[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 116-76]
NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES AND
U.S. MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE
GREATER MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 10, 2020
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
43-478 WASHINGTON : 2021
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Sixteenth Congress
ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY,
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island Texas
RICK LARSEN, Washington JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JIM COOPER, Tennessee ROB BISHOP, Utah
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JOHN GARAMENDI, California MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
JACKIE SPEIER, California K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia
RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California MO BROOKS, Alabama
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland, Vice PAUL COOK, California
Chair BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama
RO KHANNA, California SAM GRAVES, Missouri
WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
FILEMON VELA, Texas SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
ANDY KIM, New Jersey RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana
KENDRA S. HORN, Oklahoma TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
GILBERT RAY CISNEROS, Jr., MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
California MATT GAETZ, Florida
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania DON BACON, Nebraska
JASON CROW, Colorado JIM BANKS, Indiana
XOCHITL TORRES SMALL, New Mexico LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan PAUL MITCHELL, Michigan
MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
DEBRA A. HAALAND, New Mexico
JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine
LORI TRAHAN, Massachusetts
ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia
ANTHONY BRINDISI, New York
Paul Arcangeli, Staff Director
Jonathan Lord, Professional Staff Member
Mark Morehouse, Professional Staff Member
Natalie de Benedetti, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1
Thornberry, Hon. William M. ``Mac,'' a Representative from Texas,
Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services.................... 2
WITNESSES
McKenzie, Gen Kenneth F., Jr., USMC, Commander, U.S. Central
Command........................................................ 4
Townsend, GEN Stephen J., USA, Commander, U.S. Africa Command.... 6
Wheelbarger, Kathryn, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs, Department of Defense.......... 3
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
McKenzie, Gen Kenneth F., Jr................................. 62
Townsend, GEN Stephen J...................................... 79
Wheelbarger, Kathryn......................................... 47
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Gallagher................................................ 101
Mr. Gallego.................................................. 102
Ms. Houlahan................................................. 101
Mr. Rogers................................................... 102
Ms. Torres Small............................................. 101
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Gallego.................................................. 108
Mr. Golden................................................... 111
Ms. Houlahan................................................. 110
Mr. Kim...................................................... 110
Mr. Lamborn.................................................. 105
Mr. Scott.................................................... 106
Mr. Vela..................................................... 109
NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES AND
U.S. MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE GREATER
MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 10, 2020.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith (chairman
of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. Good morning. We will call the meeting to
order.
This morning we are hearing about national security
challenges and U.S. military activities in the greater Middle
East and Africa as part of our ongoing posture hearings as we
prepare for the fiscal year 2021 budget. This is basically the
presentation of the President's budget for these regions.
And we have witnesses this morning. Ms. Kathryn
Wheelbarger, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs. I think this is the first time
we have seen you since the job change, so congratulations and
welcome back. General Kenneth McKenzie, who is the Commander of
the U.S. Central Command [CENTCOM]; and General Stephen
Townsend, who is the Commander of the U.S. Africa Command
[AFRICOM].
Welcome, all of you. Look forward to hearing from your
testimony about the very important regions that you are
responsible for.
And I think the big challenge as we are going through this
posture hearing is the sheer number of challenges. And, you
know, AFRICOM sort of got a lot of attention here recently
because, as we focused on the pivot to Asia, the focus on great
power competition, there was the notion that, well, what can we
sort of not do anymore, and Africa popped up, mainly because I
guess you are first in the alphabet for the blank slate review
there. I don't think they did it that way, but you came up
first anyway.
But it did prompt a very interesting discussion about how
the world is interconnected. And having just returned from a
CODEL [congressional delegation] to Africa a few weeks ago, the
great power competition is alive and well on the continent of
Africa. So when we are looking at how we meet the national
security challenges we have, we have to look at them in a
broad, broad geographical way. Russia and China are certainly
very active in Africa, as we are as well, so how do we meet our
interests there? And I know there has been a lot of interest in
that subject, and we will look forward to those comments from
the members who ask questions about that.
Obviously, Central Command has been the central focus for
going on 20 years now. Between Afghanistan and Iraq and various
activities in the Middle East, it continues to be a challenge.
And while we are focused on great power competition, that great
power competition, of course, is present in the Central Command
as well, but we also have to continue to be worried about the
threat from violent extremist organizations. And, you know, the
lesson learned right back to 9/11 started in Afghanistan. An
ungoverned space became fertile ground for a dangerous
terrorist organization to find safe haven and plot and plan
attacks against us and our interests, and that risk is still
there. If we do not find partners in regions like the Central
Command represents to deter those groups from forming, they
will form, and they are still there; ISIS [Islamic State of
Iraq and Syria], al-Qaida, and various other offshoots.
So we have to have a plan to meet all of our challenges in
a reasonable way within our budget. And I think these two
regions are particularly ripe for a discussion of how we do
that, because you can sort of look at the needs there and it
can very quickly overwhelm you in terms of the resources we
have available.
Let me say I am a hundred percent confident with the best
U.S. military the world has ever seen, with the number of
partners that we have and the capabilities that we can bring to
bear that we can absolutely meet those challenges, if we are
smart. If we make the right resource decisions, if we manage
risks in an appropriate way, and if we, you know, give our
troops the support they need, I am a hundred percent confident
that we can meet those challenges, even in complex parts of the
world like the two that you gentlemen represent.
Lastly, given what is going on in the world, we will need
to hear from you about how the coronavirus is impacting your
regions. Obviously, Iran is one of the most impacted countries,
and how that affects things and how it is affecting your
operations as we have seen, you know, various cancellations,
travel restrictions, difficulties. Your perspective on how that
is going to impact your areas of responsibility will be very
helpful to informing us how we can help you do that. And that
is all I have.
With that, I will turn it over to Ranking Member Thornberry
for his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me join in
welcoming each of our witnesses here today.
And, General McKenzie, let me begin by expressing
condolences at the loss of two Marines in Iraq within the past
couple of days. My understanding is they were working with
Iraqi forces to clear out ISIS from some tunnels in a complex
there and have given the ultimate sacrifice to protect us here
at home.
I support the National Defense Strategy. I completely
agree--and I think it makes sense to put greater emphasis on
great power competition. I completely agree with the chairman
that great power competition takes place all over the world.
And his recent trip, as well as these two maps that are in
front of us, show Russia and Chinese activity in Africa as one
example. Also takes place in the Middle East and South Asia. It
occurs all over the world.
But the rest of the story is the job against terrorism is
not done yet. They are certainly not finished with us, and we
cannot wish it away and just presume that if we say peace has
broken out, that they are going to leave us alone. And I think
it is--you know, we get focused on different issues as time
goes on. I think it is an important reminder that every day
there are men and women risking their lives to protect us here
at home from terrorist threat, and that is true in Afghanistan,
it is true in Iraq and Syria, and it is true in Africa. It is
true in a variety of places around the world. And so as we talk
about great power competition, I don't think we can forget the
other issue, and we certainly can't afford to walk away from
it. And in y'all's two AORs [areas of responsibility], that is
particularly true.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Before we begin, two quick programming announcements. We
are again going in reverse order on our questions, so we will
start with me and Mr. Thornberry, and then we will go in
reverse order. Second, we have a classified hearing after the
public hearing, so we will stop exactly at noon and head
upstairs to 2212 for the classified portion of this hearing.
And with that, I will turn it over to Ms. Wheelbarger for
her opening statement.
STATEMENT OF KATHRYN WHEELBARGER, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
Ms. Wheelbarger. Good morning, Chairman Smith, Ranking
Member Thornberry, distinguished members of this committee. We
are grateful for the opportunity to testify today.
I would like to start by thanking the men and women of the
Department of Defense whose dedication and sacrifices enable us
to achieve our objectives in the Middle East, Africa, and
elsewhere. I would also like to recognize the strong
collaboration and bipartisan support provided by this
committee. As I said last year, as a former professional
staffer on multiple committees in Congress, I understand that
this is a vital institution, ensuring our military has the
resources, oversight, and political legitimacy to succeed at
the hard missions we give it. Congress also helps ensure we
have civilian control of the military, as enshrined in the
Constitution and required for the preservation of our
democratic values. So thank you for all you do.
As you know, our approach to the Middle East and Africa
policy is guided by our National Security Strategy and our NDS
[National Defense Strategy]. Our overall goals are to protect
the American people, defend the homeland, and promote
prosperity and peace from a position of strength. As you have
heard numerous times, our NDS directs the Department to focus
on near-peer competition, while remaining vigilant and
countering threats from rogue states like Iran and North Korea
and continuing to address violent extremist organizations like
al-Qaida and ISIS.
The need to address near-peer competitors requires us to
make adjustments to our posture and avoid prioritizing near-
term problems at the expense of building readiness and capacity
for high-end conflict in the future. As we do so, though, we
must also deter and confront current adversaries while avoiding
miscalculation or escalation that would distract and undermine
our national security interests.
In the Middle East, the United States strategy is to keep
the region from being a safe haven for terrorists or dominated
by any power hostile to the United States. The Department is
focused on ensuring continued success against ISIS and al-
Qaida, strengthening deterrence and our defenses against Iran,
and competing with China and Russia. This requires investing in
sustainable partnerships as a whole-of-government effort.
As to Afghanistan, our mission is guided by the President's
South Asia strategy. As you are aware, on February 29, the
President announced an agreement with the Taliban that is a
major step toward political settlement, but it is just a first
step. We have insisted to the Taliban that they abide by their
counterterrorism commitments negotiated in good faith with all
Afghan stakeholders and not restart violence. However, we are
prepared for all eventualities. Our presence in Afghanistan is
conditions-based, and future posture will be based on the facts
on the ground.
In Africa, the United States maintains a whole-of-
government approach to advancing security and stability on the
continent. Our commitment to the Africa continent includes
diplomatic, military, and economic efforts, and persistent U.S.
presence is not the only measure of DOD's [Department of
Defense's] commitment. Our commitment is demonstrated by our
counterterrorism training and operations, our dynamic force
employment, military training, exercises, foreign military
sales, intelligence sharing, crisis responses, and emergency
humanitarian assistance.
So I will close by saying I think the Department is well
positioned to address all the range of threats that we face.
Our approach helps us meet a variety of present and future
threats, while enhancing the strength and agility of our
forces. Again, thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Wheelbarger can be found in
the Appendix on page 47.]
The Chairman. General McKenzie.
STATEMENT OF GEN KENNETH F. McKENZIE, JR., USMC, COMMANDER,
U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
General McKenzie. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member
Thornberry, distinguished members of the House Armed Services
Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify here today.
I am proud to testify alongside General Steve Townsend from
AFRICOM and Ms. Katie Wheelbarger from OSD [Office of the
Secretary of Defense] Policy. It is this partnership within
DOD, across COCOMs [combatant commands], and between the
interagency that ensures synchronized execution of the National
Defense Strategy. My senior enlisted leader, Fleet Master Chief
Jamie Herdel of the Navy, is also here with me today.
Before I begin, I would like to recognize the sacrifice of
Captain Moises Navas and Gunnery Sergeant Diego Pongo, who were
killed in action against ISIS last Sunday in the Qara Chokh
mountains in Iraq as part of Joint Task Force-OIR [Operation
Inherent Resolve]. They will be remembered.
Today, there are nearly 90,000 men and women serving within
the 20 nations comprising Central Command as well as the
headquarters in Tampa. I am proud of their remarkable
dedication and humbled by their personal sacrifice. It is my
honor to serve with them. They are young Americans in the line
of fire, working to prevent attacks on the homeland, counter
destabilizing regional influence, prevent the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, and ensure the freedom of
navigation through international waterways. Your annual and
timely passage of both the National Defense Authorization Act
and the defense appropriation bills honors their courage and
sacrifice. I encourage you to maintain this tradition.
Keeping a pledge from my confirmation hearing in December
of 2018, I appear before you and offer my best military advice.
My written statement highlights several nations and areas of
interest within the Central Command, but my opening statement
today will focus on Iran.
The National Defense Strategy directs us to work with
partners to deny the Iranian regime all paths to a nuclear
weapon and to neutralize Iranian malign influence. This is no
easy task. Iran is persistent and is growing its arsenal of
ballistic missiles despite international condemnation.
Iran remains the world's largest state sponsor of
terrorism. Since May 2019, Iranian proxies and Shia militia
groups in Iraq have increased attacks on U.S. interests and
conducted scores of unmanned aerial system [UAS] reconnaissance
flights near U.S. and Iraqi security force bases. The Iranian
regime has attacked or seized foreign vessels in the Gulf,
sponsored attacks by Houthi forces from Yemen into Saudi
Arabia, continued the export of lethal aid to destabilizing
groups across the region, and carried out an unprecedented
cruise missile and UAS attack in September against oil
facilities in Saudi Arabia.
In early January, Iran launched more than a dozen ballistic
missiles in a deliberate attack against U.S. and coalition
forces at two bases in Iraq. This state-sponsored missile
strike crossed the threshold compared to previous attacks and
has probably set a lower bar for future actions by the regime.
While periods of decreased tension may provide the illusion of
a return to normalcy, ample intelligence indicates the regime's
desire to continue malign activities that threaten lives,
destabilize sovereign nations, and threaten freedom of
navigation, regional commerce, global energy supplies, and the
global economy itself.
At CENTCOM, we recognize that so long as the U.S. applies
diplomatic and economic pressure, the joint force must be
postured to deter Iran from employing the military element of
power to counter our actions. Our presence sends a clear signal
about our capabilities and our will to defend partners and U.S.
national interests. Going forward, it is CENTCOM's objective to
posture forces in the region with the operational depth to
achieve a consistent state of deterrence against Iran and be
adaptable to future Iranian threats. The fiscal year 2021 DOD
budget supports CENTCOM's ability to keep our forces agile,
lethal, and adaptable.
As we work with our partners to safeguard our mutual
interests, we do so with the knowledge that we are stronger
together. Key to building and maintaining regional partnerships
is the authorization, the funding, and the employment of
security assistance programs. Additionally, the National Guard
State Partnership Program currently cultivates relationships
and improves interoperability with six nations across the
CENTCOM AOR with more considering entry. Again, the fiscal year
2021 budget supports building new partnerships and forming an
enduring Middle East coalition.
As CENTCOM continues ongoing operations, we appreciate the
efforts of our DOD civilian leadership. We acknowledge the
teamwork of the interagency and thank the Members of Congress
and your staffs without whose consistent backing we would be
unable to accomplish our mission. In order for America's Armed
Forces to sustain all-domain dominance, the Department requires
your support as well as predictable, adequate, and timely
funding.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and committee members, thanks
again for all you do for our troops and our families, and I
look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General McKenzie can be found in
the Appendix on page 62.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
General Townsend.
STATEMENT OF GEN STEPHEN J. TOWNSEND, USA, COMMANDER, U.S.
AFRICA COMMAND
General Townsend. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member
Thornberry, and members of the committee, good morning, and
thank you for the opportunity to appear today. It is a
privilege to be a part of and lead America's exceptional men
and women of U.S. Africa Command, who are dedicated to
protecting America and advancing her interests on the African
continent. This morning, I am accompanied by my State
Department foreign policy advisor, Mr. Russ Schiebel, and
AFRICOM's new command senior enlisted leader, Marine Sergeant
Major Richard Thresher.
I would like to take a moment to honor the memories of
three Americans: U.S. Army Specialist Henry J. Mayfield, Jr.,
Mr. Bruce Triplett, and Mr. Dustin Harrison, who lost their
lives in the service of our Nation on January 5 at Manda Bay,
Kenya. To their families, our thoughts and prayers are with
you. Your loved ones died while protecting the American people
from the very real threat of the al-Qaida and Al Shabaab
terrorist groups.
I am here this morning with my battle buddies and friends,
Ms. Wheelbarger and General McKenzie, to discuss shared
challenges and opportunities in our areas of responsibility,
while furthering joint force readiness. Africa overwatches a
global crossroads with strategic chokepoints and sea lines of
communication that are essential to global commerce and
critical to U.S. operations in the world. Our future security
and prosperity rests on our strategic access and influence in
Africa in times of crisis.
U.S. Africa Command is engaged in an ongoing blank slate,
now COCOM review. In concert with the Department of Defense, we
have developed a prioritized list of objectives and actions to
protect the homeland and secure our strategic interests in
Africa, while focusing the American taxpayers' investments in
the right areas.
Africa is key terrain for competition with China and
Russia, who are aggressively using economic and military means
to expand their access and influence. I believe Africa offers
America a competitive edge over China and Russia, and we should
take advantage of it. We will grow more efficient to contribute
to higher defense priorities and refocus resources to global
power competition, but we cannot take pressure off major
terrorist groups like ISIS and al-Qaida. These groups and many
others remain an inconvenient reality in Africa. While we
should not try to confront each one, we should remain resolute
in confronting those who threaten American interests in the
region and the American homeland.
