[Senate Hearing 116-184]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 116-184
THE FUTURE OF U.S. POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 3, 2019
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web:
http://www.govinfo.gov
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
40-423 PDF WASHINGTON : 2020
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho, Chairman
MARCO RUBIO, Florida ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
CORY GARDNER, Colorado JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
MITT ROMNEY, Utah CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming TIM KAINE, Virginia
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
RAND PAUL, Kentucky JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
TODD, YOUNG, Indiana CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
TED CRUZ, Texas
Christopher M. Socha, Staff Director
Jessica Lewis, Democratic Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho.................... 1
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey.............. 3
Hale, Hon. David, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs,
U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC....................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Ford, Hon. Christopher A., Assistant Secretary for International
Security and Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of State,
Washington, DC................................................. 10
Prepared statement........................................... 12
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Hon. David Hale to Questions Submitted by Senator
Robert Menendez................................................ 55
Responses of Christopher A. Ford to Questions Submitted by
Senator Robert Menendez........................................ 60
Responses of David Hale to Questions Submitted by Senator
Benjamin L. Cardin............................................. 62
Responses of David Hale to Questions Submitted by Senator Tom
Udall.......................................................... 73
Responses of David Hale to Questions Submitted by Senator Ted
Cruz........................................................... 77
Responses of Christopher A. Ford to Questions Submitted by
Senator Ted Cruz............................................... 78
Letter to Hon. James E. Risch and Hon. Robert Menendez From Mike
Sommers........................................................ 80
U.S. Chamber of Commerce Article Submitted by Senator James E.
Risch.......................................................... 82
(iii)
THE FUTURE OF U.S. POLICY
TOWARDS RUSSIA
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TUESDAY, DECEMBER 3, 2019
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:48 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. James E.
Risch, chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Risch [presiding], Rubio, Johnson,
Gardner, Romney, Isakson, Barrasso, Portman, Paul, Young, Cruz,
Menendez, Cardin, Shaheen, Coons, Udall, Murphy, Kaine, Markey,
and Merkley.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Thank you all for coming today, and thank you to our
witnesses for joining us today as we examine the current state
of the U.S.-Russia relationship and our strategy to deal with
the Russian Federation.
It is timely to assess our relationship with Russia as we
have recently celebrated the 30th anniversary of events that
led to the collapse of the Soviet Union: the fall of the Berlin
Wall, Solidarity's election victory in Poland, and the Baltic
Way demonstrations, among others. Many former Soviet states
have become prosperous democracies with memberships in NATO and
the EU.
But Mr. Putin has taken Russia down another, much darker
path. Today, many Russians suffer, while oligarchs enrich
themselves through control of major industries. Russia rigs its
elections to ensure only Kremlin-approved politicians make the
cut. Russia has targeted and expelled humanitarian
organizations and free media outlets, labeling them ``foreign
agents.'' And the Russian people are inhumanely imprisoned and
tortured for daring to disagree with the government.
Not only does the Russian Federation make life at home
painful for the average Russian, but Putin is also making life
hard for people around world. He has meddled in American and
European elections, sowing political chaos. He has propped up
the murderous regime of Syrian President al-Assad. He sells
arms to human rights abusers in Africa and missile defense
systems to U.S. allies and adversaries alike. And in Venezuela,
Maduro continues to hang on to power as people suffer, thanks
in large part to Russian assistance.
Of course, we all know about the invasions of Georgia and
Ukraine over the years and about the poisoning of Russian
people in London, on other sovereign soil. The world today is
more dangerous and less free because of the Russian Federation.
As a result, the U.S. relationship with Russia is at a low
point. During the height of the Cold War, our leaders had a
lifeline to ensure that neither side made a disastrous
miscalculation, the famous red phone. Today, our engagements
with Russia are few, and there is a growing risk of a strategic
miscalculation on the seas, the ground, or in the skies.
To be clear, our problems are with Putin and his cronies.
To date, the U.S. and our allies have been pretty tough on the
Putin regime. Since 2014, we have imposed sanctions on dozens
of Russian nationals and companies that have been involved in
the illegal takeover of Crimea, the war in the east of Ukraine,
the downing of Flight MH17, as well as human rights abuses in
Russia.
In 2018, after Russia used chemical weapons on the
territory of a NATO ally, we closed two Russian consulates and
helped coordinate a 20-country expulsion of undeclared Russian
spies. The U.S. now rotates troops through Poland, and through
the Enhanced Forward Presence, NATO has stationed troops in the
Baltics. And America has provided lethal and nonlethal
defensive weapons to help Ukraine defend itself from Russian-
backed separatists.
Each of these sanctions is important to countering Russia's
malign global influence. However, they do not form a cohesive
U.S. strategy. To successfully deter future aggression,
America, including Congress, must think strategically about
Russia now and in the future.
I encourage today's witnesses to discuss the
administration's current strategy towards Russia and what it is
intended to accomplish. But I must also urge caution to the
administration and Congress about focusing our strategy on
sanctions. Sanctions are not a strategy for dealing with
Russia. They are simply a tool.
While U.S. financial preeminence makes sanctions an easy
and somewhat effective tool, I have serious concerns about the
consequences of their overuse, particularly in the absence of a
larger strategy. More sanctions do not necessarily make us
tougher on Russia.
And I am concerned about the rush to sanction in the
absence of concrete policy goals. The Nord Stream 2 bill from
Senators Cruz and Shaheen was a well-targeted sanctions bill
with a clear policy goal in mind. But more general sanctions
actions, when not connected to specific goals, can be
counterproductive. And sanctions not done in coordination with
our European allies, who are far closer to Russia in both
distance and connectivity, is a dangerous action that can
undermine our alliances.
In some cases, when insufficiently vetted, sanctions have
inadvertently helped advance Putin's goals of economic
consolidation and reinvigoration of Russian industry. These
cannot be the outcomes we want. I assume these are outcomes we
actually oppose.
So, with that, I will yield to Senator Menendez.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for
calling this very important hearing, which we have been seeking
for some time. I appreciate you doing that.
Secretaries Hale and Ford, thank you for joining us today
to talk about the administration's policy with respect to the
Russian Federation.
Before we hear from our witnesses, I would like to outline
five essential elements that I believe should comprise our
policy on the Russian Federation.
First, we must make very clear that so many examples of
Kremlin aggression since invasion of Georgia in 2008 are simply
unacceptable and cannot become the norm in international
affairs. The invasion of Ukraine, the illegal occupation of
Crimea, the attempted assassination of regime opponents with
chemical weapons on foreign soil, committing war crimes in
Syria, the attack on our 2016 election, these are just some.
Russia is clearly not a country that belongs in the G7,
despite whatever President Trump might believe. It is still
mystifying that President Trump refuses to stand up to this
behavior. To this day, he says that the Kremlin attack on our
election was a hoax. Repeating lies from Kremlin propaganda, he
says that it was Ukraine that actually interfered in the
election.
During the Cold War, those who unwittingly broadcast Soviet
propaganda were called ``useful idiots.'' I do not know what
you call those today in the administration or here in Congress
who knowingly spout Kremlin lies. Whatever it is, it does a lot
of damage.
Second, we must implement a clear sanctions regime to
change Kremlin behavior. Sanctions on Russia today have clearly
not had the desired effect. Why? Because the administration has
not been serious in their implementation.
Several mandatory provisions of CAATSA to this day still go
ignored. I will not go through the whole list, although I
could, other than to point out the most egregious example. It
has been 144 days since Turkey took delivery of the Russian S-
400 air defense system. Clearly, a significant transaction
under CAATSA.
And just last week, Turkey tested the system against an
American-produced F-16. An American-produced F-16. Enough is
enough. CAATSA sanctions must be imposed without further delay.
Any new Russian sanctions legislation must make clear our
ultimate policy goals, what kind of behavior we are trying to
change and how sanctions can be lifted in the event that that
behavioral change takes place.
If we are going to increase pressure on Moscow, we must
also be honest that it could have spillover effects. Under an
enhanced sanctions regime, U.S. companies may no longer be able
to benefit from the Russian economy. American investors may no
longer benefit from the Russian sovereign debt market. The
energy market may be impacted. The banking sector could be
impacted.
We, of course, should seek to minimize these effects. But
our ultimate measure must always be how continued Kremlin
aggression impacts our national security. At the end of the
day, that is the ultimate measure that matters.
Third, on arms control, the negative consequences for the
United States of abandoning New START, when Russia is in
compliance with the treaty and is seeking to extend it, would
be grave in the short and long term. Without New START in
place, Russia would be able to upload hundreds of nuclear
weapons onto its current strategic nuclear platforms.
This rapid expansion of Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal
would place the United States at a strategic disadvantage,
necessitating a fundamental reconsideration of our force
posture. I look forward to hearing your views on this today.
Fourth, we need to remember the plight of the Russian
people, who continue to live under endemic corruption and
relentless propaganda. The administration has strayed far from
traditional American support for the democratic process, human
rights, and universal values. These must be at the center of
U.S. policy, especially with respect to Russia.
And fifth, we need to support our friends in Europe,
especially those on the front line of Russian aggression.
European Deterrence Initiative funding should be increased.
Recently, the administration decided to redirect EDI money to
the President's border wall. So instead of Mexico paying for
the wall as the President promised, our closest allies in
Europe will bear the cost. What a deal.
Finally, I want to close on a note about Paul Whelan, the
American citizen who has been detained in Russia since last
December. If the Russian authorities have evidence, they should
charge Mr. Whelan. I, for one, am skeptical that such evidence
exists. And if they do not, they should let him go.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, I am under no illusion that
President Trump shares my views on these five elements of
Russia policy. He has abdicated responsibility for defending
this country from the threats posed by the Russian Federation.
He is simply either not interested or compromised.
We, in Congress, need to step up to defend our security and
our institutions. And next week, I look forward to working with
you and others on the committee to vote on legislation towards
that end.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Menendez.
We will now turn to our witnesses. First of all, we will
hear from David Hale, who has been Ambassador to Pakistan,
Lebanon, and Jordan, as well as special envoy for Middle East
peace. In Washington, Mr. Hale was Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for Israel, Egypt, and the Levant, and Director for
Israel-Palestinian Affairs. He held several staff posts,
including Executive Assistant to Secretary of State Albright. A
member of the Foreign Service since 1984, he holds the rank of
career Ambassador and is a native of Senator Menendez's home
State of New Jersey.
So, Ambassador Hale, please. The floor is yours.
Senator Menendez. Mr. Chairman, that is why he is such an
exceptional public servant.
STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID HALE, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
POLITICAL AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Hale. Well, thank you very much for that, and
good morning, Chairman Risch and Ranking Member Menendez and
members of the committee.
I welcome the opportunity to be here today with Assistant
Secretary Ford to discuss U.S. policy toward Russia. Under
President Trump, the United States has taken consistent action
against Moscow's attempts to undermine American interests and
those of our allies and partners around the world. The United
States will continue to use all appropriate tools of national
power, including diplomacy, to address and deter any further
such threatening actions from Moscow and to advance and protect
the interests of America and our allies and partners as they
relate to Russia.
As articulated in the President's National Security
Strategy, America is in a period of great power competition. We
must structure our policies accordingly. The administration's
Russia policy takes a realistic approach. Russia is a
determined and resourceful competitor of the United States,
although one with significant systemic and economic weaknesses.
Those weaknesses hinder its ambitions.
We do not seek an adversarial relationship with Russia. We
are open to cooperation with Moscow when it aligns with our and
our allies' interests. However, this administration will
protect our national security and that of our allies when
Moscow attempts to threaten them.
To be effective, American diplomacy toward Russia must be
backed by military power that is second to none and fully
integrated with our allies and all of our instruments of power.
The administration has increased the defense budget to $716
billion in Fiscal Year 2019 and prioritized nuclear
infrastructure investments to maintain a robust nuclear
deterrent.
Russia's systemic weakness is reflected in President
Putin's aggressive foreign policy, which is driven in part by
insecurity and a fear of internal change. This oligarchic
regime relies on repression to stifle public discontent, as
illustrated by its harsh response to this summer's protests,
the largest since 2011. The Russian people increasingly realize
that the corrupt Putin regime is either incapable of addressing
their problems or, in many cases, is the source of them.
Russia seeks to dominate its immediate neighborhood. In
Ukraine, Russia must end its belligerence and implement its
Minsk agreement obligations. We are encouraged by the positive
steps Ukrainian President Zelensky has taken to resolve the
Russia-instigated conflict in Eastern Ukraine. Thus far, we are
disappointed by Moscow's response.
The threat from Russia is not just an external or military
one. Moscow utilizes digital technologies to target us and our
democratic allies from within. These actions include election
meddling and complex well-resourced influence operations
directed by the highest levels of the Russian government in the
very heart of the Western world.
We provide significant foreign assistance in Europe and
Eurasia, almost all of which supports building resilience to
and increasing pressure on Russian malign influence, in
accordance with the Countering Russia Influence Fund. The
Department has also increased its support for the Global
Engagement Center through additional funding and staffing.
We have degraded Putin's ability to conduct aggression by
imposing costs on the Russian state and the oligarchy that
sustains it. The administration has sanctioned 321 Russia-
related individuals and entities since January 2017. These
sanctions and related actions serve as a warning to the Russian
government that we will not tolerate any activity aimed at
undermining or manipulating our 2020 election. I confronted
Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov on Russian interference in our
elections in July and have raised the matter with Russian
Ambassador Antonov several times.
We have likewise taken firm action against Russia's
diplomatic presence in America. In response to Russia's
imposition of a staffing cap on U.S. diplomatic personnel in
Russia, we closed four Russian facilities. When Russia attacked
U.K. citizen Sergei Skripal with a military-grade nerve agent,
we closed Russian facilities in Seattle and expelled 48 Russian
intelligence officials from the Russian embassy.
Our diplomats counter Russian adventurism in other regions,
including the Middle East, South America, and Africa, where
Russia's actions exacerbate instability and undermine U.S.
interests. In Syria, Russian military support to the Assad
regime and its attacks against civilians have exacerbated the
humanitarian crisis there. In Venezuela, we are pressing Russia
to withdraw its diplomatic, military, and economic support for
the former Maduro regime. In Africa, we have called out
Russia's destabilizing policies, including support for
mercenaries.
Russia's serial disregard for its international security
and arms control commitments represents another significant
challenge for our policy, and therefore, the President has
charged us to pursue a new era of arms control agreements.
We know that Congress has a critical role to play in
providing the tools and resources to implement our Russia
strategy, and we are committed to working with you in this
regard.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for inviting me today, and I
look forward to the questions of the committee.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Hale follows:]
Prepared Statement of David Hale
Good morning Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Menendez, and members
of the committee. It is a pleasure to be here today with the Assistant
Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation to
discuss the future of U.S. policy toward Russia.
Under President Trump, the United States has taken consistent
action against Moscow's attempts to undermine American interests and
those of our allies and partners around the world. The United States
will continue to use all appropriate tools of national power, including
diplomacy, to address and deter any further such threatening actions
from Moscow and to advance and protect the interests of America and our
allies and partners, as they relate to Russia.
As articulated in the President's National Security Strategy or
NSS, America is in a period of great-power competition. We must
structure our policies accordingly. The administration's Russia policy
is part of the broader NSS and takes a realistic approach to Russia as
a determined and resourceful competitor of the United States--although
a competitor with significant systemic and economic weaknesses that
hinder its ambitions to restore its great power status and re-impose
its archaic notions regarding spheres of influence. To advance broader
American interests, we fundamentally do not seek an adversarial
relationship with Russia. We remain open to cooperation with Moscow
when it aligns with our and our allies' interests. However, there
should be no doubt that this administration will protect our national
security, and that of our allies, when Moscow attempts to threaten us.
Russia's systemic weakness is reflected in President Putin's
aggressive foreign policy, which is driven, in part, by insecurity and
a fear of internal change. This oligarchic regime increasingly relies
on repression to stifle public discontent, as illustrated by its harsh
response to this summer's protests in Moscow and other Russian cities,
the largest since 2011. The Russian people increasingly realize that
the corrupt Putin regime is either incapable of addressing their
problems or, in many cases, is the source of them. Putin's approval
ratings have dropped since early 2018. A November survey by the
independent Levada Center showed that 53 percent of young Russians
would like to ``vote with their feet,'' and emigrate from Russia, the
highest percentage in the survey since 2009.
The regime's latest steps to quash dissent contradict Russia's
international commitments to protect the fundamental freedoms of its
citizens, and include new laws tightening control of the internet and
labelling individuals, not just organizations, as ``foreign agents.''
Russian security services launched a parallel clampdown on independent
human rights NGOs and increased persecution of minority religious
groups. Targets have included the Jehovah's Witnesses, eight of whom
were sentenced to long prison terms for peacefully practicing their
faith. These latest steps further extend Putin's systematic efforts to
stifle civil society since he returned to the Russian presidency in
2012.
The pattern of Russian repression at home, aggression against its
neighbors in Eastern and Central Europe, attacks on democratic
institutions against our allies and here in the United States, and
adventurism in the Middle East, Africa, and South America, all spring
from this relative weakness and insecurity. At least for the short
term, this dynamic will likely continue, with the regime miscasting
America as the cause of Russia's domestic woes and using foreign
adventures in an effort to distract Russians from reality.
The administration's Russia policy is designed to confront Russian
aggression globally by strengthening the diplomatic, military,
economic, and political foundations of American power. Diplomacy is a
tool of national security, and the day to day work of our diplomats in
European and other capitals is critical to the success of every aspect
of the administration's Russia policy. The Department of State's
diplomatic efforts reflect this administration's commitment to bolster
our alliances and partnerships to deter or reject Russian aggressive
actions. The Department also supports bilateral engagement with Russia
when it is in our interest to do so, including to stabilize our
relationship so that the United States can address key American
national security priorities. We maintain channels of communications
with Russia on Syria, Afghanistan, Ukraine, North Korea, arms control,
counterterrorism, and other bilateral matters.
The National Security Strategy recognizes that, to be effective,
American diplomacy toward Russia must be backed by ``military power
that is second to none and fully integrated with our allies and all of
our instruments of power.'' To this end, the administration has:
Increased the defense budget to $716 billion in FY19;
Prioritized infrastructure investments in the U.S. nuclear arsenal
to maintain a robust nuclear deterrent;
Increased funding for the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) by
close to $15 billion from FY17-19, with an additional $5.9
billion requested for EDI in FY2020; and
Worked with NATO allies to enact the largest defense spending
increase since the Cold War. By the end of 2020, our NATO
allies will have increased defense expenditures by an
additional $100 billion.
In its immediate neighborhood, Russia seeks to dominate, as
demonstrated by its ongoing aggression against Ukraine and Georgia. In
Ukraine, Russia must end its belligerence and implement its Minsk
agreement obligations. We are encouraged by the positive steps
Ukrainian President Zelensky has taken to resolve the Russia-instigated
conflict in eastern Ukraine; thus far, we are disappointed by Moscow's
response. The December 9 Normandy format summit provides an opportunity
to test Russia's willingness to reverse its harmful behavior. We
condemn Russia's continued militarization of Crimea and in July 2018,
the Secretary of State issued a Crimea declaration stating that the
United States will never recognize Russia's attempted annexation of the
peninsula. The construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline and Moscow's
unhelpful approach to trilateral gas negotiations with the EU and
Ukraine give Russia a new instrument for its strategy of using energy
as a political weapon.
To increase the resiliency of our Ukrainian and Georgian partners,
we have obligated over $1.6 billion in state and DoD military
assistance to Ukraine. This assistance is enhancing Ukrainian defense
capabilities including to monitor and secure its borders, deploy its
forces more safely and effectively, and improve interoperability with
NATO forces. Our assistance has saved lives while helping to build
Ukraine's long-term defense capacity. We have likewise provided Georgia
over $170 million in Foreign Military Financing since 2014, including
$94.5 million in FY2018-2019, to improve its resilience to Russian
aggression, enhance its territorial defense, and support its military
transformation efforts and interoperability with NATO.
NATO is establishing two new NATO Commands, one in the United
States focused on securing critical transatlantic sea lines of
communication, and one in Germany to enhance logistics support. These
NATO Commands will create support teams to help our allies confront new
and evolving threats such as cyber-attacks. They also will launch
major, multi-year initiatives to bolster the Alliance's mobility,
readiness, and decision-making capabilities. The Alliance is also
strengthened by the inclusion of additional members. In June 2017,
Montenegro joined NATO. Thanks to the work of this Committee and the
whole Senate, North Macedonia is on track to become NATO's newest
member once the remaining NATO member state consents to the treaty, as
the Senate did in October.
The threat from Russia is not just an external or military one.
Moscow utilizes digital technologies to target us and our democratic
allies from within. These actions include election meddling and
complex, well-resourced influence operations--directed by the highest
levels of the Russian government--in the very heart of the western
world. Russia does not discriminate along political ideology or party
lines. It aims to undermine democratic institutions--including in
places like Chile--by exacerbating the divisions inherent in a
democratic, pluralistic society. Understanding this threat is essential
for developing a long-term response.
The Department of State is working closely with interagency
counterparts and our allies to counter Russian influence operations,
both domestically and abroad. We have provided significant foreign
assistance in Europe and Eurasia to build resilience to and increase
pressure on Russian malign influence in accordance with the goals of
the Countering Russian Influence Fund established by Congress. The
Department has also increased its support for the Global Engagement
Center (GEC) through additional funding and staffing; the FY2020 State
Department Budget requested $76.5 million for the GEC, a $23 million
increase over the FY2019 request.
We support the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in
its efforts to advance the development of USAID's partner nations in
Europe and Eurasia through the Countering Malign Kremlin Influence
Development Framework (CMKI). The CMKI Development Framework responds
to the challenge of malign Kremlin influence by strengthening the
economic and democratic self-reliance of these countries. The Framework
focuses on key sectors for development in Europe and Eurasia, including
democracy and the rule of law, the news and information space, and the
economic and energy sectors. While the Kremlin seeks to weaken and
strong-arm its neighbors, the administration via USAID seeks to enable
governments, civil society, and the private sector to make their own
choices and build self-reliance by strengthening institutions and
creating new economic opportunities.
These tools are making a difference. This summer, the Department
executed a successful campaign to counter Russian disinformation that
sought to undermine the ``Baltic Way'' and the commemoration of the
thirtieth anniversary of the human chain created by two million
Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians to stand up for freedom from the
Soviet Union. The GEC, working with allies across Europe, coordinated a
series of live events, social media campaigns, and news broadcasts
across these countries. The campaign, which spread throughout social
media, was an exercise in shared messaging to strengthen transatlantic
ties and counter disinformation. Showcasing the success of the three
Baltic countries since the 1989 revolutions and the fall of the Berlin
Wall directly counters false Russian disinformation narratives about
the Baltics as ``failed states.''
As another element of this integrated response, we have degraded
Putin's ability to conduct aggression by imposing costs on the Russian
state and the oligarchy that sustains it. The administration has
sanctioned 321 Russia-related individuals and entities since January
2017. For example, on September 30, the United States increased our
sanctions on Russian oligarch Yevgeniy Prigozhin by targeting his
assets, and other actors associated with the Internet Research Agency
for their efforts to influence the 2018 midterm elections. These
sanctions, and other corresponding actions, serve as a warning to the
Russian government ahead of the 2020 elections that we will not
tolerate any activity by Moscow or its proxies aimed at undermining or
manipulating our democratic processes. I confronted Deputy Foreign
Minister Ryabkov on Russian interference in our elections during our
July meeting in Helsinki, and have raised the matter with Russia
Ambassador Antonov several times.
We have likewise taken firm action against Russia's intelligence
presence in America in response to Russia's bad behavior, including its
actions to undermine our diplomatic presence in Russia. In response to
Russia's imposition of a staffing cap on U.S. diplomatic personnel in
Russia, we closed the Russian Consulate General and consul general's
residence in San Francisco; an embassy annex in Washington, DC; and a
consular annex in New York. When Russia brazenly attacked U.K. citizen
Sergey Skripal in March 2018 with a military-grade nerve agent, we
closed the Russian Consulate General and consul general's residence in
Seattle, eliminating Russia's diplomatic presence on the west coast of
the United States, and expelled 48 Russian intelligence officials from
the Russian Embassy in Washington. We also expelled 12 intelligence
officers from the Russian Mission to the United Nations. These combined
actions in March 2018 constituted the largest expulsion of Russian
officials since the Cold War.
I mentioned earlier the valuable role American diplomats play in
advancing the administration's Russia policy--our personnel in Moscow,
Yekaterinburg, and Vladivostok are the forefront of this effort. Even
as Russia has cut the size of our diplomatic staffing in Russia, the
critical work requirements of our diplomatic mission to Russia have not
changed. Our diplomats in Russia represent the very best the Department
has to offer. They have taken on far more responsibilities and kept
pace on one of the administration's top foreign policy priorities, even
as the environment in which they operate has steadily become worse. We
all should give credit to their service.
