you hear me, though?
Ms. Bass. We can hear you fine. You just go right ahead.
STATEMENT OF LAUREN PLOCH BLANCHARD, SPECIALIST IN AFRICAN
AFFAIRS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICES
Ms. Blanchard. Okay. Chairwoman Bass, Ranking Member Smith,
and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for
inviting CRS to testify today.
While the Government of Ethiopia announced an end to its
military operations last Saturday, the situation in Tigray
remains serious, with fighting ongoing and a potential for this
to become a protracted insurgency.
For context, Tigray has a population roughly equivalent to
that of Maryland, around 6 million people. The Federal
Government is now moving to install a provisional, regional
administration in areas under its control, but it remains to be
seen how they will be received. In my testimony today, I would
like to highlight a few key points on the situation for
congressional consideration and respectfully request that my
written testimony be submitted for the record.
First, the communications blackout and access restrictions
to Tigray have made it very difficult to confirm information on
the conflict and humanitarian situation there. This allows
misinformation to flourish amidst contested and very polarizing
narratives.
Second, the conflict was not unforeseen. Tensions between
Abiy's government and the TPLF had been simmering for months
with saber-rattling from both sides. Opportunities to avert
this conflict were missed, both by domestic and international
actors.
Third, the conflict is ongoing, and there are reports of
atrocities by militia associated with both sides.
Fourth, Tigray is not the only conflict zone in Ethiopia,
and a protracted conflict there could undermine the
government's ability to respond to unrest and threats to
civilians in other parts of the country.
And finally, the conflict has implications for U.S.
interests, not only in Ethiopia but the broader region.
First, on the information blackout, with phone and internet
connections to Tigray down and journalists prevented from
accessing most of the region, it is very difficult to know what
is happening there. The extent of internal displacement and
humanitarian need are still unclear. The press suggests that
thousands have been killed, but there are no reliable estimates
on the scale of the casualties.
Prime Minister Abiy says no civilians were killed in the
government's operations, but some refugees are telling a
different story. Human rights experts note that it is very
difficult to verify responsibility for reported atrocities.
Both sides have sought to shape the narrative on the conflict,
and there has been a serious rise of hate speech on social
media platforms.
Journalists, meanwhile, are facing threats and
intimidation. Ethiopian journalists are in a particularly
difficult position, but foreign correspondents are also under
pressure. Federal authorities have issued fact-check statements
to disseminate positions and contradict what they characterize
as misrepresentations in the international media. And 2 weeks
ago, the senior analyst on Ethiopia from the International
Crisis Group was expelled from the country ostensibly over a
work permit issue.
Second, despite the Federal Government declaring victory,
reports suggest that the fighting continues in parts of Tigray.
U.N. officials and aid agencies have stressed serious concerns
about the current humanitarian situation inside the region and
the need for urgent access, particularly to the Eritrean
refugee camps inside Tigray where over 96,000 Eritrean refugees
are located.
An agreement reached this week between the U.N. and the
Federal Government is an important development, but it isn't
yet clear how civilians in areas beyond Federal control will be
reached. Civilians have been caught in the middle of this
conflict.
Refugees who have fled to Sudan have reported the shelling
of towns and attacks on civilians by ethnically based militia.
Some refugees have arrived with wounds from knives and
machetes. The reports of ethnically targeted attacks underscore
simmering ethnic grievances in the country that have fueled
concerns for Ethiopia's stability in recent years.
U.N. officials have described ethnic violence in the
country as having reached an alarming level over the past 2
years. They have noted that the stigmatization of certain
ethnic groups, including the Tigrayans, Amhara, Somali, and
Oromo peoples, among others, have significantly contributed to
ethnic intolerance in the country. Human Rights Watch has noted
the proliferation of official and unofficial armed groups
operating with limited oversight and competing narratives of
historic injustices among the country's ethnic communities.
Communal disputes over border lands have played out across
Ethiopia. Some of the violence in Tigray reflects these
tensions over territorial disputes. The town of Mai Kadra,
where one of the worst known incidents of mass killings
occurred since the beginning of the conflict in Tigray, is one
of those contested areas. It has been administered as part of
Tigray since the EPRDF came to power, but many Amhara consider
it to be their traditional land.
The hostilities in Ethiopia threaten a range of U.S.
interests in the country and the broader region. The level of
humanitarian need in Ethiopia was already extremely high before
the conflict began, with almost 12 million people facing food
insecurity in a region that has been struggling with
overlapping natural disasters and the impacts of COVID-19.
The conflict poses risks not only for Ethiopia's democratic
transition but also potentially neighboring Sudan. The reported
role of Eritrea in the conflict further complicates the
situation.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Blanchard follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Bass. Thank you. Thank you. We will come back to you
during the questions. Thank you very much.
Our final witness is Susan Stigant.
STATEMENT OF SUSAN STIGANT, DIRECTOR OF AFRICA PROGRAM, UNITED
STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE
Ms. Stigant. Thank you, Chairwoman Bass, Ranking Member
Smith, and members of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify and for your
leadership on this issue. I am the director of the Africa
Programs at U.S. Institute of Peace, although the views
expressed here are my own.