Today, AFRICOM does that using a very light and relatively
low-cost footprint by supporting African and international
partners who are leading these efforts.
In my first 8 months on the job, I have learned that small
investments, a few troops and a few bucks, can go a long way
and make a real difference in Africa. Our whole-of-government
and partner-centric approach acts as a force multiplier to
address Africa's many complex challenges. What AFRICOM
accomplishes with a few people and a few dollars on a continent
3\1/2\ times the size of the continental United States is a
bargain for the American taxpayer and low-cost insurance for
America. A secure and stable Africa remains an enduring
American interest. U.S. Africa Command remains ready to protect
and advance American interests and respond to crises in Africa.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thanks for your
continued support to our Armed Forces. I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of General Townsend can be found in
the Appendix on page 79.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
General McKenzie, and actually, Ms. Wheelbarger as well, if
you can answer a question about the Taliban peace treaty, and
understand the negotiations that we have had with the Taliban,
but the key part now is the Taliban negotiating with the Afghan
Government. That seems problematic. And I support the effort to
try to find a peaceful solution here to enable us to reduce our
footprint and rely more on partners, but how do you see that
negotiation between the Taliban and the Afghan Government
going? What needs to happen in order for this peace agreement
to go forward?
Ms. Wheelbarger. I will begin, recognizing this is largely
a State Department lead and my colleagues in IPSA [Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs] as
well, but from our perspective, from the Secretary's
perspective, as he said, the peace agreement is not perfect,
but it is a good first step, and the inter-Afghan dialogue is a
key component of that. We do have suggestions as late as this--
or this morning before I left that there might be somewhat an
offer from President Ghani to provide some prisoner releases.
That is a basic part of the initial agreement between the U.S.
and the Taliban. That was not part--you know, the Afghans were
not in that piece of--the Afghan Government was not a piece of
that part of the agreement, but I do think we might have actual
successful, good-faith efforts, maybe even today, that we will
get the intra-Afghan conversation started.
The Chairman. And, General McKenzie, how is it affecting
operations at the moment?
General McKenzie. Sir, thank you. The Taliban need to keep
their part of the bargain, and they are continuing attacks.
Those attacks are relatively low in scale. They are not
directed against coalition forces. They are not occurring in
city centers. They are occurring at isolated checkpoints, but
those attacks are occurring, and they are not consistent with a
movement toward a negotiated settlement and they are not
consistent with the undertaking they made.
The Chairman. Thank you.
General Townsend, focusing on West Africa in particular, I
was alarmed when I was there at the growing threat from the
violent extremist organizations in the region. Burkina Faso,
Mali, and Niger, to varying degrees, their governments are all
under pressure. There are portions of their country that are
increasingly outside of their control. How do you see that
fight going in those three particular countries, and what do we
need to do to stop the spread of those groups? And I guess the
other question would be where do you see the risk that those
groups will use those safe havens to plan larger operations?
General Townsend. Chairman, in West Africa in the Sahel
region, I think that the Western and international and African
efforts there are not getting the job done. ISIS and al-Qaida
are on the march in West Africa. They are having success and
international efforts are not.
So why is that? I think that there is--you know, the
African partners there don't have a lot of capacity or
capability. There is a lot of Western assistance going in
there, European-led, French-led and European-led, with the U.S.
in support. I think it is insufficient and it is uncoordinated.
I think the French and the Europeans have recognized this and
they are taking steps to make it better coordinated. Those
efforts might actually be sufficient if they were better
coordinated.
If we don't turn this around in West Africa, I think it
becomes a growing threat in the region. I think the threat will
begin to impact on the littoral states. It has already started
to reach the northern fringes of the littoral states. I think
that Europe can and should do more before America should do
more in this part of the world. I think the problems that
manifest from West Africa will manifest in Europe before they
manifest in America. But I do believe that if ISIS can carve
out a new caliphate or al-Qaida can, they will do it, and they
will attempt to do it in West Africa.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. Thornberry. Let me just follow up on the chairman,
really, and General McKenzie and General Townsend, would each
of you give us a thumbnail sketch of the terrorist threat in
your AORs? I know we will have more detail when we go to
classified setting, but I think it is important for all members
and the American people to know, is this threat still there?
Kind of what does it look like, how is it evolving, that sort
of thing?
General McKenzie. Thank you, sir. I will begin and go from
east to west. So in Afghanistan, the principal threat that
could threaten our homeland or the homelands of our allies and
partners is either ISIS-K [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria-
Khorasan Province] or elements of al-Qaida. Both of those
forces are under considerable pressure now from us. They are
pushed up into the east of Afghanistan. If unrelenting CT
[counterterrorism] pressure is maintained, it is likely they
will find it very hard to achieve a degree of coordination
necessary to attack us. We believe that if that pressure is
relieved at some point in those ungoverned spaces, they would
regain that capability. So that is one thing.
The next thing I would note is the Taliban actually does
not entertain attack plans against the United States. They are
a regional entity. There are good reasons why we are conducting
and have been conducting operations against them because of the
fact they host two other organizations that actually have sworn
to destroy us. But the Taliban themselves are not poised or
have any background of attacking, you know, certainly not
attacking our homeland.
I would tell you in the far west end of the theater, in the
Idlib pocket, there are remnants of al-Qaida and remnants of
ISIS that do entertain attack plans against us. They are being
compressed right now. It is hard for them to generate those
attacks at the moment because of the conflict that is going on
out there. And that conflict, while it does have the effect of
limiting their ability to operate against us, is also going to
have profoundly horrific humanitarian outcomes in the western
part of Syria. So we watch that carefully.
In the south, in the Arabian Peninsula, AQAP [al-Qaida in
the Arabian Peninsula] still has visions of attacking the
United States. They are under pressure and find it hard to
realize that, but if left unconstrained, undoubtedly they would
regenerate and present a threat to us as well.
Last, I need to mention the largest state-sponsored terror
organization in the theater, the Iranian Threat Network,
whether it is Shia militia groups in Iraq, Lebanese Hezbollah,
or Kata'ib Hezbollah. All of those entities entertain, to some
degree, a desire to attack Americans generally in the theater,
but Iran's reach is not only regional, it is global, and in
fact, as you know, has been manifested a few miles from where
we stand right now.
General Townsend. I will go from west to east. In West
Africa in the Sahel, as I was just discussing a moment ago, the
threat there is both ISIS and al-Qaida. Al-Qaida has an arm, a
branch there called JNIM, Jama'at Nasr al-Islam. That group is
as part of al-Qaida as any group is on the planet, and they are
a growing threat there. And what is the interesting dynamic
that we see in West Africa that we don't see in other parts of
the world, there, al-Qaida and ISIS cooperate with one another.
I can't really explain that, and I have been asked before if I
thought that might be something new that we would see growing.
I don't think so. I think it is a local phenomenon, that these
folks have grown up with each other, known each other all their
lives, one joined one gang, one joined the other, and so they
cooperate with one another.
This threat, if it grows, if it continues to grow at the
pace it has--and we are seeing a fivefold increase since last
year just in the Sahel alone--we are going to see that threat
emerge and manifest in the littoral states of West Africa. I
think unchecked, this threat becomes a threat beyond the
region.
Moving to the north, we have ISIS there in Libya. That
threat has been significantly reduced, and we are keeping close
watch on that to ensure that it stays that way. And we have
been able to do that with work with both sides of the Libyan
Civil War. They have both supported our counterterrorism
efforts there.
Moving to the east, there is a small presence of ISIS in
Somalia and East Africa, but it is not of great operational
concern, but Al Shabaab is. Al Shabaab is the largest and most
kinetically violent arm of al-Qaida, and they are a serious
threat to not only the Somali people but the entire region. One
example is a recent attack in Kenya. Another example is their
threats to embassies in the region outside of Somalia. I can
discuss more about the threat of Al Shabaab in a closed
hearing.
I will just say that I am of the belief that Al Shabaab
today poses a significant threat to American interests in the
region, and that threat would continue whether we were in
Somalia or we were not in Somalia. And I also believe that if
left unchecked--and we have been putting a fair amount of
pressure on Al Shabaab--if left unchecked, I believe that that
would manifest into an international threat.
The Chairman. Mrs. Luria.
Mrs. Luria. Well, thank you.
And it is great to go at the beginning so we can talk about
aircraft carriers up front. So I wanted to start with General
McKenzie. Recently, the Abraham Lincoln completed the longest
deployment for a carrier since the Vietnam war, and that was
due to a casualty on the Harry S. Truman which made it unable
to deploy on time. I was just giving that background to focus
on how vital is it to your completing your mission to have a
continuous carrier presence in the Gulf?
General McKenzie. So the aircraft carrier brings mobility.
It brings offensive firepower, it brings defensive firepower.
We can position it, we can move it around. It complicates an
adversary's targeting, so it is a uniquely American piece of
capability. Additionally, the virtue of the aircraft carriers,
there are no access basing and overstrike restrictions that
operate on forces that launch from that carrier, so that gives
me great flexibility. Having said all of that, it also has a
profound deterring effect, principally upon Iran. They know
where the carrier is. They track the presence of the carrier.
And I view a carrier as a critical part of a deterrent posture
effective against Iran.
Mrs. Luria. So that actually leads into what the next part
of my question would be is, if you were to deploy Air Force
assets to the region, would you feel that you could have an
equivalent deterrent effect by Air Force and a combination of
other assets in the region if you were not to have a continuous
carrier presence?
And then secondly, has the carrier presence or any of our
presence actually deterred any of the recent Iranian
aggression? Because they continue to harass, aggress, even
though we are putting more forces there, so I was wondering
what your assessment of that was.
General McKenzie. Sure. So I tend to think of land-based
air power as complementary to sea-based air power. Again, we
can use them both. They both bring unique capabilities. Again,
the particular and unique advantage of sea-based air power is
it launches from a piece of United States sovereignty, so there
are no restrictions that will be placed on where those
airplanes go or what they do, which gives the Commander in
Chief significant flexibility as we look at what we might want
to do. So that is the military component of it.
It is my best judgment that we have reestablished a form of
rough deterrence, what I would call contested deterrence with
Iran in the wake of the strike on Qasem Soleimani and the
attack on our bases. And part of that is based, and part of
that deterrence is obtained by our obvious force presence in
the theater, force presence that was not there in the spring of
2019 that led them to undertake the cycle of violence that
culminated in January.
Mrs. Luria. Thank you. And pivoting more on that continuous
presence, and I would switch to Ms. Wheelbarger. Recently, and
in your statement here, you discuss dynamic force employment.
And in January, as the Lincoln was heading home, a spokesman
for Naval Air Forces, San Diego, said the new Navy deployment
model of dynamic force employment means less predictable
deployments will become more routine, so less predictable will
be the routine.
And the statement went on to say the length of this
deployment is not ideal or something that is going to become a
regular thing, but they are not going to be as predictable as
they were in the past. Our crews and family should, prior to
deployment, discuss the possibility of something like this,
i.e., an extended deployment happening. Do you think that the
extension of the Lincoln was an example of what you really mean
by dynamic force employment, and should we expect deployments
to be of longer duration, 8 months, such as the Lincoln, in
order to satisfy these requirements in these AORs?
Ms. Wheelbarger. Thanks for the question. I don't think we
saw that particular example as a key example of dynamic force
employment. We want----
Mrs. Luria. So you think that was a misstatement by the
spokesman for----
Ms. Wheelbarger. No. I think what we want to see is that
dynamic force employment allows us to be, as I think the
spokesman was trying to say, strategically predictable but
operationally unpredictable, but we have to have the kind of
forces that can respond to current events, both, you know,
based on the adversary, but also based on the situations within
our forces.
Mrs. Luria. Would you say that----
Ms. Wheelbarger. So I wouldn't say that the extension is--
that is common, but it is something we are going to need to be
prepared for.
Mrs. Luria. So would you say that we have been able to
respond adequately when we had the delay in the Harry S. Truman
and the extension of the Lincoln? For the combatant commander
specifically, and specifically for CENTCOM, have you felt that
the Navy and the carrier fleet has been able to respond
adequately to meet your needs for deterrence within the region?
General McKenzie. Through heroic efforts and just
tremendous flexibility, yes, they have been able to do that. I
am keenly aware of the total burden that places on the Navy in
particular and the joint force in general when they meet these
requirements.
Mrs. Luria. Thank you.
And I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Waltz.
Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I certainly share the condolences for the two Marines
that we just lost fighting ISIS. And I think that dynamic,
fighting ISIS right now, a resurgent ISIS in Iraq and what we
just went through in Syria, is exactly what we want to prevent
happening in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
General McKenzie, you just mentioned a moment ago, you just
testified that we have sufficient pressure on ISIS and al-Qaida
to keep them on their back foot, but if we relieve that
pressure, they could be and would likely be resurgent.
So let's just fast-forward a bit. Let's presume the Taliban
is sincere about peace. They enter into a process with the
Afghan Government. They meet all of our conditions for a full
withdrawal in 14 months, although I have a lot of questions
about what those conditions are, which I will hold for the
classified setting. But let's presume all of that happens. I am
struggling to wrap my mind around how the Taliban has the
military capability, even partnered with the Afghan Army, which
I think we would agree is not independently operable at this
point, to keep that sufficient pressure on half the world's
terrorist organizations in one of the most difficult places in
the world.
So how does that--help me understand. Help all of us
understand how that happens in the absence of U.S. forces. Does
the Taliban have the military capability along with the Afghan
Army to keep sufficient pressure?
General McKenzie. So over the last several months in
eastern Afghanistan, we have watched the Taliban compress and
crush ISIS presence on the ground in the southern Nangarhar
Province, and they have been very effective doing that. That is
some of the worst terrain in the world. They paid a very steep
price in their own fighters.
Mr. Waltz. Was that independent of our support?
General McKenzie. There was very limited support from us,
and I would characterize that as very limited support from us.
So they have demonstrated capability to do it. It was a bloody
mess, but they did it. In fact, ISIS really now no longer holds
ground in Nangarhar Province. They are trying to reestablish
themselves up to the north in other provinces, and it remains
yet to be seen if they are going to be successful doing that,
and we will know over time if they are. But they have
demonstrated the capability to do that. Frankly, sir, it is
more a question of will than capability, and that will have to
be developed in the fullness of time. I defer to no one in my
distrust of the Taliban, but we will have the opportunity----
Mr. Waltz. Just to be clear--sorry, I have limited time.
You believe in the absence of all U.S. forces, your military
advice, the Taliban and the Afghan Army have sufficient
military capability to keep all of those, not just ISIS, al-
Qaida, everything that exists in Pakistan, to keep them at bay,
to keep the homeland safe. And I would just remark that we all
know that if we have to fight our way back in, that we will be
tending, I think, many more funerals than a current sustained
pressure campaign with limited forces.
General McKenzie. First of all, I share those concerns. I
think those are very reasonable concerns. It is less a
capability than it is a question of will, and it is less a
question of will against ISIS than it is against al-Qaida. And
those are things that we are just going to have to see in order
to believe as we go forward, as conditions are set or they
either meet those conditions or they don't meet those
conditions.
Mr. Waltz. If we shut down Bagram Air Base, I think it is
important to have on the record here, in Syria and Yemen and
other places, we have basing capabilities around those
countries, whether it is Incirlik, Idlib, Djibouti. What do we
have around Afghanistan should those presumptions, should they
not have the capability, the Taliban and ANA [Afghan National
Army], what other bases do we have in terms of a plan B to be
able to conduct operations into Afghanistan and the FATA
[Federally Administered Tribal Areas] or western Pakistan?
General McKenzie. Well, sir, so right now, we are executing
the withdrawal----
Mr. Waltz. In the absence of Bagram. I mean, assuming
playing this all out, we withdraw all forces.
General McKenzie. So we have no plans beyond going to 8,600
right now. No one has given me any guidance to go to a lower
number.
Mr. Waltz. There is a public statement of zero forces, full
withdrawal, in 14 months.
General McKenzie. There is; however, we have not developed
military plans to that end yet.
Mr. Waltz. Okay. I think it is also worth noting that we
still have an American hostage held by the Taliban, just taken
in the last few months, so I would be extremely concerned to
see Taliban prisoner releases while the Taliban and Haqqani
network are holding a U.S. citizen, former Navy diver, hostage.
And then the last piece. In terms of great power
competition, I can't think of another American military base or
coalition military base now that Manas is gone besides Bagram
on China's western flank. Can you talk to the western flank of
China and what platforms we have there?
General McKenzie. Sir, the platforms we have are
intermittent platforms as we go in and conduct joint training,
but we have no permanent platform up in the Stans as you noted,
sir.
Mr. Waltz. Thank you, everyone, for your service. I
appreciate your testimony.
The Chairman. Ms. Escobar.
Ms. Escobar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me----
The Chairman. I am sorry. I apologize. I am sorry. I was
right. Ms. Escobar, go ahead. Sorry. We will start over.
