[Senate Hearing 116-204]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 116-204
FIVE YEARS AFTER THE REVOLUTION OF DIGNITY:
UKRAINE'S PROGRESS/RUSSIA'S MALIGN ACTIVITIES
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND
REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 18, 2019
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web:
http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
40-550 PDF WASHINGTON : 2020
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho, Chairman
MARCO RUBIO, Florida ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
CORY GARDNER, Colorado JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
MITT ROMNEY, Utah CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming TIM KAINE, Virginia
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
RAND PAUL, Kentucky JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
TODD, YOUNG, Indiana CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
TED CRUZ, Texas
Christopher M. Socha, Staff Director
Jessica Lewis, Democratic Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND
REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin, Chairman
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
RAND PAUL, Kentucky BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
MITT ROMNEY, Utah CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
Page
Johnson, Hon. Ron, U.S. Senator From Wisconsin................... 1
Prepared statement........................................... 1
Shaheen, Hon. Jeanne, U.S. Senator From New Hampshire............ 2
Prepared statement........................................... 2
Prepared Statement of Hon. Robert Menendez, U.S. Senator From New
Jersey......................................................... 42
Volker, Hon. Kurt, Special Representative for Ukraine
Negotiations, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC......... 3
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Herbst, Hon. John E., Director, Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council,
Washington, DC................................................. 9
Prepared statement........................................... 11
Polyakova, Dr. Alina, Director, Project on Global Democracy and
Emerging Technology, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC..... 16
Prepared statement........................................... 19
Carafano, Dr. James Jay, Vice President, Kathryn and Shelby
Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign
Policy, The Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC................ 25
Prepared statement........................................... 27
(iii)
FIVE YEARS AFTER THE REVOLUTION OF DIGNITY: UKRAINE'S PROGRESS/RUSSIA'S
MALIGN ACTIVITIES
----------
TUESDAY, JUNE 18, 2019
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Europe and
Regional Security Cooperation,
Committee on Foreign Relations
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:40 p.m. in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Ron Johnson,
chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Johnson, Barrasso, Portman, Shaheen,
Menendez, and Murphy.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RON JOHNSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN
Senator Johnson. Good afternoon. This hearing will come to
order.
I want to first thank our expert witness panel. Your
testimony was excellent, very informative. We look forward to
your oral testimony and answering of our questions.
I want to apologize to everybody for the late start to the
hearing. We had a number of votes. As a result, I am just going
to ask that my opening statement be entered into the record,
and we will have a very full conversation. So I will be able to
make my points during questions and answers.
With that, I will quickly turn it over to Senator Shaheen.
[The prepared statement of Senator Johnson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Ron Johnson
Good afternoon and welcome.
The Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Europe and Regional
Security Cooperation is meeting today to discuss developments in
Ukraine, 5 years after the Revolution of Dignity. Russia's subsequent
invasion, occupation, and attempted annexation of Crimea and invasion
of the Donbas are blatant violations of its international commitments
and one of the most serious threats to peace in Europe since the end of
the Cold War. With Ukraine having just completed its first presidential
election since 2014, it is an opportune moment to examine the country's
progress and to refresh the record on Russia's continuing assaults on
Ukraine's territorial integrity.
Much is at stake for the United States in Ukraine. Over the last 70
plus years, the U.S. has invested tremendous resources building an
international system predicated on democratic governance, the rejection
of force as a means of altering borders, the peaceful settlement of
disputes wherever possible, free trade, human rights, and robust
alliances. These efforts have been successful and this is especially
the case in Europe. Despite the high tensions of the Cold War, the
conflicts that ravaged Europe for centuries have been largely avoided
since the end of World War II. It is a historic tragedy that Vladimir
Putin has spurned the outstretched hand of the West and chose instead
to menace his neighbors. In 2008, Russia invaded Georgia and continues
to occupy Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In 2014, Russia invaded and
occupied Crimea, instigated an ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine that
has killed over 13,000 people, and launched a comprehensive campaign of
cyberattacks, disinformation, propaganda, economic sanctions, and
subversion aimed at destabilizing the Ukrainian state. And these are
only the most overt examples of Russian belligerence. This continuing
aggression strikes at the core of the international system the U.S. and
our allies have worked so long and hard to build and maintain.
America and Europe continue to respond to Russia's actions, though
not always as robustly as necessary. The United States has imposed
sanctions on over 700 different entities for actions related to
Russia's aggression in Ukraine and provided hundreds of millions of
dollars of defensive assistance to Ukraine including lethal defensive
aid and military training. The EU has also imposed heavy sanctions on
Russia. To date, however, Russia's behavior remains unchanged, and part
of our task today will be examining the West's response in order to
pinpoint areas where we can be more effective.
Ukraine's success will depend primarily on the efforts of the
Ukrainian government to champion the reforms necessary to unleash the
economic potential of its people and to build popular trust in the
integrity of its public institutions and the rule of law. Ukraine's
record of reform over the last 5 years is by no means perfect, but it
has made meaningful strides in vital sectors that are laying the
foundation for long-term success. It is important to grasp the
magnitude of the challenge confronting Ukraine. Casting off a legacy of
70 years of communist rule is a generational task made all the more
challenging by Russia's efforts to retain its influence and destabilize
the country. It will take time, and we must remain patient and resolute
in our support as Ukraine strives to fulfill the promise of freedom
sparked 5 years ago by those courageous Ukrainians on the Maidan.
STATEMENT OF HON. JEANNE SHAHEEN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am also
happy to submit my opening comments for the record and look
forward to the testimony of both our panels.
[The prepared statement of Senator Shaheen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Jeanne Shaheen
Thank you, Chairman, for calling this important hearing. I look
forward to working with you this Congress.
The Ukrainian people made a strong statement for democracy in their
presidential elections completed on April 21.
First, Ukraine held peaceful, credible elections while a war with
Russian-backed forces continues in its eastern regions. That
shows the resiliency of Ukrainian democracy.
Second, the Ukrainian people voted overwhelmingly for a candidate
who ran on a platform of change but expressed that will for new
leadership in Kyiv through an election, not protests.
This shows us that the Ukrainian people believe in their democracy.
The reason there were not protests in the streets or on the Maidan
(mai-DAHN) were not because an authoritarian leader prevented
them by force. They simply weren't needed.
Finally, Ukraine's new president, Volodymyr Zelensky (voh-loh-DIH-
mir zeh-LIHN-skee) took office with a message of hope for the
Ukrainian people and inclusion.
But also with a clear vision of the challenges that Ukraine still
faces, and a sense of responsibility to overcome them, by
Ukraine's leadership and its people.
I believe our distinguished panels will help us better understand
what this political shift means for Ukraine's future and U.S.
policy.
I think we can be hopeful at the moment that we have seen the most
fundamental block of a strong democracy: a credible election
and a peaceful transition of power.
I would also like today's hearing to explore some of Ukraine's
challenges: the state of its reform agenda and anti-corruption
efforts and especially how Ukraine can better address
interference from Russia--the on-going war but also Russian
intrusions in its media, cyberspace and elections.
In the 5 years since anti-government protests started in the Maidan
(mai-DAHN), we have learned a lot about the problem of Kremlin
interference, not just in Ukraine but throughout Europe and the
United States.
There is NO question that Russia interfered in our 2016
presidential elections. And, the United States must examine the
experiences of countries like Ukraine to be prepared for what
will certainly come in 2020.
We can also learn from the Ukrainian experience a certain irony. As
Russia worked so aggressively to divide Ukraine, Ukraine's
sense of unity endured and its commitment to a European future
only grew stronger, as President Zelensky made clear.
Ukraine has built an enthusiasm for joining Europe and its
institutions at a time when Europe has increasingly doubted
itself.
Five years ago President Poroshenko and a new parliament had the
mandate to reform the government, improve the economy and,
above all, translate the enthusiasm of the revolution into
reality.
The challenge before President Zelensky is to continue those
reforms and use the enthusiasm behind his own candidacy for
positive change.
I hope this hearing will give us better clarity on how to assist
our important ally Ukraine continue to develop the strong
institutions it needs for a European future.
And I hope that we can better understand what we must do to protect
ourselves from foreign interference.
I look forward to the testimony of our distinguished witnesses and
to hearing their perspectives on this important topic.
Senator Johnson. Well, thank you.
Ambassador Volker has agreed to give his opening testimony
and then slide over and let the other panelists, other
witnesses give their testimony. Then we will open it up to
questions.
So we will start with our first witness. Ambassador Kurt
Volker is the U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine
Negotiations and Executive Director of the McCain Institute for
International Leadership.
Ambassador Volker was a career member of the U.S. Senior
Foreign Service, with over 23 years of experience working on
European policy under five U.S. administrations. His postings
include Ambassador to NATO and Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs.
Ambassador Volker has previously served as Acting Senior
Director for European and Eurasian Affairs at the National
Security Council, as Deputy Director of the Private Office of
then-NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson.
Ambassador Volker.
STATEMENT OF HON. KURT VOLKER, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR
UKRAINE NEGOTIATIONS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Volker. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you, Senators, for the opportunity to testify today.
I also have a statement that I would like entered for the
record, if I may, and I will just try to speak a little bit
candidly with you about the situation in Ukraine.
First off, it is an honor for me to be here, and again, I
appreciate that.
Second, I want to thank all of you Senators from both sides
of the aisle for your commitment and dedication to Ukraine. It
is critically important. And if I may, let me just say a few
words about why that matters, where Ukraine is today, and a few
suggestions looking forward.
Concerning why Ukraine matters, I think most importantly we
start with the people. Ukrainians are people who seek and
deserve freedom, democracy, market economy, rule of law, and
security just like other people in Europe. The United States
has led the development of NATO and a strong NATO for decades.
The European Union has also helped build a strong, prosperous,
free, secure Europe. And there is no reason why Ukraine or
others in the region who are not part of that now should not be
part of that. They have very much the same values and very much
the same aspirations. So the first thing is the people.
The second is that they are a country that is fighting a
war of self-defense. They have been attacked. Their territory
has been seized. The fighting continues to go on, and they are
in need of support. And it is important that we support them on
the merits of that alone and also because we want to make sure
that we are not allowing a Europe to be taken apart through the
use of military force. If we go back to the Helsinki principles
of 1975, which the Soviet Union supported at the time, we are
talking about no changing of borders by force, no threat or use
of force, no coercion, countries have the right to choose their
own security orientations and so forth, those are principles
that we need to continue to uphold. If we do not do so in
Ukraine, we run the risks that we will be seeing them
challenged across Europe, and that would be dangerous for all
of us. If we do not invest in security today, we will pay for
the lack of security tomorrow.
Now, where we are today. Ukraine is really in the balance.
As you know, they have just had a presidential election.
President Zelensky was elected with 73 percent of the popular
vote, and he came out of nowhere coming into this. So he has
zero seats in the parliament. And so Ukraine has gone to early
parliamentary elections. And his major task, the number one
thing he has before him right now, is to take that 73 percent
public support and convert it into actual votes for his program
in the Rada. So that is his political challenge at the moment.
In the course of his campaign, he promised substantial
massive reform of everything from corruption to the economy,
political systems, and judiciary. And that is what the
Ukrainian people voted for. So with 73 percent of the public
voting for him, he also generated very high expectations of
what policies he would pursue as president.
Let me take a minute and say that I believe that President
Poroshenko also did an excellent job in promoting reforms in
Ukraine over the past 4 years, probably more accomplished in
the last 4 years than the preceding 20. But what we saw in this
election was that the Ukrainian people wanted even more. They
wanted to go faster, further, more aggressively, and that is
what President Zelensky has promised.
I believe it is important that we support those policies
and those principles, and as long as he as willing to continue
to advance that agenda, he deserves as much of our support as
we can give him.
I believe that he has a few other important challenges
ahead of him. One of them is amassing the political capital to
carry out real reform. Another is that a lot of the power
structures in Ukraine are behind the scenes in the form of
oligarchs who control a lot of the economic assets, control the
media, and it is going to be very difficult for him to take on
that system. But ultimately taking on that system is what is
exactly essential for Ukraine to break free of its past and
take advantage of the natural resources, the great human
capital, and its position as a country of potential phenomenal
growth within Europe. It has to do that.
I would also say that since he has become president, of
course, everyone is putting their oar in the water to try to
influence the outcome in Ukraine, whether that is the Russians,
whether that is the oligarchs, whether that is reformers. We
have seen an increase in Russian media propaganda and presence
in the Ukrainian media over the past few weeks. These are all
areas of concern and another reason why it is important that we
support Zelensky as much as we can.
Concerning U.S. policy, we have over the past few years
engaged in a significant strengthening of U.S. policy. I would
argue that we have gone from a period in which time appeared to
be on Russia's side to a time in which time now appears to be
on Ukraine's side as they are more unified, more of a strong
national identity, more pro-Western, more pro-European, more
pro-NATO, more Russia-skeptic than ever before as a country.
And that is giving Ukraine a resilience as they go through this
period that I think will serve them well for the long term.
And in addition, we have worked very hard to keep Western
policy unified and strong. We and the EU have both maintained
sanctions and increased sanctions. The U.S. has lifted the ban
on lethal arms sales to Ukraine, and that has gone through with
the acceptance of our European allies as well. We have
strengthened their armed forces. Just today, we are announcing
how we are dealing with an additional $125 million in support
for Ukraine's military that the Congress approved. So we are
grateful for that. So we have maintained a much stronger
position. I believe we have a sustainable position. If what
Russia wants is a Ukraine that is once again part of a Russian
sphere of influence, a greater Russian empire, I believe that
opportunity is lost because the Ukrainian people will never go
back there.
What we also have done is make sure that we have a hand
outreached to work together with Russia to end this conflict if
Russia wishes to do that. Thus far, we have not seen any
indication from Russia that they do want to do that. And in
fact, they remain in denial about their responsibility. They
actually lead the military forces in the Donbas. They pay for
the contract soldiers that are there. They hand-pick the civil
administrations. They pay for those civil administrations. They
provide the intelligence services. So this is 100 percent
Russian-controlled, and yet, Russia denies their involvement
and instead says that this is an internal Ukrainian matter,
which we know not to be the case.
We have continued to insist that Russia release the sailors
that it seized in November in international waters. We have
urged them to pursue a longer-term ceasefire. I have reached
out recently to my Russian counterpart to ask whether they
believe it is time to get together and see whether we can make
any progress. Certainly in my consultations with you and
Ukraine, with the French and Germans, we believe there is an
opportunity to move ahead again or at least it is worth a try,
but we need to know whether Russia wants to take this seriously
and seize such an opportunity as well or not. Thus far, we do
not see any indication of that.
In terms of outreach to President Zelensky, I have stressed
that this is critically important. I think that the future of
Ukraine over the next 5 years is going to be shaped in the next
3 months. How this election comes out, how President Zelensky
assembles a government, and whether he is able to operate
independently and in charge as President of Ukraine without
undue influence of any individuals or oligarchs in Ukraine,
will be absolutely critical. And it is important that he know
that he has the full support of the United States and Europe in
doing so.
We have reached out significantly. Secretary Pompeo called
the candidate Zelensky and also then-President Poroshenko on
the eve of the elections. President Trump called to
congratulate President Zelensky on the night of the election.
As you know, Senator, you took part in a presidential
delegation, along with Secretary Perry and myself and our EU
Ambassador Gordon Sondland, to be there for the inauguration.
We had a lengthy meeting with President Zelensky then.
Since then, President Trump has written to President
Zelensky, has indicated that he is welcoming him for a visit to
the White House at a time yet to be agreed. We hope that is
soon. And we have remained engaged in a number of ways. Our EU
Ambassador hosted President Zelensky for a dinner in Brussels.
And he has also made the rounds in Europe and is, in fact, in
Berlin today and was in Paris yesterday. So we are reaching out
in a variety of ways, and I hope that we are able to assemble
another trip to Ukraine in advance of his White House visit in
the next several weeks.
Finally, I do want to put one point out there. It is very
important that we not forget about the people of the Donbas.
They are living through a war on their territory. Of a pre-war
population of about 4 million, it is down to about 1.5 million
to 2 million. They are dealing with all kinds of privations,
whether it is threats to water supply, a collapsed economy,
environmental degradation, pressure on the health care system,
lack of freedom of movement, and difficulty in crossing
boundary crossings between the occupied area and the rest of
Ukraine, outages of electricity, outages of cell phone service,
which is a vital means of communication. So it is a grinding,
awful situation for the people in the Donbas. They need as much
support as the Ukrainian Government can give them and as we can
give them. And ultimately that is why we need to keep the
spotlight on this issue, as you are doing with this hearing,
because we cannot forget about those people even though we see
a very difficult situation in terms of resolving this conflict
going ahead.
