[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEFENDING U.S. ALLIES AND INTERESTS
AGAINST RUSSIAN AGGRESSION
IN EASTERN EUROPE
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 16, 2022
__________
Serial No. 117-66
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Reform
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available on: govinfo.gov,
oversight.house.gov or
docs.house.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
46-905 PDF WASHINGTON : 2022
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND REFORM
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York, Chairwoman
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of James Comer, Kentucky, Ranking
Columbia Minority Member
Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts Jim Jordan, Ohio
Jim Cooper, Tennessee Virginia Foxx, North Carolina
Gerald E. Connolly, Virginia Jody B. Hice, Georgia
Raja Krishnamoorthi, Illinois Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin
Jamie Raskin, Maryland Michael Cloud, Texas
Ro Khanna, California Bob Gibbs, Ohio
Kweisi Mfume, Maryland Clay Higgins, Louisiana
Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, New York Ralph Norman, South Carolina
Rashida Tlaib, Michigan Pete Sessions, Texas
Katie Porter, California Fred Keller, Pennsylvania
Cori Bush, Missouri Andy Biggs, Arizona
Shontel M. Brown, Ohio Andrew Clyde, Georgia
Danny K. Davis, Illinois Nancy Mace, South Carolina
Debbie Wasserman Schultz, Florida Scott Franklin, Florida
Peter Welch, Vermont Jake LaTurner, Kansas
Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr., Pat Fallon, Texas
Georgia Yvette Herrell, New Mexico
John P. Sarbanes, Maryland Byron Donalds, Florida
Jackie Speier, California Vacancy
Robin L. Kelly, Illinois
Brenda L. Lawrence, Michigan
Mark DeSaulnier, California
Jimmy Gomez, California
Ayanna Pressley, Massachusetts
Russ Anello, Staff Director
Daniel Rebnord, Team Lead
Amy Stratton, Deputy Chief Clerk
Contact Number: 202-225-5051
Mark Marin, Minority Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on National Security
Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts, Chairman
Peter Welch, Vermont Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin, Ranking
Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr., Minority Member
Georgia Virginia Foxx, North Carolina
Mark DeSaulnier, California Bob Gibbs, Ohio
Kweisi Mfume, Maryland Clay Higgins, Louisiana
Debbie Wasserman Schultz, Florida Vacancy
Jackie Speier, California
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on February 16, 2022................................ 1
Witnesses
The Honorable Michael McFaul, Director, Freeman Spogli Institute
for International Studies, Stanford University
Oral Statement................................................... 5
Lieutenant General (ret.) Ben Hodges, Pershing Chair in Strategic
Studies, Center for European Policy Analysis
Oral Statement................................................... 7
Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Ph.D., Director, Transatlantic Security
Program, Center for a New American Security
Oral Statement................................................... 9
The Honorable Richard Grenell, Former Acting Director of National
Intelligence
Oral Statement................................................... 11
Written opening statements and statements for the witnesses are
available on the U.S. House of Representatives Document
Repository at: docs.house.gov.
Index of Documents
----------
The document below is available at: docs.house.gov.
* Statement for the Record; submitted by Rep. Comer.
DEFENDING U.S. ALLIES AND INTERESTS
AGAINST RUSSIAN AGGRESSION
IN EASTERN EUROPE
----------
Wednesday, February 16, 2022
House of Representatives
Committee on Oversight and Reform
Subcommittee on National Security
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m.,
via Zoom, Hon. Stephen F. Lynch (chairman of the subcommittee)
presiding.
Present: Representatives Lynch, Maloney, Welch, Johnson,
DeSaulnier, Mfume, Wasserman Schultz, Speier, Grothman, Foxx,
Gibbs, and Higgins.
Mr. Lynch. So, the committee will come to order.
Thank you for joining us for today's critically important
and very timely hearing.
Today, the Subcommittee on National Security will examine
Russia's continued aggression and destabilizing activity in
Eastern Europe.
As we all know, since late 2021, Russia has amassed more
than 150,000 troops along Ukraine's borders and has the country
virtually surrounded from--including Russian-occupied Crimea,
which it seized and annexed illegally in 2014.
Yesterday, President Biden warned that a Russian invasion
of Ukraine remains distinctly possible, although we are hearing
different stories from Putin himself. President Biden has
rightly assessed that a Russian invasion of Ukraine would be,
quote, ``the most consequential thing that has happened in the
world in terms of war and peace since World War II,'' close
quote.
So, if we let that sink in, a Russian invasion of Ukraine
would be the most consequential thing that has happened in
terms of war and peace since World War II.
By holding Ukraine hostage, unless the United States and
NATO surrender to his demands, President Putin threatens the
fundamental principles of sovereignty, self-determination, and
territorial integrity that have helped to preserve global peace
and security that form the basis of the rules-based
international order, or as Secretary of State Antony Blinken
astutely described it, the idea that one nation can simply
change the borders of another nation by force.
So, there is one person and one person only who is
responsible for the current situation in Eastern Europe and
that person is Vladimir Putin.
The United States does not want war with Russia. NATO does
not want war with Russia. Neither do we want Russia to go to
war with Ukraine.
But it is in our strategic and national security interests
to help support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
Ukraine, and President Biden has been absolutely clear that if
Russian troops cross over the border, the United States will
respond decisively and impose swift and severe consequences.
I will conclude with one final point. The diplomatic
engagement we have seen in recent weeks between the United
States, NATO, and Ukraine has been unprecedented.
President Biden and his administration are leading from the
front to restore America's global standing in the world and to
strengthen our transatlantic alliances after four years of
chaos and division under the former president.
As a result, Russia's aggressive actions in Eastern Europe
have achieved the opposite of what Putin wants and that is a
closer and more united NATO alliance.
With that, I look forward to hearing from our expert
witnesses about their assessment and policy recommendations for
the current situation in Eastern Europe, and I will now yield
to the ranking member, the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr.
Grothman, for his--Mr. Grothman, excuse me--for his opening
remarks.
Thank you.
Mr. Grothman. Thanks so much. You all hear me?
Mr. Lynch. Yes, sir.
Mr. Grothman. OK. Thank you, Chairman Lynch.
I want to--thank you to our witnesses for being here today
and I want to thank each of you for your service.
We are here today facing dire circumstances, a threat to
freedom and Western values on a scale we haven't seen in
decades.
There was a slight show of hope. Russia said it had begun
to relocate troops back to their home garrisons. But the NATO
Secretary General said he is not really seeing any signs of
movement or de-escalation.
Then Putin announced that there was an act of genocide
going on in Eastern Ukraine. I can't imagine what that means.
And then the Russian Parliament passed a bill recognizing the
Donbass rebel groups.
It does not appear troops have removed. This is not
deescalation. Words without action ring hollow and Russian
words are not to be trusted.
As it stands now, Russia and President Putin stand ready to
invade Ukraine, topple the most pro-Western government Ukraine
has ever had, and install a puppet government and deal a blow
to free countries around the world.
These are the moves of a ruthless autocrat and must be
condemned with the strongest language.
Let me be clear. While invasion of Ukraine is incompatible
with international law and will be met with swift and forceful
sanctions from the U.S. and NATO, no U.S. troops should step
foot in Ukraine.
This does not mean we cannot or should not support Ukraine.
The United States and our allies should continue to apply--
continue to supply Ukraine with defensive weapons and support.
We should shore up support with our NATO allies and ensure
we speak as one voice. We should share information where we can
with Ukraine to help them prepare for any Russian incursion.
Recently, declassified information suggested Russia will
incorporate information, cyber, and kinetic warfare in its
assault on Ukraine. This could include a false flag in which
Russia manufactures a cause by staging fake video of a
Ukrainian attack on Russians to include actors portraying
corpses.
Again, this is not the work of a president but of an
autocrat who should have no role on the international stage.
The Biden administration has spent months trying to defuse
the situation with little or no success. That is because the
President and Secretary Blinken are doing so from a position of
weakness.
They dropped sanctions on Nord Stream 2, they forecasted a
lack of desire to implement proactive sanctions against Putin,
and they have continued to allow allies, particularly Germany,
to be easily fractured and they continue to beg Putin for
diplomacy.
I don't think Putin can be met with weakness. All of this
is colored in the background by the disastrous withdrawal from
Afghanistan that kind of puts a cloud over, I think, the Biden
administration.
I think what is going on our southern border--you know,
kind of an unprecedented open borders sort of thing with tens
of thousands of people coming here every month--also screams
weakness.
President Biden should have put more economic pressure on
earlier. He should have shored up support within NATO with
regard to Nord Stream 2. We can walk and chew gum at the same
time. We can assist Ukraine while taking concrete steps to
improve our negotiating position with Putin while preparing to
defend NATO.
The world is watching, the Ayatollah is watching, the
Chinese president is watching, North Korea is watching, and
this is what we have when we have weakness already displayed.
Weakness shows a threat to Israel, to Taiwan, and South
Korea. Our allies are relying on us. I hope we stand ready to
defend freedom. This is a scary part of the world.
You know, I remind my colleagues what happened--the
relations between the Soviet Union and Ukraine in the early
1930's where, you know, 4 million to well over 4 million people
starved to death. I hope we won't go overboard in appeasing the
world's buddies.
Before I yield back, I would like to ask for unanimous
consent to place in the record a statement from Ranking Member
Comer.
Thank you, and I yield back.
Mr. Lynch. Without objection, so ordered. The statement
shall be submitted to the record.
Mr. Lynch. I thank the ranking member.
I would like to now recognize the chairwoman for the full
committee, the gentlelady from New York, Mrs. Maloney, for her
brief opening statement.
Ms. Maloney. Thank you, Chairman Lynch.
The fact that you are holding today's hearing with Russian
forces ready to invade Ukraine at any moment reflects the
seriousness with which you take your oversight responsibilities
as chairman of the National Security Subcommittee.
So, I would like to thank you, as always, for your
leadership. The whole world is watching how we are reacting to
this.
Vladimir Putin is at it again. After his illegal occupation
and annexation of Crimea in 2014 and his backing of separatists
rebels in the Donbass region, he now appears to have turned his
sights toward the rest of Ukraine.
