[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
EXAMINING THE DOMESTIC TERRORISM THREAT
IN THE WAKE OF THE ATTACK ON THE
U.S. CAPITOL
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 4, 2021
__________
Serial No. 117-1
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
44-243 PDF WASHINGTON : 2021
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas John Katko, New York
James R. Langevin, Rhode Island Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey Clay Higgins, Louisiana
J. Luis Correa, California Michael Guest, Mississippi
Elissa Slotkin, Michigan Dan Bishop, North Carolina
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey
Al Green, Texas Ralph Norman, South Carolina
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Mariannette Miller-Meeks, Iowa
Eric Swalwell, California Diana Harshbarger, Tennessee
Dina Titus, Nevada Andrew S. Clyde, Georgia
Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida
Kathleen M. Rice, New York Jake LaTurner, Kansas
Val Butler Demings, Florida Peter Meijer, Michigan
Nanette Diaz Barragan, California Kat Cammack, Florida
Josh Gottheimer, New Jersey August Pfluger, Texas
Elaine G. Luria, Virginia Andrew R. Garbarino, New York
Tom Malinowski, New Jersey
Ritchie Torres, New York
Hope Goins, Staff Director
Daniel Kroese, Minority Staff Director
Natalie Nixon, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable John Katko, a Representative in Congress From the
State of New York, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
Witnesses
Mr. Christopher Rodriguez, Ph.D., Director, Homeland Security and
Emergency Management Agency, District of Columbia:
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
Ms. Elizabeth Neumann, Founder and Managing Director, Neu Summit
Strategies and Former Assistant Secretary for Counterterrorism
and Threat Prevention, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 11
Prepared Statement............................................. 13
Mr. Jonathan Greenblatt, Chief Executive Officer, Anti-Defamation
League:
Oral Statement................................................. 21
Prepared Statement............................................. 23
Mr. Brian Michael Jenkins, Senior Advisor to the Rand President,
The Rand Corporation:
Oral Statement................................................. 41
Prepared Statement............................................. 43
For the Record
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security:
The Year in Hate and Extremism 2020............................ 102
The Role of Guns & Armed Extremism in the Attack on the U.S.
Capitol...................................................... 108
Letter From The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights 121
Letter From Greg Nojeim, Center for Democracy & Technology..... 125
Appendix
Question From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson for Christopher
Rodriguez...................................................... 127
Questions From Ranking Member John Katko for Christopher
Rodriguez...................................................... 127
Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson for Elizabeth Neumann. 132
Questions From Honorable Donald M. Payne for Elizabeth Neumann... 132
Questions From Honorable James Langevin for Elizabeth Neumann.... 132
Questions From Ranking Member John Katko for Elizabeth Neumann... 133
Questions From Ranking Member John Katko for Jonathan Greenblatt. 133
EXAMINING THE DOMESTIC TERRORISM THREAT IN THE WAKE OF THE ATTACK ON
THE U.S. CAPITOL
----------
Thursday, February 4, 2021
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. via
Webex, Hon. Bennie G. Thompson (Chairman of the committee)
presiding.
Present: Representatives Thompson, Jackson Lee, Langevin,
Payne, Correa, Slotkin, Green, Clarke, Swalwell, Titus, Watson
Coleman, Rice, Demings, Barragan, Gottheimer, Luria,
Malinowski, Torres, Katko, McCaul, Higgins, Bishop, Van Drew,
Norman, Miller-Meeks, Harshbarger, Clyde, Gimenez, LaTurner,
Meijer, Cammack, Pfluger, Garbarino.
Chairman Thompson. The Committee on Homeland Security will
come to order. The committee is meeting today to receive
testimony on examining the domestic terrorism threat in the
wake of the attack on the U.S. Capitol.
Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare the
committee in recess at any point.
Today the committee is meeting to examine the threat of
domestic terrorism in the wake of the attack on the U.S.
Capitol on January 6. I would like to start by thanking the men
and women of the U.S. Capitol Police, National Guard, Secret
Service, Metropolitan Police Department, and all other law
enforcement agencies that worked to keep us safe that day and
in the days since.
I also want to take a moment to remember Officer Brian
Sicknick, who lost his life in the line of duty, and other
members of law enforcement who responded to the attack who have
tragically passed away.
Several others tragically lost their lives during the
domestic terrorism attack on our Nation, incited by the former
President and his enablers seeking to overturn the results of a
legitimate election.
As Members of this committee are keenly aware, this act of
terrorism was not an isolated incident. During the 116th
Congress, the committee held 11 hearings that looked at various
domestic terrorism threats. Over a year ago, FBI Director Wray
sat before us and warned that domestic terrorism cases were at
an all-time high, with racially-motivated violent extremists
posing the greatest threat.
Then, in July 2020, we received testimony from domestic
terrorism expert J.J. MacNab that cautioned, and I quote,
``that the upcoming election will spark one or more violent
events if the President loses his reelection bid.
``[His supporters] want him to continue, and they have
talked about civil war now for years if he does not.''
Last September, Director Wray testified again before us,
saying that racially-motivated violent extremists make up the
largest portion of domestic terrorist cases that his agents are
investigating.
Then, in October, just 4 months before the attack on the
Capitol, the Department of Homeland Security's threat
assessment identified racially-motivated violent extremists,
specifically White Supremacist extremists, as ``the most
persistent and lethal threat in the homeland.''
Today, we will begin to shed light on why these warnings
were not heeded. The irrefutable fact is that the threat of
right-wing, and, more specifically, White Nationalist
terrorism, has been growing for years.
The previous administration failed to address this threat
appropriately, and on January 6 we saw the result right here at
the U.S. Capitol. I witnessed the event unfold first-hand from
my view in the House Gallery, where we had gathered to observe
the counting of the electoral votes as required by the
Constitution.
I am hopeful that the Biden administration will work to do
a better job of confronting this threat, which has been allowed
to fester and even encouraged in recent years. Already DHS has
taken action as the Department issued a rare warning last week
about the heightened threat from domestic terrorism.
I look forward to engaging newly-confirmed Secretary of
Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas on this critical issue.
President Biden also tasked the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence, DHS, and FBI, who are conducting a
comprehensive assessment of the threat. I commend this swift
action.
I also urge the administration to prioritize the report on
domestic terrorism required by the Domestic and International
Terrorism DATA Act, which is now 7 months past due.
As Members of the Homeland Security Committee, we, too,
have our work cut out for us in this Congress. This committee
held 11 hearings last Congress on the threat of domestic
terrorism, but clearly much more remains to be done. During a
time in which ``both sides-ism'' runs rampant through our
politics, I implore Members of this committee to follow the
threats wherever they may lead. Any denial or attempt to
distract from the threat at hand won't help us address the
problem that many have been and continue to sound the alarm
about.
The conversations will be difficult, and they should be.
This threat has long plagued and preyed on the most vulnerable
in our society. But we must work together to find solutions.
Our democracy and American lives are at stake.
Today, we have a panel of experts that will outline the
domestic terror threat as it stands, identify what was missed
prior to January 6, and present what we ought to do moving
forward. I look forward to their testimony and their responses
to our questions so we can find a path to keep us all safe.
[The statement of Chairman Thompson follows:]
Statement of Chairman Bennie G. Thompson
February 4, 2021
Today the committee is meeting to examine the threat of domestic
terrorism in the wake of the attack on the U.S. Capitol on January 6. I
would like to start by thanking the men and women of the U.S. Capitol
Police, National Guard, Secret Service, Metropolitan Police Department,
and all other law enforcement agencies that worked to keep us safe that
day and in the days since.
I also want to take a moment to remember Officer Brian Sicknick,
who lost his life in the line of duty, and other members of law
enforcement who responded to the attack who have tragically passed
away. Several others tragically lost their lives during the domestic
terrorism attack on our Nation, incited by the former President and his
enablers seeking to overturn the results of a legitimate election.
As Members of this committee are keenly aware, this act of
terrorism was not an isolated incident. During the 116th Congress, the
committee held 11 hearings that looked at various domestic terrorism
threats. Over a year ago, FBI Director Wray sat before us and warned
that domestic terrorism cases were at an all-time high, with racially-
motivated violent extremists posing the greatest threat.
Then in July 2020, we received testimony from domestic terrorism
expert J.J. MacNab that cautioned, and I quote, ``that the upcoming
election will spark one or more violent events if the President loses
his re-election bid . . . [his supporters] want him to continue and
they have talked about Civil War now for years if he does not.''
Last September Director Wray testified again before us saying that
racially-motivated violent extremists make up the largest portion of
domestic terrorist cases that his agents are investigating. Then in
October, just 4 months before the attack on the Capitol, the Department
of Homeland Security's threat assessment identified racially-motivated
violent extremists--specifically White Supremacist extremists--as ``the
most persistent and lethal threat in the homeland.''
Today, we will begin to shed light on why these warnings were not
heeded. The irrefutable fact is that the threat of right-wing and more
specifically, White Nationalist terrorism has been growing for years.
The previous administration failed to address this threat
appropriately, and on January 6 we saw the result right here at the
U.S. Capitol. I witnessed the events unfold first-hand from my view in
the House Gallery, where we had gathered to observe the counting of the
electoral votes as required by the Constitution.
I am hopeful that the Biden administration will work to do a better
job of confronting this threat, which has been allowed to fester and
even encouraged in recent years. Already, DHS has taken action as the
Department issued a rare warning last week about the heightened threat
from domestic terrorism. I look forward to engaging newly-confirmed
Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas on this critical
issue.
President Biden also tasked the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, DHS, and FBI with conducting a comprehensive assessment
of the threat. I commend this swift action. I also urge the
administration to also prioritize the report on domestic terrorism
required by the ``Domestic and International Terrorism DATA Act,''
which is now 7 months past due.
As Members of the Homeland Security Committee--we too have our work
cut out for us in Congress. This committee held 11 hearings last
Congress on the threat of domestic terrorism, but clearly much more
remains to be done. And during a time in which ``both sides-ism'' run
rampant through our politics, I implore Members of this committee to
follow the threats--wherever they may lead. Any denial or attempt to
distract from the threat at hand won't help us address the problem--
that many have been and continue to sound the alarm about.
These conversations will be difficult, and they should be. This
threat has long plagued and preyed on the most vulnerable in our
society. But we must work together to find solutions--our democracy and
American lives are at stake.
Today, we have a panel of expert witnesses that will outline the
domestic terror threat as it stands, identify what was missed prior to
January 6, and present what we ought to do moving forward. I look
forward to their testimony and their responses to our questions so we
can find a path to keep us all safe.
Chairman Thompson. With that, I recognize the Ranking
Member, the gentleman from New York, Mr. Katko, for an opening
statement.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your
comments.
I appreciate being here with all of you today, and welcome
to the witnesses.
I am honored to serve with all of you and with all of our
colleagues in the 117th Congress and recognize how timely and
necessary today's hearing is.
This year will mark the 20th anniversary of the September
11 terrorist attacks, the very tragedy that necessitated the
creation of the Department of Homeland Security and this
committee.
In the days and months following the deadliest terror
attack on U.S. soil, Americans of all views came together to
unify against the threat of foreign terrorists. Like so many
challenges in our Nation's history, we emerged stronger than
ever.
To confront the emerging threats to our homeland today, we
can't play politics with National security. That is why, Mr.
Chairman, I appreciate your partnership as we have set out to
ensure that this committee remains above the fray and focused
on solving problems.
Today, we sit here just shy of 20 years after 9/11 to
examine the increasingly prevalent and troubling threat from
violent extremists, not from some distant land but from here at
home.
The threat posed by domestic violent extremists may be new
to many of us, but it is not new for our country. In the 1960's
and 1970's, left-wing extremists known as the Weather
Underground carried out dozens of bombings, including one right
here inside the U.S. Capitol. In fact, in an 18-month period
between 1971 and 1972, extremist groups conducted over 2,500
bombings here in the United States.
Three decades later, an anti-Government extremist planned
and carried out the deadliest home-grown attack in United
States history, killing 168 people with a truck bomb at a
Federal building in Oklahoma City.
The sad reality is that there will always be those who use
ideology and politics as an excuse to commit violence. It is
our responsibility to see to it that they are not successful.
Over the past 12 months we have seen a marked increase in
the activity of domestic violent extremists. In July, amid
Nation-wide protests, extremists in Portland set fire to police
stations and attacked a Federal courthouse. In December, a man
in Nashville detonated a bomb planted in a recreational
vehicle, killing himself, injuring 8 others, and disabling a
critical telecommunications facility.
Just last month right-wing extremists attacked the United
States Capitol. Five people died on that dark day, including a
Capitol police officer who was laid to rest this week. Just
like 9/11, we will never forget. We will never forget the
assault on the heart of our democracy on January 6. It was a
very difficult thing to watch unfold.
While our Nation's law enforcement and National security
agencies are better prepared to combat emerging threats like
domestic extremism than in previous years, much more needs to
be done to bolster information sharing among Federal, State,
and local partners.
While investigations are on-going, I am concerned that our
counterterrorism efforts continue to be hindered by
bureaucratic silos, a failure to share the necessary
intelligence, and then to act on that intelligence.
The Department of Homeland Security is central to our
Nation's effort to protect against terrorist and extremist
violence here at home, and it is imperative that we ensure it
is well-equipped for that mission.
It is also our job here at the Committee on Homeland
Security to better understand what motivates these extremists
and ultimately how to stop them. Radicalization of all sorts
that leads to any violence should be unacceptable across the
board.
With that in mind, I want to encourage all of my colleagues
to rise above partisan politics and work together to examine
these issues and find solutions. We must do the job our
constituents sent us here to do by being honest about the
challenges facing our country from violent extremism, even when
it may not be politically expedient to do so. It is our solemn
responsibility, especially on this committee, to be sober-
minded in our efforts to secure our homeland.
That is why I co-sponsored legislation championed by
Ranking Member Davis on the House Administration Committee to
establish a National commission on the domestic terrorist
attack on the U.S. Capitol. Similar to the 9/11 Commission
which helped create the homeland security enterprise we have
today, this important bipartisan commission would provide
Congress with real answers to our questions and solutions to
close critical homeland security gaps.
This legislation, referred to our committee, has the
support of every Republican Member of the committee, and I urge
my colleagues on the other side of the aisle to join us and
move this bill through Congress.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member Katko follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member John Katko
February 4, 2021
I am honored to serve with you and all of our colleagues in the
117th Congress and recognize how timely and necessary today's hearing
is. This year will mark the 20th anniversary of the September 11
terrorist attacks--the very tragedy that necessitated the creation of
the Department of Homeland Security--and this committee. In the days
and months following the deadliest terrorist attack on U.S. soil,
Americans of all views came together to unify against the threat of
foreign terrorists. Like so many challenges in our Nation's history, we
emerged stronger than ever.
To confront the emerging threats to our homeland today, we can't
play politics with National security. That's why Mr. Chairman I
appreciate your partnership as we've set out to ensure that this
committee remains above the fray and focused on solving problems.
Today, we sit here just shy of 20 years after 9/11 to examine the
increasingly prevalent and troubling threat from violent extremists--
not from some distant land--but from here at home. The threat posed by
domestic violent extremists may be new to many of us, but it is not new
for our country.
In the 1960's and 70's, left-wing extremists known as the Weather
Underground carried out dozens of bombings, including one right here
inside the U.S. Capitol. In fact, in an 18-month period between 1971
and 1972 extremist groups conducted over 2,500 bombings here in the
United States.
Three decades later, an anti-Government extremist planned and
carried out the deadliest home-grown terrorist attack in United States
history, killing 168 people with a truck bomb at a Federal building in
Oklahoma City.
The sad reality is that there will always be those who use ideology
and politics as an excuse to commit violence. It is our responsibility
to see to it that they are not successful. Over the past 12 months, we
have seen a marked increase in the activity of domestic violent
extremists. In July, amid Nation-wide protests, extremists in Portland
set fire to police stations and attacked a Federal courthouse. In
December, a man in Nashville detonated a bomb planted in a recreational
vehicle, killing himself, injuring 8 others, and disabling a critical
telecommunications facility.
And just last month, right-wing extremists attacked the United
States Capitol. Five people died that on that dark day, including a
Capitol police officer who was laid to rest this week. Just like 9/11,
we will never forget. We will never forget the assault on the heart of
our democracy on January 6. It was a very difficult thing to watch
unfold.
While, our Nation's law enforcement and National security agencies
are better prepared to combat emerging threats like domestic extremism
than in previous years, much more needs to be done to bolster
information sharing among Federal, State, and local partners. While
investigations are on-going, I am concerned that our counterterrorism
efforts continue to be hindered by bureaucratic silos and failures to
share necessary intelligence and then to act on that intelligence. The
Department of Homeland Security is central to our Nation's effort to
protect against terrorist and extremist violence here at home, and it
is imperative that we ensure it is well-equipped for that mission.
It also is our job, here at the Committee on Homeland Security, to
better understand what motivates these extremists and ultimately how to
stop them. Radicalization of all sorts that leads to any violence
should be unacceptable across the board.
With that in mind I want to encourage all of my colleagues to rise
above partisan politics and work together to examine these issues and
find solutions. We must do the job our constituents sent us here to do
by being honest about the challenges facing our country from violent
extremism--even when it may not be politically expedient to do so. It
is our solemn responsibility, especially on this committee, to be
sober-minded in our efforts to secure our homeland.
That is why I co-sponsored legislation championed by Ranking Member
Davis on the House Administration Committee to establish a National
Commission on the Domestic Terrorist Attack upon the U.S. Capitol.
Similar to the 9/11 Commission, which helped create the Homeland
Security Enterprise we have today, this important, bipartisan
commission would provide Congress with real answers to our questions
and solutions to close critical homeland security gaps. This
legislation, referred solely to our committee, has the support of a
dozen Republican Members of the committee, and I urge my Majority
colleagues to join us and move this bill through Congress.
Chairman Thompson. Other Members of the committee are
reminded that under the committee rules opening statements may
be submitted for the record.
Members are also reminded that the committee will operate
according to the guidelines laid out by the Chairman and
Ranking Member in our February 3 colloquy regarding remote
proceedings.
I welcome our witnesses.
Our first witness is Dr. Christopher Rodriguez, the
director of Washington, DC's Homeland Security and Emergency
Management Agency. Dr. Rodriguez is responsible for emergency
planning, preparedness, response, and recovery for the city,
including operations at a 24-hour emergency operations center
in the District's intelligence fusion center.
Our second witness is Ms. Elizabeth Neumann, the former
assistant secretary of counterterrorism and threat prevention
at the Department of Homeland Security. Ms. Neumann has over 2
decades of experience developing and implementing homeland
security and National security policies and strategies for
multiple Federal agencies.
Our third witness is Mr. Jonathan Greenblatt, the CEO and
national director of ADL. Mr. Greenblatt brings extensive
experience from the private sector and Government. Under Mr.
Greenblatt, ADL has worked in new and innovative ways to
counter and combat extremism in all forms.
Our fourth and final witness is Mr. Brian Michael Jenkins,
senior advisor to the RAND president. A former military
officer, Mr. Jenkins is the author of numerous books, reports,
and articles on domestic and international terrorism.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted in the record.
I now ask Dr. Rodriguez to summarize his statement for 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER RODRIGUEZ, PH.D., DIRECTOR, HOMELAND
SECURITY AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Mr. Rodriguez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Ranking Member Katko, Members of the committee.
I am Dr. Christopher Rodriguez, director of the District of
Columbia's Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency,
which I have led since 2017.
Prior to this role, I was a counterterrorism analyst at the
Central Intelligence Agency for over 10 years. As an appointee
of Mayor Muriel Bowser, I am honored to lead an agency that is
responsible for Washington, DC's preparedness, coordination,
management, and recovery from all hazards, from a snowstorm to
a hurricane to a global pandemic, and of course to a terrorist
attack such as the one we saw on January 6.
I appear today to discuss the January 6 attack that led to
the insurrection at the U.S. Capitol, which based upon my
experience was clearly an act of domestic terrorism. This
attack exposed in the starkest terms the threat we face from
domestic terrorists and from right-wing extremism specifically.
Now, at various times throughout our history we have
witnessed virulent strains of political ideologies and violent
political ideologies that run through the American bloodstream.
But time and again these radical movements have been rooted out
or minimized in our system.
Well, what should concern us now, in 2021, is that the
current manifestation of these movements is so insidious,
because while in the past they existed on the fringes of
society, they are becoming rapidly part of the cultural
mainstream. These movements are fueled and fed by
misinformation and lies that, if not addressed, will only
continue to exacerbate our underlying social divisions and
threatening to tear at the delicate fabric of our democratic
culture.
Now, as we manage and coordinate public safety agencies to
respond to various nefarious acts, the District of Columbia is
reimagining safety and security in the face of the evolving
threat of domestic terrorism. I want to speak very briefly
about the 5 elements of our strategy.
First, we must regain the narrative. A byproduct of radical
violent movements entering the mainstream is that they distort
real and meaningful debate. Right-wing extremism and left-wing
extremism are not mainstream viewpoints. QAnon, Proud Boys,
Oath Keepers, anarchists, and Antifa do not espouse mainstream
perspectives, nor should they be treated and validated as such.
While the District of Columbia hosts hundreds of First
Amendment events per year and respects the rights of all
Americans to exercise this Constitutional guarantee, even when
we disagree with those viewpoints, we will not tolerate
violence in our city and we will call such acts what they are
in accordance with the law--crimes and terrorism.
In a similar vein, we also know, and we have experienced
this here in the District, that our foreign adversaries, Russia
in particular, are employing decades-old tools of covert action
to fan the flames of cultural conflict here in the United
States, and our foreign enemies do this by creating or
perpetuating false narratives that strike at the heart of
democracy itself--that our elections are rigged, that our
system is inherently corrupt and should be overthrown, and that
radical voices who call for violence or insurrection have
legitimate views that should be heard.
In regaining the narrative, we need to call these actions
what they are--a direct assault on our system of government.
Second, we must demonstrate an overt security presence in
the District of Columbia, at least for now. The District of
Columbia, at Mayor Bowser's direction, has requested that 500
D.C. National Guard personnel remain on standby as a Quick
Reaction Force through March 12. We believe that this posture
is essential to ensuring that the Metropolitan Police
Department can deploy resources to all parts of the city during
an emergency.
We also believe that we can achieve security in our city--
and specifically on Capitol Hill--without making permanent the
current razor wire-topped fencing and armed troops surrounding
the Capitol.
As the host of our Federal Government, the District
government plays an important role in the Capitol's long-term
security posture. Mayor Bowser has already suggested one
commonsense proposal, and that is to transfer control of the
D.C. National Guard to the Mayor of the District of Columbia,
which would allow her swifter operational decisions during an
evolving incident. As we saw on January 6, under Federal
control the guard is not as nimble and responsive as it could
be.
Third, we must leverage our National intelligence network
better. At its core, the value of intelligence is early
warning. It gives policy makers, such as yourselves, the
decision-making advantage in a world full of strategic threats.
We need to utilize a key tool developed after 9/11 in a more
systematic way, and that is the State fusion centers.
Funded by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, these
intelligence hubs need to do better at sharing information
across the network, because the domestic terrorist threat is
fundamentally one that originates locally and then spreads
across State borders.
The nearly 80 fusion centers that exist across the Nation
have more than 2,000 intelligence analysts that are funded by
Federal dollars, but their intelligence should be more widely
disseminated to those who need it.
In the District of Columbia, we seek to build out our
fusion centers' analytic capabilities in both the physical and
virtual realms, particularly to assist local and Federal law
enforcement. In the coming months, the fusion center will begin
to deploy personnel to key Federal agencies, but we need more
funding and more resources from DHS for this program.
Fourth, we must engage our communities and work forces
better. A particularly troublesome finding in the early
investigations of those who participated in the January 6
insurrection is that a small but disproportionately impactful
segment of the mob used military tactics to organize and manage
the successful advance into and throughout the Capitol. FBI
investigations that have been made public have reported that
some of these individuals had U.S. military backgrounds and
participated in military-style training camps prior to
traveling here to Washington, DC.
All this said, surely there are people in our communities
that might know such activities are taking place, either in
plain sight, in the dark corners of the internet, or in casual
conversations. We need to prioritize insider threat programs in
the U.S. military and law enforcement to ensure that their
specific skill sets, which are developed to defend the Nation,
State, and community, are not then turned on the very people
they are sworn to protect.
Finally, we must be prepared for a long fight. Many of the
initiatives discussed here will require new law enforcement and
legal tools. However, the key element of our success will be
ours, yours and mine, as well as the American people's
willingness to persist in the fight.
The mental and psychological toll of what happened on
January 6, as all of you and your staffs and our police
officers can personally attest, can be overwhelming.
Tragically, some of our finest have already taken their lives
following the insurrection.
Our best chance for success, though, is to be straight with
the American people that the threats we now face are arguably
as dangerous as they were in the post-9/11 environment and
these threats are not going away.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and I look forward
to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rodriguez follows:]
Prepared Statement of Christopher Rodriguez
February 4, 2021
Thank you, Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Katko, and Members of
the committee. I am Dr. Christopher Rodriguez, and I have served as the
director of the District of Columbia's Homeland Security and Emergency
Management Agency--or HSEMA--since 2017; the agency hosts Washington,
DC's intelligence fusion center, which leads counterterrorism analysis
and preparedness for the city. Prior to this role, I was a
counterterrorism analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency for more
than 10 years. As an appointee of Mayor Muriel Bowser, I am honored to
lead an agency that is responsible for Washington, DC's preparedness,
coordination, management, and recovery from all hazards--everything
from a snowstorm to a hurricane to a global pandemic, including the
attack at the U.S. Capitol. Like FEMA, HSEMA sits at the crossroads of
the District government's interagency operations, and the HSEMA team
works tirelessly to ensure unity of effort before, during, and after
emergencies.
I appear today to discuss the January 6 attack leading to the
insurrection at the U.S. Capitol, which, based upon my experience, was
an act of domestic terrorism. This attack exposed, in the starkest
terms, the threat we face from domestic terrorists generally, but also
from right-wing extremism specifically. At various times throughout our
history, we have witnessed virulent strains of political ideologies
running through the American bloodstream. But, time and again, these
radical, violent movements have been rooted out or minimized by a
combination of medicines unique to the American experience: The central
role of democratic institutions, the rule of law, and the unshakeable
resolve of men and women of goodwill seeking to build a better Nation.
What should concern us now, in 2021, is that the current manifestation
of these movements is so insidious because while, in the past, they
existed on the fringes of society, they are becoming part of the
cultural mainstream. These movements are fueled and fed by
misinformation and lies that, if not addressed, will only continue to
exacerbate underlying social divisions, threatening to tear the
delicate fabric of our democratic culture.
The gains our adversaries have made must be stemmed and reversed.
As we manage and coordinate public safety agencies to respond to
various nefarious acts, the District must reimagine safety and security
in the face of the evolving threat of domestic terrorism. There are 5
elements of our strategy.
First, we must regain the narrative.--A byproduct of
radical, violent movements entering the mainstream is that they
distort real, meaningful debates. ``Right-wing extremism'' and
``left-wing extremism'' are not mainstream viewpoints. QAnon,
Proud Boys, OathKeepers, anarchists, and Antifa do not espouse
mainstream perspectives, nor should they be treated and
validated as such. While the District of Columbia hosts
hundreds of First Amendment events per year and respects the
rights of all Americans to exercise this Constitutional
guarantee--even when we disagree with those viewpoints--we will
not tolerate violence in our city, and we will call such acts
what they are in accordance with the law: Crimes or terrorism.
In a similar vein, we know that our foreign adversaries--
Russia, in particular--are employing a decades-old tool of
covert action to fan the flames of cultural conflict here in
the United States. Our foreign enemies do this by either
creating or perpetuating false narratives that strike at the
heart of democracy itself: That our elections are rigged; that
our system is inherently corrupt and should be overthrown; that
radical voices who call for violence or insurrection have
legitimate views that should be heard. In regaining the
narrative, we need to call these actions what they are: A
direct assault on our system of government and to call those
who lend credence to these views as succumbing to foreign
influence.
Second, we must demonstrate an overt security presence in
DC, at least for now.--The District of Columbia, at Mayor
Bowser's direction, has requested 500 D.C. National Guard
personnel remain on standby as a Quick Reaction Force through
March 12. This posture is essential to ensuring the
Metropolitan Police Department can deploy resources to all
parts of the city during an emergency. However, we believe we
can achieve security in our city, and specifically on Capitol
Hill, without making permanent the current razor wire-topped
fencing and armed troops surrounding the Capitol. The
``people's house'' must remain exactly that and not be turned
into an armed fortress, closed off from the rest of our city.
As the host of our Federal Government, the District government
plays an important role in the Capitol's long-term security
posture. Mayor Bowser has already suggested one common-sense
proposal: The transfer of control of the D.C. National Guard to
the Mayor of the District of Columbia, which would allow for
swifter operational decisions during an evolving incident. As
we saw on January 6, under Federal control, the Guard is not as
nimble and responsive as it could be.
Third, we must leverage our National intelligence network
better.--At its core, the value of intelligence is early
warning; it gives policy makers decision-making advantage in a
world full of strategic threats. We need to utilize a key tool
developed after 9/11 in a more systematic way: The State fusion
centers. Funded by the Department of Homeland Security, these
intelligence hubs need to do better at sharing information
across the network because the domestic terrorist threat is
fundamentally one that originates locally and then spreads
across State borders. The nearly 80 fusion centers across the
Nation have more than 2,000 intelligence analysts funded by
Federal dollars, but their intelligence should be more widely
disseminated to those who need it. In the District of Columbia,
we seek to build out our fusion center's analytic capabilities
in both the physical and virtual realms, particularly to assist
local and Federal law enforcement. In the coming months, the
fusion center will begin to deploy personnel to key Federal
agencies, but we need more funding and resources from DHS for
this program.
Fourth, we must engage communities and workforces better.--A
particularly troublesome finding in the early investigations of
those who participated in the January 6 insurrection is that a
small, but disproportionately impactful, segment of the mob
used military tactics to organize and manage the successful
advance into and throughout the Capitol. FBI investigations
have reported that some of these individuals had U.S. military
backgrounds, held ``leadership only'' planning calls, and
participated in military-style training camps prior to
traveling to Washington, DC. Recently discovered evidence that
some of the attackers were carrying hand ties conjure up foiled
plots last year to kidnap the Governors of Michigan and
Virginia. All this said, surely people in our communities might
know such activities are taking place, either in plain sight,
in dark corners of the internet, or in casual conversation. We
need to prioritize insider-threat programs in the U.S. military
and law enforcement to ensure these specific skill sets, which
are developed to defend a nation, a State, or a community, are
not then turned on the very people they are sworn to protect.
Finally, we must be prepared for a long fight.--Many of the
initiatives discussed here will require new law enforcement and
legal tools, such as a domestic terrorism statute. However, the
key element of our success will be our--yours and mine--as well
as the American people's, willingness to persist in this fight.
The mental and psychological toll of what happened on January
6, as some of you, your staffs, and our police officers can
personally attest, can be overwhelming--and tragically, some of
our finest have already taken their lives following the
insurrection. Our best chance for success is to be straight
with the American people--that the threats we now face are
arguably as dangerous as they were in the immediate post-9/11
environment, and these threats are not going away. We will be
tested; we will be challenged. But in the end, as we have
throughout our history, we will prevail--and those who seek to
divide us will never be as strong as a people united in a
common purpose, for good.
Thank you, and I look forward to answering your questions.
Chairman Thompson. I now ask Ms. Neumann to summarize her
statement for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF ELIZABETH NEUMANN, FOUNDER AND MANAGING DIRECTOR,
NEU SUMMIT STRATEGIES AND FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
COUNTERTERRORISM AND THREAT PREVENTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
Ms. Neumann. Good morning, Chairman Thompson, Ranking
Member Katko, distinguished Members of the committee. Thank you
for holding today's hearing.
I offer my deepest condolences to Officer Sicknick's
family, all of the police officers that were injured, and to
you, Members of Congress, and your staff.
While the attack on January 6 was an assault on our
democracy and, therefore, on all Americans, it was an extremely
personal experience for each of you. I thank you for your
willingness to serve the American people during this dark time,
even in the face of threats of violence.
I have spent my career immersed in homeland security-
related Government reforms needed to address emerging threats
and Government failures. The security failure of January 6 was
not an intelligence failure. Many had warned about the threat
of violence. It was, rather, a failure of poor judgment and
insufficient preparation.
It was also an act of domestic terrorism. As I explain in
my written testimony, the statutory definition is clearly met
by the crimes that occurred and the intent of the individuals
that stormed the Capitol.
Bipartisan agreement upon this designation is paramount to
ensuring future security efforts. We must be clear with our
words on this matter and stand unified against rhetoric that
incites violence to achieve political goals.
In my written testimony I lay out 5 recommendations. For
brevity, let me highlight 3 here.
I believe we need to establish an independent, bipartisan
commission to explore the best ways to update our laws,
policies, and culture to address domestic terrorism. I believe
we need to criminalize domestic terrorism and consider updating
other statutes to ensure equal justice is applied. I believe we
need to formally codify the Office of Targeted Violence and
Terrorism Prevention to send a strong signal to the community
that we are investing in prevention.
Since I last appeared before one of the subcommittees of
this body, I believe the environment in which we approach
domestic terrorism has become exponentially more complicated.
A few highlights.
First, the global COVID-19 pandemic increased social
isolation and other stress factors known to increase
radicalization. These stressors exposed cracks and amplified
grievances held by vulnerable individuals, which led to
increased radicalization and some mobilization to violence.
As a side note, the term ``vulnerable individuals'' is
explained more thoroughly in my written testimony and there is
a graphic at the end of my testimony which you can refer to
which outlines these terms. It shows a simplistic framework for
the different stages of how an individual radicalizes and
mobilizes to violence. This graphic came out of a RAND study
that was done for DHS in 2018.
Second, the underlying causes behind the January 6 attack
also increased the number of vulnerable individuals. So
recruitment is easier now for extremist groups than it ever has
been before. Extremist ideas have been mainstreamed and
normalized through political speech, conspiracy theories, and
communications that use humor and memes to mask the danger of
those ideas present.
Consequently, there is a high likelihood of violence in the
coming months on a range of softer targets associated with
their perception of the ``Deep State,'' including
infrastructure, mainstream media, law enforcement, ``Big
Tech,'' and elected officials.
There are many other complicating factors I can't go
through at this moment. But, sadly, I do believe that we will
be fighting domestic terrorism that has its roots and
inspiration points from January 6 for the next 10 to 20 years.
For this reason I believe it is paramount that we establish a
shared understanding of this threat and a bipartisan commitment
to address it so that discussions about domestic terrorism
itself can't be manipulated or misreported, further feeding the
grievance cycle into radicalization and mobilization to
violence.
So let me return to where I started. I urge the Congress to
consider establishing a domestic terrorism commission. I urge
that at a minimum we change our laws to ensure equal justice,
treating threats from ideologies that originated overseas and
within the United States the same. These are very complicated
and thorny issues, which is why I believe we need a commission
to address them appropriately.
Last, I want to urge you to scale the prevention work we
began together in the 116th Congress. Thank you for your
support during my tenure at DHS and thereafter. Your bipartisan
work on expanding prevention capabilities in the United States
has prepared us for this moment, but there is still much work
that needs to be done. You led a 1,200 percent increase in
funding for prevention over the last 2 fiscal years. In Federal
budget terms that is almost unheard of.
I would ask you to please consider accelerating these
prevention efforts. In particular, I urge you to authorize the
Office of Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention and help
it scale rapidly through additional resources to be able to
assist our State and local partners with developing the
prevention capabilities we need in our communities to better
assist individuals before they mobilize to violence.
In closing, we need to recognize that the root causes of
this new face of terrorism are not things that the security
community can fix. President Obama called it ``an
epistemological crisis.'' He said, ``If we do not have the
capacity to distinguish what is true from what is false, then
by definition the marketplace of ideas does not work and by
definition our democracy does not work.''
Today's hearing is an opportunity for each of us to
demonstrate democracy does still work. We can disagree without
becoming disagreeable.
I believe there is much upon which we can agree.
Confronting this threat will require calling on other parts of
our society to defeat domestic terrorism.
The challenge ahead requires rediscovering we are Americans
before we are a party affiliation or a political philosophy. It
requires rebuilding civic society at a local level, choosing
respectful civil discourse over cancel culture, and rejecting
political ideologies or identity politics that focus on
grouping ``them'' into an ``enemy'' of the ``tribe.''
We will begin here today, but each of us has a role as we
lead in our homes and in our local communities, because the
greatest disruption to the grievance cycle that leads to
violence begins by loving our neighbor as we would like to be
loved ourselves.
Thank you so much. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Neumann follows:]
Prepared Statement of Elizabeth Neumann
February 4, 2021
introduction
Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Katko, and distinguished Members
of the committee, thank you for holding today's hearing ``Examining the
Domestic Terrorism Threat in the Wake of the Attack on the U.S.
Capitol.''
Before addressing the hearing topic, I want to thank this committee
for their support in the last Congress, during my tenure at DHS and
thereafter, for working on a bi-partisan basis to support the expansion
of prevention capabilities across the country. Many of the Members of
the last session of Congress continue on this committee today--and
because of their willingness to work with us--we were able to increase
DHS funding for prevention efforts by over 1,200 percent in 2 fiscal
years. That is unheard of in Federal budgeting. Thank you. While my
remarks today will not go into the details of prevention--I wanted to
note for the record that I believe the plan we laid out in 2019 in the
Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence, and
what we began implementing, are a critical part of the set of solutions
needed to address domestic terrorism.
the january 6, 2021 attack on the capitol was domestic terrorism
I have spent my career immersed in homeland security-related
Government reforms--stemming from Government failures, like the attacks
of September 11, 2001, or the Hurricane Katrina response, as well as
emerging threats. The security failure of January 6, 2021 is nearly
incomprehensible for me. I believe the failure was not one of
intelligence, but a failure of imagination born of a lack of judgment
and preparation. I believe the investigation should be thorough and
must make recommendations that ensure we never see such a security
failure again.
While we can debate the merits of whether to call those that
stormed the Capitol ``terrorists,'' the attack on January 6 meets the
definition of domestic terrorism as laid out in U.S. Code at 18 U.S.C.
2331(5):\1\ ``Involving acts dangerous to human life that are a
violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State;
Appearing to be intended to: (1) Intimidate or coerce a civilian
population; (2) Influence the policy of government by intimidation or
coercion; or (3) Affect the conduct of a government by mass
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and (4) Occurring primarily
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/fbi-dhs-domestic-terrorism-
definitions-terminology-methodology.pdf/view.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A police officer was killed and 140 officers were injured--
thus it was ``dangerous to human life'';
We see from the indictments that there are multiple
``violations of criminal laws'';
Based on video testimonials prior to, during, and after the
attack--the motivation for many was to interrupt a
Constitutionally-mandated activity and ``intimidate or coerce''
the U.S. Congress to change the outcome of the election of our
President; and
There is evidence, though we should wait for the
investigations to conclude, that some of the attackers had
prepared for assassinating, or taking hostage, Members of
Congress and the Vice President.
The attacks may also meet other criminal statutory definitions,
such as seditious conspiracy and treason, but we will leave that to the
investigators and prosecutors to determine.
framing the radicalization to extremism and mobilization to violence
process
While the radicalization process is not necessarily linear, I find
it helps to use a linear framework to identify the different places
individuals might be on the pathway to violence. During my time at DHS,
we asked the RAND Corporation to help us identify where to head with
our prevention efforts. A graphic they produced in the resulting study
lays out the different stages of radicalization. I have included the
graphic as Appendix A to this testimony for the Committee's reference.
As the RAND Study on Practical Terrorism Prevention \2\ explains,
they used a ``basic model to anchor their work,'' which divides
``people involved in radicalization processes into 3 relevant
populations:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Jackson, Brian A., Ashley L. Rhoades, Jordan R. Reimer, Natasha
Lander, Katherine Costello, and Sina Beaghley, Practical Terrorism
Prevention: Reexamining U.S. National Approaches to Addressing the
Threat of Ideologically Motivated Violence. Homeland Security
Operational Analysis Center operated by the RAND Corporation, 2019.
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2647.html. Also available
in print form.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vulnerable population--i.e., all the people who might
radicalize to violence
Individuals who are radical of thought but may or may not
become violent
Individuals actually involved in attempted attacks (planning
or actual carrying out of attacks).''\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Ibid., xix.
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RAND explained that ``each successive population is much smaller
than the population preceding it, with only a small percentage of any
vulnerable population radicalizing and only a percentage of that
population escalating to violence.''\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Traditional counterterrorism efforts have focused on the third
category--criminal activity that requires a law enforcement response to
disrupt, investigate, and prosecute. The first 2 categories of
individuals concern government and the people because of their
potential for moving to violence. Since they have not moved into
criminal conduct, the Government's activities toward these individuals
need to be framed differently than those in the third category.
RAND also noted that, ``the model is not specific to any given
ideology or population.''\5\ This latter point is notable. Yes, we need
to understand the ideologies of violent White Supremacists and anti-
Government extremists. In part because they may help us understand
where the next attack may occur or the method they may use, and it may
help law enforcement better detect associations with or activities of a
particular extremist group. But many extremism experts note that the
motivation to join terrorist movements tend to be less about the
ideology and more about filling unmet needs caused by trauma, exposure
to violence, a sense of marginalization, grievance, or humiliation.\6\
This means, arguing with a White Supremacist about why their ideology
is wrong and disgusting, is not an effective de-mobilization or de-
radicalization technique.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Ibid.
\6\ This is the assessment of many that research extremism. For
example, see: Miller-Idriss, Cynthia. Hate in the Homeland: The New
Global Far Right (pp. 3). (2020). Princeton, NJ. Princeton University
Press. Picciolini, Christian. Breaking Hate: Confronting the New
Culture of Extremism (pp. xxi-xxiii). (2020). New York, NY: Hachette
Books. An interview with Jessica Stern: http://www.bu.edu/articles/
2021/jessica-stern-on-why-january-6-attack-on-capitol-was-act-of-
terroris m/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
participants in the january 6 attack represent a different kind of
extremism
It was clear even as the attack unfurled, that several organized
violent extremist groups were present, including Neo-Nazis, Proud Boys,
Oath Keepers, and Three Percenters. There were also less organized
Groypers and QAnon adherents, along with unaffiliated individuals there
to support Trump. The investigations are still underway and while there
are some signs of coordination among some organized extremist groups, a
study released this week from the University of Chicago found startling
distinctions between those who have been indicted thus far for actions
on January 6 and ``traditional'' domestic extremists.\7\ The indicted
January 6 attackers have significantly less ties to organized extremist
groups; about 10 percent of those arrested had ties compared to almost
50 percent of domestic extremists in the 2015-2020 period. January 6
attackers were also, on average, older and 40 percent owned businesses
or held white-collar jobs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/02/the-capitol-
rioters-arent-like-other-extremists/617895/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As we examine the current state of the threat and discuss what to
do, we need to keep in mind that the threat that manifested on January
6 was likely aided by organized extremist movements, but it appears
that a large majority that participated in criminal acts were
unaffiliated with an organized group and primarily motivated by
grievances created and amplified by the former President.
the challenges of addressing domestic terrorism
When I appeared at my last hearing a year ago this month, the
challenges I highlighted related to scaling up DHS's prevention and
protection capabilities to address the threat of domestic terrorism. We
were concerned about a growth in violent White Supremacist and anti-
Government extremist groups and what we often call the ``quick-
radicalization'' problem--the speed at which an individual can be
exposed to extremist content and mobilize to violence. And the
Government was challenged by lack of good prevalence data. While those
challenges remain, I believe the environment in which we approach
domestic terrorism has become more exponentially more complicated.
1. The global COVID-19 pandemic increased social isolation and
other stress factors known to increase radicalization. Last March,
while at DHS, I asked my team to research how pandemic mitigation
efforts might exacerbate violent extremism. For decades, the Secret
Service, the FBI, and academic researchers have examined the
backgrounds and pre-attack behaviors of mass-attack perpetrators. Some
of the risk factors of violent extremism they identified are increasing
Nation-wide: Social isolation, financial stress, job loss, loss of
loved ones, and significant changes or uncertainty in life. My team
assessed that some groups would perceive public health measures as
Government overreach infringing on rights and liberties, which might
encourage anti-Government extremists. And we had already observed
foreign actors and domestic violent extremists spreading disinformation
about the pandemic to foment discord and encourage violence.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Note: This paragraph originally appeared in my opinion piece
published in the Washington Post on October 16, 2020. https://
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/10/16/threats-against-democratic-
governors-prove-trumps-rhetoric-encourages-violence/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While we were frustrated that our warnings and recommendations for
building resilience were not heeded by the previous administration's
COVID-19 Taskforce, they were included in the recently-released 2020
Homeland Threat Assessment, which concluded: ``Domestic Violent
Extremists [present] the most persistent and lethal threat . . .
Violent extremists will continue to target individuals or institutions
that represent symbols of their grievances, as well as grievances based
on political affiliation or perceived policy positions . . . The
domestic situation surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic creates an
environment that could accelerate some individuals' mobilization to
targeted violence or radicalization to terrorism.''
Three examples of this challenge:
In the first months of the pandemic, Moonshot CVE studied
the impact of mitigation measures on engagement with violent
extremist content on-line. They found a 21 percent average
increase in engagement with White Supremacist content on-line
in States with local ``stay at home'' directives in place for
10 or more days, compared to a 1 percent average increase in
engagement in States with local ``stay at home'' directives in
place for less than 10 days.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ https://moonshotcve.com/social-distancing-white-supremacy/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The rapid rise, even quasi-mainstreaming, of QAnon
conspiracy theories during the pandemic.\10\ While the
conspiracies alone are not domestic terrorism--there are
individuals who have attempted acts of terrorism in response to
their conspiratorial beliefs--including the intentional
derailing of a freight train near the hospital ship Mercy in
Los Angeles and QAnon supporters that traveled to Philadelphia
during the city's ballot counting operations who were arrested
with an AR-15 rifle and 160 rounds of ammunition.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/tech/2020/08/31/qanon-
conspiracy-theories-trump-election-covid-19-pandemic-extremist-groups/
5662374002/.
\11\ https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/oct/15/qanon-
violence-crimes-timeline.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The arrests in October of militia group members allegedly
training for civil war, plotting to kidnap Michigan Governor
Gretchen Whitmer and Virginia Governor Ralph Northam.
2. The underlying causes behind the January 6 attack has increased
the number of ``vulnerable individuals''--likely leading to increases
in the other two categories (individuals with radicalized thought but
may or may not become violent; and individuals actually intending,
planning, or attempting violence).
We are often asked about prevalence. How many people in the United
States are domestic terrorists? This is a difficult question to answer
due to lack of good data and the way in which Government systems
categorize data. In her recent book, Hate in the Homeland, Cynthia
Miller Idriss offers a ``best estimate--looking across all groups and
organizations . . . of 75,000 to 100,000 people affiliated with White
Supremacist extremist groups in the United States, not including
individuals who engage occasionally from the peripheries of far-right
scenes or who are ideologically supportive but engaged either on-line
or off-line.''\12\ Germany, which has better monitoring of domestic
extremists, estimates they have approximately 24,000--what they term,
``right-wing extremists''--and about 50 percent of those are considered
potentially violent.\13\ If we apply their ratio to our numbers, that
would put us at 37,000-50,000 potentially violent White Supremacists
within the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Miller-Idriss. Pp 20.
\13\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Because we lack monitoring and data collection capabilities, I
caution how these numbers are used, but it certainly gives you a sense
of the scope. When the FBI briefed Congress last year, they indicated
they had about 1,000 open domestic terrorism investigations--but we may
have significantly more potentially violent individuals in just one
type of domestic terrorism (White Supremacy). We are outmanned.
More chilling, those were estimates prior to the attack on January
6. According to an Economist/YouGov poll completed last week, 78
percent of Trump voters believe the Presidential election was
``stolen''.\14\ That's approximately 57 million Americans. The 2020
campaign was framed as an existential battle for the ``soul of the
country.'' If one believes the election was ``stolen'' and that the
``other side'' poses an existential threat, one could be vulnerable to
arguments that violence is justified. While it might be illegal and
immoral, it is not illogical for one to conclude a revolution might be
called for if you believe your Government has broken its obligations to
you under the Constitution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ YouGov surveyed 1,500 U.S. adults, including 1,245 registered
voters, between January 24 and January 26 for its latest poll. Its
overall margin of error stands at 3.4 percentage points.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To be clear, statistically speaking, it would be a relatively small
percentage that might move to violence--but even if it is as low as
0.5-1 percent--that's somewhere between 240,000-570,000 people. (For
context, imagine how our Nation would react if that was the number of
international terrorists living among our citizens.) It is a number
that far exceeds any law enforcement or security capability we have
within the country. Accordingly, one of our primary goals in these next
months needs to be debunking the lies about the stolen election, in
order to shrink the number of individuals vulnerable to radicalization
to violence.
We do not have much time. On-line chatter collected by open-source
groups like the SITE Intelligence Group indicates significant
elevations of anti-state sentiment from QAnon and Trump supporters, as
they feel they've been pushed out of the mainstream.
Further, we expect to see a networking effect from January 6--
having physical, in-person encounters during an emotional experience
that many consider to be a ``battle'' is likely to form bonds among
people that perhaps had never before met or had previously been limited
to on-line contact. What we are seeing on-line seems to align with that
expectation--intermingling between traditional organized extremist
groups and disaffected Trump supporters and QAnon adherents.
