[Senate Hearing 116-96]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 116-96
ASSESSING THE ROLE OF THE
UNITED STATES IN THE WORLD
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 27, 2019
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web:
http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
38-613 PDF WASHINGTON : 2020
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho, Chairman
MARCO RUBIO, Florida ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
CORY GARDNER, Colorado JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
MITT ROMNEY, Utah CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming TIM KAINE, Virginia
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
RAND PAUL, Kentucky JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
TODD, YOUNG, Indiana CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
TED CRUZ, Texas
Christopher M. Socha, Staff Director
Jessica Lewis, Democratic Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho.................... 1
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey.............. 2
Burns, Hon. William J., President, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, Washington, DC............................ 4
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Hadley, Hon. Stephen J., Principal, RiceHadleyGates LLC,
Washington, DC................................................. 10
Prepared statement........................................... 12
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Response of The Honorable Stephen Hadley to Questions Submitted
by Senator Todd Young.......................................... 41
(iii)
ASSESSING THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE WORLD
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WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 2019
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m. in
Room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. James E.
Risch, chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present. Senators Risch, Rubio, Johnson, Gardner, Romney,
Isakson, Portman, Young, Cruz, Menendez, Cardin, Shaheen,
Coons, Murphy, Kaine, Markey, Merkley, and Booker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO
The Chairman. The Foreign Relations Committee will come to
order.
Welcome, everyone. We have very distinguished guests with
us here this morning, and I am going to make a few opening
remarks. Then I am going to turn it over to the ranking member
to make some opening remarks. And then we are just delighted to
have both of you with us here today.
So with that, for the first time in a generation, the
United States is facing a great power competition that
threatens to disrupt the world order America created with our
allies in the aftermath of World War II. That world order has
arguably benefited all, especially those who believe in the
principles of democracy, human rights, the rule of law, free
trade, and a capitalistic free economy.
These cornerstones of liberty and prosperity, however, are
once again under assault as we face a global power competition,
most notably by a rising China intent on reshaping the world in
its own image, and a Russia that wants to be seen as more than
a regional actor and regain the influence it had during the
height of the Soviet Union.
It is no secret that China seeks to surpass us both
economically and militarily. One of the primary ways they have
attempted to do this is by stealing our technology and
intellectual property. The Chinese use American innovation to
put our people out of work and stack the rules of the global
economy in their favor. I have seen this firsthand as Micron
Technologies, an Idaho-based memory chip company, had its trade
secrets stolen by a Chinese company in an attempt to out-
compete the very companies from which they steal.
In order to compete on a global scale, there must be
adherence to rule of law. That is paramount. Chinese law and
practice allow the government total control over its companies.
Whether or not Beijing is currently using tech firms like
Huawei or ZTE to spy, it certainly could demand it and no court
ruling or constitutional check would be necessary for them.
This is a serious threat to our national interests and to the
interests of our allies and friends.
As to Russia, the Russian Government is making efforts to
return us to the 1960s, attempting to reignite a nuclear arms
race by cheating on nearly all of its arms control agreements.
In doing so, Putin is confirming over and over again what many
of us already know, and it is time to reexamine and reset our
nuclear nonproliferation architecture and that must include
China.
While our strategic competition with China and Russia is a
more recent development, the threats of the post-9/11 world
remain. It is an accomplishment that today ISIS is on the ropes
and al Qaeda is in retreat.
However, having failed states, corruption, lack of economic
opportunity, and political oppression are on the rise around
the world. According to Freedom House, global liberty declined
in 2018 for the 13th consecutive year, at a time when even our
allies in Europe are facing homegrown challenges to democracy
and the rule of law. The United States needs to stand firm
against tyranny and corruption now more than ever.
Ranking Member Menendez and I decided on holding this first
hearing to provide the opportunity to set the agenda for the
future work of this committee. The themes you will hear again
and again from witnesses and Senators on both sides of the
dais, China, Russia, nuclear proliferation, counterterrorism,
human rights, and the rule of law are subjects the committee
intends to focus on intently in the coming months.
This committee has a constitutional role in shaping the
nation's foreign policy agenda, and both the ranking member and
I intended to exercise this authority provided to us by the
Founding Fathers of this great nation.
With that, I will ask my friend and colleague, Ranking
Member Senator Menendez, to make some opening remarks.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Menendez Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
for holding this hearing. And particularly, thank you, our
distinguished witnesses.
I join you in many of the things that you said, Mr.
Chairman, especially towards the role of this committee in
terms of foreign policy, and I am glad to hear what you had to
say about the pathway forward. I believe it is critically
important for this committee to maintain an active role in
assessing the United States' role in the world, understanding
the administration's policies, and leveraging our own role as a
coequal branch of government.
We face continuing and new challenges from an aggressive
Russia, a rising China, and an evolving but still threatening
ISIS and al Qaeda. We face a world with greater strategic
competition with more dangerous competitors. So let us be clear
about both our challenges and our opportunities.
Russia continues to be a leading source of global
instability and chaos that directly seeks to undermine
foundational American values. In addition to interfering in our
democratic processes, Russia has sought to destabilize the
democratic values of many of our allies and partners. How we
respond to Putin's strategic adventurism will help define our
role in the world no less than our efforts to confront the
challenge of Chinese President Xi Jinping's neo-Maoist
authoritarian great power nationalism.
Similarly, the world will judge and indeed follow our lead
on how we live up to commitments to those who have put
themselves on the front lines of the fight against terrorism.
I would also like to note at the outset of this hearing my
concern about the escalation of violence in South Asia in
recent days. I urge Islamabad and New Delhi to immediately
engage in dialogue to deescalate tensions. Past Republican and
Democratic administrations have played constructive roles at
the highest levels to promote peace and stability in South
Asia. And if we are to see a peaceful resolution to the current
violence, the Trump administration must follow suit.
In our interconnected and ever smaller world, we cannot
afford only to address the headline-grabbing challenges. New
trade patents, new technologies, new economic relationships are
both bringing tens of millions out of poverty but also
displacing and disrupting the lives of millions more, many in
the United States. Indeed, many of these new technologies,
including artificial intelligence, robotics, and genomics,
offer huge promises for human advancement, but they also
threaten to erode valuable democratic institutions, social
relationships, and economic order. We face unprecedented
migration challenges, including millions of refugees in our own
hemisphere and millions more around the world. And we have yet
to come to grips with the mounting realities of catastrophic
climate change.
At a fundamental level, democracy, good governance, human
rights, the importance of international institutions and
alliances, the values the United States has championed for the
past century and that best equip nations to promote peace and
prosperity are also under attack around the world.
And I am sad to say, Mr. Chairman, rather than embrace
these values on a domestic or global level, President Trump in
many cases has chosen to abandon the very American values and
institutions that for over two centuries have enabled the
United States' leadership in the world.
We are an exceptional nation, a nation founded on ideas and
ideals, and it is those ideas and ideals, more than our
economic strength, though that has been considerable, and more
than our military might, though that has been unparalleled,
that has rallied others to our cause as their own, built
partnerships and alliances, enabled the free flow of global
commerce, and allowed us to help shape a world that has served
our interests and allowed our values to flourish. All of that
is today at risk.
When the United States fails to stand by our allies and
international institutions or, worse, attacks them, our leaders
place at risk the very relationships and institutions that have
made us strong and have guaranteed peace and stability for 70
years.
When the United States fails to stand up for human rights
or, worse, enables the depredations of authoritarian regimes,
our leaders set conditions for abuse and turmoil that undermine
true stability.
When the United States looks the other way as journalists
are killed or our leaders themselves brand the press the enemy
of the people, we threaten the vibrancy of civil discourse
necessary for the values we as a people cherish.
When the United States fails to enforce the rule of law or
our leaders suggest that law enforcement is transactional, we
lead the way to creating global disorder.
When the United States scales back or cuts our State
Department and foreign assistance budgets or pushes out career,
experienced diplomats, we fatally undermine our ability to
renew and revive our leadership at just a time when our
leadership is more essential than ever before.
When America builds walls, America First becomes America
Alone.
America derives its strength from our values. We could
never retreat from that core concept. And as we look across the
globe, we must lecture less and lead more.
The world today stands at an important moment, balance
between order and chaos, between continuing with the decades-
long project of building a peaceful and prosperous
international order or retreating to isolation and anarchy. The
path we are on under this administration I feel will leave us
less safe and less secure in an increasingly complex world,
unable to advance our ideas or to secure our prosperity. I hope
we can change that course.
And I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Menendez.
And we are now going to hear from our witnesses. We will
start with Ambassador William Burns.
William Burns is a 33-year veteran of the Foreign Service
and holds its highest rank, career ambassador. He was just the
second Foreign Service officer to become Deputy Secretary of
State, an office he held from 2011 to 2014. Prior to that, he
was the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. Before
that, he served as a U.S. Ambassador to the Russian Federation,
and prior to that role, Ambassador Burns served as the
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs.
Ambassador Burns is currently President of the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace.
Ambassador Burns, welcome.
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM J. BURNS, PRESIDENT, CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Burns. Thank you so much. Chairman Risch,
Ranking Member Menendez, members of the committee, it is an
honor to be with you and an honor to join Steve Hadley, a
friend and former colleague for whom I have deep respect.
I will highlight briefly three points from my written
testimony, which I ask be entered into the record.
The first point is about the international landscape
unfolding before us. Understanding that landscape is an
essential prerequisite to crafting an effective strategy.
America faces a world that is more crowded, complicated,
and competitive than at any point in my three and a half decade
diplomatic career. The global order that emerged at the end of
the Cold War has shifted dramatically, creating unprecedented
challenges for American statecraft.
Great power rivalry is back, bringing with it complex risks
and tradeoffs for which we are out of practice.
Crises of regional order continue to bubble, nowhere more
so than in the Middle East, which remains best in class in
dysfunction and fragility.
And challenges like climate change and the revolution in
technology are outpacing the capacities of governments to
create workable international rules of the road.
The second point I would make is about America's role on
this disordered landscape.
The bad news is that we are no longer the only big kid on
the geopolitical block. The good news is that we still have an
opportunity to lock in our role as the world's pivotal power,
shaping a new international order before others shape it for
us. We still have a better hand to play than any of our rivals
if we play it wisely.
Fashioning a strategy for America in a post-primacy world
is no easy task. The most critical test of American statecraft
is managing competition with China, cushioning it with
bilateral cooperation wherever our interests coincide and
developing a web of regional alliances and institutions that
amplify our leverage. The primary aim, it seems to me, is not
to contain China or force others to choose sides, but to ensure
that China's rise does not come at the expense of everyone
else's security and prosperity.
Meanwhile, this week's summit in Hanoi offers a rare
opportunity to reduce the threats posed by North Korea's
nuclear and missile programs. That will require a serious,
sustained, disciplined diplomatic effort, backed up by economic
and military leverage and closely coordinated with our allies
in South Korea and Japan and other key regional players like
China.
We will also have to manage relations with a resurgent
Russia, playing a long game within a relatively narrow band of
possibilities, from the sharply competitive to the nastily
adversarial. But even as we push back firmly against Putin's
belligerence, we cannot ignore the need for guardrails that can
help us reduce the risks of collisions and manage nuclear
dangers.
The challenges of renewed great power competition will
require us to take a hard look at our involvement in the Middle
East. We cannot neglect our leadership role in a region where
instability is so contagious, but we ought to continue to shift
the terms of our engagement with less demand on the American
military and more reliance on creative diplomacy.
We also cannot afford to neglect our interests in Africa, a
continent whose population will double by the middle of this
century or in our own hemisphere, in many ways the natural
strategic home base for the United States.
Being a pivotal power is all about putting ourselves in a
position to manage relationships and build influence in all
directions. That will require us to shore up our alliances, to
deal with both immediate crises and long-term global challenges
and to do better when it comes to following through on our
international commitments. I worry that we are hemorrhaging our
credibility at an alarming pace, especially with our closest
allies in Europe, at a moment when the rise of China and the
resurgence of Russia make transatlantic ties more, not less,
important.
And that brings me to my third and final point, this
committee's vital role in formulating a new strategy for the
decades ahead. You have an opportunity and a responsibility to
help bridge the disconnect between an uncertain American public
and an often undisciplined Washington establishment. We have to
show our fellow citizens that effective American foreign policy
not only begins at home in a strong political and economic
system but ends there too in more jobs, more prosperity, a
healthier environment, and better security.
This committee has an equally important role when it comes
to overseeing and shaping the tools of American foreign policy.
Diplomacy in the years ahead will matter more than ever as our
tool of first resort. We can no longer get our way in the world
on our own or by big sticks alone.
Unfortunately, American diplomacy has suffered from decades
of strategic and operational drift, which the current
administration has made infinitely worse by its unilateral
diplomatic disarmament. Not surprisingly, adversaries are
taking advantage, allies are hedging, and the global order we
did so much to build and defend is teetering.