Ms. Escobar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And many thanks to our witnesses for your presence here
today and for your service. And I just want to say at the
outset, obviously we all want to see peace happen. We are
hoping for successful conversations between the Taliban and the
Afghan Government, but I do have some serious concerns, General
McKenzie. Secretary Esper has authorized the drawdown to the
8,600 troops. That is happening. That is happening before the
deal between the Taliban and the Afghan Government is sealed
and worked out.
Given recent events, especially our need to strike against
Taliban fighters just days after we signed the peace deal, what
confidence do you have in the Taliban honoring their
commitments to us? You keep saying it is not a question of
capacity but that it is more a question of will. What
confidence do you have in that will?
General McKenzie. So I have no confidence, because I am
going to be driven by the observed facts. Either they will draw
down the current level of attacks or they won't. And if they
are unable to draw down the current levels of attacks, then
political leadership will be able to make decisions based on
that. But it doesn't matter whether I am optimistic or I am
pessimistic; we will see what happens on the ground.
To date, Taliban attacks are higher than we believe are
consistent with an idea to actually carry out this plan. That
may be because the Taliban has made a decision at the top to
continue those attacks and press us. It may be because the
Taliban's leadership is fractured, and it takes a while to get
all this down to the subordinate leaders. Their command and
control is not as effective or as rapid as ours. We will know
very soon on that.
But I would say, first of all, right now, attacks are
higher than we want, although they have not chosen to attack
coalition forces. They have not chosen to attack inside the
major urban areas, although ISIS has conducted some of those
attacks. So we will see what happens going forward.
The last point is we are going to go to 8,600, and we are
going to achieve that here by the middle of the summer. It is
my best judgment and the judgment of the commander on the
ground, General Scott Miller, that we can be very effective in
our CT efforts at that force level.
Ms. Escobar. What is our plan specifically, and who makes
the determination about when that line is crossed, when we have
had enough, when we are not seeing enough progress? Are there
specifics? I understand you may not be able to divulge those in
an unclassified setting, but are there very specific measures
that we will be using? Is it somebody's sense?
General McKenzie. So we have a very sophisticated system
for tracking attacks, how many were initiated, how many
casualties were caused as a result of those attacks, where
those attacks occur. We report that, and I have a
recommendation on that. General Miller has a recommendation on
that. It goes to the Chairman or the Secretary. The decision
about what is tolerable and what is not tolerable is not a
military decision. That is a political decision, a policy
decision. I defer that to Ms. Wheelbarger to talk about.
Ms. Wheelbarger. I will just add what I have heard the
Secretary, and I think you have probably heard the Secretary
say in response to Mr. Waltz' question as well, 14 months of
going to zero is an aspirational benchmark based on the
conditions being achieved. The Secretary is well prepared to
look at the terrain in a few months and see what the Afghans
and the Taliban have come to. And he is prepared, as he has
said to me, and I think he has said to the committees, to
readjust our force posture up or down based on what the
conditions require to achieve our objectives, which are to
continue to ensure Afghanistan is not a safe haven for
terrorists who could particularly hit the homeland. So he is
prepared to look at the truth on the ground and make decisions
accordingly.
Ms. Escobar. Thank you. And, Ms. Wheelbarger, we know that
we are at the beginning of the process, and understandably, we
have got to wait and see and have high hopes, but, you know,
obviously keep close watch. But the intra-Afghan dialogue
phase, which was supposed to start today, has been delayed. How
do we know this is not just the Taliban trying to run out the
clock?
Ms. Wheelbarger. Sure. I mean, like I said, before I
arrived this morning, I did ask if there were any updates, and
it did seem like there might be sort of a fig leaf from Ghani
coming down. We actually will start those conversations today.
I think all of us have to remain somewhat skeptical that this
is going to work precisely as planned but remain open and
flexible to the Afghans over time working this out with
themselves. But again, our interests are continuing to put
political pressure on them to achieve that objective, while
continuing to have the military platforms and posture to allow
us to achieve our national security requirements.
Ms. Escobar. Perhaps not beginning the withdrawal so soon
would have helped provide some leverage for the Afghan
Government.
I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Mitchell.
Mr. Mitchell. Thanks, Mr. Chair.
First, let me start by thanking you all for your service.
For those you command, you are in a tough neighborhood some
days, many days, and I appreciate it.
Let's stay on the subject of Afghanistan which seems to be
significant. If I have time, I will hop to Syria just to keep
us entertained here. I think Mr. Waltz' comment, which I want
to reinforce, is that General McKenzie, correct me, but I think
with the ability to manage or to keep ISIS under control in
Afghanistan very much depends upon the Taliban working with the
Afghan Army in some cooperative manner to manage that or to
keep that under control. Yet we haven't exactly seen that the
Taliban seems interested in doing that. Am I mistaken in my
impression at this point in time?
General McKenzie. You are correct, we have not seen any
movement in that direction. I would agree that coming to some
ability to operate together or at least in a complementary
fashion is going to be critical to their movement forward.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, in keeping with Mr. Waltz' question,
the reality is, is while zero may be an aspirational goal, the
point that he makes which, with all due respect, sir, you
avoided, was if we withdraw from Bagram, if they run out the
clock, don't attack coalition or U.S. forces, continue the
current mode they are at, we then have to face going back in,
because it is my impression we don't have an alternative kind
of staging in that area. Is that incorrect? Leaving Bagram is a
problem.
General McKenzie. If we were to pull out completely from
Afghanistan, you are correct. We have looked at all kinds of
over-the-horizon options, and none of them are particularly
good. Back in 2001, 2002, it was very difficult to get into
Afghanistan in the first place. Those problems would present
themselves again, so I acknowledge that.
The only point I would make is--and again, I emphasize I am
not optimistic or pessimistic; I am just going to be driven by
the facts here as we see it. Over a 14-month period, the
Taliban are also going to be acted upon by the Afghans, so it
is not strictly that the Taliban have a perfect secret plan to
take over. You know, there are a lot of people in Afghanistan
that have a strong view of the Taliban, and the Taliban
consistently polls at about 12 percent popularity in
Afghanistan. So they face their challenges too, and we should
not assume that they will run to victory as we withdraw.
Mr. Mitchell. Ms. Wheelbarger, if you could relay, I think,
to Secretary Esper, and maybe if you get a chance to relay to
the Secretary of State, I am not sure it is an adequate
standard to say so long as the Taliban dial back or stop
attacks on coalition and U.S. forces, that we are comfortable
saying it is all good in Afghanistan. I support we don't want
to be there. We have been there far too long now, but the idea
that so long as you don't bother us, we will go away and hope
you don't bother anything in the future is--let me put it this
way. I told my management staff when I ran a company, hope is
not a plan; it is the last step before desperation. And we need
to have more indication that the Taliban and Afghans can
actually work in some manner cooperatively before we just walk
away and say we are done with it, because we do not want to
have to go back in. That would be catastrophic.
Ms. Wheelbarger. Understood. I will relay that back. I do
think part of the conditions that we expect the Taliban to live
up to is ensuring that they are not renewing their
counterterrorism activities that brings insecurity and lack of
stability to the entire country. I mean, I have heard the
Secretary say numerous times that he is prepared to ensure that
we will defend our interests. And that is, again, going after
the terrorist elements that will now or in the future pose an
external operations threat to us.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, our interests also included the one
U.S. Armed Forces hostage that the Taliban hold.
Ms. Wheelbarger. Understood.
Mr. Mitchell. And if I were in a different seat, and I am
not, I am in this seat, there is no way in God's green Earth I
would sign off any agreement until that hostage was put in
front of me in good condition. The idea they are holding a
member of our Armed Forces and we signed some agreement offends
me, and I think, frankly, if I asked privately the gentlemen
sitting to your left, I am not sure they wouldn't be equally
offended. We want him back, and we want him back now, and we
want him back in good shape.
Ms. Wheelbarger. There is one thing I will add. I think
this administration has been very, very focused on hostage
releases and rescues, so it continues to be a priority, but I
take your point.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, focused is one thing. Somebody needs to
relay the message that it is not acceptable. I am offended by
it.
Quickly, if I can make a comment about Syria. I think
someone needs to explain to--I am not sure our commanders as
well, but also to the forces on the ground and the American
people what our objectives are in Syria. They seem to keep
changing dramatically, and it is not helpful. It is not helpful
to our allies. It is not helpful to our forces on the ground. I
am not sure we understand them here. I was pretty blunt about
my assessment that these mercurial changes simply do not allow
for an effective command in Syria and leave us vulnerable. So
someone needs to explain to Congress and remind the gentleman
sitting to your left what our objective is in Syria and when we
define that we have met that objective and we are prepared to
leave. So I will ask simply, someone sometime, please, because
that would be helpful.
The Chairman. Thank you. The gentleman is out of time.
Mrs. Trahan.
Mrs. Trahan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General McKenzie, thank you for being here. You recently
indicated that your biggest concern in the near term was not
necessarily a direct Iranian attack; it is their proxies in
areas like Iraq and Syria where they could come against us. And
in your written testimony, you also indicated that ample
intelligence points to Iran's desire to continue malign
activities that threaten Americans' lives. So can you please
describe the threat of Iranian retaliation as you understand
it, conventional or by proxy forces, to us, our soldiers, and
to our allies?
General McKenzie. Certainly. So we believe that Iran has a
long-term vision of ejecting the United States from the
theater, from the Central Command region, and specifically the
place where they would like to see that first would be in Iraq.
That is the place that they would like to start. So they would
believe they can apply considerable pressure on us, raise the
level of pain high enough so that we would come out. They have
a lot of tools to do that in Iraq. They have a large Shia
militia group there, numbering in the tens of thousands, that
is responsive in varying degrees to Iranian control. But
nonetheless, they hold everything from explosively formed
penetrators, which killed a lot of people in Iraq in the 2007-
2010 period, to large rockets and precise missiles that they
can employ.
The Iranian desire, I believe, would be to try to do that
in a manner that is not completely attributable to Iran. They
may be wrong in making that guess because we are pretty
confident we can determine attribution. But, you know, what we
have seen are a number of attacks at the U.S. Embassy, some as
recent as just, what, less than 2 weeks ago. Rockets fell very
close. Rockets have fallen inside the embassy compound.
We have a variety of things that we do to protect
ourselves, and we have been good so far in doing that. That
luck is not going to hold out forever. And at some point, the
degree of Iranian command and control over those Shia militia
groups may be tested.
I have always said that Iran can certainly direct attacks
in Iraq. Iran may not be able to prevent attacks from occurring
in Iraq. And frankly, you know, the fact that Qasem Soleimani
is no longer there to tie it all together makes it a little
more difficult for them to affect command and control, even
though I think the threat is less with his death.
Mrs. Trahan. Sure. Thank you. So as we draw down troops in
Afghanistan, I am wondering, are we expanding our military
footprint in the region? Are we reshuffling troops? I ask
because I am concerned with force protection, but I would also
like visibility into what our troop presence is going to look
like or as you project it through the year.
General McKenzie. Certainly. So we are on a glide slope to
draw down to 8,600 in Afghanistan. We will reach that goal by
the middle of the summer. We will have, in my judgment,
adequate force protection for those forces that remain there.
On the other end of the theater, in Iraq, you know, we have
got around 5,000 U.S. forces there. We have got a number in
Syria, and I will be happy to talk about that in the closed
session just a little bit later. But we believe that in
general, we have adequate force protection measures there. We
are also in the process of bringing air defense systems,
ballistic missile defense systems into Iraq in particular to
protect ourselves against another potential Iranian attack. So
we will look at those. I balance those two active theaters all
the time.
Now, there are other forces, obviously, in the theater as
well. Over the last few months, as you know, we brought forces
into the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, both to assure them and to
add operational depth to our force presentation against Iran in
order to deter them. Our buildup at Prince Sultan Air Base, or
PSAB, is indicative of that. The beauty of that base is it is
out of short-range ballistic missile range of Iran but yet is
close enough for our various types of fighter attack aircraft
to operate out of there. It is well defended and provides
significant additional depth in the theater.
We talked a little bit earlier about naval presence in the
theater. Naval presence is always the most effective and
flexible form of presence because you can dial it up and down,
and you don't have to worry, again, as I have noted earlier,
about access basing and overflight as you bring those in. So we
constantly balance forces in the theater.
And I would just close by saying, I was the director of the
Joint Staff when the NDS was written. I am very much aware of
the larger priority we need to place against the China threat,
the Russia threat, and other threats. So I know the cost that
we ask when we bring forces into the CENTCOM AOR.
Mrs. Trahan. Thank you. I appreciate that. In my remaining
time, and I know I don't have much, but I am wondering if the
Secretary could just comment on the diplomatic efforts that are
riding alongside our military presence.
Ms. Wheelbarger. With respect to Iran specifically?
Mrs. Trahan. Yes.
Ms. Wheelbarger. Our major policy continues to be an
economic and diplomatic pressure campaign. None of us see that
decreasing anytime soon, and we think that pressure is going to
gain over time. Economically we do think, you know, that Iran
economy faces a lot of challenges. They are resilient, but we
think that over time, the goal is to bring them back to the
negotiating table for a more comprehensive deal.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Bacon.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for being
here today.
Americans want to see a positive, peaceful outcome in
Afghanistan, especially after 18\1/2\ years of war, but we also
can't afford to have Afghanistan return to a pre-9/11
capability where the Taliban are providing safe haven for al-
Qaida. I think today we have a minimal presence there at a cost
that is much less than what we have had in years past. However,
if we withdraw, and the Taliban find themselves dominant in
Kabul to provide safe haven again, I think it will be a much
higher cost later. So those are some of my concerns.
So my question to General McKenzie is what evidence do you
have that the Taliban have severed their close ties or alliance
with al-Qaida?
General McKenzie. So we think in terms of two groups that
threaten the United States. We are confident of the Taliban's
picture on ISIS-K, as an example.
Mr. Bacon. Right.
General McKenzie. We have talked a little bit about that. I
am less optimistic about al-Qaida. That is something they are
going to have to demonstrate. That has not yet been
demonstrated. The--not the beauty of it but the fact of it is
as we go forward, we are going to have ample time to see if
they actually do that, and that will be before we become
irrevocably committed to a force presence that would not allow
us to have adequate leverage in Afghanistan. We don't need to
trust them. We don't need to like them. We don't need to
believe anything they say. We need to observe what they do, and
we have the capability to do that.
Mr. Bacon. That would be the chief concern is that alliance
with al-Qaida. Let's say in 2\1/2\ years, the Taliban are
largely in control of Kabul and they are providing safe haven
to al-Qaida. What is our options at that point? How do we
respond? I think the cost would be much higher than what we
have, what we are putting in now. Just curious for your--I know
it is a hypothetical, but I am just curious for your response.
Where do we come in from and how do we hold them in check?
General McKenzie. Sir, and so without getting into a
hypothetical, I would tell you that we know how we got in in
2001, so we have an object lesson on how to enter Afghanistan.
It is difficult. It is painful. It is very expensive to do
that, but we did it.
Having said that, again, I come back to we talk about this
a lot. I think we are going to have a lot of opportunity to see
the way this goes forward and the dynamic between the Taliban
and the Government of Afghanistan. And I am just not prepared
to assume that the Taliban have good intentions, no, but I am
also not prepared to assume that the Government of Afghanistan
is defenseless and unable to assert themselves and come to a
workable agreement with the Taliban. We don't know the answer
to that question. We are going to have good opportunity to
observe and get the answers to those questions.
Mr. Bacon. I would say the strength of this is it is
delayed, an agreement where we can watch and monitor and turn
up the thermostat or lower the thermostat based on Taliban
response. So I do appreciate that.
Ms. Wheelbarger, I want to ask your thoughts on missile
defense coordination and integration. As we know, Iran has
approximately 1,000 ballistic missiles, and a lot of the
countries in the region need to have some capability to
respond. How are we doing it, helping them integrate a
capability so it is not every man or woman for themself?
Ms. Wheelbarger. Right. One of our key priorities at the
moment is helping Saudi Arabia in particular be more capable
and integrated with their own missile defense assets. They do
have significant numbers of them, but I do think over the last
few decades, we have been trying to get them to improve their
integration to advance their capability.
With respect to integration within the region writ large,
that I would say is aspirational at best. I mean, you can see
these countries eventually improving their defenses by working
together, but we have many interagency efforts to try to get
our Gulf partners in particular to work more cohesively across
the numerous lines of effort, and it is a long-term project. I
will just put it that way. But the key--and I defer to General
McKenzie as well to talk about what the military has been able
to achieve in advancing particularly Saudi Arabia's
capabilities.
Mr. Bacon. When we look at Iranian capabilities, this is
probably their primary capability to hold us at threat and our
allies.
General McKenzie. Sir, it is, and I would say Iran actually
has about 2,500 to 3,000 ballistic missiles.
Mr. Bacon. Okay. Thanks for the update.
