[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 117-52]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES HEARING
ON
FISCAL YEAR 2022 BUDGET REQUEST
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
FOR FIXED-WING TACTICAL AND TRAINING AIRCRAFT PROGRAMS
__________
HEARING HELD
JULY 13, 2021
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
45-620 WASHINGTON : 2022
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES
DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey, Chairman
RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia
MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey, Vice SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
Chair MATT GAETZ, Florida
KAIALI'I KAHELE, Hawaii DON BACON, Nebraska
MARC A. VEASEY, Texas MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee
STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida RONNY JACKSON, Texas
STEVEN HORSFORD, Nevada
Heath Bope, Professional Staff Member
Kelly Repair, Professional Staff Member
Caroline Kehrli, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Hartzler, Hon. Vicky, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces........... 3
Norcross, Hon. Donald, a Representative from New Jersey,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces......... 1
WITNESSES
Costello, Darlene, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics...................... 5
Fick, Lt Gen Eric, USAF, Program Executive Officer, F-35 Joint
Program Office................................................. 13
Loiselle, RADM Andrew, USN, Director, Air Warfare Division
(OPNAV/N98), United States Navy................................ 9
Ludwigson, Jon, Director, Contracting and National Security
Acquisitions, Government Accountability Office................. 14
Nahom, Lt Gen David S., USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and
Programs, United States Air Force.............................. 6
Nogueira, Joseph, Acting Director, Cost Assessment and Program
Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of Defense................. 12
Stefany, Frederick J., Acting Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Research, Development and Acquisition.......................... 7
O'Toole, Dr. Raymond D., Jr., Acting Director, Operational Test
and Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of Defense............. 11
Wise, LtGen Mark R., USMC, Deputy Commandant for Aviation, United
States Marine Corps............................................ 8
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Costello, Darlene, joint with Lt Gen David S. Nahom.......... 48
Fick, Lt Gen Eric............................................ 104
Ludwigson, Jon............................................... 123
Nogueira, Joseph............................................. 99
Norcross, Hon. Donald........................................ 45
O'Toole, Dr. Raymond D., Jr.................................. 91
Stefany, Frederick J., joint with LtGen Mark R. Wise and RADM
Andrew Loiselle............................................ 73
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Dr. Jackson.................................................. 151
Mr. Kahele................................................... 151
Mr. Veasey................................................... 151
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]
.
FISCAL YEAR 2022 BUDGET REQUEST OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FOR FIXED-WING
TACTICAL AND TRAINING AIRCRAFT PROGRAMS
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, July 13, 2021.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:02 p.m., via
Webex, Hon. Donald Norcross (chairman of the subcommittee)
presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD NORCROSS, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM NEW JERSEY, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND
LAND FORCES
Mr. Norcross. Well, I would like to call this hearing to
order.
I would like to welcome everyone to our hearing, and to my
good friend, Mrs. Hartzler from Missouri, and--for her
participation in putting this hearing together.
This is the mandatory remote hearing script that you have
all heard many times, and we will repeat it today.
I welcome all the members remotely joining today's hearing.
Members participating must be visible on screen for the
purposes of identifying and verification, establishing and
maintaining a quorum, participating in proceedings, and voting.
Members must continue to use the software platform video
function the entire time while they are in attendance, unless
experiencing connectivity issues or other technical problems
that render them unable to participate on camera.
If a member is experiencing technical difficulties, they
should contact committee staff for assistance. Video of members
participating on Cisco Webex is being broadcast via HASC's
[House Armed Services Committee's] internet livestream.
Members must seek recognition verbally and are asked to
mute their microphones when not speaking, to eliminate
background noises.
Members may leave and rejoin the proceedings. However, if
members depart the hearing for a short while for reasons other
than joining a different proceeding, they should leave the
video function on. If members will be absent for a significant
period or to depart to join different proceedings, they should
exit the platform entirely and then rejoin it when they return.
Members may use the software platform chat feature to
mute--to communicate with staff regarding only technical or
logistic support issues. I have designated a committee staff
member to, if necessary, mute unrecognized members' microphones
to cancel any inadvertent background noise that may disrupt the
proceedings.
With that, I would like to turn to my opening statement.
Again, to welcome our distinguished panel of witnesses for
joining us today for the fiscal 2022 budget request of the
Department of Defense for fixed-wing tactical and training
aircraft programs.
Today's hearing on tactical aviation is certainly one of
the most important annual oversight events we hold in this
subcommittee. This year, the hearing, even though complicated
by the transition of a new administration, to the extreme
lateness of the budget submission, and our committee's tight
timeline for building this year's defense authorization bill,
certainly more important than ever.
This afternoon, we will be receiving remote testimony from
a very large panel, nine senior acquisition aviation leaders
from across the Department of Defense. We will also hear from
GAO [Government Accountability Office] representative, our
independent agency helping us evaluate investment decisions and
execution of challenging, particularly the F-35 program.
Overall, we are at a critical inflection point and time for
the tactical fighter aviation requiring the subcommittee's
consideration, deliberation, and certainly decision making.
Each military service before us today has proposed significant
initiatives in this budget that will begin to reshape the
tactical fighter air forces to achieve what they describe as
capabilities required to meet the challenges to deter and, if
necessary, act against a near-peer threat of the future.
But what concerns me about DOD's [Department of Defense's]
current appearance is a deliberate indifference that the steady
state, rotational requirements that our continuing global
military presence, responding to contingencies below the level
of highly contested warfare, are no longer applicable, and I
certainly would disagree with that.
DOD currently equates the term ``legacy'' to mean old,
irrelevant, dangerous, unacceptable in meeting our current or
future requirements. I certainly disagree with this. I would
offer that ``legacy'' should instead be replaced by
``existing,'' and that we should reference current force
structure as existing force structure. And when assessing the
existing force structure, it should be evaluated against a
particular mission set for its relevancy or irrelevancy
supporting that particular mission or strategic or operational
risk associated with any gap in its availability or capacity.
I believe that our aircraft capabilities do need to evolve
and keep pace with our global competitors, which is a wide
spectrum depending on which competitor we are trying to
influence to achieve our national defense strategic objectives.
I also believe that we need to maintain and achieve a proper
effective ratio of existing and next-generation aircraft
capabilities to meet those diverse missions and a level of risk
that is well defined, clearly explained, and truly acceptable.
Further, we cannot fiscally afford to divest in any
existing aircraft in favor of buying the next-generation high-
end capabilities and cannot fiscally afford having our next-
generation high-end aircraft supporting the enduring steady
state presence or lesser contingency operation of our combatant
commanders.
The current design and capability of the F-15EX is not the
same as the F-15C that rolled out back in the seventies. The
current design capabilities of the F/A-18 Block III Super
Hornet is not the same as the original F/A-18 Hornet that
rolled out back in the eighties. The F-35 and F-22 are perfect
cases in this point as it relates to realistic affordability
and planning to buy large numbers of advanced next-generation
aircraft.
Those two aircraft, very capable and sophisticated when
they work as designed, but neither currently works as intended
often enough, and both are extremely expensive to own and
operate. This requires us to understand how both the Air Force
and Navy next-generation air dominance programs plan to avoid
and mitigate the development and affordability pitfalls of the
F-22 and the F-35 that experience or are experiencing as this
case may be for the F-35.
For this hearing, we need to understand the path that each
of the services is on to achieve that relevant mix of both
combat and training aircraft capabilities while maintaining
affordability and acceptable risk informed by our fiscal
realities.
Speaking of the F-35, we had a very productive hearing
already back on April 22 this year. I don't want to rehash all
those issues that we know so well today.
For the record, I still maintain the same concerns that
were raised at that April 22 meeting, and, therefore, the
subcommittee today expects to receive F-35 program updates on
the status of resolving current maintenance and availability
issues regarding the F135 propulsion system power modules; the
current status of TR-3/Block 4 developments and testing; and
how the F-35 is progressing to achieve the cost-per-tail-per-
year affordability goals set by each of the services,
particularly as it relates to the adaptive engine transition
program technology will be finished and integrated into the F-
35A and C models. This will help reduce the skyrocketing
sustainment cost and improve combat capability.
Certainly a lot on our plate with many distinguished
speakers, but first I would like to recognize our ranking
member of the TAC Forces [Tactical Air and Land Forces
Subcommittee], Mrs. Hartzler, for her opening remarks.
Vicky.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Norcross can be found in the
Appendix on page 45.]
STATEMENT OF HON. VICKY HARTZLER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND
FORCES
Mrs. Hartzler. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank each of our witnesses for their dedicated
service to this Nation, for your support of our service men and
women and each of their families, and for being here to provide
testimony on the budget request for fixed-wing tactical and
training aircraft modernization programs.
Recognizing the hard decisions and challenges imposed on
all of you by the President's proposed budget top line, I look
forward to working together to determine what is the right
balance to prioritize and fund both current tactical readiness
and modernization investments required for future capabilities.
It is critical that our tactical fighter aircraft force is
capable of keeping pace, deterring, and, if necessary--
[inaudible] and lethality of your fighter aircraft fleets. And
I look forward to the discussion [inaudible]----
Mr. Norcross. Excuse me one moment.
Mrs. Hartzler [continuing]. Are capable and ready to deter
our adversaries in the near term as well.
From a strategic and operational risk management
perspective, I expect the witnesses to address how their future
[inaudible] plans are impacting the current readiness and
sustainment of existing tactical aircraft capabilities. I have
consistently expressed my concerns that the Navy's decision to
end procurement of the F/A-18 Super Hornet beginning in fiscal
year 2022 creates too much operational risk in the near term
given the Navy's current shortfall of 49 aircraft.
I want a full assessment from today's military witnesses of
the risks, specifically in terms of potential aircraft
shortfalls, gaps in capabilities, industrial base impacts, and
future costs each of the military services is accepting within
its existing tactical air programs in order to develop and buy
the fighter aircraft fleets of the future.
This information is critical for myself and members of the
subcommittee as we review the military services' plans for
divestments, decreasing fleet sizes, squadron relocations, and
significant unfunded priority requests, and to make decisions
for this year's Defense Authorization Act.
So I thank the chairman for organizing this important
hearing, and I yield back.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you.
I am not sure if I was the only one that was not hearing
your full testimony, but I believe I am looking at others that
are having difficulty, Vicky, just to give you a heads-up.
With that, I would like to turn to our panel of nine
witnesses who are joining us today.
First, we have Ms. Darlene Costello, Acting Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics; Lieutenant General David Nahom, Deputy Chief of
Staff for the Air Force for Plans and Programs; Mr. Jay
Stefany, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research,
Development and Acquisition; Lieutenant General Mark Wise,
Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Aviation; Rear
Admiral Andrew Loiselle, Director of Navy's Air Warfare
Division; Dr. Raymond O'Toole, Jr., Acting Director of
Operational Test and Evaluation for Department of Defense; Mr.
Joseph Nogueira, Acting Director of Cost Assessment and Program
Evaluation for the Department of Defense; Lieutenant General
Eric Fick, F-35 Program Executive Officer; and Mr. Jon
Ludwigson, Director of Contracting and National Support--
Security Acquisition for the GAO, the Government Accounting
Office.
With that, we would ask each of our witnesses to try to
adhere to the 3-minute opening remark. And we will go right
down the order as I just introduced you, starting with Ms.
Darlene Costello.
STATEMENT OF DARLENE COSTELLO, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
THE AIR FORCE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS
Ms. Costello. Good afternoon. Chairman Norcross, Ranking
Member Hartzler, and distinguished members of the subcommittee,
thank you for having us here today to provide testimony of the
Department of the Air Force's fiscal year 2022 budget request
for fixed-wing tactical and training aircraft programs.
Additionally, I want to thank you for your continued
leadership and dedication to the United States military and
Department of the Air Force.
Air superiority is essential for military operations and
protection of joint forces, and it has been our asymmetric
advantage for more than 70 years. To keep pace with emerging
threats, we must refresh our fighter fleet with a mix of
fourth-generation and fifth-generation aircraft as well as
selectively modernizing our existing aircraft to ensure the
right capacity and capability to fully implement the National
Defense Strategy.
In the fiscal year 2022 budget request, the Air Force
TACAIR [tactical aircraft] portfolio of approximately $12.2
billion includes procurement of 48 F-35s, 12 F-15EXs, key
modifications to both our F-22 and fourth-generation fleets,
and investment in technologies for our next-generation air
dominance efforts.
In addition, we have requested $2.7 billion to not only
continue procurement of some of our key munitions, but also to
invest in munition technologies to counter future peer threats
in highly contested environments.
The F-35A will be the cornerstone of the Air Force fighter
fleet for decades. We are fully committed to the F-35 and its
fifth-generation capabilities. While sustainment costs have
come down, they are still not where we need them to be. We are
evaluating opportunities to further reduce the cost of material
and manpower and will continue to work with the Joint Program
Office and industry to address affordability.