Political transitions rarely move forward with consistent,
one-directional progress. It is normal that there will be
resistance to reforms. It is normal that there will be
fundamental debates about the nature and shape of the State,
and it is expected that the legacy of a system that was based
on exclusion and repression over decades requires sustained
generational efforts to forge a justice and genuine inclusion.
Amidst the escalating tensions that other witnesses have
discussed and failed efforts of dialog, it is deeply concerning
but unsurprising that Ethiopia's Federal Government and the
Tigrayan People's Liberation Front would view the exercise of
force as logical, effective, and even necessary in the short
term. However, all of our best thinking and practice and
knowledge underlines that violence does not work. This
knowledge has forged consensus about the imperative of
prevention in U.S. policies and assistance, and this approach
needs to be at the center of U.S. policy and partnerships with
Ethiopia. The reverberations resulting from the violence have
exacted intolerable costs--humanitarian, human, economic, food
security, and Ethiopia's own regional leadership. And these
have provoked core questions about the trajectory of the
transition and should provoke a fundamental reassessment of
U.S. policy.
In this spirit, I would like to focus my testimony on four
recommendations for the U.S. administration and the continued
leadership from this committee to end and prevent further
cycles of violence.
First, the U.S. administration and Congress need to
continue to send consistent private and public messages about
the imperative to deescalate violence, also to actively
discourage outside military engagement and pursue a political
solution. The U.S. can and needs to underscore the long-term
costs the conflict will have on Ethiopia's economy and
international image. The U.S. can signal and galvanize broader
coordinated support with global partners for the African
Union's leadership to silence and to keep silent the guns.
Second, the U.S. administration and Congress can actively
request and provide funding for an independent investigation.
Allegations of incidents that could amount to war crimes have
been reported by all parties. Investigation and documentation
are needed to deter further violations, mitigate the risks of
escalating rhetoric, and provide a path toward justice and
accountability.
Preliminary reporting by Amnesty International and the
Ethiopian Human Rights Commission needs to be bolstered by
investigations in other areas where fighting has occurred and
with those who have fled the country. Amidst the deep
polarization, the competing narratives and potentially complex
jurisdictional issues, the U.N. High Commission for Human
Rights and other U.N. mechanisms are needed to bolster the
existing efforts.
Third, the U.S. Government can safeguard space for
inclusive conversations about the transition. In public and
private messaging, the U.S. needs to strengthen its messages in
support for freedom of expression, space for independent
journalism, and they need to expand conversations to those who
have diverging views. Existing assistance programs in support
of the transition and democratic development can be activated
to support conversations about what inclusion means and ways
that confidence can be built toward dialog. Structures and
mechanisms for inclusive conversations are needed to safeguard
the broader democratic transition and to prevent backsliding.
Conducting credible elections will eventually depend on
fostering security, trust, and reconciliation. Ethiopians will
need to feel confident that engaging in political debate and
campaigning is possible. And eventually agreeing on changes to
the Federal structure will require sensitive discussions and
negotiations. Setting a precedent that such changes will be
done through dialog, and not imposed, will be critical.
Finally, the U.S. can and needs to engage Ethiopia in the
context of a new political and diplomatic strategy for the Red
Sea arena that puts inclusive, legitimate governance at the
center. A recent bipartisan senior study group convened by USIP
determined that in recent years, the geopolitical and
geoeconomic dynamics of the Horn are increasingly tied to the
Middle East, and yet the U.S. policy has not kept pace with
these changes.
To overcome the bureaucratic seams, there is a need to
designate a special envoy with responsibility, or the deputy
secretary to bridge between the Horn of Africa and the Middle
East. There is a need to realign U.S. assistance to promote
inclusive legitimate governance and economic growth, possibly
by designating the Horn of Africa as a priority region under
the Global Fragility Act.
And there is a need for sustained, active congressional
engagement to strengthen the coordination between congressional
bodies on a transregional and interdisciplinary basis and to
encourage bipartisan congressional champions to provide
particular support to the transitions in the Horn.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Stigant follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Bass. Thank you very much.
Let me take this opportunity to thank all of our witnesses
for taking time to be with us today and also as we navigate
this COVID virtual environment. We are used to having hearings
in person, and so this is a bit challenging.
I now want to go to questions. I will recognize each member
for 5 minutes. I will start with myself, then go to ranking
member, and we will go back and forth, Democrat, Republican.
I would like to ask one, our witness that just finished
testifying. You were talking about the relationship of the Horn
and the Middle East, and I wanted to know if you could expand
on that a little more, referencing specific countries and what
aspects of the relationship were you referring to?
After that, I would like to ask Mr. Badwaza if he would
talk about what are some of the minimum preconditions that have
to be met for a genuine national dialog that could lead to an
effective political settlement. I would also like to ask Mr.