Over and over again, Vladimir Putin has shown that he has
little if any regard for international law. He has poisoned and
imprisoned political dissidents and conducted disinformation
campaigns to interfere in democratic elections in other
countries.
He has enabled President Bashar al-Assad and Iranian-backed
militias in the Middle East, which has contributed to
humanitarian suffering on a massive, massive scale, and now he
is threatening to invade Ukraine unless the United States and
NATO concede to his outrageous demands to deny the people of
Ukraine their own political autonomy, security, and right to
self-determination.
As Speaker Pelosi rightly argued over the weekend, and I
quote, ``An assault on Ukraine is an assault on democracy,''
end quote.
Fortunately, President Biden is not afraid to stand up for
democracy. Unlike the former president who worked with Putin
and Kim Jong-un, President Biden has united our allies to send
a strong message to Putin that we will impose swift and severe
consequences on Russia if he uses any military force against
Ukraine.
But military power is not the only tool in Putin's toolkit.
He will also likely continue to use other tools including cyber
operations to try to destabilize and influence his enemies.
Those threats extend not only to Ukraine but also to our
country, the United States. I was glad to see that the
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, or CISA, over
the weekend released a shields up alert that encourages all
U.S. organizations to, quote, ``adopt a heightened posture when
it comes to cybersecurity and protecting their most critical
assets,'' end quote.
I am very proud that the Oversight Committee has played an
important role in enhancing and strengthening our Nation's
cybersecurity and we did it in a bipartisan way. Our national
security is definitely a bipartisan issue, and I look forward
to continuing our work with the Biden administration to improve
our Nation's cyber defenses, especially in response to Russia's
belligerent activity in Ukraine and around the world.
I would like to conclude by thanking the expert panel of
witnesses for testifying today and, again, I want to applaud
you, Chairman Lynch, for holding this timely and critical
hearing. The whole world is watching. The whole world is
concerned. We all thank you.
I yield back.
[Pause.]
Mr. Lynch. I am sorry. I was muted. I am sorry.
Now I would like to introduce our witnesses. Today, we are
joined by the Honorable Michael McFaul, who is the director of
the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at
Stanford University.
Mr. McFaul has an extensive--has extensive experience on
Russian and Eurasian affairs and previously served as United
States Ambassador to Russia from 2012 to 2014.
We are also joined by retired Lieutenant General Ben
Hodges, who is the Pershing Chair in strategic studies at the
Center for European Policy Analysis. Over an almost four-decade
career in the United States Army, Lieutenant General Hodges
serves in multiple joint and Army assignments including
commander of NATO Allied Land Command in Turkey and as
commanding general of the U.S. Army in Europe and Germany from
2014 to 2017.
Also with us today is Dr. Andrea Kendall-Taylor, who is the
director of the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center
for New American Security here in Washington.
Dr. Kendall-Taylor has written and researched extensively
on U.S. security challenges regarding Russia. From 2015 to
2018, Dr. Kendall-Taylor served as Deputy National Intelligence
Officer for Russia and Eurasia at the National Intelligence
Council.
Last but not least, we are also joined by the Honorable
Ambassador Richard Grenell, who has served in multiple roles
for the U.S. Government.
Most recently he served as the former Acting Director of
National Intelligence from February to May 2020, and he
previously served as Ambassador to Germany from May 2018 until
June 2020.
And as a matter of full disclosure, Ambassador Grenell and
I were classmates at Harvard's Kennedy School many, many years
ago and he was a gracious host on a number of our CODELs to
Germany while he served as the Ambassador, including during at
least two Munich security conferences, and I want to thank him
for his kindness on both of those official--well, several of
those official visits on my part.
I want to thank you all for attending. We look forward to
your testimony. The witnesses will be unmuted so we can swear
them in. Please raise your right hand.
Do you swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to
give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth
so help you God?
[The witnesses are sworn.]
Mr. Lynch. Let the record show that the witnesses have all
answered in the affirmative.
I want to thank you all. Without objection, your written
statements will be made part of the record.
And with that, Ambassador McFaul, you are now--McFaul, you
are now recognized for five minutes for your testimony.
Thank you.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL MCFAUL, DIRECTOR, FREEMAN SPOGLI INSTITUTE
FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, STANFORD UNIVERSITY
Mr. McFaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and other members of
this committee for the opportunity to speak here today. I have
written a longer testimony that I submitted for the record, and
I am not going to try to summarize it in five minutes.
Instead, time permitting, I want to focus on three topics
today. First, Putin's goals in mobilizing 150,000 soldiers to
invade Ukraine or have them on the ready to do so; second, the
Biden response; and third, time permitting, some ideas about
the long term for how to contain Putin's Russia.
In my particular expertise on Putin, somebody I met in
1991, written about for 22 years, and dealt with indirectly
when I was in the government for five years, I will focus
mostly on the first topic, but have plenty to say on the second
and third, time permitting, or maybe during questions and
answers.
So, first, what does Putin want? What is his end game? Some
have argued that we could end this conflict overnight by just
ending NATO's open-door policy. I believe that analysis is
wrong.
First, this argument assumes that Putin would credibly
commit to a new agreement and stop threatening Russian
democracy. Why?
He has already violated numerous European treaties and
agreements that Moscow signed in the past, including, most
germane to this crisis, the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on
security assurances for Ukraine.
So, why should anyone in Kiev, Brussels, or Washington
believe Putin will be more sincere this time around?
Second, Putin understands perfectly well that he has
invented from scratch this alleged threat of Ukrainian
membership in NATO to Russia's security interests.
Putin, of course, knows fully well that NATO will not
accept new members that have Russian soldiers occupying parts
of their territory. That is exactly why he invaded Georgia in
2008, it is why he invaded Ukraine in 2014, and now occupies
parts of both of those countries.
That is a tragic fact. He knows that fact well.
Third, while we are distracted and debating the origins of
NATO and NATO expansion, going back 30 years about something
that Jim Baker said to Gorbachev, Putin has continued to march
forward on a much larger destabilizing agenda of undermining
democracy in his neighborhood.
Democratic expansion, not NATO expansion, threaten Putin
and his autocratic regime. Since the so-called color
revolutions in Georgia in 2003 and 2004, Putin has deployed
multiple instruments--20 years now he has been at this--of
power to undermine democracy and sovereignty in these countries
and in other parts of the region.
Putin's massive military buildup on Ukraine's border now is
just the latest tactic in this long-term campaign. Already the
threat of invasion has profoundly stressed the Ukrainian
economy. That is a Putin goal.
Putin aims to overthrow the democratic leader of Ukraine,
Volodymyr Zelensky, and pressure Ukrainian democracy to
collapse.
He seeks a failed state in democratic Ukraine to make the
argument for his successful state in autocratic Russia.
Fourth, Putin seeks to unite a single Slavic nation of
Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, which he thinks was unjustly
divided by the collapse of the Soviet Union.
In a recent long article, Putin explained why Ukrainians
and Russians, from his point of view, are one nation or one
people. He wants to unite them again, even through force or
coercion.
Fifth, more broadly, Putin aspires to weaken and, ideally,
destroy European multilateral institutions and continental
norms about democracy and human rights.
In Putin's view, the post-cold war settlement from 30 years
ago was unfair to Russia. Although he understands well the low
probabilities of success regarding these sets of objectives,
Putin seeks an end to NATO and to the European Union, and more
immediately, at least, weakened unity in both of those
organizations.
So, that is why I don't think a decision about NATO or not
will end this crisis. We will be dealing with this crisis of
Russia's threat to democracy and sovereignty in that part of
the world for as long as Putin remains in power.
So, I see I only have 18 seconds left. I am not going to
get to No. 2 and No. 3. I worried about that. Let me just say
one last thing on the Biden response.
How the well has it done? I think pretty well. When I wrote
my testimony yesterday, I had one criticism. It is that they
hadn't explained to the American people what they are doing.
I had to amend that last night after President Biden's
speech last night, which, I think, made very clear what is at
stake here for American national interest, and if we have time
in questions maybe I will get to some longer-term ideas for how
to contain Putin's Russia.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Ambassador.
Lieutenant General Hodges, you are now recognized for five
minutes for a summation of your testimony.
STATEMENT OF BEN HODGES, PERSHING CHAIR IN STRATEGIC STUDIES,
CENTER FOR EUROPEAN POLICY ANALYSIS
General Hodges. Thank you, ladies and gentlemen, for the
privilege to speak today on the situation in Ukraine.
My testimony is informed by my visit to Kyiv two weeks ago
as part of a small delegation of retired Ambassadors and
generals. We met with President Zelensky, senior government
officials, and members of the Rada.
The currently deployed Russian land and naval forces are
like a boa constrictor around Ukraine, choking its economy and
further threatening its sovereignty.
If the Kremlin can bring about a collapse of the Ukrainian
economy and government, it will not need to launch a new
offensive or worry about sanctions.
The Kremlin's aim is to make Ukraine a failed state, to
force concessions, and ensure Ukraine never becomes an
integrated member of the West within the EU or NATO.
The Kremlin believes they can achieve this by applying
constant pressure on Ukraine's borders and isolating it from
the Black Sea, as they are doing now, without actually
launching a new offensive.
Nonetheless, the Russian general staff has put in place
everything needed to give President Putin multiple options,
including launching a new offensive. Russian ships continue to
arrive through the Turkish Straits into the Black Sea.
The Kremlin has deployed more than 100,000 well-equipped
troops near the Ukrainian border and in Belarus. Crimea remains
home to 30,000 Russian troops and military capabilities and
provides a massive bridgehead into Ukraine.
Based on the current deployments and signals from the
Kremlin, I believe that a new offensive within the next two
weeks is possible but unlikely.
If there is a new offensive, I do not believe that it will
be a massive assault on all fronts or a large-scale attack
toward Kyiv. Such attacks are neither feasible nor necessary to
achieve the Kremlin's aim.
Any new offensive is more likely to be a continuation or
expansion of the current conflict, particularly along the coast
near Odessa and Sea of Azov, the same pattern Russia has
employed since 2008 in Georgia.