Certain violent extremist groups like the Neo-Nazi's, are sharing
tips on how to recruit disheartened QAnon and Trump supporters. The
SITE Intelligence Group assessed one such post as ``notable for the
confluence of far-right concepts and slogans, tied together with more
mainstream conservative ideas in an effort to make them palatable to a
broader audience.''\15\ And postings on both Neo-Nazi and Proud Boys
channels, offered instructions on how to approach--including guidance
to not ``haze'' but be a ``shepherd'' and ``let them know there is an
alternative to what the Beast System offered them''.\16\ Others were
more direct, encouraging Trump supporters to ``Abandon the GOP'' and
``embrace the ultranationalist 3d position'' fascism.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ SITE Intelligence Group Bulletin, January 12, 2021. ``We
Cannot Vote Our Way Out Of This'': Prominent Neo-Nazi Channel Addresses
Trump Supporters.'' https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Far-Right-/-Far-
Left-Threat/we-cannot-vote-our-way-out-of-this-prominent-neo-nazi-
channel-addresses-trump-supporters.html.
\16\ SITE Intelligence Group Bulletin, January 23, 2021.
``Prominent Neo-Nazi Venue Urges Trump Supporters to `Abandon GOP' and
Embrace `Third Position' Fascism.'' https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Far-
Right-/-Far-Left-Threat/prominent-neo-nazi-venue-urges-trump-
supporters-to-abandon-gop-and-embrace-third-position-fascism.html.
\17\ Ibid.
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Recruitment is easier for extremist groups now than ever before.
Dr. Miller-Idriss explains that extremist ideas have been mainstreamed
and normalized through ``political speech, conspiracy theories, and . .
. communication styles'' that use ``humor and memes . . . [to make]
extreme ideas seem less dangerous than they really are.''\18\
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\18\ Miller-Idriss. Pp 47.
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The expanded pool of vulnerable individuals resulted in some
mobilization to violence on January 6. Extremism experts believe we
will likely see more. There is a high likelihood of violence in the
coming months on a range of softer targets associated with their
perception of the ``Deep State'' including infrastructure, mainstream
media, law enforcement, ``Big Tech'', and elected officials.
But beyond the short-term, I believe we will be fighting domestic
terrorism that has its roots or inspiration points in the events
leading up to and on January 6 for the next 10-20 years.
3. We lack a shared understanding and unity of commitment to
address the threat, and discussions about Domestic Terrorism are being
manipulated and disinformation is further feeding the grievance cycle--
which could cause more people to radicalize to violence.
There is a growing overlap between extremism and political
discourse. Foundations have been laid for years by right-leaning media
outlets that ``mainstream media'' is misleading, biased, or presents
``fake news.'' In fact, during the 2016 election cycle and its
aftermath, right-leaning media were heartened (and amused) that Trump
would ``fight back'' and ``push against'' the ``mainstream media.''
This onslaught created an atmosphere of distrust of the ``mainstream
media,'' and sent many into seeking news and information within ``echo
chambers'' that provided feedback that substantiated opinions, but not
facts.
To wit, there has also been significant conflation between news
desks and opinion show formats--where the latter presents ``breaking
news'' opinion as factual news. Already, certain voices on the right
side of the political spectrum have used opinion media platforms to
assert that ``the mainstream media'' have declared anyone who attended
the rally on January 6 a ``domestic terrorist.'' Next right-leaning
opinion commentary declared that ``radical liberals'' consider all 74
million that voted for Trump ``domestic terrorists''.\19\
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\19\ https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/01/28/tucker-
carlson-is-telling-his-viewers-that-democrats-see-them-terrorists/.
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As an avid news consumer and commentator on this topic, I have not
seen an example of a major news organization or ``mainstream media''
opinion commentator declaring everyone on the right a domestic
terrorist. Nor, in reviewing the prominent commentators' assertions,
have I found right-leaning opinion shows to present actual facts and
evidence to back-up those arguments. In other words, I believe they
are, based on financial and marketing decisions, purposefully lying to
their viewers. But that does not matter in our present moment when
passions are inflamed, and those who are told they are being
disenfranchised by the ``radical left,'' trust no one but your ``side''
to tell you ``truth.''
Disinformation and lack of action by the Trump administration also
created an impression of equivalency between extremist groups that
identify with the far right-side of the political spectrum and those
that identify with the far-left. In particular, the former President's
obsession (fueled by right-leaning media outlets' obsessions) with
ANTIFA--a descriptor that stands for Anti-Fascist--led to a redirection
of resources away from open domestic terrorism investigations \20\ and
led many to believe that they are just as dangerous as Neo-Nazis. The
statistics do not support this belief.
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\20\ https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/30/us/politics/trump-right-
wing-domestic-terrorism.html?searchResultPosition=4.
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While all violence should be treated equally under the law, the
Government should portion its resources to those threat actors posing
the gravest threats to our National security. The Government will need
to repeatedly offer the facts about the number of arrests, attacks, and
deaths caused by violent White Supremacists and anti-Government
extremists versus those adhering to a far-left ideology. But as with
the disinformation challenge noted above, it will be difficult for the
Government to communicate facts to an audience that is predisposed to
believing the disinformation.
I agree with President Obama's assertion that we are facing ``an
epistemological crisis.'' ``If we do not have the capacity to
distinguish what is true from what is false, then by definition the
marketplace of ideas does not work, and by definition our democracy
does not work,'' he explained.\21\
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\21\ Goldberg, Jeffrey. ``Why Obama Fears for Our Democracy''. The
Atlantic. November 16, 2020. https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/
2020/11/why-obama-fears-for-our-democracy/617087/.
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It is not law enforcement or the counterterrorism community's
responsibility to fix an epistemological crisis. But if our society
does not fix it, it will increase the workload of the security
community. And in addressing this challenge and the violent threat
associated with it, we must be careful to not inadvertently ostracize
and anger more people, which could then lead to more radicalization to
violence.
4. Some in the counterterrorism, homeland security, and law
enforcement communities underestimated the threat.
The narratives of ``lone-wolf'' attackers have dominated threat
assessments for decades. While mostly true that Oklahoma City, Mother
Emannuel Church, Pittsburgh, Christchurch, El Paso, and other attacks
were committed by one individual--they were not alone in getting to the
point of committing acts of violence. Rather this is the preferred
tactic by design of White Supremacist movement.
Before we design tactics and strategies and consider changes in
law, we need a deeper understanding of the history and intent behind
these extremists movements. For example, Kathleen Belew, a historian of
the White Power and paramilitary movements in America, explains that in
1983 the White Power movement declared war on the Federal
Government.\22\ Their goals were to destabilize the Government, wage a
revolutionary race war, and establish a White homeland. They also
decided to follow a leaderless resistance model and encouraged
individual or small group attacks to reduce detection by law
enforcement.
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\22\ Belew, Kathleen. Bring the War Home: The White Power Movement
and Paramilitary America (pp. 104). (2018). Cambridge, MA. Harvard
University Press.
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During my time in Government, I asked intelligence analysts for
assessments on the motivations and strategic aims of violent White
Supremacists, I was never briefed about their 1983 declaration of war
on the Government, or that some were pursuing the establishment of a
``White homeland.'' I was left with the impression that their primary
efforts were to create fear among non-White populations--which of
course is horrid--but not as sophisticated an intent as overthrowing
the U.S. Government.
Calling the attackers ``lone wolves'' left the impression for
policy makers and those crafting counterterrorism strategies, there is
a randomness to attacks--that you can explain their actions away as
individuals that are mentally unwell--and therefore we cannot track the
threat the same way we track threats emanating from ISIS or al-Qaeda.
But that is inaccurate.
I believe January 6 may be a turning point for the law enforcement
and counterterrorism community to see the movement behind the
individuals. President Biden's task to DNI Haines for a threat
assessment was scoped wisely to include data and expertise from outside
Government. That's the first step--understand the enemy.
what should we do?
In closing, some thoughts on where we go from here.
I believe as the pandemic ends, hopefully later this year, and
people begin to return to some form of normal socializing we are likely
to see both a decrease in vulnerability to radicalization--the comforts
of our old lives will help ease anxieties, people will spend less time
on-line indulging in conspiracy theories; but paradoxically, the
increase in mass gatherings will provide the targets that violent
extremists are waiting for. Therefore, we must be prepared for these
attacks.
1. Define the Threat and Educate the American People About the
Threat
The DNI-coordinated threat assessment will provide a baseline from
which the Government can begin to educate the American public about
domestic terrorism.
Information will help inoculate some that might be in the
``vulnerable'' category on the radicalization spectrum. It will also
help bystanders better understand what to look for if a loved one or
colleague demonstrates a change of behavior that might be indicative of
radicalization to violence.
DHS, FBI, and State and local law enforcement should recognize that
they are not necessarily viewed as credible voices by some Americans,
and as such, they should work with voices viewed as credible to educate
the public about the intent of extremist groups, the ways they recruit,
and that breaking the law will lead to prosecution and legal
consequences. In particular, there appears to be significant
misinformation about the legality of private militia groups in the
United States. A concerted campaign to educate on what is and is not
protected by the 2nd Amendment may reduce their numbers.
2. Encourage Potential Targets to Dust-Off Security Plans and Urge
Public Vigilance and Bystander Reporting
I have confidence that the new leadership at DHS and current
leadership at FBI will continue to encourage public vigilance, see
something/say something; and encourage owners and operators of
infrastructure, especially those hosting public spaces--including
faith-based organizations--to review their protective security plans,
consider running exercises and update security plans as necessary.
The recent National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS) Bulletin \23\
issued by DHS makes it easier for State and local governments to access
overtime funding for security functions, which is helpful in a
heightened threat environment. Congress could consider providing
additional funds to assist faith-based and non-profit organizations
which are often mentioned as potential targets by the White Power
movement. Such considerations should also factor in that many COVID-19
and QAnon-related conspiracy theories promote anti-Semetic beliefs and
often list specific infrastructure targets such as 5G towers.
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\23\ https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/ntas/alerts/
21_0127_ntas-bulletin.pdf.
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3. DHS should continue expanding locally-based, multi-disciplinary
prevention capabilities, and the administration should encourage State
and local governments to join the effort. The Congress should codify
DHS's Office of Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention to
memorialize its support for these prevention efforts.
4. Federal Law Enforcement activity should appropriately
demonstrate that any threat or acts of violence is treated the same
regardless of the ideological motivation. In particular, the Government
needs to explain their rationale for acting, or not acting, on
situations often raised by those on the conservative side of the
political spectrum pertaining to ``far-left violent extremism.'' The
Government should also publicize data on the actual number of acts of
violence and arrests associated with the protests last summer to help
debunk the disinformation spread about ANTIFA-related attacks.
5. We must explore domestic terrorism-related statutory, policy,
and culture changes with diligence, wisdom, and care.
I believe equal justice under the law requires treating threats
from ideologies that originated overseas and within the United States
the same. Of course the way we investigate U.S. citizens and those
residing within the United States is different than how we investigate
a foreigner overseas. But it makes no sense that the same plans to
commit a crime within the United States in the name of ISIS can
leverage more investigative tools and stiffer penalties than if it's
committed on behalf of a violent White Supremacist ideology.
I believe that at a minimum, we should pass a law that makes
domestic terrorism a crime, which would allow more flexibility in
investigations and stronger sentences. It also may serve as a deterrent
effect. I also believe the material support statute should be updated
to reflect any new criminal domestic terrorism statute.
Finally, I believe we should consider and robustly debate expanding
the current foreign terrorist designation capability to domestic
terrorism. While this is usually looked at through the lens of the aide
it provides FBI and DOJ--I would encourage those studying the pros and
cons to examine the assistance a designation process may provide to
other parts of the counterterrorism community. Tools such as
watchlisting, screening, and vetting would benefit from a designation
process. Likewise, private industry can be better informed about whom
they should not conduct business and the tech industry has guidance it
can rely on for decisions related to content takedown and deplatforming
for violations of their terms of service. This also allows for clear
communication to the public about such groups and may have a deterrent
effect.
As we have learned over the years, such efforts can also have
unintended consequences and those should be examined. We may find
domestic terrorist groups adapt to be even more decentralized or
constantly rebranding (as Attomwaffen Division has done). And of
course, such changes need to be undertaken in a way to ensure
Constitutional rights and liberties are protected.
For these reasons, I renew the call I made last year before a
subcommittee of this body--for a bi-partisan commission to be
established to explore the best ways to update our laws, policies, and
cultures within the security community to ensure we address this threat
appropriately. We must learn from both the successes and the failures
of the past 20 years of counterterrorism. You responded to that call
with a proposed commission that nearly made it into law, but was cut
from the NDAA at the last minute.
The attacks of January 6 demand not only an accounting of how they
occurred, but a thorough review of options to better address this
complex and rapidly-changing threat. These are difficult issues and
they would benefit from deep consideration by a bi-partisan set of
legal, security, and civil liberties experts that can dedicate most of
their attention to quickly examining options. These debates need to be
removed from the political spotlight for reasonable and diligent
deliberations to occur. And once the commission reports its findings
and proposed solutions, those solutions should be debated by the public
through their representatives in Congress.
Finally, a year ago, when I testified at a subcommittee of this
committee--I stated: ``We need to make it harder to carry out an attack
and reduce the potential loss of life, as well as prevent individuals
from mobilization to violence in the first place. Achieving those
objectives is beyond the Federal Government's capability and role
alone.''
At the time, I was referencing the need for a multi-disciplinary
approach to prevention. But where we sit now a year later, the threat
requires more. We must call on other parts of our society to reflect on
their contributions to our current moment. What can the technology
community do better? What can educators do to help? How can the faith
community better help their followers who chose a dark path?
Ultimately, repairing what is broken in our country will not happen
inside the institutional halls of Washington, DC. Yes, the security
community has a role and the Congress should debate what additional
tools and resources to give them to carry out those roles. And yes,
those who incited or committed the attacks on January 6 must be held
accountable. But that alone will not fix the extremist threat we face.
The challenge ahead requires rediscovering we are Americans before
we are a party affiliation or a political philosophy. It requires
discipline among citizens, and exercising leadership among elected
officials and the media, to not give into the monetized grievance cycle
of our media and political system. It requires rebuilding civic society
at a local level; choosing respectful civil discourse over cancel-
culture; and rejecting political ideologies or identity politics that
focus on grouping ``them'' into an ``enemy'' of the ``tribe''. Where
and how do we start? Locally. By remembering how to love our neighbor.
Chairman Thompson. I thank you very much.
I now ask Mr. Greenblatt to summarize his statement for 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF JONATHAN GREENBLATT, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER,
ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE
Mr. Greenblatt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Katko, and all the Members of the committee. It is a pleasure
to be here today.
My name is Jonathan Greenblatt. I am the CEO of ADL. It is
an honor to talk with you about the urgent threat posed by
domestic terrorism.
As many of you know, ADL is the oldest anti-hate group in
the world and one of the longest-standing civil rights
organizations in the United States. For more than a century ADL
has worked to stop the defamation of the Jewish people and
secure justice and fair treatment to all. As part of our work,
we have built a world-class team investigating extremist
threats, an evil that has intensified and expanded with
devastating consequences.
Indeed, we should keep in mind extremism is not new. It has
evolved and mutated over the decades. In the 1960's what we
could describe as left-wing terrorism was a serious threat. But
in recent decades, and in particular over the past 5 years,
right-wing extremism, and in particular White Supremacy, has
experienced a terrifying resurgence.
Let me make clear this is not a Republican problem or a
Democratic problem. It is an American problem. I am heartened
to see this committee coming together to tackle it.
Why is the threat of right-wing extremism on the rise? I
believe there are two forces that are fueling this movement.
First, leaders at the highest levels who have repeated
their rhetoric, co-opted their conspiracies, and whether
intentional or not, given extremists the green light.
The second is social media. No longer does a person have to
decamp to a clandestine compound in the woods. Today you can
find hate 24/7 with just a few clicks on your phone. As we
know, on-line hate can explode into real-world violence.
We saw this in 2015 at a Black church in Charleston, South
Carolina, in 2018 at a synagogue in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania,
in 2019 at a Walmart in El Paso, Texas.
Indeed, White Supremacists are responsible for more murders
than any other type of domestic extremists, accounting for
nearly 60 percent of all such crimes in the past decade.
ADL just released yesterday our annual report on murder and
extremism. We found that extremist activity skyrocketed in
2020. Sixteen out of 17 of the deaths were caused by right-wing
extremists, and there were more than 5,000 incidents of White
Supremacist propaganda in the country last year, almost double
the number in 2019.
Frighteningly, as we saw on January 6, more and more
ordinary people are being radicalized and spurred to acts of
terror, weaponized against this very Congress and the Republic
itself.
For decades, ADL's Center on Extremism has been actively
monitoring hate groups of all stripes, and in recent months we
have tracked domestic extremists lashing out at elected
officials in the wake of last November's election. Indeed, what
happened at the U.S. Capitol was the most predictable terror
attack in American history.
That act of domestic terrorism was a watershed moment for
the White Supremacist movement in this country. For them, the
sight of Congressmen and -women cowering under tables,
Confederate flags and Nazi symbols being paraded through the
building, was nothing short of a victory.
At ADL, while we were shocked by the violence, we weren't
surprised. This insurrection didn't materialize out of thin air
and it will not dissipate in its aftermath unless we take
action. We believe it is time not just for a whole-of-
Government approach, but a whole-of-society strategy to combat
White Supremacy and all forms of domestic terrorism.
With that in mind, ADL respectfully presents to you today
the bipartisan PROTECT framework, a comprehensive 7-part plan
to mitigate the threat posed by right-wing extremism and
domestic terrorism while staying true to American freedoms and
values.
The details are in my written testimony and I am happy to
talk about it in the Q&A, but the highlights include, No. 1,
passing the Domestic Terrorism Prevention Act; No. 2,
coordinating across all Government agencies--Federal, State,
and local--with a clear prioritization of the problem; No. 3,
ensuring that extremists cannot serve in the military, in law
enforcement, or in elected office; No. 4, holding social media
companies accountable for their complicity in facilitating
extremism; No. 5, funding creative efforts to prevent people
from radicalizing and off-ramping individuals caught up in
these conspiracies; and No. 6, targeting foreign White
Supremacist terror groups, because make no mistake, this
movement is a global threat.
Here is what you need to keep in mind and what I think
makes our plan different than some of the others. There is no
silver bullet to stopping the threat of domestic terrorism. A
singular statute won't solve the problem. This is a multi-
pronged approach to address a multi-pronged issue. It
acknowledges the existing authorities that are already
available, even as we innovate with new approaches.
Members of the committee, we can accomplish our goals while
protecting vulnerable communities. Together these actions
should have a significant impact on preventing and countering
domestic extremism and protecting the homeland.
Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Greenblatt follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jonathan Greenblatt
February 4, 2021
Chair Thompson, Ranking Member Katko, Members of the committee,
good morning. I am Jonathan Greenblatt, chief executive officer and
national director at the ADL, and it is an honor to appear before you
today to address the issue of domestic terrorism and the dire threat
that it poses.
Since 1913, the mission of ADL (the Anti-Defamation League) has
been to ``stop the defamation of the Jewish people and to secure
justice and fair treatment to all.'' For decades, one of the most
important ways in which ADL has fought against bigotry and anti-
Semitism has been by investigating extremist threats across the
ideological spectrum, including White Supremacists and other violent
extremists, producing research to inform the public of the scope of the
threat, and working with law enforcement, educators, the tech industry,
and elected leaders to promote best practices that can effectively
address and counter threats to communities.
As ADL has said time and time again, extremists must be taken at
their word. Anyone who has been paying attention to extremist activity
across the country, or to the chorus of disinformation and hatred
rampant across extremist media and some corners of social media, will
tell you that what happened at the U.S. Capitol on January 6 was in
some ways the most predictable outbreak of political violence in
American history.
For many of the people who were roused to violence that day, their
actions were the product of years of incitement, spread with stunning
speed, scope, and impact on social media. A portion of these
individuals constitute a new breed of extremist, one foundationally
animated by devotion to now-former President Trump. They are also
living in an entire ecosphere of disinformation, lies, and conspiracy
theories, ones fertilized by Alex Jones, QAnon, groups like the Proud
Boys, Oath Keepers, and Three Percenters, the former President, and
many others.
But the insurrectionists who stormed the Capitol last month are by
no means our Nation's only concern when it comes to domestic extremism.
Without a doubt, violence from White Supremacists and other right-wing
extremist actors is currently the greatest domestic extremism threat.
From Charleston to Charlottesville to Pittsburgh, to Poway and El Paso,
we have seen the deadly consequences of White Supremacist extremism
play out all over this country. We cannot afford to minimize this
threat. We need a bipartisan ``whole-of-Government approach''--indeed,
a ``whole-of-society'' approach--to counter it, and the work must start
today.
Right now, many policy makers and pundits are looking for a silver
bullet--a one-size-fits-all approach that will solve the challenge of
domestic terrorism. Unfortunately, we know from our extensive work and
analysis in this field that no such panacea exists. That is why ADL is
launching the PROTECT plan--a comprehensive, 7-part plan to mitigate
the threat of domestic terrorism while protecting civil rights and
civil liberties. The key elements of this plan, discussed in more
detail below, are appropriately prioritizing and allocating sufficient
resources--informational, legal, and financial--to address this
extremist threat. Together, they can have an immediate and deeply
significant impact in preventing and countering domestic terrorism and
the extremism associated with it--more so than any one law--and can
accomplish these goals while protecting vulnerable people and
communities against the risk of Government overreach.
In my testimony today, I will explain and elaborate on this
framework and offer concrete steps that Congress can take to begin to
confront and reduce the lethal threat of domestic extremism and
domestic terrorism. First, however, I will contextualize the events as
they unfolded on January 6 and summarize what we know and what the data
tells us regarding the rising threat of domestic extremism and domestic
terrorism in our Nation today.
insurrection at the capitol
Overview of Events
On January 6, a broad coalition of right-wing extremists descended
on Washington, DC and a number of State capitals. Ostensibly gathered
to hear President Trump and his family speak and to dispute the results
of the 2020 Presidential election, rioters stoked violence against law
enforcement officers before storming the U.S. Capitol in an
extraordinary display of political violence.\1\ By the afternoon, the
Capitol was under siege by domestic terrorists who had taken over the
building, videoing and photographing themselves in the House chamber,
calling for the execution of administration officials and Members of
this Congress, violently attacking overwhelmed law enforcement members
charged with protecting this body, and trapping Members and staffers
throughout the building.
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\1\ Washington Post staff, ``Woman dies after shooting in U.S.
Capitol; D.C. National Guard activated after mob breaches building,''
Washington Post, January 7, 2021. (https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-
md-va/2021/01/06/dc-protests-trump-rally-live-updates/#link-
FLU6WSIEHRHQRJKE6ANICM7ZQQ).
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As the chaos unfolded, President Trump tweeted his support for the
insurrectionists: ``These are the things and events that happen when a
sacred landslide election victory is so unceremoniously & viciously
stripped away from great patriots who have been badly & unfairly
treated for so long. Go home with love & in peace. Remember this day
forever!'' The tweet was later deleted by Twitter, and the President's
account was put on a temporary suspension, which has since been made
permanent.
Earlier in the day, Metropolitan Police discovered and successfully
detonated 2 homemade bombs which were placed near the buildings housing
the offices of the Democratic and Republican National Committees.
The siege resulted in at least 5 deaths: 3 from ``medical
emergencies,'' 1 pro-Trump extremist who was shot by Capitol Police,
apparently while breaking into the Capitol, and 1 Capitol Police
officer who apparently was hit repeatedly by protesters wielding a fire
extinguisher and subsequently died from his injuries. Furthermore, 2
officers who responded to the violent insurrection reportedly died by
suicide in the intervening days, and dozens of officers present at the
scene have sustained documented injuries.\2\
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\2\ Caitlin Emma and Sarah Ferris, ``Second police officer died by
suicide following Capitol attack,'' Politico, January 27, 2021.
(https://www.politico.com/news/2021/01/27/second-officer-suicide-
following-capitol-riot-463123)
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Context
The attack on our Capitol took place against a political and
cultural backdrop in which hate has proliferated and gone largely
unchecked, particularly over the past 5 years. This has served only to
embolden extremists, especially White Supremacist and other right-wing
violent extremists. Right-wing extremists--including anti-Government
extremists--have been responsible for 75 percent of domestic extremist-
related killings in the United States over the course of the past
decade, most of them targeting marginalized communities.\3\
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\3\ ADL, ``Murder and Extremism in the United States in 2019.''
(https://www.adl.org/media/14107/download) Over the past 10 years,
right-wing extremists committed 75 percent of extremist-related
murders, making the 2019 figure higher than average.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Therefore, the attack on the Capitol does not mark a sudden
increase in extremist violence. Rather, it is the unfortunate and
largely predictable result of years of growing hate and violence coming
home to roost. Just as the attack did not materialize out of nowhere,
the threat has not dissipated in its aftermath. We are all at risk if
we do nothing.
For years, ADL has warned of the growing threat of White
Supremacist violence here in the United States. This goes hand-in-hand
with a significant threat of violence from anti-Government extremists,
including militia groups.
The White Supremacist Threat
Since the 2016 Presidential election campaign, White Supremacy has
experienced a resurgence, driven in large part by the rise of the alt
right, the newest segment of the White Supremacist movement.
Modern White Supremacist ideology is centered on the belief that
White people are in danger of extinction, drowned by a rising ``tide''
of people who are not White, who are being controlled and manipulated
by Jews. White supremacists believe that almost any action is justified
if it will help ``save'' the White race from ``replacement.''
Violence and crime represent the most serious problems emanating
from the White Supremacist movement. White Supremacists have killed
more people in recent years than any other type of domestic extremist,
accounting for 58 percent of all domestic extremist-related murders in
the past 10 years.\4\ They are also a troubling source of domestic
terror incidents, including 21 plots or attacks within the past 5
years.\5\
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\4\ ADL, ``Murder and Extremism in the United States in 2020.''
(https://www.adl.org/murder-and-extremism-2020).
\5\ ADL H.E.A.T. Map. (https://www.adl.org/education-and-resources/
resource-knowledge-base/adl-heat-map).
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Yet murders and terror plots represent only the tip of the iceberg
of White Supremacist violence, as there are many more incidents
involving less severe crimes, including attempted murders, assaults,
weapons and explosives violations, and more. In addition, White
Supremacists engage in a large amount of non-ideological crime,
including crimes of violence against women and drug-related crimes.
From 2011 through 2020, White Supremacists alone killed 249 people
in the United States in terrorist acts, hate crimes, and other violent
acts. Other right-wing extremists added 107 more deaths to the grisly
toll.
Describing these as ``lone wolf'' attacks is often a
mischaracterization or tells only part of the story. There is a
throughline from the attacks at Charleston and Charlottesville and
Pittsburgh to Poway and El Paso, as well as to attacks by White
Supremacists that took place outside of the United States, such as the
massacre of Muslim worshippers in Christchurch, New Zealand.
And each attack was followed by White Supremacists celebrating on-
line. Extremists use the internet as a gathering place, a place to
extoll supposed martyrs, a place to declare their intentions, and a
place to share encouragement and instructions. As we've said before, a
number of on-line forums and platforms host what amounts to a 24/7
extremist rally. We need to recognize that because of the internet,
extremists need not travel to a training camp to be inculcated with a
toxic ideology and learn how to carry out deadly attacks.
Anti-Semitism and Racism on Display
The domestic terrorists who attacked our Capitol wore racist and
anti-Semitic clothing, and triumphantly marched a Confederate flag
through the halls of the Capitol building. This mix of racism and anti-
Semitism was not an accident, nor was its display a coincidence.\6\ The
goal of the January 6 attack was not merely to assert political power
and to overturn the result of the 2020 Presidential election. For some,
it was also to assert White power and create fear in marginalized
communities.
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\6\ ADL, ``Antisemites Implicate Jews, Zionists in DC Violence,''
ADL Blog, January 7, 2021. (https://www.adl.org/blog/antisemites-
implicate-jews-zionists-in-dc-violence).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After the insurrection, various extremist channels celebrated the
attack as a victory against Jews and other communities and expressed
optimism about the potential for future violence.\7\ On Telegram, for
example, the ``National Socialist Network''\8\ channel posted that
``the brave White men in Washington DC have lit a flame that will never
go out. By storming the spiritual home of the global parasite class,
those heroes proved--before the whole world--that the Jews and their
lackeys are not invulnerable.'' The ``White American National
Socialist'' channel similarly exclaimed, ``what Whites must do now is
to go out there and oppose these Jews & Sellout Politicians more and
more because we finally showed ourselves we can be United and we
achieve Victory here in America taking back our country along with
showing the White People that we won't be tolerated by a lousy Jewish
Minority!''\9\
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\7\ Id.
\8\ ADL, National Socialist Movement. (https://www.adl.org/
education/references/hate-symbols/national-socialist-movement).
\9\ ADL, ``Antisemites Implicate Jews, Zionists in DC Violence,''
ADL Blog, January 7, 2021. (https://www.adl.org/blog/antisemites-
implicate-jews-zionists-in-dc-violence).
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What Went Wrong
The attack on the U.S. Capitol was not a failure of intelligence.
Planning for this event took place in plain sight, largely on social
media; it was there for all the world to see. Then-President Trump--and
some of his closest supporters--incited it in broad daylight. ADL knew
that a severe conflagration might be coming, even publishing a roundup
of some of the violent calls to arms that we were seeing in the days
leading up to the event.\10\
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\10\ ADL, ``Extremists and Mainstream Trump Supporters Plan to
Protest Congressional Certification of Biden's Victory,'' ADL Blog,
January 4, 2021. (https://www.adl.org/blog/extremists-and-mainstream-
trump-supporters-plan-to-protest-congressional-certification-of).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After President Trump lost the election and started reasserting
ever more baseless accusations of voter fraud, ADL also warned of the
danger that his words posed. In light of the tension across the country
and the demonstrated tendency of right-wing extremists to resort to
violence, we warned that his charges placed our nation ``in a red zone
without precedent.''\11\ We urged elected officials, particularly
members of the GOP, to call for calm, for law enforcement authorities
at all levels to monitor these threats with utmost vigilance, and for
social media services to remove any content that endorsed violence in
any form. We watched extremist Trump supporters (and some mainstream
ones) gather in D.C. on November 14 for the so-called ``Million MAGA
March,''\12\ and then again on December 12 for multiple pro-Trump
demonstrations,\13\ including one that was organized by White
Supremacists and another that featured extremist speakers on its dais.
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\11\ ADL, ``Extremists and Mainstream Trump Supporters Plan to
Protest Congressional Certification of Biden's Victory,'' ADL Blog,
January 4, 2021. (https://www.adl.org/blog/extremists-others-respond-
to-president-trumps-calls-to-stop-the-count).
\12\ ADL, ``Extremists and Mainstream Trump Supporters Gather for
`Million MAGA March,' '' ADL Blog, November 15, 2020. (https://
www.adl.org/blog/extremists-and-mainstream-trump-supporters-gather-for-
million-maga-march).
\13\ ADL, ``Pro-Trump Rallies in DC Attract Extremists & Erupt into
Violence,'' ADL Blog, December 13, 2020. (https://www.adl.org/blog/pro-
trump-rallies-in-dc-attract-extremists-erupt-into-violence).
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In the days leading up to January 6, on-line chatter among
potential attendees increased dramatically. On ``TheDonald.Win'' forum,
users shared messages filled with violent rhetoric directed at a wide
range of perceived enemies. In response to a user who wondered what
would happen if Congress ignored ostensible ``evidence'' that President
Trump won the election, another user wrote, ``Storm the capitol'' and
another added, ``My truck is lifted and I have a plow on it right now.
What do you need Mr. President?''
Many extremist Trump supporters, and some mainstream ones, began
framing the rallies as a last stand to prevent Joe Biden from being
sworn in as the next President, and chatter indicated that there was a
desire among some people to engage in radical or violent tactics to
ensure that the election was not stolen from President Trump. As one
user wrote on a militia forum, ``The 6th is the line for me. It will
change or it will begin.'' Added another, ``I am waiting until the 06
Jan date, then if Trump does nothing . . . I have a few LEO [law
enforcement officer] friends who are going to do some major action and
I am joining them.''
All of this information was readily available--to the public, to
elected leaders, to extremism experts, and to law enforcement. What was
missing, and what has been missing for quite some time, is the
political will to appropriately identify, adequately prioritize, and
allocate sufficient resources to this ever-growing threat. As recently
as late September 2020, for example, ADL expressed concern about the
nomination of Chad Wolf for Homeland Security Secretary, in part due to
his serious downplaying of the threat posed by White Supremacists and
right-wing extremists in the year-plus that he had already spent in
leadership at the Department of Homeland Security.
Reportedly, the DHS intelligence office was ``gutted'' months ahead
of the Capitol attack \14\--the same office in which the Trump
administration had previously disbanded the unit specializing in
addressing domestic terrorism.\15\ A former DHS intelligence official
claims to have been ordered to downplay the threat of White Supremacist
terrorism, despite a clear intelligence picture that it was a rising
and present threat.\16\
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\14\ Josh Margolin and Lucien Bruggeman. ``Months Ahead of Capitol
Riot, DHS Threat Assessment Group was Gutted: Officials.'' ABC News. 9
January 2021. (https://abcnews.go.com/US/months-ahead-capitol-riot-dhs-
threat-assessment-group/story?id=75155673).
\15\ Swan, Betsey. ``Homeland Security Disbands Domestic Terror
Intelligence Unit.'' Daily Beast. 2 April 2019. (https://
www.thedailybeast.com/homeland-security-disbands-domestic-terror-
intelligence-unit).
\16\ Zolan Kanno-Youngs and Nicholas Fandos. ``DHS Downplayed
Threats from Russia and White Supremacists, Whistle Blower Says.'' New
York Times. 9 September 2020. (https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/09/us/
politics/homeland-security-russia-trump.html).
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Almost exactly 1 year ago, I myself testified before the House
Committee on Homeland Security's Subcommittee on Intelligence and
Counterterrorism on the topic of confronting the rise in anti-Semitic
domestic terrorism.\17\ I warned then, as I do again today, of the
unique dangers posed by White Supremacist extremism and the urgent need
for action. Without a concerted, committed effort by our political and
social leaders to combat this threat now as a major priority, we cannot
hope to meaningfully address it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Testimony of Jonathan Greenblatt before the House Homeland
Security Committee Subcommittee on Intelligence and Counterterrorism,
``Confronting the Rise in Anti-Semitic Domestic Terrorism,'' January
15, 2020. (https://www.adl.org/media/13948/download).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
current trends: the growing threat of domestic terrorism
After years of manifestos and mass killings by domestic extremists
in the United States, these attacks should no longer come as a surprise
to anyone. Lawmakers, law enforcement, and the public need to recognize
the grave and dangerous threat posed by right-wing extremism and White
Supremacist extremism in particular. We cannot begin to defeat this
deadly form of hatred if we fail to recognize it.
ADL Trends: By the Numbers
ADL's 2020 Murder & Extremism Report
ADL will soon be publishing our Center on Extremism's sixth annual
report on extremist-related murders, ``Murder and Extremism in the
United States in 2020.'' The good news is that 2020 saw a significant
decrease in extremist-related killings--primarily because we were
fortunate, for the first time in several years, to avoid mass killing
attacks. However, the relatively low number of murders does not mean
that extremists were less active overall. In fact, the opposite is
true.
In 2020, domestic extremists killed at least 17 people in the
United States in 15 separate incidents. This represents a significant
decrease from the 45 extremist-related murders documented in 2019, and
the 54 murders of 2018. This is the lowest annual total in ADL
statistics since 2004, which saw 14 extremist-related murders.
It is important, however, to look at these extremism-related
murders in context. First, 2020 was consistent with years past in terms
of the proportion of the murderers who displayed right-wing extremist
ideologies. Second, this drop in numbers is an apparent outlier when
compared to other years, though we would certainly wish for this dip to
continue.
As has been the case for most of the past 30 years, the extremist-
related murders in 2020 were overwhelmingly tied to right-wing
extremists. All but one of the incidents last year (16 of the 17
murders) were linked to right-wing extremism; more than half had ties
to White Supremacists.
Similarly, all but one of the 42 extremist-related murders in 2019
(the sixth-deadliest year for domestic extremist-related killings since
1970) were perpetrated by right-wing extremists.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ ADL, ``Murder and Extremism in the United States in 2019,''
ADL Center on Extremism, February 2020. (https://www.adl.org/media/
14107/download).
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Taking a longer view, of the 429 people killed by domestic
extremists in the last 10 years, 75 percent were murdered by right-wing
extremists--77 percent of whom were White Supremacists. This makes
White Supremacists the deadliest type of extremist movement in the
United States over the past 10 years, by far.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ ADL, ``Murder and Extremism in the United States in 2020,''
ADL Center on Extremism, February 2021. (https://www.adl.org/murder-
and-extremism-2020).
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Despite the relatively low number of extremism-related murders in
2020, extremists were not less active overall in 2020. ADL recorded 16
right-wing extremist-related terrorist plots or attacks through
November 2020, an increase from the 13 documented in 2019. We also
counted more than 5,000 incidents of White Supremacist propaganda
distribution in the United States in 2020, compared to 2,724 in 2019--
nearly a 100 percent increase.
ADL's Audit of Anti-Semitic Incidents
Since 1979, ADL has compiled an annual Audit of Anti-Semitic
Incidents (the Audit) tracking both criminal and non-criminal acts of
harassment and intimidation throughout the United States, including
distribution of hate propaganda, threats, and slurs. The data we have
compiled from the last 3 years show that anti-Semitism in America is
increasingly pervasive. Our 2019 Audit, for example, recorded 2,107
anti-Semitic incidents in the United States,\20\ a 12 percent increase
from the 1,879 incidents recorded in 2018. There were incidents
reported in every State except Alaska and Hawaii. The Audit found that
there were, on average, as many as 6 anti-Semitic incidents in the
United States for each day of the year--the highest level of anti-
Semitic activity ever recorded by ADL. 2019 also included 5 fatalities
directly linked to anti-Semitic violence, and another 91 individuals
were targeted in physical assaults.\21\
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\20\ ADL, ``Audit of Anti-Semitic Incidents: Year in Review 2019.''
(https://www.adl.org/audit2019).
\21\ Id.
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While most anti-Semitic incidents are not directly carried out by
extremists, a growing number of incidents do have ties to extremism. In
2019, ADL recorded 270 anti-Semitic incidents attributed to known
extremist groups or individuals inspired by extremist ideology. This
represents 13 percent of the total number of incidents, tying 2018 for
the highest level of anti-Semitic incidents with known connections to
extremists or extremist groups since 2004.
For even more up-to-date information regarding anti-Semitic
incidents on an ongoing basis, we urge your committee to regularly
consult ADL's ``Tracker of Antisemitic Incidents,''\22\ which includes
more recent cases of anti-Jewish vandalism, harassment, and assault
reported to or detected by ADL.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ ADL, Tracker of Anti-Semitic Incidents. (https://www.adl.org/
education-and-resources/resource-knowledge-base/adl-tracker-of-
antisemitic-incidents? field_incident_location_state_tar-
get_id=All&page=1).
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Latest Hate Crime Data
While countering domestic terrorism in particular is the core
objective of this hearing, we cannot ignore the relevance of other
crimes, such as hate crimes, that are often committed with the same
discriminatory motivations, even if they are not carried out by
extremists or rise to the level of domestic terrorism.
The FBI's annual Hate Crime Statistics Act (HCSA) report reveals
that 2019, the most recent year for which the Bureau has data, was the
deadliest year on record, with 51 hate crime murders--a 113 percent
increase over the previous record of 24 set in 2018. Total hate crime
incidents rose to 7,314, marking the fourth increase in the past 5
years.
It is instructive to look at the short-term trends. Race-based hate
crimes remained the most common type of hate crime, as has been the
case every year since the FBI began reporting hate crime data nearly 3
decades ago. Constituting over 50 percent of all hate crimes reported
to the FBI, in 2019 race-based hate crimes underscore the importance of
the national action to counter systemic and pervasive anti-Black
racism.\23\
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\23\ FBI, Hate Crime Statistics 2019. (https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-
crime/2019/hate-crime).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After declining in 2018, religion-based hate crimes increased by 7
percent in 2019, with fully 63 percent of the total number of reported
religion-based hate crimes directed at Jews and Jewish institutions.
Anti-Hispanic hate crimes rose nearly 9 percent, the fourth straight
year of escalating numbers. In our experts' views, this is spurred by
the escalation of anti-immigrant rhetoric, bigotry, and dehumanization
in the public discourse emanating in part from the previous
administration.
After a 41 percent increase in 2018, hate crimes targeting
individuals based on gender identity rose another 18 percent last year.
The increase in reported hate crimes comes despite the fact that,
for the second straight year, the number of law enforcement agencies
providing data to the FBI has declined. The FBI's annual report has
consistently provided the most comprehensive snapshot of bias-motivated
criminal activity in the United States, but a notable reporting gap has
long existed that has resulted in a significant underestimate of the
true number of hate crimes that occur each year. Hate crime reporting
by law enforcement agencies is voluntary, and in 2019, 86 percent of
participating agencies did not report a single hate crime to the FBI,
including at least 71 cities with populations over 100,000. That is
simply not credible. In order to effectively combat hate crimes, the
Government needs to be able to measure and analyze them, and that
endeavor is undermined by underreporting or the lack of any reporting
in certain areas.
Congress should act swiftly to ensure that the Federal Government
transparently reports on hate crimes to the public, and that State and
local governments are empowered to effectively report hate crimes to
the Federal Government to guarantee this reporting accurately
represents the threat of hate in our communities.
It would be remiss not to mention that another significant problem
in reporting hate crimes comes from the distrust of Government felt by
many in communities that are disproportionately targeted by such
crimes. Building greater trust between law enforcement and those
communities is essential and should be a law enforcement priority.
White Supremacist Propaganda
With hate and extremism in America on the rise, White Supremacist
extremism in particular poses a grave and underappreciated threat to
everyone in this country.
The White Supremacist movement is not as overt about its true
objectives as it might once have been when racist skinheads dominated
White Supremacists' ranks in the 1980's and early 1990's. Within the
White Supremacist community, there is some disagreement about the best
strategy to pursue. Many now seek to dress in a nondescript manner and
use coded language. They feel the need to adhere to ``optics''\24\ and
purposefully obfuscate their views in an effort to infiltrate
mainstream politics. Others hope to purposefully spark a race war, an
ideology known as ``accelerationism.''\25\ With one approach involving
secrecy and coded language, and the other sometimes including seemingly
random acts of violence, both approaches are alarming in different
ways.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ ADL, ``Tree of Life Shooting Revives `Optics' Debate Among
White Supremacists,'' ADL Blog, November 6, 2018. (https://www.adl.org/
blog/tree-of-life-shooting-revives-optics-debate-among-white-
supremacists).
\25\ ADL, ``White Supremacists Embrace `Accelerationism,' '' ADL
Blog, April 16, 2019. (https://www.adl.org/blog/white-supremacists-
embrace-accelerationism).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 2020, ADL documented more than 5,000 incidents of White
Supremacist propaganda distribution, by far the highest number of
propaganda incidents ADL has ever recorded.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ ADL, ``Murder and Extremism in the United States in 2020,''
ADL Center on Extremism, February 2021. (https://www.adl.org/murder-
and-extremism-2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Propaganda allows White Supremacists to maximize media and on-line
attention while limiting the risk of individual exposure, negative
media coverage, arrests, and public backlash that often accompanies
more public events. It can include everything from veiled White
Supremacist language to explicitly racist images and words, often
features a recruitment element, and frequently targets marginalized
communities, including Jews, Muslims, Black people, non-White
immigrants and the LGBTQ+ community. We urge your committee to
regularly consult ADL's Hate, Extremism, Anti-Semitism, and Terrorism
(H.E.A.T.) Map,\27\ which provides the public with a jurisdiction-
specific, on-going opportunity to review incident and propaganda data
from all 50 States and Washington, DC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ ADL, H.E.A.T. Map p. [sic] (https://www.adl.org/education-and-
resources/resource-knowledge-base/adl-heat-map).
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ADL's Efforts to Combat Election-Related Extremism
In the months leading up to the 2020 Presidential election, we
increased our efforts to combat election-motivated violent extremism.
ADL's Center on Extremism, in conjunction with ADL's Center for
Technology and Society, released a series of news briefs and blog posts
on topics of concern regarding the role extremists and extremism more
broadly were playing in regard to our political environment. We worked
with partners to analyze the chatter and trends we were seeing on-line
across numerous platforms used by extremists, and broke down
information geographically to assist local partners and otherwise
mitigate the impact of on-line extremist propaganda.
We engaged State Attorneys General, Secretaries of State,
Governors, Mayors, law enforcement, and other key players to bring
visibility to the extremist threat to election safety and to empower
officials to respond to these threats, briefing approximately 400 State
and local government officials on election security. We created and
disseminated a toolkit for State and local officials with actions to
mitigate election-related extremist violence. ADL also established a
new on-line incident reporting tool that would enable voters to flag
any potential hate crimes or disruptions involving extremists.
Our work became even more urgent in the immediate aftermath of the
election, when the country heard then-President Trump make baseless and
increasingly wild accusations of massive voter fraud grounded in
conspiracy theories. In light of the tension across the country and the
amply demonstrated tendency of right-wing extremists to try to
manipulate such tensions and resort to violence, these charges were not
just unprecedented--they were an abuse of power and unequivocally
dangerous, like throwing a match into a stack of kindling that could
light the country aflame.
It wasn't long before ``Protect the Vote'' and ``Stop the Steal''
pro-Trump rallies began popping up Nation-wide, with particular
attention being paid to Las Vegas,\28\ Detroit, Philadelphia, Phoenix
\29\ and Atlanta--all cities in States where results were close, or
where the Trump campaign was contesting the count. On Facebook, support
for the ``Stop the Steal'' campaign grew rapidly among some mainstream
Trump supporters. One ``Stop the Steal'' Facebook group, which included
posts promoting disinformation and violence, reportedly \30\ gained
more than 300,000 members within a matter of days before Facebook
finally shut it down. Extremists across less mainstream social media
platforms, including Parler, Telegram, and militia forums, also
continued to promote the false ``Democratic election theft''
narrative.\31\ After all major media outlets called the Presidential
election for President Joe Biden, right-wing extremists reacted to the
news as expected--with anger, distrust, and nebulous, non-specific
threats of violence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ Tea Party Patriots, Protect the Vote. (https://
www.teapartypatriots.org/protect-the-vote/).
\29\ Id.
\30\ David Gilbert, ``A GOP-Linked `Stop the Steal' Facebook Group
Is Gaining Thousands of Members a Minute,'' Vice, November 5, 2020.
(https://www.vice.com/en/article/xgzx8q/a-gop-linked-stop-the-count-
facebook-group-is-gaining-thousands-of-members-a-minute).
\31\ ADL, ``Extremists, Others Respond to President Trump's Calls
to `Stop the Count,' '' ADL Blog, November 6, 2020. (https://
www.adl.org/blog/extremists-others-respond-to-president-trumps-calls-
to-stop-the-count).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the time, Trump ally and former White House adviser Sebastian
Gorka appeared to advocate extreme actions in response to Democrats'
alleged fraud, telling listeners of his November 5 ``America First''
radio show, ``We need the judges to enforce the rule of law, and if the
local bureaucrats prevent us from seeing the evidence, from seeing the
legitimate votes, we need the U.S. Marshals to deploy and they need to
break down the doors of those polling stations and stop the crimes
being committed. It is that simple.'' Gorka added, ``Now, now, now, get
out on the streets, protest and show them who you are and that they
can't get away with it.''\32\ Donald Trump, Jr. appeared to urge
``total war'' over the election results, tweeting: ``The best thing for
America's future is for Donald Trump to go to total war over this
election to expose all of the fraud, cheating, dead/no longer in State
voters, that has been going on for far too long.''\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ Media Matters staff, ``Sebastian Gorka: `We need the U.S.
Marshals to deploy and they need to break down the doors of those
polling stations,'' Media Matters, November 5, 2020. (https://
www.mediamatters.org/sebastian-gorka/sebastian-gorka-we-need-us-
marshals-deploy-and-they-need-break-down-doors-those).
\33\ Chantal da Silva, `` `Reckless' and `stupid': Trump Jr calls
for `total war' over election results,'' Independent, November 6, 2020.
(https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-election-2020/
trump-jr-election-results-war-b1634841.html).
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Our Center on Extremism prioritized monitoring and reporting on
election-related extremism, both before and after the election itself.
We dedicated additional staff and resources to ensure that we would be
able to continue producing news briefs, blog posts, and expertise on
this rapidly-evolving situation.
The Growing Threat of On-line Hate
The internet is an incredibly powerful tool that, by its nature,
gives every user a platform and a loudspeaker. However, the internet is
only a tool, neither good nor bad, and can therefore be used by bad
actors and for destructive ends. The particularly viral spread of
misinformation and hate depends upon two things: One a human bias and
the other a factor related to the dominant tech business model, which
relies on engagement.
As much evidence has shown--and as tech companies well know--
inflammatory content such as that which taps into existing grievances
and beliefs will generate quick engagement. As that content is clicked
on, liked, hovered over, forwarded, commented on or replied to, tech
company algorithms almost immediately show it to still more users,
prompting more and more engagement, and thus more revenue. Among other
things, at its worst, this turns social media into likely the most
powerful confirmation bias machine we have ever seen, and also explains
why some advocates have even labeled this business model ``hate by
design.''\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ Brookings Institution, ``How Misinformation Spreads on Social
Media--and What to Do About It,'' May 9, 2018 (https://
www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/05/09/how-misinformation-
spreads-on-social-media-and-what-to-do-about-it/).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
And indeed, two significant concerns at ADL are the use of social
media to spread stereotypes and hate, and the use of social media to
coordinate extremist activity.