The A-10 remains an effective close air support platform
for the current fight, rewinging the A-10's most significant
modernization effort, and we have purchased wings to outfit a
fleet of 218 aircraft. In fiscal year 2022, we will continue
executing fiscal year 2021 funding to begin installs and
support engineering change orders and other government costs
that are typically required to execute major modification
efforts.
Our investment in next-generation air dominance
technologies is critical to ensuring air dominance within the
emerging threat environment for future joint operations. In
this program, we are incorporating agile and digital
acquisition practices that are yielding favorable results and
providing greater value for the taxpayer.
In terms of propulsion, in the extensive prototype ground
testing, we continue to demonstrate and validate the benefits
of adaptive engines. These include increases in fuel
efficiency, thrust, thermal management capacity, all of which
can translate to the warfighter as increased range, more air
time, and aircraft capability.
Again, thank you for your leadership and support of the
Department of the Air Force. Lieutenant General Nahom and I
look forward to answering any questions you may have for us.
Thank you.
[The joint prepared statement of Ms. Costello and General
Nahom can be found in the Appendix on page 48.]
Mr. Norcross. Thank you.
Lieutenant General.
STATEMENT OF LT GEN DAVID S. NAHOM, USAF, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
FOR PLANS AND PROGRAMS, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
General Nahom. Chairman Norcross, Ranking Member Hartzler,
and distinguished members of this subcommittee, thank you for
having us here today to provide testimony on our fiscal year
2022 budget request for the Department of Defense for fixed-
wing tactical and training programs.
Additionally, thank you for your continued leadership and
dedication to the United States military and the Department of
the Air Force's 689,000 total force airmen serving around the
world today.
As you know, our Nation faces a complex set of current and
future security challenges that require we think and act
differently and with urgency. Our citizens face threats from a
variety of actors in physical and digital arenas, and our
competitors continue aggressive efforts to negate our
longstanding warfighting advantages.
As we continue to work with each of you, it is becoming
apparent that our collective understanding of the threat is
increasing, and we are waking up to this challenge. Together,
under this committee's oversight and leadership, along with our
industry partners, and innovative airmen, we remain a
preeminent power projection force in the world today.
In light of this, I would like to briefly outline some core
elements in our tactical and training portfolio that we regard
as of specific interest to you.
Extensive wargaming and analysis make it clear that we must
reassess our future fighter force mix and adjust investment
priorities to provide the capability and capacity and
affordability required to meet the peer threat. Modernization
programs cannot transform our fourth-generation fighters into
fifth-generation or fifth-generation fighters into the next-
generation air dominance.
In concert with the Office of Secretary of Defense, the Air
Force is in the final stages of a comprehensive tactical air
study that will help inform our decision to build the correct
mix of capability and quantity that our Nation needs to win
against near-peer competitors. We have recently reviewed some
of the preliminary findings from these studies, and we will
gladly share the results once we have finished our final
analysis.
Regarding the F-35, it is a cornerstone of a future fighter
fleet, but it is still--is still complementary to other
capabilities required for a winged force mix. While the F-35
today is a formidable platform, it faces challenges to ensure
it stays dominant against an evolving future threat.
To keep pace with the threat in future contested scenarios,
follow-on modernization efforts centered on Block 4 enabled by
Tech Refresh 3 hardware must be affordably realized on
competition-relevant timelines.
The F-35 operating costs, as currently projected, and long-
term sustainment costs are areas of concern and need to be
continued--need continued focus to work to address
affordability.
For the remainder of our fighter force, the Air Force is
building complementary capabilities with the F-15EX, adding
next-generation air dominance. The F-15EX will provide a role
in critical infrastructure defense and the ability to employ
outsized weapons. NGAD, or next-generation air dominance, which
benefits from full digital engineering and production, is a
revolutionary leap forward in capability that will help us
ensure air superiority for the joint force in any future
scenario.
I am honored to serve on the same team as Ms. Costello, and
we look forward to answering all your questions regarding our
tactical and training aircraft programs.
Mr. Norcross. [Inaudible] you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF FREDERICK J. STEFANY, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF THE NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION
Mr. Stefany. Oh, thank you, sir.
Chairman Norcross, Ranking Member Hartzler, distinguished
members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today to discuss the Department of Navy's
tactical aviation programs.
Sustaining our naval TACAIR superiority is critical to
engaging in competition now and winning the high-end fight if
necessary. We thank Congress and this committee for your
support over these programs.
Department of Navy is committed to investing in the
aviation and strike weapon programs we need to support our
national security priorities. In fiscal year 2021, we will
deliver 54 new manned aircraft and 4 unmanned aircraft to Navy
and Marine Corps units. These aircraft will improve our
aviation capabilities to address the pacing threat.
To fulfill our Nation's commitment now and our strategic
investments in the future, the fiscal year 2022 budget request
includes funding to procure 48 new fixed-wing aircraft. Most of
these aircraft are fifth-generation Joint Strike Fighters,
including 20 F-35C carrier variants and 17 F-35B short takeoff
and vertical landing variants. The budget request also
maintains consistent aviation depot funding and increased
flying hours funding, both of which will improve our aviation
readiness.
To address a couple items in your invitation letter, during
the fiscal year 2022 budget development process, the Navy
identified an opportunity to drive efficiencies into our
operational test squadrons. The Department will maintain full
operational test capability of F-35, F/A-18E through Gs, and
other high-end systems, including our Next Generation Jammers
and IRST [Infrared Search and Track].
However, with aviation capitalization nearing completion,
in fiscal year 2022, we will execute some manning reassignments
from our operational test squadrons while maintaining the rigor
and sufficiency required to--for effective weapons system
operational tests through the combined use of developmental
testing and fleet squadron assets.
As the service--as the current service acquisition
executive for the Joint Strike Fighter program, I am working
closely with all three U.S. services, the Office of Secretary
of Defense, Joint Strike Fighter Program Office, and our
industry partners, to continue reducing the program's costs and
ensuring timely warfighting capability upgrades, all while
implementing a sustainment strategy that meets the fleet's
needs. That starts with having predictable schedules and
realistic cost estimates for all development and sustainment
efforts, and that has been my focus this year.
For example, after much discovery and cost [inaudible] last
year, the tech refresh development effort has been on budget
for the last two quarters and is tracking to meet the required
Lot 15 cut-in of that capability.
We are also working closely with our industry and the Joint
Strike Fighter organic engine heavy maintenance facility at
Tinker Air Force Base on the depot repair recovery efforts.
These efforts focus on increasing power module throughput by
reducing the technical assistance timelines; standing up a
second shift at the depot; accelerating the planned stand-up of
additional enterprise depot capacity at various locations, such
as FRC [Fleet Readiness Center] Southeast; and increasing
engine time on wing through module and mini module sparing.
Overall, this budget represents the deliberate and informed
development of a modernized--sorry--modernized, integrated,
all-domain naval force for the future fight to meet an
uncertain and complex security environment.
Thank you once again for the opportunity to appear before
your subcommittee today, and we all look forward to your
questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Stefany, General Wise,
and Admiral Loiselle can be found in the Appendix on page 73.]
Mr. Norcross. Thank you.
Lieutenant General Mark Wise, you are now recognized.
STATEMENT OF LTGEN MARK R. WISE, USMC, DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR
AVIATION, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
General Wise. Yes, sir.
Chairman Norcross, Ranking Member Hartzler, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you and discuss the Marine Corps
plan for tactical aviation.
First, I will address our existing TACAIR capabilities. The
F/A-18 Hornet and the AV-8B Harrier have served us well and are
now the Marine Corps bridging platforms for our transition to
fifth-generation fighter aircraft. They have benefited from
continuous readiness and sustainment investments we initiated
in fiscal year 2017. Both platforms are capable and ready but
require continuous modernization to maintain lethality,
survivability, and fifth-generation interoperability.
Programs to extend the service life of the Hornet, such as
the high flight hour and center barrel replacement efforts,
have extended the service life up to 10,000 hours. The aircraft
will operate until fiscal year 2030.
The AV-8B effort, called reclamation in lieu of production,
provides F402 engines to account for planned attrition through
the Harrier sundown at the end of fiscal year 2027.
Next, as we address our peer and near-peer competitors in
today's great power competition, we continue to broaden and
deepen our understanding and experience with the F-35 Lightning
II.
The F-35C will integrate and deploy for all Marine Corps
global force commitments, to include carrier air wings as part
of TACAIR integration with the Navy. The F-35B, which can land
vertically, will deploy with Marine expeditionary units and
elsewhere.
As we continue our transition to F-35, we have two fleet
replacement training squadrons, six operational line squadrons,
and have provided aircraft to one operational test squadron.
Operationally, the Marine Corps F-35Bs are deployed
currently with the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit in the
INDOPACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command] area of responsibility.
Additionally, 10 F-35Bs are deployed aboard Her Majesty's Ship
Queen Elizabeth as part of the Carrier Strike Group 21 joint
deployment of the United Kingdom, United States, and the
Netherlands.
With respect to force posture related to our Commandant's
Force Design 2030, the Marine Corps contracted with Johns
Hopkins University in 2020 to study our TACAIR transition plan
and force posture. Completed this spring, this study, along
with ongoing wargaming and experimentation, will help determine
the appropriate number and size of Marine Corps F-35 squadrons
in support of force design priorities. Currently, the F-35
program of record remains at 420 total aircraft, 353 Bs and 67
Cs.
As we look to the future, continued investment in the
survivability and lethality of the Lightning II and of its
current and future suite of weapons will ensure we are able to
counter and defeat our peer adversaries and others if asked to
do so. Marine Corps tactical aviation is ready, it is lethal,
and it is fully integrated into operations with our partners of
the United States Navy, the joint force, and is interoperable
with our international partners.
Enabled through continued congressional support, the Navy-
Marine Corps team is deployed forward and postured to address
threats around the clock and around the world.
I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you.
Rear Admiral Loiselle, you are now recognized.
STATEMENT OF RADM ANDREW LOISELLE, USN, DIRECTOR, AIR WARFARE
DIVISION (OPNAV/N98), UNITED STATES NAVY
Admiral Loiselle. Chairman Norcross, Ranking Member
Hartzler, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank
you for the opportunity to appear today and discuss the
Department of the Navy's tactical aviation programs.
TACAIR's striking power within our carrier air wing,
delivered from the 11 most survivable airfields in the world,
the nuclear aircraft carrier, is vital to controlling the seas
and providing long-range fires necessary to win the high-end
fight. As we modernize the carrier air wing to pace the threat,
we continue to balance the correct mix of fourth- and fifth-
generation fighter aircraft.
Today, the Navy is managing F/A-18 inventory requirements
through service life modification, SLM, and previously
authorized procurement, and F-35C requirements through
continued procurement. This month marks the maiden deployment
of the Navy's first F-35C squadron, VFA-147, embarked in USS
Carl Vinson with Carrier Air Wing Two.
The F-35C transition plan is predicated on the stable
procurement profile and on-time delivery. The Navy is committed
to Tech Refresh 3 and Block 4 upgrades for all aircraft in the
Navy's inventory in order to reduce long-term sustainment costs
associated with maintaining both TR-2 and TR-3 configurations.
The Navy will continue to learn and better quantify costs,
mission capable rates, and operations of the F-35C as we
conduct our first deployment and continue transitioning to our
fourth- and fifth-generation mix.
Our operational test squadrons will continue to provide
critical test support to ensure all fixed-wing aircraft are
poised and ready for high-end requirements. Delivering these
transformational capabilities to frontline forces as soon as
possible remains our top priority.
The President's budget 2022 continues the positive trend in
arresting our strike fighter shortfall. F/A-18 SLM, combined
with changes to the master air plan, changes to the Navy
adversary roadmap, and returning 28 Super Hornets from long-
term down status has allowed our strike fighter shortfall to be
eliminated by 2025, according to current annual analysis.
Strike fighter shortfall will be controlled in future years
with the 78 new production F/A-18s that will continue to come
off the line through 2025 and varying the SLM induction rate as
required. Our focus on increased aircraft availability with a
commitment to appropriate mission capable rates allows us to
manage the correct footprint of tactical aircraft across the
naval aviation enterprise.
We are laying the groundwork for the highly networked air
wing of the future with the next-generation air dominance
family of systems that leverages manned/unmanned teaming and
will deliver overwhelming firepower in contested spaces in the
years ahead. We are prioritizing funding to accelerate
development of the sixth-generation capability and other key
aviation wholeness investments to ensure the carrier air wing
will maintain dominant strike fighter capability and capacity
to pace the most stressing threat through the 2030s and beyond.
We are developing methods to achieve the required training
and readiness, utilizing tactical surrogates, live virtual
constructive range integration to improve training fidelity at
a reduced cost.
As the naval aviation enterprise manages fiscal
constraints, we thank Congress and this subcommittee for your
continued support of important aviation priorities, including
flight hour funding, critical aircraft upgrades, and investment
in future capabilities.
I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you.