Elsewhere, our diplomats are seized with countering Russian
adventurism in other regions--including the Middle East, South America,
and Africa--where Russia's actions exacerbate instability and undermine
U.S. interests. In Syria, Russian military support to the Asad regime
and its attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure are
destabilizing and have exacerbated the humanitarian crisis in that
country. We continue to stress to Moscow that the only way to resolve
the conflict is through the U.N. facilitated political process in line
with UNSC Resolution 2254. In Venezuela, we are pressing Russia to
withdraw its diplomatic protection and military and economic support,
through Rosneft, for the former Maduro regime, which has created a
humanitarian disaster that radiates into neighboring countries.In
Africa, we have called out Russia's destabilizing policies, including
support for mercenaries like the U.S.-sanctioned Wagner Group--an
outfit also active in Libya, Ukraine, and Syria. Furthermore, the
Wagner Group and similar actors have advanced disinformation campaigns
and election meddling schemes, weakening already fragile states
throughout the continent.
As the Assistant Secretary of International Security and
Nonproliferation will describe in more detail, Russia's serial
disregard for its international security and arms control commitments
represents another significant challenge for our policy. To address
this challenge, the President has charged us to pursue a new era of
arms-control agreements. We have not ruled out an extension of New
START, but our priority is to promote arms control that goes beyond the
confines of a narrow, bilateral approach by incorporating other
countries--including China--and a broader range of weapons--including
non-strategic nuclear weapons.
We fully appreciate that Congress has a critical role to play in
providing the tools and resources needed to address and implement all
aspects of our Russia strategy. We are committed to working with all of
you to counter the threats and challenges posed by Russia.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for inviting me today to discuss our
policy towards Russia. I look forward to your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you, Ambassador Hale.
We now have Dr. Christopher Ford. He is Assistant Secretary
for International Security and Nonproliferation. He has also
been delegated the authorities and functions of the office of
the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International
Security. Dr. Ford previously served as Senior Director for
Weapons of Mass Destruction and Counter-proliferation at the
National Security Council.
Dr. Ford began his public service in 1996 as assistant
counsel to the Intelligence Oversight Board and then served on
several congressional staffs. He has served as Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary in the State Department's Bureau of
Verification and Compliance and as U.S. Special Representative
for Nuclear Nonproliferation.
From 2008 to 2013, he was a senior fellow at the Hudson
Institute. A native of Cincinnati, he is the author of three
books and holds both a doctorate and a law degree.
Dr. Ford, welcome. The floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER A. FORD, ASSISTANT
SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Ford. Thank you, Chairman Risch, Ranking Member
Menendez, and members of the committee for having us here.
In his remarks, Under Secretary Hale has summarized the
broad sweep of our strategy to approach the challenges that
Russia presents us with today. In my own testimony, I would
like to address these questions from the perspective where I
am, exercising delegated authorities of the Under Secretary, as
you mentioned.
I will abbreviate my remarks for oral delivery, and I would
respectfully request that the full version be entered into the
record.
The Chairman. They will be entered.
Dr. Ford. Thank you, sir.
From the perspective of arms control and the ongoing
challenges of managing our relationship and in a strategic
sense with Moscow, Mr. Chairman, I think it is important to
remember that we come to all of these tasks out of a long
background not just of tensions and problems, but also of some
notable successes over time. The changes in the strategic
environment that were occasioned by the waning and then the end
of the Cold War made possible an enormous lessening of nuclear
tensions and in a strategic arms reduction that has seen both
countries' nuclear arsenals come down to small fractions of
what they once were.
I mention this because I think it is important to remember
this background. It reminds us that it is possible to make
progress in reducing nuclear tensions and the intensity of our
strategic standoff with Moscow when the circumstances of the
security environment are conducive to such movement. We hope to
get back to such an environment, Mr. Chairman, and our policies
are designed to help make this possible, as well as to protect
the security of the American people and that of our allies
until that point.
For now, however, of course the security environment is,
indeed, very challenging. Russia is presently developing an
extraordinary new bestiary of nuclear delivery systems for
which there are no U.S. counterparts and most of which seem
likely to fall outside existing arms control frameworks. Russia
also has a large arsenal of nonstrategic nuclear weapons, up to
2,000 of them, a vastly larger stockpile than we have, and it
is projected to expand this number of weapons considerably over
the next decade.
Most observers, Mr. Chairman, will, of course, be familiar
with the Russian 9M729 ground-launched cruise missile, which we
call the SSC-8. Production and deployment of that system placed
Russia in material breach of the INF Treaty, and Russian
unwillingness to change course in that regard forced us into
the unhappy position of having to withdraw from the treaty in
the wake of those Russian violations.
But that SSC-8 is only one of a broad range of new Russian
ground-, sea-, and air-based nuclear or dual-capable delivery
systems. These systems have more accuracy, longer ranges, and
lower yields than before, and they are coming online in support
of a Russian nuclear doctrine and strategy that emphasizes, and
periodically demonstrates in exercises, both coercive and
military uses of nuclear weaponry.
We assess that Russia does still remain in compliance with
its New START obligations, but its behavior in connection with
most other arms control agreements and not merely the ill-fated
INF has been nothing short of appalling. As indicated in Under
Secretary Hale's statement, Russia remains in chronic
noncompliance with its conventional arms control obligations,
and it is only selectively fulfilling others.
There is also the problem, of course, of chemical weapons,
where Russia condones and seeks to ensure impunity for
continued violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention by its
Syrian client state. Further alarming is that Russia has itself
used chemical weapons in violation of the Chemical Weapons
Convention by developing and using a so-called ``novichok''
military-grade nerve agent on the territory, as Chairman Risch
indicated, of a NATO ally, United Kingdom, in 2018.
Moscow is also up to no good in new and emerging domains of
actual or potential future conflict, such as cyberspace and
outer space. It has been developing capabilities in all these
respects, and even as it has been trying to promote hollow and
disingenuous arms control proposals that would not address the
challenges that Russia itself is working very hard to create.
So this track record is a miserable one.
I would refer you to my written statement for some of the
details of how our responses are being directed, but I would
stress that we are working to address these challenges on
multiple fronts. They are robust, and they are extensive.
These efforts in the Department of State are being
approached increasingly systematically as we coordinate them
into an integrated strategy for pushing back against Russian
mischief. The U.S. National Security Strategy makes very clear
that it is our duty to take great power competition seriously,
and we are doing so.
It is this kind of resolution and focus, Mr. Chairman, in
the face of national security threats that I think we very much
need and that can be our ticket to getting through this phase
of geopolitical competition. We need to stay on course,
maintaining our solid deterrence strategy, completing our own
nuclear and military modernization, continuing to reassure our
allies not just of our capacity, but of our enduring
willingness to side with them against intimidation and
aggression and keeping of all these initiatives on track while
still seeking good faith negotiation to advance shared
interests where it is possible.
If we can do that, I think we can stabilize the situation
and, indeed, turn things around, and that is what our policy is
devoted to.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Ford follows:]
Prepared Statement of Christopher A. Ford
countering russian intimidation and aggression and building a better
security environment
Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Menendez, and members of the
Committee, thank you for inviting me.
I am pleased to join Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
in briefing you on the various ways in which we are working at the
Department, under the Secretary of State's leadership, to meet the
challenges of competitive strategy that have been forced upon us by
Russia's continuing efforts to be--as the Under Secretary has
described--a determined and resourceful strategic rival of the United
States.
In his remarks, the Under Secretary has summarized the broad sweep
of our strategy to approach these challenges. In my own testimony, I
will address these questions from the perspective of my current duties
exercising delegated authorities of the Under Secretary of State for
Arms Control and International Security across the so-called ``T''
family of bureaus at the Department. I will abbreviate my comments for
oral delivery today, but I respectfully request that my full prepared
remarks be entered into the record.
i. a background of hope
From the perspective of arms control and the ongoing challenges of
managing our strategic relationship with Moscow, Mr. Chairman, it is
worth remembering that we come to these tasks out of a long background
not just of tensions and problems but also of some notable successes.
The changes in the strategic environment that were occasioned by the
waning and then end of the Cold War made possible an enormous lessening
in nuclear tensions and in strategic arms reductions that have seen
both countries' nuclear arsenals come down to small fractions of what
they once were--in the U.S. case, a reduction of an extraordinary 88
percent or so.
It's important to remember this background, because it reminds one
that it is possible to make progress in reducing nuclear tensions and
the intensity of our strategic standoff with Moscow when the
circumstances of the security environment are conducive to such
movement. We hope to get back to that kind of environment, of course,
and to contribute to this--as I will mention in a moment--we seek a new
arms control relationship with Moscow to forestall the destabilizing
global arms race that Russia's policies and posture today threaten to
create.
ii. an array of russian challenges
For now, however, the security environment is indeed challenging,
thanks in large part to Russia's destabilizing actions. Even leaving
aside the broader aggression and revisionism in Russian behavior under
the Putin regime, the diversification and expansion of Russia's nuclear
arsenal--and the increasing salience of such weapons in its strategy
and doctrine--are troubling and destabilizing.
Russia is presently developing an extraordinary new bestiary of
nuclear delivery systems for which there are no U.S. counterparts.
These include not merely the new Sarmat intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM), but also hypersonic delivery vehicles, a nuclear-
powered underwater drone, and the madly reckless ``flying Chernobyl''
of the Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile--a flying, nuclear
reactor which recently experienced a flash meltdown that killed several
Russian technicians and released radioactive contamination while the
Russians were trying to recover it after having left it sitting on the
bottom of the White Sea for a year, a mere 30 kilometers from the city
of Severodvinsk.
Russia also has a large arsenal of non-strategic nuclear weapons:
up to 2,000 of them, a vastly larger stockpile than we have. This
Russian arsenal was already a source of concern in Washington when the
New START agreement was before the Senate in 2010--so much so that the
Senate at the time made clear that addressing Russia's non-strategic
nuclear weapons needed to be a high priority for any future arms
control agreement--but the problem is getting worse. Russia is
projected to expand its number of non-strategic weapons considerably
over the next decade.
Mr. Chairman, most observers will be familiar with the Russian
9M729 ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM), which we call the SSC-8.
Production and deployment of that system placed Russia in material
breach of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Russian
unwillingness to return to full compliance led the United States to
suspend, and eventually withdraw, from the INF Treaty. Yet the SSC-8 is
only one of a broad range of new Russian ground-, sea-, and air-based
nuclear or dual-capable delivery systems. These systems have more
accuracy, longer ranges, and lower nuclear yields than before, and they
are coming on line in support of a Russian nuclear doctrine and
strategy that emphasizes--and periodically demonstrates, in large-scale
exercises--both coercive and military uses of nuclear weaponry.
We assess that Russia does still remain in compliance with its New
START obligations, but its behavior in connection with most other arms
control agreements--and not merely the ill-fated INF Treaty--has been
nothing short of appalling. As indicated in the Under Secretary's
statement, Russia remains in chronic noncompliance with its
conventional arms control obligations in the Conventional Armed Forces
in Europe (CFE) Treaty, and it is only selectively fulfilling its
commitments under the Vienna Document.
And then there is the problem of chemical weapons, where Russia
condones and seeks to ensure impunity for continued violations of the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) by its Syrian client state. Further
alarming is that Russia has violated the CWC itself--most dramatically,
by developing and using a ``novichok'' nerve agent on the territory of
a NATO ally, the United Kingdom, in 2018. This violation underscores
that Russia failed to completely declare and destroy its complete
chemical weapons program in contravention of the CWC. As the Under
Secretary noted, Russia also implements the Open Skies Treaty only
selectively; this causes concern because such selectivity risks
undermining the Treaty's confidence-building benefits, which are rooted
in the demonstrable openness of being willing to allow overflights
anywhere (and not merely over what one does not care to conceal).
Furthermore, Russia's decision to leave the International Partnership
for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), ultimately taking China
with it, was also a blow to international efforts to make continued
progress on disarmament.
Moscow is also up to no good in new and emerging domains of actual
or potential future conflict. In cyberspace, even while using malicious
cyber behavior to meddle with democratic processes and intimidate
leaderships abroad, Russia is working with China to co-opt and subvert
discourse on international stability between states in cyberspace by
turning it into a tool to help authoritarian governments exert so-
called ``sovereign'' control over the information their populations are
permitted to see and express.
Russia has also been developing capabilities that have turned space
into a warfighting domain. It openly brags of having a ground-based
laser system designed to ``fight satellites in orbit,'' for instance,
and it is developing a ground-launched anti-satellite (ASAT) missile
and conducting sophisticated on-orbit activities in support of its
counterspace capabilities. And it has been doing this while advocating
hollow and hypocritical arms control proposals for the ``prevention of
placement of weapons in outer space.''
Mr. Chairman, this is obviously a miserable record. And that is
even before taking into account persistent questions that remain about
Russia's compliance with the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
(BTWC) in light of the fact that Russia shows no sign of ever having
rid itself of the secret and illegal biological weapons program that
President Yeltsin actually admitted Russia possessed--and which
President Putin has gone back to denying.
Nor have I yet mentioned Russia's troubling diplomatic campaigns to
undermine institutions of transparency and accountability in
controlling weapons of mass destruction at the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), and the United Nations. All of this would add up to a
very grim picture even if Russia were not continuing its aggression and
territorial seizures against Ukraine and Georgia, undertaking
expeditionary warfare on behalf of the murderous regime in Damascus,
and working to subvert democratic processes in the United States,
Europe, and elsewhere.
iii. a robust american response
As the Under Secretary outlined, however, we are certainly not
taking all of this sitting down. From the perspective of the State
Department's ``T'' bureaus alone, we are working to address these
challenges on multiple fronts.
Since 2014, in response to Russian aggression in Ukraine and
Georgia, the United States has dramatically increased security
assistance across the region, which signifies our steadfast commitment
to collective defense under the North Atlantic Treaty and our continued
support to European Allies and partners to counter Russian aggression
and malign influence.
For example, as the Under Secretary highlighted, State and DoD have
provided over $1.6 billion in security assistance to Ukraine alone, in
addition to significant assistance to key allies who are menaced by
Russia's aggressive behavior. State, in particular, is using Foreign
Military Financing (FMF)--through such programs as the Countering
Russian Influence Fund (CRIF), the Black Sea Maritime Domain Awareness
Program, and the European Recapitalization Incentive Program (ERIP)--to
build defensive military capabilities, enhance territorial national
defense to include border and maritime security, increase cyber
security defenses, improve NATO-interoperability, and reduce partners'
dependency on Russian-legacy equipment.
As the diplomatic interface between the U.S. defense sector and
such recipients, the Political-Military Affairs (PM) Bureau has been
instrumental in helping preserve the security and political autonomy of
multiple U.S. allies, partners, and friends, and ensures State and
Department of Defense funding and programs are closely coordinated to
further our diplomatic and military objectives. Further from 2015-2018,
the State Department authorized a total of $1.75 billion in nationally-
funded Foreign Military Sales and $603 million in Direct Commercial
Sales to Eastern Europe.
Nor is that all. The Bureau of International Security and
Nonproliferation (ISN) continues to provide several million dollars in
capacity-building programming to support Ukraine, helping its export
control system prevent smuggling of nuclear materials originating in
Russia and helping its Maritime Border Guards rebuild themselves in
order to be able to police the new maritime border they face as a
result of Russia's invasion and attempted occupation of Crimea.
ISN has also been very active all around the world for the last 2
years in diplomatic outreach leveraging the threat of sanctions under
Section 231 of the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions
Act of 2017 (CAATSA). CAATSA is a potent tool that Congress has given
us, and we have been using it to cut back the revenue streams the
Kremlin derives from overseas arms sales and to undermine the malign
strategic relationships and geopolitical dependencies that Moscow
builds through its arms trade. Even though we have only invoked Section
231 sanctions once--against China last year for taking delivery of
Sukhoi fighter aircraft and S-400 missiles from Russia--we have so far
managed to shut down billions in Russian arms sales that would likely
otherwise have taken place. In conjunction with our PM colleagues, who
seek to help U.S. friends and partners find alternatives to Russian
equipment, we will be vigorously continuing this CAATSA diplomacy in
2020.
We have also been imposing costs on Russia for some of its more
egregious behavior--specifically, through sanctions on Russia under the
Chemical and Biological Warfare (CBW) Act of 1991 in response to
Russia's novichok attack in Britain. And we have continued to impose
sanctions against Russian entities that supply weapons to programs of
concern under the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act
(INKSNA), as we announced most recently in May 2019.
Meanwhile, the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for
Cyber Issues (S/CCI) has been working to blunt Russian efforts to
weaponize discourse on state behavior in cyberspace. As our answer to
such disingenuous and dangerous Russian (and Chinese) efforts, we are
working with likeminded foreign partners to promote norms and standards
of responsible behavior that we hope will become ``best practices'' for
all nations in cyberspace, and to build international cooperation to
hold states such as Russia accountable when they transgress those
norms.
For its part, the Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance (AVC)
Bureau continues efforts to bring Russia back into compliance with its
arms control agreements and norms, and works to draw attention to
Russia's destabilizing pursuit of exotic nuclear weapons and new
domains of warfare. One example of this is the ongoing engagements with
foreign counterparts to advance effective and non-legally binding
transparency and confidence building measures and guidelines that
promote responsible behavior in outer space.
I would like to stress, Mr. Chairman, that these State Department
efforts are being approached increasingly systematically, as we
coordinate them into an integrated strategy for pushing back against
Russian mischief. The U.S. National Security Strategy makes clear that
it is our duty to take great power competition seriously after many
years of post-Cold War neglect, and we are doing so. At the ISN Bureau,
for instance, we have been working to posture ourselves better in this
regard, including by leveraging nonproliferation-derived tools and
skills--such as in using export controls, sanctions, and interdiction
to keep dangerous technologies out of dangerous hands--into the
competitive strategy arena. Indeed, we are working to replicate this
intensity of focus across the whole ``T''-family space in support of
broader State Department and U.S. Government efforts.
In that respect, Mr. Chairman, though they are not State Department
lines of effort in themselves, I would be remiss if I did not at least
mention some of the ways in which other parts of the Government are
responding to the Russian challenge as well. This administration is
firmly committed to keeping the United States' own nuclear
modernization on track--including through replacing legacy delivery
systems in order to prevent block obsolescence of our nuclear
``Triad,'' developing a new sea-launched cruise missile to replace the
one scrapped by the Obama administration, developing a lower-yield
ballistic missile warhead to help us meet the threat of Russia's
extensive and growing array of analogous devices, deploying the
modernized version of our B61 nuclear gravity bomb and ensuring that
our allies maintain dual-capable aircraft in order to keep NATO nuclear
deterrence relevant in the years ahead, and building the kind of
responsive nuclear production infrastructure we need to support defense
and deterrence on an ongoing basis.
Similarly, in the wake of the INF treaty's demise as a result of
Russian violations, the United States is now growing the seeds planted
by the administration's INF Response Strategy in 2017. As you will
recall, Mr. Chairman, that strategy started the process of exploring,
in a treaty-compliant manner, potential U.S. development of INF-class
delivery systems as a way to give Moscow a concrete incentive to change
course and abandon its illegal SSC-8 program. As it turned out, of
course, Moscow refused to come back into compliance, thus killing the
INF Treaty. Nevertheless, we are increasingly well prepared to meet
U.S. defense needs in the post-INF era. At present, the Department of
Defense has begun research, development, and testing of conventionally-
armed ground-launched INF-range systems to provide us and potentially
our allies with more options when confronted with the dangerous
proliferation of dual-use Russian (and Chinese) missiles worldwide.
iv. building a new, improved security environment
It is this kind of resolution and focus in the face of national
security threats, Mr. Chairman, that can be our ticket to getting
through this troubling phase of geopolitical competition. If we can
stay on course--maintaining our solid deterrence strategy, completing
our own nuclear and military modernization, continuing to reassure our
allies not just of our capacity but of our enduring willingness to
stand with them against intimidation and aggression, and keeping all
these various responsive initiatives on track, while seeking good faith
negotiation to advance shared interests wherever possible--I believe we
can stabilize the situation.
Here is where it is again important to recall our Cold War history.
Even during some of the most dangerous days of that perilous rivalry,
it was usually possible to communicate and even negotiate with the
USSR. It was still possible to find, and to pursue, shared interests--
not only in preserving strategic security and using arms control and
confidence-building diplomacy to help keep that bilateral arms race
from precipitating into chaos, but also in signal accomplishments such
as negotiating the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty together.
Such engagement, Mr. Chairman, we can yet do. There remain signs of
life for constructive dialogue with Moscow, upon which I believe we can
build. Russia works with us constructively, for instance, in co-
chairing the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), and
Russian diplomats have been willing to participate in the pathbreaking
new initiative on Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament
(CEND). This administration has already had two engagements with Russia
in our Strategic Security Dialogue--the first in Helsinki in 2017, in
which I had the honor of participating when serving on the National
Security Council Staff, and the second last summer with the Deputy
Secretary and the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International
Security--and we hope to re-engage on this soon, as we build out our
vision of a future for arms control.
We made clear in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review that we seek arms
control where it contributes to the security of the United States and
our allies, and when it is verifiable and other parties comply with
their obligations. In fact, the President has made his personal
commitment to effective arms control very clear--and, in particular, to
limiting the dangerous Russian and Chinese nuclear ambitions. He has
publicly called for us to engage both Moscow and Beijing in a new
project of trilateral arms control to help effectively manage strategic
competition and build towards a better, safer, and more prosperous
future together.
As the Secretary of State has made clear, we have convened teams of
experts to explore the way forward, including the question of possibly
extending New START, which would otherwise expire in early 2021 but
could be extended for up to 5 years by agreement with Russia. We are
hard at work on these issues, and hope to have more to say about this
soon. Let me say, Mr. Chairman, that I am personally excited about the
prospect of building out our new arms control initiative. I look
forward to keeping this Committee informed of these developments, and
to working with you and your colleagues closely.
v. conclusion
Clearly, Mr. Chairman, we face formidable challenges in the current
security environment--many of them specifically the result of Russian
behavior. I would submit, however, that there are also grounds for
hope. Even as we work resolutely to counter Russian intimidation and
aggression everywhere it raises its head, I can assure you that we at
the State Department are keenly focused upon turning such hope into
reality, while continuing to protect the national security interests of
the American people.
The Chairman. Thank you. I am going to ask a question to
start with. Then we will do a 5-minute round.
Mr. Ford, for you, give me your thoughts, if you would. As
you know, I was one of the strong opponents of New START. New
START now has been in place as long as it has, and obviously,
we cannot talk about--in this setting, we cannot talk about
absolute compliance by the Russians. But from a general
standpoint, I think we can say that they are substantially more
in compliance with the New START, with their major weapons,
than they ever were with the more intermediate weapons that
were covered by the INF.
Why the disparity there? Why were they so far out of whack
on INF and ignored us as far as the pressing we did to get them
to comply? Why the difference between the two treaties and the
two agreements and the difference in the weaponry systems?
Dr. Ford. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would hesitate to try to
get into Mr. Putin's head in this respect. But they clearly
made a decision that they felt they wanted to have the
capabilities that the INF Treaty did not allow them to have.
They seem to have assumed that we would remain compliant with
the treaty, even if we found out----
The Chairman. And they were right in that regard?
Dr. Ford. They were absolutely correct, sir. We were
scrupulously compliant for the entirety of our period in the
treaty. That certainly--that is something we are now working to
try to address the challenge of meeting those Russian threats
with the development of new conventionally armed intermediate
range systems, such as the ground-launched cruise missile that
was successfully flight tested last August.
But, yes, they assumed we would remain in compliance and
that they--and indeed, they were correct for a while that they
would be able to get away with not just testing, but developing
and deploying a treaty-prohibited system in the hope that we
would not respond to it. Why they did not do something like
that with New START is something that I would not be in a
position to hazard a guess about, but they do not seem to have
decided they needed to.
But I would point out, Mr. Chairman, that Russia is
developing today and, indeed, openly brags about the
development of new strategic delivery systems, most of which it
is very difficult to imagine would ever be brought within the
New START arms control framework. We have seen President Putin
brag about his development of a new super heavy ICBM, about
development of a nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed underwater
drone.
We are now all familiar with the sort of ``flying
Chernobyl'' disaster of their nuclear-powered cruise missile
that had such a catastrophic--or criticality incident, I should
say, up in the White Sea area just last August. They are
developing a whole range of systems, including an air-launched
ballistic missile. Most of these are not likely to fall within
New START, and these are things on which the Russians are
already working very hard today.
So, and that is leaving aside the issue of their
development of nonstrategic weapons. As I indicated, they
already have a large arsenal, and it is projected to grow
dramatically over the next decade or so as well. So these are
things Russia is already deciding to do and moving out upon
outside of the framework of current arms control, and that is
something that we need to make sure that our policy is in a
position to address.
The Chairman. Thank you, Dr. Ford.
Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Thank you.
Secretary Hale, did Russia interfere in the 2016 election
in favor of Donald Trump? Could you put your microphone on,
please?
Ambassador Hale. Yes, the intelligence community assessed
that Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence
campaign in 2016 aimed at our presidential election.
Senator Menendez. Was the Kremlin's interference in our
2016 election a hoax?
Ambassador Hale. No.
Senator Menendez. Are you aware of any evidence that
Ukraine interfered in the 2016 U.S. election?
Ambassador Hale. I am not.
