[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE CECC AT 20: TWO DECADES OF
HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE AND DEFENSE IN CHINA
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 13, 2022
__________
Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available at www.cecc.gov or www.govinfo.gov
_________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
50-186 PDF WASHINGTON : 2023
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
Senate
House
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon, Chair JAMES P. McGOVERN, Massachusetts,
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California Co-chair
MARCO RUBIO, Florida CHRISTOPHER SMITH, New Jersey
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma THOMAS SUOZZI, New York
TOM COTTON, Arkansas TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey
STEVE DAINES, Montana BRIAN MAST, Florida
ANGUS KING, Maine VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
JON OSSOFF, Georgia RASHIDA TLAIB, Michigan
JENNIFER WEXTON, Virginia
MICHELLE STEEL, California
EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
DANIEL K. KRITENBRINK, Department of State
MARISA LAGO, Department of Commerce
THEA MEI LEE, Department of Labor
LISA JO PETERSON, Department of State
UZRA ZEYA, Department of State
Matt Squeri, Staff Director
Todd Stein, Deputy Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Statements
Opening Statement of Hon. Jeff Merkley, a U.S. Senator from
Oregon; Chair, Congressional-Executive Commission on China..... 1
Statement of Hon. James P. McGovern, a U.S. Representative from
Massachusetts; Co-chair, Congressional-Executive Commission on
China.......................................................... 3
Statement of Hon. Thomas Suozzi, a U.S. Representative from New
York........................................................... 4
Statement of Hon. Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the House............. 5
Statement of Teng Biao, Hauser Human Rights Scholar, Hunter
College, and Pozen Visiting Professor, University of Chicago... 9
Statement of Rana Siu Inboden, Senior Fellow, Robert Strauss
Center for International Security and Law, University of Texas
at Austin...................................................... 11
Statement of Sophie Richardson, China Director, Human Rights
Watch.......................................................... 13
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements
Biao, Teng....................................................... 32
Inboden, Rana Siu................................................ 34
Richardson, Sophie............................................... 39
Merkley, Hon. Jeff............................................... 42
McGovern, Hon. James P........................................... 43
Submissions for the Record
``Authoritarian States: Blocking Civil Society Participation in
the United Nations,'' a report by Rana Siu Inboden, published
by the Robert Strauss Center for International Security and Law 45
CECC Truth in Testimony Disclosure Form.......................... 72
Witness Biographies.............................................. 73
(iii)
THE CECC AT 20: TWO DECADES OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE AND DEFENSE IN CHINA
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TUESDAY, DECEMBER 13, 2022
Congressional-Executive
Commission on China,
Washington, DC.
The hearing was held from 10:00 a.m. to 11:50 a.m., in Room
106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, DC, Senator
Jeff Merkley, Chair, Congressional-Executive Commission on
China, presiding.
Also present: Representative James P. McGovern, Co-chair,
and Representatives Smith, Suozzi, and Wexton.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF MERKLEY, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
OREGON; CHAIR, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
Chair Merkley. Good morning. Today's hearing of the
Congressional-Executive Commission on China entitled ``CECC at
20: Two Decades of Human Rights Abuse and Defense in China''
will come to order.
This year marked the start of the Commission's third decade
monitoring the People's Republic of China's compliance with
international human rights standards and developments related
to the rule of law in China. The Commission's annual report,
hearings, and other products provide a detailed multi-year
accounting. Over that time, our work documents a dramatic arc
from the early 2000s of a movement within China to stand up for
and defend human rights to the current situation, the Chinese
Communist Party's escalating efforts to constrict space for
internet freedom, for civil society, and for the exercise of
citizens' basic rights.
In that same period, the hope some held on to that China's
inclusion in global institutions would be accompanied by
improvements in human rights has met the harsh reality: Chinese
authorities are using those institutions to debase and
discredit the very notion of universal rights. As we close out
the 117th Congress, this hearing aims to take stock of where
the last two decades have left us and where those fighting for
fundamental freedoms can go from here. We are joined by some of
the leading experts in the field, who will shed light on the
evolution of the domestic situation in China, the international
legal landscape, and the Chinese Communist Party's efforts to
shape both.
Before we hear their testimony, our examination of this
topic will be framed by special remarks from a very special
friend of this Commission. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi
spoke from the dais at the first hearing of the CECC 20 years
ago, just a floor above us in this very building, to help
launch a Commission she played a key role in creating. As we
thank her for her historic leadership in Congress and tireless
work on behalf of human rights everywhere, but especially in
China, there is nobody more fitting for us to hear from to mark
two decades of the Commission's work and help chart what we can
do to keep fighting for the people against the powerful.
That is the essence of what the Commission tries to do. The
talented and professional staff has published 21 annual
reports, compiled over 10,000 Political Prisoner Database
records, and met with countless stakeholders over the years. In
this Congress alone, we've passed the groundbreaking Uyghur
Forced Labor Prevention Act, advanced legislation establishing
a China Censorship Monitor and Action Group, held 15 hearings
that ran the gamut of issues within our mandate, sent dozens of
advocacy letters, and published analysis on the treatment of
Muslim minorities, economic coercion against American
companies, the case for sanctioning those responsible for
political persecution, and the dismantling of Hong Kong's civil
society.
Since the first days of the Commission, the backbone for
all of this work has been Judy Wright. The first person hired
to staff the CECC, Judy Wright has been the only Director of
Administration the Commission has ever had. After nearly 21
years in this role, and almost 40 years working for the U.S.
Congress, Judy will begin a richly deserved retirement at the
end of this month. She has kept the Commission running
smoothly, supported research staff through thick and thin,
maintained institutional memory over the many political
transitions in Congress over the years, and has been a
treasured friend to generations of CECC staffers and
commissioners. Judy, this team will miss you dearly. We wish
you all the best in retirement, and thank you for your service.
This is my last hearing as chair before we transition to
the next Congress. It has been an honor to serve with my co-
chair, Congressman McGovern, who has shown tremendous
leadership these last four years in translating the work of the
Commission into meaningful legislation defending Uyghurs, Hong
Kongers, Tibetans, and others experiencing abuse. That work has
been truly bipartisan and bicameral, and as we prepare for the
next Congress, I look forward to continued close partnership
with Congressman Smith, with Senator Rubio, and with all of
this Commission's champions for human rights and the rule of
law in China.
I will now turn to Co-chair McGovern.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES P. McGOVERN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MASSACHUSETTS; CO-CHAIR, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON
CHINA
Co-chair McGovern. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
for scheduling this hearing. I look forward to the testimony of
our witnesses, and I want to thank you for your incredible
leadership. It has been an honor to serve alongside you, as
well as with my friend Congressman Suozzi from New York. I've
really admired your style and your commitment to the human
rights of the Chinese people.
You know, today we take stock of the changes in China and
the evolution of international law in the two decades since the
CECC was established. Our intent is not to look back but to
plan for the future by assessing our work amidst a changing
landscape. Xi Jinping will continue to lead a government that
employs the newest tools to suppress dissenting viewpoints,
impose social control, and repress critics domestically and
across borders. We want to make sure that the Commission is
properly equipped and oriented to fulfill its mandate and to
serve our constituents--Congress, the executive branch, the
China human rights community, and most important of all, the
people of China.
Chinese, Tibetans, Uyghurs, Southern Mongolians, Hong
Kongers, and all others who live in the PRC deserve to have
their rights and dignity respected. Human rights are inherent,
as enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
protected by the covenants and agreements that have flowed from
it. The Chinese Communist Party would have us believe that some
rights count more than others, citing Chinese values to
discount certain civil and political rights. Some in the United
States also believe that some rights count more than others,
citing American values to discount certain social and economic
rights.
Under international law, both are wrong. Human rights are
universal, independent, and mutually reinforcing. This
Commission, by statute, is mandated to assess China's
compliance with international human rights standards. These
standards are not determined by any party in China and not by
any party in the United States. These standards, codified at
the United Nations and widely adjudicated, apply to every
person in every country and territory on Earth. We do a
disservice to the people of China if the Commission's work is
shaped by personal or political preferences, rather than by the
universal human rights that the people of China are entitled
to. Over two decades, the Commission has earned a reputation
for objective and informative analysis. And let's keep it that
way.
On a personal note, this is my last hearing as co-chair of
this Commission. With my co-chairs, Senators Rubio and Merkley,
along with Congressman Smith, we have sought to translate the
Commission's expertise into advocacy and legislative impact. We
helped get into law the Hong Kong Autonomy Act, the Hong Kong
Human Rights and Democracy Act, the PROTECT Hong Kong Act, the
Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act, and the Tibetan Policy and
Support Act. I give special mention to the Uyghur Forced Labor
Prevention Act, which was the product of Commission staff
research that led to a report, a hearing, legislation, and then
law. I propose it as a model both for how the Commission can be
effective and how it can craft robust human rights policy. I
hope to be able to continue to serve on this Commission and to
work on a bipartisan basis to promote human rights in China.
Lastly, none of this would be possible without the hard-
working non-partisan staff of the Commission. They are experts
in the field and committed to both the cause of human rights
and to the accuracy in reporting that has made the Commission's
work so respected. I cannot thank them enough. Like the chair,
one staffer I will mention by name is Judy Wright. She's
retiring after 20 years at the Commission and many years before
that in the House. As Director of Administration, she has made
everything possible. We will miss her. I wish her a well-
deserved and fulfilling retirement. I also want to acknowledge
our lead staffer in the House, Todd Stein. I have worked with
nobody who knows more about China, who is more fluent in human
rights law, who cares more deeply about this issue than him.
And it has really been a privilege and an honor to work
alongside him. We're going to continue to work together on this
issue for many years to come.
As we're waiting for Speaker Pelosi to arrive, let me just
say that I want to pay a special tribute to her. You know, she
reminds us all the time, even when it's inconvenient, about how
important focusing on human rights is. And with regard to human
rights in China, she reminds us that if we don't have the
courage and the guts to speak out against human rights abuses
in China, then we don't have the moral authority to speak out
against human rights abuses anywhere on this planet. The
legislation that both of us have pointed out, that has been a
product of this Commission, would not have become law were it
not for the leadership of Speaker Pelosi in the House. And I
cannot thank her enough for her commitment.
So thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to hearing from
our witnesses as to their recommendations for how this
Commission, Congress, and the United States Government can best
advocate for the universal rights of the people of China. And
with that, I yield back.
Chair Merkley. Thank you very much, Co-chair McGovern.
Hopefully we'll be continuing to work together, though in
different roles, shortly.
Congressman Tom Suozzi is with us from New York. He is
retiring from Congress. We've really appreciated your service
on this Commission and all the other excellent work you've done
while serving in the House of Representatives. Would you like
to share any opening comments?
STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS SUOZZI,
A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW YORK
Representative Suozzi. Yes, Senator, thank you very much
for your leadership of this Commission. We're very grateful to
you for your professionalism and the great work that you've
done over the past couple years. It's been a great honor to
serve with you and with Chairman McGovern, who's been involved
in human rights issues for so many decades, as well as
Congressman Smith who's, I'm sure, joining us either
electronically or will be joining us in person soon. And of
course, it's such a great honor to follow in the footsteps of
someone like Speaker Pelosi, who's really been a leader on
human rights issues for such a long time.
As I look back on the 20-year anniversary of this
Commission, I just want to quickly mention four dates--1972,
1989, 2001, and 2022. 1972 is when Nixon first went to China.
And at that time, we thought the more that China was exposed to
the United States and our way of life and the West as a whole,
to democracy and to capitalism, the more that they'd become
like us. We know today that that just simply hasn't happened.
1989, Tiananmen Square. We thought, Wow, maybe something's
going to happen here; people are really waking up to the
realities of human rights abuse in China, and the people are
rising up. And we saw that revolution crushed in that massacre.
But people were paying more attention than before.
2001 is when China joined the WTO. Globalism was this new
idea and we thought we were going to really benefit from China
participating in the world economy. They can uplift their
quality of life. They can participate in the world economy, and
we can get cheaper goods in the process. Wow, what a great
opportunity. And maybe they'll finally wake up to their human
rights abuse and become more like the West in recognizing that
they have to address human rights concerns. And that's when
this organization was set up, soon after China joined the WTO.
But today, in 2022, things couldn't be worse than they are. We
see what's happening to the Uyghurs. We see what's continued to
happen with the Tibetans, the repression in Hong Kong, the
saber-rattling in Taiwan, and so much more.
This Commission plays such an important role here in the
United States and on the world stage in trying to call to the
world's attention these human rights abuses. We know this well
because we look at it, because of the great work our staff
does, the research that's done, the hearings that we hold, the
experts that we listen to, like we'll listen to today. But the
world doesn't really realize how bad things are in China. As
the chair of the Uyghur Caucus, I'm particularly aggrieved by
the way that the Uyghurs are treated, but all the different
human rights abuses that I've mentioned continue to go on every
day. We have to recognize that we're going to have to pay more
for our jeans and t-shirts, but that's okay because we have to
hold China accountable for the human rights abuse that exists.
And I look forward to the work that this Commission will
continue to do in the future. I'm excited to hear Speaker
Pelosi as we celebrate, and thank her again for her leadership.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chair Merkley. We are absolutely delighted to welcome the
Speaker of the House. Madam Speaker, you have missed the
accolades that we have been putting forth, pouring forth,
really, recognizing that you were instrumental in the creation
of this Commission and have been a champion for human rights,
particularly regarding China, throughout these decades. We've
so appreciated that leadership, that important fight for human
rights across the world, and particularly in China. We are
honored that you've come to share with us some comments today.
Welcome.
STATEMENT OF NANCY PELOSI,
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE
Speaker Pelosi. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for your great
leadership of the Commission. Your values, your strategic
thinking, and all the rest, are invaluable to the cause. I
thank you and recognize that. I'm glad to be here with Mr.
McGovern. In the House, we call him our spiritual leader,
whether we're going to Tibet, or elsewhere in China, to make
the case. And Mr. Suozzi, thank you for your leadership. We'll
miss you here, but you took this on so seriously, and I really
appreciate that. And to your witnesses here today, welcome, and
thank you for your courage.
I was a witness at the first meeting of this Commission. I
was a brand-new whip of the House. I had just been sworn in as
whip of the House. So it was the first testimony I ever gave as
a member of the leadership. And today, this will be the last
testimony I will give as a member of the leadership--but not my
last comment on human rights in China.
In the interest of time, I will stick with my remarks, but
there's just so much to be said about this subject, and how we
could have done better as a nation since Tiananmen Square to
avoid the situation we're in now. I see that they handed me
this--China says it has taken U.S. semiconductor rules to the
WTO. Imagine that. When I invited the chairman of the People's
Congress to the Capitol--they had hosted us in China--and we
were reciprocating, I said: I'm really sorry to bring up the
fact, on your first visit here, that China is violating--it was
announced that day that they were dumping rubber into the U.S.
And I said, I hate to begin the meeting this way, but you
shouldn't be doing that. And I can't ignore that fact.
And the chairman of the People's Congress had the chair of
this committee and that committee of the People's Congress, a
very distinguished group. And they said, Well, we all agree
that when we joined the WTO they said we didn't have to obey
that rule. So that was how they came into the WTO. But I thank
the co-chair, Mr. McGovern. Thank you for your leadership.
Thank you Chairman Merkley, for yours. It's an honor to join
the Congressional-Executive Commission on China as we mark 20
years of tireless work on human rights. It seems like it went
by just like that.
It's fitting that we do so just days after U.N. Human
Rights Day, marking the adoption of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights in 1948. Sitting here, I recall that first
meeting I talked about. In my remarks, I made clear that we
must not abandon human rights for economic opportunity in
China. As we gather today, our concerns remain just as salient
and strong. So I'm grateful to all of you, to the CECC for
organizing this timely hearing, ``CECC at 20: Two Decades of
Human Rights Abuse and Defense in China.''