Ultimately what we seek--and this has been U.S. policy for
as long as I have been involved--is the restoration of
Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity and the safety
and security of all Ukrainian citizens regardless of ethnicity,
nationality or religion.
And with that, Senator, I will end my remarks. I look
forward to the question and answer. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Volker follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador Kurt Volker
Thank you Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Shaheen, and members of
the Committee for calling today's hearing. I am happy to have the
opportunity to talk about the state of negotiations with Russia to end
the fighting in eastern Ukraine and take an important step toward
restoring Ukraine's territorial integrity. I had the honor of being in
Ukraine last month as part of a U.S. presidential delegation led by the
Secretary of Energy Rick Perry, and including the United States
Ambassador to the European Union, Gordon Sondland, for the inauguration
of President Zelensky. Senator Ron Johnson joined us in Kyiv for the
inauguration, reflecting his staunch support for Ukraine.
The United States' support for Ukraine's sovereignty and
territorial integrity is unwavering. Russia's aggression and efforts to
undermine Ukraine continue, but Ukraine is stronger, more united, more
cohesive, and more resilient than ever before, and with our support,
those trends will continue.
We are deeply concerned about the ongoing 5-year old conflict in
eastern Ukraine. Unfortunately, the fighting continues unabated, and
Ukrainian soldiers are still being killed nearly every week. The
conflict is a humanitarian tragedy for the residents of the Donbas,
with around 13,000 people killed, 40,000 injured, millions displaced,
and untold damage to civilian infrastructure. The arbitrary separation
created by Russia's invasion and installation of their artificial
political proxies has caused needless suffering, divided families and
communities, and damaged vital health and social infrastructure,
businesses, and supply lines. In short, Russia has created one of the
worst humanitarian crises in Europe since the wars in the Balkans in
the 1990s. This suffering is a direct result of Russia's aggression and
will end only when Russia withdraws its military and security forces
from Ukraine, and implements the Minsk agreements--which remain the
best vehicle for achieving peace through the reintegration of the
currently Russia-controlled areas in the east.
Russia, however, remains the primary obstacle to implementing the
Minsk agreements. Ukraine has done what it can to implement the
agreements. Ukraine passed legislation that would provide amnesty for
people who committed crimes as part of the conflict. It has passed
legislation that would provide for so-called ``special status.'' In
December 2014, Ukraine attempted to hold local elections in the Donbas
consistent with Ukrainian election laws, as called for by the Minsk
agreements, only to be blocked by Russia. It has held elections
throughout the rest of Ukraine and would do so in the Donbas as well if
the Government of Ukraine were able to access these Russia-controlled
areas.
Unfortunately, Russia appears to have made a deliberate choice to
maintain the status quo. Russia continues to prop up its puppet
regimes, the so-called ``People's Republics'' of Donetsk and Luhansk
that have no place under the Minsk agreements or Ukraine's
constitutional order. Russia continues to lead and support the
fighting, and has yet to implement a ceasefire or withdraw its forces
from eastern Ukraine. Russia's highly provocative recent decision to
provide expedited Russian citizenship to Ukrainians in the Donbas
created another serious obstacle to the implementation of the Minsk
agreements and the reintegration of the Russia-controlled territories
in the east. There is a lot that Russia has to do to stop its ongoing
aggression against Ukraine so that we can get on with the other aspects
of full implementation of Minsk. It's very much what we want to do, but
Russia remains intransigent.
In the meantime, the people living on both sides of the frontlines
but especially in the Russia-controlled areas of the Donbas need as
much support and assistance as can be delivered by the Ukrainian
government and by the international community. Many things need to be
done--including assisting with mine clearance in areas where the
Ukrainian government actually has control, improving the safety of
boundary crossings between the Russia-controlled areas and the rest of
Ukraine, facilitating the delivery of pensions to those needing
assistance, making sure that vital services such as gas, water, and
electricity are connected and continuing. These are all areas where,
with the support of international humanitarian organizations, I believe
more can be done. We continue our close cooperation with the Ukrainian
government, our European Allies, and international organizations to
address the humanitarian suffering.
The United States has provided and will continue to provide support
to protect and assist conflict-affected Ukrainians in the Donbas. This
includes mental health and psychosocial support, legal aid, and
critical infrastructure repair. These activities have also demonstrated
the tangible reform progress that Ukraine has made since the Revolution
of Dignity and helped build relationships between citizens and the
state impacted by the on-going conflict. In providing communities of
the Donbas with modern administrative services and opportunities to
young entrepreneurs, Ukraine is supporting economic revitalization and
good governance in the region and illustrating the way a united Ukraine
can provide a better life for its citizens.
Of course, the best step that could be taken to end this artificial
conflict would be for Russia to get out of eastern Ukraine. In addition
to our own bilateral efforts, we support the French and German efforts
in the Normandy Quartet and the work of the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in the Trilateral Contact Group, and
we coordinate closely to ensure our bilateral efforts and negotiations
complement these efforts. Unfortunately, Russia has been stalling and
uninterested in progress for the past 18 months.
The election of President Zelensky creates a good opportunity to
re-energize efforts to end the 5-year old conflict in the Donbas.
President Zelensky has repeatedly reiterated his commitment to peace
and to the Minsk agreements, to seek to ease the suffering of the
people in the Donbas, and has expressed an openness to creative
approaches to break the deadlock. During this critical period, it is
vital that the United States continue to support Ukraine and work
closely with the new president on his diplomatic initiatives.
We have encouraged the Russians through a variety of channels to
take advantage of this opportunity. I would like to meet with my
Russian counterparts in the near future, but I do not know what form
that will take at the moment. I am willing to meet with them to discuss
a way forward, if Russia is serious about making progress. I told the
Russians that a good first step would be for Russia to release the
Ukrainian sailors and vessels it seized during its unjustified attack
near the Kerch Strait, which would be in keeping with the recent
provisional order of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.
While we are open to supporting initial confidence-building steps,
we are also focused on the central elements of Minsk implementation,
starting with the ceasefire, withdrawal of foreign forces, the
disarming of the illegal armed groups, and creating a situation of
security in the Donbas so that additional political steps that are also
part of Minsk can be taken. These include amnesty for people who've
committed crimes as part of the conflict, implementing a so-called
special status for the region under Ukraine's constitution, and holding
local elections, resulting in the peaceful reintegration of this
territory with the rest of Ukraine.
We hope that Russia will finally choose peace and work with us to
end the fighting. In the meantime, it is important to continue to
strengthen Ukraine and increase its resilience to better withstand
Russian aggression and to support ongoing reforms to integrate Ukraine
more closely with the West. We will continue to support the work of the
OSCE Special Monitoring Mission, which serves as the world's ``eyes and
ears'' for the conflict in eastern Ukraine and now includes
approximately 800 monitors and 420 local staff operating under
extremely challenging political and security conditions. We are working
with Ukraine on its reform agenda and creating an open, competitive
economy that creates opportunity for its people. A democratic, free,
and prosperous Ukraine creates a stark contrast with those living in a
second-rate police state in the Russia-controlled Donbas.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Ambassador Volker, for first of
all your past service and your future service as it relates to
Ukraine.
We will call up the other witnesses right now. While that
is happening, just a couple comments.
I really do believe that Ukraine is just ground zero in
this geopolitical conflict between Russia and the United
States. And we are really here in support of the Ukrainian
people. This has been, I think, a real demonstration of
bipartisan support. I keep pointing out to our European
partners the extraordinary nature of the fact that on a
unanimous basis we approved lethal defensive weaponry. I mean,
that is a really big deal and just demonstrates that support.
And a final comment before we go to additional opening
statements is I did meet with a delegation from their foreign
affairs committee, and I did express to them my concern that if
there is conflict between the legislative branch and the new
president, that is just not good from the standpoint of
maintaining strong, unanimous support here in Congress. They
have it now. They can maintain it as long as they work together
as patriots for the benefit of Ukraine. And so that is what I
think we all need to encourage. That is kind of the support
that we need to give.
Again, I want to welcome our next witnesses. Our first
witness we will go to is Ambassador John Herbst. Ambassador
Herbst is the Director of the Atlantic Council's Eurasia
Center. Ambassador Herbst served for 31 years as a Foreign
Service officer in the Department of State, retiring with the
rank of career minister. He was Ambassador to Ukraine from 2003
to 2006 and Ambassador to Uzbekistan from 2000 to 2003. He is a
recipient of the Presidential Distinguished Service Award, the
Secretary of State's Career Achievement Award, and the State
Department's Distinguished Honor Award.
Ambassador Herbst.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN E. HERBST, DIRECTOR, EURASIA CENTER,
ATLANTIC COUNCIL, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Herbst. Thank you, Senator Johnson and Senator
Shaheen. It is an honor to be here today.
I know you want to save time. I am tempted to say every
word Kurt said, I agree.
But we are here to talk about one of the most critical
issues on the international agenda today: the Kremlin's war
against Ukraine and Ukraine's efforts to reform and actually
transform itself into a rule of law society, closely aligned
with Europe and the broader democratic world.
We are in a period of great power conflict that pits the
democratic world against revisionist authoritarians.
Unfortunately, President Putin is challenging the world order.
He claims a right to a sphere of influence in Russia's
neighborhood. He seeks to weaken NATO, the EU, and the U.S.,
and he has launched two wars against Georgia in 2008 and
against Ukraine since 2014.
The U.S. has a vital interest in stopping Kremlin
revisionism, and the place to do it is in Ukraine. Within the
limits of Moscow's operations in Donbas, Kyiv has fought the
world's second most powerful military to a standstill. I came
back Saturday from 5 days in Ukraine with General David
Petraeus. He was impressed by what he saw. We met most of the
new leadership, including the army chief of staff Khomchak,
visited Ukrainian commanders at the front and the troops at
Abdiaka along the line of contact with the Russians.
There are 2,500 Russian military officers leading the
Kremlin war in Donbas, and they have at their disposal over 450
tanks and 700 pieces of artillery. That is very serious
hardware.
Despite the two Minsk ceasefires, there has not been a day
of peace since Moscow's aggression began in the spring of 2014.
Less than 18 hours after we left the front, Russian artillery
hit a residential building in Marinka, wounding four civilians.
Over 13,000 Ukrainians have died in this war. Moscow hopes
that its constant pressure on Ukraine will force the government
to stop building a democratic and open society oriented to the
West. So far the Kremlin is not succeeding.
An important reason for Moscow's failure is it has two
vulnerabilities: a weak economy based on hydrocarbon exports
and also the Russian people have clearly stated that they do
not want Russian forces fighting in Ukraine.
The first means that Moscow is susceptible to economic
pressure. The second means that Putin must hide his casualties
and keep them to a minimum because the Russian people do not
want Russian soldiers fighting in Ukraine.
This makes it possible for the West to help Ukraine and at
low cost, especially compared to, say, the cost of defending or
even deterring Russian aggression against our Baltic allies.
Western sanctions impose a real cost on Russia's economy. One
to 1.5 percent of GDP growth a year is lost because of the
sanctions. And Western military support, especially advanced
weapons like the Javelins, nullify Moscow's tank advantage.
I salute President Trump for his courage in sending the
Javelins to Ukraine. The U.S. should consider sending more
Javelins to Ukraine, also sending more counter-battery radar
for missiles. These radar reduce Ukrainian casualties. The U.S.
should also provide shore radar, Mark V speed boats, and anti-
ship Harpoon missiles, which will help Ukraine to deter Kremlin
provocations at sea, which we have seen increasingly over the
past 18 months.
Western support for Ukraine has been substantial and
essential but has not been as agile and effective as it could
be. Part of that is due to the reluctance on part of some
members of the EU. Chancellor Merkel deserves credit for
maintaining EU sanctions on Russia.
But Moscow is constantly seeking ways to increase the
pressure on Ukraine and it has found a new mechanism. Starting
in the spring of 2018, it began an inspection regime of ships
heading to Ukraine's ports in the Sea of Azov. As a result of
this inspection regime, shipping from Donbas, Ukraine has
dropped by anywhere from 33 to 50 percent by imposing major
economic costs, new economic costs on Ukraine. In November last
year, Russian ships attacked and seized three Ukrainian ships.
They have imprisoned the 24 sailors. No sanctions were imposed
for the inspection system on Ukrainian ships, and U.S.
sanctions for the incident in the Straits of Kerch came late
and were weak.
Congress has played a major role in sanctions policy. It
should consider sanctioning a major Russian bank such as
Gazprom Bank or VnesheconomBank.
The Senate has introduced legislation, the Defending
America's Security from Kremlin Aggression Act of 2019. This
could be a vehicle for strengthening our sanctions policy.
The U.S. should also be able to persuade Germany and the EU
to drop the Nord Stream 2 project, a pipeline that will allow
the Kremlin to bypass Ukraine and exert geopolitical leverage
over the nations of Eastern Europe. Chancellor Merkel has asked
for the Kremlin to guarantee substantial flow of gas through
the Ukrainian pipeline even as Nord Stream 2 is built. But
numerous statements by Russian officials as high as Prime
Minister Medvedev have cast this problem into doubt.
With this in mind, Congress and the U.S. should consider
sanctions on companies providing the high tech necessary to
complete the project. This needs to be managed very carefully
since U.S.-German cooperation has been vital for overall
sanctions policy. But it is hard to imagine Nord Stream 2
proceeding if it permits Moscow to shut out Ukraine as a gas
transporter.
Moscow has also active trying to influence political
developments in Ukraine, including in the recent Ukrainian
presidential election. The Atlantic Council, in partnership
with the Pinchuk Foundation and the Transatlantic Commission on
Election Integrity, set up a Ukraine election task force to
monitor Kremlin disinformation, cyber, and military operations.
Our task force found substantial Russian disinformation and
cyber-attacks, but there was little success. Moscow was pleased
that Poroshenko lost the election, but they have been skeptical
about new President Zelensky whose deaf response to Putin's
passport provocation put Putin on a rare public defensive.
Moscow is now busy trying to undermine Ukraine's upcoming
parliamentary elections.
President Zelensky has two great battles to win against
Kremlin aggression and against domestic interests impeding
fundamental reform. With assistance from the United States and
the EU, he can win both battles. Congress should continue to do
its part in providing that assistance.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Herbst follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador (Ret.) John E. Herbst
Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Shaheen, Members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the invitation to speak this afternoon. It
is an honor.
Ukraine emerged as a new independent state following the fall of
the Soviet Union and into a new security order in Europe and Eurasia.
This order, based on the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the
Paris Charter, ushered in an unprecedented period of peace and
prosperity.
The foundations of this security system include: the territorial
integrity of nations; the sovereign right of nations to choose their
own political and economic systems and rulers; the right of nations to
choose their own external partners and allies; and the commitment of
nations to resolve differences by diplomacy and international law.
Sadly, Ukraine has not been able to exercise these internationally
agreed rights in peace. For well over a decade, the Kremlin has been
pursuing an openly revisionist policy, one explicitly designed to
overturn the rules established in the Helsinki and Paris documents.
In 2013, Moscow sparked the current crisis when it insisted that
Ukraine not sign the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with
the European Union. Then-President Yanukovych decided to abandon the
agreement. A violent crackdown against Ukrainian demonstrators resulted
in a successful revolution, forcing Yanukovych to flee to Russia. In
the wake of these events, Moscow began military operations against
Ukraine. It first seized the Crimean Peninsula by force, and then
launched its not-so-covert, hybrid war in Donbas.
This war is of critical importance to the United States for one
simple reason: Moscow's revisionist ambitions go well beyond Ukraine.
The Kremlin's aims include weakening the European Union, NATO, and the
Transatlantic relationship. Its efforts to achieve these objectives
have led it to interfere in elections in France, Germany, the U.K., and
the United States.
Moscow has claimed the right, and even the duty, to intervene on
behalf of ethnic Russians and even Russian speakers in other countries;
it has proclaimed a right to a sphere of privileged influence on the
territory of the former Soviet Union; and it has proclaimed that there
will be new rules or no rules in the international system.
More immediately, and perhaps more dangerously, Moscow has
continued to put tremendous pressure on the three Baltic States for
their alleged mistreatment of ethnic Russians, which comprise
approximately 25 percent of the population in Estonia and Latvia. To
reduce the risk of Russian provocations against NATO allies, it is in
the vital interest of the United States to help Ukraine stop Kremlin
aggression in Donbas. The cost of doing it there is much smaller than,
for instance, doing it in Narva, Estonia.