Senator Menendez. You know, I appreciate Dr. Fiona Hill's
testimony before the House, the former National Security
Council Director for Europe and Russia, who said that that
theory is a fictional narrative that is being perpetrated and
propagated by the Russian security services themselves. Do you
have any reason to disagree with Dr. Hill?
Ambassador Hale. I do not.
Senator Menendez. In February of 2017, at a press
conference with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban,
President Putin himself suggested that Ukraine interfered in
the 2016 U.S. election, did he not?
Ambassador Hale. I do not recall that myself, but I do not
doubt that.
Senator Menendez. Okay. He said at a 2017 press conference,
``As we all know, during the presidential campaign in the
United States, the Ukrainian government adopted a unilateral
position in favor of one candidate. More than that, certain
oligarchs, certainly with the approval of the political
leadership, funded this candidate--or female candidate, to be
more precise.''
Has this been a regular Russian propaganda point since
then?
Ambassador Hale. I have not followed that that has been a
regular point, but I do not follow that on a day-to-day basis.
Senator Menendez. Would it be in Putin's interest to push
such a narrative?
Ambassador Hale. Possibly.
Senator Menendez. Possibly. Well, let me ask you. You are
the Under Secretary here. How is it that on something as
critical as Russia, vis-a-vis the United States and our
national security interests, you would think that it would only
possibly be in Putin's interest to push a narrative? What would
be the other possibilities?
Ambassador Hale. I will say yes to your question, sir.
Senator Menendez. Did President Putin make this point to
President Trump when they met in Helsinki last year in any of
their conversations?
Ambassador Hale. I do not know.
Senator Menendez. That is the problem. Neither do we. It is
a big problem, and especially when the President meets alone
with Putin and even confiscates the notes of his interpreter.
But it is curious that Ukrainian interference in the 2016
election does not appear to be the position of senior diplomats
like yourself or any intelligence official. Yet this lie makes
it somehow, somehow into the President's talking points.
Is our national security made stronger or weaker when
members of the administration or Members of Congress insist on
repeating debunked Russian lies?
Ambassador Hale. That does not serve our interests.
Senator Menendez. Now let me turn to sanctions. Does the
administration have authority under Section 232 of CAATSA to
impose sanctions against Russian pipelines?
Ambassador Hale. I do not know that we have that exact
authority. I am not an expert when it comes to pipelines.
Senator Menendez. Well, let me offer to you that the answer
is yes, as one of the authors of CAATSA. The administration has
the authority under Section 232 of CAATSA to impose sanctions
against, among other things, Russian pipelines. Then why has
the administration not imposed sanctions on Nord Stream 2? The
President talks tough about this pipeline, but the
administration has not lifted a finger to prevent its
construction.
This committee passed legislation to require Nord Stream 2
sanctions. They will likely be included in the NDAA. Senator
Shaheen, Senator Cruz are the authors of that. But every day
that ticks by is one more where another pipe is laid, and you
could act today. Do you have any idea why you have not acted in
this regard?
Ambassador Hale. Well, I will say that we, like you, oppose
the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, and we have made our opposition----
Senator Menendez. If you oppose it, you have the power to
do something about it. Why--I am trying to get a sense, is
there a policy reason why you have not actually pursued the
sanctionable authority you have under the law to be able to
stop what the administration opposes?
Ambassador Hale. We have been so far using--trying to use
other tools to stop the Nord Stream 2 pipeline from going
forward by working with our allies in the EU in particular in
that regard. I know that the----
Senator Menendez. The most powerful opportunity would be to
create a huge problem for the companies involved that would lay
the pipeline knowing that they would be sanctioned, and that
would be the most powerful tool. You have it, and you have not
used it.
Let me ask Secretary Ford. Are CAATSA sanctions mandatory?
Dr. Ford. Depends which section of CAATSA you are referring
to, but I believe if you are talking about Section 231,
Senator, I think that it is a ``yes,'' sir.
Senator Menendez. And what is the trigger for Section 231
sanctions?
Dr. Ford. The trigger for Section 231 sanctions is a
determination by the Secretary of State that a significant
transaction, as it is called, has occurred with a--well, with
someone on a list of specified persons relating to the Russian
defense or intelligence sector.
Senator Menendez. Did Turkey begin to take delivery of the
S-400 system on July 12th of 2019?
Dr. Ford. I do not recall the specific date, but that
sounds correct, sir.
Senator Menendez. They took possession. There is no
question about that?
Dr. Ford. I believe they are in possession.
Senator Menendez. Did Turkey pay for the system?
Dr. Ford. To my knowledge.
Senator Menendez. Public reports suggest anywhere between
$1.5 billion to $2.5 billion. So a transaction took place.
Russia delivered the system, and Turkey paid for it. Is that
fair to say?
Dr. Ford. I believe that is correct, sir.
Senator Menendez. Does the presence of the S-400 in Turkey
have an impact on U.S. security interests?
Dr. Ford. We believe it does. That is why we have begun
unwinding Turkey from its participation in the F-35 fighter
program.
Senator Menendez. Does it present a challenge to NATO
operations in the region?
Dr. Ford. That is why Secretary of Defense Esper and
Secretary Pompeo have made very clear that the F-35 and the S-
400 cannot coexist.
Senator Menendez. Now you, in fact, have sanctioned China
for purchasing the S-400 from Russia, which I applaud. But you
have sanctioned China for the very exact system that is clearly
a significant transaction, but Turkey, 144 days later, with
delivery, payment, and just recently tested it against an F-16,
which I am sure made your negotiations a hell of a lot better
to try to get to the conclusion you want, and we still have not
sanctioned them.
So you send a global message that, in fact, we are not
serious about uniformly enforcing the sanctions that the
Congress passed 98 to 2 and that are mandatory. And that is a
challenge because other countries will say, well, Turkey got a
pass. Why can I not? And the consequences of that undermine the
very essence of one of the major sanctions against Russia,
which is to undermine its military procurement sales throughout
the world.
So this needs to be asked, and I appreciate the chairman,
who is soon having a markup to try to move forward. But when
you do not ultimately pursue mandatory sanctions, then the
discretion that you seek--and other administrations have
sought, I acknowledge that--but the discretion that you seek is
very tough for some of us to accept because if you do not do it
when you are mandatory, how are we ever going to believe that
when you have discretion, you are not going to consistently use
the discretion? So this is a problem.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Menendez.
And you are quite right regarding the issue with Turkey, a
NATO ally by law. But you are going to have the opportunity, we
are all going to have the opportunity to speak on this next
week and to help out the administration in that regard. We do
intend to have a markup next week on the Turkey bill.
So, with that, Senator Johnson.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Assistant Secretary Ford, let me just follow up on that and
give you the opportunity. What is the reluctance to impose the
mandatory sanctions on a NATO ally?
Dr. Ford. Secretary Pompeo has made it very clear that he
will comply--we will comply with the CAATSA law. This is a
deliberative process that is still currently under way. Ranking
Member Menendez is quite correct. We did sanction China for
taking possession actually not just of S-400s, but of Sukhoi
fighters as well, flankers.
We--they took possession in January of 2018, and it was
approximately 8 months later in September that we issued our
sanctions determination with respect to the Chinese procurement
entity, known as EDD, as well as its director. So that--as the
nature of these things go, that was a deliberative process that
we needed to work through in order to make sure that we
understood the implications and had done our homework with
regard to the sanctions that we did impose upon the Chinese
procurement entity.
So that is, indeed, the precedent here. It took about 8
months to do that, rather longer than 144 days. The
deliberative process with respect to Turkey is still under way,
and that is where we presently are, sir.
Senator Johnson. Okay. I wanted to give you an opportunity
to explain that.
Under Secretary Hale, I want to talk a little bit about the
Broadcasting Board of Governors and the capability that has
been appropriated before but just has not been particularly
used to try and circumvent the firewalls around the Internet
into countries like Russia, China, and Iran. They have not used
the appropriations. They seem reluctant to do so.
We had the confirmation hearing of Michael Pack, the
Director--the nominee to be Director of the Broadcasting Board
of Governors. That nomination seems to be a little bit snagged.
Hopefully, we can get that individual confirmed.
Can you--is it the administration's policy to aggressively
pursue those type of technologies that can circumvent the
Internet firewalls imposed by countries like Russia and China
and Iran?
Ambassador Hale. Yes, it is.
Senator Johnson. Can you expand on that a little bit more?
Why have we not done it? There seems to be a real reluctance
and to spend more of the money of the Broadcasting Board of
Governors, Voice of America, those types of things, Radio Free
Europe, on broadcast programs as opposed to technology that
opens up the free Internet to repressed citizens.
Ambassador Hale. I agree with the thrust of your concern,
and unfortunately, that is not an area of my direct
responsibility. So I will have to get back some answers for you
on this.
Senator Johnson. But that makes sense to you. Correct?
Ambassador Hale. Yes.
Senator Johnson. Okay. Again, hopefully, this committee can
pass Michael--or recommend his confirmation to the Senate as
soon as possible.
Mr. Hale, I would also just kind of like to get your
evaluation of Russia's current relationship with--you only have
2 minutes, so pick and choose. I would like to understand
China's thinking--or Russia's thinking right now, their
relationship to China, to Iran, and to Turkey.
Ambassador Hale. Well, I think that in general Russian
behavior is characterized by opportunism. They look for
opportunities in order to deflect attention to their internal
problems, and they use aggressive tactics to try to undermine
U.S. interests and those of our allies in the West.
So I think in that context and the context of great power
competition, Russia and China are finding some congruencies of
interests. Both want to sort of subvert our values. Both want
to harm our economies. Both want to interfere with our
democratic practices.
So I would put that in that context. There are also
differences, frankly, of interest between China and Russia, but
we need to watch very closely what is happening between those
two countries.
When it comes to Turkey, again, I would characterize it as
opportunism. Turkey is seeking to promote its own interests in
various ways, at times in congruence with us. At other times,
we have had to work out our differences. I think Russia seeks
to exploit those openings when they can.
With Iran, I say that Russia probably plays a less
prominent role in Iran today than in other periods of history.
We continue to consult with Russia, by the way, on all of these
topics. We would like to find areas where we can find
commonalities of interest, but it has been difficult to do
that.
But when it comes to North Korea, to Syria, to Iran, to
Ukraine, to Venezuela, to Libya, arms control issues,
counterterrorism, we do have dialogues to try to find common
ground.
Senator Johnson. So going back to my original question in
terms of the mandatory sanctions under CAATSA, is part of the
deliberative process, is part of the concern that in imposing
those we are going to basically push Turkey right into the
welcoming arms of Russia?
Ambassador Hale. Well, we are obviously not interested in
doing that. We want to make sure that Turkey is anchored fully
in NATO, as it is today. That is a long-term U.S. strategic
objective.
We are trying to, of course, in addition to the points that
the Assistant Secretary made, we are in discussions with the
Turks on the disposition of the S-400s in a manner that will
protect U.S. national security interests and counter Russia's
malign influence.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Well, let me thank both of our witnesses
and thank the chair and ranking member for this hearing.
Secretary, I want to follow up on the questions on the
meddling in the elections by Russia. You have indicated you
have had conversations with the Russians about the interference
in the coming election. Administrator Wray, FBI Director Wray,
testified in July before the Senate Judiciary Committee that
Russia absolutely intends on trying to interfere with our
elections.
So have we just been ineffective in our relationship with
Russia to prevent them from trying again in 2020 elections? Has
diplomacy failed? Have the sanctions not been used effectively?
Has the messaging of this administration not been effective? Or
do you disagree with Director Wray?
Ambassador Hale. I agree that Russians are seeking to
influence the 2020 elections. Of course, Russian behavior is
not just about influencing elections. They also use social
media and other cyber tools to try to sow division in our
country on a whole host of issues. So we have to have continual
focus on this problem.
Another concern, of course, is that there is a deniability
element that the Russians hide behind. Now we are able----
Senator Cardin. So in your conversations with the Russians,
is that what they are doing? I am trying----
Ambassador Hale. Yes.
Senator Cardin. You said you have had conversations. But
according to Director Wray, we have not been successful in
stopping them from trying to interfere in 2020, at least as of
July of this year.
Ambassador Hale. I have been in frequent engagement with my
Russian counterpart and with the Russian Ambassador here to
expose the information that we have that demonstrates Russian
interference, to warn them of the potential consequences if
they repeat that performance in 2020.
Senator Cardin. And that is our strategy? Are we taking any
other steps to prevent Russia's interference?
Ambassador Hale. Well, that is our diplomatic message to
the Russians. We also have a whole of government approach to
defend and deter our Nation from this kind of interference.
Senator Cardin. You mentioned misinformation. In the Fiscal
Year 2017 budget, Congress appropriated $625 million to the
Countering Russian Influence Fund. Can you tell us how
effectively that was used in trying to counter the propaganda
that you are talking about?
Ambassador Hale. Well, I do not have measurable data with
me today, but we are very pleased to have that kind of support
so we can, on a global basis, work with our allies and directly
to counter Russia's propaganda. They are not just trying to
influence our elections. They have been trying to influence
elections all along their border, within the EU, particularly
those countries that are relatively new democracies.
Senator Cardin. If my recollection is correct, the
administration held up the use of that money for a period of
time. Additional congressional pressure was exerted,
bipartisan, to utilize that money. You are saying it was very
helpful.
Is there a strategy in this administration to seek
additional resources in order to counter Russia's propaganda
influence?
Ambassador Hale. Yes, I mean, for example, the Global
Engagement Center's budget last year--or for the first 2 years
was $30 million. We would like--we are asking for $76.5
million----
Senator Cardin. Congress gave you $600-some million that
you did not ask for and did not spend, or at least initially.
Ambassador Hale. I can tell you from where I sit that that
kind of support is very helpful.
Senator Cardin. I want to get to the chairman's point about
a strategy. Our foreign policy is always best when it is
wrapped within the values of America, what we stand for. And we
talked about sanctions working, being strategic. And the
Magnitsky sanctions, I would say, are probably the most
targeted sanctions for those who are specifically involved in
human rights violations.
It is the 10th anniversary of Sergei Magnitsky's death. It
was in November. We know that Russia has upped its activities
against NGOs, against those defenders of human rights,
imprisoning people who dissent with Putin. What is our strategy
to make sure that they know they have the support of America
and in what they are trying to do in reforming their own
country? Do we have a strategy to up the game against Russia in
regards to these imprisonments?
Ambassador Hale. Yes, the most powerful thing we can do is
speak out, and we do so. And I hope that we will have an
Ambassador in Moscow, very grateful for the work of this
committee to move that nomination forward because the people on
the ground in Russia are hard-working and hard-pressed team at
the embassy in Moscow as the first line for speaking out and
meeting with and engaging these individuals.
Senator Cardin. Are you aware there has been a bipartisan
letter sent by members of this committee, including--authored
by Senator Rubio and myself, suggesting that you look at
Magnitsky sanctions in regards to the----
Ambassador Hale. Yes, I am aware of that.
Senator Cardin. And what is the status of that?
Ambassador Hale. I would have to look into it. Obviously,
we have not responded yet, but we certainly intend to.
Senator Cardin. That letter I think was sent in July. So it
has been a while.
Ambassador Hale. Yes.
Senator Cardin. And the protests, the people that are
protesting are still being arrested and imprisoned. I
appreciate your words. Actions speak louder than words.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Romney.
Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I applaud the fact that the President looked at China and
said, look, we have been asleep at the switch here for far too
long. China has been aggressively pursuing their national
interests, and we have recognized those interests and have
taken action appropriately to push back against them. And while
I think there is a lot more to be done in developing a strategy
that pushes back against China, I applaud the fact that we
finally recognized that we had not been aware of the--or
recognized their malevolent intent.
I wonder whether the same is occurring today with regards
to Russia on the part of the administration. And I say that
because what you have described is a series of actions by
Russia that are really extraordinarily alarming, and I just--
they are investing aggressively in the Middle East with
military personnel, in North Africa, in Latin America,
supporting some of the world's worst actors.
They are violating--did violate the INF. And Mr. Ford, you
indicated they are about to make a massive investment in
increasing the number of nuclear missiles of an intermediate
range. They are making a--have made a major investment
upgrading their nuclear arsenal. They are developing new
technologies, new weaponry.
And of course, the invasions of Georgia and Ukraine. They
are interfering in elections around the world and particularly
here in the United States.
And so I wonder, what is their ambition? What is their
strategy? What is their goal? What are they hoping to achieve?
Why are they doing these things that a country that has a
declining population, a weak industrial base, really ought to
be focusing domestically, given our perspectives, they would be
trying to find ways to help their people, to improve their
economy. But instead, they are investing massively in weapon
systems, in interference around the world. What is their
objective?
From our standpoint, from the standpoint of our State
Department, what is Russia's strategy? What is their objective?
And I will let either of you or both respond to that.
Ambassador Hale. Well, I can start, sir. Thank you for the
question.
I agree with so much of what you said about Russian
behavior. That is why we have to impose costs, and we
appreciate the support of the Senate in helping us get the
legislation right so we can do that, but as part of a broader
diplomatic strategy with intelligence pieces, with law
enforcement pieces, with financial pieces, and military
elements as well.
You ask about the motivations. Russia seems to be striking
out in order to distract attention from its internal problems.
Russia seems to want to dominate states around it as some kind
of a buffer perhaps. And they look for opportunities in order
to try to demonstrate that America is weak. So they seek
openings in places where there are conflicts and where states
may not be as strong as they could be.
Senator Romney. Those are tactics, and I recognize those
tactics. But what is their ambition? Is it to re-establish the
Russian empire? Is it to become a superpower on par with the
United States? What are they--I mean, are they looking to
invade other neighbors?
I mean, their population is shrinking. Are they looking to
grab population from other former Soviet states to rebuild
their population and to become more of an industrial power,
economic power? But what are they hoping to accomplish?
Ambassador Hale. I think that they want to restore their
self-image and global image as a superpower.
Senator Romney. Mr. Ford.
Dr. Ford. I certainly do not disagree with that at all. I
think it is actually quite significant that the National
Security Strategy of this administration expressly calls out
both China and Russia as revisionist powers who are engaged in
a great power competition with the United States, that it is
our obligation as stewards of the national security interests
of the American people to pursue and to make sure that we
protect those interests.
You are quite right about a shift in China policy, Senator.
And I think very much the same thing can, indeed, be said about
Russia, that our National Security Strategy and all that we
have been doing since its issuance I think speaks to. It turns
out, unfortunately, that the end of the Cold War did not, as
many of our policy community seemed to have assumed, it did not
usher in an enduringly benign security environment in which we
got to relax and worry about other things.
It turns out that during that very period in which we took
a somewhat complacent approach to great power competition,
Moscow and Beijing were working very hard at their own
strategies to build their influence, to--as we described them
in the National Security Strategy, to take a revisionist
approach to the current system of global order. It is now our
challenge to make up for that time and to adopt policies that
will help stabilize a deteriorating security environment and
try to turn that around so that we can find a stable and safe
and mutually prosperous way to coexist with them after putting
all of these acting's out back in line.
Senator Romney. Yes, I would suggest that the goal of
having a collaborative coexistence with Russia is not something
that they are pursuing and that they have very different intent
and that we need to be very clear-eyed about what their intent
is and to make sure that we develop a comprehensive strategy,
as opposed to ad hoc sanctions here and there against
individuals or against various actions that they take.
But that we need to have a very dramatic strategy. I go
back to the George Kennan strategy in the days of the Cold War.
I am not suggesting we return to the Cold War, but I am
suggesting we develop a comprehensive strategy that gets them
to be diverted from the course that they are on. Because they
are continuing in an activity that is extraordinary malign and
not in the interest of a peaceful world, and that gives me
great concern.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator. Senator Murphy.
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to both of you for your tremendous public
service.
There is, of course, no way to unwind our policy towards
Russia with our policy towards Ukraine, and we are going to
have plenty of opportunities in the House and the Senate to
litigate what our policy has been in the past towards Ukraine.
But I thought it might be appropriate to level set and just
clarify what our policy is currently towards Ukraine.
And so, Ambassador Hale, just a few quick questions. Is it
currently our policy with respect to Ukraine to request
investigations into an entity called CrowdStrike?
Ambassador Hale. No.
Senator Murphy. Is it currently our policy towards Ukraine
to request investigations into the connection between the
former Vice President's family and a company called Burisma?
Ambassador Hale. Not that I am aware of.
Senator Murphy. Is Rudy Giuliani involved today in any
diplomatic conversations with Ukraine?
Ambassador Hale. Not that I am aware of, sir.
Senator Murphy. I think it is important to acknowledge
those facts because part of the defense of the President's
actions will be that those requests were, in fact, appropriate,
and I think it is relevant that since the uncovering of those
demands have been made, they are no longer part of official
U.S. policy query whether or not if those actions were
appropriate, they would have been dropped after these
investigations began.
On another topic, one of the sort of ways to talk about our
competition with Russia is through a prism of what is called
``asymmetric warfare.'' They have capabilities that we do not
have. And it has always struck me that that is a choice. It is
not an inevitability.
There are some things that they are willing to do that we
just are not willing to do from a moral standpoint, from a
standpoint of conscience. But there are also capabilities that
they have that we choose not to utilize, in particular the way
in which they use their energy resources to bully nations
around them and to win friends and influence adversaries.
We have chosen not to use our energy resources in the same
way, but there are appropriate means by which we could provide
more direct assistance to countries in and around Russia's
periphery to make them energy independent. A bunch of us--
Senator Johnson, Senator Rubio, myself, and others--have a
piece of legislation that would set up a billion-dollar
financing capacity in the Federal Government to help actually
finance energy independence projects in and around the Russia
periphery.
It strikes me as a way to sort of close this gap that
exists without asking our private sector energy companies to
throw their weight around in a way that is completely
integrated with U.S. security interests. Do you agree that
there are ways in which we could increase the support that we
give countries around Russia to try to end this asymmetry that
exists today in the way that they leverage their energy
resources and we leverage ours?
Ambassador Hale. Yes, I agree very much with the thrust of
your comments, and it is also--I mean, part of that is making
sure that our allies have alternate sources of energy. That has
been a major thrust of our strategy on Nord Stream 2 is because
we do not want Germany and others in Europe to be even more
dependent on Russian energy sources.
I, myself, have had multiple conversations in my travels in
Ukraine and Belarus and Eastern Europe on this very theme. The
private sector, of course, would have to be, hopefully, a very
prominent partner in that enterprise.
Dr. Ford. If I might, Senator, add to that?
Senator Murphy. Please.
Dr. Ford. I think the Under Secretary is quite right and
you are quite right about the importance of manipulated energy
relationships and Russia's strategic policy. And one of the
things that we are also doing to try to meet this challenge is
through not just promoting any particular type of energy
alternative, but also focusing upon civil nuclear cooperation.
We are working very hard, for example, in my corner of the
State Department to promote improved relationships with
partners and friends around the world in order to help provide
them with alternatives in the form of carbon-free nuclear
energy from U.S. suppliers, which serves our nonproliferation
interests. It serves our strategic interests.
And in promoting those kinds of things and trying to find
alternatives to Russian relationships and Chinese
relationships, which often come with very elaborate and too
good to be true debt bondage sort of financing terms, at
least--I am not familiar with your particular bill--but in
principle on being able to offer more financing alternatives to
our partners in the civil nuclear business would be--it would
be very helpful.
Senator Murphy. My continued hope is that we get that bill
before this committee as soon as possible. I think it enjoys
support in the administration and on both sides of this
committee.
My time is up. I will end there. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Portman.
Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And let me start by thanking both of you for your service,
and to our native Cincinnatian, like me, I am going to start
with you because you are from Cincinnati.
[Laughter.]
Senator Portman. Ukraine. After the Revolution of Dignity
in 2014, I had the opportunity to go over shortly after that
and see what was going on. And incredible. Here, you have a
country that was dominated by Russia, chose to take a different
direction to encourage economic and political freedom, joining
with us in the EU, and we needed to stand by them. And to a
certain extent we did, but for the first couple of years, we
refused to give them the assistance they needed to defend
themselves against the Russian aggression.
I have also been to the line of contact. I have seen where
3,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed. It is a hot
conflict. I do not care what people say. And they needed the
opportunity, at least to try to defend themselves. They were
not asking for U.S. troops. They were asking for help.
In 2017, 2018, 2019, the Trump administration did that, and
I think that should be noted. It was a bipartisan effort up
here on the Hill, by the way, starting in 2014, and I
appreciate the fact you raise that in your written testimony.
My question for you is, where do we go from here? One, I
think it is important that we re-establish the fact that we
are, indeed, allies of Ukraine and that we want to help them.
And as, again, this administration has done, without precedent,
we have been helpful to them.
But what do they need now? Talk a little about anti-
aircraft weaponry, among other things. What can we do to be
more helpful in addition to the Javelin missiles and to the
ships that we have now provided?
Dr. Ford. Well, Senator, I would actually add that not only
am I a Cincinnatian, I grew up in your old House district, if I
recall correctly. But----
Senator Portman. Even better. Who did you vote for is the
question.
[Laughter.]
Dr. Ford. That does not get me a pass to the question,
though, does it, sir?
Senator Portman. No.