Dr. O'Toole, you are now recognized.
STATEMENT OF DR. RAYMOND D. O'TOOLE, JR., ACTING DIRECTOR,
OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE
Dr. O'Toole. Chairman Norcross, Ranking Member Hartzler,
and distinguished members of the committee, thank you very much
for the opportunity to testify today.
I have submitted a formal statement for the record and
would like to offer just a few introductory comments.
While a majority of the F-35 initial operational tests and
evaluation, including open-air testing, is complete, one
essential element of the T&E [test and evaluation] program
remains: trials in the Joint Simulation Environment, or JSE for
short.
The JSE is the only means, other than actual combat against
a peer adversary, to assess the F-35 against the threat types,
density, and operational scenarios we expect it to face. DOT&E
[Director, Operational Test and Evaluation] therefore cannot
issue its IOT&E [initial operational test and evaluation]
report without the data the JSE would gather from executing the
planned 64 trials.
I cannot yet comment on the F-35's operational
effectiveness, though I can provide, in a closed session, the
results of the F-35/A-10 comparative testing. Suitability
metrics showed signs of slow improvement over time, but in many
areas, still falls short of required thresholds. I cannot
address F-35's survivability in an open forum.
F-35 Block 4 program already is underway. The current
development process, known as Continuous Capability Development
and Delivery, or C2D2, is supposed to deliver a new tested and
verified increment of software every 6 months. However, each
increment has been flawed, more flawed than expected.
Further, software changes intended to add new capabilities
or fix deficiencies have instead introduced stability problems
that adversely affected certain existing F-35 functionality. I
am cautiously hopeful that the program office's decision to
move to a 12-month software cycle will mitigate some of these
issues, but I remain concerned about the ability to conduct
adequate operational T&E of Block 4.
More broadly, DOD's T&E enterprise is now at a crossroads.
DOD's mission success and our national security reflect a
quality of the operational tests and evaluation we perform. A
large number of new and complex technologies are in the
development and acquisition pipeline, and our adversaries
continue to advance their capabilities.
To be able to properly test the systems we intend to buy
against the threats we expect to face, DOD must invest today in
creating a robust T&E infrastructure with both live and
synthetic environments equipped with cutting-edge tools and
staffed by people with deep expertise. Simply put, we cannot
determine a system's combat credibility, nor thoroughly prepare
our warfighters, if our test and training capabilities are not
kept up to date.
DOT&E appreciates the committee's continued emphasis on the
value of T&E and allocation of the resources necessary to
deliver combat-credible systems.
Again, I appreciate the opportunity to be part of this
panel today. As always, I would be happy to meet with any of
you or your staff for a more detailed discussion.
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. O'Toole can be found in the
Appendix on page 91.]
Mr. Norcross. Thank you.
Mr. Nogueira, you are now recognized.
STATEMENT OF JOSEPH NOGUEIRA, ACTING DIRECTOR, COST ASSESSMENT
AND PROGRAM EVALUATION, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Mr. Nogueira. Thank you.
Chairman Norcross, Ranking Member Hartzler, distinguished
members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
discuss the Department of Defense's collaborative effort to
develop, acquire, and operate an appropriate mix of tactical
aircraft. These efforts prioritize China as the pacing
challenge while addressing threats emanating from Russia, Iran,
and North Korea.
I would like to thank your staff and the staffs of the
other defense committees for the hours they have dedicated to
discussing this important topic with us. Their insights have
been very helpful.
In the interest of time, I would like to succinctly address
your three questions to CAPE [Cost Assessment and Program
Evaluation].
First, in support of the fiscal year 2022 budget request,
CAPE conducted several analytic efforts assessing the
capability, capacity, and readiness of the Department's
tactical aircraft. Several of these studies were directed by
Congress, to include the 2020 independent cost estimate for the
F-35 program, and the 2021 assessment of
F/A-18E/F service life modifications. To support major defense
acquisition program milestones, CAPE generated independent cost
estimates for the F-15 Eagle Passive/Active Warning and
Survivability System program, and the Next Generation Jammer
low and mid-band programs. In addition, CAPE oversaw the joint
TACAIR Synthetic Training Analysis of Alternatives and both the
Air Force and Navy Next-Generation Air Dominance Analysis of
Alternatives.
CAPE also conducted other internal analyses directed by
Department leadership to investigate TACAIR survivability,
lethality, overall affordability, and novel concepts of
operation to support combatant commander needs. Taken together,
this work provided critical decision support to the Secretary
and Deputy Secretary in making final decisions in this
portfolio.
Second, as part of the fiscal year 2021 National Defense
Authorization Act, Congress tasked CAPE to complete analyses on
the service acquisition strategies for sixth-generation
aircraft, as well as a nonadvocate review of the Air Force
Digital Century Series business case. Both studies are
currently underway, and CAPE is engaged in detailed discussions
with the program offices, contractors, and other stakeholders
to gain the necessary data and insight to inform the
Department's evolving acquisition approach and satisfy
congressional reporting requirements. The Digital Century
Series business case review should be complete in August, and I
expect to send it to you shortly thereafter.
Third, there are a number of separate but closely related
analytical efforts underway across the Department to determine
the appropriate balance of sixth-, fifth-, and fourth-
generation capabilities. CAPE is leading analysis focused on
TACAIR affordability and the key tradeoffs between capability
and capacity.
The Joint Staff, in coordination with the combatant
commands, is leading the Department's thinking on how TACAIR
should be employed in a future conflict. Finally, the Air Force
and Navy are conducting TACAIR studies focused on assessing
both near- and long-term requirements. The results of these
efforts will inform the National Defense Strategy and decisions
to be captured in the President's fiscal year 2023 budget
submission and associated Future Years Defense Program.
Thank you again for this opportunity, and I look forward to
your questions today and a continuing dialogue about TACAIR
investments.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Nogueira can be found in the
Appendix on page 99.]
Mr. Norcross. Thank you.
Lieutenant General Fick, you are now recognized.
STATEMENT OF LT GEN ERIC FICK, USAF, PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICER,
F-35 JOINT PROGRAM OFFICE
General Fick. Thank you very much.
Chairman Norcross, Ranking Member Hartzler, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for this
opportunity to discuss the F-35 Lightning II program and for
allowing me to address how the F-35 is bringing its exceptional
capabilities to the services' tactical aviation portfolios.
This program continues its dedicated focus on capability,
affordability, and availability, and we will continue to work
with the services to ensure we meet their warfighting
requirements at a price our taxpayers can afford.
Since appearing before this committee in April, F-35s have
continued to deploy and operate worldwide in support of the
United States and our international teammates. In addition to
the INDOPACOM embarkation mentioned by Lieutenant General Wise,
a U.S. Marine Corps F-35B squadron is deployed today with our
U.K. [United Kingdom] allies aboard the HMS Queen Elizabeth,
showcasing the value of the F-35 partnership as well as the
capability and interoperability of this amazing air system. At
the same time, the USS Carl Vinson has embarked on the Navy's
first operational deployment with the F-35C. These deployments
complement those previously conducted by the U.S. Air Force and
the home station and deployed combat operations of our
warfighting customers around the world.
In these environments, around the world and around the
clock, the F-35 continues to deliver war-winning combat
capabilities. More powerful than the hardware itself, however,
these combined operations telegraph impactful messages of
partnership and teaming to our adversaries around the globe.
In our tireless pursuit of affordability, I am pleased to
announce that late last month, the program reached a handshake
agreement with Lockheed Martin on a [fiscal year] 21-23 air
vehicle sustainment contract that emphasizes improved aircraft
full mission capable rates and continues cost reductions for
all our services, partners, and customers.
Over the last 90 days, our TR-3 and Block 4 progress has
stabilized. And while we are not out of the woods yet, I am
encouraged by the team's improved performance in capability,
development, and delivery.
I am similarly pleased with the progress the team is making
on our F-35 logistics systems, including the progress we are
making fielding upgraded ODIN [Operational Data Integrated
Network] hardware and planning for the new ODIN data
environment and software.
Finally, I will share that on 2 June 2021, we completed our
final open-air initial operational test and evaluation trial.
And thanks to the independent assessment of the Joint
Simulation Environment and the successful execution of our May
full-mission threat event, I am increasingly confident we will
be able to continue and complete development of the JSE in
order to execute the final 64 runs of IOT&E.
We will update the Defense Acquisition Executive on our
projected timeline in August, which will inform our acquisition
program baseline and the timing for milestone C and our full-
rate production decision.
The F-35 continues delivering incredible capability to our
warfighters today. The operational value of this air system
will only improve as we continue to drive cost out of the
program, expand our global sustainment enterprise, and deliver
future increments of capability that will outpace our enemies
and serve as the foundation of the multidomain integrated
warfighting concepts and development now across the Department.
Thank you for your time today. I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of General Fick can be found in the
Appendix on page 104.]
Mr. Norcross. Thank you.
Mr. Ludwigson, you are now recognized.
STATEMENT OF JON LUDWIGSON, DIRECTOR, CONTRACTING AND NATIONAL
SECURITY ACQUISITIONS, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Ludwigson. Chairman Norcross, Ranking Member Hartzler,
and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity
to discuss GAO's F-35 acquisition work.
The F-35 remains DOD's most expensive acquisition, intended
to provide decades of air power superiority, replacing a large
portion of our tactical fleet, and serving critical roles in
the fleets of our allies.
GAO has examined the F-35 since inception. The program has
not always followed [inaudible] acquisition leading practices.
It has moved ahead despite recurring challenges. Our earlier
reports raised concerns about technology maturity, high levels
of concurrency, unrealistic cost and schedule estimates, and
the prospect of deferred capabilities.
Much has been done at great cost to turn the idea of the F-
35 into an operational aircraft. The baseline development
program is nearly complete, but as I will discuss, key
challenges remain.
With regard to the baseline program, a few recent findings
included, despite 13 years building the plane, many
manufacturing processes were not meeting metrics for production
consistency. Recurring supply chain challenges, including late
deliveries and shortages, were compounded by the need to
replace Turkish suppliers of over a thousand parts. Several
reliability and maintainability metrics were still not being
met. While many deficiencies were closed, those still open
remain high, 864 deficiencies, including 8 critical. And,
finally, the program has again not completed the simulator,
which, in turn, has delayed the full-rate production decision.
Our recent Block 4 modernization findings are similar to
earlier baseline program findings. In 2018, we reported that
the Block 4 effort began without a business case, technology
readiness assessment, cost and schedule estimate, test and
evaluation plan, and an improved acquisition strategy. Last
year, we found that the Block 4 cost estimate previously
provided to Congress did not reflect all development costs.
And, finally, this year, we reported that some Block 4
capabilities had been deferred; the schedule was not realistic
given the recent development pace; and the contractor had not
followed its own software development process, leading to late
discovery of defects.
Over the years, we have made many recommendations. For
example, we recommended that prior to moving into full-rate
production, the program should resolve all critical
deficiencies, meet all R&M [reliability and maintainability]
metrics, or formally reassess those metrics, and provide
Congress information on production risks remaining with plans
to mitigate them, including those in the supply chain and the
production processes.
Clearly, the F-35 has followed its own path and has already
built a high percentage of aircraft under low-rate initial
production. However, we maintain that the full-rate production
decision is a critical point for weapons system development.
The myriad challenges with the F-35 confound U.S. efforts
to modernize its tactical fleet in order to face near-peer
adversaries and modern threats. Delays and high cost of the F-
35 could impact the size and composition of the tactical fleet.
Nonetheless, the challenges remaining with testing, production,
supply chain, and the Block 4 effort, along with sustainment
and affordability issues, raise questions about how many
aircraft can realistically be produced on time in the near
term, while supporting fielded aircraft, and heighten the need
for continued congressional oversight.
Chairman Norcross, Ranking Member Hartzler, this concludes
my statement. I would be happy to answer any questions the
subcommittee members may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ludwigson can be found in
the Appendix on page 123.]
Mr. Norcross. I would like to thank all of the witnesses
for their statement, and we will now transition to some
questions. Certainly a huge portfolio in front of us today, but
I would like to start out with following up on some of the
statements that a few of the witnesses talked about.
So let's start out with General Nahom and Mr. Nogueira.
The Air Force, Joint Staff have currently undertaken those
studies that each of you have mentioned, but I want to dig down
a little bit more. Can you provide us with--you talked about
the status--but the scope and the timing that we can expect
that full report, but more importantly for today and the
discussion, some of the early insights and findings and
possible recommendations, understanding that the full report
isn't finished?
Also, were the Marines and the Navy involved in any of
these studies?
Let's start with you, General Nahom.
General Nahom. Thank you, Chairman Norcross, for the
question. And I will--for the broader DOD studies, I will defer
over to Joe Nogueira for clarification there. I will try to
keep my remarks specific to the Air Force's service study.