There are no real signs of deescalation from the Kremlin,
despite recent vague comments from Moscow about minor troop
withdrawals. We will know more in the next few days.
In a way, it feels like we are watching a slow-motion train
wreck happening before our eyes, and unless we can get the
initiative, President Putin is driving that train.
Belarus is a key part of the Russian scheme. Mr. Lukashenko
could be gone by this summer. The Kremlin will send him into
retirement and replace him with their own guy.
We are seeing now the next phase of bringing Belarus
formally and finally into the union state with Russia. Nobody
in Europe will shed a tear at Lukashenko's departure and the
world will now easily sigh in relief that Russia did not attack
Ukraine again.
This has long-term implications for Putin remaining in
power and could result in Russian troops being permanently
stationed in Belarus next to the very vulnerable Suwalki
Corridor.
The administration and the Department of State deserve huge
credit for the most comprehensive diplomatic effort I have seen
since the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords. Every NATO country
continues to reject the Kremlin's demands.
We all recognize that this is about much more than Ukraine.
Our alliances remains a bedrock of stability and security, but
that security and our prosperity are in danger if Putin can
expand his sphere of influence at will, and, perhaps as
important, a failure of deterrence in the Black Sea will send a
signal of weakness to China.
We should continue doing everything possible to enable
Ukraine to defend itself on the scale of the Berlin Airlift. We
should take the next steps required to deploy the NATO Response
Force to the Eastern flank for exercises to reduce the time
required for employment. It is not escalation if you are
already there.
Thankfully, we still have our bases in Germany as our
foundation in Europe for power projection, command and control,
building readiness, and presence. We would be in a very
difficult situation now without the access and bases we have
today in Germany.
We need a strategy for the entire Black Sea region that
uses all elements of U.S. and allied power, including repairing
the damaged relationship with Turkey.
At present, because we do not have a healthy relationship
with our Turkish ally, we are unable to use the single greatest
element of leverage that we have--Turkey's sovereign control of
the Straits, codified in the 1936 Montreux Convention, which
would allow Ankara to close the Bosporus and Dardanelles to
Russian ships.
The West should give President Putin the opportunity to
draw back forces and reduce the chances of a conflict, but not
at the cost of betraying Ukraine, our allies, or any of our
values.
Of course, we should still maintain dialog with the
Kremlin, but we must understand the nature of diplomacy with
the Kremlin. They are not Boy Scouts.
They use chemical weapons, poison, and murder against their
own domestic opposition, and they use cyber and disinformation
to destroy lives, societal structures, and trust in our
democratic systems.
We should talk, but we need to understand with whom we are
talking.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Lieutenant General.
Dr. Kendall-Taylor, you are now recognized for five minutes
for a summation of your testimony. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF ANDREA KENDALL-TAYLOR, DIRECTOR, TRANSATLANTIC
SECURITY PROGRAM, CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY
Ms. Kendall-Taylor. Wonderful.
Thank you, Chairman Lynch. Thank you, Ranking Member
Grothman and distinguished members of the committee. It is
really wonderful to be here with you today.
As my colleagues have said, we remain in a critical period.
Russia could invade Ukraine at any time with no additional
warning, and while the door to diplomacy is not closed and
every effort must continue to be made to find a diplomatic path
to avert crisis, there remains a significant risk that Russia
will launch a military incursion into Ukraine.
President Putin seeks to keep Ukraine in Russia's orbit.
This has been a long-standing Russian objective. But for Putin,
this is really personal. He has tried and failed repeatedly
over the course of his 22 years in power to bring Ukraine back
into Russia's fold and he, apparently, calculates that now is
the time through the threat or use of force to halt Ukraine's
westward and democratic trajectory.
And while this is about Ukraine, it is also about more than
Ukraine. Putin is seeking to reverse the consequences of the
Soviet collapse. He wants to rewrite the rules of the European
security order and reinstate spheres of influence.
I also think Putin may be thinking about his legacy and I
think he likely sees himself as the last Russian leader who is
willing to take such significant risks to reassert Russia's
preeminence in what Putin insists is his privileged sphere and
in world affairs.
He still has options. We should be clear about that. If he
remains committed, however, to advancing his maximalist
objectives, which I think--you know, he is looking for autonomy
in regions in the East that would give Russia a veto over
Ukraine's foreign policy and he wants to keep Ukraine out of
NATO.
If he remains committed to these maximalist objectives, I
think he could view a military incursion as necessary to
accomplishing those aims. But the critical question now is
whether there is anything short of those maximalist objectives
that Putin could walk away with and that would be acceptable to
Ukraine.
This is a crisis of Putin's making and he can still pursue
a peaceful path if he chooses.
In terms of the Biden administration's response, they have
taken several very prudent steps to influence how Putin weighs
these various options.
They raised the alarm bells early and they declassified
information that robbed the Kremlin of the element of surprise
and their ability to control the global narrative.
We fostered cohesion with our NATO allies and partners. We
have worked to reinforce Ukraine. They have clearly outlined
the costs that Putin would face for escalation, and they have
identified a list of mutually beneficial arms control and risk
reduction measures that we could engage on.
Along with other NATO member states, the administration
also wisely sent U.S. troops to strengthen the Eastern flank,
and to ensure that if there is conflict that that conflict
remains contained to Ukraine.
I think that was a solid signal of America's commitment to
NATO and to President Putin that the United States is very
serious about increasing U.S. force posture in Europe if he
invades, and that is a deterrent to President Putin.
We should also be clear that this is the riskiest thing
that Putin has done in his 22 years in power. There is ample
room for him to miscalculate, as highly personalist
authoritarian leaders are prone to doing, and including in ways
that could destabilize him domestically.
And so, it is up to the United States and its allies to
respond strongly and decisively to any escalation so that we
are sure that that external pressure that Putin faces is
punishing.
Of course, there is a risk that the Kremlin could look to
retaliate for costly Western sanctions. So, Washington has to
be prepared for and seek to prevent that escalating spiral of
responses.
But I want to foot stomp something that Mike McFaul was
talking about. I think regardless of what happens in Ukraine,
the United States needs a new approach to Russia.
This military buildup was an unmistakable signal that the
Kremlin has no interest in the stable and predictable
relationship that Washington sought to establish, and if Russia
invades and is successful in its objectives, it will only
harden the dividing line between liberal democracy and
authoritarianism.
It is also even if Russia doesn't invade the United States
can't simply return to its previous business of focusing
predominantly on China. Washington and its allies are now
dealing with a more brazen Russia, one that uses or threatens
military force to pursue objectives that are at odds with
America's interests and values.
And we know, moreover, it is not just that they will
maintain the intent but they will have the capacity to
challenge U.S. national security interests for decades to come.
Russia will remain a persistent power. You can think of it
as a good enough power and that means that the United States
can't afford to look past Russia.
Of course, China is the most significant long-term
challenge the U.S. faces. But it is not the only challenge, and
so Washington has to make strategic and budgetary decisions
that reflect this reality.
Thank you.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Doctor.
Ambassador Grenell, you are now recognized for five minutes
for a summation of your written testimony.
Thank you. Welcome.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD GRENELL, FORMER ACTING DIRECTOR OF
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Mr. Grenell. Thank you.
First, let me just say to Chairman Lynch, Congressman
Lynch--my friend, Steve--it is so great to see you so
successful. You are the most important and successful student
we have seen out of our class, and so I know so many people are
cheering for you. It warms my heart to see you doing so well.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Lynch. You are too kind. But thank you.
Mr. Grenell. And to Ranking Member Grothman, thank you for
having us today.
I think it is important for us to have Q&A, so I want to
try to get to it as quickly as possible. But let me just give a
quick summary of what I think is happening in the current
situation.
I think the United States is being aggressively alarmist
right now. We have shoved aside diplomacy. There is all sorts
of talk of war. We are rejecting the tools that the United
States has in terms of sanctions. I have noted that all of the
witnesses today haven't talked about Nord Stream 2.
Despite the fact that we have had, let us say, President
Biden saying that the most consequential thing since World War
II is Russia's actions here in Ukraine, we had one person this
morning talk about this is the riskiest thing Putin has ever
done.
I have to say that if we really believed that this was
verified intelligence that this was the riskiest thing that
Putin has ever done or, as Jake Sullivan said, war is
immediate, if verified intel really showed a bloody war around
the corner coming very soon, I can't think of something more
callous than to wait for bloodshed to be put on the TV screens
before we would make a move on diplomacy and do Nord Stream 2
sanctions.
Nord Stream 2 sanctions--by the way, Nord Stream 1 the
United States has no problem with. Russian gas is a part of the
diversified energy portfolio for Europe. But Nord Stream 2 goes
too far.
The Germans have undermined us when it comes to Nord Stream
2, and to have all of official Washington racing toward
military options, ignoring the diplomatic tool that will
cripple Putin, that will deny him the money that he so
desperately needs to go on the offense, to not even discuss
Nord Stream 2, I think, is shameful.
It is typical of Washington and all of the pundits in
Washington that race to talk about war instead of utilizing
diplomacy. Sanctions and the tools of the U.S. Government are
incredibly important and, yet, official Washington is talking
about troops and buildup and, literally, pushing aside the
diplomatic response. I find it to be shameful.
The aggressive talk that is coming out of Washington is
not, and let me repeat, is not verified intel. We have to
remember that intelligence is an estimate. Sometimes we get it
right. Sometimes we get it wrong. Sometimes we overestimate.
Sometimes we underestimate.
Let me just give you in recent memory a couple of times
that the intel was overestimated and wrong because it was raw
intelligence and not IC verified intelligence, a fundamentally
different move, and the media does a terrible job of
distinguishing between the two.
First of all, we were told that moving the U.S. embassy
from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem would cause World War III. Not true.
Kim Jong-un is brain dead. That ran on CNN for weeks and every
official newspaper in Washington, DC, and many politicians ran
with that narrative. It was wrong.
Trump was a Russian asset. Wrong. Fifty former U.S.
intelligence officials signed a letter one month before the
2020 election, saying, don't look at Hunter Biden's laptop
because it is Russian disinformation. Wrong.