Dr. Ford. I actually am not in a position to speak to the
specific operational needs of the Ukrainian armed forces. We
have certainly gone to enormous trouble, as you quite correctly
point out, to try to help them in the very difficult situation
that Russian aggression has put them in. I believe we have
given something on the order of $1.6 billion or so in various
State and DOD assistance for their armed forces.
That does include, as you indicate, the Javelin anti-tank
systems. I believe there are more Javelins in the pipeline. I
think Congress has been notified of an additional move in that
respect.
I am not in a position to speak too precisely what it is
that they need next, but I can certainly----
Senator Portman. One thing that would be helpful, I think,
to the committee, I saw that in your testimony, $1.6 billion.
If you could provide us with a list of what has been provided,
because there has been some information out there I think that
has not been accurate. And again, if you could, in talking to
the appropriate people, give us a sense of what is needed.
Under Secretary Hale, in talking about Ukraine, as you
know, President Zelensky has chosen to take the initiative in
terms of a peaceful settlement of what is going on the eastern
border of Ukraine and Crimea. And in fact, there is a meeting
of the so-called ``Normandy Format,'' which is France, Germany,
and Russia--not us--in Paris coming up shortly to talk about
this. It is happening next week, as I understand it.
What is our position? What is the U.S. Government position
on his initiative to try to resolve the issues on his eastern
border in Ukraine?
Ambassador Hale. We strongly support him. The Secretary of
State put out a statement, I think last night, in this regard.
And looking forward to the Normandy meeting, we think he has
done some considerable steps that have helped move toward a
resolution of the problems.
We have seen a reinforced truce, although, as you said, the
war is still hot. We have seen an exchange of prisoners, which
was very welcome. The Russians returned a vessel that they had
seized from the Straits last year, and they repaired a bridge,
pedestrian bridge that is very important for local
communications.
So we strongly support this, and we have--we definitely
back the president and the people of Ukraine in this regard.
Senator Portman. I have always thought we should be part of
the Normandy group. Why are we not, and should we be?
Ambassador Hale. It is a historical development as to why
we are not there. I do not--frankly, I was not involved at the
time. I do not have an answer for you. But we are very, very
closely lashed up with the Germans and the French in this
regard. We also talked to the U.K., and we will be very present
during this process.
There are discussions about trying to expand it. We will
keep you posted on that.
Senator Portman. Yes, I would hope that that could happen.
On the Global Engagement Center, you mentioned earlier in
response to a question from Senator Cardin that you are
supportive of it. In fact, you look at your proposal, you are
saying you are looking for additional funding. I think that is
really important. And I know Senator Murphy agrees. We have
worked on this over the years to try to ensure that we have the
ability to push back on the disinformation, the propaganda.
Could you tell us a little about that? You have a new
leader there, Lea Gabrielle. I met with her several times. I
think she is taking the center in the right direction. What
kind of capabilities do we need that we do not have, and why
are you asking for additional funding?
Ambassador Hale. Well, thank you for the vote of support
for Lea Gabrielle. We are also very impressed by her
leadership.
The GEC, as I understand it, provides primarily a
coordination role. So while $75 million is a lot of money,
there is even more--there are even more resources across our
Government, across our agencies to promote this messaging
strategy. So if you look at each of those budgets, you will see
components of it which the GEC will be responsible for helping
to coordinate and make sure that we are doing everything we can
to counter Russia's propaganda.
Senator Portman. Well, thank you. My time has expired. Just
to make the point, this is largely countries like the countries
in the Baltics that are under enormous pressure.
Ambassador Hale. Correct.
Senator Portman. And so we are helping some of our allies.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Markey.
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The New START Treaty with Russia is due to expire in just
over 1 year. Fortunately, Presidents Trump and Putin can extend
the treaty by an additional 5 years by mutual agreement. Russia
has recently said that New START will additionally cover
Russia's only two new strategic nuclear systems that are
reported to be deployable prior to 2026, a hypersonic glide
vehicle and a new heavy ICBM.
Secretary Ford, why would we not extend a treaty with which
Russia is complying and which will continue to cap existing and
new types of strategic forces?
Dr. Ford. Well, Senator, I certainly have not said that we
would not. That is a decision that has not yet been made. It is
currently under consideration.
As you indicated, there may be some systems that the
Russians are developing now that will or could be brought under
New START. And depending upon whether and to what degree it is
extended, I would qualify your statement slightly in the sense
that it can be extended by agreement between the two powers for
up to 5 years, but it could be extended for shorter periods of
time as well.
What we are doing in approaching New START extension as a
policy question is to look at it through the prism of our
broader objectives on arms control and, in particular, the
President's objective of some kind of a trilateral framework
that will help us nip in the bud the potential emerging arms
race that is being triggered by not just Russian, but also
Chinese nuclear developments.
China, of course, being, in addition to all of the problems
I mentioned with Russia, China being on track to at least
double the size of its arsenal over the next decade or so. And
so our hope is to find a framework that will provide an
enduring future for the arms control enterprise and bringing
those threats under control, and we are approaching New START
extension through the prism of how we can most effectively
contribute to that broader long-term goal.
Senator Markey. So China has a fraction of the warheads and
the strategic delivery systems which the United States and
Russia have, and we have an existing agreement, which can be
extended, which would then serve as a basis to, in turn, begin
to negotiate with the Chinese. But if we cannot realistically
bring China within an extension of START within a year, does it
really make any sense for us to give up on the START extension
so that, you know, we lose the benefits?
Dr. Ford. As I indicated, Senator, I am not suggesting that
we are or would necessarily give up on New START extension. The
question is how we can best approach these questions in a way--
--
Senator Markey. Are you saying that you will--are you
saying flat out you will not extend START if the Chinese are
not included? Are you saying that?
Dr. Ford. A decision on these questions has not yet been
made, sir. What we are trying to do is find a way to bring both
Russia and China into some kind of an arms control framework
that meets the challenges that are presented by their ongoing
modernization and their buildup of their nuclear forces, as
well as the pressures that their conventional military buildup
and regional adventurism are placing proliferation upon our
friends and allies around the world.
Senator Markey. I appreciate that, but it is just highly
unlikely, as a time, energy, you know, logistical matter, which
we are going to be able to bring in the Chinese during that
period of time. And if New START expires, will U.S. inspectors
be able to conduct on-the-ground inspections of Russian
deployed and non-deployed strategic systems, and will they have
access to thousands of notifications on the movement of such
systems?
Dr. Ford. I would think that if New START were to expire,
with it would go the verification protocols and onsite
inspection procedures that are associated with that treaty,
sir.
Senator Markey. Yes. So we would lose that, which is a huge
breakthrough which was made in terms of that on-the-ground
inspections of Russian deployed and non-deployed strategic
systems. I do not think that would be a step that would be
advancing our national security.
If New START expires, will U.S. Strategic Command be able
to as easily predict the future shape and size of Russian
strategic forces to inform how the United States configures its
own nuclear force posture?
Dr. Ford. Well, our hope, Senator, is that it will be
possible to put some kind of arms control base limits upon not
just Chinese, but also Russian forces designed to cover some of
the things that they are building that are not likely to be
covered by New START, such as the nuclear-powered cruise
missile.
Senator Markey. No, I am talking about if we do not reach--
I am talking about if we do not reach an agreement to extend.
If we do not reach an agreement to extend, will we lose our
ability to see what is going on inside of the--inside of Russia
and, as a result, not be able to as accurately anticipate the
shape and the size of the Russian strategic force so that our
own research, development, and ultimate deployment reflects the
threat that they could be posing?
Dr. Ford. There is certainly visibility into Russian
posture that is afforded by the treaty, that if the treaty--
when the treaty goes away, whether it is extended or not, we
would lose. But what we are also interested in trying to keep
our eyes upon is the long game of what happens beyond those 5
years.
In some sense for the future of this potential emerging
arms race that Russian and Chinese actions are on the verge of
triggering, the even more important question is what happens
after those 5 years? We are on track with our plan of record
and our modernization program to cover the next 5 years and
then quite a bit more. What is in some sense more important for
the future of arms control and the future of the strategic
relationship between these three powers is what happens after
that, whether it is in 2 years' time or 6 years' time.
Senator Markey. No, I appreciate that. My concern, amongst
other things, is that if we mishandle this, we could wind up
with a new nuclear arms race that could cause--cost us
trillions of unnecessary dollars because we missed the
opportunity to have a negotiated resolution of the issue, first
with the Russians, which is obviously something that the
Chinese deal with. And if we do not miss that--if we do not
take that opportunity, I just think we are going to wind up
with a deficit that is going to be ballooning because of a
nuclear arms race that was avoidable.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Young.
Senator Young. Secretary Ford, I was a lead Republican on
some legislation dropped with Senator Van Hollen earlier this
year that would ensure the U.S. made every effort to engage in
New START negotiations and ensure whatever limitations were
reached through those negotiations were adequate. We did
address the China issue, which I will get to momentarily, in
our legislation.
But I think I just heard you, which is consistent with
everything I read and hear, indicate that Russia is currently
in compliance with New START, right?
Dr. Ford. We do, sir, believe that they are in compliance
with the central treaty limits. We are, both parties, in
compliance.
Senator Young. Okay. Is there enough time to negotiate a
renewal of New START? It is starting to become a real concern
because we are at the 15-month mark from when New START will
expire, and we are running out of time. So do you feel the same
sense of urgency towards renewal?
Dr. Ford. Well, I think there is, in fact, plenty of time
to extend, if that decision were to be taken. Extension is not
something that would be particularly negotiated because it
could be simply extended on its own terms. That would simply
take agreement of the two parties. In theory, that could be
done very quickly, indeed.
Senator Young. But it sounds as though there are some
reservations to just pure extension on account of the China
dynamic, which I think is a fair one, which is why Senator Van
Hollen and I included that in our resolution.
So, among other things, the legislation that we put forward
would require our Director of National Intelligence to assess
the impact that a renewal or an extension would have on China's
actions. You know, whether if we stayed in or stayed out what
might China do, and what would the likelihood of Chinese
compliance with the parameters of New START, what would the
likelihood of that be?
So we would want to consider the dynamic of China under
this legislation, and so I hope this is something that the
administration will study and then report back to Members of
Congress, irrespective of whether or not that legislation
passes. Is that something that is being studied right now?
Dr. Ford. We are certainly very mindful of how these
relationships between Moscow and Washington affect Chinese
behavior and vice versa. I think one of the challenges that we
have in trying to build this future for the arms control
enterprise and make it serve our interests and that of
international peace and security is precisely to figure out how
these three-way dynamics work.
We have conceptual templates from the Cold War that are
bilateral----
Senator Young. Sure.
Dr. Ford. --and those do not make sense in an at least
trilateral world. We are trying to figure that out right now.
Senator Young. Understood. So, Secretary Ford, you are
mindful of it. Are you conducting a formal assessment of
Chinese response to an extension of New START or a renewal of
New START?
Dr. Ford. We are certainly considering those questions. I
do not know that it would be fair to describe it as a highly
formal assessment, but that is obviously a very important part
of our decision-making. And as you quite rightly point out, it
is a critical question.
Senator Young. We are dealing with nuclear weapons here and
important arms control agreements. Would it not be both
appropriate and right to conduct a formal assessment, working
with our best intelligence to try and come up with a
probability of different Chinese responses and the nature of
those responses, were a renewal or an extension to occur?
It seems like that would be a responsible action to take as
you carry out your analysis. Do you agree?
Dr. Ford. I think making sure that we have a clear
assessment of those questions is very important, sir.
Senator Young. Okay. So will it happen?
Dr. Ford. It is already being considered, and it will, of
course, happen that we bring all of these questions together
as----
Senator Young. So considered. Does that mean a formal
assessment is occurring?
Dr. Ford. As I said before, Senator, I do not know how
formal it would be fair to describe the process, but certainly
those are precisely the questions, among others, that we are--
--
Senator Young. Is a written work product being produced as
it relates to the topic we have been discussing for the last 2
minutes?
Dr. Ford. We are working with the intelligence community
and with all relevant elements of the policy interagency to
make sure that questions including, but not limited to, that
are part of what our principals are able to consider as they
seek to make a decision on not just New START extension, but of
these broader questions of how best to pursue a trilateral arms
deal.
Senator Young. It sounds like at the least, if we can
elicit from the intelligence community or from the State
Department a formal assessment, then perhaps a classified
briefing on this topic would make sense. So we will follow up
on that.
What is our country doing to ensure a dialogue is in place
to negotiate a potential renewal or extension?
Dr. Ford. Well, we have already had in this administration
two engagements with the Russians. This is what was described
as the Strategic Security Dialogue. I actually had the great
honor and privilege of being able to participate in the first
of those in 2017 when I was in a different capacity.
Last summer, Deputy Secretary Sullivan from the Department
of State led our delegation to engage with Deputy Foreign
Minister Ryabkov in Geneva for the second of these engagements,
and we committed to doing another one. It is then simply a
question of figuring out what the mutually acceptable time is
to hold that engagement, but I anticipate that it would
hopefully happen in the very near future.
These are our principal channel right now for having
discussions along these sorts of lines, talking about strategic
and arms control and nuclear weapons related issues. It is an
important way for us to be in touch with our Russian
counterparts and to hopefully understand each other better and
to perhaps lay the groundwork for whatever may come, such as
potentially at least the New START extension talks.
Senator Young. In the next 15 months.
Thank you so much. I am way over time, and I appreciate
your important service.
The Chairman. Senator Merkley.
Senator Merkley. Assistant Secretary Ford, is it correct
that the U.S. has had more than 500 overflights under Open
Skies of Russia since 2002?
Dr. Ford. I must confess I do not know the exact number,
but I would not be surprised if that were precisely right.
Senator Merkley. Is it correct that we have done about
three times more overflights of Russia than they have done over
the U.S.?
Dr. Ford. I do not know the ratio. Certainly all parties to
the treaty exchange their----
Senator Merkley. Okay, you can just take my word for it
then.
Dr. Ford. Okay.
Senator Merkley. You can check and let me know if I am
wrong. This is a lot of confidence-building contacts between
the two countries, and Deputy Secretary Sullivan said that any
decision to leave Open Skies would require unanimous consent of
the NATO countries. Do you share that understanding of U.S.
policy?
Dr. Ford. I do not have the terms of the treaty at my
fingertips with respect to withdrawal procedures, but I can
certainly say that there has been a lot of press speculation on
our Open Skies policy, not all of which one should believe.
As Mark Twain, I think, is reputed to have said of his own
death, ``Reports of its demise are greatly exaggerated.'' We
are currently complying with----
Senator Merkley. You believe Open Skies provides a valuable
contribution to the nuclear security at this point?
Dr. Ford. It does make contributions to our security and
that of our partners. What we are doing right now is
undertaking a thorough review of the merits and demerits of
continued participation. No decision has been made to get out.
We are going to some trouble to----
Senator Merkley. Okay. I will just take that.
Dr. Ford. --with our allies and partners.
Senator Merkley. So Secretary Pompeo, in response to a
question I asked him, said that any extension of New START
would have to take into account new systems and new actors,
which we understood by his conversation to mean China. Now the
new weapons, that is not such a big issue because you have got
two systems that the Russian foreign minister has said they
already agree would be covered--the Avangard and the new heavy
ICBM that they are building. So the hypersonic glide vehicle
and the new heavy ICBM.
They are two that would not be deployable until the end of
the next decade. So those we do not worry about too much. And
then there is the conversation that has to be worked out over a
planned air-launched ballistic missile, which if covered from a
heavy--launched from heavy bomber would be covered, but if
launched from a fighter would not be. Just like a cruise
missile, similar distance would not be covered if it was
launched from a fighter.
So that seems like a manageable--it comes down to one
weapons system. The China piece, though, that has been raised
consistently. So China has approximately how many nuclear
warheads?
Dr. Ford. I would refer you to the Intelligence Committee
on that.
Senator Merkley. About 300. Would you say that that is in
the ballpark of reported numbers?
Dr. Ford. I have certainly seen it much talked about in the
press on that number.
Senator Merkley. And how many strategic warheads do we have
deployed?
Dr. Ford. At present, I should know that number, I am
afraid, Senator. But I do not have it at the tip of my tongue.
Senator Merkley. It is about 1,750. And for Russia, it is
about 1,600. And how many total warheads do we have if we
include tactical warheads?
Dr. Ford. Not much more than that.
Senator Merkley. Well, quite a lot more, actually. Several
thousand more. But the point is 300 Chinese warheads with their
triad in the kind of infant stage of development. We have a
very sophisticated triad. So does Russia. We have just in
strategic warheads more than five times their number. That is a
huge disparity.
Are we really going to say that we have to resolve the
architecture between China with this neophyte program and U.S.
and Russia with the much-larger sophisticated program in order
to extend New START?
Dr. Ford. I was not making the point, Senator, that all of
that needed to be resolved and tied up with a bow before one
reaches the end of whatever lifetime New START still has. We do
think it is incredibly important that we be engaged with both
Russia and China in finding a future that is trilateral for
arms control. Because if we cannot do that, we will run up
against the same problems sooner or later.
Senator Merkley. So as you think about that, do you think
of the U.S. coming down to the Chinese number of 300 or the
Chinese being given permission to come up to the U.S. number of
1,750 deployed strategic warheads? Are you advocating for an
increase in Chinese weapons?
Dr. Ford. No. I am actually very keen to try to prevent----
Senator Merkley. Are you advocating that the U.S. come down
to the Chinese level?
Dr. Ford. I am advocating that we find a way to stop what
is now an incipient arms race from becoming a full-blown and
very dangerous one, and it is not----
Senator Merkley. Well, you have to argue for one or the
other. You either have to argue for us to come down or China to
come up, or you are arguing that you think they would agree to
differential numbers, locking them into a much lower number
than the U.S. Are you arguing for that?
Dr. Ford. Actually, what the President has directed us to
do is to pursue a trilateral cap on the arsenals of all three
powers precisely in order to stop what could be a very
dangerous emerging arms race and give us all breathing space to
pursue this over the long term.
Senator Merkley. Okay. I am disturbed. I really am
disturbed that in order to take into the vast difference
between China and the U.S., you have one of three options. You
either have to argue that we are going to put on a cap that
China is going to be able to come up to, or a cap closer to
China that we are going to come down to, or that you think you
can lock in a differential with China that they would agree to.
Those are the three options, and you have not said you support
any of those three.
And you are saying that, you know, we are just a year out
from the end of the initial New START, and there have not been
serious negotiations with China to figure out which of these
three options you are going to pursue. I do not like any of the
three of them myself.
Dr. Ford. Well, I would say, Senator, that those kinds of
questions are just the kind of thing that we need to be and
should be talking about with our Russian and Chinese
counterparts, which is why it is so essential for them to come
to the table with us to engage on finding a future that manages
these challenges effectively.
Senator Merkley. Okay. Well, you have not engaged in those
serious conversations yet, and I know from the past arms
negotiations, it can take many, many years to work out details
when there are actually fairly uniform relationships between
two powers. And this is not a uniform relationship.
So I will just close there since I am over time, but I
think what we do not want to see is this China used as an
excuse to blow up the existing or potential extension of an
agreement with Russia that contributes to international
security and, of course, in the nuclear realm that is very
important to our survival.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
Dr. Ford, for the edification of this committee,
understanding this is an open setting, regarding the Open Skies
Treaty, can you talk a little bit about the disparity, the
issues that Russia has caused as far as not allowing access and
perhaps enlighten people on why that is causing difficulties
with where we are?
Dr. Ford. I will try, Mr. Chairman. We first found Russia
to be in noncompliance with its Open Skies obligations in the
summer, I believe, of 2017. But I would stress that was the
first time at which we found them--we decided to declare them
in noncompliance. In fact, the things that they had been doing
at that point and, in many cases, are still doing are things
that they had been doing pretty much continuously since the
treaty came into force in 2002.
We have found them to be in noncompliance with regard to
certain overflights of the Baltic enclave of Kaliningrad. We
have found them to be in noncompliance with regard to flights
in the vicinity of the enclaves that they essentially invaded
and carved off of the country of Georgia and are maintaining
there by proxy forces. And we have found them to be selective
in allowing--not allowing some overflights of Russian military
exercises.
All of these things, you know, amount to a situation in
which Russia has been in chronic noncompliance with some Open
Skies obligations and a selective non-complier with other of
their Open Skies obligations. This causes great concern to us
and to our allies, quite naturally.
The Chairman. And obviously, un-levels the playing field
that the treaty is supposed to create. Is that correct?
Dr. Ford. That is a challenge and a question. We have not--
it has not gotten to the point where we have declared that we
feel there to be--to have been a material breach, but there
have clearly been breaches, and they things that we very much
hope that Russia will turn around. We are looking at the
situation day by day.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Senator Gardner?
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks to both of you for your time and testimony today.
The Russian Federation under Vladimir Putin has invaded its
neighbors Georgia and Ukraine. It supports the murderous regime
of Bashar al-Assad, our enemies in Afghanistan, and it has
engaged in active information warfare against Western
democracies, including meddling in the United States election
in 2016.
Russia is also responsible for heinous actions such as the
downing of Malaysia Flight 17 over Ukraine in 2014 and the
chemical attacks in Salisbury, United Kingdom, in 2018.
Clearly, an adversary. Their malicious interference in the 2016
elections and continue to intend to do that in 2020, and other
democratic elections around the world as well.
I believe Vladimir Putin is a thug. The Russian Federation
should be designated a state sponsor of terror, to join Syria,
North Korea, Iran, and Sudan.
This committee has been working on a number of bills,
Stopping Malign Activities from Russian Terrorism Act. That is
1189, a bill that Senator Menendez and I have authored to
require the State Department to submit a report to Congress
establishing whether or not Russia fits the criteria to be
declared a state sponsor of terror under U.S. law.
The DASKAA is a bill that many on the committee have worked
to put together that, obviously, creates economic, political,
and diplomatic pressure on Russia in order to respond to
Russia's interference in democratic processes, their malign
influence in Syria, their aggression against Ukraine and in the
Strait as well. The European Energy, Security, and
Diversification Act, Senate bill 704, that many of us have
worked on. Legislation that would authorize $1 billion to help
finance catalyzing public and private investment in European
energy projects to help wean their dependence off of Russian
energy assets.
So we know that Russia supports terrorist groups. They have
carried out the actions that we have talked about. We know they
fund insurgencies and separatist movements around the world.
They have interfered in democratic elections, and they have
found it--been found to be responsible for a chemical attack on
the soil of a NATO ally.
Secretary Ford, do you believe that Russia is a state
sponsor of terrorism?
Dr. Ford. I must confess, Senator, my portfolio does not
have a lot to do with SST designations, and I am not as
familiar with the elements that go into that as I probably
should be. I would defer to others on that question.
Senator Gardner. Dr. Ford? Excuse me. Dr. Hale? Secretary
Hale. Dr. Ford. Sorry about that.
Ambassador Hale. I will answer to any title. The State
Department has not, at this stage, determined that Russia is a
state sponsor of terrorism. There is a fairly complex
deliberative process for doing that, and we look forward to
sharing information and working with you and other members of
the committee.
Senator Gardner. Based on these descriptions, though, do
you believe that they would fit the criteria?
Ambassador Hale. Well, I agree with all of your
characterizations of Russia's malign behavior. I do not
personally see that, per se, as state sponsorship of terrorism,
terrorist attacks. But they are supporting, they are getting
very close to the edge in some places on that.
We also have to recognize Russia has--itself has been a
victim of terrorism, too. I think it is safe to say that on the
record as well.
Senator Gardner. We have seen, I think in 2016, a series of
RAND reports, analyses that showed based on Russia's buildup in
the military that they could sweep the Baltics in less than 60
hours. Secretary Hale, has that analysis changed to any degree
with the increases in investments in NATO and other
developments we have seen in Europe?
Ambassador Hale. I am not familiar with that RAND study,
and I am not an expert on these matters, but I can tell you
that we are very concerned about the defense of all of our NATO
allies and particularly the vulnerable Baltic States and,
therefore, have done a great deal to bolster their defenses and
to increase NATO's true presence and other instruments on their
soil.
Senator Gardner. When it comes to Europe and the actions of
our European allies, what action is the United States taking to
press--what are we actually pressing our European allies to do
more when it comes to Russia's continued aggression?
Ambassador Hale. Well, I think job number one is to
increase their defense spending in line with the Wales pledge
of 2 percent and also to realign the burden-sharing in a NATO
common fund. These are topics under discussion as we speak in
the NATO summit.
We also are very focused on the vulnerabilities of the
eastern flank of NATO, if I can put it that way. These are
relatively new democracies, and they are very--very vulnerable
to Russian intimidation, Russian tactics to use corruption, use
access to media, to undermine those societies from within. We
have seen cyberattacks and other types of interference that
have been really quite dramatic.
And so we want to boost those defenses as well, which is
more complex than just a military response. We have to use all
the tools we have talked about in other questions.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
both for being here.
Dr. Ford, in your opening statement, you talked about
progress that has been made in reducing nuclear tensions, and I
have listened to the back-and-forth around the New START
Treaty. Do you support an extension of the New START Treaty?