It really looks at our fighter fleet where we sit right
now. You know, with seven distinct fighter fleets we sit on
right now, we have a fleet average this year approaching 30
years old. We have--we have some problems with our fighter
fleets, and we are trying to arrest that and actually modernize
the fleet, as well as make it more lethal and make it match up
to the threat that is here today and the threat that is coming
with near-peer competition. And you have heard the chief talk
about seven to four-plus-one, and that is certainly part of our
TACAIR study.
For the timing, our TACAIR study, we are just finishing it
up now. I have seen some preliminary results on it. We are
doing some final analysis. We are hoping to have that available
for conversation by the end of the summer, and right now, we
are just working through the final approvals on that too.
You are hearing the chief----
Mr. Norcross. Is there something you can share with us at
this point?
General Nahom. Well, see, I would say the big thing is a
seven of four--seven to four-plus-one, which really gets at
what is our fighter fleet going to look like in 10 to 15 years.
And we see four fighter fleets, one at the very high end, the
next-gen air dominance.
The next is the F-35, as we have talked about for a long
time, as a cornerstone of our fighter fleet, that fighter that
can do things that our F-16s and A-10s do today but do those
things in contested environments.
And then we think there is a place for the F-15EX and--
excuse me--carrying those outsized weapons as well as its
ability to do critical infrastructure defense.
And then--and then the fourth. Very important, the Air
Force is tasked with a lot of capacity missions around the
world. I call--I call it affordable capacity, that sitting in
Afghanistan for a long time, which no longer there, but where
is that next location? The homeland defense CAPs [combat air
patrols], all the things that we don't need F-35s and F-22s
doing but we as an Air Force must do.
The F-16 does it very cheap and does it very well. What
does that look like in the future? Right now, the good thing is
we have F-16 post block, the newer F-16s out for the next 15 to
18 years, and we are going to take advantage of those. Those
may someday get replaced by F-35s. We don't know that yet, but
we do know we need that affordable capacity.
And the last is the plus one. We have A-10s. We would like
to go down to a fleet of seven operational squadrons, 218
airplanes. We have them for the next period of time that we can
use for those lower-end missions. So that is that plus one.
So that is a big broad stroke of where you are going to see
this TACAIR study going. It is going to drill down with a lot
of analysis on how this looks, sir.
Mr. Norcross. Well, thank you. Very good at covering the
end story, and I look forward to that.
Mr. Nogueira, can you share some of your insights on what
we have so far and where we might be going?
Mr. Nogueira. Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Right now,
we are really setting up the analysis, working closely with the
Joint Staff as well. Our work is really--we are taking a look
at a variety of strategic and operational concepts trying to
set up the models themselves so we can do a number of different
analytic looks to support the National Defense Strategy review
that is underway right now.
So we have aimed our work to come to fruition towards the
middle of the fall to support program budget review decisions
by the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary. That is in line with
what the Joint Staff's TACAIR mix. So these are sort of very
compatible and complementary studies, if you will, that we will
bring these together, as I said, towards I think the September-
October timeframe, sir.
Mr. Norcross. So to the degree you can have that
conversation in an open forum, obviously when F-35 started 20-
plus years ago to the point that we--it becomes fully capable,
25 to 30 years, certainly when the program began, some of the
developments that our near-peer competitors are able to look at
us with were not around.
The F-35 is a very capable aircraft and will continue to be
used. But when we start to make these critical decisions moving
forward, is there anything you can share with us at this
meeting before a year from now that would help enlighten us to
try to focus on that mix that we are talking about in our----
Mr. Nogueira. Yes, sir. I think the evolving nature of the
threat, which has been happening quite rapidly in the last 2 or
3 years--you might recall CAPE led a TACAIR mixed study that
went to Congress in 2017. There has been a lot of change in the
threat the last few years. And as we have watched that happen,
we are starting to see the need even more so for the F-35 and
its full Block 4 capabilities. That is critical to being able
to execute the emerging operational concepts that we see coming
out of all the services and emerging from the Joint Staff
itself.
Because of those needs, we also see, in assessing the two
analyses of alternatives that the Air Force and the Navy did on
next-generation air dominance, we fully understand and expect
that those kinds of requirements and technologies, not
necessarily the platform itself, but think of the technologies
writ large, and the weapons, which is critical that we actually
have the weapons produce and arrive on time, that that is what
we need for the 2030s, mid-2035 timeframe.
So the programs that are in the fiscal year 2022 request
are exactly the kinds of things that we are starting to see
early indications of in the analysis we have done. It is
consistent with past analysis. But as we have seen the threat
evolve rapidly, it is even more critical that we get those as
we expect them to, and as you know, sir, that we have
experienced some issues with that.
Mr. Norcross. And certainly in the timeframe we need it.
Mr. Nogueira. Yes, sir.
Mr. Norcross. I will get another round after we go through,
but first let me turn it over to my ranking member, Mrs.
Hartzler.
Vicky.
Mrs. Hartzler. Hi. We will try here. I have switched to my
phone, so hopefully--can you hear me now pretty good? All
right. Very good.
Mr. Norcross. Good.
Mrs. Hartzler. So last year, the Navy briefed the committee
that it predicted a strike fighter shortfall of 49 aircraft in
fiscal year 2021 and a shortfall of 12 aircraft in fiscal year
2024. Furthermore, the Navy was not forecast to achieve its
strike fighter aircraft inventory goal until 2030. But now, for
fiscal year 2022 planning, the Navy asserts that the strike
fighter inventory shortfall will be resolved to zero in fiscal
year 2025, which is 5 years earlier than planned.
Absent a revised FYDP [Future Years Defense Program] or
additional explanation, the committee is uncertain of the
accuracy of the Navy's new analysis. Since the fiscal year 2021
budget submission, the Navy has delayed the fielding of its
planned F/A-XX aircraft over what was planned last year; two,
removed 104 F/A-18E/F Block II aircraft from the planned
service life modification, or SLM program; and, three, failed
to raise the F-35C procurement quantity to the 24 aircraft per
year that the Navy has previously testified was necessary to
bring down the strike fighter shortfall over the next decade.
It seems that these factors would exacerbate the shortfall
rather than expedite the resolution of the shortfall prior to
fiscal year 2030.
So, Mr. Stefany, specifically the budget request for the
Navy did not request any funding for continued procurement of
F/A-18E/F Super Hornet aircraft, an aircraft the Navy calls its
workhorse. And it decreased the procurement numbers for F-35C
from the fiscal year 2021 projected 20 aircraft to only 15
aircraft.
Noting that the next-generation air dominance program has
just begun defining aircraft requirements and development
concepts, how does the Navy plan to manage tactical aircraft
inventory risk and reduce the current strike fighter inventory
shortfall absent continued procurement of the F/A-18E/F Super
Hornet aircraft and increased procurement of F-35C above plans?
Mr. Stefany. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for that question. So,
first of all, the F/A-18, a very good aircraft. We really
support that aircraft as well as the F-35. But a number of
things have changed in the last year as far as the use--the
ability of us to meet that shortfall. And while the points you
brought up are very accurate, we also have a different mix of
aircraft in the fleet going forward.
And I would really like to turn it over to Admiral
Loiselle, because he actually has the detail. We will come over
without the FYDP--we need to come over and actually brief you,
ma'am, all the way through the process so you can see it all
the way through.
But at the top level, Admiral, would you kind of go through
the things that have changed in the last year?
Admiral Loiselle. Absolutely, sir.
So, ma'am, we have made several changes to the map, so we
have taken the F-35C portion of our 44 strike fighters and
reduced that from two squadrons of F-35s down to a single
squadron, but then increased the number of tails in that
squadron from 10 to 4. So we had adversary requirements for our
fleet out at Fallon and in our Reserve squadrons. And so in our
previous plan, those were F/A-18s. And now, in Fallon, we have
taken some F-16s from the Air Force and Air National Guard to
relieve that requirement, and we bought F-5s from Switzerland
to relieve another squadron's work of Reserve F/A-18
requirements.
And our NAMCE [Naval Aviation Maintenance Center for
Excellence] population of professional maintainers have been
able to return 28 Super Hornets from long-term down status and
put those back in the fleet.
So we believe that the combination of those improvements
has reduced our strike fighter shortfall to zero by 2025 based
on current year analysis. This is an analysis that we repeat on
an annual basis and based on current budget projections.
We believe that the SLM lines--we have two lines
operating--will have the additional capacity during the--at the
2025 period in question to take additional SLM tails. Should
our current analysis be revised and we require that additional
capacity, we believe the infrastructure will support additional
modification to the Block III status.
Mrs. Hartzler. So, unfortunately, there was a little bit of
a delay, and I wasn't able to quite hear all of that answer.
But regarding the SLM lines, these aircraft are coming in with
a lot more salt damage than originally thought and it is going
to take longer to be able to produce them.
So how are you able to say that you think we are going to
get additional aircraft through SLM with the condition of these
aircraft?
Admiral Loiselle. Yes, ma'am. Take that, sir? Okay.
So all of our Block II aircraft that we are planning for
SLM, we intended for our first 30 aircraft--and we are about
halfway through that now--to be a learning platform. So agree
100 percent that there was damage beyond expectation from a
corrosion perspective on some of the initial aircraft. However,
Boeing is seeing significantly improved condition in the
aircraft that we are now submitting for SLM.
So with the number of Block II Super Hornets in our current
inventory, compared to the number of Block II Super Hornets
that we intend to conduct SLM on, that allows us some
selectivity in those tails that we put through the modification
line. And so we are learning in this process and we are now
conducting inspections prior to induction that are looking at
these hard areas, to identify whether or not the corrosion that
is present in those aircraft justifies inclusion in our SLM
process, or whether or not we might look at a different
aircraft to conduct that on.
But right now we are continuing to learn and we are
continuing to bring down the time associated with getting an
aircraft through the SLM process. And we anticipate that by the
2025 timeframe, we should be in full swing on two lines at 1
year per SLM aircraft at that point in time in 2023 and after,
coming off the line and a full 10,000-hour modification in full
Block III configuration
Mrs. Hartzler. So if there is a lot of corrosion, it sounds
like you won't be bringing them in for the induction into the
SLM program, but just by--I don't see how that is going to
help, because if they are in such poor condition that they
can't enter the program, won't that just further delay a very
bad situation and make it even worse when you do bring it in?
Admiral Loiselle. So, ma'am, those first aircraft that we
are looking at are aircraft that are right up against their
6,000-hour service life. And so much of that corrosion is
mitigatable at the Navy's level. And, so, to reduce costs, we
are looking at employing our own artisans to go in there and
conduct those repairs prior to bringing it to Boeing. And if it
is anything that is structural in that nature, then we have our
engineers that take a look at those particular corrosion spots
and make determinations as to the repair level that is
necessary for that particular aircraft to get it through its
remaining service life.
Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. You talked about adversary support in
moving a lot of these new aircraft over to play the role of the
adversary, but there is also the issue of the Navy Reserve's
only remaining strike fighter squadron, the VFA-204, they are
currently available for contingency deployment, and they
routinely conduct carrier qualifications, which is not possible
for F-16s. If I understand right, you are going to be giving
them F-16s instead of the F-18s.
So Admiral Loiselle, is the Navy planning to walk away from
that mission, the ability for VFA-204 to activate in a time of
crisis?
Admiral Loiselle. So, ma'am, the sole Reserve squadron that
will retain F-18 capability is VFA-12 in Oceana. And so that
decision was made in order to single-site the Super Hornet
maintenance at either Oceana or Lemoore. And so, VFA-204 is
planned to go to F-5s because they are the closest to our other
VFA squadron down in Key West and they provide the predominant
level of support to our FRS [Fleet Replacement Squadron]
training squadrons out of both the New Orleans ranges and the
Key West ranges.
The F-16s I mentioned are all going to be in Fallon where
we are currently operating F-16s and we already have that
maintenance support in place there. So we right now we will
have a single Reserve squadron flying Super Hornets.
Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. Very good. Well, I have some
additional questions, but I will yield back and allow other
members to go ahead and ask their questions.
Thank you.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you. So we have on deck Mr. Carbajal,
Turner, Horsford, and Wittman to give you a little bit of
indications coming up.
We now recognize Mr. Carbajal for 5 minutes.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Chairman Norcross and Ranking
Member Hartzler. And I appreciate the witnesses joining us
today. When this subcommittee had a hearing on the F-35 in
November 2019, I asked about the Department's effort to develop
an intellectual property [IP] strategy, and the issue of DOD's
inability to obtain IP and technical data across the entire F-
35 supply chain. Then-Under Secretary Lord and General Fick
said that the DOD was in the process of doing a fundamental
rewrite of all acquisition policy.
General Fick, what steps has the JPO [Joint Program Office]
and the Department taken since that hearing to address IP
concerns in the F-35 supply chain and to develop the IP
strategy?
General Fick. Thank you for the question. In the time that
has elapsed since the fall of 2019, we have continued to work
to ensure that we have the appropriate intellectual property
and technical data required to execute the mission of the F-35
and of the F-35 enterprise to include the establishment and the
stand-up of the component repair depots, each of which comes
with the appropriate technical data to allow us to do so.