Thank you, again, Chairman Merkley, Co-chair McGovern,
Congressman Chris Smith--in a bipartisan way we've worked on
this issue for a long time. And thank you, Mr. Suozzi, for your
leadership. You all have honored the long bipartisan, bicameral
tradition of the CECC, the foundation of its remarkable success
and lasting impact on policy. This has always been bipartisan.
And that is so much the beauty of it. Excuse me. Let us salute
the Biden administration for strengthening your work by
appointing executive branch commissioners for the first time
since 2014. Thank you, Mr. President.
As we all know, the Commission was established as the
People's Republic of China acceded to the World Trade
Organization. In 2000, I took to the House floor to urge my
colleagues to block China from the WTO, arguing that we should
not put deals ahead of ideals. As the world's strongest
economy, America has a moral duty to link our trade relations
with human rights. I just told you how casual and cavalier the
Chinese were about obeying the rules of the WTO.
However, there were those who argued that Beijing's
inclusion in international business institutions would bring a
wave of reform and progress. In doing so, corporate America and
its allies in the United States Government--in our government--
gave China a blank check, letting big businesses prosper from
China's abuses and disadvantaging America's small businesses
and America's workforce. Mr. Chairman, the U.S.-China Business
Council, at the time that we were starting this fight 30 years
ago after Tiananmen, had been in existence for over 70 years.
And they were getting pushed out of the trade situation by
corporate America who was in there for insurance and finance,
and all that. But our products were not given access to China
unless we gave them our designs. And that still wasn't access
to their markets but just made them competitors on the world
scene, thereby disadvantaging small businesses and America's
workforce, while we hoped that China would change its behavior
on human rights.
But many of us knew--and the world has witnessed--that this
approach was fated to fail. As we reevaluate the last 20 years,
it is clear that delinking trade and human rights has not
improved our trade relationship. Just think of this, my
colleagues. When we were starting this discussion following
Tiananmen Square, the China-U.S. trade deficit, their advantage
in trade, was $6 billion a year. I thought for $6 billion, we
can free the prisoners at Tiananmen Square, we can gain access
to their markets, we can stop their proliferation of dangerous
weapons that contribute to--weapons of mass destruction
delivery systems, and the rest--for $6 billion a year. Now it
is more than $6 billion a week--a week! And look what has
happened in human rights at the same time.
At the same time, the CCP's exploitative labor practices
created unfair competition for American business and workers--
and prison labor--and it's a bad deal for American businesses
too, subjecting themselves to intellectual property theft for
access to Chinese markets. As I mentioned, you want to sell,
you want to manufacture in China? You have to give them your
designs. They no longer need you. They have your intellectual
property. And then they say, but you can't compete--you can't
sell in our market. We have your designs. We can sell in our
market. We can now compete globally.
So meanwhile, in terms of human rights and the rule of law
over the last 20 years, the more things change the more they
stay the same. In the 1990s, we fought against Beijing's use of
prison labor. Harry Wu, and there were so many other leaders,
made big sacrifices documenting the use of prison labor. Now
we're combating the use of forced Uyghur labor and
concentration camps. Meanwhile, the world has witnessed the
PRC's decades-long campaign of terror and repression to achieve
total coercive control, including the aggression against the
culture, religion, and language of Tibet, which we witnessed
when we visited there.
The president of China had said to me when I complained to
him, with Dianne Feinstein, about what they were doing in
Tibet, he said: Go see for yourself. We've done great things in
Tibet. I said, Well, thank you for that because I've been
trying for 25 years to get a visa to go to Tibet. [Laughs] But
since he was asking us to go see for ourselves, we went. And
Mr. McGovern was our spiritual leader on that trip.
So Tibet. The crushing of Hong Kong's autonomy and civil
rights. What they're doing in Hong Kong--really? Intimidating
the people of Taiwan, the jailing of dissidents like Jimmy Lai,
Joshua Wong, Ilham Tohti and, of course, for such a long time
now, the Panchen Lama.
One of the most sinister forms of torture is to tell the
imprisoned, Nobody even knows you're here, or why you're here,
so why don't you just confess to what we want you to confess
to? But that's not true, because with the Commission's prisoner
database we have made it clear to the CCP and to the world that
America knows, remembers, and will call attention to it. Make
no mistake about it, if we don't speak out for human rights in
China because of economic reasons, we lose all moral authority
to talk about human rights anyplace in the world.
That's why, led by the efforts here in the CECC, Congress
has taken bold bipartisan action to bolster the defense of
human rights in China. Our Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act
will harness America's economic might to combat the genocide of
the Uyghurs. Our Tibet Policy and Support Act makes clear
America's commitment to the political rights of the Tibetan
people. Our Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act sent a
strong message of support to the courageous protesters marching
for freedom. And with our CHIPS and Science, we are investing
in American workers and American industry, ensuring that we
remain competitive with China, reducing our dependence on their
factors of production for us to compete with them. With this
President, we asserted our independence.
As we engage in this retrospective today, we must remain
vigilant against putting deals ahead of ideals, business
interests at the expense of basic rights, a trend many of us
saw developing more than two decades ago, really since
Tiananmen Square. And let us be unequivocally clear--America
must defend all human rights, as you made clear in your
statements earlier--I could hear what you all were saying, even
though I wasn't in the room--we cannot and we must not
discriminate. It is my hope that the Commission will continue
to lead the charge now, and for 20 years more to come.
Thank you, again, to the CECC for the opportunity to
participate today. And now I yield back to the distinguished
co-chair, Mr. McGovern, with gratitude to all of you who are
participating today.
Chair Merkley. Madam Speaker, thank you for summing that
up. And that phrase, ``do not put deals ahead of ideals,'' sums
up so much of our effort to illuminate the abuses occurring in
China, to advocate for dramatic improvements, to stand on the
side of ideals. And thank you very much for your service over
these decades.
Speaker Pelosi. If I may, Mr. Chairman, I want to salute
you. Because you--all of us on the West Coast know how
important trade with Asia is to the economy of our communities.
And to balance the human rights and the trade issue is a
challenge. But I thank you for your courage in taking the lead
in such an important way. Thank you.
Chair Merkley. It's been an honor to do so. Thank you. We
now will turn to our experts to take a look, to scrutinize
these last two decades and what has transpired. I will
introduce each of them now.
Teng Biao is a human rights lawyer and currently the Hauser
Human Rights Scholar at Hunter College, City University of New
York. He formerly taught at China University of Political
Science and the University of Chicago. One of the earliest
promoters of the rights defense movement and the New Citizens
Movement in China, he cofounded two human rights NGOs in
Beijing, the Open Constitution Initiative and China Against the
Death Penalty, in 2003 and 2010, respectively.
Rana Siu Inboden is a senior fellow with the Robert Strauss
Center for International Security and Law at the University of
Texas at Austin. She previously managed the State Department's
Human Rights and Democracy Fund China Program and served in
several other roles related to China. Her book, China and the
International Human Rights Regime, examines China's role in the
international human rights system between 1982 and 2017.
Sophie Richardson is China Director at Human Rights Watch.
She has overseen the organization's research and advocacy on
China since 2006 and has published extensively on human rights
and political reform in China, as well as in Southeast Asia.
She is author of China, Cambodia, and the Five Principles of
Peaceful Coexistence. She has testified before the U.S. Senate
and House of Representatives, Canadian Parliament, and European
Parliament.
Thank you all for lending your expertise to us for this
hearing. Without objection, your full written statements will
be entered into the record. We ask that you keep your remarks
to about five minutes.
Mr. Teng Biao.
STATEMENT OF TENG BIAO, HAUSER HUMAN RIGHTS SCHOLAR, HUNTER
COLLEGE, AND POZEN VISITING PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
Mr. Teng. Thank you very much. Thank you for your wonderful
work for human rights in China, and elsewhere in the world.
When Xi Jinping came to power, he hugely intensified the
crackdown on human rights. He actually waged a war on law. Just
as in 1989, when the CCP believed that the social
liberalization and democratic movement had threatened one-party
rule, it did not hesitate to crush the peaceful protests with
tanks and machine guns. Xi Jinping abolished the two-term limit
for the presidency, shut down thousands of NGOs, rounded up
human rights lawyers and dissidents, persecuted all religious
groups, and intensified censorship.
Since 2009, 159 Tibetans have self-immolated to call for
freedom. And Hong Kong's freedom has been destroyed since 2020.
And Uyghur genocide is still ongoing. Women were systematically
raped and sexually harassed in the concentration camps,
intellectuals and elites were purged, children were forcibly
separated from their parents, a million Han Chinese officials
were sent to live with Uyghur families. The Xinjiang Victims
Database has documented 210 deaths in the camps. The real
number must be higher than this.
What is extremely terrifying is that the CCP has
established an unprecedented totalitarian surveillance system
in China. At least half a billion surveillance cameras are
installed throughout the country, and the number is still
increasing sharply. A social credit system is expanding
rapidly. Powerful phone trackers can connect one's digital
footprint, real-life identity, and physical whereabouts. Facial
recognition, voiceprint, and gait recognition capability,
together with government-controlled big data, make privacy
hardly possible. The authorities have collected DNA data from
hundreds of millions of Chinese by cheating or by force. Social
media controlled by the CCP--Weibo, WeChat, TikTok and others--
are also effective tools to surveil all Chinese internet users.
By strengthening high-tech totalitarianism, the Chinese
government's goal is to maximize its capacity to monitor
everyone's every movement in every corner at every moment.
Furthermore, COVID-19 has become a perfect excuse for the CCP
to strengthen its control. Four hundred million people are
under COVID lockdown. Every citizen is required to show a green
health code and also a venue code and itinerary code to leave
home. Before two human rights lawyers departed to meet their
client, their health codes suddenly turned red, which was
obviously a manipulation by the authorities to restrict their
travel. The zero-COVID policy has been purposed more to tighten
its perfect dictatorship than to fight coronavirus.
Some recommendations: Democracies should urge the Chinese
government to release all political prisoners. I call your
attention to the jailed prisoners of conscience, like Ilham
Tohti. I have a slide show of photos of the leading human
rights lawyer Xu Zhiyong and Ding Jiaxi. Xu Zhiyong and Ding
Jiaxi, the leaders of the New Citizens Movement, and still in
detention after secret trial. And also Wang Binzhang, Gao
Zhisheng, Gulshan Abbas, Go Sherab Gyatso, and Jim Lai.
The Chinese government should immediately release all the
protestors detained during the recent A4 revolution. I have
confirmed that protesters have been tortured by the police.
Peng Lifa, who hung the banners at Beijing Sitong Bridge, is
the new Tank Man who inspired the A4 revolution. A girl,
reportedly named Li Kangmeng, was the first person to hold a
white paper. The whereabouts of Li Kangmeng and Peng Lifa
remain unknown.
Democracies should also urge the Chinese government to stop
its repressive policies in Xinjiang, Tibet, and Inner Mongolia,
including restriction of their native languages, destruction of
their cultural heritage, religious persecution, forced
marriage, torture, and arbitrary detention. Democracies should
stop appeasing the CCP regime. Not seeking regime change is the
wrong message to send the CCP.
It's imperative to help the Chinese people jump the Great
Firewall. When the Chinese people can access information from
the free world, many of them will be awakened and will tend not
to tolerate the brutal rule of the CCP. A bit more affordable
technologies or equipment like VPNs will make a great
difference. Democracies should sanction the global companies
that are complicit in the CCP's censorship and surveillance.
Cisco and some other tech giants facilitated China's Great
Firewall. Zoom terminated the meetings organized by Chinese
activists and suspended the host accounts upon instruction from
the Chinese government.
Today I request a congressional investigation of Apple.
Apple has ceded legal ownership of its customers' data to a
company owned by the Chinese government. Apple neglected labor
rights violations in its supply factories in China and has
removed the VPN apps from its app store in China. The company
restricted the use of AirDrop soon after the Sitong Bridge
protest. Apple should tell the public where it received the
instructions and where it has been complicit--and why it has
been complicit--in China's suppression and censorship.
Because of my human rights work, I have been repeatedly
kidnapped, detained, and tortured. But so many Chinese people
have suffered and sacrificed so much. Many activists have even
lost their lives, including the Nobel Laureate Liu Xiaobo. The
recent A4 revolution has shown the world how eager the Chinese
people are to demand freedom and democracy, and how much they
are willing to risk in fighting against the dictatorship. It's
our moral and political obligation to support the freedom
fighters. The bottom line is, a business based in the free
world facilitating the dictatorship should not be tolerated.
Thank you very much.
Chair Merkley. Thank you very much. Now we'll turn to Dr.
Inboden.
STATEMENT OF RANA SIU INBODEN, SENIOR FELLOW, ROBERT STRAUSS
CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND LAW, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS
AT AUSTIN
Ms. Inboden. Thank you. Distinguished commissioners, fellow
witnesses, and guests, it is an honor to be a part of today's
hearing. In the 20 years since the CECC was established, one of
the most profound changes is an emboldened China that actively
works to dilute U.N. human rights procedures and norms. This
manifests in a number of ways.
First, China is leading a coalition comprised primarily of
Global South nations, as well as Russia, that constrains the
international human rights regime. This group, which numbers
nearly 50 nations, goes by the generic title the Like-Minded
Group, and advances a regressive human rights vision that
downplays civil and political rights and prioritizes
sovereignty over international monitoring, even in cases of
gross human rights violations. This group acts as a mutual
defense network, shielding each other from scrutiny.
China, for example, defended Iran, Myanmar, Syria, Belarus,
Eritrea, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Sri Lanka. Beijing also
mobilizes these countries to divert attention from its human
rights record. Earlier this fall, when a resolution on Xinjiang
was introduced in the Human Rights Council, it failed with 17
nations voting for, 19 nations voting against, and 11
registered abstentions. Among the 19 nations voting against the
resolution, 11 have affiliated with the Like-Minded Group.
The U.S. must respond by seeking to draw nations away from
this group. Although a number of these countries are severe
human rights violators, not all of them fit neatly into the
autocratic camp. They align with this group partly out of a
sense of global solidarity, rather than a zeal for
authoritarian practices. Some of these countries could even be
described as swing states, such as India and Indonesia. The
U.S. State Department should make clear to these states that
their affiliation with this group undermines human dignity.
The lack of a vigorous U.S. presence on the Human Rights
Council has allowed China to co-opt this body and secure
passage of resolutions that defend dictators instead of human
rights victims, challenge the universality of human rights, and
favor anemic dialogue over robust accountability. The insertion
of Xi Jinping's slogans also indicates that the PRC uses these
resolutions to extend the CCP's influence abroad. The U.S.
retreat from the Council served China's interests and enabled
it and other autocrats to fill this vacuum. Unfortunately, we
now see a mushrooming of authoritarian influence.
China and a number of other repressive nations devote
considerable resources to staffing their missions, enabling
their diplomats to master U.N. rules and build relationships
with other states in Geneva. The U.S. must respond with a
proactive presence by increasing staffing for its mission and
ensuring that American diplomats have the resources and
opportunities to gain relevant U.N. expertise and build bridges
with other members of the Council. A reinvigorated posture in
Geneva that includes paying diplomatic attention to smaller
states and identifying shared human rights concerns with other
nations, can counteract China's influence.
The U.S. should use its speaking time during the Universal
Periodic Review process not only to list China's myriad human
rights violations, but to specifically call for the release of
prisoners such as Uyghur Ilham Tohti, house church pastor Wang
Yi, Tibetan Yeshe Choedron, and human rights defender Qin
Yongmin. While China has sought to debilitate from within, the
U.S. needs to think about strengthening from within.