General McKenzie. But the point that Ms. Wheelbarger made
is integrated air defense, the ability to sit--for example, if
I go and look at a console at one of my ballistic missile
defense sites in UAE [United Arab Emirates], or I go up into
another location far west of the theater, we are going to see
the whole theater in a common operational picture. That is the
strength of the United States approach to war and with our NATO
[North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and coalition partners. We
would like to have that capability replicated in the Gulf. We
are working hard to that end. We begin with small steps. It has
taken us a long time.
When I was the J5 at U.S. Central Command in 2011, we said
the same thing. So I am very much aware this is something we
have not been very good at. However, the fact that there is a
clear, obvious, evident threat tends to focus people, and I
think in particular, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is now focused
on this.
Mr. Bacon. And I had a question for General Townsend, but
this will be the close of the comments because I am running out
of time. I just want to commend you for starting Task Force
Somalia. Especially after Manda Bay, I think it is needed. So I
just applaud the effort of your command for doing that. Thank
you.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Slotkin.
Ms. Slotkin. Hi, everyone. Hello. General McKenzie, can you
just answer for me, is the U.S. engaged in hostilities against
Iran or Iranian forces?
General McKenzie. No, we are not.
Ms. Slotkin. Do you believe, as CENTCOM commander, that you
have authorization for military force against Iran?
General McKenzie. No, I do not.
Ms. Slotkin. Does the 2001, or 2002, authorization of
military force give you authority to get into hostilities with
Iran?
General McKenzie. With the caveat that you always have the
authority to defend yourselves.
Ms. Slotkin. Of course, self-defense, but from the
authorization.
General McKenzie. No. No, it does not.
Ms. Slotkin. According to the IAEA [International Atomic
Energy Agency] quarterly report that just came out on March
2nd, Tehran now has enough enriched uranium to produce a
nuclear weapon. They reported 220 pounds of enriched uranium,
which is three times what they reported in November 2019.
Today, in addition to more uranium, we have more spinning
centrifuges. The U.N. [United Nations] has been kicked out of
many facilities. In addition, as you noted, Iranian proxies
have become more active. We have had--as you say, we crossed a
critical--I forget your term--a critical threshold with the
attacks, the ballistic missile attacks on the al-Asad Air Base,
which is personally sensitive to me, since my son-in-law's unit
is on that base. Are we more or less safe as a country from
Iran, and are our allies more or less safe than a year ago?
General McKenzie. So, I think I would go from the period of
the exchange in early January. I think since then, we have
established a rough deterrence.
Ms. Slotkin. Just from a year ago, though. I mean, I
respect your best military advice. In terms of a force
protection matter, our allies in the region, ourselves, our
partners, when you look at Iran in totality, particularly the
nuclear file, which we know is the existential threat, are we
more or less safe? Are your forces more or less safe in
theater?
General McKenzie. So I would say we are more safe in
theater now, because last spring, there weren't many forces in
theater. And the fact that the force density was so low was a
major part of the Iranian calculus to act out in the kinetic
sphere.
I think that by the posture we have established in the
theater, really beginning since May of last year, they are far
more constrained than they were a year before then. So yes, I
believe we are safer.
Ms. Slotkin. From the nuclear threat, are our allies and
partners more or less safe from a year ago?
General McKenzie. I would defer to Ms. Wheelbarger on the
nuclear threat.
Ms. Slotkin. I will take that. I want to ask a couple of
questions on Iraq and Syria. We did lose two Marine special
operators. My understanding is it took 6 hours to get to these
guys. Can you help me understand, since I know many of us are
concerned about the golden hour and making sure we get to
forces. What happened? Do we have enough on the ground to
actually protect the forces we have?
General McKenzie. Sure. The terrain was vertical. It is
some of the worst terrain in the world. I monitored it hour by
hour, along with General Pat White. There is no way to do it
any faster than we did it. It is a very tough, difficult
tactical situation. The problems we encountered were not
problems of resources.
Sometimes you fight on hard ground. Sometimes someone falls
a long way and has to be recovered. What you don't want to do
is get somebody else killed in that recovery, or put yourself
in a situation where you are going to put more lives at risk. I
am completely confident the commanders on the ground did
everything they could to get these two folks out as quickly as
possible.
Ms. Slotkin. So should we expect additional--I mean,
hopefully not--but killed in action because of the terrain?
General McKenzie. So there are different kinds of terrain
in Iraq. As you know, this is northeastern Iraq. Terrain is
particularly bad up there. That is partially why ISIS is up
there.
We will continue to operate there. Any time something like
this happens, we take a look at our tactics, techniques, and
procedures to make sure we are going at it at the most
effective way. But, as you know, combat is a clash of human
wills, and sometimes the bad guys are going to have a good day.
Ms. Slotkin. Can you tell me, there are reports in Syria of
drones dropping mortars and grenades on our troops near or
around oilfields. Can you help me understand what is happening
there, and do we have adequate force protection?
General McKenzie. Sure. So we have reports--I don't think
as many as are in the NPR [National Public Radio] report, but
yes, people work Group 1 UASs, which are the small UASs. They
will try to find a way to carry an explosive and fly over
either not necessarily us alone, but the Russians have had some
significant casualties in this regard, as have other nations
that are operating there.
So yes, it is a problem. We look at it very hard. It is one
of my highest priorities.
Ms. Slotkin. Who is operating those drones?
General McKenzie. So, I think probably, in this case, ISIS,
but we are still working that. But if I had to judge today, I
would say it was possibly ISIS, but probably not a state entity
operating the drones.
Ms. Slotkin. Okay. I yield back. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Gallagher.
Mr. Gallagher. Just a quick follow-up. Are those commercial
off-the-shelf DJI drones that they weaponize?
General McKenzie. That would be my guess. As you know, they
are universally available.
Mr. Gallagher. Another follow-up to Ms. Slotkin's
questions. I think we are getting ready later this week to vote
on H.J. Res. [House Joint Resolution] 68, which directs the
President to terminate the use of Armed Forces, use of Armed
Forces for hostilities against Iran, but you have just said we
are not engaged in hostilities against Iran.
So one could say this legislation is unnecessary, but, in
your professional military judgment, what do you assess would
be the impact of this legislation, particularly when it comes
to our deterrent posture with respect to Iran?
General McKenzie. So, sir, I have to confess, I am not
familiar with the--I know the legislation exists. I have not
done a detailed study of it. I know that our ability to deter
Iran effectively comes from two things: our capability and our
will. And so, the ability to demonstrate those two things are
what provides a cognitive effect in the mind of the person you
want to deter that, no, you don't actually want to do something
now.
Mr. Gallagher. I will ask the same question to Ms.
Wheelbarger.
Ms. Wheelbarger. I think I would follow up similarly, that
a signal to any potential adversary that we don't have support
of Congress to defend ourselves, if necessary, would send a
signal that would not be helpful to deterrence.
Mr. Gallagher. And just to reiterate, we are not engaged in
hostilities with Iran, though we retain, as always, inherently,
under Article II, the right to defend ourselves if attacked?
Ms. Wheelbarger. Yes.
Mr. Gallagher. Similarly, are you aware of anything you are
doing today exclusively because of the 2002 AUMF [Authorization
for Use of Military Force]? Not the 2001, the 2002 AUMF. Are
you aware of anything you are doing that relies on the 2002
AUMF?
Ms. Wheelbarger. As you know, that 2002 AUMF provides
budgeting authority for what we are doing in Syria, because the
threat of ISIS emanating from Syria has been a supplemental
justification for our military activity there. Our coalition
forces, for example, rely on the defense of Iraq for their
justification. So it is a mutual sign that we see the threat
from ISIS from Iraq.
I will say, that I think the notification you all received
on the Soleimani strike did include an additional 2002 AUMF
justification for domestic legal basis.
Mr. Gallagher. At the time, we got vague assessments about,
perhaps, some detentions we have related to the 2002 AUMF. For
the record, I disagree with that. I am with you on opposing an
attempt to undermine our deterrent posture with Iran, and I
think that legislation was unnecessary. I think it is far past
time for us to repeal the 2002 AUMF. I think it is doing no
work at all, and it would be a good matter of congressional
hygiene when it comes to war powers, but that is a debate for
another day.
Quickly, I know we have had a lot of discussion about
Afghanistan. General McKenzie, in the PB-21 [President's budget
2021] budget request, it looks like the request for Operation
Freedom's Sentinel is $14 billion, while the request for
enduring OCO [overseas contingency operations] requirements is
$28 billion.
So, to clarify, if all U.S. service members left
Afghanistan, would that $14 billion go down to zero while that
$28 billion would stay roughly the same as other forces
stationed within the CENTCOM AOR would continue to conduct CT
operations?
General McKenzie. Sir, I will have to come back to you on
the details of that. I can tell you, it is my understanding
that that budget does reflect a proposed force level of 8,600
in OFS [Operation Freedom's Sentinel] going forward from, like,
July of this next year. But I will have to take that one for
the record and come back with you with the detailed question
that you just asked.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 101.]
Mr. Gallagher. And then for those who are concerned about
the rapidity of our withdrawal from Afghanistan, I guess to put
it, what vital interests are at stake, if any, in Afghanistan,
and what is the geopolitical importance of Afghanistan?
General McKenzie. So the vital national interest that
threatens us from Afghanistan is the ability of al-Qaida and
ISIS-K to generate attacks against the homeland of the United
States, and against the homelands of our allies and partners.
So we have seen that happen. We know that is not something that
we are talking about as a conditional future possibility. We
know that it has happened in the past.
The best intelligence estimates tell us that if we do not
maintain pressure on those two entities, that in a period of
time--and you can say a year, you could say 2 years, you could
say somewhere in between--they are going to generate the
ability to do external attacks again. And that will manifest
itself here in the United States. That is a vital national
interest.
Mr. Gallagher. And then finally, and most broadly, and I
only have 25 seconds, I know no theater commander is ever going
to argue for less attention and resources, but do you
understand the basic premise of the NDS, which is that, because
China is the pacing threat, INDOPACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific
Command] is the priority theater, not CENTCOM?
General McKenzie. I was the Joint Staff J5, Director of
Strategic Plans and Policy, and the Director of the Joint Staff
during the creation of that document. I was present at the
creation. I am intimately familiar with it.
Mr. Gallagher. A great title for a memoir.
General McKenzie. It is.
Mrs. Davis [presiding]. Ms. Torres Small.
Ms. Torres Small. Thank you, Ms. Chair, thank you, Ranking
Member, and thank you all so much for your service.
General McKenzie, I really appreciated your comments during
your opening statement about how important it is that we be
adaptable to future Iranian threats. And DOD has spent billions
of dollars on kinetic and nonkinetic counterdrone systems to
that effect. These systems are often tested at White Sands
Missile Range, which is in the district that I represent.
However, they have yet to be fielded widely.
And I remain concerned that our operators are under
significant threat from especially small drones and enemy drone
swarms, especially from Iran and its allies and proxies.
Is it accurate that your command is experimenting with new
and more effective counterdrone capabilities that utilize
artificial intelligence and autonomous systems?
General McKenzie. We aggressively pursue anything that will
improve the capabilities, particularly against those Group 1
and 2 UASs, as you mentioned. That is one of the things that
worries me the most in the theater every day, is the
vulnerability of our forces to those small UASs.
Ms. Torres Small. And specifically to the question about AI
[artificial intelligence] and autonomous systems.
General McKenzie. So I am aware of some experimentation on
that. I will have to come back to you on more details on that.
Ms. Torres Small. Okay. I will take that for the record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 101.]
General McKenzie. I will tell you that we have a very broad
set of joint requirements to drive that, so it is possible
there is something there.
Ms. Torres Small. We will take that for the record.
General McKenzie. Certainly.
Ms. Torres Small. It is my understanding there has been
specific testing with WSMR [White Sands Missile Range]. I would
love to look into that further. And I will submit this question
to the record as well, but can you please provide us a plan for
fiscal year 2021 that would enable us to accelerate the efforts
that you are taking?
General McKenzie. Absolutely, I would be delighted to do
that.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 101.]
Ms. Torres Small. Fantastic. And are your command's needs
for effective counterdrone systems being met currently?
General McKenzie. I am convinced the system is generating
as much as it can. The Secretary and I have talked about this.
I own a lot of the systems that are available across the entire
United States inventory. I am not satisfied with where we are,
and I believe we are at great risk because of this.
Ms. Torres Small. Fantastic. So you are also exploring
options that we do not currently own, correct?
General McKenzie. That is correct. We are open to anything.
And a lot of smart people are looking at this. We are not there
yet, but I think the Army having executive agency for this will
actually help in a lot of ways. It will provide a focus to
these efforts. This is a significant threat.
Ms. Torres Small. Thank you so much.
Switching over to Africa briefly, it is estimated that over
the next decade, 7 out of 10 of the world's fastest growing
economies will be in Africa. Against the backdrop of tremendous
opportunity on the continent, China has ramped up its
engagement--and this was distributed to all of us, I think it
is a pretty clear example of China's ramped-up engagement--not
only surpassing the United States as Africa's largest trading
partner, but also expanding its military presence through an
overseas base in Djibouti and increased arms sales. And what is
interesting is this also shows that Djibouti has one of the
largest debts to China on the continent.
So, General Townsend, is it accurate that strategic
investments in development and diplomacy support defense to
demonstrate that the United States is a better partner for
developing countries than China?
General Townsend. Absolutely, they do. At AFRICOM, we work
every day, hand in hand, with our diplomatic partners and our
development partners.
Ms. Torres Small. Thank you so much. And likewise, what are
the national security costs of ceding ground to our competitors
like China, especially in continents like Africa?
General Townsend. Well, as you can see from the diagrams,
Russia and China are competing really hard on the African
continent. I don't believe that we have to outcompete them in
all 53 countries of the AFRICOM AOR, 54 if you include Egypt on
the continent.
You don't have to outcompete them everywhere, but we have
to pick and choose where we need U.S. access and influence in
the future. And there are probably some places where maybe if
they have the edge over us, it is okay. It is not critical for
our national security. So I think that it is very important
that we look at the continent and decide where we are going to
prioritize our efforts.
Ms. Torres Small. Where do you think we are not investing
now that we really should be?
General Townsend. I think in global or great power
competition.
Ms. Torres Small. Within Africa?
General Townsend. Yes. I think we are appropriately focused
right now, and the whole point of this blank slate, or a COCOM
review, that the Secretary is running with the entire
Department is to focus all of our efforts more at global power
competition than we have been in the past. So I think we have
got the right focus.
Ms. Torres Small. I can take that for the record if you
want to supplement any specific locations.
General Townsend. Sure.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 101.]
Ms. Torres Small. Thank you. I yield the remainder of my
time.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
Mr. Byrne.
Mr. Byrne. Let me follow up on that last line of questions,
General. You said we need to prioritize. What would you say the
priorities are?
General Townsend. Well, the Secretary of Defense has given
me clear guidance. The first is to maintain our U.S. ability to
implement our war plans in the world. The second is to compete
with China and Russia. Third is to focus on the violent
extremists, the violent extremist groups that threaten U.S.
interests and U.S. homeland. And fourth is to be prepared to
respond to crises on the African continent.
So those are my priorities from the Secretary of Defense.
They are clear, and we are working through how we adequately
ensure those are adequately resourced.
Mr. Byrne. Maybe I misunderstood what your answer was
before. I thought you were talking about priorities with regard
just to trying to measure up in the competition with Russia and
China. Are there priorities that you have within that?
General Townsend. There are, and they basically revolve
around ensuring we have access and influence in selected parts
of the continent. And I would prefer to take the rest of that
into classified session.
Mr. Byrne. Fair enough. Let me just follow up one more. If
you need to save this for classified as well, that is fine. Do
you feel like you have the resources that you need to meet
those priorities?
General Townsend. Today, I think AFRICOM is adequately
resourced to do what we have been told to do.
Mr. Byrne. Let me ask you about--and maybe you are not the
right person to ask. Let me just ask it anyway. Where are we on
Libya right now?
General Townsend. I will defer to my colleague from the
Department of Defense.
Ms. Wheelbarger. If I could just respond to your previous
line of questioning real quickly, I just want to highlight that
our overall competition with Russia and China on the continent
is a whole-of-government effort more than just the military
tool. We are looking, and we have Prosper Africa, which is a
White House-driven effort to increase economic activity from
our private sector in Africa, find ways for the African
economies to adjust better to, sort of, private sector entities
in the Western model and less just the sort of predatory
funding that the Chinese provide, as well as supplemented by
diplomacy and development aid. So, we do have a very strong
whole-of-government effort that prioritizes more than just the
military component.
I lost your second question. I am sorry.
Mr. Byrne. Libya.