We have established an intellectual property strategy that
we are actively executing with a number of underlying guiding
principles that lead us to conduct cost-benefit analysis of
whether we should challenge a technical data assertion or
intellectual property assertion, or whether we should consider
simply purchasing or securing the use of the intellectual
property based upon our desired and required end state.
So, in short, it is not--we talked about this a little bit
in April. It is not about going out and getting all of the data
because getting all of the data, purchasing all of the data, or
challenging Lockheed or Pratt to their ownership of the data
would be counterproductive. We can't afford to buy all of that,
but we need to go after the data that is required to allow us
to do the things that we need to do.
One of the places that we talked about in April had to do
with our intention of expanding the authorities of maintainers
on the flight line. Back in the beginning of the program, a
maintenance concept was developed, and as we have worked to
move forward and execute changes to our maintenance philosophy,
our maintenance strategy, we have had to secure technical data
associated with the steps required to perform those kind of
tasks.
We have, over time, and this is actually since 2014, so not
just since 2019, but we have assessed 447 different maintenance
data changes. We have approved 207 of them, and we have
actually completed 105 of them and we anticipate the net
savings associated with the stand-up of that increased organic
maintenance capacity to save us about $1.9 billion over cost of
the F-35 life cycle.
So what we are executing, in my mind, is a broad initiative
targeted at getting the data we need to do the things we need
to do, and not wasting time and money on things that are
superfluous to that requirement.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, General. My second question, my
colleague, Mr. Gallego, is unable to attend our subcommittee
hearing today, so I am asking the following question on his
behalf.
Lieutenant General Nahom, should Congress prohibit
divestment of the A-10 fleet once again? I would like to make
sure the Air Force has made plans to keep the full fleet
sustained and modernized. Perhaps the most critical is the need
to finish wing replacement across the fleet as aircraft that do
not have new wings are rapidly approaching the hours limit on
their original wings. Last year, the Air Force requested $100
million to purchase 24 wing sets, and Congress fully authorized
and appropriated this funding while also prohibiting
divestment.
So far, the Air Force has only placed orders for two wing
sets with this funding counter to congressional intent. Will
you commit that should Congress prohibit divestment of the A-10
fleet, once again, the Air Force will quickly move to place at
least 22 more wing sets on contract?
And if Congress provides additional wing replacement
funding, the Air Force will execute that expeditiously as well?
General Nahom. Congressman, I will start out for the wing
set and I am going to lean on Ms. Costello next to me, but
thank you for the question.
The Air Force is not divesting--is divesting out of the A-
10 mission. Our intention with this year's President's budget
is to reduce our A-10s from 281 down to 218. That is nine
operational squadrons of A-10s down to seven, and this is part
of the transformation of our Air Force. The A-10 is a wonderful
airplane. It has done incredible things for our Nation, but we
have to start repurposing some of the resources on the A-10
into some modern capabilities, specifically manpower. If we
don't reduce the A-10 slightly this year, we run into extreme
problems----
Mr. Norcross. General, if I could, the gentleman's time
expired. I gave 30 seconds extra. If we can, we will come back
to that in next round. Obviously that was a fairly tough
question to answer in 17 seconds. So if you could allow the
witnesses enough time as you ask your questions.
With that, we will turn to Mr. Turner, you are now
recognized.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Fick, engines
for the F-35 represent a significant cost, both in operation,
maintenance, and in production. And the GAO report that we had
showed that there is significant concern about the effects of
the current engines for the F-35 and its effect on production
with the GAO report saying that less than 4 percent of the
engines are delivered on time.
As we look to trying to lower the overall costs for
operations and maintenance, engines certainly are an area where
we could pick up both in lowering our overall maintenance
costs, increasing our operational capabilities, and I was
wondering what our current status is in looking at alternative
engine configurations or future engine opportunities for the F-
35 that can increase flight time, range, and lower overall
operational costs.
General Fick.
General Fick. Sir, thank you for your question. First,
relative to the 4 percent delivered on time metric, I don't
challenge your data in any way, shape, or form. I believe that
that is actually correct, but I do know that we have not
delivered an aircraft late due to a late engine delivery, to my
knowledge, in my time on the program which dates back to 2017.
So while I will agree that there have been some late
deliveries, by and large----
Mr. Turner. It is in the GAO report cited in the----
General Fick. Thank you. I will note also that, despite the
impact of COVID in 2020, Pratt did, in fact, deliver all of the
engines that they had on contract plus one extra. So they
actually did pretty good, but with that said, engine costs in
sustainment are challenging. And as we rapidly approach the
2,000-hour, first scheduled engine removal, those--we will
start to bear those costs in the sustainment of the air system,
and we also know that we have begun to reach a flat or a
flatter spot in the learning curve relative to the overall cost
of production engines.
When I couple that with the notion that post the current
Block 4 content, we will likely need increased power and
increased thermal management capability from our propulsion
system, I think the need to look for our options from a
propulsion system perspective is present. I will tell you I was
in--I went to GE [General Electric Aviation] in Evendale [OH]
about 6 weeks ago. I toured the line. I saw the work they are
doing on AETP [Adaptive Engine Transition Program] and
candidly, I was impressed.
But there is a lot of work to be done before that becomes a
production engine, before that becomes a reality for the F-35
program perhaps. But, sir, I will pledge to work with my Air
Force, Navy, and Marine Corps services as we work to explore
options and alternatives to addressing the F-35 propulsion
issues moving forward.
Mr. Turner. Great. Thank you.
General Nahom, as the Air Force looks to retire aircraft,
certainly the C-130H is on the block. In Mansfield, Ohio, there
is a Guard base, which they operate, that could be affected
significantly as a result of the decreased number of planes;
there will need to be transitions for that facility and other
facilities across the country. Could you please give us some
information as to what the current plans are or planning that
is being undertaken [inaudible] to future [inaudible] for
facilities that might be losing the C-130H?
General Nahom. Congressman, thank you for the question. We
have said we would like to--our stretch goal is to reduce the
C-130 inventory from 300 down to 255. Those 45 C-130Hs would be
approximately 5 units. We have also said we stand by that we
will not reduce any units with that unless we can find a
mutually agreeable replacement mission. So we are working very
closely with units that have C-130s to see if there is
something out there that we can agree on. We have done this
recently with Maxwell, the Air Reserve unit there,
transitioning them to the MH-139, our newest helicopter, and we
are looking for other options. One of the opportunities out
there is cyber, and we are actually looking for a unit that is
interested in taking on a cyber wing because it is something we
are going to need as we look at peer competition.
But, again, we are only going to look if we can find
something mutually agreeable with the unit and the State.
Mr. Turner. Great, well General, I know that there is a
number of people that would be very interested in that. So I
look forward to additional discussion as to how you are
progressing.
General Nahom. Yes, sir.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you.
Mr. Horsford, you are now recognized.
Mr. Horsford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you also
to our witnesses for your service and your testimony to date. I
was very pleased that the Air Force recently selected Nellis
Air Force Base, located in my district, as its fifth-generation
center of excellence. This selection not only reinforces
Nellis' critical role in Air Force modernization, but also
means that a substantial number of new fifth-generation
aircraft will soon be coming to Nellis.
Lieutenant Nahom, very briefly, can you speak to any
potential impacts on F-35 and F-22 basing decisions if the Air
Force is prevented from divesting the requested 42 A-10
aircraft?
General Nahom. Yes, sir. Thanks for the question. That is,
we are obviously working very closely to make sure we can
reduce the A-10 ultimately over 2 years to 63. In the 2022 PB
[President's budget], it is 42 aircraft. You correctly say
that. And it is important to reduce those because it very much
relates to Nellis Air Force Base and the fifth-gen center of
excellence because part of the problem at Nellis over the last
10 years is we have continually poured stuff into Nellis,
really without check. And now we have an overcrowding there,
not only in the dormitories for the airmen, certainly in the
airspace, certainly on the ramp. So pulling out some of the
non-fifth-gen-related items at Nellis Air Force Base to make
room for more F-35s is very important.
And one of the things we would like to pull out of there is
the rescue capability. Not only the weapon school and the
rescue test, but also the operational rescue, and pull that
down to Davis-Monthan. What that does is that frees up space at
Nellis for those fifth-gen assets that come in. The place they
are going to go down at Davis-Monthan is where some of the A-10
footprint is down there right now. And, so, by reducing the A-
10, it allows us to open up this room for that fifth-gen center
of excellence as you discuss.
So if we do not reduce those A-10s, we are just going to
have to go back and take further analysis and see what we can
do. Right now it will be problematic, though, if we keep all
the A-10s as are in the system right now.
Mr. Horsford. Thank you. I would like to move to a broader
national security issue. In the past weeks, we have seen the
Taliban make territorial gains at a pace that was unimaginable
just a couple of months ago. It is increasingly clear that we
will need to rely exclusively on our over-the-horizon
intelligence assets, like the MQ-9 Reaper, to ensure that
Afghanistan does not, again, become a safe haven for terrorist
groups like al-Qaida. Last week, Secretary Austin said that
while the effort to station ISR [intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance] assets in neighboring countries was still a
work in progress, ISR missions were already being flown from
countries in the Gulf.
General McKenzie told this committee last month that his
number one unfunded priority for Central Command was additional
funding for the MQ-9 program. He assessed that planned
reductions to the MQ-9 fleet would endanger both deployed and
re-deploying forces. This assessment was deeply concerning to
me and other members, and I believe better reflects the reality
on the ground as we complete our withdraw.
The risk assumptions surrounding MQ-9 procurement made by
the Air Force when developing their budget request were based
on a starkly different reality in Afghanistan, one in which the
Taliban had not rapidly captured nearly one-third of
Afghanistan's territory. The loss of control over broader
regions is especially concerning to me, and I think it is a
fair assumption that we will soon see a proliferation of anti-
air assets in the country that could place many of our manned
and unmanned aircraft at risk.
I was pleased to see that the House Appropriations
Committee plans to include funding for 12 new MQ-9s in the 2020
appropriations bill, and I firmly believe that we should follow
suit to ensure that the program meets the needs of our forces
on the ground, and considers possible attrition of the
aircraft.
Ms. Costello, can you give any specific reasons why this
committee should not authorize the procurement of these 12 MQ-
9s and what steps the Air Force has taken to reassess the risks
of ending MQ-9 procurement given the rapidly deteriorating
situation in Afghanistan?
Mr. Norcross. In 4 seconds, so if you could----
General Nahom. We are not reducing the MQ-9 fleet. We have
300-plus airplanes that will give us MQ-9s out into the mid-
2030s if we had the fleet we have right now. We are not
reducing any airmen that fly or fix those airplanes. We are
actually just reducing some of the combat lines which are very,
very manpower intensive. The MQ-9 is very valuable, but also,
it has very much limitations. It is not an asset we are going
to be taking into the South China Sea or in any kind of
contested environment. So we have to have a good balance of our
assets across the Air Force.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you. The gentleman's time expired.
So on deck we have Mr. Wittman, Ms. Sherrill, Jackson,
Kahele, DesJarlais, and Mr. Brown.
So with that, Mr. Wittman, you are now recognized. Is Mr.
Wittman there?
Not hearing from Mr. Wittman, let's go to Mr. Jackson.
Mr. Wittman. Wait a second. Here we are.
Mr. Norcross. There they are.
Mr. Wittman. It helps when I press the mute button. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Lieutenant General Nahom, I wanted to begin with talking
about what we have been through now essentially for the last 6
years, and that is, the need for modernization and the balance
between generating current readiness and modernization. And
what we are seeing is that there are anticipated projections
where conflicts brought over by certain flashpoints around the
world, like Taiwan, may be upon us faster than what we had ever
imagined, and, essentially, looking at this balance, we have a
couple of options, actually three options, I believe, in front
of us.
We can increase the top line, we can compromise near-term
readiness to fund modernization, or we can continue to pay the
appreciating cost of aging platforms. So these are all
challenges that we face. In seapower, we are talking about the
bathtub the Navy's going through in retiring legacy systems and
bringing on new systems. The problem is, is all of the dreams
about modernization come outside the Future Years Defense Plan
better known as the FYDP. So we are going to do all these great
things, yet we go through a bathtub of losing capability.
And when I look at the Air Force's proposed divestments, I
see that there are 48 F-15s, we are going to require 47 F-16s,
and 8 C-130s, and I have to ask, if you will let us know what
is the Air Force going to do to address this bathtub that you
are going to find yourselves in with retiring all these assets
as you try to take these savings and plow them into future
assets, but many times, those aren't going to be available for
at least 5 years-plus out in the future?
General Nahom. Well, Congressman, thank you for the
question. I would say also over the last couple years, we have
brought on in excess of 300 F-35s now. And we have actually
reduced very few fighters in that timeframe. So we actually
have to start getting rid of some of our older planes so these
F-35s that we are bringing on, we have the resource, the
manpower. I will tell you right now, we are really short on
manpower, especially maintainers, because we continue to buy,
you know, 48 F-35s this year, 48 F-35s plus 12 F-15EXs. We have
got to retire some older airplanes so we can make room in the
resources.