The window for defining America's pivotal role will not
stay open forever. Whether we seize the moment of opportunity
before us will depend in large measure on whether this chamber
and this committee can help recapture a sense of shared vision
and shared purpose, whether we can recover a sense of
diplomatic agility out of the muscle-bound national security
bureaucracy that we have become in recent years, and whether we
can come to terms with the realities of a new international
landscape and shape it skillfully with our considerable
enduring strengths.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Burns follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador William J. Burns
Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Menendez, Members of the Committee--
it's an honor to be with you today and an honor to join Steve Hadley, a
friend and former colleague for whom I have deep respect. I'm very
pleased to offer some brief thoughts about America's changing role on a
changing international landscape and its implications for the work of
this important committee.
the landscape
Today's world is more crowded, complicated, and competitive than at
any point in my three and half decade diplomatic career. The global
order that emerged after the end of the cold war has shifted
dramatically, creating unprecedented challenges for American
statecraft.
Great power rivalry is back, and it has brought with it complex
risks and tradeoffs for which we are out of practice. China is flexing
its muscle and expanding its influence. The Chinese leadership no
longer subscribes to Deng Xiaoping's ``hide your strengths and bide
your time'' philosophy, and has accelerated its effort to not only
establish China as a global economic peer of the United States, but to
supplant it as the leading power in Asia.
China's ambition to recover its accustomed primacy in Asia has
already upended many of our comfortable assumptions about how
integration into a U.S.-led order would tame, or at least channel,
Chinese aspirations. And our traditional allies in Asia, as well as new
partners like India, are taking notice and adjusting their strategic
calculations--raising regional temperatures and increasing
uncertainties.
Russia is proving that declining powers can be at least as
disruptive as rising ones, punching above its weight as it exploits
divisions within the West. Vladimir Putin's relentless focus for much
of the past two decades has been to reverse the decline of the Russian
State and its international standing--and the result is a Russia that
sees its best bet for preserving its major power status in chipping
away at the American-led international order. If he can't have a
deferential government in Kiev, Putin can grab Crimea and try to
engineer the next best thing, a dysfunctional Ukraine. If he can't
abide the risk of regime upheaval in Syria, he can flex Russia's
military muscle, emasculate the West, and preserve Bashar al-Assad atop
the rubble. Since I left government, Putin has shifted from testing the
West in places where Russia had a greater stake and more appetite for
risk, like Ukraine and Georgia, to a wider range of places where the
West has a far greater stake, like the integrity of our democracies.
Alongside these great power frictions, crises of regional order
continue to bubble, driven by both the strengths of local competitors
and the weaknesses of failing states. Nowhere is this clearer than in
the Middle East, which remains best in class in dysfunction and
fragility. No longer the global energy player it once was, no longer
able to sustain its rentier economies, no longer able to camouflage its
deficits of opportunity and dignity, much of the Arab world teeters on
the edge of more domestic upheavals, with extremists eager to prey on
its vulnerabilities.
Beyond the unsettled rivalries of states, and the decaying
foundations of regional stability, new global challenges are straining
the capacities of governments to create workable international rules of
the road. The pace of the revolution in technology makes the impact and
dislocations of the Industrial Revolution look plodding by comparison.
Advances in artificial intelligence, machine learning, and synthetic
biology continue to move at breathtaking speed, outpacing the ability
of states and societies to maximize their benefits while minimizing
their potential downsides. We have already seen how authoritarian
regimes can harness the apparently decentralizing power of technology
to consolidate control of their citizens.
Meanwhile, the transformative effects of climate change are
becoming more evident with each passing season. With polar ice caps
melting, sea levels rising, and weather patterns swinging wildly, the
consequences of an environment badly damaged by human behavior are
growing more dangerous and immediate.
america's pivotal role
These challenges would be daunting in any era, but they are
particularly urgent now, at a time when America's singular post-cold
war dominance is fading. On today's international landscape, we are no
longer the only big kid on the geopolitical block. That's not a
defeatist argument; it's merely a recognition that the United States no
longer occupies the unrivaled position of strength that we enjoyed
after the collapse of the Soviet Union. What we do have, however, is an
opportunity to lock in our role as the world's pivotal power--still
with a better hand to play than any of our rivals.
No other nation is in a better position to navigate the complicated
currents of twenty-first-century geopolitics: we still have the world's
best military, spending more on defense than the next seven countries
combined; our economy remains the most innovative and adaptable in the
world, despite risks of overheating and gross inequalities; advances in
technology have unlocked vast domestic potential in natural gas and
clean, renewable energy; and we still have more allies and potential
partners than any of our rivals, with greater capacity for coalition-
building and problem-solving. These advantages are not permanent or
automatic--but they do give us a window in which we can shape a new
international order before others shape it for us.
Fashioning a strategy for America in a post-primacy world is no
easy task. Neither unthinking retrenchment nor the muscular reassertion
of old convictions will be effective prescriptions in the years ahead.
We will have to rebalance American foreign policy priorities to tackle
the most pressing challenges and respond to the most urgent threats.
That will mean sharpening our attention on managing competition with
great power rivals, and using our capacity to mobilize other players to
address twenty-first-century challenges. That ought to be infused with
a bold and unapologetic vision for free people and free and fair
markets, with the United States as a more attractive exemplar than it
is today.
Asia must continue to be our first priority. The most critical test
of American statecraft is managing competition with China, cushioning
it with bilateral cooperation wherever our interests coincide, and a
web of regional alliances and institutions that amplify our leverage.
Our economies are deeply intertwined, but that is not in itself a
guarantee against conflict.
Both the United States and China will have to work to ensure that
our inevitable disagreements do not spiral out of control. As regional
apprehensions about Chinese hegemony grow, there will be increasing
opportunities for us to strengthen existing relationships and forge new
partnerships in the region. Part of our strategy has to be defensive,
pushing for overdue changes in China's trade and investment practices,
ideally in concert with partners in Asia and Europe who share similar
concerns. And part ought to be affirmative, laying out a compelling
vision--and a renovated architecture of trade relationships, alliances,
partnerships, and institutions--for Asia's future. The primary aim is
not to contain China or force others to choose sides, but to ensure
that China's rise doesn't come at the expense of everyone else's
security and prosperity.
We also have before us a rare moment of opportunity to reduce the
threats posed by North Korea's nuclear and missile programs, with a
second summit meeting unfolding this week in Hanoi. This will require a
serious, sustained, disciplined diplomatic effort, backed by economic
and military leverage, and closely coordinated with our allies in South
Korea and Japan, and other key regional players, like China.
A deeper American focus on Asia makes transatlantic partnership
more, not less, significant. It implies a new strategic division of
labor with our European allies, where they take on more responsibility
for order on their continent, and do even more to contribute to
possibilities for longer-term order in the Middle East, while the
United States devotes relatively more resources and attention to Asia.
Now is the moment for a renewed Atlanticism, built on shared interests
and values in a world in which a rising China--as well as a resurgent
Russia and persistent problems in the Middle East--ought to cement a
common approach.
Managing relations with Russia will be a long game, conducted
within a relatively narrow band of possibilities, from the sharply
competitive to the nastily adversarial. Even as we push back firmly
against Putin's belligerence, we cannot ignore the need for
guardrails--lines of communication between our militaries and diplomats
that can help us reduce the risks of inadvertent collisions. We should
be engaging in serious strategic stability talks, and working in our
own cold-blooded self-interest to limit nuclear threats. Russian
violations have helped trigger the demise of the INF Treaty, but it
would be foolish for us to let the New START Treaty lapse in 2021.
We should not give in to Putin, but we should not give up on the
possibility of more stable relations with the Russia beyond Putin.
Russians may eventually chafe at being the junior partner of a rising
China, just as they chafed at being the junior partner of the United
States after the cold war, and that may open up space for artful
American diplomacy.
Tackling these challenges will require us to take a hard look at
America's involvement in the Middle East, where we have focused so much
of our foreign policy attention for the past several decades. We are no
longer directly dependent on the region for the bulk of our energy
needs, and a clear-eyed assessment of our interests argues for a
different kind of engagement. We cannot neglect our leadership role in
a region where instability is contagious and threats can quickly
metastasize, but we ought to continue to shift the terms of our
engagement, with less demands on the American military and more
reliance on creative diplomacy,
As part of a long-term strategy, we should reassure our traditional
Arab partners against the threats they face, whether from Sunni
extremist groups or a predatory Iran. But we should insist in return
that Sunni Arab leaderships recognize that regional order will
ultimately require some modus vivendi with an Iran that will remain a
substantial power even if it tempers its revolutionary overreach. We
should also insist that they address urgently the profound crisis of
governance that was at the heart of the Arab Spring. At a time when
authoritarians feel the wind in their sails, the United States cannot
afford to blindly and willfully indulge autocratic impulses. This body
has already strongly condemned acts like the killing of Jamal Khashoggi
and called for curtailing the overreach that has bred such horrendous
conditions in Yemen; we must also do more to make sure that these
condemnations are followed by tangible actions.
As members of this committee know very well, the strategic
significance of Africa and our own Hemisphere has often been
underplayed in Administrations of both parties. That is a mistake.
Demography--with Africa's population likely to double to two billion
people by the middle of this century--and a variety of uncertainties
and possibilities in both of these critical regions will only increase
their importance for American interests.
Successfully executing a pivotal power strategy will require
shoring up America's alliances. Just as in domestic politics, it's
important to ``remember your base''--in this case, a set of
partnerships that sets us apart from lonelier powers like China and
Russia, and serves as an enormous force multiplier. Over the coming
decades, we'll have an increasing interest in putting ourselves in
position to manage relationships and build influence in all directions.
European partners will be instrumental in countering Putin's Russia,
while our allies in Asia will be a necessary part of a broader strategy
for dealing with the rise of China.
We must also do better when it comes to following through on our
international commitments. It was, in my view, an historic mistake to
make the perfect the enemy of the good and walk away from the Trans-
Pacific Partnership; with a subsequent effort in Europe, we could have
anchored two-thirds of the global economy to the same high standards
and rules as our own system, helped emerging markets join the club over
time, and shaped China's options and incentives for reform. Our
withdrawal from agreements like the Paris climate accords and the Iran
nuclear deal has further deepened international mistrust of our motives
and undercut our image as a reliable partner. So has our backtracking
on migration and refugee issues, and humanitarian diplomacy more
broadly, which has hampered efforts to get other states to do their
part and left critical frontline partners increasingly on their own.
reconnecting with americans and rebalancing our tools
Just as it has at other crucial moments in our history, this
committee can play a vital role in answering these challenges, and in
formulating a new strategy for the century ahead. You have both an
opportunity and a responsibility to help bridge the disconnect between
an uncertain American public and an often undisciplined Washington
establishment, and rebalance the tools in our national security toolkit
to fit a new era.
All of you are acutely aware of the tradeoffs and interplay between
America's foreign and domestic priorities. You know firsthand the costs
and benefits of our international commitments. It will be impossible to
fulfill America's potential as the world's pivotal power unless we make
more vivid the connection between smart American engagement abroad and
renewal at home. We have to show our fellow citizens that effective
American foreign policy not only begins at home, in a strong political
and economic system, but ends there too--in more jobs, more prosperity,
a healthier environment, and better security.
In my experience, most Americans don't need to be convinced of the
wisdom of disciplined American leadership in the world, in our own
enlightened self-interest. But they are less persuaded of our capacity,
across Administrations of both parties, to be disciplined in the
application of American power, and to ensure that Americans across our
society are positioned for success in a hyper-competitive world.
This committee has an equally important role when it comes to
overseeing and shaping the tools of American foreign policy. In the
years ahead, we won't be able to get everything we want on our own, or
by force alone. So as a recovering diplomat, it won't surprise you that
I am absolutely convinced that diplomacy--backed up by military and
economic leverage and the power of our example--will matter more than
ever as our tool of first resort.
Unfortunately, American diplomacy has suffered from decades of
strategic and operational drift. We were lulled into complacency by our
strength after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and we inverted
further the roles of force and diplomacy in American statecraft
following the terrible shock of September 11.
These long-term trends have been greatly exacerbated by the current
administration's hollowing out of American diplomacy. The after-effects
of its early, ill-conceived ``redesign process'' are still lingering.
Intake into the Foreign Service was cut by over 50 percent. The Foreign
Service has lost many of its most capable mid-level and senior
officers. Key Ambassadorships and senior positions in Washington remain
unfilled. What was already painfully slow progress toward better gender
and ethnic diversity has been thrown into reverse. Most pernicious of
all has been the practice of blacklisting individual officers, simply
because they worked on controversial issues in the previous
Administration.
There is never a good time for diplomatic malpractice, but this is
a particularly damaging moment. This committee can--and should--help
shape an affirmative agenda for diplomacy's renewal. At its core ought
to be a compact--a two-way street in which the State Department and the
executive branch follow through on serious reforms, streamline
structures, and find a rational balance for budgets and roles across
the national security community, in return for more support from
Congress.
That will mean an honest self-appraisal by the State Department;
while individual American diplomats can be remarkably innovative and
entrepreneurial, the Department as an institution is rarely accused of
being too agile or too full of initiative. It will mean smart
bureaucratic reforms that de-layer the Department and push authority
downwards and outwards, empowering Ambassadors in the field. It will
mean holding nominees to high standards and working to fill vital
diplomatic posts around the world. And it will mean adequate resources
for diplomacy, with more flexibility allowed in the use of funds.