We--the United States, NATO, and the European Union--have a great
advantage here. Russia is weak. While it has a very talented and
educated people, and extraordinary natural resources, its economy is
frail, lacking diversity and innovation. It relies heavily on the
export of natural resources because its corrupt government and feeble,
compliant legal system make it hard for entrepreneurs to benefit from
their own ingenuity and hard work. The absence of the rule of law means
the insecurity of wealth, which explains the outflow of tens of
billions of dollars every year. For the Russian economy to prosper, its
own money must be invested at home and it must attract foreign direct
investment.
While between its nuclear and conventional forces Russia has the
second most powerful military in the world, its stuttering economy
means that its military position vis-a-vis the United States and NATO,
and China separately, will diminish with time. This means that prudent,
strong policies by the United States, NATO, and the European Union will
eventually persuade the Kremlin to cease its aggression in Ukraine,
and, more broadly, move away from its current revisionist course.
moscow's war on ukraine
Ukraine is ground zero of Kremlin revisionism. The government is
currently fighting the Kremlin to a standstill in Donbas. Kyiv has
established strong defensive lines and there has been little
acquisition of territory on either side over the last 3 years. Despite
the 4-year-old Minsk II ``ceasefire,'' the normal day in Donbas
averages over 100 exchanges of fire with the majority originating in
Russian-controlled territory. Moscow's current aim is to destabilize
Ukraine by a low intensity war of attrition. It is not succeeding.
Two factors restrain Moscow from sending a large conventional force
into Ukraine. Such an operation might aim either to seize Mariupol,
establish a land supply corridor to Crimea, or take control of the
water canal north of Crimea to ease the difficult problem of supplying
water to the peninsula.
First, such an offensive would reveal the entire charade propagated
by the Kremlin, and repeated by the timid in Europe, that Ukraine is
experiencing a civil war. Despite its bravado, the Kremlin does not
want more punishing sanctions. Russian economic officials have at times
acknowledged that the sanctions cost Moscow's already sluggish economy
1 to 1.5 percent of its growth per year. The major Russian offensive
required to achieve any of these objectives would likely provoke major
new sanctions.
Second, this is a Kremlin war against Ukraine, not a Russian war.
Polls by Moscow's Levada Center repeatedly show that a large majority
of the Russian people do not want their soldiers fighting Ukrainians
and dying in the process. Casualties are thus a political problem for
Mr. Putin, meaning that he must do everything possible to conceal them.
There are currently over 1,500 and maybe as many as 3,000 regular
Russian officers leading the fighting in Donbas.
strangling the economy of donbas
The Kremlin has been searching for low-cost ways to further
pressure Ukraine while avoiding more serious sanctions and major
Russian casualties. Unfortunately, Moscow seems to have found one.
Starting last spring, the Kremlin began to harass Ukrainian and
international shipping in the Sea of Azov. Russian naval vessels are
stopping and inspecting ships stopping at Ukraine's ports of Mariupol
and Berdyansk. Shipping delays and rising insurance costs have reduced
commercial sea traffic from Donbas between 33 and 50 percent, at major
new cost to Ukraine's economy. Despite a few denunciations, the United
States and European Union have done nothing to respond to Moscow's
aggression in the Sea of Azov. The same was true when the Russians
illegally completed the bridge over the Straits of Kerch last summer,
connecting Russia proper with its conquest in Crimea.
In late November, Moscow's war in Ukraine took an ominous turn.
When Ukrainian naval vessels tried to exercise their sovereign right to
transit the Kerch Straits, Russian naval units attacked, detaining 24
Ukrainian sailors and impounding their ships. Unlike in the Donbas land
war, Moscow did not try to hide the use of its conventional military
forces against Ukraine. This May, the International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea ruled, with near unanimity, that Russia should
``immediately'' release all 24 Ukrainian sailors and three vessels.
Western reaction to this Kremlin escalation has been slow. In mid-
March, nearly 4 months after this provocation, the United States and
European Union announced sanctions. Even worse, the sanctions were
weak, targeting mid-level Russian officials involved in the Kerch
military action and a few Russian firms involved in maritime
production. This frail Western response makes the Kerch escalation look
like a tactical victory for Putin.
The Kremlin conducted interesting, and at times constructive,
negotiations with the United States on ending the war in Donbas. U.S.
Special Envoy Kurt Volker had two meetings with Vladislav Surkov in
September 2017 and January 2018. But after that Moscow stopped
negotiating seriously. Putin decided to wait for the outcome of the
Ukrainian 2019 presidential and then Rada elections. His hope was that
the new president and Rada would be more pliable.
The presidential elections did not turn out the way the Kremlin had
hoped. While glad to see the defeat of former President Petro
Poroshenko, Putin is not sure what to make of the new president.
Although a political neophyte, Volodomyr Zelensky has expressed
national security views similar to that of his predecessor Poroshenko;
and his first trip abroad was to Brussels, where he reiterated
Ukraine's interest in much closer alignment with the EU and NATO.
Mr. Putin expressed his dissatisfaction with the new president by
failing to congratulate him on his election victory. Moreover, the
Kremlin strongman tested Mr. Zelensky before he took the oath of office
by offering Russian passports and citizenship to Ukrainian citizens in
Moscow-controlled Donbas, a violation of international law and a long-
practiced Kremlin tactic used to exert influence and justify aggression
abroad. President Zelensky's response, dismissing a Russian passport as
a ticket to a life without human rights and the right to choose your
own leaders, put Mr. Putin on the rhetorical defensive.
President Putin is now hoping that the Rada elections, which are
expected to take place on July 21, will lead to the creation of a
strong political bloc in the parliament that will try to steer Kyiv
away from a pro-Western foreign policy. Although we do not know how the
Rada election will turn out, it is unlikely that a party or bloc of
parties with such views would gain even 20 percent of the Rada seats.
In other words, the new Rada, like the new president, is unlikely to
reverse Kyiv's westward course.
Once Putin realizes this, he faces an important choice. Does he
resume real negotiations designed to allow him to save face and end his
aggression in Eastern Ukraine, or does he escalate? We know that the
technocrats and commercial elites understand the need to end Kremlin
aggression in Donbas. This may also be true of some of Putin's allies
within the military, security services, and the police. If Putin
clearly understands that a Kremlin escalation will lead quickly to
strong Western sanctions, the odds of his choosing negotiations go up
substantially.
the need for a stronger policy in washington and brussels
That is why it is critical for the United States and the European
Union to impose additional, serious sanctions on Moscow for its
aggression at Kerch. Serious Western measures would turn Putin's
current tactical victory into a strategic defeat. My first
recommendation would be for sanctioning a major Russian bank, either
Gazprom Bank, VnesheconomBank, Promsvyazbank, or a combination of
these.
It also makes sense to add a new twist to our personal sanctions
policy, placing sanctions on the family members of those high Kremlin
officials and Putin cronies. Some may argue that placing sanctions on
family members unfairly tars them with the misdeeds of their parent or
spouse. But it is well known that sanctioned individuals often
``transfer'' their assets to their relatives. Moreover, there is a need
to tie these family sanctions to Kremlin repression of individual
Ukrainians. For instance, the Kremlin has unjustly imprisoned 24
Ukrainian sailors during the Kerch aggression and Ukrainian filmmaker
Oleg Sentsov. Sanctions should be levied against the family members of
25 Kremlin officials and cronies and last until these Ukrainians are
released.
The United States should also consider allocating additional
military aid to Ukraine that would reduce Moscow's naval advantage in
the Sea of Azov. We should supply anti-ship missiles like Harpoons,
which we have in surplus, coupled with a radar system that would enable
Ukraine to chart the presence of Russian ships and direct fire. We
should also provide Mark V patrol boats to Ukraine. These would provide
Kyiv with an asymmetric capacity against the scores of Russian naval
vessels in the Sea of Azov. Finally, an excellent training program has
been established for the Ukrainian army and special forces, and this
program should be expanded to increase the overall capability of
Ukraine's armed forces.
Finally, NATO should increase its presence in the Black Sea.
British and U.S. ships have visited the Black Sea nearly 10 times since
the Kremlin's November 25 attack on Ukraine's ships. This is in
addition to April's Romanian-led naval exercise, Sea Shield 2019, that
included more than 20 ships from Romania, Bulgaria, Canada, Greece, the
Netherlands, and Turkey, along with five ships from the NATO maritime
group. We should keep up this pace of naval visits, but NATO ships
should also cruise regularly in the eastern Black Sea. The idea is to
complicate the planning of the Russian General staff and demonstrate
that Kremlin aggression in Ukraine has not enhanced Russian security.
Congress took the lead on sanctions policy in 2017 when it passed
the Countering America's Adversaries through Sanctions Act--CAATSA.
This led to sharp sectoral and individual sanctions with serious
repercussions. The Senate has introduced new legislation, the Defending
American Security from Kremlin Aggression Act of 2019, which would
impose major sanctions on Moscow for its aggression in Ukraine and
provocations elsewhere, including in the United States. Passing this
act with, for instance, its prohibition on American participation in
any new issuance of Russian debt, or adding to the draft bill some of
the measures that I offered above, would be a major blow to Kremlin
aggression and give Putin reason to opt for negotiations designed to
end his war on Ukraine.
The administration and Congress should also consider action to stop
Moscow's Nord Stream 2 project, which is designed, like Moscow's
shipping inspection regime, to deliver a blow to Ukraine's economy. Not
only would building Nord Stream 2 deprive Ukraine of $2 billion a year
in transit revenues, but it would enable Moscow to supply Europe with
gas while suspending shipments to Ukraine.
This project is geopolitical, not commercial. Even Russia's
Sberbank produced a report noting that the project was not in the
country's economic interests--it was an expensive way to deliver the
Russian gas currently flowing through the Ukrainian pipeline--but it
was in the interest of President Putin's intimates, who were building
the pipeline.
Chancellor Merkel, unfortunately, has doubled down in her support
for the project in recent months, even though there are serious qualms
about it in her party. Recognizing the damage that this project could
do to the Ukrainian economy, the Chancellor has said that Moscow should
continue to send a significant amount of gas through the Ukrainian
pipeline. But several statements by Russian Prime Minister Dmitry
Medvedev and Energy Minister Alexander Novak impose intolerable
conditions on Ukraine for doing just that. And Moscow has told gas
consuming countries in Europe that it will cease sending gas to them
through Ukraine's pipeline at the end of 2019.
In light of all these factors, American sanctions against the firms
providing the high-tech elements for the pipeline are warranted. It is
not easy to make this recommendation. Chancellor Merkel has been the
key European leader on sanctions; and U.S.-EU cooperation on sanctions
has been a key factor in imposing costs on Moscow for its aggression in
Ukraine. We want to continue to work with the Chancellor on sanctions.
But a large number of EU countries also oppose Nord Stream 2, which
they see as a German imposition. And Germany has not reacted to the
Kremlin's provocations against Chancellor Merkel's own suggested
safeguards for gas transit through Ukraine. Deft diplomacy that
utilizes these factors should enable us to maintain cooperation on
sanctions as we use sanctions to stop Nord Stream 2. Better yet, the
threat of sanctions, Kremlin provocations, and deft American diplomacy
persuade the EU or Germany to drop Nord Stream 2.
If Germany truly sought to mitigate the strategic risks of Nord
Steam 2 and perhaps attenuate the pressure for sanctions, it might
consider putting even more of its weight behind EU efforts to diversify
gas sources. Germany could back more LNG terminals, including in Poland
and the Baltics as well as Germany; support thickening the web of gas
pipelines to undercut the Russian near-monopoly of gas; press for
rigorous, rapid implementation of the anti-gas monopoly provisions of
the EU's Third Energy Package; bring Ukraine into an emerging European
gas network outside of Moscow's control; and guarantee Ukraine the
revenues from a substantial minimum of Russian natural gas flows
through its pipeline system.
The Three Seas Initiative which brings together Poland, Croatia,
Romania and other countries of Central Europe; the EU, U.S., Germany
and other stake holders; and private business, could prove a useful
political umbrella to get past the current political acrimony and work
out the details of a common approach. As I learned in my diplomatic
career, when faced with a stand-off, enlarge your ambitions.
My remarks thus far have focused on Moscow's military aggression
against Ukraine and the dangers of our weak response to the Kerch
provocation. But it is important to understand that the Kremlin is
pursuing a full spectrum aggression that includes disinformation and
cyber operations, economic sanctions and blockade, subversion, and
assassinations. One particular object of Kremlin attention has been
Ukraine's 2019 presidential and parliamentary elections.
Failing to achieve a favorable result during Ukraine's presidential
election, Putin has ceased serious negotiations. He now waits for the
outcome of the upcoming Rada elections, trying to create the conditions
for a more malleable leadership in Kyiv. Recognizing the Kremlin's
well-established capacity to interfere in foreign elections, and its
intention to do so in Ukraine, the Atlantic Council has partnered with
the Victor Pinchuk Foundation in Ukraine and the Transatlantic
Commission on Election Integrity to establish an Elections Task Force
under the direction of David Kramer, a former Assistant Secretary of
State and former Director of Freedom House. The task force has been
operating since early December. Kremlin activities designed to shape
the election's outcome include massive disinformation mischaracterizing
the major candidates and seeking to call into question the legitimacy
of the election process, cyber operations particularly against the
Central Election Commission, and the raising and lowering of military
operations in Donbas to encourage Ukrainians to seek peace on Moscow's
terms.
some observations on reform
While this statement has been devoted to Ukraine's security
challenges, it would be a mistake to close without briefly addressing
the other great issue facing Ukraine: socioeconomic reform and
transformation. There is much debate on this topic, both in Ukraine and
abroad.
The first point is the most important. There has been substantial
progress in transforming Ukraine over the past 5 years. These
achievements include: stabilizing the economy after Ukraine lost 17
percent of its GDP in 2014-15 because of Russian military aggression
and severe trade sanctions; reducing the budget deficit from over 10
percent of GDP to 2.5 percent of GDP; and reducing public debt.
Inflation has been slashed from 61 percent to 9 percent. Economic
growth has returned but stays low at 3 percent. Major changes have also
taken place in the banking sector; more than 80 insolvent banks have
been shut down and the nation's largest private bank, Privat,
nationalized.
In the course of these economic reforms, the government has
eliminated major sources of corruption. Most important has been the
equalization of gas prices, which has eliminated government subsidies
as much as 6 percent of GDP per year. Another major reform has been the
introduction of the electronic state procurement system ProZorro, which
has eliminated 1 percent of GDP per year in excessive public
expenditures.
The second point, however, is that one area has seen little reform.
That is the judicial sector: the prosecutors' offices and the courts.
Yes, the anti-corruption bureau (NABU) was established, but its good
work has been hindered by rivalry with the Prosecutor General's Office.
The corruption in this area was one of the reasons for the surprise
victory of President Zelensky.
Candidate Zelensky ran as the anti-corruption candidate. We will
now see if he takes on this huge challenge. Certainly, he has been
saying the right things. While slow in handing out positions, several
of his picks have been reformers, and only one selection raises
questions.
Senior U.S. and European officials have had the chance to talk with
the new president. He has assured all interlocutors of his reform
intentions. The reformers on his team are also optimistic.
The Ukrainian leadership and people have done a commendable job
defending their country against aggression by the world's second
leading military power and introducing serious reforms. Western and
especially American help has been essential to address both challenges.
Greater assistance, in the form of additional sanctions on the Kremlin,
more arms and military assistance to Ukraine, and more economic aid
with tight conditionality, is called for. Such increased aid by the
United States would protect our interests by hastening an end to
Kremlin aggression and revitalizing the process of reform in Ukraine.
This would greatly enhance stability in Europe and add to both its and
our prosperity.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Ambassador Herbst.
Our next witness is Dr. Alina Polyakova. Dr. Polyakova is
Director of the Project on Global Democracy and Emerging
Technology at the Brookings Institution and an adjunct
professor of European studies at Johns Hopkins University
School of Advanced International Studies.
Dr. Polyakova specializes in Russian foreign policy,
European populism and U.S.-Russian-Europe relations and is a
frequent contributor to many media outlets.
Previously she was the Director of Research and Senior
Fellow for Europe and Eurasia at the Atlantic Council.
Dr. Polyakova.
STATEMENT OF DR. ALINA POLYAKOVA, DIRECTOR, PROJECT ON GLOBAL
DEMOCRACY AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGY, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION,
WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Polyakova. Thank you, Chairman Johnson and Ranking
Member Shaheen, and distinguished members of the subcommittee.
It is an honor and privilege to address you today on this
important issue. Thank you for inviting me to speak.
I could also just shorten my comments and say that I agree
with everything that Ambassador Volker and Ambassador Herbst
have just said, but in the interest of laying out a broader
picture, I will not do that.