Amplification of Hate and Harassment
Where people go, hate follows. This past year, we have seen
communities shift into a virtual-first world and, against the backdrop
of COVID-19, our institutions have relied on digital spaces to continue
to function. We have increasingly relied on the internet to facilitate
work, school, worship, and social activities. So too, however, has the
digital world facilitated hate, harassment, racism, extremism, and the
proliferation of conspiracy theories. The Asian, Jewish, Muslim,
Latinx, immigrant, and LGBTQ+ communities in particular are
experiencing an onslaught of targeted hate, fueled in large part by
White Supremacists and other extremists.
Whether you consider it the catalyst or just a conduit, the fact is
that social media often amplifies hate. It's frequently a font for
conspiracy theories, weakening societal tolerance post after post,
tweet after tweet, like after like. And the hate festering on social
media inevitably targets the most vulnerable--particularly marginalized
groups like religious, ethnic, and racial minorities, as well as
members of the LGBTQ+ community.
We do not have nearly enough information about the prevalence of
hate and extremism on-line, the connection between on-line hate and
off-line domestic terrorism, or the measures that can be taken to most
effectively counter this phenomenon. We do know, however, that on-line
hate and harassment is extraordinarily prevalent. According to ADL's
2020 On-line Hate and Harassment survey,\35\ 44 percent of Americans
experienced on-line harassment and 28 percent experienced severe on-
line harassment--including stalking, physical threats, swatting,
doxing, and sustained harassment. ADL's research also shows that
targeting based on specific identity-based characteristics has
increased--1 in 3 Americans who are harassed on-line attribute the
harassment to their identity. The 2020 ADL data, for example, show that
race-based harassment affected 55 percent of Asian-American respondents
and 42 percent of Hispanic and African-American respondents. Sixty-one
percent of Muslim-American respondents who reported experiencing on-
line harassment felt they were targeted because of their religion and
43 percent of Jewish-American respondents felt they were targeted with
hateful content because of their religion. Additionally, 37 percent of
female-identified respondents felt they were targeted because of their
gender. Finally, 48 percent of LGBTQ+ respondents reported harassment
based on sexual orientation in particular.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ ADL Survey, ``On-line Hate and Harassment Report: The American
Experience 2020.'' (https://www.adl.org/online-hate-2020).
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Coordination by Extremists
In addition to amplifying hate, the internet has also become a
forum for extremists to communicate, organize, and mobilize. It is also
a place for extremists to recruit, and the rising mainstream popularity
of alt-tech platforms like Gab and Telegram, among many others, allows
extremists to mix with--and possibly influence--non-extremists.
Without a doubt, extremists relied on ``fringe'' platforms and apps
such as Parler, Gab, and thedonald.win both before and during the
events of January 6. According to at least one report, for example,
directions for which streets to take to avoid the police and which
tools to bring to help pry open doors were exchanged in comments on Gab
leading up to the attack. On the day of the attack, Gab CEO and founder
Andrew Torba posted on Gab: ``In a system with rigged elections there
are no longer any viable political solutions.'' The phrase ``there is
no political solution'' is used in on-line accelerationist White
Supremacist circles and embraces political violence as the only valid
response. Before hundreds of rioters broke into the Capitol building,
Torba reportedly posted on his platform: ``would be a real shame if the
people outside stormed the Senate.''\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ ADL, ``ADL Calls on U.S. Justice Department to Investigate Gab
For Possible Criminal Liability in Capitol Attack,'' January 13, 2021.
(https://www.adl.org/news/press-releases/adl-calls-on-us-justice-
department-to-investigate-gab-for-possible-criminal).
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Yet hate-fueled violence isn't limited to the darkest corners of
the internet. Many extremists also use mainstream platforms--Twitter,
Facebook, and Reddit--to communicate their message and recruit
adherents, and it's clear that these outlets are playing a central role
in the radicalization of domestic extremists too. Platforms like
Facebook, which employ algorithms designed to promote engagement and
thus end up amplifying the most corrosive content, serve up a firehose
of material that glorifies hate and violence.
long-term trends
You cannot successfully defeat an enemy that you do not know. While
new strains of extremism are always evolving, there are observable
long-term trends that we can study and analyze now to help us
understand exactly what it is that we are up against and can reasonably
expect to face in the foreseeable future. While trends are just that--
neither an exhaustive list nor a guaranteed prediction--they can be
deeply informative in helping us understand the state of extremism, the
threat it poses, and the mindframe of extremists today.
Extremist Groups
The January 6 attack on the Capitol reflected some of today's most
active extremist groups, including the Proud Boys, Oath Keepers, Three
Percenters, and other far-right contingents, including some White
Supremacists.\37\ ADL's Center on Extremism immediately started working
to identify those who participated in the assault. We remained in close
communication with law enforcement leading up to, during, and after the
event. This was a natural extension of not only the work that we have
been doing to track ``Stop the Steal'' and similar events since the
election, but the work that our Center on Extremism has been doing for
years to monitor and expose domestic extremists. In 2020 alone, ADL
provided over 1,000 tips to law enforcement to address these threats.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ ADL, ``Extremists Engage in Political Violence During Pro-
Trump Rallies,'' ADL Blog, January 6, 2021. (https://www.adl.org/blog/
extremists-engage-in-political-violence-during-pro-trump-rallies).
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Our assessment of the White Supremacist threat is outlined in
detail above. The following provides additional information about 3
specific groups that played a significant role in the January 6, 2021
siege on the U.S. Capitol.
Proud Boys
The Proud Boys are a right-wing extremist group with a long track
record of violence. Members of the group have always loudly insisted
that they are not racist. In the face of any accusation of anti-
Semitism or White Supremacy, they make a show of pointing to their
Cuban-American leader, their Black and Latino members, or their tiny
chapter in Israel.
Proud Boys leadership has carefully crafted a public image of an
inclusive club for men of all races, backgrounds, and sexual
orientations who subscribe to one mantra: The West (i.e. ``Western''
culture) is best, and anyone who ``opposes'' it (``leftists'' of all
stripes and feminists, among others) is the enemy.
The group has been remarkably successful at building a brand and
they have become popular public allies and security providers for a
host of right-wing and conservative activists and politicians, even
receiving positive attention from President Trump.\38\ Proud Boys
leader Enrique Tarrio seems to understand that expressing overt anti-
Semitism or racism would not help them, and Tarrio's continuing
assurances of anti-racism as well as his own Latino background provide
the Proud Boys with a ready way to defend themselves against charges of
bigotry. However, the actions of the group's members and even
leadership have repeatedly belied the official party line.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ Neil MacFarquhar et al., ``Far-Right Group That Trades in
Political Violence Gets a Boost,'' New York Times, September 30, 2020.
(https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/30/us/proud-boys-trump.html).
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At the December 12 pro-Trump rally in Washington, DC, a member of
the Proud Boys attacked a counter-protester while screaming ``Fucking
Jew.''\39\ The incident was captured on video that ADL has viewed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ ADL, ``Pro-Trump Rallies in DC Attract Extremists & Erupt into
Violence,'' ADL Blog, December 13, 2020. (https://www.adl.org/blog/pro-
trump-rallies-in-dc-attract-extremists-erupt-into-violence).
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Later that night, Tarrio, alongside an unidentified member of the
Proud Boys, allegedly tore down and set fire to a Black Lives Matter
banner outside the Asbury Methodist Church, one of the oldest Black
churches in Washington, DC.\40\ Tarrio later claimed that the attack
was not motivated by race, but rather because ``BLM is a Marxist
movement,'' adding, ``the burning of this banner wasn't about race
religion [sic] or political ideology it [sic] was about a racist
movement that has terrorized the citizens of this country.'' However,
his action is being investigated as a potential hate crime by
Washington's Metropolitan Police Department.\41\ Tarrio was arrested
and charged for his actions upon arriving in the District of Columbia
ahead of January 6th's events.\42\
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\40\ Peter Hermann, ``Proud Boys Leader Says He Burned Black Lives
Matter Banner Stolen From Church During Demonstrations in D.C.,''
Washington Post, December 18, 2020. (https://www.washingtonpost.com/
local/public-safety/enrique-tarrio-proud-boys-black-lives-matter-sign/
2020/12/18/c056c05e-415a-11eb-8db8-395dedaaa036-story.html).
\41\ Id.
\42\ Elliot Hannon, ``Proud Boys Leader Arrested and Charged With
Burning D.C. Church's Black Lives Matter Banner,'' Slate, January 5,
2021. (https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2021/01/proud-boys-leader-
arrested-charged-burning-church-black-lives-matter-banner.html).
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The Proud Boys' history of racist associations goes back to its
founding. The 2016 creation of the group was first announced in Taki's
Magazine, a right-wing publication that has published virulent racists
like Jared Taylor and Richard Spencer.\43\ Since then, there have been
many examples of close ties between the Proud Boys and racist right-
wing extremists, just some of which are outlined here.
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\43\ Gavin McInnes, ``Introducing: The Proud Boys,'' Taki's
Magazine, September 15, 2016. (https://www.takimag.com/article/
introducing_the_proud_boys_gavin_mcinnes/).
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In 2017, members of the Proud Boys marched at the deadly Unite the
Right rally in Charlottesville, although the organization denounced the
event and warned members that they would be banned from the group if
they marched.\44\ At the time of the event, Unite the Right's organizer
Jason Kessler was a member of the group.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ Leighton Akio Woodhouse, ``After Charlottesville, The American
Far Right Is Tearing Itself Apart,'' The Intercept, September 21, 2017.
(https://theintercept.com/2017/09/21/gavin-mcinnes-alt-right-proud-
boys-richard-spencer-charlottesville/).
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Despite their loud and persistent denials, the Proud Boys are all
too willing to embrace racists, anti-Semites, and bigots of all kinds
as long as they subscribe to the superiority of ``western''
civilization. The Proud Boys powerfully illustrate that an organization
with a Latino leader and Jewish members is quite capable of racism and
anti-Semitism.
Three Percenters
Three Percenters (also known as 3 percenters, III percenters, and
Threepers) are anti-Government extremists who are part of the militia
movement. Three Percenters have a track record of criminal activity
ranging from weapons violations to terrorist plots and attacks. They
believe that, just as a small revolutionary vanguard overthrew the
tyrannical British rule in America, a dedicated group of modern
patriots could rid the United States of today's alleged tyranny. The
term itself is a reference to a false belief that the number of
Americans who fought against the British during the Revolutionary War
amounted to only 3 percent of the population at the time (historians
say that percentage was actually far higher).\45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\ John A. Tures, ``More Americans Fought in the American
Revolution Than We Thought,'' Observer, July 3, 2017. https://
observer.com/2017/07/soldiers-militia-american-revolution/).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Though the media often refer to Three Percenters as a movement or a
group, they are neither. Rather, they constitute a major part of the
broader anti-Government militia movement, whose ideology they share.
Some Three Percenters form militia groups, while others form non-
paramilitary groups or create on-line networks; even more are active as
individual or unaffiliated Three Percenters.
At its core, the Three Percenter concept may be best understood as
a way to simplify, popularize, and spread the ideology and beliefs of
the militia movement--a right-wing anti-Government extremist movement
that arose in 1993-94. Its core belief centers on the idea that the
Federal Government is collaborating with a shadowy globalist and
socialist conspiracy (often referred to as the ``New World Order'') in
order to strip Americans of their rights and freedoms, starting with
their right to bear arms, so that Americans can be made slaves to the
New World Order and its agenda. Militia activists view the Federal
Government as tyrannical and illegitimate; some seek to defend
Americans from its perceived ravages, while others occasionally plot to
attack the Government.
The Three Percenter concept both contributed to and benefited from
the resurgence of the militia movement in 2008 through a blog, the
Sipsey Street Irregulars. The blog was run by Mike Vanderboegh, an
Alabama-based anti-Government extremist who had been involved in the
militia movement for many years. Vanderboegh's creation of the Three
Percenter concept occurred at a propitious time for the militia
movement, due in part to anger and anxiety caused by the recession and
mortgage crisis as well as the election of Barack Obama as President.
These developments gave right-wing anti-government activists in both
mainstream America and on its far right fringes a new focus for their
anger.
In keeping with militia movement ideology, Three Percenters have
typically focused most of their anger on the Federal Government. Their
anti-Government ire usually focuses on gun control or on perceived
``victims of government'' militia that Three Percenters seek to
protect. Many adherents of the militia movement strongly support
President Trump. As a result, Three Percenters have not been as active
in opposing the Federal Government in recent years, directing their
anger at other perceived foes, including leftists, antifa, Muslims, and
immigrants.
Three Percenters have been active in 2019-2020 in reaction to a
range of issues, including attempts to pass State level gun control
measures, State-imposed restrictions and lockdowns to prevent the
spread of COVID-19, and the protests that have taken place across the
country over the May 2020 murder of George Floyd in Minneapolis.
Oath Keepers
The Oath Keepers are a large but loosely-organized collection of
right-wing anti-Government extremists who are part of the militia
movement, which believes that the Federal Government has been co-opted
by a shadowy conspiracy that is trying to strip American citizens of
their rights.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\46\ ADL, ``Oath Keepers,'' ADL Blog. (https://www.adl.org/
resources/backgrounders/oath-keepers).
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Though the Oath Keepers will accept anyone as members, what
differentiates them from other anti-Government extremist groups is
their explicit focus on recruiting current and former military, law
enforcement, and first responder personnel. Their propaganda reminds
potential recruits that they swore an oath to defend the Constitution
``from all enemies, foreign and domestic,'' and asks them to pledge to
disobey theoretical unconstitutional orders they might get from
superiors--orders that explicitly or implicitly reference militia-
related conspiracy theories,\47\ such as mass gun confiscation or
rounding up Americans to put them in concentration camps.\48\ Each
theory goes back to the idea that the U.S. Government has fallen under
global governance and will at some point use police and military
members to enforce the New World Order's plans. The Oath Keepers urge
military and law enforcement personnel to step up to stop the
conspirators.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\47\ Mike Giglio, ``A Pro-Trump Militant Group Has Recruited
Thousands of Police, Soldiers, and Veterans,'' The Atlantic, September
30, 2020. (https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/11/right-
wing-militias-civil-war/616473/).
\48\ Jennifer Williams, ``The Oath Keepers, the far-right group
answering Trump's call to watch the polls, explained,'' Vox, November
7, 2016. (https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2016/11/7/13489640/
oath-keepers-donald-trump-voter-fraud-intimidation-rigged).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The number of active-duty police and military personnel who have
publicly admitted to being Oath Keepers is very small; the number of
closeted members may be larger. The Oath Keepers have had more success
in recruiting former military personnel, which is a much larger pool to
draw from; many Oath Keepers speak of past military service. The group
has also recruited from among people already involved in the anti-
Government extremist movement. Membership has never actually required
current or former ties with military, police, or first responders. The
popularity of Oath Keepers social media accounts illustrates clearly
that many more people support the Oath Keepers without ever officially
joining (which requires paying dues).
Based on its monitoring of the Oath Keepers, ADL estimates that the
group has up to several thousand members, though the Oath Keepers have
claimed far more. This estimated size would still make the Oath Keepers
larger than any single traditional militia group. Though there is a
formal national leadership, on the local level many Oath Keepers are
essentially self-organized, forming official, semi-official, or
informal groupings of Oath Keepers in specific, sometimes even
overlapping, geographic areas.
The Oath Keepers were particularly active in 2020, participating in
various anti-lockdown protests, providing vigilante-style ``security''
for local communities and businesses during the Black Lives Matter
protests that spread in the wake of the murder of George Floyd, and
warning about a potential takeover by the ``Marxist left'' during the
2020 election.
The group also gained notoriety for their armed participation in
disputes between ranchers or miners and Federal agencies, particularly
in 2014 and 2015. However, their decision to retreat from the Bundy
Ranch standoff in 2014 out of a fear of possible drone strikes
tarnished the group's reputation among other anti-Government
extremists.
Members of the Oath Keepers have also been arrested in connection
with a wide range of criminal activities, including various firearms
violations, conspiracy to impede Federal workers, possession of
explosives, and threatening public officials.
A New Breed of Extremists
President Trump has provided extremists the gift of a narrative
that will carry them through at least the next 4 years. Extremists are
often animated by the angry and paranoid conviction that something
sacred is being or has been taken away from them, and the former
President has offered a story about a ``stolen election,'' all thanks
to the treasonous ``left'' and mainstream media, who are, as the
narrative goes, suppressing the rights and voices of ``real
Americans.''
Many of the people who were roused to violent extremism for the
first time on January 6 as the result of such incitement. They
constitute a new breed of extremist, one foundationally animated by
devotion to President Trump, placing him over party or country. They
are living in an entire ecosphere of disinformation, lies, and
conspiracy theories, one fertilized by Alex Jones, QAnon, President
Trump and his most devoted enablers, and many others.
Over the coming months and years, as they mingle with established
extremists--including White Supremacists, anti-Government extremists,
anti-Semites, and hardcore conspiracy theorists--these individuals
could coalesce into a distinct and potent extremist movement.
Alternatively, they could eventually add to the ranks of those other
hateful causes.
To be clear, this is not to argue that supporters of President
Trump's policy agenda are domestic extremists. Indeed, 74 million
Americans voted for him in the 2020 general election, and their
interests, perspectives, and concerns should not be thoughtlessly
dismissed. However, we must also recognize that Donald Trump's
sustained propagation of falsehoods and acrimony--especially but not
exclusively regarding the election result--has played an essential part
in fueling our Nation's crisis of domestic extremist radicalization,
recruitment, and violence.
Looking Ahead
While it is hard to say with certainty what lies ahead, we know
that White Supremacists and some other extremists, including
Islamophobes, anti-immigrant extremists and anti-Semites, are also
driven by manufactured fears around demographic change. Some within the
movement believe these changes will only accelerate during the Biden
administration as it enacts more welcoming policies toward immigrants
and refugees who are people of color. Extremists equate those policies
to ``White genocide.''
Militia and other anti-Government groups may also be very active in
the next few years. The militia movement has historically derived much
of its energy and vitality from its rage toward the Federal Government.
However, the movement's support of President Trump over the past few
years dulled that anger. A Biden administration will allow militias to
return to their foundational grievances--the belief that a tyrannical
government in league with a globalist conspiracy is coming to enslave
them by first taking their guns and then the remainder of their rights.
Finally, anti-Semitism will likely continue to be a central part of
the conspiratorial views that fuel right-wing violence. Many of the key
narratives, especially the conspiracy theories that animated the D.C.
attackers, are also drivers of anti-Semitism.
Conspiracy Theories
No one who stormed the Capitol was radicalized the day before. They
were animated over time by a conspiracy theory about a stolen election,
stoked by politicians up to and including President Trump, and a
fervent commitment to preserving the status quo. One of the most
prominent conspiracy theories supporting President Trump is QAnon, with
substantial numbers of adherents coming to ``Stop the Steal'' events
across the country after the election and establishing a notable
presence at the Capitol attack.
QAnon
QAnon is not a coherent organization or movement. It is instead an
ill-defined and wide-ranging conspiracy theory that encompasses a host
of other conspiracy theories. It has spread from the backwaters of the
internet onto mainstream platforms, where it has built a substantial
following among supporters of former President Trump. Since the
inauguration of President Biden, QAnon's adherents have been scrambling
for purpose and direction.
At its core, QAnon is a sprawling global conspiracy holding that
rings of pedophiles control world governments. In the United States,
QAnon adherents accuse leading Democrats and a supposed ``Deep State,''
which includes high-profile celebrities, of being part of a cabal of
pedophiles who were determined to bring down President Trump. In recent
months, QAnon has been a primary driver of the false conspiracy theory
that the election was stolen from President Trump by virtue of massive
voter fraud. The violent mob action and assault on the U.S. Capitol on
January 6 grew out of the viral spread of these conspiracy theories.
Yet for years, there have been warning signs that social media
platforms such as Twitter were providing a fertile environment for
increased radicalization and potential violence from conspiracy groups
like QAnon.\49\
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\49\ Craig Timberg and Elizabeth Dwoskin, ``As QAnon grew, Facebook
and Twitter missed years of warning signs about the conspiracy theory's
violent nature,'' Washington Post, October 3, 2020. (https://
www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/10/01/facebook-qanon-
conspiracies-trump/).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
QAnon played a key role in the attack on the U.S. Capitol, with
QAnon accounts on Twitter and other platforms hailing the violence as
the first step in a civil war.\50\ Reportedly, QAnon supporters were
the first rioters to enter the Capitol. One of them, Jake Angeli, a
far-right conspiracy theorist dubbed the ``QAnon Shaman,'' has been a
predictable presence at far-right rallies supporting President Trump's
attempts to discredit the 2020 election.\51\ After several QAnon
supporters claimed Angeli was a member of antifa, Angeli publicly
denied the charges and reiterated his support for QAnon.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\ Jessica Guynn, `` `Burn down DC': Violence that erupted at
Capitol was incited by pro-Trump mob on social media,'' USA Today,
January 6, 2021. (https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2021/01/06/trump-
riot-twitter-parler-proud-boys-boogaloos-antifa-qanon/6570794002/).
\51\ Rachel E. Greenspan and Haven Orecchio-Egresitz, ``A well-
known QAnon influencer dubbed the `Q Shaman' has been arrested after
playing a highly visible role in the Capitol siege,'' yahoo!news,
January 9, 2021. (https://news.yahoo.com/well-known-qanon-influencer-
dubbed-230306934.html).
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QAnon's wide-reaching conspiracy theory is popular among a range of
right-wing extremists and some public supporters of President
Trump,\52\ including a number of recent candidates for Federal office
and 2 Members of Congress.\53\ Its adherents follow the anonymous
poster ``Q'' and believe that a shadowy cabal of pedophiles who control
world governments must eventually be brought to justice. This dangerous
conspiracy theory, which originated on the on-line message board 4chan
in 2017, has been connected with a number of violent events,\54\ such
as an armed standoff near the Hoover Dam,\55\ in addition to the attack
on the Capitol in Washington, DC and an array of other plots noted in
Representative Malinowski's bipartisan House resolution H. Res. 1154
that was passed resoundingly in October by 371 to 18 with ADL's
endorsement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\52\ ADL, ``QAnon,'' ADL Blog. (https://www.adl.org/qanon).
\53\ Em Steck et al., ``The congressional candidates who have
engaged with the QAnon conspiracy theory,'' CNN, October 30, 2020.
(https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2020/10/politics/qanon-cong-
candidates/).
\54\ Lois Beckett, ``QAnon: a timeline of violence linked to the
conspiracy theory,'' The Guardian, October 16, 2020. (https://
www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/oct/15/qanon-violence-crimes-
timeline).
\55\ William Mansell, ``Man pleads guilty to terrorism charge after
blocking Hoover Dam bridge with armored truck,'' ABC News, February 13,
2020. (https://abcnews.go.com/US/man-pleads-guilty-terrorism-charge-
blocking-bridge-armored/story?id=68955385).
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the time is ripe for change
According to a recent ADL survey \56\ taken shortly after the
events of January 6, approximately two-thirds of Americans believe that
Donald Trump (67 percent) and members of White Supremacist, far-right,
or militia groups (64 percent) are at least somewhat responsible for
the violence at the Capitol. Roughly three-quarters of Americans are at
least somewhat concerned about violence in the next year from anti-
Government and militia movement members (77 percent) and White
Supremacists (75 percent).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\ The survey of U.S. adults was conducted from Jan. 7-8, 2021 by
YouGov, a leading public opinion and data analytics firm, on behalf of
ADL. There were 1,176 respondents, 1,102 of whom were aware of the
incident in the Capitol. The figures have been weighed and are
representative of all U.S. adults aged 18 or over. The survey has a
margin of error of +/- 2.95 percentage points. ADL, ``American
Attitudes toward Extremist Threats: A Survey Following the Events at
the U.S. Capitol.'' (https://www.adl.org/american-attitudes-toward-
extremist-threats).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Over half of Americans also believe that social media companies
like Facebook and Twitter (61 percent) and Congressional Republicans
who said they would oppose certification of election results (55
percent) are at least somewhat responsible for the violence on January
6.
Unequivocally, Americans want the Government to do more to address
violent domestic extremism. Sixty-five percent want the Government to
do more to address the rise of far-right extremism. Sixty-six percent
of Americans believe that the Government should prosecute individuals
who stormed the Capitol, and 63 percent agree that social media
companies should ban posts and individuals encouraging or celebrating
extremism and conspiracy theories.
policy recommendations
Just as the attack on our Capitol did not materialize out of
nowhere, so too has the threat not dissipated in its aftermath. Those
who perpetrated the attack will not readily abandon their principles,
nor will those who supported this act of domestic terrorism from afar.
We cannot expect there to be a change unless we change something about
our approach. The trauma of January 6 must not be in vain. It is time,
at long last, for action. It is time for a whole-of-Government and
whole-of-society approach to combating domestic extremism.
With that in mind, ADL respectfully presents to this committee the
PROTECT plan--a comprehensive, 7-part plan to mitigate the threat posed
by domestic extremism and domestic terrorism while protecting civil
rights and civil liberties. Together, these 7 steps can have an
immediate and deeply significant impact in preventing and countering
domestic terrorism--more so than any one action, policy, or law--and
can do so while protecting vulnerable people and communities against
the risk of Government overreach. Our suggestions are that you:
P--Prioritize Preventing and Countering Domestic Terrorism
R--Resource According to the Threat
O--Oppose Extremists in Government Service
T--Take Domestic Terrorism Prevention Measures
E--End the Complicity of Social Media in Facilitating Extremism
C--Create an Independent Clearinghouse for On-line Extremist
Content
T--Target Foreign White Supremacist Terrorist Groups for Sanctions.
prioritize preventing and countering domestic terrorism
First, we urge Congress to adopt a whole-of-Government and whole-
of-society approach to preventing and countering domestic terrorism.
Civil society has an important role to play in this effort. We must all
work together toward a common goal if we hope to be successful.
The Biden-Harris administration must ensure interagency
coordination, as well as coordination between Federal, State,
and local stakeholders, civil society, and the private sector.
An important starting point would be the hosting of a
``Preventing Domestic Terrorism Summit'' with civil society
groups.
The Biden-Harris administration must work to develop a
comprehensive interagency strategy designed to prevent and
counter domestic extremism and domestic terrorism, including
any international connections. This strategy must prioritize
transparency and oversight, so that the public can see how the
Government is analyzing the threat and that resources are being
devoted proportionately.
Law enforcement must be both instructed and trained to use
the available existing legal authorities, which are sufficient,
to investigate and prosecute domestic terrorist threats, and
provided adequate resources to do so.\57\
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\57\ Notably, this plan does not include the creation of a new
Federal criminal domestic terrorism statute. Although there are a
number of existing authorities for charging individuals with committing
certain acts of domestic terrorism, a broad criminal domestic terrorism
statute has not yet been codified at the Federal level, and for good
reason. The Government's history of targeting marginalized communities
and political activists in the name of National security, as well as
First Amendment, Fourth Amendment and other civil rights concerns,
raise serious questions about its feasibility. Trying to address the
threat of White Supremacist violence through reforms that overstep or
infringe on civil liberties and potentially expand racial profiling or
unwarranted, discriminatory surveillance and harassment of marginalized
communities would be unacceptable. Indeed, as a number of experts who
are former law enforcement involved in counterterrorism have noted, law
enforcement has all of the investigatory and prosecutorial powers it
requires and that are consistent with Constitutional limitations, to
effectively combat domestic terrorism.
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Congress should, to the maximum extent possible, work with
the Biden-Harris administration to restore and empower offices,
like the domestic terrorism unit within the Department of
Homeland Security's Office of Intelligence and Analysis
(I&A),\58\ that have been hindered in their work to address the
threat of domestic terrorism in recent years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\58\ Woodruff, Betsy. ``Homeland Security Disbands Domestic Terror
Intelligence Unit.'' Daily Beast. April 2, 2019. (https://
www.thedailybeast.com/homeland-security-disbands-domestic-terror-
intelligence-unit).
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Congress must explore opportunities to keep firearms out of
the hands of convicted hate crimes perpetrators and to disarm
violent hateful groups. It is clear that guns are the weapon of
choice among America's extremist murderers, regardless of their
ideology, and a major reason why the death toll of such attacks
has risen over time.
The Domestic Terrorism Documentation and Analysis of Threats
in America (DATA) Act provided for appropriate coordination,
accountability, and transparency in the collection and
recording of data on domestic terrorism. A version of the bill
passed in the fiscal year 2020 National Defense Authorization
Act that became law in December 2019, yet has not been fully
implemented. Congress should continue to monitor implementation
of these requirements and ensure that we have accurate and
comprehensive data on domestic terrorism.
Congress must call out domestic terrorism as ``terrorism.''
Federal prosecutors have a range of charges to choose from in
individual cases and make those decisions based on specific
facts to which the general public is generally not privy.
Whether someone is formally charged with committing an act of
domestic terrorism in court is distinct from whether they have
committed an act of domestic terrorism as a definitional
matter--namely, criminal acts that are dangerous to human life
and intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population or
influence the policy or conduct of the Government. Public
officials have an obligation to use their bully pulpit to call
domestic terrorism what it is, regardless of what formal
charges are brought. That sends an important message, and
notably, means the Government is acknowledging that the
priority threat in the United States at this time--right-wing
and often White Supremacist political violence--is in fact
domestic terrorism.
resource according to the threat
Second, we must ensure that the authorities and resources the
Government uses to address violent threats are proportionate to the
risk of lethality of those threats. In other words, allocation of
resources must never be politicized, but rather transparently based on
objective security concerns.
Congress should immediately pass the Domestic Terrorism
Prevention Act (DTPA) to enhance the Federal Government's
efforts to prevent domestic terrorism by formally authorizing
offices to address domestic terrorism and requiring law
enforcement agencies to regularly report on domestic terrorist
threats. Congress must ensure that those offices have the
resources they need and can deploy those resources in a manner
proportionate to existing threats.
Along with prioritizing the threat within existing budgets,
legislative appropriators must work to expand the funding
resources available to Federal and State officials to address
the threat of domestic terrorism.
oppose extremists in government service
Third, it is essential that we recognize the potential for harm
from when extremists gain positions of power, including in Government,
law enforcement, and the military. Of broader concern, however, is the
inherent power imbalance between civilians and those in Government, law
enforcement, and the military. As such, we must be especially
thoughtful about whom we give Government authority and sensitive
resources. In the wrong hands, it can be deadly.
To the extent permitted by law and consistent with
Constitutional protections, take steps to ensure that
individuals engaged in violent extremist activity or associated
with violent extremist movements, including violent White
Supremacist and unlawful militia movements, are deemed
unsuitable for employment at the Federal, State, and local
levels--including law enforcement. Appropriate steps must be
taken to address any current employees, who, upon review, match
these criteria.
To the extent permitted by law and consistent with
Constitutional protections, take steps to ensure that
individuals engaged in violent extremist activity or associated
with violent extremist movements, including violent White
Supremacist and unlawful militia movements, are not given
security clearances or other sensitive law enforcement
credentials. Appropriate steps must be taken to address any
current employees, who, upon review, match these criteria.
Finally, it is imperative that appropriate steps be taken to
identify any elected officials who have endorsed, given
credence to, or intentionally promoted QAnon content, and
leaders should decline to assign them to positions of
authority, which in ADL's view should also mean removing such
Members from Congressional committees.
take domestic terrorism prevention measures
Fourth, we must not wait until after someone has become an
extremist or a terrorist attack has happened to act. Effective and
promising prevention measures exist, which should be scaled. We can and
must approach this problem holistically rather than through an
exclusively reactive lens.
Congress can provide funding to civil society and academic
programs that have expertise in addressing recruitment to
extremist causes and radicalization, whether on-line or off-
line. By providing funding for prevention activities, including
education, counseling, countermeasures, and offramping,
Congress can help empower public health and civil society
actors to prevent and intervene in the radicalization process
and undermine extremist narratives, particularly those that
spread rapidly on the internet.
These initiatives must, of course, be accompanied by an
assurance of careful oversight and safeguards. They must also
meaningfully engage communities who have been targeted by
domestic terrorism and who have been targeted when prior
terrorism authorities have been misused. They must be
responsive to community concerns, publicly demonstrate careful
oversight, and ensure that they do not stigmatize communities.
While Congress has funded a small grant program for
prevention measures domestically, the program is too small to
have an impact at scale and, in some cases, DHS's
implementation of the program has lost the confidence of
communities. The administration should reform the Targeted
Violence and Terrorism Prevention office at DHS and Congress
should significantly scale its grant program; ADL has
recommended a $150 million annual grant level.
end the complicity of social media in facilitating extremism
Fifth, Congress must prioritize countering on-line extremism and
ensuring that perpetrators who engage in unlawful activity on-line can
be held accountable with regard both to criminal charges and civil
liability, and do so without implicating First Amendment concerns.
There is clearly a role for Government here; we note, for example, that
the few meaningful steps taken by the large social media companies to
self-regulate came about only when the companies also faced a
combination of legislative and regulatory pressure, as well as public
outrage and significant reputational damage. It has also become
abundantly clear that self-regulation will never be enough.
We need aggressive enforcement actions, increased transparency and
accountability from social media platforms, and reports studying the
prevalence of hate, harassment, and extremism across key platforms. We
also need cyber hate victim resource centers, training for law
enforcement, and funding for innovative tools to combat these issues.
So-called ``transparency'' reports touted by platforms such as
Facebook are opaque and inadequate at best. Indeed, as ADL and others
have reported, it is nearly impossible to understand the prevalence and
impact of hate on social media, as well as accurate measurements of how
effective enforcement is, based on platforms' current transparency
reports. This is not surprising because platform transparency reports
are self-initiated and, thus, there is no independent oversight of
reporting requirements. Without clear and accurate reporting, there
will inevitably be significant gaps in our understanding of how on-line
extremism and cyber hate influence or impact domestic terrorism and
hate crimes.
The public also urgently needs more research on the impact of
social media platforms' recommendation systems and algorithmic
amplification mechanisms on the mental health of users, especially
related to addiction and radicalization. This can give us an important
understanding of the role social media plays in amplifying extremism.
Another imperative is more funding and support for technology
innovation to mitigate on-line hate, including tools related to the
measurement, detection, support, and mitigation of hate and abuse.
Another area that urgently lacks research and data is the world of
on-line games and its relation to White Supremacy, harassment, and
domestic extremism. Studying similarities between on-line games and
social media platforms is crucial to determine the need for better
oversight of their potential market power, influence on youth and adult
consumers, and impact on our democratic systems. ADL's research shows
that more than 80 percent of the 66 million U.S. on-line multiplayer
gamers aged 18-45 have experienced harassment while gaming on-line.\59\
Alarmingly, nearly 1 in 10 on-line multiplayer gamers (9 percent)
witnessed discussions on White Supremacist ideology. We need to learn
more about how gaming platforms enable hate and extremism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\59\ ADL, ``Free to Play? Hate, Harassment and Positive Social
Experience in On-line Games 2020.'' (https://www.adl.org/free-to-play-
2020#results).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On-line gaming should be considered a key part of the conversation
about preventing on-line extremism and creating more just and inclusive
digital social spaces.
Congress can work with independent extremism experts to
protect vulnerable targets from becoming either victims of
abuse or radicalized perpetrators of violence. Legislation like
the National Commission on On-line Platforms and Homeland
Security Act,\60\ for example, would establish a commission to
investigate how on-line content implicates certain National
security threats, such as targeted violence. Congress should
also pass legislation like the Raising the Bar Act,\61\ which
would attempt to reduce the amount of content related to
terrorism on social media platforms.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\60\ H.R. 4782--National Commission on On-line Platforms and
Homeland Security Act, 116th Congress (2019-2020). (https://
www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/4782).
\61\ Emily Birnbaum, ``Democratic lawmaker introduces bill to
tackle on-line terrorist activity,'' The Hill, November 20, 2019.
(https://thehill.com/policy/technology/471226-dem-lawmaker-introduces-
bill-to-tackle-online-terrorist-activity).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We also need to provide better recourse for victims and
targets of on-line hate and harassment. In the 115th Congress,
Representative Katherine Clark (D-MA) introduced and led H.R.
3067, the On-line Safety Modernization Act,\62\ which, among
other things, would have provided Federal protections against
doxing and swatting. It is time to pass laws that cover these
types of harms. It is crucial that legislation provide private
rights of action.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\62\ H.R. 3067--Online Safety Modernization Act of 2017, 115th
Congress (2017-2018). (https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/
house-bill/3067).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We also need to train law enforcement to investigate cyber
crimes and require better reporting of these crimes. Only then
can we fully understand the extent of the problem.
Finally, Congress must amend Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act to make tech companies legally
accountable for their role in enabling stalking, facilitating
violence, civil rights violations, and inciting domestic
terrorism. We do not support the elimination of Section 230
altogether for the simple reason that doing so will have the
unintended consequence of allowing more hate on-line where that
hate is heinous and harmful, but doesn't on its own rise to the
level of being unlawful. We are also well aware that too blunt
a legislative instrument in this area could silence and harm
the very communities and speech we seek to protect. We
therefore urge lawmakers to seriously consider Section 230
reform proposals that prioritize equity and justice for users
and bar immunity when platforms put profit over people. This
could include enacting measures such as the Protecting
Americans from Dangerous Algorithms Act,\63\ which would
prevent the use of algorithms to amplify discriminatory
content, or aid and abet terrorism. We will separately be
providing more details on ADL's views on reform.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\63\ ``Reps. Malinowski and Eshoo Introduce Bill to Hold Tech
Platforms Liable for Algorithmic Promotion of Extremism,'' October 20,
2020. (https://malinowski.house.gov/media/press-releases/reps-
malinowski-and-eshoo-introduce-bill-hold-tech-platforms-liable-
algorithmic).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
create an independent clearinghouse for on-line extremist content
Sixth, Congress should work with the Biden-Harris administration to
create a publicly-funded, independent nonprofit center to track on-line
extremist threat information in real time and make referrals to social
media companies and law enforcement agencies when appropriate. The
Center should be well-funded with sustained, on-going funding, but
should be independent of the Federal Government.
This approach is needed because those empowered with law
enforcement and intelligence capabilities must not be tasked
with new investigative and other powers that implicate civil
liberties--for example, through broad internet surveillance.
Scouring on-line sources through an independent organization
will act as a buffer, but will not prevent the nonprofit center
from assisting law enforcement in cases where criminal behavior
is suspected. This wall of separation, modeled in part on the
National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC),
will help streamline National security tips and resources while
preserving civil liberties.
target foreign white supremacist terrorist groups
Finally, Congress must recognize that White Supremacist extremism
is a major global threat of our era and mobilize with that mindset.
Foreign White Supremacists influence domestic extremists and vice
versa. Like the social media channels through which it courses, White
Supremacy knows no borders.
To date, no White Supremacist organization operating
overseas has been designated as a Foreign Terrorist
Organization. Only one has been designated as a Specially
Designated Global Terrorist. The National Security Council
should immediately hold a Deputies Committee meeting to review
how these designation decisions were made, if any additional
racially or ethnically motivated extremist groups outside the
United States, particularly White Supremacist groups, have
reached the threshold for either designation, and whether doing
so would help advance U.S. National interests.\64\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\64\ The First Amendment's assembly and speech protections would
not permit designation of White Supremacist organizations operating
here in the United States, but designating foreign White Supremacist
groups could make knowingly providing material support or resources to
them a crime--extending authority for law enforcement officials to
investigate whether such a crime is being planned or is occurring. Mary
B. McCord, ``White Nationalist Killers Are Terrorists. We Should Fight
Them Like Terrorists,'' Washington Post, Aug. 8, 2019. (https://
www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/white-nationalist-killers-are-
terrorists-we-should-fight-them-like-terrorists/2019/08/08/3f8b761a-
b964-11e9-bad6-609f75bfd97f_story.html).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Biden-Harris administration must also ensure consistent
analysis of the global nature of the White Supremacist
terrorist threat, including by scrutinizing links between
foreign and domestic White Supremacist extremist groups. The
recent surge of mass shootings targeting Jews, immigrants,
Hispanics, Blacks, and Muslims from Pittsburgh to
Christchurch--and many others--provide ample evidence of the
global influence and network of the threat. One way to target
foreign White Supremacists is by empowering the National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) to analyze the threat to the
fullest extent permitted by law. Another would be for the U.S.
Department of State to create a comprehensive strategy to
address the issue (as required by the NDAA) and carefully carry
that strategy out. Congress and the administration should
consider additional measures as well.
States also have a role to play, including working closely
with Federal authorities to identify and investigate foreign
connections to domestic terrorist activity. Many times the
first line of defense to a domestic threat is a State or local
law enforcement official. States should ensure officials are
aware of their role in protecting against this global threat
and that they are working seamlessly with Federal counterparts.
conclusion
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before this committee and
for calling a hearing on this urgent topic. ADL data clearly and
decisively illustrates that the impact of hate is rising across the
United States, and that domestic extremism and terrorism will continue
to pose a grave threat.
It is long past time to acknowledge that these threats
overwhelmingly come from right-wing extremists, especially White
Supremacists, and to allocate our resources to address the threat
accordingly, while assiduously preserving civil liberties.
We must also address these threats holistically rather than
piecemeal. This is precisely what ADL's PROTECT plan does, applying a
whole-of-Government and whole-of-society approach to the fight against
hate and extremism. On behalf of ADL, we look forward to working with
you as you continue to devote your attention to this critical issue.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
I now ask Mr. Jenkins to summarize his statement for 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF BRIAN MICHAEL JENKINS, SENIOR ADVISOR TO THE RAND
PRESIDENT, THE RAND CORPORATION
Mr. Jenkins. Thank you, Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member
Katko, Members of the committee, for inviting me to again
testify.
We have come through a difficult year that has witnessed
anguish, anger, and turmoil in our cities, which violent
anarchists and others have exploited to advance their own
agendas. We have recently seen the resurgence of threats from
the far right, as the previous members of the panel have
pointed out, culminating in the events of January 6. I want to
focus on that event and its potential consequences.
But first, I, too, want to acknowledge the Capitol police
officer killed during the attack, the 2 police officers who
ended their lives shortly after, and the many brave officers
who were injured defending the Capitol.
A violent mob invaded the very symbol of our Republic
during a Constitutionally-mandated procedure necessary for the
peaceful transfer of power, the very essence of our democracy.
This unprecedented assault on America's political system will
have long-term consequences, including the likelihood of
further violence throughout the country, as the most determined
elements of the movement transition from mass protests to
clandestine campaigns.
I have called for a National commission to review what
happened on January 6, conduct impartial inquiries, and level
hard criticism when warranted. The commission's purpose would
not be to affix blame, but the reasons for the inadequacy of
security must be examined and remedied.
Our concern is not just protecting the Capitol. Most of
you, I suspect, have been obliged to think more about your own
security in recent days. Incessant threats to politicians,
their staffs, and their families, vandals attacking the homes
of Congressional leaders, armed protesters barging into
statehouses, extremists plotting to kidnap a Governor, now the
violent invasion of the Capitol, are having a profound effect
on public officials. The normalization of violence and threats
affects their willingness to remain in office, and it could
discourage others from entering public service.
Tougher laws against incitement and communicating threats
may be necessary, but how much control is possible while
maintaining First Amendment rights?
Many, including my fellow panel members here, are arguing
for a domestic terrorism statute. Frankly, I have to say I am a
bit wary about this. A new statute should improve the chances
of preventing attacks by facilitating intelligence collection
and criminal investigations. I believe that that can be
addressed by adjustments in the Attorney General's guidelines,
combined with Congressional oversight.
What many mean by a new domestic terrorism statute is a
domestic version of the material support provision of the
PATRIOT Act, which criminalizes providing material support to a
designated foreign terrorist organization.
Now, that requires designating domestic terrorist groups,
and there is the problem. There are hundreds of extremist
groups on both ends of the political spectrum, along with other
issue-oriented groups that conceivably might be labeled
terrorist organizations. Battle lines will be drawn as each
party proposes its preferred list. The contentious debate could
distract us from the problem, and it could end badly.
My advice is to avoid the terrorism as much as possible and
base prosecutions on existing criminal offenses, putting aside
the political pretensions of the perpetrators.
Mr. Katko mentioned that we are coming up to the 20th
anniversary of the 9/11 attack. For the past 20 years, home-
grown jihadists have been a principal concern of authorities.
Efforts to thwart their plots fortunately have been largely
successful.
I believe that shutting down domestic violent extremists
may prove far more difficult. They are better organized than
the home-grown jihadists, and recent actions have given them
the opportunity to expand their networks. They are better
armed. Some have military or police experience. Intelligence
operations may operate in a less permissive environment, and
programs aimed at preventing radicalization will provoke
greater resistance.
Let me conclude with a personal observation. Any realistic
appreciation of the situation cannot ignore the current
political environment. We, the people, elect you to represent
our interests. Those interests are diverse and often
conflicting. Addressing them requires calm discourse,
thoughtful deliberation, and creative political compromise. How
you conduct yourselves sets the tone. Whether it is one of
divisive, bellicose rhetoric or instructive civil discourse,
the choice is yours.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Jenkins follows:]
Prepared Statement of Brian Michael Jenkins \1\ \2\
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\1\ The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are
the author's alone and should not be interpreted as representing those
of the RAND Corporation or any of the sponsors of its research.
\2\ The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops
solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities
throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier, and more
prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public
interest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
February 4, 2021
the collapse of comity: perilous times in the third turbulent century
of our political experiment, ct-a1175-1
Thank you Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Katko, and Members of
the committee for inviting me to again appear before the House
Committee on Homeland Security.
It is not an exaggeration to say that these are perilous times.
We face a continuing threat from a global jihadist enterprise that
remains determined to mount terrorist attacks on the United States from
abroad while exhorting home-grown jihadists to carry out attacks here.
We face a still-raging COVID-19 pandemic that in the past 12 months
has killed more Americans than were killed during World War II.
And we face a heightened threat of domestic violent extremism.
a trifecta of dangers
It is a trifecta of dangers that is testing the resiliency of
American society and the strength of our democratic institutions.
I believe that we will come through this as we have come through so
many dark moments in our Nation's turbulent history, but we should not
underestimate the hazards.
Jihadist fronts remain active in many parts of the world. At great
cost in blood and treasure, we have degraded their operational
capabilities, but we have not diminished their determination. They
continue to plan operations against the United States--last in
December, authorities revealed that a foreign jihadist plot to train a
pilot to carry out a 9/11-style attack in the United States.\3\ And as
the arrest of a U.S. solider in New York in January confirms, there are
still Americans willing to assist the jihadists in terrorist
operations.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ U.S. Department of Justice, ``Kenyan National Indicted for
Conspiring to Hijack Aircraft on Behalf of the Al Qaeda-Affiliated
Terrorist Organization Al Shabaab,'' press release, December 16, 2020
(as of February 1, 2021: https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/kenyan-
national-indicted-conspiring-hijack-aircraft-behalf-al-qaeda-
affiliated-terrorist).
\4\ U.S. Department of Justice, ``U.S. Army Soldier Arrested for
Attempting to Assist ISIS to Conduct Deadly Ambush on U.S. Troops,''
January 19, 2021 (as of February 1, 2021: https://www.justice.gov/usao-
sdny/pr/us-army-soldier-arrested-attempting-assist-isis-conduct-deadly-
ambush-us-troops).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pandemics devastate economies, as COVID-19 has done. Pandemics
expose and exacerbate existing inequalities in society, including
throughout the recovery. Their economic, social, psychological, and
political effects last long after the disease has subsided.
Historically, pandemics have been accompanied by popular resistance
to public health measures, threats to political authority, increases in
violent crime, and the spread of conspiracy theories. These things we
have also seen here.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Brian Michael Jenkins, ``Could 2020 Spawn `70's-Style Radicals
and Violence?'' NBC News THINK, August 16, 2020 (as of February 1,
2021: https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/08/could-2020-spawn-70's-style-
radicals-and-violence.html).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We have come through an exceptionally difficult year that has
witnessed anguish, anger, and turmoil in our cities, which violent
anarchists and other extremists have exploited to advance their own
agendas. These actions continue. On Inauguration Day, anarchist
protesters in Portland and Seattle attacked the offices of Federal
agencies and a headquarters of the Democratic Party.\6\ We have
experienced the most contentious election in our Nation's history.\7\
We have seen the resurgence of violent activity by far-right extremists
across the country. In the wake of the recent attack on the Capitol,
these extremists are currently the most immediate but certainly not the
only cause of concern, and they are the focus of the remainder of my
remarks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ There were violent demonstrations in Portland on both January 6
and January 20 and in Seattle on February 20. See ``Windows Smashed,
Portland Police Declare Unlawful Assembly,'' KOIN 6 News, January 6,
2021 (as of February 1, 2021: https://www.koin.com/news/protests/
direct-action-protest-justice-center-portland-01062021/); Lindsay
Nadrich, Jennifer Dowling, Jenny Young, Hannah Ray Lambert, and Elise
Haas, ``Inauguration Day in Portland: Tear Gas, Arrests,
Demonstrations,'' KOIN 6 News, January 20, 2021 (as of February 1,
2021: https://www.koin.com/news/protests/inauguration-protests-
portland-01202021/); ``Three Arrested During Destructive March in
Downtown Seattle,'' KING 5, January 20, 2021 (as of February 1, 2021:
https://www.king5.com/article/news/local/protests/seattle-protests-
downtown-january/281-6e085af2-4d54-4238-8ec8-9b3c0fb3834d).