Dr. Ford. Senator, I would support it if I concluded that
that were the most effective way to contribute to our goal of
bringing both China and Russia into some kind of an arms
control framework, and that is just the question that we are
all considering right now.
Senator Shaheen. And did I understand you to say that we
look for opportunities and areas of mutual agreement where we
can work with Russia on some things?
Dr. Ford. Yes, indeed. We try to keep channels of
communication open and find ways to work together on shared
interests.
Senator Shaheen. And has Vladimir Putin not actually
suggested that this is one area that he would like to see
negotiations resume?
Dr. Ford. I believe the Russians have made that clear. They
also by their actions, rather than by their words, have made it
clear that they would like to continue an uninterrupted
military buildup and a nuclear buildup----
Senator Shaheen. Yes, I am not asking you about that. I
appreciate the uninterrupted military buildup. I think we would
all agree that that is not something that we want to allow to
continue to happen, and we need to look for ways to prevent
that. But I am asking you about New START only.
When--is it not possible that we could move forward with an
extension of New START at the same time we are looking to
negotiate other issues and include China and other nations that
may be a concern in terms of nuclear weapons?
Dr. Ford. That is, indeed, one of the possibilities that we
are considering right now, ma'am.
Senator Shaheen. Why would we not want to do that?
Dr. Ford. Well, I think we would want to do that if we
determined that that was the best way forward to meet the
longer-term objective of bringing these troublesome arms race
dynamics under control.
Senator Shaheen. So what is the long-term concern about
doing that? Because that would give us more time to actually
negotiate a broader agreement that would include China and
could potentially look at other areas where there are weapons
that we might want to include in a treaty. So why would we not
want to continue an extension of New START?
Dr. Ford. As I indicated, that is precisely one of the
questions we are considering and the alternatives that we are
mulling over right now. We do not have a decision from our
interagency and our principals as yet, but that is certainly
one of the things that is before them.
Senator Shaheen. I would suggest that--well, I would align
myself with the comments of Senator Merkley that I think this
is a red herring to suggest that we cannot do anything about
New START without including China and some of the other issues.
So I would hope that we would look at how we can best move
forward and continue the progress that has been made under New
START while we look at other ways we can negotiate a broader
agreement.
Ambassador Hale, I continue to be very concerned about the
repercussions of the decision in Syria to withdraw our troops
and what that means in terms of increasing Russia's influence
in Syria and the Middle East. Can you talk about what our
withdrawal has done to strengthen Russia's position in Syria?
Ambassador Hale. Well, we do still have troops, of course,
present. There has been an adjustment in line with all the news
that we have seen and the agreement that was reached in
October.
We have had a dialogue and continue to have a dialogue with
Russia on Syria.
Senator Shaheen. Do we have any potential to influence
their bombing of Idlib and what is happening in that part of
Syria? Have we tried to do that?
Ambassador Hale. Yes, we have. Ambassador Jim Jeffrey, who
is our envoy handling these matters, has had intensive
discussions with his Russian counterpart. I have as well with
my counterparts, and I am sure the Secretary has engaged as
well. We believe these kinds of bombardments absolutely must
stop, and we will not be able to really cooperate well with the
Russians unless they do so.
Senator Shaheen. Is that the only leverage we have? To say
we are not going to cooperate with you if you do not stop
bombing?
Ambassador Hale. When it comes to--I was just talking about
not cooperating in the case of Syria. No, the Russians know we
have a wide range of tools. That is part of the benefit of
having sanctions is that they know that that is a potential
avenue we may go down.
Senator Shaheen. But we have not suggested that that would
be an option in Syria if they continue bombing?
Ambassador Hale. I have not had that discussion myself,
Senator.
Senator Shaheen. So the President was just in Afghanistan,
and one of the things he suggested was that he was planning to
resume talks with the Taliban. Do you know if there have been
any discussions with Russia, either with respect to Syria or
Afghanistan, about potential role that they could play in
helping to address the resurgence of ISIS?
Ambassador Hale. Yes. Ambassador Khalilzad and Ambassador
Jeffrey, as I mentioned, both talked to their Russian
counterparts intensively about this. We would like to see
stronger Russian cooperation not just in defeating the D-ISIS,
but in helping the political processes that are needed to
stabilize countries so D-ISIS--excuse me, ISIS does not have
the opportunity to regroup and to develop. So that is the
essence of our approach with the Russians.
Senator Shaheen. And what has their response been?
Ambassador Hale. Less than ideal. They have not offered the
kind of support that we would expect from them.
Senator Shaheen. And when we actually had a presence in
Syria, they were not--and were engaged full-blown in the fight
against ISIS, they were also not helpful in that effort
particularly, were they?
Ambassador Hale. They were not.
Senator Shaheen. Again, as we think about restarting talks
with the Taliban, do you have any sense of what discussions
there will be around the resurgence of ISIS in Afghanistan?
Actually, it is not a resurgence, the growing presence of ISIS
in Afghanistan and what we will be asking the Taliban to do
with respect to ISIS?
Ambassador Hale. I do not want to get into classified
information, so let me just offer generally. This is a growing
concern, a source of alarm in the administration. I was
Ambassador to Pakistan as my last assignment. We watched it
begin then, and we were ringing the alarm bells.
And I think, effectively, we need to make sure that all
elements that are prepared to come into a peace process are
focused on that problem as well.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking
Member. I would hope that you would consider a classified
hearing to discuss the potential for ISIS to be a problem in
any negotiations with the Taliban in Afghanistan. I think that
is a huge threat, and we need to be concerned about it.
Thank you.
The Chairman. I agree with that, and we will talk about
having a briefing in that regard. Thank you so much.
Senator Paul, you are next.
Senator Paul. Ambassador Hale, sanctions are intended to
change behavior. For years, we have been adding sanctions to
Russia. Can you name some specific changes that Russia has
undertaken with regard to and because of our sanctions?
Ambassador Hale. Well, this is a work in process. I mean,
we have not achieved our overriding objectives in terms of
having Russia withdraw from Ukraine. Certainly, they continue
to violate human rights, and we continue to see interference in
our elections. So we will continue----
Senator Paul. So no specific changes from Russia that you
can name?
Ambassador Hale. Well, there may be a deterrence effect,
but it is hard to measure, and we want to continue. It is going
to take time, as we know, when it comes to sanctions regimes,
for them to have----
Senator Paul. So we have put on sanctions for some specific
behaviors we do not like, and there is not any indication that
there has been any change in Russia's behavior. Are there
discussions with Russia, specific discussions saying if you do
X, we will remove these particular sanctions? Are there that
level of particular discussions with Russia?
Ambassador Hale. I think the Russians are well aware of
what they need to do in order to get sanctions relief.
Senator Paul. But no specific discussions on, you know, we
will remove sanctions on your members of the Duma coming here
if you do X?
Ambassador Hale. I think in various conversations that that
may have been touched upon.
Senator Paul. Well, I think this sort of illustrates sort
of the problem. It is easy to put sanctions on. It is easy to
say we want to change behavior, but it does not seem to really
be working. And if it is not working, maybe we need to
reconsider exactly, you know, what we are doing.
We have also put sanctions on. The Congress decides that we
know better than the President, so we are going to put
sanctions on, and then the President cannot take them off. Do
you think that makes it easier or harder to negotiate
behavioral changes if Congress puts on sanctions that the
President does not have the means or the power to remove?
Ambassador Hale. I think it makes it harder in most
instances. I think you put your thumb on a very important
point, which is the need for reversibility and flexibility.
Often the threat can be more effective than the actual
imposition of a sanction.
Senator Paul. Probably the only time I can think of in
recent times where sanctions actually appeared to work and it
was very obvious was the President either putting on or
threatening sanctions on Erdogan recently in Turkey. And then
immediately, when the behavior changed, removing the sanctions.
So I would argue that the threat of sanctions actually has
leverage, but once we place them on, they almost have no
leverage. And we leave them on for decades, and it does not
appear that anything is changing.
And in fact, contrary to what people think, we may actually
get the opposite. It may actually solidify bad behavior because
countries have their own sort of national pride, and once they
get their back up, they are like, ``Well, we are not changing.
You know, we are never going to do that in result of it.''
Some would say the sanctions worked in bringing Iran to the
table for the Iranian Agreement, but the contrary argument also
might be that it finally came because we engaged Iran, and we
offered them something. They actually signed the agreement
because they got something in exchange. And so I think, as we
look at the world, we can think that we can tell the world what
to do, but it does not seem to--there does not seem to be a lot
of evidence of it working.
There may also be the evidence that--or at least the
argument can be made that sanctions or embargos, such as the
longstanding embargo with Cuba, may actually have the opposite
of the intended effect. And it seems like we would want to
study these things because the Castro's for decades said,
basically, your economy sucks and you have no food because of
the Americans and because of the embargo.
So I think we ought to at least be open to the argument of
whether sanctions work. We ought to try to study whether they
work. If we believe that sanctions are the way to go, we should
also have an additional effort saying we want to have this talk
with you about if you will do X, we will do X. You know, that
there is some kind of exchange.
The problem is, is it is like so many things that we have.
We start out with unrealistic proposition. So like our
proposition with Russia is when you leave Crimea, you know,
then we will consider relieving your sanctions. I think from a
practical point of view, I think it was wrong that they invaded
Crimea, and I do not agree with the policy. I think it is also
very, very unlikely that they ever leave Crimea, short of
someone pushing them out of Crimea.
And so if that is our point, the sanctions will stay on
forever, and eventually, the Russians will say, you know, and
they simply will have no effect. So I think we do need to look
at if we believe that sanctions work, we need to have
negotiations with our adversaries and say, all right, if you do
X, we will do X.
One very minor thing I proposed and got virtually--well,
really no support. I had the vote in this committee to try to
relieve sanctions on Russian members of the legislature to
travel here, and it is like we are sanctioning diplomacy. And I
was the only vote for allowing Russian members to come here,
but that is a very small sanction that could be exchanged for
something.
There are things that the Russians want that we could at
least exchange little things for little things, as opposed to
saying you have to do everything for everything because I
think, as a consequence, nothing ever happens. Because our
goals are too large and too unreasonable.
Your response?
Ambassador Hale. I agree, Senator, that we should be very
thoughtful about how we impose sanctions. The more that they
are targeted and specific in nature, the better off we are. We
agree about the need to maintain flexibility and reversibility
so we can incentivize the target to behave the way we want.
Senator Paul. That is the key, the reversibility.
Ambassador Hale. Yes.
Senator Paul. We have to be negotiating how to unwind them,
or they are of no value.
Ambassador Hale. I agree, sir. And I would just make the
general point that we should not look at sanctions in isolation
of our overall diplomatic strategy.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
There are certainly some valid points that Senator Paul has
made regarding sanctions. I think we have a tendency to reach
for those quickly without the thought process sometimes that
you need to go into them. Having said that, I think it
stretches a little bit to ask how effective have they been.
Because you cannot measure something they did not do in light
of the fact that they were facing sanctions.
So that is hard to do. But on the other hand, I think the
more pointed they are and particularly the ability of the
administration to be able to remove them when they want to is
important. And I know you consider that whenever we are working
with these. So thank you very much.
Senator Coons.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Chairman Risch, Ranking Member
Menendez.
And I would like to thank both of you, Under Secretary Hale
and Assistant Secretary Ford, for your long service to our
country and for your testimony here today.
Under Secretary Hale, Russia undeniably attacked our
elections in 2016 and has every intention of doing so again,
according to the Director of the FBI and the Director of
National Intelligence. And as you confirmed in response to
earlier questions from Senator Menendez, as you yourself said
in your opening testimony, Moscow engages in election meddling
and complex, well-resourced influence operations directed by
the highest levels of the Russian government. I agree. You went
on to say understanding this threat is essential for developing
a long-term response.
Two weeks ago, Dr. Fiona Hill of the National Security
Council testified before the House Intelligence Committee that
the Russian intelligence services have, in fact, been promoting
a false narrative that Ukraine interfered in our 2016 election.
And you previously told Senator Menendez in response to his
questioning that you are not aware of any credible evidence
that Ukraine interfered in our 2016 elections.
Would you agree, as you said in your own opening, that
understanding the Russian threat requires our also being clear
that there is no evidence of Ukraine having interfered in our
2016 elections?
Ambassador Hale. Yes, I do, Senator.
Senator Coons. Have you seen any intelligence assessment or
any open source reporting that would support the idea that
Ukraine interfered in our 2016 election?
Ambassador Hale. I have seen nothing that is credible along
those lines, sir.
Senator Coons. Are you aware of any U.S. diplomat or
executive branch official who is asserting publicly that
Ukraine interfered in our 2016 elections?
Ambassador Hale. Any diplomat?
Senator Coons. Anyone other than President Trump?
Ambassador Hale. That is correct, sir.
Senator Coons. So if an American politician of either
branch repeats this Russian disinformation effort, says falsely
that Ukraine, not Russia, interfered in our 2016 election, does
that promote our diplomatic interests or our national security?
Ambassador Hale. Well, it is a free country. People can
debate any ideas that they want. But our focus at the State
Department has been, and as it should be, on the proven Russian
interference in the 2016 elections and plans to do so in 2020.
Senator Coons. Would it be in the interests of securing our
2020 election to continue distracting the American public,
American legislators from that demonstrated Russian intent to
interfere?
Ambassador Hale. Well, again, I said that I have seen no
credible evidence about these allegations of Ukraine. So,
again, as foreign policy practitioners, our focus is not there.
It is on the Russian problem.
Senator Coons. Well, on the Appropriations Committee, I
worked with Senator Leahy and colleagues from both parties to
secure an additional $250 million this year in election
security funding in an appropriations bill that has not yet
passed the House and Senate. This would prevent future
cyberattacks against our election machinery.
Do you think that is a wise domestic investment in our own
election security? And do you think we should be doing not just
that, but more to secure democracy here and in Europe against
Russian aggression?
Ambassador Hale. I am not familiar with the details of the
legislation, but in principle, I believe firmly that we need to
do everything we can to deter and necessarily defend against
these attacks here at home and with our allies.
Senator Coons. Well, thank you, Ambassador. As you have
heard from many Senators today, we agree Russia needs to pay a
price for attacking our elections, for their annexation of
Crimea, their ongoing support for separatists in Ukraine, their
undermining democracy in Europe and separating the United
States from NATO, their support for the murderous regime of
Bashar al-Assad, and the list goes on.
One area of real interest to me where Russia has recently
stepped up their brazen and exploitive activities is in Africa.
Strengthening ties with African countries is one of Putin's top
foreign policy goals. In October, he convened more than 40
African heads of state for a Russian-led conference in Sochi,
and they have demonstrated their influence or attempted to
influence recent elections in Madagascar, in Guinea, in Congo,
in Zimbabwe, and in the Central African Republic.
Last month, I introduced the bipartisan Libya Stabilization
Act, which would include sanctions on those involved in the
Russian intervention there and would require an administration
strategy to push back against Russian actions there in Libya.
And according to recent public reports, there are literally
hundreds of Russian mercenaries now in Libya.
What is the State Department doing to address or limit
Russian influence in Africa, in Libya and in some of the other
countries I just mentioned?
Ambassador Hale. Well, again, it is a topic in our
conversations with Russian officials. I do not think that that
dialogue is producing or yielding results that are necessary
for our national security. I think more significantly is to
point to our policy toward Africa and toward African states. We
are trying our best to make sure that our relationships with
Africa are well maintained, that we are promoting U.S. business
there.
We are also increasing our assistance levels so that U.S.
business can be participating in the economic growth and
development of those countries. I think that is a very
important area. Also our cooperation in areas of security in
the Sahel. That is very important.
In the matter of Libya, I would say our strategy there is,
of course, to try to do what we can to bring about a ceasefire
and compliance with various U.N. Security Council resolutions
so that the situation is stabilized. Meanwhile, we have thrown
a spotlight on Russian--the Russian presence there in various
statements, but it is most unsatisfactory.
Senator Coons. Well, I see my time has expired. Thank you,
Mr. Under Secretary and Ambassador, for your testimony today,
and I look forward to our working to keep an open line of
communication between the administration and the Senate because
I think continuing to cooperate in standing up to Putin's
aggression against our upcoming elections is very important for
the future of our republic.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator. Senator Cruz.
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony today.
Secretary Hale, you just said a moment ago, in response to
Senator Coons, that our focus is on the Russia problem. I agree
with that sentiment. I think the administration needs far more
of a focus on the Russia problem. Russia is not our friend.
Putin is not our friend.
I want to focus right now on two areas where the
administration can do better. Let us start with Nord Stream 2.
In your judgment, if Russia completes the Nord Stream 2
pipeline, what would the effect be for Russia, for Europe, and
for the United States?
Ambassador Hale. Very negative. It would create another
tool for the Kremlin to use Russia's energy resources to divide
Europe and undermine and destabilize Ukraine.
Senator Cruz. As you know, we are at the precipice of Nord
Stream 2 being completed. Last month, the last regulatory
barrier that stood in place, Denmark gave the final
environmental approvals to complete the final portion of Nord
Stream 2. My understanding is we are roughly 60 days away from
the completion of that pipeline. It is now or never.
As you know, I authored bipartisan legislation in this
committee that passed this committee by an overwhelming
bipartisan vote, a vote of 20 to 2, to stop the Nord Stream 2
pipeline. It is narrow, targeted sanctions, like a scalpel,
designed specifically to prevent the only ships that can lay
the pipeline from laying the pipeline and completing that
pipeline.
Now there is some hope that the Senate, even in this
bizarre partisan time, will manage to work together. There has
been considerable progress. Perhaps passing that Nord Stream 2
legislation as part of the National Defense Authorization Act,
I am hopeful that will happen. I am grateful for the assistance
of Chairman Risch and Ranking Member Menendez to try to make
that happen. I think that would be an enormous bipartisan
victory for the Senate and for the United States.
But that being said, at the end of the day, we do not need
to pass that legislation to stop this pipeline. The
administration has full authority under CAATSA right now,
today, to impose those same targeted sanctions. Those sanctions
that would result in shutting down the ships that are laying
the pipeline and stopping it right now, today. Why has the
administration not yet acted?
Ambassador Hale. Well, we have been using our diplomatic
tools to seek our goal of stopping this project, which I think
you and I share, the administration shares your concern.
Senator Cruz. Has that succeeded?
Ambassador Hale. At this stage, we have slowed it down, but
we have not stopped it.
Senator Cruz. Is there any prospect, is there a snowball's
chance in hell that talking to the German Ambassador is
suddenly going to magically stop the Nord Stream 2 pipeline?
Ambassador Hale. Certainly not talking to the German
Ambassador. But we have a range of leadership engagements on
this which are still unfolding. We do have some time. There is
a deliberative process about what our options are if we clearly
come to the conclusion our diplomacy has not achieved our goal,
and sanctions are among them.
Senator Cruz. So, Secretary Hale, let me give you a very
clear message to take back to your colleagues. I have had
multiple conversations with Secretary Pompeo, with Secretary
Mnuchin, with the White House on this topic. Time is of the
essence.
A strategy that is let us pursue our diplomatic options at
this point is a strategy to do nothing. It is a strategy that
will result with 100 percent certainty in the pipeline being
completed and Putin getting billions of dollars and Europe
being made energy dependent more so on Russia and in weakening
the United States position in the world.
The administration can stop it. It is only inertia. There
have been principal meetings. There have been, sadly, some
bureaucratic intransigence, I think particularly from the
Treasury Department, pushing back against exercising clear
statutory authorization to stop this pipeline.
I want this to be very clear. If the pipeline is completed,
it will be the fault of the members of this administration who
sat on their rear ends and did not exercise the clear power.
You have an overwhelming bipartisan mandate from Congress to
stop this pipeline. It is clear. It is achievable. It is a
major foreign policy victory. And the only thing that would
allow this pipeline to be built is bureaucratic inertia and
dithering within the administration.
So I very much hope that dithering ends, and you exercise
the clear authority and stop this pipeline before it is
completed next month.
Ambassador Hale. Thank you for your message, sir.
Senator Cruz. I want to turn to a second topic on Russia,
which is, Dr. Ford, we were talking about the Open Skies
Treaty, and you said something there that I wrote down because
it startled me. You said, and I think this is verbatim, ``It
does make contributions to our security and those of our
partners.''
Dr. Ford, it is my understanding that that statement is
directly contrary to the assessment of the Department of
Defense and the intelligence community. And in fact, I will
give you some specifics. In 2015, then the Director of the
Intelligence--Defense Intelligence Agency under President
Obama, General Vincent Stewart, told Congress, ``The Open Skies
construct was designed for a different era.'' It ``allows
Russia to get incredible foundational intelligence on critical
infrastructure, bases and ports, all of our facilities, and it
gives Putin 'a significant advantage.'"
The STRATCOM, the head of STRATCOM in 2016, commander of
STRATCOM said it gives Russia ``a capability to be able to
reconnoiter parts of our country and other nations.''
2017, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General
Dunford, told Congress, ``We don't believe the treaty should be
in place if the Russians aren't complying.''
You told this committee, ``Russia is in chronic
noncompliance.'' We are allowing Russia to fly over the United
States to engage in reconnaissance on our major cities, our
defense infrastructure, New York City, Washington, D.C. We are
making ourselves more vulnerable. And we are gaining, as I
understand it, little to nothing. Because everything we would
gain from the overflights we gain from our satellite
technology, and Russia is not complying with the treaty.
How is it possibly in our interest to benefit the Russian
military by exposing our defenses while not gaining serious
actionable intelligence on the other side?
Dr. Ford. Well, Senator, those are some of the very
questions that we are, in fact, considering right now in the
course of our Open Skies review. When I said that there are
some--that the treaty provides some benefits, I think that is
true. There are also clearly, as you quite correctly point out,
some problems and some concerns.
I think the relevant question is what sort of the net is
between benefits that it offers and the challenges that it
presents, and it is evaluating the relative weight of each of
those elements on a scale that is precisely the policy question
that we are trying to assess.
On the positive, our allies and partners, many of them
feel--seem to feel strongly that there are confidence-building
benefits and diplomatic benefits that they feel strongly about.
We need to take that into consideration, and we are carefully
consulting with them.
But at the end of the day, we do need to make a call as to
how that--what that net equation looks like, and there are
elements on both sides.
Senator Cruz. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And thanks to both of
you for coming.
Secretary Hale, good to see you again. I have seen you in a
lot of real estate around the world over the years. I want to
begin with you.
The title of this hearing is ``The Future of U.S. Policy
Toward Russia.'' Your testimony has a number of references to
NATO in your testimony, both written and verbal. So how about
just start with the direct question. How important is it to the
future of U.S. policy toward Russia that NATO remain strong?
Ambassador Hale. I would say it is absolutely essential.
The strength of NATO has been a cornerstone--well, NATO has
been a cornerstone of our National Security Strategy since the
1940s, and it is inconceivable what the world would be like if
we had not developed that concept and continued to support it
until today.
Senator Kaine. NATO has many priorities. NATO has been very
helpful to the United States in the battle against terrorism,
for example. So it is not as if Russia is the only priority.
But I take your testimony that NATO remains very important, and
it remains an important element of U.S. policy toward Russia.
Would our NATO allies say the same thing? That a strong,
vibrant, continuous NATO is important in their own faceoff vis-
a-vis Russia?
Ambassador Hale. I believe so. There may be variations of
intensity of view on that point.
Senator Kaine. Right.
Ambassador Hale. But certainly the closer you get to
Russia, the more ardent that view is. But I would support that.
Senator Kaine. I have no quarrel with the administration
pressing NATO allies to not only, you know, feel the commitment
and benefit from NATO, but also to contribute proportionally. I
think that is a smart thing to do.
I have a piece of legislation pending before the committee
and a few months ago offered it as an amendment to an energy-
related bill and, at the chair's request, pulled it aside, and
I hope that we may take it up in our next business meeting. The
piece of legislation would basically say this. Sort of in honor
of NATO's 70th anniversary, it would clarify that no President
could unilaterally withdraw from NATO, but that any withdrawal
of the United States from NATO would have to be accomplished
either by a Senate ratification--the Senate ratified the NATO
treaty--or through an act of Congress.
Would something like that provide assurance to our NATO
allies that the United States intends to stay in NATO and be a
partner as we use that alliance structure to benefit not only
the United States, but other nations in the world?
Ambassador Hale. Well, Senator, I do not want to address
the specifics of your legislation. There may be other
dimensions to the legal authorities and privileges for the
executive branch in play there.
But I would say that in my meetings, at any rate, with NATO
allies there is no alarm over the U.S. position. They are
focused on appropriate burden-sharing. Our conversations----
Senator Kaine. How about the French president saying that
he viewed NATO as being on brain death because of concerns
among European allies that the United States was backing away
from NATO?
Ambassador Hale. I do not want to characterize the French
president's comments. I mean, that is up to him----
Senator Kaine. You would not characterize that as an
expression of alarm?
Ambassador Hale. I would say he has legitimate concerns. We
all need to focus on NATO's future and make sure that it is
relevant to the challenges----
Senator Kaine. And be clear in our commitment to them.
Ambassador Hale. And clear in our commitments. Absolutely,
sir.
Senator Kaine. Well, my hope is this piece of legislation,
which is bipartisan, I think it would send a strong message
that the United States, under any administration, under
Congress of whichever party's dominance, would be very, very
committed to NATO.