I think, last, let me just say, that official Washington is
also wrong when it comes to NATO unity. The Germans are
undermining NATO. Many NATO members are not paying their fair
share and their obligations. The Germans have attacked Estonia
for trying to bring in hardware.
And I will just echo what President Zelensky said about the
U.S. policy, and I agree with it, that right now, it is the
worst of both worlds. It is definitely not deterring Putin and
it is ruining our ally, Ukraine's, economy.
With that, I look forward to taking many questions.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you.
I now recognize myself for five minutes of questions.
In terms of intelligence, I do want to just put out there
that--and my Republican colleagues and my Democratic colleagues
on this call, we are all party to a very grim, very accurate,
and unanimous assessment on the part of the intelligence
community at a recent classified briefing at the Capitol in the
House auditorium where the intelligence was confirmed by all of
our intelligence agencies that the threat is, indeed, imminent.
So, I don't want to--I don't want to discount the
classified intelligence that is all--I can't go into detail
but--because this is not a secure call--but my Republican
colleagues know exactly what I am talking about as my
Democratic colleagues do as well.
You know, President Biden has said that he is prepared to
impose swift and severe costs on Russia if President Putin
decides to invade Ukraine. Some of those costs might include
additional economic sanctions and ramping up our security
assistance to Ukraine, and I do support the president in doing
that if--and I believe those steps are absolutely necessary.
But, in truth, we have had sanctions in place against
Russia since the annex o Crimea, and that has not deterred
Putin from poisoning political dissidents, launching cyber
attacks, and interfering in our own elections.
And I understand and appreciate that we don't want to do
anything that would escalate the situation with Russia or that
could result in an armed standoff or a hot war between two of
the largest nuclear powers in the world.
But if we are, truly, defending the international system,
the rules-based international order that has helped preserve
peace in Europe since the end of World War II, I think we have
to get serious about the costs that we are willing to impose on
Putin if he does, in fact, invade Ukraine.
Ambassador McFaul, to all our witnesses, have we signaled--
you know, when I hear the dialog coming out of NATO about, you
know, economic sanctions against Russia for, you know,
eliminating borders and invading Ukraine and, you know, taking
away the self-determination, self-government of 44 million
people, the idea that, you know, we are going to put a price on
that can be taken a completely different way by authoritarian
regimes.
You know, we have in the background China that is always
playing the long game. If we said that there would be economic
costs for taking Taiwan or, in this case, economic costs of
taking Ukraine, and that is our--you know, we put that out
there as our response, there are some authoritarian leaders who
play the long game might just try to amortize those costs and
go forward with taking other countries.
And so, I am just concerned about, at the outset, putting
economic prices on the actions of these authoritarian regimes,
and it seems like we have stepped back from--considerably from
the Truman Doctrine.
And I just wonder, the wider question--the macro issue of
protecting democracy and that international system.
Ambassador McFaul or Dr. Kendall-Taylor, do you have any
insights on that?
Mr. McFaul. Sure. Let me say a couple of things. A great
hard question.
First thing I want to talk about is Putin and then us. So,
with Mr. Putin, I think it is important to remember that the
Russian system is a dictatorship. It is not a democracy.
You know, we tend to think in cost benefit analysis--if he
invades or not what is going to be the cost to his economy. He
doesn't--he is not subject to pressures from the oligarchs or
other constituencies in the same way he would be in a
democracy. I think that is very important to understand.
No. 2, I think he thinks of his mission in life in more
ideological terms and more sweeping terms. He thinks about his
mortality already and, therefore, what happens in the short
term is not as important to him.
So, worrying about the prices of their bank's stock next
week is not something on his mind in the way it might be for
investors. That is the first thing I would say.
My own personal view on sanctions is that we haven't done
enough, and I go back to 2014. In my view, I left the
administration right as Mr. Putin seized Crimea. That was the
moment when we should have put in comprehensive sanctions.
And two things--we talked about Nord Stream 2. Nord Stream
2 has been building for several years, everyone. It didn't just
pop up this year. I think we should have been sanctioning Nord
Stream 2 a lot longer--you know, years ago.
And No. 3--another thing which I know nobody supports but I
want you to know, Congressman, my view--my view is that
sanctions need to be like parking tickets. The way we think
about them now is somebody does something bad and we give them
a parking ticket, and then we just let them park there forever.
So, Crimea.
Whereas my view is that you have to ratchet up. You know,
here at Stanford, if you if you park--and believe me, it only
takes 15 minutes to get a parking ticket here at Stanford--and
you leave your car there the next day, guess what, Congressman?
You get another parking ticket. And if you are there for a week
you get seven parking tickets.
And I think that construction, that if you are violating
sovereignty, if you are at war, you need to ratchet up the
pressure, not just have one level of pressure and leave it in
place. But I know that is very unpopular.
One last thing about sanctions, I would say. My own view in
this crisis was that we should have publicized the sanctions we
were planning to do with our NATO allies and European partners,
in part so that Putin knew for sure but in part for the Russian
people to know for sure what we were going to do, and third, in
part, to tie our hands.
I think the worst thing to do in a crisis is to have a long
debate about which sanctions we are going to do or not. If you
publicize them, then you have to credibly commit to enforcing
them if it happens.
The Biden administration has a different view. They thought
that by publicizing them that would lead to a big debate within
the alliance, and I respect that argument and I understand that
argument. But I had a different view earlier on.
Mr. Lynch. OK. Thank you.
I see my time has expired, and I now recognize my
colleague, the ranking member, the gentleman from Wisconsin,
Mr. Grothman, for five minutes for his questions.
Mr. Grothman. Thanks.
So, let us start off with Mr. Grenell. Last year, President
Biden lifted the sanctions on Nord Stream 2. Do you want to
comment on that or your opinion as to why President Biden would
drop the sanctions and the effect of it?
Mr. Grenell. Yes. Look, I think that consensus is a really
nice word. It really sounds good. But my eight years inside the
U.N. Security Council will tell you that consensus is more
times than not almost exclusively terrible for the United
States. It is a watered-down statement. It is a watered-down
set of policies. It is the lowest common denominator of what
people believe.
Now, I want to respond a little bit to why we didn't
publicize the possible sanctions from the Ambassador. The main
reason is because the Germans were against it, and Joe Biden
and the Biden administration have decided that we have to act
in concert with the Europeans on this and, therefore, the
Germans are really watering down our response.
I would argue that we don't share the same threat
assessment that Berlin and Paris and Brussels do. I am all for
a transatlantic alliance as long as it is Western facing. There
is no reason to just be in an alliance that ignores the West.
What we need is a strong statement of these are the
sanctions that would be put in place, and we weren't able to do
that. We weren't able to do that because what the Biden team
maximizes is consensus with people who don't share the same
threat assessment that we do.
Mr. Grothman. OK. Right now, we are backing away a variety
of policies, green policies, whatever the motivation. We are
backing away from energy independence here in the United
States.
Do you want to elaborate on that a little and what effect
our backing away from energy independence or producing energy
here in the United States has on this potential conflict?
Mr. Grenell. Well, certainly, we know that our policy, the
European policy of diversified energy is a good policy, and
when you diversify your energy sources then you can't be in a
situation where one country has an over influence on you.
I think the Nord Stream 2 pipeline actually is a pipeline
of influence into Europe. And by the way, one big mistake that
Washington consistently makes is that somehow Europe wants this
pipeline.
The European Parliament said no to the Germans. They should
not have the Nord Stream 2 pipeline because it went too far.
Again, Nord Stream 1 is fine when it comes to some Russian gas
being utilized.
When it comes to the United States, your question is very
important because we have seen a transformation of our foreign
policies simply because we were getting off Middle East oil and
we were able to produce and be energy independent and use
energy in the best way possible.
Mr. Grothman. Yes. I don't mean to cut you off. But is it
accurate to say that if we were producing more energy in this
country, we would be in better shape in a variety of ways here?
Mr. Grenell. Absolutely.
Mr. Grothman. OK. Next question I have--the Biden
administration has been critical of the East Bloc countries--
Poland, I think Hungary, I believe.
Do you want to elaborate on that or is that having an
influence here?
Mr. Grenell. I am sorry. You cutoff there. Can you repeat
the question?
Mr. Grothman. OK. The Biden administration has been
critical of some formally East Bloc countries--Poland, I think
Hungary. I am not sure of that.
Could you elaborate on what effect that has on this
situation?
Mr. Grenell. Look, I believe that Washington, over the last
decade, has fundamentally viewed Europe as just what Paris,
Berlin, and Brussels think, and Europe is much more
complicated.
What we have seen in the last few years is rewriting of the
borders of Europe and a shrinking of the EU. Those are just
facts that nobody can ignore. Europe is not in a stronger
place. It is in a much weaker place.
In 2014, we saw Crimea being grabbed, and that is rewriting
of the European borders. I have heard Chancellor Merkel talk
about rewriting of the European borders as a terrible thing and
the most awful thing. I think we have got to view the EU in
whole, and voices like Poland and Hungary and others need to be
just as strong as Berlin and Paris.
Mr. Grothman. OK. One other quick thing. About 90 years ago
now there was a horrible famine caused by the Soviets in
Ukraine. I would think, insofar as knowledge of that history,
would do nothing but help us in Europe. Why, in your opinion,
does nobody talk about that?
Mr. Grenell. Well, I think that we have viewed most of our
policy with Ukraine as too simplistic, and what we have to be
able to do is understand the multiple voices inside Ukraine and
the multiple voices inside the EU. There are a lot of things
that we are missing.
Mr. Grothman. Yes. You are not asking my question. Why is
that not more common knowledge or something that is talked
about?
Mr. Lynch. The gentleman's time has expired some time ago.
Maybe we can come back to that in another round, Mr. Grothman.
Mr. Grothman. Thanks. Thanks.
Mr. Lynch. Absolutely. Thank you. It is an important
question, but I do have a lot of members in line.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr.
Johnson, for his questions for five minutes. Welcome.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, and good to be with you, Mr.
Chairman. Thank you for holding this very important hearing.
Russia's current behavior is unsettling and dangerous. At
any moment they could initiate the largest land invasion since
World War II, risking significant casualties and millions of
people displaced.