China has also misused its seat on the U.N.'s Economic and
Social Council's NGO Committee to block the applications of a
number of civil society groups seeking U.N. consultative
status. China has actively blocked applications from
organizations working on human rights. Between 2016 and 2019,
repressive countries were responsible for blocking the
applications of 964 NGOs, with Beijing leading this
obstruction. The U.S. State Department has begun rectifying the
authoritarian dominance on the NGO Committee by calling for
votes on stalled applications.
Using this maneuver, earlier this month the Economic and
Social Council voted to award nine NGOs U.N. accreditation.
While the State Department, especially the U.S. mission in New
York, should be commended for this, roughly 1,000 NGOs,
including a number of organizations that work on North Korea,
remain in limbo in this committee. The U.S. should continue to
use this kind of proactive and inventive diplomacy.
Even as the Chinese government contests the universality of
human rights, the protests last month remind us that the desire
for human dignity resonates deeply with the Chinese people.
Thank you.
Chair Merkley. Thank you very much, Doctor, in particular
for illuminating the Like-Minded Group and the importance of
the U.S. strengthening our response.
Dr. Richardson.
STATEMENT OF SOPHIE RICHARDSON,
CHINA DIRECTOR, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
Ms. Richardson. Chairman Merkley, Co-chairman McGovern,
distinguished members of the Commission and fellow panelists,
thank you for inviting me to join you today. And many
congratulations on two decades of the Commission's work. It has
been an extraordinary partner in its exemplary research and
advocacy, and its genuine bipartisanship.
My written testimony details the methods and implications
of the Chinese government's increasingly active anti-rights
posture across the United Nations human rights system, a system
that matters because too often it is the only means of redress
and accountability for people living under governments that
either fail to protect them or violate their rights. At the
time this Commission was formed, Beijing was content to merely
try to block scrutiny of China within the U.N. human rights
system. Two decades later, Beijing aspires to remake it.
We have documented obstruction of independent civil society
organizations, roadblocks put up to weaken treaty body reviews,
efforts to strip peacekeeping operations of human rights
funding, and increasingly vitriolic attacks on the mandates of
independent human rights experts. Beijing is now also chipping
away at established human rights norms, with a view, we fear,
toward trying to change black-letter human rights law.
Beijing's goal is not just to weaken scrutiny of its own
appalling human rights record. It is also to weaken the
architecture as a whole, making it harder to address other
global human rights crises. In September, the Chinese
government was one of only three states voting against a
resolution to renew the mandate of a special rapporteur on
Afghanistan. In November, it was one of only six governments to
vote against a fact-finding mission on Iran.
The system is showing some signs of resilience--the August
publication of a strong report by the Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights, detailing possible Chinese
government crimes against humanity targeting Uyghurs and
others, and the recent remarks by the new High Commissioner
Volker Turk taking ownership of that report. Key treaty bodies,
including the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination and the Committee against Torture, and
extraordinary collaboration by special procedures, have kept a
focus on Beijing, despite the Chinese government's hostility.
Just last week, as Professor Inboden just mentioned,
Beijing and other authoritarians lost a long-running battle to
block accreditation of several civil society groups. But it
bears pointing out that at least one of them had waited 15
years for such status. And the reality is that the threats are
far greater. The U.N. human rights system is byzantine,
susceptible to politicization, and deprioritized by
democracies--precisely the kind of vacuum in which the Chinese
government has thrived. That there has not yet been a debate at
the Human Rights Council about Beijing's ongoing crimes against
humanity speaks to its capacity to ensure impunity. That
activists for the people across China have no meaningful access
to this system does too.
What needs to change? First, democracies should exceed
Beijing's anti-rights ambition, determination, and resources,
partly by forming a coalition to strengthen the human rights
system. They should work together to ensure that every human
rights space--every position, election, fund, agency, norm, and
pro-rights reform across the U.N. system--is protected. It is
encouraging to hear that with bipartisan support the State
Department has created a new office, the Office of Multilateral
Strategy and Personnel, to take on some of this critical work.
But please consider whether these resources are sufficient to
the task of coordinating with other democracies to challenge
Beijing.
Second, democracies should be wholly committed to pressing
for an investigation into Chinese government crimes against
humanity, both because of the scope, scale, and severity of the
crimes but also as a critical test of the U.N. human rights
system's resilience. There should be no political or diplomatic
wavering. Some in Congress or the administration may see the
October Human Rights Council vote as a loss. We strongly
encourage everyone to see it as a victory in the longer effort
toward holding Chinese government officials accountable. It
would be a loss for human rights and a big win for Beijing if
there were no further efforts to discuss the U.N. Xinjiang
Report at the Council and to establish an independent
international investigation.
Third, democracies should support civil society
organizations, particularly ones from China blocked by Beijing,
to share their work and perspective directly in capitals and
across the international system. Democracies should press at
the highest level at the United Nations for better protection
of these activists and to ensure that all cases of state
reprisals against them are investigated and addressed.
A last thought: In early 2000, around the same time that
the 106th Congress was drafting the legislation to establish
this Commission, Liu Xiaobo was starting to write again
following a three-year ``reeducation through labor'' sentence.
In an essay from around that time, he urged attention to ``the
people who have suffered terribly because of abuses of power or
dereliction of duty in government,'' noting that ``whoever
remembers such people, even if it is only to stop for a moment
to say a silent prayer for them, is honoring the fundamental
human condition.''
So our sincerest thanks to the CECC for two decades of
precisely such efforts to honor the human rights, the
fundamental human condition, of people across China. Thank you.
Chair Merkley. Thank you, Dr. Richardson.
We'll now enter a period of questions. I'll ask you to keep
your responses as concise as possible. We'll try to get through
them.
Dr. Teng, I observed your comment that the Chinese
government seeks to monitor every movement at every moment of
its citizens, as a way to describe the overwhelming high-tech
surveillance and oppression. I particularly want to observe the
white paper protest, often referred to as A4, because of the
size of the paper.
The idea that you protest by saying nothing is so powerful,
because you know why people are protesting, but they can't say
so because they'll be arrested for saying so. And maybe they'll
be arrested for saying nothing. But holding up that white paper
I thought was just an extraordinarily innovative way to say the
system must change. And I want to applaud every member of the
Chinese citizenry that has stood up holding that white paper.
It's been very, very powerful.
We have seen these protests and wondered whether these are
fueled not so much by the COVID lockdown, but by so many other
concerns and grievances, particularly among younger Chinese. So
what does that protest say, as we look to the future? Is this a
limited event or is this an event that paves a path for much
more resistance to the overwhelmingly oppressive tactics of the
Chinese government?
Mr. Teng. Thank you very much. Yes, there's nothing on the
white paper, but everything is already on it. On the white
paper, you know, there was anger, the frustration of the COVID
lockdown, and also the desire for freedom and democracy in
China. It's really amazing, under such totalitarian
surveillance, that so many Chinese people took to the streets
to demand freedom and democracy. Not only the end of the zero-
COVID policy, but also in Shanghai and Chengdu, people were
chanting: Communist Party, step down! Xi Jinping, step down! No
autocracy, we want democracy! Like that.
And now the protest has been crushed by mass arrests and
detentions. The Chinese Communist Party is still arresting
protesters. And many of them have been tortured. And we don't
know how many have been detained. But this wave of protest and
the A4 revolution are extremely important, though this time
Chinese people are not able to change the political system. But
so many Chinese people have overcome their fear, and if the
Communist Party does not change the zero-COVID policy, then
that kind of anger will accumulate.
But if the current COVID policy is loosened, it could be
seen as encouragement to the protesters, to the Chinese people.
And then it provides more opportunity for further protest. So
generally, I don't know when the next protest will be, but we
have seen more and more that the Chinese people do not want to
tolerate this brutal dictatorship, especially the one-man--
that's Xi Jinping--dictatorship. And I believe there will be a
larger-scale peaceful movement for democracy.
Chair Merkley. Thank you very much.
Dr. Inboden, in recent years Freedom House has identified
authoritarian collaboration--a subject you have studied
extensively--as an enabler of transnational repression, with
China taking a leading role, something that we have been
holding hearings on and illuminating here on the Commission.
How do you assess the problem of authoritarian states
collaborating with one another to suppress rights outside their
borders? And what is our best response?
Ms. Inboden. Thank you for that excellent question. The
problem of transnational repression is one that reaches even
into the United States. Teng Biao, my fellow witness, can
testify to that, having personally known people or perhaps
himself feeling the long reach of the Chinese government. In
order to combat this, the U.S. should do several things. First,
at the U.N. Human Rights Council, the U.S. should consider
advancing a resolution that tackles the problem of
transnational repression.
Also, because the problem of transnational repression is
abetted by authoritarian collaboration, the U.S. needs to
respond with a transnational coalition that pushes back against
this. The U.S. can build this within the U.N. Human Rights
Council, as well as outside this body. And finally, even as
Freedom House, civil society groups, and the State Department
have become increasingly aware of transnational repression, law
enforcement in the United States also needs to be aware of the
kinds of help that people like Teng Biao and others who have
fled repression in their countries need when they face
repression here in the United States. Thank you.
Chair Merkley. Within the context of that response, of
countries working together to respond, what is the thing that
would be most effective in persuading Chinese officials to say,
Yeah, we're no longer going to send people out to threaten a
Chinese expatriate in the United States, to threaten their
family back in China, because the U.S. will respond in this
fashion? In other words, what is the single most effective
thing that would make Chinese authorities think twice about
this strategy?
Ms. Inboden. I think the U.S. move to raise several court
cases highlighting this problem, and prosecuting, is an
incredibly important step. The U.S. also needs to be aware of
how the Chinese might use their presence here in the United
States under the cover of diplomacy and others to place agents
here to engage in repression. And so there needs to be a
thorough investigation into this. And finally, China is still
sensitive to its global image. So I commend the U.S. Government
for advancing three court cases in the same day. I think this
sends a very powerful message.
Chair Merkley. Thank you very much.
Co-chair McGovern.
Co-chair McGovern. Thank you. Dr. Richardson, this
Commission's mandate is to monitor China's compliance with
international human rights standards. According to the U.N.,
United Nations human rights treaty bodies have confirmed that
sexual orientation and gender identity are included among
prohibited grounds of discrimination under international human
rights law. This Commission has found that the LGBTQ community
in China continues to face persistent stigma, widespread
discrimination, and harassment and that Chinese government
authorities increased restrictions on LGBTQ advocacy and
organizing, as they have done with other advocacy groups.
Do you believe that the Chinese government is obligated to
respect the rights of LGBTQ persons in China? And is it
appropriate for this Commission to monitor its compliance? What
is Human Rights Watch's view on the subject?
Ms. Richardson. Yes--to all of those questions. I mean,
first of all, it's an issue that we have tracked and reported
on. The most recent full-length report we documented on this
topic was about forced conversion therapy in medical settings
in which mostly adult LGBT people had been forced by their
parents to go to clinics that promised to ``cure'' them,
regarding their sexual orientation. But LGBTQ rights are
protected, as is every other human right, by way of all of the
core international and human rights instruments. And even if
the text of the treaties themselves does not explicitly make
reference to sexual orientation, comments by the Human Rights
Committee, which is the entity that interprets the treaties,
have made clear that those rights are absolute. So, yes, it is
appropriate to expect that of the Chinese and, yes, it's an
appropriate issue for the Commission.
Co-chair McGovern. Thank you.
Dr. Inboden, your testimony gives an insightful look at how
China uses its allies to deflect human rights criticism within
the U.N. system. I appreciate that you've written a book on the
subject. My question is whether there is a way to avoid blocs
in the Human Rights Council, or other bodies, so that debates
over human rights don't devolve into power contests between one
group and another. How do we keep the focus on international
principles and law?
Ms. Inboden. I love that question. I think, first of all,
even if we are facing a geopolitical contest of sorts, we
should not let this seep into the U.N. Human Rights Council.
The U.S. needs to have a principled position in the Council and
when it raises China, be clear that we are raising it out of a
concern for the violations in Xinjiang, not about our own
concerns about geopolitics. I also strongly think that the U.S.
needs to build more bridges across regions so that when it does
advance resolutions it has those relationships to secure
support. I also think that the U.S. needs to be open to
providing training or opportunities for diplomats from smaller
states that have fewer resources to gain expertise in U.N.
procedures and norms and could even host that in the United
States.
Co-chair McGovern. Thank you. I guess this is a question
for you and probably Dr. Richardson. In both of your
testimonies you speak to the importance of working from within
an imperfect U.N. system. Regarding the advantages of being in
the room when debates actually happen: In June 2018, the Trump
administration unilaterally withdrew from the U.N. Human Rights
Council at a time when China had a seat. From the perspective
of winning over allies on human rights advocacy, is that
withdrawal a model to be repeated or avoided?
Ms. Richardson. No, of course it's not a model. Look,
democracies need to not just show up and defend human rights
issues; they actually need to make the U.N. system as
expansive, with respect to rights, as they possibly can. But
they also have to invest in these initiatives. You know,
Professor Inboden's testimony spoke to the resources that some
governments invest in thwarting scrutiny and weakening these
institutions. I think it is critically important for the U.S.
and other democracies to meet and match that.
It's hard to do, I think, because people in the United
States have other means. And other democracies can expect free
presses, and functional court systems, and hope to find
accountability or redress within their own systems. But I think
if democracies want people in authoritarian systems to be best
equipped to argue for their own rights and to find
accountability, this is the system that has to be made to work.
Is it flawless? Of course it isn't. Is it the system that
Human Rights Watch would design? Of course there are changes
and reforms that are necessary, but ceding the field to a
regime like the one in Beijing is not helpful. I mean, we're
all familiar with the phrase, ``nature abhors a vacuum.''
Nature has not met the Chinese Communist Party. And leaving
this system to that government's instincts has profound
implications not just for 1.4 billion people across China, but
people all over the world, including the United States. It has
to be made to work well.
Ms. Inboden. I'd like to add that I think the United States
needs to start thinking about the U.N. Human Rights Council in
a different way; thinking about fighting from within. You can't
win these fights if you're standing outside the Council. And I
would build on Dr. Richardson's point. The CCP loves a vacuum.
And they have taken advantage of this. I would also say that
the Xinjiang resolution was actually winnable. If you look at
the votes, there were several abstentions. There were several
states that, with more vigorous lobbying, I believe the United
States and other democratic allies could have convinced those
countries to vote with us.
There's also a bright spot in the U.N. human rights system
that Dr. Richardson and I have spoken about or included in our
written testimony. And that's the special procedures system.
Many of them have been speaking out jointly with very strongly
worded statements condemning China for the violations in
Xinjiang and Hong Kong. Keeping those mandates healthy is very
important, and those mandates are renewed through resolutions.
If the U.S. is not there fighting to keep the language strong
and make sure that the people who are appointed to those
mandates have integrity and character and the right kind of
expertise, the autocratic camp will start chipping away at that
part of the U.N. human rights system.
Co-chair McGovern. Thank you. My time has expired. Thank
you very much.
Chair Merkley. Congressman Smith.
Representative Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Oh, Mr.
Suozzi, you were here first?
Representative Suozzi. Mr. Chairman, I have to go to
another meeting. Would it be OK if I just did this quickly?
Chair Merkley. I think everyone is yielding to you.
Representative Suozzi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, let
me put on the record that I discussed with you earlier that I
have a constituent from Syosset, New York who is being
imprisoned in China, Mr. Kai Li. The U.N. has declared that
he's being held arbitrarily, and there's not been any proper
process whatsoever. And I need the Commission's help to
continue to try and advocate for his release. We'd like to try
and get a meeting between his family and President Biden.