Ukraine remains a key arena of contestation between Russia
and the West. An unstable Ukraine means a Europe that is less
secure and less able to defend itself from future threats. For
these reasons, the United States must continue to support
Ukraine's democratic path, its Euro-Atlantic future, and its
ability to defend itself. Deterrence of an increasingly
aggressive Russia must start in Ukraine.
The Kremlin seeks to keep Ukraine in a so-called permanent
``gray zone.'' To do so, Russia continues to destabilize
Ukraine through conventional and non-conventional means. Today
I am going to focus my oral comments on Russia's non-
conventional warfare against Ukraine, Ukraine's progress and
challenges and reforms, and what the U.S. should do to ensure
Ukraine's continued progress.
But one comment on the conventional threat. Russia
continues to occupy and militarize Ukraine's Crimean Peninsula.
It is important to note that over the last 18 months, we have
seen a steady and significant buildup in Russian military
capabilities in Crimea and the surrounding waters. Beginning in
January 2017, Russia began deploying S-400 surface-to-air
missile systems to Crimea. Since then, there have been at least
five known S-400 armed battalions positioned in Crimea. This
means that with the S-400 presence, in addition to other
capabilities on land and surrounding water, Russia de facto has
military dominance over the Azov Sea and the entire Black Sea
region. And this is something we must pay attention to from our
national security interests.
Ukraine has long been a test lab for Russia's growing
arsenal of political warfare. This includes information
warfare, cyber-attacks, and the use of energy supplies to exert
political pressure. And while Russian interference in Western
elections may have surprised many, Russia has a very long track
record of intervening in Ukraine's elections since the Orange
Revolution in 2004. Ukraine's experience is thus a bellwether
for assessing the Russian tactics that may be deployed here in
the United States or against our allies.
For example, ahead of Ukraine's most recent presidential
elections, the Russian media spread disinformation claiming
that Ukraine's candidates were U.S. puppets and that the
election systems were controlled by Ukraine's intelligence
agencies, among other colorful disinformation campaigns.
In a new and worrying tactic, a Russian operator confessed
to being tasked with identifying Ukrainians who would be
willing to, quote/unquote, rent out their Facebook accounts for
the spread of disinformation.
Russian information warfare does not stop when the ballot
box closes. While Ukraine remains Russia's top target, Russian
disinformation, especially in the digital domain, is an ongoing
threat to democracies, including the democracy of the United
States.
On the cyber front, there have been at least 15 known
Russian-attributed cyber-attacks on Ukraine since 2014. A 2015
cyber-attack caused a blackout affecting over 230,000
Ukrainians. The malware used in that attack has been identified
by the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security as present
in the electrical utilities in the United States. What happens
in Ukraine does not stay in Ukraine.
Further, Russia has continued to aggressively use natural
gas as a tool of political warfare. The current gas transit
contract between Ukraine and Russia expires at the end of this
calendar year. This raises a concern, with the negotiations
stalled, of a potential gas crisis this coming January that
could also affect supplies to Europe.
Nord Stream 2 is part of Russia's political warfare against
Ukraine. When completed, the pipeline will allow Russia to
circumvent Ukraine as a transit route for Europe-bound natural
gas. However, it is important to note, in addition to what
Ambassador Herbst has laid out, Nord Stream 2 has a military
and security objective. Currently the line of contact in the
Donbas tracks almost perfectly with the gas transit pipelines
in Ukraine. This means that Ukraine's gas pipelines are de
facto acting as a deterrent on further Russian military
aggression. Without Russian gas flowing through those
pipelines, that deterrent will also disappear.
Despite Russia's continued aggression against Ukraine, Kyiv
has made significant strides on reforms. Most significantly,
Ukraine has reformed its energy sector, set up anti-corruption
infrastructure, and cleaned up the banking sector. Taken
together, it is estimated that these reforms should return up
to $6 billion in annual revenue to Ukraine.
Still, it is important to note that Ukraine's new president
inherits an embattled anti-corruption institution structure.
For example, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau, the so-called
NABU, is meant to investigate high-level corruption, but
convictions remain elusive because Ukraine has failed to reform
its judicial sector. This must be the priority for this new
administration and the incoming parliament. Until the Ukrainian
Government makes a serious effort to tackle corruption, it will
remain a vulnerability the Kremlin will continue to exploit.
And while with their votes Ukrainians have closed the door to
the East, they must still work to keep the door to the West
open.
The United States has led the international effort to help
Ukraine defend itself. This legislative body has consistently
authorized hundreds of millions in military aid to Ukraine.
These funds and related programs have gone a long way to secure
Ukraine's sovereignty.
On sanctions, since 2014, the U.S. Government has
sanctioned at least 762 individuals and entities under the
combined authorities afforded to the administration. This is a
significant number. Sanctions against Russian entities and
individuals should continue to be a core tool of U.S. strategy
to deter further Russian aggression. But it is critical that
future sanctions, especially those against Russian energy
companies, be coordinated with our European allies. And
sanctions should only be one part of a broader U.S. strategy.
In addition, the United States should continue to put
pressure on Kyiv to institute judicial and anti-corruption
reforms, remain steadfast on the conditionality of our
assistance, together with the EU and international partners,
should continue high-level bilateral engagement with the
Ukrainian Government. I would hope to see a visit from
President Zelensky in Washington in the near future.
We should increase U.S. investment in countering Russian
influence in Ukraine and Eastern Europe and support independent
media and civil society already doing so.
Russia's invasion of Ukraine has assured Ukraine's Western
orientation. The Kremlin has lost the Ukrainian people. But as
Ukraine's new government forms, Kyiv will need continued
international support led by the United States, and it will
also need a commitment to its territorial integrity and a
resolve to impose additional costs on Russia for its escalatory
behavior. Ukraine cannot be permanently relegated to the gray
zone. Moscow sees a successful democratic Ukraine as a threat
to President Vladimir Putin's authoritarian regime. It is in
Ukraine's interest to see Ukraine's democratic and economic
reforms fail, and therefore, it should be our mission to ensure
that they do not.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Polyakova follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Alina Polyakova
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Dr. Polyakova.
Our final witness is Dr. James Carafano. Dr. Carafano is
Vice President of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute
for International Studies at The Heritage Foundation. A 25-year
Army veteran, Dr. Carafano served in Europe and South Korea,
retiring with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. He is also an
adjunct professor at Georgetown University and visiting
professor at the National Defense University.
Dr. Carafano's recent research is focused on developing the
national security required to secure the long-term interest of
the United States, protecting the public, providing for
economic growth, and preserving civil liberties.
Dr. Carafano.
STATEMENT OF DR. JAMES JAY CARAFANO, VICE PRESIDENT, KATHRYN
AND SHELBY CULLOM DAVIS INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AND
FOREIGN POLICY, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Carafano. Thank you, Senator. So this is a little
unusual. I have two thank yous. First of all, I want to thank
the subcommittee for holding an incredibly important hearing on
an issue that is very important to the United States, but I
think we should all thank Kurt Volker for his service. It has
been extraordinary and his continued service for the country in
this matter. It really is.
Senator Johnson. I agree.
Dr. Carafano. So I made five points in my statement for the
record, which I will not read.
One is to talk about the importance of the bilateral
relationship and why we should care about the Ukraine.
The second was to stress, which I do not think we can do
this emphatically enough, that the problem is Putin that his
policies are the chief destabilizing threat in the region, and
we should never lose focus on that.
The third is to emphasize what everyone on the panel has
already mentioned, which is the importance of early and really
active engagement with the new presidency, also though to focus
on the broader regional engagement of the United States on how
many of the things going on outside Ukraine are really
important to the success of Ukraine.
And finally, to mention something that I think is really
important, which is not just to keep the door for NATO
membership open for the Ukraine, but that the United States
should lead through that door.
If I could just briefly emphasize two of those points: why
the U.S.-Ukraine relationship is so important and on the
importance of regional engagement and NATO.
The United States is a global power with global interests
and global responsibilities. To exercise that, we have got to
connect to the rest of the world. And the three most important
pieces of the world that do that are Europe, the Middle East,
and the Indo-Pacific. So it is in our vital interest that those
parts of the world are at peace and prosperous. And our
alliances, our relationships are the key to doing that.
I think often overlooked in that and particularly in regard
to Western Europe is the role of small states, not that Ukraine
is small but small in comparison in population and power to
some of the other bigger states in Europe. But small states are
critical for three reasons.
One is often it is not how big they are, but where they
are. And their geopolitical position is crucial. I think that
is definitely true for the Ukraine, which is part of this, I
think, vital backbone between Europe and Russia that has to be
stable and coherent both politically, economically, but also
geographically.
The second is our alliances in Western Europe are built on
the principle of collective defense, and collective defense is
the choice of countries to decide their future and who they
choose to partner with in their future to secure that. Keeping
the door open for countries that want to join that alliance I
think is incredibly important and certainly in the case of
Ukraine.
And the third is at the end of the day, small nations can
actually be net contributors to collective defense. We have
that case in a number of countries within NATO, and there is no
doubt in my mind that a successful and peaceful and prosperous
Ukraine is going to be a positive net contributor to collective
security in the West.
The second point is the larger regional engagement of the
United States in Europe and how important that is to the future
of the Ukraine. We have mentioned the concerns about Nord
Stream 2, which I fully share. There are others issues in which
the U.S. is engaged, which are important to the future of
Ukraine. The Three Seas Initiative is one. It is an important
series of energy projects, the fruition of which will improve
the entire region, not just in energy but in terms of regional
economic integration and economic growth. It is important for
the United States to strongly support that.
I mentioned in my testimony the importance of better
Ukrainian-Hungarian relationships and how the United States
plays an important role there.
Also implied is the broader issue of Black Sea security.
That is a regional challenge, and having that successful also
has an impact on the Ukraine.
And finally, I just want to mention briefly the importance
of not just keeping the door open for Ukrainian membership to
NATO, but that the United States leads toward that door. I
think now that North Macedonia is essentially off the table, it
is time for a discussion about the next round of NATO
enlargement. And I think North Macedonia not only kind of
cleared the table, it also taught us a really important lesson,
that countries can figure out really complex, difficult
problems and, for their own collective security, figure out a
path forward. And I think that should make us optimistic about
the future of NATO enlargement.
I also think in the case of Georgia, we have a case study
in how you can move forward on NATO membership despite the fact
that a portion of your country is occupied by another country.
My colleague Luke Coffey has written on this extensively on how
within the existing charter, membership for Georgia is
certainly realistic. And I think that sets a precedent for
Ukraine. And I think the most important point is Vladimir Putin
cannot have a veto on who gets to join NATO by simply occupying
a piece of somebody else's country.
I look forward to your questions. Thank you again.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Carafano follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. James Jay Carafano
Mr. Chairman and other distinguished Members, I am honored to
testify before you today on this vital subject. My name is Dr. James
Jay Carafano. I am the Vice President for Foreign Policy and Defense
Studies, the Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute
for National Security and Foreign Policy, and the E.W. Richardson
Fellow at The Heritage Foundation, a non-partisan research institution.
The views I express in this testimony are my own, and should not be
construed as representing any official position of The Heritage
Foundation.\1\
In my testimony, I would like to: (1) stress the importance of
Ukraine to the U.S. strategy for a secure and flourishing transatlantic
community; (2) underscore that the principle threat to peace and
stability remains the recalcitrant, malicious, destabilizing, and
dangerous policies and actions of Russian President Vladimir Putin; (3)
emphasize the imperative of immediate, strong and active engagement
with the new Ukrainian government; (4) discuss regional developments
that are crucial for the future peace and security of Ukraine and U.S.-
Ukraine bilateral relations; and, finally, (5) emphatically make the
case that it is vital that the U.S. lead in preparing Ukraine for
membership in NATO.
My responsibilities at The Heritage Foundation comprise supervising
all of the foundation's research on public policy concerning foreign
policy, defense, and national security. Heritage has assembled a
robust, talented, and dedicated research team. I have the honor and
privilege of leading that team.
Heritage analysts have studied and written authoritatively on
virtually every aspect of the challenges of foreign policy and national
security that affect the transatlantic community and U.S.-Ukraine
relations. The results of all our research are publicly available on
the Heritage website at www.heritage.org. Of particular note, and
relevance here are, the Heritage Index of U.S. Military Strength, which
includes a comprehensive review of contemporary European security
issues and the Heritage Index of Economic Freedom, which grades every
nation in the world on its level of economic freedom (the trends in
Ukraine and neighboring states are especially instructive).
We collaborate frequently with the research community, including
such institutions as the American Foreign Policy Center, the Hudson
Institute, the Foundation for Defense of Democracy, the Jamestown
Foundation, the Center for European Policy Analysis, the Center for
International Private Enterprise, the International Republican
Institute, and the U.S. Institute of Peace, all of which have done
substantive and important work on Ukraine, the Russian threat, and
regional issues.
I, and our research team, have also widely traveled in Ukraine and
the region, and have participated in the regional and international
conferences on the spectrum of vital issues from security and economic
development to health care and the challenges of public corruption.
In addition to our regional work, we have substantial expertise on
defense issues. I served 25 years in the U.S. Army, including two tours
with NATO forces. Our team also includes senior retired officers from
each of the armed services with well over a century of operational and
combat experience, a good deal of it in the European theater.
I am particularly proud of The Heritage Foundation's long and
substantive record of research on Ukraine. Our effort reflects the
foundation's commitment to advancing public policies that keep America
free, safe, and prosperous. We believe that U.S.-Ukrainian bilateral
relations have important implications for meeting this aspiration.
why ukraine still matters
The U.S. is a global power with global interests and
responsibilities. American interests can only be protected if the U.S.
is forward present to safeguard, or can get where it needs to be, to
exercise power in support of those interests. There are three vital
regions that link the U.S. to the world--Europe, the Middle East, and
the Indo-Pacific. Regional peace and stability in each is a vital U.S.
interest. These requirements are strongly reflected in the U.S.
National Security Strategy, and sustaining and strengthening that
commitment is crucial.\2\ In this respect, the stability of the
transatlantic community is foundational to U.S. security, and the
future of Ukraine has strong implications for that stability and
security.
In U.S. efforts to ensure regional stability in an age of great
power competition, what is, in fact, more important than ever, is the
role of ``small powers.'' \3\ There are three reasons why small states
matter to the United States, particularly in the context of the
transatlantic community and Western Europe.
First, geography matters. In geopolitics--as in real estate--a
critical consideration is ``location, location, location.'' To a major
power, another country's greatest asset might be its map coordinates
rather than the size of its arsenal or bank account. Part of the reason
why the U.S. must insist that NATO continue to keep its membership door
open is because there are nations still not included, whose accession
would enhance collective security due to their geographical location.
Second, freedom matters. Like-minded nations make better partners.
One of the reasons why NATO works is because the Alliance is a
partnership of free nation-states. The foundational rationale of the
transatlantic Alliance is that free states have the right to associate
for the purpose of collective security. To close NATO's door to new
members would undermine what NATO stands for: the right of free peoples
to choose their future.
Third, contribution matters. Small nations can be net contributors
to peace, security, and economic development. A free, secure, and
prosperous Ukraine can provide all three of these benefits. Conversely,
failing to support Ukraine adds to the prospects for diminishing and
weakening the transatlantic community, and losing a pivotal state in
the U.S. effort to help sustain peace and stability in Europe. A
successful Ukraine is an important U.S. interest, and the U.S. should
invest its time, influence, and treasure consistent with that interest.
russia is the greatest destabilizing threat to peace
and security in western europe
Ukraine and the transatlantic community share a common cause:
resisting, mitigating, and abating the malicious and dangerous actions
of Russian President Vladimir Putin. Russia has been occupying
Ukraine's Crimean peninsula illegally since 2014, and continues to
stoke a deadly war in the east that has resulted in thousands of
deaths, tens of thousands of wounded, and almost 2 million people
internally displaced. In addition, Russia meddles in Ukrainian internal
affairs, seeding political and economic disruption and fueling
corruption. Of particular note is how Russia uses religion and
religious narratives, through tactics of misinformation, to further sow
divisions.\4\
Of greatest significance is Russia's armed intervention in Ukraine.
In addition to illegally occupying Crimea, Moscow stoked sectarian
divisions in eastern Ukraine. Backed, armed, and trained by Russia,
separatist leaders declared the so-called Lugansk People's Republic and
the Donetsk People's Republic. Russia continues to support separatist
factions in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine with advanced weapons,
technical and financial assistance, as well as Russian conventional and
special operations forces. Two cease-fire agreements--one in September
2014 and another in February 2015, known as Minsk I and Minsk II,
respectively--have come and gone. As events in eastern Ukraine since
the signing of Minsk II have shown, the agreement is a cease-fire in
name only.