And you are absolutely right. We have got to compromise, we
have got to have that balance between that modernization and
some of the aging platforms so we can continue the capacity
that COCOMs [combatant commands] need today from their Air
Force.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you, General Nahom.
Lieutenant General Fick, let me ask you: Several months ago
there was testimony about engines for F-35s, about supply chain
issues with parts for the engines. At that time, we were sure
that the supply chain issues were going to be taken care of. It
has been roughly 3 months, I said 2 months, but it has roughly
been 3 months since that hearing. Can you give us an update on
where we are with supply chain issues concerning the F-35
engine?
General Fick. Yes, sir, I can. Thank you for your question.
So in the 90 days that have passed since our last conversation
on this topic, we have continued to execute the three-prong
plan that we described there, the first of which is to increase
our throughput at the heavy maintenance center at Tinker Air
Force Base. I am working very, very closely with Lieutenant
General Gene Kirkland, the sustainment center commander out
there, and with Matthew Bromberg, the president of Pratt &
Whitney military engines, to put a number of initiatives in
place to including increasing tooling, reducing engineering
disposition turn times, stand-up of a second shift, the
establishment of a rotable pool of mini modules that will
increase capacity there, as well as the burndown of defects in
the technical data. That work is going very well. We have
actually seen over the course of our time there at Tinker that
the turn time go from 240 days down to about 183, and our
target by the end of this calendar year is 120 days.
Since that time, we have also continued to work to stand up
a capacity at other locations and, of course, the third lever
that we are pulling on is doing things to keep the engines on
wing longer. We are actually actively investigating the CMAS
[calcium-magnesium-alumino-silicate] issue that was leading to
the coating degradation that we talked about when I was last
before you, and we are exploring ways to potentially leave
those engines on the wing longer, based upon increased
understanding of those mechanisms. The big picture result is we
believe that now this number has changed since we last spoke.
Supply will equal demand from an engine power module throughput
perspective in 2024, and we anticipate being recovered to the
zero backlog by about 2029.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you. Thank you, Lieutenant General Fick.
I want to get to Mr. Stefany real quick. Simple one-word
answer. If looking at the window of potential conflict with
China over Taiwan, if that were to happen before 2025, when you
talk about the shortfall of strike fighters, does that
shortfall today introduce unacceptable risk if that conflict
scenario has moved to the left?
Mr. Stefany. Sir, that is not a one-word answer, but I
think our COCOMs have seen it as a risk that they understand
and would be able to address.
Mr. Wittman. Okay. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I yield back.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you. Ms. Sherrill, you are now
recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Sherrill. Thank you, Mr. Norcross. And thank you,
gentlemen, for being here, and Madam. I want to start with Mr.
Nogueira. Given both the current cost overruns with the F-35,
as well as the long-term operation and sustainment cost which
to meet current acquisition requirements will require the Air
Force to come up with a 43 percent sustainment cost reduction
and the Marine Corps to come up with a 24 percent cost
reduction. I am curious what other systems we are missing out
on as a result of fielding these aircraft which didn't perform
well in recent strategic games countering our pacing threat of
China in the Pacific?
Mr. Nogueira. Thank you, ma'am. We have gone back and
looked to try to find systems that have had to realize these
kinds of cost savings, and we have not found anything in the
previous cost estimates that we have done that have shown that.
So I think you are right. Our cost estimate, our last ICE
[independent cost estimate] that we sent over in 2020 clearly
lays out the challenges of bringing down the sustainment costs,
and I think Lieutenant General Fick can speak to those specific
steps that the JPO and the services are undertaking, but we
agree with you, it is clearly challenging to reduce those
costs.
Ms. Sherrill. And, so, you are not worried about some of
the other systems we may be missing out on because of those
continued greater-than-expected costs?
Mr. Nogueira. Ma'am, at this point, in terms of a
capability that we think the Department needs to meet the
future threat, the
F-35 fully deployed with Block 4 is really the capability that
the Department needs in this portfolio. So the challenge
becomes then not so much, you know, a combination of things,
how do we bring those costs down to make sure that we can
deploy the F-35 as expected because that, as I said, that
capability is critical that we have seen thus far in the
modeling that we have done.
Ms. Sherrill. So Lieutenant General Nahom, over the past
several weeks, you know, I have had several concerning
conversations with former acquisition and sustainment officials
about the amount of risk we are taking on with other
modernization priorities by continuing to shore up the F-35
program. I guess as a thought exercise if tomorrow Congress
stopped funding the F-35 program to get at this another way,
what we are missing out on, what would your plan be to
modernize our aircraft and perform the required missions?
General Nahom. Well, ma'am, thanks for the question.
Obviously, we are very concerned, too. In the F-35, our chief
has recently said that it is a very good aircraft, and the
crews that fly it very much like what it does. But
unfortunately, we are paying for outstanding and we are not
getting outstanding. So we actually--if you look at the F-35,
although our numbers of F-35s have come down over the years
what we are purchasing, our level of funding has not changed,
and it has continually gone up.
So it is concerning to us in the Air Force of the
increasing cost, especially in a modernization, as well as the
O&S, the operation and sustainment, costs have not come down to
the level where we would like. And I think you have heard that
and our chief recently saying that right now, we are filling in
the holes for some of those capacity missions around the world
with F-16s and A-10s. Well, eventually, we said years ago that
we were going to replace all F-16s and A-10s with the F-35. I
am not sure we are at that point yet where we can say that
right now. Because unless the F-35 comes down in its O&S cost,
we will not be able to afford an entire fleet of fighter
aircraft in the Air Force at that level. That is why the chief
said there may be something else later on if we cannot get
these costs down. So it is certainly a concern with the Air
Force.
Ms. Sherrill. And Lieutenant General Hinote recently noted
that much of our current fleet was not effective actually in
the simulated conflict against China in the Pacific and in
June, he mentioned a need for dispersed vertical lift
capability for logistics. Do you see a vertical takeoff and
landing capability as a future requirement for our fighter
fleet, and if so, how do you see this changing your
requirements in the coming years?
General Nahom. We do. And we are watching the technology
very closely. Certainly our Army friends are involved with
future vertical lift and other technologies that are out there.
You are seeing us with things like our Agility Prime and some
of our other R&D [research and development] efforts right now.
If you look--it would have to get back into a classified
setting to really get into this conversation. But if you look
at the places where we think you are going to need logistics,
there could be limited runway or no runway. So there will be a
need for a vertical takeoff and land type of capability in the
future.
I do believe that tactical lift, as we see it today, will
change and it is something we are certainly keeping an eye on,
watching the technology very, very closely. And I would love to
come back in a classified setting to talk more about this,
ma'am
Ms. Sherrill. I would appreciate that. Thanks so much.
And I yield back.
Mr. Norcross. Mr. Jackson, you are now recognized for 5
minutes.
Dr. Jackson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
Hartzler, for holding the hearing today. Also want to thank
each of our distinguished witnesses for being here. I have been
pleased to see the Department investing in technologies to
build systems that are both lethal and survivable against a
peer threat and move on from some of our outdated and costly
platforms. One of these investments that I want to focus on is
the Advanced Pilot Training program and the new T-7 Alpha Red
Hawk which will replace the aging T-38 fleet that is flown in
my district at Sheppard Air Force Base.
This year's budget request contained a decrease in funding
relative to what previous years' budgets had projected that we
would need. Last month, I asked the Chief of Staff for the Air
Force, General Brown, about this decrease in funding. He told
me it was caused by technical issues with the program that I
think were related to a missed milestone. I understand there
have been supply chain issues that have caused delays.
Regardless, General Brown reaffirmed the Air Force's
commitment to the T-7, which I was glad to hear, because we
absolutely need to update our trainer fleet. The theme of
supply chain issues has seemed to be a common trend across many
different programs. With the T-7 specifically, I am told that
we are having trouble with sourcing and establishing critical
parts from the global supply chain.
Ms. Costello, can you speak to some of the supply chain
issues that the T-7 has faced? Also, do these supply chain
issues have any link to reliance on a peer competitor such as
China?
Ms. Costello. Thank you very much for the question. So you
reference supply chain issues, and that is something that we
are seeing globally right now. COVID only exacerbated that
across our entire industrial base, and the T-7 program is one
of the many who is experiencing some of that. Unprecedented
supply chain challenges, Boeing and T-7 is no different than
anybody else. The tail assembly is one example in the T-7
program that is affected because of reliance on international
supply partners. The real--we have to get through the COVID
pandemic recovery efforts, and really, then, we can get back to
where we were before, but every company is dealing with it a
little bit differently and every country is, actually.
We are committed to the T-7 program. That is one of the
factors that led to the milestone C delay from first quarter to
fourth quarter of 2023, but it is not the only issue but it was
a contributing factor. And we will continue to work with Boeing
and our industry partners to address and try to mitigate any of
the supply chain challenges. We believe Boeing is working very
carefully and we have confidence we will be able to mitigate
that effect for T-7 specifically.
Dr. Jackson. Yes ma'm, and are there any things in the
supply chain that are related to China, in particular?
Ms. Costello. I can't say right now if there is any that
are specific to China, but our entire force is intended to
satisfy that mission requirement. So I can take that for action
and come back and let you know, if that would be helpful.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 151.]
Dr. Jackson. Yes, ma'am. Thank you. And my next question
is, some of the T-38s being flown in my district are over 50
years old obviously. We can all agree that training in an
aircraft built in the 1970s is not going to be adequate for
training pilots for an F-22, F-35, or a future fighter
aircraft.
Ms. Costello, as we have seen the T-38 in service for many
decades, what is the projected timeline that we can expect to
see the T-7 being used for pilot training?
Ms. Costello. So where we are looking at an IOC [initial
operating capability] for T-7 of 2024, so our plan is to start
transitioning at that point in time. The rate at which, of
course, will be based on the deliveries. And, of course, we do
agree it is time to replace the T-38, which is why we have the
T-7 aircraft and it is very important that we get those in
place on time.
Dr. Jackson. Yes, ma'am. Thank you.
My last question I would like to speak about the decrease
in funding for the program and the delays that we face. I
understand why the funding request is at a level that it is,
but I think I speak for all my colleagues when we say that we
need to significantly reduce the number of delays that we are
seeing in major acquisition programs. Many of our industry
partners are working in the best interest of the Department and
working to help us fill next-generation systems that will allow
us to compete with countries like China and Russia.
Ms. Costello, while delays are usually unexpected, do you
see any further delays occurring with the T-7, or do you
anticipate things being on time from here on out? And further,
can you speak to how the Department is working with industry
partners to avoid any more delays?
Ms. Costello. So relative to the T-7, we do not project any
further delays. We believe Boeing has the supply chain issues
being mitigated properly and the particular software design
issue that has been identified, the fix has already been
identified. We have to go back and finish the testing to
demonstrate and validate it, but we believe we can support the
schedule based on sliding from first quarter to fourth quarter
of 2023.
So we project we can still maintain our IOC and [inaudible]
on that particular program. And there are issues across
acquisition programs that we work daily with industry in order
to mitigate so that we don't have schedule delays. Thank you.
Dr. Jackson. Thank you, ma'am. I think my time is up.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you. Mr. Kahele, you are now recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Kahele. Mahalo, Mr. Chair. And thank you for having
this hearing today. My question is for General Nahom. And just
for some background, my question is going to revolve around the
C-130 aircraft. Recently, the Air National Guard leadership has
called for installation of infrared suppression systems on the
legacy C-130 aircraft, which is critical to protect against the
MANPAD [man-portable air defense] threat.
On June 23, an Ethiopian Government C-130 was shot down--
this was a C-130 that was provided to the Ethiopian Air Force
by the United States--by Tigray forces in the ongoing conflict
in the region. That aircraft--obviously, it is a U.S. aircraft.
It shares the same engines, the same general airframe, and the
structure that many of our Air National Guard, Air Force
Reserve, and Active Duty C-130Hs have. It is an unfortunate
reminder of the constant threat environment facing our legacy
tactical airlift fleet, not only from complex missile systems,
but also widely proliferated weapons like the man-portable air
defense system.
So my question is, in seeking to counter this threat posed
by MANPADS, specifically for the Air Guard designated C-130H
infrared suppression hardware as a critical need in the 2021
weapons modernization priorities book, given that you
previously stated that the Air Force intends to continue
fielding C-130H models into the future, do you agree with the
Guard's assessment that infrared suppression is a critical need
for these aircraft?
Do you also think that additional TTPs--tactics,
techniques, and procedures--need to be modified for the MANPAD
threat for a mobility aircraft like the C-130, potentially C-5/
C-17? And can you describe how the Air Force is addressing this
critical need in its budget submission, and given the lack of a
future years defense programming this year, how this program
will be implemented over the next few years?