\7\ Brian Michael Jenkins, ``Domestic Terrorism and the U.S.
Elections,'' RAND Blog, October 7, 2020 (as of February 1, 2021:
https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/10/domestic-terrorism-and-the-us-
elections.html).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Right-wing extremism in the United States is an assemblage of
causes and grievances. We saw that on full display on January 6. Many
of the extremists' causes constitute a continuing dark undercurrent in
American history that widens during periods of economic, social, or
political stress.
There is no single organization or doctrine that unites these
disparate groups other than their shared hostility toward political
authority in general and the Federal Government in particular.
Their discontents fuel and feed upon the increasing polarization of
American politics and society.
Many elements of the movement coalesced in what I have called ``the
Battle of Capitol Hill.''\8\ This was a turning point in our cultural
and political history. It will have long-term consequences.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Brian Michael Jenkins, ``The Battle of Capitol Hill,'' The
Hill, January 9, 2021 (as of February 1, 2021: https://thehill.com/
opinion/national-security/533474-the-battle-of-capitol-hill).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Astonishingly weak security made it possible for a violent mob to
invade the Capitol (the very symbol of our democracy) during a
Constitutionally-mandated procedure necessary for the peaceful transfer
of power (the very essence of democracy).
Some of those who broke in wandered about the building like
tourists. Others trashed offices or stole so-called souvenirs. Some
reportedly hunted for the Vice President and certain Members of
Congress who were forced to hide out or barricade themselves in the
House chamber.
Retaking the building took hours. It could have been worse. This
was an unprecedented assault on America's political system.
a 1/6 commission
In an opinion piece published in the Los Angeles Times on January
19, I called for a National commission to review the events of January
6: What happened, how it happened, what lessons can be learned, and
what should be done. Insulated from the passions that sunder our
politics and our society, a commission can conduct impartial inquiries,
assemble experts, and level hard criticism when warranted.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Brian Michael Jenkins, ``Why We Need a January 6 Commission to
Investigate the Attack on the Capitol,'' Los Angeles Times, January 19,
2021 (as of February 1, 2021: https://www.rand.org/blog/2021/01/why-we-
need-a-january-6-commission-to-investigate-the.html).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A commission can also provide an accurate historical record of the
events. The
9/11 Commission is still the most authoritative source on the attacks
of September 11; although we now have additional information, its
conclusions hold.
A 1/6 commission should aim for a detailed chronology that looks at
the political setting over recent decades, the contentious atmosphere
following the November 3 elections, the days and hours leading up to
January 6, and a minute-by-minute account of what happened--from the
gathering of the crowd in front of the Capitol to the clearing of the
building hours later. There remains much that we do not know.
This is not merely for the historical record. A thorough and
accurate accounting would provide the basis for an informed discussion
of measures and policies. It is also a way of recording and thereby
bounding the National trauma. A 1/6 commission could offer a road to
National recovery.
why did security fail so spectacularly?
The commission's purpose would not be to affix blame, but the
reasons for the inadequacy of security on January 6 must be examined.
One issue is the matter of intelligence.
Public statements by Capitol Police, DC Police, and various FBI
officials have offered contradictory accounts of whether there was
intelligence warning of an attack and, if there was, who saw it. That
sharing intelligence about potential attacks in the Nation's capital is
still a problem nearly 2 decades after 9/11 seems astounding. One of
the tasks of a commission would be to sort out who knew what when.
Even if there was no specific intelligence warning of the assault--
often a finding of previous commissions looking at surprise attacks--
that is no excuse for the security failure. Rarely is there specific
intelligence indicating an imminent attack. If there were, the
authorities could intervene and prevent it. There is a difference
between specific tactical intelligence and sensible foresight.
An assault on the Capitol should have been anticipated. Shootings
and bombings have occurred here in prior years. Since 9/11, the Nation
has been especially concerned about a terrorist attack on the Capitol.
We have gone through a year of protests in Washington. Violent street
clashes occurred in the city just weeks before January 6. Members of
Congress warned of potential problems.
Days before January 6, groups with histories of violence were
gathering again. Internet chatter among these extremists--as reported
in the news media--included discussions about smuggling guns into the
Nation's capital. Formalizing the electoral count, which would take
place in the Capitol, was identified by some extremists as the last
opportunity to change the outcome of the November election. Yet no one
thought the Capitol might be a target?
The Department of Homeland Security is responsible for preparing
intelligence reports on domestic threats and sharing them with Federal,
State, and local law enforcement, including the Capitol Police.
Reportedly, social media were buzzing with talk of violence in the days
leading up to the invasion, but the Department of Homeland Security had
stopped at least some of its reporting months before. Why?
Whether the Capitol Police reportedly was prevented from enlisting
help or rejected offers of assistance in preparing for January 6
appears to be another area of conflicting accounts. That still would
not let other Federal agencies entirely off the hook. They were aware
of the threat and had routinely dealt with situations like this before.
The President's State of the Union Address, for example, is a
``National Special Security Event'' that engages all assets of the
Federal Government to protect it against terrorist attack. The
Department of Homeland Security designates the events that fall in this
category. Was doing so in the case of the electoral count even
considered as a possibility?
The Department of Homeland Security is in the Executive branch. The
Capitol Police operates under Congressional authority. Did
jurisdictional issues get in the way?
Some have suggested that, following the criticism of the
militarized response to the Black Lives Matter demonstrations over the
summer, Federal authorities did not want to create the appearance of
another oppressive armed presence. Was inadequate security at the
Capitol an overreaction to an overreaction?
The Capitol Police performed bravely, as evidenced by the many who
were injured and the death of one officer. (One other Capitol Police
officer and one member of the DC Police who defended the Capitol later
committed suicide.) And it is understandable that being so badly
outnumbered discouraged futile resistance, but there are disturbing
reports of inappropriate behavior, suggesting affinity with the
invaders.
The astonishing inadequacy of security raises questions about the
leadership, recruitment, and training of the Capitol Police, but it
also raises questions about the adequacy of oversight. Did Congress
take responsibility for ensuring its own safety, or did members simply
assume that they would be adequately protected? After all, the Capitol
Police comprises 2,300 officers and civilian employees and has an
annual budget of $460 million.
A question going forward is whether the Capitol Police, which
mainly mans security checkpoints at entrances, should be held
responsible for protecting the facility from mass assaults.
The mass demonstrations and riots in the United States during the
1960's, the barricade-and-hostage situations that began in the 1970's,
and the Middle East truck bombs of the 1980's required continuing
changes in security measures and response. Facing large groups of
potentially violent occupiers, some of whom may be displaying but not
using firearms, along with others who may be carrying concealed
weapons, requires rethinking how to protect public officials and
enforce the law.
addressing broader issues
Earlier commissions charged with investigating specific events also
identified broader National challenges. The 1960's commissions on civil
disturbances pointed to the fundamental problem of violence in America
and warned of a divided society.\10\ The Long Commission not only
examined the 1983 Beirut bombing but warned that terrorism had become a
new mode of warfare--17 years before the
9/11 attacks--for which the Nation's armed forces must be prepared.\11\
More than a year before 9/11, the National Commission on Terrorism
warned of the potential for large-scale terrorist attacks on U.S.
soil.\12\
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\10\ National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, Report of the
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders: Summary of Report,
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968 (http://
www.eisenhowerfoundation.org/docs/kerner.pdf).
\11\ See, for example, DOD Commission on Beirut International
Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983, Report of the DOD Commission
on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983,
Washington, DC, December 20, 1983 (as of February 1, 2021: https://
fas.org/irp/threat/beirut-1983.pdf); see also Brian Michael Jenkins,
The Lessons of Beirut: Testimony Before the Long Commission, Santa
Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, N-2114-RC, February 1984 (as of
February 1, 2021: https://www.rand.org/pubs/notes/N2114.html).
\12\ National Commission on Terrorism, Countering the Changing
Threat of International Terrorism: Report of the National Commission on
Terrorism, Washington, DC, 2000 (as of February 1, 2021: https://
fas.org/irp/threat/commission.html).
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The 1996 White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security
made numerous practical suggestions for improving security, but it also
argued that aviation security was a component of National security, a
concept that was accepted only after 9/11. The 1998-2001 Commission on
National Security/21st Century determined that the United States would
become increasingly vulnerable to hostile attack within its own borders
and that U.S. military superiority would not entirely protect American
citizens.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ United States Commission on National Security/21st Century:
New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century; Supporting
Research and Analysis, Washington, DC, 1999 (as of February 1, 2021:
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=2078).
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The practical problem of defending Government officials and
buildings goes beyond barriers and tactics. On the same day as the
invasion of the Capitol, armed protesters showed up at the Georgia
State house, demanding to see the secretary of state.\14\ In April
2020, armed protesters entered the Michigan legislature to protest
control measures for dealing with COVID-19.\15\ Similar incidents have
occurred at State capitols across the country, raising a fundamental
question: How do we maintain the reality and appearance of open
government that guarantees access by the public to elected officials
and at the same time protect public officials and their staffs and even
their families?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Associated Press, ``Georgia Secretary of State's Office
Evacuated as Armed Protesters Gather,'' WBUR News, January 6, 2021 (as
of February 1, 2021: https://www.wbur.org/news/2021/01/06/georgia-
election-secretary-of-state-evacuated).
\15\ ``Coronavirus: Armed Protesters Enter Michigan Statehouse,''
BBC News, May 1, 2020 (as of February 1, 2021: https://www.bbc.com/
news/world-us-canada-52496514).
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The internet and social media offer access to information and
unprecedented connectivity. At the same time, they have become highways
of hate, disinformation, radicalization, and incitement to violence
while they facilitate mobilization and planning. How does a society
maintain its commitment to free speech but deny those bent upon its
destruction from hijacking this powerful communication technology?
The Capitol was not invaded by extraterrestrials. Domestic violent
extremists are made in the USA. Part of the inquiry must be an
examination of the motives and intentions of those who broke into the
Capitol. That does not mean offering a forum for the spread of hate or
excusing anyone's behavior. The country needs to understand the
invaders' perspective, not just dismiss them as fanatics and lunatics.
Who were the invaders? What did they want to do? Was this merely an
aroused but disorganized horde that swarmed into the Capitol, or were
there elements within it following a preconceived plan? If so, what
were the objectives? Did they receive direction or support from others
not on the scene?
The invaders describe themselves as ``patriots,'' and Revolutionary
War symbols were certainly abundant on January 6. In the eyes of most
people, invading the Capitol and threatening the lives of
democratically-elected officials hardly qualifies as an act of
patriotism or a defense against criminal charges, but it is significant
that the invaders see themselves in this way. If they were merely a mob
of vandals and looters, devoid of intellectual content or spiritual
impetus, this would be a security and law enforcement problem. The
thinking they reflect runs deeper and poses a greater societal
challenge.
the political consequences of normalizing threats and violence
As heirs to the Founding Fathers of this Nation, Members of
Congress bear an awesome burden--increasingly, it is a dangerous one. I
suspect that probably all of you have received venomous communications.
Most of you, I suspect, have been obliged to think more about your own
security in recent days.
When the mob broke into the building on January 6, no one knew how
many might be armed or what their intentions were. Security had already
broken down. A single determined shooter could have caused a massacre.
Or the invaders could have seized hostages, leading to a dangerous
siege.
Incessant threats to politicians and their families on social
media, vandals attacking the homes of Congressional leaders, armed
protesters barging into State houses, extremists plotting to kidnap,
and, most dramatically, the violent invasion of the Capitol on January
6 are having a profound effect on those in public office and their
families.\16\ This goes beyond an immediate security issue and affects
the psychology of politicians--whether they can trust their colleagues,
their willingness to remain in office. It will alter the readiness of
others to enter public service.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Brian Michael Jenkins, ``Capitol Rioters and Threats to
Lawmakers Could Distort the Political Landscape for Years,'' NBC News
THINK, January 25, 2021 (as of February 1, 2021: https://
www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/capitol-rioters-threats-lawmakers-could-
distort-political-landscape-years-ncna1255602).
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Some historians have noted that recent political violence may be no
worse than that witnessed throughout U.S. history--a periodic spasm.
But the violent takeover of the U.S. Capitol building on January 6
changed perceptions. This was an unprecedented assault on American
legislators conducting a solemn responsibility, and it has
understandably rattled Members of Congress.
An angry mob invaded your workplace. Experiencing any kind of
criminal assault can cause anxiety, apprehension, and other
psychological problems, which can take months or even longer to get
over. Crowds, sudden approaches by individuals, shouts--any loud noise
can trigger alarm. This is especially difficult for politicians who
move constantly among strangers, shaking hands, pressing the flesh,
drawing strength from noisy crowds--an affirmation of connectivity in a
tumultuous democracy.
In addition to shootings, bombing plots, and angry mobs,
politicians are targets of continuous, often graphic threats on social
media, in e-mails, and on phone calls. A heavily-armed man arrested in
Washington, DC, the day after the Capitol invasion had previously
texted, ``Ready to remove several craniums from shoulders.''\17\
Authors of threat messages seldom turn out to be assassins, but for the
foreseeable future, no threats can be dismissed. They are a constant
reminder of peril, and they contribute to distress.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Porter Garrison, ``Officials: Man Who Traveled from Colorado
to DC with Assault Rifle Charged with Threatening Pelosi,'' Denver7,
January 10, 2021 (as of February 1, 2021: https://
www.thedenverchannel.com/news/local-news/officials-man-who-traveled-
from-colorado-to-dc-with-assault-rifle-charged-with-threatening-
pelosi).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Improving security is necessary, but there are practical and
philosophical limits to what can be done. Are armed fortresses
necessary to protect democracy from itself? Should 24-hour Secret
Service protection be offered to all Members of Congress, as well as at
the State level for Governors and legislators? Can politicians go
entirely virtual, operating from undisclosed locations? Do we risk
disconnecting Government from the citizenry?
Tougher laws against incitement and communicating threats may be
necessary. More policing by social media platforms may be required. But
how much control is possible while maintaining First Amendment rights?
are new domestic terrorism laws needed?
A number of analysts have indicated that the takeover of the
Capitol building meets the definition of terrorism. Federal prosecutors
may or may not decide to add the terrorism enhancement to the criminal
charges facing those involved. You may note, however, that I have
avoided using the terms terrorism and terrorist as they apply to
domestic crime. This avoidance is deliberate, but not for political
reasons.
The term used by the U.S. Government is domestic violent
extremists, or DVEs. The operative word is violent, which falls in the
category of ordinary crime, like assault, kidnapping, or murder, for
which there already are criminal statutes. Domestic refers to location,
and without violence extremist beliefs are not a crime. Hate speech
might be considered to be a nonviolent expression of extremism,
although it often involves threats.
Terrorism is a pejorative. Affixing a terrorist label to one's foes
offers political advantage. In the 1970's, national governments and
nongovernmental organizations battled about the definition of
terrorism, and it took years to achieve a rough international consensus
based on specific acts, such as airline hijacking, or target
categories, such as diplomats.
We can expand the definition of terrorism to include whatever
crimes we want, but doing so will make the term increasingly
meaningless.
Many have argued for a domestic terrorism statute, not as
enhancement that increases a potential sentence but as a stand-alone
crime. I am wary. In part, these initiatives reflect a popular view
that ordinary criminal statutes do not adequately reflect the heinous
nature of a deed. In part, they reflect a desire to draw greater
attention to the threat.
In my view, neither of these is a valid reason to justify new laws.
The only justifications for a new terrorism statute would be to improve
the odds of preventing attacks by facilitating intelligence collection
and criminal investigations or to assist prosecutions, thereby removing
dangerous actors from society and deterring others, all while not
creating other complications.
I believe that intelligence operations and decisions to open
investigations can be achieved by adjustments in the Attorney General's
guidelines, combined with Congressional oversight.
Hate crimes are included in the Federal criminal code, also as an
enhancement. These are crimes committed on the basis of the victim's
race, color, religion, National origin or motivated by a person's
ethnicity, sexual orientation, gender, gender identity, or disability.
Hate speech is another expression of extremism, but owing to First
Amendment concerns, hate speech is not in the Federal criminal code.
Congress could legislate new laws or increase the penalties for
illegally entering Federal buildings or disrupting Government
operations. These need not contain the word terrorism.
Timothy McVeigh was not prosecuted for terrorism. He was charged,
convicted, and executed for murdering 8 Federal law enforcement
officers--a capital crime.\18\
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\18\ Timothy McVeigh was charged with ``conspiracy to detonate a
weapon of mass destruction,'' ``use of a weapon of mass destruction,''
``destruction by explosives resulting in death,'' and ``first-degree
murder'' (specifically, the murder of 8 law enforcement officers during
the attack).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
What many mean by a new domestic terrorism statute is a domestic
version of the material-support provision of the Patriot Act, which
criminalizes providing material support to a designated foreign
terrorist organization. Prosecutors have interpreted this broadly, and
the courts have gone along.
The problem with a domestic version of a material-support provision
is that it requires designating domestic terrorist groups--and therein
lies the trouble. There are hundreds of extremist groups on both ends
of the political spectrum, along with other issue-oriented groups that
conceivably might be labeled terrorist organizations. And organization
in the domestic context is a slippery term. Some ``organizations'' are
definable groups. Others are mindsets.
Some are large. Others are little more than a website.
The emotive and propaganda power of the term terrorism will raise
the political stakes.
Battle lines will be drawn as each side proposes its preferred
list. One can envision Congressional horse-trading. The end result is
not likely to be a coherent list of terrorist groups. The immediate
consequence is that the effort could completely distract us from the
problem.\19\ My advice is to avoid the term as much as possible and
base prosecutions on ordinary criminal offenses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ To avoid the political complications that inevitably would
arise in designating domestic terrorist groups, some Federal officials
suggest relying on the earlier version of the material-support
provision, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2339A, which addresses material support for
crimes that entered the U.S. criminal code when the United States
signed international conventions prohibiting certain crimes, such as
airline hijacking. To ensure that hijackers, for example, would not be
granted asylum, some of the conventions called for extradition or
prosecution. Material support for tactics or target sets covered by
these conventions is also illegal. However, the conventions that are
part of the Federal criminal code address only a limited range of
terrorist activity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
future tactics
Public revulsion over the Capitol building takeover, denunciations
by politicians who were once viewed as supportive, and the deterrent
effects of rigorous prosecution may combine to reduce the ranks of the
extremists. With popular participation declining, the diehards may move
from street brawls to more surreptitious operations.
Scenarios drawn from past attacks and plots include mass shootings
by lone gunmen, such as the 2011 attack in Oslo, Norway, which also
involved a large bomb, and the 2019 shooting at a mosque in
Christchurch, New Zealand.
We can envision assassination attempts like the assassination of
President Kennedy in 1963, the shooting of President Reagan in 1981,
the 2011 shooting of Representative Gabby Giffords in Tucson, Arizona,
and the 2017 shooting of Republican House members at baseball practice
in Alexandria, Virginia.
The scenarios contemplated by those arrested for plotting the
kidnapping of the Governor of Michigan included taking over the State
house in Lansing and holding hostages, including the Governor. Armed
takeovers of Government buildings to seize hostages, create Government
crises, and perhaps make demands must be considered part of the
potential terrorist playbook. There have been a number of dramatic
hostage incidents in the United States, including in Washington, DC.
The arsenal displayed at some of the right-wing protests suggests a
predilection toward shootings rather than bombings, which were the
favored tactic of domestic terrorist groups in the 1970's; however,
bombings cannot be excluded. Until 9/11, the 1995 bombing of the
Federal building in Oklahoma City was the deadliest domestic terrorist
attack the country had seen.
Although mass casualties were not the intent of the recent
Nashville bomber, and his motives are still not entirely clear, the
event reminds us that large-scale bombings remain a threat.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Natalie Allison and Adam Tamburin, ``Retracing the Key Moments
After the Christmas Morning Bombing in Nashville,'' Tennessean, January
10, 2021 (as of February 1, 2021: https://www.tennessean.com/in-depth/
news/local/2021/01/10/timeline-christmas-morning-bombing-nashville/
6578915002/).
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Suspected pipe bombs were placed at the headquarters of the
Republican and Democratic National Committees on January 5;\21\ on
January 27, the FBI arrested a suspected extremist with pipe bombs who
might have been targeting California's Governor and social media
companies who had blocked his accounts. Pipe bombs suggest a continuing
terrorist campaign.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Michael Balsamo, ``FBI: Pipe Bombs at RNC, DNC Were Planted
Night Before Riot,'' ABC News, January 29, 2021 (as of February 1,
2021: https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory/fbi-pipe-bombs-rnc-dnc-
planted-night-riot-75566629).
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we face a more difficult challenge
For the past 20 years, home-grown jihadists have been a principal
concern of authorities.
Efforts to disrupt terrorist networks, prevent terrorist
recruitment, thwart terrorist plots, and deter attacks through
prosecutions of those who plotted or carried out attacks have largely
been successful.\22\ Shutting down domestic violent extremists may
prove more difficult, for a variety of reasons.\23\
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\22\ Brian Michael Jenkins, Paths to Destruction: A Group Portrait
of America's Jihadists--Comparing Jihadist Travelers with Domestic
Plotters, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-3195-RC, 2020 (as
of February 1, 2021: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/
RR3195.html).
\23\ Some of these points are discussed in greater detail in Brian
Michael Jenkins, ``Domestic Violent Extremists Will Be Harder to Combat
Than Homegrown Jihadists,'' The Hill, January 31, 2021 (as of February
1, 2021: https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/536637-domestic-
violent-extremists-will-be-harder-to-combat-than-homegrown).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The home-grown jihadists have never had a supportive constituency.
With deep roots in American history and society, today's domestic
extremists may have a sympathetic underground.
Domestic violent extremists are better organized than the home-
grown jihadists. Recent actions have given them opportunities to
network, build contacts, and coalesce.
The Nation has not been galvanized. Fortunately, there has been no
follow-on
9/11-scale attack to bring the country together in a fervent National
effort. Rather than being a catalyst for unity, the events of January 6
seem to be a source of continuing division.
Right-wing extremists are better armed than the jihadists.
Jihadists have been able to acquire firearms, but they did not match
the personal arsenals on display at far-right protests.
Many right-wing extremists have military or police training, which
adds to their skills in planning operations and avoiding arrest. We may
have an insider problem.
Preventing radicalization will provoke outrage and raise civil
liberty concerns. The idea that domestic extremists may be the subjects
of thought control and thus require a form of ``deprogramming'' has
already provoked angry complaints. The environment for domestic
intelligence collection will be less permissive, and prosecutions may
be more difficult.
Historically, the American political system has been adept at co-
opting issues and addressing underlying grievances, thereby separating
violent extremists from larger potential constituencies. A majority of
Americans of all races believe that systemic racism against Black
Americans is a problem that should be addressed, although perceptions
vary greatly according to race.\24\ Recognition is important to getting
something done, although real progress is required.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ ``Most Americans Agree That Institutional Racism Is Real and
That Change Is Needed,'' Ipsos, September 2, 2020 (as of February 1,
2021: https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/most-americans-agree-institutional-
racism-real-and-change-needed).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Co-option is harder with far-right extremists. Government cannot
compromise with those whose views are antithetical to unalienable
rights and American values. However, a strategy aimed at reducing
reservoirs of potential recruits for far-right extremists should not be
ignored.
Beneath the anger, there are some legitimate and understandable
complaints. Segments of our population and regions of our country have
been left behind by technological developments, globalization, and
insufficient investment in physical and human infrastructure. Education
has not equipped them--or their children--to compete in the new
economies. They have been marginalized, dismissed, and disparaged. Drug
addiction, drink, and suicide are killing off middle-aged and younger
White men who do not have college educations.\25\ The system has failed
them. Their despair does not entirely explain the rise of domestic
extremists, but those who have been left behind are part of their
constituency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ Anne Case and Angus Deaton, Deaths of Despair and the Future
of Capitalism, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The challenges are daunting, but the situation is not hopeless.
Continuing violence may attract some, but it will alienate many. The
FBI ultimately cracked the Ku Klux Klan without a domestic terrorism
statute. Recent arrests and revelations suggest that the bureau already
has informants inside the extremist constellations. A new strategy will
be required. I am confident that our democracy will prevail.
a final observation
Let me conclude with a personal observation. I am ferociously
nonpartisan. However, any realistic appreciation of the situation
cannot ignore the current political environment.
We, the people, elect you to represent our interests. Given this
vast and diverse country, those interests are equally diverse and often
conflicting. Addressing them requires calm discourse, thoughtful
deliberation, and creative political compromise.
How you conduct yourselves sets the tone--whether it is one of
divisive bellicose rhetoric or instructive civil discourse, the choice
is yours. It will determine the course of our Nation.
Chairman Thompson. I thank the witness for his testimony.
I will remind each Member that he or she will have 5
minutes to question the witnesses. I now recognize myself for
questions.
Dr. Rodriguez, just for the sake of the committee's
information, were you aware of the potential violence that
might have occurred on January 6? If so, who did you notify of
this information?
Mr. Rodriguez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Can you hear me?
Chairman Thompson. Yes.
Mr. Rodriguez. OK. So it is a great question. The Homeland
Security Emergency Management Agency worked very closely with
the Metropolitan Police Department and our Federal partners to
assess the threat environment prior to the January 6
insurrection. We did, and as I think all Federal agencies that
were sharing information with the city, did indicate that there
was the potential for violence and that there was intelligence
to suggest that there could be violence. So that information
was shared with the city.
What it prompted us to do, Mr. Chairman, as the District of
Columbia government, was to recommend to Mayor Bowser that we
call up the National Guard. We did that on December 31 to help
with traffic management and crowd control on city property. So
we also activated our Emergency Operations Center to ensure
interagency coordination from the city's standpoint prior to
that--prior to the protests that were expected on the 6.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
Mr. Greenblatt, earlier before this committee you talked
about the importance of political leaders' rhetoric in
combating anti-Semitism. Do you see that kind of rhetoric as a
problem for what occurred on January 6?
Mr. Greenblatt. Thank you for the question, Mr. Chairman.
There is no doubt that right-wing extremists have been
encouraged to see their rhetoric repeated, to see their memes
moved around by elected leaders at the highest levels.
Again, when individuals, including the ex-President, would
make statements, like after the melee in Charlottesville where
a woman was murdered, where White Supremacists rampaged through
the town chanting, ``Jews will not replace us,'' when the
President, the prior President, said that, ``There are very
fine people on both sides,'' or, again, when he would retweet
out the rhetoric coming from White Supremacists and use their
language, like making claims about globalist conspiracy
theories or telling the Proud Boys in a debate that they
should, ``stand back or stand by,'' or even after the melee--
after the attack on the Capitol, suggesting that his supporters
were, ``very special people,'' and that he loved them, when I
say that this rhetoric emboldens them, I don't mean that
rhetorically. I mean it literally.
Because at ADL we track the extremists. We are monitoring
them on Facebook and Twitter, but also on Signal and Telegram
and the other platforms that they use, and they were saying,
``We feel emboldened,'' to one another. The Proud Boys were
saying, ``Reporting for duty, sir.''
Again, we know that tens of thousands of people who showed
up at the National Mall, look, the vast majority of them were
ordinary individuals who had come to believe and been
brainwashed to think that somehow the election wasn't
legitimate, that somehow the votes had been stolen, despite the
overwhelming and unambiguous evidence to the contrary.
So there is no question, Mr. Chairman, and all the Members
of the committee, no matter--there is nothing political in
pushing back on prejudice, right? There is nothing partisan in
adhering to a basic set of principles. When leaders don't do
that it creates the space, if you will, that extremists can
exploit and move from the margins into the mainstream.
I will just make one last point. It isn't just about,
again, the President of the United States. It could be the
president of the local PTA. But people in positions of
authority need to clearly and consistently call out
disinformation, extremism, and hate. Whether, again, it is
coming from the President of the United States or a first-term
Member of Congress, those who obsess about conspiracy theories,
those who spread anti-Semitism and racism, they don't belong in
the public conversation with a seat at the table. Period. End
of story.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of the full
committee, the gentleman from New York, Mr. Katko, for
questions.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Greenblatt, I appreciate your comments, and I do think
that the rhetoric has definitely led to what happened on
January 6. I credit what you are saying. It is incumbent upon
all of us to be mindful of what that rhetoric can do and what
it did in this case.
That is why I voted for impeachment, because there is no
question in my mind--as a Republican, I was the first to do so,
and I did so because there is no question in my mind that the
rhetoric inflamed and turned the boiling water from a hot pot
of water to overflowing, and that is what happened. There is
just no question about it. So thank you for that.
But I want to look at the issues more broadly, because that
is what our job is. Ms. Neumann, you mentioned that we need a
domestic terror commission, if you will. What would you
envision that looking like, and what would you think we should
do from a legislative standpoint to form that commission and
make sure it is effective?
Ms. Neumann. Thank you, Ranking Member, for the question.
Look, as a former Executive branch official, the day-to-day
work that you have to do, the portfolios that counterterrorism
professionals and law enforcement professionals have is
enormous. You are often looking at urgent threats, at trying to
make sure, especially in a heightened threat environment that
we are in, that we are staying ahead of the threat actors.
So my concern is that in this moment that we have really
the fantastic people that I trust, that I think are experts
that are coming into the Biden administration, that are going
to treat this seriously. They are going to look at updating
what they can from a policy perspective or from even a cultural
perspective. I think we need to explore how various
institutional cultures may have contributed to missing this or
not taking a threat seriously enough.
The honest truth is this is extremely complex. As Mr.
Jenkins pointed out, we really need to weigh the pros and cons
of what, if we change the law, what are the unintentional
consequences? There are many communities that have been
historically hurt by laws that were passed to try to address
terrorism. We need to treat that seriously and hear their
concerns.
It is not something that in your day-to-day work as a
counterterrorism official you have the time and the space to
treat with the level of diligence it deserves.
That is why I think this is where you need a commission.
You also need it out of, quite frankly, the political
spotlight. The rhetoric I am seeing on certain fairly prominent
commentators that are painting with very broad brush strokes,
they, whoever ``they'' is, believe that 74 million Americans
that voted for President Trump are domestic terrorists.
Now, I am an avid consumer of news, and I have been a news
commentator of late. I haven't heard anybody saying that. It is
not a prominent talking point in the mainstream, if you will.
Yet we have just informed an echo chamber and it continues to
be repeated that they are now painted as domestic terrorists.
Well, unfortunately, that feeds the grievance cycle. That
is likely to create more moving toward radicalization,
potentially mobilizing to violence, because they have now been
told that they are been painted as domestic terrorists.
So we have got to cut that off. We have got to cool the
rhetoric happening on both sides. Part of the way to do that is
to stand up a commission, bipartisan, that the people that are
selected are trusted as being experts, honest brokers, and let
them go off behind closed doors and debate this. Then let them
bring it out to the public, to you, the Congress, who have the
most important job of debating what the laws should be in our
country.
So I think you are looking for expertise in
counterterrorism, law enforcement, civil liberties, and
representatives from communities that have historically been on
the receiving end of too much scrutiny or abuse by authorities.
We need expertise from all those to come and evaluate what the
best path forward is here.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Ms. Neumann.
Mr. Jenkins, real briefly, 2 questions, and you can answer
them briefly, if you can.
First of all, obviously, some of the far-right violent
extremism manifested itself on January 6, but is it fair to say
that, you know, violent extremism goes across the entire
political spectrum, from the far left to the far right, and
that is something we need to keep in mind as we go forward
here? That is No. 1.
No. 2 is, did you want to add anything to what this
commission should look like and what Ms. Neumann said?
Unmute yourself, please.
Mr. Jenkins. To the first question, you, yourself, pointed
out that in the 1960's and 1970's we were dealing with left-
wing terrorists. In the 1980's and 1990's it shifted back to
the right. For the last 20 years we have been looking at
jihadist terrorists. In recent years right-wing terrorists has
resurged again to be our principal problem.
This moves over time, and I think we do have to address all
dimensions of the threat coming from left and right. That is
the nature of the kind of political violence we deal with in
our country.
In answer to the second part, about the mission of the
commission, I certainly agree with Ms. Neumann that a
bipartisan commission, insulated from daily news and partisan
politics, can, No. 1, provide an accurate, thorough history of
the events of January 6. The 9/11 Commission's history of the
9/11 events is still the most accurate, thorough account, and
that is useful.
I think it can look at the intelligence issues, the
security issues, not in the narrow sense but in the broadest
sense about how we protect our Government and its processes
going forward in an age of the internet and without turning
really our public buildings, including the Capitol, into armed
fortresses.
Mr. Katko. Thank you very much.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The Chair now recognizes other Members for questions they
may wish to ask witnesses. I will recognize Members in order of
seniority, alternating between Majority and Minority. Members
are reminded to unmute themselves when recognized for
questioning and to then mute themselves once they have finished
speaking and to leave their cameras on so they may be visible
to the Chair.
The Chair recognizes for 5 minutes the gentlelady from
Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and to
the Ranking Member as well, and to the witnesses.
The attack on the Capitol was an act of domestic terrorism
and it was primarily and much attributed to the words of the
President of the United States, President Trump, who emboldened
those who carried out this terrorist act.
I want to first of all acknowledge the loss of our beloved
officer, Officer Sicknick, and other officers who have also
lost their lives, but those who now continue to suffer with
injuries, some of whom are still in hospitals. I believe it is
our responsibility to find a solution and to do it in a
bipartisan way. We need to do it as Americans.
So I am interested, Dr. Rodriguez, you indicated
information coming from a number of sources. Would you tell me
whether you as DHS know that you got information directly from
FBI national? Did you convey that information to the Capitol
Hill officers, police officers, brass, the chief and others, in
your preparation?
Dr. Rodriguez.
Mr. Rodriguez. Thank you, Representative Jackson Lee. I
appreciate the question.
To the first part, about getting information from the
Federal Government or from the FBI, yes, we have good
information-sharing and intelligence-sharing relationships with
the Washington Field Office here in the District and we were
getting information from them about the potential for violence.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Did you convey that to the police on
Capitol Hill?
Mr. Rodriguez. I was just about to get to that. So we did
convene--the Metropolitan Police Department and my office
convened a variety of different phone calls and briefings with
all relevant Federal stakeholders, the Park Police, the Capitol
Police, and all of our Federal partners, to make sure that
everyone had the same intelligence and the same----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you so much very. I support Mayor
Bowser's need for control over the National Guard. Thank you so
much very much.
Let me ask Ms. Neumann about the idea of what has been
represented is the number of witnesses--excuse me--the number
of individuals found to be affiliated with the United States
military and law enforcement formally, either active or
retired.
What would be your thought about the idea of stopping this
tide of extremism in these particular organizations, overcoming
the many excellent officers who stood the line for us, visibly
fighting against domestic terrorists? How do we address that?
I would like the witness, Mr. Jenkins, to answer that
question as well. Thank you.
Ms. Neumann? My time is short. Thank you.
Ms. Neumann. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for the question.
Yes, can you hear me?
Ms. Jackson Lee. Very well.
Ms. Neumann. Thank you for the question.
I believe that, though it might have shocked the American
public and there has been a lot of conversation about it, this
has been a known challenge for decades. We know that White
Supremacist groups and militia groups have targeted military,
former military and former law enforcement, for recruitment
purposes upon their retirement.
We also know that they encourage people when they are
young, when they have been recruited into these movements, to
stay clean so that they can enter into and not get caught
through screening mechanisms that are in place, so that they
can get into the military, get into law enforcement. This is
primarily because they are looking for people to have the
training associated with being in the military and law
enforcement.
So your question was, what do we do about it? I do know
that military and law enforcement cultures do have----
Ms. Jackson Lee. I have a short period of time, so I will
take your answer.
Ms. Neumann. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I will just get Mr. Jenkins for a brief
moment, because I would like to ask a question of Mr.
Greenblatt very quickly. I have a very short time, seconds.
Mr. Jenkins, do you want to offer any comments?
Mr. Jenkins. Yes. No, the military canon over the years has
repeatedly had to address the issue of political displays, of
political loyalties, of things that interfere with the unity of
effort that is required in the military. They have experience
in doing so, and they can do so.
With regard to police departments, the major police
departments have the ability to do this and are addressing it.
But we have 17,000 police departments in this country and to
get some of the smaller police departments in various parts of
the country to do this is a much bigger challenge.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Mr. Greenblatt, the symbols of racism, hatred for African
Americans, hatred for people of the Jewish heritage and faith,
why is that so strong in the White terrorists or domestic
terrorism?
Mr. Greenblatt. So there are different types of right-wing
extremists, Congresswoman, that you could bunch into White
supremacists and sort of anti-Government types, but racism and
anti-Semitism is at the beating heart of these movements. They
believe there is a conspiracy controlled by Jews to use Black
people to take over the White race. It is wrong, it is lunatic,
but that is what we are dealing with, and unfortunately it is
far too prevalent.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you so very much.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you so very
much.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana for 5
minutes, Mr. Higgins.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me say I am
humbled to return to the Homeland Security Committee to
continue working to ensure the safety and security of our
Nation.
I would also like to welcome all the new Members to the
committee. This is an effective and functional and well-led
committee. We seek nonpartisan solutions to challenges that
face our country.
It is an honor to resume my duties as the Ranking Member of
the Border Security, Facilitation, and Operations Subcommittee.
There is still an abundance of work to be done to secure our
Nation, and I look forward to working with my colleagues in
this committee to make that happen.
The Biden administration has unfortunately begun
implementing dangerous policies that threaten our homeland. The
administration's proposal of amnesty for 11 million illegal
immigrants will allow individuals who have knowingly committed
the crime to receive the benefits and privileges that normally
come with United States citizenship. This could be at the
expense of hardworking Americans who are struggling due to the
COVID-19 impact.
This issue is further compounded by the Biden
administration's Executive Order to end funding for the border
wall. Reports from boots on the ground and crime statistics
overwhelming show that physical barriers work. They deter and
delay illegal crossings, which gives our border agents an
advantage, and they need that over the illicit activities of
drug cartels, gangs, and human traffickers. Those guys are
outnumbered down there, and any delay and deterrence to the
actual crossing gives them a chance to respond.
Further, what is referred to as the ``Remain in Mexico''
policy, MPP, has been a critical tool in securing our Southwest
Border. MPP ended the incentive of making fraudulent asylum
claims and prevented migrants from disappearing into the United
States. The end of that. Catch and release is back. Reversing
that policy allows our laws to be exploited.
These Biden administration actions encourage illegal
immigration. They reward it, and they will undoubtedly result
in a surge of immigrants at the border, creating a new
humanitarian crisis in the middle of a pandemic.
Politically-driven policies to reduce the footprint of
Customs and Border Protection capabilities and resources at our
Southern Border will also increase the number of immigrants who
choose to take the dangerous, illegal journey across our
Nation's bottom border.
The administration's immigration policies are not safe for
the American people or immigrants. Border security should not
be as partisan of an issue as it has become. It never was
before. We should all agree that we should secure our sovereign
border. Together, we can work on making improvements to our
immigration system while enforcing laws and providing security
to our citizens.
I am pleased to continue the important duty of securing our
homeland. I look forward to working with my colleagues moving
forward.
I thank the witnesses for being here today. The topic of
domestic terrorism should continue to be addressed aggressively
through this committee. None of us condone any type of violent
protest. While at the same time we support a citizen's right to
have his grievances heard through his First Amendment
protections to assemble and to redress those grievances.
So we must seek a balance of aggressively prosecuting
domestic terror where it is truly uncovered after a thorough
investigation and due process has been served and, at the same
time, maintain our core principles of protection of First
Amendment rights and freedoms across the country.
Mr. Chairman, I especially appreciate your leadership. You
have been a solid and fair and incredibly even-handed gentleman
through the course of my service. I look forward to working
with my colleague and friend, Representative Katko, as the
Ranking Member. God bless us, one and all. We have work to do.
I yield, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr.
Langevin, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I want to congratulate you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for, again, sharing together in a very timely and
important hearing, but I especially want to congratulate you on
once again taking the helm, the gavel, as our Chairman. I look
forward to continue working with you.
I want to congratulate also Mr. Katko on his new role as
the Ranking Member of the full committee. I have found Mr.
Katko to be one of most bipartisan Members of Congress.
I have enjoyed working with you, Mr. Katko, on a number of
issues, particularly around cyber, and I especially appreciate
your leadership on that topic.
So, with that----
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
I also just wanted to welcome our witnesses. Thank you for
your input and your insights today and helping us and guiding
us as we go forward to get our arms around the challenges we
face around domestic terrorism and the undermining of our
democracy. This is a long-term challenge that we are going to
have to confront, and we have to get this right for the good of
our country.
One of the most corrosive things I see out there and that
we have to contend with is the disinformation/misinformation
campaigns that are out there and that continue to have this
terrible corrosive nature.
Ms. Neumann, I wanted to start with you, asking what tools
and metrics does the Department of Homeland Security have in
place for measuring the prevalence of corrosive disinformation/
misinformation in circulation?
Also, Ms. Neumann, I wanted to ask, in your written
testimony, you highlight that the starting point for many
extremists is a vulnerable population who may be frustrated or
angry and are susceptible to messages of blame and grievance.
You list countermeasures, including community-based resilience
and direct counter-messaging.
What agencies or organizations are in place to implement
these countermeasures, and what more can we be doing?
But if you can start with the misinformation/
disinformation.
Ms. Neumann. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question.
On the disinformation, at DHS, the Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency, CISA, largely has taken the
lead around disinformation, in particular because of election
security, but I believe they appreciated that there is much to
disinformation that expands far beyond the elections.
In particular, we noted, when the pandemic was starting
back in March, we saw early signs of disinformation and
misinformation. My former staff actually predicted that we were
likely to see violence related to that, and, sadly, that became
true.
You asked, though, how we measure it, and I don't know that
I have a good answer. During my tenure, it was certainly more
qualitative, not necessarily quantitative. But it has been a
year since I was at the Department, so they may have made some
advances. Certainly, they were able to tell me whether there
had been an increase or a decrease or if the nature or origin
of it had shifted, but I don't know that we have solid metrics.
That would be a good question to ask the Department.
On the nature of the vulnerable individuals and what do we
do, that is where the Office of Targeted Violence and Terrorism
Prevention is doing work around innovation and research. You
all provided grant funds. This last year, it increased to $20
million. Those funds, in part, are going to research some of
these issues.
There are also some private industry or private-sector
efforts. Moonshot CVE comes to mind, where they are looking at,
when people search for certain terms, if they are offered kind-
of an alternative perspective, does that messaging work? Does
that move people away from maybe the disinformation that they
were seeking?
So there are any number of efforts, including one that I
feel is fairly promising, a peer-to-peer exchange where college
students, as part of a class in communications, develop
campaigns to basically counter disinformation. The winning--
usually it is done in a contest style--the winning campaign
gets paid for to be used more broadly in their community.
I think innovation is really important here.
Disinformation, of course, has been around for decades, but the
viral nature of it through technology makes the challenge very
hard.
Mr. Langevin. OK.
Do you think that DHS is the agency that should be leading
this counter-messaging resilience within the U.S. Government,
yes or no?
Ms. Neumann. It certainly--yes, in strong partnership with
other agencies that have expertise.
Mr. Langevin. OK.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina for
5 minutes, Mr. Bishop.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Neumann, you are familiar with the security profile
around Lafayette Square and the events of last June, where St.
John's Church was burned somewhat, and then there was a big
controversy over the security cordon that was sort of
established thereafter, right? You are familiar with that?
Ms. Neumann, are you able to hear me?
Ms. Neumann. I am familiar. I was a private citizen at the
time.
Mr. Bishop. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Neumann. Yes, I can. I was a private citizen at the
time, but I am familiar with the public accounts.
Mr. Bishop. OK. You spend time in Washington even now, I
assume, right?
Ms. Neumann, were you able to hear me?
Ms. Neumann. Yes, I live in the area.
Mr. Bishop. Have you been in the Lafayette Park area since
then and seen the fencing and so forth that is in that area?
Ms. Neumann. Yes, I live in----
Mr. Bishop. It is also true that, since last summer, much
of the downtown area has been boarded up and so forth, correct?
Ma'am, it has been--there were a lot of the storefronts and
so forth----
Ms. Neumann. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bishop [continuing]. That have been continuously
boarded up, Right?
You have also said in your paper, made the point, in fact,
on page 10----
Ms. Neumann. That is correct.
Mr. Bishop [continuing]. That there is a known challenge
involving right-wing extremist violence. In fact, you sort-of
make the point that, you know, there is a false equivalence
drawn. You make the point that the official view is that the
source of right-wing violence is actually more concerning as a
matter of domestic violent extremists. Is that correct?
Are you able to hear me, ma'am?
I am not sure my----
Ms. Neumann. My point is that, historically, the statistics
show that the preponderance--yes. Sorry. There does seem to be
a delay. I am able to hear you.
The issue is that the statistics show that there has been
more violence, more planned attacks, more arrests coming from
groups that would be considered right-wing extremists.
CSIS, ADL, multiple organizations have studied this from a
statistical standpoint, and you have seen--let's just take the
last 10 years--76 percent of all hate-crime-related murders are
coming from that right-wing violent extremist ideology, as
compared to Islam jihadism and left-wing violent extremism.
So the issue----
Mr. Bishop. Yes, ma'am. So, Ms. Neumann, given----
Ms. Neumann. So the issue is, No. 1, not that we don't need
to treat all violence with seriousness and go after that
threat----
Mr. Bishop. Given the prevalence of that----
Ms. Neumann [continuing]. But, statistically speaking, we
have seen more come from what is ultimately the right wing.
Mr. Bishop. Given the prevalence of that, wouldn't it be
true that there would have been a fairly obvious need for a
significant security profile around the Capitol on January 6?
In fact, I understand there were some threat warnings and
so forth in advance. Do you have any insight as to why
decisions were made not to have the sort of security around the
Capitol that we have right now?
Chairman Thompson. I think Ms. Neumann is having some
challenges with her internet right now.
Ms. Neumann. I will tell you that, as I was observing on
the TV, I was--can you hear me?
Mr. Bishop. Mr. Chairman, I think, unfortunately, there is
such a delay----
Ms. Neumann. I will keep talking in case you can.
Mr. Bishop [continuing]. I think perhaps I will just yield
back.
Ms. Neumann. I believe that what I observed on TV, I
thought that the security was woefully unprepared. It did not
make sense to me why police officers----
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman has yielded his time, Ms.
Neumann, and we will go to our next questioner.
The Chair recognizes Mr. Correa for 5 minutes for
questioning.
Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear me OK?
Chairman Thompson. Yes, we can.
Mr. Correa. Thank you very much.
First of all, I want to thank you, Chairman Thompson, for
holding this most important hearing on domestic terrorism.
Mr. Katko, I want to congratulate you for your position as
the Ranking Member.
We are going to continue to have a long discussion
[inaudible]. As you know, this is not a Democrat or Republican
issue, but, rather, this is an issue about security of all
Americans, here and abroad.
Mr. Chairman, again, I thank you for this hearing because,
as you remember, I called on the House Homeland Security
Committee right after the Charlottesville ``Unite the Right''
rally, where 32-year-old Heather Heyer was killed, I called on
this kind of a hearing to address this home-grown right-wing
terrorism. So I am glad we are finally here.
In the few moments that I have, I want to ask some of our
witnesses a couple of questions.
First, my question to all of you: Given the events that we
just witnessed, especially January 6, and, again, having been
in that gallery myself and watching everything unfold, are we
now prepared? Are we adequately redirecting resources to
address domestic terrorism?
After 9/11, rightly so, we focused almost exclusively on
foreign terrorism. My question is, to all of you, are we now
focused the way we should be on domestic terrorism?
Mr. Rodriguez.
Mr. Rodriguez. Thank you, Representative Correa.
I do think that, in the wake of January 6, we need to
reinforce the importance of information sharing and
intelligence sharing. That is why I spoke in my comments----
Mr. Correa. I am limited in my time, Mr. Rodriguez, so let
me ask you: We have more than 17,000 police agencies, fusion
centers. Do we need more legislation? More resources? Or do we
just have to have a better attitude in terms of coordinating
information?
Mr. Rodriguez. We need more information [inaudible] and get
that information flowing into liaison officers into some of
these Federal agencies. Yes.
Mr. Correa. Ms. Neumann, same question.
Mr. Greenblatt.
Mr. Greenblatt. What I would say, Mr. Congressman, is, we
at the ADL work closely with the FBI, who I think is focused on
the problem, but we do not yet have a whole-of-Government
approach. We do not yet have adequate resources. The Biden
administration has given us some very encouraging signals and
said they will make it a priority, but now we really need an
integrated Federal strategy across the Executive branch.
Mr. Congressman, we also need State and local governments
to make sure they are also resourcing to the threat.
Mr. Correa. Mr. Jenkins.
Mr. Jenkins. Certainly the focus is there right now. I
can't answer to how the resources are being readjusted. I think
we do need, however, to have a rethink of our fundamental
strategy. We simply cannot take the strategies that we have
used to deal with home-grown jihadists and say we will apply
these to domestic violent extremists. Because there are
different conditions, we do need to have a fundamental rethink
of our whole-of-Government strategy to deal with this problem.
Mr. Correa. So, Mr. Jenkins, you talked about the material
support, a legal framework, as it addresses foreign terrorism,
maybe flipping that and applying that to domestic terrorism. I
am thinking to myself, YouTube, GoFundMe, First Amendment, hate
speech that incites hate violence.