Anything you can do to help, I would appreciate.
I want to thank the witnesses so much for the great work
that they do, not just here today but throughout their lives.
We're so grateful to them for the work that they do. Looking
back at the 20 years, so much good work has been done by this
Commission, but there's more work ahead. I want to take
advantage of the opportunity of your expertise to just ask:
What do you think the next three hearings of this Commission
should be about?
You know, we've had hearings under the chairman recently on
transnational repression. I think a great idea coming from the
things we're hearing today is, What should the U.S. role be in
the U.N. to hold China accountable, and what can we do as the
U.S. Government and as a Commission to hold the U.N. more
accountable for their treatment of China, and to bring in
expert testimony on that. But I'd like to ask each of you to
give me one suggestion as to what you think a hearing of this
committee should be over the next two years that you would love
to see us delve into in detail.
Mr. Teng.
Mr. Teng. One suggestion is, as I just mentioned--we should
investigate the role that American and global companies play in
the repression of freedom in China. Many, many tech giants and
other American companies are involved in human rights
violations, like labor rights violations and censorship and
surveillance. These companies provide technology, the
equipment, and training to the Chinese government to facilitate
surveillance and censorship. So that's one thing we should
organize a hearing on.
The second I can recommend is political prisoners. So many
people, like writers, bloggers, lawyers, and human rights
defenders, even foreign citizens, and religious practitioners--
the believers--and, of course, Hong Kongers, Tibetans, and
Uyghurs are in prison or in the camps. We should know the
details of how the Chinese government treats these people--you
know, how these people have been arbitrarily detained and
tortured. So that's two ideas.
Representative Suozzi. Okay. Thank you.
Ms. Inboden. Thank you. That's an excellent question.
First, I think the U.S. should have a hearing on how to work
with other allies, especially in Europe. This is because even
though the U.S. took the wonderful step of passing legislation,
the risk is that some of the tainted cotton that is produced
with Uyghur forced labor will just be diverted to other
markets. I really think that the U.S. needs to be a leader on
this and figure out how to convince other democratic allies to
take similar steps.
Representative Suozzi. Even a joint hearing would be a good
idea, with some of our European allies.
Ms. Inboden. That's an excellent idea. I also echo Teng
Biao's mention of the private sector. We need to figure out how
to exert the right kind of pressure, because the private sector
on its own has not been a partner in this. In fact, over the
decade that I've been working on this, I've seen how the
private sector has, at critical times, undermined efforts. But
they can play a positive role, because I think there are
opportunities--especially the tech sector. We need to look at
encrypted technology and how that can help dissidents.
Finally, I think that an effort to help people think about
how to build bridges across communities that are repressed by
the Chinese government is a useful one. Figuring out how
Tibetans and Uyghurs can work together, figuring out how house
church pastors who are repressed can work with human rights
defenders. I mentioned the case of house church Pastor Wang Yi.
He also has a background in political activism. The combination
of his work leading a vibrant church in Chengdu and his
political activism has landed him in prison, and so I think
figuring out how to have a united front against the CCP would
be very useful.
Representative Suozzi. Good idea.
Ms. Richardson. I came up with five, sorry. [Laughs] First,
companies, please, please. From Apple to Thermo Fisher, please
get them in here and ask them questions about their human
rights due diligence strategies; second, a discussion about
both domestic and international means for accountability for
crimes against humanity targeting Uyghurs. You know, there are
opportunities under U.S. law, not just through an institution
like the Human Rights Council.
Okay, I'll just add one other, which is we continue to be
extremely concerned about Chinese government threats to
academic freedom in the United States, particularly as it
pertains to students and scholars of and from China. Schools
keep saying to us, We've got rules; it's under control;
everybody has the same degree of academic freedom. We beg to
differ. I think it would be very important to have a discussion
in a forum like this with people who are informed both about
the nature of the problem, but also who are well equipped to
offer up suggestions about solutions. I think it is an enormous
problem that people come to campuses in the U.S. expecting to
be able to freely study and debate certain ideas, but then have
an experience that leads them to say to us things like, Why did
I come? That's a fixable problem.
Representative Suozzi. Thank you for your excellent
suggestions. Mr. Smith, thank you so much for yielding. Mr.
Chairman, thank you so much.
Chair Merkley. Congressman Suozzi, thank you for your, I
believe, four years of service on the Commission. And as you
head into new chapters, I want to thank you for spotlighting
Kai Li, your constituent from Syosset. I'll follow up with you
to brainstorm about how we might bring even more attention to
that case.
Representative Suozzi. Thank you so much.
Chair Merkley. Thank you.
Congressman Smith.
Representative Smith. Thank you very much. I too want to
thank Tom Suozzi for his extraordinary contributions, not just
to this Commission but to the issue of human rights in China.
He formed the Uyghur Caucus and invited me to come and co-chair
it with him. We've worked on issues related to Xinjiang ever
since it became apparent that not only are they being
discriminated against but actually genocide on a huge scale is
being committed against the Uyghur people and others in that
area. So I want to thank him for that. The Hong Kong Human
Rights and Democracy Act, he and I did that together.
I also want to thank Scott Flipse. It was his idea in the
first place, back in 2014, that we do it. I think that makes a
difference. We have tremendous staff on this Commission. And it
does make a difference, because it helps us do a better job. We
get unbelievably effective and informed witnesses, as we have
here today. It's always good to see Sophie, and the others. But
again, Tom, I want to thank you. You have made such a
difference and will continue to do so as we go forward. So
thank you.
Just a few very brief remarks, Mr. Chairman. I would ask
that my full statement be made a part of the record. Oddly
enough, I voted against creating this Commission. Why? It was
part of the PNTR vote. It was put into the PNTR ending MFN and
annual reviews as a way of saying, See, we still care about
human rights. And I said, Do a separate bill on a China
commission. Don't try to sweeten what I think is an egregious
mistake, and it was--getting rid of at least the annual review
of MFN.
You know, my good friend Jim McGovern made a very good
point about how foolish it was for us to leave the Human Rights
Commission, flawed as it is. We need to be a voice that becomes
even more powerful, not less. I openly criticized the Trump
administration when they did that, and I wrote letters to them
asking that they reconsider, because I think having that voice
and the ability to organize inside even a council that is
filled with rogue nations can help mitigate some of the worst
abuses that they commit, and they do commit huge abuses.
We all know that we missed an opportunity when the
commission became the council, and all the fanfare about how
the Human Rights Council was different and was a reformed
product of the flawed commission which preceded it. It's the
same thing. It's just turning the page, putting a different
name on it. I remember speaking to people like Kofi Annan and
others to say, Get this right.
You know, having rogue nations sitting in judgement,
forming partnerships--the way China and so many others do--to
prevent scrutiny and to go after other countries, including
Israel--you know, for a country that is that small, and is a
democracy, for it to get the focus at the UN almost
exclusively--there are more resolutions on Israel than all the
other countries in the world combined. That's ludicrous. And it
shows, I think, an antisemitism that is very, very unseemly.
That being what it is, we need to be there. And we are there.
And we need to work it very, very hard. And maybe some good
things occasionally will come out of it, and some of the worst
abuses that get overlooked and trivialized will get the kind of
hearing that they need.
I just want to say too, that this Commission has a
tremendous staff. And our prisoners list--in 2008, Frank Wolf
and I went over, three weeks before the Olympics, because they
were rounding up all the dissidents so the press wouldn't be
able to talk to them. It was the last time I got a visa for a
very long time because they penalized Frank and me for that.
But what did we bring? Our big prisoners list. And we had a
press conference there. We went through names. We said, This
isn't about the Olympic Games. You know, they should go to a
country that at least isn't abusing its own people, even while
the Games are going on, and rounding up the usual suspects, the
best and the brightest, so they can't talk to the press.
We went through that and they threatened to throw us out,
but they didn't. But again, it was the prisoners list produced
by this tremendous Commission and its staff. And I put emphasis
on the staff, because they're the ones who did it. I've chaired
a number of hearings of this Commission. I've served as
chairman, co-chairman, ranking member. And when you add it all
up, with my subcommittee on human rights over on the House
side, and working with Jim over on the Lantos Commission, I've
chaired 76 hearings on human rights abuse in China. Still not
enough. We need more laws. We need more implementation of those
laws. Jim, great job on the Uyghur legislation, but how well is
it really being implemented? We need to hold the
administration's feet to the fire.
And I don't care who is in the White House. When it comes
to somebody who is being tortured and languishing in a
political prison, or a gulag, or a laogai, reform through labor
camp--which they say they got rid of--we've got to be very,
very honest and aggressive in calling that out. I called Bill
Clinton out, and I know my colleagues know this, when he
delinked human rights from China on May 26th, 1994, and I was
all in for applauding Clinton for linking them one year before
by executive order. And it was a tremendous executive order. We
lost so much. They took the measure of the United States of
America and our government and said: All they care about is
profits; and human rights is a sidebar issue, if it's even
that.
Many of the people--and I think some were very well
meaning, thought if we just traded more, they would matriculate
from a dictatorship to a democracy. That's been blown apart.
That is false. I always thought it was false. Others, like
Nancy Pelosi, our Speaker, with whom we worked very closely,
along with Frank Wolf and others--we all thought that was
false. Have the linkage. You know, say it matters. And we'll
even get a carry-over effect on intellectual property, because
the rule of law is more likely going to be adhered to.
Much has to be done going into next year. Chairman, thank
you for your leadership. Thank you, Co-chair, for your
leadership this year and last on the Commission. And you know,
we've got to work very hard. I love the question about what we
need to do next year in terms of hearings and thank you for
that. Please feel free to convey that to all of us as we go
forward. We've got much to do.
The organ harvesting issue--as Jim and I know, we did a
hearing in the Lantos Commission. Fifty to a hundred thousand
people every single year are having their organs ripped out,
two to three organs per person, and they're the healthiest
people in China. They're believers. They're Falun Gong
especially, and others who are picked out. Average age, 27 to
28, as you know so well. We have not done enough to rein in
that horrible Josef Mengele-type abuse that's being committed
as we sit here in a hearing.
So thank you. Thanks to our staff. Thanks to our co-chairs
for a great two years of leadership. And may it continue. I
yield back.
Chair Merkley. Thank you very much for your advocacy over
so many years, and the intensity and passion that you have
brought to standing for human rights of all citizens, but in
particular in regard to China.
Dr. Richardson, we've banned the import of products of
forced labor from Xinjiang, and other coercive labor
arrangements in China. We're working to make sure the United
States Government robustly implements the law, but it's more
effective if the United States is not acting alone. What do we
need to do to broaden the coalition to send this message that
the slave labor in Xinjiang is unacceptable and that the
products will not be allowed anywhere in the rest of the world?
Ms. Richardson. First, I think Congress is particularly to
be complimented on the overwhelming support with which the
UFLPA was adopted, because I think that sent a very powerful
message to parliaments in other democracies about the
unacceptability of subsidizing forced labor and that nobody
should want to buy products that have been made that way. There
are initiatives underway, both across the European Union and in
Germany and a few other democracies, to adopt somewhat similar
constraints. They're structured in different ways. They don't
necessarily apply to companies of all sizes. I think they will
be helpful in limiting goods. They are not as, I think,
definitive or broad as what the UFLPA imagines.
I also think it would be very important--and if I may seize
the opportunity to suggest another possible hearing topic--to
revisit the UFLPA regularly and publicly, to understand what's
working, what's not. There are a lot of people across the
community--Human Rights Watch is a proud member of the
Coalition to End Forced Labor in the Uyghur Region--looking at
whether, for example, adequate resources have been provided to
CBP to inspect goods properly. It's early days, right? It's a
new piece of legislation. It asks for different things of the
regulatory authorities. And I think it will be useful to
revisit that, but also maybe use that as an opportunity to
coordinate with some democratic allies to push for a similar
approach. Because obviously the effect is much greater the more
states adopt similar legislation.
Chair Merkley. Thank you. I think that's something we
really have to follow up on. And Dr. Teng, I wanted to ask you
about the state of the lawyers who defend rights in China. So
many of them have been imprisoned or silenced. Is it still
possible for a Chinese citizen to get any true legal assistance
when being unjustly held or imprisoned for expressing an
opinion or perhaps holding up a piece of white paper?
Mr. Teng. Since 2015, in the 709 Crackdown, more than 320
human rights lawyers were detained or were disappeared. Some of
them are still in prison. Now it's extremely difficult for the
human rights lawyers and other human rights defenders to defend
human rights and freedom in China. Some human rights lawyers
still continue their activism; they try to take human rights
cases, politically sensitive cases, but they face harassment
and intimidation from the authorities. Now it's very dangerous.
For the past two or three years, more than 60 human rights
lawyers have been disbarred. They have difficulty even earning
a living. I know recently a group of human rights lawyers in
China publicly announced that they wanted to provide legal
assistance to the protesters of the A4 revolution, but they
were harassed and prevented from doing so. One of them, Wang
Quanzhang--all of her case files were taken away by the local
authorities. It's a clear message that the Chinese government
doesn't want to see any human rights lawyers in any sensitive
cases.
Chair Merkley. Well, I believe when there are no human
rights lawyers, there's no human rights. And that's a real sign
of that. I'm going to defer now to Congresswoman Wexton, who
has joined us electronically.
Representative Wexton. Thank you so much, Mr. Chair, and
Jim. I also want to thank the witnesses for being here today,
and for the very important work that you do to preserve human
rights in China.
I do have some questions for you, Dr. Richardson, about the
U.N. report from the commissioner of human rights. It was
published in August. It actually went a little bit further than
people really thought that it would, so I'm curious as to
whether you can speak a little bit more to that report, and
just talk a little bit more about whether there are any updates
or critical facts that we need to be aware of that have been
happening since that August report.
Ms. Richardson. Thanks for the question. It is our view
that the report was quite strong, both in its findings that
drew on interviews but also drew extensively on Chinese
government documents, press conferences, and other state
materials. I think it's worth pointing out that the Chinese
government has not dismissed any of the material on which the
report is based. It has not rejected its own materials in
trying to undermine the credibility of that report. I think it
is very important that the report suggests the possibility that
the Chinese government has committed crimes against humanity.
It may be worth mentioning here that it's our understanding
that the report phrases it as ``may possibly constitute
international crimes, including crimes against humanity,''
simply because the Office believes that that judgement--whether
it is crimes against humanity or not--ultimately falls to a
court, and not to them. They are not, I think, in any sense
trying to underestimate the scope or the scale of the crimes.
I think the most important developments since the report
was actually published involve the new high commissioner having
publicly taken ownership of the report. The Chinese government,
and a number of other governments, tried to say that because
the report was not a product of a voted resolution, for
example, that it did not have legitimacy. I think the new high
commissioner, having said that he owns the contents and
respects them, is important.
The key now, I think, is that a report like this, meaning
one that makes such strong allegations, actually be the basis
of a briefing for member states, possibly an intersessional
briefing, in order to maintain the momentum toward the
establishment of an investigation.
Representative Wexton. Right, because there hasn't been
much follow-up and action items as a result of what the report
says. I'm glad that it goes as far as it does, but there still
needs to be more action, clearly.
Can we get an update from you about what things look like
on the ground in Xinjiang? You know, how many people have been
transferred to long-term prisons, forced labor centers? Do you
have any update about what things are like there? Are things
improving or are they getting worse in the wake of this report?
Ms. Richardson. I think it's fair to say that the situation
is a bit changed. I would certainly not say that it has
improved. You know, we're talking about a region that's
effectively an open-air prison. Even if the Chinese government
radically changed its policies tomorrow, it's our view that the
government officials who are responsible for crimes against
humanity still need to be investigated and prosecuted. We
published in September an analysis of the shocking number of
cases that have been prosecuted through the formal legal
system, we think with a view toward trying to create a veneer
of legitimacy, to try to suggest or somehow substantiate that
there are such profound problems in the region that the
authorities have had to prosecute unprecedented numbers of
people.