There is a legal question that has been raised. It takes
the Senate, a two-thirds vote of the Senate to ratify a treaty.
NATO was ratified by the Senate in that way. The Constitution
is silent about exiting from treaties.
The relevant case law from the Supreme Court makes pretty
plain when the Constitution is silent on something like that,
Congress is free to legislate. There is no barrier to Congress
legislating. So right now, the situation without legislation is
an ambiguity. But Congress can legislate and remove the
ambiguity and provide reassurance to our NATO allies.
At this 70th anniversary of this very, very important--to
your own testimony, and I think others would agree--alliance,
it is my hope that we would send that signal. That a treaty
that was entered into by the Senate cannot be unilaterally
discarded by any President but would require some congressional
action prior to it being withdrawn or the U.S. presence in it
being withdrawn.
So just to my colleagues, I hope that we might be able to
take that up, and I think at the 70th anniversary, we could
send some strong messages of the importance of the alliance
that you continue to attest to, to our allies.
So, with that, Mr. Chair, I yield back.
The Chairman. Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Thank you. Thank you both for being here.
I find it--first of all, I have been consistently and
aggressively outspoken about the threats posed by Russia I
believe going back to October of 2016. I was a candidate on the
ballot, and I would not comment on the leaks and things that
were coming out. I said it was the work of a foreign power
then.
But I also am fascinated how a nation--I understand there
are tactical nuclear weapons, and I understand there are
strategic nuclear stockpile and so forth, but I find it
fascinating, if we just take a deep breath here, how totally
consumed American politics has become by a nation whose GDP is
equivalent to Italy's and the State of New York, whose GDP is
less than the State of Texas and Brazil's, and whose GDP is
half the size of the State of California.
And I thought there was a really important question today.
Earlier, I was watching on the broadcast. Senator Romney asked
what their goal is, and I want you both to comment on this. One
of the things I think Americans do not fully appreciate or
understand is there are a lot of different ethnic groups within
the Russian Federation, and they have always had friction
internally, domestically.
You combine that with the rising prices, a growing sense of
injustice and inequality, and what you have is, in many ways, a
lot of what we see around the world and even here what they try
to do in the U.S. is about Vladimir Putin and trying to
position himself as this great historic unifier of all of these
different groups.
You go back to 2014. They invaded Crimea. It was a high
point in the public polling on his behalf because he built a
sense of national unity around that, right? The argument to all
these different groups within Russia that he was the one that
they all faced the same threat from the West, and he was the
one that was bringing them together.
And you even see now in many of the things he is doing
around the world that much of these policies and much of what
he is doing is designed to remind people of the time when the
Soviet Union vis-a-vis Russia were a great global power, and
much of this is, as much as anything else, about distracting
from the domestic problems that they face internally.
Is that not a big, if not a significant, the significant
driver of a lot of these things at the end of the day is a
desire to address these internal things and rally everyone
around this nationalistic sense of pride by distracting from
the domestic policies and to portraying himself as an
indispensable leader and Russia as a great power? Which they
are not economically, but they can project power militarily and
in smart and creative ways that allow him to pull off this
charade.
Ambassador Hale. Yes, Senator. You have said more
eloquently what I tried to say in response to Senator Romney's
question that precisely that, that this is a matter of Russia
and Russia's leader trying to live up to a self-image as a
global power and that much of that is in order to distract from
the internal problems within Russia that they are experiencing.
Senator Rubio. In that sense, I would imagine he deeply
enjoys--not that we should not look into things or talk about
and so forth. But it would be my sense that he greatly enjoys
watching so much of American politics be about Vladimir Putin
and consumed by it for the last 2 1/2 years. I mean, that
certainly makes the argument, does it not?
Ambassador Hale. It is consistent with what we know the
Russians are trying to do through social media and other tools
to divide our Nation.
Senator Rubio. And the reason why I say that is not because
I do not want us to focus on those issues. I am a member of the
Intelligence Committee. We spent 2 years looking at it and
talking about issues of what I thought was a very good
bipartisan report, but I think we somehow have to figure out in
this country how to do two things.
On the one hand address these threats. I believe one of the
things we need to do is pass the DETER Act, which would
actually put in place sanctions that would kick in, if and when
Russia were to do this again, because I do think Putin is a
cost-benefit analyzer. He looks at the--cost-benefit player,
and if the costs outweigh the benefits, it would most certainly
affect him.
But I also think we need to be conscious about or at least
aware of these ongoing efforts. This is not a one-off effort on
the part of the Russians via the efforts that Putin has put in.
For example, this whole impeachment situation that is playing
out nationally, and I do not expect you opine on it. But I will
tell you that you can see, you can just stand back and watch
how they are even using this as a way to sort of--the first
thing they say is America is completely dysfunctional.
The second argument is they are eroding trust in democracy,
that it does not work, that I think they also view it as an
opportunity to damage our relationship with Ukraine. And I
think the goal ultimately, as I said, is to portray the U.S. as
dysfunctional, to exacerbate our domestic tensions, which adds
to that portrayal of dysfunctional, and also to argue that our
system is corrupt.
And I think it is as important as anything else. I think
sometimes we get tunnel vision, and we think that this is about
supporting one singular individual or what have you. This is
much bigger than that, and this is going to be here long after
any of us are gone.
It is this effort to weaken us from the inside, get us to
fight one another, and to point to us as dysfunctional, not
working, coming apart at the seams. Because it also elevates
him as a person who, in some ways, has this sly smile on his
face every time he is blamed for it because it sort strengthens
the argument that he is this big global player.
That is my comment.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Rubio. Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just a couple of things. I agree with my colleague and
friend. The only thing I would say is that we harm ourselves
more when we internally ultimately espouse the very essence of
the Russia propaganda. That is, to me, one of the most
detrimental elements of what has been happening.
But Secretary Hale, on a different matter for the moment, I
am alarmed to have learned today that Secretary Pompeo may be
considering changing the way in which the State Operations
Center places and participates in calls with foreign leaders. I
am concerned about the lack of transparency and lack of
recordkeeping that such a change may entail, in effect keeping
the American public and Congress in the dark at a time when we
know that the President, senior State Department officials, and
others appear to be carrying out official U.S. Government
foreign policy on personal cell phones.
I am not looking for an answer from you today, but this
committee needs to understand what changes are being proposed,
how the Department will maintain full and complete records, and
what the intent is behind what appears to be an effort to keep
the American public, Congress, and others from knowing about or
understanding our Government's communications with foreign
leaders. And I urge you to bring this back to the Secretary
because if there was ever a time that such an action would be
disconcerting, it certainly is right now.
Ambassador Hale. I am not aware of any proposed change to
our policy. The Secretary is in London today, but I understand
your concerns and questions. I will take it back to the
Secretary of State, and we will get back to the committee.
Senator Menendez. I appreciate that. Now very briefly,
Secretary Ford, you know, you repeated something earlier in
response to the chairman's first rounds of questions that
detractors of New START repeatedly bring up, that Russia's new
exotic nuclear systems and how the treaty may not constrain
these systems are an issue.
But you must be aware that Russia has already stated that
two systems, the Sarmat ICBM and Avangard hypersonic glide
vehicle, will fall under New START. Is that not true?
Dr. Ford. I believe the Russians have said that, and
hopefully, that, indeed, turns out to be the case. There would
still be three systems then--the Burevestnik, the Poseidon, and
I believe the Kinzhal--that would, of course, not be covered in
that respect.
Senator Menendez. Well, here is the thing. When we say
that, in fact, you know, we cannot imagine that these new
systems would not be covered, well, here is two already that
the Russians themselves have agreed to cover. And if you do not
explore in a negotiation what is willing to be covered, then I
do not think you can dismiss it out of hand.
Other, further reports indicate that other systems of
concerns likely will not even reach deployment during the
lifespan of New START, even if it is extended. So I join the
echoes of concerns that several of my colleagues have said.
First, on the China angle, China is dramatically under the U.S.
ability in the nuclear arsenal. So seeking to include them
creates a real dilemma in terms of what Senator Merkley
obviously pointed out.
And secondly, suggesting that Russian systems are a reason
not to continue New START is also alarming, when we have seen
that they have agreed to two and maybe, when pursued, might
agree to others. So I would urge the administration looking at
New START in a totally different way, and I think that even
our--some of our allies have urged us to do so.
Let me ask you something else. Egypt is reportedly planning
to purchase Russian Sukhoi jets. Have you had meetings with the
Egyptians to dissuade them from making this purchase?
Dr. Ford. Well, Senator, I am not in a position to speak
about any specific information we may or may not have about any
particular potential Russian arms transactions. I can say that
we have been very active----
Senator Menendez. Well, I know about it. So I do not know
why we are not talking about it. What is this big hush? It is
out there in the public realm.
Dr. Ford. But what I can say, sir, is that we have been
very active around the world, including with partners, amongst
them Egypt, making very clear that they--helping them
understand the potential for CAATSA Section 231 sanctions
exposure. I, myself, have had conversations making those points
about the importance of the law and avoiding that exposure
personally in Cairo, as well as elsewhere.
These are the kinds of engagements that we have been, I
think, very successful in having around the world and have been
essential in our CAATSA diplomacy to turning off or dissuading
billions of dollars' worth of already.
Senator Menendez. I would like to get a--I would like to
get a classified briefing if you are not going to answer in
public on this and other items as to where it is that we are
pursuing other entities in the world.
Finally, my understanding is you have been given all the
authorities of the Under Secretary for Arms Control and
International Security. Is that correct?
Dr. Ford. On the 21st of October, Secretary Pompeo
delegated to me the authorities and responsibilities of that
office, sir. Yes.
Senator Menendez. Okay. Now here is an example. While you
may be very capable of doing that, you have not been nominated
for such a position. This appears to be another case of the
State Department playing fast and loose with the rules in hopes
that no one will notice.
In order to do that, you should be nominated for the
position. And if you were nominated, under the law, you would
be allowed to serve in that role for only 210 days. So this is
another concern I have for the State Department, acting in ways
that seeks to circumvent the oversight and jurisdiction of this
committee. It is not acceptable. It is not acceptable.
Dr. Ford. I would say, Senator, that there is, of course,
no intent to circumvent anything. What there is, is recognition
of the importance of not having those important duties be
gapped. I am filling in until----
Senator Menendez. Oh, I agree with you. Nominate somebody.
Nominate somebody. But at the end of the day, do not circumvent
the committee.
I mean, you all think that we are asleep at the switch
here. We are not. We are not.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. We have a couple of minutes left
on the vote, but Senator Cardin, did you want another?
Senator Cardin. Yes, thank you very much. That is right. We
did start a vote.
Fortunately, the floor tolerance on votes seems to be
pretty extensive. As long as the chairman stays here, I know I
am safe.
The Chairman. We have another important matter. That is the
picture of the committee.
Senator Cardin. Yes. I will try to make this as quick as I
can. I want to get to Russia's intentions in regards to
Ukraine. We know the occupation of Crimea, what is happening in
Eastern Ukraine falls into Russia's playbook to seed disunity
in Europe, to prevent Ukraine from fully integrating or even
applying for NATO membership. We know that.
We also know that--and we have had many questions on this
during this hearing--that the press accounts of Ukraine being
involved in our election, which has been stoked by some
individuals, works into Russia's playbook, even though there
are no facts at all from any of the security people, the
Intelligence Committee, diplomacy, that Ukraine was involved at
all in the 2016 elections.
I want to get to how we are proceeding with the peace
talks. We first had Minsk, the Minsk Protocols, and Russia was
very excited about that but just never complied with it. So I
am not sure exactly what their intentions are.
We now have the Steinmeyer formation, and I would like to
get from Secretary Hale your thoughts about how we are
proceeding. Is Russia winning this debate on how we are going
to resolve the conflict in Ukraine by developing a formula that
will ignore the occupation of Crimea and establish semi-
autonomy for Eastern Ukraine, but still keeping Ukraine a
divided country? Is that where we are heading? What is going on
in this process?
Ambassador Hale. We are united with our allies in Europe
and, of course, with the leadership in Ukraine to get the
Russians out of Ukraine. Crimea is part of Ukraine. Eastern
Ukraine is part of Ukraine. So that is the objective, and we
call for the immediate end to this occupation.
Now our focus--there are several initiatives, as you have
said, and it is good that the Normandy process is resuming
after a long period where there was really nothing happening.
We will see what comes of that meeting on the 9th of December.
I do not want to predict something that has not fully formed
yet.
But we have also seen that President Zelensky has, with
some success, been able to engage in dialogue with the Russians
to at least reduce the tension. But we need to see much more on
the security front prior to any political activities related to
Minsk, and that gets to the heart of the issue of the
occupation.
Senator Cardin. And as it relates to the Steinmeyer
formulation that was recently released, it looks like Ukraine
is following that. Russia seems to be excited about it, at
least from what we have been told. Are we assured that we are
not going to end up with some type of legitimacy of Russia and
Crimea?
Ambassador Hale. We will never accept that.
Senator Cardin. Well, that is pretty definitive. I
appreciate that. I think you have a lot of support here in
Congress for that position. Obviously, we would like to ease
the tensions wherever we can. So that is certainly a positive
step.
But as we have seen, Russia does not play by any organized
playbook of fairness on each side. Their objective is to keep
us divided. So it is hard for us to imagine that they are going
to follow any process that does not extend the division of
Ukraine.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Thank you to both of our witnesses. We sincerely appreciate
your service to the country and appreciate your testimony here
today.
I will be entering some supplemental materials for the
record as well for the information of the members. The record
will remain open until the close of business Friday. If the
witnesses could respond rapidly to questions, we would greatly
appreciate it.
[The information referred to is located at the end of the
hearing]
With that, the committee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, AT 12:04 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Hon. David Hale to Questions
Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez
NORMANDY FORMAT TALKS
Question. The next round of Normandy negotiations will take
place next week. Who is the lead within our government on
ensuring full implementation of the Minsk agreements? In the
past, we have had senior officials from Assistant Secretary
Victoria Nuland to Ambassador Kurt Volker fulfill that role.
How many trips has that lead made to Paris, Berlin, Kyiv or
Moscow to implement the agreement? How many times has that lead
met or communicated with Russian negotiator Vladislav Surkov?
How many times has that lead met with Russian negotiator Dmitry
Kozak?
Answer. EUR Acting Assistant Secretary of State Reeker
visited Kyiv on December 4 and spoke with Ukrainian, French,
and German officials in the days prior to the Normandy format
Summit in Paris on December 9. Under Secretary Hale and Acting
Assistant Secretary Reeker also spoke with Ukrainian, French,
and German officials after the summit.
Our engagement with Russia depends on Moscow's readiness to
engage constructively and fully uphold its Minsk agreements
obligations. AA/S Reeker met with Russian officials in Moscow
in September, including Deputy FM Ryabkov. We look forward to
the arrival of former Deputy Secretary Sullivan in Moscow later
this month to begin his tenure as U.S. ambassador to Russia.
BORIS NEMTSOV'S ASSASSINATION
On February 27, 2015, Russian opposition leader Boris
Nemtsov was gunned down on a bridge in front of the Kremlin.
Nearly 5 years on, the organizers and masterminds of his
assassination remain unidentified and unindicted. In June, the
Senate unanimously passed S. Res. 81 that ``condemns Vladimir
Putin and his regime for targeting political opponents and
working to cover up the assassination of Boris Nemtsov'' and
``urges the United States Government, in all its interactions
with the Government of the Russian Federation, to raise the
case of the assassination of Boris Nemtsov and underscore the
necessity of bringing the organizers and masterminds to
justice:"
Question. What is the U.S. Government currently doing to
advance this goal?
Answer. Since Boris Nemtsov's assassination, the Department
has been outspoken in calling for justice, both in public and
in private, bilaterally and in multilateral settings. We
continue to make statements commemorating his tragic death and
honoring his legacy. Department officials took part in the 2018
dedication ceremony of Boris Nemtsov Plaza in Washington, make
visits to the site of his murder to lay flowers, and continue
to meet with his family and colleagues to express our support
and commitment to the ideals to which Nemtsov dedicated his
life.
Unfortunately, despite international pressure, the Russian
government has failed to conduct an objective investigation
into the killing. As we made clear at the time that Russia
convicted five low-level operatives for carrying out the crime,
we will not consider justice to be done until all those who are
responsible for it, including those who organized and ordered
it, are identified and held to account. In May 2019, the U.S.
government imposed sanctions under the Russia Magnitsky program
on Ruslan Geremeyev, an officer in the Chechen Ministry of
Interior, for his role in organizing Nemtsov's murder. We were
saddened to use the very law for which Nemtsov lobbied so
strongly in life to impose sanctions on those responsible for
his death, but believe this step sent a strong message to
Russia about the need for justice.
POLITICAL PRISONERS IN RUSSIA
According to the Memorial Human Rights Center, Russia's
most respected human rights organization, there are currently
318 political prisoners in the Russian Federation. They include
journalists, opposition activists, peaceful demonstrators,
adherents of prohibited religious groups such as Jehovah's
Witnesses, and members of ``undesirable'' political
organizations such as Open Russia. According to Memorial, in
the last 4 years the number of political prisoners in Russia
has increased five-fold. Politically motivated incarceration
violates Russia's obligations under the OSCE, and is thus of
legitimate concern to the United States as a fellow OSCE
member:
Question. What is the U.S. Government doing to advocate for
Russia's political prisoners and push for their release?
Answer. The Department fully shares your concern about the
troubling growth in the number of political prisoners in the
Russian Federation. We routinely highlight this problem in
public messaging and in multilateral fora, including at the
OSCE. We engage bilaterally with the Russian government to urge
the release of individual prisoners of concern, and frequently
highlight such cases on social media. We have been supportive
of the diplomatic efforts that have led to the release of
Ukrainian political prisoners held by Russia through prisoner
exchanges. Whenever feasible, Embassy Moscow observes the
trials of political prisoners. When legal thresholds are met,
we have used sanctions to respond to reports of abuses against
political prisoners. For example, in May 2019, the Treasury
Department imposed sanctions under the Russia Magnitsky program
on the head of a prison colony for his role in the torture of
Ildar Dadin, an activist jailed for participation in peaceful
demonstrations.
Approximately 75% of those on Memorial's list have been
jailed for their exercise of religious freedom. This was one
weighty factor that led the Department to place Russia on the
``Special Watch List'' of severe violators of religious freedom
in both 2018 and 2019.
SOLICITING INVESTIGATIONS BY FOREIGN POWER
Question. Is it ever appropriate for the President to use
his office to solicit investigations by a foreign power into a
domestic political opponent?
Answer. That is not what I would advise.
AMBASSADOR YOVANOVITCH/SUPPORT FOR PERSONNEL
Earlier this year, a respected Ambassador--one who you said
was doing an ``exceptional job,'' was subjected to a baseless
smear campaign, and asked for her Department's help in
defending her. It did nothing, and she was recalled (even after
you personally asked her to extend her stay in Ukraine). When
the President referred to her as ``bad news,'' the Department
still did nothing. Before that, multiple employees from a
bureau--one that you oversee--reported that they had been
targeted for perceived political beliefs and ethnicity. Yet,
the Department took no action. In recent weeks, a number of
Department officials, yourself included, have testified before
the House. Many have faced bullying, smears, and worse,
including by the President. Yet, the Department has said
nothing:
Question. Has the Department done enough to stand up for
career Department personnel?
Answer. The Department has no greater resource than our
people, the more than 75,000 career employees, Foreign Service,
Civil Service, and Locally Employed Staff who work domestically
and abroad to advance America's foreign policy goals. The
Department takes seriously any allegations of mistreatment of
Department employees and provides a range of resources to
address such misconduct.
Question. How do you explain the Department's silence to
date in defending Ambassador Yovanovitch?
Answer. I, along with other senior Department officials,
have publically supported Ambassador Yovanovitch.
Question. Does the Department's failure to issue a public
statement of support for Ambassador Yovanovitch trouble you?
Answer. I, along with other senior Department officials,
have publically supported Ambassador Yovanovitch.
Question. In your personal opinion, how have the attacks on
Department personnel affected morale?
Answer. The Department is a large organization and as has
been consistent since the Department's establishment, there are
a range of views that represent the diversity of our employees.
I am continually impressed and inspired by the men and women of
the State Department who come to work every day in Washington
and across the world and apolitically carry out America's
foreign policy and advance our national security objectives. As
always, we are focused on our work and getting the job done.
Question. What message does the Department's failure to
hold perpetrators of political retaliation and targeting fully
accountable send to employees?
Answer. The events that occurred in the Bureau of
International Organizations (IO) were completely unacceptable
and negatively affected the morale in a vital bureau. Bureau
leaders cited by the OIG report have since left, and we are
working to reestablish trust and accountability within IO. I
have held several meetings with IO employees to hear their
concerns, solicit their feedback, and preview our corrective
action plan. That action plan is being implemented. I am
personally exercising greater oversight over IO's work and
personnel selections until that trust and accountability has
been restored.
Question. As you know, I wrote Secretary Sullivan and Under
Secretary Bulatao expressing my concern about retaliation
against Department employees who have testified before Congress
as part of the House impeachment inquiry. What are you doing,
personally, to ensure that employees are not subject to any
adverse action? (I am aware of Undersecretary Bulatao's
response; I would like to hear what you will do).
Answer. I have provided the text of Under Secretary
Bulatao's letter to the regional Assistant Secretaries under my
chain of command and instructed them to ensure that all the
employees are aware of the laws and policies regarding
prohibited personnel practices and that they understand how to
report suspected violations.
SHADOW UKRAINE POLICY
Question. Sondland testified that as late as September 24,
2019, Secretary Pompeo was directing Kurt Volker to speak with
Giuliani. Did you think this was appropriate?
Answer. I had no knowledge of these activities, and
therefore no basis to judge.
Question. Sondland testified that he kept the senior
leadership of the State Department and the NSC about his
communications and dealings with Giuliani, which included
specific mentions of the 206 election and Burisma as ``topics
of importance to the President.'' What did you know about a
shadow Ukraine policy being carried out Rudy Giuliani? Did it
concern you? Did you think it was appropriate? What did you do
to stop it?
Answer. I had no knowledge of these activities.
Question. Are you aware of Rudy Giuliani playing any role
in any other area of U.S. foreign policy beyond Ukraine?
Answer. I have no personal knowledge of any such role.
Question. Are you aware of any ``unofficial'' diplomatic
channels beyond Ukraine? If so, what?
Answer. I have no personal knowledge of any such channels.
RETALIATION
In August 2019, the State Department Inspector General
found that Ambassador Moley made ``inappropriate accusations of
disloyalty'' to career employees. Ambassador McKinley testified
that the Department's failure to remove Assistant Secretary
Moley after those findings had an adverse impact on morale at
the Department:
Question. Do you agree with Ambassador McKinely's
assessment that the Department's failure to take any action
against Ambassador Moley had a negative effect on morale?
Answer. The events that occurred in the Bureau of
International Organizations (IO) were unacceptable and
negatively affected morale in the bureau. Bureau leaders cited
by the OIG report have since left the Department, and we are
working hard to reestablish trust and accountability in the
bureau.
Question. What do you think the Department could have done
differently or better?
Answer. I have held several meetings with IO employees to
hear their concerns, solicit feedback, and discuss our
corrective action plan. That plan aims to prevent a similar
situation in the future by improving communication within the
bureau, training staff on available resources to report poor
behavior, and increasing engagement with my office. The plan is
being implemented, and I am personally exercising greater
oversight over IO's work and personnel selections until that
trust and accountability can be restored.
Question. What steps are you personally taking to ensure
that political retaliation does not take place in the future?
Answer. The Department takes allegations of retaliation
seriously. I have communicated the Department's policies on
retaliation to the leadership of the bureaus under my chain of
command to ensure all employees fully understand the laws and
policies on prohibited personnel practices and that they know
where to report suspected violations.
Question. What additional steps can the Department take to
ensure employees remain free from any political retaliation?
Answer. The Department, in coordination with the Office of
the Inspector General's Whistleblower Protection Coordinator,
works diligently to ensure employees are aware of their rights
under the Whistleblower Protection Act, as well as to ensure
accountability for any documented retaliation. The Under
Secretary for Management, Director General, and others are
examining additional avenues to educate and inform employees
about their rights and to ensure managers are equipped to
address any suspected violations.
Question. How would you characterize the morale in IO and
the Department at large after the publication of the IG's
August 2019 report? Has the morale improved?
Answer. As in any large organization, Department of State
employees reflect a variety of views and opinions about the
state of the organization. Department leadership is committed
to maintaining employee satisfaction, and we take seriously any
allegations of prohibited personnel practices, including
politically-motivated retaliation against Department employees.
The events that occurred in IO negatively affected morale in
that bureau, and we are taking steps to rectify the situation.
Our corrective action plan aims to improve communication within
the bureau, train staff on available resources to report poor
behavior, and increase engagement with my office.
Question. What are you doing to ensure that employees in IO
are treated properly and feel free to raise concerns with
senior officials?