Do we need more legislation? How can we pivot from foreign
material support to domestic support and preserve our
Constitutional rights?
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Correa, in my written testimony and in my
oral testimony, I have said that I am very wary of additional
legislation or additional criminal statutes. I think we do have
adequate criminal statutes to deal with this as a criminal
problem.
I think that, if we go in the direction of adding terrorism
statutes to deal with the domestic issue, we are going to
become embroiled in endless discussions about definition and
about designation of groups. So I would be very, very cautious
in that area.
Mr. Correa. Mr. Greenblatt, same question to you, sir.
Mr. Greenblatt. Mr. Congressman, it may be a bit beyond
scope for this committee, but I believe that Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act absolutely needs attention. It needs
to be reformed. It creates a shield of liability for the big
social media platforms, a shield that I would suggest to you
they have abused. They have utilized it to the detriment of the
public.
It absolutely needs attention. I know Congressman
Malinowski and Congresswoman Eshoo have a bill on that. It
absolutely merits your attention and that of other Members of
Congress.
Mr. Correa. So you do believe there are some legislative
fixes that we can----
Mr. Greenblatt. The Domestic Terrorism Prevention Act
absolutely should be passed. That is out there right now. So
there are some existing--and the NO HATE Act, as well, should
be looked at to deal with hate crimes.
Then I think new legislation, Mr. Congressman, to look at
Section 230, it is long overdue. You will find wide-spread
support in civil society and in the business community if you
take that on.
Mr. Correa. Same question, Ms. Neumann----
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time from California has
expired.
Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Van
Drew.
Mr. Van Drew. Good morning, everybody. It is wonderful to
be with you all.
I do want to congratulate the Chairman on being Chairman
once again and look forward to working with him. I had a
wonderful relationship last year. Of course, our Ranking
Member, Congressman Katko, I know will do a wonderful and fine
job, and I look forward to working with him.
I am proud to be here with my colleagues on both sides of
the aisle and to be addressing these real issues that are
facing our Nation. As you know, I am someone that served at
almost every level of Government, and I understand the
importance of bipartisanship. It would be supremely cool--I
don't know how else to say it--if we actually could do it. It
would be wonderful if we were, like, an example of one of the
very, very few committees that actually achieves that goal. I
think that that is possible.
You know, in all my years as a dentist and in State
politics, State senate, which I was in for 16 years, I never
thought I would be here discussing the threat that violent
domestic extremism exposes to our great Nation. Whether it is
left-wing extremism, such as what we saw in Portland, Seattle,
Kenosha, and even here in the District of Columbia, or right-
wing extremism, as what occurred at the Capitol on January 6,
it is a serious issue, and it must be remedied.
Just to be clear, I am not condemning peaceful rallies in
memory of George Floyd or Jacob Blake, but, rather, the violent
anarchists who senselessly take advantage of protests. No
form--no form--of extremism should ever be tolerated, period.
We can't pretend one side is good and one side is bad. We need
to use common sense and work with one another.
We live in a country where freedom of speech is not only
allowed but it is encouraged, which needs to happen without
destructive and divisive actions. That is the real devil in the
details here with all of this. Our voices as Members of
Congress need to be used to soothe rather than to inflame.
I just wanted to agree with Jonathan Greenblatt on Section
230. I think there is support for legislation along those lines
on the Republican and the Democratic side.
I think you are absolutely right. They have gotten away
with too much, too arbitrarily. Thank you for making that
statement.
I have a couple of questions, and one of them is--and let
me find it--to Chris Rodriguez.
Chris, what I wanted to ask was, how much is too much when
we talk about the kind of protection--this is a very specific
question--around the Capitol?
We didn't have enough before, obviously. I have to be
honest with you. As somebody who was used to being in the State
capitol many years and now in this Capitol for a few years, as
you just walked around, sometimes you would have the sense--
wonderful, brave, good men and women--that there just wasn't
enough of them and enough help for them.
So we have learned the hard way that we need to do more.
But are we overdoing it a bit? I mean, we are literally
affecting commerce in the city. We are affecting traveling in
the city. We are affecting a way of life.
You know, somebody asked me, when I went to the
inauguration, how did I feel or how did it feel. To be really
honest with you, I felt like I was in a Third World country or
I was somewhere--like, I was in Venezuela or somewhere. It just
didn't feel like America, the amount of National Guard we had
and the amount of barbed wire.
When is too much just too much?
Mr. Rodriguez. Thank you, Congressman. It is good to see a
fellow New Jerseyan today.
But I would say that----
Mr. Van Drew. We always stick together. You know that.
Mr. Rodriguez. Yes, we do, sir.
I would say that we do recognize, from the city's
standpoint, the importance of security. We do not agree that
the current security footprint at the Capitol is something that
should be maintained permanently. It is the people's House, and
we need to make sure that the citizens who it serves have
access to it.
Mr. Van Drew. Yep. I agree with you. I think that is one of
the first things we have to work at, is really finding the
right formula for safety but making sure it is still the
people's House. Just the feeling you get in your gut, it is
just--it is not reminiscent of America. It is not reminiscent
of our Capitol and what we have been.
We have had things happen before. We have to fix them. We
have to make sure we are safe. We may need more, and we may
need to check better, and I have no problem with that. But we
have to, in some way, get back to--you know, I have all these
kids piled up--everybody does here--who want to go and tour the
Capitol, and families and just people. It belongs to them, and
we want to get them back. So that is so important, and I hope
that we do that soon.
I had another question, if I have time for one more
question, and that----
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Van Drew. It did. I couldn't see the clock. Thank you
so much, Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr.
Payne, for 5 minutes.
Unmute yourself.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It seems like you have
been inundated with New Jerseyans all of a sudden.
Ms. Neumann, I would like to ask about the responsibility
that political leaders bear for encouraging and inciting the
violence at the Capitol.
In your testimony, you note that, as of last week, 78
percent of Trump voters believe that the Presidential election
was stolen. This follows months of lies by the former President
and his allies that the election was stolen. These baseless
claims of election fraud have been rejected by courts over 60
times in multiple jurisdictions.
Can you please share with the committee how these months of
lies helped contribute to the violent mob that killed a USCP
officer and led to 2 others to death by suicide?
Ms. Neumann. Yes, sir.
The issue that we have at the present moment is that there
is still a perpetuation of this belief that the election was
stolen. The latest poll from last week was around 78 percent of
Trump voters believe this, and that is about 57 million
Americans.
So, when I look at that for the potential of violence, of
course not all 57 million would go and do something violent
about this. I think, in some ways, January 6 really
crystallized for many that that was too far.
But when you are looking at the radicalization process, you
have vulnerable individuals, a smaller subset of those
radicalized in their thought, and a smaller subset of those
mobilized to violence. That is what that graphic that RAND
produced kind of shows.
My concern is, when your vulnerable pool is 57 million
people, 1 percent or even half of 1 percent puts us at 250,000-
ish people, and that is too much. I mean, if somebody were to
say, we have 250,000 ISIS adherents inside the country, the
country would panic.
But the potential that we have the longer that this lie is
allowed to stay out there--so it is really important for
credible voices within the community to come out very clearly
and explain the election was not stolen, that there was not
enough fraud to overturn the results of the election, and help
us shrink that pool of vulnerable individuals.
That is not going to save us all of the potential violence,
but that goes a long way to helping the security officials be
able to wrap their arms around the challenge that we have.
Mr. Payne. Thank you.
Also in your testimony, you note that recruitment is easier
now for extremists. Extremist ideas have been mainstreamed and
normalized via political speech.
Is this trend reversible? If political leaders that are
perceived to be sympathetic to extremists were to speak out and
disavow these lies about the election, could that lead to a
reduction in the threats and violence?
Ms. Neumann. So, yes, we need more credible voices to be
speaking out, calling for calm, telling the truth. That reduces
our vulnerability.
Mr. Payne. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I will yield back.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The gentleman yields back.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. McCaul,
for 5 minutes.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As the Chairman knows, when I was Chairman, we had several
hearings on domestic terrorism. I know it has been an issue of
concern for the Chairman as well.
I think that what happened on January 6--when you look at
the USA PATRIOT Act, they actually define domestic terrorism,
and international, but they never include any charges or
penalties for domestic terrorism. They only did it for
international. I think it was because, in 2001, they were more
focused on foreign terrorists like al-Qaeda, those responsible
for 9/11.
But the definition says: Activities that involve dangerous
acts to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws in
the United States or any state that appeared to be intended to
influence the policy of a government by intimidation or
coercion, or affect the conduct of a government by mass
destruction.
I think the Capitol attack seems to fit squarely within
that definition.
So my question: I introduced a bill, along with Congressman
Weber, last Congress called the Domestic Terrorism Penalties
Act, which--in working with the FBI, who fully agree. You know,
they open up DT cases, but they can't charge it as a domestic
terrorism case.
So my question is to both Ms. Neumann and Director
Rodriguez. Do you believe that now is the time that we should
proceed with this type of legislation?
Ms. Neumann. I do. I believe that, while the prosecutors
and the FBI are doing the best that they can with the tools
that they have--and they will tell you, ``Hey, I can usually
deal with this''--you also see them having to go the extra mile
in a way they really shouldn't.
There was a case late summer of last year that was a
Boogaloo Bois case, and the best way to be able to make sure
that they were able to be prosecuted was to see that they got
tied to Hamas in their planning. That just shows you, it is
indicative that, hey, if we can get them tied to a foreign
terrorist ideology or group, it is easier for us to prosecute.
So there is one thing. You know, let's make their jobs just
a little bit easier.
But the second thing is just equal justice. It doesn't make
sense to me why, if you commit a crime in the name of White
Supremacy or you commit a crime in the name of an ISIS
ideology, that you get more jail time for ISIS versus a violent
White Supremacist act. We should treat things equally. That is
what ``equal justice under the law'' means.
Mr. McCaul. I agree with that statement.
Mr. Rodriguez.
Mr. Rodriguez. Yes, Congressman, I do believe that it is
absolutely critical that we hold individuals accountable for
terrorism, domestic and international.
Mr. McCaul. Well, thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I hope we can work on getting this bill out
this Congress. I think, if anything, what happened January 6
just cries out--and I was a Federal prosecutor as well, and I
know there are other charges that could be brought, but I think
it sends a strong message about where Congress is, that we are
going to treat domestic on an equal plane as international
terrorism.
My last question has to do with threat streams. I also
introduced a bill to use the fusion centers to gather the
social media. It is my understanding that, prior to January 6,
there was quite a bit of social media coming in. I think it was
underestimated. I think the crowds were underestimated and the
level of violence was underestimated. I think it would have
been helpful in terms of the planning of security for January
6, specifically the National Guard.
What do you think about a bill to allow the fusion centers
to gather this social media in advance to help in the planning
of these events? But, also, what in the world happened with the
National Guard that day? Why did it take maybe 2\1/2\ to 3
hours for the National Guard to respond?
I would ask Director Rodriguez and I guess Ms. Neumann
again.
Mr. Rodriguez. Congressman, thank you for the question.
If you are referring to the Protecting America through
Information Sharing Act----
Mr. McCaul. Yes.
Mr. Rodriguez [continuing]. I believe that that is
absolutely critical for the fusion centers to be able to work
with technology companies to look at the indicators of violence
and of terrorism.
The challenge, as you know, sir, is that some of those
fusion centers are not designated as law enforcement entities,
and some of them cannot access that information. So I know here
in the District of Columbia we have legislation that has
already been passed and signed by our mayor that designates our
fusion center as a law enforcement entity to access law-
enforcement-sensitive information.
On the issue of the National Guard, I think you would have
to ask the National Guard. But that is one of the reasons why
we support the mayor of the District of Columbia controlling
the Guard, as a Governor, as the equivalent of a Governor, to
be able to deploy or redeploy resources as swiftly as possible.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you.
Ms. Neumann, any final comments?
Ms. Neumann. I concur. I will keep it short and just say I
concur.
Mr. McCaul. Well, Chairman, I would love to work with you
on these two pieces of legislation, and I think it is vitally
important.
Chairman Thompson. I think there is a general sentiment
that we have to do something, and we have a number of Members
who have expressed an interest. So I am sure, somewhere, there
will be agreement on specific legislation.
The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Michigan, Ms.
Slotkin, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Slotkin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Congratulations to
you and Mr. Katko. I am happy to have you leading our
committee.
I am really proud to be back and to be subcommittee Chair
for the Intel and Counterterrorism committee. A lot of the
issues that we are talking about today are going to be the
bread and butter of that subcommittee. They are sticky issues,
complicated issues.
I have started to discuss with my Co-Chair what an
opportunity it is for our subcommittee and for this committee
writ large to set an example that we, as Democrats and
Republicans, can do our best at keeping this out of politics
and focusing on protecting the American people. I think we have
a real opportunity to demonstrate that.
I think it is important. Because, for me, as someone who
worked on preventing terrorist attacks on the United States for
the first 20 years of my career, I believe the post-9/11 era is
over. I think January 6 was the cap of one era and the
beginning of another that makes clear that the most dangerous
threat right now to us as Americans, physical threat, is the
division between us and the way that some are exploiting those
divisions.
So I think it is good that we are having our first hearing
on this and we are going to be really diving into this in this
new Congress.
For those of us who are from Michigan, what happened on the
6th is extremely familiar. In my district, in particular, in
April, we had armed protesters force their way into our
capitol. We had plots uncovered in my district where people
were trying to kidnap and kill my Governor. We have had a
precipitous rise in groups like the Proud Boys and Boogaloo
Bois, a four-fold increase in anti-Semitic events in the State
of Michigan. Then, of course, threats against elected leaders,
myself and others on this screen.
So I knew there was going to be violence on the 6th; I just
didn't think it would be inside the Capitol. I thought it was
going to be outside, which is why I directed my staff not to
come to work that day.
But there are legitimately complicated issues around
domestic terrorism because, at its heart, it is about our
fellow citizens. It is about our neighbors and making sure that
civil liberties aren't rolled over.
Some of these issues we brought up today--do we want a
commission? Do we need a new domestic terrorism law? I think
what is going to hold us steady in this committee is agreement
on the definitions of ``terrorism'' versus ``extremism'' and
then the data, making sure that we are not expanding and
exploding the numbers, the cases, the instances, that we use
data.
As FBI Director Wray came and testified in front us last
Congress about what the real nature of the threat is, and we
know he said that there are now more open domestic terrorism
cases than foreign domestic cases and that White Supremacy
constitutes the largest number of those domestic threats.
One of those complicated issues some have talked about
here, and it is the role of social media companies. It is very
clear to me--we heard them testify last Congress. Frankly, they
could not get their act together. They could not come up with a
common policy. They could not rise to the occasion of this new
industry and talk about how they were going to protect the
public. Then the pendulum swung after the 6th, and thousands of
people have been kicked off social media platforms.
So we heard from Jonathan Greenblatt on this. I would like
to hear from Ms. Neumann on what you think we should do with
the social media companies vis-a-vis domestic terrorism.
Ms. Neumann. Thank you for the question, and
congratulations on your Chairmanship. I was pleased to see that
you were appointed to that role.
I agree with your assessment. They have dragged their feet
too long. There are places where they have done really good
work; it is just not enough. We need them to be moving faster.
I am supportive, as others have mentioned, to looking at
Section 230, in particular what Congressman Malinowski proposed
last session, or the last Congress, that we need to explore the
algorithms and the monetization of the algorithms. I think
there are ways in which we can create incentive structures for
them to do the right thing.
I was also heartened by the Apple chairman, Tim Cook. In
his comments last week, he also seemed to challenge the tech
community.
In the United States, we always prefer for industry to
self-correct, but we might be at the point where it is needed
for the Congress to not just hold a hearing but potentially
pass legislation to address this problem.
Ms. Slotkin. I know I am out of time, Mr. Chairman. I look
forward to working on those issues and the other sticky issues
with this committee.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. I don't think there
is any question about us looking at social media companies and
whether or not they are being as forthright in managing those
platforms as they should be.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr.
Norman.
Mr. Norman. Thank you, Chairman Thompson and Ranking Member
Katko. Thank you for holding this meeting.
Mr. Jenkins, you have had a storied career in the military
with the Green Berets, and thank you for that service. But what
is your opinion--we have talked a lot about, you know,
incitement of violence and different things. But how does--when
you have a Time magazine that publishes a defense of violent
protest, when you have the Hachette Book Group publishing ``In
Defense of Looting,'' when you have those calling for defunding
the police, when you have sanctuary cities that don't cooperate
with the police, what effect does this have on extreme
movements and, I guess, their empowerment?
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Norman, thank you very much for the
question.
Look, there is no--we protect in this country free speech.
A lot of that free speech is hateful, it is repugnant, but it
is part of our country's history that we protect that.
No. 2, we protect the right of protest in this country, and
we do so fiercely. We realize that throughout our history there
has been a lot of pushing and shoving in terms of getting
things done. So that has to be maintained. We can't destroy
that.
However, I think, in the area of incitement, which is the
word that you use, the courts have interpreted the incitement
laws very narrowly, particularly applying the Brandenburg rule.
I think, in the age of social media, in the age of internet, in
the age of this kind of communications technology that we have,
that we do have to reexamine how we view incitement.
Now, that is not to destroy free speech, that is not to
destroy right to protest. But I think that looking for too
narrow of a connection between a specific word spoken by an
individual and subsequent actions that take place, I think we
do have to reexamine that.
I think we do--I would agree with the others. I am cautious
about new anti-terrorism legislation that leads us to deciding,
well, you are a terrorist, this group is a terrorist, this
group is a terrorist. That is going to be a long and futile
argument.
But examining these communications technologies and how
these platforms run and rule themselves is something I think we
have to do.
Mr. Norman. Let me take it a step further. You know, we
have talked about what happened on the 6th at the Capitol. We
had fences. We had a perimeter that was fortified by our
Capitol Hill police. It ended up not being enough.
But from your vantage point, were they given, I guess, the
enforcement measures, regardless of what it was to stop people
from coming in a Capitol that was clearly off limits? What if
the Green Berets had been there? What force would you describe
that you would be authorized to take to stop it?
Mr. Jenkins. First, Mr. Norman, as a former soldier, I
would desperately like to keep the military out of these civil
terrorism, these domestic terrorism issues as much as possible.
The National Guard is different, but if we are talking about
the Armed Forces, if we are talking about Green Berets, Special
Forces, no, they do not have a role in dealing with domestic
terrorism. We are not there.
Insofar as putting that aside, the problem is that,
clearly, the defenders of the Capitol were badly outnumbered.
That was simply--I think is at issue. Now, a commission can
investigate this further, but just having a greater number of
people on the exterior, as well as--and I think this is one
thing that I don't see in the response, is that there should
have been inner perimeters as well.
In other words, the presumption that, what if they break
through that outer line? What if they break through the doors?
Now we are dealing with them inside. Do we have prepared
security within the Capitol Building, as opposed to around the
Capitol Building, that will protect the officials and their
staffs that are threatened by this action?
Mr. Norman. Yes. But wouldn't it go to----
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green,
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I may, I would like
to associate myself with every word that you spoke in your
opening statement. I totally concur with you.
Let me start with this. My assumption is that all of our
witnesses believe that there is something called White
privilege. If I am incorrect, I would like for the witness who
differs with me to say so. Is my assumption correct, that all
of our witnesses have some understanding of what White
privilege is?
Hearing none, I assume that they do.
I would like to know, what role do you think White
privilege played in the response that the officers had to the
persons who marched on the Capitol, who stormed the Capitol,
who, by many standards, participated in what was called an
insurrection?
So let me just start quickly and ask--we will start with
Director of Homeland Security Rodriguez, if you would, please.
Mr. Rodriguez. Thank you, Congressman Green.
I know that there are a variety of investigations that are
on-going and commissioned by the Hill, and we will certainly
find out the role that, I think, far-right and White Supremacy
played in the insurrection.
The FBI and U.S. Attorney's Office----
Mr. Green. If I may, not White Supremacy, White privilege.
White privilege. What role did it play in the reception that
those persons who marched on the Capitol received?
Mr. Rodriguez. Well, Congressman, as I said, I think that
that is going to come out a lot in the investigations that are
on-going as we speak.
Mr. Green. All right.
Is there anyone who has an opinion as to what role White
privilege played?
Ms. Neumann. I----
Mr. Greenblatt. What I might offer, Mr. Congressman, is,
you know, as a civil rights organization that tracks these
issues, we definitely have seen law enforcement not take quite
as seriously when a bunch of young people get together with
Confederate flags. They treat them very differently than a
bunch of boys or young men of color when they get together.
But I will just say that the failure of law enforcement to
create a National security special event and adequately protect
the Capitol on January 6 contributed to what was nothing short
of catastrophe. There is no excuse for it.
So I think White privilege may have played a role, but it
was incompetence at the top or maybe even a political decision
that created the ultimate consequence that we are all dealing
with today.
Mr. Green. All right.
I will yield to the lady next, please.
Ms. Neumann. I echo what Mr. Greenblatt just said. It does
appear that the nature of the threat, perhaps it is unwitting,
perhaps it is--I wrote in my testimony that some of the
challenge that we have had with this threat is that it wasn't
taken seriously. It is really hard to understand fully
everybody's motives behind that.
I think one of the problems was the persistent use the term
``lone wolf'' when you describe various attackers over the last
10 years associated with domestic extremism, and it kind of
leaves you with the impression that they are kind-of alone in
their motivations, when, in fact, they are part of a massive
movement.
So we way underestimated what I believe to be the number of
people in the country that are involved in the movement. They
are not all violent. But in underestimating, I think that led
to some of the bad judgment calls.
But, yes----
Mr. Green. If I may interrupt----
Ms. Neumann [continuing]. I do think that White privilege
is a part of this.
Mr. Green. Let me apologize for interrupting, but I want to
ask you a follow-up question.
If the persons who marched on the Capitol--and I am being
kind by saying ``marched,'' in my opinion--were of color and
had hockey sticks and nooses and swastikas--I am told there may
have been some, but let's say shirts with ``Auschwitz'' on
them--would the reception have been the same? This is your best
guess. Would it have been the same?
Ms. Neumann. No. I think the evidence of even recent events
like this last summer have showed that we treat threats
differently based on the color of the protesters' skin. That
needs to change.
Mr. Green. Which leads me to my final question. Do we need
some sort of means by which we can educate--I would prefer not
to use the term ``train''--but educate the constabulary, those
among the police and constables and sheriffs, all of these
various departments, about something that we call an
unconscious bias? Do we need to train and teach people about
this?
Ma'am?
Ms. Neumann. Yes.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time----
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson [continuing]. From Texas has expired.
The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Iowa, Mrs. Miller-
Meeks, for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Thank you so much, Chairman Thompson,
Ranking Member Katko. I am delighted to be a Member of this
committee and look forward to working with all of you.
I just had a question. We have heard from several of the
witnesses about disinformation and specifically disinformation
in social media. But I also want to ask Ms. Neumann, with a
very short answer, if you will, do you feel that there was also
disinformation among the traditional media?
Ms. Neumann. From time to time, but the term of
``disinformation'' means intentional. I think what we were more
often likely to see in traditional media is the misinformation,
which is inaccurate information but there is not an
intentionality behind it. That often happens when things go
viral and it takes a while to circle back around and discover
things aren't true. That is a common problem that we have in
this society today.
Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Did you see on traditional media with
police cars burning and being told by traditional media
reporters and anchors that these were peaceful protests?
Ms. Neumann. No, I----
Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Is that considered disinformation or
misinformation?
Ms. Neumann. You know, if we are talking about the protests
over the summer where there was rioting in certain cities, is
that what you are referencing?
Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Neumann. The way that I--and I consume a lot of
different media, but the media I personally consumed seemed to
frame this as we did have some places where there was violence.
Some of it I would classify as traditional criminal riots, you
know, criminal actors taking advantage of a moment and/or very
angry and acting out their anger. It is illegal. It should be
handled appropriately.
We also had a number of right-wing violent extremists use
protests as a cover for acceleration of violence. That is part
of their ideology. Boogaloo Bois have been arrested. They were
very prominent in some of the killings of law enforcement
officers. We saw on-line chatter any time there was a planned
protest of right-wing violent extremists using this as an
opportunity to potentially cause acts of violence.
I think the data might refer to--the ADL, they might have
better stats, but some of the data that is now coming out
demonstrates that the preponderance of actual violence,
intentional violence, as opposed to looting, was sadly more
coming out of those right-wing violent extremist organizations
as opposed to what had been argued, that it was Antifa. We, as
far as I know, only have one incident of Antifa-related murder.
Mrs. Miller-Meeks. So thank you very much for that,
acknowledging that there is misinformation and disinformation
both within social media and in traditional media, both in what
is covered and portrayed.
Mr. Jenkins, there is a question about the National Guard
and why it took so long for the National Guard to respond.
Would it be fair to say that the National Guard is made up of
individuals who are not stationed at a post or a base, they are
not stationed collectively together, that they have to be
called upon to be activated, and that would cause a delay, they
are not like a police SWAT team where they can immediately
respond to an incident?
Mr. Jenkins. That is true, that normally the National Guard
are at their homes and are summoned to deal with various types
of emergencies.
However, as we have seen in the cases during the summer and
in preparation for other events in Washington, National Guard
units are mobilized in advance to be on standby. They may not
be visible, but they are mobilized, they are in the area and
can readily respond.
I don't know the reasons for the delay in the response on
January 6, but the fact that members of the National Guard in
their normal civilian lives are scattered is not one of the
reasons. We have seen them mobilize to standby before.
Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Thank you.
Throughout this have you heard of disinformation on the
attacks on January 6? I am just wondering if people have
investigated or looked at irregularities in voting that could
have perpetuated disinformation. Have we had that oversight
investigation yet to your knowledge?
Mr. Jenkins. I don't know that we have had that
investigation, if I understand your question correctly. I mean,
in terms of the irregularities in the voting, there have been
numerous investigations by the State authorities which run the
elections in ensuring that there is an accurate count of the
vote and that the elections can be certified.
Are you talking about an investigation beyond that?
Mrs. Miller-Meeks. I was just wondering if any of the--if
you had looked into irregularities or complaints of
irregularities. So thank you.
Mr. Jenkins. No, I have not.
Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Thank you very much.
I yield my time.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from New York, Ms.
Clarke, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Clarke. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for your
continued strong, fair, and inclusive leadership. Today's
hearing is quite timely.
I would like to acknowledge my fellow New Yorker. It is
great to have you serving as the Ranking Member of this
extremely crucial committee.
I continue to extend my condolences to the family, friends,
and loved ones of Capitol Police Officer Sicknick. He lost his
life protecting our lives, and I and the people of the Ninth
District of New York prayerfully stand with their family during
this season of bereavement.
Last Congress one of the focuses of this committee was to
highlight the threat of domestic terrorism. With terrifying
frequency we have seen White supremacist terrorists terrorize
our communities. Until January 20 of last month, we had a
Federal Government that refused to take the threat seriously
enough to address it, in effect complicit with the exponential
rise of these terrorist organizations.
Just a few short weeks ago this rising tide of White
supremacist domestic terror combined forces with another
dangerous force: Donald Trump's efforts to overturn the results
of the 2020 election. The result was an attempted coup,
orchestrated by none other than Donald Trump himself, and an
insurrection at the Capitol, as we gathered to elect and
certify the election of Joe Biden as our new President.
We cannot parse words. This was an act of domestic
terrorism, an attack on our citadel of democracy. It was
incited and operationalized by Donald Trump. There are Members
and Senators in this body who voted to overturn the results of
the election, even after the very building where we work was
attacked.
Yes, this was an intelligence failure. Yes, this was a
security failure. But even more troubling, this was a societal
failure. Until we put to rest the lies about the election, the
conspiracy theories like QAnon, and the racist ideologies that
drive so many toward hate we will not be safe.
As I mentioned, actions of these domestic terrorists are
directly linked to the words of President Trump. For 2 months
he promoted the lie after lie about the election fraud and
demanded that they, ``Stop the Steal.''
So my question, Mr. Jenkins, is, do you agree with my
assessment that Donald Trump is directly responsible for and
must be held accountable for what happened on January 6?
Mr. Jenkins. You are going to be disappointed in my answer,
not because it is contrary to the events as you have laid out.
But, look, we have Congressional investigations taking place.
We have criminal investigations taking place. We have an
impeachment trial beginning next week.
Ms. Clarke. Mr. Jenkins, I have a short period of time. If
it is yes, it is yes. If it is no, it is no.
Mr. Jenkins. It is neither. It is----
Ms. Clarke. OK.
Mr. Jenkins. That is a political question which I can't
answer.
Ms. Clarke. Very well. It is a practical question. But be
that as it may.
It is no secret that White Supremacist groups such as the
Proud Boys were key players in the attack on January 6. This is
not an isolated incident. From Charleston to El Paso to
Pittsburgh to Wellington, deadly White Supremacist attacks have
become the norm, not the exception.
So my question is--and this is for any of our panelists.
Let me direct it to Jonathan Greenblatt.
What explains this surge in hate? What role has
Presidential rhetoric played in fostering it over the last 4
years? What additional steps can the new administration take to
prioritize this deadly threat?
Mr. Greenblatt. Thank you for the question, Congresswoman
Clarke. It is nice to see you.
Ms. Clarke. Likewise.
Mr. Greenblatt. I would say a few quick points.
So, No. 1, I mean, fighting hate previously was not a
Republican issue or a Democratic issue. It was a bipartisan
issue. That changed in the last 4 years when the prior
President, indeed from the rhetoric he used on the campaign in
2015 to 2016, when he would retweet White Supremacists and he
would use their language, terms like globalists and whatnot and
George Soros, that created the conditions in which they felt
encouraged. So, No. 1, it was a failure of leadership, and,
again, to call them out clearly, consistently, cogently, after
Charlottesville, after the debate, every time.
No. 2, the extremists felt emboldened, Congresswoman, and
they leapt into the vacuum that he created. They recruited,
they did more public events, they ran for office, and they
really exploited social media. So they felt emboldened.
No. 3, social media. Again, the tech companies have been
far too lax and lazy about enforcing their own terms of
service. They do not as a business have to abide by the First
Amendment. But even then, freedom of expression isn't the
freedom to incite violence. What has happened in the past 30
days, taking off the worst actors, Congresswoman, it should
have happened years ago.
Social media should abide by the same standards as any
business and give no quarter to those people who would commit
violence against Jews, African Americans, or any other
marginalized community in this country.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Tennessee, Mrs.
Harshbarger, for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Harshbarger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am just going to introduce myself to the committee today.
I am Diana Harshbarger, and I represent the First District of
Tennessee, which is east Tennessee.
As a health care provider and pharmacist for the past 30
years, I really appreciate being put on this committee because,
you know, I understand the National security threats of having
over 90 percent of our finished pharmaceutical products and our
chemicals that we use to make those products come outside of
the United States of America--and in a lot of cases from
adversarial nations, as a matter of fact. It took the COVID
pandemic to open a lot of people's eyes as to the problem that
we have with this.
What we need to do is get domestic supply chains into this
country so we won't have to worry about that, because we have
an overreliance to those foreign adversarial countries for that
supply chain.
In my district of east Tennessee we have a couple of
different things as far as National security threats to
infrastructure. I have Nuclear Fuel Services, which works
closely with the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and I also have
Holston Army Ammunition Plant in my district.
I wanted just to comment on something that Mr. Jenkins said
and he made the statement that the defenders of the Capitol
were woefully outnumbered and we need to investigate this. I
would hope honestly that we would be able to do that to see if
there was any information exchanged between the Capitol Police,
the D.C. Mayor, and the FBI, and, you know, that is of utmost
importance. Also everything that has been said about Section
230 and taking that immunity away from these social media
companies, that is imperative.
I look forward to working with my colleagues on things that
would help with National security, both foreign and domestic.
I yield the remainder of my time back, sir. Thank you.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
Mr. Jenkins, do you want to respond? I can go to the next
questioner.
Mr. Jenkins. Just very, very quickly.
I mean, the public statements made by various officials in
the FBI, Capitol Police, District police are somewhat
contradictory as to who knew what when. That is, to what degree
the warnings that were seen, in some cases produced by specific
parties, were shared with other parties. That has to be an
issue for the commission. I don't have personal knowledge to
sort that out now.
Insofar as the inadequate numbers, again, this was
inadequate preparation. Why this was not already indicated as a
special event requiring the coordination of all of the
authorities and the sources available as, for example, the
inauguration or the President's State of the Union Address,
again, that is something that has to be investigated. Was it
impeded? Was it poor planning? Was it bad decisions? I don't
know.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
The gentlelady yields back.
The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Nevada, Ms. Titus,
for 5 minutes.
Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
From Nevada, from Las Vegas, I am no stranger, we are no
strangers to this whole problem of domestic terrorism. We have
had a U.S. Forest Service building bombed in Carson City. We
had the Bundy armed stand-off against the BLM over their
illegal grazing of cattle on public lands. He has since
commented that you needed to get the work done, you can't drain
the swamp by standing off to the side, and encouraged more
people to turn out for Donald Trump's rally and attack on the
Capitol.
When I flew home after that incident that was so terrible
that we all watched in horror there were people on the plane
with me who had obviously come from Nevada to attend that. They
were sharing pictures on their phone. They were talking about
it. They were wearing masks that had derogatory comments on it.
So that just leads me to ask Ms. Neumann the question about
the screening of terrorists on airlines. We have heard that
many of the people there maybe were already on the FBI's
Terrorist Screening Database, known as the terrorist watch
list, but that sometimes results in additional screening or
not, but it doesn't necessarily mean that these people end up
on the No Fly List, which is managed by DHS.
Just tell me if that is correct or not and tell me if there
would be any value in maybe redesigning or certainly looking at
that comparison to see if we should put them on the No Fly
List. You mentioned it just briefly in your statements, but
could you unpack that a little bit more for us?
Ms. Neumann. Yes, ma'am. The No Fly List is very explicitly
for individuals that the intelligence community assesses pose a
threat to aviation. So if in their assessment an individual
poses a threat, that alone does not put you on a No Fly List.
The second thing is that the purpose of the watch list,
there are individuals that are known terrorists and there are
individuals that are suspected terrorists, and then there are
associations, meaning we don't quite know, but there is reason
to believe that there might be associations that lead us to
believe we need to screen this person more effectively before
we allow them to receive an immigration benefit or board a
plane or seek some other type of activity.
The watch list in particular was designed for screening and
vetting purposes, but it was designed at a time that we were
primarily concerned about terrorists over there trying to get
to us over here.
I do know that there have been efforts to update and figure
out if within existing authorities the watch list screening and
vetting apparatus is able to apply it to anybody that has met
the criteria to join the watch list.
So I know that they are doing as much as they can, but it
would be a good thing to talk to DHS, maybe have some closed-
door briefings to see if they have ideas of authorities that
might help them be able to go do those things.
That is part of the reason why I think there at least needs
to be a discussion about a designation. I recognize that that
is fraught with peril, as Mr. Jenkins has pointed out. But some
of the tools that we have in our toolkit at DHS would be more
effective if there were some clear ways in which you determine
who is designated and who is not.
So I just believe it needs to be discussed. I don't have my
own opinion yet of what the right answer is.
Last, I just want to point out there were a lot of
conversations or media reports that people had been booted off
of planes because they were, ``on the No Fly List.'' I believe
that was misunderstood. Airlines have the ability to make
decisions about who they allow on their planes for certain
reasons. If they had been No Fly-listed they wouldn't have been
allowed into the secure area past TSA screenings. So most
likely those circumstances probably are a little different as
opposed to saying that people had already been No Fly-listed.
Ms. Titus. Well, thank you for that. I think we definitely
need to look into it, because if we do come with some other
kind of designation, TSA is going to have to be trained,
airports are going to have to figure out how to accommodate
that, and it would be a pretty big project, but certainly maybe
one worthwhile to pursue. So thank you.
Just briefly, a follow-up on Mr. Correa's question about
fusion centers. You know, Las Vegas has the best private
security in the world. We have got the eye in the sky watching
everything that goes on along the Strip and in the gaming
casinos that are so regulated. I wonder if these fusion centers
are taking advantage of cooperating or working with or setting
up some kind of plan to interact with private security.
Anybody?
Dr. Rodriguez.
Mr. Rodriguez. Representative Titus, yes, I think there is
a lot of work that still needs to be done in that environment
and certainly building out the fusion center capabilities to
work closely with the private sector is one of them, yes. There
is a lot more work that could be done.
Ms. Titus. Great.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The Chair recognizes Mr. Gimenez from Florida for 5
minutes.
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and it certainly is a
pleasure for me to be here. It is my first complete meeting. I
am very honored to work with you and the Ranking Member on this
most important topic. If we, you know, want to work in a
bipartisan manner--and I don't think--if we can't agree to work
in a bipartisan manner on homeland security, I don't know what
we can agree on.
I have a couple of questions that I would like to get to. I
know that we have a lot of topics, but I want to really home in
on what happened on the 6th here at the Capitol.
Mr. Rodriguez, is the Capitol Police part of the D.C.
fusion center?
Mr. Rodriguez. The D.C. fusion center has representatives
at the U.S. Capitol Police, sir.
Mr. Gimenez. All right. Did you have any information that
indicated that there was a significant event about to happen on
January 6?
Mr. Rodriguez. Sir, as I have stated, we have had
intelligence to suggest there would be violence in the city on
January 6, and recall that there was some indication that there
might be protests on the 4th and the 5th as well, which didn't
materialize to the level that we had anticipated. But we did
have indications that there would be violence on the 6th, yes.
Ms. Gimenez. Was the National Guard offered to the Capitol
Police?
Mr. Rodriguez. Sir, from the city's standpoint, we are not
responsible for security at the Capitol. So that would have to
be a question for the Capitol Police. From the city, we did
request the National Guard and we did receive National Guard
resources in response to the threats that we received.
Ms. Gimenez. I understand that that is something that the
Capitol Police may have to respond to. But do you have any
knowledge that the National Guard actually offered their help
to the Capitol Police for the 6th?
Mr. Rodriguez. Not prior to the 6th, sir, no, I do not.
Ms. Gimenez. OK.
To Ms. Neumann. You said there was poor judgment and poor
judgment was exhibited. Who exhibited the poor judgment?
Ms. Neumann. I will leave it to the investigation to show,
but it just makes no sense to me that there were so few, such a
low law enforcement presence at the Capitol, that there wasn't
stronger perimeter security, that those law enforcement
officers present didn't have riot gear. There are just basic
things that we have learned over the last 20 years that a
strong deterrent often avoids violence, and that was not
present on January 6. So somewhere somebody made a bad judgment
call.
Ms. Gimenez. OK. Back to Mr. Rodriguez, do you know what
the rules of engagement were that the Capitol Police was given?
Mr. Rodriguez. No, sir, I do not. That is a question for
the Capitol Police.
Ms. Gimenez. What are your rules of engagement when you
are--you know, look, I was the mayor of Miami-Dade County. We
saw some disturbances in Miami back in June, July. But my rules
of engagement were very, very direct to my director. As mayor,
I also happen to be the sheriff, OK, of Miami-Dade, and my
rules of engagement were we will protect everybody's right to
protest, but once they leave that boundary and now they go into
violence, there was no--there was zero tolerance.
So they tested us the first night and they went into what
is called Bayside, a very popular tourist site, and Miami-Dade
police went in and made sure those people that were rummaging
through Bayside were arrested and dispersed.
What are the rules of engagement here in the District of
Columbia concerning protestors, the right to protest, and then
once they cross that boundary?
Mr. Rodriguez. So, sir, as the sheriff, you will appreciate
the answer here, which is I am not going to speak for the
Metropolitan Police Department. But we can get you that
information on the rules of engagement from the police
department.
Ms. Gimenez. You don't know--obviously, you also don't know
what the Capitol Police's rules of engagement were for the 6th.
Mr. Rodriguez. No, sir, that would have to be for the
Capitol Police.
Ms. Gimenez. Fair enough. OK. I think I have got
sufficient.
One more question to Ms. Neumann.
You said that we needed a law, and I agree with you. I do
think we need a law concerning terrorism, all kinds of
terrorism. In Florida they are looking at upping significantly
the penalties for people that break the law while they are
protesting, in other words, they go outside the bounds of just
protesting and now they start to create violence, destruction,
et cetera.
If we do, in fact, have a Federal law, how do you--how
would you think that we would standardize the enforcement of
those laws, say, if in a particular area the leadership, the
political leadership, actually agreed with the philosophy or
the ideology of the people that were protesting?
Ms. Neumann. I mean, that is one of the very real
challenges of going into strengthening our domestic terrorism
laws, right? The threat is what it is today, but as has already
been discussed, 50 years ago it looked different and we have to
presume 50 years from now it will look different again.
I think the critical factor is the violence associated with
it. You know, clearly, given the experience we have just had, I
would love to see an exploration of how we might be able to
hold even our political officials accountable, either
criminally or civilly, for incitement to violence. I think we
need to send a strong signal that if you are choosing to take
an oath of office, if you are choosing to take a leadership
role in our society, that you have to be responsible for the
words that you use.
We do have individuals in this country that are both--we
certainly have people that are mentally unwell. We also have
people that are just vulnerable, maybe not definably mentally
ill but are vulnerable to disinformation, they are vulnerable
to their grievances being fed.
We have seen over the last 5 years this increase in hateful
political rhetoric and examples of it happening on the left as
well as obviously a lot on the right.
So I think that we may need to have, you know, an
examination of what else could we do to encourage our elected
officials and other leaders to be more responsible for their
words.
Ms. Gimenez. I agree with you on both the left and the
right.
Thank you. I yield my time.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from New Jersey for 5
minutes, Mrs. Watson Coleman.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to the
Ranking Member. Congratulations to both of you. Thank you for
this really important hearing. I appreciate the information
that has been shared and the concerns that have been raised.
I have a couple of observations. I certainly have a
question for a former New Jerseyan, Dr. Rodriguez.
First of all, I want to say that we all were pretty scared
on January 6 and fearing for our lives and we all had some idea
that things were really bad behind the--in the hallways and in
the rooms. We were closeted in various places and perhaps we
were safe or maybe not so much, depending upon what happened to
us with COVID, but we knew that this was serious. We knew also
that this was a breach, this was an insurrection against our
Government.
Here is my concern. I agree that rhetoric is bad. I agree
that inflaming incitement happened on that day in the Ellipse.
I agree that the higher up the rhetoric comes from, the more
intense it is experienced and the more action that it provokes.
I also think that things that happened afterwards were
equally as important. Two of the things that concern me,
particularly, is the way these thugs were treated breaching the
Capitol, predominantly White female and male, and how other
protestors of color have been treated in our Capitol, and also
after the fact.
We have got two examples of White women brought before
judges who were given what I consider the ultimate White
privilege in what happened to them. The first one was a young
woman who stole the laptop and threatened Nancy Pelosi. She was
given an ankle bracelet and sent home to her mommy.
The second one was a woman who owns a small business and
had tickets to go to Mexico. She is given permission from the
court to leave the country to go to Mexico. Yet there are young
people in prison right now for stealing backpacks, for having
small drug offenses, that are people of color.
This disparity in justice at all levels sickens me. This
latest manifestation of this White Supremacy, this White
privilege, has just got to stop.
We had a gathering of the most diverse group of people who
hate something in the whole country in the Capitol on January
6. You know what I find the common thread was that brought them
together? The former President of the United States, Donald
Trump. So if they were anti-Government, they were pro-Donald
Trump. If they were anti-Black or anti-Semitic or anti-LGBTQ or
whatever they were against, they were pro-Trump. So the common
thread there was Donald Trump and he needs to be held
accountable.
Mr. Rodriguez, I have got a question for you. I want to
know, how early did you have information that we were possibly
going to experience the kind of violence that we did
experience, either before the 5th or the 6th, and what agencies
were you communicating with specifically, and what were their
responses? Because I don't think that this was a lack of
intelligence. I think this was a lack of a desire to do what
they needed to do to keep this Congress safe, to keep our
leadership safe, and to have enough resources to push back what
became an insurrection. I want everyone accountable.
Before you answer that question, I have one more issue, and
that is I don't know if we need more legislation or if we need
more enforcement of existing legislation, and I look forward to
that investigation, that kind of commission consideration, so
that we know where we should go. We can't jump before we know.
We need to know before we jump.
So, Mr. Rodriguez, could you please in the time that I have
left answer the question, when did you know, who did you tell,
and what was their response? I want to know specifically what
agencies you communicated with.
Mr. Rodriguez. Yes, thank you, Congresswoman. It is good to
see you again, and I appreciated working with you when I was
the director in New Jersey.
We saw indications that there would be violence for the
4th, 5th, and the 6th in the middle of December. I will caveat
that by saying that we had known that there would be or at
least the initial indications of intelligence there would be
violence around the election period. We were planning, and we
briefed Mayor Bowser on this, that we could see protracted
violence through the inaugural period.
So as we began to brief--and that is why the Mayor called
up the National Guard. That is why she activated the emergency
operations center. That is why we activated our fusion center.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Did you communicate with anyone up
higher than the local government? I want to know how far up in
the Federal Government, the State government, the FBI, the
Capitol Police, whoever, I want to know who knew what you
thought was going to happen.
Mr. Rodriguez. Yes, ma'am. As you know, it is an
information-sharing process. It is an iterative process. FBI,
Secret Service, U.S. Capitol Police, U.S. Park Police,
Metropolitan Police Department, the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security Intelligence and Analysis. So all of those entities
are being communicated with on the violence and the threats.
I think it is important also, if I could just say one last
thing, Congresswoman, is that as an intelligence analyst by
trade, the issue here was not the lack of intelligence or the
lack of information. The issue here was the inability or the
unwillingness to act on the intelligence.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Amen. Amen. That is where the
accountability needs to take place. I think Ms. Neumann----
Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady from New Jersey's time
has expired.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. You know, I gently yield back. Thank
you, sir.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
Mr. Katko. Mr. Chairman, sir, could I speak just for a
moment?
Chairman Thompson. Yes, the Chair recognizes the Ranking
Member.
Mr. Katko. There has been repeated questions about what
happened that day and how we are going to get to the bottom of
it. I just want to reiterate that I have a bill out there that
does exactly this. I think it is really important and it would
be incumbent upon Members of the committee, I think, to join
onto the bill and get that bill passed, so we can get this
commission up and running and find out. Because I think, until
we do that, we are going to have a hard time really
understanding where the shortfall was here and where people
fell down.
So, with that, I will just yield back. Thank you, sir.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. I agree.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Georgia for 5
minutes, Mr. Clyde.
You need to unmute yourself, Representative.
I think there are some technical issues around
Representative Clyde.
We will go to Mr. LaTurner while Mr. Clyde gets his
technical challenges corrected.
Mr. LaTurner.
Mr. LaTurner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that.
I want to say to you, this is my first meeting, and want to
say to you and the Ranking Member and all the colleagues that I
am honored to be on this committee. I look forward to working
with you on the very serious issues that this committee has
jurisdiction over.
It is my sincere belief, and I hope that it rings true as
we go through this process, that National security issues
should not be partisan. I hope we can work together and make
sure that we are working on behalf of the American people.
My question is for Ms. Neumann. I have a couple of them.
The first thing I would like you to talk about, you talked
about January 6 was an inspiration point and would be an
inspiration point for 10 to 20 years. So I would like for you
to talk about the concept of it being an inspiration point,
have you seen evidence of that, and where the time frame of 10
to 20 years comes from.
Ms. Neumann. Thanks for the question.
We have seen on January 6 and in the month since then on-
line chatter that indicates that White Supremacist groups and
anti-Government groups in particular view this as a rallying
point. I don't want to say a starting pistol because they have
existed for so long and have had this ideology of eventually
overthrowing the U.S. Government. If you are a White
Supremacist, you want to establish this White homeland within
the United States.
But it is certainly this moment where for many this fantasy
was finally coming true and they--one of the examples is that
in ``The Turner Diaries'' there is an attack on the Capitol. It
is different than what we saw on January 6, but many cited that
scene out of ``The Turner Diaries'' which, if folks watching
are not familiar, is that horrible book about White
Supremacists basically taking over the world. But there is this
scene where they attack the Capitol and that is, like, the
starting point for eventually leading to societal collapse and,
you know, leading to nuclear war, and then you are able to
start over and have a White homeland.
So, sadly, some view this as a huge success, even though,
you know, it only lasted a few hours. They see the terror that
it caused. They see that it was easy to do. They believe that
this is their moment, that they may actually be able to lead us
into a civil war. So some of the concern is that those that
belong to those types of ideology are going to be inspired to
try to bring more violence so that they can eventually reach
that civil war state.
The other factor here is that you have such a large group
of people that are unaffiliated with these terrorist movements
or terrorist organizations but they are very vulnerable right
now. They are disheartened QAnon followers, for example, or
former Trump supporters who really thought that something was
going to happen on January 6 and Trump was going to remain
President.
They are very vulnerable and we actively see neo-Nazis
recruiting Trump supporters to their ideology. They are very
sophisticated in how they do it. They don't come right at you.
You don't necessarily know you are talking to a White
Supremacist.
So the concern I have is that we may see more mainstreaming
of this fringe right ideology and, from that, you are going to
have larger numbers of the people, not necessarily that are all
the way to the violent end of the spectrum. But the more you
have in the radicalized section of that graph, the more likely
you are to see acts of violence.
Then, last, you asked about the generational struggle. In
talking with extremist experts, most of them see this as one of
those moments in our history where it is going to inspire and
encourage people for quite some time and that is why I gave
that time period.