We found this particularly strange logic. You know, we're
talking about one of the most heavily policed regions of an
already heavily policed country. And the idea that there had
suddenly been a crime wave that would have yielded such a high
number of prosecutions strained credulity, to put it politely.
Representative Wexton. It was horrible, horrible that 40
people died in Xinjiang in the apartment fire in Urumqi. But it
did spark these protests, which you're seeing across the
country. As we have always seen in China, whenever there are
protests, there's pushback. What do you think this means about
the future of the resistance and government rule in Xinjiang
and beyond?
Ms. Richardson. I don't think there's much evidence to
suggest that the protests across the country were in any way
coordinated. I would certainly defer to my fellow panelists to
add to this. But I think what's very clear is that people had
not just had a guts full with respect to the lockdowns, but
also, as Professor Teng spoke about earlier, people went out on
the streets and called for Xi Jinping to step down and for an
end to Chinese Communist Party rule.
Even if we are all tracking in this moment, in the days and
weeks and months to come, what's happening to protesters who
have been detained, often it takes a long time to find out
what's happening to people. Even if people may feel deterred in
this particular moment as a result of the kinds of detentions
right after these protests, I think it's fairly clear that
people across the country are very interested in their rights.
They are willing to go out onto the streets. They are taking
the risk of being identified and seeing, I think, in a sense,
the fruit of their protests, that the government has backed
down, that there have been relaxations of the restrictions.
Some of the authorities have now said that they will even
dial back some of the means of electronic surveillance that
were implemented specifically around COVID. We'll believe that
when we see it. I want to be clear that just because they've
said they're going to do it doesn't mean it's actually
happened. But surely this is encouraging to people, the idea
that they can protest and demand respect for rights, and that
policy changes ensue, I think, is emboldening. We'll see what
that means in the coming weeks and months.
Representative Wexton. It would not be at all surprising if
the CCP then decided to crack down even more on people, because
that is historically what has happened in the past. That's one
other thing I'm worried about. I hope that we in the U.S. and
throughout the international community will continue to support
these protesters. Thank you so much. I'll yield back at this
time.
Chair Merkley. Thank you very much, Congresswoman. We'll
now turn to Co-chair McGovern. Congressman Smith also has
additional questions.
Co-chair McGovern. I just have one question for all of you.
Do you think it's warranted for the United Nations to appoint a
special rapporteur on China? And if so, how would the U.S.
Government go about this?
Ms. Inboden. I would love to see the appointment of a
special rapporteur on China. That would have to be done through
a resolution. The fate of the Xinjiang resolution tells us that
if the U.S. is going to pursue that, the U.S. needs to be very
concerted in its lobbying, start earlier than it did in the
session, whereas the Xinjiang resolution was introduced
relatively late. The U.S. presence in Geneva also needs to be
stepped up, with a bigger delegation, higher level delegation.
The U.S. needs to be lobbying other states for this kind of
resolution to create a special rapporteur on China by the very
highest levels of our government. The President, the Secretary
of State, and others need to reach out to countries to secure
their votes. I think that would be an incredibly important
step.
Co-chair McGovern. Mr. Teng.
Mr. Teng. Every time a special rapporteur visits China, the
Chinese government tries their best to harass these independent
investigators. Sometimes the interviewees are prevented from
meeting them, and interviewees are intimidated and sometimes
detained. Then the Chinese government actually harasses the
dissidents and activists at the U.N. in different forums.
That's something we should pay more attention to. The Chinese
government also tried to send their own experts to the U.N.
There is a report that a U.N. ``expert'' got $200,000, and then
she became kind of a propagandist for the Communist Party.
Co-chair McGovern. Dr. Richardson.
Ms. Richardson. Yes, three quick reasons why I think that's
a good idea. First of all, just to have somebody who's already
well informed. Second, to have somebody who can be a focal
point for civil society groups, particularly ones who don't
have access to the U.N. human rights system. But third, one of
the realities, I think, of the October vote was that some
governments saw it as just another battle in a fight between
the U.S. and China. And they didn't want to take sides in that.
I think having a position like a special rapporteur really
keeps the focus specifically on human rights violations
committed by the Chinese government. It's not tied to a
particular capital. It's not appointed by a particular
government. It's a mandate that's created across a system that
is grounded in adherence to international human rights law and
standards.
Co-chair McGovern. Thanks. I think it's a good idea,
personally, and I'm hoping we can find a way to pursue it. I
thank you all for your testimony and for your responses. And I
yield back.
Chair Merkley. Thank you very much, Co-chair McGovern.
We'll turn now to Ranking Member Smith.
Representative Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
One of the many lawyers that I and members of this
Commission have followed closely over the years is Gao
Zhisheng. A tremendous, heroic man. He wrote a book, A China
More Just. Right around when you started taking up your work,
Sophie, back in 2006--right around that time his troubles
began. He was convicted in 2011. He was let out. The torture
that was committed against him, frankly, was barbaric. I mean,
putting cigarettes all over his face, putting electric prods on
his genitals, in order to cause the most extreme pain
imaginable. This man has gone through all of this, and we don't
know exactly where he is. Maybe you could speak to it.
One of the things I'm hoping we'll do next year is really
focus on the human rights lawyers who have suffered so
horribly. I would just say, parenthetically, we had Gao
Zhisheng's wife, Geng He, testify before our committee a couple
of times. We had his daughter, Grace, along with four other
daughters of incarcerated political prisoners--I called it
``the five daughters hearing.'' She made an emotional plea, in
that case, to President Obama, to meet with him. Month after
month after month, I would call down to the White House, and my
staff would, and said: Will you please just meet with the five
daughters?
They said something at the hearing I'll never forget, Grace
and the other daughters. They said: President Obama has two
daughters. He'll understand and he'll raise it with the right
leaders in China to get our fathers freed. It was very
impassioned. I will never forget that hearing, ever. It was so
powerful, because I have two daughters, too. And I know a
father's love for his daughters is so powerful, and there is
Grace, pleading for her dad. So we will invite them back next
year.
Do any of you know about Gao's situation? Are we doing
enough? What more can we, and the administration, be doing?
When the President talks to Xi Jinping for up to two hours,
please mention--with all respect, Mr. President--please mention
the prisoners by name. One of the things that we all learned
during the Soviet Union days, and my first trip on human rights
was to Moscow and Leningrad in 1982, in my first term, with the
National Conference on Soviet Jewry. The biggest takeaway was
that silence enables. Name names. It helps the individual. It
helps to mitigate some of the harshness of what they suffer.
One of the leading dissidents, the father of the Democracy
Wall, I had him at a hearing and he said, When you don't speak
out, they beat us more in the prisons. When you speak out, and
it's paradoxical and seemingly not true, but it is true, they
beat us less. So I would encourage all of us to ask
respectfully that the White House and Secretary of State
Blinken name names and do it over and over. Every contact. Our
Green New Deal czar, John Kerry, an accomplished United States
Senator, sat in hearings here for years, and as leader of the
Foreign Relations Committee. He gets it. He always raises
names.
Gao, in my opinion--and there are others--needs to be at
the top of the list. Chen Guangcheng got out, I believe, in
large part--a heroic man--because there was so much focus on
securing his freedom, and so we need to do it for Gao. And we
will be inviting the wives and children back to appeal to our
own President and to appeal to Xi Jinping to show some
semblance of humanitarianism. So if you could speak to that.
Secondly, on religious freedom, Xi Jinping has done a lot
in the area of crushing all faiths--all faiths. There's nobody
who gets an exception, even the officially recognized patriotic
church and the Three-Self Movement. All of them are being
crushed now and told that they need to comport with his Marxist
principles. And he calls it sinicization. Any updates you can
give us on that and how we might push back on that?
And finally, when it comes to our colleges and
universities, I have been concerned for years--held hearings on
this as well with the chancellor of NYU--and I even invited
myself--he was gracious enough to have me go to Shanghai to
speak about human rights. But still, what role are these
colleges and universities actually playing when domestically,
they allow such influence peddling, as we see at the Confucius
Centers. We also have, obviously, others who then seem to mouth
and curb their own criticism of all things human rights in the
People's Republic of China. If you want to speak to that. I
know there's not much time. But, Gao, if you could speak about
him as well.
Gao Zhisheng has been disappeared for almost five years
and four months. Nobody knows whether or not he's still alive.
I have two daughters. I can feel the pain, you know, how Gao
Zhisheng's daughter and son suffer every day, every second. The
Chinese government is using forced disappearance more and more.
We know not only Gao, but many other Tibetans and Uyghur and
Chinese dissidents have also been disappeared. So I totally,
totally agree with you. It's very, very important to name
names. When the American President, when all the senators--
every leader, every world leader--the U.K. Prime Minister, the
German Chancellor, everyone, has a chance to meet Chinese
leaders, they should name names and ask them where Gao Zhisheng
is. Where are Peng Zaizhou and Li Kangmeng?
Ms. Inboden. Thank you very much. I also have to say, I'm
familiar with your work even from my time at the State
Department, where your concern for human rights was very
evident. I am going to answer the question a little bit
differently, because there are so many people like Gao who are
suffering. I'd just like to raise the case of Rahile Dawut, a
Uyghur professor who has been disappeared since 2017. Her case
is extremely troubling, because her only crime really was
researching and celebrating Uyghur folklore. I think not enough
has been done around her case.
I want to mention again my recommendation that the U.S. use
its speaking time during the Human Rights Council Universal
Periodic Review to mention names specifically, and even to say
something about the stories behind some of these people,
because I do think that in some of the ``swing states'' that
are not necessarily hard autocracies but are also not in the
democratic camp--I think the more they hear about the
individual suffering, it's un-deniable the scale of human
rights violations in China.
Ms. Richardson. I'll just add that it's been good to see
more Magnitsky sanctions against Chinese government officials.
I think that's an important way of naming people, too. But we,
of course, share the view that naming people who have been
wrongfully detained, and calling for their release--it's not
just saying their names; it's explicitly calling for their
release--is an incredibly important thing to do. I think one of
the problems is that the lists have gotten so much longer.
We're no longer talking about hundreds and hundreds of people
across China.
I think if the U.S. is going to be serious about
transnational repression, it should also be publicly calling,
where family members have given their consent, for the release
of the wrongfully detained family members of U.S. citizens and
lawful permanent residents. I think it could be potentially
very effective, for example, for Secretary Blinken to sit and
literally read out loud a list of every single person the
United States Government thinks should be released, whether
they're people inside China, whether they're relatives of
people who live here. I think that would be a very powerful way
of underscoring this point.
Mr. Smith, on the point about the sinicization of religion,
I think there are few governments in modern history as powerful
as the Chinese government, that have set themselves the task
of, and tried to justify, essentially eradicating independent
religious practice and reshaping it in ways that suit a very
specific political agenda. We see this across Islam. We see it
across Buddhism. We see it across Christianity.
You name it, whether it is taking down signs outside of
mosques in Ningxia, whether it is remaking the curriculum of
Buddhist communities across the Tibetan region, we don't have
time to go into all the details today, but I think it is a
profoundly frightening phenomenon that a government decides it
is going to make religion into particular formats that suit its
political imperatives. That's not what international human
rights law has to say about religious freedom and the freedom
of belief.
Chair Merkley. Well, thank you.
As we approach the end of this hearing, I'm just pondering
how much change we've seen in China. You know, this hearing was
about the arc of the 20 years. It is now 11 years since former
Majority Leader Reid led a bipartisan delegation of 10 senators
to China. At that point, there was considerable hope for a
lessening of restrictions.
We were seeing some signs of increased permission for
religious activities across a range. We were talking to
reporters who were allowed free range of movement within China,
and who no longer had a companion at their elbow monitoring
their every movement. We were starting to see some opportunity
for those within China who were raising issues about labor
concerns and environmental concerns not being imprisoned and
actually, on occasion, having their reports welcomed as a
necessary observation for potential improvement.
All of that's completely gone under leader Xi Jinping, and
now we see that he's been reelected or appointed to another
five years, and perhaps for life. I'm very concerned that this
trajectory is going to get locked in, this massive electronic
surveillance state, this massive repression of human rights,
over a billion-plus people. Really affecting freedom of the
press, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, every freedom--
freedom of movement. It's almost like watching a science
fiction movie about the future, but it is here now.
It has been important work of this Commission over the last
two years to illuminate many dimensions of that. We need to
continue that in an aggressive and bold fashion on behalf of
all humanity. My concern is that this model, using high-tech
surveillance--as you reference, Dr. Teng--of every movement and
every moment is something that will appeal to other
authoritarian leaders. I'm concerned about the use of facial
recognition expanding here in the United States, and the
encroaching power of government to monitor what we do here in
America. We absolutely need to double down in the years ahead
on this important work.
I want to thank all the members, all the commissioners. I
will no longer be the chair, as we rotate between the Senate
and the House, but I hope to remain very involved in this
incredibly important work. Huge thanks to the staff for what
they have done over the last two years. We've done a lot of
hearings on a lot of different dimensions, working hard to
shine a spotlight on all the places where a spotlight needs to
be shined.
With that, we will close this hearing. I thank the three of
you for your testimony. The record will remain open until the
close of business on Friday, December 16th for any items
members would like to submit for the record or any additional
questions for the witnesses. With that, this hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the hearing was concluded.]
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A P P E N D I X
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Prepared Statements
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Prepared Statement of Teng Biao
High-tech Totalitarianism and Xi Jinping's War on Law
Since the reform and opening-up policy was adopted in the late
1970s, the legal system in China had been re-established from the chaos
and brutality of the Cultural Revolution. Laws and regulations were
made, the judiciary and lawyer system were recovered, and market-
oriented economic and administrative reforms were implemented. Space
for traditional media was enlarged, after the 1990s, and the internet
played an important role in the growth of China's civil society.
Cellular phones, social media and new communication technologies
greatly facilitated the ability of social movements to mobilize and
organize and offered rights activists convenient channels to find and
connect with other like-minded users across China. Publishers
introduced many liberal works and translations, and intellectual
circles expressed enormous interest in liberal thought, though the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has never given up censorship on media,
internet, schools and publishing.
The ``Rights Defense Movement'' (Weiquan movement) emerged in the
early 2000s as a new focus of the Chinese democracy movement,
succeeding the Xidan Democracy Wall movement of the late 1970s and the
Tiananmen Democracy movement of 1989. Lawyers, activists, human rights
defenders and NGOs asserted their constitutional and legal rights
through lawful means and within the legal framework.
But not long after the emergence of the rights defense movement,
the Chinese government came to see it as a real threat to the regime
and engaged in a concerted campaign to harass and crack down on human
rights activists and NGOs. The government adopted a flexible and
comprehensive strategy, from oral warnings, disbarment, house arrest,
travel bans, criminal charges, and reeducation camps, to abduction,
torture and collective punishment.
When Xi came to power in late 2012, the CCP was facing an
accumulation of post-1989 new social energies--in the form of the
internet, the market, the spread of liberal ideas, the rights defense
movement--and on the other hand, official corruption, conflicts between
officials and citizens, an ecological crisis, and, most alarmingly, the
economic decline. The CCP already eliminated democratization--whether
gradual or sudden--from its menu of options for responding to crises.
And so all it is left with is strengthening centralized power and
enhancing the forces of repression.
This is why Xi Jinping has hugely intensified the crackdown on
human rights. He actually waged a war on law. Just as in 1989, when the
CCP believed that social liberalization and a democratic movement had
threatened its one-party rule, it did not hesitate to crush the
peaceful protests with tanks and machine guns.