Badwaza if he would comment about the U.S. response so far,
which has been to suspend aid. And oftentimes, that--well, not
oftentimes, but with this administration suspending aid might
be a tactic that is used, but I am just not sure whether that
helps move the country toward peace.
So would you please begin? Ms. Stigant?
Ms. Stigant. Thank you for that question. I think if we
look at the recent transition that took place in Sudan, it has
to point to a way where it is critical to involve Gulf
countries. If we look back to the Ethiopia-Eritrea peace
agreement and the role that the United Arab Emirates and Saudi
Arabia played in helping to convene and move forward that peace
agreement, I think it points to the ways that the Gulf
countries have a vested and strong interest going forward.
There have been some reports and rumors that there might be
some level of involvement of the UAE, given its close
relationship with Eritrea. I think that, along with the
investigations that have been raised, probably needs some
further understanding and information and documentation.
I think there is also an opportunity, not just in terms of
potentially dangerous actions, but the ability of key partners
to Ethiopia, including the Emiratis, to deliver similar
messages to what the United States is delivering, that violence
is not a sustainable path forward, that the stability and the
integrity of the country is critical, and to use some of their
diplomatic and financial and technical partnerships to drive in
the same direction forward.
So I think this is--there is an increasing thought that
ensuring that we think about the interconnectedness of the
economic, political, and security aspects is important.
The other piece that I mention is that there have been
efforts, and one of the priorities for the Federal Government
of Ethiopia has been to forge a stronger relationship with
Eritrea and Somalia. And if we look at the Red Sea coastline
and the strategic positioning of the coastline, this will
impact on the overall power dynamics and where the country goes
going forward.
Ms. Bass. Thank you very much.
Mr. Badwaza.
Mr. Badwaza. Thank you, Chair Bass, for those questions. I
think as I was reading earlier, in terms of for an effective
dialog to take place and to move sort of the needle from the
political stalemate that Ethiopia has found itself in, frankly,
descended into an armed conflict, there should be a reset of
how we understand the entire concept of dialog in a political
context in Ethiopia.
Oftentimes, it is taken to mean having large gatherings
with everyone that has a claim to be a political organization
without even necessarily having their status updated or their
membership testifying to them. So I think we should be able to
clear that with a prior audit, so that we can identify which
ones are the legitimate representatives of communities and have
something to contribute to the political process.
I think it should also be based on rules agreed to by all
parties, and there should be consequences for those who are not
complying with these agreed-upon rules. And it should not be
facilitated by one of the parties, one of the contending
parties. There should be an agreed-upon independent facilitator
of this dialog----
Ms. Bass. Excuse me. Let me ask you, when you say
``independent,'' independent in what way? Outside of the
country, international, or how can it be internal?
Mr. Badwaza. Not necessarily. There have been a number of
institutions in Ethiopia that have reasonably wide respect and
acceptance among the population. This could be from religious
groups, interreligious groups. This could be from thought
leaders in the academia where a reasonable agreement by all
parties could be reached. Or if that is necessary and for, I
think, mainly professional reasons and providing technical
support, there should also be a room for international
facilitators.
So it should be--it is a perception from the beginning,
parties going into with this path, that this is going to be
dominated by a certain group of actors that dooms a lot of
these efforts at dialog so far. So there should be confidence
on the facilitators, there should be confidence that there is
consequences, and there should be rules that guide that.
And I think dialog in a type of environment that is the way
the political space is gradually shrinking is not going to give
us the results that we aspire. There should be some gesture of
releasing all people that are in prison because of the
political views that they were--they have espoused. This
include journalists, political leaders, and other dissidents.
So there should be a broader approach and a systematic
approach to what we have done, dialog in Ethiopia so far for it
to be effective.
Ms. Bass. Thank you. Thank you, thank you.
Let me now turn to Ranking Member Smith for his questions.
After all of the members have asked questions for 5 minutes, we
will do another round if members would like that.
Mr. Smith. Thanks very much, Madam Chair.
Ms. Blanchard, in your testimony, you point out that the
TPLF denies initiating the conflict on November 4, accusing
Abiy of starting the war to consolidate his personal power.
Could you--and I have a number of questions, and I want to stay
within the time limit. Is there any doubt that the TPLF was
involved with going after munitions and going after the
military in Tigray, No. 1?
Second, you also point out, you know, as maybe a precursor
of some of this, that the Federal Government's decision in
October to reshuffle the leadership of the military's Northern
Command exacerbated the tensions. You might want to speak to
that in connection with that first question.
In terms of dialog--and you have all made very good, good,
passionate pleas for meaningful dialog and hopefully under some
auspices, maybe the U.N. Is the best. But there are three
envoys, including Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, who have been deployed
to try to find a way of getting all parties to speak. Would the
African Union be, you know, the right institution to initiate
this? What are those three envoys doing, you know, in order to
encourage national dialog and to deconflict this problem?
The safety of humanitarian workers, we know that reports
were there were about four people who were killed in refugee
settings. They were helping Eritreans, but they were killed. We
do not know the details. I have looked for them online and
elsewhere, do not know it, maybe you know it. But what about
the safety of humanitarian workers? You know, we know in so
many conflict areas they get targeted, and unfortunately they
often get killed, and that is a very, very serious protection
that needs to be in place.