Mr. LaTurner. The other thing I want to ask you really
quick, because my time is running out, is the problem that I
very much acknowledge is the social isolation that makes people
more vulnerable to these kinds of arguments. As I am sure you
would agree with me, this is going to exist after COVID is
over. It will get better. But this has been a growing problem
for the last couple of decades with the rise of what is in all
of our pockets. That is a contributing factor. We can't pass a
law to make people get to know and care about their neighbor.
So what is the future of this social isolation? What can be
done about it? Where do you see it going?
Ms. Neumann. A couple of thoughts.
No. 1, I do think when the restrictions related to the
pandemic--and hopefully later this year--some of the challenge
that we are facing right now will lessen a bit. So that is some
bright news in an otherwise dark assessment.
But you are absolutely right, we are increasingly isolated.
This is a problem that has been documented going back at least
2 decades. It is not one Government can solve. I wrote in my
written testimony it really is so far beyond anything that the
security industry can solve or the Government can solve. We
really need to ask citizens and leaders within our
neighborhoods and within our communities to stand up and decide
that they want a country that looks different than the current
moment that we are in. It does require changes in the faith
community. It requires changes in the tech community. It
requires changes maybe within our education system.
I don't--I personally don't think--I am a conservative--I
don't think that is coming from the Federal Government. I think
what makes America great is when it comes from--organically
from grass roots. I think there are so many amazing men and
women in this country that love their country and don't want
another January 6 attack, and we need to encourage them to step
up and serve their communities and demonstrate the good that we
still have in this country and push back the darkness and the
violence and the hateful rhetoric.
Mr. LaTurner. Thank you, Ms. Neumann.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from California for 5
minutes, Ms. Barragan.
Ms. Barragan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me start by saying that I appreciate every Member of
Congress in this committee that believes 9/11 is real and that
it happened. I never thought I would have to actually say that,
but I have much greater appreciation now. So I wanted to start
by thanking my colleagues on this committee for believing and
agreeing that it occurred and that we are doing everything we
can to stop another domestic terrorism attack or those coming
from foreign terrorists from coming to our country.
Ms. Neumann and Mr. Greenblatt, questions for you. The FBI
warned, called QAnon a domestic terror threat. How dangerous is
it for Members of the Congress to support these domestic terror
groups and repeat their lies?
Ms. Neumann.
Ms. Neumann. QAnon has certainly accelerated as a threat,
particularly over the summer. I think a lot of that has to do
with what we were just talking about, social isolation, the
pandemic, people searching for answers for why their lives had
been turned upside down and seeking for a way to take control.
It is really hard to extract people once they really go
down the rabbit hole. So it is really important for anybody in
a position of authority, particularly those that are considered
a credible voice, which is often a pastor or, you know, a media
personality or an elected Member of Congress, it is really
important that they talk about what truth is and what is not
truth.
Even if in QAnon, it is a lot of asking questions like,
``Well, suppose,'' or, ``What if?'' You know what? Like that is
gossip and slander. We need to kind-of go back to the basics of
we don't tell--we don't bear false witness. If you don't have a
first-hand account of the conspiracy that you think is true,
then you probably don't need to be spreading it. I think we
need to help encourage our citizens to get back to the basics
of civic society.
Ms. Barragan. Thank you.
Mr. Greenblatt.
Mr. Greenblatt. Congresswoman, thank you for the question.
I would say dangerous conspiracy theories, from 9/11
truthers to the Sandy Hook kind of people to QAnon, are all
part of a piece. They are a danger to our National security,
and they are a danger to our communities.
So the QAnon folks demonstrate anti-Semitism. They
demonstrate racism. They demonstrate demonizing other people,
suggesting that Democrats are pedophiles or part of some
conspiracy to kill and eat children. All of it is disgusting.
Whether you are an elected Member of Congress or some other
office or you are an aspirant, whether you say it now or you
said it in the past, it should disqualify you from being on
committees or participating in it.
If you believe that our democracy is being taken over by
pedophiles and you subscribe to these crazy theories about
Jewish space lasers, you don't belong at the table. Period. End
of story.
Ms. Barragan. Mr. Greenblatt, what message will it send if
there are no consequences?
Mr. Greenblatt. It is baffling how no matter what party you
are a part of, no matter how you choose to pull the lever in
the ballot box, that people think that someone who believes
such crazy, outrageous lies should be part of a political
process, who thinks that Sandy Hook didn't happen should sit on
an Education Committee. It boggles the mind, and it undermines
the credibility of whatever party would choose to do that and
the political process overall.
Ms. Barragan. Thank you very much.
Now, often the role of women in extremist groups or
movements is overlooked or underplayed. What role have women
played in growing domestic terrorist movements over the past 4
years, and what role did they play in the January 6 attack?
Ms. Neumann, do you want to start?
Ms. Neumann. I actually think my colleagues might have
better answers to that. It is a really good question, though.
Ms. Barragan. OK.
Mr. Greenblatt. Congresswoman, if I might. So ADL has
studied extremists for decades. First of all, I would say there
is a clear link between White Supremacy and misogyny. So we
should just point out right up front that White Supremacist
rhetoric and extremist rhetoric often demeans and denigrates
women. I would be happy to send you and all the Members of the
committee our reporting and analysis on this.
Second, it is also worth letting you know that, like, women
can be radicalized just like men, and QAnon and conspiracy
theories, disinformation campaigns, aren't just, if you will,
the portion of one gender.
We watched, you know, the ADL has watched all these
extremists as they converged on the Capitol, and there were
women and men among the crowd. We know that young woman was
killed when she tried to literally burst into the Chamber of
the Speaker.
So women are often denigrated by these movements and yet
they can be brainwashed and radicalized just like anyone else.
Ms. Barragan. Good. Thank you.
With that, my time has expired. I yield back, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. The gentlelady
yields back.
The Chair again recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr.
Clyde, for 5 minutes.
We still can't hear the gentleman from Georgia. We will
wait on the technical correction for the gentleman from Georgia
again.
We will go to the gentlelady from Florida, Ms. Cammack, for
5 minutes.
Mrs. Cammack. Hello. Can you all hear me?
Chairman Thompson. Yes, we can.
Mrs. Cammack. Excellent. Excellent.
Well, I want to thank the gentleman for yielding. I am
honored to join the Homeland Security Committee and look
forward to working with Members of this committee this Congress
to ensure the security of our Nation.
I also want to thank my colleagues on both sides of the
aisle for continuing the tradition of bipartisanship and
addressing the issues and threats facing our National security.
Because of COVID restrictions, I haven't had the
opportunity to meet all of my colleagues on this committee and
wanted to take a brief moment to introduce myself. I proudly
represent Florida's Third Congressional District, which I
affectionately refer to as the Gator Nation, central, north-
central Florida.
The issue of homeland security is a personal and passionate
issue for myself, having graduated from the United States Naval
War College with a master's degree in information operations
and counterterrorism.
Additionally, for nearly a decade I have worked closely
with law enforcement and first responders throughout the State
of Florida and I am keenly aware of the issues that they face
on a daily basis. In fact, my husband is a SWAT medic and a
first responder for Gainesville Fire and Rescue in our
hometown. Together we have created a nonprofit organization
called The Grit Foundation which serves to provide critical
life-saving equipment to our departments.
That experience over the last few years has given me
critical insight into how we can better serve and protect our
communities by bolstering resources for first responders,
rather than cutting them.
I am also honored to serve as the Ranking Member on the
Subcommittee for Emergency Preparedness, Response, and
Recovery, along with Chairwoman and fellow Floridian Val
Demings. I look forward to the work that we will do there.
But turning now to the events of January 6 and the broader
issue that we have been facing, which is extremism and domestic
terrorism.
As someone who witnessed the attack personally from the
House floor, I have been vocal about condemning the attacks of
that day, just as I have been very vocal about condemning the
violence that we witnessed in Portland, Minneapolis, the
District of Columbia, Denver, and beyond last year.
I personally spent the following days after the attack
speaking to law enforcement and custodial staff that was
present there with us that day. That brings me to the
conclusion that there is no doubt in my mind that the events of
that day were premeditated and that a thorough and complete
investigation that is extraordinarily transparent is needed,
which is why I am very proud to support Ranking Member Katko
and Representative Davis' efforts to create a 9/11-style
commission to investigate the events leading up to January 6.
I would be remiss if I did not make note of the fact that
several of our colleagues have continued to rachet up divisive
political rhetoric, for example, insinuating that fellow
Members have been complicit in the planned violence of that
awful day, January 6.
We must also speak out against more than 570 protests last
year that turned violent, resulting in 2,385 looting incidents,
624 arson incidents, and more than 2,000 police officers that
have been injured.
Baseless and continual accusations are not helpful. We must
denounce racism, we must denounce hate, and we must denounce
violence, regardless of its origins. We need to collectively
hold these criminals accountable that stormed the Capitol to
the fullest extent of the law.
I believe that we as Americans are bigger than the divisive
rhetoric that continues today. I believe that we are bigger
than the events of January 6. We are bigger and stronger that
the challenges that we face as a Republic.
So I know that I am limited here on time. I am going to
turn this to Mr. Jenkins and ask, I know that you have touched
on this a bit today, but I wanted to bring up this important
issue again. How does Government and the Members of this
committee here best move forward in preventing extremism and
domestic terrorism, while preserving all Americans' First
Amendment rights and privacy?
Mr. Jenkins. Thank you very, very much for the question. I
think that there are a couple of things that you do.
No. 1, I, again, come back to the issue of a commission
would be a most useful thing to start with a full exploration
of the events of January 6 and what happened then.
I think a second thing I have already heard repeated a
number of times from my colleagues on the panel and from new
Members of Congress, and that is to try to recover some of the
comity that has been a hallmark of this Nation and to reduce
the bellicose rhetoric going forward.
Put aside the issues of the past for a moment, looking
ahead. We still have people in this country talking about civil
war. I am talking about high-ranking officials in State
governments and elsewhere talking about civil war, talking
about secession, talking about loading up with ammunition.
That kind of rhetoric isn't going to help us going forward.
It has nothing to do with going after and prosecuting those
responsible for violence. They should be prosecuted wherever
they are coming from on the political spectrum. But we
certainly, as part of our National strategy, need to bring it
down a notch and to try to set the standards for how we are
going to communicate with one another.
Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady from Florida's time has
expired.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr.
Gottheimer, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Gottheimer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor to
be on this committee, and I want to thank you for welcoming me.
I am grateful to be here and looking forward to serving
together with all of my fellow Members on both sides of the
aisle.
In the wake of the unprecedented terrorist attack on the
Capitol, we have seen detailed reports, thanks to the Anti-
Defamation League, of the involvement of despicable and
dangerous extremist groups, such as the Oath Keepers, the Three
Percenters, the New Jersey European Heritage Association, the
Proud Boys, and others which were on the ground that day.
Ms. Neumann, if I can ask you a question. What do you
believe is the single most impactful thing we can do right now
to stamp out these groups?
Ms. Neumann. When you limit it to right now, I mean, most
of the prevention work that interacts with individuals, helping
them to either not radicalize or, if they are radicalized, to
kind-of off-ramp them from violence, that takes a long time.
The capabilities that we have in the country are limited. They
are scaling. I think we can scale faster. That is something I
noted in my comments that I hope to see you all take up.
But we have very limited resources to do the one-on-one
individual work that we really need to get after this problem
from a comprehensive perspective. So if I look at the moment
right now, the best thing would be, if we can clarify that the
election was not stolen from credible voices, that reduces the
vulnerable and reduces then the pool from which perhaps, you
know, people get recruited into a Proud Boys or Boogaloo Bois
or a neo-Nazi group. That is probably the single most important
thing that we could do.
Then the other thing is we have got to make sure that our
protective systems are there. It has been a while since we have
had mass gatherings. I think as summer comes, we will be
outside. There will be more people. Hopefully the pandemic is
starting to wane. That will create targets of opportunity.
Now is the time to encourage critical infrastructure,
owners and operators of any sort of event venue, malls,
restaurants to dust off those plans, make sure that you have
your protective measures. If you haven't exercised them in a
while, you should do them now.
Mr. Gottheimer. I appreciate that, and I appreciate you
being here.
There seems to be a difference of opinion about whether we
need a statute criminalizing domestic terrorism or not. But
without a Federal law, given the failure to enforce laws in
most States criminalizing paramilitary activity, won't these
groups continue to openly gather and threaten our communities
if we don't take this action?
Ms. Neumann. Yes. In particular I love that you pulled out
the militia piece. That is something that we could probably
make an impact on rather quickly if we could do some sort of
coordinated public advisory, public communication effort to
educate people that it is illegal to participate in a private
militia, that that is not Second Amendment activity. I won't
get into all of the nuance. There are experts out there,
especially at Georgetown, that have put together the campaign
that we would need to be able to educate people in the States.
But I think there is a ton of misinformation out there,
people thinking that it is perfectly legal and Constitutional
for them to join these militia, and once you are in that group
that it is easier for individuals to potentially follow that
pathway to something violent.
If we can educate people that private militias are not
legal, and the second step, as you suggested, if we could pass
a Federal law that makes that even more clear, that would be
very helpful.
Mr. Gottheimer. Thank you very much.
Mr. Greenblatt, for years the ADL has diligently detailed
the rise of anti-Semitism, and, of course, the rise in anti-
Semitism and violent extremism are intertwined. For instance,
we were all sickened and horrified to see a man on the Capitol
on January 6 wearing a hoody with the words ``Camp Auschwitz''
on the front and ``Staff'' on the back. I saw others the days
before wearing other shirts with anti-Semitic slurs across
them.
How has the failure to contain and confront virulent and
anti-Semitic conspiracy theories like QAnon and accelerationism
led us not just to the lone wolf attacks in Pittsburgh and
Poway, but to the insurrection here at the Capitol on January
6?
Mr. Greenblatt. Well, thank you for the question, Mr.
Congressman.
I think we know that anti-Semitism is literally at the root
of White Supremacy and that it courses through right-wing
extremism as an underlying theory of the case. They believe
that Jewish groups, that Jewish people are somehow controlling,
manipulating the levers of power, Government, Wall Street,
Hollywood, the media. I could go on. We need to--law
enforcement needs to recognize this and to see those symbols,
like what you mentioned were on display at the Capitol.
By the way, the ADL maintains an open source database of
extremist symbols. You can find it at adl.org. We need law
enforcement to utilize these things, take advantage of the
information that we have, so that when they arrest someone and
they see patches on their jacket or tattoos on them that
indicate an affiliation with anti-Semitic, racist, White
Supremacist groups, they treat them appropriately.
I think the question was asked earlier by the Congressman
from Texas about White privilege. We need to treat these
hatemongers, these extremists, like the criminals that they
are.
Look, as a First Amendment--as a civil rights organization,
Congressman, that deeply believes in the First Amendment, I
have no problem with hate speech, even if I don't like it. But
when people seek not hate--not just hate--but to cause harm,
that is a clear and present danger that needs to be dealt with
to the fullest extent of the law.
Mr. Gottheimer. Thank you very much.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time from New Jersey has
expired.
Mr. Gottheimer. I yield back. Thank you so much, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Clyde, for 5 minutes.
Unmute yourself.
Mr. Clyde. OK. All right. Is the third time the charm here?
Chairman Thompson. The third time is the charm.
Mr. Clyde. Great. Thank you. Thank you for holding this
important hearing.
Thank you for the witnesses for coming out today.
First, I must remind the Members of the committee of the
President's own words during the demonstrations held on January
6. President Trump said, ``I know that everyone here will soon
be marching over to the Capitol Building to peacefully and
patriotically make your voices heard.''
Our President called for peaceful and patriotic protests
here at the Capitol, which is the right of every American
citizen, and that is one of the reasons I did not support and I
voted against the sham impeachment of President Trump. There
was no investigation. There were no witnesses called. There was
no cross-examination. Nothing was consistent with any prior
impeachment precedent.
That was wrong. Our Nation is a nation of law and order,
and I think everyone will agree with that, and that includes
the right of due process for everyone, including the President.
Mr. Greenblatt, my question is for you. Your comments about
screening members of the military--and I am a proud member of
the military. I served 28 years in the Navy, including 3 combat
tours, both Active and Reserve. But your comment about
screening the members of the military, law enforcement, and
every Government position, including those in elected office,
are very concerning to me. This smacks of the thought police.
We are Americans. We respect every person's right to their
own opinions, especially those with which we do not agree. We
all raised our hand and swore to the same oath of office.
So, Mr. Greenblatt, do you agree that people can have
differing opinions on issues and ideologies, but those
differences will not affect the jobs that they do for our
country, be it in the military, be it in law enforcement, or be
it in political office?
Mr. Greenblatt. So, Mr. Congressman, first, let me just
thank you for your service. I appreciate not just your service
as a Member of Congress but your service in the U.S. military.
I am the son of a veteran of the U.S. Army, and I have only the
highest respect. I have family members who are in law
enforcement. I have only the highest respect for people in
public service.
Again, as a civil rights organization who deeply believes
in free speech, I fully appreciate and fiercely protect the
right of Americans who have differing opinions, even those that
I don't like.
But freedom of speech is not the freedom to commit
sedition. Let's just be clear----
Mr. Clyde. I did not----
Mr. Greenblatt. Let me just----
Ms. Clyde. I said differing opinions and ideologies.
Mr. Greenblatt. But, Mr. Congressman, at the ADL, we track
extremists. It was mentioned earlier by Ms. Neumann. We know
for a fact that right-wing militias and White Supremacists have
made it a point to try to be recruited into the military and
enter law enforcement----
Mr. Clyde. Can you answer the question, Mr. Greenblatt?
Mr. Greenblatt. I am. I am answering the question. I am
answering the question.
It is not thought police to make sure that our police don't
subscribe to White Supremacist ideals. It is not thought police
to make sure that our politicians don't subscribe to conspiracy
theories and want to overthrow the Government. I draw a
distinct line between the two.
Mr. Clyde. Mr. Greenblatt, can people not have differing
opinions and those opinions not affect the actual work that
they do? We all raised our hands to the same oath of office. Do
you not agree with that, that they can have differing opinions
and it cannot affect the job that they do?
Mr. Greenblatt. I deeply agree on the value of differing
opinions and fierce debate. But fierce debate shouldn't----
Mr. Clyde. OK. All right. Thank you----
Mr. Greenblatt. But fierce debate shouldn't allow you to
dehumanize me or any other person from any minority group.
Mr. Clyde. I didn't say that.
OK. Thank you.
I would also like to comment that I completely disagree
with putting the National Guard under the mayor of the District
of Columbia. The mayor of the District of Columbia is not a
Governor. As a Reservist, I think it is very important that
that separation continue to exist.
Thank you, and I yield back my time.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman from Georgia yields back
the time.
The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Virginia, Mrs.
Luria, for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Luria. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to all of our witnesses for joining us to talk
about this important topic today. As a new Member of this
[inaudible] and also joining the Homeland Security Committee,
because I know this is really a threat to our country and our
democracy, and I think it is these important issues that we
need to continue to address.
I would like to address my question to Mr. Greenblatt. It
follows on what one of my colleagues just mentioned a few
minutes ago.
You know, as you mentioned, we have seen the photos of
insurrectionists in the Capitol. They were wearing sweatshirts
that say ``Camp Auschwitz,'' ``6MWE,'' 6 Million Wasn't Enough,
which is just reprehensible to myself as a Jewish American but,
you know, I would assume, to everyone who is watching and
listening to this today.
You know, I would like to just spend a little bit of time
addressing in a little bit more depth some of the anti-Semitic
tropes that appear frequently in these White Nationalist groups
and are associated with movements such as QAnon and how we
could potentially look to address these issues and what you as
an organization are doing to identify these groups and threats
and, you know, root out some of these tropes that have existed
for a long time but are just very clearly manifesting
themselves today in the public eye.
Mr. Greenblatt. Well, thank you very much for the
questions, Congresswoman. I would say a few thoughts.
So, No. 1, again, anti-Semitism is at the core--is a
conspiracy theory of sorts and at the core of White Supremacy
in this country. So it didn't just start on January 6. We saw
this from Capitol Hill to Charlottesville and before that. You
have seen it again and again. You know, Ms. Neumann referenced
``The Turner Diaries.'' If you go back and look at White
Supremacist literature and philosophy, again, it is rooted in a
hatred of the Jewish people. Again, it is not right or left; it
is just right and wrong. There should be no excuse for it in
any public setting.
In terms of what do about it, I mean, there are a few
things.
No. 1, I do believe--and I believe this very fiercely--that
we have to hold these White Supremacists and right-wing
extremists accountable for their actions. Every individual who
perpetrated in that attack should be identified and arrested
and prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law. We need to
make sure that hate crimes are tracked effectively at the local
level and the perpetrators punished, again, to the fullest
extent of the law so there is some degree of deterrence.
But I also think that we can't just legislate or arrest our
way out of this situation. We also have to change hearts and
minds. I really applaud Congresswoman Maloney for the Never
Again Education Act that was passed in the last session that
mandates Holocaust and genocide education. We are doomed to
repeat the mistakes of history if we don't learn from them. So
educating young people about the Holocaust and hate, all forms
of hate, can have a demonstrable impact.
At the ADL, we are one of the largest providers in the
United States of anti-hate content in schools. We reach over
1.5 million kids a year. We do that because we have seen the
difference it makes. When children learn about difference, they
demonstrate more compassion, more empathy. It can affect
conditioning the environment to be more tolerant of everyone,
no matter how you pray or where you are from or who you love.
Mrs. Luria. Well, thank you for that additional insight and
feedback, and, you know, I appreciate the work that you
continue to do on behalf of this important topic.
I yield back the remainder of my time.
Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady yields back.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas for 5
minutes, Mr. Pfluger.
Mr. Pfluger. Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Katko, thank
you for this opportunity. I am grateful to serve on this
committee. Really, there is no greater importance to our
country than for us and those in our military and law
enforcement to safeguard the American people from any threats.
As a 20-year veteran of the U.S. Air Force myself and
somebody who has fought all over the world and, most recently,
against terrorism in the Middle East, I hope that I can bring
some value and that same commitment to our work here.
As you may know, the 11th District of Texas, which I
represent, is a critical intersection of National security
interests for our country. It lays just north of the Southern
Border, over 1,200 miles of shared border between Texas and
Mexico, and is home to the top-producing area for oil and gas,
a tremendous amount, millions of acres in fact, of agriculture,
of farm and ranch land, and of a military base which trains
intelligence personnel for our joint defense. It is a pretty
incredible place that produces food, fuel, fiber, and powers
and feeds the American people.
A country that feeds and fuels itself is inherently safer
and more secure. Ensuring that the development and the
transportation of these resources remains safe and secure from
chemical, biological, and cyber terrorism or any other threats
is of utmost importance. So I appreciate the work that is being
done here.
I am additionally thankful for the trust bestowed upon me
to use my experiences to lead my Republican colleagues on the
Subcommittee for Intelligence and Counterterrorism. I would
like to congratulate Chairwoman Slotkin as the Chair for that
subcommittee, and I look forward to working with her to
continue to strengthen the intelligence community and deter
those future threats. I look forward to working together with
all of the committee on something that really is a nonpartisan
issue, the security of our country.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to specifically thank you for
your thoughts earlier on making sure that we don't distract
from the threat, that there is no attempt to distract from the
threat. Right now our country is facing a number of threats,
and homeland security is incredibly important.
I would like to explore a topic--and I will start with Mr.
Greenblatt--on the subject of rhetoric and specifically that
rhetoric which could embolden.
I would like to kind-of pull this thread a little bit, Mr.
Greenblatt, and ask your opinion on the escalation of rhetoric
that has happened--and I will use a partisan term--that has
happened on both sides, or the lack of rhetoric, or the lack of
ability to condemn violence, or selective condemnation, and
just hear your thoughts on where we are today and how that
rhetoric has shaped this point.
So, Mr. Greenblatt, over to you.
Mr. Greenblatt. Congressman Pfluger, thank you for the
question.
I think it is absolutely fair to say that neither side of
the political spectrum is exempt from intolerance. As I said in
my opening remarks, we have seen extremism on both sides. It is
absolutely true. I think it is incumbent upon everyone,
regardless of how you vote, to represent a core set of values,
like decency and fairness and the humanity of their fellow man
and woman.
That being said, I don't want to engage in kind-of a what-
aboutism here. Like, what happened on January 6 really has no
precedent. I mean, again, at ADL, we track these extremists,
and I just want to clarify, what we saw that day wasn't a riot;
it was an attack. Right? Those weren't, like, protesters. They
were militants who were marching up the Capitol steps to kidnap
and murder many of you if they had the chance. Those people who
would try to undermine our democracy and kidnap and kill our
elected officials, I just think we have to acknowledge the fact
that they were coming from one particular hateful ideology.
Let me just say this. I don't think White Supremacy, like,
has anything to do with traditional Republican politics. Like,
we do ourselves and we do our great democratic tradition a deep
injustice when we pretend as if these people are on the
spectrum. They are not. They are way off the spectrum. They
belong in the dustbin of history.
Mr. Pfluger. Thank you, Mr. Greenblatt.
Ms. Neumann, thank you, and to all the witnesses, for your
expertise today.
I am very interested in your thoughts on how a commission
and how a nonpartisan look at this issue can be executed and
recommendations for how we can conduct this and the types of
resources that we pull in to make sure that we hear the facts,
that we make good decisions, and that we come up with a good
solution.
Ms. Neumann.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time has expired, but I
will allow Ms. Neumann to answer the question.
Ms. Neumann. I would suggest that the model that we got out
of the 9/11 Commission works fairly well. I am sure that some
of the staff and commissioners probably have some lessons
learned about how they could improve on that model, and I think
that is something that is worth the committee's consideration.
It certainly needs to be bipartisan. It certainly needs to
be staffed on a full-time basis. They certainly need to have
the authority to be able to review documents and compel people
to tell the truth.
Then you need a wide variety of expertise. You also need to
ensure that various perspectives that have concerns, legitimate
concerns, feel heard and that there is buy-in into the process.
What I specifically mean is that, already, in the last few
weeks, we have seen voices from the Muslim community, from the
Black community express concern that, if we change the law, it
ultimately will boomerang back around--even though we are
saying it is because of White Supremacists, it is going to
boomerang back around and affect their communities.
This is coming from very real experiences that these
communities have faced in the previous decades. That needs to
be heard. We need to learn from our mistakes of the last 20
years, in particular, and build that into whatever
recommendations come out.
But I also would argue that we have seen too many deaths.
We have seen the most catastrophic symbolic and physical attack
from a domestic terrorist since 1995. Not doing things, not
updating our laws that in some cases haven't been touched in 50
years is also not the answer.
So we would encourage that we hear from the voices that
have concerns, treat that with seriousness, but also not to let
that become so chilling that we can't find a path forward.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman from Texas's time----
Mr. Pfluger. Thank you so much for allowing that.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
The gentleman from Texas's time has expired.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey for 5
minutes, Mr. Malinowski.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I am so
happy to have a chance to join the committee this year and look
forward to working with you and all of my colleagues.
Mr. Greenblatt, I wanted to start by taking you back to
something you said about the people who were part of that mob
that attacked the Capitol on January 6. You said, I think quite
rightly, that under normal circumstances we would have
recognized them as just ordinary Americans who were absolutely
convinced in that moment that what they were doing, this
deviant thing that they were doing, was something completely
normal. They were also probably convinced that most Americans
were completely on their side, agreed with them.
You mentioned that one reason for this--and this is, I
think, the core problem we face--is that they were radicalized
to these beliefs on social media. They came to believe that
what they doing was normal and everyone supported them.
My first question to you is, how did that happen? Did they
just wake up one morning, these schoolteachers and real estate
agents and fitness instructors, and decide they were going to
search on the internet for neo-Nazi beliefs or White Supremacy?
Or did something recommend it to them?
Mr. Greenblatt. So, Congressman Malinowski, thank you for
your question. Again, as someone who I know throughout your
career you have looked at human rights issues around the world,
I think what you probably saw happen on January 6 bore
resemblance to coups and other insurrections you have seen in
developing countries across the planet.
Mr. Malinowski. It did, yes.
Mr. Greenblatt. So I want to say one thing that builds upon
my earlier answer. We need to recognize that the reason why
tens of millions of ordinary Americans came to the National
Mall is because, first, I will just say they were rallied to do
so by mainstream politicians. They were encouraged to show up
by mainstream pundits on cable news shows.
So we do need to acknowledge that there is a broad
responsibility for what happened. Again, the politicians who
were standing there on the Mall encouraging them with waving
their fists to go take Congress, they were only from one--I
mean, it is not a political statement to--it is an observation
of fact, they were only from one party. So let's say that, No.
1.
No. 2, indeed, why do people believe this kind of insanity
and this lunacy, that there are pedophilia--you know, Satan-
worshipping Democrats, you know, in the basements of pizza
parlors eating children, for God's sake?
Part of it is because the algorithms that animate these
social media platforms, invisibly to the user, route
information to them. So, once you click on a certain kind of
story, it is often reinforced. Any of us can see this today, if
we have a normal internet browser like Chrome or Firefox or
Edge, and you look at a YouTube video, it will start to send
you more videos, the kinds of which you just looked at.
So that algorithmic routing that happens to the user,
unknown, shapes their world view and creates what Eli Pariser
calls ``filter bubbles.'' They are deeply dangerous when they
are telling people that, again, you have this conspiracy trying
to hurt them.
Mr. Malinowski. Just one example of that. You know,
Facebook, in 2018, they did an internal study in which they
determined that 64 percent of all joins, people joining an
extremist group, on their platform was due to their
recommendation tools, that it was recommended to them to do
that by Facebook.
The reason for that is that these algorithms are
engagement-based, right? In other words, they are designed to
maximize the time that everybody spends glued to the screen.
They have figured out that what does that to us is content that
reinforces our most passionate, intense beliefs, our fears and
our hates. Isn't that correct?
Mr. Greenblatt. It is absolutely correct. Their business
models are based on engagement and clicks. As they used to say
for local news, if it bleeds, it leads. Right? So, again, if it
is a conspiracy, it drives clicks.
It is deep--we see that things don't happen in a vacuum.
On-line hate and conspiracy theories can metastasize into real-
world violence, and we saw that on January 6.
Mr. Malinowski. So, you had mentioned the legislation that
I introduced with Congresswoman Eshoo----
Mr. Greenblatt. Yes.
Mr. Malinowski [continuing]. Which is a narrow, narrow
effort to deny these companies immunity under Section 230 if
that kind of content, which they promote through these
algorithms, contributes to real-world violence.
I would say to all my colleagues, we can believe that the
biggest problem is on the right, on the far right, or on the
far left; it doesn't matter. We can debate that. But whichever
of those things you believe, you should be for this, because
the mechanism works the same way. It pushes people on the left
further left, it pushes people on the right further right,
until they reach an extreme that, as you rightly said, is
totally out of the mainstream.
Thank you so much.
I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
I assure the gentleman from New Jersey that that issue has
come up in a number of questions and responses to those
questions, and, at some point, that part of the jurisdictional
edge that we have, we will look at it. We will talk to the
other committees, obviously. Because it presents a clear and
present danger to us all if we don't get our arms around it.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan, Mr.
Meijer, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Meijer. Thank you, Chairman Thompson and Ranking Member
Katko, and our esteemed guests for joining us here today.
I am Peter Meijer, representing Michigan's Third
Congressional District, and proud to also be the Ranking Member
on the Subcommittee on Oversight, Management, and
Accountability. You know, I am extremely excited to be sitting
on this committee. I am excited for the opportunity to work in
a bipartisan fashion to address the security concerns that are
confronting our Nation, especially those of a domestic nature.
I have been greatly enjoying and learning a lot from the
conversation so far.
Ms. Neumann, I really appreciate you offering that
clarification. The way in which we are engaging--the delta
between how we treat international terrorism and, sort-of, the
statutory grounding to prosecute versus domestic, I think, is a
really salient issue. As you noted, the arrests in September of
2 Boogaloo Bois, you know, for conspiring with Hamas. The way
that the FBI, especially in undercover operations, has to, in
most cases, default to finding an international connection in
order to move forward on a prosecution, you know, does suggest
that we need to be reevaluating or, as Mr. Jenkins said,
fundamentally rethink some of these dynamics. That is a point I
want to get back to in a minute.
But one thing that was in Mr. Greenblatt's written remarks,
I think, I really want to drill down in a little bit, and it is
around the concept of accelerationism. You know, originally it
came from Marx. It was a claim that capitalism carries the
seeds of its own destruction, with the inherent social
conflicts it creates.
But what started off as a sort-of more left-wing notion has
kind-of crossed over--and maybe it is with a horseshoe theory,
where extremists on both sides loop back in the middle--and
found its root on the right as well. The Boogaloo Bois are
arguably accelerationists. You know, one of the uniting threads
between some of the people who stormed the Capitol, such as the
QAnon shaman with the face paint and the Viking horns, is just
this desire to bring about some type of cataclysm, some means
of upsetting the order.
The question is, why is that so persuasive? Why are so many
folks feeling disaffected and becoming entranced by some of
these wilder theories?
I think, Ms. Neumann, you said in your testimony, you know,
it is about filling unmet needs caused by marginalization,
grievance, and humiliation. Indeed, a lot of the folks I spoke
to who felt compelled and came out on the 6th, not necessarily
those who were violent--I didn't speak to any of them--but they
did feel a sense of humiliation, they felt a sense of grievance
and a means of address.
Obviously, please do not take this to be a what-aboutism or
a both-sidesism. I voted for impeachment and was 1 of only 10
Republicans to do so and have unequivocally condemned the
actions of January 6 and look forward to, in this hearing,
making sure we are doing the necessary steps for redress.
But I want to circle back and ask the question of Mr.
Jenkins: When you talk about fundamentally rethinking our
approach, as Ms. Neumann said, with the challenge between how
we treat international terrorism and how we treat domestic, it
also seems that the broader issue is, it is easier to go after
an organization, something with a hierarchy, a command-and-
control structure, and that is identifiable in a way.
But when it is a more pervasive, persuasive ideology like
accelerationism, you know, how do we then root out that cause
at the individual level, rather than having a strictly reactive
approach?
So, Mr. Jenkins, I would appreciate your thoughts along
those lines.
Mr. Jenkins. Thank you very much for the question.
Look, some recent research, not done by RAND but done by
the University of Chicago, looking at the people who were
arrested for participation in the events on January 6, based
upon statements they made on their own Facebook accounts and so
on, indicates that about 20 percent of them were actually
members of extremist groups going in, that the remaining 80
percent were there because they felt the election had been
stolen.
Now, that raises a broader issue, and that is, we don't
want to see the radicalization of the 80 percent by that 20
percent. Part of the strategy, counterterrorism strategy, has
to be that we will isolate the violent extremists from a
potential constituency. That means going after with the full
force of the law the violent extremists. But it also means
addressing some of the issues that are broader.
Now, I am not for one moment suggesting any had kind-of co-
option or compromise with individuals in groups whose causes
are fundamentally antithetical to unalienable rights that we
accept. But I am saying that within that broader community
there are individuals who feel marginalized, people who have
lost faith in our political systems. This is on both sides of
the political spectrum. What we have to do, in our zeal to go
after the violent component, is not accidently brand as enemies
of the state a broader section of our population.
Now, that is a continuing strategy, and that is one of the
reasons, actually, why I want so much of our efforts against
the violent extremists to be done within the ordinary criminal
code. Put aside the political pretensions. Don't give them
that. These are crimes--murder, assault, willful destruction of
property. Deal with it on that basis.
Mr. Meijer. Thank you, Mr. Jenkins.
I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California for 5
minutes, Mr. Swalwell.
Unmute yourself.
Mr. Swalwell. Thank you, Chairman. Also, thank the Ranking
Member, you know, for the collaboration on taking on such an
important issue. I think for this to be our first hearing in
the new Congress reflects the true threat that we are facing
from domestic terrorism, particularly from White Supremacy
groups.
Last year, researchers at the Combating Terrorism Center at
West Point Academy, they monitored QAnon activity on Telegram,
and they found that there is a growing overlap between QAnon
channels and more extremist channels affiliated with Proud
Boys, paramilitary groups, and White Supremacists.
Have any of you similarly observed an overlap between QAnon
adherents, White Supremacists, militias, and other potentially
violent extremists?
Ms. Neumann, I think we should start with you, just
considering your expertise and service in Government.
Ms. Neumann. Thanks for the question.
Yes, I mean, look, this idea of ideology is--we started to
recognize maybe 3 or 4 years ago that it is kind-of held
loosely. There is a phenomenon called ideology-hopping. When I
was serving in the Government, we had U.S. attorneys telling us
anecdotes of individuals that would join one White Supremacist
group, then get frustrated it wasn't violent enough, and then
join an ISIS-related group, which you would think is
contradictory. But for some, it is just about the other
psychological unmet needs that are driving them toward the
violence and not about the ideology itself. So, increasingly,
you are seeing intermixing of groups.
QAnon, you know, kind-of made it famous to build your own
conspiracy, so the thing that you might think QAnon is 5 days
ago has changed at this point. We certainly see that as it
pertains to, there was this expectation that January 20 was
going to be the big moment and everybody was going to get
rounded up and executed in one big day of judgment and Trump
was still going to be President. When it didn't happen, some
recognized, ``Oh, I have been conned'' and moved on, but a
whole bunch just came up with the next theory: Now it is
January 31; now it is March 4. They just keep evolving the
theory.
So, the more that some of these conversations go
mainstream, the more that you see intermingling between the
groups. The fact that they were in person together on January 6
is this massive networking opportunity. As Mr. Jenkins pointed
out, we have got to drive a wedge between these two. We don't
want the organized organizations to be able to recruit from the
unaffiliated, because that unaffiliated population is very
large.
So all of those factors have made the job of law
enforcement counterterrorism specialists more difficult,
because we are so used to thinking about a neat ideology, and,
in fact, what is driving individuals may change from day to
day.
Which is why the prevention efforts that we started a few
years ago that were based off of this RAND study that they ran
in 2018 actually are ideologically neutral, that the signs and
indicators of somebody mobilizing to violence--the risk
factors, the stress factors--they were largely ideologically
neutral, which allows us to train by standards and develop
capabilities, locally-driven capabilities, that might be able
to intervene with an individual before they mobilize to
violence.
Mr. Swalwell. Ms. Neumann, what effect does it have on a
group like QAnon or a White Supremacy group when people who
they perceive are leaders in Government and people they would
support denounce them? Like, does that have an effect, when
they are denounced by people who they are supporting? How
important is it to do that, as far as legitimizing or
delegitimizing them?
Ms. Neumann. Historically, your anti-Government extremist
and White Supremacists groups are used to being antithetical to
the Government, meaning they view the Government as the enemy,
so they are used to the condemnation.
What shifted was that, all of a sudden, people in
authority, elected officials, and then, quite frankly, some of
the media outlets started using some of their ideology to
justify their positions. That mainstreaming effect emboldened
them. Then, when given the opportunity to condemn, and certain
personalities have not, that further emboldens them, and it
makes them feel like they can be more brash and bold in both
what they say and in what they do.
So, to counteract it, yes, it would be great if we could go
back to the way things were, and the condemnation helps prevent
enlarging the problem, but it doesn't necessarily get rid of
the problem.
Mr. Swalwell. Thank you very much.
I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr.
Garbarino, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Garbarino. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I just want to thank the Chairman and the Ranking Member
for hosting this hearing today. Securing the homeland from all
threats is the most critical thing that we can do in America. I
am honored and eager to fill the seat on this committee left by
my predecessor, Congressman Pete King, and I look forward to
continuing to protect New York and our Nation from all security
risks.
Nearly 500 Long Islanders were killed in the horrific
events on September 11, and many more Long Islanders have died
or become sick in the years following that fateful day. I am
committed to continuing the fight against radical Islamic
terrorism as well as the increasing threat of additional
foreign and domestic terrorism.
As a New Yorker who is tough on terrorism and strongly
supportive of law enforcement, I am eager to get to work as the
Ranking Member of the Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection,
and Innovation Subcommittee, and I look forward to working with
my fellow New Yorker, Congresswoman Clarke, on these important
issues.
I am also excited to be a Member of the Emergency
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Subcommittee. My district
was ravaged by Superstorm Sandy, and dealing with these issues
is very important to me and my constituents.
As all Americans continue to adapt to working and learning
remotely as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, I believe it is
now more important than ever to work with agencies like CISA to
fight to protect our data, infrastructure, and networks.
Although it remains true that malicious cyber attacks are
an increasing tactic used by America's adversaries to degrade
our operational capabilities, we cannot ignore the fact that
physical attacks by extremists in our Nation exist today.
Physical threats and attacks by extremist groups are one of the
greatest risks to our democracy, as evidenced by the events
that occurred against the United States Capitol on January 6.
We must not let these criminals win. We must rise above
partisan labels and rhetoric and denounce all forms of violent
extremism. That is why my colleagues and I are cosponsoring
H.R. 275, to establish the National Commission on the Domestic
Terrorist Attack Upon the United States Capitol.
We must condemn the actions of those who stormed the
Capitol and urge law enforcement to prosecute these criminals
to the fullest extent of the law. The establishment of a
commission will provide a bipartisan venue to ensure that what
happened on January 6 never happens again in our country.
Just as the September 11 Commission has been cited as one
of the most widely-accepted data sources on 9/11, I strongly
believe that our National commission to analyze these events on
January 6 will provide factual data and solutions that will
help heal our wounds and begin to pave the way to recovery
across the United States.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr.
Torres, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Torres. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
It was noted earlier that the security failure on January 6
was not an intelligence failure but it was a planning failure.
For me, the lack of preparedness on the part of the Federal
Government for the siege on the U.S. Capitol reflects a deeper
problem. It reflects a pattern of almost willful blindness to
White Supremacist violence as a domestic terror threat.
Even though White Supremacist violence has been the
dominant driver of domestic terrorism in the United States for
decades, the Federal Government did not designate a White
Supremacist group as a terrorist organization until 2020.
What does that tell us about the seriousness, or lack
thereof, with which the Federal Government treats White
Supremacist extremism as a domestic terror threat?
That question is for Ms. Neumann.
Ms. Neumann. Thank you for that question.
So, interestingly enough, the designation that you are
referencing uses the foreign terrorist designation statute.
That means that we cannot use it--the restrictions that are in
there do not allow us to designate a group that originated in
the United States.
Sadly, most of what we consider global White Supremacism at
this point is originating from the United States. Now, there
are other active pockets, particularly in Germany, some of the
Nordic countries, Russia. Australia recognizes that they have
some challenges.
But, in large part, when you talk in the counterterrorism
community--and this happened. In 2018, I was at a conference
with 100 other like-minded nations that were supposed to be
talking about retraining foreign terrorist fighters coming out
of Syria, and everybody was acknowledging that the growing rise
of what the world calls right-wing violent extremism was a
problem. They were turning to us and saying, ``You guys are the
exporters. What are you going to do about it?''
The laws are not written to address the global nature of
the threat that we are facing. Many of these laws have been
around for decades. It is time for them to be updated, in my
opinion.
Mr. Torres. Fair enough. But I think it is important to
emphasize that the United States does not have a monopoly on
White Supremacist extremism; it is a global phenomenon. I find
it odd that the United States until 2020 did not designate any
White Supremacist group anywhere in the world as a terrorist
organization. For me, it just speaks volumes about the
counterterrorism priorities of the Federal Government.
I have a question about social media sites. We all know
that social media sites have been amplifiers of disinformation,
and we know that social media sites have been an enabler of
coordination among White Supremacist extremists who might
otherwise operate as lone wolves but who can organize more
easily on-line.
So social media companies have been part of the problem. My
question is, how do we get those companies to be part of the
solution? How do we get those companies to do their part in
countering terrorism?
Mr. Greenblatt. Who was that question directed to, Mr.----
Mr. Torres. It could be anyone, but I think it was
Greenblatt who actually brought up social media companies
earlier, so I will direct it to you.
Mr. Greenblatt. Sure.
So, first of all, I would say your earlier point about the
global threat of White Supremacy is real. There were European
White Supremacists marching in Charlottesville. There have been
American White Supremacists who have participated in marches
and training exercises in Europe. We saw what happened in
Christchurch; that harkened back to what happened in
Charleston. You are absolutely right; it is a global terror
threat and needs to be treated as such.
With respect to social media companies, look, ADL literally
opened a center in Silicon Valley in 2017. I have staffed that
not with nonprofit veterans but, rather, with industry veterans
from the technology space. Because we need to have engineers on
our side working to address these issues. We can't wait for the
companies to do so.
But I will be honest, Mr. Congressman. Their lackadaisical
approach to this, their laziness, feeling like they are
shielded from liability by Section 230, therefore they can be
hands-off, that needs to change.
We saw what happened in the wake of Capitol Hill attack. We
saw how they could immediately move, when push came to shove,
to remove armed militia groups, to remove White Supremacists,
to shut down those accounts that were spouting disinformation,
delegitimizing the election, and literally inciting violence.
They have had the capabilities.
But, in order to align interests, I would encourage you,
No. 1, to look very hard at how do we reduce the liability
shield to clarify what they are responsible for. No. 2, I think
you have to look at the issue of monopolistic indifference and
whether platforms like Facebook are just so big, just so large,
that they are immune and invulnerable to the typical
competitive pressures and fiduciary pressures that most
companies deal with.
So I think, both from the 230 and even the anti-trust end,
there is work for Congress to do to apply the appropriate
oversight to make sure these companies, which, again, are so
innovative and have done so much good on so many levels, are
not undermining our democracy and spreading stereotypes and
hate.
Mr. Torres. I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. The gentlemen's time has expired.
Well, let me just take off from that, as Chair.
It is obvious that 230 we will look at. I will repeat it:
If the companies don't assume the interest in policing their
own platforms, then you leave Government no choice.
So, for those companies who might be listening to this
hearing, it is absolutely essential that they step up in a big
way. Because, obviously, from the questioning and the
responses, there is interest on the right and the left,
Democrat and Republican, that we have to look at it, and I
assure you as Chair that we will.
I want to thank the witnesses for their testimony and the
Members for their questions.
The Members of the committee may have additional questions
for the witnesses, and we ask that you respond expeditiously in
writing to those questions.
I would also like to ask unanimous consent to enter into
the record the following reports: the Southern Poverty Law
Center's report entitled ``The Year in Hate and Extremism
2020'' and Everytown's report entitled ``The Role of Guns and
Armed Extremism in the Attack on the U.S. Capitol.''
[The information follows:]
The Year in Hate and Extremism 2020
February 01, 2021
By Rachel Janik and Keegan Hankes, Southern Poverty Law Center
introduction
``Our country has had enough. We will not take it anymore, and that
is what this is all about . . . we fight, we fight like hell, and if
you don't fight like hell, you're not going to have a country anymore.
. . . So we are going to, we are going to walk down Pennsylvania Avenue
. . . And we're going to the Capitol . . . ''--with those words on Jan.
6, Donald Trump incited a mob that included the hate and antigovernment
groups the Proud Boys, the Oath Keepers, and the Three Percenters to
storm the U.S. Capitol in an insurrection to maintain white supremacy.
Trump refused to condemn the insurrection, which left five people
dead, including a Capitol law enforcement officer. He even praised the
rioters, calling them ``patriots,'' saying ``we love you'' and ``you
are very special.'' The episode was reminiscent of his notorious
declaration that there were ``very fine people on both sides,'' in the
aftermath of the violence at the deadly 2017 white supremacist rally in
Charlottesville, Virginia.
While every few months it seemed there was a new, brazen moment
that would define the Trump presidency, it was this siege of the U.S.
Capitol, with pro-Trump rioters parading through the halls of Congress
with Confederate flags and a self-described white nationalist pilfering
from the office of House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, that will exemplify
Trump's racist demagoguery for posterity.
Historically, SPLC research shows that when extremists perceive
more allies in the halls of power, their numbers dip. Not so with the
Trump presidency. For the first 3 years of his presidency, SPLC
recorded historically high hate group numbers as bigotry found a
comfortable home in the White House, and white nationalist ideologues
influenced policies like the Muslim ban and separation of immigrant
children from families at the border.
Hate groups that traditionally occupy the mainstream, like anti-
LGBTQ groups and anti-immigrant groups, saw their influence in
government balloon over the last 4 years, with serious consequences for
human rights in America and around the world. Nativist bigotry brought
about one of the worst human rights crises in modern U.S. history, when
the Department of Homeland Security separated children from their
parents at the southern border. The administration also effectively
suspended the legal asylum process, stranding people who fled violence
in their home countries, and vacated asylum protections for survivors
of intimate partner violence. Anti-LGBTQ appointments to the judiciary
will likely threaten trans and queer Americans' civil rights for a
generation.
hate groups declined, but hate did not
In 2020, SPLC tracked 838 active hate groups. Though numbers have
dropped 11 percent overall, we are still recording historic highs. In
2015, the numbers jumped from 784 to 892, and they have remained well
above 800 for the duration of the Trump presidency.
It is important to understand that the number of hate groups is
merely one metric for measuring the level of hate and racism in
America, and that the decline in groups should not be interpreted as a
reduction in bigoted beliefs and actions motivated by hate. The SPLC
has begun conducting polling as an additional tool to measure extremist
sentiment. Our August 2020 polling, for example, revealed that 29
percent of Americans personally know someone who believes that white
people are the superior race.
As another metric, SPLC keeps track of extremist flyers reported
around the country. This year we recorded almost 4,900 flyering
incidents. Groups under the white nationalist ideology exploited
flyering as a tactic to spread their hateful worldview nearly 12 times
more than all other ideologies combined.