Xi Jinping abolished the two-term limit for the presidency, shut
down thousands of NGOs, rounded up human rights lawyers and dissidents,
persecuted Falun Gong, Muslims, Tibetan Buddhists, Christians, and
other religious groups, destroyed mosques, temples, and churches,
intensified censorship on the internet, media, and in schools, arrested
entrepreneurs, journalists, artists, academics, and anyone who
disobeyed its dictates.
The CCP has brazenly and deliberately violated its international
promise of ``one country, two systems'' in Hong Kong by eliminating the
umbrella revolution and the anti-extradition movement and eventually in
2020, by implementing the National Security Law in Hong Kong. Hong
Kong's freedom and rule of law have been totally destroyed by the CCP
since 2020.
Since 2017, between one million and three million Uyghurs, Kazakhs,
and other Turkic people in Xinjiang (East Turkestan) have been detained
in concentration camps (which are called ``reeducation centers'' by the
CCP). Women were systematically raped and sexually harassed in the
camps, Turkic intellectuals and elites were purged, children were
forcibly separated from their parents, a million Han Chinese officials
were sent to live with Uyghur families, closely monitoring them, and
the Chinese government is systematically imposing forced inter-ethnic
marriages on Uyghur women. As of late 2022, the Xinjiang Victims
Database has documented 210 deaths in the camps since January 2017, but
the real number must be much higher than this, given the extreme danger
and difficulty of collecting information. (https://shahit.biz/eng/
#lists)
Since 2009, 159 TIBETANS HAVE SELF-IMMOLATED IN TIBET AND CHINA to
call for freedom and human rights. Most of what the Chinese government
has been doing in Xinjiang is taken from the playbook of how it ruled
in Tibet after the protests in March 2008.
What is extremely terrifying is that the CCP has established an
unprecedented totalitarian surveillance system in China. I coined the
term ``high-tech totalitarianism'' to describe this surreal dystopia.
At least half a billion surveillance cameras are installed throughout
the country, and the number is still increasing sharply. A social
credit system, which documents people's transactions, moral and
political behavior, and punishes them for any variation from its rules,
is expanding rapidly. Powerful phone trackers can connect one's digital
footprint, real-life identity and physical whereabouts, and facial,
voiceprint, and gait recognition capability, together with government-
controlled big data, make privacy hardly possible. Virtual reality (VR)
was used to test party members' level of loyalty to the CCP. The
authorities have collected DNA data from hundreds of millions of
Chinese by cheating or by force. Social media controlled by the CCP--
Weibo, WeChat, TikTok and others, are also effective tools to surveil
all Chinese internet users. By strengthening ``high-tech
totalitarianism,'' the Chinese government's goal is to maximize its
capacity to monitor everyone's every movement in every corner at every
moment.
Furthermore, Covid-19 has become a perfect excuse for the Communist
Party to strengthen its control of Chinese society. At least 400
million people and hundreds of cities, are under covid lockdown. Every
citizen is required to show a Green Health Code (and also a Venue Code
and Itinerary Code) to leave home. Before two human rights lawyers
departed to meet their client, a citizen journalist sentenced to four
years for her reports of the outbreak of Covid-19, their health codes
suddenly turned red, which was obviously a manipulation of the
authorities to restrict their travel. This has happened to thousands of
petitioners in Henan Province, as well. The Zero-Covid policy has been
purposed more to tighten its perfect dictatorship, ``controlocracy'' as
Norwegian sociologist Stein Ringen put it, than to fight the
coronavirus. It can be called ``COVID totalitarianism.''
Ridiculously enough, the collateral damage has been much greater
than that caused by the pandemic. Whistleblowers and activists have
been arrested and silenced, doors and windows were sealed, patients in
urgent medical need have been denied care by hospitals, people locked
in their own homes have been left with a lack of food (some even
starved to death), students were not allowed to attend exams and
farmers were forced not to plant or harvest. The ``white guards'' have
arbitrarily humiliated, detained, and assaulted civilians. Uyghurs have
also died as a result of poisoning from disinfectants sprayed in their
homes--the list goes on.
Because of my human rights work in China, I have been disbarred,
banned from teaching and fired by the university, kidnapped, detained
and severely tortured, and my wife and children were targeted. But so
many people have suffered and sacrificed so much. Some activists have
even lost their lives. Li Wangyang, Cao Shunli, Zhang Liumao, Peng
Ming, Yang Tianshui, Tenzin Delek Renboche, the Nobel laureate Liu
Xiaobo, and many others.
recommendations
Democracies should urge the Chinese government to release all the
human rights defenders, dissidents, journalists, and citizens who were
imprisoned because of their political opinions and religious beliefs. I
call your attention to the jailed prisoners of conscience, Ilham Tohti,
Xu Zhiyong, Ding Jiaxi, Wang Binzhang, Gao Zhisheng, Gulshan Abbas, Go
Sherab Gyatso, and Jim Lai. Especially, the Chinese government should
immediately and unconditionally release all the protesters arrested and
detained during the A4 revolution. I have confirmed that many
protesters have been tortured by the police. Peng lifa, who hung the
banners at Beijing Sitong bridge, is the new Tank Man, who inspired the
A4 revolution. A girl reportedly named Li Kangmeng, was the first
person to hang a white paper at Nanjing Communication College. Both
were taken away by the police and their whereabouts remain unknown.
Democracies should urge the Chinese government to shut down the
concentration camps in Xinjiang and stop the practice of forced
marriage, torture, systematic rape, brainwashing, forced labor, and
homestay of Han officials.
Democracies should urge the Chinese government to stop all of its
repressive policies in Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia, including
restrictions of their native languages, mandatory or quasi-mandatory
boarding schools, travel restrictions, destruction of cultural
heritage, religious persecution, and purges of elites and activists.
Democracies should make it easier for the Uyghurs, Tibetans, Hong
Kongers, and Chinese activists/dissidents to seek political asylum.
There's an urgent need to prevent these people from being deported to
China.
Democracies should stop appeasing the CCP regime. Human rights
issues should be linked to trade and technology talks. Human rights
should not be sacrificed for short-term economic and political profit.
Every time world leaders meet CCP leaders, they should not be silent or
soft on human rights issues. When genocide and crimes against humanity
still continue, silence is complicity.
``Not seeking regime change'' is the wrong message to send the CCP.
The CCP will continue to suppress freedom and manipulate international
human rights laws, and has become the biggest threat to the liberal
international order.
It's extremely important and necessary to help the Chinese people
jump the Great Firewall (GFW). When the Chinese people can access
information from the free world, many of them will be awakened and will
tend not to tolerate the brutal rule of the CCP. A bit more budget on
affordable technologies or equipment (like VPNs) will make a great
difference.
Congress should categorize the ongoing atrocities against Uyghurs
and Kazakhs in Xinjiang as genocide. Democracies should sanction human
rights abusers and put more Chinese officials on the list of the Global
Magnitsky Act. Democracies should sanction the global companies that
are complicit in the CCP's censorship and surveillance. Cisco and some
other tech giants facilitated China's GFW. Zoom terminated meetings
organized by Chinese activists and suspended host accounts upon the
instructions of the Chinese government.
Today I request a congressional investigation of Apple. Apple has
ceded legal ownership of its customers' data to Guizhou-Cloud Big Data
(GCBD), a company owned by the Chinese government. Apple did not care
about labor rights violations in its supply factories in China. Apple
removed the VPN apps from its App Store in China. Apple restricted the
use of AirDrop soon after the Sitong bridge protest (Apple limited
AirDrop sharing to 10 minutes in China after its use in protests).
Apple should tell the public where it received the instructions, and
why it has been complicit in China's suppression and censorship.
The recent A4 revolution has shown the world how eagerly the
Chinese people demand freedom and democracy and how much they want to
risk to fight the dictatorial regime. It is our moral and political
obligation to support the freedom fighters, and the bottom line is, a
business based in the free world facilitating the dictatorship should
not be tolerated.
______
Prepared Statement of Rana Siu Inboden
Distinguished Commissioners, fellow witnesses, and guests, it is an
honor to be a part of today's hearing. I also want to thank Senator
Merkley and Representative McGovern for their leadership and service on
this commission.
My main focus today will be on China's ambitions in the
international human rights system. Unfortunately, as China has grown in
wealth, power, and international influence over the past three decades,
it has used its rise to undermine international human rights
instruments rather than support them. There are three particular points
I want to emphasize. First, under Xi Jinping an emboldened Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) is on the offensive in the international human
rights system as it actively is working to dilute UN human rights
procedures and norms. This trend has become particularly evident over
the last five years as the PRC has begun introducing UN human rights
resolutions intended to propagate China's human rights views, assumed
more of a leadership role among illiberal nations, marshaled protective
statements for other repressive governments, and subjected UN experts
who seek to hold China accountable for its human rights violations to
bombastic vitriol. Second, although China's more assertive posture
presents challenges, there remain a number of strengths within the UN
system. Third, as my recommendations demonstrate, there are important
contributions the U.S., in partnership with other nations committed to
human rights and democracy, can make to uphold and strengthen the
international human rights architecture.
beijing's human rights assault
There are multiple layers and components to China's drive to weaken
the UN's human rights system and assert its own vision globally.
First, China is not only part of a coalition of nations drawn
primarily from the Global South as well as Russia that collectively
acts to constrain the international human rights regime but has begun
organizing and leading this group. In the Human Rights Council (HRC),
this group of nations, which goes by the generic moniker, the ``Like-
Minded Group'' (LMG) has come to number roughly 50 nations.\1\ What
these nations are like-minded about is advancing a regressive human
rights vision that downplays civil and political rights and prioritizes
sovereignty over international monitoring even in cases of gross human
rights violations. While China has consistently been a member of this
group since it first emerged in the UN Commission on Human Rights in
the late 1990s, it previously avoided a prominent leadership role until
2012 when it began delivering statements on behalf of the group in the
HRC.
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\1\ Rana Siu Inboden, China and the International Human Rights
Regime: 1982-2017 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 73.
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The LMG, which includes a number of autocracies, impairs the UN
human rights regime in multiple ways. These nations form a base of
support that Beijing has relied on to secure adoption of several Human
Rights Council resolutions that advance its regressive human rights
views, its national prerogatives, and even Xi Jinping's political
slogans.\2\ This coalition also acts as a mutual defense network that
reflexively shields each other from human rights scrutiny. This
behavior corrodes UN procedures that were meant to hold nations
accountable for their human rights abuses. For example, in 2018 Belarus
exploited the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) to state that China
should ``Continue to promote participation, integration and the sharing
of development benefits by vulnerable groups.'' \3\ The use of the word
``continue'' and the amicable wording portrayed Beijing's existing
policies in a positive light despite credible and extensive reporting
about repression of ethnic minorities, particularly Tibetans and
Uyghurs. In turn, when Belarus was reviewed by the Council in 2021,
China stated that it ``supported the achievements of Belarus in
protecting human rights and its efforts to maintain its independence,
sovereignty, security and development.'' \4\ Cumulatively, these kinds
of statements during the UPR from the LMG form a chorus of praiseworthy
or softball comments, even for rights-violating countries, that drowns
out expressions of concern from liberal democracies. Moreover, the LMG
undercuts the effectiveness of the UN human rights system by resisting
the use of ``country-specific'' human rights monitoring, including the
appointment of special procedures, special sessions and resolutions
even though human rights abuses often occur along national lines.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Rana Siu Inboden, ``China and Authoritarian Collaboration,''
Journal of Contemporary China, Volume 31, Issue 136, 505-517.
\3\ United Nations General Assembly, ``Draft report of the Working
Group on the Universal Periodic Review, China'' December 26, 2018, UN
Doc. A/HRC/40/6.
\4\ UN General Assembly, ``Draft report of the Working Group on the
Universal Periodic Review, Belarus,'' January 4, 2021, UN Doc. A/HRC/
46/5.
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Beijing mobilizes many of these countries to prevent and deflect
attention from its human rights record, particularly its genocidal
campaign against ethnic Uyghurs and its strangling of Hong Kong's
democracy. In this vein, the PRC recruited over 60 countries to sign a
letter addressed to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights urging
her not to release a report that ultimately verified and corroborated
reports of mass detention, state control, and repression of Uyghurs.
Over the last several years, each time nations committed to democratic
values and human rights jointly expressed concern about Xinjiang and
Hong Kong, the PRC mobilized a swath of like-minded nations to come to
its defense.\5\ In 2020 when Germany delivered a statement at the UN on
behalf of 39 countries that expressed concerns about Hong Kong and
Xinjiang, Cuba offered a statement signed by 45 countries defending
China's record in Xinjiang, and Pakistan delivered a statement that
supported China's actions in Hong Kong that was joined by 55
nations.\6\ Earlier this fall, when a resolution on Xinjiang was
introduced in the Human Rights Council by the United States, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom, the
resolution failed with 17 nations voting for, 19 voting against, and 11
registering abstentions.\7\ Among the 19 nations voting against the
resolution, 11 have affiliated with the LMG.\8\ Although many of the
PRC's supporters appear to be motivated by a sense of developing world
solidarity, the PRC is known to engage in vigorous pressure and
inducements, including using its economic power, to secure votes. In
turn, China is steadfast in protecting its autocratic allies and
opposing ``country-specific'' human rights monitoring of their own
abuses. For example, during the HRC's special session on Iran last
month, China tried to stymie the creation of a fact-finding mission by
introducing a poison-pill amendment to the resolution.\9\
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\5\ In addition to China's reaction to the German-led statement, in
2021, after Canada delivered a joint statement on behalf of 44 nations,
including the U.S., that expressed deep concern about the treatment of
Uyghurs, China mobilized a statement in the HRC that was delivered by
Belarus and signed by 65 countries that defended China's human rights
abuses.
\6\ ``Statement by Ambassador Christoph Heusgen on behalf of 39
Countries in the Third Committee General Debate, October 6, 2020,''
Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the United
Nations, June 10, 2020, https://new-york-un.diplo.de/un-en/news-corner/
201006-heusgen-china/2402648
\7\ ``51st regular session of the Human Rights Council:
Resolutions, decisions and President's statements,'' UN Human Rights
Council, https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/regular-
sessions/session51/res-dec-stat
\8\ Among those voting to shield the PRC from being held
accountable were Bolivia, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Cuba, Eritrea,
Gabon, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Mauritania, Namibia, Nepal, Pakistan,
Qatar, Senegal, Sudan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan and Venezuela.
\9\ Emma Farge, ``China fails to weaken Iran motion before UN
rights body,'' Reuters, November 24, 2022.
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Many of these nations have supported the resolutions in the HRC
that Beijing has introduced over the last five years. This has allowed
China to co-opt the Council as a forum to propagate China's regressive
human rights vision rather than advance accountability for rights-
abusing states and protection for human rights victims. Beijing has
secured passage of resolutions that protect repressive states over
individual human rights victims, prioritizes claims to sovereignty over
universal human rights, and favors anemic and diversionary ``dialogue''
over robust accountability for states. The extensive insertion of some
of Xi Jinping's favored slogans also indicates that the PRC seeks to
use HRC resolutions to extend the CCP's ideational influence
abroad.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Inboden, ``China and Authoritarian Collaboration,'' 510-517.