With regards to the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation of 2009,
both Karen Bass and I noted that in H. Res. 128, as being, you
know, an instrument that was so expansive, particularly as it
relates to groups like Jerwaz (ph), and we know now that there
is a new antiterrorism law of 2009. It seems to have some wide
open language about punishing those who incite terrorism. I am
not sure what the definition is, but, again, laws need to be
well defined or else they could be easily breached and bad
things can happen. I have got a lot of other questions, but
that would be my time, please try to answer those.
Ms. Blanchard. Thank you, Mr. Smith. You have asked me a
complicated question. The government's narrative--the Federal
Government's narrative is that the TPLF attacked facility's
Northern Command and killed soldiers and seized weapons. The
TPLF debates that narrative, and it is very difficult to, you
know, ascertain who is right and wrong on this. What we do know
is that there was a lot of saber-rattling, and there were
tensions that built up to this.
And I want to go back to the postponement of elections and
the decision by the Tigray Government to go ahead and have
their own elections. And basically what that resulted in was
both sides declaring the other illegitimate, the government in
Tigray saying that the government in Addis, the Federal
Government, did not have the constitutional mandate to extend
its own term and needed to have elections before its term
expired in October. And then by the same token, the Federal
Government declaring that the elections that Tigray went ahead
and held for regional positions were illegitimate.
And so after that, when the Federal Government tried to
change out some of the leadership of the Northern Command,
which by most accounts is sort of one of the most heavily armed
commands in the country, as a legacy of the long border war and
standoff with Eritrea, TPLF sort of considered that to be a
threat.
There were reports by the TPLF before the conflict started
on November 4 of troop movements toward the border with Tigray.
And so by some accounts, the TPLF felt that it was going to be
attacked and moved to respond in self-defense. So the narrative
has competed, and CRS certainly isn't in a position to verify
which is the correct story.
You know, the unfortunate aftermath is that you have a
split within the military and the security forces in Tigray and
elsewhere. There are reports that there has been some isolated
fighting among forces, Ethiopian military forces, including in
Somalia, that--one of the things I was going to mention, I ran
out of time--Ethiopia's reported to have pulled back at least
3,000, if not more, of their forces from Somalia where they are
fighting Al Shabaab and supporting regional stabilization
operations. And there are reports of tensions within the
forces. So that is, you know, I think something else of U.S.
concern.
On the issue of the envoys, President Ramaphosa of South
Africa, who is the current chairman, appointed these three
former leaders to serve as envoys. The Federal Government in
Addis has resisted the idea of mediation, of a negotiation with
the TPLF. But those envoys did visit and held meetings in Addis
Ababa. I do not think they were able to meet with the TPLF, and
I do not know what the status of their engagement is. And there
are a lot of, I think
[inaudible] Out there on how to move forward on a
discussion that deescalates the conflict from here.
Ms. Bass. Thank you very much.
Let me move now to Susan Wild.
Ms. Wild. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate it. Thank
you for conducting this hearing.
My first question is to Mr. Badwaza. Last year, on November
28, the Ethiopian Prime Minister declared victory over the
Tigray People's Liberation Front and the end of the military
operation in the Tigray region. Since then, however, reports of
ongoing violence and unrest have continued. What, in your
estimation, is the actual current state of the conflict with
the People's Liberation Front? That is my first question, and
then I have two subquestions to that.
Mr. Badwaza.
Mr. Badwaza. Thank you for the question. As you mentioned,
once the Federal Government declared the cessation of military
operations on Saturday, there have been rocket launches to
Eritrea. So that is, I think, an indication of the fact that
there is still a TPLF force with a capability to engage some
sort of military engagement.
On top of that, there have been daily reports from outlets
that are affiliated with the TPLF talking about downing fighter
jets and taking prisoners of war that belong to the Eritrean
Army. So if the TPLF leadership explained that there is
reasonable assessment, then there is reason to believe that at
least some of their forces are fighting in some form or
another.
So again I would reiterate that it is still difficult to
come up with any independent confirmation of what is going on
in the region, but I am of the opinion that fighting has--I am
of the opinion that the fighting has not yet completely
stopped.
Ms. Wild. Do you have any thoughts on intermediate steps
that could or should be taken by the United States to avert
even greater loss of human life, a major humanitarian crisis
and a major refugee crisis in the region?
Mr. Badwaza. I think that there are opportunities and some
gestures by the Federal Government that are being taken, one of
them being the agreement that they reached where they are going
to supply humanitarian assistance.
And I think that should be complemented by reiterating the
call for--since the government has already declared that armed
hostilities have stopped, the next step should be the start of
how to engage in peacemaking. So I think these are
opportunities for the United States to call for the
continuation of dialog and engagement, particularly giving a
chance to the initiative by the African Union, which the
current chair, President Ramaphosa, has started.