Neither the State Department nor the Congress can revitalize American
diplomacy on their own, and this partnership will only work if it's
embedded in a wider compact with citizens that restores their faith in
disciplined American leadership and the significance and utility of
diplomacy itself.
The window for defining America's pivotal role will not stay open
forever. Whether we seize the moment of opportunity before us will
depend in large measure on whether this chamber and this committee can
help recapture a sense of shared vision and shared purpose; whether we
can recover a sense of diplomatic agility out of the muscle-bound
national security bureaucracy that we've become in recent years; and
whether we can come to terms with the realities of a new international
landscape, and shape it skillfully with our considerable enduring
strengths.
Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you, Ambassador. Thoughtful remarks.
Now we will hear from the Honorable Stephen Hadley. He
served as National Security Advisor for President George W.
Bush from 2005 to 2009 where, beyond his national security
duties, he had special responsibility for U.S.-Russia political
dialogue, the Israeli disengagement from Gaza, and developing a
strategic relationship with India.
Mr. Hadley is current a principal at RiceHadleyGates, an
international strategic consulting firm, as well as the senior
advisor to the U.S. Institute of Peace where he has co-chaired
a series of senior bipartisan working groups on a broad range
of issues.
With that, Mr. Hadley. Good to have you here.
STATEMENT OF HON. STEPHEN J. HADLEY, PRINCIPAL, RICEHADLEYGATES
LLC, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Hadley. Thank you, Chairman Risch and Ranking Member
Menendez, and other distinguished members of this committee. I
am grateful for the opportunity to be before you today with my
friend and colleague, Bill Burns.
As the chairman has pointed out, after World War II, the
United States and its friends and allies created an
international system based on democratic values and free market
principles, and that system produced unprecedented prosperity
and security for the United States and much of the world. But
the system must be revised and adapted to reflect both
geopolitical and domestic political changes in the last 70
years that have undermined its foundations.
At the geopolitical level, the world has seen a return of
great power rivalry and ideological competition. China and
Russia are challenging the existing international system and
America's dominant role in it. Their alternative model of
authoritarian State capitalism is attracting adherence because
America's model of democracy and free market appears to be in
decline.
Much of this is our own doing. Our economic system appears
unable to produce sustained, inclusive growth offering equal
opportunity for all our citizens to share in its benefits, and
our political system appears to be unable to address
longstanding societal challenges, like immigration, fiscal
deficits, entitlement reform, infrastructure, climate change,
even though workable solutions have been more or less apparent
for years, if not decades. If the United States is to compete
successfully in the new world it is facing, it must address its
own political and economic problems, and fixing the American
model at home will strengthen the American brand abroad.
The reemergence of ideological competition parallels what
opinion polls clearly show is a crisis of confidence among the
citizens of democratic states. They are no longer confident
that democracy and free markets work for them at home or are
worth promoting abroad. If the United States is to compete
successfully in the new world it is facing, it must engage its
citizens on the basic principles of democracy and free markets,
and restoring American confidence at home will empower American
leadership abroad.
Once the United States and other democratic societies have
renewed their commitment to these principles, they must engage
other states, including China and Russia. A system based on
democracy and free markets is more likely to produce stable
states able to meet the needs of their people, states that will
live in peace with one another, and a world in which Americans
can prosper in security and freedom. If the United States is to
compete successfully in the new world it is facing, it must
seek a global consensus behind a revised and adapted
international system basing it on the principles of democracy,
free markets, human rights, and the rule of law.
It is hard to imagine a revised and adapted international
system in which China does not have a major role. Some say that
China wants a seat at the table in revising the system and that
China does not want to overturn and replace it. The United
States should test this proposition by engaging China and
embracing appropriate Chinese suggestions and initiatives, and
the United States should seek strategic cooperation with China
in meeting global challenges like climate change, environmental
damage, terrorism, pandemics, and the societal effects of
revolutionary technological change. These are challenges that
neither country can solve alone but that must be solved if
either country is going to realize its goals, whether the China
dream or the American dream.
The problem, of course, is that China, with its
increasingly diplomatic, economic, and military might, is a
strategic competitor like no other America has ever faced. But
strategic competitors need not be strategic adversaries. The
challenge is to see if China and the United States can be both
strategic competitors and strategic cooperators at the same
time. The United States should make the effort but not be
naive. It will be very difficult. And it will only succeed if
the United States is fully prepared and capable of competing
successfully with China if the effort fails and if China
clearly understands this fact.
If the United States is to compete effectively in the new
world it is facing, it must develop its own capabilities in
critical technological areas and get in the game and mobilize
private industry and private capital, incentivize innovation
and technology development, and reenergize cooperation among
industry, academia, and government, along with our friends and
allies.
Does the United States still need to be the global leader?
Yes, for the problem, sadly, is that there is no one else.
Europe is too caught up with its own internal problems, and
most of the world does not want either China or Russia to be
the global leader. Without U.S. leadership, the international
system is likely to move towards spheres of influence,
oppression of smaller states, authoritarian politics, state-
controlled economies, and abridgment of human rights. This is
not a world in which the United States' friends and allies
would live in comfort, prosperity, or security even if they
could retain their freedom.
America's continued global leadership cannot be taken for
granted, but isolationism and retreat do not work. We know
because we have tried them before, and history has not been
kind to the result.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hadley follows:]
Prepared Statement of Stephen J. Hadley
Thank you Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Menendez, and other
distinguished members of the committee.
I am grateful for the opportunity to testify before you this
morning on assessing the role of the United States in the world.
My testimony will focus on the current challenges to the
international system, how we should respond, and the continued need for
the United States to lead but in a different way.
what has changed?
After World War II, the United States and its friends and allies
created an international system based on democratic values and free
market principles. That system produced unprecedented prosperity and
security for the United States and much of the world. But it must be
revised and adapted to reflect both geo-political and domestic-
political changes in the last 70 years that have undermined its
foundations.
At the geopolitical level, the world has seen the return of great-
power rivalry and ideological competition. The 2017 National Security
Strategy said it well: ``The competitions and rivalries facing the
United States are not passing trends or momentary problems. They are
intertwined, long-term challenges that demand our sustained national
attention and commitment.'' At the same time, an unfolding Digital Age
promises incredible developments in key 21st century technologies--
artificial intelligence and quantum physics, robotics and autonomy,
cyber and biotech--that will revolutionize how people communicate,
learn, work, live--and how militaries fight.
China and Russia are already using these 21st century technologies
to challenge the existing international system and America's dominant
role in it. They are weaponizing digital platforms to weaken our social
cohesion, to undermine the foundations of our national power, and to
fracture our alliances. Disinformation and disruption are not new, but
digital tools are extending the scale and reach to unprecedented
levels. Their alternative model of authoritarian state capitalism is
attracting adherents because America's model of democracy and free
markets appears to be in decline.
how we should respond?
Much of this is our own doing. Our economic system appears unable
to produce sustained, inclusive growth offering equal opportunity for
all of our citizens to share in its benefits. Our political system
appears unable to address long-standing societal challenges--like
immigration, fiscal deficits, entitlement reform, infrastructure, and
climate change--even though workable solutions have been more or less
apparent for years if not decades. If the United States is to compete
successfully in the new world it is facing, it must address its own
political and economic problems--and fixing the America model at home
will strengthen the American brand abroad.
The reemergence of ideological competition parallels what opinion
polls clearly show is a crisis of confidence among the citizens of
democratic societies. No longer confident that democracy and free
markets work for them at home or are worth promoting abroad, the
resulting political disruption has distracted the United States and
other democracies and made them less willing to play their traditional
leadership role in the world. If the United States is to compete
successfully in the new world it is facing, it must engage its citizens
on the basic principles of democracy and free markets--and restoring
American confidence at home will empower American leadership abroad.
Once the United States and other democratic societies have renewed
their commitment to these principles, they must engage other states
including China and Russia. A global consensus is emerging that the
international system needs to change. The issue is on what principles
should the revised system be based. A system based on democracy and
free markets is more likely to produce stable states able to meet the
needs of their people, states that will live in peace with one another,
and a world in which Americans can prosper in security and freedom. If
the United States is to compete successfully in the new world it is
facing, it must seek a global consensus behind a revised and adapted
international system--and basing it on the principles of democracy,
free markets, human rights, and rule of law.
how do we persuade russia and china to participate?
Russia seems to bear the greatest grievance against the existing
international system, is the most resentful of American leadership, and
has become a spoiler in almost every international crisis or conflict.
U.S.-Russian relations need to return to the traditional framework for
dealing with adversarial states: cooperate where possible, defend
American values and interests where challenged, and manage differences
so as to avoid confrontation and conflict. Until then, engaging Russia
in seeking to revise and adapt the international system is likely to be
a frustrating activity. But if China engages, Russia is likely to want
to participate as well.
It is hard to imagine a revised and adapted international system in
which China does not have a major role. Sophisticated Chinese analysts
admit that China has been one of the biggest beneficiaries of the
existing international system. Many say that while China wants a ``seat
at the table'' in revising the system, China does not want to overturn
or replace it. The United States should test this proposition by
engaging China and embracing appropriate Chinese suggestions and
initiatives. The United States missed an opportunity when it refused to
participate in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), now
widely viewed as a responsible development institution and not just a
tool of Chinese hegemony. The United States should test whether China's
Belt Road Initiative (BRI) could become something similar. And the
United States should seek strategic cooperation with China in meeting
global challenges (e.g. climate change, environmental damage,
terrorism, pandemics, the societal effects of revolutionary
technological change) that neither country can solve alone but that
must be solved if either country is to realize its goals--whether the
China dream or the America dream.
The problem is that China--with its increasing diplomatic,
economic, and military might--is a strategic competitor like no other
America has ever faced. But strategic competitors need not be strategic
adversaries. The challenge--and the opportunity--is to see if China and
the United States can be both strategic competitors and strategic
cooperators at the same time. The United States should make the effort
but not be naive. It will be very difficult. There are few positive
historical precedents. And it will only succeed if the United States is
fully prepared and capable of competing successfully with China if the
effort fails--and if China clearly understands this fact.
Competition in the key 21st century technologies--the risk of a
``Technology cold war''--and the strategic challenge presented by the
Belt Road Initiative are two of the areas that most threaten to disrupt
U.S./China relations. The United States and China need to construct a
framework for their competition in these areas that reduces the risk of
confrontation and conflict. At the same time the United States must
ready itself to compete and win in those areas critical to its national
security and economic future. For example, it is just too risky to let
China dominate--let alone monopolize--the digital infrastructure of the
21st century. But for less critical infrastructure, the United States
should cooperate with China if China will follow international best
practices of transparency, intellectual property protection, resilience
to corruption, sustainability, and fiscal, environmental, and social
responsibility.
If the United States is to compete effectively in the new world it
is facing, it must develop its own capabilities in critical areas and
``get in the game''--and mobilize private industry and private capital,
incentivize innovation and technology development, and reenergize
cooperation among industry, academia, and government, along with
friends and allies.
does america still need to be the leader?
When global leadership became too burdensome for a Great Britain
exhausted by World War II, it passed the torch to the United States.
More than half a century later, many Americans are ready to pass the
torch to someone else. The problem, sadly, is that there is no one
else. Europe is too caught up with its own internal problems, and most
of the world does not want either China or Russia to be the global
leader. Without U.S. leadership, the international system is likely to
move toward spheres of influence, oppression of smaller states,
authoritarian politics, state-controlled economies, and abridgement of
human rights. This is not a world in which the United States, its
friends and allies, would live in comfort, prosperity, or security,
even if they could retain their freedom.
does america have to lead in a different way?
While America must still lead, others must both assume more
responsibility and carry more of the burden. But they will only do so
if given a greater role in setting the rules, running the institutions,
and establishing the arrangements for a revised and adapted
international order.
This applies especially to America's friends and allies. They are
most likely to share our values and vision for a revised and adapted
international system. If given a greater role and participation, they
can be extenders of democratic and free market principles and America's
biggest source of leverage.
Governments are not the only players in the new world America is
facing. Involving others means involving the business sector,
charitable organizations, academic institutions, civil society, and
other non-governmental entities. These are now critical actors in the
emerging international system.
The United States must overcome the ``not invented here'' syndrome
and be willing to embrace sensible ideas and innovations from other
sources, consistent with the fundamental principles of a revised and
adapted international system.
Iraq and Afghanistan-style interventions are likely to be a thing
of the past. The new formula of fighting terrorists ``by, with, and
through'' local forces clearly works and is the right model.
The United States and like-minded states need to adopt a preventive
strategy to stop and roll back the spread of extremism in fragile
states. They must empower local partners willing to improve their own
governance and better serve their people.
The United States must continue to develop and give priority to
effective non-military measures like sanctions to deal with countries
like North Korea and Iran. But without broad participation and support,
sanctions risk isolating the United States and encouraging others to
create alternative financial structures. Nations forced to choose
between a U.S.-based international financial system and an alternative
(especially one backed by China and Russia) may surprise us with their
choices.
America's continued global leadership cannot be taken for granted.
But isolationism and retreat do not work. We know because we have tried
them before--and history has not been kind to the result.