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China also seeks to intimidate and dissuade other actors from
drawing attention to its human rights violations. In particular,
Beijing's diplomats have employed hyperbolic language to counter
attention from the UN's Special Procedures system, which is comprised
of independent experts who investigate, report on, and draw attention
to, a variety of human rights abuses. Because of their independent
status and the wide variety of human rights topics they cover, this
part of the human rights system is often considered to be particularly
effective. In response to the repression of Uyghurs, Hong Kong
protesters and Chinese human rights lawyers, the independent experts
serving in the Special Procedures system have responded with strongly
worded joint statements, including a 2020 statement signed by over 50
mandate holders and a 2022 statement joined by over 40 of these
experts. China reacted by slandering and criticizing the mandate
holders by name and pushing for changes to the Special Procedures that
would curtail the autonomy of these experts to speak out against human
rights abuses.\11\ These ad hominem attacks should also be viewed in
the context of China's behavior in the UN that has become increasingly
aggressive, where Beijing's actions go beyond normal diplomacy as it
uses bullying and intimidation.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ See, for example, ``Chinese Mission Spokesperson Refutes the
Smears by Certain Special Procedure Mandate Holders,'' Permanent
Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN in Geneva, http://
geneva.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/ryrbt/202206/t20220610_10701825.htm and
Rana Siu Inboden, ``China and the United Nations Special Procedures:
Emerging Threats to the Human Rights System's `Crown Jewels,' ''
manuscript submitted to the Special Issue project ``Power shifts and
international organisations: China at the United Nations''.
\12\ Human Rights Watch, The Costs of International Advocacy:
China's Interference in United Nations Human Rights Mechanisms, (New
York: Human Rights Watch, 2017.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This destructive behavior is not limited to the UN's Geneva-based
bodies but extends to other parts of the United Nations. In particular,
China has misused its seat on the UN's Economic and Social Council's
(ECOSOC) NGO Committee to thwart civil society participation in the
United Nations by stonewalling the applications of a number of civil
society groups seeking UN consultative status. This status enables NGOs
to participate in UN activities and meetings, host side events, gain
access to observing sessions in person, and speaking at UN events and
meetings. China, along with other LMG countries, has actively blocked
applications from civil society organizations working on human rights,
including NGOs working to combat abuse perpetrated by China's
authoritarian allies, such as North Korea, Russia, and Iran.\13\
Between 2016 and 2019, LMG countries were responsible for blocking the
applications of almost 1,000 NGOs, with Beijing being the leader in
effectively vetoing NGO applications.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Rana Siu Inboden, ``China at the UN: Choking Civil Society,''
Journal of Democracy, Volume 32, Number 3 (July 2021): 124-135.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
challenges, accomplishments and opportunities
Over the last twenty years, China has amassed economic power and
global political influence that provide it with new tools to obstruct
and undermine the international human rights regime. Moreover, after
years of focusing primarily on avoiding resolutions on its record,
China is no longer content with merely playing defense, and is now
pairing its efforts to weaken the international human rights system
with transnational repression that targets human rights activists
overseas and utilizes illicit influencing campaigns in other countries
in an attempt to forestall open discussion and debate about China.
These developments present new challenges to the U.S. and other nations
committed to the ideals of freedom and democracy.
At the same time, the U.S. can point to some accomplishments. Over
the last twenty years, American efforts to nurture civil society in
China have helped spawn activists and groups that tenaciously seek to
engage with the UN. Cao Shunli, the human rights defender who died in
police custody in 2014 (after attempting to attend a training event in
Geneva) is emblematic of this drive. Even when they cannot engage
directly due to concerns about safety and security, many of these
China-based advocates provide information to civil society groups
overseas who are then able to disseminate reporting to a wider
international audience.
The United States must be cognizant that there remain important
avenues to bolster the international human rights system and that
American engagement matters. Energetic and inventive U.S. diplomacy at
the UN and other multilateral institutions can make a meaningful
difference. The independent human rights experts who serve in the
treaty body and special procedures system remain a bright spot in the
UN human rights system, and have actively used press releases, joint
statements, decisions and reports to highlight China's human rights
violations.\14\ Moreover, while the CCP has sought to repudiate the
universality of human rights norms, the remarkable protests that sprang
up across China last month demonstrate that these ideals resonate
deeply with the Chinese people. These opportunities form the basis of
my recommendations below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ For example, see UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights, ``China: Human rights defenders given long jail terms,
tortured--UN expert,'' press release, June 28, 2021, https://
www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2021/06/china-human-rights-defenders-
given-long-jail-terms-tortured-un-expert.
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Proactive Engagement With the UN
Even as we recognize some inadequacies of the UN Human Rights
Council, including the lack of membership criteria, the U.S. should not
only remain involved with the Council but should increase its
engagement in Geneva. Retreating from the Council only served China's
interests, and enabled it and other autocrats to fill this vacuum. It
is not surprising that we now see a mushrooming in authoritarian
influence and collaboration in these bodies. Instead, a vigorous
presence in Geneva will position the U.S. and our allies to push back
against China's attempt to hijack the Human Rights Council. For
example, in 2022, when China introduced a resolution titled ``Realizing
a Better Life for Everyone,'' that was full of blandishments and
Chinese slogans, resistance from the U.S. and a range of other
countries forced China to withdraw the resolution. A more proactive
posture in Geneva that includes paying diplomatic attention to smaller
states on the HRC and seeking out their views will also help the U.S.
regain credibility. While China has sought to debilitate from within,
the U.S. needs to think about strengthening from within.
Bolster Resources and Expertise
In contrast to the PRC, which devotes considerable staff time to
lobbying in Geneva and developing expertise on the rules and diplomacy
of the Council, the U.S. State Department has failed to adequately
staff and support the U.S. mission in Geneva. The U.S. must exceed
efforts by China and other members of the LMG, including Cuba, which
have not only allocated significant staff resources but have encouraged
their diplomats to do multiple tours in Geneva, enabling them to master
UN rules and procedures as well as diplomatic lobbying of other HRC
member states. This imbalance in resources and expertise enables China
to secure votes for its initiatives and to protect itself from
scrutiny, even demonstrating that it can mobilize votes in less than 24
hours.\15\
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\15\ Human Rights Watch, The Costs of International Advocacy, 88.
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Divide the Like-Minded Group
The U.S. Government should pursue a two-pronged approach toward the
LMG. First, the U.S. should try to draw countries away from this
grouping. Although a number of the countries are some of the most
severe human rights violators, such as Belarus, not all of the
countries in the LMG fit neatly into the autocratic camp but rather
align with this group partly out of a sense of Global South residual
anti-imperialist solidarity, rather than a zeal for authoritarian
practices. Some of these countries could be described as ``swing
states,'' such as India and Indonesia. India's LMG role in particular
has been disappointing, especially since it contrasts with its more
favorable developments such as its participation in the Quad with the
U.S., Japan, and Australia. The U.S. State Department should put on the
bilateral agenda with these swing states that their affiliation with
the LMG is not helpful, and undermines human dignity. Moreover,
bolstering civil society and even journalists in some LMG countries to
enable them to monitor their own government's behavior in Geneva will
be key to shifting the behavior of their governments in the UN.
Build a Regionally Diverse Group of Nations
While the other liberal democracies coming from the Global North
are some of America's natural allies and a transatlantic alliance might
be a natural starting point in securing the future of the UN human
rights system, countering the transnational assault on the UN will
require a transnational response. Thus, the U.S., in partnership with
other nations, needs to build a regionally diverse, flexible group of
states that champions initiatives in the Council.\16\ In order to do
so, the U.S. could initiate and catalyze this by going on a listening
tour in Geneva and learning about issues of import to other countries,
being attentive to their ideas, identifying shared human rights
concerns, and encouraging other nations to exercise leadership so that
this is not viewed as a primarily American effort. This endeavor should
not be cast as being part of a geopolitical competition between the
U.S. and China but rather being driven by shared human rights interests
and concerns. Costa Rica, which has in the past played a key role in
drafting international standards to combat torture, will begin its term
on the HRC and might be well-positioned to build bridges.\17\ The U.S.
has recently demonstrated an ability to organize this kind of coalition
in the UN Economic and Security Council where it, along with over 20
other nations, overcame authoritarian blocking efforts in the NGO
Committee and secured UN consultative status for 9 NGOs by pushing for
an ECOSOC vote.\18\ The U.S. can build on this momentum by taking up
the cases of NGOs that are of import to other nations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Yaroslav Trofimov, ``Can the U.S. Lead a Human-Rights Alliance
Against China?'' The Wall Street Journal, May 21, 2021.
\17\ Jared Cohen and Richard Fontaine, ``The Case for
Microlateralism: With U.S. Support, Small States Can Ably Lead Global
Efforts,'' Foreign Affairs, April 29, 2021, https://
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2021-04-29/case-microlateralism
\18\ ``Remarks on Presenting the Draft Decision in ECOSOC on
Bringing NGO Applications to a Vote in the ECOSOC Management Segment,''
United States Mission to the United Nations, https://
usun.usmission.gov/remarks-on-presenting-the-draft-decision-in-ecosoc-
on-bringing-ngo-applications-to-a-vote-in-the-ecosoc-management-
segment/ and Edith M. Lederer, ``After years of delay 6 rights groups
get UN accreditation,'' AP News, July 22, 2022, https://apnews.com/
article/russia-ukraine-united-states-social-issues-
9377aa5124589c8a84bab1f81adbfc21
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Use Existing Tools in Novel and More Effective Ways
There are a number of existing tools that the U.S. can use more
actively. While U.S. and other diplomats from the Western European and
Others Group have sought to use their speaking time during the
Universal Periodic Review to highlight China's myriad human rights
violations, the U.S. could also begin using the UPR as an opportunity
to call for the release of specific prisoners in both its verbal
remarks as well as its recommendations to China. This might even be
coordinated with other nations to jointly highlight the cases of
specific prisoners of conscience, such as Uyghur academic Ilham Tohti,
house church pastor Wang Yi, Tibetan Yeshe Choedron, and human rights
defender Qin Yongmin. Of course there are many other prisoners who
could be added.
The UN Secretary General's annual report on reprisals against
individuals who seek to report human rights abuses to the UN has
included the cases of a number of Chinese human rights defenders, and
is another potential tool. While a number of UN bodies such as the
ECOSOC NGO Committee and the HRC lack membership criteria, when China
comes up for election, the U.S. should draw more attention to China's
inclusion in this report and the stories of the human rights activists
who were targeted by the state in order to show that China is unfit for
membership.
Be Creative About International Fora
The U.S. should not be dissuaded by the failure of the HRC to pass
a resolution on Xinjiang. Aside from the HRC, there are other
multilateral bodies to consider, such as the International Labor
Conference or the UN's Third Committee. The Third Committee's remit
includes social, humanitarian, and cultural issues, and last year the
Committee passed country-focused resolutions on North Korea, Myanmar,
Iran, Ukraine, and Syria.\19\ The ILC, which passed a resolution on
forced labor in Myanmar in 1999, is another candidate organization
where the U.S. and other countries concerned with China's abuses could
pursue action. Because the ILO is composed of not only governments but
labor and industry groups, recruiting sufficient votes to secure
passage of a resolution on China might be more feasible.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ ``Social, Humanitarian & Cultural Issues (Third Committee)
Status of action on draft proposals,'' UN General Assembly, https://
www.un.org/en/ga/third/77/proposalstatus.shtml.
\20\ Inboden, China and the International Human Rights Regime, 159-
220 and Kellie Currie, ``How to Stop China Killing Human Rights at the
U.N.'' Foreign Policy, November 9, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/
2022/11/09/china-human-rights-un-xinjiang-resolution-international-
system/
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______
Prepared Statement of Sophie Richardson,
China Director, Human Rights Watch
Remarks Addressing the Chinese Government's Human Rights Record
and Its Approach to the International Human Rights System
introduction
Over the course of the two decades since the establishment of the
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, the Chinese government has
transformed from a relatively benign actor in the international human
rights system to a significant threat to human rights globally. Under
Xi Jinping, who in October awarded himself a third term as General
Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, the government has not only
launched an unprecedented rollback of human rights domestically, but
also made clear its intentions to remake the international human rights
order to protect its interests. Allowing Beijing to do so will not only
have catastrophic outcomes for the victims of Chinese government human
rights violations--including crimes against humanity--inside China, it
will also significantly weaken protection for victims of abuses
worldwide. It is essential that democracies match Beijing's ambition to
protect the norms, laws, and institutions currently under threat.
the chinese government role in international human rights bodies
In recent years, the Chinese government has become considerably
more active in a wide range of United Nations and other multilateral
institutions, including in the global human rights system. These
include developments that on their face are positive: ratifying several
core UN human rights treaties, serving as a member of the UN Human
Rights Council, and seconding Chinese diplomats to positions within the
UN human rights system. Beijing has launched various undertakings
abroad that have major human rights implications: it has created the
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment
Bank (AIIB) under the mantra of promoting economic development, and it
has become a significant global actor in social media platforms and
academia.
This new activism on issues from economics to information by one of
the most consequential actors in the international system, if
underpinned by a serious (albeit unlikely) commitment among senior
Chinese leaders to uphold human rights, could have been transformative.
But the opposite has happened. Particularly under President Xi
Jinping's leadership, the Chinese government does not merely seek to
neutralize UN human rights mechanisms' scrutiny of China, it also
aspires to neutralize the ability of that system to hold any government
accountable for serious human rights violations. Increasingly, Beijing
pursues rights-free development worldwide, and tries to exploit the
openness of institutions in democracies to impose its world view and
silence its critics.
It is crucial--particularly for people who live in democracies and
enjoy the rights to political participation, an independent judiciary,
a free media, and other functioning democratic institutions--to recall
why the international human rights system exists. Quite simply, it is
because states often fail to protect human rights, particularly in
countries that lack credible systems for redress and accountability for
rights violations. People need to appeal to institutions beyond their
government's immediate control.
Beijing is no longer content simply denying people accountability
inside China: it now assertively seeks to bolster other countries'
ability to do so even in the international bodies designed to deliver
some semblance of justice internationally when it is blocked
domestically. Within academia and journalism, the Chinese Communist
Party seeks not only to deny the ability to conduct research or report
from inside China, it also increasingly seeks to do so at universities
and publications around the world, punishing those who study or write
on the topics it considers sensitive--an endlessly arbitrary realm. The
rights-free development the state has sanctioned inside China is now a
foreign policy tool being deployed around the world.
Beijing's resistance to complying with global public health needs
and institutions in the Covid-19 crisis, and its crushing of democratic
aspirations in Hong Kong, should not be seen as anomalies. They are
clear and concerning examples of the consequences for people worldwide
not only of a Chinese government disdainful of international human
rights norms but, increasingly, also seeking to rewrite those rules in
ways that may affect human rights protections globally. Chinese
authorities act as if they fear that the exercise of these rights
abroad can directly threaten the party's hold on power, whether through
criticism of the party itself or as a result of holding the leadership
accountable for its human rights violations.
Human Rights Watch has tracked Beijing's efforts to undermine the
UN human rights system, publishing a report in September 2017, The
Costs of International Advocacy: China's Interference in United Nations
Human Rights Mechanisms. This detailed the ways the Chinese government
obstructs the participation of independent civil society organizations,
manipulates the accreditation process for those actors, and thwarts the
work of treaty bodies, special procedures, the Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights, and the Human Rights Council. Since that
time, we have also exposed Beijing's efforts to strip human rights
funding from UN peacekeeping budgets, its increasingly vitriolic
attacks on not just the mandates of independent human rights experts
within the UN system, but also on the individual experts themselves,
and its reprisals against independent civil society groups from China
for their efforts to engage the UN human rights system.
China routinely opposes efforts at the Human Rights Council to hold
states responsible for even the gravest rights violations. When the
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and the European Union jointly
presented a resolution to address Myanmar's international crimes
against Rohingya Muslims in 2017, China called a vote and was one of
only two countries to vote against. In September 2022, China was one of
only three states voting against a resolution to renew the mandate for
a Special Rapporteur on Afghanistan; that initiative prevailed with the
support of 29 member states. In November, China was one of only six
countries to vote against the establishment of a Fact-Finding Mission
on Iran in response to the recent protests.