Answer. Bureau leaders cited by the OIG report have since
left the Department, and we continue to reestablish trust and
accountability within the bureau. I have held several meetings
with IO employees to hear their concerns, solicit their
feedback, and discuss our corrective action plan. I have also
invited employees to meet me individually to discuss any
concerns privately. I am personally exercising greater
oversight over IO's work and personnel selections until that
trust and accountability have been restored.
----------
Responses of Christopher A. Ford to Questions
Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez
SERBIAN PURCHASES OF RUSSIAN WEAPONS
Question. Serbia has reportedly purchased a Russian Pantsir
system, and I understand that the State Department sent a team
to Belgrade to discuss this purchase. Can you please share the
details of those conversations? Is this purchase a significant
transaction?
Answer. On November 8, 2019, the Department of State sent
the Director of the Bureau of International Security and
Nonproliferation's Task Force 231, which leads U.S.
implementation of Section 231 of the Countering America's
Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA 231), to meet with
senior officials from the Serbian government, including the
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Finance. The visit
is an example of the consultations the Department conducts with
U.S. partner and allied governments around the world regarding
the implementation of CAATSA Section 231. The discussions were
intended to ensure clarity about the need for full
implementation of CAATSA 231 with respect to any Serbian
transactions with Russia's defense or intelligence sectors. The
United States welcomes the Serbian government's pledge of
increased transparency and looks forward to close cooperation
with regard to Serbia's intentions and activities.
The Secretary of State has made no determination pursuant
to CAATSA Section 231 with respect to any transaction between
Serbian entities or individuals and Russia's defense or
intelligence sectors, and we cannot pre-judge sanctions
determinations.
Question. I also understand that earlier this month the
Serbian military took delivery of four Mi-35Ma multi-role
combat helicopters from Russia. What conversations has State
had with the Serbians regarding this transaction? How much did
Serbia pay for these helicopters? Is this delivery a
significant transaction?
Answer. The United States has encouraged all its partners
and allies, including Serbia, to avoid transactions for new
weapons systems, such as combat helicopters, from Russia's
defense sector, due to the risk of possible sanctions under
Section 231 of the Countering America's Adversaries Through
Sanctions Act (CAATSA 231).
The Secretary of State has made no determination pursuant
to CAATSA Section 231 with respect to any transaction between
Serbian entities or individuals and Russia's defense or
intelligence sectors, and we cannot pre-judge sanctions
determinations. Serbia has not publicly confirmed the financial
or other terms of the procurement deal for the Mi-35s.
Question. If sanctions are not imposed over these
purchases, aren't you concerned that Russia will only deepen
its ties in Serbia?
Answer. The Department of State has encouraged all its
partners and allies to avoid transactions for new weapons
systems with Russia, due to the risk of possible sanctions
under CAATSA Section 231 and the increased dependency upon
Russia that such transactions foster. Our goal in fully
implementing the law is to deter transactions that would
otherwise generate revenue, access, and influence for the
Russian government. As a result of our engagements, we have
deterred or delayed billions of dollars in potential Russian
arms sales worldwide while thus far only imposing CAATSA
Section 231 sanctions once--on China's main military
procurement entity, the Equipment Development Department, and
its director, Li Shangfu, in September 2018.
We encourage the Government of Serbia to acknowledge the
value of its partnerships with both NATO and the United States,
and note that on December 3, 2019, Serbian President Vucic
publicly stated that Serbia's armed forces would ``stop buying
weapons'' from any supplier.
Question. According to the administration, what is the
current status of the Open Skies Treaty?
Answer. The United States continues to implement the Treaty
on Open Skies, and we are in full compliance with our
obligations under the treaty, unlike Russia. The United States
remains committed to effective arms control that advances U.S.,
allied, and partner security; is verifiable and enforceable;
and includes partners the comply responsibly with their
obligations. We will continue to approach the Treaty on Open
Skies from that perspective.
Question. Have you consulted with our allies about the
future of the Open Skies Treaty? Do our allies believe they
gain militarily valuable information from Open Skies flights?
Answer. The United States regularly consults with Allies on
the Treaty on Open Skies. A number of Allies have told us they
value the Treaty and view it as a key confidence-building
instrument, including for gathering information on Russian
military formations and troop deployments. We continue to work
with our Allies and partners on all compliance and
implementation issues related to the Treaty on Open Skies.
Question. Is it true that the sensors of Open Skies
aircraft are carefully limited in the resolution of the visual
information they can acquire? And that the United States
certifies every sensor Russia uses on its Open Skies flights?
Is it true that Russia has satellites with higher degrees of
resolutions that Open Skies aircraft?
Answer. Article IV, paragraph 1 of the Treaty on Open Skies
provides for four different categories of sensors (optical
panoramic and framing cameras, video cameras with real-time
display, infrared line-scanning devices, and synthetic aperture
radar). However, in accordance with Article IV, paragraph 11,
no sensor may be used on an Open Skies observation mission
without first being certified. The certification process, in
which every State Party has a right to participate, is
described in Annex D to the Treaty. To date, only optical
panoramic and framing cameras and video cameras with real-time
display have ever been certified for use on Open Skies
missions.
Article IV, paragraph 2 of the Treaty limits the ground
resolution for optical and video cameras to no better than 30
centimeters. An important purpose of the certification process
is verification that the sensor complies with the Treaty-
mandated resolution limit. Once a sensor has been certified, it
may be used on Open Skies missions, subject to pre-flight
inspections before each mission to confirm that the observation
aircraft, its sensors, and associated equipment correspond to
those certified.
Question. Is it true that Russia has to share all of the
information they gather on Open Skies flights with the United
States and all other treaty parties?
Answer. Yes. Article IX, Section IV of the Treaty on Open
Skies requires that imagery collected by sensors during Open
Skies observation flights be made available to all States Party
upon request.
Question. During our Open Skies flights over Russia, do the
United States and our allies gather information on Russia's
military infrastructure, nuclear testing facilities, military
bases, conventional and nuclear forces?
Answer. The Department of State refers all questions on
imagery collection to the Intelligence Community.
Question. How many missions over Russia did the United
States and our allies conduct in 2019? How many flights did
Russia conduct over the United States in 2019?
Answer. The United States, alone or with a partner,
conducted 15 Open Skies observation missions over Russia in
2019. Our Allies and partners overflew Russia an additional 15
times. Russia overflew the United States eight times in 2019.
Question. Do you believe it is in the security interests of
the United States to remain party to the Open Skies Treaty?
Answer. The United States has not withdrawn from the Treaty
on Open Skies; we are in full compliance with our obligations
under the Treaty, unlike Russia. The United States remains
committed to arms control efforts that advance U.S., Allied,
and partner security, are verifiable and enforceable, and
include partners that comply responsibly with their
obligations.
----------
Responses of David Hale to Questions
Submitted by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
ELECTION SECURITY
In July 2019, FBI Director Christopher Wray told the Senate
Judiciary Committee that ``the Russians are absolutely intent
on trying to interfere with our elections,'' and in October
2019, Facebook reported that it removed a Russia-based network
of Facebook and Instagram accounts (together with three Iran-
based networks) engaged in a disinformation campaign targeting
U.S. presidential candidates. Former DNI Dan Coats said that
Russia, among other nations, is ``increasingly using
cyberoperations to threaten both minds and machine in an
expanding number of ways--to steal information and to influence
our citizens.'' Former Special Counsel Robert Mueller found in
his recent report that Russia interfered in a ``sweeping and
systematic fashion'' in our 2016 presidential election:
Question. Do you agree with these assessments from the FBI,
DNI, and Special Counsel?
Answer. I agree with the intelligence community's
assessment that Putin ordered an influence campaign in 2016
aimed at the U.S. presidential election; one of the objectives
of Russia's influence campaign was to erode faith in U.S.
democratic institutions. I also agree with the DNI statement in
December 2018 that while there was no evidence that U.S.
election infrastructure was targeted in the 2018 midterms, the
intelligence community saw Russia conduct influence activities
and messaging campaigns targeted at the United States to
promote their strategic interests. I anticipate that Russia
will continue to try to promote Moscow's strategic interests,
stoke internal division, and erode faith in U.S. democratic
institutions in the lead up to the 2020 elections.
Question. Is the United States government doing enough to
deter and prevent Russian election interference in the United
States or elsewhere? What specific steps would you additionally
take to deter Russian interference?
Answer. The administration is working on a whole-of-
government basis--together with an integrated public-private
coalition--to ensure the security of America's elections. This
administration has imposed serious sanctions on Russia for
prior attempts at election interference, including a new round
of sanctions in September 2019. I have been clear with Russian
officials that there will be serious consequences should Russia
or its proxies attempt to interfere in our electoral processes
again. The Department will continue to emphasize to Moscow that
Russia will meet swift costs for attempts to interfere in
democratic processes.
Question. What are Russia's objectives in seeking to
interfere in the 2020 U.S. presidential election?
Answer. I anticipate that Russia will continue to try to
promote Moscow's strategic interests, stoke internal division,
and erode faith in U.S. democratic institutions in the lead up
to the 2020 elections.
ELECTION SECURITY AND LEGISLATION
Last summer, we became aware that a Russian oligarch close
to Vladimir Putin became the largest investor in a fund tied to
the company that hosts Maryland's statewide voter registration,
candidacy, and election management system; the online voter
registration system; online ballot delivery system; and the
unofficial election night results website. The disclosure to
state officials of this change in ownership was made by the FBI
and not the company itself. This is why Senators Klobuchar, Van
Hollen, and I introduced the Election Systems Integrity Act
(ESIA) (S. 3572), which would require disclosure of foreign
ownership of election service providers.
In 2016, accounts tied to Russia circulated misinformation
targeted to African American groups. The messages contained
incorrect information about voting, and were designed to sow
division. Senator Klobuchar and I have also introduced the
Deceptive Practices and Voter Intimidation Prevention Act (S.
1834) which, among other actions, addresses the use of digital
platforms to disseminate false information regarding federal
elections to U.S. voters:
Question. Do you believe this legislation would help
prevent Russian interference in the 2020 election?
Answer. The Department appreciates the critical goals of
protecting U.S. elections from foreign interference and
deterring malign disinformation campaigns. As a practical
matter, the administration, with the help of Congress, already
has ample authorities to address malign Russian behavior,
including EO 13848 (Imposing Certain Sanctions in the Event of
Foreign Interference in a United States election), EO 13694, as
amended by EO 13757, which targets malign cyber-enabled
activities, and CAATSA, which targets a range of Russian
conduct. The administration appreciates Congress providing this
authority.
Question. Will you commit to review both the ESIA and the
Deceptive Practices and Voter Intimidation Prevention Act?
Answer. Yes, I commit to reviewing the ESIA and Deceptive
Practices and Voter Intimidation Prevention Act.
CORRUPTION
Russia uses transnational corruption networks to influence
politicians, gain access to elite circles, and produce foreign
policy outcomes advantageous to both Russia and its
authoritarian model. This system uses ill-gotten gains to exert
foreign influence. Sergei Magnitsky's murder is just one
example of the measures Putin will take to ensure his corrupt
regime thrives.
Question. How can the United States combat this
weaponization of corruption? How can we be more proactive in
engaging in anti-corruption diplomacy?
Answer. Our response to Russia's export of corruption to
achieve its political objectives continues to be rooted in
democratic principles of transparency, accountability, and
integrity. We will proactively identify and publicly address
Russian corruption and speedily impose sanctions on corrupt
foreign officials and agents working on behalf of or aligned
with Russia. We will also continue to work with our allies to
press Russia to uphold its anticorruption obligations and
defend against attempts by Russia to distort the international
anticorruption framework. We will use all the tools of
diplomacy, including foreign assistance, to insulate our
partners from all avenues of Russia's malign influence.
Question. Corrupt Russian officials go about conducting all
manner of malfeasance to protect their interests, twist the
system of governance to their will, and silence rivals,
dissidents, activists, journalists, and others who might expose
their wrongdoing. They achieve this through a combination of
reputation laundering and transnational repression, such
abusive red notices at INTERPOL, defamation lawsuits meant to
bankrupt their target, or plain old assassination. How can the
United States counter these two aspects of Russian foreign
policy?
Answer. As a democratic country that values freedom of
speech, we must continue to respond quickly and publicly to
Russian officials' misuse of legitimate institutions to silence
their political critics. The U.S. government will continue to
work with allies and partners to quickly identify and address
these abuses by corrupt Russian officials. We also will
continue to coordinate with allies and partners to push back
against Russia's attempts to undermine or abuse the
international framework to combat corruption. One example of
progress to this end is INTERPOL's reforms allowing for a legal
review of red notices prior to publication.
Question. How can the United States and our allies work to
diminish our roles as safe havens for Russian illicit wealth?
How can we cease to be a complicit element of authoritarian
kleptocracy?
Answer. The U.S. government will continue its whole-of-
government approach--in addition to its combined efforts with
allies and partners--to identify Russian individuals and
corporations who attempt to obfuscate their identity and
nationality to bring money into the United States illegally and
take measures to prevent them from doing so.
RUSSIAN INFLUENCE ABROAD
With a GDP slightly smaller than that of the state of New
York, Russia seeks to play an outsize role in influencing world
affairs to its strategic and economic advantage. Putin's
interference since 2015 has permitted Bashar al-Asad's regime
to maintain its stranglehold on Syria, sought to drive a wedge
between the United States and its NATO ally Turkey, undermined
U.S. influence in Latin America, and promulgated an African
agenda based on weapons sales, securing contracts for energy
and mineral rights, and helping to conduct disinformation
campaigns to benefit dictatorial regimes sympathetic to Russian
priorities.
Question. What is the U.S. position on current Russian
activities in Syria?
Answer. Russia has unique influence over the Asad regime
due to the political and military support it provides, and
Russia could do more to promote resolution of the conflict
pursuant to UNSCR 2254. Many of Russia's activities in Syria
are destabilizing. Russia continues to provide military support
for the Asad regime's offensive against the last rebel-held
enclave of Idlib--which has killed and displaced countless
civilians--despite international condemnation. Russia also
provides political support to the regime at the U.N. and other
venues, which shields the regime from criticism that it is not
making progress on the political process and prevents it from
being held accountable for its chemical weapons use.
Question. How does the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Syria
affect Russia's military and diplomatic role in Syria and the
broader Middle East?
Answer. The United States continues to work with partners
and allies in the region to counter Russian influence. We have
used and will continue to use our diplomatic and economic
leverage to ensure that Russia cannot single-handedly dictate
Syria's future. We will apply careful diplomacy with the
Russians, back by economic tools and broadly supported
international pressure on Assad, to leverage Russian influence
on the Assad regime to not only seek a lasting negotiated
political solution through UNSCR 2254, but also to cease its
indiscriminate bombing of civilian targets in Idlib. At the
same time, there are limited areas where we can work with
Russia to advance U.S. priorities. One example is de-
confliction mechanisms, which have enabled both U.S. and
Russian forces to conduct D-ISIS operations without creating
unnecessary risk of unintended incidents.
Question. What is your assessment of Russian objectives in
expanding its military, economic, and diplomatic activity
worldwide, including in places like Venezuela, Libya, and the
Central African Republic?
Answer. President Putin aims to restore Russia to what he
views as great power status, by offering an alternative to the
U.S.-led international order. As part of this effort, Russia
supports regimes whose sovereignty the Kremlin perceives is
threatened by the west. In addition, Russia presents itself as
a geopolitical alternative to the west, unconstrained by
international norms or values, including human rights. Putin's
Russia offers military and economic support to beleaguered
regimes, including the illegitimate Maduro regime in Venezuela.
Russia also deploys mercenary forces in conflicts around the
world, including in Libya and the Central African Republic, to
undermine western efforts toward a political solution, and to
secure special security and economic privileges for Russia or
Kremlin-associated oligarchs.
NOTIFICATION OF AL-BAGHDADI RAID
Before the 2011 raid in Pakistan that killed al-Qaida
leader Osama bin Laden, the Obama administration gave advance
word to the top two Democrats and Republicans in the House and
Senate, as well as the four leaders of the congressional
intelligence committees. Before the raid in October that led to
the death of ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Trump did not
notify congressional leadership of the impending raid, but did
alert Russian authorities about a planned operation--U.S.
military aircraft reportedly overflew parts of Syria under
Russian operational control en route to the target site. Trump
later expanded on his decision to alert Russia to the impending
operation: ``[The Russians] were very cooperative . . . we did
say it was a mission that they'd like too. Because, you know,
again, they hate ISIS as much as we do:''
Question. How are we to interpret remarks by the President
suggesting that Russia harbors a greater animus toward ISIS
than do members of the Democratic Party?
Answer. I refer you to the White House for clarification on
the President's remarks.
Question. President Trump's notification to Russia before
the Baghdadi raid echoes the troubling 2017 incident during
which he invited the Russian Ambassador and Foreign Minister
into the oval office with a photographer from a Russian news
agency. Is the State Department actively pushing back on the
administration's tendency to grant more permissive access to
Russian government officials than U.S. elected officials with
whom he disagrees?
Answer. The State Department seeks to fully coordinate with
Congress on matters of foreign policy, when possible and
appropriate. For questions related to the President's
communications with Russia, I refer you to the White House.
UKRAINE
On October 1, 2019, the Ukrainian government said that it
agreed to implement the so-called ``Steinmeier formula,'' a
refinement of the Minsk Protocols that would provide for
internationally-monitored and approved elections in Russian-
controlled territories in eastern Ukraine in exchange for
granting them ``special status.''
Question. What are Russia's aims in agreeing to the
Steinmeier formula? What is the U.S. position regarding the
``Steinmeier formula?''
Answer. The United States supports efforts to achieve a
diplomatic solution to the conflict in eastern Ukraine that
restores Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity. In
late 2019, President Zelenskyy agreed to the so-called
Steinmeier formula, one of Russia's preconditions for the
December meeting of the Normandy Quartet leaders. The
Steinmeier Formula--named after former German FM Steinmeier who
first proposed it--stipulates the terms of initiating ``special
status'' for certain districts in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts
currently controlled by Russia-led forces ahead of local
elections. It also stipulates the ``special status'' would
become permanent if approved through elections deemed ``free
and fair'' according to OSCE/ODIHR standards. The Steinmeier
Formula thus complements, but does not alter, Russia's security
obligations under the Minsk agreements, which should be met
prior to local elections taking place.
As part of the 2014-15 Minsk agreements, Russia must
withdraw its forces and all heavy weapons, disband and end its
support to illegal armed formations on Ukraine's territory, and
reinstate Ukraine's full control of its international border.
The United States continues to emphasize that the
implementation of political measures, such as local elections
and special status, discussed in the Minsk agreements is only
possible after there is security on the ground.
Question. With the resignation of U.S. Special
Representative Kurt Volker, what is the status of U.S.
engagement in the conflict resolution process?
Answer. The Department of State is actively engaged in
finding a diplomatic solution to the conflict in the Donbas. As
the Secretary reiterated in his January 31 visit to Ukraine,
the United States' support for Ukraine's sovereignty and
territorial integrity is ironclad. We will never recognize
Russia's occupation and attempted annexation of Crimea. EUR
Acting Assistant Secretary of State Reeker coordinates with
French and German counterparts to support Ukraine in the
Normandy Process and maintain pressure on Russia to implement
the commitments it signed onto in the Minsk agreements. Under
Secretary Hale also engages key U.S. allies and partners on the
peace process.
Question. How do you assess Russia's views of the new
government in Ukraine and its objectives in Ukraine?
Answer. Despite some positive developments in the Ukraine-
Russia relationship in 2019, including the first ``Normandy
Format'' summit since 2016 and two exchanges of prisoners,
Russia's attempts to undermine Ukraine's sovereignty and
territorial integrity continue. Five years on, Russia has yet
to implement any of its security obligations under the Minsk
agreements and has not reciprocated Ukraine's commitment to
decrease violence and improve humanitarian conditions for
persons living on both sides of the Line of Contact. Russia
continues to militarize the Crimean peninsula, oppress ethnic
Crimean Tatars and other Crimean residents who remain loyal to
Ukraine, and refuses to discuss Crimea's return to Ukrainian
sovereignty.
Question. How does the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Syria
affect Russia's military and diplomatic role in Syria and the
broader Middle East?
Answer. The United States continues to work with partners
and allies in the region to counter Russian influence. We have
used and will continue to use our diplomatic and economic
leverage to ensure that Russia cannot single-handedly dictate
Syria's future. We will apply careful diplomacy with the
Russians, backed by economic tools and international pressure
on Assad, to leverage Russian influence on the Asad regime to
not only seek a lasting negotiated political solution through
UNSCR 2254, but also to cease its indiscriminate bombing of
civilian targets in Idlib. At the same time, we are limited in
areas where we can work with Russia to advance U.S. priorities.
One example is de-confliction mechanisms, which have enabled
both U.S. and Russian forces to conduct D-ISIS operations
without creating an unnecessary risk of unintended incidents.
Question. Congress has appropriated $625 million for the
Countering Russian Influence Fund, which among other things
provides support to countries in Europe and Eurasia to protect
electoral mechanisms against cyberattacks, improve the rule of
law and combat corruption, and help countries combat
disinformation:
Is the Fund an effective mechanism, in your view? How can
it be improved?
Answer. The Countering Russian Influence Fund (CRIF) has
been an effective mechanism to address the specific levers of
Russian malign activity in the region. Foreign assistance funds
appropriated under CRIF are an important piece of our overall
foreign assistance efforts to support the goals of Countering
America's Adversaries through Sanctions Act, and to counter
Russian malign influence in Europe and Eurasia. CRIF enables
the Department and USAID to provide targeted and innovative
bilateral and regional programs to enhance defense capacity of
allies and partners; improve cyber and energy security; help
diversify economies; support rule of law, independent media,
and civil society; and to counter disinformation in
coordination with other Department programs, including from the
Global Engagement Center. The Department appreciates
legislative improvements Congress made by removing geographic
restrictions for CRIF.
Question. Why do you think the Kremlin has resorted, as in
the Soviet era, to taking more political prisoners, especially
when many of their cases are widely known and condemned
internationally? Do you foresee more Russian and Ukrainian
prisoner exchanges in the future?
Answer. We share your concern about political prisoners in
Russia. The number of cases has grown from approximately 40 in
2014 to approximately 300 now, corresponding with a time period
in which the government's overall tolerance for dissent in the
country dramatically decreased. It is clear from the
composition of the list of political prisoners maintained by
renowned human rights NGO Memorial that the Kremlin has
targeted members of a range of social groups for reprisal,
including Jehovah's Witnesses, Muslims, protesters,
journalists, human rights defenders, and Crimean Tatars and
other dissidents from Russia-occupied Crimea.
We support the diplomatic efforts that led to the release
of Ukrainian political prisoners held by Russia through
prisoner exchanges. We call on Russia to immediately release
all of its political prisoners, including Ukrainians and
members of the Crimean Tatar community.
Question. In addition to imposing robust sanctions against
officials responsible for politically motivated imprisonment,
how else can the USG continue to push for the release of
political prisoners and ensure accountability for those
responsible for human rights abuses?
Answer. The Department shares your concern about the
troubling growth in the number of political prisoners in the
Russian Federation. In addition to imposing sanctions on those
responsible for abusing political prisoners, we routinely
highlight this problem in public messaging and in multilateral
fora. We engage bilaterally with the Russian government to urge
the release of individual prisoners of acute concern, and
frequently highlight such cases on social media. We support the
diplomatic efforts leading to the release of Ukrainian
political prisoners held by Russia through prisoner exchanges.
Whenever feasible, Embassy Moscow observes the trials of
political prisoners. Approximately 75% of Russia's political
prisoners have been jailed for their exercise of religious
freedom. This was one weighty factor that led the Department to
place Russia on the ``Special Watch List'' of severe violators
of religious freedom in both 2018 and 2019.
Question. How do you assess the state of religious freedom
in Russia? How can the United States defend Russian religious
minorities against the misapplication of ``extremism'' laws?
Answer. Religious freedom in Russia continues to
deteriorate as the government engages in and tolerates severe
violations of religious freedom, including torture, arbitrary
arrest, and imprisonment. Widespread suppression of religious
practice has led to the imprisonment of over 250 individuals
for practicing their faith. Peaceful Jehovah's Witnesses,
deemed an ``extremist'' organization in 2017, have subsequently
been targeted. In Russia-occupied Crimea, dozens of Muslim
Crimean Tatars have been sentenced to long prison sentences
after being falsely accused of belonging to a ``terrorist''
organization. The United States will continue to speak out
against Russia's misuse of ``extremism'' laws against religious
minorities.
PROTESTS FOR FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS
Throughout the summer in Moscow, thousands of protesters
took to the streets to protest the blocking of registration of
many independent candidates, as well as general protests
advocating for free and fair elections and an open society. The
protests were marked by severe police and security service
brutality against peaceful protesters. Though charges were
dropped in many instances, some protestors still face jail time
or are awaiting trial. The Russian government has since
declared Alexei Navalny's group Anti-Corruption Foundation
(also known by its Russian acronym FBK) a ``foreign agent.''
Since then, FBK offices all over Russia have been subject to
destructive searches/ransacking and other official harassment.
Question. What do you make of the Russian protest movements
this past summer ahead of the Moscow municipal elections? Are
they similar to protests we have seen before, or do they
represent a new movement that could bring about real change?