Senators, I thank you for this opportunity to testify before you
and look forward to your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Also very thoughtful.
We are now going to do a 5-minute round of questioning back
and forth between each side. I am going to reserve my questions
as we go down the pike. And with that, I am going to turn it
over to Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for your very thoughtful and insightful
remarks.
I just came back recently, along with some other
colleagues, from the Munich Security Conference and from
meetings at the European Union and at NATO.
In this world that you both have described, would you say
that our multilateral efforts to meet some of these challenges
are one of the essential ingredients of potential success?
Ambassador Burns. Absolutely I would. I believe that what
sets the United States apart on this complicated landscape from
lonelier powers like China and Russia are precisely our
alliances, our partnerships, our capacity to mobilize other
countries to deal with many of the broader challenges that
Steve was talking about.
Mr. Hadley. I agree.
Senator Menendez So I will tell you that the synthesis of
the comments that I got from our friends and allies in Europe
is that they have a sense that we are going it alone. They do
not have a sense of the strong foundational commitment that the
United States has had with them. They see us drifting from them
and not in concert with them. And that to me is a huge
challenge.
It is interesting to listen to the Chinese be there and
talk about the importance of multilateralism. Of course, it is
somewhat hollow based upon their performance so far. But where
there is a void, it will be filled by those who have their own
aspirations.
So I think this is critically important for us to be able
to move forward.
Let me ask you specifically in the context--you both have
had experiences with Russia and you both addressed China. So
what are the risks to U.S. national security of a world without
any limitations on Russian nuclear forces? What are the
implications for strategic stability if no inspection regime
exists to provide information on the size and location of
Russian nuclear forces?
Mr. Hadley. Two things. One, the problem I think with
alliances is while they are a high leverage proposition for the
United States and one of our unique resources for dealing with
the world, there is an effort, I think rightly, by the Trump
administration to rebalance within our alliances and to get our
allies and friends to take more responsibility going forward. I
think that is part of what a revised adapted international
system is going to look like. I think it is going to have more
players and more people who want a seat at the table. And the
trick is to rebalance those relationships without straining
them beyond repair. And that is, I think, the challenge the
administration has.
The dilemma on the nuclear piece in terms of the INF Treaty
is that in some sense, the Russians very shrewdly put us in a
box. They violated the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty by
deploying a ground-launched system that violates its terms. We
addressed it over a period of two administrations, asked them
to come back into compliance. They did not. And the dilemma was
do you stay in a treaty where the other side is violating it or
do you accept the opprobrium of getting out of the treaty,
which is the box Putin I think put us in because I think he
actually wanted to get out of the treaty too.
The question I think is going to be in terms of the New
START treaty which I would hope would be both extended but also
in some sense renegotiated to address these new emerging
nuclear systems that Russia is deploying that were not in
contemplation at the time that agreement was put into place
that need to be addressed. There are more nuclear systems than
are covered by the New START treaty, and the question is can we
renegotiate, as the head of STRATCOM suggested just yesterday,
a new arrangement that would cover these additional systems
that are not covered by the New START treaty and would also
perhaps cover the intermediate nuclear systems that used to be
covered by the INF Treaty.
Ambassador Burns. The only thing I would add, Senator, is
that I really do think it would be a huge mistake to let the
New START agreement expire both for the reasons that you
mentioned, you know, the transparency that the intrusive
verification measures provides to the United States and the
ways in which that enhances our security, but also because, at
least with regard to the limitation of strategic nuclear
weapons, this is a really important part of a global regime to
try to reduce the dangers of nuclear war. So however profound
our differences with Russia are--and they are profound and are
likely to remain that way--it is important in my view to
preserve some guardrails in that relationship especially with
regard to strategic nuclear weapons.
Senator Menendez I will just make one comment. Rebalancing
these alliances and having their fair-share burden is one
thing. Straining them to the point that they believe that they
are not an alliance is another thing.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Gardner?
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to the witnesses for your testimony today and
your service to our country.
For the last 4 years on this committee, I have been
privileged to chair the Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific,
and International Cybersecurity Policy. The Indo-Pacific, as
you know, is home to half of the world's population, half of
the world's GDP, some of the world's largest standing armies,
and six U.S. defense treaty allies. The security and economic
future of the United States lies in a free and open--and the
right policies in a free and open Indo-Pacific.
On December 31st, on New Year's Eve, President Trump signed
into law the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act that I carried
with Senator Markey. ARIA is a generational effort that has
garnered broad bipartisan support. Senator Coons, Senator
Cardin, Senator Kaine, others in Congress were cosponsors of
this generational effort that has garnered support in Congress,
the White House, the business community, policy experts, and
leaders on both sides of the Pacific. ARIA authorized nearly
$10 billion in new resources for a long-term strategy to
enhance security cooperation with our allies to promote
American businesses through trade opportunities and to project
American values of democracy, human rights, and rule of law in
the Indo-Pacific region.
As stated in the editorial in the "Manila Times," January
20th of 2019, just last month, with ARIA's passage, America's
engagement of the Indo-Pacific has more focus and resources.
The new legislation also makes for a long overdue commitment to
strategic thinking about the region.
In the 116th Congress, in partnership with Senator Markey--
and I must say it has been an incredible bipartisan committee--
we intend to conduct rigorous oversight to ensure that ARIA is
fully implemented and fully funded. The line of questioning and
conversations this morning has focused a lot on building
alliances. That is exactly what ARIA is intended to do, to
build alliances.
And so I would just as you both, how would you advise the
current administration to best utilize the resources provided
by ARIA and the language that we have developed to address
economic security and values in the Indo-Pacific?
Mr. Hadley. I would urge them to embrace it. I think given
the challenge presented by China, the United States needs to be
present in Asia in every dimension, diplomatically,
economically, militarily, private sector, public sector, and
working closely with our friends and allies in the region. It
is one of the reasons why I thought it unfortunate that we
stopped the further negotiation of the TPP, the Trans-Pacific
Partnership.
Senator Gardner. And ARIA embraces a lot of the language
and the trade of TPP and puts it into the language.
Mr. Hadley. Exactly. And that is why I think it is a
wonderful vehicle to allow us to embrace in a different
framework perhaps those very principles and connections that we
need to strengthen if we are going to be able to manage the
emergence of China in Asia. So I think it is a terrific
initiative.
Senator Gardner. Thank you.
Ambassador Burns?
Ambassador Burns. I agree absolutely. It seems to me that
dealing with the rise of China across the Indo-Pacific is, as
you said, Senator, the principal strategic challenge we face.
There are several dimensions to a smart strategy. One is to try
to reshape the terms on trade, investment, and other issues.
And here I think what the administration is doing is right, and
a lot of those efforts are long overdue. We ought to try to do
it I think in concert with other countries, whether in Asia or
Europe. We share a lot of the same concerns.
But the second dimension of the strategy is exactly what
you are talking about and that is an affirmative vision for an
Indo-Pacific region in which China's rise does not come at
anybody else's expense. And as Steve suggested, that would
require in my view taking another look at the Trans-Pacific
Partnership because that provides a framework that is going to
shape China's own incentives and disincentives for how it
operates economically across Asia.
So I applaud the effort and I just hope that it will be one
important building block in an effort to not only lay out that
affirmative vision, but then build a web of alliances,
partnerships, new institutions that gives us the leverage to
help deliver on it.
Senator Gardner. The focus today is on Vietnam and what is
happening in Vietnam. I think the opportunity for us to
continue building that strategic balance for the region is
important. Obviously, Vietnam had a long a history with China,
obviously a neighbor to China. There are certain things that
they are going to be tied together on forever. But to provide
U.S. leadership, provide this kind of legislation, an
opportunity for strategic balance with Vietnam, business
opportunities, to work with Vietnam on certain democracy, human
rights values is incredibly important.
And I hope that we can continue engaging the administration
on funding this effort because to have another great term of
rhetoric, rebalance or pivot, simply is not enough. We have to
provide actual leadership on the ground with real face and real
dollars involved.
Mr. Hadley, you talked a little bit about the United States
should test this proposition by engaging China and embracing
appropriate Chinese suggestions and initiatives. I am
concerned, though, when you look at the opportunity they have
with North Korea. Obviously, North Korea has relied on China
for its economy, for its resources, for its aid. We know China
continues to turn a blind eye to the violations of U.S.
sanctions, ship-to-ship transfers, some of which have occurred
at least in open source reports in Chinese territorial waters.
I do not know how we are going to engage them when they do
not want to and they are reluctant to. They could be a critical
player when it comes to denuclearization of North Korea, but
yet they have refused to be that leader.
I am out of time. I am going to stop. But I am skeptical of
China's willingness to engage in a responsible global capacity.
The Chairman. Thank you so much, Senator. And that raises
a lot of issues that are probably appropriate for another
hearing. There are a lot things, moving parts there.
Senator Cardin?
Senator Cardin. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you
very much for holding this hearing.
I want to thank both of our distinguished witnesses for
their service to our country and their being here today.
Both the chairman and ranking member, both witnesses have
mentioned that American values are our strength, that promoting
good governance, rule of law, human rights, and our global
leadership working with international partners will give us a
more stable international community, is in our national
security interest.
So that is being challenged today by many of the policies
of this administration. We could talk about the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia. We could talk about the Philippines. We could
talk about Russia. We could talk about China. But both of you
have mentioned the importance of Asia in your statements and
response to your questions. The President today is in Hanoi
meeting with Kim Jong-un of North Korea. So I want to talk and
get your response in regards to that second summit meeting
between Kim Jong-un and President Trump.
Senator Menendez has already questioned whether America is
committed to the future agreements with Russia in regards to
INF and New START. We know that the Trump administration has
withdrawn from the Iran nuclear agreement. And when you try to
look at Iran and North Korea, you see some similarities between
those between countries. North Korea was much further
advanced--is much further advanced on the nuclear weaponization
than Iran was, and they continue to promote a nuclear program.
North Korea has been judged to be in worse violations of human
rights towards its own citizens than Iran is. So the President
withdraws from Iran without the support of our international
partners and is now having a second summit with the leader of
North Korea.
We had a hearing in this committee in the last Congress
that said the first step needs to be a declaration of the
program if you are going to have denuclearization. And to my
knowledge, there has been no declaration by North Korea of its
program and no game plan to understand where they are today so
that we can have a road map to denuclearize.
So my question to you, with a second summit between the
President of the United States and the leader of North Korea,
are we just giving Kim Jong-un international legitimacy? And
what have we accomplished by having a second summit?
Mr. Hadley. I think we do not know. We will have to see
what comes out of the summit.
But I think the point you made is a good one. You know,
three administrations have done sort of top-down agreements
with North Korea to try to get it to denuclearize, and none of
those administrations were able to keep North Korea in those
deals. And while there has been a lot of criticism of President
Trump, those of us who were involved in those efforts that were
unblemished by success I think we ought to give the President's
approach a chance.
And I think it is going to look different because, as you
said, Senator, North Korea is different than Iran. And I think
rather than some kind of big overall framework agreement, I
think the road they are on is to try to get North Korea to take
steps in the direction of denuclearization in return for steps
that we would take that over time build some kind of
relationship between the United States and North Korea and
gradually degrade their nuclear weapons capability and their
ballistic missile program capability and to try to get Kim
Jong-un to the point where he will make a strategic shift and
decide that he is better off rather than being isolated--
Senator Cardin. Compare that to what has happened in Iran
with the U.S. pulling out of the nuclear agreement that was
being enforced, an agreement, by the way, that I did not agree
with initially, but disagreed with pulling out. I do not quite
get the rationale here that we are going to give North Korea a
long lead time to make incremental progress where we had
significant progress with another country and we pull out. How
does that gibe?
Mr. Hadley. Well, I think it is because the reasons the
administration gave for getting out of the Iran deal were, one,
because they did not like the terms. They did not think the
terms lived up to the promise of preventing Iran from finding a
way to be a nuclear weapons State and it did not deal with
other--
Senator Cardin. Well, we had inspections. We had limits on
what they can enrich, and we have nothing in North Korea.
Mr. Hadley. I agree.
Senator Cardin. Mr. Burns, do you have any--
Ambassador Burns. No. The only thing I would add is if you
will recall, Senator, the interim agreement that we did with
the Iranians at the end of 2013, which froze their program,
rolled it back in some significant respects in return for very
limited sanctions relief, we preserved almost all of our
sanctions leverage for the later comprehensive talks. And we
were able to introduce some quite intrusive verification and
monitoring measures as well. If you could get something like
that as a first significant step in dealing with North Korea,
setting aside the irony of this, given the administration's
view of the Iranian nuclear agreement, that I would suggest
would be a significant tangible step forward.
The risk, as you have suggested, is that we end up getting
caught up in triumphalist rhetoric and give too much too soon
in return for too little. I hope that is not the case. I hope
we are able to make some hard-nosed, tangible progress. That
would be a good thing if we can.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cardin. Well thought-out
remarks.
I would just observe that dealing with North Korea and Iran
are two different situations in that they both have nuclear
problems, as far as we are concerned, but Iran's problems go
way beyond that when it comes to dealing with the terrorists
and that sort of thing.
Senator Cardin. I would just argue both countries go well
beyond their nuclear problems.