Moreover, Russia continues to direct cyber attacks against
Ukrainian military, energy, and other computer networks as
recently as yesterday.
I commend President Biden for emphasizing diplomacy at
every approach through meetings and mediation. But if Russia
insists on being a hostile actor, the United States of America
is prepared to meet the challenge.
Ambassador McFaul, the Biden administration has warned that
a Russian invasion of Ukraine would likely come at significant
costs to human life of which 50,000 innocent civilians could be
killed while millions of people in Ukraine would be displaced,
potentially, creating an unprecedented refugee crisis in
Europe.
Are there steps that the U.S. and NATO can or should be
taking right now to minimize the humanitarian impacts that are
expected to ensue as a result of a Russian invasion of Ukraine?
Mr. McFaul. Thank you, Congressman. I will just take a
first stab, but I do think we should hear from General Hodges
on this, too--a man who knows a lot more about those kinds of
issues than I do.
I would say I am impressed with what the Biden
administration has done so far. It was very controversial to
move our embassy from Kyiv to Lviv.
I think that was the right call. I think it was correct for
the administration to call on Americans to leave Ukraine. That
also was a very controversial call. I think it was the right
call.
The last thing we want to see if, God forbid, Putin should
decide whether to invade would be to see Americans in Ukraine
die as a result of that.
Third, I want to remind everybody Ukraine is not a
homogenous society. If Putin launches an aerial campaign
against its major cities, he will be killing ethnic Russians as
well. It will not just be ethnic Ukrainians. And I hope that
that is part of his consideration.
On the one hand, he talks about we want to unite with our
Slavic brothers. On the other hand, he is threatening to kill
his Slavic brothers right--not just ethnic Ukrainians, but
ethnic Russians--and I hope that will give him some pause in
terms of launching, you know, the catastrophic war.
And I think what Ambassador Grenell said about
intelligence, I don't know if it will be 50,000 or not. I
think, as Andrea said, he has got lots of options between full-
scale military intervention and something much shorter,
including not even using boots on the ground or tanks.
But anywhere in there, I think, would be catastrophic and I
hope he thinks twice about those casualties that you just
mentioned.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Ambassador.
General Hodges, what is your assessment of the situation in
terms of what would happen if Russia actually invades?
General Hodges. So, thank you.
Well, of course, we have some sense of what it would look
like because they did it back in 2014 and they never left, and
so what I expect is a continued expansion of what they have
been doing, lower-level type operations, where they think they
can remain below some perceived threat threshold, where all of
us would have to go forward with these massive sanctions.
So, that is why I think we are going to see more cyber,
more sabotage, amphibious operations along the coast of Azov,
possibly on the Black Sea.
I do think that the three best things that we can do, No.
1, continue to stick together. With respect to our former
Ambassador to Germany, I do think that Germany today is a
different--there is a different government than there was a few
years ago and the ground is beginning to change here among the
German elites. I think they realize that their credibility as a
leader within the European Union was eroding rapidly.
And so, there is a different sense to it. It is not where
we want it to be, but I have a more optimistic view about that.
Second, we have got to figure out how to get the
initiative. We are always getting whipsawed worrying about what
President Putin is doing or what are the Russians doing, and
everybody on this call knows from your own education and
training or sports that you want the initiative.
So why, in this most important situation, are we on our
heels all the time? And I think that working with our ally,
Turkey, is what would give us the most initiative where Turkey
could tell the Kremlin, we are going to close off the Straits
and you are not going to be able to move ships through there.
And, of course, Moscow would go crazy on Ankara. So, we
have got to make sure that Ankara is confident that we will not
leave them exposed to the inevitable retribution that would
come from the Kremlin.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you. My time is expired so I yield back
what I can, anyway.
Mr. Lynch. I thank the gentleman.
The chair now recognizes Mr. Gibbs for five minutes for his
testimony. Welcome.
Mr. Gibbs. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Ambassador Grenell, I want to make a comment here and you
can tell me if I am right and if you agree with me.
But, you know, the chairman made a comment earlier here a
few minutes ago about how sanctions have been in place forever
and they don't always work and because, I would argue, that
some of the sanctions, as you know, have been removed and we
are looking very weak.
But when Putin attacked Crimea in 2014 under the Obama/
Biden administration, I believe that was the last time that
Putin or anybody else in the world gained an acre of land by
aggression. Is that correct, Ambassador Grenell?
Mr. Grenell. From 2016 to 2020 when Donald Trump was
President, we did not see President Putin or Russia go on this
type of offense.
Mr. Gibbs. That is the point I wanted to make. Thank you
for concurring with that.
Because I think sanctions do work and strength does work,
and we have seen the Biden administration, their disgusting
withdrawal out of Afghanistan, put a strong signal to the rest
of our aggressors around the world, including Putin, that they
would probably get away with most of anything and now they are
challenging this administration.
So, that is what I am saying. The administration looks very
weak right now and so I got this problem.
Do you believe Germany--Ambassador Grenell, do you believe
Germany will ever approve sanctions to the Nord Stream 2?
Mr. Grenell. No, I don't. I think it is very clear that
their current energy needs are pushing them to actually have
this Russian gas pipeline. It is really important to note as
well is that the German government promised that there would be
two liquid natural gas terminals--at least two in Germany that
they would utilize U.S. LNG for.
As soon as Biden was elected, the German government
canceled those two. There is no more plans to have terminals in
Germany to receive liquid natural gas from other sources.
Mr. Gibbs. Well, that is interesting. I guess I wasn't
aware of that. That also, I guess, signals at same time you
said President Biden did that he also pretty much shut down our
fossil fuel industry in the United States by not renewing or
not opening leases up on Federal lands and curtailing pipelines
and just sending incentives for the industry not to produce
more but then at the same time beg OPEC and Russia to produce
more, which is actually--I call it Putin's dirty gas and that
is what their pipeline is sending to Europe and Germany. So,
that is really a shame.
Ambassador Grenell, can you talk a little bit more? You
know, we have heard so much about--you mentioned about not
verified intelligence. You know, we have seen it over the years
our intelligence agencies come in and give us classified
briefings and turns out later we know that some of those things
that we were told weren't true, especially when it came to
Russian collusion with the Trump administration and the Trump
campaign.
You know, can you expound a little bit on there? Is your
experience, you know, as being the National Security Adviser
when you talk about the types of intelligence and then we see
some people in our intelligence committee who can go out and
say things that are different than what they were being briefed
on?
Mr. Grenell. Look, it is really important to note that the
fact that Russian--the Russians are building up along the
border are true. The intelligence agencies are correct when
they give us that assessment that there is a military buildup.
But it is quite a different point when you try to look at
the analysis of why, and that is where the intelligence
community does not agree, and to jump to the conclusions that
the intelligence community does absolutely know what Putin is
going to do or why he is doing it that is not true.
They are accurate in the buildup and the threat. Of course,
Russia is always a threat. But there is much different analysis
when you look at what is next and how to read the intel for the
future.
Mr. Gibbs. I believe the intel--is that really a legitimate
thing or how are politics--is there political pressure put on
some of our people in intel to do or don't do things? What
would you say about that?
Mr. Grenell. I would say that the majority of our
intelligence officers are phenomenal people who care very
deeply about the United States. I have always believed that
they need to police themselves.
They know who the leakers are. They know that the leakers
are for partisan purposes. It is no secret that the leaks have
stopped under the Biden administration. That is because there
are leakers within the intelligence agencies, all of the
intelligence agencies that are too partisan. Sometimes it
happens on both sides of the aisle.
But we have a crisis within the intelligence agencies of
people who leak, and I can tell you, from my experience, the
overwhelming majority of intelligence officers know that, they
are not happy with it, and they are working to police
themselves. They need to do a better job. But it certainly
would help if the political types cracked down on the leaks
immediately.
Mr. Gibbs. Thank you. I am out of time. I yield back. Thank
you.
Mr. Lynch. The gentleman's time has expired.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Maryland, Mr.
Mfume. You are now recognized for five minutes. Welcome.
Mr. Mfume. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. I want to thank
you and the ranking member, Mr. Grothman, and everyone who has
gotten us to this point. This is a very important topic,
obviously, and this particular hearing I think will help clear
the air on some other things and then hopefully put this in
perspective in some other ways.
More than anything else, the bottom line here is that this
is Russian aggression. It is man-made Russian aggression. I
think we can all agree that this is about Vladimir Putin. It is
not about the Russian people per se. And after 22 years of
pretty much dictatorial reign, Mr. Putin is looking on this as
a way to seal his fate in history and to reverse the collapse
of the Soviet Union.
I am member of the Ukrainian caucus here in the Congress,
and I can tell you that we have, like all of you, watched this
situation with a great deal of interest. Like some of you, I
remember well, because I grew up in a cold war America, the old
Soviet Union. I remember reading in the Weekly Reader about
something called the Iron Curtain and it had to be explained to
me what was going on. My parents and my uncles told me about
the war they had just come out of. I grew up in the Korean era,
in the 1950's, and the Soviet Union continued dominance that
carried on throughout that.
So, I have got a different perspective on this, and some
people might say, ``Well, why is this so important?'' I guess
because I have seen what happens when you don't treat things
like this as important.
I remember Hitler's aggression and what was known as war
creep, and I can tell you what we are seeing here is war creep.
It started just this century, in 2008, with the taking of
Georgia, and, you know, we were silent, defenseless. We
watched, after that, in 2014, as we all know and it has been
stated, the taking of Crimea. And when you look at the
parallels that circle those two events and you look at what is
going on today, in my opinion, the similarities are striking
and they should bring about a great deal of concern. Troop
movements, 2008, 2014. Locations of weapons. The particular
kind of propaganda that came out of Moscow, so much similar as
today.
So, the Soviet Union is gone, but Mr. Putin believes that
he has some divine authority to try to reinstate it. And in my
opinion, when you look at the old Russian orbit in which
Estonia and Latvia and Lithuania were all part of that. I just
believe that Vladimir Putin is determined to try to take all of
that back, and if can do it in the Ukraine, what is going to
stop him? There are certainly different answers about that, but
I think if we think the way he is thinking, nothing can stop
him.