Ms. Wheelbarger. Libya, yes. We are very concerned with
events in Libya. Obviously, it is a location of numerous other
powers competing with each other. You see Russia. You see
Egypt. You see Turkey. Our overarching strategy is to continue
to be able to address the terrorism threat that we see there,
and I think we can effectively address that, while bringing the
diplomacy to bear to bring both sides of, basically, the civil
war together, recognizing that the military tool in Libya needs
to be part of a functional government, and not actually running
that government. So we continue to work with, sort of, both
competing factions, and also try to call on other powers to not
continue to destabilize and ignore arms embargoes that are in
place.
Mr. Byrne. Have things gotten worse or better in the last
year in Libya?
Ms. Wheelbarger. I would assess they have gotten worse.
Mr. Byrne. What are we doing about that?
Ms. Wheelbarger. Well, we are, again, number one priority
for us is the counterterrorism effort. Number two with respect
to the ongoing strife, it is a diplomatic-led effort from our
State Department colleagues, trying to work with our European
partners as well to bring the conflict to an end, given, as I
think General Townsend said earlier, the threat emanating from
Northern Africa is most acutely a European challenge.
But we are very cognizant, especially from the Department
of Defense's perspective of what we see as sort of Russian
encirclement in the eastern Med [Mediterranean Sea], and it is
something that is complicating and a challenge.
Mr. Byrne. With a minute and 10 seconds left, can you tell
me where we are in Yemen?
Ms. Wheelbarger. Yemen. Yes. Once again, the U.S. is trying
to support our diplomatic colleagues at the State Department
and the U.N., led by Martin Griffiths, in his efforts to bring
those competing forces together. We have seen some successes in
the Sweden agreement between the two sides, and some efforts to
have, I wouldn't call it a ceasefire, but minimizing violence.
The Houthis, like the Taliban, are not easily trusted, but we
do see that there is renewed interest, I think, from the Saudi-
led coalition to find an end to the conflict, that we continue
to believe there is no military solution to it, it has to be a
diplomatic/political solution.
And I will just also add, we continue to support our Saudi
and UAE partners and how they need to defend themselves against
the UAV [unmanned aerial vehicle] and ballistic missile
challenges coming out of Yemen.
Mr. Byrne. Thank you. I yield back.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
Mr. Crow.
Mr. Crow. Thank you, Chairwoman.
Thank you to all of you for your testimony and continued
service.
I would like to start by clarifying a timeline issue that I
have been struggling with a little bit. The administration
directed General Miller to conduct an assessment of troop
withdrawal in Afghanistan last year. Is that correct?
General McKenzie. [No verbal response.]
Mr. Crow. And based on that assessment, he came up with an
8,600 number, is that correct? I am sorry, I can't hear you.
General McKenzie. That is correct. That is correct.
Mr. Crow. General Miller told a group of us when we were in
Afghanistan in October, and then again during testimony in
December, that that 8,600 drawdown was going to occur
regardless of whether or not there was an agreement with the
Taliban. Is that your understanding as well?
General McKenzie. No, that is not my understanding. Our
understanding is this was driven--this was a branch plan that
we held. We could adopt it if directed to do so, but we didn't
have clear guidance to do it until recently.
So we were not planning to do this until we received
Presidential direction. That may seem like a very fine point,
but it is actually a big deal. We have plans for a lot of
things. We had a plan to go to 8,600.
Mr. Crow. It is a big deal. So you are saying that the
8,600 drawdown was only going to occur if there was a peace
agreement with the Taliban. Is that what you are saying?
General McKenzie. What I am saying from the military side,
we were going to go to 8,600 when directed to do so by national
leadership of the United States. I defer the rest of that,
actually, to Ms. Wheelbarger here.
Ms. Wheelbarger. I will just add, I do think, based on
General Miller's advice, we were prepared and planned to go to
8,600. And the Secretary was prepared to adjust the force
posture, in the absence of an agreement, if that was in our
national security interest, but no decision had been made to do
so.
Mr. Crow. Independent of an agreement with the Taliban?
Ms. Wheelbarger. Yes. He was prepared to do that if it
looked like it was necessary, or appropriate for us, given our
desire to instill readiness in the force, and being able to
achieve the mission.
Mr. Crow. As of October of 2019, was it your understanding
that that drawdown was to occur?
Ms. Wheelbarger. No.
Mr. Crow. Okay. How about December of 2019?
General McKenzie. It was a contingency, but it was--we
didn't have a date to start it and no intent to execute it
until directed. We had no direction to do so.
Mr. Crow. Well, then the folks in this committee are
getting contradictory information, and I would recommend that
you clear it up within the Department of Defense.
Secondly, I had the opportunity to review the entire
agreement, including the annexes. Two thousand four hundred
Americans have given their lives in Afghanistan. Over 20,000
have been wounded. This is America's war, not any one
administration's war.
Are there plans within the administration to release the
entire agreement so the American public can see under what
terms we are going to be withdrawing from Afghanistan?
Ms. Wheelbarger. My understanding is the two side
agreements, or annexes, are not public for operational
requirements, and I would defer to my colleagues on why that is
the case, and that they are not intended to be secret from the
committees, but continue to be not public to the public.
General McKenzie. I would echo that.
Mr. Crow. I have read the entire agreement, and I see no
reason why they could not be released. And I just want to be
very clear that I believe, as do many people on this committee,
that the American public deserve to know under what terms we
are withdrawing from Afghanistan.
Lastly, in October, when a group of us was in Afghanistan,
it was very clear to us by everybody that we talked to that the
Afghan National Defense and Security Forces was incapable of
standing up on its own any time in the next couple of years,
yet under the plan, we will completely withdraw, including
support services and contractors, within 14 months. If that
occurs, will the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces be
capable of standing up on its own?
General McKenzie. That is going to be another discovery-
based process as we go forward. So we are going to go to 8,600
by the summer. Conditions on the ground will dictate if we go
below that. If conditions on the ground are not permissive, my
advice would be not to continue that reduction. That would not
be my decision, that would be my advice.
So that will be based on performance of the Afghan
military, their ability to incorporate the Taliban if the
Taliban is going to be incorporated at all. I will have an
opportunity to give advice on this. I had an opportunity to
give advice on the decisions that have just been made. So these
are not things that will happen in and of themselves.
Mr. Crow. So if 14 months from now, the Afghan National
Defense and Security Forces are not capable of standing up on
their own and defending Afghanistan and the government, it will
be your advice not to withdraw those support services?
General McKenzie. Absolutely, that would be my advice, but
that is a future contingency and there are a lot of--it is far
more complex than just that. But, yes, and I will have an
opportunity to give that advice.
Mr. Crow. And what are we doing--pivoting to Iraq very
briefly, what are we doing now to protect the Syrian Kurds,
stateless persons, and Syrian nationals who fought with us and
make sure that them and their families are secure against
attacks in the region?
General McKenzie. Sir, as you know, the area that we
control in Syria with our Kurdish partners is generally what we
call the eastern Syria security area. We have trained and
continue to train significant internal security forces to
maintain local security. We can be answerable for that through
our SDF [Syrian Democratic Forces] partners and through our
other partners there. I am confident that we have measures in
place to protect them now. I am obviously less confident if you
go into western Syria, because we don't have the ability to
reach out to there.
Mr. Crow. Thank you. I yield back.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
Mr. Brooks.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you. I have got four quick points before
I get to my questions. Point number one, General McKenzie, in
your written testimony, you state that, quote, ``All wars have
a political end,'' end quote. I think that is very insightful.
Number two, the United States has been in Afghanistan the
time equivalent of a little bit more than five World War IIs,
five World War IIs. That is a remarkable statistic.
Number three, in my judgment, our military has performed
superbly, and we won in Afghanistan. We effectively destroyed
al-Qaida's operational capability in the early years of the
war, we toppled the Taliban government, and we killed Osama bin
Laden.
Number four, I am skeptical that the Afghan people
adequately appreciate America's sacrifice of American lives and
treasury on their behalf. Perhaps you have a different view on
that, but that is my view is, I don't think that we are
properly appreciated for the sacrifices that we have engaged in
in Afghanistan.
With that kind of as a backdrop, the question: The text of
the Afghan Peace Agreement appears to commit the United States
to withdrawing its forces within 14 months, subject to
conditions on the ground.
General McKenzie, why was 14 months chosen?
General McKenzie. I would defer to the negotiator to arrive
at that, to arrive at that point. I cannot answer the question
why 14 versus 13 versus 22 months. I do not know the answer to
that question, sir.
Mr. Brooks. Does 14 months allow America to withdraw its
forces and equipment from Afghanistan safely?
General McKenzie. It does if conditions are applied to that
withdrawal, and we hold to the conditions.
Mr. Brooks. What is the least amount of time needed to
safely withdraw American forces and equipment from Afghanistan?
General McKenzie. I prefer to talk about that in a closed
session, and I would be happy to do that.
Mr. Brooks. Ms. Wheelbarger, the same three questions.
First, why was 14 months chosen?
Ms. Wheelbarger. Unfortunately, I do have to defer to the
State Department negotiators as well. I don't have insight.
Mr. Brooks. Do you have a judgment as to whether that 14
months allows America adequate time to safely withdraw our
forces and equipment?
Ms. Wheelbarger. I would trust my military colleagues to do
all they can to ensure any removal or retrograde of our troops
is done with force protection being their number one priority.
Mr. Brooks. And do you also have no opinion that you are
willing to express in this setting about the minimum amount of
time required for us to safely withdraw our troops and our
equipment, salvageable equipment, from Afghanistan?
Ms. Wheelbarger. I would assess that 14 months is probably
enough time to withdraw safely. I just want to second what we
have said before, which is 14 months is aspirational. Trying to
set sort of a timeline suggestion that both sides can see their
objectives potentially being fulfilled and, therefore, giving
us the conditions that we feel is in our national security
interest to actually withdraw.
Again, all of this is going to be based on whether the
commitments are made and the security situation is such that we
can continue to defend our own interests.
Mr. Brooks. General Townsend, moving to Africa, what, in
your judgment, are the most important flashpoints, or critical
areas, in Africa at this time that we should focus our primary
efforts on?
General Townsend. First, I would say Somalia and
specifically southern Somalia in the Kenya border region in
southern part of Somalia. Secondly, I would say in West Africa,
in the Sahel region, in the tri-border region that is formed by
Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, and where that descends down to
the littoral states.
Mr. Brooks. Back to General McKenzie, if the Afghan talks
do not begin as scheduled, will the United States delay its
troop withdrawal and, if so, for how long? And perhaps Ms.
Wheelbarger would be better to answer that, but I will defer to
each of you.
General McKenzie. Sir, I would defer to her. But I would
also point out to you that that withdrawal has begun.
Mr. Brooks. About 3,000 troops, more or less?
General McKenzie. It is a small number. It is not linear.
It will go--you know, it won't be a certain number every week
as units come and go, but it has begun.
Ms. Wheelbarger. Again, in my conversations with the
Secretary, his comfort level with that withdrawal decision was
not just based on the agreement, but based on the assessment
that we can continue to achieve our missions with that force
posture. If something on the ground changes in light of the
Taliban not keeping its commitments, not just on the inter-
Afghan agreement but on their use of violence, it is a decision
he is willing to readdress.
Mr. Brooks. Well, I pray that we will not be there
indefinitely. Thank you for your service.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
Ms. Houlahan.
Ms. Houlahan. Thank you, and thank you all for being here
today.
My question has to do with women and girls, the beginning
part to my question. The Women, Peace, and Security Act
reflects the growing body of evidence confirming that the
inclusion of women in the peace process helps to reduce
conflict and to advance stability.
Research shows that higher levels of gender equality are
associated with lower propensity for conflict. Data from
countries around the world demonstrate that women's inclusion
in peacekeeping units, police forces, and in the security
sector improves accountability and decreases abuse against
civilians.
So one of my first questions--and this goes along with Mr.
Crow's question is: Can you first comment on whether or not
there was any aspect of the agreement with the Taliban that
related to women and to girls?
Ms. Wheelbarger. Based on my conversations with my State
Department colleagues, the focus on this being an inclusive
inter-Afghan agreement would include the necessity that women,
in particular, are part of the peace negotiations, inter-Afghan
peace negotiations.
Ms. Houlahan. Gentlemen, do you have any----
General McKenzie. I would associate my remarks with that.
The only other point I would say is I particularly agree with
you, the inclusion of women in policing activities and low-
level tactical activities is extremely helpful. It is difficult
to achieve in Afghanistan, as you are aware. But our inability
to better--than we are having--the results we are getting is
not from a lack of trying. We are trying very hard on that.
Ms. Houlahan. Sir? I know you can't talk on that area.
General Townsend. I can't speak to the Taliban issue.
Ms. Houlahan. So my understanding is, that there is no
inclusion of women and girls in the agreement, in any of the
aspects of the agreement. And, so, I find that really
disappointing, and I don't know who to aim my ire at. And so, I
just would like to understand that better. And maybe offline,
if we have the opportunity to talk about that, I would
appreciate it, because it certainly seems that everybody--and I
was on the trip with Mr. Crow. Everyone who we were with
assured us that that was important. You know, we had
opportunities to meet with a lot of folks about that particular
issue, and it would be really disappointing if that was the
case.
Can you comment, now, on how AFRICOM and CENTCOM have
engaged women in counterterrorism efforts in your regions? How
are you working to make sure that we do continue to include
this important part of our population?
General Townsend. Sure. So women and peace and security is
sort of part of our DNA at AFRICOM. I actually have a full-time
gender adviser on our staff there. This is an issue that is
embedded in every training event we do on the continent, or in
Europe, for example. And so, just three quick examples.
We had a recent communication symposium which I spoke at
where we brought women in the armed forces from African nations
to Germany for a symposium. We conducted a female intel officer
course on the continent, and we just had a fairly large-scale
exercise called Flintlock. It is a special operations forces
exercise. It had a women's and peace and security component to
it. So we worked as hard to impress upon our African partners
the importance of this.
Ms. Houlahan. Thank you, sir.
General McKenzie. So I would echo what General Townsend
said. You know, we have two tactical areas of operation where
ability of women to interact at the tactical level is critical
to obtain cultural entry into locations. So on the U.S. and on
the coalition side, fully embedded. It is a critical capability
that we simply cannot do without. And I am referring
specifically to Afghanistan, Iraq, and parts of Syria as well.
Outreach to our partners, it is better in some areas than
others. Afghanistan, there are profound cultural barriers to
doing it. We work it across the entire theater. It is integral
to all our training activities, and so, I am a very big
supporter of it.
Ms. Houlahan. Thank you. Ms. Wheelbarger.
Ms. Wheelbarger. Sure. I will just add I myself have
visited the female commandos that work with Scotty Miller, and
they are impressive and important. I will also add, from my
perspective from my position, one of the things I try to put a
lot of energy to is meeting with parliamentarians, particularly
female parliamentarians, around the world, because including
female voices in more than just security structures, but,
actually, in representational democracy is part of what we
should be pushing forward. So that is a key point that I strive
to do.
Ms. Houlahan. And I couldn't obviously agree with you more.
And I did have the opportunity when I was over with the CROWDEL
[Congressman Crow congressional delegation] is what we called
it to have the opportunity to meet with our side, who is
leading the charge on women and girls issues.
I only have 30 seconds left, so I will just ask this
question for the record. General Votel, your predecessor,
General McKenzie, stated that cyber will be integrated through
all operations. However, CENTCOM continues to be challenged by
constrained resources, including trained cybersecurity
personnel.
I was wondering if you could comment on whether or not you
continue to feel the effects of constrained cyber resources and
trained personnel, and how you would propose to solve that
issue. And the same for, you know, both theaters. And I only
have 4 seconds, so if it is okay, I will just take that for the
record.
General McKenzie. We will come back to you on the record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 101.]
Ms. Houlahan. I yield back.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Madam and gentlemen, thank you for being here. One thing I
do want to mention, I am a little taken aback that we have left
Sudan on the State Sponsors of Terrorism list along with
countries like Iran. That country has come a long way since the
incidents with Darfur. And I am disappointed that the State
Department put additional conditions on them coming off of that
list as we look to work by, with, and through countries in that
region. If we leave them on the State Sponsors of Terrorism,
they are left with no choice but to move towards China and
Russia. And so, I hope that any assistance you can give us with
helping to resolve that you will do.
As we talk about China, I am extremely concerned,
especially about the natural resource extraction. And as we met
with you in peacekeeping mission in Mali, they expressed
concerns that, effectively, the theft of the natural resources
of many of the countries would in the end lead to civil war in
many of those countries, and I hope that we are attempting to
make sure that the people of those countries get a square deal
as much as possible.
General Townsend, thank you for your hospitality as some
colleagues of mine visited AFRICOM. I have been in that area a
couple of times. One was with General Furness at Djibouti for
approximately a week, went to Manda Bay, spent some time in
Somalia, Mogadishu.
I am a little taken aback at the lack of assets at that
base for it to be under the command of somebody. I believe he
was a two-star at the time. There are just very few assets in
Djibouti, and I am concerned about the lack of assets available
to our teams in the region.