Of recent note, on November 25, 2018, Russian Federal Security
Service border-patrol boats opened fire on three Ukrainian navy vessels
near the Kerch Strait, a narrow body of water connecting the Black Sea
and the Sea of Azov. Twenty-four Ukrainian sailors are still being
illegally detained.
In addition, the 24 sailors being illegally detained, it is
estimated Russia also illegally holds about 70 other Ukrainian
citizens.\5\
There is no demonstrable evidence that Russia will cease its
destabilizing activities any time soon. Thus, without question, without
the support of the U.S. and the international community, stability and
security in Ukraine will be at grave risk. As a result, the U.S.
should:
Sustain commitment. Five years later, we can't show ``Ukraine
fatigue'' in the face of Russia's naked aggression.
Maintain and strengthen the economic sanctions.
Continue to provide support and lethal aid to Ukraine.
Never consider making concessions in U.S. support to Ukraine as a
trade for Russian cooperation on other issues.
Work to sustain the international coalition condemning and
punishing Russia for its illegal and malicious activity.
Continue to demand that the starting point for future
negotiations is Russia's full compliance with the Minsk
agreements.
engagement with ukraine is the answer
There is no question of whether the U.S. should continue its level
of engagement and support to the people of Ukraine. The only issue that
should be up for discussion is how to make the U.S. effort the best it
can be.
The election of Volodymyr Zelensky (official English-spelling
released by his administration in late May) as president of Ukraine
raises many hotly debated questions about which key policies he will
adopt and who will most influence the administration.\6\ Right now, I
think it is fair to say: We just don't know for sure.
The direction of the government may be clearer after parliamentary
elections on July 21, 2019, (unless Ukraine's highest court stops the
vote, which is highly doubtful). But, even that assessment is
debatable. Zelensky has created a new party--Servant of the People--and
his governing style will definitely be guided by how successful his
party is in the July election. The more compromises that have to be
made to form a majority coalition, the more difficult it is to
speculate about future policies. When the cabinet is filled later this
summer, the picture might be clearer.
the u.s. can't wait
The time to ramp up engagement is right now. The U.S. must send
strong, clear, and consistent messages of its expectations. What will
best serve to strengthen the U.S.-Ukraine bilateral relationship is a
stronger Ukraine. That requires advances in the three crucial areas:
(1) security, (2) economic development, and (3) advances in good
governance.
1. Security. Security assistance and cooperation remain a high
priority, particularly accelerating lethal defense aid and maritime-
security capabilities.\7\ Military reforms are lagging. That said,
Ukraine's military has made remarkable progress and looks more and more
like a competent, professional modern military. Naval power, however,
is particularly problematic. Two of the six U.S. Island class patrol
boats are getting ready to be sent, after long delay, but as of today
Ukraine still has no navy--just five gunboats and one dock-bound former
Soviet cruiser in Odessa. Ukraine has no naval ability to defend
Odessa. Among the actions the U.S. could take are:
Supply more ships to Ukraine. A strong Ukrainian navy is in
America's interests. Transferring two Island-class former Coast
Guard ships to Ukraine is a good first step in rebuilding
Ukrainian maritime capability after it lost many ships to
Russia in 2014, but more should be done. The U.S. should move
ahead with providing surplus Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class
frigates as part of the Pentagon's program to dispose of excess
defense property.\8\
Help Ukraine rapidly improve its anti-ship missile capability. The
right to self-defense does not stop at a country's shoreline.
The U.S. can help fund and speed up getting Ukraine's
domestically produced Neptune anti-ship missile in operation
faster. In addition, the U.S. should consider appropriate off-
the-shelf options for anti-ship missile platforms for Ukraine.
Assist Ukraine in improving its maritime domain awareness
capability. Most of the non-lethal support provided by the U.S.
to Ukraine since 2014 has focused on the land war in the east
of the country. The U.S. should expand this help to improve
Ukraine's maritime security by providing improved radar and
appropriate surveillance capabilities, such as unmanned aerial
vehicles.
Lift geographical restrictions on U.S. troops in Ukraine.
Currently, the 300 U.S. troops in Ukraine as part of a training
mission are restricted to the western half of the country, more
than 800 miles from the front lines. On a limited basis, the
U.S. should allow U.S. trainers and observers to the front
lines to gain a better understanding of the situation on the
ground and of training requirements for the Ukrainian military.
Evaluate NATO's trust funds for Ukraine. NATO should evaluate the
effectiveness of the six trust funds established at the 2014
Wales Summit. For example, there is no trust fund focused on
improving Ukraine's maritime capability.
2. The Economy. Economic reforms are also lagging. According to the
Index of Economic Freedom:
Ukraine's economic freedom score is 52.3 [out of 100], making its
economy the 147th freest in the 2019 Index. Its overall score has
increased by 0.4 point, with improvements in fiscal health, business
freedom, and property rights outpacing declines in labor freedom and
trade freedom. Ukraine is ranked 44th among 44 countries in the Europe
region, and its overall score is below the regional and world
averages.\9\
Progress on the economic front is vital.
As Ukraine's oligarch-dominated economy improved in 2018, partly
because of greater inflows of remittances, Western institutions found
that they had less leverage to press for further reforms.
On the other hand, the results of the national elections clearly
demonstrate that the people of Ukraine are impatient for change. If the
government cannot deliver, it will not remain popular for long.
According analysis at The Heritage Foundation, what is need most are:
Contentious but much-needed structural reforms, such as cutting
subsidies and raising energy tariffs, fiscal consolidation, and
the fight against corruption.
Developing Ukraine's capital markets, privatizing state-owned
enterprises, and improving both its legal framework and the
rule of law.
3. Governance. Advances in good governance are also important. The
ability of Ukraine to hold free and fair elections is notable,
particularly given the number of obstacles thrown in its path. The U.S.
should be proud of its contributions in this area, and that in of
itself should encourage America to do more. For example, in Ukraine,
the International Republican Institute (IRI) has been on the ground
since the country first gained its independence nearly 28 years ago.
Since that time, the IRI has worked side-by-side with tens of thousands
of elected officials, party representatives, and citizens to set up and
strengthen the country's nascent democratic institutions, and has
monitored every single election since independence, including the
recent successful presidential election. There is so much to be done.
Good government starts at the top with professional, dedicated, and
competent senior level appointments in the Ukrainian cabinet,
the president's staff and the military staff. The U.S. has to
make that point at every opportunity.
President Trump should meet with the new President in Washington
and continue to demonstrate the continuation of our policy of
support for Ukraine during this transitional period. Apparently
a visit is tentatively scheduled after the parliamentary
elections in mid-July. At their meeting, the president should
both support and encourage Ukraine's president to follow
through on anti-corruption commitments and offer additional
military assistance to deter further Russian aggression. The
U.S. government could also exert more influence on Ukrainian
governance issues by ``being there.'' President Trump or Vice
President Pence and Cabinet-level officials across the U.S.
government should visit Ukraine. Their visits should be
followed up with regular calls by senior officials from all
areas of the U.S. government.
U.S. policymakers should not play into Russian propaganda about
Ukraine as a failed state by focusing only on the negative. The
U.S. should hold Ukraine to account where it is failing, and
praise Ukraine for the strides it has made in tackling
entrenched challenges.
Congress has an important role to play. Congress should continue
its strong support for U.S.-Ukraine bi-lateral relations and
interaction with Ukrainian ministers and parliamentarians. In
particularly, Congress could helpfully underscore at every
opportunity U.S. support for an independent Ukraine with the
bedrock of our policy being continued U.S. commitment to
Ukraine's territorial integrity.
The U.S. should not forget human rights. Ukraine and the U.S.
should set the example. The two countries should work together
to highlight and bring attention to the plight of the Crimean
Tatars, who are being persecuted and oppressed by the Russian
government. The Trump administration should be praised for
raising the profile of this important issues.
regional issues
Many of the issues that will help to strengthen U.S.-Ukrainian
bilateral cooperation are not confined to the borders of Ukraine.
Addressing these challenges would help as well.
Of particular note is the disagreement between Hungary and Ukraine
that dates to 2017 when Ukraine's government began to consider a
``language law'' that makes mandatory the use of the Ukrainian language
in secondary schools, which in Ukraine start in sixth grade. After much
debate, Ukraine's parliament, the Verkhovna Rada passed the law on
April 25. This resulted in a disagreement not of Ukraine's doing, but
rather the result of Hungary's unique view of what constitutes the
nation-state. The dispute has had important consequences, as Hungary
has reacted by blocking ministerial-level meetings of the NATO-Ukraine
Commission--the venue for cooperation between Ukraine and the Western
Alliance. It bears repeating that it is Ukraine's sovereign right to
take this step, just as it is in ours to ensure that our schoolchildren
are taught in our national language, English. Every nation has the
right to ensure that its youth grow up to be literate and productive
members of a cohesive society. U.S. officials are to be lauded for past
efforts to ameliorate the dispute.
The U.S. must sustain a highly activist regional policy.
In particular, the U.S. must continue to press for more
constructive Ukrainian-Hungarian relations and end the
obstructionism that negatively affects Ukrainian-NATO
cooperation.\10\
The U.S. should continue to demonstrate strong support for the
Three Seas Initiative and remain firm in its opposition to the
Russian pipeline Nord Stream II.\11\
The U.S. should work with the European Union and regional partners
who share our interest in the future of a free and prosperous
Ukraine.
commitment to nato enlargement
Finally, the U.S. must continue not just to keep the door for NATO
membership open, but must also craft a plan and advocate hard for
getting Ukraine through the door. The ascension of North Macedonia not
only paves the way for other countries, it demonstrates that thorny
geopolitical obstacles can be overcome. The U.S., and its friends and
allies, are already working on the reforms and capacity-building that
will 1 day make Ukraine a successful candidate. There is also, already,
a course of action for how to press for Ukrainian membership, despite
the continued illegal Russian occupation of Ukrainian territory. My
colleague Luke Coffey mapped out a solution with regards to a similar
challenge faced by Georgia.\12\
In conclusion, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I
look forward to your comments and questions.
The Heritage Foundation is the most broadly supported think tank in
the United States. During 2018, it had hundreds of thousands of
individual, foundation, and corporate supporters representing every
state in the U.S. Its 2018 operating income came from the following
sources:
Individuals: 67 percent
Foundations: 13 percent
Corporations: 2 percent
Program revenue and other income: 18 percent
The top five corporate givers provided The Heritage Foundation with
1 percent of its 2018 income. The Heritage Foundation's books are
audited annually by the national accounting firm of RSM U.S., LLP.
----------------
Notes
\1\ The Heritage Foundation is a public policy, research, and
educational organization recognized as exempt under section 501(c)(3)
of the Internal Revenue Code. It is privately supported and receives no
funds from any government at any level, nor does it perform any
government or other contract work.
\2\ James Jay Carafano, et al., ``Preparing the U.S. National
Security Strategy for 2020 and Beyond,'' Heritage Foundation Special
Report No. 214, May 23, 2019.
\3\ James Jay Carafano, ``Why Small States Matter to Big Powers,''
The National Interest,'' August 10, 2018.
\4\ This section of this testimony is adapted from Luke Coffey and
Daniel Kochis, ``The Trump administration and the 115th Congress Should
Support Ukraine,'' Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3200, April 11,
2017, and Luke Coffey and Alexis Mrachek, ``Improving Ukraine's
Maritime Capability: Next Steps for the U.S.,'' Heritage Foundation
Issue Brief No. 4926, November 28, 2018.
\5\ Halya Coynash, ``Russia is holding over 70 Ukrainian Political
Prisoners of War,'' June 6, 2018.
\6\ There are causes for concerns over senior appointments. See,
Vladimir Socor `` Ukraine's New Presidential Administration Filled With
Show Business Friends,'' Eurasia Daily Monitor (16/75).
\7\ The recommendations in this section are adapted from Coffey and
Mrachek, ``Improving Ukraine's Maritime Capability: Next Steps for the
U.S.''
\8\ The Defense Surplus Equipment Disposal, Including Law
Enforcement 1033 Program.
\9\ (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2019).
\10\ See, for example, James Jay Carafano and Daniel Kochis, ``The
Growing Spat Between Hungary and Ukraine Helps Putin,'' Heritage
Foundation Commentary, October 25, 2018.
\11\ See, for example, Edwin J. Feulner, ``Three Seas, One Aim:
Preserving Liberty,'' Heritage Foundation Commentary, January 24, 2018.
\12\ Luke Coffey, ``NATO Membership for Georgia: In U.S. and
European Interest,'' Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 199,
January 29, 2018, and Luke Coffey, ``Creativity and Bold Leadership
Needed for Georgia's NATO Membership,'' Heritage Foundation Issue Brief
No. 4969, June 12, 2019.
Senator Johnson. Thank you all for your testimony.
As we work our way through this, one thing I would like to
have as a conclusion of this hearing is a list of priorities
and literally prioritize. I mean, this is the first thing we
need to focus on, second, third, fourth, and fifth.
I just want to quick start the questioning. I was heartened
by--I should probably get up on my news report--Merkel will
only lift the Russian sanctions if Ukraine's sovereignty is
restored. I mentioned Crimea in that statement as well. I
thought that was a pretty good sign.
In one of your testimonies, you talked about how Nord
Stream 2 literally was not economic. It was all about
geopolitics. Can you, first of all, explain? Because it does
not make sense what Germany is doing there, why you would give
that kind of economic power, geopolitical power to Russia. Can
somebody just kind of walk through what the rationale is from
the Germans' perspective, what we possibly can do, you know,
the harm it will create to Ukraine?
Ambassador Herbst. The argument by those in Germany who
want Nord Stream 2, because it is not everybody, is that they
want to build pipeline capacity because more pipeline capacity
means more energy security.
The argument against Nord Stream 2 is that, first of all,
it is economically expensive. You are building a whole new
capacity when the Nord Stream 1 pipeline is not fully used, and
you have this large Ukrainian pipeline system.
A Russian bank, VnesheconomBank had a report on its website
for a week or so which argued that Nord Stream 2 was not in the
economic interest of Russia for the reasons I have just
described. It did say it was in the economic interest of
Putin's cronies who were building Nord Stream 2 and getting
Russian contracts.
But more importantly from our point of view, Nord Stream 2
gives Moscow the ability to deliver all the gas it has to
Europe bypassing not just Ukraine, but all the countries of
Central and Eastern Europe, which means that they can play
coercive gas diplomacy with Ukraine, with Belarus, with Poland
as they have a number of times over the past 10 years.
And Alina mentioned another very good point, which is that
the current Ukrainian pipeline system, which ships Russian gas,
is vulnerable to Russian military operations in east and
central Ukraine. So this is another deterrence on Kremlin
military activity.
Senator Johnson. So again, I think you mentioned,
Ambassador Herbst, how crucial Germany is to keep this
coalition together and make sure sanctions are maintained. How
do we deal with this? Why is Germany doing this, and what can
we do to stop them? I know you have some suggestions on
effective sanctions.
Ambassador Herbst. For starters, the Social Democrats in
Germany traditionally have been rather soft in their approach
to Moscow, and they are 100 percent in favor of this project.
Of course, there are the peculiar circumstances of the former
chancellor of Germany working for Mr. Putin on precisely this
project and other gas matters. So that is point one.
Point two, there are German businessmen who will benefit
from this project. But it is all so true--and this is something
which does not come up in the conversation that much--that
there is serious opposition to Nord Stream 2 first in the Green
Party in Germany and also in Chancellor Merkel's own party.
There is also serious opposition to this within the EU. The
EU Commission, by and large, is not favorably disposed towards
this project. At least 13 EU nations have written against this
project, and they believe that Nord Stream 2 working through
the EU has been imposed by Germany, completely inconsistent
with the third energy package of the EU and inconsistent with
the concept of consensus within the EU.
I in my testimony focused on the specific, I would say,
kind of condition that Chancellor Merkel herself has advocated,
that the Kremlin, as part of the Nord Stream 2 deal, should
guarantee that a large flow of gas will continue through
Ukraine's pipelines. But senior Kremlin officials, led by
Medvedev himself, the Prime Minister, have cast doubt on it.
And numerous times over the past several months, Russian
officials and Russian gas--people in the gas industry have
warned Central and Western European powers that gas flow
through Ukraine will cease on December 31st of this year. So
they are, in fact, sticking their fingers in Chancellor
Merkel's eyes, but we have not seen a response yet from the
German leadership.