Ms. Wild. And do you have any thoughts on a longer-range--
or what the United States should do on a longer-range basis to
encourage a political resolution to this conflict?
Mr. Badwaza. I think one of it starts with getting the
messaging right. I think there should be a consistent,
coherent, balanced, and principled messaging from the United
States concerning all actors in Ethiopia.
So, for example, the perception that Ethiopians have toward
the United States' stand with regard to the Nile--the Great
Renaissance Dam negotiations has to be rectified, in terms of
enhancing the U.S.'s standing among the Ethiopian populations,
without any efforts that the U.S. Government would be a part
of, could be accepted by the Ethiopian population and have the
desired effect.
So apart from getting a consistent messaging all across the
branches of the U.S. Government, there needs to be a very
thoughtful and deliberate approach to reaching the communities
from both sides but the Ethiopian population in general
directly. Because that is one of the challenges we are looking
at, in terms of all parties taking a piece of that messaging
and trying to use to further their stance.
So there should be a way of reaching the messaging to the
Ethiopian population as well as Ethiopia's other development
partners, including the African Union.
Ms. Bass. Thank you.
Let me now move to Representative Phillips.
Mr. Phillips. Thank you, Madam Chair.
And greetings to today's witnesses.
And a special welcome to my friends among the Ethiopian
diaspora in my home State of Minnesota, who are surely watching
today's hearing with both great interest and equally grave
concerns.
And I want to reiterate the sentiments of Chairwoman Bass,
of Chairman Engel, and Ranking Member McCaul, in that Ethiopia
is a key ally of the United States of America, and we must
continue our important work of preserving the democratic gains,
the spurring of economic growth, and advancing peace and
security for all.
With that said, I remain extremely concerned, gravely
concerned, by the fighting in Tigray and the risk of
internationalization of the conflict and the humanitarian
impacts of the conflict as well.
I want to focus on human rights for my first question.
U.N. officials are saying that ethnic violence has reached,
quote, ``an alarming level over the past 2 years'' and note
that the stigmatization of certain ethnic groups, including the
Tigray, Amhara, Somali, and Oromo, among others, has
significantly contributed to ethnic intolerance throughout the
country. Recently, Amnesty International as well as other NGO's
have reported a major uptick in ethnic and religious violence
during the conflict, of which we are all aware.
So my first question is a very fundamental one. What should
and can Ethiopia be doing to better protect civilians from
ethnic and religious-based violence?
Perhaps we can start with you, Mr. Badwaza.
Ms. Bass. Actually, before you respond, Representative
Phillips, I think your screen is blocked, or we are not sure
what is happening with your screen.
Go ahead, Mr. Badwaza.
Mr. Phillips. Is that on now?
Ms. Bass. No. But you can--do not worry about it if you
cannot get it on.
Mr. Phillips. Okay.
Ms. Bass. Okay.
Mr. Badwaza. Thank you for those questions.
I think the escalation of the ethnic violence,
intercommunal violence, in Ethiopia can be attributed in part
to how wrongly the transition that started in 2018 has been
managed so far.
One of the outcomes of this transition and the
liberalization of the political space over the past 2-1/2 years
in Ethiopia is the emboldenment of these local and regional
actors and some with ethno-nationalist sentiments to use even
government resources to organize and train ethnic-based
militias and special forces and using those to settle political
and territorial scores.
There have not been any constitutional foundations to some
of these armed groups that every State in Ethiopia now seems to
have, the militias. And then those, even by the government's
own admission, are being actively used to fuel and carry out
some of these very violent intercommunal clashes.
So I think, for a resolution to be found in that regard and
to return the political transition back to track, there should
be, I think, a serious measure that the Federal Government
should be taking, either to regulate these armed militia and
special forces that every region seems to have and also put a
political and legal framework that regulates political
organization in Ethiopia--that is, in terms of regulating using
ethnic and religious affiliation as a political organizing
form.
So, with these measures and getting the legal and political
framework and the regulatory framework right, I think there
could be some relief, at least when it comes to the various
atrocities that the country has witnessed over the past 2-1/2
years.
Mr. Phillips. Okay. Thank you, sir.
I am so sorry about my video. I apologize for that.
I would like to ask--if I can continue questioning, Madam
Chair, I would like to ask a question about the elections, of
course.
As you all know, Ethiopia's election board announced in
March 2020 that national and regional elections scheduled for
August would be postponed because of the COVID-19 pandemic.
The Tigray regional government, led by the TPLF, of course,
went ahead with its regional council elections in September
despite the Federal Government warning that the vote, of
course, would be illegal. The only exacerbated tensions between
the Abiy government and the TPLF, of course, has since led to
the conflict.
Ms. Stigant, if you could please answer, what can the U.S.
do to support the coronavirus precautions while also ensuring
that Ethiopia is able to safely hold free and fair elections
next year?
Ms. Stigant. Thank you for your question.
You know, part of the reason that the national election
board postponed the elections was that, in March, they made a
determination that they wouldn't have been able to put in place
the necessary technical pieces in the roadmap. And so I think
an important foundation point is to have a clear calendar that
is regularly updated.