I want to thank the chair for referencing the classified
briefing of the entire intelligence community that many of us
sat in last week on. It was bipartisan--well, two weeks ago--
bipartisan. General Milley, Chair of the Joint Chiefs,
addressed us, as did Secretary Austin, as did the Director of
National Intelligence, Secretary of State Blinken, and others.
And the information that came out of that briefing was
concerning, to say the very, very least.
So, I want to just offer something here, because, you know,
we are having this hearing. It is an open hearing. And as the
chairman said, many of us did get that briefing. We ought to
remember that because this is an open hearing we should, I
think, find a way to ask the tough questions without creating a
circle of firing squad, and to whatever extent we can resist
the urge to point fingers, on both sides of the aisle.
When I got to the Congress years ago for the first time, in
the 1980's, there was an unspoken rule that all politics
stopped at the water's edge, that there had to be some sense of
unity among ourselves. Otherwise, people would not assume that
we were a unified nation, in many, many respects.
So, I am going to just, not stop, but I do have a quick
question for any of you or all of you. I heard something
earlier--and by the way, Ambassador McFaul, thanks for taking
about Putin's goals, Biden's response, and long-term
containment. I am sorry we have not had enough of an
opportunity today to deal with that, and maybe we will before
we wrap up.
But I also heard from General Hodges clearly that we have
got to find some sort of way to not always be on our heels with
Russia and with Putin, and that looking past this, once we do
get past it, hopefully, there has got to be some offensive
postures or some offensive positions or offensive steps that we
ought to start putting in place, because as sure as we are all
here, Vladimir Putin is not going away, and whatever he is up
to he will be up to continually.
So, if someone can talk about any of that in the time that
is remaining. I am like Representative Johnson when he said if
I had any time left at all. I may not. But those are my
thoughts, and if somebody could take a quick stab at any of
that, that would be great.
Ms. Kendall-Taylor. Do we have time, Chairman? Oh Chairman,
you are on mute.
Mr. Lynch. Ms. Kendall-Taylor. I know we are going over
here a second, but we have not heard from you, and I think this
is something that you could speak to directly. So, could you
briefly respond to the gentleman's question?
Ms. Kendall-Taylor. I think it is such an important point
that Lieutenant General Hodges talked about going on the
offensive, and there are, I think, a lot of currently
underutilized domains in our relationship with Russia where we
could take more proactive steps. The Biden administration has
begun some of those, but the focus on anti-corruption, for
example, making that a national security priority. There are
certainly parts of resilience to that, but I think we could be
a lot more creative and proactive in terms of using sanctions
to go on the offensive to bust up corrupt networks, using
sanctions to go after the cronies around Putin as well as their
families. There are things that we could do to support
investigative journalism.
You know, we talked about the rising repression inside of
Russia. There are a tremendous amount of Russian civil society
actors who are being forced to flee the country. There are ways
the United States could take a lot more proactive steps to
enable those people to continue to do their business, continue
to shine a light on corruption inside Russia.
So, I think there are a number of ways. You know, I do not
want to go on too long here, but we can pick up on this,
because I think your point about a kind of a cold war mentality
where we need persistent pressure across all domains of our
relationship with Russia in order to kind of disrupt the
Kremlin's destabilizing actions and to constrain their ability
to disrupt internationally in the mindset we need to return to.
And like I said, I do think that there are a number of
different domains where we could take a lot more engaged and
proactive posture.
Mr. Mfume. Thank you.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you. The chair now recognizes the
gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Higgins, and we will try to
rebalance the time available for Republican questioning, just
to even things off. But welcome, Mr. Higgins.
Mr. Higgins. I thank my friend and colleague, Chairman
Lynch, and Ranking Member Grothman. Thank you for holding
today's hearing.
What we are seeing unfold in Eastern Europe and Ukraine is
a direct result of the Biden administration's foreign policy.
This is a reality we have to deal with and respond to
peacefully and diplomatically. But we have to recognize that
the current Administration owns the turmoil we are witnessing
worldwide. Weak leadership out of the White House has
emboldened America's adversaries. When the American President
presents himself as soft and unstable, the whole world suffers.
If we do not change course, Putin will take advantage of the
world stage, and he will solidify Russia's position in the
world and increase his economic leverage and his energy
leverage.
A key factor in countering Russian aggression during the
last administration was American energy dominance. Expanded LNG
exporting agreements with our European allies and sanctions on
the Nord Stream 2 pipeline served as an important counter to
Russian influence and aggression in the region. Instead, our
White House has sought to restrict United States oil and gas
production and has waived sanctions, allowing the Nord Stream 2
pipeline to move forward. These actions have empowered Putin
and increased Europe's reliance on Russian energy.
Leaders across the world are questioning the strength and
resolve of America's President. Weakness invites aggression,
and President Biden has unfortunately exhibited weakness, both
on the international stage and domestically, here in the border
crisis, the shameful retreat from Afghanistan. You know, the
world is watching these things.
So, America must counter Russian aggression with strength,
and that includes embracing pro-American policies, America
First policies, that project strength and stability on the
global stage. This current conflict that is poised in Eastern
Europe, I don't know what we can do to stop that. We should
have stopped it before it got here by displaying strength and
resolve and strong America policy, America First policy, and
energy dominance.
Mr. Grenell, heads-up, sir. I am going to ask you a couple
of questions. With President Biden lifting the Trump
administration sanctions, like removing the sanctions on
Russian Nord Stream 2 pipeline, how has this enabled Putin to
push on Eastern Europe and reignite his aggressive policies
that he pursued under the Obama Administration?
Mr. Grenell. Congressman Higgins, thank you for that
analysis. I think that it was very accurate, and it is also
frustrating to see.
I would say that you are correct that weakness invites
aggression, and we have seen it in a variety of cases.
Certainly, getting rid of the Nord Stream 2 sanction has really
emboldened Putin. There is no question about it. There is a lot
of handwringing in Washington that we need to go on the offense
or we need to constrain Russia's offensive behavior. There is
no better way than to cutoff Nord Stream 2 sanctions except for
the Biden administration lobbied the Senate to drop Nord Stream
2 sanctions. That is a strategic mistake, just like when the
Biden administration got the Houthis off the terrorist list.
What did we see within weeks after that? The Houthis were
sending missiles into the UAE.
I want to just reiterate, your point about weakness
inviting aggression is exactly what we are seeing with Putin.
From 2016 to 2020, we did not see this aggression. The last
time we saw this aggression was in Crimea, when Joe Biden was
the Vice President.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you for your response. Mr. Chairman,
thank you for holding this hearing. I look forward to a
bipartisan agreement on how we can move forward to encourage a
resurgence of American strength overseas so we can bring some
stability to Europe.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield.
Mr. Lynch. The gentleman yields back.
The chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Florida, Ms.
Wasserman Schultz, for five minutes. Welcome.
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think it
is important for us to, for me to begin by pointing out that
the previous President, Mr. Trump, was Putin's patsy, and that
he stood in front of the whole world at a press conference and
essentially just took Mr. Putin's word for it when he said that
he hadn't interfered in the Presidential election in the United
States of America. I mean, it is ludicrous to suggest that
Donald Trump was actually stronger against Putin than Joe Biden
or Barack Obama or any other President. He rolled over for
Putin every single day, in front of the whole world.
Now my question focuses on the fact that for decades Russia
has been using propaganda and disinformation to undermine
democracy and exploit wedges between the United States and our
allies. So, it is no surprise that President Putin would do
that now in Eastern Europe. Through multiple disinformation
channels, Russia portrays itself as an innocent victim of
western aggression and uses Ukrainian leaders of being, quote,
``pure Nazis.'' The goal seems clear: validate further Russian
intervention in Ukraine.
Ambassador McFaul, in the context of Russia's troop buildup
on the Ukrainian border what are Russia's aims in launching
this propaganda campaign, and who are the intended audiences?
Mr. McFaul. It is a good question. Thanks for asking. I
would say a couple of things. One, Putin is an idealogue. He is
not some realpolitik, cost-benefit analysis person that just
thinks about power. He thinks about ideas. He agrees with what
President Biden said in his address to you all that we are in a
battle between autocracies and democracies. He believes that.
He is very explicit about it, by the way. You don't need a PhD
in Russian studies. You can read it. He is very blunt about
what he thinks.
No. 2, in that battle between democracies and autocracies,
it is not just between countries anymore, as it sometimes was
portrayed in the cold war. The cold war was actually a lot more
complicated than that, but it is within countries as well. So,
within countries, in Hungary, in Italy, in France, in our own
country, Putin has a very concrete set of ideas--it is kind of
orthodox, nationalist, populism--where he is seeking to create
alliances, ideological alliances, with leaders throughout those
countries and many more, and he devotes tremendous resources to
this enterprise, way more----
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Ambassador McFaul, I have--thank
you--I have another question that I want to ask you, and the
sort of preamble here is that thankfully President Biden and
his Administration are taking a proactive approach to debunking
Russian disinformation, and instead of letting Russia's false
narrative propagate and spread, the Biden administration calls
them out for what they are--lies.
In my district, I represent many Venezuelan, Colombian, and
Cuban constituents, so I am particularly concerned about
Russia's attempts to exert influence in Latin America. In
recent years, Russia has sold weapons and tanks to Cuba and
Nicaragua, and aircraft and anti-missile systems to Venezuela,
and has also held bilateral military exercises with Venezuela.
And this is especially concerning given that senior Russian
officials recently suggested that interference by the United
States or NATO in Ukraine could prompt the deployment of
Russian forces to Cuba or Venezuela.
Our U.S. National Security Advisor, Jake Sullivan,
described this treat from the Russians as ``bluster,'' but the
thought of Russian forces in the Americas is deeply troubling.
So, Ambassador, given your expertise, how credible do you
find Putin's threat to deploy forces in Cuba or in Venezuela or
take any action in that direction, and do you have other
concerns about how Russia's sphere of influence in Latin
America impacts this occurring moment?
Mr. McFaul. Thanks for the question, and Dr. Kendall-Taylor
has thought a lot about this question too, so if we have time,
I want to hand it over to her.