General Townsend, you were very kind in providing resources
to my colleagues and I to travel to see a couple of your ODA
[Operational Detachment-Alpha] teams in Africa. We saw one ODA
operating with the 127 Echo program, one team operating
without. Could you speak to the members of the committee about
the differences in the teams that operate with the 127 Echo
program, and those that operate without it?
General Townsend. Sure. Congressman, first, you know, you
asked about--let me kind of double back to something you said a
moment ago about we hope that we are helping these countries
get a square deal with the Chinese.
The Department of State has an initiative where they review
contracts with these countries. It is a free service. Bring
your contracts in. We will read the Chinese version, we will
read the version in your language, and we will tell you where
the traps are, and if there are differences in the versions. I
think this has gone a long way to help some of the countries on
the continent avoid the debt trap diplomacy problem.
To your question about resources in Africa, you know, I
have served around the globe, a lot of time in CENTCOM. In
AFRICOM, our troops and our efforts there are the most thinly
resourced of any I have ever encountered, or had to contend
with. That said, we are not in the lead in any place on the
African continent. We support our international partners,
African partners, European partners, et cetera, AMISOM [African
Union Mission in Somalia], U.N., AU [African Union] partners.
So I think if our troops are frustrated, could they do more
if they had more? Absolutely, they could, but it is not their
place to do more. It is their place to support our partners.
That is our role. And sometimes that is a little hard to get
our more junior leaders to understand, because they know what
they can do, especially veterans of other theaters know what
they could do if they had more resources. So we are
constrained, but I think it is by deliberate choice.
Your specific question about 127 Echo and, for example, a
triple 3, 333-resourced force are significant. The 127 Echo
essentially has full resourcing, because it is a force that is
operating with U.S. oversight and control, and the 333 program
is a partner force. They are just different sections authorized
by Congress as to what we can provide those forces.
Mr. Scott. General, I am very short on time. I, again, want
to thank you, but I do want to mention this, and this is not a
military mission. It would be more of a State Department
mission.
We are bringing men in, predominantly men in that area, and
we are training them in military tactics, and they have
effectively, a third-grade education level. And we have them 7
days a week, 24 hours a day. I do think that it would be
worthwhile for the United States, with other governments,
through some type of aid program, to provide educational
resources for those men while they are there on those bases.
Otherwise, we are training somebody and then releasing them
without an education.
The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you.
Mr. Brown.
Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me just preface by stating the obvious. Africa is a
large continent, 3\1/2\ times the size of the United States, 54
nations, very diverse in its challenges and opportunities. So
as I ask my questions, I don't want anyone to think that I am
confused that it is, you know, one nation and homogeneous or
monolithic.
General Townsend, I think you are right, you know, that our
soldiers may not be--you know, I am quoting you--not their
place to do more, but I will say that after meeting with you in
Stuttgart with Representative Scott when we went to Africa,
USAID [United States Agency for International Development] said
they could do more if there were more of you. The State
Department mission said that they could do more if there were
more of you. So there is a lot more that could be happening in
Africa, in terms of development and diplomacy, with a larger
military presence.
Let me ask you this question: You know, and I really
appreciate this place mat that you provided. You provided a
classified version when we were in Stuttgart. It is scary when
you look at the trendline of China's presence, both, you know,
the infrastructure, the business investments, the arms sales.
African nations don't want to be caught in the middle between
the United States and China or Russia.
But my question is, what will the DOD, AFRICOM, do to
ensure, and ultimately deliver, on the desire to be the
preferred partner for African nations? And while you are
answering that, maybe you can, once again, just define great
power competition with China in Africa.
General Townsend. Thanks, Congressman. So the first part of
your question about great power, or global power competition,
as I like to refer to it. Really, it is all about gaining and
maintaining influence. That is what that competition is all
about. So on some future rainy day, we have the access and
influence that we need. So we are in a struggle with China and
Russia to gain and maintain that influence.
What they want from us--we can't compete with China. We are
not going to build stadiums and railroads and ports and
palaces, which are all things China builds on the continent.
But what they do want from us is they want help building their
capacity, their security forces, and they want our help with
the counterterrorism problem that they have.
So even though some people may not necessarily agree with
this, I believe in Africa, building partner capacity and
counterterrorism efforts, or counter-VEO [violent extremist
organization] efforts, are a way we do global or great power
competition in Africa, because that is what our partners are
hungry for. They come to us because of our capacity to do that,
they come to us because of our skill, and they come to us
because of how we treat them and our values.
Mr. Brown. Let me interject with another question. Can you
briefly describe how you are going to deploy the 1st Security
Force Assistance Brigade that you now have in your AOR?
General Townsend. Sure. So I can cover this in more detail
in the classified session, but we have them. They are already--
some of them are already on the continent doing--they have been
leaning forward since about October, and they moved very
quickly once we got approval.
We are going to deploy them in some countries with
persistent presence. In some of our highest priority countries,
we will have persistent presence with those partners, and in
other countries, we will have sort of an episodic or a
scheduled presence.
And so, in some places they will take up--they will elevate
our game, because they can advise and train at a higher level
than some of our soft forces that are actually training, you
know, units of action at the small unit level.
Mr. Brown. Let me see if I can get this one in. I know it
is an austere environment. And when I was there in August, I
mean, it takes weeks to get major end items in place, I mean,
if not months. It takes weeks to get repair parts to the ODA
teams.
Now that you are bringing in the SFAB [Security Force
Assistance Brigade], I mean, what infrastructure needs, what
are the unmet infrastructure needs or logistical support needs
on the continent?
General Townsend. I don't think that the SFAB has any
additional requirements that other elements of DOD have on the
ground. Theirs are basically the same. We will make sure they
have the right support, the right security. Wherever we send
them in Africa, they will be properly supported.
I think they are going to probably--if any of them are
veterans of Afghanistan or Iraq, they are going to be shocked
when they first arrive by the level of resourcing I was
referring to earlier, how thinly resourced Africa is. It is
going to be--it is very austere, very expeditionary, as you
have seen with your own eyes.
Mr. Brown. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. I just want to emphasize a point
that General Townsend made, Mr. Brown elicited, is, what is the
value add that we have to build relationships in Africa? China
is throwing all kinds of money around. But it really is, during
my trip to Tunisia, actually, this is a huge point. I mean,
they want us and need us as the most reliable partner on
security. That is something that Russia and China really can't
offer. They don't have the sustainable equipment. They don't
have the training. It is a skill set that we bring that helps
us build that relationship. Obviously, there are other things
that we do with diplomacy and USAID and all of that, but that
security relationship is a way to build partnerships in Africa
without a question.
Mr. Rogers.
Mr. Rogers. First, let me thank all of you for your service
to our country and for making yourself available today.
General McKenzie, in your unfunded priorities list, you
address a need for more drones and surveillance to increase
your ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance]
capability for base resilience and defense. Is that something,
are you trying to fill a gap or you just don't have enough ISR
capability at present?
General McKenzie. Sir, every combatant commander wants more
ISR capability. Their current plans to reduce the number of
particularly MQ-9 drones that are available, we would like to
see if there is a way that we can keep those in the theater and
continue to use them.
I recognize that there is a pressing requirement for those
drones worldwide, and there are other places that they can be
used. Nonetheless, we believe we have a genuine requirement for
them, both in the VEO fight, as well as positioned against
Iran, even though the MQ-9 is a vulnerable platform against
some Iranian capabilities. Nonetheless, particularly in places
like the Strait of Hormuz and other areas, it gives us
visibility and intelligence-gathering capabilities that we
might not otherwise have.
Mr. Rogers. Was this a request that you put in your base
request list, and was pushed to UFR [unfunded requirements]
list, or was it initially put in the UFR list?
General McKenzie. Sir, I will have to come back to you on
the details of that. I believe we are responding to a very
reasonable, understandable desire by the Air Force to divest
its legacy systems in their request. So we were reacting to
that. I will have to come back to you with a detailed answer to
that, and I will.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 102.]
Mr. Rogers. Great. And I very much appreciate your
Birmingham, Alabama accent. I am glad you haven't lost it in
all your years of service around the world.
General McKenzie. Sir, thank you.
Mr. Rogers. I picked up on it real quick.
General Townsend, your recent completion of the Flintlock
exercise 2020 with your African partners, tell me what, if
anything, that did to increase your capability to combat
violent extremists in the region?
General Townsend. Thanks, Congressman. I would like to also
join General McKenzie in his comments about the ISR. We are in
the same boat as CENTCOM. So we understand that those resources
could be used elsewhere in the world. We also know that the Air
Force would like to transition to hire in more capable
platforms, and they are going to have to divest some of the
lower-end stuff. But the lower-end stuff works really well for
us in AFRICOM and in CENTCOM.
On your question about Flintlock, so Flintlock is an
exercise for special operations forces, and it is very much
directly focused on counterterrorism. It is about improving and
building partner capacity. So these countries come together,
and we operated this year in Mauritania and in Senegal were the
two main areas of focus.
And I think that--well, you can just read from some of the
quotes from some of the press reports of the participants how
much they thought they got out of Flintlock. Flintlock is one
of our more successful exercises, and I think it helps build
capacity for counterterrorism operations in Africa writ large.
Mr. Rogers. And it is an annual exercise?
General Townsend. It is.
Mr. Rogers. How many years has it been taking place?
General Townsend. I am sorry, I didn't hear the question.
Mr. Rogers. How many years has it been taking place?
General Townsend. I don't know. I will have to take that
and get back to you on that.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 102.]
Mr. Rogers. Ms. Wheelbarger, tell me about the Department's
objectives with Syria, and how they comply with the overarching
objectives of CENTCOM AOR?
Ms. Wheelbarger. The military's objectives or the
Department's objective in Syria remains the D-ISIS, enduring
defeat of ISIS. The U.S. Government has broader objectives in
Syria, which includes also political settlement along the lines
of 2254, the U.N. process, as well as having fewer Iranian
forces in Syria.
But the military component is the D-ISIS campaign. And we
have, you know, never--we have continued that fight
continuously, even while we repositioned our forces, based on
Presidential guidance over the years.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you. I yield back.
The Chairman. Okay. We are going to do Mr. Carbajal and Mr.
Gallego, and then we are going to go do the classified brief.
So, Mr. Carbajal.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and welcome to all the
witnesses.
China has steadily increased its influence in Africa
through its Belt and Road Initiative, BRI, showing the
effectiveness of soft power. China has pledged $60 billion in
new financing for African countries, and is now the continent's
biggest trading partner, with Sino-African trade topping $200
billion per year. While there is bipartisan criticism for BRI,
the U.S. must be able to offer an alternative narrative.
Secretary Wheelbarger, what actions has DOD taken in
conjunction with other Federal agencies to offer an alternative
to BRI in Africa? I know this was raised earlier, but I am not
sure the answers were as substantive as they can be.
Ms. Wheelbarger. Of course. So, the administration does
have a policy to increase trade and development on the
continent. It is called Prosper Africa. I think the efforts are
primarily focused, again, other agencies, but the idea is how
can we make the economic models within Africa comport more with
our industry standards, or our economic way of doing business
rather than just sort of the Chinese way of just sort of
flowing in money.
We do, of course, recognize that a lot of this has to do
with how we speak to our partners and how we can highlight that
their short-term economic gains in the near term might result
in long-term loss of sovereignty. And we have seen this in
other countries.
And I think many of our African partners are actually
starting to see that that is affecting them, that the economic
benefits that they think they are going to get rapidly aren't
necessarily accruing to them specifically. Many Chinese
companies that are there, they don't hire a local workforce.
They are really just extracting the resources and not providing
a lot of benefit to the countries themselves.
So it is not just what we can do in addition to bringing
economic might in, but, also, highlighting that they are
actually setting themselves up for a long-term challenging
relationship if they are going to rely on Chinese monetary
investment.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
General Townsend, has BRI undermined or threatened
partnerships or security cooperation on the continent?
General Townsend. I think the short answer is yes. I think
that BRI is just part of a larger strategic approach that China
has not only to Africa, but the world, but in Africa it is
playing out.
Their approach is Belt and Road Initiative, bilateral
engagement, multilateral engagement. It is very much a whole-
of-government approach. It is easier for them to orchestrate
their whole-of-government, maybe, than it is for us to do so.
And they are putting a lot of money in.
So, without question, they are able to buy influence in
Africa, not only from partners maybe who are willing to take
bribes, but they are willing to buy--they can buy influence
from even pretty strong partners, because they are partners in
need.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
I want to turn to climate change and its nexus with our
national security. Nine of 10 most climate change vulnerable
states are in sub-Saharan Africa, and in a region whose total
population is expected to double between now and 2050.
General Townsend, I am sure you have considered how the
changing climate will impact security needs and operations. How
are you managing the risk of regional instability due to the
impacts of climate change, such as increasingly dangerous
natural disasters and food and water insecurity?
General Townsend. Well, Congressman, as you said, we see
the effects of climate change all over Africa today.
Desertification, the creeping southward of the Sahara Desert is
one of those. Competition for water, which has a potential to
erupt into state-on-state conflict in a couple places. And we
are dealing with locust swarms. Not only do we have
coronavirus, we have locust swarms on the African continent in
East Africa right now.
So these are all problems that we have to deal with. And
they don't really have military solutions. This is where we
have to work with our partners, not only in our own State
Department, in our own USAID, but, also, NGOs [nongovernmental
organizations] and international partners as well.
Mr. Carbajal. Do you feel we are being effective, taking a
whole-of-government approach with all these different agencies,
addressing this issue?
General Townsend. Well, I think some of these challenges
defy solutions by any one nation, desertification and the water
competition, for example. With the smaller scale problem of
Ebola and locust swarms, I think we are.
There is an international effort to help, and I know the
United States is contributing to both of those. And, in fact,
in the case of Ebola, the countries that are dealing with that
have developed a self-capacity to handle that problem without a
lot of outside assistance. That is an example of where we have
helped.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, General.
Mr. Chair, I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Gallego.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you.
Ms. Wheelbarger, we have heard a number of data points
about our African partners, AFRICOM itself getting less
attention and funding. What is the risk that we are accepting
in doing so?
Ms. Wheelbarger. I will take this opportunity to highlight
that the Secretary has not made any decisions other than moving
the SFAB into the continent. He is continuing to review all
options, weighing that against the risk. And I think, from my
perspective, one of the primary ones is the long-term risk of
the evolution and metastasization of terrorist organizations.
They may look one way today, but if you don't maintain the
pressure where they exist, they may evolve in the future where
they have both the capability and the will to attack us in the
homeland. So our ability to maintain focus across the continent
is really necessary in this risk calculation.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you.
General Townsend, what is your opinion on this increased
risk that she identified?
General Townsend. I think I agree with her assessment of
the risk, and I also agree with her characterization that so
far, no decisions have been made other than we have gained an
SFAB for Africa, AFRICOM.
Mr. Gallego. To follow up, General Townsend, I noticed on
the front page of your testimony you have a statement that
says: ``A secure and stable Africa is an enduring American
interest.''
So would you agree that scaling back our already modest
Africa presence will mean that your command will do less--and
will be less resourced to fight for the national interests, our
national interests on the African continent?
General Townsend. Congressman, I agree that if we have less
resources, we will be able to do less.
Mr. Gallego. So then just to follow up, and this could be
to anyone at the table here, if AFRICOM is realigning to deal
with the great power competition, why is the security
cooperation budget for the continent planning for a $72 million
cut? Where will these programs be cut? What parts of the
continent will these be cut from? Because it seems it is
contradicting everything that we are hearing. If we are going
to realign to, you know, focus on big power competition, then
we should show that in the budget also.
Ms. Wheelbarger, do you want to start?
Ms. Wheelbarger. I will start by just highlighting again,
the zero-based review that the Secretary is doing looking at
resources in Africa, his intent is to see if the missions that
we recognize are critical and need to achieve can be done in
more efficient or effective ways. This doesn't necessarily mean
absorbing more risk. It could mean just is there a better way
to do the mission that we are already doing.
With respect to security cooperation writ large, we have a
lot of global requirements on security cooperation. My
perspective is, particularly the theaters that have low
posture, you need to look at other tools that you have at your
disposal. And, therefore, security cooperation assistance, 333
programs, for example, are invaluable to maintaining the
security partnerships we have. With respect to the specific
programmatic numbers that you brought up, unless General
Townsend has specifics, I think we are probably going to have
to take the specifics for the record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 102.]
Mr. Gallego. General Townsend.
General Townsend. I would just add, I think some of the
most important programs that we have are programs like FMF
[Foreign Military Financing], IMET [International Military
Education and Training], FMS [Foreign Military Sales], 333
programs, State Partnership Programs. A lot of those programs I
am advocating for are not even Department of Defense programs.
Those are tremendously valuable for us, especially in global
power competition.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 102.]