My understanding is that there are ongoing and existing
programming to support this aspect of Ethiopia's democratic
transition. I think it is important to protect those programs
despite some of the restrictions and holds that were put on
assistance in relation to the policies in the talks on the dam
and the GERD.
But elections aren't just technical exercises, as you well
know; they are fundamentally political exercises. And they are
moments where, rather than a country most likely coming
together, they can be deeply polarizing. And so I think as
important as the technical preparations are ensuring, going
back to your first question, that there is a space in the
country for civic actors, for people who have different plural
voices to be speaking freely their minds, that there is space
for journalists to be covering, that there is space for
political debate about fundamental questions about where the
country heads. And the U.S. can support that through its
programming; it can support it through its ongoing messaging.
And I think it is very important that there isn't a rush
toward elections, that really finding an environment that is
ripe is critical to avoid the potential to catalyze additional
violence leading into that political milestone.
Mr. Phillips. All right. Thank you.
Thank you.
Ms. Bass. And thank you, Representative Phillips. I
certainly remember the visit to your district and the very
brief meeting we had with diaspora in your area, and I am sure
your questions reflect their concerns as well.
I did want to continue, though, with Ms. Stigant for
another minute, especially talking about elections and wanting
to know what you think the U.S. might be able to do in terms of
supporting Ethiopia getting to the point where they can have
the national elections.
Ms. Stigant. Thank you for that question.
I think if we look to the experiences in other countries
coming out of transition, creating space for the inter-
political dialog that needs to take place is a priority. And so
my understanding is that there are existing programs through
democracy assistance that are working to support political
parties, that are working to support civic groups. I think that
is going to need additional attention.
We often approach elections and peace-building as separated
cones. And I think there is a particular need, coming out of
this violence and what we see as the closing space, to
interconnect these together more effectively. There will be, I
think, a tendency for political leaders to mobilize their base.
And finding ways to ensure that that remains nonviolent, if
people are coming to the streets, will be absolutely critical
going into the electoral period.
Ms. Bass. And it is an area where we have had a lot of cuts
in terms of democracy and governance. Those two categories have
had significant budget cuts.
And so, I think, looking at a new administration coming in,
I wanted to ask Mr. Badwaza and also Ms. Blanchard, what advice
do you have for the new administration? And then can you
specifically comment on the impact that cutting foreign
assistance has already had?
So I would ask both Mr. Badwaza and Ms. Blanchard to
respond to that, and then I will go to Mr. Smith for any
concluding questions that he has.
Mr. Badwaza.
Mr. Badwaza. Thank you, Chair Bass, again.
I think, again, there is a lot of support by way of
humanitarian assistance that goes to Ethiopia from the United
States. And, over the years, the core principle that used to
guide the relationship has been this cooperation over
counterterrorism efforts in the region. That has, in the years
past, I think, clouded some of the real human rights and
political concerns that the Ethiopian population was having.
And the messaging, again, from the United States was not
really to the satisfaction of a large majority of the Ethiopian
population. As it has been mentioned earlier, there have been
resolutions that needed to come out of the U.S. House of
Representatives to highlight those concerns and to, sort of,
chart a direction to a more democratic political process in
Ethiopia.
So I would say the incoming new administration should be
proactive in engaging voices outside of the government. I
understand government-to-government relations should continue,
but, in terms of getting a wider perspective of the
developments and the core national issues on Ethiopia, I think
there should be a focus on institution-building.
For example, there have been really encouraging work that
is being done, the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission over the
past few months, in terms of investigating the human rights
abuses all over the country and also trying to hold officials
to account to their deeds.
So I think the United States should focus on encouraging
institutions like this one and building independent media,
which could force the culture of inclusive dialog and
independent analysis of events, instead of the one we are
seeing, based mainly on hateful practices, hate speech, and
dangerous speech that is being particularly, in many cases,
produced by members of the diaspora and being imported to the
conversation in the domestic political sphere.
I think there are measures that need to be taken in terms
of trying to tame the impact of these harmful interventions
from actors both inside and outside of Ethiopia. And the U.S.
Government can support independent groups, independent
institutions, including the media, to try and counter those
harmful narratives and force the culture of inclusive political
dialog.
Ms. Bass. Thank you.
Ms. Blanchard, if you could quickly respond, because I have
actually run out of time.
Ms. Blanchard. Sure. Absolutely.
You asked about the U.S. assistance and how it has changed.
And, of course, democracy and governance funding and
programming in Ethiopia prior to the transition when Abiy came
into office was limited, in large part because of the
restricted political space in the country. It has since
expanded, particularly with the aim of supporting democratic
elections.
But that assistance has been impacted by the suspension
related to the GERD negotiations. As you know, in August, the
administration suspended roughly $260 million in assistance to
Ethiopia. Of that total $260 million, at least $30 million has
been redirected elsewhere. It was expiring. And of what
remains, by my tally, over $20 million in governance and
democracy and human-rights-related funding is affected.