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. I would love you both to answer.
Mr. McFaul. But I just think what you are talking about
illustrates the point that I was trying to make. This is not
just about spheres of influence and realpolitik and going back
to the 19th century. Putin has a long-term, ideological agenda,
and you described too, autocracies, right, so let's be clear
about that. That is not a spurious correlation that he is
working with them, and he will seek to deepen those
relationships. And in my view, just so we are clear, this has
been a long-term strategy that has been going on, irrespective
of whether we have a Democrat or a Republican in the White
House. You know, he invaded Georgia when George W. Bush was
President. He annexed Crimea in 2014, when President Obama was
President. And that march has continued. All of the things you
are describing, all of that continued during the Trump
administration and continues today.
And if we are going to have a strategy to push back on it
we need to have a national, bipartisan strategy. Weakness is
when we are fighting amongst ourselves and not thinking about
who the actual enemy is in the struggle.
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Mr. Chairman, could I have
indulgence in allowing Dr. Kendall-Taylor to answer as well?
Mr. Lynch. You may.
Ms. Kendall-Taylor. Mike makes an excellent point, and I
think the important thing to remember is that the Russians see
the information space as a critical battle space in this
competition between democracy and authoritarianism. That is the
lesson they learned from Georgia in 2008, and they have been
investing in and fighting in this space in a way that we
haven't.
So, I find it extremely heartening to see the Biden
administration, through the warnings that they give and their
efforts to declassify information, to be competing in a way
that we haven't shown up and done before.
On your question, though, on whether or not they would be
willing to deploy forces to Venezuela and Cuba, I don't think
so. To me that feels like the Putin regime trying to poke us in
the eye. It would be costly for them to do so. And so, I
think--you know, of course it is plausible, but in my best
judgment I don't think that is necessarily where he is headed
with this.
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
for the indulgence. I yield back the time I don't have.
Mr. Lynch. Absolutely. I thank the gentlelady.
The next on my list, the gentlelady from South Carolina,
Ms. Mace, is recognized for five minutes, although we need to
see--you need to turn your camera on. I do see someone there
but no camera.
[Pause.]
Mr. Lynch. OK. Perhaps Ms. Mace has stepped away. We will
go next to the gentleman from California, Mr. DeSaulnier.
Welcome. You are recognized for five minutes.
Mr. DeSaulnier. Thank you, Chairman Lynch. It is always a
delight to see you in your library.
I wanted to ask all of you, but let's start with Ambassador
McFaul. And I also wanted to thank you. Some years ago, I was
part of a delegation from the California State Senate and you
hosted us. It was a really remarkable conversation. I don't
know if you remember it.
We were there because we were engaged in conversations with
the Moscow Duma. They were interested in Californians,
specifically, as a member from the Bay Area, in the East Bay--
go Bears, sorry. They were interested, and they showed us, in
Moscow, the Moscow Duma, their efforts for their replication of
Silicon Valley. And right after that meeting, when I got into
Congress, I remember being at a meeting that Aspen Institute
had put on, and one of the members asked--these two comments
lead to a question--a former KGB officer, who had served with
Mr. Putin after the first Ukrainian incident in little green
men, the question was, ``How can we believe him and his
leadership when he lies?'' And the response from the former KGB
officer was, ``Well, he is not lying when everyone knows he is
lying.''
So, first maybe respond to that and how we deal with it.
And the second part is--and forget my sort of sophomoric
insight here--having hosted the Moscow Duma and the St.
Petersburg Duma and then reciprocated, and their interest in
technology and information, in hindsight it struck me as being
less about innovation and more about understanding it and using
it for things that I was probably naive about at the time than
the goodwill that we were trying to convey.
So, I wonder if you could respond to those two things. It
is hard to trust these kinds of relationships that you try to
foster when the mentality is, well, it is not lying when you
know they are lying.
Mr. McFaul. Those are tough questions and I will try to be
brief, to get other people in. With respect to technology, it
was called Skolkovo, the project you are talking about. That
was their Silicon Valley idea. It was a project spearheaded by
President Medvedev, not Prime Minister Putin at the time. And
it was a sensible idea. Russia has more PhDs in math and
physics per capita than any country in the world. Here, where I
live, there are over 80,000 people that have moved from the
former Soviet Union to work here in the Valley, for good
reason. We are attracting those people. That is what makes
America strong, by the way, is to attract the best and
brightest to our country.
But that project has kind of withered on the vine,
Congressman, because Putin doesn't believe in it. He doesn't
really believe in independent economic activity. You know,
there has been more nationalization under Putin and a shrinking
of the private sector.
And the second point, you know, part of your question, is
absolutely, we must be vigilant, not only with Russia but with
China, in understanding dual-use technologies and how we might
be inadvertently subsidizing those that we later will face on
the battlefield. And I think we need to be smart about that,
and I am glad you raised that.
With respect to truth, it is important. It was always very
frustrating, as the U.S. Ambassador to Moscow, when I was
constrained by the truth and my interlocuters were not. It is
very difficult to have a rational conversation with somebody
who can say two plus two equals five and you have to adhere to
the rules of truth that two plus two equals four. And I would
just underscore that to be very cautious about, you know, there
has been some news in the last 24 hours that it looks like
diplomacy has a chance.
And I would just be very cautious to look at the full range
of what Mr. Putin is saying. Because on the one hand he sat
with his foreign minister, Lavrov, and said, ``Well, go ahead
and keep negotiating.'' But at the same time, he said two
troubling things--well, his parliament did and he did. One, he
said there is genocide in Donbas. If the Russian President is
saying there is genocide against ethnic Russians that sounds
very ominous to me in terms of a pretext for war.
And second, the parliament, the Duma there--and let's
remember it is a fully controlled organization within Putin's
autocracy, they just passed a non-binding resolution calling
for the independence of the two republics in Donbas. That
sounds pretty scary to me, and that sounds like a very
different message than we are looking for offramps, we are
looking for diplomacy.
Mr. DeSaulnier. Dr. Kendall-Taylor, maybe you could respond
to that briefly, the intersection, as you mentioned in your
earlier comments to my colleague from Florida about
misinformation technology and how we have to be consistent, but
the reality is not as they perceive it.
Ms. Kendall-Taylor. I will try to be really quick, the
point that Putin--that there is no truth that he is tied to
conspiracy theories and creating a world in which there is no
truth means that then the barrier of truth has become extremely
high. And I think, you know, we have talked about U.S. efforts
to declassify intelligence, to be more forward-leaning with the
intelligence that we have, so that we can try to work with
allies and partners so that we can see a single truth.
I think that is an effective strategy that the United
States is now waking up to in order to try to cut through the
lies so that least we, among our allies, have a common picture
of what is happening.
But the other point to highlight is, you know, there are
some significant stakes on the line. Thinking of arms control
and other things, you know, we have just four years left before
we need a new follow-on agreement to things like New START. It
is extremely difficult to negotiate these types of agreements
with the Russians in an environment where Putin lies and
regularly reneges on the treaties that he signs. And we are
going to have to think about what an approach looks like. What
are the confidence-building measures that we can start, however
small, so that we can build some semblance of a relationship in
order to put the guardrails on the relationship that we so
desperately need. And that is going to be a challenge, and that
is where I think we need to do thinking, because the stakes are
really high.
Mr. DeSaulnier. Thank you. I yield back. Thank you for your
indulgence, Mr. Chairman, as always.
Mr. Lynch. Absolutely. And thank you, Doctor.
The chair now recognizes the gentlewoman from South
Carolina, Ms. Mace, for five minutes for questioning. Welcome.
[Pause.]
Mr. Lynch. I did, in fact, see Ms. Mace on the screen
briefly, a moment ago. But in the interest of time, I am going
to move on to the gentlewoman from California, Jackie Speier.
You are recognized for five minutes.
[Pause.]
Mr. Lynch. I don't see her camera on. Why don't we go to
the gentleman from Vermont, Mr. Welch? I see your camera is not
on either, but perhaps you could do so. There he is. Welcome.
You are muted, Mr. Welch. You are muted. There you go. Welcome.
Nope
Mr. DeSaulnier. Forgive him, Mr. Chairman. He graduated
from Holy Cross.
Mr. Welch. Am I on?
Mr. Lynch. You are on. Welcome. Please. You have five
minutes.
Mr. Welch. Thank you very much. I apologize. I want to
thank the panel for your extraordinary presentations.
You know, I think we are unified here about our opposition
to Russian aggression, and it is pretty clear they are willing
to do it. They took Crimea and now are surrounding Ukraine.
But I would like to ask you, Ambassador McFaul, another
question about NATO expansion. The major powers are
apprehensive about having another power on their borders. You
think of the Cuban Missile Crisis. And Korea, of course, when
we went up to the Yalu River, China brought its troops in, even
though at that point they were not a nuclear power. And my
understanding, historically, is that powers are extremely
sensitive about what they regard as hostile forces on their
border.
And the question of Ukraine is tied very much up to this
question of whether they should be part of NATO. And my
understanding is that there are a lot--Ukraine can decide they
want to be in NATO, but on the other hand NATO, and the U.S.
can decide what is in our national security interest.
So, I would like you to address this question of that
element that is of concern, at least reportedly, by Russia, and
what is the sensible policy for us with respect to our national
security with NATO expansion into the Ukraine.
Mr. McFaul. Thank you for the question. It is a really
hard, complicated one that goes back historically. I wrote a
book in 2002, so already 20 years ago, and one of the chapters
in it was about U.S.-Russia relations, and Chapter 8 was called
``NATO, a Four-Letter Word.'' And that is just to remind you
that this has been a debate for a long time, in U.S.-Russia
relations, and obviously in U.S.-Soviet relations.
Let me say two things. One, it hasn't been a constant
debate in Russia. I think there is a misperception that
throughout this entire 30 years of history Russia has just been
opposing and we have been imposing, imposing, imposing. I don't
see the history that way. When Boris Yeltsin first took over,
he wanted to join NATO. NATO was not considered an enemy. He
wanted to join the West because Russia was a democratic country
at the time.