General Nahom. Well, Congressman, thanks for the question.
And I just looked around at my team, too. We--I don't currently
have anything in my book right now where we are with C-130
counter MANPAD. I will have to take that for the record and get
back to you. I do agree, though, that the MANPAD threat is
proliferating, it is everywhere, it is something we are very
concerned with, especially with low-flying relatively slow
airplanes, like a C-130. And I know as we look at our
modifications across all mobility platforms, I know this is
something that the modifications in mobility platforms are very
expensive. And I know working very closely with AMC [Air
Mobility Command] and the Guard and the Reserve to make sure we
prioritize correctly, but let me take that for the record, get
back to you, and tell you where we are on that.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 151.]
Mr. Kahele. Okay. Thanks so much, sir. Let me jump over to
the ACC [Air Combatant Command] and what most of our
conversation has revolved around, which is F-35, F-22, and our
tactical fighter training programs. I guess specifically for
the F-22, you know, the Hawaii Air National Guard, we have a
composite unit out there. We fly F-22s as well. We have F-22s
out in Kadena, up in Elmendorf. So the Air Force maintains
approximately 186 aircraft in this inventory.
What do you see, sir, as the future of the F-22 as the Air
Force NGAD [next-generation air dominance] is developed and is
the Air Force planning to reduce any of its F-22 fleet prior to
NGAD being fielded?
General Nahom. Well, sir, thanks, again, for the question.
The F-22 is the dominant fighter of our time, and it needs to
be--our Nation needs that dominant fighter right now. We intend
to keep it that way in the near term. And if you look at our
schedule for our modifications for the F-22 fleet, the 123
operational F-22s, and then the others you mentioned are our
test, training, and weapons school. Maintaining that over the
near term until we get to the what-next. The what-next is the
next-generation air dominance. We can upgrade the F-22s for a
certain amount of time and then at some point, the threat we
know is going to outpace its capability and that is why NGAD,
and getting at NGAD now is so important, because we think the
U.S.--what does the Nation expect out of their Air Force? We
know that our Nation expects air dominance and that is what the
F-22 provides today. That is what the F-22 provide over the
next decade or so. And then beyond that, we expect to do that
with the next-generation air dominance.
Mr. Kahele. Do you foresee any potential fighter airframes
being based at any future Pacific bases like Andersen or other
bases that we may want to base these type of aircraft at to
shore up the Pacific Deterrence Initiative and the China
threat?
General Nahom. Sir, for that one, I will be very careful. I
really want to come back in a classified setting to tell you,
because we are actually very actively talking about what the
Pacific as well as the European friendly lay-down is going to
be in terms of our fighters. I want to be real careful I don't
say something over an open line. So I would like to come back
in a classified setting if you don't mind, sir.
Mr. Kahele. You bet. No problem. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And I yield back my time.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you. As I understand it, Mr. Veasey is
last one for first round. So from the home of the F-35, Mr.
Veasey, you are now recognized. Mark, are you there?
Mr. Veasey. Yes, I am here. I apologize.
Mr. Norcross. There you are. You are muted, although--can
others hear Mr. Veasey?
Mark, we cannot hear you. Mark?
Do we have him muted, because it is showing on my screen
that he is unmuted?
Okay. We are going to go to the second round. Let's see if
we can get a hold of Mark and work that out. In the meantime,
he is going to look up and realize we didn't hear him.
Anyway, so till we get Mark rolling, we are going to start
our second round and I would like to start out just a
clarification, Mr. Nogueira. I think I heard you say during
your testimony that a fully capable F-35 would be there to meet
the need against our near-peer competitor, in particular,
China. Although very effective, we are looking at the next
generation as one to truly be able to penetrate and go up
against some of our near-peer competitors.
Isn't that correct, or did I misunderstand what you said?
Mr. Nogueira. So, sir, without getting classified really
quickly here, we think the--based on analysis we have done to
date, we think the F-35 and its full capabilities, Block 4
capabilities is critical for the Chinese fight going through,
you know, the 2030s. NGAD is also, NGAD also will play a vital
role, in particular, as Lieutenant General Nahom mentioned.
NGAD for the Air Force is the air dominance platform. I think
beyond that, we should come back and talk to you classified to
really go through that.
Mr. Norcross. We are on the same page. I thought I
misunderstood what you said.
Mr. Nogueira. Yes, sir.
Mr. Norcross. It wasn't China or Russia--it was someone.
Mark, can you hear me, Mark? You were muted during your
question. You still are. So you want to see if you can work
that out and then we will recognize you as we go on.
I want to switch back to follow up on some of the questions
that Mr. Turner talked about with regards to power module and
the
F-35 engine and the maintenance issue.
So this would go to Mr. Stefany, Ms. Costello, and General
Fick. For the F-35, how many aircraft today do not have
engines? Let's start out with that question. And then from
there, I want to go into the capacity and repair issues at the
F135 heavy maintenance center in Oklahoma. But first, how many
aircraft do we have today, 135s without engines?
Mr. Stefany. Frederick J. Stefany, from the Navy and Marine
Corps. The Marine Corps is zero right now, and the Navy, just
as you know, we are just starting to field aircrafts. I believe
we are at zero, but I would have to take a look at [inaudible].
Ms. Costello. And from the Air Force, as of July 8 of this
month, we are 41 F-35s are without an engine, and 56 F135 power
modules are in work at the repair facility at Tinker. I think
General Fick can speak to the other actions.
General Fick. Yes, sir. I will tell you there is some
difference of opinion relative to the total number of MICAP
[Mission Impaired Capability Awaiting Parts] engines. I know
that in some corners, aircraft that are long-term down are
being counted against the MICAP count, but those count
sometimes and don't count in others. But to Ms. Costello's
point, if I look at the 41 U.S. aircraft, my information as of
today says I have 41 U.S. Air Force tails using Ms. Costello's
map; I have 3 partner aircraft, I have 1 Marine Corps aircraft,
and I have 1 U.S. Navy tail that are MICAP for an engine. Some
of those are power modules, some of those are MICAP for other
reasons.
Mr. Norcross. Well, thank you. And you made a point to
suggest, General Fick, that not one delivery of an aircraft was
delayed by the engine, which is obviously very important. You
know, we have had issues with Turkey. We all know that and set
us back a little bit in the pandemic, no question about it, but
additionally what I call in some ways a self-inflicted wound is
those additional aircraft that we purchase that were not
requested, and the idea of rolling them out in new aircraft
with an engine while others are sitting, and I am hearing the
numbers and we can argue over which ones they are, but are
certainly something that is a real concern and, as we have
heard in testimony, the idea is to make sure those engines are
available just as importantly in the depots.
So let's talk about the F135 heavy maintenance center in
Oklahoma. The status of that increasing repair and the
capacities. Where are we today in terms of the operation and
the parts that they need to perform?
General Fick. Yes, sir. If I can conflate the two questions
relative to Pratt & Whitney's ability to deliver production
engines throughout the pandemic, we have actually pulled 6
production engines forward and sent them to the field to take
advantage of their ability to continue to deliver, and we have
actually pulled 12 power modules forward from calendar year
2022 into calendar year 2021, again, to help leverage some of
that capacity to help the fielded fleet.
Relative to the progress at Tinker, we have done a good job
of optimizing the maintainers on the floor, really treating
them like we treat surgeons in an operating room, finding ways
to keep them on the engines longer, on the power modules
longer, and make them more effective at what they do, whether
it is increased training, increased access to tools. We have
moved the needle from a heavy maintenance center production
perspective.
Now, conversely, we have also seen, in the time since we
last spoke, an increase in the removals of power modules as a
byproduct of the same phenomenology that we saw over the summer
with the CMAS degradation. These are power modules that should
have been found over the course of the last 9 to 12 months, but
due to deficiencies in our ability to execute the borescope
inspections in the field, they were left on the aircraft longer
than usual. We have been working very, very closely with the
Air Force to help with the borescope inspection procedures. We
have removed those power modules from service, with the
exception of a few who are being monitored very, very closely
for the progression of damage. We are using this as an
opportunity to learn from the aircraft in the field at what the
progression of this coating degradation and turbine blade
distress looks like.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you. What I want to do now is turn it
over to Ranking Member Hartzler, and then I understand Mr.
Veasey has returned. We will give him another shot, but Vicky,
you are now recognized.
Mrs. Hartzler. Sure. Thank you. I would like to ask a
question about the F-15EX. So in addition to the budget request
for funding for 12 F-15EX, the Air Force also submitted funding
request for an additional 12 F-15EX aircraft in its fiscal year
2022 unfunded requirements list. So could you elaborate,
General Nahom, on why the procurement of these additional 12
aircraft are critical in fiscal year 2022?
General Nahom. Yes, ma'am. Ranking Member Hartzler, thank
you for the question. So if you look at our aging aircraft and
the F-15C/EX are replacing immediately are very problematic.
Right now, the Air National Guard will tell you they have 20
airplanes that are long-term grounded. We have several
airplanes, Active Duty and Guard, at our depot that are long-
term grounded for cracks. Getting the F-15C that is well past
its service life, retired, and getting its replacement as
quickly as possible is a concern of ours.
We were only able to put 12 EXs on our original budget for
the--if there is additional money, that this would greatly help
us in not--getting the F-15Cs replaced and keeping these
fighter operations open. I am worried as the F-15Cs retire, if
we retire them on time, about not having enough aircraft in the
right places to keep these operations continuous; so the
additional airplanes would be very, very helpful. The EX--the
reason to put EXs over F-35 is the EXs are ready to go. If F-
35s are coming off the line right now with full TR-3 and Block
4, it would be a different discussion, but they are not. So
that is why there is EXs there, ma'am.
Mrs. Hartzler. You bet. Okay, thank you. I also wanted to
ask about a different take on the F-35 engine. We know that
Congress and the taxpayers have invested over $4 billion in the
last decade to mature adaptive cycle engine technology across
multiple engine companies. Those programs are culminating this
year with testing of full-scale prototypes of engines designed
to integrate with the F-35. My understanding is that these can
bring transformational capability improvements in aircraft
range, acceleration, and thermal management capacity that will
be needed to support the Block 4/Tech Refresh 3 enhancements.
So how are you integrating this capability into your long-
term
F-35 roadmap, and do you intend to capitalize on the
significant taxpayer investment that has been made to this
point, and transition this capability to our warfighter, and
what timing do you think is appropriate?
General Nahom. Ma'am, thank you for the question. I will
start and let Ms. Costello take a hack as well. We are very
excited about this technology. And as General Fick said, it is
very, very impressive, not only the fact of having an
alternative power plant for the F-35, but the capability this
brings with it, its efficiency, as well as its increased power
greatly enhance the capability of F-35. We are in a struggle,
though, as an Air Force to bring this to any kind of
operational capability because we got--significant investment
as you said to get this technology, but there is another
significant investment that is needed to integrate this into
the F-35. And right now, given the current top line we have
right now, we are going to struggle to get any further with
this technology.
Darlene.
Ms. Costello. And as you said, you will have this test
information in fiscal year 2022, and we are working closely
with the JPO in order for them to understand it and plan it in
their future. But we do have fiscal issues we have to consider,
too, and integration costs have not been factored at this point
in time. Thank you.
Mrs. Hartzler. You bet. Thank you, and I don't know if Mr.
Carbajal is on or not and asked the question for Mr. Gallego
about the A-10s, but if he is not, then maybe we can circle
back and get some clarity on the wing replacement and the
budget and what has been spent and hasn't.
Thank you.
With that, I will yield back, Chairman.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you. As I understand it, Mr. Veasey is
connected. So Mark, you are now recognized.
Mr. Veasey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear me okay?
Mr. Norcross. Very good.
Mr. Veasey. Okay. Awesome. Awesome. I wanted to ask,
neither the Navy's fiscal year 2022 budget request or its
unfunded priorities list included new F-18 Super Hornets, and
when asked about this during the most recent fiscal year 2022
budget hearing, Admiral Gilday testified that the Navy has
procured as many F-18 Hornets as it needs. He went on to say we
are at the twilight of fourth-generation purchases, and we are
picking up the pace on fifth-gen.
I was wondering, do you concur with General Gilday's
comments that the Navy is pivoting to fifth-generation
fighters, and was just open if you had a comment or thought on
that, that that would be--I think that would be interesting.
Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir. I will start and pass it over. Yes.
We have the right transition, the right mix of generation four
and generation five aircraft in our air wings going forward.
And while we have a shortfall in the near term, by the time any
aircraft that would be bought in 2022 would show up, we will
have addressed that shortfall for the plan to get by the end of
2024, in 2025, to get that to a zero shortfall.
And with that, I will turn it over to Admiral Loiselle.