Mr. Gallego. It just seems like $75 million compared to how
big our budget is seems like, you know, it would be very naive
for us to just cut that funding, considering I think it does do
good work.
Just last question, because they are probably our closest
allies on the continent and have the most experience. Have you
had discussions with our French allies about their posture if
we make decisions about our posture in Africa altogether? Ms.
Wheelbarger.
Ms. Wheelbarger. Yes. The Secretary has had several
meetings with his counterpart Minister Parly. She understands
the Secretary's need to restore readiness to the force and
review all missions and all support to foreign partners. The
French do highlight, of course, the importance of U.S. enabling
support to their operations. Just some capabilities they simply
do not have. And what we have been doing is trying to encourage
them to speed up their decision making on having those
capabilities for themselves so they no longer are reliant on
United States support.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you. I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you. That will conclude this portion of
the hearing. We will give you like a 10-minute break and we
will reconvene at 12:10 at 2212.
Thank you, we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:01 p.m., the committee proceeded in
closed session.]
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
March 10, 2020
=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 10, 2020
=======================================================================
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
=======================================================================
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
March 10, 2020
=======================================================================
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. GALLAGHER
General McKenzie. The FY21 President's Budget (PB) assumed a DOD
presence in Afghanistan of 8,600 for the entire year, from 1 October
2020 to 30 September 2021. Should the conditions support a further
reduction of troops, and under the direction of the POTUS, the
Department, with significant input from the Services, will review the
budget request. Any reductions to the request (savings) will depend
upon drawdown timelines, maintenance schedules for redeploying
equipment, base closure costs, the amount of Afghanistan Security
Forces Fund that must be retained to support the Afghanistan National
Defense Security Forces, etc. There is no scenario where the OFS FY21
request would go to $0. [See page 24.]
______
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TORRES SMALL
General McKenzie. Currently, the U.S. Central Command is employing
Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-UAS) in response to urgent
operational needs using existing and commercially available
capabilities. Some examples do exist of AI supporting C-UAS systems to
detect, classify, and identify small UAS and separate friend from foe.
AI has also been shown to support frequency spectrum management and
electronic warfare attack against adaptive threat systems. This becomes
even more critical when dealing with swarms of systems. I can provide
more details under a separate cover. [See page 25.]
General McKenzie. The Secretary of Defense designated the Secretary
of the Army as the DOD Executive Agent (EA) for Counter-Small Unmanned
Aircraft Systems (C-sUAS). In this capacity, the EA will lead,
accelerate, and streamline the DOD enterprise C-sUAS effort in
coordination with the Services, Joint Staff, and OSD.
The Joint Staff and the Services are still working to review and
refine the objective Joint C-UAS requirements. These requirements will
help shape the future C-UAS capability and will determine how
technologies such as AI and autonomous systems might best fit into that
future solution. [See page 25.]
General Townsend. The national security cost to the U.S., our
allies and partners include threat to our operational security and
deployed forces in active theaters and potential loss of access and
influence in regions and chokepoints critical to U.S. security and
economic interest, for example; the Bab al-Mandeb, Suez Canal, the
Straits of Sicily, Strait of Gibraltar, and the Mozambique Channel.
These considerations have driven the engagements of U.S. Africa Command
with countries such as Morocco and Djibouti, where China has also
sought to expend their influence. [See page 26.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. HOULAHAN
General McKenzie. Cyber is a dynamic, man-made battle space that
requires a concerted effort across all COCOMs, Services, and Agencies,
as well as our allies and partners, in order to enable a collective
defense. My focus remains on ensuring Cyber is integrated throughout
all operations while simultaneously ensuring we are postured to protect
our critical assets from cyber-attacks. This requires a highly
specialized workforce that not only understands the Information
Technology complexities and terrain, but also the adversaries'
capabilities and intent. We are closely aligned with U.S. Cyber Command
(CYBERCOM) and their subordinate organizations, Joint Force
Headquarters-Cyber, and the Cyber Operations Integrated Planning
Element. They have established an effective construct to oversee cyber
mission force readiness, employ offensive and defensive cyber forces,
and enhance situational awareness. However, cyber is still a growing
sector of the multi-domain approach to our future force employment and
currently, the cyber workforce is still a high demand but low density
operational force. CYBERCOM is undertaking a series of studies on the
capacity of the cyber mission force and their ability to meet current
and future demands. I am confident that the investments made thus far
have enhanced our readiness, as we are collectively committed to
developing adaptive programs that will allow us to outpace our
adversaries. [See page 33.]
______
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GALLEGO
Ms. Wheelbarger. For FY 2021, The Secretary of Defense is
rebranding the DSCA Security Cooperation Account as the ``National
Defense Strategy Implementation (NDS-I) Account'' to reflect the role
security cooperation plays in advancing the National Defense Strategy
and consolidating multiple funding lines into the account to provide
greater flexibility in executing programs according to NDS objectives.
The Department anticipates this consolidation will result in greater
efficiencies and cost savings through increased scrutiny combined with
active prioritization and coordination to ensure security cooperation
efforts focus on NDS objectives. The Secretary has requested a broad
review of programs globally in order to align resources with our
National Defense Strategy. These reviews ensure programs and readiness
that allows the Department of Defense to accomplish prioritized
objectives. The Department of Defense intends to brief relevant
Congressional Committees, as well as other concerned Members, prior to
implementing any future decisions. [See page 41.]
General Townsend. I would just add, I think some of the most
important programs that we have are programs like 333, FMF, FMS, IMET
and the State Partnership Program are critical whole of USG programs we
use for Global Power Competition in Africa. We have collaborated with
the DOD and have reduced the proposed 333 cuts from $72 million to $55
million which shapes our focus in countries such as Nigeria, Chad,
Niger, Morocco, Burkina Faso, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti. We will
continue to prepare and posture additional program opportunities, based
on the NDS priorities, should increases in funding occur this year.
[See page 41.]
______
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS
General McKenzie. The Department funds ISR requirements from both
base and OCO funding. This specific request would be temporary in
nature, to support operational taskings and military operations to
defeat ISIS, deter Iran, and ensure freedom of navigation across the
AOR. [See page 37.]
General Townsend. Exercise FLINTLOCK has occurred annually since
2005 in Africa. This year's exercise that just concluded in February of
2020 marked the 16th year of exercise FLINTLOCK in Africa. [See page
38.]
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 10, 2020
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN
Mr. Lamborn. Have you seen a degradation in the effectiveness of
the IRGC Quds Force in Iraq and Syria after the strike which killed
Qasem Soleimani?
We've communicated to Iran and the IRGC our redline that killing an
American will result in a serious response: we killed Soleimani and
Mohandes in response to their lethal attack on Americans in Iraq.
Senior Taliban leadership appear to believe they can kill U.S. and
Afghan security forces with impunity: what costs will be in imposed on
senior Taliban leaders should they kill an American? Can we use the
IRGC model with the Taliban?
Ms. Wheelbarger. The depth and breadth of relationships Solemani
cultivated over time with a diverse variety of key players in Iraq will
be difficult for anyone else in Iran to replicate. It is still too soon
to determine with confidence if there has been a major change in
Iranian influence in Iraq, but the loss of such a key Iranian player is
likely to decrease that influence in time. We have not seen a change in
IRGC effectiveness in Syria as a result of the Solemani strike. Since
the signing of the Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan between
the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, which is not recognized by the
United States as a state, and is known as the Taliban, and the United
States of America (referred to as the U.S.-Taliban agreement), the
Taliban have ceased attacks targeting U.S. and coalition forces.
Nevertheless, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) places the highest
priority on force protection and remains postured to defend against any
potential threats to American personnel. Should the Taliban attack or
kill an American, the United States would re-evaluate the terms of the
agreement and will not hesitate to respond appropriately. U.S. response
would depend on the specific conditions of an attack on a service
member. Removing the leader of the Taliban would create a short term
disruption in operational planning, but will not have a significant
effect on Taliban operations as demonstrated by the previous removals
of Taliban leaders. Pursuing a durable peace settlement in Afghanistan
is the best path towards protecting service members.
Mr. Lamborn. In your testimony, both of you point out that ISIS has
the ability to constitute in Iraq and Syria if the U.S. and our
coalition partners do not maintain pressure on them. With that in mind
I'd like to ask you about the level of cooperation and coordination
between the U.S. and the Government of Iraq.
Has the Government of Iraq been allowing full freedom of movement
and military independence to the U.S.?
Have our counter-ISIS operations been hampered at all by the Iraqi
government's restrictions on U.S. and our partners?
If yes to either question, can you characterize the nature of their
interference?
Ms. Wheelbarger. The Department of Defense continues to engage with
the Iraq Ministry of Defense and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) on a
regular basis through the Operation Inherent Resolve mission to defeat
ISIS, the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq, and through senior
leader bilateral discussions. At the moment, all train and advise
activities with the ISF have been temporarily paused due to concerns
over the spread of COVID-19; however, U.S. and Iraqi leaders continue
to cooperate on a wide-range of security issues using means other than
in-person meetings until such time normal operations are able to
resume. The State Department announced on 7 April that it plans to
engage with the Government of Iraq on a Strategic Dialogue scheduled to
take place in June. The purpose of the dialogue will be to come to a
mutual understanding regarding the future of the U.S. military presence
and economic cooperation that serve as the foundation of the strategic
bilateral relationship. The U.S. Department of State delegation will be
led by Ambassador David Hale, Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs. The delegation will also include representatives from the
Department of Defense, Department of the Treasury, and other relevant
departments and agencies. In general, the Government of Iraq (GoI) has
allowed freedom of movement for U.S. forces within Iraq. As with any
country, there are sections of Iraqi airspace designated as Restricted
Operating Zones (ROZ). In Iraq, ROZs are typically established over
religious sites and restrict overflight for all aircraft. U.S. and
Coalition aircraft are precluded from operating in these areas without
special approval from the Iraqi government; however, the GoI has
approved Coalition aircraft participating in the counter-ISIS mission
to operate in these areas.
Mr. Lamborn. It is my assessment that our adversaries have
discovered the limits in our current missile defense architecture,
including lack of 360 degree radar, lack of sufficient capacity, and
lack of capability against lower tier threats. We have seen 20 air
attacks, including rockets, on U.S. assets in the Middle East in the
past 5 months.
What are you currently able to do to protect our men and women in
uniform and our strategic assets currently under threat from these
ongoing attacks in your AOR?
Wouldn't fielding to your AOR the Iron Dome batteries the Army
recently procured, as soon as they are ready (and as mandated by
Congress), help to address this threat as an initial step even if you
required more systems in the next few years to further address the
threat?
I know the Army wants to incorporate every missile defense system
into its still-developing IBCS, but wouldn't placing a battle-tested
system into theatre now help protect our troops and strategic assets
and deter future such attacks?
General McKenzie. [The information is classified and retained in
the committee files.]
Mr. Lamborn. Have you seen a degradation in the effectiveness of
the IRGC Quds Force in Iraq and Syria after the strike which killed
Qasem Soleimani?
We've communicated to Iran and the IRGC our redline that killing an
American will result in a serious response: we killed Soleimani and
Mohandes in response to their lethal attack on Americans in Iraq.
Senior Taliban leadership appear to believe they can kill U.S. and
Afghan security forces with impunity: what costs will be in imposed on
senior Taliban leaders should they kill an American? Can we use the
IRGC model with the Taliban?
General McKenzie. [The information is classified and retained in
the committee files.]
Mr. Lamborn. In your testimony, both of you point out that ISIS has
the ability to constitute in Iraq and Syria if the U.S. and our
coalition partners do not maintain pressure on them. With that in mind
I'd like to ask you about the level of cooperation and coordination
between the U.S. and the Government of Iraq.
Has the Government of Iraq been allowing full freedom of movement
and military independence to the U.S.?
Have our counter-ISIS operations been hampered at all by the Iraqi
government's restrictions on U.S. and our partners?
If yes to either question, can you characterize the nature of their
interference?
General McKenzie. The Government of Iraq (Gol) did not restrict
coalition forces during ground operations with Iraqi Security Forces
(ISF), however Gol did restricted overflight of several cities in Iraq
without prior approval from Iraqi Air Traffic Control (ATC). Coalition
Forces operate within Iraq at the request of the Iraqi government to
conduct Defeat-lSIS operations and to share the responsibility of
protecting Coalition Forces throughout the country. Yes. The Government
of Iraq (Gol) restricted U.S. and coalition airborne assets through the
establishment of Restricted Operating Zones (ROZ). The Gol placed ROZs
over several cities and areas in Iraq. ROZs restrict overflight without
prior approval from Iraqi Air Traffic Control (ATC). In some cases,
ROZs degrade the coalition's ability to observe indicators and warnings
of potential threats to U.S. and Coalition Forces.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
Mr. Scott. The JSTARS was brought back from mission operations in
CENTCOM and returned to the region only a few months later. What is the
current role of the JSTARS in the CENTCOM AOR? As you assess your ISR
requirements and the various systems available to you to fulfill these
requirements, how critical is Joint STARS? Specifically, could you
perform the wide area surveillance mission without it?
General McKenzie. Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
(JSTARS) is primarily employed to maintain vigilance on Iranian
maritime and land based weapons systems in the Arabian Gulf. In the
event of credible imminent threats from Iranian-backed militia in Iraq,
JSTARS would support force protection of deployed forces in Iraq. At
the strategic level, its Moving Target Indicator (MTI) capability
enables us to watch adversary nation force movements while standing off
outside of their airspace. Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar
System (JSTARS) is the premier Moving Target Indicator (MTI) system in
the world. Its MTI capability allows it to collect on target types that
few other MTI systems can, with a larger field of view. Thus JSTARS is
employed in our highest priority areas, and is in very high demand.
Yes, however, there would be a degradation of sensing capability.
Moving Target Indicator (MTI) is one of many sensors that allow for
wide area collection, including other wide area electro optical full
motion video (FMV) and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) sensors. Joint
Surveillance Target Attack Radar System MTI tracks vehicles--combined
with FMV and SIGINT--allows us to develop enemy targets, determine
their typical movement patterns, and protect our forces.
Mr. Scott. If more JSTARS were available, could our warfighters and
tactical intelligence units benefit from its wide area surveillance
capability in CENTCOM and AFRICOM? In short, could you use more Joint
STARS in theater?
General McKenzie. Yes to both questions.
Mr. Scott. What is the role of the U.S. Coast Guard in CENTCOM?
General McKenzie. The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) has the mandate to
conduct operations under Title 10 and Title 14 U.S. Code, but while
under U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) they operate almost
exclusively under Title 10 and Department of Defense Rules of
Engagement. The USCG supports U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) in various
ways: First, USCG Patrol Forces Southwest Asia (PATFORSWA) contribute
to the organic surface fleet under the operational control of NAVCENT.
These 6 cutters support the NAVCENT missions of maintaining the free
flow of commerce and global freedom of navigation while enabling U.S.
and coalition maneuver across the contested maritime environment of the
Arabian Gulf. Secondly, PATFORSWA's Maritime Engagement Team (MET)
serves a dual purpose of maintaining warfighting competencies for the
unit through training efforts and conducting Theater Security
Cooperation for NAVCENT's Planning and Engagement Directorate. The MET
conducts interoperability engagements and subject matter expert
exchanges with regional and international allies and partners. These
engagements normally focus on atsea visit, board, search, and seizure
(VBSS) of vessels of interest. During the last twelve months, the MET
conducted 28 engagements. There is also the USCG Maritime Security
Response Team that provides an Advanced Interdiction Team to NAVCENT.
This detachment is a tactical assault force capable of conducting
operations including opposed boardings under NAVCENT's maritime
security operations mission. Lastly, the USCG provides the Maritime
Infrastructure Port Facility Training Advisory Group to the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia under a Title 22 security assistance case. This team is
responsible for the mentorship of a 5,000-person Saudi Arabian force
responsible for the organic protection of critical maritime
infrastructure. The team operates under the authorities of the Chief of
Mission and is operationally controlled by USCG Headquarters Office of
International Affairs.
Mr. Scott. If more JSTARS were available, could our warfighters and
tactical intelligence units benefit from its wide area surveillance
capability in CENTCOM and AFRICOM? In short, could you use more Joint
STARS in theater?
General Townsend. AFRICOM has a valid Ground Moving Target
Indicator (GMTI) requirement, which JSTARS provides, but JSTARS is not
the preferred option for AFRICOM. Our demand is more specific to point-
area GMTI versus wide-area collection. As a result, JSTARS could be
utilized in Africa but is not the optimal GMTI capability to support
today's current AOR-wide dynamic Counter Violent Extremist Organization
(C-VEO) fight.
Mr. Scott. What is the role of the U.S. Coast Guard in AFRICOM?