When we signed the NATO Russia Pact in 1997, go back and
read it. There is a lot of very cooperative language there,
because in 1997, we were not in a battle and a kind of cold war
posture that we are in today. It was very different.
When President Putin came in, even before he was president,
in 2000 he was visiting London and he said, ``I think it might
be a good idea for Russia to join NATO.'' Hold on. If NATO is
such a threat to Russia, why is Vladimir Putin saying he wants
to join NATO?
And even just in 2010, when I was in the government, I was
at the NATO summit in Portugal. President Medvedev was there at
the time. I encourage you to go back and read what he said
then. He didn't say anything about NATO expansion. He was not
concerned about NATO expansion. He was talking missile defense
cooperation between Russia and NATO.
So, I just tell you some of those tidbits because this has
not been a constant. What triggers concern about NATO
expansion? It is when there has been a so-called color
revolution around the borders. That is what Vladimir Putin is
really worried about.
His first--You know, back in 2002, I want to remind people
we were allies. ``Allies'' is too strong a word, but we were
cooperating right after September 11th. That last major wave of
expansion that was announced in 2002, was not a big event. And
then we have got 2003, 2004, and then what happened in 2014.
Mr. Welch. Thank you. Thank you very much. Dr. Kendall-
Taylor, do you want to give your point of view on this?
Ms. Kendall-Taylor. I agree with everything the Ambassador
just said. I think the other important way to think about it
is, you know, these countries are asking to join a defensive
alliance, and if President Putin pursued a less antagonist and
aggressive approach to his neighbors, I think there wouldn't be
such a press and such a demand from these countries to join
what is a defensive alliance.
It is really notable to see, even in countries like Finland
and Sweden, who are not part of the alliance, the way that
their internal debate has changed, again, in the face of
renewed Russian aggression against Ukraine. They are talking in
a very renewed and reinvigorated way about the prospects of
NATO membership.
So, all of the things that Mike said I also agree with, but
just to add the point that the reason that these countries want
to join this alliance is because of Russia's own aggressive
actions, and if it were to revise its approach to its neighbors
then I think Russia itself would be in a very different place.
Mr. Welch. I yield back. Thank you very much.
Mr. Lynch. I thank the gentleman. At this point I would
like to recognize Mr. Grothman, the ranking member, for any
concluding remarks that you might have, Ranking Member, just as
a courtesy. I would yield you five minutes for any concluding
remarks from the minority. Thank you.
Mr. Grothman. OK. I am glad we had the hearing. I think it
is important to stress the gravity of this situation and the
degree to which past--I guess I would call it nothing else but
weakness puts us in this situation. I think it is important, as
I mentioned during my questioning, to talk about past relations
between Russia and the Ukraine. I don't see a downside to it,
and I think it is something everybody ought to be aware of, so
that everybody in the world understands that there may be some
natural animosity between the countries.
Can I ask Mr. Grenell one more question?
Mr. Lynch. Of course. Of course.
Mr. Grothman. OK. I would like to ask you your opinion of
NATO expansion.
Mr. Grenell. So, I agree with Ambassador McFaul that it is
a difficult question and it is something that is fraught with
all sorts of issues. First of all, I would say that no one
should be telling Ukraine that they cannot seek NATO
membership. We have seen the Germans try to do that. We have
seen the Biden administration suggest to the Ukrainians that
they take that off the table, and certainly that would please
the Russians. But no one should be telling a country,
especially Ukraine, not to seek NATO membership.
With that being said, I find it difficult to add NATO
members at the present time when current NATO members are not
paying their fair obligations. Why would we extend this defense
umbrella to more nations when the current ones are not paying
and being good members? I still am of the mindset that the
Germans are undermining NATO like never before, and we need to
call it out.
Mr. Grothman. OK. Well, thank you for that. Thank you for
your opinion. Maybe I should give one of the other witnesses a
chance to respond to that as well. Maybe Ms. Kendall-Taylor.
Ms. Kendall-Taylor. In terms of what, NATO expansion?
Mr. Grothman. Yes.
Ms. Kendall-Taylor. I mean, I just kind of just repeat, I
think, what Mike said, is like it hasn't been a consistent
story, but Russia has been more or less kind of sanguine about
NATO expansion over the course of history. And it really is,
again, these countries demand to join a defensive alliance.
I think the other thing that we need to focus on, obviously
NATO expansion is one issue, but this is really also a question
about a country, Russia, using the threat of force or the use
of force to change borders. And so that, in and of itself, I
think is extremely important to push back against that
principle alone.
Mr. Grothman. I agree with you. I will wrap up by
mentioning that in our Pledge of Allegiance we pledge
allegiance to the Republic of the United States of America. And
while there is some ambiguity as far as who said it upon
writing the Constitution, I think Benjamin Franklin is usually
quoted as saying as we have a republic that you can keep it.
I think it is important that important members of our
foreign affairs establishment understand what form of
government we have, and if you don't understand that I don't
think you really understand why America has become such a great
country, and you don't understand what we should be encouraging
other countries to become.
OK. Again, I would like to thank our chairman for convening
this committee. It was certainly very interesting. I would like
to thank all our guests for taking time out of their day and
enlightening us.
Mr. Lynch. I thank the gentleman. Reclaiming my own time, I
would like to ask Lieutenant General Hodges. I have not been
back to Ukraine for several years, especially with this
pandemic, but previously I had been there after the massacre at
the Maidan, I had been there several times before the
annexation and invasion of Crimea. And it was a challenge to
get a sense of the readiness and willingness of Ukraine to
defend itself.
Previously, before the Crimea annexation, we did see there
was a draft that was instituted for males, I think, from 18 to
35. It was not as coherent as you might like. I have also had
an opportunity to visit a number of our bases in Germany,
Landstuhl, and got the flavor of the acceptance of U.S. forces
in Europe.
And obviously we have heard reports of NATO and U.S. troop
movements into places like Poland and Romania. So, this is not
classified information we are talking about here. Could you
give me a sense of your perspective on U.S. NATO readiness in
that region, and especially focus on the NATO cohesiveness,
which seems much improved right now. However, we all know how
that can sometimes dissolve in the face of military kinetic
action.
So, I would just like to get your assessment of all of
that. Thank you.
General Hodges. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me take, I
think, three different points. First, as to Ukrainian armed
forces, you are exactly right. This is not the same Ukrainian
armed force of 2014, because of their own effort and because of
the support from the United States over the last eight years,
as well as some other allies. In a variety of ways they have
significant improved capability, and maybe most importantly,
the willingness to fight, not just soldiers but also amongst
the population. I think we are seeing this a lot these days.
Clearly the Russians will have a significant overmatch in
terms of sea power and air power, but when it comes to ground
forces, I think one of the reasons we are not going to see a
massive Russian land assault is because they will suffer
incredible casualties and would not be likely to reach Kyiv,
let alone encircle it or destroy it. So, I think on the ground
it is a much better force, but certainly there is much more to
do, particularly in terms of anti-ship capability, air defense
capability, where we can help.
Ukrainian soldiers impress me with how quickly they learned
technology. Several years ago, our government gave them what we
call Q-36 counter-fire radar, put it in the hands of Ukrainian
soldiers. That radar is much better than I ever knew it was. Of
course, I had never been under Russian artillery fire or rocket
fire. That is a powerful motivator for innovation, and that
radar has been a very, very useful piece of equipment for them,
as an example.
For our own forces, of course no commander is going to say
he has enough, but we are really, really light in terms of
naval or sea power ourselves. I think basically there are four
U.S. Navy ships assigned to U.S. Navy Europe. That is it. And
those are the same vessels that are in the Mediterranean, the
Black Sea, Arctic, North Atlantic, all around this theater. So,
there is a shortage of naval capability to address all the
requirements, and our great Navy is typically overstretched.
Land forces, we are in a pretty decent place. I am
absolutely happy with the deployment that the President
directed, of troops coming from Fort Bragg and Fort Campbell as
well as from Germany to reinforce NATO's eastern flank.
I used to be against this, but I have changed my mind. I
think it is time to reconsider permanent basing along NATO's
eastern flank in Poland, in Romania, in Baltic countries. I
think Secretary Jens Stoltenberg--and there is not a statue big
enough for that guy; he has done so much to hold our alliance
together--has begun to talk about maybe we should reconsider
the idea of permanent basing along NATO's eastern flank.
Mr. Chairman, if I may, one last thing. The best thing that
we can do to deter Russia and to protect our country is to live
up to our own talking points. I live in Germany. I am from the
great state of Florida, but I have lived here now for the last
several years since retiring, and it is hard to watch. And all
of my European friends shake their heads when they talk about
January 6. They can't believe what they see and hear. And I am
not talking about just in Germany. I am talking about the full
range of European countries. And it undermines our desire to
project American power when we look so divided. I mean, it is
not who they all grew up respecting.
And it really--so I commend this committee for trying to
address this, the work that you are dealing with, that you are
trying to do. But we are so vulnerable right now to everything
that the Kremlin wants to do. We are an easy target, to be very
candid.
Mr. Lynch. Well, thank you very much, General. Those were
pointed and really important remarks, especially with respect
to the way Europe and the world views us after January 6. We
are our strongest when we are together, and we need to get to
that place. I know we have got some distance to cover in that
regard. That was a very dark day. But I do appreciate your
assessment and I hope you are right with respect to the
readiness of the Ukrainian people.
So, I want to thank all of our witnesses. You have been
terrific. I want to thank our members for your thoughtful and
insightful questions. I really do appreciate the work you have
put into this, and I think it revealed a lot during the
hearing.
In closing I want to thank our witnesses for their remarks
today. I want to commend my colleague again for your
participation in this important conversation. And with that,
and without objection, all members will have five legislative
days within which to submit additional written questions for
the witnesses to the chair, which will be forwarded to the
witnesses for their response. And I ask our witnesses if you
receive questions in that regard please try to respond as
promptly as you are able so that we can close the record.
This hearing is now adjourned. I thank you all, and please
be safe, and thanks for your participation, and thanks for your
service to your country, both past and ongoing. Thank you.
Ms. Kendall-Taylor. Thank you, Congressman.
[Whereupon, at 11:54 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[all]