Admiral Loiselle. Yes, sir. Just a little bit more
specifics on that. We currently are executing a multiyear
procurement of
F-18s, 78 total. We have got 70 left to deliver that will
deliver between now and fiscal year 2025. So they are
continuing to add to our totals of F-18s throughout the next
timeframe. That is why I think we can get to SLM in
modification the current F-18s after that timeframe. We
mentioned the UPL [unfunded priorities list], we have five F-
35s on our unfunded priorities list as well to try and
accelerate that transition, because the F-35C is the last
customer we are--we have the smallest number of tails in the F-
35 fleet thus far in the Navy. So we are in the mid-50s right
now, and so, that will allow us to accelerate our transition to
a fourth-/fifth-gen mix.
Mr. Veasey. Okay. Good. Good. I think that is really
important if that will help pick up the pace as Admiral Gilday
pointed out, that that is really good information for the
committee.
Lieutenant General Nahom, the Air Force has been procuring
F-35s at a rate at nearing full production for the past several
years. Air Force leaders have testified that the F-35 is coming
off of the production line today, that they have the best break
rate in the Air Force. Recently publicized data showed F-35s
having the best mission capable rate out of all of the Air
Force fighter fleets in 2020, and despite these significant
achievements, the Air Force fiscal year 2022 budget proposes
reducing F-35s annual procurement below last year's
appropriated level while purchasing additional fourth-gen
fighters that have not produced at rates for the Air Force in
roughly 20-plus years.
As the Air Force tries to mitigate a fighter shortfall, how
does this revised acquisition plan not add additional risk and
how does the Air Force plan to mitigate this risk?
General Nahom. Thank you, Congressman, for the question.
So, you know, we have 48 aircraft on our budget, and the reason
we have put in the UPL is as these aircraft come off their
line, these will not be in the Tech Refresh 3/Block 4
configuration.
Every aircraft that the Air Force buys before we get to
that point, we are going to have to spend money to retrofit.
And so, right now, we are watching that very closely.
As I said before, the F--your stats are right on. The MC
[mission capable] rate--the crews who are flying this airplane
love it. It is doing great work. It is a very, very good
airplane. We are paying for outstanding, though, and we would
like to get this aircraft in the configuration we need, which
is the Tech Refresh 3 and Block 4 modernization.
We are committed to the F-35, and we truly believe it is
the cornerstone of our future fighter fleet.
Mr. Veasey. Okay. Thank you very much.
General Nahom, in the 25 seconds or so that I have
remaining, an article that I saw from just a few days ago, I
wanted your quick comment on it. And this--that is the Air
Force's F-16 boneyard project that you are working on. Is that
going to be something that you all are just going to do just
for the F-16 or is that going to be something that can be used
for other models, for other platforms?
General Nahom. And, sir, let me say--and I did read about
it. Let me--and you are talking about the digital twin piece
that has come out----
Mr. Veasey. Right. Exactly.
General Nahom. I think we need to take it for the record.
Ms. Costello. I think we need to take that for the record.
General Nahom. Yeah. We will take that for the record, sir,
and we will come back to you on that, sir.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 151.]
Mr. Veasey. Thank you. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Norcross. Absolutely.
Mr. Jackson, if you are still with us, you are recognized.
Mr. Jackson, are you still with us? Going once.
Mr. Horsford, are you there?
Okay. Not hearing any of them, Vicky, we are back to you.
You are now recognized until one of the others return.
Mrs. Hartzler. There you go. Great.
Just if you could finish up and clarify, I believe Mr.
Costello--or Ms. Costello--excuse me--you were answering the
question [inaudible] about the A-10. You know, the budget
request for fiscal year 2021 contained a request for $99.9
million to purchase 24 wing sets, which of course, as you know,
Congress fully authorized and appropriated.
So as wing replacement for the entire fleet is a critical
element of the fleet sustainment into the 2030s, but we have
learned recently that the Department of the Air Force has not
yet obligated the vast majority of fiscal year 2021 funding for
additional wing sets, and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force
stated in congressional testimony--they said in 2021 that the
Air Force planned to execute 55 percent of the remaining fiscal
year 2021 funds by the end of the fiscal year. So that is
obviously not 100 percent of the funds that Congress provided
for the wing sets.
So does the Department of the Air Force still intend to
obligate the full fiscal year 2021 funding for additional wing
sets during this fiscal year consistent with what Congress
appropriated and authorized? And, if not, please explain what
the Department of Air Force plans to do with the remaining
funds authorized and appropriated for additional wing sets if
you are not going to spend them on new wings.
Ms. Costello. Thank you very much for the question and the
opportunity to clarify.
So we do have--we have--we have procured all of the wing
kits that we are planning to with the fiscal year 2021 funds.
The final four wing kits are spares and are going to be on
contract in August of 2021. The first article is going to
arrive in fourth quarter of 2022. The three other articles are
going to arrive at the beginning of 2023, and the full-rate
production, fourth quarter. So we are on track for procuring to
support our planned fleet size of 218 aircraft.
The balance of that funding is planned to do the installs
and continue the work there, and we do plan to have them fully
obligated and expended in accordance with our required
timelines.
Thank you.
Mrs. Hartzler. You bet.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you.
So let me--unless somebody else is still with us, let me
just follow up on the F-35 TR/Block 4 development.
Mr. Ludwigson, major risk, where do we foresee the F-35
program and the upgraded--where do you see us going, and what
is our largest risk before that comes online? Obviously, you
hear about the buys that we are making and trying to wait till
that is fully capable before we buy those additional planes.
But we can't wait, but we have to be able to plan.
Won't you bring us up to speed from where you sit and what
you see with that upgrade.
Mr. Ludwigson. Are you asking about the Block 4 upgrade or
the risks in general as it relates to the program?
Mr. Norcross. The risk to not having TR-3/Block 4 in the
timeliness that we need it.
Mr. Ludwigson. Well, I think that some of the other--some
of the other witnesses have clarified that. They are still
aiming for insertion for the Lot 15. The challenge is, as I
understand it, they are still conceivably going to be
installing TR-2 kits during the production and then
retrofitting those tails before they are actually received by
DOD. So you have built in this retrofit cost because of the
delays that have occurred with relation to final development of
the full TR-3 kit.
And I think that the--as a lot of the witnesses have also
noted, the Block 4 capabilities are really instrumental to why
F-35, right? I mean, F-35 has a lot of characteristics that are
pretty helpful, I think, for the warfighter, but the Block 4
capabilities are what you really need in a high-end fight.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you. And I am not sure if I am the only
one hearing, but your sound is broken up, but I got most of
your answer.
So, General Fick, let's talk about ALIS [Autonomic
Logistics Information System] and ODIN. And I know it is your
favorite subject, right? Certainly, the issues that we were
addressing when Mrs. Lord was on board, but that transition to
ODIN, quite frankly, would be quicker, easier, and more
helpful.
Give us an update on where we are in terms--and this is the
difference between Readiness and Chairman Garamendi in the
joint meeting that we had, because it is important when we look
to the future on what we are going to buy, we need to know
where the system is going to be.
So bring us up to speed on ALIS-ODIN and where you think we
are going with that.
General Fick. Absolutely, sir. Thank you very much for the
question.
We continue to make progress along the ALIS to ODIN
transition plan that we discussed back in the April timeframe--
--
Mr. Norcross. Right.
General Fick [continuing]. Which relies upon deliberate and
consistent upgrades to the ALIS baseline so that we can both
increase the--I am sorry--decrease the pain experienced by the
users as they continue to use that system over time, and then
put us in a place where we can seamlessly transition into the
new ODIN software and capabilities.
Now, remember, ODIN is not just one thing. ODIN is a
hardware kit; ODIN is a new software environment; and ODIN is a
new underlying data environment. All of those things are being
simultaneously developed.
The delivery of the new ODIN base kit is really--really
helping the field. As we push it out there, it is 75 percent
smaller physically, it is 90 percent smaller in weight, and it
is 30 percent cheaper than the legacy hardware that it is
replacing. And we are getting great reviews from the team, and
we are also getting great reviews from our interactions with
the users.
We are--we have established what we call a Joint ALIS
Working Group where we actually interact with the units in the
field as they work to establish the user agreement and the
capability needs statement that we talked about last time, and
then to prioritize the fixes that go into ALIS as we work our
way into ODIN.
I think that over the course of the last 9 to 12 months, we
have decreased the admin workload time by about 40 percent. We
have decreased air vehicle flight download time by about 30
percent. We have decreased the air vehicle transfer time from
days to minutes. We have increased or enhanced the
cybersecurity posture of ALIS by making a transition to Win 10.
The team is doing a lot of work both on the near term in fixing
ALIS while at the same time ensuring a smooth transition into
ODIN.
Mr. Norcross. So let me just dig into that a little bit. So
you talked about the decreased time, the speed that we are now
doing that. And is that with the new hardware, using ALIS, or
is that with the new hardware using the ODIN?
So what is the base that those figures are coming from?
General Fick. Yeah. So those decreased download and
processing times are using legacy hardware and the upgraded
ALIS software. Our next steps are going to be to what we call
deprecate or break up----
Mr. Norcross. Right.
General Fick [continuing]. The ALIS spaghetti code into
discernible chunks that we can then begin to transition in--
into ODIN. And whether we use them as-is or whether we change
them, whether we hire someone else to do that work or whether
we use Lockheed or a commercial off-the-shelf product to do
those functions, those are those next steps that we have to do
to allow us to make that transition smoothly and seamlessly.
So the results that we have seen from a software
perspective and a processing time perspective are largely ALIS
software on legacy hardware. The improved hardware--the target
hardware for ODIN, if you will, is showing even better
progress.
Mr. Norcross. So why all of a sudden is ALIS working
better, quite frankly? We collectively made that decision with
yourself, Mrs. Lord, that we were going to keep the
intellectual property, Lockheed is going to have that, and we
are going to have our own ODIN that we, in essence, control.
Yet, here, which is good news, all of a sudden, these numbers
that you just shared with us are great. Why is ALIS all of a
sudden working in a better form and fashion?
General Fick. So, sir, I don't want to leave you with the
impression that everything is rainbows and unicorns, right? We
still have a lot of work to do with respect to ALIS. But I
think that what I have seen over the course of the last year is
that my team and the Lockheed team really buckled down and
decided that, you know what, we have to do this and we have to
do it together.
The environment in the fall of 2019 when we first set about
this transition was--I am going to say it was bitter and
contested. It was adversarial. It was tough going. As we
started down that path and as we learned more about what it
would take to actually transition this system in a smooth and
seamless way without impacting the user, that we were going to
have to team and do this differently.
So I think--I think, in part, the relationship is better. I
think the expressed and executed intent to do the quarterly
releases based upon solving user pain points has been a huge
win for the program as we have been able to focus on those
things that make the most difference to maintainers on the
flight line. I think those things are all positive as we move
forward.
And then, you know, again, the feedback that we are
starting to get from the users is, you know what, we like the
way you are going. As you transition to ODIN, let's make sure
you don't lose all this.
Mr. Norcross. Are we still going to transition to ODIN,
that original concept that was rolled out almost 2 years ago?
General Fick. Yes, sir. Absolutely.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you.
With that, do we have anybody else waiting?
Vicky, do you have any more questions?
Mrs. Hartzler. No.
Mr. Norcross. I can't wait to get back to live. We were
obviously having some challenges. But I want to thank all the
witnesses. We had a very full agenda, to say the least, and we
really appreciate the answers forthwith. And we have a couple
of follow-ups.
With that, we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:14 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
July 13, 2021
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
July 13, 2021
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[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
July 13, 2021
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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. KAHELE
General Nahom. AMC has examined IR suppressor technologies and it
does not provide additional capability against known IR threats.
Current IR countermeasure capabilities on the C-130 provide sufficient
risk mitigation for known IR threats. AMC anti-manpad TTPs are very
robust, have evolved over time, and continue to evolve to counter
threat changes. AFSOC employs C-130 in a different flight envelope and
would need to be contacted to understand the risk assessment for AFSOC
C-130s. [See page 31.]
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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. VEASEY
General Nahom. Digital twins are integrated multi-physics,
multiscale, probabilistic simulations of an as-built system that mirror
and predict activities and performance over the life of the
corresponding physical twin. They are one element of modern digital
engineering practices and part of the Department of the Air Force (DAF)
digital transformation.
We are fully engaged and invested in a Department-wide digital
transformation. We have established guidance and training for
acquisition and sustainment programs, including a comprehensive digital
guide, digital building code, and community knowledge sites for sharing
techniques, best practices, and lessons learned.
The DAF has not directed all legacy aircraft to create full-scale
digital twins; however, all programs are encouraged to embrace digital
engineering practices to advance our ability to deliver and sustain
warfighter capabilities. We expect our legacy system program offices to
determine the need for a digital twin (in whole or in part) based on a
business case analysis to inform their decision. New programs will
embrace digital twin technology to reduce development and sustainment
costs, optimize performance trades, and generate the contiguous digital
thread to support lifecycle operations. [See page 37.]
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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY DR. JACKSON
Ms. Costello. No. The T-7A system does not have any supply chain
challenges related to China. [See page 30.]
[all]