Typically, new hate groups are formed and membership grows in
reaction to changes in society, especially changes that challenge white
hegemony. A historical example of this is the Ku Klux Klan, which was
virtually nonexistent in the 1930's and 1940's after its membership
reached record levels in the 1920's, and came roaring back in the
1950's. White nationalist beliefs had not declined in the 1930's and
1940's alongside group membership, a fact that became clear when
organized hate activities erupted after the 1954 Supreme Court decision
in Brown v. Board of Education made segregation illegal. In the modern
era, we tracked a gradual rise of hate groups during the George W. Bush
administration, when numbers peaked in the 800's. After Barack Obama
became the Nation's first Black president, the number jumped to more
than 1,000.
The demise of the Klan in the last decade has specifically resulted
in an overall reduction in the number of hate groups that the SPLC
tracks. The Ku Klux Klan, formerly a significant generator of white
supremacist terror, saw its count dwindle to 25 groups in 2020. The
number of Klan groups the SPLC tracked used to be consistently over
150; in recent years they dropped below 100, and then under 50. A major
reason for this is that the Klan's name has become extremely toxic--if
you are a Klan member and your employer finds out, for instance, you
are all but guaranteed to be fired. Unfortunately, those declining
numbers do not reflect a parallel reduction in support for their ideas.
Despite the massive drop in Klan groups, there are now many
alternative hate organizations that make Klan membership obsolete. For
example, the Proud Boys, which SPLC lists under the General Hate
category, vandalized historically Black churches in Washington, DC.
during a December pro-Trump demonstration, and members of the Proud
Boys were front and center during the U.S. Capitol insurrection.
Many extremist ideologues are not formal members of any
organization. Online platforms allow individuals to interact with hate
and antigovernment groups without joining them, as well as to form
connections and talk with likeminded people. And, despite the lack of
formal affiliation, these individuals still take real-world actions.
The U.S. Capitol insurrection exemplifies this. Most of the people
storming the Capitol building may not be card-carrying members of a
hate or antigovernment group, but they harbor extremist beliefs.
The U.S. Capitol insurrection also showed us how the Trump campaign
and the MAGA movement offered individuals a twisted kind of camaraderie
that you get from being a member of a hate or antigovernment group,
where Trump himself was a radicalizing force. We again see this with
the people who were arrested--many had previously attended several
rallies, and viewed President Trump as their leader.
Two other trends that impacted the count in 2020 and will likely
affect it in future years: (1) COVID-19 minimized overt hate group
activity. There were some groups that we did not relist this year
because they ceased their in-person activity and did not appear to do
anything online; and (2) Hate groups are increasingly being booted from
popular social media platforms and moving their communications into
encrypted chatrooms, which makes it harder for the SPLC to track them.
the hate group landscape in 2020
As previously mentioned, The Ku Klux Klan continued its collapse,
with only 25 active chapters in 2020.
White nationalist group numbers also dipped by 27, a change that
does not signal a trend toward less white nationalist organizing. Both
white nationalist groups and neo-Nazi groups are becoming more diffuse
and difficult to track and quantify as they proliferate online and
communicate on encrypted platforms, a trend this report will explore in
greater detail in our next installment.
Anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim and anti-LGBTQ hate groups, which are
typically more successful at laundering their ideas into mainstream
political discourse, saw their numbers remain largely stable, though
their in-person organizing was curtailed due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Even though anti-immigrant groups were not able to hold as many in-
person events as years past, their influence was felt where it
mattered: In policy and legislation. Over Trump's 4 years in office,
according to data published by the Migration Policy Institute, the
Trump administration implemented more than 400 policy changes to curb
both legal and illegal immigration. Exploiting the COVID-19 pandemic to
stoke health and economic fears, the Trump administration enacted a de
facto moratorium on all immigration to the U.S. by the end of 2020.
Influential anti-LGBTQ hate groups became further entrenched in the
Trump White House, and the Trump administration continued its years-
long pattern of appointing Federal judges with ties to anti-LGBTQ
groups. The most high-profile of these appointments was Amy Coney
Barrett, who joined the Supreme Court last fall and has ties to
Alliance Defending Freedom, which SPLC has designated an anti-LGBTQ
hate group. Though the anti-LGBTQ hate movement has lost an ally in the
president, they are likely to continue to use the lower courts and the
Supreme Court to try and roll back LGBTQ rights.
The number of anti-Muslim hate groups dropped by 12, from 84 last
year to 72 this year. The largest anti-Muslim hate group in the
country, ACT for America, enjoyed attention from the Trump White House,
which met with ACT head Brigitte Gabriel on at least two documented
occasions in 2020. A former ACT staffer was also hired at the State
Department. Despite that influence, the group suffered from infighting
between smaller local chapters and the national office in Washington,
DC. Following Trump's election loss, some leaders in the anti-Muslim
movement have signaled a shift toward local and State-level organizing.
Recommendations to combat extremist groups:
Enact the Domestic Terrorism Prevention Act, which would
establish offices within the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), the Department of Justice, and the FBI to monitor,
investigate and prosecute cases of domestic terrorism--and
require these offices to regularly report to Congress. Passed
overwhelmingly by the House of Representatives last September,
this legislation would also provide resources to strengthen
partnerships with State and local law enforcement authorities
to confront far-right extremism and create an interagency task
force to explore white supremacist activities within the U.S.
armed forces and Federal law enforcement.
Improve Federal hate crime data collection, training, and
prevention. Data drives policy. The FBI's annual Hate Crime
Statistics Act (HCSA) report is the best national snapshot of
hate violence in America, but data received from the 18,000
Federal, State, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies is
vastly underreported--in part because reporting is not
mandatory. In 2019 (the most recent report), 86 percent of
police agencies either affirmatively reported that they had
zero hate crimes, or they did not report any data to the FBI at
all.
As we work to build support for mandatory hate crime
reporting to the FBI, Congress should enact the Khalid Jabara
and Heather Heyer National Opposition to Hate, Assault, and
Threats to Equality Act of 2019 (NO HATE Act), which would
authorize incentive grants to spark improved local and State
hate crime training and data collection initiatives, as well as
State-based hotlines to connect victims with support services.
The law is a blunt instrument to address violent hate and
extremism--it is much better to prevent these criminal acts in
the first place. Congress should shift funding away from
punishment models and toward the prevention of violent
extremism. It should focus on programs that build resilient
communities and empower adults--including parents, teachers,
caregivers, counselors, therapists, faith leaders, and
coaches--to help steer young people away from dangerous ideas.
These programs are better housed in the Department of Education
and Department of Health and Human Services than DHS or other
national security agencies.
Reject efforts to create a new criminal domestic terrorism
statute--or the creation of a listing of designated domestic
terrorist organizations. A new Federal domestic terrorism
statute or list would adversely impact civil liberties and
could be used to expand racial profiling or be wielded to
surveil and investigate communities of color and political
opponents in the name of national security.
confronting far-right and racist narratives
The incoming Biden administration faces dual challenges: Reversing
the catastrophic damage to civil rights done by Trump and his allies,
and doing the harder work of exposing and dismantling the engines of
entrenched, systemic white supremacy that have always threatened
inclusive democracy in the U.S. For example, SPLC's August 2020 poll
found that 65 percent of respondents believe racism exists and is
harmful, but 49 percent believe that people of color are more likely to
be poor because of a lack of work ethic.
Findings were similarly disturbing around gaps in health outcomes,
with only 38 percent of respondents believing that systemic racism
played a role, even as COVID-19 ravages communities of color.
Despite some high-profile support for Black Lives Matter protests
this summer, the poll showed that 51 percent of Americans thought that
the looting which occurred in several cities was a bigger problem than
police violence against Black people, and 51 percent also thought that
the protests were not justified because the problem with police
violence was isolated to a few ``bad apples.''
These racist narratives and beliefs have been reinvigorated thanks
to one of the most enduring and pernicious legacies of the Trump era:
the far right's success constructing a false alternative reality,
bolstered by a never-ending stream of baseless conspiracy theories and
disinformation. This fight over the frame of reality has polarized
American society further and fundamentally ruptured trust in
institutions and information. The tech sector, an opportunistic ally in
the propagation of this fraud, abdicated its responsibility so long ago
that it has not been able to meaningfully recover. Only after Trump
incited a deadly insurrection and Democrats flipped the Senate did they
suspend the President's accounts and begin to purge other extremists
from their platforms. The echo chambers have formed, trust in the
credibility of reputable media outlets has been disastrously
diminished, and the polarization of American society has accelerated.
Some of the robber barons of social media are warming to revisions
of section 230 of the Communication Decency Act--legislation that, in
its current form, insulates platforms from liability for the content
users post--long after its true utility ran out for their companies.
The toxic networks that they nurtured are migrating to new platforms,
like Parler and Telegram.
The dangers of these isolated and tainted wells of information
reached their most critical point during the 2020 election, when Trump,
his allies and the extremists who support him, denied the severity of
COVID-19 and preemptively declared the results of the general election
fraudulent. Throughout the year, armed militias became fixtures at
State houses, and election officials were targeted and threatened in
multiple States, including at their private homes.
Fortunately, predictions of violent attempts to disrupt voting
proved largely unfounded, and the U.S. celebrated historic voter
turnout. But in the weeks after Biden's victory, Trump and his
compatriots spread disinformation and conspiracy theories at a
breathtaking rate, and called on State and Federal elected officials,
as well as judges, to overturn the will of voters in five States. By
late November, only 20 percent of Republicans surveyed said they
believed Joe Biden was the true winner of the election, after he won
the popular vote in a free and fair election by a margin of more than 7
million and secured the electoral college by 74 votes.
While most--but not all--elected officials and judges ignored
Trump, his followers succeeded in temporarily halting the certification
of the 2020 election during the joint session of Congress on Jan. 6.
The election, and the violent backlash from the right, have all
taken place against the backdrop of a global pandemic which has claimed
the lives of more than 400,000 Americans in less than a year--
disproportionately people of color, who have to contend with white
supremacist systems that limit their access to high-quality healthcare
and other vital resources. And skepticism toward safety measures and
the vaccine--much of it fueled by rightwing conspiracy networks--
remains high.
Recommendation to address far-right and racist narratives
Hold former President Donald Trump and those who helped
incite the deadly assault on the U.S. Capitol accountable.
Action by the House of Representatives to impeach former
President Trump was absolutely necessary to protect the future
of our democracy. Now the Senate must have the courage and true
patriotism to convict him and permanently disqualify him from
holding public office. In addition, Congress should discipline,
censure, or expel all of the 147 Senators and Representatives
who supported the insurrection and baseless ``Stop the Steal''
lies by voting against Electoral College certification of
President Biden's victory.
Public figures involved in inciting and giving encouragement
to the armed insurrectionists who stormed the U.S. Capitol on
Jan. 6--destroying property, injuring dozens of officers, and
leaving five people dead--should be permanently deplatformed
from all social media. In addition, corporations should
permanently suspend political donations to Members of Congress
and other elected officials that helped incite the violent
siege and request that any past political donations to their
campaigns be returned.
Provide funding for the Department of Education to develop a
curriculum on structural racism and funding for States to
implement their own related initiatives. Americans can only
dismantle white supremacy if they understand how racism shaped
(and continues to shape) housing, education, policing, health
care and other policies and practices that affect our everyday
lives.
Require renaming of military bases named for Confederate
leaders, and ban the display of Confederate flags or other
racist symbols from all military installations, Federal parks,
streets, and highways. The 2015 Charleston church massacre
sparked a nationwide effort to remove Confederate symbols from
public places, but hundreds remain--a sign that we have failed
to fully acknowledge the injustices of slavery or affirm our
commitment to a wholly inclusive, pluralistic democracy. In
addition, Congress should create a Federal grant program to
help municipalities remove symbols of the Confederacy.
american attitudes about racism
Just weeks before the COVID-19 pandemic took hold of the United
States, a different tragedy gripped Brunswick, Georgia when Ahmaud
Arbery was pursued by three white men (one a former police officer)
while he was jogging and shot to death. Despite the incident being
captured on video, law enforcement made no arrests in connection with
the attack for more than 70 days.
Arbery's death was among the first extrajudicial killings of Black
people in 2020 to garner national media attention. Each one is a
reminder that the census of hate groups undertaken by the SPLC's
Intelligence Project is only one metric for understanding the toll that
white supremacy takes on Black and Indigenous Americans, along with
other Americans of color.
Despite a historic, national outcry over these murders, SPLC's poll
showed a limited understanding of such structural racism. Large
majorities of the population surveyed acknowledged the dangers posed by
organized antigovernment and white power groups, but failed to connect
their existence and influence to the greater culture of white
supremacy. For example, the narrative of the odd ``bad apple'' in
police departments persists, even as reports of violence and death at
the hands of law enforcement proliferate across the country.
Throughout his presidency, Trump and his allies denied and
minimized the reality of bigotry in this country, and legitimized white
supremacy through policies like the Muslim ban and the child
separation, through personnel like Stephen Miller, Julia Hahn, Jason
Richwine and Darren Beattie, and through behavior like defending
Confederate monuments and the extremists who marched in
Charlottesville. His administration mocked and resisted public
education about our country's racist legacy, attacking the New York
Times's The 1619 Project in particular. In late September, President
Trump issued an executive order banning some forms of diversity
training for Federal employees and contractors.
Recommendations to change attitudes about racism
Establish a national truth, racial healing and
transformation commission to examine the history of white
supremacy and structural racism in the United States. This
long-overdue truth and reconciliation commission would help the
United States reckon with the injustices our country has
committed and help spark a movement to eliminate racial
discrimination.
Prohibit racial, ethnic and religious profiling in Federal,
State and local law enforcement. Black, Latinx, Muslim and
Indigenous people are subject to discriminatory policing,
including increased surveillance, more harsh criminal sentences
and disproportionately high rates of being killed by police.
antigovernment uprising
On Aug. 25, a 17-year-old named Kyle Rittenhouse traveled the 20
miles between his hometown of Antioch, Illinois and Kenosha, Wisconsin.
He was answering an open call, sent out over social media, for armed
militia to ``defend'' Kenosha from the mostly peaceful protests that
had sprung up in the city after a Kenosha police officer chased Jacob
Blake into his car and shot him four times in the back, paralyzing him.
Rittenhouse, despite being a minor, had procured a semiautomatic rifle
and brought it with him to the protest. Before the night was over, he
allegedly shot three men, killing two. He has been charged with
multiple counts of homicide, and his attorneys are arguing he acted in
self-defense. People on the right, from the mainstream to the fringe,
not only defended his actions, but celebrated them.
The shootings in Kenosha were the apex of a year of feverish
paramilitary vigilantism, which began in January 2020 when militias
showed up in Richmond, Virginia to oppose gun measures promised by a
newly Democratic-controlled State legislature. Soon, they found a new
mobilizing cause: As COVID-19 began to spread across the country,
antigovernment groups came out in force to oppose mask mandates and
other safety measures to slow the spread of the disease. As mass
protests for racial justice mobilized around the country,
paramilitaries styled themselves as ad hoc deputies of law enforcement,
``patrolling'' the streets in opposition to the largely peaceful
protests.
A similarly laudatory reaction from the right greeted Mark and
Patricia McCloskey, who brandished guns at a passing group of Black
Lives Matter protesters in St. Louis. They were rewarded with a
speaking slot at the Republican National Convention.
In their defense of Rittenhouse and other armed militia action, the
right has signaled that antigovernment participation is an acceptable
form of right-wing political expression, a stance that did not even
waver when members of a Michigan militia were arrested and charged with
plotting to kidnap their Governor, Gretchen Witmer.
The thwarted plot came after a string of violence and arrests
attributed to the Boogaloo movement, a predominantly white and heavily
armed online subculture that began as a racist meme. The subculture is
an illustration of the porous boundaries between the antigovernment
movement and the larger hate ecosystem, and how anonymous posting
forums like 4Chan continue to influence both. Its adherents advocate
for a second civil war and have been involved repeatedly in acts of
violence, including murder.
The antigovernment movement will be explored in detail in a
subsequent installment of this report, along with SPLC's 2020 list of
antigovernment groups.
Recommendations for squelching the antigovernment uprising
End funding for police militarization and the transfer of
excess military property to law enforcement agencies. Police
militarization disproportionately exposes communities of color
to police violence and it inflames the paranoia of the extreme
right, which uses State-sponsored violence as evidence of
government tyranny and impending civil war.
End funding for DHS Countering Violent Extremism/Targeted
Violence and Terrorism Prevention programs that profile and
target immigrants, Muslims and Black Americans and result in
illegal spying and surveillance. They are not only ineffective,
but harmful.
Codify independent authority and autonomy protections for
whistleblowers and inspectors general at Federal agencies--
including Federal law enforcement agencies. President Trump's
unprecedented purge of several Federal agency inspectors
general revealed the limits of current law to protect these
necessary government watchdogs, who are capable of injecting
much needed accountability into the Federal Government.
Whistleblower protection can help address the ``Blue Wall of
Silence'' and encourage reporting of racist law enforcement
officials.
the path forward
As we move into 2021, and beyond the Trump presidency, we must find
ways to counter the reactionary, authoritarian populism that is
mobilizing on the heels of Trump's loss. Hate groups that lose salience
or public attention will not go away. Instead, they will find shelter
elsewhere among the far right, particularly in the militant edge of
campaigns like ``Re-Open'' and ``Stop the Steal.''
An effective opposition to this antidemocratic movement has to
dismantle the symptoms of white supremacy culture that justify it and
give it fuel. The SPLC has developed four Impact Statements that help
define and quantify our mission, and each has a role to play in
combating the extreme right.
First, dismantling white nationalism and protecting democracy. With
robust anti-racist education, we can reduce the population of Americans
that harbor sympathy for a white nationalist worldview.
Second, protecting voting rights and civic engagement. By
dismantling voter suppression laws, we can keep the power in the hands
of the American people and safe from undue influence by the small
antidemocratic minority.
Third, decriminalizing and decarcerating Black and Brown people.
Mass incarceration and overcriminalization saps resources and
opportunities from communities of color and contributes to a culture
that dehumanizes Black and Brown people and fuels the core ideology of
white nationalism.
Finally, eradicating poverty. Yet again, systemic racism creates
barriers to advancement, meaning Black and Brown people are
overrepresented in populations experiencing poverty. The challenges
poverty presents overlap with the other challenges we face in the fight
against white supremacy.
Lydia Bates, Eddie Bejarano, Freddy Cruz, Hannah Gais, Tracey Gale,
Rachel Goldwasser, Raven Hodges, Caleb Kieffer, and other members of IP
research staff contributed to this report. Policy recommendations were
contributed to this report by SPLC Senior Policy Advisor Michael
Lieberman and other SPLC Policy staff.
______
The Role of Guns & Armed Extremism in the Attack on the U.S. Capitol
By Everytown For Gun Safety
The attack on the U.S. Capitol is the latest--not the first, nor
the last--demonstration of the danger armed extremism poses to our
democracy. Failure to address this threat will lead to the continued
growth of extremist groups and violent incidents.
The deadly insurrection attempt at the Capitol was fueled, in part,
by gun rights extremists who brought their firepower to Washington to
stop the certification of the electoral college votes. At least nine
people who were at or around the Capitol have already been arrested on
weapons charges, including a heavily armed man in D.C. who prosecutors
allege had texted his intention to ``[put] a bullet'' in Speaker Nancy
Pelosi's head. Thousands of rounds of ammunition were recovered by
authorities. Rioters displayed militia patches, waved a ``Come and Take
It'' Confederate flag with an AR-15 image, and dawned insignia of gun
groups including the NRA. A review of the digital footprint of those
arrested at the Capitol reveals ties to the NRA and other forms of gun
rights extremism.
Armed extremists seeking to undermine our democractic institutions
are a chronic and ongoing problem. In 2020, white supremacists and
anti-government extremists, including the ascendant boogaloo movement,
used guns as tools of intimidation and violence in increasingly open
ways, including taking advantage of weak State gun laws to brandish
weapons at anti-government protests, to intimidate peaceful protests
for racial justice, and in plans and actions to kill. Data collected by
the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) and the
Bridging Divides Initiative (BDI) at Princeton University shows at
least 100 instances of armed protesters and incidents involving guns at
protests in State capitals from May 2020 through mid-January 2021.
These events were precursors to the attack on the U.S. Capitol and
foreshadow a possible violent escalation in the future.
Former President Trump has emboldened extremists and given them and
their conspiracy theories a place in the political mainstream. But far
right extremism did not start with Trump, his response to
Charlottesville, or his call from the debate stage for the Proud Boys
to ``stand back and stand by.'' Nor will it end now that he has left
office.
In fact, for decades, the NRA and the broader gun lobby has enabled
access to guns by anti-government and white supremacist extremists
through their advocacy against common-sense gun laws, while
simultaneously harnessing their fixation on guns and violent response
to perceived government overreach. In doing so, the gun lobby has
amplified radicalizing messaging to new and broader audiences. The gun
lobby's rhetorical, political, and sometimes organizational overlap
with the extreme right--from the militia movement of the 1990's to the
Oath Keepers that stormed the Capitol--has yielded dangerous and, at
times, catastrophic results. The arrest of several insurrectionists on
weapons charges and the presence of gun rights absolutists at the
storming of the U.S. Capitol are just the latest example of the toxic
mix of guns and extremism. In fact, just days before January 6th, NRA
CEO Wayne LaPierre sent a letter to members warning of ``armed
government agents storming your house, taking your guns, and hauling
you off to prison'' and that they must ``STOP GUN CONFISCATION.'' This
is the type of conspiratorial rhetoric that animates extreme right
actors.
In September 2020, Everytown released a comprehensive report
detailing these threats entitled ``Armed and Dangerous: How the Gun
Lobby Enshrines Guns as Tools of the Extreme Right.'' This report,
which builds on the findings of our prior research, reviews (i) the
presence of firearms at the Capitol insurrection, (ii) the
constellation of extreme right actors present at the Capitol, (iii)
these same groups' presence at armed protests throughout 2020, (iv) the
gun lobby's complicity in the rise of extremism, and (v) policy
solutions for disrupting how extremists use firearms to undercut
democracy.
the armed insurrection at the u.s. capitol
On January 6, 2021, a group of insurrectionists stormed and
vandalized the U.S. Capitol building. The day started with a pro-Trump
rally outside the White House calling for the results of the U.S.
Presidential election to be overturned. The former President, several
allies, and members of his family spoke. Some members of the rally then
marched to the Capitol where the angry mob quickly became impossible to
control.
The insurrection caused the evacuation and lockdown of the U.S.
Capitol. Five people died. One Capitol Hill Police officer was killed
and approximately 81 members of the Capitol Police and 58 members of
the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department sustained injuries--officers
were trampled, struck with a bat, pinned against a statue, hit with a
fire extinguisher, sprayed with bear spray, and pushed down stairs,
among several other violent acts. A number of the insurrectionists were
armed leading to seizures of weapons and arrests on weapons charges. In
addition, police discovered pipe bombs placed near the headquarters of
the RNC and DNC. Monitoring of the event picked up individuals from a
number of well-known extreme right groups in the crowd.
The insurrectionists were armed.--While additional indictments may
be forthcoming, at least nine individuals have been arrested on
firearms charges relating to events in or around the Capitol. A review
of the police reports related to the arrests show that police seized at
least 3,071 rounds of ammunition during the course of these arrests--
enough ammunition to shoot every member of the House and Senate five
times. Hundreds of rounds of additional ammo were found during the
subsequent arrests of other individuals who participated. The firearms
related arrests include:
Cleveland Meredith.--Arrested in D.C. in possession of at least one
handgun, an assault rifle, and 2,500 rounds of ammunition.
Ahead of his trip to D.C., Meredith texted that he would be
``putting a bullet'' in Speaker Nancy Pelosi's head. He also
bragged he was ``headed to DC with a sh*t ton of 5.56 armor
piercing ammo.'' News reports indicate that during the summer
of 2020 Meredith ``put several [Black Lives Matter] protesters
on edge'' when he counterprotested at a Black Lives Matter
rally armed with a large Tavor X95 rifle.
Lonnie Coffman.--Arrested in D.C. in possession of materials to
build nearly a dozen Molotov cocktails, plus three handguns, an
assault rifle, and five separate types of ammunition. He faces
a 17-count indictment on weapons charges. Prosecutors assert
that Coffman appears to have been motivated to conduct violence
against elected representatives, and notes in his possession
listed Representative Andrew Carson as ``one of two muslims in
House of Reps.''
Thomas Gronek.--Arrested in D.C. with two guns, along with 275
rounds of .22 cal ammunition and a drum magazine that holds 110
rounds of ammunition. Ahead of the election, Gronek posted
conspiratorial content about the ``mass takeover of our
country.''
Grant Moore.--Arrested in D.C. with a semi-automatic handgun, and
approximately 36 rounds of ammunition. When he was confronted
by the police, Mr. Moore allegedly pointed to a red ``Make
America Great Again'' hat and told the officer ``I'm one of
these.''
The arrest and seizure data likely vastly understate the presence
of weapons at and near the Capitol on January 6, as social media
monitoring indicates many users sharing plans to carry guns at the
Capitol and law enforcement did not detain and search the majority of
the insurrectionists. One officer present that day indicated he
intentionally avoided drawing his gun because ``I didn't want to be the
guy who starts shooting, because I knew they had guns . . . And the
only reason I could think of that they weren't shooting us was they
were waiting for us to shoot first. And if it became a firefight
between a couple hundred officers and a couple thousand demonstrators,
we would have lost.''
Police reports and court filings indicate the insurrectionists made
explicit threats to harm several elected leaders, the preponderance of
which seemed to be aimed at Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Rep. Andrew Carson,
Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, D.C. Mayor Muriel Bowser, and Senator
Raphael Warnock. All of these leaders are women or Black--a fact that
is consistent with the level of misogyny and racism found amongst
extreme right organizations.
The constellation of far right groups that rioted in the U.S.
Capitol includes numerous extremist groups and individuals.--Members of
the Oath Keepers and Three Percenters, anti-government militia groups
organized around conspiratorial beliefs of looming civilian
disarmament, were present at the Capitol on January 6. Stewart Rhodes,
the founder of the Oath Keepers, was photographed outside the Capitol
on the 6th. After the November election, Rhodes told conspiracy-peddler
Alex Jones that his group was ready to attack Washington in defense of
Trump, saying ``We'll also be on the outside of D.C., armed, prepared
to go in, if the president calls us up.''
Proud Boys leader Enrique Tarrio was arrested in D.C. 2 days before
the riot with two illegal gun magazines emblazoned with the Proud Boys
logo. There was a significant Proud Boys presence at the Capitol,
including Nick Ochs, a founder of the Hawaii chapter of the Proud Boys
and co-host of the streaming show ``Murder the Media,'' who was
arrested for unlawful entry into the Capitol. Similarly, a Proud Boys
organizer from Orlando, Florida, Joe Biggs, was arrested for his
participation in the riot. A Proud Boy member who goes by the alias
``Spazzo'' was reported to have broken a window during the Capitol
insurrection. He was arrested and identified as Dominic Pezzola of
Rochester, New York--he is facing charges of unlawful entry and
destruction of property.
Many individuals who were arrested for illegal conduct at the
Capitol were not caught with weapons on their person, but are connected
with extremist organizations, gun rights groups, or have espoused the
intention to use firearms in pursuit of their idea of justice. Notable
arrested individuals include:
Richard Barnett.--Arrested for unlawful entry of the Capitol and
infamously posed for pictures sitting in Speaker Pelosi's
chair. Mr. Barnett is a gun rights activist from Arkansas that
self-identifies as a ``white nationalist.'' In post arrest
hearings, prosecutors revealed that Barnett had previously had
several encounters with local law enforcement, including one
where he matched the description of a suspect who had pointed a
gun at a woman in July 2020, and another where he was parked in
a school zone ``in possession of an AR-style rifle around his
back and a pistol on his side.''
Wiliam McCall Calhoun, Jr.--Arrested for unlawful entry of the
Capitol; disorderly conduct; and witness tampering. Calhoun is
a gun rights activist and attorney whose since-deleted website
listed ``Self-defense/2d Amendment'' work. Calhoun's Twitter
profile picture includes him prominently wearing a NRA ballcap.
He organized at least one gun rights rally after the 2020
election, the purpose of which he said was ``we're not going to
tolerate an election with no transparency.'' Calhoun's social
media is filled with threats of armed violence, including that
he was attempting to join a militia to ``become an officially
state sanctioned COMMIE KILLER.'' In one post, he told another
user, ``My AR15 set up will do head shots at 200 meters no
problem. You have no clue what's coming.'' In another, he
warned, ``I'll be slinging enough hot lead to stack you commies
up like cordwood.'' On Twitter, Calhoun quoted the well-known
NRA slogan, ``from my cold dead hands.'' In advance of the
Capitol insurrection, Calhoun allegedly advised his followers,
``Whether the police can enforce their gun laws depends on how
many armed Patriots show up.'' Afterwards, he reportedly told
them, ``The word is we're all coming back armed for war.''
Karl Dresch.--Arrested for obstruction of justice, disorderly
conduct, and unlawful entry of the Capitol. Authorities found a
SKS rifle with an unattached bayonet, a shotgun and a .40-
caliber Glock handgun, along with ammunition, in a search of
Mr. Dresch's home. Due to a previous felony conviction, Mr.
Dresch cannot lawfully own guns. While Dresch was not charged
with bringing a gun into the Capitol, prosecutors noted that a
backpack that he had on Capitol grounds was found with
ammunition in it.
Guy Wesley Reffitt.--Arrested for obstruction of justice and
unlawful entry of the Capitol. Prosecutors allege that Reffitt
had ties to the Texas Freedom Force, what they describe as a
``militia extremist group.'' Reffitt's wife told authorities he
identified as a Three Percenter. The night Reffitt came home
from his trip to the Capitol his son saw Reffitt take out two
firearms from his car, an AR-15 rifle and a pistol, and bring
them into the house. Reffitt allegedly made several threats of
violence against his own family, including that ``if you turn
me in, you're a traitor and you know what happens to traitors .
. . traitors get shot.''
Kevin Greeson.--News reports indicate that Mr. Greeson suffered a
fatal heart attack during the insurrection. Social media posts
made under his account in the month ahead of the events at the
Capitol include posts encouraging civil war (``let's give it to
them. A war. Democrats don't have guns. We do . . . Im Bringing
MY GUNS'') [sic]. Over the summer Mr. Greeson appears to have
been agitated by Black Lives Matter protests, posting ``time
for protesting is over! Put the military in the streets of
every city.'' In November, Mr. Greeson posted on Parler: ``All
males over the age of 18 join a group . . . be ready to defend
our country!! Spend your money on guns and ammo . . . It's time
to stop this shit!!!!!'' Mr. Greeson regularly posted violent
content online and followed extremists like the Proud Boys and
militia groups.
Joe Biggs.--Arrested for unlawful entry of the Capitol; disorderly
conduct; and obstructing an official proceeding. Biggs is a
well-known member of the Proud Boys and a former Infowars
employee. He is also a reported NRA member who has been
mentioned multiple times on the NRA website. In 2016, Biggs
attended the NRA Annual Meeting, where he interviewed then-NRA
personality Colion Noir. Biggs has frequently posted about gun
rights online, at one point encouraging his followers to ``Get
a gun. Bu[y] ammo. [ . . . ] be ready because the left isn't
playing anymore and neither should we.'' There is also at least
one episode of an online show about gun ownership on a far
right website hosted by Biggs.
Michael Curzio.--Arrested for unlawful entry of the Capitol. Curzio
was previously convicted and served prison time for attempted
murder in a 2012 shooting. On Facebook, Curzio had previously
dismissed the idea of gun laws, claiming, ``I'm a convicted
felon but I can get my hands on almost any weapon I have the
money to buy, and without the cops and legal weapons
confiscated. What do you think would happen if people like me
rose up and wanted to really take what we wanted and do what we
really wanted?'' The day after the 2020 election, he posted,
``If shit really hits the fan, who's with me to do the right
thing? And you know what I mean, and you know what I'm talking
about.'' From his DC hotel room before the insurrection, he
posted a video to Facebook, saying, ``if anything happens--we
get fucked up, arrested, or killed--just know, man, I love
y'all and I did what I believed in [ . . . ] if I die, or if I
get fucked up, or whatever, y'know, it is what it is.'' Even
after being arrested for his role in the insurrection, Curzio
posted he had ``no regrets for anything.''
Len Guthrie.--Arrested for unlawful entry of the Capitol. Mr.
Guthrie is a self-described ``lifetime NRA member'' who shared
NRA content, including the insurrectionist theory of the Second
Amendment, on his Facebook page.
The insurrectionists were organized.--Video of the insurrection,
and cached posts on social media, indicate that the storming of the
Capitol was not spontaneous. Indeed, prosecutors have charged three
individuals who were members of the Oath Keepers and/or the Ohio State
Regular Militia (Thomas Caldwell, Jessica Watkins and Donovan Crowl)
with conspiracy to obstruct the Congress' affirmation of the Electoral
College, among other criminal charges, for their actions at the
Capitol. Court affidavits filed by the government in the case describe
the Oath Keepers as a ``paramilitary organization'' who ``believe that
the Federal Government has been coopted by a shadowy conspiracy that is
trying to strip American citizens of their rights.'' The same affidavit
describes how the defendants moved ``in an organized and practiced
fashion'', with one sending a voice message that ``We have a good
group. We have about 30-40 of us. We are sticking together and sticking
to the plan.'' One man was overheard offering words of encouragement
during the riot saying ``Get it, Jess Do your fucking thing. Everything
we fucking trained for.'' Recorded messages also revealed an individual
saying ``You are executing a citizen's arrest. Arrest this assembly, we
have probable cause for acts of treason, election fraud.'' Evidence
presented in the case further indicates that the defendants had made
extensive plans for the day, what one called ``an Oathkeepers Op,'' in
a message, including gathering supplies, meeting up with other Oath
Keeper groups, and ``night hunting'' of Antifa.
The organization of the insurrectionists was evidenced by their
supplies and mechanisms of communications. Pictures of an
insurrectionist with flex cuffs, later identified by authorities as
Eric Munchel, maneuvering through the gallery of the U.S. Senate
quickly went viral. Flex cuffs are used by police to detain and
transport suspects. Munchel was allegedly carrying a gun outside the
Capitol, which he stashed before entering the building. After his
arrest, prosecutors found an arsenal at Munchel's home, including
``assault rifles, a sniper rifle with a tripod, shotguns'' and what was
described as a ``drum-style magazine.'' Similarly, an FBI affidavit in
connection with Proud Boy Joe Biggs notes the presence of earpieces
among individuals associated with Proud Boys. This was not a
spontaneous storming of the gates--it was a deliberate and orchestrated
insurrection.
In the days after the riot, the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force
arrested Proud Boy supporter Eduard Florea on weapons charges. News
reports indicate Florea has allegedly threatened to kill people in the
past and made several online threats to elected leaders and government
agencies. Florea allegedly posted online ``Guns cleaned loaded . . .
got a bunch of guys all armed and ready to deploy . . . we are just
waiting for the word'' and ``Its [sic] time to unleash some violence.''
Symbols of hate were commonplace throughout the Capitol
insurrection. Far right iconography, such as signs supporting QAnon (a
conspiracy that places former President Trump as the heroic savior of
the republic against a cult of liberal pedophiles), Crusader
paraphernalia (symbols popular with far-right ethnonationist groups),
and references to Pepe the Frog (a series of memes popular in racist
and bigoted spaces on the internet), were present. Imagery captured at
the riot indicate the presence of the neo-Nazi group NSC 131, and some
insurrectionists wore anti-semetic clothing with sayings such as ``Camp
Auschwitz.'' Confederate flags were openly flown at the insurrection,
with at least one with the pro-gun message ``Come and Take It''
emblazoned on it. A noose and gallows was erected outside the Capitol,
and indeed, certain insurrectionists chanted ``hang Mike Pence.''
Photographs captured attendees wearing various forms of firearms-
related paraphernalia, including an NRA hat and a patch from the
extremist gun group the Virginia Citizen Defense League.
In sum, the insurrectionists at the Capitol were armed, organized,
and violent.--Apart from the physical presence of guns, the strong ties
of several of the insurrectionists to gun extremism is hardly
surprising--guns are a recruiting and motivating tool for the extreme
right. Conspiracies about election-rigging and the ``stolen'' election,
driven by a deep state of shadowy government actors, echoed the same
imaginary threats the gun lobby has parroted for years to motivate gun
rights absolutism around the supposed looming confiscation of guns by
the government.
2020: the year of dangerous extreme right protests
The insurrection at the U.S. Capitol on January 6 was a
continuation of a pattern of extreme right wing intimidation and
violence that has grown unchecked during the Trump presidency. In 2020,
the extreme right used guns as tools of intimidation and violence in
increasingly open ways, most notably by taking advantage of weak State
gun laws to brandish weapons at anti-government protests and to
intimidate peaceful protests for racial justice. These incidents, which
are detailed in Everytown's September 2020 report ``Armed and
Dangerous: How the Gun Lobby Enshrines Guns as Tools of the Extreme
Right,'' are summarized below.
Armed Protests in State Capitals and Cities Around the Country.--An
analysis of data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project
and the Bridging Divides Initiative at Princeton University shows at
least 100 instances of armed protesters and incidents involving guns at
protests in capital cities of 28 different States from May 2020 through
mid-January 2021, including, but not limited to, the following
examples:
Richmond, Virginia Gun Extremist Rally.--In January 2020, heavily
armed protesters descended on Richmond, VA to decry anticipated
changes to Virginia's gun laws. Event organizers issued a
statement welcoming participation of militia groups at the
event, writing, ``We welcome our militia brothers and sisters
to be part of making the day a success!'' Militia groups,
including the Three Percenters and Oath Keepers, and other
extremists quickly organized. Ahead of the event, one far right
leader publicly threatened a State legislator: ``you should be
pulled out of office by the hair on your head, walked down the
streets of the capital, walked up to the steps of a swinging
rope that's placed around your neck.'' Militia groups who
descended on Richmond even organized and held a conference the
day before, titled, ``The State of the Militia,'' at which
various militia leaders spoke, including some who had helped
plan the violent Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville. The
scene around Richmond on the day of the protest was
militaristic and chaotic. Protesters openly carried pistols and
AR-15 assault-style rifles, among other weapons, often donning
military fatigues and tactical gear. Heavily armed militia
groups lined up and marched throughout the area. If not for the
work of the FBI in disrupting an accelerationist plot by white
supremacists who were building untraceable ghost guns to launch
an attack at the event, the Richmond rally could have been a
mass-casualty event.
Lansing, Michigan.--For three consecutive weeks in Michigan in
spring 2020, armed protesters, openly brandishing semi-
automatic assault-style rifles, led rallies in and around the
Michigan State Capitol to protest the Governor's extension of
the State's COVID-19 stay-at-home order. The extremist Michigan
Liberty Militia and Michigan Proud Boys participated in these
armed events at the capitol. At one of the protests, a large
Confederate flag with an AR-15 rifle and the phrase ``Come and
Take It'' was displayed in the crowd. At another, armed
protesters stormed the capitol building to brandish their
weapons and intimidate lawmakers during their legislative
session. Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer noted the overlap
of hate symbols and firearms at these protests, saying, ``There
were swastikas and Confederate flags and nooses and people with
assault rifles.'' The FBI later arrested and charged extremists
who were plotting to kidnap Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer.
The arrests included individuals who had reportedly attended
the armed protests and were members of the militia group
Wolverine Watchman.
Frankfort, Kentucky.--The Bluegrass State has been the home of
several armed protests, including one during which participants
hung an effigy of the Governor from a tree. Participants
included individuals with insignia from the Three Percenter
militia group. At another event, gun rights extremists marched
through the State capitol rotunda brandishing assault-style
weapons. More recently, after the riot at the U.S. Capitol,
approximately 100 individuals took to the State capitol in
Frankfort, once again armed.
BLM Counterprotests.--Armed extreme right appeared at a number of
Black Lives Matter and racial equality protests after the killing of
George Floyd, with the overwhelming majority of these counterprotesters
being white. Their appearance followed conspiratorial rhetoric around
the threat of left-wing violence pushed by a constant barrage of
statements and tweets from President Trump and his allies, including an
allusion to gun violence by Trump, who tweeted, ``When the looting
starts, the shooting starts.'' The theme of false equivalence had been
pushed by the NRA for years. After a neo-Nazi murdered a peaceful
protester at the Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, then-NRA
spokesperson Dana Loesch lectured, ``Don't think for 1 second that
Antifa and Black Lives Matter are somehow more virtuous than the alt-
right. It's all the same stuff.'' The Southern Poverty Law Center
chronicled at least 55 incidents of militias attending racial equality
protests between the spring and fall of last year.
Kenosha, Wisconsin.--After an online call for ``Armed Citizens,''
right-wing extremists carrying assault rifles and handguns were
visible throughout protests seeking justice for the police
shooting of Jacob Blake. This included a 17-year-old white
Trump supporter who drove across State lines to ``protect'' the
city from racial justice protesters. He patrolled the streets
brandishing a long gun and ultimately shot three protesters,
two fatally. The shooter is a self-described militia member and
was later photographed flashing a white power sign while posing
with members of the Proud Boys. The violence in Kenosha could
have been even worse had the FBI not arrested two heavily armed
individuals who had driven from Missouri to Kenosha allegedly
``with the intention of possibly using the firearms on
people.'' The two had attended a Trump rally in Kenosha and
planned to go to Portland, Oregon. Both were members of the
Missouri-based 417 Second Amendment Militia, and one reportedly
said he was willing to ``take action'' if police were defunded.
Rise of the Boogaloo Movement.--The emergent boogaloo movement rose
to national prominence in 2020 as a new and dangerous subset of the
extreme right. The movement's focus on a supposedly imminent second
civil war is rooted in a sense that American political institutions and
norms are hopelessly corrupt and beyond peaceful reform. This belief
set involves the fetishization of a civil war, ranging from obsessive
preparation for it to action to hasten its arrival. Public displays of
weaponry, particularly at political protests, are central to this
movement's adherents. Among these groups, firearm training is a common
part of preparation for the anticipated civil war. There were several
instances of boogaloo violence in 2020, including in Santa Cruz,
California, where prosecutors linked a man charged with the shooting
and murder of two Federal law enforcement officers to the boogaloo
movement. This is still an emergent movement, but its ideological core
centers around guns and distrust of authority, whether that be the
government, police, or political institutions.
Threats to the Administration of Elections.--The rise in armed
protest resulted in serious concern for the safety and security of the
2020 election. Two incidents underscored the dangers of mixing guns and
democracy. First, in Phoenix Arizona, supporters of President Trump--
some armed--rallied outside of the vote counting at the board of
elections the day after the election. Second, two men were arrested en
route to Philadelphia's vote-counting center in the days following the
election. Police indicate the men drove with pistols, an AR-15 rifle,
and roughly 160 rounds off ammunition. These same individuals, 2 months
later, allegedly attended the U.S. Capitol insurrection, with one of
them reportedly giving a speech as rioters stormed the building.
Extremists are able to mount these armed intimidation campaigns
because in most States it is legal to open carry loaded firearms at or
around State capitol buildings or at demonstrations. This is largely
due to the absence of State laws prohibiting the open carry of firearms
in public, commonly known as the ``Open Carry Loophole.'' Few State
legislatures have addressed the legality of the ``open carry loophole''
because responsible gun owners have not traditionally openly carried
firearms in public. In fact, in 41 States, civilians can open carry
loaded, semi-automatic rifles without a permit. More information about
the Open Carry Loophole can be found in Everytown's June 2020 report
``Armed COVID-19 Protests Exploit Open Carry Loophole.''
the gun lobby and extreme right politics
For decades, the gun lobby has sought to capture and wield the
political fervor of right-wing extremists, spreading radicalizing far
right conspiracy theories about mass civilian disarmament and looming
authoritarianism to everyday Americans in a craven attempt to stop the
reforms that would keep guns out of the hands of those very extremists.
Guns and gun fanaticism are central organizing principles of this kind
of extremism in America, including that of the groups and individuals
that supported the storming of the U.S. Capitol.
In the early 1990's, the NRA used over-the-top rhetoric to
denigrate efforts to pass the Brady Bill and the Federal assault
weapons ban. The organization leveraged the deadly law enforcement
raids at Ruby Ridge, Idaho in 1992 and Waco, Texas in 1993 to
villainize Federal law enforcement, repeatedly comparing them to Nazis
in books and full-page newspaper ads, and suggesting the gun reforms
were authoritarian measures to target gun owners. At the same time,
armed extremists--animated by the same conspiracy theories around gun
laws, Ruby Ridge, and Waco--were coalescing into the nascent anti-
government militia movement. One such extremist, who devoted himself to
conspiracy theories about mass disarmament, visited the Waco siege, and
read about Ruby Ridge in an NRA publication, was Timothy McVeigh.
In a fundraising letter dated April 13, 1995, LaPierre referred to
Federal agents as ``jack-booted government thugs,'' saying it was no
longer ``unthinkable for Federal agents wearing nazi bucket helmets and
black storm trooper uniforms to attack law-abiding citizens,'' all
while specifically referencing ``Randy Weaver at Ruby Ridge . . . Waco
and the Branch Davidians.'' Six days later, McVeigh bombed the Alfred
P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, a target he chose because
it housed an ATF office, killing 168 people. The NRA falsely denied
connections to the militia movement in the aftermath, instead blaming
the ATF for ``creating the climate'' that led to the bombing.
Those kinds of conspiracy theories form the backbone of the far
right worldview of grievance and siege, namely the belief that the U.S.
political system is compromised by a shadowy cabal of enemies enacting
a grand conspiracy. The combination of a deep skepticism toward
democratic institutions and paranoia over fictional threats from
shadowy actors leads some extremists to conclude that there are few, if
any, legitimate democratic solutions to these threats, and as a result,
mass violence is inevitable or even justified. For these groups and
radicalized individuals, guns are essential tools for that tactic of
violence. Beyond simply purchasing or using guns individually, far
right extremists, especially those in anti-government circles, organize
politically to advocate against any limit to gun rights.
The gun lobby has sought to leverage that political activism to its
own ends, warning its members that the only thing standing between them
and a grand authoritarian conspiracy or even their fellow Americans was
their easy access to any and all firearms. To paint this picture, the
gun lobby draws on many of the same conspiracy theories that the far
right depends on, particularly those which hinge on the protection of
lax gun laws: Either the imagined conspiracy has yet to happen because
Americans have easy access to firearms, or the conspiracy itself is an
attempt to disarm Americans (so that the first category of conspiracies
can be executed).
One extreme viewpoint at the forefront of the NRA's messaging for
decades is the insurrectionist theory of the Second Amendment. In 1994,
NRA CEO Wayne LaPierre summed up the theory when he wrote that the
Second Amendment ``state[s] in plain language that the people have the
right, must have the right, to take whatever measures necessary,
including force, to abolish oppressive government.'' LaPierre put it
more plainly years later, in 2009: ``Our Founding Fathers understood
that the guys with the guns make the rules.'' More recently, days after
the Capitol insurrection, NRA Board President Carolyn Meadows
regurgitated the view writing in a column entitled ``Why They Fear
Us,'' that ``gun-control advocates want control, but are often stopped
because the Second Amendment fundamentally undermines their attempt to
turn people into submissive subjects of a controlling state.''
The nebulous idea that the Second Amendment provides the right for
armed groups to attack the government when they decide it has become
tyrannical is particularly dangerous when the same people making that
claim are also the ones baselessly accusing political adversaries of
having an authoritarian agenda. In short, the NRA has relentlessly
insisted to its members that their guns give them the right to
violently overthrow a tyrannical government, while at the same time
sounding the alarm that anyone who wants to implement even the most
modest regulation of gun ownership is a tyrant-in-waiting. It's a
recipe for the exact kind of disaster seen at the U.S. Capitol on
January 6th: Americans fraudulently convinced the democratic process
had been hijacked and left feeling that armed insurrection is a
justifiable remedy.
For far right ideologies, defense of lax gun laws is paramount,
which makes the gun lobby the hero standing in the gap to stop any and
all efforts to regulate guns and, by extension, supposedly looming
rampant criminality and authoritarianism. And in portraying itself as
the hero, the gun lobby can activate its most ardent followers and
raise more money from its members. As the NRA's former No. 2 recently
put it in a tell-all book, LaPierre knew that when the NRA needed to
raise money, it could depend on fear-mongering messaging, which
LaPierre purportedly referred to as pouring ``gasoline on the fire.''
Deploying this kind of rhetoric, the gun lobby exposes a wide
audience to these radicalizing messages, pushing those in the
mainstream toward extremism and those already radicalized further
toward violence.
The insurrectionists at the Capitol, many deceived by lies and
conspiracy theories, believed that not only was the 2020 election a
fraud, but it was a fraud in furtherance of installing an
administration they wrongly view as an oppressive threat. As a result,
in invading the Capitol, they believed they were exercising the
nebulous right the NRA claims is granted to them by the Second
Amendment ``to abolish oppressive government.'' This worldview is
largely responsible for the resurgence of the anti-government movement,
particularly the boogaloo movement, in the past year.