The Chairman. There is no question about that. I agree
with that 100 percent. But the meddling they are doing in the
Middle East is a very bad situation for us.
So with that said--and thank you. Well thought-out.
Senator Romney?
Senator Romney. Mr. Hadley and Mr. Burns, thank you so
much for being here. I appreciate the service that you have
given to our country and the wisdom that you provided this
morning.
Thank you also to Chairman Risch and Ranking Member
Menendez for your comments and questions and your leadership of
this committee. This is in my view a critical time for this
committee's work, and under the leadership of these two
gentlemen, I hope we are able to make the kind of progress that
the country needs.
Following the Second World War, Dean Acheson, Harry Truman,
and others worked together--George Kennan--to establish a
foreign policy for our nation, objectives and a strategy, if
you will, that we followed quite consistently over the many
decades. We now live in kind of a very different world than
that that existed following the Second World War. And there are
some, like myself, who believe that we have not devised a new
strategy or even set objectives for what we hope to accomplish
over the coming decades or century.
One, I question is that right? Is it we are sort of
flailing with an uncertain path in the face of nations like
Russia and China that apparently do have very clear objectives
and strategies? China has even published them. And if that is
the case, let me ask you, how do we go about the process of
establishing a clear set of objectives and strategy for our
foreign policy going forward? And do you have any suggestions
of an element or two or three or whatever that ought to be part
of the strategic thinking for the vision for America over the
coming decades?
Ambassador Burns. Well, thanks, Senator.
I think the first step is to understand the landscape and
the way in which it has changed not since the era of Acheson
and others, but since the end of the Cold War, which launched a
moment of 20 years or so in which we really were the singular
dominant player in the international system. I think we have to
recognize that that landscape is more competitive now and
recognize also our strengths. I do not think we need to be
defeatist about this at all. We still, as I suggested in my
opening remarks, have a better hand to play than any of our
rivals. The question is how we play it. And I think recognizing
that one of our great assets is our ability to draw in
alliances, to build partnerships with new emerging countries
like India, for example, and then to think strategically about
our priorities which, as both of us suggested, I think has to
start with Asia. It does not end there. And ironically I think
that makes transatlantic ties more rather than less important
because we both share concerns--we and our principal European
allies--about Chinese rise, about Russia's resurgence.
And at the same time, my last point is we also have to take
into account that range of truly global challenges well beyond
the reach of any one State, whether it is the revolution in
technology, climate change, just as two profound examples, and
look for ways in which we can take the lead in mobilizing other
countries to address them because those are going to be,
especially with regard to climate, I think a truly existential
challenge.
Senator Romney. Thank you.
Mr. Hadley. Senator, I would say we need to revise and
adapt the international system to reflect the new changed
circumstances. The question is, is it going to be based on our
principles or somebody else's? And that is why one of the first
steps--something we did at the Atlantic Council was to roll out
a declaration of principles that takes the traditional
principles under the old order but revises and adapts them for
the new situation. That begins the process.
We are going to engage China on these principles, and I
think whether we are going to successfully adapt that
international system is going to depend a lot on our
relationship with China. And that is why I focused so much on
China in my testimony. I think we know the problem. I do not
think we have a strategy at this point on China. I think it is
one of the things that this committee could really do to have
an intensive set of hearings on China strategy because I think
we know the problem. I do not think we have a strategy.
I think it starts by getting ourselves in a position so
that we can compete successfully with China. And I think if we
do that, there are selective things on which we can get China
to cooperate with us. But first we have got to fix I think--our
foreign policy begins at home. We have got to have a firm
foundation here at home. Engage with China but make it clear to
China that we are also prepared to compete with it, and if they
are not willing to cooperate, they will be on the short end of
the stick.
Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Coons?
Senator Coons. Thank you, Chairman Risch, Ranking Member
Menendez.
And I would like to thank Ambassador Burns and Security
Advisor Hadley. Thank you for your decades of service and your
very insightful framing comments that have led to this
conversation.
I will just note that both of you made the point that the
single best thing we can do to promote and protect democracy
abroad is to get our act together here at home. I will just
comment that all of us are engaging in a broad and searching
and constructive and important hearing with you. Yet, our
nation is glued to the television watching testimony in the
other chamber about stuff that does not necessarily advance
democracy. Can I put it that way? Transparency does. But we
just had a government shutdown of 35 days that, as best I could
tell, amounted to a fight over the world "wall" versus "fence."
In Munich, I heard grave concern about our drift and our
lack of reliability. I really appreciated the broad group that
put out these principles to reassert our engagement and our
commitment to them. Later today the Senate Human Rights Caucus
will hold another event focusing on the bipartisan effort to
combat human trafficking and human slavery globally. I think
central to our pushing back on China and Russia is continuing
to reassert our commitment to core principles like human
rights.
I could not agree more with you that coming up with, as a
full committee, a thoughtful, well reasoned strategy for
confronting and engaging and potentially partnering with China
is the most important thing we can do.
But I would like to ask you for a minute, if I could, about
fragile states and your engagement and role in delivering a
report yesterday. So the United States Institute of Peace
convened an impressive, broad working group that both of you
served on to come up with a strategy for engaging fragile
states and preventing extremism. 18 years after 9/11, we have
spent almost $6 trillion on combating extremism, not
exclusively of the Islamic variety but mostly. And we should be
able to pivot to Asia and engage with China, but we will not if
we cannot find a better path forward for conducting preventive
investments on a multilateral basis to confront terrorism. I
would be grateful if both of you could briefly speak to your
work on that task force on extremism in fragile states and the
recommendations that came out of it.
Ambassador Burns, why do you think the U.S. Government can
do a better job than we have done to ensure that fragile states
do not become failed states, that we do not have, for example,
Somalia be repeated in Ethiopia or Kenya or South Sudan?
And, Mr. Hadley, if you would, the report calls for the
creation of an international fund with a different approach to
preventing fragile states becoming failed states. I would be
interested in your thoughts on how that fund would work, why
there is a compelling role model, and how you see that going
forward. If you would, in order. Thank you.
Ambassador Burns. Well, thanks so much, Senator. And I was
privileged to join Steve and a number of others on the task
force that you mentioned.
I think briefly we have all learned I think over the last 2
decades since the terrible shock of 9/11 that the use of
kinetic action of military resources are absolutely essential
in dealing with the al Qaedas or the ISISes of the world. But
that kind of terrorism, as profound a threat as it is, is
oftentimes a symptom of a deeper extremism which thrives in
fragile or collapsing societies.
And so one thing I think we both agree is on the need--it
will not surprise you as a recovering diplomat that I believe
in this on prevention, on looking at places where you have
partners in place who are committed to good governance--and
that is not going to be in every fragile place in the world--
both in governments and in civil society with whom we and other
international partners can work to try to create some models of
success. Over the last 20 years, Colombia is one example of
that where through administrations of both parties, the United
States working with some courageous leaderships in Colombia was
able to make real progress. We need to look for other places
where we can make that kind of long-term investment, not just
the United States on its own but working with other
international partners who share that concern.
Mr. Hadley. Fragile states are places where terrorists
recruit and other powers meddle. They are the problem. The
problem in fragile states is governance. And the model we talk
about in the report is to go with the Millennium Challenge
account kind of model where you partner with leaders of States
who understand the problem is governance and want to deliver
more for their people. Partner with them in a program they
embrace and develop to advance their societies. Then go to the
Global Fund, as we did for the Global Fund for AIDS relief, get
the international community to contribute and then fund that
kind of program. It is really a combination of the MCC, the
Global Fund, partnering with local states and leaders who are
willing to address the problem of governance that is the
problem in fragile states.
Senator Coons. And you can think of lots of challenges we
face that would be addressed or reduced if, for example, the
nations of El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala actually had a
successful decade-long progress towards stability,
transparency, rule of law or if the countries of the Sahel had
a decades-long progress towards transparency and stability. And
we could then focus on the bigger challenges that all of us
agree we have to focus on. There is more extremism. There are
more fragile states today than there was 18 years ago. And we
have spent $6 trillion.
We need a different strategy. And I am reintroducing a bill
in this Congress with six members of this committee that would
authorize this new strategy and move us towards funding a
preventive strategy to dealing with failed states.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Coons.
Senator Young?
Senator Young. Mr. Burns, Mr. Hadley, thanks so much for
your service to our country and for being here today and for
your thoughtful testimony.
Both of you have provided some thoughtful commentary in
your written submissions, as well as your words here today,
with respect to our strategic competition with China.
I am particularly concerned with our economic competition.
This is something I credit the administration for elevating,
the predatory economic practices of the Chinese, as have my
colleagues on the other side of the aisle. I think all
Americans recognize that we have to deal with intellectual
property theft and forced technology transfer and the dumping
of manufactured goods into this country and other illicit
behaviors that violate the liberal international order that we
invited China into back in 2000.
With that said, I am concerned that a bilateral approach to
addressing these matters is not going to be effective. I think
we will end up ultimately with some sort of agreement with
respect to terrorists and the tit for tat that we have seen
that does not address the root issues of intellectual property
theft and some of the other things. And I think we need more
leverage, candidly, or perhaps another international forum
outside of the WTO because it is so difficult to reform the WTO
in order to address these matters.
And I just wanted to open up the floor to you gentlemen to
see if you have some ideas that we ought to entertain here on
this committee and encourage the administration to adopt,
working with our international allies and partners, to help
address this what will be probably a multigenerational issue.
Ambassador Burns. Thanks, Senator, very much.
I mean, I think I really appreciate the question, and I
think in terms of American strategy, it does have to have two
dimensions and both of those dimensions cannot be purely
bilateral. The defensive dimension, just as you said, is the
overdue effort to push back against Chinese practices which
disadvantage us.
The one missing element I think our strategy so far over
the last couple years has been not working more energetically
with lots of other countries who share those same concerns, and
instead we have launched off on kind of second flank trade wars
in steel and aluminum, whether it is with the European Union or
with Japan or others, rather than making our priority trying to
push back against Chinese practices.
The second dimension is the affirmative, and that is where,
as both of us said, I do think it was a mistake for the United
States to pull out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership because if
you want to deal effectively with China and its predatory
economic practices over time, you have to create an affirmative
framework for the kind of Asia that we want to see and lots of
our friends and partners want to see across Asia with a set of
high-end international standards that reflect our values and
also are going to position American business to compete
effectively in the future.
So I agree with you. I think this is not just a question--
important as bilateral efforts are, it has got to be within a
wider framework.
Senator Young. Mr. Hadley?
Mr. Hadley. I think it is great that there is bipartisan
support for the proposition that these structural elements of
China's economy that take advantage of us need to be addressed.
I think they are dealing with these structural issues so far as
I can tell in the bilateral negotiations going on. We are going
to be at this for a long time to get China on the right sheet
of paper in terms of these things.
So I would say view this as kind of a pump primer or a jump
start. I would hope that we would then bring other allies in
behind the effort. I think WTO reform is something that we need
to be doing and we need to be leading on. So I would hope that
this would start a process that would be an inclusive one that
you described.
Senator Young. So I know these core issues of intellectual
property theft and the others are on the agenda, and to that
extent, I think they will be addressed. Some laws will be
promulgated in China. Some new rules will be put in place.
But the key is enforcement mechanisms. And it strikes me
that we are going to need some new enforcement mechanisms.
Perhaps the administration is working on that. I am not aware
of what new enforcement mechanisms might be included in a
potential agreement. But do you agree that is what we should be
looking for?
Mr. Hadley. Absolutely. We have heard this rhetoric out of
China before. It is always where the rubber meets the road,
that things do not seem to happen. That is why I think we are
going to be in a long process for this. We need enforcement
mechanisms, and we need others to join with us in using those
mechanisms.
Senator Young. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Young.
Senator Murphy?
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for being here and for your years of
service. Thank you for challenging this committee to find some
enduring common ground on the challenges and priorities that we
are talking about. I agree that that is more important than
ever, and I hope that we take up your call to action.
Ambassador Burns, I wanted to ask you to expand on your
comments about the future of the EU and NATO. Secretary Pompeo
gave a really remarkable speech in Brussels in December that
got very little attention here but had serious reverberations
throughout the continent, in which he engaged in a pretty
remarkable broadside against multilateralism in defense of
sovereignty. And you combine that together with the cheering of
Brexit, cheerleading of some of the nationalist movements on
the continent, and I worry. I think many of us worry about the
work that we are doing both quietly and loudly to undermine the
European Union and NATO as well.
Tell us about the status of both of those alliances and how
this committee can do work to try to make clear that this is in
the long-term interest of the United States to support both.
Ambassador Burns. Thanks, Senator.
Well, the first point I would make is I think with all of
our focus on Asia, which makes perfect sense as you look out
over the next couple of decades, it does make transatlantic
ties more rather than less important because we share a lot of
common interests and we certainly share values in ways which
makes that transatlantic relationship unique.
Second, I think we do have to recognize that many of our
closest allies in Europe and the European Union in particular
are in the midst of an existential crisis. I mean, they are
having a nervous breakdown at the same time as in some ways we
are on this side of the Atlantic. And while we do not get a
vote on issues like Brexit, the United States certainly has an
interest in those issues, has an interest in a vibrant European
Union on whom we can rely and on whom Europeans can rely when
they look at their relationship with the United States.