Over the past five years, Human Rights Watch documented the Chinese
government's mass arbitrary detentions, pervasive surveillance
technology, and crimes against humanity targeting Uyghurs and other
Turkic communities across Xinjiang. The UN human rights system's
engagement on the Uyghur issue reflects Beijing's power: denying access
to the region for UN human rights investigators, stalling and then
constraining a visit by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights,
lobbying intensely to prevent the release of that office's report on
the crisis, then lobbying even more intensely to block even
discussion--let alone movement towards an investigation--on the issue.
There is however some cause for optimism. Since 2018, UN special
procedures, treaty bodies, and the Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights have consistently documented grave human rights violations
by the Chinese government and offered myriad recommendations on fixing
the proximate and systemic abuse. The former high commissioner,
Michelle Bachelet, under intense diplomatic pressure, in August 2022
published a report, based largely on interviews with victims and
Chinese government sources, on possible crimes against humanity in
Xinjiang. In October, the Human Rights Council fell short by only two
votes in an effort to advance a discussion about the report; Human
Rights Watch believes this was a critical first step towards securing a
positive outcome in the future. Several states otherwise reluctant to
criticize Beijing over its human rights record voted in support of the
initiative out of concerns about institutional integrity: the basic
idea that no state is above scrutiny for its rights record. It is also
an encouraging sign that in late November the new High Commissioner for
Human Rights, Volker Turk, said, ``It's my office's report, and I'm
invested in it.'' OHCHR also called on Chinese authorities to respect
people's rights to peaceful protest as people took to the streets to
protest ``zero-Covid'' lockdowns.
Chinese Government Role in Changing Human Rights Norms
When the Chinese government began ratifying international human
rights instruments in the 1980s, it made little effort to challenge the
contents or the norms informing those documents. In 2004 the government
amended the Constitution to explicitly recognize a state obligation to
respect human rights, and at varying times senior officials have
expressed support for the universality of human rights.
But towards the late 2000s, the Chinese government took an
increasingly more repressive approach. And under Xi Jinping, the
government takes the position that human rights norms and law must be
subordinated to ``Chinese characteristics'' or ``national conditions.''
It has resisted bringing domestic law on key human rights issues, such
as torture, into conformity with the definition as set out under the UN
Convention against Torture, despite being cited in multiple reviews of
the convention for failing to do so.
Chinese authorities also increasingly seek to replace existing
norms and concepts with ones that undermine established human rights.
The notion of ``mutually beneficial cooperation'' is just one example.
In March 2018, China introduced a resolution on ``Promoting the
International Human Rights Cause through Win-Win Cooperation'' at the
Human Rights Council. The title sounded innocuous, but the resolution
gutted procedures to hold countries accountable for human rights
violations, suggesting ``dialogue'' instead and the important role of
``mutually beneficial cooperation.'' It failed to specify any course of
action when rights violators do not cooperate with UN experts,
retaliate against rights defenders, or actively reject human rights
principles. And it even did not acknowledge any role for the Human
Rights Council itself to address serious human rights violations when
``dialogue'' and ``cooperation'' did not produce results. The
resolution was adopted by a distressingly strong majority.
The resolution requested a report from the Council's Advisory
Committee. Many delegations expressed concern, but gave the resolution
the benefit of the doubt, abstaining so they could wait to see what the
Advisory Committee produced. Beijing's intentions soon became crystal
clear: its submission to the Advisory Committee hailed its own
resolution as heralding ``the construction of a new type of
international relations.'' The submission claims that human rights are
used to ``interfere'' in the internal affairs of others, thus
``poisoning the global atmosphere of human rights governance.''
The Advisory Committee report, published just before the June 2020
Council session, only reinforced these concerns: it acknowledges that
``serious conflicts of views exist with regard to the concept of
`mutually beneficial cooperation,' '' but offers no clear definition,
identifies no value-added that the term brings over more established
concepts such as technical cooperation and capacity-building--already
part of the Council's agenda--and even calls into question the
universality of rights, referring to ``so-called `universal' values.''
recommendations
* Democracies should respond to the Chinese government's efforts to
remake the international human rights system with ambition, principle,
discipline, and resources.
* Democracies should form a coalition to protect the UN human
rights system. This should include working together to leave no space
across the UN human rights system uncontested--these are vacuums that
Beijing is highly skilled at filling. They should strongly support the
candidacies of democracies for the Human Rights Council, and truly
independent experts for treaty body, special procedure, key committee,
and thematic group openings. They should be tracking and vigorously
pushing back against Beijing's efforts to weaken norms, and should
especially watch for attempts to advance soft law that could undermine
international human rights law. It is encouraging to hear that with
bipartisan support the US State Department has been able to create a
new effort within the International Organizations Bureau, and the
Office of Multilateral Strategy and Personnel, to take on this critical
work. Please consider whether those resources are sufficient to the
task of coordinating with other democracies and challenging Beijing.
* Second, democracies should be committed to pressing for an
investigation into Chinese government crimes against humanity targeting
Uyghurs and other Turkic communities because of the scope and scale of
the crimes. But they should also do so as a test of the UN human rights
system's resilience. In this sense there should be no political or
diplomatic wavering about this challenging but critical project. Some
in the Congress or administration may see the October Human Rights
Council vote as a loss--we strongly encourage everyone to see it as a
victory in the longer effort towards holding Chinese officials
accountable. It would be a loss for human rights, and a big win for the
Chinese government, if there were no further efforts to discuss the
Xinjiang report at the council and to establish an independent
international investigation.
* Finally, democracies should support civil society organizations--
particularly ones from China, blocked by Beijing from accessing the UN
human rights system--to share their work and perspective. They are
critical sources of information and policy recommendations, yet are
systematically denied an opportunity to share their work and
perspective throughout the UN system. These governments should also
press the UN, the Human Rights Council, and the Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights to bolster protection of these activists,
and ensure that all cases of state reprisals are investigated and
addressed.
Prepared Statement of Hon. Jeff Merkley
Good morning. Today's hearing of the Congressional-Executive
Commission on China entitled ``CECC at 20: Two Decades of Human Rights
Abuse and Defense in China'' will come to order.
This year marked the start of the Commission's third decade
monitoring the People's Republic of China's compliance with
international human rights standards and developments related to the
rule of law in China. The Commission's annual report, hearings, and
other products provide a detailed multi-year accounting.
Over that time, our work documents a dramatic arc, from the early
2000s of a movement within China to stand up for and defend human
rights, to the current situation, the Chinese Communist Party's
escalating efforts to constrict space for internet freedom, civil
society, and the exercise of citizens' basic rights. In that same
period, the hope some held on to that China's inclusion in global
institutions would be accompanied by improvements in human rights has
met the harsh reality: Chinese authorities are using those institutions
to debase and discredit the very notion of universal rights.
As we close out the 117th Congress, this hearing aims to take stock
of where the last two decades leave us and where those fighting for
fundamental freedoms can go from here. We are joined by some of the
leading experts in the field, who will shed light on the evolution of
the domestic situation in China, the international legal landscape, and
the Chinese Communist Party's efforts to shape both.
Before we hear their testimony, our examination of this topic will
be framed by special remarks from a very special friend to this
Commission. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi spoke from the dais at
the first hearing of the CECC 20 years ago, just a floor above us in
this very building, to help launch a Commission she had played a key
role in creating. As we thank her for her historic leadership in
Congress and tireless work on behalf of human rights everywhere, but
especially in China, there is nobody more fitting for us to hear from
to mark two decades of the Commission's work and to help chart what we
can do to keep fighting for the people against the powerful.
That is the essence of what the Commission tries to do. The
talented and professional staff has published 21 annual reports,
compiled over 10,000 Political Prisoner Database records, and met with
countless stakeholders over the years. In this Congress alone, we've
passed the groundbreaking Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, advanced
legislation establishing a China Censorship Monitor and Action Group,
held 15 hearings that ran the gamut of issues within our mandate, sent
dozens of advocacy letters, and published analysis on the treatment of
Muslim minorities, economic coercion against American companies, the
case for sanctioning those responsible for political prosecutions, and
the dismantling of Hong Kong's civil society.
Since its first days, the backbone for all of this work has been
Judy Wright. The first person hired to staff the CECC, Judy Wright has
been the only Director of Administration the Commission has ever had.
After nearly 21 years in this role and almost 40 working for the U.S.
Congress, Judy will begin a richly deserved retirement at the end of
this month. She has kept the Commission running smoothly, supported
research staff through thick and thin, maintained institutional memory
over the many political transitions in Congress over the years, and
been a treasured friend to generations of CECC staffers and
commissioners. Judy, this team will miss you dearly. We wish you all
the best in retirement and thank you for your service.
This is my last hearing as chair before we transition to the next
Congress. It has been an honor to serve with my co-chair, Congressman
McGovern, who has shown tremendous leadership these last four years in
translating the work of the Commission into meaningful legislation
defending Uyghurs, Hong Kongers, Tibetans, and others experiencing
abuse. That work has been truly bipartisan and bicameral, and as we
prepare for the next Congress, I look forward to continued close
partnership with Congressman Smith, with Senator Rubio, and with all of
this Commission's champions for human rights and the rule of law in
China.
Prepared Statement of Hon. James P. McGovern
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for scheduling this hearing. I look
forward to the testimony from our witnesses.
I want to thank you for your incredible leadership. It has been an
honor to serve alongside you, as well as with my friend Congressman
Suozzi from New York. I've really admired your style and your
commitment to the human rights of the Chinese people.
Today we take stock of the changes in China and the evolution of
international law in the two decades since the CECC was established.
Our intent is not to look back but to plan for the future by assessing
our work amidst a changing landscape.
Xi Jinping will continue to lead a government that employs the
newest tools to suppress dissenting viewpoints, impose social control,
and repress critics domestically and across borders. We want to make
sure that the Commission is properly equipped and oriented to fulfill
its mandate and to serve our constituents--Congress, the executive
branch, the China human rights community, and most important of all,
the people of China.
Chinese, Tibetans, Uyghurs, Southern Mongolians, Hong Kongers, and
all others who live in the PRC deserve to have their rights and dignity
respected. Human rights are inherent in all human beings, as enshrined
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and protected by the
covenants and agreements that have flowed from it.
The Chinese Communist Party would have us believe that some rights
count more than others, citing ``Chinese values'' to discount certain
civil and political rights. Some in the United States also believe that
some rights count more than others, citing ``American values'' to
discount certain social and economic rights.
Under international law, both are wrong. Human rights are
universal, interdependent, and mutually reinforcing. This Commission,
by statute, is mandated to assess China's compliance with international
human rights standards. These standards are not determined by any party
in China, and not by any party in the United States. These standards,
codified at the United Nations and widely adjudicated, apply to every
person in every country and territory on Earth. We do a disservice to
the people of China if the Commission's work is shaped by personal or
political preferences, rather than based on the universal human rights
that the people of China are entitled to. Over two decades the
Commission has earned a reputation for objective and informative
analysis. Let's keep it that way.
On a personal note, this is my last hearing as cochair of this
Commission. With my cochairs, Senators Rubio and Merkley, along with
Congressman Smith, we have sought to translate the Commission's
expertise into advocacy and legislative impact. We helped get into law
the Hong Kong Autonomy Act, the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy
Act, the PROTECT Hong Kong Act, the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act, and
the Tibetan Policy and Support Act.
I give special mention to the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act,
which was the product of Commission staff research, that led to a
report, a hearing, legislation, and then law. I propose it as a model
both for how the Commission can be effective and how to craft robust
human rights policy. I hope to be able to continue to serve on this
Commission and to work on a bipartisan basis to promote human rights in
China.
Lastly, none of this would be possible without the hard-working
non-partisan staff of the Commission. They are experts in the field and
committed to both the cause of human rights and to the accuracy in
reporting that has made the Commission's work so respected. I cannot
thank them enough.
One staffer I will mention by name is Judy Wright. She is retiring
after 20 years at the Commission, and many before that in the House. As
Director of Administration, she has made everything possible. We will
miss her. I wish her a well-deserved and fulfilling retirement.
I also want to acknowledge our lead staffer in the House, Todd
Stein. I have worked with nobody who knows more about China, who is
more fluent in human rights law, who cares more deeply about this issue
than him. It has really been a privilege and an honor to work alongside
him, and we're going to continue to work together on this issue for
many years to come.
I want to pay a special tribute to Speaker Pelosi. She reminds us
all the time, even when it's inconvenient, about how important focusing
on human rights is. With regard to human rights in China, she reminds
us that if we don't have the courage and the guts to speak out against
human rights abuses in China, then we don't have the moral authority to
speak out against human rights abuses anywhere on this planet.
The legislation that both of us have pointed out, that has been a
product of this Commission, would not have become law unless had it not
been for the leadership of Speaker Pelosi in the House. I cannot thank
her enough for her commitment.
Again, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to hearing from our
witnesses, and hearing their recommendations for how this Commission,
the Congress, and the U.S. Government can best advocate for the
universal rights of the people of China.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Witness Biographies
Teng Biao, Hauser Human Rights Scholar, Hunter College, and Pozen
Visiting Professor, University of Chicago
Teng Biao, an academic lawyer, is currently Hauser Human Rights
Scholar at Hunter College, City University of New York. He was formerly
a lecturer at China University of Political Science and Law and Pozen
Visiting Professor at the University of Chicago. His research focuses
on China's criminal justice, human rights, social movements, and
political transition. He co-founded two human rights NGOs in Beijing--
the Open Constitution Initiative, and China Against the Death Penalty,
in 2003 and 2010, respectively. Teng is one of the earliest promoters
of the Rights Defense Movement and the New Citizens Movement in China
and has received various international human rights awards including
the Human Rights Prize of the French Republic (2007) and the Democracy
Award from the National Endowment for Democracy (2008). He is
completing a book on China's threat to global freedom and democracy.
Rana Siu Inboden, Senior Fellow, Robert Strauss Center for
International Security and Law, University of Texas at Austin
Rana Siu Inboden is a senior fellow with the Robert Strauss Center
for International Security and Law at the University of Texas at
Austin. She serves as a consultant on human rights, democracy and rule
of law projects in Asia for a number of NGOs and conducts research
related to international human rights, Chinese foreign policy, the
effectiveness of international human rights and democracy projects and
authoritarian collaboration in the United Nations. Her book, China and
the International Human Rights Regime, examines China's role in the
international human rights regime between 1982 and 2017. Dr. Inboden
has served in the U.S. State Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human
Rights, and Labor, where her primary responsibilities included managing
the State Department's Human Rights and Democracy Fund China Program
and promoting U.S. human rights and democracy policy in China and North
Korea. She also served at the U.S. Consulate in Shanghai, in the Office
of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs, and in the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research. Dr. Inboden holds a DPhil from the Department of Politics and
International Relations at Oxford University. She received an M.A. from
Stanford University in East Asian Studies and a B.S. from the School of
Foreign Service at Georgetown University.
Sophie Richardson, China Director, Human Rights Watch
Sophie Richardson is China Director at Human Rights Watch. She has
overseen the organization's research and advocacy on China since 2006
and has published extensively on human rights and political reform in
the country and across Southeast Asia. She has testified at the
Canadian Parliament, European Parliament, and the United States Senate
and House of Representatives. Dr. Richardson is the author of China,
Cambodia, and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (Columbia
University Press, Dec. 2009), an in-depth examination of China's
foreign policy since 1954's Geneva Conference, including rare
interviews with Chinese policy makers. She speaks Mandarin and received
her doctorate from the University of Virginia and her B.A. from Oberlin
College.
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