Senator Johnson. So, Ambassador Volker is the point person
in terms of trying to negotiate with Russia and our European
partners. There is a bill here that would impose sanctions on
those companies that are building the pipeline. What do you
believe we should do?
Ambassador Volker. Thank you very much.
I have been advised that we do not comment on pending
legislation in the Senate, so I will avoid from commenting on
the specific legislation.
However, let me join you and Ambassador Herbst and Alina in
saying that the clear motivation behind the Nord Stream project
is to increase Russia's influence over Europe and division of
Europe. And there are many countries in Europe that are as
concerned about this as we are. So you can look in Central and
Eastern Europe. You can look at some West European countries.
This is not a uniformly welcomed development.
For the past decade or so, maybe even a little more, Europe
has been on a trajectory of increasing its independence,
decreasing its reliance on Russian gas as part of the mix in
Europe. This project actually reverses that trend.
So the motivation behind the legislation that is pending is
clearly to try to stop that development, stop the re-increase
of dependence on Russian gas from both the source and the hard
means of supply, and I think we agree with the thrust of that
legislation.
Senator Johnson. Again, let me ask it this way. If
sanctions were imposed on those companies building the
pipeline, would that complicate your job?
Ambassador Volker. Not at all. In that respect, I think
everyone knows that there are many issues out here, but the
fundamental issue is one of Russia knowing exactly what it is
doing in fighting in eastern Ukraine and trying to use that to
gain political leverage over Kyiv. The Germans know that. The
French know that. We talk about this very openly. We have
differences of view over Nord Stream, but we fundamentally
agree on where the issues lie with Russia.
Senator Johnson. Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you all very much for being here today and for
your testimony.
As has been pointed out, one of the main tools that the
United States and the EU have used against Russia has been
sanctions. So can you comment on how effective those sanctions
have been in addressing Russians' behavior, and have they done
anything to resolve the Ukraine conflict or to restrain Russian
aggression?
Dr. Polyakova. I can start perhaps, Senator.
So as all of us mentioned in our testimonies I believe, it
is estimated that the U.S. sanctions, with the combination of
European sanctions, have cost the Russian economy between 1 and
1.5 percent annually. However, the Russians have adapted to
this new reality.
In my view the greatest message sent by the sanctions
regime is one of transatlantic unity and resolve against an
increasingly aggressive Russia. It is for that reason that I
strongly believe the sanctions should be coordinated with our
European allies and also with our other allies, Canada,
Australia, most notably because that sends the message to the
Kremlin that there will be consequences for increased
escalation.
There is an argument to be made, however, which I believe
many of my colleagues would disagree with, that in terms of
changing behavior on the ground, sanctions have not achieved
that. Yet, targeted sanctions against specific Russian
individuals, which has been the tack the U.S. has pursued in
the most recent sanctions rounds, I think have been very, very
effective in sending a clear message that there will be
consequences for increasing escalatory behavior.
I will stop there.
Ambassador Herbst. I agree that the sanctions have not
persuaded Moscow to cease its aggression in Ukraine, but they
have been a reason for Moscow not escalating. And that is very
important.
But there is a second, to my mind, very important reason
for the sanctions. The economic cost is real. Over time, this
will have a major impact on Russian economic production. They
cannot sustain a world-class military with a third world
economy. And we are contributing to their economic problems.
And if they are going to pursue a revisionist foreign policy,
it is in our interests that their economy not be able to
sustain a world-class military indefinitely.
Senator Shaheen. Well, I certainly agree that. That is why
I am sponsoring the DASKA sanctions.
But do we have any estimates about how long they can
continue to operate with this kind of a hit to the economy?
Dr. Carafano. Well, I think the answer is forever because
that is the nature of authoritarian regimes is they have the
capacity to redirect resources as they see fit.
Senator Shaheen. Let me rephrase that. How long they can
continue with this kind of a hit to support the military and
the buildup in the way that they have been.
Dr. Carafano. I think the answer is the same.
Senator Shaheen. Is still indefinitely?
Dr. Carafano. But I think the point, which my co-panelist
made, is, one, understand the purpose of sanctions. It is very
unlikely under an authoritarian regime that sanctions are going
to change behavior. The purpose of the sanctions is to punish
behavior, and I think that has been extraordinarily effective.
But a sanction is a tool just like a tank is a tool. So a tank
is not a strategy. A tank is effective in driving across Europe
in World War II because it is done in the context of a whole
bunch of things. And so when we look at sanctions, we should
never have just a discussion like are the sanctions achieving
our strategic end state, but are the sanctions contributing to
the overall strategy. And our overall strategy--the goal is to
end Russia's destabilizing influence in Western Europe.
And I do think that the combination of the sanctions which
punish and bring together solidarity and the military
deterrence of a strong NATO presence and working on energy
security for Western Europe and others, together I think it
makes perfect sense. And taking the sanctions away would be
like having a table and taking one of the legs away and
expecting it to still not fall over.
Senator Shaheen. So this may be a question for you,
Ambassador Volker. As we look at where we are in the crisis
with Ukraine, are the Minsk agreements still a way forward? Do
you think they have any credibility at this point, or should we
abandon those and look for another way forward?
Ambassador Volker. Well, thank you very much for that
question.
Let me add on the sanctions point. I agree with what James
just said, that sanctions do not work until the day they do. So
you keep them in place for that reason.
And in addition to that, you have--I am sorry. I lost my
train of thought there with the phone ringing.
Let us turn to Minsk. On Minsk, I think it is very
important that the Minsk agreements stay in place because they
are the most important means by which Russia formally
recognizes the territorial integrity of Ukraine, even if in
reality they do not. It is the basis on which the European
Union keeps sanctions in place.
In addition, it is the framework that has everything in the
bag, everything on the table, if you will: ceasefire,
withdrawal of heavy weapons, humanitarian access, all of the
things that are necessary for a solution. What is lacking in
Minsk is the political will of Russia to actually implement it.
As I said, they are denying that they have a responsibility in
this.
So I do not think it has outlasted its purpose. I think it
serves a very important purpose. But what we have to do--and
this comes back to the point I wanted to make--we have to get
to the point where Russia makes a different decision. Sanctions
is a part of a strategy. It is one piece among many that can
add up to a decision in Russia that says, you know, it is not
worth it. It is not working. And that is what I think we are
really striving for through the combination of sanctions,
through support for Ukraine reform, anti-corruption, support
for the military. All of these things add up to making it more
and more clear to Russia that their effort to re-subordinate
Ukraine to its sphere of influence is not going to work.
Senator Shaheen. So one of the things that we have done
since 2017 is we have put in place legislation called the
Women, Peace, and Security Act that defines a strategy to
include women at the table as we are looking at conflict
negotiations. As we look ahead to a time when we hope there
will be negotiations to end this conflict in Ukraine, how
important is it to have women at the table in those
negotiations? Ambassador Volker, do you want to go first?
Ambassador Volker. I would like to say something on that,
though, because when you visit the conflict area in Eastern
Ukraine, you meet almost uniquely with women. The young men
have all gone away because they do not want to be drafted into
the military forces of the Russians. Young women have gone away
because it is not safe. And the people that are there are
elderly and mostly women, and they are holding down the
property so that they try to maintain some semblance of
continuity for life in the future. I do not think there is a
way to talk about peace and the restoration of normal life
without women.
Dr. Polyakova. I will make one quick comment.
In the context of Ukraine, there was a women's militia
group on the Maidan. It was primarily women who organized the
delivery of food and other supplies to the front in the very
early days when the Ukrainian military was not able to organize
those kinds of logistics themselves. And they continued to be
incredibly helpful in resettling the IDPs. There are 1.5
million internally displaced people in Ukraine right now. Women
play a very strong role in the communities where those
individuals end up.
Lastly, on a broader scope about women in conflict
resolution, there are many studies that show that when there
are more women at the table, you end up with a better
negotiated solution at the end. So absolutely, I think it is
critical to have women at the negotiating table.
Dr. Carafano. Can I just say I was really pleased to see
the administration come up with a strategy to actually
implement the act?
Senator Shaheen. Me too.
Dr. Carafano. And when you look at that, where can this
actually work and be effective, you have to have a modicum of
security. You have to have a modicum of civil society, and you
have to have some capacity for economic growth to actually
implement those kinds of program and make them happen. I think
Ukraine is literally the poster child for where this kind of
strategy ought to work.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. So you are all in agreement.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Johnson. Senator Portman.
Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks for
holding this hearing.
I was just thinking, as I was hearing you talk about the
women in Ukraine, I was there last month and met with two of
the strong women from the previous administration. And one is
the minister of health, whom many of you know, Ulyana Suprun,
and the other was the minister of finance, Oksana Markarova.
And boy, two strong women who have taken on some heroic
reforms. I will leave it there.
But you are absolutely right, Senator Shaheen. Women play a
key role in this, including at the Maidan and since.
And, Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing. This
is really timely, and it is wonderful to hear from a panel of
experts, all of whom basically agree on the need for us to keep
the pressure on and to help this fledgling country that is
trying to do the right thing.
Thanks to some of my constituents back home--some of you
know we have a big Ukrainian community in Ohio--I got involved
in these issues early on and right after the Maidan, within a
few months, I was over there. I could still see the scorch
marks. In fact, you could still smell the burning rubber, and
the encampment was still there. I have been back several times
since, including meeting with President Zelensky last month,
which was for me very refreshing actually. I worked well with
President Poroshenko, but President Zelensky said something--
and I have repeated this since in the media. I do not talk
about our specific conversation, but--that I thought was
telling. I congratulated him, of course, for winning 74 percent
of the vote. I said that does not normally happen in the United
States of America. Maybe I am wrong. Maybe some of my
colleagues have had votes like that, but probably not. And his
response was not, yes, I ran a great campaign or we had all the
right things going on. He said, you know, what? It is not about
me. It is about a hunger for reform. And that is really
important right now.
So as we talk about the importance of pushing back on the
Russian aggression, we also have to talk about the importance
of reform and transparency and fighting corruption. And I think
there is no question in my mind that he is personally committed
to that and that he needs our help to be able to accomplish
what he would like to do in terms of truly making this
transition, looking to the West and a democratic country that
is prosperous that practices free enterprise and pushes back on
the corruption. So I am encouraged.
I was encouraged today when the Department of Defense
announced plans to provide Ukraine with an additional $250
million in security assistance. That is consistent with what we
appropriated here, of course, and authorized. That is $1.5
billion since 2014, which I raised with the President. I also
raised that with General Khomchak who some of you met with
recently I know. And they appreciate it. They get it. I mean,
these are my taxpayers, taxpayers represented in this panel and
around the Senate, who have been willing to say, you know, we
are going to stand up beside this country that wants to move
toward a more optimistic future and toward the West. And it is
in many respects the example of what we all talk about in terms
of the competition between us and Russia, and two different
visions for the future.
So I am pleased to say that the aid that we authorized
first in 2015 through legislation--did not actually happen till
2017--for lethal defensive aid is now there and more is coming.
You will see in the NDAA--this is the authorization bill we are
about to vote on here in Congress--that there will be
additional ideas expressed there. I will not talk about them in
specifics because I know the chairman is still working through
those, but I think all of us in this panel have probably
involved in helping to ensure we get the right aid there.
Ambassador Volker, you have been involved in ensuring that we
know what they want and what they need. So my hope is that we
will have some good news here shortly.
I was on the contact line last year at a time when the
snipers were pretty active. One of the things that I think most
of my constituents do not realize is the degree to which it is
still a hot war. So when I placed the wreath at the memorial
recently for the Ukrainians who have lost their lives there, it
includes about 3,000 troops who continue to face the artillery
and the snipers.
Ambassador Herbst, your testimony was in many respects the
most powerful for me because you were talking about what is
really happening on that contact line, the number of Russian
officers who are involved and the number of tanks and
artillery. I mean, it is overwhelming. It is amazing that the
Ukrainians have been able to push back as they have. We got to
help them not because we want war but because we want peace.
The one question I would have for you all that you did not
really talk about was the Kerch Straits and what happened in
November and these 24 sailors and what are we going to do about
it. You know, do you recommend additional sanctions? I think,
Ambassador Herbst, you talked about maybe an additional company
to be sanctioned. I would tell you President Zelensky
emphasized that a lot, and I know that he is focused like a
laser on that issue.
It was a flagrantly illegal attack. There is no question
about it. They were near Russian territorial waters. I think
the United Nations has not been nearly as aggressive as it
should be in pushing back. I think we move too slowly. I think
NATO moves much too slowly.
What should the U.S., NATO--this U.N. Law of the Sea
tribunal came out just before I was there last month and was
very clear that this is an illegal act and the sailors must be
returned. What more can we do? How can we actually make this
happen? And should, Ambassador Volker, this not be a
precondition to negotiations with Russia on any kind of a
peaceful settlement of the Donbas?
Ambassador Volker. Well, if I may, Senator. Thank you very
much for your comments and for that question as well.
And to address a few of the things you said, first off I
agree with you. I think the provision of security assistance to
Ukraine is vitally important. I think it has had an impact both
psychologically as well as militarily on the
professionalization and the capacity of the Ukrainian forces.
I think it is also important that Ukraine reciprocate with
foreign military purchases from us as well, and I know that
they intend to do so.
In terms of priorities, I think the anti-sniper systems
that were provided through foreign military financing were very
important, the anti-tank Javelin missiles also very important.
And as we look ahead, we need to look at air defense, at
coastal defense, that maritime picture, coastal capabilities,
all of them very important.
The second thing that I want to call attention to, NATO's
decision at the ministerial meeting that took place here in
Washington on the Black Sea strategy because I think that was
also a U.S. initiative to talk about this. Other countries
picked it up. And it is very important that NATO be present in
the Black Sea, that it support freedom of navigation, that it
provide a fabric of port calls and engagement with Ukraine and
other states in the region. If you look around, you have got
NATO allies, three of them, Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey. You
have got two partner countries, Georgia and Ukraine that are
all Black Sea littoral states. So it is not by any means a
Russian lake. And I think it is important that NATO stand up to
make clear that all of us have an interest in the freedom of
navigation, the open access, the economic development of the
region, and the security of the region.
In terms of the Kerch Straits, we have raised at every
juncture the importance of Ukraine releasing these sailors. In
the letter I sent to my Russian counterpart last week or 2
weeks ago, I mentioned it again. It is critical that Russia do
that. As you said, it was an illegal seizure of the vessels and
the sailors, and there is no justification for continuing to
hold them.
As far as engaging the Russians, I think that we have a
balance sheet right now where there is nothing going well. If
you look at Syria, if you look at Venezuela, if you look at
North Korea, if you look at Iran, if you look at nuclear
issues, you look at Ukraine, you look at Georgia, and there is
really nothing on the positive side of the ledger. And I think
that is a dangerous situation to have generally and even more
dangerous if we are not going to be talking with Russia at all.
So I think it is important that we do both. We keep the
pressure up, calling attention to the Ukrainian sailors and
demanding their immediate release, and that we also be willing
to talk with Russia if there is an opportunity because of the
seriousness of all the problems we have.
Senator Johnson. Senator Murphy.
Senator Portman. Thank you, Chairman.
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Good to see you all. Thank you very much for being here.
I was one of the long-time skeptics of providing additional
lethal aid to Ukraine in part because from the beginning, this
appeared to me ultimately to be as much or more a political
problem than it was a military problem. I think it is
important, when we have these meetings, to find what the
Russian objectives are so that we can tailor a solution to try
to counter those objectives.
And so, Ambassador Volker, I will just ask that simple
question. My impression is that Russia has never and does not
to this day want to militarily own all of Ukraine. They want to
destabilize the country to a point that ultimately they can
reinstall a client government or a friendly government in Kyiv
to be back into their umbrella, as was the case prior to the
Maidan. That does not mean that military assistance is not
vital. It means, though, that if their ultimate goal is the
political conquest of Ukraine, rather than the military
conquest of Ukraine, it should probably inform the way in which
we are spending money.
Is my assumption about Russian aims wrong?
Ambassador Volker. Well, Senator, that is an excellent
question.
And, no, your assumption is not wrong about Russian
objectives, but I do have a different perspective on how we go
about addressing Russia's policies here.
I agree with you that Russia has a political objective of
dominance over the entire country of Ukraine. It is using
military force as a means of putting pressure on Ukraine toward
that objective. I, therefore, think it is very important that
we provide military assistance to Ukraine to help make sure
that Russian strategy does not work, that they are not able to
increase their military pressure in any effective way. This
gives Ukraine time, space, confidence, and resilience so that
they can withstand that pressure from Russia and not succumb to
the political objectives that Russia has.