You know, Europe faces challenges of uncertainty about
whether they can rely on the United States, and I do not think
the Secretary's speech in Brussels helped that. I think they
face uncertainties as they look across the Mediterranean at the
south and the insecurities that come out of the Middle East and
Africa. And certainly there is the specter of a resurgent
Russia and Putin's belligerence as well.
So for all those reasons, we ought to be paying a lot of
attention to investing in those alliances.
And with regard to NATO, as Steve said, of course, we need
to push for more burden sharing. That is not a novel insight
for this administration. Its predecessors have also pushed.
Maybe we did not do it as hard as we should have. But there
does need to be a better balance. But at its core, I think that
relationship, both with the EU and with NATO, is as or more
important than ever for the United States.
Senator Murphy. You cannot combat the growing hegemony of
China without the United States and Europe being together in
that project.
Mr. Hadley, I wanted to point you to a really interesting
turn of phrase that Ambassador Burns used at the end of his
testimony. He asked whether we can recover, quote, a sense of
diplomatic agility out of the muscle-bound national security
bureaucracy that we have become in recent years. I thought that
was a really interesting challenge to us.
And I think about that in the context of Syria where we
have been told over and over by experts before this committee
that this is a political problem without a purely military
solution. And yet, the United States has had 2,000 troops
inside Syria and virtually no diplomats in part because 19-
year-old marines are pretty well equipped to go very quickly
into conflict zones and 50-year-old diplomats are not. You put
that side by side with Russia and China who, if nothing else,
are much more nimble than the United States in taking advantage
with pace of opportunities and weaknesses around the world.
What are your recommendations in a short amount of time as
to how we try to make diplomacy more nimble, how we try to get
people who can solve complex political problems into those
places as opposed to what we do today, which is put very
capable warfighters into these places who may not be as well
equipped as others in our national security infrastructure?
Mr. Hadley. I will give you a short answer. I think the
appointment of Jim Jeffries as Special Envoy for Syria, an
experienced diplomat, is an effort to put someone at the front
of our diplomacy who is not chained by the bureaucracy, can be
more nimble. But in order for him to succeed, he has to have
leverage. And the problem we have had in Syria is we have not
been present in a form that gives us leverage remotely similar
to what the Russians and the Iranians have. So it is great to
have an agile, flexible diplomat, but if we do not give him the
gravitas behind him and the leverage behind him to achieve a
good result that serves our interests, he will fail.
Senator Murphy. Does leverage only come through military
deployments?
Mr. Hadley. No, it does not only. But in a place like Syria
in a combat zone--
Senator Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Murphy.
Senator Portman?
Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate
your holding this hearing. A great way to kick off your tenure
to have a broad-based look at America's role in the world. The
problem is we only have 5 minutes to ask 5 hours' worth of
questions.
The Chairman. We are going to have some more hearings,
Senator. You will get a shot.
Senator Portman. But these two are great diplomats in
their time and great public servants, and we appreciate your
service to our country and your continued advice to us. Hadley
in particular. I had a chance to meet one of his colleagues. So
I saw the kind of advice he gives the President of the United
States and the great respect he has among his peers.
So many issues. And let me just focus on Russia and China
quickly.
One, Steve, I read your piece recently in "Foreign Policy"
with regard to the Kerch Straits and what we should be doing.
You advocated a much more aggressive response to Russia and
talked about the fact that after Crimea, there was very little
response, and even on the eastern border, not an adequate
response in Donbass.
What should we do specifically right now with regard to
their obviously illegal activities in the Kerch Strait?
Mr. Hadley. The article suggested that we should have
sanctions in response to--
Senator Portman. Specific sanctions just as to that issue?
Mr. Hadley. Specific sanctions tied to the incident in
Kerch where basically Russia broke an agreement that they had
with Ukraine that there would be joint sovereignty over that
strait.
Secondly, we need to take steps that are preventive so that
Russia does not mistake the lack of response for an invitation
to do more. There are areas north of there that are important
for water supplies for Crimea, a concern that the Russians
might take another chunk out of Ukraine.
Senator Portman. Fresh water reservoirs.
Mr. Hadley. We should be putting observers and forces there
to ensure that Putin is not tempted. And I think we need
greater naval operations in that area and in the Baltic Sea for
the same reason.
Senator Portman. And pushing NATO to do more in the region
with regard to the naval presence.
So quickly on another Russia issue, and this is one
actually Senator Murphy and I have worked a lot on over the
last several years, and we now have this Global Engagement
Center at the State Department. We have promoted and funding
disinformation, propaganda.
Ambassador Burns, when you were in Russia, you saw this.
But I would imagine you would say that between the period you
were there, which I think was around 2005, and today that
things have changed dramatically.
What should we be doing that we are not doing to push back?
And do you all have information about the Global Engagement
Center? How do you think that is being set up?
Ambassador Burns. Well, thanks, Senator.
No. I think it is a very smart initiative. I think there
are lots of things that we can do. I mean, first is to
recognize the severity of the problem, and the 2016 elections I
think drove that home to all of us as well. But that is not the
end of it. I mean, that challenge is continuing not just for us
but also for our allies in Europe where Putin and the Kremlin I
think are past masters of trying to meddle in problems there as
well.
So I think there are things that we can do that help
identify, working not only as a government but with the private
sector to identify efforts, whether it is using bots or others,
to infiltrate into our systems as well. There are things we can
do to help strengthen and safeguard our own electoral processes
as well. There are examples and experience that we can share
with the Europeans who face many of those same challenges.
So, again, I think this is an area where making common
cause with some of our transatlantic partners on the Russian
disinformation threat is a really smart long-term investment.
Senator Portman. Steve, any thoughts?
Mr. Hadley. I agree.
Senator Portman. Moving on to China quickly, we are doing
a hearing tomorrow with regard to Chinese influence here in our
country with regard to our colleges, universities, and our K
through 12 institutions. These are the so-called Confucius
Institutes. A report is coming out today. They spend about 150
million bucks since 2006 through really a propaganda arm of the
Chinese Government to fund these institutes, colleges, and
universities. About a hundred of them are happy to take the
money and work with Confucius Institutes. My understanding is--
and we will talk about this tomorrow--more that these
individuals who come from China have a contract with the
Chinese Government, including the application of Chinese law.
And there are visa issues. There are issues with regard to
transparency, universities not reporting the payments, which
they are required to do after it meets a certain threshold.
Any thoughts about that issue broadly and then more
specifically, with regard to influence here in this country
through our university system, research, technology transfer
with regard to China?
Mr. Hadley. I think one of the things that is important is
to expose what is going on. People are very sensitive to
Russian interference in our country internally, not so aware of
what the Chinese are doing. So the first step is exposure.
Second of all is a balanced reaction. The solution in my
view is not to exclude all Chinese graduate students from any
American graduate school. There is a lot of value added we get
from being an open society where students from all over the
world can come and study in our institutions. But having
guidelines and restrictions that keep China from using these
students as a source of stealing intellectual property and
national security secrets is just common sense.
So the question is expose the problem, get people aware,
but then avoid an overreaction, and try to craft a sensible set
of policies that in some sense take a little bit of a middle
road and balance competing considerations that are at stake
here.
Senator Portman. My time is up. I like your idea of
strategic competitors and strategic partners, and that would be
consistent with that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And thanks to our witnesses.
Jumping right in, you have each testified to the value of
NATO and the importance of a strong nation having strong
alliances versus a strong nation being a lonely nation.
I have a bill that Senator Coons, Senator Gardner, Senator
Rubio--we have introduced together to clarify that we would not
withdraw from NATO unless there would be an act of Congress or
a Senate vote on that. NATO was a treaty ratified by the
Senate. The Constitution says treaties must be ratified by the
Senate. The Constitution is silent about how treaties come to
an end. But there is a general understanding that when the
Constitution is silent about that, it is an area where Congress
can legislate.
Would specifying that we would not withdraw from NATO
absent a vote of the Senate or Congress send a positive message
about the importance of that alliance to the United States?
Ambassador Burns. Yes, it certainly would, Senator.
Mr. Hadley. I completely agree.
And I want to commend the Senators who joined what I think
was the largest congressional delegation ever at the Munich
Security Conference. I think it was critically important to put
the Congress and the American people on record as supporting
NATO. I salute you for having done it. I think this would be
very worthwhile legislation for the same reason.
Senator Kaine. Mr. Chair, I would hope we might have some
opportunity to discuss that in committee, especially given the
70th anniversary in April.
Second, should the United States policy still be to promote
a two-State solution between Israel and Palestine? Have the
facts, Israeli settlements on the one hand or the fractured
nature of Palestinian leadership, especially between Gaza and
the West Bank--have they made it essentially an unrealistic
goal, or is it a realistic goal that we should continue to
promote, and if so, how?
Ambassador Burns. I mean, Senator, it is a really good
question because I think the chances of producing a two-State
solution have become more and more elusive over time for lots
of different reasons. You mentioned most of them.
I still think it is an extremely important aspect of
American policy to promote that. I think if you look at the
reality of what a one-State solution would look like, in other
words, the reality in which our friend and ally in Israel and
the land that it controls from the Jordan River to the
Mediterranean has a political reality in which Arabs, as you
look out over the next 4 or 5 years, are likely a majority in
that area, it is hard to see how you sustain the kind of Jewish
democratic state that all of us have been committed to for so
long. And I think that is the reality, quite apart from the
legitimate aspirations of the Palestinians for a state of their
own.
So as elusive as the goal is--and it is getting more
elusive every day--I think there remains a sense of urgency
about that. I do not underestimate the obstacles in the path of
it, but I think we will all regret it if we wake up 5 or 10
years from now and it turns out that that outcome is
impossible.
Senator Kaine. Mr. Hadley?
Mr. Hadley. I do not know what the administration's long-
promised initiative on Middle East peace is going to look like.
I think we will need to see that.
I would think it would be very useful for this committee to
focus on a study that was done by the Institute for National
Security Studies in Israel, which is a proposal for concrete
steps on the ground that would improve the life of the
Palestinians but, at the same time, would preserve the
possibility for a two-State solution down the road because I
agree with Bill. I just do not think the politics in either
community, either Israel or the Palestinian community, are
ready for a two-State solution now. But this was a very
interesting set of proposals to try to help the Palestinians
build institutions, improve livelihood, improve economic
activity, and keep open the option for a two-State solution. I
think that is the best we can do right now.
Senator Kaine. One of the things that I hear on the Armed
Services Committee often is that we should avoid activity that
tends to drive our adversaries together. And occasionally we
will hear testimony there about Russia and China cooperating
more together. There were Russian military exercises recently
that the Chinese participated in.
From your vantage point, do you worry about Russia and
China cooperating more, or do you think there are natural
limits to that cooperation and we need not worry about it?
Ambassador Burns. No. I think it ought to be an object of
concern for us. I think it is more than just a marriage of
convenience right now between China and Russia. I think they
share a broad interest in chipping away at an American-led
order around the world.
Having said that, I also think you are right, Senator, that
if you play this out over the next 5, 10, 15 years, I do not
think Russians are going to be any more comfortable being
China's junior partner than they were being the junior partner
of the United States in the immediate post-Cold War era. And so
I think whether you look at the Belt and Road Initiative by
China and the likely political collisions at least in Central
Asia that you can see, there is going to come a time I think
when Russians probably beyond the Putin era see more of an
interest in a healthier relationship with Europe, with the
United States as a hedge in a way against China's rise. So I am
not predicting that is coming anytime soon, but it is something
that we ought to at least be aware of as we look at longer-term
strategy.
Senator Kaine. Excellent.
Well, I am over time. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to
the witnesses.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
Senator Rubio?
Senator Rubio. Thank you both for being here.
I think this is a really important conversation. We spend a
lot of time talking about tactics around here, but if tactics
are not driven by a strategic aim, then I think it is difficult
both to justify to the American people and ultimately you just
lose yourself in why you are doing things. And I think this is
a long overdue conversation, and I am very happy that the
chairman and the ranking member chose this topic because we
have got some decisions to make about our strategic view that I
think could be a bipartisan one and a strong consensus in our
foreign policymaking in this new era.
There are a lot of challenges, but there are two I want to
ask you about. The first is this rise of autocratic regimes who
go through some of the rituals of democracy. They have an
election but nobody can run against them, and there is no free
press and things of this nature. And they also have elements of
state-controlled capitalism. And so the rise of these--and they
are sort of out there arguing to people look how stable we are,
we are prosperous, and we have stability. And then they point
to the West and the upheaval we are facing across the developed
nations of the West. Some of it is a function of technology and
globalization that have impacted the working class and the
middle class and leading to real upheaval that is manifested
politically.
The other interrelated is we have our first near-peer
competitor in China since the end of the Cold War. I mean, yes,
Russia is a strategic competitor in key parts of the world,
largely as a spoiler and increasingly as an aggravator, but not
like China. In fact, I would argue they pose a comprehensive
challenge. Unlike even the Soviet Union was never an industrial
or technological challenger in that realm. And the Chinese are
spreading their model of authoritarian capitalism, and they are
trying to shape these post-World War II institutions in a way
that is sort of beneficial to them. And then you also see them
in these efforts to dominate the Asia-Pacific region, most
certainly be a dominant power there. They view that as their
right historically. And then, of course, challenge the U.S.
across multiple domains across the world.