Answer. The protest movement in 2019 was significant and
reflects the Russian people's desire to have their voices heard
and their votes counted. The Department will continue to call
on the Russian government to honor its OSCE commitments to hold
free and fair elections and respect the rights of free
expression, association, and assembly.
Question. How can the United States operate in the Russian
human rights sphere when Russia has cracked down on ``foreign
agents'' and ``undesirable organizations''? How can we best
support Russian human rights organizations?
Answer. Despite pressure on civil society, Russian
organizations and individuals continue to express a desire to
engage with the United States. As long as this continues to be
the case, the United States will support opportunities for
peer-to-peer, educational, cultural, and other regional
programs that create opportunities to exchange views and best
practices. The Department continues to engage in a range of
ways with human rights defenders in Russia and around the
world. We would be happy to brief you on these efforts in
person.
Question. How can the United States support media freedom
and the protection of journalists in Russia?
Answer. The United States is an outspoken proponent of
media freedom and journalist safety in Russia. We frequently
voice our concerns about the growth in restrictions on the
press in Russia and engage directly with the Russian government
regarding cases of individual journalists who are under acute
threat. The Department uses a range of other mechanisms to
support media freedom and protect journalists in Russia and
around the world. We would be happy to brief you on these
efforts in person.
Question. What else can the U.S. do to bring attention to
the plight of political prisoners in Russia?
Answer. The United States will continue to advocate
publicly and privately for the release of political prisoners
in Russia and support coordination with likeminded allies to
press for accountability for human rights violations in
international fora such as the U.N. and OSCE. The United States
will explore every possible avenue to ensure accountability for
those responsible for human rights abuses, including the use of
targeted sanctions and visa ban authorities, in such cases
where we can demonstrate that an individual's conduct meets the
legal threshold for such action.
Question. Does the recent prisoner exchange between Russia
and Ukraine signal a new era of Russian willingness to
compromise when it comes to political prisoners, or was it
simply a one-off event?
Answer. The Kremlin is willing to use all possible methods
to silence political opponents, including by detaining more
political prisoners. We support President Zelenskyy's efforts
to seek a peaceful resolution to the conflict in eastern
Ukraine, and call on Russia to release all Ukrainians it has
unjustly imprisoned, including the dozens of Crimean Tatars
detained by Russian occupation authorities simply for voicing
their opposition to Russia's occupation.
Question. What is the situation surrounding press freedom
in Russia? How can the U.S. stand up for journalists like Ivan
Golunov, who was arrested and then released after an
international outcry?
Answer. Press freedom in the Russian Federation is
significantly restricted. The government continues to institute
new laws restricting press freedom, particularly regarding
online speech. Authorities routinely use procedural violations
and restrictive or vague legislation to detain, harass, or
prosecute journalists who write unfavorably about the
government or pro-government actors and institutes. Journalists
have been subjected to physical attack, harassment, and
intimidation as a result of their reporting. The government
exercises editorial control over most media, creating a media
landscape in which most citizens are exposed to predominantly
government-approved narratives. Significant government pressure
on independent media constrains coverage of numerous issues,
including of Ukraine and Syria, LGBTI issues, the environment,
and elections. Censorship and self-censorship are widespread.
The United States joined the international community in
publicly condemning the wrongful arrest, abuse, and framing of
journalist Ivan Golunov. In the case of Golunov, international
and domestic outcry appeared to have ensured his release, but
we remain committed to advocating for the freedom of those less
fortunate journalists in Russia and other authoritarian states
who remain jailed in retaliation for their work.
Question. In your view, how effective have sanctions been
in response to Russian activities?
Answer. Our actions have sent a clear message to those who
engage in malign Russian activity. They are on notice that if
they continue to support election interference, aggression in
Eastern Ukraine and Crimea, human rights abuse, support for the
Assad regime, or other threatening activity, they will suffer
consequences. There is also evidence that sanctions have indeed
imposed a cost on Russia, one that will provide us leverage
when they are prepared to negotiate diplomatic solutions. Any
new discretionary sanctions will be framed with an eye towards
our critical transatlantic unity on this vital national
security issue.
Question. What is your assessment of the impact of sectoral
versus targeted sanctions with regard to Russian activities?
Answer. Both sectoral and targeted sanctions have had
significant effects on Russian activities. The Russian defense
sector has suffered with the cancelling of billion-dollar arms
deals between Russia and foreign actors. Sanctions have also
targeted Russia's energy sector, deterring foreign firms from
engaging in Russian arctic offshore, deep water, or shale
projects.
Targeted sanctions have shown to be significant at the firm
level, with research finding firms facing a total asset
valuation drop of one-half. There is evidence that the
government shields some sensitive targets via state subsidies.
We estimate the direct cost to the Russian government of
shielding strategic firms to be at least $13 billion.
Question. How does the U.S. plan to respond to Russian
retaliatory actions such as creating its own payment system
(via the Mir card) which has adverse impacts on U.S. payment
providers and Russian citizens?
Answer. This response contains Sensitive But Unclassified
(SBU) information and will be sent via secure correspondence.
Question. Why has the administration not used the full
range of sanctions authorities Congress established in the
Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act
(CAATSA)?
Answer. This response contains Sensitive But Unclassified
(SBU) information and will be sent via secure correspondence.
Question. Does the administration intend to impose
sanctions on Turkey for taking the delivery of Russian S-400
missile systems?
Answer. I cannot pre-judge a sanctions decision prior to a
determination by the Secretary of State, nor can I preview a
timeline for a decision under Section 231 of the Countering
America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). The
Secretary has made clear he intends to comply with the law.
The decision to unwind Turkey from the F-35 program--prior
to the outcome of CAATSA deliberations--makes clear how
seriously we take this issue. As President Trump told President
Erdogan during his visit, resolving the S-400 issue is vital to
achieve progress on other elements of the bilateral
relationship. We continue to stress to Turkish officials that
this kind of defense cooperation with Russia is not in Turkey's
interests and should end.
Question. Do you support an extension of New START?
Answer. The administration has not yet made a decision
about a potential extension of the New START Treaty, which does
not expire until February 2021. Central to the U.S. review of
potential New START extension is whether an extension is in the
U.S. national interest, and how the treaty's expiration would
affect U.S., Allied, and partner security in an evolving
security environment. Our arms control policies and agreements
should be responsive to the threats we face.
Question. Should future strategic arms reductions with
Russia be considered? If so, should they cover a wider range of
weapons and countries?
Answer. We stand ready to engage with Russia on arms
control that advances U.S., allied, and partner security; is
verifiable and enforceable; and includes partners that comply
responsibly with their obligations. President Trump has charged
his national security team to think more broadly about arms
control, both in terms of the countries and the weapon systems
involved, including Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons, new
kinds of Russian delivery vehicles that would not count against
New START's limits, and China's growing nuclear arsenal.
Question. In your view, what are possible implications of
the U.S. withdrawal from the INF treaty?
Answer. On August 2, 2019, the United States terminated the
INF Treaty because Russia failed to return to compliance after
developing, flight-testing, and then fielding multiple
battalions of an intermediate-range missile system, the SSC-8,
in violation of its obligations. Russia is solely responsible
for the treaty's demise. Our NATO Allies fully supported the
United States' determination and withdrawal from the Treaty,
and we are working closely to ensure NATO's deterrence and
defense against the full-range of Russia's capabilities,
including the SSC-8. Arms control is only useful for advancing
U.S., allied, and partner security if Russia understands that
the United States will not tolerate non-compliance.
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Responses of David Hale to Questions
Submitted by Senator Tom Udall
Under Secretary Hale, thank you for taking the time to meet
today.
It has been nearly 22 years since this committee held a
series of 6 hearings to debate the prospect of NATO enlargement
and its impact on U.S. and Russian relations.
After years of NATO expansion, multiple restarts in the
relationship with Russia, the passage of New START, election
interference, Syria interventions by both nations, and multiple
sanctions, the relationship with Russia is in very bad shape.
And this is a major nuclear power with an authoritarian
government.
The Doomsday clock maintained by the Bulletin of Atomic
Scientists is now 2 minutes till midnight. Significantly closer
to midnight than the 17 minutes 22 years ago. And now with two
existential threats facing humanity. Nuclear weapons and
climate change.
It is well known that Vladimir Putin is engaging in a
deliberate effort to undermine the United States and Western
Europe. And we are now caught in tit for tat measures that
could worsen the current security dilemma with regards to
Russia.
Mr. Hale, President Trump attacked Ambassador Yovanovitch
and other during the House impeachment hearings via twitter . .
. .as she testified.
The Russian intelligence agencies and foreign ministry are
now following how the State Department has failed to stand up
for her and other diplomats.
Russia is likely to conclude that they can ignore the State
Department. They will seek to deal more directly with the
President, his family, and political staff in the White House.
When it comes to this part of the world, the President
seems more inclined to heed advice from people like Rudy
Giuliani than the trained experts in the State Department. That
deeply concerns me. Does that concern you when it comes to
Russia and their sophisticated intelligence agencies?
In 1990 George Kennan wrote that:
``We have never been at war with Russia, should never need
to be and must not be... The greatest help we can give will be
of two kinds: understanding and example. The example will of
course depend upon the quality of our own civilization. It is
our responsibility to assure that this quality is such as to be
useful in this respect.''
It may be uncomfortable to talk about, but our President
has major foreign business interests, which are not disclosed
to the American people.
This is completely unprecedented in our history. You would
not be allowed to do these things in your position--it's
against the law which requires divestment for federal officials
to avoid conflicts of interest. And to reduce the risk of
corruption.
Our State Department is rightly critical of very real
corruption problems in many foreign countries--including but
not limited to Russia and Ukraine. I am gravely concerned that
our President is failing to set a good example on corruption in
the way that George Kennan described:
Question. The President has publicly talked about
corruption in Ukraine. Has he ever personally directed any
actions to combat corruption in Russia, and if so, what were
those actions?
Answer. The administration fully shares congressional
concerns about corruption in Russia. Under a range of sanctions
authorities, including the Global Magnitsky Act, the
administration has imposed sanctions and visa bans on some of
the most notoriously corrupt actors in Russia.
Question. Follow up: What is the U.S. anti-corruption
agenda for Russia and what progress are we making?
You met with Russian officials in Helsinki last year and
your office put out a short readout of the meetings, stating:
``that while the United States seeks to narrow differences
and foster cooperation with Russia on a number of global
challenges, Russia's negative actions continue to be a barrier
for progress in our bilateral relationship.''
For all of their problematic behavior, Russia remains in
the Paris agreement on climate and the JCPOA on Iran, and has
expressed that they wish to renew the New START treaty.
It is President Trump who has stated that he is not in
favor of any of these actions. Russia's position on these
issues strike me as areas where we should have agreement.
So let's focus for a minute on nuclear issues, and New
START.
Answer. Given the gravity of the corruption problem in
Russia, we remain committed to proactively using sanctions and
visa ban authorities to identify and respond to corrupt foreign
officials and agents working on behalf of or aligned with
Russia. We continue to work with our allies to press Russia to
uphold its international anticorruption obligations and defend
against attempts by Russia to distort the international
anticorruption framework. We use all the tools of diplomacy,
including foreign assistance, to insulate our partners from all
avenues of Russia's malign influence, including corruption.
Question. Historically, the U.S. has not tied nuclear
agreements to other disagreements. Is that the case today? Are
we actively pursuing future nuclear arms control agreements
with Russia and if not, why?
Answer. The United States remains committed to effective
arms control that advances U.S., allied, and partner security;
is verifiable and enforceable; and includes partners that
comply responsibly with their obligations. We stand ready to
engage with Russia on arms control that meets these criteria as
the U.S. Government advances President Trump's priority of
seeking arms control that includes more countries and
categories of weapons than past treaties. State Department
officials regularly meet with Russian officials bilaterally and
multilaterally to discuss matters relating to arms control and
risk reduction. We will continue these discussions as
appropriate in the interest of U.S. national security.
I sincerely hope that we are not approaching Russia in the
same way we are approaching Iran, with a ramp up to maximum
pressure, hoping we can achieve a pipe dream of demands while
ignoring the need to cooperate on issues of global importance
such as arms control and climate change.
Question. Do you agree with former Ambassador Jon
Huntsman's assessment?
Mr. Hale, Russia has traditionally been a more European
leaning nation, but since the Cold War, there seems to be a new
shift by Russian to look more towards Asia. To countries such
as China and India.
Former Ambassador Jon Huntsman wrote this year in a Wall
Street Journal Op-ed that:
``Blithely implementing sanctions without making sure they
fit into a larger strategy of engagement costs us the ability
to shape outcomes. Russians have accepted that U.S. sanctions
will probably remain in place for the long term, inevitably
distorting the market as Russians create alternative supply
chains that aren't always conducive to American interests.''
One of those alternative supply chains is China:
Answer. Following Western imposition of economic sanctions
after its aggression in Ukraine, Russia stepped up purchases
from Chinese producers. But Russia's orientation to the East,
even in consumer goods, has been overstated by the Russian
government. While China is now Russia's largest single trading
partner, it is still dwarfed by the EU.
Given the importance of trade with the West to the Russian
economy, there is evidence that sanctions have indeed imposed a
cost on Russia.
We estimate the direct cost to the Russian government of
shielding strategic firms from sanctions is at least $13
billion. In addition, sanctions have reduced Russia's ability
to access funding in the financial, energy, and defense
sectors, as well as limit its access to certain technologies.
Foreign investment is also down as a result of sanctions, which
depresses Russia's economic growth.
We are committed to a policy of consistent cost imposition
until Russia changes course, and sanctions will remain a key
part of that.
I'd like to conclude with a discussion about the future.
Tolstoy wrote in War and Peace that:
``The strongest of all warriors are these two--Time and
Patience.''
George Kennan wrote in 1990:
``Give them time; let them be Russians; let them work out
their internal problems in their own manner.''
Question. What is your takeaway from Russian history and
culture, and how can you incorporate that for our engagement?
In other words, how do you reach the current and future leaders
of Russia to open the door to increased rapprochement?
Answer. Our public diplomacy efforts in Russia are designed
to engage, influence, and further U.S. policy in the long term.
Through creative public diplomacy programs, Mission Russia
advances key strategic priorities include bolstering Russian
society to be more resilient and democratic, furthering civil
society development, and promoting American business and
entrepreneurship. Our programs also focus on countering Russia
propaganda. Despite a challenging environment, the Mission has
had significant success in using public diplomacy tools to
further U.S. policy interests. Our programs continue to attract
large audiences and exchange program alumni have become
prominent citizens, scholars, and officials in Russian society.
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Responses of David Hale to Questions
Submitted by Senator Ted Cruz
Question. In your assessment, should Sudan's designation on
the State Sponsor of Terrorism list be rescinded?
Answer. Considering rescission of Sudan's State Sponsor of
Terrorism designation requires the Government of Sudan to
demonstrate to the satisfaction of the United States that it
meets the statutory and policy criteria for rescission. In line
with the relevant statutory criteria, when considering
rescission of a State Sponsor of Terrorism designation, the
Department of State reviews the relevant government's
activities to assess whether the government is supporting acts
of international terrorism and obtains assurances from the
government that it will not support such acts in the future.
Question. To what degree does the administration intend to
meaningfully consult with Congress before coming to any
decision regarding the potential rescission of Sudan from the
State Sponsor of Terrorism list?
Answer. Before the rescission of a State Sponsor of
Terrorism designation can take effect, the President must
transmit the statutorily required report and certification to
Congress.
Question. Pursuant to the three statutes that underpin the
State Sponsor of Terrorism designation--the Arms Export Control
Act, the Foreign Assistance Act, and the Export Controls Act--
there are two paths for removing a foreign government from the
SST designation. The first path allows for the President to
certify and report to Congress that (1) there has been a
fundamental change in the leadership and policies of the
government of the country concerned; (2) that government is not
supporting acts of international terrorism; and (3) that
government has provided assurances that it will not support
acts of international terrorism in the future:
If the administration pursues this path, what criteria is
used to determine a ``fundamental change in the leadership?''
Answer. Under the first path for considering the rescission
of a State Sponsor of Terrorism designation, the Department of
State draws from all available sources and takes into account
the totality of the situation in assessing whether there has
been a fundamental change in the leadership and policies of the
government of the country concerned.
Question. The second path allows for the President, 45 days
before a rescission takes effect, to certify to congressional
leadership that (1) the government concerned has not provided
any support for acts of international terrorism during the
preceding 6-month period; and (2) the government concerned has
provided assurances that it will not support acts of
international terrorism in the future:
If the administration pursues this path, can you commit to
notifying Congress that Sudan's designation is under review, in
addition to notifying Congress once the 6-month period begins?
Answer. The required certification that the government
concerned has not provided any support for acts of
international terrorism is a review of the preceding 6 months
before the time that the report is sent to Congress. It is a
look back on the government of concern's activities over the
preceding 6 months, not a decision to examine that government's
activities over a pre-determined 6-month period. We look
forward to continuing our close coordination with Congress on
Sudan, as the U.S. government works with the civilian-led
transitional government.
Question. Aside from the statutory requirements, what, if
any, additional conditions is the administration considering
when evaluating whether to change Sudan's designation?
Answer. As we finalize a new engagement plan with Sudan, we
will consult with the Hill and will take into account a number
of issues important to the bilateral relationship. This
includes the need for Sudan to address certain terrorism-
related claims and for the new government to establish and
implement policies that differentiate its conduct on
counterterrorism issues from that of its predecessor.
Question. Is the administration seeking to ``de-link'' a
potential rescission of Sudan from the SST list from the Five
Track plan, which included conditions ranging from progress on
human rights and religious freedom to outstanding terrorism-
related claims?
Answer. The Five Track plan and its ``Phase II'' were plans
specifically designed to engage the Bashir regime. They were
suspended in February 2019 and with Bashir's ouster will not be
resumed. We are in the process of designing a separate
engagement plan more appropriate for a relationship with a
civilian-led government. Specifics of that plan have not been
finalized.
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Responses of Christopher A. Ford to Questions
Submitted by Senator Ted Cruz
Question. Regarding Arak reconversion, how can waivers for
ongoing modernization be reconciled with Sec. Pompeo's demand
to close the reactor? Why shouldn't the State Department demand
that it be closed and authorize work only pursuant to such
closure?
Answer. Secretary Pompeo has made clear that ``Iran must
stop enrichment and never pursue plutonium reprocessing. This
includes closing its heavy water reactor.'' The work permitted
under the waiver is intended to redesign the Arak heavy water
reactor so that it would not produce weapons-grade plutonium
that could be reprocessed, consistent with the Secretary's
demand that Iran never pursue plutonium reprocessing and the
closure of the previously designed reactor.
Question. Regarding the TRR waiver, do you assess Iran
entitled to import highly enriched uranium? If so, pursuant to
what are they entitled to conduct those imports?
Answer. The waiver covers the return to Iran of increments
of near-20 percent uranium fuel materials for the Tehran
Research Reactor on an as-needed basis determined by the
International Atomic Energy Agency; it does not provide for the
import of highly enriched uranium. The mechanism to return
these fuel materials was designed to ensure Iran would have no
reason to enrich uranium to near-20 percent to fuel the reactor
and to prevent Iran from readily converting the material for
use in a potential breakout scenario once irradiated in the
reactor.
Question. Also regrading to the TRR waiver, how can waivers
for such imports be reconciled with demands that Iran
denuclearize? Is the State Department prepared to accept a
final agreement that keeps in place robust Iranian civil-
nuclear work involving highly enriched uranium?
Answer. Absent a mechanism for Iran to continue importing
uranium fuel materials for the TRR, we expect Iran would argue
it could resume production of near-20 percent enriched uranium
to fuel the reactor. Resumed production of such material would
reduce the breakout timeline for Iran to produce enough fissile
material for a nuclear weapon, should it choose to do so.
Secretary Pompeo has made clear that as part of the
comprehensive deal we are seeking Iran must stop all enrichment
activity.
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Letter to Hon. James E. Risch and Hon. Robert Menendez From Mike
Sommers
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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U.S. Chamber of Commerce Article Submitted by Senator James E. Risch
U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
PRINCIPLES FOR SANCTIONS AS A TOOL OF EFFECTIVE STATECRAFT
Economic sanctions have become a frequently-used tool of
U.S. foreign policy in the post-war era, and with good reason:
Policymakers need to have options that lie between diplomacy
and military action--alternatives that lie between dialogue and
open warfare--to advance key American interests overseas.
Too often, though, sanctions are used as a blunt instrument
when circumstances call for a scalpel. At times, the United
States has applied sanctions in a sweeping manner without
sufficient regard for their effectiveness or possible
collateral harm to other U.S. interests.
The risk is not only that sanctions will fail to achieve
their primary foreign policy objectives but that they will
erode U.S. credibility in the long haul and harm international
economic ties that sustain economic growth and jobs at home.
With Congress considering new sanctions legislation
targeting a range of foreign governments, the Chamber offers
these principles to maximize the effectiveness of these
measures and minimize any collateral damage to U.S. interests:
SANCTIONS SHOULD TARGET SPECIFIC FOREIGN POLICY GOALS
To be effective, sanctions legislation and executive action
should be calibrated carefully to achieve specific, clearly
articulated objectives. Fundamentally, these objectives center
on altering the future behavior of a foreign government (for
this reason, sanctions should not be retroactive).
The aim of sanctions should not be punitive: Sanctions that
do nothing but impose hardship on the citizens of another
country will only undermine U.S. interests in the long run,
erode America's international standing and ``soft power,'' and
are at odds with America's humanitarian values and support for
human rights. In addition, close consultation between Congress
and the executive branch, in the inter-agency process, and
between government and the private sector will help enhance
effectiveness and limit collateral harm.
SANCTIONS MUST BE MULTILATERAL TO ACHIEVE THEIR AIMS
Success in bringing economic pressure to bear on a given
country through sanctions increasingly depends on support from
a broad range of foreign governments, only some of which are
close U.S. allies. After all, the United States is a minor
trade and investment partner for most of the countries targeted
with sanctions in recent years.
History demonstrates that unilateral sanctions
uncoordinated with other significant economies immediately
present opportunities for non-U.S. competitors to ``backfill''
commercial opportunities as U.S. firms are forced to exit the
market. In these circumstances, U.S. governmental action simply
hands lucrative foreign markets to American companies'
competitors on a silver platter, with real-world implications
for jobs, competitiveness, and earnings back home. In the worst
case scenario, U.S. sanctions may obligate American companies
to sell foreign assets suddenly at fire-sale prices--an outcome
that is not just lamentable but often beneficial to bad actors.
SANCTIONS SHOULD BE CONDUCT-BASED, NOT BROAD OR SECTORAL
Sanctions should focus on documented malign conduct and
those who engage in it. Some of the most effective sanctions
employed by U.S. authorities in recent years have been focused
on foreign government officials, executives of state-owned or
state-directed enterprises, and specific foreign firms.
Targeting foreign individuals and entities and their
financial holdings and ability to travel has been highly
motivating in many instances. Given that these sanctions are
generally applied to undemocratic regimes that tend to be
unmoved by blunt sanctions that harm their own citizens, this
targeted approach has added attractiveness.
SANCTIONS SHOULD ALLOW FLEXIBILITY FOR SWIFTLY CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES.
Sanctions legislation must allow a level of discretion for
the executive branch. Sanctions are often contemplated in a
context of armed conflict, which can shift rapidly, and
executive branch officials must be provided the leeway to alter
course. Failing to provide a degree of discretion for the
executive branch would constrain its ability to direct U.S.
foreign policy as provided by the Constitution.
Discretion should be provided with regard to sanctions-
related decisions involving the initiation of investigations,
which sanctions on a menu will be imposed, the possible
issuance of waivers, OFAC licenses, and alteration of
sanctions. If a sanction or threat of sanction induces a
behavior change consistent with a foreign policy objective, the
efficacy of the overall sanctions regime will benefit if the
executive branch has the ability to remove or adjust a sanction
swiftly.
SANCTIONS SHOULD SEEK TO AVOID SPILLOVER TO THIRD-COUNTRY MARKETS
The application of U.S. sanctions to joint ventures and
other enterprises in third countries exacerbates the
``backfill'' problem mentioned above and multiplies the harm to
U.S. industry without adding in any way to the sanctions'
effectiveness.
For instance, the reach of secondary sanctions into third
countries incites economic, diplomatic, and legal conflicts
with U.S. allies and frustrates joint action. Indeed, imposing
sanctions on entities in countries that U.S. officials are
often attempting to enlist to assist U.S. efforts is inimical
to the very aims of sanctions.
SANCTIONS MUST AVOID OVERREACH OR RISK ERODING U.S. INFLUENCE
U.S. influence and leverage are substantial, but they are
finite resources that may be exhausted through overuse.
For example, the United States retains substantial economic
leverage through its leadership role in the Society for
Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT)
financial messaging network that financial institutions use to
transfer information securely. However, U.S. use of this
influence in ways that lacked broad support has led allies and
other countries to begin the development of alternate systems
that will allow commerce to flow around the barriers raised by
U.S. sanctions. In the end, sanctions overreach puts at risk
the country's future ability to impose sanctions.
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