General Townsend. The U.S. Coast Guard's unique missions,
authorities, and responsibilities play a small but important role in
the development of partner nations' maritime security throughout the
African continent. U.S. Africa Command benefits from the assignment of
Coast Guard officers and senior enlisted members at our headquarters in
Stuttgart, Germany. These Coastguardsmen and women lend their
operational expertise as legal advisors, cuttermen, naval aviators and
law enforcement experts in the execution of the African Maritime Law
Enforcement Partnership Program, or AMLEP. The Coast Guard also employs
its expertise with members assigned to U.S. Naval Forces Africa-Europe,
Naval Combined Task Force 65, and as part of Coastal Riverine Squadrons
that escort vulnerable and high-value maritime traffic in Djiboutian
waters.
Mr. Scott. Are there any plans to establish a Joint Interagency
Task Force like JIATF South within AFRICOM's AOR? How much would it
cost? What would be the advantages of establishing a JIATF for AFRICOM?
General Townsend. There are no current plans to establish a Joint
Interagency Task Force (JIATF) within AFRICOM's Area of Responsibility.
The associated cost to operate a JIATF is uncertain without a thorough
analysis. Were we to pursue a JIATF it could potentially allow us to be
more responsive to interagency requests within the region. It could
bring additional or unique resources to bear on specific threats in
Africa where criminal organizations converge with violent extremists
and terror groups to move drugs, weapons, and other illicit goods.
Furthermore, a JIATF could serve as AFRICOM's executive agent to
coordinate DOD support to Law Enforcement counterdrug, counter threat
finance, and other counter transnational organized crime initiatives
within the AFRICOM area of responsibility. Again, AFRICOM does not
currently plan to pursue a JIATF.
Mr. Scott. Do you support the assignment of additional Coast Guard
personnel to CJTF-HOA? Could Africa benefit from more Coast Guard
cutter port visits? Do you support increased Coast Guard maritime
engagement in and around East Africa?
General Townsend. While there are currently no U.S. Coast Guard
personnel assigned to AFRICOM's Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of
Africa (CJTF-HOA) headquarters, the U.S. Coast Guard serves as an
essential force provider to the multiservice (U.S. Navy/U.S. Coast
Guard) Coastal Riverine Squadrons, who deploy to CJTF-HOA to conduct
force protection of strategic shipping and naval vessels operating in
the maritime approaches to Djibouti. CJTF-HOA's personnel structure is
currently under review, and should inform the potential for any
additional personnel there. Both U.S. Africa Command and its African
partners, around the continent not just in the east, would gladly
welcome any additional maritime presence in Africa, including the U.S.
Coast Guard. Since most African partners do not employ their navies and
coast guards in an expeditionary capacity, the U.S. Coast Guard serves
as an ideal model for maritime security and governance. This past year,
U.S. Coast Guard Cutter THETIS participated in AFRICOM's multi-national
maritime exercise OBANGAME EXPRESS and leveraged its maritime law
enforcement authorities in combined maritime law enforcement Operation
JUNCTION RAIN with our African partners. Recognizing the value of U.S.
Coast Guard support in the region, I recently requested additional U.S.
Coast Guard cutter and law enforcement detachment support for the
fiscal year 22-26 resource planning cycle.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GALLEGO
Mr. Gallego. I understand that shifts to the budgets associated
with USAFRICOM may result in reductions to our force posture. In the
hearing, General Townsend indicated that his command will ``do less
with less.'' If ``less'' is now what we expect from DOD in Africa, have
we discussed our force posture changes with our African allies and
partners, many of whom cannot sustain counterterrorism efforts on their
own? If so, what is their response, and what is our plan to mitigate
risk stemming from a likely increase in terrorist activity and other
activity counter to U.S. interests?
Ms. Wheelbarger. Through the Combatant Command Review process, we
are evaluating the best resource-informed balance for USAFRICOM along
with global tradeoffs. The USAFRICOM review is ongoing. It is best to
wait until this review is complete before we have substantive
discussions about possible force posture changes with our African
allies and partners. The outcome of the review would also inform a plan
to mitigate risk from terrorist activity and other activity counter to
U.S. interests.
Mr. Gallego. Following the killing of General Soleimani and the
Iranian retaliation attack on al Asad Airbase, there was a real risk of
open war with Iran. What is the internal DOD plan for escalation
management in the event of another crisis with Iran? Please include
detail on how OSD, CENTCOM, and other relevant parts of DOD would seek
deescalation in the event of another crisis.
Ms. Wheelbarger. The President has been clear--we do not want a war
with Iran. In response to repeated attacks, the United States has
increased our defensive posture and taken action intended to degrade
the capabilities of those groups that pose a risk to U.S. forces. DOD
continuously considers the potential escalatory and deescalatory
effects of all of its actions. The Department manages escalation in the
Middle East by maintaining a deterrent posture, ensuring escalation
dominance, messaging our intentions, and collaborating with the State
Department to leverage our nation's diplomatic tools to achieve
deescalatory effects. In addition, we continue to raise the threat
posed by Iranian proxies with our Iraqi partners and stress the need
for the Government of Iraq to mitigate these threats.
Mr. Gallego. Following the killing of General Soleimani and the
Iranian retaliation attack on al Asad Airbase, there was a real risk of
open war with Iran. What is the internal DOD plan for escalation
management in the event of another crisis with Iran? Please include
detail on how OSD, CENTCOM, and other relevant parts of DOD would seek
deescalation in the event of another crisis.
General McKenzie. We do not seek escalation with Iran. We seek to
deter Iran from further aggressive and offensive actions against the
U.S., the Coalition, and our partners in the region. In order to
prevent escalation, and if required to manage escalation, at the
direction of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Central Command has
proactive measures in place to deter further action by Iran and its
proxies. Over the last few months the U.S. has deployed capability into
theater while repositioning forces to protect them from a range of
threats. Concurrently, we are working with our partners and allies to
integrate existing assets across the peninsula to provide a more
comprehensive defense of the region. An essential part of avoiding
escalation is maintaining a posture that enables an effective defense.
The President has made it clear that a loss of U.S. life will result in
a response. I will provide my advice through the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense and the President on the
appropriate military-responses. Our main goal is to deter Iran from
using aggression against U.S. forces and interests, to include our
partners and allies, in the region.
Mr. Gallego. I understand that shifts to the budgets associated
with USAFRICOM may result in reductions to our force posture. In the
hearing, General Townsend indicated that his command will ``do less
with less.'' If ``less'' is now what we expect from DOD in Africa, have
we discussed our force posture changes with our African allies and
partners, many of whom cannot sustain counterterrorism efforts on their
own? If so, what is their response, and what is our plan to mitigate
risk stemming from a likely increase in terrorist activity and other
activity counter to U.S. interests?
General Townsend. U.S. Africa Command is working closely with the
Secretary of Defense, Office of Secretary of Defense, and the Joint
Staff through the Combatant Command Review to consider strategic
objectives and potential force posture changes. Our allies and partners
are aware of these reviews and understand the importance of judiciously
allocating defense resources. We are working with the Office of the
Secretary of Defense on mitigating threats and messaging our allies/
partners to address their concerns once the Secretary makes decisions.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. VELA
Mr. Vela. What strategically is CENTCOM's top three priorities for
the region? What value do the forces in Saudi Arabia play in achieving
CENTCOM's strategic priorities?
General McKenzie. U.S. Central Command's (USCENTCOM) strategic
priorities for the region remain deterring Iran, resolving the conflict
in Afghanistan, and maintaining our defeat ISIS campaign in Syria and
Iraq. With Iran, our military elements of power in theater support the
maximum pressure campaign. In Afghanistan, we seek a negotiated
settlement that supports long-term U.S. security requirements, namely
the prevention of terrorist attacks against the Homeland from
Afghanistan. USCENTCOM's current posture in Syria and Iraq, mostly
through enablers and advise/assist units, is sufficient to achieve the
objectives of the defeat-lSIS campaign. The forces deployed to Saudi
Arabia provide operational depth to maintain a credible deterrent to
escalating Iranian actions and are part of our broader campaign to
counter Iranian malign influence in the region.
Mr. Vela. President Trump stated last week that it's possible the
Taliban will overrun the Afghanistan Government as a result of this
peace deal. In your military opinion, what is the likelihood this would
happen with the withdrawal of U.S. troops, and what would be the
consequences of the Taliban again ruling Afghanistan?
General McKenzie. Assuming the Government of the Islamic Republic
of Afghanistan and Taliban are able to reach a political settlement,
the main threat to the Afghanistan National Defense and Security
Forces--the Taliban--will be neutralized, and the remaining security
threats will primarily consist of Violent Extremist Organizations such
as ISIS-K and criminal organizations. The current peace agreement with
the Taliban involves the joint participation of the Taliban and the
government of Afghanistan to establish a lasting political solution.
The United States has advocated for an inclusive government, which is
more likely to protect the advances in human rights that the Afghan
people have come to enjoy. However, if the Taliban were to regain
control of Afghanistan without the involvement of an inclusive
government, there are serious concerns from various elements of Afghan
civil society, particularly women and ethnic minorities, that the human
rights advances they have achieved would be lost.
Mr. Vela. The attack at Manda Bay caught us all by surprise. What
vulnerabilities did AFRICOM identify from this incident? What other
forward operating based have been assessed at risk? What action have
been taken to date and what still needs to be done?
General Townsend. Although the Manda Bay investigation is still
underway, three general impressions have emerged regarding
vulnerabilities there. First, a lack of appreciations for the evolved
threat at all levels of command. Second, a lack of an adequate
defensive barrier plan for the airfield. Third, a lack of clarity over
security responsibilities between U.S. and host nation forces. U.S.
Africa Command and its components have recently assessed our sites for
vulnerabilities and develop strategies to mitigate risk. Based on the
violent extremist threat across Africa, I would assess nearly every
location has a threat and we must remain vigilant to respond. We are
improving and updating defensive barriers defense, updating our
technological capabilities, and deploying additional security
personnel. We also work with partner forces to improve their physical
security capabilities at shared locations. We have also identified
funding to support force protection improvements, but as protection is
a continuous effort we will continue to pursue additional security
funding.
Mr. Vela. What is the current situation in Libya? What is the U.S.
doing in Libya? What are European nations and NATO doing in Libya?
General Townsend. Libya has been embroiled in civil conflict since
the 2011 revolution. In April 2019 the self-proclaimed Libyan National
Army (LNA) launched its ongoing offensive against Tripoli and the UN
recognized Government of National Accord (GNA). Both the LNA and GNA
are supported by multiple external nation state actors. United States
Africa Command (USAFRICOM) supports the Department of State efforts to
bring stability and political reconciliation to Libya. The U.S.
Military currently has no DOD personnel in Libya; however, USAFRICOM
maintains a U.S. unilateral counterterrorism capability to surveil and
strike ISIS-Libya and AQIM in Libya. This counterterrorism capability
is predominantly by unmanned aerial systems in coordination with the
GNA and LNA. European countries have participated in diplomatic
engagements with both Libyan sides, and external actors, in support of
United Nations reconciliation efforts. The European Union has started a
new operation in the Mediterranean Sea with the mission to enforce the
United Nations' Libya arms embargo and train the GNA Coast Guard/Navy.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. KIM
Mr. Kim. Having invested billions of dollars to building the
capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces and the Kurdish Regional
Guard Brigades to fight and defeat ISIS, how are we ensuring that there
is a plan, funding, and capability for the Iraqis to maintain and
sustain the equipment and training we have provided over the last 5
years?
Ms. Wheelbarger. The Department of Defense, together with Iraqi
Security Forces (ISF), has made significant gains in the continued
disruption of ISIS networks and safe havens. After the physical
destruction of the so-called ``caliphate'', ISIS has transitioned to an
insurgency and is expected to seek to re-establish governance in
sparsely populated areas. With the intent of denying an ISIS
resurgence, the Department plans to direct Fiscal Year (FY) 2021
funding towards specific ISF and Peshmerga units actively engaged in
areas identified as enemy sanctuaries. Additionally, the Department is
transitioning from equipping and logistical support to training and
sustainment support. An increase in sustainment support, along with
continued security sector reform efforts, will enable the ISF to
achieve adequate readiness rates to independently and effectively
conduct D-ISIS operations. The Department ensures the Government of
Iraq is taking the appropriate steps to maintain and sustain U.S.
divested equipment through a 5-year security cooperation plan,
Congressionally mandated reports, and End-Use-Monitoring for certain
types of high-valued equipment. State Department announced on 7 April
that it plans to engage with the Government of Iraq on a Strategic
Dialogue scheduled to take place in June. The purpose of the dialogue
will be to come to a mutual understanding regarding the future of the
U.S. military presence and economic cooperation that serve as the
foundation of the strategic bilateral relationship. The U.S. Department
of State delegation will be led by Ambassador David Hale, Under
Secretary of State for Political Affairs. The delegation will also
include representatives from the Department of Defense, Department of
the Treasury, and other relevant departments and agencies.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. HOULAHAN
Ms. Houlahan. General McKenzie, your predecessor, General Votel,
had stated that cyber will be integrated through all operations,
however, ``CENTCOM continues to be challenged by constrained resources
including trained cybersecurity personnel.'' Does CENTCOM continue to
feel the affects of constrained cyber resources and trained personnel,
and how would you propose to solve that issue?
General McKenzie. Cyber is a dynamic, man-made battle space that
requires a concerted effort across all Combatant Commands, Services and
Agencies, as well as our allies and partners, in order to enable a
collective defense. My focus remains on ensuring Cyber is integrated
throughout all operations while simultaneously ensuring we are postured
to protect our critical assets from cyber-attack. This requires a
highly specialized workforce that not only understands the Information
Technology complexities and terrain, but also the adversaries'
capabilities and intent. We are closely aligned with U.S. Cyber Command
and their subordinate organizations. They have established an effective
construct to oversee workforce development, employ defensive cyber
forces and enhance situational awareness. I am confident that the
investments made thus far have enhanced our readiness as we are
collectively committed to developing adaptive programs that will allow
us to outpace our adversaries. This will require a sustained effort
across the Department of Defense with continued investment in people
and resources.
Ms. Houlahan. General Townsend, what's your perspective on cyber
challenges within the AFRICOM area or responsibility?
General Townsend. U.S. Africa Command is focused on malign
activities of Global Power Competitors on the continent and their
ability to influence our African partners. We have established the U.S.
Africa Command Joint Cyber Center as our primary synchronization
element to ensure we are focus both our Intel and Cyber planning
elements with U.S. Cyber Command. I think Cyber is like ISR in that
every Combatant Commander wants more capability. U.S. Africa Command
has a nascent, not a robust cyber force, but we are leveraging
resources to inform our African partners on what the malign actors are
doing.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GOLDEN
Mr. Golden. It is clear that Baghdad must stand down the Popular
Mobilization Forces. Some of these militias, such as Kata'ib Hezbollah,
are foreign terrorist organizations responsible for killing Americans.
What actions, if any, are the U.S taking to facilitate this endstate?
Ms. Wheelbarger. The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) are part of
the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), reporting to the Prime Minister's
Office, and its members are Iraqis. Over 40 groups are part of the PMF,
many of them Shia, but also Sunni, Christian, and Yezidi. Disciplined
elements of the PMF, those under the control of the Iraqi government
and beholden to its civilian leaders, were instrumental in the
territorial defeat of ISIS and we recognize the critical role they
played in the fight. Some elements, however, are Iranian-backed,
operate semi-autonomously, and are particularly destabilizing in the
liberated areas, prioritizing smuggling and extortion for personal gain
over fighting ISIS. The groups are also responsible for recent attacks
against facilities hosting U.S. and Coalition forces causing several
casualties. The Department of Defense supports the Government of Iraq's
efforts to bring all armed groups fully under state control. This is an
important step towards ensuring Iraq's future as a strong, sovereign,
unified, democratic, and prosperous state. We continue to engage with
the Government of Iraq on the need to gain control over non-compliant
militia groups that threaten U.S. forces and support their efforts to
do so. That said, we have an obligation to defend U.S. and Coalition
forces against attacks and will take the necessary actions to ensure
the safety of our forces.
Mr. Golden. The Syrian Democratic Force is currently administering
prison camps in northeastern Syria containing thousands of ISIS members
and their families. Is this situation sustainable, and what are we
doing to help?
General McKenzie. [The information is classified and retained in
the committee files.]
Mr. Golden. It is clear that Baghdad must stand down the Popular
Mobilization Forces. Some of these militias, such as Kata'ib Hezbollah,
are foreign terrorist organizations responsible for killing Americans.
What actions, if any, are the U.S taking to facilitate this endstate?
General McKenzie. In close coordination with the Ambassador, U.S.
Central Command continually conducts Key Leader Engagements (KLE) with
senior Iraqi military officials to urge ISF to bring non-compliant PMF
units into compliance with the Iraqi law and the rule of law. The
enduring success of the GOI will be predicated on an ISF that is solely
responsible and responsive to the GOI. CJTF-OIR continues to reinforce
and support the ISF efforts to address the security threats posed by
non-compliant militia groups to both the Government of Iraq and
Coalition Forces.
[all]