And so I think there are two big strategic decisions we
need to make. The first is are we going to defend liberal
democracy and in particular the value of individual human
rights because if we are not pushing back on that, both in
words and in action--it is not just a nice thing to do. Right?
There is a strategic value to doing that, but if there is no
counterbalance to this authoritarian movement.
And then the other is China where we have kind of been told
there are only two choices at least in the broader scheme. One
is that we either try to modify their rise or we try to stop
their rise. And I think the question is whether there is a
third option there and that is some level of strategic
equilibrium since we do not want there to be an imbalance in
the relationship because it could very well lead to conflict.
And that is why we have to be careful about things like Made in
China 2025. They want to dominate these 10 key industries from
aerospace to agriculture machinery and technologies and the
like.
And just back on the first point on the pushing back on
this autocratic rise, it also explains why we should care about
the internment of Uighur Muslims in China or why we should
support those in Venezuela that are demanding democracy through
their constitutional order. That is why we should care about
the murder of Khashoggi. You do not chop people up in
consulates. And because we do not push back, we have completely
surrendered that.
So just on those points, first of all, I think you would
agree that it is important for there to be sort of a strategic
consensus in order to drive our tactics and our policies.
And particularly on the China point, is the right way to
frame it or is it the right view that this is not about
constraining? They are going to be a great power. It is about
ensuring that there is a strategic balance between the
countries because the absence of that balance could lead to
conflict.
Mr. Hadley. I think you got it just right. You know, after
the end of the Cold War, we thought the ideological struggle
was over and we had won. And I agree with you that in the
emergence of China, we see a competitor like we have never
known before in terms of its scale across the board,
diplomatic, economic, militarily.
They do have a different model than we do. They are
competing actively advocating that model in the international
system. We are hardly in the game. We need to start affirming
our confidence in our model and fix our problems at home so the
brand looks good internationally because it is working
effectively at home and then compete in the ideological
struggle with China. I think in the end of the day if we do
that, we will win. But I think at this point we are not in the
game.
I agree with you on China. That is why I tried to say can
we be strategic competitors and strategic cooperators at the
same time. And that means in some areas we are going to have
to--for example, like the digital infrastructure where I think
we are going to have to make sure that China does not
monopolize or dominate that area. There are other areas that I
think are less strategic to us where we can cooperate. We are
going to have to try and find some balance.
Ambassador Burns. Just two quick comments, Senator, if I
could add.
First, on China, I absolutely agree with you. This is not
an issue in my view so much of constraining China because its
rise is going to continue. But the question is into what world
does it rise. And we have the capacity through the rejuvenation
of ourselves, our political and economic system at home, and
then working with friends and allies across the Indo-Pacific
and around the world and adapting institutions to help shape
that world into which China's rise occurs and to help shape its
own incentives and disincentives for its actions in that world.
And then finally on human rights, I could not agree with
you more. This is not just a moral issue, as important as that
is for the United States. It is a practical source of our
influence in the world especially if we are consistent about
this and we are willing to call to account not just
adversaries, which is easier to do, but also friends of ours
because it is not as if they are doing a favor to us by
listening to those kind of concerns. State after state around
the world--it is particularly true in the Middle East, and we
saw this in the Arab Spring--that do not pay attention to those
basic indignities or human rights become brittle and break, and
they do not become reliable partners over time. So I could not
agree with you more. It is very important for us to factor that
in for practical reasons to the way in which we deal with other
societies.
The Chairman. Thank you, both.
Senator Isakson?
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You know, when you are last, everything has been said. You
just have not said it. I have been sitting over here trying to
remember my days with Steve and others to ask some intelligent
questions, and I want to make a couple suggestions.
First of all, I think that Senator Coons was right on
target. We embarrassed ourselves in the shutdown, we being
Republicans and Democrats. A lot of things we said and were on
TV at a time when all the other things were going on I think
sent the wrong signal to our friends and neighbors and probably
to our adversaries too.
I think also what everybody did in going to Munich--I did
not go to Munich, but that was a great message to send. I have
been to that conference, and at the particular time we are in
now, that sent a positive message on NATO.
I would like to make a couple suggestions. There is one
thing out there that we could bring up in this committee, do
thorough hearings on, and challenge ourselves to either adopt
it or not adopt it. And that is the Law of the Sea. That
affects China. That affects Russia, and that affects the United
States more than any other thing that is out there. And it is
controversial. And on the conservative side, there are a lot of
people who do not like it. But the Seabed Authority in Jamaica
oversees the distribution of the fees that are paid to the UN
body that does the management of this and gives you access to
rare earth minerals in the South China Sea, the Arctic changing
on the North Pole, things that are big issues, the North Pole
with Russia and the South China Sea with China.
So I think a great way to bring something up that is laying
there for us to talk about that affects our relationships with
Russia and China is to bring up the Law of the Sea somewhere
down the line and talk about that vis-a-vis us being in the
world and not being a part of that treaty. It is very
interesting that only Iran and Venezuela and a couple others
and us are not members of it. Everybody else has already signed
it. So we are a little late to the party, but it would be
perfect timing to accomplish what you want to and engage more
in discussions that we should have.
Mr. Burns, in your statement, I took it that you did not
think using tariffs and using trade negotiations vis-a-vis
foreign relations is a good thing to mix. Was I right with that
or wrong with that?
Ambassador Burns. No. I mean, I think there are instances
where we can use tools like that to get better ends. My only
point, at least with regard to China, was that I think we get
farther in addressing some of the structural problems, real
problems we have with China when we are working with other
countries who share those same concerns. And my comment was
more about us. While at the same time we are pushing the
Chinese rightly to reverse some of those trade and investment
practices that disadvantage us, it would make sense to try to
make common cause with Asian allies, with European partners as
well rather than start sort of second and third front tariff
conflicts with them at the same time. That was my only point.
Senator Isakson. I agree with you on the TPP. I was sorry
that we dropped out of that. But I have to admit it had some
positive effect too by getting people thinking. Now, we still
need to engage with China. Not having a trade agreement in that
part of the world is dangerous for our country I think, and I
think we need to do it.
I have found that some of the strategy that has been used
in those tariff negotiations have been pretty neat to get
people to the table and other things that they were not at the
table before.
My last thing for the chairman is I will make you an offer,
Mr. Chairman. This past weekend I entertained two couples in
Atlanta from the northeastern part of the country, one of them
a professor. I took them to the Museum of Civil Rights and
Human Relations in Atlanta, one of the most moving experiences
they had had. And I think we could have a 1-day CODEL sometime
this year for the committee and go to Atlanta and go through
that three-story museum, which includes all the King papers,
but lots of other things too, all about human rights and all
about civil rights, and then take some of the programs that
have come from the Carter Center and from Emory University and
from Georgia Tech. Sam Nunn's institute is at Georgia Tech, and
his Nunn-Lugar initiative is managed out of that location. You
could put together a great one day for the committee, fly down
and come back, but learn a lot about human and civil rights and
also about what we have been doing through other mechanisms,
both Nunn and others in terms of foreign relations. So I will
be happy to volunteer as a tour guide if you decide that is a
good thing for us to do.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Isakson. I yield back.
The Chairman. Well, that completes our first round, but I
will yield to Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have one
question I want to follow up.
But I want to say to my dear colleague, Senator Isakson, I
agree with you on the Law of the Sea. I conducted hearings when
I was the chairman of the committee towards the Law of the Sea.
I think it is critical in so many ways to our national security
and strategic interests to be part of the Law of the Sea at a
time in which America is an Atlantic State, it is a Pacific
State, it has its nexus in the Arctic. I mean, it has critical
interests. And I would embrace that. I would just hope that we
could overcome the ideological issues of some of these treaties
and move forward in our own national interests. So I want to
second your call.
And certainly we would love to take a trip down to see the
center.
On China, as part of devising a strategy, is a critical
element of that not an embracing of--and reforming it, fine--
but embracing of multilateralism? You know, when the European
Union and the United States joined together in an economy, it
begins to rival China. When the United States joins with Asian
and South Asian communities, it begins to challenge China. When
China spends unlimited amounts of money in ways to influence
its not only economic interests but its foreign policy
interests, we are not going to go dollar for dollar or euro for
euro, but that is not where our competitive advantage is
either.
So is it not critical for us, as we think about the
strategy, that we need to create the strategic relationships
with others in order to be able to more successfully ultimately
meet the challenge of China and by that rebalancing of economic
and other interests be able then to compete more effectively
with China and bring it closer to it being part of a new
international world order? I think that is critical because on
our own, despite being a great nation, I am not quite sure that
we can meet that challenge just strictly on our own.
Do you have perspectives on that?
Mr. Hadley. I would agree with you. And I think it is one
of the things that is useful that the administration has what
they call the Indo-Pacific Strategy because what that tells me
is that to manage China, we and our friends and allies are all
going to have to work together.
And I think we can use multilateral institutions to put
pressure on China. They announced the Asia Infrastructure
Investment Bank. A lot of people thought that was just a
strategic play by China. It turns out it is a pretty good bank.
China's influence is declining. It is fairly professional. It
partners with the other international banks and development
banks. I think we should try the same thing with the Belt/Road
Initiative, to use the fact that some of the countries that
receive Chinese funds are having buyer's remorse and push China
to put that in an international multilateral framework too that
meets professional standards of transparency, fiscal
responsibility, environmental responsibility, benefiting the
recipient countries. I think we need to use the entire
international community to try to manage this problem that we
have never seen before, which is the emergence on the world
scene of somebody with the weight that China now has and is
increasingly going to have. So I agree with you.
Ambassador Burns. Senator, all I would add is I think the
United States' great strategic advantage, as you look out as
far as I can see into the 21st century, is our ability to work
with and mobilize others.
You know, China by comparison is a relatively lonelier
power today for all of its strengths and for all of its
inevitable rise. So if you look at trade issues, if we had been
able to remain in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, knit together
40 percent of the global economy, if in future years we had
added to that a kind of transatlantic analog to that around the
same high-end standards, you could have mobilized two-thirds of
the global economy around a set of standards which inevitably
shapes China's choices, its incentives and disincentives.
The same is true with regard to the Law of the Sea. We are
in a much stronger position in the South China Sea against
pushing back against the Chinese if we are able to point to
those rules and we are a part of that system as well. So I
agree.
Senator Menendez Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Cruz?
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to each of the witnesses for being here this
morning. Thank you for your testimony.
Let us start with what you were just addressing in the last
set of questions, which is China. In my view, China is the
greatest geopolitical long-term threat to the United States,
both economically and militarily. I want to ask both of you. Do
you share that assessment, number one? Number two, if so, what
should we expect from China in the next decade?
Mr. Hadley. I worked for President Bush, and each morning
we would come in at about 5 after 7:00 and tell him of all the
terrible things that had happened overnight. And he would
always say, well, your job, gentlemen, is to take each problem
and challenge and turn it into an opportunity. And I think that
is what we need to try to do with China, and I think that is
what Senator Rubio was talking about. It is a huge challenge.
I do not think we know where China is heading, and that is
why I think the point Bill made is right about trying to
condition the environment in which China is emerging, to try to
influence its behavior, because the trends are troubling. If
you look at the extent of the increasing control that the party
is exercising over the society, if you look at the social
credit scheme and using data to really incentivize party-
approved behavior from the citizenry, it is the kind of tool
that Stalin would have loved to have had in his era.
We do not know where they are going economically. They
clearly have some trouble. I think there is a tension between
their political system and their economic system, that you
cannot have the kind of political control and have the kind of
economic reform and opening up China needs if it is going to
achieve its objectives for its own self.
So I think there are all kinds of dilemmas in terms of
where China is heading, and the most we can do is to try to
condition the environment, shape as much as we can Chinese
choices, but put ourselves in a position that if it comes to a
head-to-head competition, we are going to win.
Ambassador Burns. Senator, I agree with you. I think we
have to be clear-eyed about what Chinese ambitions seem to be,
and I think China wants to be a global economic peer of the
United States and it is well on its way to that outcome. And
second, I think it wants to recover across the Chinese
political elite what it sees to be its accustomed role as the
dominant player in Asia.
Now, both of those ambitions carry with them the seeds of
collisions with the United States. I mean, history is full of
collisions between rising powers and established powers. I do
not think there is anything foreordained about that, and that
is why, as both of us have said, I think that has a lot to do
with how forward looking, how nimble we are in trying to shape
the conditions in which China rises so that we can limit the
risks of collisions over time. I think that is possible. But
that is the single biggest strategic challenge we are going to
face.
Senator Cruz. So in your judgments, what should our
objectives be with regard to China and dealing with China in
the next decade? And what tools do we have to accomplish those
objectives? And I would ask that you include in your answers
some assessment of the Chinese investments in propaganda,
whether it is in countries across the globe or here in the
United States through organizations like Confucius Institutes
that are funded by the PRC and designed to spread a particular
message that is agreeable to the government of China.