NRA communications to its members continue to ``pour gasoline on
the fire'' of right-wing extremism. In a recently uncovered fundraising
letter to members, Wayne LaPierre warns of ``armed government agents
storming your house, taking your guns, and hauling you off to prison''
in language that worryingly echoes his words in the letter the NRA sent
to members mere days before the Oklahoma City bombing. In the recent
letter, LaPierre boasts that ``only the NRA has the strength to win
knock-down brawls on Capitol Hill.'' The letter's accompanying envelope
read ``NOTICE OF GUN CONFISCATION''--an overt invocation of civilian
disarmament conspiracy theories. Similarly, even after the events at
the Capitol, the NRA promoted a branded meme on social media with an
AR-15 and the phrase ``Come and Take It.'' This was the same phrase and
symbolism that flew on a Confederate flag during protests of the
Governor of Michigan last spring and that was flown at the Capitol on
the 6th.
policy recommendations
The January 6, 2021 insurrection at the U.S. Capitol demonstrated
the urgent need for policymakers to confront armed extremism. While
there are many reasons for the rise in armed extremism, we know that
strong gun policy is critical to address violent extremists' access to
firearms and establish clear and strong legal standards on what conduct
is not acceptable in our democracy. To fully address the threat, we'll
need to address easy access to firearms in the United States, including
through common sense measures that stop prohibited individuals from
obtaining guns--like comprehensive background checks and regulations on
ghost guns. In the meantime, the following three steps can disrupt how
extremists use firearms to undermine democracy and promote
insurrection.
First, the law should prohibit the carrying of firearms at and
around sensitive government facilities. The carrying of firearms by
members of the public intimidates citizens, emboldens extremists, and
is ultimately the means by which a protest can morph into an
insurrection or escalate into a gunfight. Federal law already prohibits
firearms at the Capitol and on Capitol Grounds. Federal and State law
should extend the prohibition on gun carrying to all State capitals and
their grounds, and the other buildings essential to the functioning of
government and the electoral process, including polling locations and
vote counting facilities.
Second, guns should be prohibited at demonstrations on public
property. Peaceful protest is an essential form of expression and a
pillar of American democracy; however, the dangers inherent to the
carry of firearms in demonstrations are very real, and a recent
Department of Homeland Security memo warned that ``militia extremists''
are prepared to take advantage of public demonstrations to incite
violence. The presence of armed protesters is in and of itself a show
of intimidation. The armed extreme right's targets of intimidation are
often members of already marginalized communities, as evidenced by
their presence throughout the year at protests for racial equality.
Third, armed extremists must be held accountable under existing
laws for their criminal conduct. Federal and State officials must
enforce laws against unlawful carrying and armed intimidation with a
focus on the armed extremists and white supremacists who have abridged
civil rights or sought to intimidate democratic institutions. Laws on
firearm brandishment should be enforced to capture the tactics we have
seen deployed by extremists and white supremacists, including those
armed extremists who go to the homes of elected officials and
government workers. All 50 States prohibit unauthorized, so-called
``private militias,'' from engaging in activities reserved for the
State, including law enforcement activities, but those laws are being
underutilized to address the unlawful conduct by armed extremists.
Chairman Thompson. I would also like to indicate that there
is an FBI report on extremist activities in the United States
that is 7 months overdue. I don't know what we will have to do
to get the FBI to produce that information on extremist
activities in the United States, but it would be advantageous
to the committee and the public at large if that report was
made available. I assure you, we will push the necessary
buttons again to ask for that report, as mandated by Congress.
Additionally, I ask unanimous consent to submit a letter
from The Leadership Conference and signed by 135 civil rights
organizations, as well as a letter from the Center for
Democracy and Technology and signed by 24 additional civil
rights organizations, for the record.
[The information follows:]
Letter From The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights
January 19, 2021.
Dear Member of Congress: On behalf of The Leadership Conference on
Civil and Human Rights (The Leadership Conference), a coalition charged
by its diverse membership of more than 220 national organizations to
promote and protect civil and human rights in the United States, and
the undersigned 134 organizations, we write to express our deep concern
regarding proposed expansion of terrorism-related legal authority. We
must meet the challenge of addressing white nationalist and far-right
militia violence without causing further harm to communities already
disproportionately impacted by the criminal-legal system. The Justice
Department (DOJ), including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
has over 50 terrorism-related statutes it can use to investigate and
prosecute criminal conduct, including white supremacist violence, as
well as dozens of other Federal statutes relating to hate crimes,
organized crime, and violent crimes. The failure to confront and hold
accountable white nationalist violence is not a question of not having
appropriate tools to employ, but a failure to use those on hand. To
date, DOJ has simply decided as a matter of policy and practice not to
prioritize white nationalist crimes.\1\ Congress should use its
oversight and appropriations authorities to ensure that law enforcement
appropriately focuses investigative and prosecutorial resources on
white nationalist crimes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Michael German and Sara Robinson, Wrong Priorities on Fighting
Terrorism, The Brennan Center (Oct 31, 2018), https://
www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/wrong-priorities-
fighting-terrorism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We urge you to oppose any new domestic terrorism charge, the
creation of a list of designated domestic terrorist organizations, or
other expansion of existing terrorism-related authorities. We are
concerned that a new Federal domestic terrorism statute or list would
adversely impact civil rights and--as our nation's long and disturbing
history of targeting Black Activists, Muslims, Arabs, and movements for
social and racial justice has shown--this new authority could be used
to expand racial profiling or be wielded to surveil and investigate
communities of color and political opponents in the name of national
security.
As the Acting US Attorney for the District of Columbia stated on
January 12, 2021 regarding the January 6 insurrection attack on the
Capitol, Federal prosecutors have many existing laws at their disposal
to hold violent white supremacists accountable.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Department of Justice, Acting U.S. Attorney Michael Sherwin for
The District of Columbia and FBI Washington Field Office ADIC Steven
D'Antuono Provide Update on Criminal Charges Related to Events at the
Capitol on January 6 (Jan 12, 2021) https://www.justice.gov/opa/video/
acting-us-attorney-michael-sherwin-district-columbia-and-fbi-
washington-field-office-adic.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The magnitude of last week's attack demands that Congress focus on
ensuring that our government addresses white nationalist violence as
effectively as possible. Members of Congress should not reinforce
counterterrorism policies, programs, and frameworks that are rooted in
bias, discrimination, and denial or diminution of fundamental rights
like due process. Rather, as highlighted below, Congress should focus
on its oversight and appropriations authority to ensure that the
Federal Government redirect resources toward the ever-growing white
nationalist violence plaguing our country, and hold law enforcement
accountable in doing so.
law enforcement has the tools to hold white nationalist
insurrectionists accountable
White supremacist violence goes back to our nation's founding, and
has never been appropriately addressed--and it manifested last week in
an unprecedented way. On January 6, 2021, thousands of pro-Trump
supporters, many of them radical, right-wing, white supremacists,
unlawfully and violently broke into the nation's Capitol. The rioters,
some with ``Camp Auschwitz'' shirts, others carrying confederate flags,
and some who hung a noose on the Capitol grounds, were intent on
blocking the ratification of President-elect Biden's electoral win.
Some carried weapons and zip ties, reportedly to kidnap or kill Members
of Congress and the Vice President. Because of the violent mayhem that
ensued, at least five people lost their lives and countless others were
wounded. As this historic event on the nation's legislative branch by
violent white nationalist insurrectionists is being investigated
thoroughly, we know that our Federal law enforcement officials have
more than enough tools at their disposal to address the attack on the
Capitol.
According to the Federal Government's own research and reports,
white nationalist violence has been on the rise for years with the FBI
reporting that more murders motivated by hate were recorded in 2019
than any year before.\3\ This 2019 data included the El Paso massacre,
when a white supremacist targeted the Latino community and shot and
killed 23 people after publishing a manifesto in which he embraced
white nationalist and anti-immigrant hatred.\4\ The Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and the FBI have repeatedly testified before
Congress, stating that the greatest threat to US national security
emanates from white supremacist violence.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ FBI National Press Office, FBI Releases 2019 NIBRS Crime Data
(Dec 9 2020), FBI Releases 2019 NIBRS Crime Data--FBI; see also Tim
Arango, Hate Crimes in U.S. Rose to Highest Level in More Than a Decade
in 2019 (Nov. 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/16/us/hate-
crime-rate.html.
\4\ Peter Baker and Michael D. Shear, El Paso Shooting Suspect's
Manifesto Echoes Trump's Language (Aug. 4, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/08/04/us/politics/trump-mass-shootings.html.
\5\ The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, Letter
from Civil Rights Organizations Calling for Investigation and Hearings
Into DHS Coverup of White Supremacist Intelligence (Sep 24, 2020),
House_Homeland_on_White_Supremacist_Cover_Up_092420.pdf
(civilrightsdocs.info).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Yet, despite overwhelming evidence making clear the source of the
threat,\6\ the Federal response has failed to prioritize an effective
policy to combat white nationalist violence. Instead, the Federal
Government has disproportionately targeted and surveilled Black and
Brown people, including increasingly targeting Arabs and Muslims since
9/11, treating them as threats to US national and homeland security.
This has led to the over-policing of these communities, including
intrusions into community centers, mosques, and almost every aspect of
their lives.\7\ US counter-terrorism policy has devastated communities
of color and religious minorities, and by failing to rein in white
nationalist violence in a serious way, those same communities suffer
twice over: First by being over-criminalized and securitized and
second, by having the State not respond to white nationalists who
target them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, Letter
from Civil Rights Organizations Calling for Investigation and Hearings
Into DHS Coverup of White Supremacist Intelligence (Sep 24, 2020),
House_Homeland_on_White_Supremacist_Cover_Up_092420.pdf
(civilrightsdocs.info).
\7\ Michael German and Emmanuel Mauleon, Fighting Far-Right
Violence and Hate Crimes (July 1, 2019), at 7,
Report_Far_Right_Violence.pdf (brennancenter.org).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
what should congress do?
Congress should not enact any laws creating a new crime of domestic
terrorism, including the Confronting the Threats of Domestic Terrorism
Act (H.R. 4192 in the 116th Congress) or any other new charges or
sentencing enhancements expected to be introduced in the 117th Congress
``to penalize acts of domestic terrorism.'' These bills and others with
similar provisions are the wrong approach because, as we have seen,
they will continue to be used as vehicles to target Black and Brown
communities as they have done since their inception.\8\ The Federal
Government has no shortage of counterterrorism powers, and these powers
have been and will be again used to unjustly target Black and Brown
communities, including Muslim, Arab, Middle Eastern, and South Asian
communities, as well as those engaged in First Amendment-protected
activities.\9\ The creation of a new Federal domestic terrorism crime
ignores this reality and would not address the scourge of white
nationalism in this country.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Brennan Center, Countering Violent Extremism in the Trump Era
(Jun. 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/countering-violent-
extremism-trump-era.
\9\ Patrick G. Eddington, MLK and the FBI: 50 years on, secrets and
surveillance still (Apr. 2019), https://thehill.com/opinion/civil-
rights/436437-mlk-and-the-fbi-50-years-on-secrets-and-surveillance-
still.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Instead, Congress should use its oversight and appropriations
powers to demand that Federal agencies make public how they have and
are now using resources to fight white supremacist violence. Moreover,
Congress should support other efforts to address the white supremacy at
the core of these violent attacks. At the outset, Congress should
identify ways to address the white supremacist infiltration of law
enforcement that was documented by the FBI. This, a clear and present
danger, which was highlighted at an Oversight Committee hearing last
year, puts lives at risk and undermines the criminal legal system.\10\
Hate crimes data should be mandated and made publicly available so
Federal leaders, as well as those at the State and local level, can
address the threat in a manner best suited to their community. Finally,
the Leadership Conference encourages Congress to regularly, hold
hearings featuring communities that are experiencing white nationalist
violence in an effort to encourage accountability and transparency.
This would allow Congress to provide communities impacted by white
supremacist violence support to develop and lead their own programs to
meet the needs that they identify.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Press Release Rep. Jamie Raskin, Experts Warn Oversight
Subcommittee that White Supremacist Infiltration of Law Enforcement
Poses a Threat to Cops, Communities (Sep. 29, 2020) https://
raskin.house.gov/media/press-releases/experts-warn-oversight-
subcommittee-white-supremacist-infiltration-law.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Please contact Becky Monroe at [email protected] and Iman
Boukadoum at [email protected] to further discuss this matter
or if there are questions or concerns.
Sincerely,
The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights
Access Now
Act To Change
Advancement Project, National
Alabama State Association of Cooperatives
American Civil Liberties Union
American Friends Service Committee
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC)
Americans for Democratic Action (ADA)
Amnesty International USA
Andrew Goodman Foundation
ANYAHS Inc.
Appleseed Foundation
Arab American Institute
Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund (AALDEF)
Asian Americans Advancing Justice/AAJC
Augustus F. Hawkins Foundation
Autistic Self Advocacy Network
Bend the Arc Jewish Action
Black Alliance for Just Immigration (BAJI)
Brennan Center for Justice
Bridges Faith Initiative
Brooklyn Defender Services
Center for Constitutional Rights
Center for Democracy & Technology
Center for Disability Rights
Center for International Policy
Center for Law and Social Policy (CLASP)
Center for Popular Democracy/Action
Center for Security, Race and Rights
Center for Victims of Torture
Center on Conscience & War
Charity & Security Network
CLEAR project (Creating Law Enforcement Accountability &
Responsibility)
CODEPINK
Color Of Change
Common Cause
Common Defense
Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR)
Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), Washington Chapter
Defending Rights & Dissent
Demand Progress Demos
Detention Watch Network (DWN)
Drug Policy Alliance
Durham Youth Climate Justice Initiative
Emgage Action
End Citizens United/Let America Vote Action Fund
Equal Justice Society
Equality California
Federal Public and Community Defenders
Fight for the Future
Free Press Action
Freedom Network USA
Friends Committee on National Legislation
Government Information Watch
Greenpeace US
Human Rights Campaign
Human Rights First
Human Rights Watch
Immigrant Defense Network
Immigrant Justice Network
Immigrant Defense Project (IDP)
In Our Own Voice: National Black Women's Reproductive Justice Agenda
Interfaith Alliance
Japanese American Citizens League
Justice for Muslims Collective
Kansas Black Farmers Association/Nicodemus Educational Camps
KinderUSA
Labor Council for Latin American Advancement
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law
Legal Aid Society of Metropolitan Family Services
Louisiana Advocates for Immigrants in Detention
Matthew Shepard Foundation
Montgomery County (MD) Civil Rights Coalition
MPower Change
Muslim Advocates
Muslim Justice League
Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC)
NAACP
NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC. (LDF)
National Alliance for Partnerships in Equity (NAPE)
National Association of Social Workers (NASW)
National Council of Jewish Women
National Education Association
National Employment Law Project (NELP)
National Equality Action Team (NEAT)
National Immigration Law Center (NILC)
National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild (NIPNLG)
National LGBTQ Task Force Action Fund
National Network for Immigrant & Refugee Rights
National Organization for Women (NOW)
National Partnership for Women & Families
National Women's Law Center
NETWORK Lobby
New America's Open Technology Institute
North Carolina Association of Black Lawyers Land Loss Prevention
Project
Open MIC (Open Media & Information Companies Initiative)
Open The Government
Oxfam America
Palestine Legal
Partnership for Civil Justice Fund
People's Parity Project
Presbyterian Church (USA)
Progressive Turnout Project
Project Blueprint
Project On Government Oversight
Public Advocacy for Kids (PAK)
Public Citizen
Public Justice
Quixote Center
Radiant International
Restore The Fourth
Rethinking Foreign Policy
Rural Coalition
S.T.O.P.--The Surveillance Technology Oversight Project
Sisters of Mercy of the Americas Justice Team
South Asian Americans Leading Together (SAALT)
Southeast Asia Resource Action Center (SEARAC)
SPLC Action Fund
TASH: equity, opportunity and inclusion for people with disabilities
Texas Progressive Action Network
The Human Trafficking Legal Center
The Sentencing Project
The Sikh Coalition
Transformations CDC
True North Research
Tuskegee University
UnidosUS
Union for Reform Judaism
United Church of Christ, OC Inc.
US Human Rights Network
Veterans for American Ideals
Voices for Progress
Win Without War
Wind of the Spirit Immigrant Resource Center
Workplace Fairness
______
Letter From Greg Nojeim, Center for Democracy & Technology
January 22, 2021.
Chairman Richard Durbin,
Ranking Member Chuck Grassley,
Senate Judiciary Committee.
Chairman Jerrold Nadler,
Ranking Member Jim Jordan,
House Judiciary Committee.
Re: Law Enforcement Authorities in the Wake of the January 6 Capitol
Assault.
Dear Chairmen Durbin and Nadler and Ranking Members Grassley and
Jordan: We are writing to urge that as you consider appropriate
responses to the January 6 assault on the Capitol, and that you refrain
from advancing legislation that would expand law enforcement
surveillance authorities or create a new crime of ``domestic
terrorism.'' As the perpetrators of the attack on the Capitol are
brought to justice, the security failures that permitted that attack
should not become the basis for expanded police surveillance authority
or for expansion of prosecutorial authority.
On January 6, an angry mob, inspired by President Trump and
encouraged by others, ascended Capitol Hill during the ceremonial
counting of the votes of the electoral college. They overran the thinly
staffed Capitol police who were on patrol, broke into the building,
ransacked members' offices, and called for the hanging of Vice
President Pence. They organized their attack in plain sight, on social
media platforms accessible to each other and to the public. In the days
prior to the attack, news outlets had reported on the violent plans
unfolding online, and the Virginia Field Office of the FBI warned of an
impending ``war.'' Despite this information, the police presence was
minimal and proved insufficient to stop or repel the attack.
Crime of Domestic Terrorism.--Some are arguing that Congress should
create a new crime of ``domestic terrorism'' because the violence at
the Capitol was directed at civilians and was politically motivated. We
urge you to resist those calls as creating such a crime would threaten
civil liberties and civil rights, and because the FBI already has
sufficient legal authority to charge the insurrectionists who stormed
the Capitol. A new crime of ``domestic terrorism'' would give license
to authorities to investigate based on political motivation, and we
have no doubt that it would be turned against marginalized communities
and those who protest government abuse, stifling free expression and
leading to punitive policing of communities who had no role in the
January 6 attack. As the Leadership Conference on Civil and Human
Rights Stated in a Sept. 6, 2019 letter to Congress, when similar
legislation was contemplated as a response to gun and hate violence:
``The Federal Government has no shortage of counterterrorism powers,
and these powers have been used to unjustly target American Muslim,
Arab American, South Asian American, African American communities and
those who fight for racial and social justice. The creation of a new
Federal domestic terrorism crime ignores this reality and does nothing
to address the problem of gun violence and hate violence incidents in
this country.''
Instead of creating a new crime of domestic terrorism, Congress
should work to ensure that law enforcement response to a protest turns
on evidence of criminality and violence, as opposed to the political
motivation of the protesters. Any documented disparities in police
response based on race, religion, political motivation or other
protected characteristics must be addressed.
Moreover, a new crime of domestic terrorism is unnecessary. The
government already has ample authority under existing law to prosecute
those who stormed the Capitol. The FBI has charged more than 140 people
with crimes, is investigating more than 330 people, and has indicated
that it may level sedition charges that carry a 20-year prison
sentence. There is no reported instance in which the FBI has identified
someone who participated in the attack but has been unable to bring
charges for lack of statutory authority.
Surveillance Authorities.--After major national tragedies, Congress
has frequently considered legislation that would add to the
surveillance authorities and capabilities that law enforcement
officials already have. However, new surveillance authority is not
needed to prevent an assault like the one that occurred on January 6.
The attack on the Capitol was planned and executed in plain sight, and
was splashed all over social media as the insurrectionists published
pictures and video clips of themselves and each other breaking into the
Capitol, invading members' offices, and parading through corridors with
the Confederate battle flag. Within a few days of the event, the FBI
said it had received over 130,000 videos and photos associated with the
attack. The Bureau has commenced one of the largest investigations in
U.S. history, and it is being inundated with information, not starved
of it.
The information in the public domain and on publicly available
social media was more than sufficient to alert law enforcement
officials to the danger at hand. Given the ready availability of this
information, rather than granting additional surveillance powers,
Congress should be asking authorities why they were so unprepared for
such a predictable tragedy. Congress should further inquire into what
other law enforcement and intelligence agency priorities distracted
officials from preparing the Capitol for a literal insurrection.
Finally, it should be asking what investigative techniques are being
deployed, whether unreliable and invasive technologies such as facial
recognition are being used to investigate these crimes (and generate
unreliable leads), and whether unconstitutional techniques, such as
geo-fence warrants, are being used as well. As with domestic terrorism
efforts, expanding surveillance capabilities will inevitably harm
marginalized communities while adding little marginal value to law
enforcement efforts.
In short, we urge you to ensure that the January 6 assault on the
Capitol is not used as an excuse to expand surveillance authority or to
create a dangerous new crime of domestic terrorism.
Please direct your response to this letter to Greg Nojeim at the
Center for Democracy & Technology, [email protected].
Sincerely,
Access Now
Brennan Center for Justice
Center for Democracy & Technology
Defending Rights & Dissent
Demand Progress
Downsize DC
Due Process Institute
Fight for the Future
FracTracker Alliance
Free Press Action
Government Information Watch
Human Rights First
Institute for Policy Studies New Internationalism Project
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
National Coalition Against Censorship
New America's Open Technology Institute
Open the Government
Open MIC (Open Media & Information Companies Initiative)
Palestine Legal
Partnership for Civil Justice Fund
Project Blueprint
Project on Government Oversight
Restore the Fourth
ReThinking Foreign Policy
Security Policy Reform Institute
Chairman Thompson. Without objection, the committee record
shall be kept open for 10 days.
Hearing no further business, the committee stands
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:44 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Question From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson for Christopher Rodriguez
Question. I understand that Washington, DC's fusion center receives
information from DHS and other law enforcement and public safety
partners and share it with local partners in the District of Columbia.
As a consumer of DHS intelligence at the local fusion center, do you
feel the Department produces products that meet the needs of your
office? What could the Department do differently to help with threat
awareness and preparedness efforts?
Answer. The support the District's Fusion Center receives from the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is fantastic. DHS is
proactive in sharing information it believes to be valuable to the
District and is consistently clear and concise in its requests for
information.
We believe DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis can improve by
providing more products that are timely, relevant, and actionable for
District senior leadership. DHS could also better support the Nation's
fusion centers by producing additional derivative or tear-line products
from Classified material that fusion center analysts could leverage to
inform understanding of the local threat environment.
Questions From Ranking Member John Katko for Christopher Rodriguez
Question 1. In your testimony you stated that ``we know that our
foreign adversaries--Russia, in particular--are employing a decades-old
tool of covert action to fan the flames of cultural conflict here in
the United States''. Could you elaborate on the impact of these false
narratives being perpetuated by foreign adversaries? What effects are
you seeing from the local government level?
Answer. It has been well-reported in the media, and confirmed by
the U.S. intelligence community, that foreign adversaries take a vested
interest in sowing mis- and disinformation oriented around U.S. issues
to undermine the efficacy of U.S. Government officials--both policy
makers and law enforcement. Russia, not unlike other foreign
governments, identify and work to enflame social tensions in the United
States by antagonizing radicalized groups on social media and other on-
line forums. The results of these on-line campaigns have the potential
to influence U.S.-based organizations and individuals who champion
radical causes and demonstrate those beliefs violently.
Question 2. During the hearing you stated that the D.C. government
had been in contact with the National Guard, Capitol Police, and
Federal agencies (including DHS and DOJ). Could you provide a time line
of when discussions with these Federal partners occurred and what they
consisted of?
Answer. See attached time line.
Question 3. At what point on January 6 did the D.C. government
contact other States to ask for assistance? Was this assistance
immediately provided? Did any Federal Government entity assist with
this request?
Answer. The District's Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and Joint
Information Center (JIC) were activated on January 4 to provide common
operating picture, resource support, operational coordination,
situational awareness, and public information. The EOC, upon receiving
the request for additional law enforcement support from United States
Capitol Police, initiated a request to Maryland, New Jersey, and
Virginia for State police response through the Emergency Management
Assistance Compact (EMAC). There were no Federal entities involved in
this process. Through the EOC, I began coordinating directly with
executive command at United States Capitol Police Command Center to
coordinate the DC National Guard response. Additionally, at 2:55 p.m.
and 8 p.m., EOC staff participated in calls hosted by FEMA Region III
with the State emergency management directors of Maryland, Virginia,
West Virginia, Delaware, and Pennsylvania. These calls were to provide
updates on the situation at the Capitol, confirm the receipt of the
EMAC requests, and evaluate options for additional support.
Question 4. Do you believe that there's anything which can be done
to assist with more seamless communication and coordination between
Federal, State, and local partners going forward? Legislatively or non-
legislatively.
Answer.
Increased investment in National Capital Region's (NCR)
Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) program.--FEMA's UASI
program provides financial assistance to address the unique
multi-discipline planning, organization, equipment, training,
and exercise needs of high-threat, high-density Urban Areas,
and to assist these areas in building and sustaining
capabilities to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to,
and recover from threats or acts of terrorism using the Whole
Community approach. The NCR, comprised of the District of
Columbia, along with 23 jurisdictions in northern Virginia and
southern Maryland, received an UASI allocation for fiscal year
2021 of $51.75 million. Future NCR funding levels should
reflect the increased attention and actions by domestic
terrorists to disrupt political acts held in Washington, DC, as
the home of the Nation's capital. The fiscal year 2021 UASI
allocation for the Chicago and Los Angeles/Long Beach areas is
$68 million each.
Leverage our National intelligence network better.--Funded
by DHS, these intelligence hubs need to do better at sharing
information across the network because the domestic terrorist
threat is fundamentally one that originates locally and then
spreads across State borders. The nearly 80 fusion centers
across the Nation have more than 2,000 intelligence analysts
funded by Federal dollars, but their intelligence should be
more widely disseminated to those who need it.
Increased Federal presence in District's 24/7 operation
center.--The District of Columbia's Joint All-Hazards
Operations Center (JAHOC) is the 24/7, 365 hub of coordination
for city-wide response operations. The JAHOC looks across all
jurisdictions within the District as well as the region to
coordinate alerting, warning, notification, and operational
support. Currently, FEMA's Office of National Capitol Region
Coordination is the only Federal agency that positions staff in
the JAHOC, but several other agencies will assign staff to the
JAHOC for special events on or near their jurisdiction,
including the Pentagon Force Protection Agency, Department of
Homeland Security, and others. This is valuable but not
consistent. HSEMA is expanding the space within the JAHOC
beginning in 2022 and welcomes additional Federal liaisons to
operate from the JAHOC to enhance information sharing and a
common understanding of what is happening in the District.
Engage communities and workforces better.--People in our
communities might know nefarious activities are taking place,
either in plain sight, in dark corners of the internet, or in
casual conversation. We need to prioritize insider-threat
programs in the U.S. military and law enforcement to ensure
these specific skill sets, which are developed to defend a
nation, a State, or a community, are not then turned on the
very people they are sworn to protect.
Attachment
February 23, 2021
This memorandum is intended to memorialize the time line of
preparations for, and the response to, the large-scale demonstrations
in Washington, DC on January 5-6, 2021. This information was collected
from various District agencies.
Monday, December 14, 2020
12 P.M.--MPD holds Law Enforcement Briefing with Metro
Transit Police, USSS, FBI, USPP, HSEMA/NTIC, U.S. Postal
Inspectors.
Sunday, December 19, 2020
President Trump tweets about election results and
mentions.--``Big protest in D.C. on January 6th. Be there, will
be wild!''
Monday, December 28, 2020
12 P.M.--MPD holds bi-monthly Law Enforcement Partners
Briefing with USSS, FBI, USPP, HSEMA/NTIC, and U.S. Postal
Inspectors.
Tuesday, December 29, 2020
10 A.M.--MPD holds a First Amendment Coordination Call with
Partners (FBI, USCP, Supreme Court Police, United States Park
Police, Metro Transit Police, HSEMA, USSS, DCFEMS).
Thursday, December 31, 2020
Mayor Bowser convenes public safety and senior staff for a
briefing on pending applications before the National Park
Service for ``Public Gathering Permits.''
Mayor Bowser sends letter to DC National Guard (DCNG) Major
General requesting DCNG support for Metropolitan Police
Department (MPD) and DC Fire and Emergency Medical Services
(FEMS) for downtown DC. The letter cites concern about the
potential for violence, given previous large-scale
demonstrations in the District of Columbia after the
Presidential Election.
MPD issues press release on street closures and parking
restrictions (traffic box) for January 5-7, 2021, in downtown
DC during potential First Amendment activities. The press
release highlights that no one shall bring illegal weapons into
the District because it violates District law. MPD hangs signs
across the District asserting that no one illegal firearms are
allowed in the city. Media is invited to watch MPD hang the
signs.
8:30 A.M.--HSEMA convenes the Chief Operations Officers/
Senior Emergency Managers Group from all District agencies to
plan and prepare for the demonstrations.
9 A.M.--MPD participates in the National Park Service call
on Freedom Plaza demonstration.
11 A.M.--MPD participates in the National Park Service call
on Ellipse demonstration.
12 P.M.--DC fusion center sets up a call with U.S. Capitol
Police (USCP) and provides a threat brief indicating the
potential for violence in the city during January 5-6.
Friday, January 1, 2021
NPS grants a ``Public Gathering Permit'' on the Ellipse to
Women For America First on Wednesday, January 6, 2021, with
5,000 as an anticipated number of participants. Permit allows
move-in beginning on January 2, 2021, and for the event date,
gates opening at 7 o'clock a.m. and the program occurring
between 9 o'clock a.m. to 3:30 p.m. Since June 2020, the NPS
has granted ``Public Gathering Permits'' despite D.C.
restrictions on gatherings due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Saturday, January 2, 2021
8:10 P.M.--Chief Contee speaks with USCP Chief Sund.
Sunday, January 3, 2021
Mayor Bowser issues press release urging ``Washingtonians
and those who live in the region to stay out of the downtown
area on Tuesday and Wednesday and not to engage with
demonstrators who come to our city seeking confrontation.''
12 P.M.--MPD holds internal CDU Briefing in preparation for
First Amendment Demonstrations.
Monday, January 4, 2021
Mayor Bowser provides situational update to the public and
members of the media and reiterates request for residents to
avoid the area.
HSEMA stands up the District's Emergency Operations Center
(EOC).
8 A.M.--MPD participates in the National Park Service call
on Rally to Revival demonstration.
9 A.M.--MPD participates in the National Park Service call
on Freedom Plaza demonstration.
9 A.M.--Director Rodriguez and Chief Contee brief the
Council of the District of Columbia in closed session on D.C.
government preparations for the January 5-6 protests.
10:40 A.M.--Chief Contee receives verbal confirmation from
SecArmy via a conference call that DCNG members will be
provided for traffic posts and crowd management. Also on the
call: DC National Guard Commanding General and the Chief of
Staff of the Army. SecArmy stated that the DCNG members may
only be re-tasked or moved with his permission and under his
authority. He also stated that NG members could not be posted
east of 9th Street.
11 A.M.--MPD participates in the National Park Service call
on Ellipse demonstration.
11:30 A.M.--D.C. fusion center meets with MPD to discuss
threat assessment and operational posture for the 5th and 6th.
12:30 P.M.--D.C. fusion center provides threat briefing to
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, which
requested information on the protests on the 5th and 6th.
1 P.M.--D.C. fusion center conducts meeting with regional
and State fusion centers in Virginia and Maryland to discuss
the District's readiness and outreach to the National Network
of Fusion Centers.
1:30 P.M.--D.C. fusion center convenes the National Network
of Fusion Centers for an emergency call to discuss the
potential for violence in Washington, DC on the 5th and 6th.
D.C. fusion center requests enhanced intelligence sharing and
possibly mutual aid.
2:30 P.M.--D.C. fusion center conducts coordinating call
with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Intelligence
and Analysis liaison.
3 P.M.--MPD holds a First Amendment Coordination Call with
Partners (FBI, USCP, Supreme Court Police, United States Park
Police, Metro Transit Police, HSEMA, USSS, DCFEMS).
3 P.M.--D.C. City Administrator Donahue briefs regional
counterparts on mutual assistance need and potential Emergency
Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) requests from the District
of Columbia. This puts State and local law enforcement in the
region on alert to support MPD.
3:30 P.M.--Chief Contee participates in a coordination call
led by the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia;
included heads of the Washington Field Offices of the FBI and
ATF.
3:30 P.M.--D.C. fusion center provides threat briefing, on
behalf of D.C. Health, to the D.C. Healthcare Coalition and
discusses potential impacts from violence to the District's
health care system.
4 P.M.--D.C. fusion center conducts a coordination call with
USCP.
5 P.M.--HSEMA convenes the Consequence Management Team
(CMT)--a group of all District department Directors--to discuss
and move toward finalizing planning and preparation for the
demonstrations.
National Park Service grants a ``Public Gathering Permit''
on Freedom Plaza to Rally for Revival on Tuesday, January 5,
2021, with 5,000 as an anticipated number of participants.
Permit is for 5 o'clock A.M. to 11:59 P.M. with program
occurring between 1 o'clock P.M. and 8:30 P.M.
Evening of January 4, through media inquiries, Mayor's Chief
of Staff Falcicchio learns that Federal law enforcement from
CBP and Bureau of Prisons have been activated for the
demonstrations without notification to District Government. It
is not clear what mission they will serve or where they will be
deployed.
National Park Service increases permit from 5,000
participants to 30,000 participants for January 6 Women For
America First event on the Ellipse.
Tuesday, January 5, 2021
Mayor Bowser is cc'd on a letter from Senator Murphy (D-CT)
to Acting AG Rosen, SecArmy McCarthy, A/SecDef Miller that
``calls on officials to adhere to new law requiring all Armed
Forces and Federal law enforcement officers to visibly
identify''. This is based on a new law authored by Murphy and
Senate Minority Leader Schumer and passed as the National
Defense Authorization Act.
Mayor Bowser sends letter to AG, A/SecDef, and ArmySec
asserting that Federal law enforcement deployments on city-
owned streets--without notification or coordination--can cause
confusion and threaten National security, and per new Federal
law, must be identifiable when responding to civil disturbance.
12 P.M.--Chief Contee participates in a law enforcement
partners' inauguration briefing hosted by U.S. Capitol Police
Chief Steven Sund. The demonstrations were discussed as well.
4:30 P.M.--D.C. fusion center initiates intelligence
coordination calls with law enforcement partners.
Wednesday, January 6, 2021
9 A.M.--D.C. fusion center leads intelligence coordinating
call with fusion centers in Maryland and Virginia; MPD; U.S.
Park Police; USCP; and the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security.
12:58 P.M.--USCP requests MPD assistance at the U.S.
Capitol. MPD immediately authorizes deployment of 2 platoons to
the west front of the U.S. Capitol and puts third platoon on
standby at Third Street S.W. and Maryland Avenue S.W.
1:01 P.M.--USCP requests FEMS assistance at the U.S.
Capitol.
1:03 P.M.--MPD advises USCP they have arrived on the scene.
1:16 P.M.--Contee calls Mayor Bowser to provide situational
update.
1:18 P.M.--FEMS arrives at U.S. Capitol.
1:29 P.M.--Contee calls Donahue to provide situational
update from U.S. Capitol.
1:30 P.M.--FEMS Engine 18 establishes Incident Command at
U.S. Capitol.
1:35 P.M.--Mayor Bowser joins call with Contee and Donahue
and approves city-wide curfew.
1:49 P.M.--MPD declares a riot at the U.S. Capitol.
Following this declaration, Mayor Bowser speaks with SecArmy.
1:56 P.M.--Media reports large crowds aggressively probing
barricade lines on east side of U.S. Capitol.
1:59 P.M.--FEMS representative arrives at U.S. Capitol
Police Headquarters.
2:03 P.M.--Media reports barricade has been breached.
2:10 P.M.--Director Rodriguez calls USCP Chief Sund asking
what support is needed immediately; Sund replies he needs
anything that can be provided. With MPD and FEMS already at the
Capitol under the Mayor's authority, Rodriguez offers to set up
a call with DCNG and MPD to outline USCP's specific needs for
DCNG support. This can only be approved by SecArmy and A/
SecDef, and DCNG includes staff of SecArmy on the call.
2:22 P.M.--Rodriguez convenes a call for USCP with MPD,
FEMS, DCNG, and staff of SecArmy to ensure coordination; other
D.C. government officials listen in, including Mayor Bowser. On
the call, USCP requests immediate DCNG support from General
Walker and staff of SecArmy. Contee directly asks Sund if he is
requesting DCNG at the U.S. Capitol. Sund says yes. In
response, staff of SecArmy says they are not comfortable
sending DCNG to the Capitol to confront peaceful protestors
without a comprehensive plan. MPD has already been on scene at
the U.S. Capitol for over an hour.
2:25 P.M.--On behalf of USCP, the District EOC issues EMAC
requests to Virginia and Maryland for 200 State Troopers from
each State (400 total).
2:28 P.M.--Curfew announced effective 6 P.M. to 6 A.M. city-
wide.
2:31 P.M.--Mayor's Office contacts the White House Executive
Office of the President and staff-level conversations commence.
2:39 P.M.--Falcicchio calls counterparts in Maryland and
Virginia to confirm formal requests have been made, and both
confirm Governors are approving resources to the District of
Columbia.
2:40 P.M.--Mayor Bowser declares a State of Emergency.
2:53 P.M.--EOC convenes a call with Virginia, Maryland,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, and West Virginia emergency management
officials, as well as FEMA Region III, to discuss resource
needs for USCP.
2:54 P.M.--HSEMA issues city-wide Wireless Emergency Alert
declaring a city-wide curfew will be in effect from 6 P.M. to 7
A.M. the next day.
2:54 P.M.--Dozens of House Members and staff are escorted
from the floor.
2:56 P.M.--Mayor Bowser speaks with Mark Meadows, Chief of
Staff to President Trump.
2:59 P.M.--HSEMA confirms Virginia State Police is in
contact with USCP.
3:05 P.M.--New Jersey counterpart contacts Falcicchio
offering resources.
3:10 P.M.--EOC releases additional EMAC request to New
Jersey for 75 State Troopers.
3:26 P.M.--Mayor Bowser speaks with Secretary of the Army,
who confirms USCP request for DCNG support has been approved.
3:30 P.M.--Mayor Bowser calls Speaker Pelosi and House
leaders.
3:30 P.M.--HSEMA convenes the Chief Operations Officers/
Senior Emergency Managers from all District agencies to discuss
consequence management.
3:35 P.M.--Mayor Bowser and Chief Contee brief the Council.
4:30 P.M.--HSEMA convenes the CMT.
4:31 P.M.--Meadows calls to confirm National Guard approval.
4:45 P.M.--Mayor Bowser holds news conference with Contee,
McCarthy, Rodriguez, and Donnelly.
6 P.M.--USCP begin fully searching each room inside of the
Capitol and sweeping with K-9s.
6:29 P.M.--MPD was notified that the U.S. Capitol has been
secured with no rioters visible inside.
7:15 P.M.--MPD begins arresting individuals breaking the
Mayor's curfew order.
10:49 P.M.--Mayor Bowser holds news conference with Contee,
Rodriguez, and Donnelly.
Thursday, January 7, 2021
Mayor Bowser provides situational update with Contee,
McCarthy, Mitchell, Rodriguez, and Donnelly.
Friday, January 8, 2021
On behalf of Mayor Bowser, Director Rodriguez requests an
extension of DCNG support for MPD and FEMS through January 25,
2021.
Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson for Elizabeth Neumann
Question 1. On January 27 DHS put out a Terrorism Advisory bulletin
to warn the public about the on-going domestic terrorism threat that
manifested itself as an attack on our democracy on January 6. The
bulletin states that ``some ideologically-motivated violent extremists
with objections to the exercise of governmental authority and the
Presidential transition, as well as other perceived grievances fueled
by false narratives, could continue to mobilize to incite or commit
violence.'' Were there any warnings the bulletin left unsaid that you
would pass on the American public? What changes, if any, do you
recommend to the National Terrorism Advisory System?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. In April 2020 the State Department designated the
Russian Imperial Movement (RIM) as a Specially-Designated Global
terrorist, putting them in the same league as al-Qaeda, Hizballah, and
others. This is the first time a White Supremacist group such as RIM
has been given this label. Given the transnational nature of the
threat, do other groups need this label? From your time at DHS, can you
describe what input DHS had with the State Department toward a
designation like this?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question From Honorable Donald M. Payne, Jr. for Elizabeth Neumann
Question. In your testimony on February 4, you stated: ``the longer
that this lie is allowed to stay out there, so it's really important
for credible voices within the community to come out very clearly and
explain the election was not stolen, that there was not enough fraud to
overturn the results of the election, and it helped us retreat that
pool of vulnerable individuals.'' (sic)
Later you said: ``We need more credible voices to be speaking out
calling for calm, telling the truth, that reduces our vulnerability.''
Can you please share with the committee:
Who are these ``credible voices''?
What messages are they currently saying?
What language could they use that would help to reduce our
vulnerability to further attacks?
Can you share some examples of political leaders or other
``credible voices'' disavowing rumors, lies, and extremism to
help reduce tensions and further a peace process?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Honorable James Langevin for Elizabeth Neumann
Question 1a. What measurement tools and metrics about the
information environment would you have found useful in your role at
DHS, had they been available?
What offices or resources are available in the Department today to
develop and operationalize these metrics?
Question 1b. What outside resources could be utilized or used in
partnership with DHS to monitor the information environment?
Question 1c. What guidelines on boundaries and constraints would be
necessary before implementing monitoring tools, such that freedom of
thought and expression would be threatened neither in fact nor in the
public's perception?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2a. You stated that the Department of Homeland Security
would be an appropriate agency to take the lead on counter-messaging
and information resilience, in strong partnership with other agencies.
Which office or agency within DHS should take the lead, or do you
recommend creating a new office?
Which other State, local, or Federal agencies should be in
partnership?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2b. What kinds of counter-messaging programs would be
appropriate? Would you support:
i. Public service announcements and information awareness education
on broadcast media?
ii. Public service announcements and information awareness
education on internet media (YouTube, Facebook, Twitter)?
iii. Peer-to-peer outreach such as the college program you
mentioned (more information about this would be welcome)?
iv. Faith-based programs?
v. Mental health programs?
vi. School education programs?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3a. You recommended that Congress codify DHS's Office of
Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention.
What would be an appropriate size, structure, and budget for the
office?
Question 3b. What proportion of the office's attention should be
directed to threats of foreign origin such as ISIS, versus home-grown
extremism?
Question 3c. What additional programs would you recommend for this
office above and beyond its current activities?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Ranking Member John Katko for Elizabeth Neumann
Question 1. You were invited as a witness at the hearing titled
``Examining the Domestic Terrorism Threat in the Wake of the Attack on
the U.S. Capitol''. It is our understanding that your area of expertise
at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) focused on threat
prevention and more specifically traveler vetting and terrorism
prevention.
What function do the offices of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) and
the Office of Operations (OPS) play in real-time response and
coordination regarding civil unrest and domestic attacks? Is it correct
that you did not work in either of these offices during your time at
DHS?
What role would you have played in the DHS response had you been in
your previous position of Assistant Secretary for Counterterrorism and
Threat Prevention on January 6?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. During your time at DHS you were responsible for
pushing initiatives regarding terrorism prevention and domestic
terrorism at DHS.
The DHS Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Targeted
Violence--how long did that strategy take to produce? What level of
outside contract help was involved in the final production of the
framework?
The Implementation Plan for that strategy was due in January 2020.
Yet, when you left in April 2020, that plan was not completed. What led
to the delay in completion? Recently, DHS issued an NTAS Bulletin
regarding domestic threats. Do you agree with that Bulletin? If so, how
many times did you personally advocate for such a Bulletin during your
time at the Department?
How many times did you speak with the Secretary regarding your
concerns that DHS was not doing enough in the domestic terrorism space?
What domestic terrorism initiatives did you push forward to DHS
leadership that they declined to act on?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. During the hearing on February 4 you advocated for the
codification of a Domestic Terrorism criminal statute because it would
pose a ``deterrent effect''. Do you believe that actors like Timothy
McVeigh or the perpetrator responsible for planting pipe bombs at the
Democratic and Republican National Committee Headquarters' on January 6
did so because they did not believe they would suffer serious criminal
consequences for their actions?
What legal or legislative education and experience do you have
which leads you to this conclusion?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4. You have been outspoken about former President Trump.
Yet, you worked for him for almost 3 years. During that time E.O.
13769, titled Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into
the United States, politically labeled as a Muslim Ban, was implemented
(understanding that your office was responsible for putting together
the Department's travel vetting and restrictions). During your time at
DHS, did you advocate for or against the travel restrictions--either at
the Department, with the interagency, or before Congress?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Ranking Member John Katko for Jonathan Greenblatt
Question 1. During the hearing you spoke about the impact of social
media on the domestic terrorism landscape. What do you see as the ideal
way to address this issue legislatively? Does this involve section 230
and/or other possible legislative measures?
Answer. Social media has had a profound impact on the domestic
terrorism landscape. Extremists use social media to spread
disinformation, amplify conspiracy theories, gain political aims,
recruit followers, and provoke violence. They find ways to engage on
mainstream social media platforms like Twitter, Facebook, Youtube, as
well as emerging platforms like Parler, and the Dark Web (e.g., Gab,
DLive, america.win). Today, there is a profound distrust of Government
and institutions and the mainstreaming and normalization of these
beliefs (including virulently antisemitic and racist conspiracy
theories) is unprecedented--millions of Americans believe in QAnon
conspiracies and other extremist ideologies. The ability for extremists
to spread their message as far and wide as possible is because of
social media and the complicity of the tech companies running
platforms. This has led to dangerous activity on-line and on the
ground, including the insurrection at the Capitol. To adequately
address this legislatively, Congress must consider the many areas that
impact social media's complicity to domestic terrorism because there is
no single fix to this multifaceted issue.
First, Congress must increase platform accountability--including by
reforming Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. Tech companies
must be held accountable for their roles in facilitating genocide,
extremist violence, and egregious civil rights abuses. Relief, however,
must prioritize both civil rights and civil liberties concerns and not
result in an overbroad suppression of free speech. While many lawmakers
and policy experts have focused on reforming CDA 230, it is important
to acknowledge that this is a single step in a much larger process.
This is especially important because Section 230 reform is unlikely to
affect much of the ``lawful but awful'' hate that is devastatingly
common on the internet because that speech is protected by the First
Amendment. In light of this, the Government must also pass laws that
require regular reporting, increased transparency, and independent
audits regarding content moderation, algorithms, and engagement
features.
Second, Congress must ensure platforms put people over profit. Tech
company algorithms are designed to optimize for user engagement because
keeping people on the platform for as long as possible, to see as many
ads as possible, generates revenue. Government must focus on how
consumers and advertisers are impacted by a business model that
optimizes for engagement and consider how algorithmic amplification and
monopolistic power can fuel hate. They should ensure algorithms are
ethical and fair, so that groups associated with hate, misinformation,
or conspiracies are not recommended to users--even if it results in
less engagement from users.
Third, interrupting disinformation and finding off-ramps and
effective mitigation strategies to mitigate recruitment and
radicalization to extremist violence is a critical issue that requires
a whole-of-Government and society approach. Many individuals have been
radicalized on social media to the point of storming the Capitol or
committing other acts of domestic terrorism. Disinformation has had,
and continues to have, profound risks for our democracy. It is a threat
to National security. Government must find civil rights-protecting ways
to undermine disinformation and provide resources to civil society
organizations working to counter it, such as by supporting the grant
program run by the DHS Office for Targeted Violence and Terrorism
Prevention (TVTP). Congress must investigate the impact of platforms'
product designs that allow hatemongers and extremists to exploit
digital social platforms and spread anti-democratic and hate-based
disinformation.
Question 2. In your experience, what impact do foreign governments
have on what you describe as the ``growing threat of on-line hate''? Do
you see any way, legislatively or otherwise, to combat this foreign
government influence?
Answer. All governments have a basic responsibility to combat
hatred and the violence that it fuels. But the anonymity of the
internet has increased the ability and the temptation for irresponsible
foreign government actors to use the web for fueling hatred for
political gain, especially given the relatively low costs. Whether the
on-line hate that they fuel is primarily directed at vulnerable groups
at home or abroad, the harm that it causes often knows no national
borders.
The U.S. Government has identified state-linked actors responsible
for trying to intervene in American elections through the promotion of
cyber hate to exacerbate American polarization and societal tensions.
While ADL certainly does not have access to the underlying intelligence
in these assessments, we are alarmed that this may be the case.
Domestically, Congress and the Biden-Harris administration must
prioritize countering the threat posed by any foreign malign influence
that manifests as on-line hate that impacts Americans. Once on-line
hate has impacted Americans, the tools to counter it are those that we
may use whether the hate is fueled by foreign governments or our own
citizens--a comprehensive approach to expose, prevent, investigate, and
prosecute that hate, when applicable depending on the context. U.S.
actions to expose, deter, and punish foreign government perpetrators
are important, and should be considered, but they are only part of the
solution. Globally, a U.S. foreign policy approach that proactively
encourages pluralism and offsetting such hateful narratives are also an
important part of addressing this challenge. Here at home, we must
engage on countering on-line hate wherever we see it, including by
establishing an independent clearinghouse for on-line extremism that
can serve--independently from the U.S. Government--as a mechanism to
refer on-line extremism that may indicate criminal behavior to law
enforcement, therefore stemming the tide of on-line extremism while
protecting civil liberties.
While many of our allies are already taking pro-active steps to
combat the evolving threat of extremism, both on-line and off-line,
much remains to be done. We must take steps to support multilateral
cooperation and promote global best practices, while at the same time
committing adequate resources to improving our domestic responses to
on-line hate.
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