So I think there is a political component. There is an
economic component. There is an anti-corruption component to
our strategy, but I do believe that military assistance for the
resilience of Ukraine is a vital component as well.
Senator Murphy. I do not deny that. I think my query is
whether we have the allocation between the military spending,
which is not simply only in the NDAA, it is also the $4 billion
per year that we are spending on a broader European defense
initiative that arises out of this, versus other forms of
support for the Ukrainian regime.
And I guess I will give sort of a different version of the
question to Dr. Polyakova because you have thought a lot about
these other means by which Ukraine has to develop capacities to
fight back against political interference, whether it be cyber-
attacks, disinformation, or the ways in which American aid can
help ease the transition to economic reform. I mean, it is not
outside of the realm of possibility that we could talk about
using our financial largesse to try to incentivize economic
reforms instead of focusing only primarily on military aid.
So are we doing enough in those other sectors right now,
and what more can we be doing?
Dr. Polyakova. Thank you for that question, Senator.
I fully believe that our military support for Ukraine
should be one part of a much broader, full-spectrum strategy to
ensure Ukraine's sovereignty, to ensure Ukraine's continued
democratic progress.
I will note one thing, though. If we look back at Georgia,
as an example, what we see today is that there is no steady,
quote/unquote, border between the occupied territories and the
Georgian Government-controlled territories. What we see is a
slow creep, almost on a daily basis of that contact line.
And in fact, that is likely what we would see in Ukraine if
we pulled back some of our support. In some ways the Russian
activities in the Sea of Azov that focus on basically
economically strangling the Ukrainian ports there, Mariupol and
Berdyansk, is a desire to achieve what the Russians are not
able to achieve militarily by land, which was to take over the
southeastern Ukraine line and to have a land pass directly to
Crimea. They failed at that primarily because Ukrainians stood
their line with U.S. military support.
On the political side, I mentioned in my testimony that we
should continue to impose conditionality on any further
assistance programs, and we should think through in a much more
focused way what that actually means. The reason why Ukraine
has been able to achieve what it has been able to achieve in
the last 5 years in terms of economic reforms, anti-corruption
reforms, energy reforms is because of the so-called sandwich
model where you have pressure from the top, including from the
United States and other international institutions, and
pressure from the bottom from civil society.
So it should be our intention to make sure those civil
society actors remain to put the pressure on the new Ukrainian
Government to do the right thing and that we continue to impose
conditionality on top and loans for reforms. This is basically
the model that I think we should follow, and I do think it is
critical to continue to invest in a U.S. presence through the
European Deterrence Initiative to send a signal to Moscow that
they cannot continue on this creep.
Senator Murphy. I guess my question is whether loans for
reform is an effective enough tool moving forward, and if we
admit that we are going spend billions of dollars in the region
on military aid, why are we not having a conversation about
spending some of that money other than through loans, through
direct grants for other mechanisms as well.
I want to squeeze in one additional question, and that is
back to you, Ambassador Volker.
I thought Chairman Johnson raised an important point about
the need for patriotism, especially at a moment today where
there is a difficult transition of power. Obviously, we do not
require regular agreement in this body as a measure of the
health of our democracy. We fight in democracies, and that is
okay. But there are some pretty powerful members of the
opposition in Ukraine today and a very new, inexperienced
president.
What are our expectations of the opposition? What are the
ways in which we expect them to cooperate, and what are the
ways in which we expect that they would exercise legitimate
opposition? What are the ways in which they might cross that
boundary that we should be watchful for?
Ambassador Volker. Well, thank you.
And I think that is a great framing question because
democracy, as you know as an elected official, is a competitive
process rather than a consensus-based process. People are
competing to see the realization of their ideas.
And I think what we expect from the opposition is to stand
for principles and policies that will advance the interests of
all of Ukraine, the Ukrainian people, and to hold the
government to account, hold the president to account if he is
not doing that, to be competitive in a way that lifts up the
country.
That has not always been the case in Ukraine. We have seen
people in the Rada acting on behalf of private interests and a
great deal of corruption in the country and not really changing
the country sufficiently to advance the interests of the
people.
There is a fresh opportunity with this Rada election that
we are going through right now. It will produce a very
different Rada, very different members of the parliament than
has been the case up to this point. And I do hope that they
play a different kind of role than what we have seen
historically, of one holding the government to account.
If I may add two additional points. One of them is on U.S.
assistance and the broader package there.
We do provide a great deal of other assistance as well. It
is not purely military, including through AID, including in
anti-corruption reform, including economic reform. But the real
big ticket of the economic assistance is coming from the IMF
and to some degree also from the European Union in helping
Ukraine with a fundamentally difficult budgetary problem. And
this, therefore, gives leverage as well. It is important that
we work with the IMF and the European Union to establish the
parameters by which that assistance is given so that Ukraine is
doing what it needs to do to advance the right kinds of
reforms.
And my second point in that area, if I can take the
opportunity to bring it up, is we often talk about corruption
in Ukraine as the problem, and to be sure, it is a problem. But
I also believe that corruption is really a symptom of a bigger
problem, which is the oligarchic system itself, where a handful
of people have disproportionate control over so many levers of
power in the country. And I think that there is an opportunity
with the new president and with the new parliament to pursue an
aggressive effort to implement antitrust legislation, to break
up holdings, and in doing so, create competition. And this
might be something that is done in coordination with the U.S.,
the EU, and the IMF and might be something in which we make the
resources and that kind of assistance contingent upon even more
far-reaching reform in this area than has been the case to
date.
Senator Murphy. And that connects back to your first point
about the legitimate role of the opposition to protect the
interests of the country rather than the interests----
Ambassador Volker. Absolutely. Exactly right, Senator.
Thank you.
Senator Johnson. Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can I ask that a
statement that I have be included in the record at this time?
Senator Johnson. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Senator Menendez follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Robert Menendez
Thank you, Chairman Johnson and Ranking Member Shaheen for holding
this hearing. With Ukraine's recent peaceful transition of power and
Russia's decision to respond by illegally giving Ukrainian citizens
Russian passports, now is a good time to examine Ukraine's progress
over the past 5 years and Russia's constant attempts to undermine
Ukraine's sovereignty and subvert the will of its people.
In February 2014, the people of Ukraine made history. When
President Yanukovic chose to listen to Moscow over his citizens,
Ukrainians stood up for their country in the face of brutal repression
and Russian interference, driving him out with the Revolution of
Dignity. The courage Ukraine's people showed in their calls for
democracy, for independence, and for sovereignty reflect the strong
Ukrainian spirit and serve as an inspiration to us all.
Unfortunately, Vladimir Putin continues to assault Ukraine's
sovereignty and its people. From the illegal invasion of Crimea days
after the Revolution of Dignity, to the ongoing war in the Donbass that
has claimed over 13,000 lives to date, to last November's unprovoked
attack on Ukrainian ships in the Kerch Strait, the Kremlin has
repeatedly breached international law and harmed Ukraine with its
malign activities. Twenty-four Ukrainian sailors remain in a Russian
jail today, nearly 8 months after their illegal capture. Russia must
release these men immediately and end any actions that threaten freedom
of navigation in the Kerch Strait and the Sea of Azov.
I also want to register my continued frustration with the Trump
administration's inexcusably weak response to the 24 sailors'
detention. The sanctions announced on March 15 were late, weak, and
insufficient to make any difference. President Trump had previously
said he would not meet with President Putin until the sailors are
released, but now he plans on meeting Putin at next week's G20 summit.
The President must advocate for the sailors' release, demand that Putin
stop violating Ukraine's sovereignty and restart the peace process.
Implementing Minsk II's provisions must be a top foreign policy
priority for the U.S. I look forward to hearing from Ambassador Volker
about the prospects for Minsk II and the peace process, as well as what
plans the U.S. has for supporting Ukraine in the face of Moscow's
continued malign activities. I also look forward to hearing his ideas
on how the U.S. can be more active in the peace process.
It is clear that Russian aggression against sovereign states like
Ukraine will continue until the rest of the world strongly pushes back.
That is why Senator Graham and I introduced the Defending American
Security from Kremlin Aggression Act of 2019. DASKA would increase
economic, political, and diplomatic pressure on the Russian government
in response to its malign activities in Ukraine and around the world.
DASKA's provisions include sanctions on 24 FSB sailors deemed complicit
in the Kerch Strait attack and sanctions on Russia's shipbuilding
sector if Russia violates freedom of navigation in the Kerch Strait or
anywhere else in the world. This is what a strong response to Russia
looks like. Passing DASKA will send a strong signal to Moscow that the
U.S. will not take their illegal actions lying down. It will also show
those bearing the brunt of Russian aggression, like Ukraine, that we
stand with them in their fight for sovereignty and democracy.
One particular area where I believe the United States can stand
with the Government of Ukraine is with care for veterans and injured
soldiers. Ukraine is in the process of setting up its own Veterans
Administration (VA) to care for the many veterans of the ongoing war
with Russia. Ukraine would benefit from American insights on
establishing and running a VA, and I urge the administration to provide
advice and support to Ukraine as it develops this critical institution.
I further understand that the Armed Forces of Ukraine are in need of
Mobile Army Surgical Hospitals, more commonly known as MASH units, and
that the U.S. Armed Forces have older MASH units that are not currently
in use. The U.S. should transfer those unused MASH units to the
Government of Ukraine for use by its Armed Forces. This simple action
could save countless Ukrainian soldiers' lives.
Ukraine's government and people are also working to build up their
democracy and restore the rule of law. Since the Revolution of Dignity
Ukraine has made a number of important reforms to tackle corruption and
strength democratic institutions. This April saw a peaceful transition
of power to Ukraine's new President Volodymyr Zelensky, who has spoken
of his desire to implement strong anti-corruption measures. However,
there is still a lot of work to be done. I am particularly concerned
about the influence of oligarchs in Ukraine's political system. I would
like today's witnesses to address the future of anti-corruption and
rule of law efforts in Ukraine under President Zelensky and what the
United States is doing in support of them.
The Ukrainian people have been clear in their vision for their
country: a fair, free and transparent democracy with opportunities for
all its people and strong ties to Western allies who share those
values. The Revolution of Dignity five years ago demonstrated their
resolve to stand up for that vision in the face of incredible pressure.
The United States must stand with the people of Ukraine in their fight
for the sovereign, democratic country they want and deserve.
Senator Menendez. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate you holding
this hearing.
Ahead of last December's G20 meeting, President Trump said
he would not meet with President Putin until Russia released
the Ukrainian ships and sailors that it illegally detained in
the Kerch Strait. Russia still holds those 24 sailors and the
ships. Yet, President Trump said last week that he will meet
with Putin at the upcoming G20 summit.
Now, that is not necessarily a bad thing in and of itself
if--if--the President is clear and unequivocal about the
remarks he makes to Putin on this, as well as other things,
including our elections.
Ambassador Herbst, what should President Trump--I am not
going to ask Ambassador Volker because that would put him in a
difficult position, not that I am averse to that. But in any
event, what should President Trump be saying to President Putin
about not only the sailors but the ongoing occupation of
Crimea, the conflict in the Donbas? What is the statement that
he should be making to him both privately as well as publicly?
Ambassador Herbst. I think that the policies of the
administration vis-a-vis Russia and vis-a-vis Ukraine have been
sound policies, meaning on the sanctions on the Kremlin for its
aggression, the important decision on supplying Javelins to
Ukraine. It would be wonderful if, when the President saw
Putin, he were to say to him things that reflected completely
the policy of the administration. The fact that that has not
happened in the past has raised confusion and other feelings as
well, which I think you are well aware of.
So, again, from my standpoint, if when he sees Putin, he
were to say unequivocally, as he has said at certain points,
you know, Mr. Putin, I cannot improve relations with you until
you stop your aggression in Ukraine that would be a good thing
for him to say, in fact, to say not just privately but also
publicly.
Senator Menendez. Now, the sanctions on Russia--and I have
been the architect of a fair number of those. But the ones
following the Kerch attack were very late. They were weak, and
they were clearly ineffective. The fact of the matter is the
sailors are still in detention.
It is abundantly clear that President Putin will keep
interfering with the affairs of sovereign states such as
Ukraine unless the rest of the world firmly and strongly pushes
back.
I appreciate, Ambassador Herbst, that in your statement you
talked about the legislation that Senator Graham and I have
introduce, the Defending American Security from Kremlin
Aggression Act. DASKA, as we call it, would increase economic,
political, and diplomatic pressure on the Russian Government in
response to its malign activities in Ukraine and around the
world; the provisions, including sanctions on the 24 FSB
sailors deemed complicit in the Kerch Strait attack; sanctions
on Russia's shipbuilding sector, if Russia violates freedom of
navigation in the Kerch Strait or anywhere else in the world.
That is a hard-hitting sanction.
And I came in at the tail end of Mr. Carafano, I guess in
response to some question, talking about sanctions. My view is
that we only have a handful of peaceful diplomacy tools at our
disposal. The use of our aid and trade to induce countries and
leaders to act in a certain way, international opinion to the
extent that a country and/or leader is actually subjected to
that, and then the denial of aid, trade, and access to our
financial institutions as a consequence to move them in a
different direction. Other than that, after 27 years of foreign
policy work, I have not figured out what other foreign peaceful
diplomacy tools we have.
Now, Russia uses its military in pursuit of its foreign
policy objectives. That is something we do not do.
So in light of that, should we not be passing something
like DASKA to ultimately force back, keeping all the elements
of the stool together--I am all for that, the energy side, the
diplomacy side, and all of that. But I think Putin only
understands strength at the end of the day, and at the end of
the day, having real consequences in the sanctions,
particularly in some sectors of the Russian economy, I think
would be very significant. What are your views on that?
Ambassador Herbst. I think Congress has played an essential
positive role overall in our policy towards Russia and Ukraine,
but particularly in the sanctions area. What you folks did in
the summer of 2017 was absolutely critical, and I salute you
for it.
I spoke positively of the legislation you and Senator
Graham introduced, and I think it would have a positive impact
now. I think that, for whatever reasons, congressional
encouragement is necessary both to move Washington and, for
that matter, in a less direct way but still a real way,
Brussels in the right direction.
Senator Menendez. Ambassador Volker, why are we not we
doing this, whether it be by legislative action--I do not hold
you responsible for that, but certainly some of these things
could be pursued by the administration separately of
legislative action.
Ambassador Volker. Yes, and that is exactly what I was
going to say too, Senator. So thank you.
I think the administration has increased sanctions
periodically over time throughout the course of the
administration. We are in a stronger position now with more
pieces of the puzzle referenced than before. We have Crimea. We
have Minsk. We have the Kerch Strait now. We have the
elections. We have the Skripals. There has been a growth of
sanctions against Russia.
Speaking just from my experience, I have always seen a
difference of view between various administrations, not only
this one, and the Congress as to who should be in the driver's
seat on sanctions. It is always a question as to how much
leeway the administration has in implementation versus how much
the Congress----
Senator Menendez. But should we not be doing more? You just
listed all of the reasons that Russia deserves a firmer
response. And the simple question is, should we not be doing
more?
Ambassador Volker. We have been doing more, and I believe
we will continue to do more.
Senator Menendez. Well, let me ask you this. When I was the
chairman of this committee, I offered the Ukraine Freedom
Support Act, and I advocated then with President Obama to
robustly help the Ukrainians. And now in response to Russia's
illegal actions in the Kerch Strait, I called on this
administration to increase security assistance to Ukraine,
including providing lethal maritime assistance and weapons, and
to assist Ukraine's efforts to improve its maritime domain
awareness.
Have we, the United States, taken any steps to increase its
support for Ukraine's security?
Ambassador Volker. We have, and we appreciate the
appropriation that has been made by Congress, $250 million FMF
for this year. The Pentagon is moving forward with that. There
was just an announcement today of how we are going to deal with
$125 million of that. And the priorities that you listed,
maritime domain awareness, coastal defense, air defense, those
are very much the priorities that are under discussion between
us and the Ukrainians right now.
Senator Menendez. One quick question. I understand the
armed forces of Ukraine are in need of mobile army surgical
hospitals, or MASH units, and that the U.S. armed forces have
older MASH units that are not currently in use.
Have we considered transferring some of those unused MASH
units to the Government of Ukraine?
Ambassador Volker. I do not know the specific answer to
that. I would be happy to track it down. There is no reason why
we would not.
Senator Menendez. Get back to me because if we want people
to fight for their own country, one of the things we have to do
is they have to be taken care of at the end of the day.
Ambassador Volker. Absolutely.
Senator Menendez. Mr. Chairman, if I may have one more
moment.
Senator Johnson. Absolutely.