Mr. Hadley. I think we start by preparing to compete with
China in those areas where it is in our national security and
economic interest to do so and put ourselves in a position to
compete and win in those areas. At the same time, to try to put
a framework around that competition so that it does not swallow
up the entire relationship and push us from competition to
confrontation and even conflict. And by so doing, open a space
for cooperation because, as I said in my testimony, there are a
lot of issues on which it is in China's and the United States'
interest to cooperate. We need to find a way to strategically
compete, bound the competition so it does not overwhelm the
relationship, and still have a space to cooperate in those
areas where it is in our interest to do so.
Finally, we need to take on the ideological challenge. We
have got to show the world again that authoritarian state
capitalism is not the route to a stable, prosperous, secure
society, and that our model works. I think we have lost some
confidence in that, and we need to reaffirm our commitment to
it and then demonstrate it in our own society.
Ambassador Burns. I agree. I mean, I think a lot of this
has to do with the power of our example in the world. We get a
lot further with the power of example than we do with the power
of our preaching. I have always found in many years overseas it
has to do with restoring our ability to compete effectively,
and we ought not to be defeatist about this. The United States,
as you well know, Senator, has enormous strengths to bring to
bear. They are not the same singular dominance that we had for
15 or 20 years after the end of the Cold War, but they are
still a better hand to play than any of our rivals'. But we
have a window within which we can play that wisely because
windows do not stay open forever. And if we do not try to shape
that environment, others are going to shape it for us. And I
think that is the challenge right now with China and more
broadly in the world.
Senator Cruz. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator. A good line of
questioning.
Senator Markey?
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
Kim Jong-un and President Trump are meeting in Vietnam and
the stakes are very high. There is a Kim family playbook going
back to his grandfather where they extract U.S. rewards. They
then delay meaningful concessions from their side, and then
they exploit ambiguities in any understanding. And as he
arrives, the President has a bit of excessive exuberance going
into this meeting. And my concern is that the President can
give away the farm while not, in fact, receiving real
concessions from the other side.
So my question is, has North Korea taken sufficient
denuclearization steps thus far to warrant significant U.S.
concessions? And are the promises of future North Korean steps
towards denuclearization, of which we do not even have an
agreed-upon definition yet, sufficient for significant U.S.
concessions at this summit?
Mr. Hadley. I think that they do have a playbook. They are
very tough to negotiate with. We have had three administrations
have agreements with them to denuclearize, and none of those
administrations were able to keep them into it.
And President Trump has tried an unconventional approach.
He initially saber-rattled and everybody said, oh, my gosh, we
are going to war. It turns out he was probably right because he
got Kim Jong-un's attention. He has got the Chinese attention.
Senator Markey. But did he get any concessions?
Mr. Hadley. He has got a cessation of their missile
testing, a cessation of their nuclear weapons testing, some
dismantlement of facilities. The significance of that is that
while the program is ongoing--he is still generating fissile
material and ballistic missiles--it is not--
Senator Markey. Right. He is developing nuclear ballistic
missiles. He is still producing fissile material.
Mr. Hadley. It is a step on what will be a long road. Does
it justify some response on the U.S. side? Yes. Does it justify
significant concessions? Your question. Probably not at this
point. Those need to be down the road. And I think what the
administration is trying to do is have some narrow steps they
can take like a declaration about the end of hostilities and
maybe some diplomatic opening.
Senator Markey. Which is very important to the North
Koreans. That is a big concession from their perspective.
Mr. Hadley. That is right, and we ought to get some further
dismantlement and degradation of their nuclear and missile
program in return.
Senator Markey. And if we do not get that?
Mr. Hadley. I think we need to proceed step by step, and
let us see what the President comes up with.
Ambassador Burns. Senator, I guess I would just add a
couple of points.
I mean, first, as Steve said, any of us who have worked on
this issue for the last 25 years start from a point of humility
because it is not like our record is exactly pristine in
dealing with North Korea's nuclear and missile threats.
Second, I do think it is really important that we be
careful in not giving away too much too soon because, as Steve
said, the North Koreans are practiced masters at dangling
things, which then turn out to be easily reversible. I have
never thought this was an argument against engaging at the
highest level of leaders. It is not a problem with talking to
one another. The problem is talking past one another. And that
is why I think this is a classic challenge of really hardnosed
diplomacy, step by step, to ensure that we do not give away too
much even if it is in terms of a declaration of the end of
hostilities, which is something, as you said, the North Koreans
would really value because there is a lot at stake in that. If
we can get something practical for it in terms of freezing
fissile material production and rollback, that is a good thing.
But we also have to be careful in light of the long-term
strategic competition with China because North Korea's playbook
is pretty clear. They would like to sow the seeds of
uncertainty about the U.S. commitment to our alliance with
South Korea, our alliance with Japan, and that also happens to
suit a long-term Chinese calculus as well.
So it is not an argument against a declaration of that
sort, but we need to be careful to make sure we get something
very tangible in response.
Senator Markey. Now, the UN Panel on Experts on North
Korea is set to publish an assessment of the Kim regime's
continued illicit behavior. It has got three things in it:
engaging in sanctions of Asians to sell natural resources and
to procure oil at levels above the UN caps; two, sending North
Korean technicians to Syria, possibly to assist with ballistic
missiles and chemical weapons programs; and three, selling
military equipment and expertise using the Syria connection as
a conduit to the Middle East and Africa, including sales to
Libya, Sudan, and the Houthis in Yemen.
How can the United States provide significant concessions
to a North Korean regime that is engaging in those types of
activities?
Mr. Hadley. Well, it is interesting you should mention it
because that was exactly the problem that a lot of Republicans
had with the Iran nuclear deal. How can you do a deal on
nuclear when Iran is one of the great State sponsors of terror
and is destabilizing its neighbors?
So this is a dilemma. And I think the proper approach is to
put all the issues on the table even though you might work
through them incrementally in terms of getting this process
started with North Korea. And I do think one of the things we
are not making the most of is the human rights issue, which we
should be raising for its own self, but also because it
embarrasses Kim Jong-un and is actually a source of leverage on
Kim Jong-un.
So I think we need to be cognizant of all these problems
with the regime and have a strategy to begin to address all of
them but also use all of our instruments of influence to try to
get the kinds of substantial response that you are calling for.
Senator Markey. And again, my only point is that if you
look at the totality of his conduct, as the Panel of Experts is
going to be reporting back, it is actually less cooperation and
intensifying the conflicts that we, the United States, are on
the other side of around the world.
So we thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Rubio?
Senator Rubio. And I just wanted to ask both because of
the expertise and experience that both of you have to ask you
briefly about ongoing events with Venezuela, which is a part of
the world that we have not really talked a lot about in the
last 20 years.
First, I think one of the things we perhaps need to spend
more time on is explaining why we should care. And I think one
of the issues is what we had discussed in my first round of
questions, the autocracy versus democracy debate. But this is
in our own hemisphere becoming even more pronounced.
And the other is it is in our national interest. I mean, if
things in Venezuela do not improve the migratory crisis,
another 2 million to 3 million people are projected to leave
which would potentially collapse social services in Colombia
but also Peru, Ecuador, even Brazil. So it becomes a regional
disaster. The drug flights sponsored by their government--these
planes are literally flying out of their air space protected by
their armed services. They turn right into Central America.
They land in Guatemala or Honduras. They are trafficked into
the U.S. It is a fuel for the gangs that are terrorizing people
and causing migration from that part of the world, not to
mention the drugs headed to us. They harbor terrorist groups
openly. The ELN, as an example, just killed 20 police cadets
about a month in Colombia, openly harbored in Venezuelan
territory.
And something that has not been covered, the environmental
destruction that is occurring in the gold mining, just absolute
catastrophic degradation of once pristine areas.
So a couple observations because I want your insight given
your years of experience. The first is all this talk about
multilateralism. In many ways the administration's approach to
this has been sort of the model of that, the OAS, the Lima
Group, virtually all the EU countries. In fact, the EU would be
there if it was not for Italy and I believe Greece that are
refusing to come on board, but everybody else is there, 60
countries sort of aligned with this position and the like.
And the assessment I have is that this is a regime core
made up of cronies who are isolated from reality and a lot of
other people, a lot of yes-men around them when you are in that
level of power. But they are able to provide incentives to the
security forces, by the way, are multilayered down to street
gangs that they are using to protect them. But they are still
able to provide incentives to the security forces to protect
them and to spy on each other. And hence, I think the policy
approach has been to target those incentives that they are able
to provide by going after hard currencies through the sale of
oil, none of which benefited the Venezuelan people, and of
course, the diplomatic isolation as well.
But what strikes me is this has been going--the crisis has
been going on for a long time, but from the moment the interim
president swore in to today it has been 4 weeks and a couple
days. So it has not been 4 years or 4 months. 4 weeks. And
everybody wants to know why is it not over yet.
First of all, your observation of the general situation
and, second, the value of some level of strategic patience.
These sanctions and this pressure, both the international
isolation and the economic, take time to build in before you
begin to see the security forces and the elites that are
supporting them crack. It does not happen from one day to the
next, and sometimes they are unpredictable. They happen very
quickly. And embedded in that too is the notion that we do want
to see some of the institutions there, as flawed as they may
be, survive because if the police officers do not show up the
next day, there is no security, and then it gets really bad. So
just your general observations on how long it takes to do this,
the strategic patience part of it, and anything else with
regard to it.
Ambassador Burns. Three quick comments, Senator.
First, I absolutely agree with you on what is at stake.
Through administrations of both parties, we have tended not to
pay as consistent strategic attention to our own hemisphere as
we should have. And you are right about the spillover dangers
too for Colombia, a success story in the last 20 years, but
which could really be badly affected by this.
Second, I think in terms of our approach, you are right. I
think the reliance on multilateralism, on diplomacy, on working
with partners in the hemisphere, as well as Europe, is exactly
the right approach.
Strategic patience is I think the right frame for thinking
about this. It takes time for that kind of pressure to take
effect. As you know better than I do, there are all sorts of
challenges which would arise in terms of military intervention
given the history of our involvement in the hemisphere and the
baggage that comes with that. So I think it is the right
approach to build up that kind of pressure.
And the only last comment I would make is that I hope we
are being very careful about, in a sense, preparing for success
because the day after can bring huge challenges, just as you
suggested, in Venezuela. If you end up in a situation where all
the institutions are broken and you have got lots of people who
have an incentive to breed further insecurity, it is a huge
challenge as well. So a lot of attention needs to be put into
that.
Mr. Hadley. Two quick points.
I agree we do need patience. I agree it should be
multilateral. The problem is I do not see that we have got
enough leverage to get Maduro gone. And I think where the
committee can focus and where I hope Elliott Abrams is focusing
is what is the strategy that gets us more leverage that will
actually crack this regime.
Secondly, on Bill's point, one of the things John Allen
said, you know, when you plan a major intervention that is
going to perhaps crater or change a regime, you need to start
with phase four and work backwards. What do you want the
situation to be after you have succeeded and then work
backwards in your planning so the things you do now to achieve
that result are not working at cross purposes with where you
want to end up. I do not think we have done that kind of
deliberative planning with respect to Venezuela given how it
came up. I think we need to start it now.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Well, gentlemen, thank you so much for your time here
today, and I know I speak on behalf of both myself and the
ranking member that we were honored to have the two of you. You
were chosen specifically for this as our initial hearing here
this year. And we look forward to working with you in the
future. Again, you have our thanks. Thank you so much.
And this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Response of The Honorable Stephen Hadley to Questions Submitted by
Senator Todd Young
Question. How can the United States maintain its position as the
leading global innovator? Which technologies do you see as vital for
the U.S. and how can the U.S. construct a framework for fair
international competition in those sectors?
Answer. The United States will be able to maintain its position as
the leading global innovator if our technology sectors continue to
focus on key developments in artificial intelligence (AI), robotics,
augmented reality/virtual reality (AR/VR) and financial technology
(fintech). The United States should be most focused on the dual use
technologies: VR for gaming, AI, robotics, and virtual reality will be
foundational so that many applications or end-use technologies will be
built upon them. These foundational technologies will be component
technologies for future innovations much the same way that
semiconductors have been components in all electronics. For example,
facial recognition and image detection for social networking and online
shopping has real application in tracking terrorists or other threats
to national security and much of today's commercial autonomous vehicle
technology and drone technology solutions find their genesis in DARPA
programs.
China aims to dominate the same key industries, to reduce reliance
on foreign technology, and to foster indigenous innovation. Through
published documents such as 5-year plans and Made in China 2025,
China's industrial policy is clear in its aims of import substitutions
and technology innovation. Currently the US does not have a
comprehensive policy or the tools to address this massive technology
transfer to China. CFIUS is one of the only tools in place today to
govern foreign investments but it was not designed to protect sensitive
technologies. CFIUS is only partially effective in protecting national
security given its limited jurisdiction. The USG does not know what
technologies we should be protecting and because competition is likely
to be particularly intense in the technologies that will define the
world economy in the next decade--artificial intelligence, cyber
autonomy, biotech, quantum computing, and information technology, it is
important that the USG construct a framework for fair international
competition in these sectors.
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