Now, how much of an effect is a little bit difficult to
tell, because a lot of that programming was also somewhat
slowed by the COVID pandemic and partners' ability to program
in the midst of that. And, of course, the election delay also
had some impact. But I think there are concerns that the
suspension of assistance may have an impact on U.S. and
partners' ability to respond to the conflict.
With the prospect of elections coming up, there is so much
work to do, if they are to be held--voter registration
exercises and otherwise.
And, of course, you know, these outstanding questions about
whether or not the conflict continues, that will impact the
ability to hold elections in Tigray but potentially in other
parts of the country. This was part of what had delayed the
election processes, including a planned census, was the large
amount of displacement from conflict in the years preceding.
Ms. Bass. Thank you.
Mr. Smith, would you like to close us out with a round of 5
minutes?
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
A couple of questions on the antiterrorism law of 2019.
Does it comport with human rights norms? Did it truly replace
the proclamation of 2009, which we were very, very critical of?
The safety of humanitarian personnel, we did not have time
to get an answer to that. Do you feel there will be enough
assurances there?
Mr. Badwaza, you had talked in your testimony about an
audit of political actors, and I am not sure what you meant. Is
that for accountability, or is that to include them in a
dialog? Maybe you could just amplify or give some clarity as to
what that audit would look like.
And, Ms. Tsedale Lemma, in your November 11 op-ed in The
New York Times, you claimed that much of the blame for the
Tigray conflict lies with Prime Minister Abiy. One of the
pieces of evidence that you cite is that the Prime Minister
dismantled the old political order and marginalized the TPLF
through the creation of the Prosperity Party last year, which
the TPLF did not want to join.
However, you did point out in the op-ed that, following
massive protests by the Oromo and Amhara communities, which
together make up nearly two-thirds of the population, you know,
you point out that these protests were against the TPLF's
dominance of the government, the TPLF coalition and their
authoritarian rule.
So I am just--you know, when you have a true majority,
shouldn't there be some restructuring of the old political
order which had dominated Ethiopia for so long?
And, again, the massive human rights abuses over the years
being committed by previous governments--and Don Payne, who was
my ranking, and I was his ranking when he was chair--we went
back and forth, like Karen and I have gone back and forth over
the years--he, too, was very critical, you know, in terms of
the massive human rights abuses. So maybe you could speak to
that.
And the role of faith-based. Are the faith-based leaders,
whether they be the Islamic community or from the Christian
community, are they playing a positive role?
Ms. Blanchard.
Ms. Blanchard. Sorry. I did not know if you had directed
that at me.
Let me start with your last question. The faith-based
community in Ethiopia has been trying to engage to stop the
fighting. The Inter-Religious Council has called for an
immediate end to the fighting and called for dialog and echoed
some of the sentiments that have been expressed by the AU
leadership and others in the international community.
To your other questions, you know, I would defer to Yoseph
and Tsedale on their thoughts on the revisions to the
restrictive legislation. But, as you note, there was a major
political opening in 2018 and 2019, and that cannot be
discounted. You know, thousands of political prisoners
released; opposition leaders and groups that had been in exile
and accused of treason able to come back into the country; sort
of a flourishing of press freedom.
But, by the same token, I think in the last year and a half
or so there has been some sign of a tightening space. And that,
I think, reflects some of the government's struggles in trying
to figure out how to manage this simmering ethnic conflict,
communal conflicts that are happening around the country.
The unrest that broke out in July, in which, you know,
hundreds of people were killed, I think the government
struggled with how to deal with that. But the 3-week shutdown
of the internet meant that, you know, I think, ability for
other voices to stem the violence and stem the disinformation
that was spreading was very limited. And that was very
difficult. And we are seeing the same with the situation in
Tigray now.
Mr. Smith. Mr. Badwaza and Tsedale, if you could respond.
Mr. Badwaza. Thank you, Ranking Member Smith. I will take
the antiterrorism proclamation question.
I think, overall, it is a major departure from the 2009
really draconian law. I say this for a couple of reasons.
One, the level of effort that the drafting committee made
to include different perspectives, including civil society,
media professionals, and regional actors, was, I think, one of
the very encouraging features that distinguishes the new
antiterrorism proclamation from the 2009 one.
And in terms of content, second. I think the changes it
made to the acts that were considered a terrorist deedd and
also the evidentiary provisions that it introduced by rejecting
some of the very controversial aspects of the older law, I
would say this is a much better piece of legislation as
compared to the 2009 one.
The audit I mentioned of political groups is related to, I
think, making the dialog interventions effective. What I am
saying is that there are hundreds of political parties that
have registration certificates from the National Electoral
Board of Ethiopia, and I think an actual audit would reveal
that, once the registration criteria have been met by many of
these political groupings, it is very questionable whether a
lot of them have a functioning constituency that they
represent.
Yet many of these groups get to a gathering that is named a
dialog, and you see a venue full of people that are talking
about different priorities of their own, sometimes individuals,
sometimes a small group, mixed with political groups that have
a genuine political agenda, economic plans, and socio-cultural
policies to actually transform the lives of people for the
better.