Senator Menendez. Thank you.
Last question. I heard your answer about President
Zelensky. I hope that is where we are headed. I know he came
into office on a strong anti-corruption platform. But there are
concerns about his connections to certain Ukrainian oligarchs.
You talked about the whole challenge of oligarchs in the
Ukraine as an undermining element and particularly Igor
Kolomoisky who is under suspicion of stealing money from a bank
he co-owned. President Zelensky has denied that Kolomoisky, who
owned the TV that aired his comedy show, or any other oligarch
controls him.
Is that the view of the State Department?
Ambassador Volker. I think the view is that President
Zelensky has said all of the right things. He does not have the
power in his hands right now to do what he has said he will do.
He has zero votes in the Rada right now. We believe that he
deserves the benefit of the doubt, and we want to stand by the
principles and the policies of reform and fighting the
domination of the Ukrainian political system by oligarchs such
as Kolomoisky. We hope that he is able to amass the
independence and to execute what he says he will do. And it is
our intention to be both helpful and to hold him to account if
he does not.
Senator Menendez. I will be looking at the accountability
aspect.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Johnson. Senator Barrasso.
Senator Barrasso. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Volker, good to see you again.
I wanted to talk about illicit coal exports for a second.
Ukraine's minister for temporarily occupied territories and
internally displaced persons recent stated, quote, Ukraine is
aware of Russia's scheme for smuggling coal illegally mined
from a part of the occupied Donbas to the ports of different
countries. The coal is reportedly being transported from
eastern Ukraine across the border to Russia where it is
repackaged and relabeled and then sent to Europe.
I am concerned by the reports detailing the illegal sale of
millions of dollars of sanctioned coal from the Ukrainian
breakaway regions often using Russian businessmen as proxies
and as intermediaries.
So can you just share? Is the administration currently
investigating this trade in coal, the mechanisms used to
introduce it into the international market, and the individuals
involved in this illicit trade?
Ambassador Volker. Senator Barrasso, if I may, I would like
to offer to get back to you with any specifics on that. But I
can say that I share the assessment that this is what is
happening. Russia has occupied the areas and then a number of
people with connections are getting access to resources,
repackaging, relabeling, and trying to make a profit out of
this.
Russia is not investing in the Donbas. So they are not
building new things. They are not fixing mines. A lot of things
have gone into disrepair. But to the extent that they are able
to extract from there, yes, indeed, it is our perception they
are doing so.
Senator Barrasso. And then also for Ambassador Volker, as
well as Ambassador Herbst, if I could please. I want to talk
about Germany's efforts with regard to Ukraine and specifically
Nord Stream 2, which I believe is Putin's pipeline. It is a
German trap I believe.
A year ago, when meeting with Ukrainian President
Poroshenko, Chancellor Merkel said I made very clear that a
Nord Stream 2 project is not possible without clarity on the
future transit role of Ukraine.
So what guarantees is Germany seeking? What actions has
Germany taken to ensure that Gazprom continues to export gas
through Ukraine? Could you just kind of talk about that topic
and your thoughts on it?
Ambassador Herbst. You are right, Senator, that Chancellor
Merkel has said that Russia should guarantee a substantial flow
of gas through Ukraine even as Nord Stream 2 goes into
operation.
But Moscow has basically been flouting this requirement to
the Chancellor in a very public way for the last several
months. Both Prime Minister Medvedev, the Russian prime
minister, and the energy minister Novak have said that, yes,
they are happy to do this to send gas through Ukraine, first,
if the economic conditions are viable--and that is a reasonable
condition--but also if Gazprom in Russia and Naftogaz in
Ukraine have no more issues on their bilateral agenda. That is
a completely unacceptable condition because what they want,
they want the Ukrainian firm Naftogaz to give up the court
settlements it has won, which will cost Gazprom billions of
dollars. And they have also insisted--this is Medvedev's
words--that, quote ``Ukraine must be stable for this to
happen.'' And we know that the Kremlin characterizes unfairly
Ukraine as unstable. So Moscow has shown it has no interest in
meeting the Chancellor's condition.
One more point. Multiple times over the past several
months, Russian officials have told Western and Central
European governments that the gas flow through Ukraine's
pipeline from Russia will end on December 31st this year.
So the point is zero progress and, in fact, I would say
regression on this issue. And so far, we have seen no reaction
from Germany.
Senator Barrasso. Ambassador Volker, anything you would
like to add to that?
Ambassador Volker. Well, I agree with John's assessment on
that. I think that Germany has recognized in some ways that its
pursuit of Nord Stream 2 puts Ukraine in a difficult position.
It has, therefore, tried a few things such as negotiating with
Russia a guaranteed amount of gas transit. Russia has no
interest in this, and Germany is kind of in a quandary. They
want to pursue the project for their own reasons, and at the
same time, they know some of the consequences of it.
I do believe also it is appropriate that we continue to put
pressure on it because it is not just us but many countries in
Europe are concerned about this development, especially those
in Central and Eastern Europe that would be more vulnerable to
Russian pressure if it goes forward.
Senator Barrasso. One of the things a number of us are
trying to do is put that pressure on through some legislation
called the ESCAPE Act. President Trump and the administration
do continue to raise concerns about Russia's Nord Stream 2.
The ESCAPE Act does a number of things. It is something we
have recently introduced. It directs the U.S. Permanent
Representative to NATO to encourage NATO member states to work
together to achieve energy security. It creates a transatlantic
energy strategy focused on increasing the energy security of
our NATO allies and partners and increasing American energy
exports to those countries. It requires the Secretary of Energy
to expedite approval of natural gas exports to NATO allies. It
authorizes mandatory U.S. sanctions on the development of
Russian energy pipeline projects such as Nord Stream 2. And I
think, Ambassador Volker, you and I have talked about this in
the past at the McCain Institute on this whole topic.
Do you support efforts to enhance our allies' energy
security and reduce the threat it poses to NATO countries? And
I would ask that you would look at this legislation. If you
have some additional thoughts on ways we can even strengthen
it, we would appreciate your efforts.
Ambassador Volker. Okay. I will be happy to take that on
board. I cannot comment on the specifics of the legislation,
but the principles behind what you are saying are exactly where
the administration is. You may have seen President Trump's
meeting with President Duda this past week in which he was very
outspoken on this issue. He is very concerned about Europe
increasing its dependence on Russian gas as opposed to
decreasing it and looking for ways to work with Europe and
incentivize Europe to open that up more, whether that is
through U.S. LNG--and Secretary Perry was obviously the lead in
our delegation going to Ukraine--or generally. It does not have
not be American gas, but it is making sure that Europe
maintains its own freedom of decision so that it is not
creating a situation of political compromise with respect to
Russia.
Senator Barrasso. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Senator Barrasso.
One of the things I am concerned, dealing with so many
Eastern and Central European countries that are not part of the
EU, are not part of NATO, I think we have all seen the positive
effect, positive influence of their attempting to join these
organizations. They are able to enact reforms that they would
not be able to enact otherwise. We just saw that with North
Macedonia and the Prespa Agreement with Greece. If we do not
have that capability--I think you all agree with the fact that
Ukraine should move toward eventual NATO membership. Is that
correct or incorrect?
Ambassador Volker. Absolutely, and that is the policy of
the administration.
Senator Johnson. There are certainly some voices in
America--I do not agree--that are concerned about that. You
know, why would we want to obligate ourselves to come to the
defense of some of these smaller countries? We were in Munich
for the security conference, and we met with Secretary-General
Jens Stoltenberg. One of the members raised that issue, that
devil advocate position, and the Secretary-General said we want
to enlarge NATO because a larger NATO is just good. It is a
defensive alliance. It literally threatens no one.
So, again, I just wanted to get on the record you all would
agree that we should be moving forward and cooperate with these
nations that want to join the European Union, want to join
NATO. It is a good thing. It is a positive thing. It helps them
provide reforms.
Does anybody want to comment on that?
Dr. Carafano. Yes.
Dr. Polyakova. Yes.
Ambassador Herbst. I agree.
Ambassador Volker. I will be a little more expansive, if it
is okay, Senator.
Senator Johnson. Sure.
Ambassador Volker. But the great thing about NATO is that
it is an alliance of free countries that are banding together
to provide collective defense and that deters attacks against
them. And that creates a secure space in which people are able
to govern themselves as democracies without threat from
outside. There is no reason why that should apply only to some
people in Europe and not other people in Europe. If everybody
shares the same values and everybody faces security threats,
why should it not be the case that all people have the same
opportunity? That has been the basis of NATO's policy on
enlargement since the time that it first became possible after
the fall of the Berlin Wall.
Now, NATO has always insisted and the U.S. has insisted
that countries be ready. They have to meet the standards of
doing so. And so we went through a long period of time, 10
years, from the fall of the Berlin Wall to when Poland first
acquired NATO membership 20 years ago. I think Ukraine still
has work to do. Others still have work to do. But the direction
on this and the principles behind it have to be crystal clear.
Senator Johnson. So, again, NATO is a defensive alliance. I
do believe you achieve peace through strength.
I am highly concerned about our, what I would consider
weak, response to the Kerch Strait aggression. I have led two
resolutions. One we passed last Congress. This one we passed
the Foreign Relations Committee trying to get it attached to
the NDAA--I think we have over 60 Senate sponsors--calling for
the United States to lead a strong multinational freedom of
navigation operation, to preposition maritime assets in the
Black Sea.
I know a number of you mentioned this in your testimony.
Some of you want to comment on what we really should do? I
mean, how strong should our response be as not a kinetic
military response but a military show of strength to keep the
Black Sea and the Sea of Azov open to navigation? Because that
is obviously what the Putin strategy is, is squeezing out those
ports and really taking control of the Black Sea.
Mr. Carafano.
Dr. Carafano. First of all, I would say from a military
perspective--and I listed some of these in my prepared
remarks--that the number one objective, particularly in
military assistance to help Ukraine, is building up their
maritime capacity. I think that is clear.
Senator Johnson. How many ships did they lose when Russia
illegally annexed----
Dr. Carafano. Three. I mean, they have virtually no
capacity to either have awareness of their own maritime domain
or to conduct any law enforcement or operations in that domain.
I do not think that is a big stretcher. I mean, their capacity
is near zero. Right? And so I think building up that capacity
rapidly and kind of taking that open space that we have created
for the Russians off the table and making it a more competitive
space for the Ukrainians--we have seen the impact that has had
in the land domain, and I think the sea domain is--as bad of a
problem they have in air defense, that is a bigger problem. But
in the maritime domain, there is a gap that can be closed
relatively quickly.
But in conjunction with that, it is not just important
about capacity building for Ukraine, it is important about NATO
and partner operations in the Black Sea area and having a
sustained--it does not have to be a permanent but a sustained
naval presence that the Russians have to take account for
within the context of what can be done both in the NATO
environment and what can be done bilaterally with our partners
in the region.
Senator Johnson. Senator Shaheen has a couple questions,
and I will close it out. I actually have a bunch. I will keep
you here for a little bit longer.
Senator Shaheen. Well, I just wanted to follow up on
Senator Johnson's question about what might have been a more
aggressive response in the Black Sea or a more robust response
in the Black Sea is probably a better way to put it in the
Kerch Strait. And that is, what kind of a message does it send
to other adversaries of the United States who are watching our
response on an issue like this to, for example, what is
happening with Iran in the Strait of Hormuz? And can you talk
about whether there is a connection and how important it is to
have some kind of a consistent policy in response to these
kinds of incidents?
Dr. Carafano. Can I just make one short comment? And then I
will turn to my colleagues.
I think the great sin was not the response. The great sin
was we knew this was coming. We knew the Russians were prepping
for this. We had months and months' notice, and yet we were a
deer in the headlights when it actually happened. That was a
sin.
I would contrast with what just happened in the Gulf
because the administration actually knew it was coming and they
prepositioned assets and capabilities to deal with it before it
happened. And I think in the Ukraine when we stop Putin in one
place, he is just going to look for something else. The real
challenge for Kurt and the administration is we need to be
constantly having situational awareness so we recognize where
the next Russian poke in the eye is coming from and we have a
response in place to deal with that before we get poked.
Dr. Polyakova. I think, fortunately, to follow up on my
colleague's comments, the Russians do make it relatively easy
for us to know from where the next poke is coming because the
incident in November in the Kerch Strait was preceded by months
of harassment of commercial vessels and detentions by the
Russian FSB. And so we knew and we continue to know, and the
Russians are basically testing the waters, in this case
literally. When they see no response, they know they can move
forward. That is exactly what happened in November. And the
fact that we waited 3 months, until March 15, to impose any
sort of U.S. and ally-coordinated sanctions, sent a very clear
message, this is not a priority to the United States and it is
not a priority to the Western alliance.
And I think in terms of setting a precedent that is
absolutely the right way to think about this, Senator.
Certainly other authoritarian regimes, including China and
Iran, who have grander aspirations for territory are observing
very closely how the West responds to Russian aggression in
Ukraine. Think of China's aspirations in the South China Sea
and vis-a-vis Taiwan. There is no question in my mind that
authoritarian regimes are learning from our inaction and our
lack of resolve, and that sets a very dangerous precedent.
Senator Shaheen. Ambassador Herbst.
Ambassador Herbst. I just want to enlarge on that a little
bit.
Jim correctly pointed out that we were ready in the Gulf.
But while Russia in my judgment under Putin is the greatest
immediate danger to our national security, the longer-term
danger is China. And in fact, so we were very weak with the
Straits of Kerch incident. I think we have not been as strong
as we could be regarding China's island building activity in
the South China Sea. So I suspect looking at this as a Chinese
policymaker might, they see reluctance in confronting Russia
there in the Sea of Azov or rather the Straits of Kerch. Yes,
they went after Iran, but Iran is a second or a third-rate
power. They have also been a little bit weak in coming after
us, the Chinese, in the South China Sea. So in that sense, it
is very bad precedent.
Senator Shaheen. So, Ambassador Volker, do you want to
defend our lack of action?
Ambassador Volker. Well, I agree with you, Senator, that it
is very important that we have a tempo of activity. I did go to
Ukraine in the end of February. I helped push forward. And then
we had a visit of the USS Donald Ross, a guided missile
destroyer, to Odessa, and I wanted to go and make sure this
attracted some visibility. We have increased the tempo of U.S.
presence in the Black Sea. And I think significantly we have
also gone to NATO and urged NATO establish a strategy for a
greater presence in the Black Sea.
But I agree with you that more can and should be done. This
should be a sense of the beginning which should, by no means,
be the end of what we see as possible.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you all very much for your
very important testimony today and your continued action in
Ukraine. We very much appreciate what you are doing.
And, Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this important
hearing.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
I have just been handed a note I do not have time to ask
you all these questions. I may submit some for the record.
One of the things--and I think we will probably hold a
hearing on this--is an evaluation of sanctions, what are the
most effective, what are not effective, what maybe do more harm
than good. I think that is something we really do need to
evaluate.
I would like to explore a little bit more in terms of the
economy of Ukraine, the oligarch control, what Ukraine needs to
do to move past there--the oligarchs. And by the way, I think
President Zelensky might be in a perfect position to do that.
But let me just kind of end the hearing on a more positive
note. The improvement in terms of the Ukrainian military--I
mean, that came through in your testimony. That is a pretty
good thing that they have been able to hold off Russian
aggression. It would have been nice if we could stop it and
reverse it, but that is in the future.
And then just Ukraine's economic potential. It is enormous
if they can shed the corruption, if they can abide by the rule
of law. I mean, Ukraine can just be the bread basket of Europe.
It has such great potential. So it really is about America
supporting the Ukrainian people. Their courage that they showed
in the Maidan, with their votes for President Poroshenko and
now with President Zelensky.
Let me end on this note. During President Poroshenko's
inauguration, the comment I made to him is you have the
opportunity to be Ukraine's George Washington. His reaction was
wow. He had not really thought of that. And I meant it from the
standpoint of being the father of his country to enact those
very important reforms. I think you can play it forward, the
way he behaved in the transition of power. And that might have
been the most important thing that George Washington did for
this nation, but I think the most important thing that
President Poroshenko did for his nation, a peaceful transition
of power.
Again, I will just reaffirm what I told those legislators
from the Ukrainian parliament. It is so important that they act
as patriots and they come together to really rid their country
of the corruption, enact that rule of law so it can realize its
full potential.
So, again, I just want to thank all of you for your
excellent testimony, both written and oral. And this will be
continued because it is so important for America to support the
Ukrainian people.
With that, the hearing record will remain open for the
submission of statements or questions until the close of
business on Thursday, June 20th.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:20 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
[all]