So my suggestion is to try and sift which ones are really
working for the good of the population and which ones are just
representing their own interests or they want to be staying in
the political scene without necessarily having a viable policy
framework to offer to the Ethiopian people. So that is what I
meant by an audit should be conducted.
Ms. Bass. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Badwaza.
Ms. Lemma.
Mr. Smith. Yes.
Ms. Lemma. Thank you.
Thank you, Ranking Member Smith. You have asked a very
legitimate question. And we all know what led to Prime Minister
Abiy Ahmed's ascent to office, is that there was a very,
almost--after the 2015 election, the first thing that happened
was a rejection of the result of that election, in which the
EPRDF won more than 99 percent of the seats.
So there was that very legitimate rejection. It has lost
its legitimacy. It has grown into a collection of some, you
know, crony members of the elite, the top elite. So they deeper
and deeper detest it, EPRDF. And, as such, there was a
legitimate need to dismantle it.
It is not the question of dismantling it. It is the
question of how it was dismantled that created no avenue for
these parties to come and have a dialog to sort their
differences. Because the EPRDF was the last, so to say,
umbilical cord that kept these parties together. For all their
differences, it somehow provided them the space to come and
talk if they could manage to settle their differences there.
With that dismantlement, the question became not only not
having the space to discuss but also a question of power.
Because when you dismantle it, you pushed away the people who
held it together and who monopolized it.
This is one point. The second one is, for 27 years, the
country did not have any other political order except for the
EPRDF. So, when you dismantle that, you are unleashing a
political force without having an alternative that could absorb
the shock that would come as a result of dismantling. So, as I
say, it was like hitting it with a blunt force. You know, it
needed an unraveling that was carefully--that should have been
carefully done.
And that is why I am holding the Prime Minister responsible
for dismantling it unceremoniously and for creating that power
vacuum in which disgruntled members of the EPRDF could come
back and, you know, demand a seat in the table. Because then it
is not only the lack of the avenue for discussion but also the
power question, and that is what is leading the multiple crises
in the country.
It also led to have no political viable force in the
Southern Nations and Nationalities when the regional State was
undergoing through an increasing number of questions for self-
administration. The dismantlement of the SEPDM in the Southern
Nations has led to the vacuum of a mediating force between
these rising questions for self-administration and the central
government.
Ms. Bass. Thank you.
Ms. Lemma. So these self-administration questions have led
to multiple violences that we have seen in the last 2-1/2
years.
Thank you.
Ms. Bass. Thank you.
Representative Phillips, you are recognized.
Mr. Phillips. We will try this again. Thank you. Sorry for
my AV problems. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Lemma, I would like to continue with you relative to
the free press.
The Ethiopian Federal Government, of course, has cut phone
service and internet communications with the Tigray region and
restricted journalists' access, making it awfully difficult for
the outside world to verify any information that we are
hearing.
Of course, we are all seeing continued reports of detention
of political opponents. And it is deeply troublesome.
So, please, very specifically, you know, what can the
United States do to ensure access of the press and due process
in Ethiopia during these trying times?
Ms. Bass. And, Ms. Lemma, I am going to ask--because we
actually are over time for the hearing. So, if you could
respond quickly, and then we will wrap up the hearing.
Ms. Lemma. Thank you very much.
It is not too late for the government to allow independent
journalists to travel to the area. However, to find out what
exactly happened in the last 1 month, it would be even too
overwhelming for even powerful media, independent media, to
establish. And without establishing what exactly happened in
the last 1 month, it would be very difficult to solve the
problem.
Going forward, it remains very crucial that communication
is restored and that Tigrayans that are living outside of the
region have the right to find out what exactly happened to
their family, not only for journalists--access to journalists,
but they have the right to find out whether their families are
dead or alive.
So the restoration of communication as soon as possible is
immediate. And the United States can do that by having a
conversation with the Federal Government, opening up all
communication, allowing journalists to travel to the area,
those who can travel to the area to travel to the area, and
continue filing the reports from the ground and talking to
other people. This remains very crucial, and it cannot wait a
day.
Mr. Phillips. I couldn't agree more. And I am grateful to
you. And thank you for your time today.
Madam Chair, I yield back.
Ms. Bass. Absolutely.
Well, let me thank the ranking member, Mr. Smith, and the
other members who attended and especially all of our witnesses.
Thank you so much. We know this is such a crucial time in
Ethiopia and in the entire region in East Africa.
And, in about 50 or so days, we will have a new
administration coming in--which I think it is going to take
some time for the new administration to get settled and
functional and for all of the top officials to be confirmed.
But I think that we need to look forward to see, what can the
U.S. do, what kind of assistance can we provide.
Clearly, we need to make sure that the accounts for
governance and democracy are well-funded and so that we can
participate in whatever way possible in helping to bring peace
to Ethiopia.
Thank you very much.
And I call the meeting adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:44 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE MAZANEC
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[all]